CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

Southern Africa, like any other underdeveloped sub-region, has always regarded regional integration as an integral part of its development strategy. Regional integration has always been perceived as a means to achieve sustained development and growth; to overcome the sub-region's structural problems of political fragmentation, low-levels of national incomes; and as the only means to promote intra-regional trade. However, privileged by early industrialization in the South African mining industry, and plagued by unfavourable global political events such as colonialism, the Cold War, and the apartheid policy in South Africa, the southern African regional integration was characterized by economic dependency and political incompatibility between South Africa and the sub-region. Thus, the history of southern African regional integration has been one of cooperation and tension between South Africa (the most industrialized state in southern Africa) and the sub-region. This historical nature is best illustrated through several sub-regional integration initiatives that were formed in response to the desire for economic and political security. The sub-regional integration initiatives include the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), Front-Line States (FLS), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

SACU is a customs union and the oldest form of regional economic arrangement in Africa, and probably in the world, dating back to 1910 and it consists of five member states, namely; South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland; the last four are also known as the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland). It is the brainchild of the South African colonial government and its original mandate was to subdue South Africa's neighbouring states under Pretoria's umbrella and serve as the main framework for regional integration in southern Africa (Nyirabu, 2004). Thus, SACU reflects the political and diplomatic ramifications of the colonial and apartheid policies which made it extremely difficult for South Africa to create a regional community that extended beyond its immediate neighbours (Gibb, 2007). SACU was established in response to the discovery of the mining industry in South Africa, and therefore, the customs union incorporated Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho for labour reserve in the mining sector (Makgetlaneng, 2011). When the apartheid government came into power in South Africa, the National Party adopted the customs union as a tool to expand its hegemonic ambitions in southern Africa. However, the integration between SACU member states goes beyond the customs union to cover such aspects as culture, job opportunities for immigrants from the BLNS countries in the South African mining sector, and the sharing of a common monetary area. Notwithstanding, SACU, as a customs union and economic arrangement, is confined to economic multilateralism between its member states, and its functionality has been argued to be underpinned by nothing more than its Revenue-Sharing Formula (RSF) (Sentsho and Tsheko, 2005).

CONSAS was established by the apartheid South African government, under the administration of Pieter Willem Botha, on the 22nd November 1979, in Johannesburg (Hentz, 2005: 39). The initiative of CONSAS was in response to the forthcoming Zimbabwe-Rhodesia independence, and according to Hentz, CONSAS would serve as an umbrella to forge closer ties between South Africa and its neighbours. On the security side, non-aggression pact would be signed, and on the economic side, CONSAS would provide an enlarged common market, technological links, transport links and the exchange of knowledge and capital to develop the sub-region (Hentz, 2005). However, the newly independent southern Africa states did not respond to the initiative of CONSAS as expected, and instead, they formed SADCC. Thus, CONSAS depicts a failed attempt of a coercive strategy to integrate southern Africa by the South African apartheid government.

The FLS was a diplomatic coalition of independent southern African states, which emerged in 1976 in order to manage the Zimbabwean-Rhodesia crisis (Evans, 1984:1). The grouping originally consisted of countries such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania, and Zimbabwe after its independence. In character, the FLS represented a unique alliance that was entirely committed to the anti-apartheid cause and the South African liberation movements and was consequently forced into a serious consideration of security pasture (Evans, 1984). Thus, under the impact South Africa's sub-regional militarization policy, the FLS moved severely towards formal military consultation and defence pact. The FLS was the driving force behind the establishment of SADCC, and was primarily responsible for blunting South Africa's CONSAS strategy (Evans, 1984).

SADCC was created in 1980 with the primary objective to coordinate development projects among newly independent southern African states and reducing the economic dependence of the sub-region, particularly but not only, on South Africa (Soko, 2008). SADCC represented a collective response on the part of the FLS to the wrecks destabilization policy that was incurred by the South African apartheid government towards the sub-region (Soko, 2008). Richard Gibb (2007:424) describes SADCC as a sub-regional policy framework that was established by the newly independent states of southern Africa to serve as a counter-strategy against the South African apartheid regime sub-regional policy of CONSAS. Thus, SADCC was the brainchild of the FLS leaders and was established to serve as an economic pillar of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the sub-region (Schoeman, 2009). SADCC served as the basis in which the development of southern African states would be laid as the process of independence continued to unfold in the sub-region. In this way, the FLS established a pattern in which post-colonial/apartheid cooperation would take place in the sub-region while striving for the safeguarding and strengthening of individual statehood in the sub-region (Schoeman, 2009). However, because of the economic might of Pretoria, the FLS leaders did not succeed in their objective of using SADCC as their pillar to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Thus, although the SADCC grouping succeeded in isolating South Africa from the rest of the sub-region politically, this could not be matched with similar successes on an economic level.

SADC was established in 1992, and it is a remodel of its predecessors, the Front-Line States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Currently, SADC is made up of fifteen member states, and those are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Southern African Development Community, 2016). SADC emerged as a vehicle to reconstruct regional integration in southern Africa in the culmination phase of independence and also prior to the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa, and from its conception, the organization was guided by three agendas: political cooperation, functional cooperation and market cooperation (Mbuende, 2012). SADC is composed of states with unequal economic structures, and South Africa is the most dominant state. This position is also maintained by authors such as Hudson (2007), Alence (2015) and Le Pere (2015) who describe South Africa as the strongest economy in Africa, with active foreign investment in all SADC countries. South Africa's economic advancement in southern Africa, as well as in Africa, can be largely attributed to its well-developed infrastructure, high Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) and its fiscal economy in comparison to its counterparts. Thus, South Africa can be described as a natural leader in southern Africa.

In light of the above, the 1994 democratic transition in South Africa, therefore, marked a milestone to an anticipated and consolidated framework for regional integration in southern Africa. The newly elected African National Congress (ANC) led government in South Africa was presumed to lead and play a focal role in the reconstruction of regional integration in southern Africa. As a gigantic economy, Pretoria's sway was anticipated to contribute enormously to a fresh, gradualist and amalgamated fashion of sub-regional integration in southern Africa, either through SACU or SADC, but the opposite proved to be the case. Instead, South Africa inherited SACU and also became a member of SADC. As eluded earlier, the two sub-regional institutions represent different phases of regional integration, although they were both created to cover the common ground of integrating the southern African region. For instance, SACU is a customs union that concentrates more on market cooperation, whereas SADC is a development community.

From the sub-regional point of view, the capability of the post-apartheid government to lead southern Africa was to be primarily determined by the policy path it chooses as awarded by the SADC and SACU groupings. However, as eluded earlier, the democratic South Africa responded by continuing its membership with SACU and joined SADC as a way of re-engaging with the sub-region. It was, therefore, in the wake of this riposte that two camps of thoughts concerning the southern African integration and leadership emerged. These two camps of thoughts can be classified as that of SACU and SADC. The argument of these postures is underpinned by the notion that the economic strength and capacity of Pretoria should be invested in the promotion of a solitary and consolidated sub-regional regime that encompasses the benefits of the wider southern African region. Therefore, it is on the basis of these vigorous debates of SACU and SADC proponents that this study seeks to look into South Africa's capacity to lead regional integration in southern Africa in the post-1994 era.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Proponents of SACU argue that SACU is the best sub-regional entity that is liable to drive regional integration in southern Africa. They substantiate they position by articulating that, unlike SADC, SACU has achieved some form of deep integration through the Multilateral Monetary Area, and therefore, if the sub-region is to achieve deep regional integration SACU is the model to be emulated. The SADC stream of thought, on the other hand, argues that

SADC, which has already achieved a free trade area and has a medium-long term goal of becoming a customs union as well, can serve well as an engine of sub-regional integration Their viewpoint is motivated, amongst others, by the fact that Pretoria enjoys a huge trade surplus from SADC markets, and Africa as a whole, through its manufactured products more than its counterparts, and this helps Pretoria to be able to counteract trade deficits and volatility that it encounters from its resource-based trade with the rest of the world (Alence, 2015:294). They further authenticate their argument by calling for SACU to be absorbed by SADC since the latter is also recognized by the African Union (AU) as the Regional Economic Community (REC) of southern Africa.

However, despite the viewpoints that have been advanced by the SADC and SACU postures, South Africa has maintained a neutral policy position on its approach towards regional integration in southern Africa. Thus, Pretoria has chosen a policy path to support both SACU and SADC as engines for regional integration in southern Africa. Therefore, in line with the above, this study seeks to engage into the debate of these two camps of thoughts, although this might be through augmenting one side of the debate over the other, with an aim to illuminate primary factors behind South Africa's policy path.

1.3. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study is to examine South Africa's real capacity to lead, drive, and strengthen regional integration in southern Africa.

1.4. AIM OF THE STUDY

This study aims to:

- Explore the position of South Africa in southern Africa in the past and present era;
- Examine the post-1994 integration objectives and official policy towards SACU and SADC;
- Identify advantages and also challenges of implementing both SACU and SADC policies;
- Provide a comprehensive explanation of why South Africa choose a neutral approach, instead of using any of the two;
- Assess South Africa's ability to meaningfully lead integration in southern Africa; and

- Give an explanation of why South Africa has so far opted for both SACU/SADC routes, maybe contributing to the debate by reconciling the two main positions in the literature, and explicitly outlining the government's position given the opportunities available to South Africa.

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION

In light of the above, this study seeks to address the following research question: why is it that despite this debate, South Africa has not chosen any of the two paths?

1.6. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Southern Africa, like any other sub-region that is made up of developing and least-developing states, still upholds integration and leadership as defining concepts to economic development. The political transition in South Africa marked a new era, while also raising expectations of growth and development in southern Africa through integration. This was due to the perceived re-engagement of the sub-region, particularly but not only, with South Africa. Thus, while the political transition of South Africa has only achieved institutional changes in terms of regional integration in southern Africa, as reflected by the reform of SADC and renegotiation of SACU, the same cannot be said in practice. As a result, there is an on-going debate about integration and leadership in southern Africa in the post-apartheid era. Therefore, this study will serve as a response to the on-going debate about integration and leadership in southern Africa in the post-apartheid era, specifically focusing on South Africa's strategy and capacity to lead integration in the sub-region.

1.7. EXISTING LITERATURE

This section will review existing literature on the subject of integration and leadership in southern Africa, however, with special attention on South Africa's strategies, opportunities, and limitations within the sub-region. The section does so by examining and reviewing existing literature on South Africa-southern African relations in the post-apartheid era. The researcher has conducted this review in order to explore and assess limitations and results that have been attained by other scholars who have worked on this subject, and also to avoid duplication of other scholars' work.

The subject of integration and leadership in southern Africa in the post-apartheid era is not a new discourse. The latter is studied in several academic disciplines of Social Sciences such as

Economics, History, Law, Political Science, Development Studies, and International Relations. However, for the purpose of this study, the literature to be reviewed will be drawn from International Relations, History, Economics and Political Science disciplines. Due to the limited scope of the study, existing literatures were explored from scholars such as Mistry P.S (1996), Peter Draper and Nkululeko Khumalo (2005), Mzukusi Qobo (2005), Sehlare Makgetlaneng (2013), Dzinesa, Nagar and Saunders (2012); Mopeli L. Moshoeshoe (2014); James J. Hentz (2005); Aparajita Biswa (2007); and Mills Soko (2005).

The phenomenon of integration and leadership in southern Africa was also highlighted in Mistry P.S (1996) article titled, "Building Infrastructure in Southern Africa: Introductory Remarks". Mistry's study was conducted under the umbrella of the African Development Bank (AFDB), with a particular focus on prospects for Economic Integration in Southern African after 1994. The study examines the extent to which cooperation and integration have been achieved in southern Africa after the political transition in South Africa. Thus, the author used key developmental components such as infrastructure, power, transport and communication, and water supply to examine the level of cooperation and integration in southern Africa thus far. The findings of the study suggest that a degree of integration has already been achieved in southern Africa through SACU which, according to the author, constitutes the inner core of SADC. The author's position is premised on the progress that has been made within the SACU grouping which includes the established monetary union, as well the free internal movement of capital, goods, and services but a less free movement of labour, which SACU is currently working towards its achievement.

According to Mistry, the SACU arrangement provides South Africa with a net gain, especially for its relatively international uncompetitive manufacturing sector, and therefore, the author is in favour of the deep integration which exists within SACU, which the author argues for it to be strengthened rather than weakened. Thus, the author believes that such integration should be extended across all of SADC as other economies adjust and converge. However, Mistry's study is old, and therefore, does not take into account recent developments that are forging close cooperation between southern African states. The author called for SACU to be strengthened, as it represents a level of deep integration in southern Africa that could be extended across all of SADC, but failed to outline factors behind SACU's level of integration. South Africa, being the most important source behind SACU's success, is the economic giant of southern Africa with proven capabilities that are anticipated to benefit the whole sub-region, instead of the small SACU section. Thus, the presence of

South Africa should be well articulated in this context and the possible politics of extending SACU's integration to other SADC members.

Peter Draper and Nkululeko Khumalo (2005) wrote a very informative chapter titled, *“Friend or Foe? South African and Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Trading System”*. The chapter focuses on how South Africa should relate to the sub-Saharan African region in the sphere of trade relations and integration. In line with the aforementioned, the authors reflect on South Africa's bilateral and regional trade relations with Africa, which was found to be in favour of South Africa. According to the authors, when trading with Africa, South Africa exhibits features of both developed and developing countries. Thus, South African imports from Africa, particularly from countries outside SADC, overwhelmingly consist of commodities, for a number of which oil being the most important one. Against this background, the authors sought to find a solution that can improve the South African government's trade relations with Africa. The authors argues that the SACU strategy is the only purportedly basis that South Africa can use. According to the authors, the 2002 SACU Agreement signifies a historic event that commits South Africa to effectively cede its sovereignty over trade policy formulation and implementation to new supra-national institutions that have yet to be established. In essence, all decisions over tariffs and trade remedies will be taken by consensus at the SACU level by a council of ministers, which is advised in turn by the tariff body and senior officials. Thus, the authors are of the viewpoint that SACU contains a built-in adjustment mechanism that could be extended to other countries in the region.

The chapter contributes to this study by partially responding to the challenge of integration in southern Africa, and Africa as a whole. The chapter portrays SACU as the only strategy that South Africa could use to promote trade and integration in southern Africa, and Africa at large. The authors’ viewpoint is premised on the assumption that if the SACU Agreement is faithfully implemented, SACU decision making will be democratized, thus, granting all member states equal power in decision-making. Draper and Khumalo note that, the faithful implementation of the Agreement will not only benefit the sub-regional entity, but it will also serve as a trade and integration framework worth to be emulated, and which could also be expanded to absorb SADC if it works well. However, this study holds that while SACU is seen as a successful case of regional integration in southern Africa, if the same efforts are to be extended to the SADC integration opposite might be the case. Two reasons support this position. First, the relationship between SACU members goes beyond economic integration to encompass historical and cultural ties, which is very much different to the case of SADC.

Secondly, how SACU was integrated is not the same as the manner in which SADC became integrated, and therefore, such considerations need to be taken into account before making any assumptions around integration in southern Africa.

In Peter Draper (2005), Mzukusi Qobo wrote a chapter that is titled *“The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Southern Africa”*, which contributes significantly to this study. The chapter focuses on how implications of regionalism in southern Africa have failed to increase intra-regional trade and ensure balanced regional development. Qobo makes this analysis by assessing the structural capacities of both SACU and SADC on southern African regional integration programmes. The author concludes by attributing this failure to the lack of leadership in southern Africa. Qobo maintains that progress in southern African regional integration will require leadership, and therefore, South Africa as a dominant state in the sub-region needs to demonstrate clear leadership. Qobo notes that South Africa should open up trade to its sub-regional counterparts as a point of departure. South Africa's counterparts, in return, should think about how they want to harness their long-term economic relations with South Africa for their own developmental benefits, and thus, also bear the responsibility for ensuring the success of economic integration in the sub-region. According to the author, negative perceptions and tensions that mark relations within SADC are counter-productive to this aim, and therefore, the new SACU Agreement offers a chance to move towards a deeper level of integration that could even go far towards resolving the present muddle of multiple regional integration schemes with overlapping memberships.

The author’s argument is based on the premise that, while SADC could retain its function as a political and economic mechanism geared towards achieving balanced development, the long-term task of deepening integration should lie with SACU. Two reasons support his position. First, SACU has a potential for managing and promoting deeper integration. Secondly, SACU, rather than SADC, offers more realistic possibilities for fast-tracking regional integration in Southern Africa. However, the author should have outlined how this could be achieved. For instance, harmonization of policy between the two institutions could be used as one method to support the author's viewpoint.

Sehlare Mkgetlaneng (2013) wrote a very informative article titled, *“South Africa’s Contribution to Southern African Regional Integration: Farewell to Illusions on Southern African Customs Union”*. The purpose of the article is to respond to the question as to whether South Africa’s contribution to southern African regional integration is best and effectively achieved through SACU or SADC. The article responds to the position that the best and effective way for South Africa to promote regional integration in southern Africa is through SACU, which is bound to absorb other SADC and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries as its members. Makgetlaneng's debate is based on the premise that South Africa is a regional power in southern Africa, which supports regional and continental integration, and therefore, central to its support for integration is the question as to what is the best and effective organizational means through which it could contribute towards achieving integration. The article concludes that SADC, and not SACU, serves South Africa's interests of integrating southern Africa. The author supports his argument by contending that SADC, and not SACU, is the regional economic community that is recognized by the African Union (AU), and therefore, SADC is the rightful organization to promote southern African regional integration. The author further argues that the pivotal component that has sustained SACU's integration this far is the Revenue Pool that is shared among member states. Thus, this is one of the major reasons why SACU is still functional.

However, while Makgetlaneng acknowledges SADC as an effective strategy to be used by South Africa to promote southern African regional integration, this study acknowledges both SACU and SADC as strategic to the sub-regional integration. This is derived from the premise that both SADC and SACU have their own implications, limitations, and a strategic position as far as integrating southern Africa is concerned. This sentiment is supported by the fact that South Africa even acknowledges both SADC and SACU as important instruments of its regional agenda. Thus, South Africa could have opted for one entity over the other, but the opposite is the case.

Dzinesa et al (2012:4-6), wrote an insightful section titled, "Regional Integration: the case of southern Africa". The section is part of an introductory overview of their book titled "*Region-Building in southern Africa: progress, problems and prospect"* and it focuses on the nature and evolution of regional integration in southern Africa. The authors captured well how the apartheid South Africa's attitude towards the region not only inspired other attempts of region-building but also became instrumental in shaping the framework of regional integration in the sub-region. Thus, the authors successfully, although on a passing note, outlined how the political transformation of South Africa in 1994 changed the atmosphere of regional integration in southern Africa. In this regard, the authors also briefly mentioned the active role that the post-apartheid South Africa played in reuniting and promoting sub-regional stability and development in southern Africa. The section is a brief review of the chapters that are found in the book mentioned above; however, it engages well on some of the key areas that augment the argument of this study with reference to South Africa's approach to integration and leadership in southern Africa post 1994 era.

Moshoeshoe (2014) also unpacked the challenges of leadership in southern Africa. Moshoeshoe focused his attention particularly on the post-1994 South Africa as a leader in the sub-region, and its relations with the southern African region, particularly within the context of SADC, with the primary aim to unravel obstacles that are affecting South Africa's performance as a sub-regional leader. In his effort to unpack the power, opportunities, and constraints of South Africa in SADC, Moshoeshoe successfully unveiled underpinning factors, such as exceptionalism, policy choices, and economic relations and disparities, which are limiting South Africa’s effective leadership in the sub-region.

Moshoeshoe’s literature, although brief, serves as a counterweight and cornerstone of this study as it partially addresses the question of the study. However, Moshoeshoe’s viewpoint of leadership is limited to the SADC FTA scope, which only addresses part of the challenge of leadership in southern Africa. Thus, the author's view is in contrary to arguments that are advanced by other scholars who consider SADC to be complicated to explicitly address South Africa's leadership in the southern Africa. Accordingly, SACU is seen as a more comprehensive framework in which South Africa's leadership in the sub-region can be assessed.

Hentz (2005) contributes a chapter on post-apartheid South Africa’s regional relations from his book“*South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation*”. In this chapter, Hentz attempts to build a framework for understanding the extent in which the post-apartheid South Africa's policy towards southern Africa has been influenced by its commercial interests and domestic political considerations. He highlighted the need for cooperation and was of the view that the post-apartheid South Africa was grounded in differentiated interdependency, that of labour-intensive industry and capital-intensive industry (Hentz, 2005: 164). In other words, post-apartheid South Africa’s relations with the sub-region it’s driven by the promotion of its domestic labour sector and big businesses. Therefore, as a result, three forms of cooperation reflected South Africa- southern Africa relations in the post-1994 era. Those were development cooperation, market cooperation, and functional cooperation. These forms of cooperation inform us about the two directions that South Africa took in the post-1994 which, depending on the political drivers of regionalism in Pretoria, could be divergent or convergent (Hentz, 2005). The directions are SADC and SACU. According to Hentz (2005), the former represents the development cooperation that addresses economic growth in southern Africa and facilitates economic development, while SACU is market cooperation, often labelled as the laissez-faire approach, which only benefits bureaucrats that dominate SACU. The functional approach is basically the interdependency that exists between South Africa and its neighbours on the bilateral basis. However, according to Hentz, SACU has had a little institutional impact, and as a result, the author shifted his attention towards SADC and its functional cooperation.

Hentz's addresses South Africa as a regional leader with an ambiguous role in its sub-regional relations. Secondly, the author successfully acknowledged SACU and SADC as key drivers to southern African integration that represent conflicting and distinct frameworks to integration. Thirdly, the chapter also successfully addressed how the post-apartheid South Africa's regional relations reflects a political compromise that reflects the different visions of South Africa's regional role and their respective political bases (Hentz, 2005:184). However, the author does not address the extent in which SACU and SADC have shaped South Africa's policy as far as southern African regional integration is concerned. On the same note, Hentz's portrayal of the impact of SACU in the post-apartheid South Africa's regional relations undermines the on-going SACU-South Africa relations and the wider scope of southern African regional integration. Evidence of SACU's importance to South Africa, as well as a sub-regional institution, is found in the South African Foreign Policy document and the on-going contribution of Pretoria in SACU, and also the on-going close ties with SACU member states on a bilateral level, such as Lesotho through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

Biswa (2007) brought refreshing perspectives on South Africa and southern Africa relations in the post-apartheid era. On the chapter, Biswa examines the economic and political relations between South Africa and members of SADC in the post-apartheid era. According to Biswa (2007), political changes in South Africa resulted in changing domestic and external scenario in the southern African region, and thus, such scenario displayed renewed interest in revitalizing and restructuring regional groupings, i.e. the 1994 SACU revision negotiations and South Africa's accession to SADC. In this tune, the author sought to address and assess whether if South Africa's entry into the regional groupings would prove to be a driving force for regional cooperation, or if South Africa would preoccupy itself with domestic issues and side-line regional issues? (Biswa, 2007:54). However, although there are doubts and speculations about South Africa's regional role, the author holds that South Africa-southern

African relations, thus integration in southern Africa, depend on how domestic political actors in each state view regional cooperation and coordination. Accordingly, the author also successfully pointed out factors such as fear of South Africa's dominance as some of the key limitations to integration in southern Africa. Similar to Hentz, Biswa also classified post-apartheid South Africa's regional relations as driven by market, development and functional approach through the SADC framework.

Biswa's study makes a utilitarian contribution to this study as it attempts to address the question of strategies and challenges to integration and leadership in southern Africa in the post-1994 era using the framework of SADC. Statements articulated by the author, such as the aforementioned one of anticipations on South Africa's entry into regional groupings, denote anticipated interests and strategies to be employed by South Africa in its post-1994 regional role. However, although Biswa's study successfully outlined some of the limitations and opportunities, such as South Africa's market approach and others to integration in southern Africa post-1994, the author was myopic of how relations, either be political or economic, between southern Africa countries are influencing integration in the sub-region. Collectively SADC countries have not achieved much, as was reflected by the hardships faced when implementing the SADC Free Trade Area. However, on a bilateral level progress is being made between members, thus contributing towards sub-regional integration. Consequently, the author's view of sub-regional integration and leadership is limited to the SADC framework and does not accommodate SACU. The latter and SADC are both important vehicles for sub-regional integration in southern Africa.

Soko (2007) focuses on the politics and economics of regional integration in southern Africa using SADC and SACU as main regional integration entities of exploration, and South Africa as a natural sub-regional power. Soko's contribution to this study is as follows: first, the author regards South Africa as a natural leader and central actor to southern African regional integration; second, the paper focuses on the integration of southern Africa using SADC and SACU as main regional entities, and also important frameworks for exploring the politics and economics of integration in the sub-region; third, the paper clearly assessed the degree in which regional integration in southern Africa depends on South Africa; fourth, the study successfully illuminates, although briefly, constraints such as economic imbalances among states, security, competition on leadership, and failure of democracy, as some of the major contributors to the failure of regional integration and leadership in southern Africa.

While Soko's paper contributes significantly to this study, the author did not focus much on the evolution of leadership and integration in southern Africa. Thus, according to this study, issues pertaining to early attempts of integration and leadership in southern Africa by South Africa, and other states in the sub-region, are important, in as much as the political evolution in South Africa is if one is to clearly articulate on this matter. This is significant as it allows us to have a more comprehensive understanding of the current structure of integration and leadership in southern Africa. For instance, institutions such as CONSAS and the Rand Monetary Union are examples of early attempts to integration and leadership in southern Africa by the pre-democratic South Africa, and they have contributed enormously to how integration is presently fashioned in southern Africa.

1.8. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This study intends to contribute to an already existing literature on leadership and integration in southern Africa by engaging into the on-going debate about South Africa's sub-regional integration policy in the post-apartheid era. While several existing literatures have addressed this subject with a primary focus on South Africa-SADC/ SACU relations, not much has been done to address the strategy, opportunities and limitations to integrate and lead southern Africa within the context of both SADC and SACU. This study is of the view that the discourse of integration and leadership in southern Africa can only be made of substance if both SADC and SACU are examined since South Africa acknowledges both entities as vehicles of regional integration in southern Africa. Thus, this study will add strength to what is already known about leadership and integration in southern Africa in the post-apartheid era through the lenses of South Africa-SADC/SACU and this will be either by augmenting one side of the debate over the other or by reconciling them.

1.9. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study will use the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS) as the main theoretical framework. THS is a significant theory for this study because it helps to understand the role played by the hegemonic power and its relations with the economic development and political stability in the international structure (Yazid, 2015:68). The theory is widely discussed as an explanation of a successful operation of the international system in certain circumstances and the failure of cooperation in other circumstances (Yazid, 2015). To state boldly, the theory claims that the presence of a single and strong dominant actor in the international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. On the contrary, the absence of a strong and dominant actor leads to disorder and undesirable outcomes in the international system (Kindleberger in Snidal, 1974:579). Accordingly, for Snidal (1974) the Theory of Hegemonic Stability entails two important assumptions. First, the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision of a stable international regime of free trade, and that is to say, hegemony provides leadership for the emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas. Thus, the latter may range from economics to politics. The second assumption is that although the hegemon benefits from the aforementioned arrangement, the smaller counterparts gain even more (Snidal, 1974:581).

In line with the above, the background of the study has reflected South Africa as a hegemonic leader in southern Africa. This could be explained by the extent in which the dynamics of southern African regional integration has always revolved around South Africa, as was the case with SACU, CONSAS, FLS, SADCC and SADC. As Schoeman notes, South Africa remains the most advanced economy in the Southern Africa region, with an advance level of industrialization as compared to her counterparts, however, with careful consideration not to articulate any claim to leadership due to its historical legacy, since any attempt to articulate a claim to regional leadership would directly run a high risk of its isolation again (Schoeman in Flemes, 2009).

To emphasize the significance of using the Theory of Hegemonic Stability as the theoretical basis for this study, the research will further explore some of the components that constitute a hegemonic leader as advanced by THS scholars such as Keohane (1984), Destradi (2008) and Flemes (2009). This is important as it will further clarify the use of the theory in reference to the study. Keohane defines hegemony, within the confines of the THS, as superiority in material resources (Keohane, 1984:34). Thus, hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods. According to Destradi (2008:10) the term hegemony can be defined as a form of power that is exercised through strategies which are more noticeable than those of states behaving as imperial powers. Thus, for Destradi (2008) a hegemonic power is often conceived as a state which adopts a helpful and cooperative attitude towards neighbouring states in international relations. The authors' perspective of a hegemonic state resonates well with Kindleberger’s remarks on how the THS can always be differentiated on whether the hegemonic leadership is conceived as benevolent or coercive, and how hegemony is related to interest and capabilities (Kindleberger in Snidal, 1974:579).).

As explicitly outlined by the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, only a powerful nation can stabilize the world economy and create a stable environment for development, and the stabilization process would include the provision of public goods to other states without sharing the cost (Snidal 1985). According to the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, this process can be referred to as benevolent hegemony. In reference to the study, South Africa has been undertaking such a task in SACU ever since the period of political transition. After structural changes in the 1969 SACU Agreement, South Africa compensates the BLNS for buying its expensive goods due to trade diversion. Even in SADC, South Africa is the largest contributor, however, with little room to flex up its economic muscles for the benefit of the entire entity. Unlike the previous government, the democratic South Africa has adopted a benevolent approach towards integration. Coercive hegemony, on the other hand, is based on the exercise of power and the pursuit of national interest. According to Lake (1993), this form of hegemony creates an economic openness by manipulating the trade policies of other states and seeking to exercise power that can effectively change policies of other states to satisfy its own goals. This was exercised by the pre-1994 governments in South Africa, and as result, this study will not focus much on this form of hegemony. Flemes (2009) has described four pivotal criteria that can be used to distinguish a hegemonic power. The criteria are a claim to leadership, power resources, and employment of foreign policy instrument and acceptance of leadership (Flemes, 2009:135).

When applying the Theory of Hegemonic Stability to the context of the study, we find that South Africa, in terms of its economic size in southern Africa, fits many descriptions that have been advanced by scholars of the THS above. For instance, South Africa accounts for more than 50 per cent of SACU GDP (Gibb and Treasure, 2014:831). Thus, South Africa contributes more than 50 per cent to the revenue pool of SACU and its contribution makes up to almost 50 per cent of government revenue in countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland, and a quarter in Botswana and Namibia (Gibb and Treasure, 2014). According to Draper (2007), SADC's economy is literally located within South Africa. The latter makes up about 60 per cent of SADC's overall trade and about 70 per cent of its GDP, with the most developed and diversified industrial base (Bosl et al, 2009). In 2016 President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, while attending the state luncheon in honour of President Edgar Lungu of Zambia, expressed his gratitude to Zambia for opening up the market to eighty-two South African companies that have invested in Zambia (All Africa, 2016).

1.10. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research methodology can be generally referred to as the process, principles, and procedures by which one approach problems and seeks answers to research problems (Guy 1987:12). This is the process that answers questions such as what, where, when and how the research intends to be conducted. Thus, a clear description of the sources and the nature of the research are important in order to conduct a meaningful and well-defined research project.

This study is a qualitative case study that has been built upon the already existing literature on leadership and integration in southern Africa. According to Baxter and Jack (2008:544), a qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates explorations of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. It is a qualitative strategy in which the researcher explores a program, event, activity, process, or individuals in depth (Creswell, 2009:227). According to Creswell (2009), the cases are bound by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time. In terms of the research methodology, the thesis has identified integration and leadership as key concepts that require conceptualization in order to provide a clear understanding of South Africa’s stature and the fashion of integration in the sub-region. The conceptualization of integration and leadership is incorporated with the historical evolution of southern African regional integration which will serve as a conduit to explore the extent in which political events, particularly the political transition in South Africa, in the sub-region, impacted the fashion of regional integration in southern Africa. In this way, one can show the root cause of the on-going debate that the study seeks to engage into.

The study proceeds to use the case study of SADC and SACU as major sub-regional entities under which leadership and integration in southern Africa can be clearly explored. The case study of SADC and SACU will also serve as the premises under which South Africa's policy path towards southern African regional integration can be assessed. Thus, this will also enable the author to draw out South Africa's strategy, opportunities, and limitation to lead and integrate southern Africa. This study is a desktop research, and it uses information drawn from both primary and secondary sources to answer the research questions and to fulfil the relevant aims and objectives of the study. Primary sources will include captured documentaries of conferences, summits, and public lectures that are related to this study. Secondary sources will comprise of second-hand information found in books, journals, articles, newspapers, internet articles, magazines, and published research reports.

1.11. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter one is our general introduction which outlines the background, statement of the problem, aims and objectives, and the research questions of the study. The chapter also includes the theoretical framework, literature review, and research methodology of the study. Chapter two is our conceptual framework. In this section, the study conceptualizes the terms integration and leadership with reference to the context of the study. Chapter three focuses on South Africa and southern African integration in the post-apartheid era. This will be realized by using the case study of SACU and SADC. Thus, the latter and the former will serve as the cornerstone in which the role of South Africa towards integrating southern Africa after apartheid can be clearly assessed. Chapter four assesses South Africa's strategy, opportunities, and limitations towards integrating southern Africa. Chapter five is our general conclusion. The chapter makes a general assessment of the extent in which the content of the study has responded to the research questions, and aims and objectives, then proceed to make a general conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE STUDY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Early sub-regional political events, such as colonization and the apartheid system, left a huge footprint on the fashion of regional integration in southern Africa. Regional integration in southern Africa has been characterized by early decades of political isolation and recent years of consolidation. This history has fashioned integration in the sub-region in a multifaceted manner, and as result not much has been achieved in terms of regional integration in southern Africa. In line with the above, South Africa has always been the focal point of the debate whose policy position always mattered most to the sub-region. Accordingly, as the paramount state in the sub-region, South Africa's political standing and strategy have always had a direct and profound impact on the sub-region. Thus, although southern Africa was politically fragmented, leadership and integration were always seen as central components of the region's development. This is clearly reflected in early sub-regional integration initiatives such as SACU, CONSAS, FLS, SADCC, SADC, and the African renaissance agenda in the post-1994 era.

Therefore, it is in line with the above that this section seeks to conceptualize integration and leadership in reference to the context of the study. While South Africa's capacity to strengthen and lead regional integration in southern Africa remains the main objective of the study, the general focus of this chapter is on conceptualizing the evolution of integration and leadership in southern Africa. Against this background, the chapter will also review early attempts of South Africa to lead regional integration in southern African. This will serve as a conduit to examine how South Africa's role in the sub-region has evolved over time, and also enable us to understand how the 1994 South African political transition impacted regional integration in southern Africa. The chapter opens up by conceptualizing integration and leadership in reference to the study.

2.2. INTEGRATION

The concept of integration in itself is broad and entails various explanations. Its roots can be traced from the disciplines of Sociology and Psychology, although it was later adopted and widely used in the disciplines of social sciences, engineering, and commercial sciences, within the fields of Political Sciences, Mathematics, Science, Economics, International Relations, and so on (Castaneda 2006:2).

According to Castaneda (2006), integration can be defined as the coming together or the combining process of different things, or objects. However, unlike in Castaneda's study wherein integration is viewed as a general phenomenon, this piece will review integration as a socio-political concept. Integration from an International Relations point of view can be related to the current forms of regional integration that are taking place in international relations. Thus, this form of integration is distinguished, for instance, in terms of geography and sector variables. The former contrasts integration as either global or regional, whereas the latter differentiate between political and economic integration (Ilievski, 2015). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, integration will be discussed in terms of the geographical region, that of the southern African region, and the economic and political variables, also known as economic and political integration. The reason for the latter is based on the fact that politics and economics are inseparable within the context of southern Africa regional integration. Early political and economic dynamics, as shall be illustrated in the following sections of the chapter, shaped the framework of regional integration in southern Africa. As Lee (1999) notes, the origins of regional integration in Africa were more political than economical motivated, and thus, a major part of regional integration in southern Africa was motivated by the desire of Africa leaders to liberate the continent from colonial and neo-colonial domination.

2.2.1. Regional Integration

The definition of regional integration has been interpreted distinctively by various scholars. For instance, in Haas (1970:611), Karl Deutsch speaks of regional integration as a process that leads to the establishment of a security community. This definition is realistic in orientation and focuses more on high politics. On the other hand, Philip Jacob and Henry Teune defined integration as a process and a fixed condition that is achieved when an unspecified threshold is passed by an unspecified mix of his ten process variables, which for the purpose of this study are not mentioned (Haas, 1970:610). Haas (1968:16) defined integration as the process wherein political actors at different national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. And, lastly, Heinonen (2006:7) defines regional integration as a process and a certain advanced level of cooperation.

However, for the purpose of this study, and out of the combination of the aforementioned definitions, regional integration can be defined as a process and setting wherein political actors with various national settings shift their loyalties, political and economic ideologies, and activities towards an established institution that possesses jurisdiction over existing member states through consensus, thus providing a certain advanced level of cooperation.

Much of the theoretical underpinning of regional integration can be attributed to the theory of neo-functionalism. The latter is a synthesis of functionalism, a theory that emerged to promote the obsolescence of the state as a dominant form of a political organization. Functionalism advocates the need for a global supranational entity that would focus on global integration, however, excluding the possibility of regional integration. A better example of this would be the United Nations (UN), a supranational global body that is bestowed with the authority to integrate the world. Neo-functionalism, on the other hand, is a theory that anticipates regional integration and its theoretical goal of establishing a supranational entity characterized by sector models, taking into account the geographic location of states (Majone, 2009). Thus, the key element to the theory neo-functionalism is the geographical grouping and spill-over impact. According to Laursen (2005), the spill-over impact is a situation in which a given action, which is related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be guaranteed only by taking further actions, which in turn creates conditions for further actions. Simply put, this is a situation in which cooperation in one sector can lead to cooperation in another.

However, Etzioni in Tom Ostergaard (1993) argues, regional schemes are also formed in response to a common external enemy. The latter might be social, political or economical in form. For instance, in southern Africa, the Frontline States, the precursor of SADCC and SADC, was formed in response of, particularly but not only, the mounting political hostility from South Africa in southern Africa Southern Africa has not yet developed integration to that level, but its aspiration is leading there through the SADC grouping. Thus, it is also important to distinguish if whether the form of regional integration that the study will be focusing on is a deep or shallow one.

Shallow integration considers only border protection measures. Thus, such form of integration generates “trade diversion” as countries within the bloc trade more with one another and less with potentially lower-cost countries outside the bloc, which will potentially lower welfare within the bloc (Evans et al, 2006:20). An example of this form of integration is presented in SACU. Deep integration, on the other hand, involves much more than removing border policies that limit the sale of commodities across international borders. It goes beyond border protection measures to include high levels of cooperation such as the establishment of a monetary union, real and financial capital mobility, liberalizing movement of labour within the trade arrangement, and more (Evans et al, 2006). Thus, a global influential example of this form of integration has been the creation of the European Union. For Southern Africa, the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA), formerly known as the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), that was spearheaded by the South African government represents an early attempt to this form of integration, although it only encompasses member states of SACU.

However, as for SADC and SACU, the two have always been a depiction of shallow integration, and as Moshoeshoe (2012) puts it, SADC members are integrated for economic reasons and not for political ones, and that's why deep integration cannot be reached. Therefore, cognizant of the aforementioned Multilateral Monetary Area, this study is of the views that although integration in southern Africa is considered to be shallow, the period of political hostilities between South Africa and the rest of the sub-region fashioned integration in “spaghetti” form of disposition. Thus, the sub-region, although not following the European Union model of regional integration, achieved some form of deep integration, through the Multilateral Monetary Area. However, as noted above, this study will tackle regional integration from both economic and political views.

2.2.2. Economic Integration

Much of the work on the theory of economic integration owes its existence to an earlier scholar and father of regional economic integration, Balassa Bela. This was echoed by scholars such as Allen (1963) in the book, “*Review of the theory of economic integration”*, who believes that Balassa’s theory of economic integration clearly defines while differentiating integration from cooperation.

According to Nigel (2013), economic integration can be defined as a branch of economics concerned with the analysis of the effects of various forms of integration of the economies of member states and the rest of the world. However, this definition is too shallow and lacks important economic elements suitable to defining a proper economic integration. For Kahnert et al (1969) economic integration can be defined as a process of dismantling successively discriminatory duties in the national borders. Matthews (1983: 240) is of the view that economic integration evolved from the theory of tariffs which forms part of the theory of international trade, and that it aims at liberalizing trade between certain countries and it varies in its stages from a mere free trade area to an economic union. However, Hosny (2013:13) argues that, scientifically, measures which only diminish discrimination between countries are considered forms of cooperation, not integration. Thus, it can also be argued that economic integration may mean something different to everybody (Allen 1963:450). However, for the context of this study and out of the combination of the aforementioned definitions, economic integration can be defined as a process of dismantling discriminatory economic duties or tariffs in the national borders of member states of an established economic institution, through consensus, under some form of supranational union, such as a free trade area or a customs union, in order to promote free movement of factors of production, goods and services between member states.

The principle behind economic integration is that countries are grouped in trade blocs through an agreement or treaty, usually on the regional basis, and therefore, such blocs will secure benefits for the participating members through the tariff-free, or tariff-reduced, cross-border movement of goods, services, capital and labour between them (Venter and Neuland, 2007:8). Thus, there are four various forms of economic integration, and those are free trade area, customs union, common market and an economic union.

The various forms of economic integration represent varying degrees of integration. In a free trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. The establishment of a customs union involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the creation of a common tariff wall against non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines the removal of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with a degree of harmonization of economic monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of economic, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies and requires the setting up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states (Balassa, 1961:5-6).

In the post-Second World War era, Africa experienced a fast growing trend of sub-regional economic integration within its confines. A large number of states from different sub-geographical regions joined together to form sub-regional economic trading blocks, which are serving as a bulwark for a larger African economic integration. For instance, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), the African Economic Community (AEC) was established and its immediate goal was to create free trade areas and other forms of economic integration in Africa. Thus, under the AEC, several Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were established as pillars. Just to name a few, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in West Africa; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a free trade area between states from east and southern part of Africa; and the SADC in southern Africa (Baylis et al, 2011).

Although much of regional economic integration occurred in the post- independence period in Africa, the southern African region is exceptional. Records of economic integration in southern Africa date back to the era of colonialism when SACU was created. However, as outlined in the previous chapter, SACU reflected the political and diplomatic ramifications of the apartheid policy that made it extremely difficult for South Africa to create a regional community that extended beyond its immediate neighbours. SACU was meant to strengthen and advance regional integration in southern Africa by the former colonial government of South Africa, but the leverage of South Africa was weak to achieve this objective. Thus, the establishment of SACU was both politically and economically motivated. Accordingly, it is little wonder that the formation of SADC by southern African independent states was in response and rejection of the SACU sub-regional structure, and for this reason, regional economic integration in southern Africa has since taken two policy paths, that of market and development integration. The latter and the former shall be explained in the following paragraphs.

According to Ostergaaard (1993), the market integration theory was initially referred to as the customs union theory. As Ostergaard (1993) notes, the term customs union applies to only one stage in the envisaged evolution from free trade area to an economic union, thus, it is more appropriate to speak of a market integration as it captures this body of theories appropriately. However, for the purpose of this study, market integration and customs union will be used synonymously.

As outlined above, a customs union consists of a free trade area plus the introduction of a common external tariff against non-member countries (Lee, 1999:32). The customs unions theory is characterized by three important indicators that measure the welfare of member states. The indicators can be classified as trade creation, trade diversion, and the polarization effect. Trade creation occurs when trade shifts from a non-member higher producer to lower cost sources of goods from within the customs union (Ricardo, 2000: 16). Trade diversion occurs when the establishment of a customs union encourages members to buy expensive goods within the union at the expense of cheaper goods outside the union due to the price-raising effect and the protection of the common external tariff (Rathumbu, 2008: 19). Polarization effect is when industries and foreign investors tend to align or destine themselves to more developed countries within the customs union since they offer substantial internal and external economies of scale (Rathumbu, 2008: 24).

In the case of the southern African regional integration, a depiction of this model is found in SACU. However, the latter depicts imbalanced market integration, and therefore, the customs union is plagued with trade diversion and polarization effect. The reason for the former and the latter derives from the fact that a great economic disparity exists between SACU member states. South Africa as the most advanced country, with a more diversified economy than other member states, attracts more investments than other member states. While there is no evidence that underdevelopment in SACU has been the result of the polarization effect, others have argued that South Africa used its dominant power to develop its own economy and thereby strengthening polarization. BLNS countries are also obliged to buy expensive goods from South Africa because of the customs unions rule, thus, resulting in trade diversion. However, BLNS countries get compensation from South Africa for buying its expensive products. The compensatory rule by South Africa corresponds well with what the THS calls "the provision of public goods by a hegemonic leader for stability in the region". South Africa compensate for exploiting the public goods in SACU.

Development integration was developed in response to the shortcomings of a customs unions theory. According to Haarlov (1997), the development integration approach was conceived out of the problems and the dysfunctionality of the market integration approach such as its static character, its sole focus on how trade creation and trade diversion will influence welfare, and its tendency to widen economic disparities between the lesser and more developed when market forces are left to function on their own. For instance, in the shortcomings of SACU as a market integration that is characterized by huge economic disparities and reflections of the incapacity to expand beyond its membership, SADC was established to respond to these shortcomings (Ostergaard, 1993). Thus, it is for this reason why a higher degree of state intervention is central to the development integration theory. It is through such intervention by regional partners/ states that cooperation and interdependency are promoted (Ostergaaard, 1993). SADC promotes more cooperation between its member states, and a level of interdependency has started to manifest between members. Although for decades members of SADC were dependent on South Africa, the latter has turned to depend on its counterpart for resources, such as oil and water, which are important for its welfare. However, for SADC to succeed as a developmental model of integration, more commitment has to be shown from its member states, particularly South Africa, the dominant economy in the sub-region. Thus, South Africa has to show sound leadership in order to avoid repeating the mistake that led to the collapse of the East African Community (EAC).

2.2.3. Political integration

The notion of political integration is mostly associated with the European Union (EU) region. According to Ilievski (2015), the EU is the first project to follow the model of integration in a political sense based on the theory of neo-functionalism, in which the concept of political integration was adopted as a theoretical concept and transformed into empirical reality. In that sense, the concept of political integration was projected according to the neo-functionalist theory of integration as discussed above. However, like any other definition of integration, political integration has also been interpreted differently according to various scholars. Thus, this study has adopted the definition that was outlined by Lindberg (1963).

According to Lindberg, political integration in its bit as a political concept is a process which obviously presupposes a certain period. In that context, political integration is perceived as a process that differs from the potential existence of political integration as a status. Therefore, in line with the context of this study, political integration can be defined as a process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs (Lindberg, 1963: 3).

Much of early integration in southern Africa was more politically motivated. Thus, political integration in southern Africa can be traced back to the period of independence among southern African states when the FLS was founded. However, although the FLS was founded upon political grounds, this political collaboration was also used as a tool to safeguard the economic interests of member states. It is along these lines that SADCC was formed as an economic pillar of the FLS. Cooperation of SADCC was facilitated by member states. Thus, it is, therefore, safe to argue that political integration serves as an economic integration basis in southern Africa. Accordingly, political integration determines the level of economic cooperation.

2.3. LEADERSHIP

Leadership is a controversial concept in the study of International Relations (IR). Scholars, such as Destradi (2010), note that the premise in which leadership is traditionally viewed in IR ignores essential features that are explored by other disciplines. Destradi, in her study *"Regional Powers and their Strategies"*, argues that leadership is not confined to the IR traditional interpretation alone, primarily that of realism and liberalism, but leadership also takes into account elements of idealism and those of disciplines outside IR, such as social psychology and political sciences, in which the study of leadership began. Thus, cognizant of interpretations from social psychology and political sciences, Destradi defines leadership as a process that involves influence that alters the motives and preferences of followers. Accordingly, leadership is viewed not as a concept of coercion, but rather as a transformational concept. However, for the purpose of this study, leadership will be explored from the viewpoint of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, as adopted by the framework of the study, which assumes that only a predominant state with disposal over preponderant resources can assume the leadership position by providing public goods (Paige, 1997). Nevertheless, due to the 1994 political transformation that altered the post-apartheid relations in southern Africa, the study will also take into cognizance Destradi's elements of leadership. This is due to the fact that the democratic South Africa, fully aware of its economic and political capabilities, did not continue with the policy that was pursued by the apartheid government in relations to the sub-region. This position was affirmed by the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, before the ANC came into power when he propounded that, South Africa would shoulder the share of the responsibility for the whole southern African region, not in the spirit of paternalism or dominance, but in mutual co-operation and respect (Mandela, 1993). Thus, this was said while locating South Africa's future role in the sub-region.

From the viewpoint of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, South Africa's leadership is located within its economic and political endowments. South Africa is the most industrialized country in the sub-Saharan region, and it generates approximately 71 per cent of SADC's GDP (Kirk and Stern, 2003). The country serves as a conduit and source of Foreign Direct Investment into Africa, and southern African region, thus providing public goods in the sub-region. South Africa's position is captured well by Vale and Maseko (1998) who are of the view that South Africa's FDI in Africa is important because every continent needs America. This sentiment was also echoed by Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania, during his address to the South African parliament in 1997, when he called upon South Africans to "take up their responsibilities and stop hiding behind false modesty, as isolationism is an excuse for selfishness" (Vale and Maseko, 1998). Remarks such as the aforementioned signify the importance of leadership in any regional arrangement, and South Africa fits the description in southern Africa

The importance of South Africa's leadership in southern Africa was also echoed by President Hage Geingob of Namibia who publicly acknowledged South Africa as a natural leader and a pivotal stabilizer to the sub-region. According to Geingob, quoted by Ndjebela in London commenting on events that were unfolding in South Africa which could have a contagious effect on Namibia, South Africa has enough ammunition in its armour to drive away the advances of marauding economic and political instabilities that could attempt to plague its landscape (Ndjebela, 2016). Geingob further made remarks that flaunted his faith in the leadership of South Africa which were based on the view that the stability of South Africa is a convenient force to the sub-region which also has a profound impact on the regional integration ambitions of SADC (Ndjebela, 2016). This explains South Africa's importance and dominion in the sub-region, and its prospectus strength to lead southern Africa to the provision of a unified, stable and integrated sub-regional regime. Flemes (2009) and, Daniel and Lutchman (2006) also note, South Africa's leadership in southern Africa is seen through its economic and trade policies in both SADC and SACU, power resources (i.e. its defence expenditure that leads to military supremacy in southern Africa), and its foreign policy instruments.

Although leadership might currently be a point of contention in southern Africa due to the manner in which the political history of the sub-region unfolded, this study holds that South Africa is a natural leader, and although it has not articulated its claim to leadership, Pretoria is using elements of leadership as articulated by the theory of hegemonic stability and Destradi. While the study is focusing on the post-apartheid period, it is in the best interest of the study to briefly capture the pre-1994 South Africa's attempts to lead and advance regional integration in southern Africa. This review is crucial as it will deepen our understanding of the extent in which post-South Africa's strategies and opportunities to lead integration in southern Africa have changed from that of its former government.

2.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to illuminate on the conceptual framework of integration and leadership in Southern Africa as outlined above. However, one can argue that the southern African region has not yet achieved much as far as the theoretical framework of integration and leadership in concerned in southern Africa. Instead, regional integration in southern Africa has always been marked by what one would call “multifacetism" due to the manner in which the political dynamics of the sub-region unfolded. Thus, although the sub-region has experienced a milestone political transition, with the new government coming into power in South Africa, this has not yet altered much in terms of regional integration fashion and structure in the sub-region. According to the theoretical framework, South Africa is a natural leader in southern Africa; however, the historical legacy of southern Africa has overshadowed the impact that South Africa can impose as far as driving leadership and integration in southern Africa is concerned.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: New Leadership and a Fresh Start for southern Africa

3.1. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of a democratic system in South Africa, the political landscape of the southern African region went through a severe change. The sub-region that was previously characterized by isolation and hostilities, primarily between South Africa and the rest of the sub-region, joined together in consolidation and harmony. South Africa, once referred to as a pariah state because of the apartheid system, re-engaged with its southern African neighbouring states politically and economically. Thus, instead of inheriting the power politics and attempts of coercive subjugation measures of the former government, the new government opted for a peaceful, reconciliatory, democratic and multilateral approach towards southern Africa. Pretoria's re-engagement with the sub-region marked a milestone, and it changed the fundamental dynamic arrangement of regional integration in southern Africa, and this can be reflected through the bilateral and multilateral relations South Africa enjoys in the SADC structure, and also through the structural reform of SACU. As Richard Gibb (1998:44) notes, after the 1994 political transition in South Africa, southern African regional integration underwent a fundamental transformation of accommodating South Africa, a sub-regional power that was previously isolated, but now considered to be of paramount importance to the future of southern African regionalism. Therefore, it is against this background that this chapter will focus on South Africa's efforts towards re-establishing integration with the sub-region in the post-apartheid era. The study will undertake this task by using the case study of SACU and SADC. However, this chapter will begin with a historical overview of early attempts to integration and leadership in southern Africa which will serve as a background to the chapter's objective.

3.2. Historical overview of early attempts of integration and leadership in southern Africa

South Africa's ambitions to integrate southern Africa date back to the period before 1994. South Africa as a predominant state in the sub-region has always considered its economic and political success to be inextricably linked to that of southern Africa. Thus, it is against this background that this study seeks to briefly review early attempts to integrate southern Africa by South Africa. However, it should be noted that while the study is focusing on the post-apartheid era, this section will focus on the pre-apartheid era in an attempt to give a preview on how integration and leadership have unfolded over time in southern Africa. The study will carry out the section by using the case study of SACU, Common Monetary Area (CMA) and CONSAS.

3.2.1. Southern African Customs Union

The history of SACU dates back in 1889 when the Orange Free State (a Boer Republic), and Cape of Good Hope (a British Colony) established the Customs Union Convention (CUC) (Ngalawa, 2014). CUC was reorganized soon after Botswana, Lesotho in 1893, and Swaziland in 1903 (Ngalawa, 2014). The three were admitted as second-class members with diminished rights, and no power to amend customs duties, alter the terms of the agreement, or vote on new concessions (Maarsdorp, 1982; Gibb, 2006). According to Treasure and Gibb (2014), the formation of SACU had more to do with the geopolitics and international relations than economic integration. SACU was designed as a governance tool to mediate relations between South Africa, the bigger member, and the BLNS, smaller members. During the early history of SACU, the entity served as a tool for the British colonial powers, representing a convenient way to maintain influence throughout southern Africa, and from 1969 the customs union was used by the apartheid government of South Africa to maintain control over policy in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (Treasure and Gibb, 2014). However, South Africa's position towards SACU changed when the apartheid regime came to an end.

3.2.2. The Common Monetary Area

The CMA can be traced back to the currency union between South Africa, Lesotho, Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Swaziland. After the establishment of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), in 1921, the South African currency (initially the Pound, and after 1961 the Rand) became the only primary medium of exchange and legal tender in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (Wang et al, 2007). There were no internal restrictions on the movement of funds within these countries, and any external transactions were effected through the banks in South Africa and subject to the South African exchange controls. According to Zyl (2003), this was an informal arrangement, known as

Rand Monetary Area, and the advantages of being part of it included the stability of exchange rates, which helps to foster the high level of trade in the area, but with no monetary discretion for the smaller countries and formal framework for consultations. This situation continued until Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland obtained independence when the formal currency union called the "Rand Monetary Union (RMA)" was established. However, after a year Botswana withdrew from the RMA. Under such circumstance, the RMA agreement was revised in April 1986 to establish the Common Monetary Area of Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa (Wang et al, 2007). Although Botswana chose to follow its own independence monetary stance, in practice, Botswana's currency, the Pula, remains linked to the Rand through a currency basket where, since 1990, the latter weighs around 60 to 70 per cent (Aziakpono 2008:190).

According to the terms of the CMA Agreement, Lesotho and Swaziland would also have the right to issue their own national currencies. Thus, Swaziland issued its national currency (the lilangeni) in 1974, followed by Lesotho introducing the loti in 1980 (Wang et al, 2007). When Namibia became independent it joined the CMA (now the Multilateral Monetary Area) and issued its own national currency, the Namibian dollar, as well. The national currencies of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (the LNS countries) have been pegged at par to the rand since their introduction, and thus, the South African currency remains critical for their competitiveness internationally.

3.2.3. Constellation of Southern African States

CONSAS was established by the apartheid South African government, under the administration of Pieter Willem Botha, on the 22nd November 1979, in Johannesburg (Hentz, 2005: 39). The initiative of CONSAS was in response to the forthcoming Zimbabwe-Rhodesia independence, and according to Hentz, CONSAS would serve as an umbrella to forge closer ties between South Africa and its neighbours. On the security side, nonaggression pact would be signed, and on the economic side, CONSAS would provide an enlarged common market, technological links, transport links and the exchange of knowledge and capital to develop the sub-region (Hentz, 2005). However, the newly independent southern Africa states did not respond to the initiative of CONSAS as expected, and instead, they formed SADCC. Thus, CONSAS is a depiction of an early attempt to lead southern Africa into regional integration by the apartheid government. While CONSAS illuminates the coercive strategy to integrate the sub-region, the post-apartheid regime has adopted a soft, multilateral, and persuasive strategy.

3.3. Post-apartheid South Africa and SACU

In the post-1994 era, the relationship between South Africa and its SACU counterparts underwent radical alterations. When the new government came into power, South Africa made it one of its primary priorities to change the structural framework of SACU fundamentally. SACU, formerly perceived as an administrative tool of the colonial powers and subsequently the apartheid government, went through the democratization process as a way to introduce equality and harmony within the customs union.

According to several scholars, SACU is one regional entity that has served for decades as a forum for the demonstration of South Africa's oppressive powers. Early SACU Agreements, the 1910 and 1969 Agreements, note that South Africa was invested with undisputable power over her counterparts. For instance, the 1910 SACU Agreement was designed under the mandates of South Africa, and there were no institutional structures designed to govern the customs union (Gibb 2006:589). This meant that the policies and procedures for operating the customs union's tariffs and the allocation of revenue were set out by South Africa's own institutions, the Treasury and Board of Trade and Industry, and thus, all member states had to maintain similar tariffs with South Africa. The 1969 Agreement, on the other hand, was not different from the former agreement. South Africa remained in control over tariff decisions, and the South African Board of Tariffs and Industry proceeded with carrying out recommendations over external trade policy (Kirk and Stern 2005). However, following the democratic elections in South Africa, the need to revise the 1969 Agreement became apparent, and negotiations for the 2002 Agreement began. This was the effort of the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government, which rejected the framework of power relations in SACU as depicting the colonial oppressor's mentality (Mandela in McGowan, 1999).

Thus, it is in line with the above that this section will explore the relations between South Africa and SACU in the post-apartheid era. To reflect on the relations between South Africa and SACU in the post-apartheid era, the study has identified six areas of focus that captures well the post-1994 relations between South Africa and SACU. The six areas of focus are; the

2002 SACU Agreement, established institutions, financial interdependency, Common Revenue Pool, Revenue Sharing Formula, and Stability

3.3.1. The 2002 SACU Agreement

The 2002 SACU Agreement was signed on 21 October 2002 in Gaborone, Botswana (Gibb 2006:595). Gibb (2006:595) maintains that unlike the 1910 and 1969 Agreements, the 2002 SACU Agreement is more comprehensive, containing 51 Articles as compared to 22 and 6 Articles contained in previous Agreements. Kirk and Stern (2005:169) are of the view that the 2002 SACU Agreement represents an important element in the reshaping of the Southern African region after the demise of apartheid in South Africa. Thus, since the 1910 and 1969 Agreements reflected the dominance of South Africa in all its spheres, (from administrative and technical capacity to the level of economic development), the 2002 Agreement sought to entrench a democratic approach of doing things in SACU (Kirk and Stern 2005). As outlined by the SACU Secretariat (2003), the 2002 SACU Agreement encompasses three main aspects: institutions and governance, trade liberalization and regulation, and Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF). Its stated objectives include: to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between territories of the Member States; to create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable trade benefits between Member States; to promote conditions of fair competition in the Common Customs Area; to ensure the economic diversification, industrialization and competitiveness of Member States; to promote the integration of Member States into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment; to facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and additional duties levied by Member States; and to facilitate the development of common and strategies (Southern African Customs Union, 2013).

South Africa's contribution to SACU can primarily be measured through the contribution that it makes to the customs revenue pool. South Africa contributes more than it gets in the revenue pool, and hence, South Africa's contribution to SACU will be outlined in terms of the customs revenue pool and the revenue sharing formula.

3.3.2. Established Institutions

The 2002 SACU Agreement provides for several established institutions. According to McCarthy (2004:174), for a customs union that was largely characterized by the dominance of one Member State, South Africa in particular, Article 8 to 13 provide for the following institutions to be established as a reflection of efforts towards democratizing SACU: a Council of Ministers, a supreme decision making institution of the customs union which will consist of one Minister from each Member State; Customs Union Commission, consisting of the most senior government officials from the Member States; a Secretariat, a permanent body with headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia, that is responsible for the day-to-day administration of SACU; a Tariff Board, a body of experts that will make recommendations to the Council of Ministers on the level and changes of customs and trade remedies; Technical Liaison Committees that will advise the Commission in its work; and an *ad hoc* Tribunal for the settlement of disputes. In addition to the aforementioned institutions, Annexes B on National Bodies and C on the Tariff Board make it too much clear that the operation of the customs union will primarily depend on National Bodies that have to be established by the Member States (McCarthy 2004:174).

However, the establishment of several SACU institutions was criticized by several authors as being over ambitious due to the divergent level of economic development within the customs union. This was supported by a statement advanced by Gibb (1997:83), which is quoted as follows: “it is hard to envisage a situation where in Lesotho, the least developing state in SACU, has the same voting rights as South Africa”. However, despite the divergent level of development between member states, South Africa also appears to be the only member with necessary skills required to run important institutions such as the Tariff Board. Again, the divergence of policy and priorities between member states may hinder the development and progress of the institutions. But, until these institutions are established, all functions are delegated to the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) in South Africa (Department of Trade and Industry 2013:4).

3.3.3. Financial interdependency

The financial interdependency between South Africa and the BLNS, as outlined in the previous chapter, dates back to the period of British protectorates. However, this interdependence was also strengthened by the establishment of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), today known as the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA), between South Africa and other SACU Member States (BLNS).

In terms of financial development and capital flows, South Africa still leads against its SACU partners. South African banks dominates the financial landscape of the BLNS with the majority of their banks owned, either in part or full, by South African banks (Aziakpono

2008:192). Despite the close link among the financial systems by virtue of the high level of South African ownership of banks and membership of the MMA, there is still a wide distinction in the level of development of financial systems between South Africa and the BLNS (Aziakpono 2008:192). While South Africa possesses well advanced and sophisticated financial and banking sectors as compared to other developed countries, its SACU counterparts remain far behind.

3.3.4. Common Revenue Pool

The SACU common revenue pool consists of all customs and excise duties collected from SACU (McCarthy, 2004). The customs revenue is based on intra-SACU imports, while excise duties consist of total duties levied and collected on goods produced in the common customs area after the deduction of the amount that goes towards the funding of SACU institutions plus the development component (McCarthy 2004). The revenue pool is administered through the South African Reserve Fund (Mongardini 2013:37), and this due to the fact that the BLNS countries have not yet developed the technical capacity to carry out such mandate. According to Benjamin (2013:1), the revenue pool plays a significant role in the economies of the BLNS. The latter receives around 55% from the revenue pool which makes up to 25-60% of their national budgets revenue (Benjamin 2013:1). Benjamin further outlines that, while BLNS countries continue to obtain a lion's share from the pool, South Africa is the major contributor to the pool. In 2012 the research showed that South Africa contributed about 1.26% of its GDP, about 98% of the pool of customs and excise duties (estimated to be R48.3 billion annually), that is shared by the customs union's countries, particularly the BLNS (Benjamin 2013:1).

3.3.5. Revenue Sharing Formula

Special attention under the Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) will be paid to three main SACU components. The latter are the customs pool, excise duties, and development component.

The customs pool component is designed to benefit smaller SACU Member States with pooled customs revenue to be distributed according to each country's share of intra-SACU imports (McCarthy 2004:165). Countries that import more from within the customs union receive a lion's share from the customs pool, thus, compensating for cost-raising and polarization effects of the customs union (Kirk and Stern 2005:179). For instance, the BLNS import more from South Africa than the other way around, and thus, BLNS' share from the customs pool is relatively higher as compared to that of South Africa (McCarthy 2004:165). In this way, South Africa will be compensating the BLNS for trade diversion. This is further advocated by Ngwenya (2002:28) when he stated that linking SACU revenue distribution to intra-SACU imports, bearing in mind South Africa's large trade surplus with the BLNS, can be presented as compensating BLNS for cost-raising and polarization disadvantages of being in a customs union with South Africa.

The excise revenue component allocation consist of total duties levied and collected on goods produced in the common customs area after the deduction of the funding of the development component which is fixed at 15% (McCarthy 2004:167). Basically with the excise revenue, after the development component has been paid, the remaining amount is distributed to each Member State according to each country's share of total SACU GDP (Kirk and Stern 2005). Thus, in this instance, South Africa gets the largest share of excise revenue than the other Member States since it has the largest GDP than all SACU Member States.

The development component aims to facilitate the development of the unequal and its logical approach is to fashion its distribution in a way that favours the economies of less-developed Member States. The development component is designed to give member states that are more dependent on SACU revenues some protection against the decline in the real value of the revenue pool that can be brought about by bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization and South Africa's increasing use of tariff rebates (Ngwenya 2002:29). This means that the development component is a fixed amount that serves as a security, in the case of a decline in the revenue pool, to those member states that significantly depends on the customs revenue for economic stability. For instance, from the total amount of excise duties, of which South Africa gets the largest share due to its level of GDP, a fixed amount of 15% is automatically deducted and used as a development component to less-developed Member States such as Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia.

3.3.6. Stability

South Africa contributes greatly to the stability of SACU economically. According to Grynberg (2014:1), all four of the BLNS are entirely financially dependent upon the SACU transfers and if the latter were to stop there would be an economic suffering in Swaziland and Lesotho (the two are 60-70% dependent on revenues from SACU), and just a serious financial disaster in Windhoek and Gaborone which are sometimes less dependent (30-40%) because of their mineral resources, diamond in particular. Although the desire of most of the lesser political parties in South Africa, such as the Congress of South African Teachers Union (COSATU), is to end SACU and the large fiscal transfers that it entails, and rather transfer the funds for service provision, South Africa is committed to the stability of SACU as its withdrawal would cripple the Namibian and Botswana economy, and dismantle Lesotho and Swaziland (Grynberg 2014:1).

South Africa’s contribution is very significant because neglecting such responsibility will fall back on South Africa’s shoulder, as this would result in the over flooding of the BLNS nationals to South Africa seeking for greener pastures. Thus, this will not only have a bad impact on the South African economy, but it will also damage South Africa’s image internationally due to the fact that the country does not have a good record of accommodating foreign nationals in their economy. This was evidence in 2008 when South African citizens launched xenophobic attacks against poverty-stricken foreign nationals. Hence, it is for this reason that this study finds South Africa's stabilization efforts to the BLNS important.

3.4. Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Southern African Development Community

South Africa and SADC, unlike SACU, were never engaged in any form of formal relations until after the democratic transition in South Africa. Although South Africa has always been of paramount importance to the Southern African region, particularly due to its level of economic advancement, Pretoria only managed to forge closer and formal relations with the SADC grouping when the ANC government came into power and eventually joined SADC. According to Saurombe (2010), since joining SADC, South Africa has become very involved in the activities of the community. Thus, regarding the many activities of SADC, such as Transportation and Communications, Agriculture, Trade, Energy, and Mining, just to name a few, these are actively pursued by the relevant South African line function departments (Saurombe, 2010).

As Davies (1996) noted, after South Africa's accession to the SADC Treaty in 1994, high expectations were generated and the country's entry into the sub-regional entity was viewed as a major catalytic event that would drive the process of regional co-operation and integration forward. For scholars such as Biswa (2004), South Africa's membership to SADC to was expected to bring about qualitative change and strengthen the sub-regional entity. SADC heads of state, such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, explicitly captured this moment when he said: "given its level and size of the economic development, South Africa will have a positive and major role to play in enhancing the efficacy of SADC as a regional organisation" (Conradie, 2001:47). Its accession to the SADC treaty of 1992 was generally viewed as a stimulus to the sub-regional organization, which would give it the verge to enhance the performance and drive progress (Seymour, 2001).

Sceptics have argued that South Africa's preoccupation with domestic problems would lead to the side lining of sub-regional issues (Chingono and Nakana, 2009). Nevertheless, more than a decade after South Africa became a member of SADC; there has been progress politically, economically and socially. Although in a very slow pace, the progress is characterized by the signing of protocols and agreements that have been difficult to implement. Experts such as De Coning (2005) have argued that ever since South Africa became a member of SADC it has not tried to emulate Nigeria's role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) where the Nigerian resources have been deployed to ensure credible and qualitative operation of the sub-region. In other words, South Africa's engagement to the sub-region has not resulted in an anticipated advanced integration of the sub-region. However, this is not to say nothing has been done ever since South Africa joined SADC, and therefore, against this background, this section will focus on major events that have defined South Africa's efforts to integrate SADC in the post-1994 era.

3.4.1. Southern African Development Community

SADC originated from SADCC (which was made up of nine member states, namely; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and it was officially established in August 1992 with the signing of the Treaty of Windhoek. The latter affirmed the sub-regional entity's intentions to establish a framework for cooperation aimed at closer economic cooperation and integration, and lifting of barriers to free movement of goods, services and factors of production (Alden and Le Pere, 2009). Currently, SADC has fifteen member states. The latter consists of the aforementioned former SADCC members including South Africa, Namibia, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Malawi. SADC was created to deal with the developmental and economic problems that were being encountered by the sub-region, which could not be addressed by its precursors (Cleary, 1999). Thus, SADC was formed with a primary goal to reconstruct integration in southern Africa, albeit growing against the background of economic inequalities among its members.

SADC's objectives, as stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992), are as follows: to Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration; Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; Promote and defend peace and security; Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States; Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; Promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region; Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region (Southern African Development Community).

Since the main aim of SADC is to achieve regional integration and eradicate poverty within the southern Africa region, various strategic plans and protocols were adopted by the heads of state and government in order to make the sub-regional organization effective. Amongst others, the most prominent ones are the Protocol on Trade and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), adopted by the SADC Summit in August 2003 (South African Development Community, 2014). The Protocol on Trade was adopted and signed on 01 August 1996 by the SADC heads of state and government, in Maseru, Lesotho (Protocol on Trade 1996. The signing of the Protocol followed the SADC conference that was hosted by South Africa in 1995, where the idea of forming a sub-regional trading bloc was first discussed. According to Moshoeshoe (2014), after South Africa acceded to SADC, integration was at the top of the regional agenda, and therefore, it was not a coincidence that the 1995 SADC conference led to the signing of the Protocol in the following year. The Protocol was then put into force on 25 January 2001. According to Article 2 of the Protocol, the latter intends to further liberalize intra-trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade arrangements, complemented by Protocols in other areas; to ensure efficient production within SADC reflecting the current and dynamic comparative advantages of its members; to contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; to enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialization of the region; and to establish a Free Trade Area in the SADC region (SADC, 1996).

The RISDP was designed to provide a clear strategic direction with respect to SADC programmes, projects and activities in line with the SADC Common Agenda and strategic priorities, as enshrined in the SADC Treaty of 1992. Thus, according to the SADC official website, this is a comprehensive development and implementation framework guiding the regional integration agenda of SADC over a period of fifteen years (2005-2020) (SADC, 1996). This five-year plan was broken down further into annual plans (SADC, 1996). Thus, SADC hopes to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency through these planning procedures. However, the most defining character of the RISDP is the outline of series of the milestone to be achieved within the context of the SADC Common Agenda in order to deepen the integration agenda of SADC. Under this framework, SADC aims to form a Free Trade Area by 2008, establish a Customs Union by 2010, achieve a Common Market by 2015, attain a Monetary Union by 2016, and accept a single currency and become an Economic Union by 2018 (Southern African Development Community, 2012).

3.4.1.1. The SADC Free Trade Area

After the signing of the SADC Protocol on Trade, SADC governments agreed to eliminate barriers to intra-trade in goods and services on basis of fair, mutual, and equitable trade framework (SADC, 1996). The practice of gradual liberalization of trade barriers, as outlined by the Protocol, was regarded as the first step towards deepening regional integration in southern Africa. Thus, to achieve the agenda of deepening integration in southern Africa, SADC embarked on a gradual process of integrating its member states. This process had to unfold according to the stages of regional economic integration, as outlined in the SADC Integration Milestone (Southern African Development Community). Accordingly, in August 2008, SADC created a Free Trade Area (FTA). Regardless of a huge economic disparity that exists between members, the FTA was considered primary for intra-trade enhancement and investment inflows in southern Africa This sentiment was also echoed by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in his speech during the launch of the FTA when he articulated that: “integration can create the basis for regional markets and industries to overcome the limits of small markets, to achieve economies of scale and enhance competitiveness” (Mbeki, 2008)

Although the implementation of the FTA began in 2000, following the signing of the SADC Trade Protocol of 1996, the FTA was only established by August 2008 by twelve of all SADC member states (TIPS, 2008). Under the FTA arrangements, member states agreed to liberalize their tariffs at different rates, depending on the country's level of development. For instance, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia removed most of their tariffs in 2000, while middle-income countries, such as Mauritius, have gradually reduced their tariffs each year between 2000 and 2008 (TIPS, 2008). This was considered to be the first step towards forging deeper regional integration that would be characterized by political unity, and greater trade and investment flows between member states. According to the SADC Secretariat, the FTA creates a sub-regional market worth US$360 billion with a total population of 170 million, with economies growing by up to 7 per cent annually. Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo could add a further US$71 billion and a population of 77 million to the SADC market (Moshoeshoe, 2014), thus, equating the total market to a potential income of US$431 billion and a population of 247 million. These figures clearly attest to the significance of the FTA as a component to integrate southern Africa in the post-apartheid era. Thus, the FTA can be classified as one initiative that the democratic South Africa has committed itself to strengthen integration in southern Africa.

However, it can be argued that the SADC FTA has never materialized ever since its inception. The incapacity of the SADC FTA is argued to be as result of competing sectors, tariff reduction and structures, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, standardization of customs certification and procedures, and contention on rules of origin (Qobo, 2005; and Moshoeshoe, 2014).

3.4.1.2. The Maputo Development Corridor

The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) is the spatial development initiative in southern Africa. In fact, it can be argued to be the largest and most successful development corridor so far in the SADC region, with high expectations its significant contribution to towards regional economic integration in southern Africa. Thus, according to Bowland and Otto (2012), the Maputo Development Corridor is an example from which lessons can be drawn for other development corridors. Conceptualized and implemented outside the SADC framework, the MDC was a brainchild of South Africa and Mozambique, and was adopted by SADC under the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) as a model for future regional transport corridor. The main objectives of the corridor have been to rehabilitate the existing core infrastructure; attract investment to the corridor and the region; make it sustainable through relevant policies and strategies; to maximize the impact of investing in and developing the corridor (TRAC). This is envisioned to produce benefits that include enhancing trade; opening up neighbouring markets to one another, and granting access to global markets; increasing cross-border tourism; encouraging private investment; and using private-sector investment to displace the use of public sector resources (TRAC). Furthermore, the corridor is expected to support the vision of regional economic integration.

The Maputo Development Corridor involves the rehabilitation road and rail links between Maputo and South Africa's economic heartland of Gauteng, while also unlocking regions of Mpumalanga and Limpopo (Mulaudzi, 2006). As Mulaudzi (2009) notes, for South Africa, the Maputo Development Corridor provides a closer access to the port of Maputo, which is closer to Johannesburg than Durban, and perhaps the most importantly, the development of the economically marginal and impoverish Mpumalanga Province, which borders on Mozambique. Thus, the MDC will link landlocked countries to their neighbours, and thus the ocean, and therefore improve the operational and economic efficiency of these countries, and also create a myriad of new economic opportunities (Bowland and Otto, 2012:2-3). According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of South Africa, the corridor will link and eventually benefit South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe (Mulaudzi, 2009). However, it has been reported that thus far the benefits of the MDC have been confined to South Africa and Mozambique only. Accordingly, for the development of its road, railway, port and more recently gas transport (pipeline) facilities, the MDC involved several public-private partnerships, driven by the Maputo Corridor Logistic Initiative, which brings together several institutional partners from Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland (Macauhub, 2015). According to the African Development Bank (ADB), the MDC has received investments of about US$2.8 billion, and accounts for 42 per cent of all the country's entire export revenue, with companies from various sectors installed around it (Macauhub, 2015).

While this project has brought South Africa and Mozambique together, there have been fears that a project like this one could undermine regional unity (Macauhub, 2015). However, this study is of the view that this project is one of the greatest and significant projects that signifies a mutual and functional cooperation between South Africa and southern Africa in the post-apartheid era. Thus, the project is of great importance to the sub-region due to the following:

The Maputo Development Corridor will minimize delays at the border and reduce red tape, given the resultant increase in traffic the border post between South Africa and Mozambique. Thus, given the fact that the project is taking place in phases, the border post has extended its daily operating hours to 18, although it remains on the agenda to increase operations to a 24-hour daily basis due to continued backlogs and pressure from stakeholders (Bowland and

Otto, 2012). In line with the above, a significant achievement has been the implementation of a freight bypass road, allowing for freight to be cleared in a one-stop operation at KM7; this serves freight entering Mozambique from South Africa, on the South African side, before the border post (Bowland and Otto, 2012). Thus, only the handover of documents is necessary at the border, with the process replicated at KM4; this serves freight entering South Africa from Mozambique, on the Mozambican side for cargo moving into South Africa (Bowland and Otto, 2012). This has effectively cut transit times from the border to the port and back to five and a half hours for certain users, from periods that used to run to anything from three days to three weeks (Bowland and Otto, 2012). This is a significant achievement, as a one-day reduction in inland travel times can raise exports by as much as 7% (Briefing by the Commissioner of South African Revenue Service, 2012). Overall, the Maputo Corridor has had a number of positive impacts, and in addition to the above, other achievements include improved efficiency in reaching the border from inland provinces; safer and more reliable passage from the border to Maputo; and reduced operational inefficiencies.

3.4.1.3. Bilateral Relations

SADC may not be making effective progress in terms of integration, however, ever since South Africa became a member, a number of bilateral agreements have piled up. South Africa is pushing for bilateral relations with almost each and every SADC member state. However, instead of capturing all bilateral relations between South African and SADC member states, this study will focus only on the South Africa-Angola relations in the post-apartheid era.

Angola has earned a strategic partner position in South Africa. Thus, the relationship between the two has been regarded as that of strategic importance to the sub-region, marked with trade cooperation. Since 2009, there has been an increase in the trade cooperation between South Africa and Angola. This is a positive achievement considering the fact that the before 1994 South Africa fought alongside the opposition in the Angolan war. Thus, when the ANC government came into power, South Africa forged close relations with the Angolan government. According to DIRCO (2015), over the past five years, South Africa and Angola have signed trade facilitation agreements, namely the Air Service Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Cooperation and Industry Cooperation. Angola is one of South Africa's largest trading partners in southern Africa, and Africa at large. Angola is currently ranked the 08th on the continent, with R22, 5 billion of imports largely comprised of crude petroleum oils (DIRCO, 2015). In 2013, the value of exports from South Africa to Angola was recorded to be R9, 7 billion, while the imports from Angola to South Africa were R18, 9 billion (DIRCO, 2015).

According to Lee (2011), South Africa, Angola and Namibia were involved in the initial work of the Trans Kunene Corridor and the envisaged Namibe-Malanje and Cubango corridors. The former and the latter are corridors found in Angola, meant to open up Angola for trade through the enhancement of the transport mode. In a business forum meeting between South Africa and Angola that was held in South Africa, in 2010, the Minister of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Rob Davies, articulated that the developmental corridors were meant to improve the transport logistics between South Africa and Angola by providing rail and road network to complement the existing network, and hence, could contribute to the promotion of investment activities (South African Government, 2010).

Aside for the corridor, President Jacob Zuma and his Angolan counterpart signed the Declaration of Intent on Financial Cooperation to enhance trade relations between the two countries. As Lee (2011) notes, this step insinuate that three of South African institutions namely, Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Industrial Development Corporation, and Export Credit Insurance Corporation, which are involved in the provision of financial resources, will increase their efforts to make more financial resources available to support the growing partnership between the two countries.

3.4.1.4. The Southern African Power Pool

In the energy sector integration has been expressed through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), which seeks to integrate the power grids of southern Africa states and distribute electricity rural and underserved communities. The major part of the SAPP is the rehabilitation of the Mozambique's Cahora Bassa Hydroelectricity dam on the Zambezi River which links power lines between Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The project involves the governments of South Africa and Mozambique, and their electrical distributing companies, namely ESKOM and Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa (Conchiglia, 2007).

SAPP was created in 1995 when the ministers responsible for the energy sectors in SADC signed an inter-governmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Beta, 2013). All SADC members are also members of SAPP except Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles. SAPP was created with the main fundamental aim to provide reliable and economical electricity supply to the consumers of each of the members of the SAPP, consistent with the reasonable utilization of natural resources and the effect on the environment (SAPP/SADC).

The objectives of SAPP are as follows:

- Provide a forum for the development of a world class, robust, safe, efficient, reliable and stable interconnected electrical system in the southern African region.
- Co-ordinate and enforce common regional standards of Quality of Supply; measurement and monitoring of systems performance.
- Harmonize relationships between member utilities.
- Facilitate the development of regional expertise through training programmes and research.
- Increase power accessibility in rural communities.
- Implement strategies in support of sustainable development priorities (www.sapp.co.za)

Power is a critical part of development that every economy requires to attract investment and aid economic growth. Kurewa (2017) notes, investors in sectors such as mining and manufacturing cannot even consider setting up shop in regions facing power deficits. Unfortunately, this has been the case with southern Africa in the past years, or so. The SADC region has been battling with power shortage, which in turn has impacted the performance of the regional economy negatively. Thus, most southern Africa countries have been making strides to improve power generation in the region, however, with numerous projects at various levels of completion (Kurewa, 2017). Commenting on these developments, an economic analyst, Emmanuel Mambo, said power was the backbone for economic growth (Kurewa, 2017). According to the annual report of SAPP for 2016, these projects are anticipated to add 32,695MW to the region by 2022, as countries move to meet the demand sparked by industrialization, increased population, among other things (Kurewa, 2017). According to SAPP, Zimbabwe will add 4,517MW to the regional grid by 2022, while Namibia and Zambia will add 1,030 MW and 3,648 MW, respectively (Kurewa, 2017). Tanzania will contribute 3,190MW, Swaziland 312MW, South Africa 10,653MW, Mozambique 3,460MW and Malawi 116MW (Kurewa, 2017). The Democratic Republic of Congo will chip in 608MW, Botswana 420MW and Angola 3,742MW (Kurewa, 2017).

Lesotho is the only member state which is not expected to bring in any new generation by 2022.

SAPP currently has an installed capacity of 61,894MW, while operating capacity stands at 46,959MW against demand and reserve of 52,542MW (Kurewa, 2017). Taking into account generation capacity reserve requirements, the generation capacity shortfall stands at 5,583 MW. In the past 12 years, SAPP commissioned 15,468MW new generation at an average rate of 1,219 MW per annum (Kurewa, 2017). The power plants will generate electricity using the wind, solar and hydropower.

3.4.1.5. Peacekeeping

When the ANC government came into power, South Africa took it upon its shoulders to foster security stability in southern Africa. For South Africa, peacekeeping in the SADC region is directly linked to the success of the socio-economic development. As propounded in the DIRCO 2009-2010 Annual Report, "our position still remains that socio-economic development cannot take place in the absence of peace and security, let alone, it being critical for addressing the root causes of conflict and instability" (DIRCO Annual Report 2009-2010). Thus, South African security stabilization agenda has three pillars: mediation, post-conflict peacekeeping and development (Zondi, 2012). The aforementioned three areas of security stability are in line with the ANC's document which stipulates that the country should resist the temptation of becoming a hegemonic power and resort to forceful means of resolving conflicts. This is also directly derived from the previous experience between the apartheid government and the sub-region, where the former played more of a destabilization political role towards southern Africa. It is therefore for this reason that in the post-apartheid era South Africa has been careful not to engage in any peacekeeping mission outside of the SADC mandate. However, this is not to say that there has never been a case wherein South Africa acted outside of the SADC mandate, thus, obliged by the security concerns of the situation at stake. One case in point was the 1998 Lesotho intervention.

The 1998 Lesotho intervention was the first military intervention to be ever taken by the democratic government of South Africa, as it has been argued by several scholars, outside of the SADC mandate. In this political event, African and the international community watched with interest when South Africa and Botswana undertook the intervention. While many views of the intervention are associated with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) (Likoti, 2007), the on-going water project between South Africa and Lesotho, this study holds that the intervention was justifiable. South Africa could not have folded hands and watched political instability erupting in a country that is situated in the center of its "heart". With the on-going tension between South Africa (then the chair of SADC) and Zimbabwe (then the chair of the Organ) about the functionality of the newly established SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) (Makoa, 1999), South Africa had to act as waiting for SADC's mandate would have cost South Africa and the sub-region. Therefore, although not turning a blind eye on the LHWP, South Africa's motives to intervene Lesotho can also be attributed to the stability of Lesotho and the southern African region.

The on-going situation of security in the sub-region, such as the DRC crisis, prompted South Africa to take a lead on the issue of regional security co-operation. Thus, the end-result of this was the formation of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) in 2004 (Rannenyeni, 2009). The SADCBRIG was established to address the sub-region's security issues on a collective level. SADC members pledged their contribution and committed itself to deliver the capabilities that other members lack (Mandrup, 2009). According to Mandrup (2009), the South African National Defence Force pledged a parachute battalion, engineering capability, sanitation (which includes a field hospital), harbour patrol boats, signal capacity, a naval support vessel and air transport, to fill the gaps of other members. While other members could only be committed to providing military personnel, South Africa considered it significant to provide the aforementioned critical functions in order to tie the operation of the SADCBRIG together.

However, over the years South Africa has also developed what is referred to as peace diplomacy in Africa and southern Africa. Thus, under the mandate of SADC, South Africa has participated in several mediation processes in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and the Comoran island of Anjuouan, just to mention a few. In 2014 SADC mandated the deputy president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, to facilitate peace talks in Lesotho after an attempt of a coup by its military. Thus, from time to time, Ramaphosa visits Lesotho to check on the progress of the country after the successful peace talks. In line with the above, it can be argued that South Africa is committed to the political stability, and a stable environment, of southern Africa.

3.5. CONCLUSION

Although earlier pre-apartheid years in southern Africa were characterized by elements of political hostility and the isolation of South Africa from the rest of the sub-region, the political dynamics have changed. After 1994 South Africa re-engaged with the sub-region, thus, emerging as a primary advocate for democracy, and sought a role that does not reflect the behaviour of the former government. In this way, South Africa sought for structural changes in SACU, reflected in the 2002 SACU Agreement, and also became an active member of SADC. Although South Africa is the biggest economy in southern Africa, with major contributions towards southern African regional integration and development, the country has not articulated any claim to sub-regional leadership but has worked collectively with others, as it is reflected above, towards developing and integrating southern Africa in the post-apartheid era.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTH AFRICA AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: Opportunities and Limitations.

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Several views have been advanced regarding South Africa's policy position towards southern Africa, and Africa at large, in the post-1994 era. Although the new democratic South Africa has placed integration on top of its regional agenda, and also committed itself to obliterate any policy that resembles the behaviour of the previous government towards its neighbours and the African continent, the policy path of South Africa is yet to be understood. This sentiment is derived from the fact that, unlike the apartheid government whose motives and policy-path towards southern Africa were clear, the new South Africa has been very conscious and careful on how it engages with the southern African region. However, although the aforementioned is the case, ever since the political transition in South Africa of 1994, the country has strived to be relevant to Africa. Relevance to Africa is important to the former liberation movement, turned into a government administration, as it gives the country an anti-Western image and an opportunity to forge close relations with its African counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that after the ANC obtained power South Africa identified itself as "simply another African state", new and inexperienced one, which has devoted much of its attention to the continent (Barber, 2005:1083). Therefore, in light of the above, this section will be assessing South Africa's strategy, opportunities, and limitations towards southern African regional integration. The chapter will achieve this by first, exploring the evolution of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa since 1994, in this way also assessing South Africa's strategy towards southern Africa; and then proceed to explore South Africa's opportunities and limitations to integrate southern Africa, and conclude by analysing South Africa's capacity to lead southern Africa.

4.2. SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1994

According to Khadiagala (2014), South Africa has been struggling to remain relevant in Africa in the post-1994 era, thus, muddling through modest engagements. South Africa's struggle for relevance in Africa is reflected in the country's foreign policy towards Africa during the Nelson Mandela administration, Thabo Mbeki's tenure, and the Jacob Zuma's presidency. In the following paragraphs, the study will focus on the evolution of South

Africa's foreign policy towards Africa, from the Mandela administration to Zuma's presidency, in order to explore the strategies that have been employed by South Africa in its regional relations.

4.2.1. The Nelson Mandela administration

When Mandela came to power, through the ANC government, South Africa had just emerged from an oppressive government system, and the world was experiencing a shift in global powers. It was after the Cold War had just come to an end, and when the world integration was taking its course through globalization. Thus, emerging from an oppressive and hostile system of the apartheid government, when the ANC came into power it stated clearly that its primary concern was the pursuit of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This was broadly interpreted to include economic, social, environmental and political rights, amongst other. Upholding its banner as the promoter of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, South Africa argued that bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth were central to the search for human rights, peace and equality (Barber, 2005). However, it did not take long after Mandela was inaugurated as the president of South Africa that the country soon clashed with Nigeria over its principal norms.

When the ANC government took power Nigeria was under an authoritarian military rule led by General Sani Abacha. A protest campaign by the Ogoni people, who claimed that their land had been ruined by the oil industry, was broken by the regime and the leaders were prosecuted before a military tribunal (Barber, 2005: 1084). Thus, the leaders were found guilty of plotting a coup and attacking chiefs, and therefore, were ordered to be killed (Barber, 2005). President Mandela saw the process as a violation of human rights and attempted to restrain the Nigerian regime through diplomacy, which included visits to Nigeria by Mbeki and Archbishop Tutu (Barber, 2005). However, South Africa's diplomatic efforts failed, and the execution took place. Thus, Mandela responded by calling for Nigeria's membership suspension from the Common Wealth, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions for Nigeria, and pointed the way by withdrawing the South African Commissioner. He called on western states to boycott Nigeria's oil and the SADC grouping put coordinated pressure on Nigeria (Barber, 1997).

South Africa's efforts amounted to nothing, and as a result, the country was isolated by African states. The western states continued to buy Nigerian oil, and South Africa was accused of breaking the Africa unity by its African counterparts who saw Nigeria not as a human rights violator, but a continental leader that supports the liberation struggle of Africa through its contribution in the defunct Organization of Africa Unity. South Africa's position was turned around by Thabo Mbeki who succeeded in moving the attention away from the violation of human rights by Nigeria to blaming the Wests for Mandela's behaviour.

South Africa was also eager to be an active international actor. The country's inspirations were motivated by economic interests and prestige. This was explicitly expressed by the former minister of trade in South Africa, Alec Erwin, who saw South Africa as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds in terms of the country's economic structure (Barber, 2005). According to Turok (1990), South Africa's aspiration of becoming an international actor did not go unchallenged domestically. Factions within the ruling party were now complaining that South Africa is succumbing to international pressures to integrate further into the global sphere (Turok, 1999). South Africa's ambition saw the country establishing about 124 diplomatic missions abroad by I996, obtaining membership of 45 international organizations which the white regime had been excluded from most of them, and soon gained further prominence by hosting and chairing a range of international bodies, including the NAM, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth (Barber, 2005: 1082). In Africa, it became a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the OAU, and in international sport, it hosted the rugby and cricket world cups. South Africa also had hopes of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Barber, 2005).

South Africa policy during the Mandela’s incumbency can be characterized as that of moralism and internationalism. The country presented itself as an upholder of democratic morals, while also simultaneously striving to integrate itself as a key international actor on behalf of Africa. However, this approach led to its isolation and suspicious attitude by its fellow African countries.

4.2.2. South African Policy under Mbeki

The experience that Thabo Mbeki encountered as the deputy of Mandela obliged him to make policy adjustment towards Africa when he came into power. Possessing concrete background knowledge and experience of South African foreign policy from the time that he was the deputy president, Mbeki's shift of South African policy towards Africa marked a milestone of South Africa's engagement with Africa. Grounded on his objective of Africa renaissance and his 1996 speech titled, "I am an Africa", Mbeki made it public that he has given top priority to Africa. Thus, the Mbeki era marked a period of multilateralism as it is reflected by his relationship and alliance with Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria's Mohammed Bouteflika, and Senegal's Abdoulaye (Khadiagala, 2014:276). This coalition exercised leadership through attempts to reconstruct African political and economic institutions such as the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

According to Khadiagala (2014), South Africa's engagement with Africa tapped into expectations of the new South Africa giving voice on critical Africa issues. Mbeki was conscious of the significance of collective leadership in search of African solutions to African problems, more especially when reflecting the former relations between South Africa and the sub-region. Therefore, recognizing the multiplicity of African challenges, Mbeki emphasized the necessity of burden-sharing, and this is how the coalition between Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa became a key player in forging a consensus on African issues (Landsberg, 2010).

Although the democratic South Africa has never articulated any claim to leadership, during Mbeki's tenure South Africa provided leadership by example in areas of peacekeeping and African development. In terms of the former, South Africa expended considerable resources in the stabilization of the Great Lakes region (Khadiagala, 2014:277). As Landsberg (2006:121) notes, South Africa's peace-making policy towards conflicts in the Great Lakes region has been based on broad geo-regional tactics, as South Africa has located them within the framework of the broader African policy of continental renewal and development vision called the African renaissance. Thus, the policy towards Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo forms part of South Africa's attempt to help develop NEPAD and the AU, which are viewed as primary for development. However, limits of South Africa's role in Africa were demonstrated in the failure of the Cote d'Ivoire civil war in the late 1990s. At the invitation of the AU, Mbeki mediated the conflict, but these efforts were undermined by the intransigence of the parties and the disproportionate role of the French in the conflict (Khadiagala, 2014:278).

4.2.3. Zuma's Policy towards Africa

Unlike Mbeki's era, it has been argued that Zuma's tenure has been marked by a shift in policy from multilateralism to commercial and economic diplomacy. This is not to say that Mbeki's administration did not have a strong economic diplomacy component, however, Zuma gave a glance to economic diplomacy by illuminating the significance of strategic economic relations with a select group of countries (Khadiagala, 2014). For instance, soon after Zuma was sworn in as the President of South Africa, he made a state visit to oil-rich Angola with the largest delegation of ministers and businessmen. Although a member of SADC, Angola embodied corruption, authoritarianism, human rights abuses and economic impoverishment, profound problems of governance, which forced Mbeki to avoided any bilateral engagement with Angola (Khadiagala, 2014). Thus, Zuma’s embrace of Angola in the name of commercial interests appeared to be an early sign that economic self-interests would trump the observance of human rights and democracy promotion in Africa.

Another case in point that reflected a shift in the South African foreign policy under the Zuma administration was the death of thirteen South African soldiers in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. South Africa's intervention in Bangui has been characterized as a coherent of its new doctrine in Africa. Leon (2013) note that South Africa's move into CAR had to prompt questions about its policy doctrine since Bangui seems to be of less strategic importance to Pretoria. According to Leon (2013), the CAR situation tested the consistency South Africa's foreign policy in the post-1994 era. This is based on the premise that, firstly; the president of CAR, Francois Bozize, installed himself in power via military coup; and secondly, President Zuma should have understood the situation in CAR better as he was once part of the liberation struggle under the party that was once labelled as a terrorist.

According to Dawes (2013), the original deployment to support the unpopular regime of Francois Bozize seems to have been motivated by the desire to advance commercial interests, including those of senior ANC figures and the party’s own investment arm; a desire to project power into Francophone Africa; and the opportunity to seize from France the initiative in both the resource business and regional politics. Thus, this raised questions about whether if South Africa is really becoming more assertive in bringing stability and democracy to Africa, or whether the objective was to thwart the meddling of France and other Western powers on the continent? (Fabricius, 2013). Fabricius extended the argument by reflecting to the instance when Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was elected as the chair of the AU Commission. According to the scholar, Zuma wanted to replace the incumbent, Gabon’s Jean Ping, whom he evidently regarded as a puppet of France, with a former ‘liberation fighter’ who would guard Africa’s independence (Fabricius, 2013).

The 2011 Libyan crisis was also one of the political events that reflected a shift in South African policy. South Africa, alongside Nigeria and Gabon, voted for the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly in Libya to protect civilians (Khadiagala, 2014). The resolution was soon met with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention that resulted in the death of civilians and the Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi. South Africa's vote was in defiance with other African counterparts and BRICS members.

In light of the above, it can be argued that South Africa's foreign policy in Africa has placed the country in different strategically positions that can be deemed as inconsistency. As outlined above, during the Mandela tenure South Africa emerged as an upholder of democracy and the country also managed to integrate itself in the international forum, while Mbeki sought to engage with Africa and promote multilateralism as far as problems of Africa were concerned. Thus, the Zuma administration is more focused on economic diplomacy and national interests.

4.3. SOUTH AFRICA’S OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS TO LEAD SOUTHERN AFRICA

This section will be focusing on South Africa's opportunities and limitations to lead southern Africa. To achieve this, the study will start by outlining the opportunities and then proceed to layout limitations.

4.3.1. Opportunities

4.3.1.1. South Africa’s Global Integration

South Africa’s invitation to join the BRICS grouping of major emerging economies, its membership in multilateral institutions such as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, G20, and the Cairns Group, has been perceived as efforts towards integrating South Africa globally and its claim to African leadership (Flemes, 2009). Although this that might be the case, South Africa’s global participation can be attributed to the country's objective to integrate the economies of the South globally. Thus, South Africa is serving as a conduit for development in the sub-Saharan region, as by being a member of the above mentioned multilateral institutions South Africa stands a better chance of forging a close partnership between the sub-Saharan region and other developed countries.

Ever since South Africa joined BRICS in 2010 there has been a tremendous increase of total trade between South Africa and its BRICS counterparts. Thus, there has been an estimated increase of 70 per cent of total trade between South Africa and BRICS which has amounted to R382 billion from R268 billion in 2011 (Brand South Africa, 2015). As a result, Africa had doubled its total trade with BRICS since 2007 to US$340 billion in 2012, and this was projected to reach US$500 billion in 2015 (Brand South Africa, 2015). However, although such developments have been taking place between South Africa, African and BRICS, Alden and Schoeman (2013) claim that South Africa's membership of BRICS, and other international forums, rests heavily on the strategy that it is speaking and acting on behalf of the African continent. Thus, it, therefore, has to find strategies and tactics that will convince its continental peers that it is worthy of and generally accepted as, the continental leader (Alden and Schoeman, 2013).

4.3.1.2. South Africa’s Access to SADC and SACU Markets

South Africa has an unmatched access to the markets of SADC and SACU. SADC and SACU serve as export markets for South Africa's internationally uncompetitive products. Payne (2014) argues that the problem of having a sub-regional economic entity that comprises of one developed member state and many other underdeveloped member states is that the developed member benefits more from the markets. Thus, well-developed member states automatically exploit the markets of smaller member states.

According to Alden and Le Pere (2004), South Africa's biggest export market is SADC, and this is often overlooked when surveying South Africa's trade figures because a great portion of South Africa's exports to other countries is hidden within SACU. As Rod Alence noted, South Africa's relation with Africa is more significant to the country than sceptical realists acknowledge (Alence, 2015). Alence further note that, although African economies are small, they are significant to South Africa’s foreign economic relations for two reasons: they are the major destination for South African products, and they generate a substantial trade surplus that makes up for its trade deficit with the world

4.3.1.3. Developmental Assistance Strategy

To strengthen South Africa’s position as an important anchor of African development, the Mbeki’s administration launched an initiative called the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) in 2001. The ARF was conceptualized and designed not only to coordinate and focus the country's aid activities, but also to facilitate triangulation, thus, enabling South Africa to become a kind of development assistance ‘broker', emphasizing partnership, rather than the more traditional relationship between the donor and recipient, as a key principle in its efforts to promote regional development (DIRCO, 2015).). For example, in 2006, the ARF provided R278 million to support presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Tapula et al, 2011).

In 2009/2010, R4 million was allocated to fund South Africa’s participation in the AU observer mission in Sudan during the 2010 elections and R24 million to fund 20 Cuban doctors in a 3-year project that offers medical services to the government of Sierra Leone (Tapula et al, 2011). It furthermore released R300 million to support economic recovery in Zimbabwe, although the effectiveness of these funds, looking at the current Zimbabwean political stalemate, remains questionable (Tapula et al, 2011). Under the umbrella of the ARF, the South African-owned Southern African Development Bank made a loan to Angola in 2011 to support the development of road infrastructure. According to Walters (2011), the project was to ensure a sufficient supply chain for diamond mining and link part of Angola more effectively with other parts of the southern African region. However, Angola is somewhat cautious about South African involvement which, it fears, might in the longer term benefit South Africa in the mine-to-market supply chain. According to some scholars, Angola's reaction presents South Africa's relationships with the rest of Africa, therefore, on which its claims to continental and international leadership depend, with a difficult balancing act (Alden and Schoeman, 2013). However, for South Africa, such development aid, largely focused on infrastructure development, is a practical way of realizing its foreign policy principles and reinforcing its self-conception as a bridge and a regional leader, employing a kind of ‘Africa first' approach, simultaneously investing in opportunities which might also benefit South Africa’s domestic economic needs and aspirations (Alden and Schoeman, 2013).

4.3.2 Limitations

4.3.2.1. South Africa’s Relevance to Africa

South Africa's foreign policy reflects the country's efforts to be relevant to African affairs. Under the Mandela administration, South Africa emerged as a promoter of democracy and human rights in Africa. This policy alienated Pretoria with most part of the continent, including its neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, and Angola. This approach proved to be a draw to South Africa in Africa as Pretoria was seen as dividing the African unity that African liberation movements and countries fought for. When Mbeki took over the office in South Africa, the foreign policy of the country shifted towards multilateralism as far as Africa was concerned. Striking for relevancy in Africa, the Mbeki government saw it as important that it tackles African issues on a collective modality with other African states. It is under this phase that Mbeki sought to integrate the continent through his framework of African renaissance, while also embarking on the transformation of the continent by initiating continental developmental strategies such as NEPAD, collectively with other African states, such as Nigeria, just to name a few.

When the Zuma administration took over, not much changed as far as South Africa-Africa policy is concerned. However, Zuma government has set economic development over the democratic principles of South Africa. In this regard, the ANC government is striving to forge bilateral relations with as many African governments as possible in the name of promoting development within the continent. However, South Africa’s inconsistence policies toward Africa has been viewed with suspicions by other African countries, who views South Africa acting out of its own national interests which do not correspond well with the African agenda.

4.3.2.2. Historical Ties

According to Hengari (2014:14.), the ANC’s alliances with former liberation movements have resulted in its having less space to pursue a strong normative regional policy that marries good governance and democracy with South Africa's regional economic agenda. The fact that the liberation movements in other southern African countries fought alongside the ANC, and also harboured its political stalwarts in exile, in the fight against the white rule has limited the ANC government to take a decisive policy-path towards the sub-region. Thus, the ANC's history of struggle and liberation, which is strongly embedded in the anti-colonialist liberation tradition in Southern Africa, has overlapped into the new era. This history includes close ties with the ruling SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) in Namibia, the ruling MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola or Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) in Angola, the ruling ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) in Zimbabwe, the ruling CCM (Party of the Revolution or Chama Cha Mapinduzi) in Tanzania, and the ruling Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front or Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in Mozambique (Hengari, 2014:14). The fact that after 1994 the ANC government emerged as an advocate for human rights, rule of law and democracy has resulted in a lot of controversies as far as reconciling these norms with regional pursuits is concerned.

Countries such as Angola, Zimbabwe, the DRC, have been reported to be violators of human rights, rule of law and democracy, while Swaziland remains the only kingdom standing, and that does not regard the democratic principles. Thus, the historical ties among SADC countries is so strong that it was, therefore, not surprising that when the President of Botswana, Ian Khama, called for change of leadership in Zimbabwe in 2016, that the Zimbabwean Information Minister hit back by calling Khama a blasphemer of Zimbabwe and fellow African leaders (news24, 2016). For Khama, Zimbabwe requires new leadership to deal with the political and economic implosion of 2000 that has dragged the SADC region down. It is also for the same reason that South Africa, during the 2008 mediation process, was criticized of partiality towards the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), by the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) (Express, 2008). Alden and Schoeman (2013) noted that Zimbabwe is perhaps the prime example of the conundrum that often faces the South Africa, especially when the issue at hand also tests its commitment to pan-Africanism and independence from traditional northern Great Powers. The historical ties between the ANC and other liberation movements in southern Africa have denied South Africa the opportunity to integrate and lead the sub-region on various occasions.

4.3.2.3. Low Level of Development in Southern African Economies

Under-development in the economies of southern Africa has also served as a critical hindrance to integrate the sub-region. There is a wide gap in the level of development between South Africa and its SADC/ SACU partners. According to Grobbelaar (2004), South Africa is regarded as an economic giant as compared to its African counterparts. With the GDP of about US$160 billion, which is eighty times larger than the GDP of an average African state, South Africa has not only dominated the economic realm of the continent in its bilateral trade, but has also expanded its relations into significant investments in the region (Grobbelaar, 2004:93). Thus, South Africa's economy contributes 19 per cent of total African economy, and almost two thirds of SADC'S GDP (South African Foundation, 2004:6).

The huge economic disparity between the SADC member states has compromised southern African regional integration in a number of ways. Thus, while regional integration requires critical economic compromises, such as regional trade liberalization from states involved, underdevelopment has undermined such efforts within the southern African context. Some of the intractable issues that resulted from the problem of economic imbalances are issues pertaining to the FTA. Although the FTA was officially launched in 2008, the economic integration zone has been impinged by many concerns among member states. The discrepancies revolve around the benefits and losses attached to the FTA. According to Moshoeshoe (2014), sensitive raw products such as sugar, wheat, textiles, and the most critical one, the government revenue, have been the center of the debate as far as the FTA is concerned. Thus, Moshoeshoe notes that these discrepancies around the FTA do not only hinder the process of regional economic integration in southern Africa, but they also reflect the lack of leadership.

The fact that the majority of southern African states rely on primary commodities, such as sugar, mineral resources, and agricultural products, for government revenue totally undermines any effort to integrate the sub-region as far as government income is concerned. Zodwa Mabuza of Swaziland's Employers and Chamber of Commerce expressed this view as follows: "Since 50% of our revenue comes from SACU revenue pool….if we want free trade we have to look at other sources of revenue" (Moshoeshoe, 2012:61-62). Thus, this is also the case in SACU where member states differ significantly as far as development is concerned. While South Africa views the customs union's CET as an industrial measure to protect its infants industries, the BLNS perceives it as a source of income. This sentiment was echoed by the South African Minster of Trade and Industry, Dr. Rob Davies, in his address to the parliament as follows: 'South Africa views tariffs (Common External Tariff) as a tool of industrial policy that would allow industrial development in the BLNS, while for the BLNS is a source of revenue" (Benjamin, 2013). Therefore, one can be of the view that southern African countries will require some form of developmental assistance, particularly with their government revenues, if economic integration is to be achieved. Thus, one would expect a country like South Africa to carry out this task as it is currently doing in SACU.

The obstacle of low level of economic development was also evident in the Maputo Development Corridors. The current six-hour closure has been reported to be creating traffic at the border and increasing transit times. According to the Chief Executive Officer of the Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI), Barbara Mommen, the port needs sustained freight volumes to make it viable and users need a one-day turnaround time to make it worth their while, especially considering that many users incur a double cost with their vehicles returning empty (Bowland and Otto, 2012). Addressing this challenge would make the corridor more viable as a whole by increasing trade volumes and incentivising the use of the Maputo port. Related to this are several operational constraints: although the one-stop border post has been implemented to a certain degree, constraints remain largely centred on each government's particular approach to the process of trade facilitation, and on security concerns. The unequal flow of trade within the corridor, with South African exports being 120 times that of Mozambican imports increases operational difficulties and logistics costs, particularly because these are significantly higher than transit times and costs in more developed countries (Bowland and Otto, 2012:3). To be more specific, transit times at the Durban port are much faster, thereby reducing the cost, and this means that some users will prefer to contend with the traffic in Durban than to use the Maputo port as it currently operates.

4.3.2.4.South Africa's Mercantilist Approach

South Africa is sub-Sahara's most industrialized country, and given these realities, South Africa has used its proven capabilities and multinational corporations to lead the revival of Africa's moribund economies and reserve the continent's marginalization in global affairs (Mulaudzi, 2009). Eager to exploit African markets, South African multinational retails companies, supported by the government, have played an increasingly significant role in promoting foreign direct investment in southern Africa and elsewhere in the continent (Mulaudzi, 2009). According to Games (2004), this incursion into African markets resonates and is also inspired by Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance initiative which has located South Africa's capital at the centre of regional integration and economic growth.

However, while South Africa has acted as an engine of development and growth in the southern African region, and lead the integration of the sub-region and the continent, concerns are being raised with regard to its policy of investments. Thus, South Africa's investments approach has been labelled as mercantilist by its SADC, Africa, counterparts. While the initial phase of South African investments was characterized by euphoria among the people of the sub-region, there is presently despondent in the retail sector in some SADC countries (Makgetlaneng, 2011). According to Makgetlaneng, their problem is that South African retail outlets operating in the sub-region do not have meaningful inter-linkages with local producers within the SADC countries, which they should have in order to contribute towards a meaningful regional integration. For instance, if one looks into the products of retail outlets such as Shoprite, Checkers, Woolworth and others, it has been argued that almost all products, including vegetables and meat, come from South Africa.

According to the Zimbabwean civil society, on an interview by Sehlare Makgetlaneng, South Africa is striving to shape the new southern Africa in a way that enhances its domination of the sub-region, and not giving other countries in the sub-region a room to develop and progress, specifically in the strategic area of industrial development (Makgetlaneng, 2011). This comes with reports of worker exploitation are commonplace with low wages, contract workers and poor working hours characterizing working conditions for locals employed by South African corporations, while key management positions are usually held by South Africans (Chidaushe Moreblessings, 2015). It is therefore not surprising that the South African retail store, Woolworths, has recently announced to focus more on sourcing goods from local SADC countries (News South Africa, 2017).

A more practical stance is the case study of Tanzania. In 2002 South African direct investments to Tanzania topped up to US$443 million, a country that before 1994 virtually had no trade links with South Africa. This increase was partly due to the fact that a number of major South African multinationals had established a base in Tanzania. These include

Amalgamated Banks of South Africa, cellular network provider Vodacom, South African Breweries, De Beers, the Protea Hotel Chain, Murray Roberts Construction Company and South African Airways, which in December 2002 acquired 49% of Air Tanzania Corporation (Nyirabu, 2004:29). The increased South African presence in Tanzania led the regional leading newspaper, The East African, to call this whole process *"the South Africanisation of the Tanzanian economy"* (Nyirabu, 2004:29).

4.3.2.5. South Africa's Domestic Challenge

South Africa's challenge to provide leadership at a regional and global level has also been compounded by the domestic outcry for a need to deal with issues at home. Domestically, the South Africa faces huge development challenges, such as high unemployment rate and poverty. Out of a population of over 50 million, only 12.7 million have jobs, with social welfare payments placing a heavy burden on the public finances (an estimated 13.8 million South Africans receive such payments, while only 5 million pay taxes) (Alden and Schoeman, 2013: 120). The country's shrinking tax base, under pressure from its unemployed masses who constitute the core voter support of the ruling party, may over time completely undermine the country's ability to pursue its ambitious foreign policy goals, even though these goals are, at least on paper, aligned with its domestic needs and interests (Alden and Schoeman, 2013:120).

In its *South African economic update* released on 20 July 2011, the World Bank pointed out South Africa's failure to attract sufficient investment to fuel growth of the economy to the level required to ensure sustainable economic development (6–7 per cent annually, as opposed to around 3 per cent for 2011), as one of the contributors to the economic shrink (World Bank, 2011). Thus, this failure is attributed to insufficient savings, rising risk perceptions, and structural impediments, such as poor transport infrastructure, and a continuing failure to integrate the country's 'two economies' (a highly industrialized and developed formal economy, and an underdeveloped, largely informal economy operating in the spatially separated black townships) (Alden and Schoeman, 2014). To these impediments the World Bank added the phenomenon of more contentious labour relations than found in other emerging markets, with South Africa's trade unions—of which the largest federation, COSATU, is a member of the governing tripartite alliance—simultaneously pushing for higher wages and putting pressure on the government not to succumb to calls for less stringent labour market regulation (Alden and Schoeman, 2013:122).

4.3. ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CAPACITY TO LEAD SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa's capacity to strengthen and drive regional integration in southern Africa goes beyond its economic structure. The dark political history between South Africa and the southern African located sub-region seems to have played a prominent role to the policy path that the ANC government has adopted towards the southern African region. Thus, this has found the country meddling through in order to achieve its anticipated objective. According to Mzukisi Qobo (2005), the old political tension between South Africa and southern Africa is assumed to have amounted to US$ 60 billion, and about one million deaths and millions of people displaced. Qobo (2005) further noted that the larger portion of these costs was shouldered by Angola and Mozambique, of which about 1.5 million people in these countries were displaced as refugees in other countries. Thus, after the 1994 political transition, South Africa was anticipated to play more of a compensatory, re-engagement and integrative role towards its sub-regional counterparts. In light of the aforementioned, South Africa's capacity to lead southern Africa was to be assessed in terms of its commitment to the above mentioned anticipated role in both SACU and SADC.

In SACU South Africa achieved the objective of its anticipated role by negotiating for a new SACU Agreement which contains fundamental internal structural changes. Most critical to these developments was the alteration of the revenue pool in favour of the BLNS. Under the new SACU agreement, the BLNS receives a lion's share of revenue, which also forms a major portion of their national government's income. For Lesotho and Swaziland, the revenue pool contributes up to half of their government revenue, while for Botswana and Namibia it makes up a quarter of their budgets. The SACU revenue pool has received so much criticism that it is currently considered as one of the stumbling blocks towards deeper integration in southern Africa, and a burden to South Africa. However, over the years South Africa has shown to be committed to the customs union by continually contributing to the revenue pool, thus, providing government stability to the BLNS countries. Situated on the borders and the heart of South Africa, the BLNS countries are a major part of South Africa, and therefore, whatever that happens in this countries becomes part and parcel of South Africa, as was illustrated by the 1998 Lesotho crisis.

To the South Africa government, SACU remains an integral part of South Africa's developmental strategy within the SADC framework. While it can be argued that the SADC structure poses limits to South Africa's anticipated objective, SACU has proven to be a more conducive forum for Pretoria to carry out the developmental mandate. To substantiate the ANC's position on SACU, the white paper on South Africa's foreign policy articulate the following, "South Africa will strongly support the transformation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) into a vehicle for advancing and deepening developmental integration, particularly as an anchor in SADC regional project. This transformation can only be achieved through the development of common trade and industrial policies, as well as strategies to build production value chains across all member states, underpinned by regional infrastructure development programmes" (White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, 2011:22-23). However, the question arises as to how South Africa intends to achieve such transformation since SADC has also set out an objective to become a customs union. Thus, it is under such circumstances that South Africa's capacity to lead the sub-region is bound to be tested. But it must be argued that SADC members are not yet in a point in which they can develop a common trade and industrial policy. The difficulty of SADC members to reach an agreement when negotiating for the SADC FTA substantiates this position. Therefore, SACU, unlike SADC, has proven to be a functional sub-entity that South Africa can focus on, however, as anchor of SADC, to strengthen economic integration in southern Africa.

In terms of the SADC grouping, ANC's decision to join the SADC grouping was seen as a positive step towards South Africa's anticipated objective, given the proven capacity of its economy and stated commitment towards strengthening southern African regional integration. Thus, instead of proceeding with the hegemonic policy of the apartheid regime, South Africa opted to be a developmental partner to the sub-region. This position is best articulated in the DIRCO policy paper as follows: "Our approach to regional integration continues to be informed by the fact that South Africa's destiny remains inextricably linked to the SADC region and the entire African continent. We are committed to supporting regional and continental integration programmes. Our foreign policy framework in relation to our engagements at the continental and regional levels still remain premised on the twin pillars of promoting peace, security, and stability; whilst advancing a regional development agenda"(DIRCO Annual Report 2009-2010). In this regard, South Africa deemed it important to contribute and rehabilitate important strategic southern African developmental facilities that have been ruined by its predecessor. It is, therefore, for this reason that South Africa has been highly involved in projects such as the MDC, and sought to forge close bilateral relations with Angola, a country that the democratic South Africa initially did not have close bilateral relations due to its assumed violation of human rights.

However, it is not that South Africa’s developmental policy position in southern Africa has not been met with criticisms. One posture of criticism has argued that South Africa’s involvement in projects such the MDC will divert its focus away from fundamental sub-regional issues of integration and concentrate more on its relationship with Mozambique (Mulaudzi, 2009). Nevertheless, this study backs to differ with such assumptions, thus advancing the viewpoint that South Africa’s participation and contribution to the MDC project taps into its anticipated role of fostering development and integration in southern Africa. Mozambique, as articulated above, is one of the countries that have suffered a great loss in the hands of the apartheid government, and therefore, projects such as the MDC reflects a step forward towards developing and consolidating the sub-region that was previously ripped apart by old tensions.

On the side of Angola, the South African government has been criticized of projecting its commercial interests of oil over its promotion of human rights and democracy in Africa. However, this view is myopic of three things. First, oil is a pivotal commodity for the South African economy to keep up with its pace as a dominant state in the sub-region. Second, strong bilateral relations between South Africa and Angola means that Pretoria will not have to source oil outside of the sub-region, thus, strengthening intra-regional trade and development among SADC countries. Third, South Africa's promotion of the western norms such democracy and human rights has been one area that has reflected the country as irrelevant in African issues, and therefore, reducing the scope of its anticipated objective of strengthening regional integration in the southern Africa. Therefore, although this might seems to be another means of advancing South Africa's national interests across its national borders, this study is of the view that these relations are part and parcel of its developmental strategy in the sub-region.

The southern African region has been plagued with conflicts for decades. Thus, Conflicts have exhausted the sub-region extensively as far as its development. It for this reason that the democratic South African government saw it as important to promote peace and security in order to achieve its developmental objective in a stable environment. Thus, South Africa has been very active in the formation of the ASF structures, particularly the SADCBRIG, which, according to the plan, should provide the AU with immediate reaction capability in terms of peacekeeping. As noted by Mandrup (2009), cooperation and contribution in the SADCBRIG may seem to be a joint SADC effort, whereas South Africa is the main provider. However, this is not unique, as this has been seen in international organizations, where bigger states contribute more. It is, therefore, for this reason, that South Africa has been largely involved in SADC peacekeeping missions, such the case of Lesotho in 1998, and recently in 2014. Thus, for South Africa, peace and stability are significant for socio-economic development to be achieved in southern Africa.

However, South Africa's capacity to lead southern Africa has been met with challenges, as outlined above. These challenges revolve around South Africa strategy of inconsistency in policy towards Africa and other limitations which were outlined above. However, regardless of the aforementioned, this section holds that South Africa has the capability to lead and strengthen regional integration in southern Africa. This is based on the premise that South Africa has been making considerable strides towards re-engaging with its sub-regional counterparts. This can be reflected by its bilateral co-operation agreements with SADC members, which this study argues to be important as it also serves as a way to build mutual trust between states.

4.4. CONCLUSION

South Africa has proven capabilities to strengthen and drive southern African regional integration. However, while South Africa has been very careful on how it cooperates with its sub-regional counterparts, particularly but not only, due to its historical legacy of apartheid, several other factors have proven to be constraints and limitations to South Africa’s capacity to achieve the objective of driving integration in southern Africa. As outlined above, this includes the underdevelopment of SADC economies, with South Africa being the most industrialized; South Africa’s strife to be relevant in African affairs; South Africa’s policy of investment, which protects South African multinational companies, while manipulating hosts’ commercial markets without developing them; and South Africa’s own domestic problems.

CHAPTER 5

5.1. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The main objective of this study was to examine South Africa's real capacity to lead, drive, and strengthen regional integration in southern Africa. The study sought to achieve this by exploring the position of South Africa in southern Africa in the past and present era; examining South Africa's post 1994 integration objectives and official policy towards SACU and SADC; identifying advantages and also challenges of implementing both SACU and SADC policies; providing a comprehensive explanation of why South Africa choose a neutral approach, instead of using any of the two policies; and by assessing South Africa's ability to meaningfully lead integration in southern Africa. In order to examine South Africa's capacity to lead integration in southern Africa, the study began by tracing the evolution of integration and leadership in southern Africa. The historical evolution of southern African integration has served as a conduit to better understand the current framework of regional integration and the call for the democratic South Africa to drive regional integration in southern Africa.

Regional integration in southern Africa can be traced back to the formation of SACU by the South African colonial government in the 1890s. SACU was established in response to the discovery of the mining industry in South Africa, and therefore, the customs union incorporated Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho for labour reserve in the mining sector. When the apartheid government came into power in South Africa, the National Party adopted the customs union as a tool to expand its hegemonic ambitions in southern Africa. However, South Africa's objective did not materialize due to the high resistance of the apartheid system and colonial rule in the sub-region. Thus, it is along this political incompatibility between South Africa and the African states in the sub-region that the southern African regional integration framework was fashioned. It was therefore under conditions such as this that the FLS was formed. The FLS was succeeded by SADCC, the brainchild of the FLS that was established to be an economic pillar for the newly independent states of southern Africa. Thus, SADCC was meant to isolate South Africa economically and politically. However, although SADCC was successful in isolating South Africa politically, these realities could not be matched with the economic success. Thus, SADCC members remained heavily dependent on South Africa for their trade and other economic facilities. This reality did not only help us to understand the dominance of South Africa in the sub-region, but also its importance to the regional integration of southern Africa.

In response to the historical trace of integration and leadership in southern Africa, the study adopted the Theory of Hegemonic Stability as the key theoretical concept. The theory deepened our understanding of South Africa's capacity to lead regional integration in southern Africa. According to the Theory Hegemonic Stability, a leader must be able to bring stability and provide public goods in an international regime. Thus, matching the criterion of the theory with the nature of regional integration in southern Africa, the study found that South Africa fits the description of a hegemonic leader in accordance with the Theory of Hegemonic Stability. Thus, this includes amongst others, South Africa's economic size and its importance in the integration of southern Africa, and the extent in which it has always used its economic might to impact the sub-region.

In light of the above, the study adopted integration and leadership as key concepts of the study. Integration and leadership were conceptualized with reference to the study, thus, breaking down key components of the concepts with reference to the objective of the study. As a result, the study found out that South African regional integration has been motivated by both economic and political occasions. For instance, SACU was formed on economic motives of the South African colonial government. Thus, the incorporation of the BLNS was seen as a strategic political move to secure labour reserves for the South African mining industry. On the other side, the FLS was established as a political merger among newly independent southern African states to fight against the oppressive tendencies of South Africa in the sub-region. However, the FLS was eventually transformed into SADCC, an economic pillar for FLS states meant to reduce the economic dependence of its member states on the apartheid South Africa. As outlined above, SADCC was successful in isolating South Africa politically, but these realities could not be matched with the economic successes between South African and SADCC member states. These realities convinced us about South Africa’s importance in the sub-region. Thus, South Africa possesses qualities of leadership in the sub-region as stipulated by the Theory of Hegemonic Stability

In the post-1994 era, South Africa contributed to the fresh start of regional integration in southern Africa through its accession into SADC and inheriting SACU. However, South Africa's move was in contrast to the anticipated southern African regional integration framework in the post-1994 era. Thus, Pretoria was anticipated that it would use its proven economic capabilities to strengthen regional integration through SACU or SADC. Instead, South Africa chose a policy to strengthen southern African regional integration using both SADC and SACU. This regional policy choice was the ANC's government initiative that was meant to re-engage with the southern African region at large. Thus, South Africa proved its capability to lead the southern African regional integration through its contribution in SADC regional integration initiatives such as the Maputo Development Corridor, the SAPP; participation in the SADC FTA; contribution on SADC peacekeeping; and forging new bilateral relations with SADC members such as Angola. In SACU, when the ANC government came into South Africa sought for new institutional reforms which would promote democracy within the customs union. This was achieved by renegotiating the 1969 SACU Agreement to the new 2002 Agreement which emphasized the establishment of SACU institutions, including the secretariat; the reform of the revenue pool in favour of the BLNS; and a further strengthening of financial interdependency between member states.

However, South Africa's capability to lead and strengthen southern African regional integration was met with challenges. The latter were significantly influenced by the strategy that the ANC government adopted in its regional relations with Africa and southern Africa. South Africa's strategy was particularly reflected in its foreign policy positions from when Mandela was in power to the tenure of Zuma. A close assessment of the evolution of South Africa’s policy towards Africa in the post-1994 suggests inconsistency in the policy. For instance, when the ANC came into power South Africa emerged as a promoter of human rights and democracy. As a result, South Africa did not enjoy close relations with its African counterparts, as some of them were considered to be violators of human rights and undemocratic. When Mbeki came into power he managed to switch the situation around and promote a multilateral approach in its regional policy. Thus, Mbeki sought for collectivism as far as the South African foreign policy towards Africa was concerned. However, Mbeki’s policy still emphasized democracy and the promotion of human rights, although it downplayed them. This strategy was adopted in order to appease African states, as well as the international community. When Zuma came into power the promotion of democracy and human rights were still at the core of South Africa’s policy. However, unlike the Mbeki and Mandela administrations, Zuma has sought to forge bilateral relations with more African states, even the ones which were considered to be undemocratic by previous the ANC administrations, for commercial purposes.

South African foreign policy’s inconsistency has set opportunities and limitations over its anticipated role of leading and strengthening regional integration in southern Africa. The opportunities include South Africa’s global integration, South Africa’s access to SADC and SACU markets, the Mbeki’s developmental strategy agency, the African Renaissance Fund.

However, limitations include South Africa’s relevance to Africa, ANC’s historical ties with the sub-region, low level of development in southern African economies, South Africa’s mercantilist approach, and South Africa’s domestic challenges.

An analysis of this study led us to understand that South Africa has the capacity to lead, drive and strengthen integration in southern Africa. However, it is important that South Africa takes into account that leading the southern African sub-region will not only require its economic capabilities, but also a better strategy to re-engage with its southern African counterparts more satisfactorily politically, economically and socially. This will enhance its capacity to strengthen its leadership role in southern Africa, as well as to strengthen its position as a natural leader in the sub-region. However, this is a task that will require commitment and support from other southern Africa member states, because South Africa’s prosperity, as a natural leader in southern Africa, is directly linked to the success of the sub-region. Maybe such commitment could start with SACU countries which have achieved deeper integration with South African, and then proceed to SADC.

In response to the debate about the best sub-regional entity which serves the best interests of South Africa to strengthen regional integration in southern Africa, this study considers both SADC and SACU as effective sub-regional entities. This position is in line with the ANC government's position, and for this study, it has been motivated by two factors. First, South Africa and SADC, non-SACU, members are still in the process of forging a close alliance with one another and building mutual trust amongst members. It is therefore for this reason that integration in SADC is most likely to be evaluated from a bilateral assessment point of view. SACU, on the other hand, is functional and has achieved some form of deeper regional integration. However, SACU's integration has to move beyond its current form of revenue sharing and distribution order to accommodate other SADC.

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