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BEYOND THE PALE: HISTORY, MOBILITY, & THE FOREIGNER IN THE POLITICS OF XENOPHOBIA AT THE BRITISH CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, C. 1800-1850

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.



Patrick O'Halloran
24 November 2019

Abstract

This dissertation historicizes the politicization of "the foreigner" in one corner of the British empire in the early nineteenth century. Through an approach that uses the colonists' archive to position British colonization of the Cape of Good Hope within broader histories of empire and exclusion, the dissertation examines the local political contexts in which categories of "foreigner" emerged, and the ways in which they were explained. The dissertation is simultaneously a reconsideration of Cape colonial history through the question of xenophobia and an elaboration of a historical method that recovers and theorizes local appropriations of political categories and concepts from a wider historical world. Importantly, this research analyzes historical modes, meanings, and mobilizations of xenophobia, rather than treating history as a determinant of politics in the present. Its contributions are local, with respect to the colony's exclusionary political discourses and movements, and "global," with regard to both the emerging historical connections and the method of inquiry into colonial archives.

Historiography of the British Cape Colony in southern Africa has largely been concerned with the development of colonial society and the processes through which white minority conquest and rule were established in South Africa. This dissertation approaches Cape history and the colonial archive differently, through considering the politicization of the figure of "the foreigner" in the Cape Colony, from c. 1800 to 1850. Specifically, it addresses modes of xenophobia: the politicization of "the foreigner" as threatening. No studies have focused directly on constructions of foreignness or modes of xenophobia in the Cape Colony. Nonetheless, different categories of "foreigner" as threatening or subversive were important to political discourses and movements in the Cape Colony. In brief, three intersecting political developments during this period of Cape history generated forms of xenophobia. First is the relationship between perceptions of foreignness and the politics of the colonial "frontier." Second is the issue of mobility captured in the twin problems of "vagabondism" and "vagrancy." Third is the opposition organized by colonists at the Cape around "convictism," or the transportation of British convicted felons to the colony.

This study of the politics of difference-making in a colonial context integrates but also complicates histories of race, racism, and colonial social relations. We find that mobility and perceived political difference often marked "the foreigner," in unstable relation to racial and ethnic categories. The threat of "the foreigner" was articulated through "improper connections" to "outside" or "foreign" sites or forms of political power, whether independent African or creole polities, mobile persons, or even missionary societies and the imperial government. Importantly, colonial discourses drew on broader patterns of knowledge—imperial, colonial, British, global—that shaped how foreignness was rationalized and politicized in the colony. These frames of reference looked to histories and concepts from Ireland, the West Indies, and England in the making of local politics. They appropriated and adapted concepts like "the Pale," "the Maroon," and "the Vagrant" to explain boundaries of difference, the manufacture of autonomy, and dangerous forms of mobility, respectively. Therefore, the dissertation contributes not only to our historical understanding of the Cape Colony, but also speaks to the broader subjective worlds in which settler politics were fomented and explained. The research posits methods for historicizing xenophobia in relation to these complex contexts, as well as for engaging with the political-subjective knowledge that animated historical worlds. It forms a starting point for more extensive study of politicizations of "the foreigner" in the Anglo-Atlantic world.

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Table of Contents

Declaration (i)

Abstract (ii)

Acknowledgements (iii)

Introduction: Asking Historical Questions of Xenophobia (1)

2. The Foreigner and History: Elements of a Historical Theory of Xenophobia (28)

3. Reading Politics in the Archive (65)

4. Political and Historical Frames of Reference: The Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant (81)

5. The Fish River Marches: Boundaries of Difference in the Politics of the Frontier (117)

6. 'Improper Connections': Vagabonds at the Cape of Good Hope (153)

7. 'The Evils of Vagrancy': Fluidity, Control, & the Foreigner (180)

8. Mobilising Xenophobia: Emigrants, Convicts, and Repealers (214)

Conclusion: Historical Context and the Dialectic of the 'Foreign' and the 'Foreigner' (252)

References (270)

BEYOND THE PALE: HISTORY, MOBILITY, AND THE FOREIGNER IN THE POLITICS OF XENOPHOBIA AT THE BRITISH CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, C. 1800–1850

'Empire has created the time of history…. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history.' – J. M. Coetzee[1]

'What cannot be measured has had some very measurable material consequences.' – E. P. Thompson[2]

'I observed that once in every generation, without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians.' – J. M. Coetzee[3]

'Immigration is known to be a great hope of the Colony. But the immigration must be free from the suspicion, even, of impurity and pollution.' – The Cape Town Mail[4]

"After all, what really lies behind what we can see?" – Achille Mbembe[5]

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[1] J. M. Coetzee. *Waiting for the Barbarians* (New York: Penguin, 1982), p. 133.
[2] E. P. Thompson. *The Poverty of Theory: Or an Orrery of Errors* (London: Merlin Press, [1978] 1995), p. 236.
[3] Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians*, p. 8.
[4] *The Cape Town Mail and Mirror of Court and Council,* IX (444), 25 August 1849.
[5] Achille Mbembe. 'The Great Riddance'. *The Mail and Guardian*, 22 June 2018. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-22-00-the-great-riddance/ [accessed 22 January 2020].

INTRODUCTION:
ASKING HISTORICAL QUESTIONS OF XENOPHOBIA

POLITICISING THE 'FOREIGNER' AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

In 1843, at a public meeting at Fort Beaufort, in the eastern reaches of Britain's southern African colony of the Cape of Good Hope, settler farmers gathered 'to petition our gracious Queen for the adoption of some sane system of Government on our frontier'. There, John Mitford Bowker related the troubles of the settler population from a xenophobe's vantage point. This son of an English farmer who emigrated to the Cape asked if the settlers,

> can or will look upon murders, daringly and cruelly committed by Kafirs[1] [*sic*] within our colony, in the same light that we view murders committed by colonists upon colonists? Are murders in England committed by Frenchmen and Spaniards? I grant we would quietly submit, and leave the law to deal with any deeds of violence committed by colonists within the colony, but this is quite another matter. We have quite enough of theft, vagabondism, &c., within reach of the laws, without being exposed to this wholesale murder and plunder of such a ruthless set of savages as the K—s. Our Government ought to be such as to make the K—r tremble at the bare idea of entering its limits for the purposes of murder and spoliation.[2]

Even while operating within a racist idiom, Bowker associated the real, fabricated, or exaggerated violence committed by Africans, and the appropriate colonial response to that violence, with the foreignness of the perpetrators. It was the understanding of Africans as 'foreigners' in the colony that underpinned his argument for a crackdown on violent crime: almost a Victorian edition of the twenty-first-century pronouncements of President Trump of the United States on the criminality of border-crossing Mexicans. Bowker did not make the claim that crime itself was foreign, but that crime committed by foreigners was of a worse variety.

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[1] Hereafter 'K—r(s)'. The most appropriate route is to replace offensive words from archival sources with non-racialised, accurate language, e.g. '[amaXhosa]', or '[African]' where general terms are called for. However, this conceals an important aspect of colonial discourses of 'Othering' or defining difference. That these words are historically and politically significant and can convey important information does not excuse their bigotry. I will not repeat them endlessly, as citing the colonial sources would require, so I have chosen to proceed with the suitably Victorian 'K—r'. It is a thin guise, but reminds us of both the white supremacy and the other forms of collective 'Othering' being written into these colonial texts. (See Chapter 3 for discussion.)

[2] John Mitford Bowker. *Speeches, Letters & Selections from Important Papers of the late John Mitford Bowker, Some Years Resident and Diplomatic Agent with Certain Kafir and Fingo Tribes* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1962), p. 113.

John Bowker proposed a 'sane system of government' through the language of xenophobia—intimating that he found the existing system insane—but he was well within the logic of governance at the Cape of Good Hope. In 1806, when a British administration was taking over the colony from its short-lived Batavian government, the new Governor, Sir David Baird, had issued a proclamation that sought to 'prevent the evils that must arise from an improper introduction of Strangers into this Colony'. The proclamation required the registration of foreigners, made it illegal for ships' masters to leave passengers behind, and required the carrying of passes by visitors in the colony.[3] In both the public meeting and from the executive seat of colonial governance, nearly forty years apart, we see 'foreigners' represented as threatening to organising social principles; as figures associated with 'insanity' and 'evil'.

The historical and geographical centre of this investigation of histories of politicised foreignness is the British Cape Colony in the first half of the nineteenth century. I address the constructions of 'the foreign' that emerged in that context, in relation to themes of human mobility and migration, and politics of difference. The first premise of this study is that foreignness was politicised, and xenophobia thought and practiced, in the Cape Colony during those decades. Baird and Bowker serve as fitting illustrations, but scholarly work has not broached the question of xenophobic politics in Cape colonial history. The nearest examples, Rachel Bright's *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-1910* and Alan Hattersley's *The Convict Crisis*, do not consider the question of the 'foreign', its construction as a threat, or politics in which it emerged. Bright is concerned with the evolution of race and empire, while Hattersley theorises a stage in the development of representative government in the colony.[4] Furthermore, generally speaking, twentieth-century scholarship about the European colony at the Cape of Good Hope, from W. MacMillan's *Bantu, Boer, and Briton*, originally published in 1929, to later contributions such as Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee's *The Shaping of South African Society* (published in two editions in 1979 and 1989) or Clifton Crais's *Making of the Colonial Order*, were oriented towards understanding how a white minority came to dominate in South Africa. Martin Legassick's *The Struggle for the Eastern Cape*, focused, according to

[3] 'Proclamation by Sir David Baird', 25 February 1806. In George McCall Theal, *Records of the Cape Colony, Volume V* (Cape Town: William Clowes and Sons, 1899), p. 354.
[4] Rachel K. Bright. *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Alan F. Hattersley. *The Convict Crisis and the Growth of Unity* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1965).

its subtitle, on *Subjugation and the Roots of South African Democracy*.[5] These works focus to varying degrees on the shaping of race and racism, or class, labour, and modes of production, all with twentieth-century South Africa's apartheid experience in mind (or, for Legassick, the end of apartheid). An at times gentle critique of apartheid was made through the re-visiting of colonial histories and challenging them on theoretical as well as empirical bases.

This was an important research agenda, but I am asking different sorts of questions. Rather than look at the Cape Colony from the vantage point of the apartheid or post-apartheid worlds, and how those later worlds were produced, I see it as a world that is looking around at itself. This is a history of how certain people—mainly English and Scottish subjects of the British Empire—thought and acted for their time and place, with regard to how they understood and politicised 'foreignness'. Many of the familiar themes of the historiography of colony and empire—race, land, and labour prominently among them—appear here; but rendered through the question of colonial constructions of foreignness and the foreigner as threat, they wear different guises. I am not suggesting that xenophobia was the most important facet of an historical epoch. I am observing that it existed, and that it is worthy of study.

The chapters that follow present further substantiations of the claim that xenophobia was part and parcel of the Cape Colony's political landscape. More importantly, they examine how this xenophobia worked, in what political contexts it emerged, and the ways in which it was explained. In brief, three intersecting historical-political developments during this period of Cape history generated forms of xenophobia. First is the relationship between perceptions of foreignness and the politics of the colonial 'frontier'. Second is the issue of mobility captured in the twin problems of 'vagabondism' and 'vagrancy'. Third is the unrest organised by colonists at the Cape around 'convictism', or the transportation of British convicted felons to the colony. Bowker addressed each of these—the frontier, 'vagabondism', and notions of criminality—in his speech in 1843. We will see how, in the colonial archive, these three problems were repeatedly linked in political discourses, creating and expressing patterns through which the foreign was understood.

This study thinks historically about xenophobia, not by identifying its historical origins, but rather historical modes, meanings, and mobilisations. It challenges the use of history to

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[5] W. M. MacMillan. *Bantu, Boer, and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1929] 1963); Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee (eds.). *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, [1979] 1989); Clifton C. Crais. *The Making of the Colonial Order: White Supremacy and Black Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Martin Legassick. *The Struggle for the Eastern Cape: 1800-1854* (Johannesburg: KMM Review, 2010).

explain xenophobia as a 'natural' consequence of a historical trajectory. It allows xenophobia to have meaning beyond national and nationalist contexts. Drawing on French anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus's notion of subjective, unique 'historical modes of politics', I theorise xenophobia as a historically-located, political-subjective mobilisation of the 'foreigner' as threatening to a social order, based on the foreigner's perceived non-belonging. This comprises particular, but fluid, modes of 'Othering'. One thing we will see quite plainly in looking at the frontier, vagrancy, and anti-convictism in the Cape colonial archive is that the politics of xenophobia was diffuse; different 'xenophobias' are evident. Xenophobia targeted different categories of people, employed different language and justifications, and stemmed from different practical and political motivations. Its theorists, subscribers, and practitioners did not always share the same social backgrounds, and they did not always share ideologies or goals. Xenophobia cropped up in the rural agricultural districts near Graham's Town and swelled in the port centre of Cape Town, amongst both sheep-farming capitalists and urban liberals. What these xenophobes did share, apart from their whiteness, was the consciousness of some brand of 'foreigner' as threatening or subversive.

Historically, the 'foreigner' has had diverse meanings. This study explores that fact, and some of those meanings. At times, in the Cape Colony, the 'foreigner' was a free and mobile African, often associated with an independent African polity; sometimes, an unfree British or Irish convict. Mobility and perceived political difference often marked the 'foreigner', in unstable relation to racial and ethnic categories. State-originated programs of differentiation, exclusion, and control, such as bans on Africans entering the colony, combined with popular calls for vagrancy laws, ideas about who should or should not immigrate to the colony, of 'improper connexions' between categories of foreigners and indecently mobile persons, and the rejection of convicted (forced) migrants, were validated through idioms of the 'foreigner' as threat. These modes of xenophobia emerged in the context of a particular politics (e.g., 'of the frontier') or political movements (e.g., for vagrancy legislation; or 'anti-convictism'). This study of politics of difference-making in a colonial context integrates but also complicates histories of race, racism, and colonial social relations.

Alongside the 'foreigner', this history confronts patterns of mobility. Indeed, mobility becomes central to the construction of the foreigner as threatening in Cape colonial politics. This is arguably true of most modes of xenophobia, and of other forms of exclusion, but it was manifested in particular ways in the nineteenth-century Cape. Foreignness and the foreigner became ways that different forms of mobility were rationalised by colonists, and the basis for politics of exclusion. Hagar Kotef has argued that the 'liberal concept of freedom emerged in

tandem with other configurations of movement, wherein movement was constructed as a threat rather than an articulation of liberty'. She continues, 'movement (or hindrance) of other subjects has been configured differently. Colonized subjects who were declared to be nomads, poor who were seen as vagabond or thrown into vagrancy as they lost access to lands, [or] women' were often seen as 'unruly subjects whose movement is a problem to be managed'.[6] While I am not situating the problem of mobility within a certain political tradition, like liberalism, or problems of freedom or governance, Kotef's points are important ones. They link the problems of political subjectivation, processes of 'Othering', and mobility within the making of politics. Kotef addresses this directly: 'Through the production of patterns of movement…, different categories of subjectivity are produced. Regimes of movement are thus never simply a way to control, to regulate, or to incite movement. Regimes of movement are integral to the *formation of different modes of being*'.[7] I understand this to mean that the politicisation of mobility entails the creation of political difference rooted in forms of mobility as practiced by or imposed upon people. The management of unruly movement, thinking with Kotef, necessarily involves the making of difference in political terms. Mobility becomes one framework in which people are categorised. This categorisation does not only come from the state, but also from within political movements. Further, not only do politics of mobility involve the categorisation of others, including the 'foreigner', but they involve deploying subjective concepts and narratives that underpin the politics of categorisation. In the Cape Colony, not only are we dealing with movement and othering, but the subjective ways in which certain political movements rationalised mobility in 'Others'.

The challenge, of course, is in making historical sense of the thought and practice of how foreignness was politicised in the early nineteenth-century Cape Colony. Although I argue that forms of xenophobia are important in that history, I do not make a case that they had specific formative influences in 'South African' history or in 'colonial' history understood as normative frameworks. This is not a national history, as I make plain in later chapters. Nor do I believe that our definitions of colonialism must be reordered to include xenophobia, or that there is something inherently 'colonial' about xenophobia. Above all, I am not arguing that xenophobia originated in the Cape Colony after 1800, or that it determined histories that followed. Historical import does not only revolve around the facilitation of change or the march towards the present. The historical import of xenophobia at the Cape was local, specific, and political;

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[6] Hagar Kotef. *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), pp. 4-5.
[7] Ibid, p. 15; emphasis original.

and I am invested in its localness, specificity, and the politics it expressed. This is a history of how the political construction of the foreigner as a threat influenced the making of politics in the history of the first half-century of British colonialism at the Cape of Good Hope. Throughout, I am concerned with the political meanings attached to the figure of the foreigner, with how to interpret these, and what they tell us about xenophobia as modes of politics. The questions began forming in the midst of twenty-first-century xenophobia.

HISTORICISING XENOPHOBIA

In a hollow in the hills, thirty miles west of the sinuous Great Fish River in South Africa's Eastern Cape Province, slumps the depressed university town known, until recently, as Grahamstown.[8] Mouse-brown veld surrounds the straggling rural outpost, growing in the shadow of the bright buildings of Rhodes University in the west and against the wood and sheet-metal walls of shacks in the east. Events in Grahamstown provoked this inquiry; and Graham's Town also emerges as an important site of archive and analysis. In its infancy, after 1811, Graham's Town was the headquarters of its namesake, Colonel John Graham, campaigning to 'clear' the rich, surrounding lands of the indigenous Xhosa people; in its youth, in the 1820s, the town was the hub of English settlement in southern Africa; in its prime it was the second largest urban area in the Cape Colony, after Cape Town, a distinction eclipsed in the 1860s. In the twenty-first century, the moribund town struggles with extreme unemployment, housing shortages, corruption, perpetual issues of water supply, and xenophobia.

On 21 October, 2015, Grahamstown was in turmoil. While police monitored a peaceful student march in the western streets of the town, a protest by local taxi associations occupied the square in front of City Hall. Failing to get an audience with the mayor, the taxi protest turned ugly. Acting on several weeks of rumours about gory crimes allegedly committed by 'foreigners', or else sometimes by an 'Arab' man, the taxi drivers spearheaded the looting of 'foreign'-owned shops, joined by many other residents of the town. Amid slogans proclaiming that the 'foreigners' 'must go', shops were emptied, down to the wires in their electrical boxes

[8] Grahamstown's name was officially changed to Makhanda in 2018. I retain the names Grahamstown or Graham's Town, throughout, for historical accuracy.

and the underwear in the lodgings out back. 'More than 70 people broke into my shop and took everything. They say we're cutting other people', said one man from Bangladesh.[9]

Since the mid-1990s, periodic xenophobic attacks in South Africa's urban areas have targeted different groups of people identified as 'foreign'. The largest and most violent episodes occurred in 2001, 2008, 2015, and 2019. The category of 'foreigners' has, in different times and places, encompassed people from various parts of Africa and Asia, often including Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia; but in Grahamstown it was largely Bangladeshi, Ethiopian, Somali, and Pakistani people whose businesses and homes were looted, although Nigerians, Congolese, Palestinians, and others too, were counted among them. For the first time, the targets were predominantly Muslim. Although many were immigrants, some had obtained South African citizenship, and most had South African family members. From that last week of October until late in November, many people, particularly male immigrants, were displaced, and congregated at a safer location outside of town; most women and children of the so-called 'foreign' families remained in town, where they often received threats and were subjected to abusive language. During the next month, many of these women were the most active in asserting their right to live in the town, and theirs or their husbands' right to be in South Africa. As in instances of xenophobic looting or violence elsewhere in South Africa, some local politicians, police, and businesspeople were implicated, directly and indirectly, in making xenophobic statements and in the looting itself.[10]

Throughout what can be properly called, in a place as small as Grahamstown, the crisis, I worked closely with a local grassroots organisation, the Unemployed People's Movement (UPM), and with the group of women whose families and businesses had been victimised, who dubbed themselves 'Voices of the Foreigners' Wives'.[11] UPM members had actively tried to stop the looting at more than one shop, while the attacks were going on. Afterwards, we worked to address the xenophobic crisis both politically and practically, through arranging for basic needs of displaced people, countering the xenophobic discourses at schools and City Hall, and pressuring the stalling municipality to act. In the end, most people moved back into their homes and shops, but the events of late 2015 left fundamental changes in perceptions about who 'belonged' in Grahamstown. Some migrants departed to other cities or countries. Almost five

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[9] Sanele Ntshingana and Paddy O'Halloran. 'Living Politics in Grahamstown'. *The Con*, 30 October 2015. Available at: http://www.theconmag.co.za/2015/10/30/living-politics-in-grahamstown/ [accessed 26 May 2019]

[10] See Paddy O'Halloran. 'Where Poverty Meets Xenophobia: Grahamstown, A City in Crisis'. *The Daily Maverick*, 27 October 2015. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-27-where-poverty-meets-xenophobia-grahamstown-a-city-in-crisis/ [accessed 1 March 2020].

[11] While this name was later changed to the more donor-palatable 'Voices of the Women of Africa', the original name captures more about the political moment in Grahamstown in October 2015.

years later, xenophobia, sometimes accompanied by looting or violence, persists in large and small urban areas in South Africa. As I write, recent events in Johannesburg and Pretoria indicate that foreigners remain 'legitimate' targets of violence and discrimination.[12]

At the time of the looting in Grahamstown, I was undertaking Master's research that involved historical investigation of the processes by which 'urban' and 'rural' came to be seen as distinct spheres of politics in the Grahamstown region. In light of this research, the xenophobic attacks raised questions for me about how to think historically about xenophobia. Parallels with exclusionary politics of the past were clear, but the fact that many people challenged xenophobia in 2015 (and challenge it today) belies any suppositions that xenophobia is the automatic consequence of a certain historical trajectory.

I worked with some preliminary ideas. It was possible to view the fears of the white settler community in nineteenth-century Graham's Town or other parts of the Cape Colony through the lens of xenophobia. We have seen Bowker's speech, and Baird's proclamation, each targeting different groups of 'foreign' folk. What I noticed in 2015 were the numerous instances in which the settlers of Graham's Town in its youth and prime complained about Africans as 'foreigners' in the colony. There were important ways in which settlers linked this foreignness to the political, social, and economic life of Africans, from the fear of real or imagined connections to Africans beyond the frontier of white settlement to criminalisation of the brewing of sorghum beer as unacceptably 'African'. As I argued, shortly after the looting in 2015:

> Citizenship was closely guarded through spatial and racial control and imbued in some cases with perceptions of urban and rural that mirrored the logic of xenophobia. A properly historicised account of xenophobia in South Africa that draws on such local examples would be valuable in analysing the politics of today…. In the daily experiences of xenophobic mobilisations in Grahamstown, [these] spatial politics…are manifested in the present…. Forms of politics at work historically were important to defining people through race, tribe, and citizenship in ways that were increasingly spatialised. The spatial exclusion of the past, which entrenched a certain form of citizenship, is among the political precursors of contemporary modes of exclusion. As seen in Grahamstown, these have local history, configuration, expression, and significance that provide opportunity for reflection on broader political contexts.[13]

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[12] Jan Borman. 'Xenophobic Heightens with Calling of "Mass Shutdown"'. *New Frame*, 2 September 2019. Available at: https://www.newframe.com/xenophobia-heightens-with-calling-of-mass-shutdown/ [accessed 4 March 2020].

[13] Paddy O'Halloran. 'Contested Space and Citizenship in Grahamstown, South Africa'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 53(1), 2018, pp. 7; 10-11.

Since writing, I have come to differ somewhat with myself. I too easily accepted that the conditions and the logic for xenophobia in 2015 were somehow provided in the trajectories of spatial and racial politics of exclusion of the nineteenth century: they were historical in the sense that some vague, century-and-a-half-long process had yielded, as might a chemical process, xenophobia in the present. I had produced an 'origin story' for post-apartheid xenophobia, and not a very persuasive one. By this historical method, I could just as soon have sought the roots of twenty-first century xenophobia in ancient Rome, or in ancient Cameroon. I was thinking within, according to the French anthropologist, Sylvain Lazarus, 'an age-old tradition that saw a given politics as bound up with a given history and a given history as bound up with a given politics'.[14] In my first effort to explain the xenophobic politics I witnessed in action in Grahamstown, I relied on simplistic conceptions of xenophobia, politics, and history that depended upon 'parallels' and (undefined) 'process'. While perhaps natural to notice such parallels, and assume such processes, it is not sufficient. Nevertheless, this is how history is treated in most analyses of contemporary xenophobia.

Despite an abundant literature on xenophobia in South Africa since 1995, no studies explore xenophobias of past 'South African' contexts (with the partial exception of Bright's and Hatterlsey's books). Sally Peberdy correctly observes that, in South Africa, 'Contemporary debates [on xenophobia] are, almost without exception, ahistorical'.[15] Several characteristics of the contemporary literature and discussion hamper historical study. First, the reliance on structural explanations for xenophobia de-historicises and depoliticises xenophobia. Xenophobia, some argue, is a consequence of global capitalism; or of apartheid; or of the organisation of global societies as nation-states.[16] Analytically worst, xenophobia is seen as a consequence of immigration, as seen in G. H. T. Hart.[17] Francis Nyamnjoh's excellent book, *Insiders & Outsiders*, perhaps best solidifies the angle on globalisation and the nation-state. He

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[14] Sylvain Lazarus. *Anthropology of the Name*. Translated by Gila Walker (Pennsylvania: Seagull, [1996] 2015), p. xxvi.
[15] Sally Peberdy. *Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa's Immigration Policies, 1910-2008* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2009), p. 15.
[16] Francis B. Nyamnjoh. *Insiders & Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2006); Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff. 'Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse and the Postcolonial State', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 27(3), 2001, pp. 627-651; Judith Hayem. 'From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic Violence and National Subjectivity in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39(1), 2013, pp. 77-97; Bronwyn Harris. 'Xenophobia: A New Pathology for a New South Africa?'. In D. Hook and G. Eagle (eds.). *Psychopathology and Social Prejudice* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2002), pp. 170-175; Leonce Rushubirwa, Nobuhle Ndimande-Hlongwa, and Nhlanhla Mkhize. 'Globalization, Migration, and Local Communities, One Adverse Upshot: A Case Review of Xenophobia in eThekwini Municipality, Durban, KZN, South Africa'. *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 30(1), 2015, pp. 97-120.
[17] G. H. T. Hart. 'The Illegal Alien Question in South Africa: Scope, Issues, and Policy'. *Geojournal* 39, 1996, pp. 27-31.

emphasises the paradox of 'the rhetoric of free flows and dissolving boundaries' and the 'intensifying reality of borders, divisions and violent strategies of exclusion', making key observations about the contemporary context, structured around freedom of capital and the control of labour, in which citizenship is closely linked to access to the labour market and the consumer market.[18] Of post-apartheid South Africa, he writes, 'the majority of nationals are yet to graduate into a meaningful citizenship', 'the competition for the lowest level jobs is keen', and 'aggressive' 'claims to belonging' are increasingly rooted in notions of authochthony. Nyamnjoh challenges the 'regime of citizenship provided by the coercive illusion of the "nation-state".'[19] While the work is excellent, it leaves one questioning how to understand xenophobia in a context where these same market forces and organisation of states are not available. There are, after all, a host of political realities that have not relied on nationality or the nation-state, where foreignness has been politicised as threat. Some of these are the basis of this research.

Second, history becomes one of these structural causes. Many scholars emphasise the historical rootedness of post-apartheid xenophobia—most often by locating the roots in apartheid—but rarely do they critically interrogate the connections they see between history and the present.[20] Loren Landau, like others, roots xenophobia in an 'extended history of South African statecraft', arguing that 'decades of discursive and institutional efforts to control political and physical space have generated two demons': 'an amorphously delimited group of outsiders that is inherently threatening' and the societal capacity for violence.[21] For Harris, to cite one more example, the 'historical factors' influencing post-apartheid xenophobia refer to continuities with apartheid law and 'a past characterised by violence and repression'. She ultimately labels xenophobia a 'contemporary form of violence', a conclusion which delimits it both historically and conceptually. Likewise, the South African Government's 'National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance' observes, 'The many years of a racist and isolationist policy of apartheid have planted seeds of xenophobia, particularly towards Africans, undoing centuries of brotherhood and sisterhood

[18] Nyamnjoh, *Insiders & Outsiders*, p. 1.
[19] Ibid, pp. 1; 228; 240.
[20] Alan Morris. '"Our Fellow Africans Make Our Lives Hell": The Lives of Congolese and Nigerians Living in Johannesburg'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(6), 1998, pp. 1116-1136; David Mario Matsinhe. 'Africa's Fear of Itself: The Ideology of *Makwerekwere* in South Africa'. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(2), 2011, pp. 295-313.
[21] Loren B. Landau. 'Introducing the Demons'. In Loren B. Landau (ed.). *Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence, and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa*. (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2011), p. 2.

among Africans in South Africa and those from other parts of the continent'.[22] When history remains uninterrogated, it becomes a structure that produces xenophobia. This is to say historical interpretation has most often been 'historicist', determined by history, when it comes to xenophobia. Neocosmos, also thinking through citizenship, nationalism, the post-colony, political identity, and political transition, writes that 'Existing explanations 'in terms of economic crisis, political transition, relative deprivation, or remnants of apartheid all contain a grain of truth but none are adequate in themselves; neither is a mere addition of these accounts sufficient'. He challenges the argument that globalisation accounts for xenophobia, because of a 'fundamentally false' conflation of 'popular interest [with] the "interests" of the market'.[23] We could say the same of the nation-state, or, indeed, of history.

Whether the cause is charged to global capitalism, an aspect of the alienation it engenders, the end of apartheid, the existence of nation-states, or global or African patterns of migration, it becomes difficult to think of xenophobia outside of these contexts. It prompts claims as nonsensical as 'you won't find xenophobia in South Africa before 1995', or that xenophobia is 'a post-apartheid concept'. I heard both of these, in the course of this project. (A pedant might reply that the word xenophobia was coined in 1909, and is thus comfortably a pre-apartheid concept.)[24] Such statements delimit histories of xenophobia. The end of apartheid, irrelevant to most histories, serves as a political *terminus post quem* for xenophobia, to use an archaeological term. To pursue the Latin, *a priori* definitions of xenophobia blend with a methodological nationalism; and of *a priori* definitions, there are plenty to go around. I have been told, for example, that xenophobia *is* the fear, justified or not, of 'foreigners' taking jobs or other benefits perceived to rightfully belong only to citizens; alternatively, xenophobia *is* a male fear of being sexually displaced by 'foreign' males; rather than jobs, it is women that are being 'stolen'. In the South African context, xenophobia is sometimes understood to *be* the activity of harming or looting 'foreigners'. Other times, assumptions about who perform xenophobia—black and poor people—betray a latent racism. In all cases, an observation about or a facet of (contemporary, South African) xenophobia becomes its full historical meaning. 'Xenophobia', too, has become a turf for staking out political positions and exercising disciplinary muscle. A

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[22] Republic of South Africa. 'National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance'. 2019. Available at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/national-action-plan.pdf [accessed 3 August 2019], p. 5.

[23] Michael Neocosmos. *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners': Explaining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), [2006] 2010), pp. 7; 105.

[24] 'Xenophobia'. *Oxford English Dictionary* [hereafter *OED*], 2nd Edition, Vol. XX (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 674.

comprehensive discussion of these debates is for another time; they do not affect the history of the Cape Colony. However, the point is this: just the passage from Bowker's speech should alert us to the fact that, even in the region that became South Africa, fear of the foreigner has not always meant the same thing, and it has been part of different politics, practiced by different people. That point is almost too obvious to require argument.

Still, a few of these South African studies have treated xenophobia historically. Generally, these remain historicist: imparting determinant qualities to history. Several scholars have stressed institutional and policy continuity between the apartheid and post-apartheid states, or even back to the Union of South Africa in 1910.[25] The thrust of these arguments is to show where the xenophobia we see around us today came from. Audie Klotz's *Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860-2010*, the most detailed example of this approach, highlights some of the problems. Klotz is correct to point out that although '*new* attention to black attitudes and *recent* attacks…implicitly suggests that xenophobia itself is novel', 'hostility to migrants is nothing new'. She mentions that 'as early as the 1890s, angry mobs periodically gathered at the port in Durban to protest the arrival of indentured Indian laborers' and mentions the example of the apartheid institutions of ethnic 'homelands'.[26] These are certainly examples of xenophobic mobilisation and institution in the history of South Africa. However, her further claims that 'the roots of contemporary xenophobia go back to the late 1800s' and that 'over time…the meanings of sovereignty, nationality, and citizenship become layered in ways that morph the old language of racial superiority into post-apartheid xenophobia' are problematic propositions.[27] Why the late 1800s; and if the late 1800s, why not the late 1700s? More significantly, how does 'morphing' occur, in historical terms?

The problem pervades Klotz's book. She writes, 'British prejudice initially focused on the Irish, but gradually dissolved with social integration, then picked up against Jamaicans from the 1950s, again dampened by their gradual integration; now controversies over South Asians'.[28] Again, how did she know when to begin studying British prejudices, and which ones are original? Presumably, the late 1800s date for South African xenophobia's roots relates to a

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[25] Sally Peberdy. 'Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South Africa'. *Africa Today* 48(3), 2001, pp. 15-32; Jonathan Klaaren. 'Citizenship, Xenophobic Violence, and Law's Dark Side'. In Landau, *Exorcising the Demons*, pp. 135-149; Darshan Vignewarasan. 'Taking out the Trash? A "Garbage Can" Model of Immigration Policing'. In Landau, *Exorcising the Demons*, pp. 150-171; Audie Klotz. *Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860-2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Audie Klotz. 'Borders and the Roots of Xenophobia in South Africa'. *South African Historical Journal* 68(2), 2016, pp. 180-194.
[26] Klotz, *Migration and National Identity*, p. 6; emphasis original.
[27] Ibid, pp. 10; 34.
[28] Ibid, p. 42.

specific form of state and specific relationships that states can have with policy formulation, with immigration, and with immigrants. But this, like any *a priori* definition of xenophobia, delimits it historically. Klotz also assumes nationality as the only index for foreignness: another way of saying what xenophobia is and when it can manifest. It parallels, if complicates, Harris's assertion that xenophobia 'is a central feature of nationalism'.[29]

Klotz's history employs a qualified form of 'path dependency', which takes into account the ways in which institutional reforms failed, arguing that these moments of potential reform and failure represent human agency that simply did not succeed in altering historical eventualities. Her focus is on immigration policy, and she provides a thorough account of citizenship and immigration debates in South Africa, compared with the other former British Dominions, particularly Canada and Australia. She uses immigration laws as the 'primary texts' to examine institution as process and institutional trajectories. 'Comparison', she argues, 'remedies [path dependency] weaknesses…. Canadian and Australian trajectories… demonstrate what some of the paths-not-taken in South Africa actually produced'. She documents the policies adopted in relation to the options not taken. 'South Africa', she states, 'is a surprisingly typical settler state'.[30] Klotz argues that, throughout her period of study, the absence of 'liberalizing coalitions', between 'rights advocates and proponents of the free market', 'allowed for the persistence of xenophobic attitudes and protectionist policies', into the present.[31] In other words, because even contested institutional trajectories have resulted in exclusionary immigration regimes, they are inevitable, at least in the absence of a 'rights-market coalition'. Elsewhere, Klotz traces the last century or so of drawing national borders in southern Africa, essentially making a similar argument: that present-day nationalisms (the cause of xenophobia) of southern Africa were manufactured in the process of implementing racist border policies of the twentieth-century South African state.[32]

Another relevant book-length study of xenophobia in South Africa is Hashi Kenneth Tafira's *Xenophobia in South Africa: A History*. Using critical race theory, Tafira argues that xenophobia is not xenophobia, but a form of 'black-on-black' racism, with its roots in colonial white supremacist violence beginning from 1488 when a Portuguese ship rounded the Cape of Good Hope, 'thereby inserting South Africa into colonial modernity'.[33] He enjoins us 'to consider the country's history of white supremacy, colonialism and virulent white anti-black

[29] Harris, 'A New Pathology?', pp. 177; 179-180.
[30] Klotz, *Migration and National Identity*, pp. 14; 18; 271.
[31] Ibid, pp. 8; 11; 171; 223; 229.
[32] Klotz, 'Borders'.
[33] Hashi Kenneth Tafira. *Xenophobia in South Africa: A History* (Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018), p. 37.

racism and how a colonised self-hating xenophobe was produced'. Colonialism, he writes, 'implies that the coloniser implants his ideas, values, thoughts, ideologies and moral bankruptcy on the mind of the vanquished…. Thus self-hatred implies allowing oneself to be brainwashed into hating oneself and all who look like them'. His point is that 'Xenophobia is a colonial construct and a derivative of white supremacy'.[34]

Several aspects of Tafira's book are valuable, around the daily interactions in which foreignness is made and given meaning in twenty-first-century South Africa.[35] However, it fails as a historical analysis. Firstly, while Tafira's argument that xenophobia is racism, not xenophobia, is provocative, it does not sit well when we are dealing with a politics in which constructions of foreignness, even when racialised, are what galvanise political mobilisations, rather than black skin. In these cases, 'Other', rather than 'self', is the source, maybe not of 'hate', but of political discourses of threat and non-belonging. Secondly, theory, rather than historical activity, interaction, and ideas, seems to provide the 1488 roots of xenophobia. Something more concrete than a passing ship and the advent of a (much contested for four hundred years) 'modernity' would be required to choose that date. Much more importantly, though, Tafira's 'history' does not move beyond saying the usual: there was a history in South Africa of exclusion, racism, 'Othering', etc., which causes xenophobia, now. However deeply theorised it is, Tafira's work does not ask us to use history any differently than the rest of the literature. Lastly, Tafira employs today's tropes in very different historical contexts: for example, how, as a result of colonial policy, 'the African ceased to be a national in his [*sic*] own country'.[36] We have to be able to acknowledge the historical differences—and the importance of those differences—in how foreignness was understood in dissimilar contexts. Neither Africans nor their colonial oppressors would have likely used the word 'national' to describe a member or non-member of the community. This is not only a lexical issue, because the idea 'national' conveys an array of political and normative meaning that, for much of the long and changing colonial period in South Africa (Tafira does not make clear specifically when he is talking about in 'colonialism') were not how xenophobia was thought or put into practice. This is a tell of the *a priori* problem, combined with an overly-theorised and not rigorous use of history. Tafira illustrates the endpoint of the inclination to notice parallels and then assume direct links to the present, which I pointed out with regard to Grahamstown.

[34] Ibid, pp. ix-x; 35-39
[35] Ibid, pp. 76-78.
[36] Ibid, p. 6.

I offer these critiques in order to show why a xenophobia that treats history differently is necessary. Klotz documents well the legislative track of discrimination against immigrants in the British settler colonies; the ethnographic facets of Tafira's research have revealed important daily interactions in which foreignness is made and given meaning in twenty-first-century South Africa. I also do not wish to claim outright that, in certain ways, racism, white supremacy, nationalism, borders, or policy continuities have not influenced contemporary xenophobia. Perhaps, and likely, they have. Yet, what I do wish to argue is that in neither Klotz's nor Tafira's work do we learn anything about xenophobia. The underlying assumption in such uses of history is that roots of xenophobia are there (or then) to be found. 'Historical factors', whatever they are, round out an array of sociological stimuli: the usual checklist of the social, political, and economic, *plus historical*. I am convinced of the truth in the words of the historian, Marc Bloch: 'In any study, seeking the origins of human activity, there lurks the…danger of confusing ancestry with explanation'.[37] I am convinced, because I took steps down this avenue when I began to recognise parallels between historical and contemporary events in Grahamstown. A historical narrative could be crafted between, say, 1820 and 2015, but I do not think that it should be. Continuities exist, as I have argued elsewhere and as Tafira argues at greater length, but this speaks more to Bloch's 'ancestry' than to his 'explanations'.[38] Furthermore, the separation of the 'historical' from such other 'factors' as the social, political, and economic puts historical factors in a paradoxically dominant but subordinate position. The roots are 'in' history, but either that historical relationship does not require analysis, as in Harris, or it is determining, as in the historiographies of institutional and legal power or white settler violence. In these views, history engenders the present, dictating trajectories and consequences. I interpret the ahistorical character of the South African scholarly debates on xenophobia not only in the sense that these debates rarely engage with history, but that in them, the present, the social, the political, and the economic are not understood as historical. In other words, historicism—a deterministic reading of history—renders xenophobia inevitable. Faced with inevitability, structural explanations, *a priori* definitions, methodological nationalism, path dependencies (however sophisticated), questionable periodisation, the focus on institutional politics, over-theorisation, anachronism, and historicism, it becomes hard to think in terms of xenophobia as what people think and do collectively in history.

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[37] Marc Bloch. *The Historian's Craft.* Translated by Peter Putnam (Manchester: Manchester University Press, [1949] 1967), p. 32.
[38] See O'Halloran, 'Contested Space and Citizenship in Grahamstown, South Africa'; Tafira, *Xenophobia in South Africa*.

In contrast to this body of scholarship, the South African historian Noor Nieftagodien's historical study of 'insider/outsider' politics in Alexandra township in Johannesburg presents a 'case study of the way ideas and practices of exclusion have evolved over time, through an articulation of state policies and an appropriation thereof by local residents'.[39] This history of the 'tension between insiders and outsiders' recognises the multiple and changing constructions of these categories in relation to specific historical and political situations, from the mid-twentieth century to the present. Importantly, Nieftagodien emphasises the 'local peculiarities' and the 'fractious character of local politics' in generating identities and politics of exclusion. He argues that it is a particular demobilisation of inclusive and participatory forms of local politics from 1994 that has contributed to the salience of exclusionary politics in Alexandra in the twenty-first century; and there is a language, logic, and history of exclusion that is drawn upon by some Alexandra residents. Although Nieftagodien is interested in change in politics of exclusion and insider/outsider identities over time, he makes clear that xenophobia is an option, not an inevitability, and that it is historically-located.[40]

In the book, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*, Michael Neocosmos makes a similar argument that a shift from popular democratic to state political subjectivities permitted the emergence of xenophobia—derived from state-oriented notions of citizenship—post-apartheid. Unlike Nieftagodien, he is concerned less with the history of belonging and/or outsider-ness than with the identification of this shift in political subjectivities. Neocosmos draws on Louis Althusser and the idea of 'interpellation', or external subjectivation, of people as citizens and non-citizens by the state. He does not argue that people never think and engage in their own subjectivation, but that there are historical periods—most, he argues—when state subjectivities are hegemonic.[41] This analysis is valuable on two fronts. First is the type of periodisation he proposes, which derives from modes of political thought rather than state or economic forms. I characterise Neocosmos's work as historical precisely because of this attention to periodisation. Second is his idea of the 'fear of politics'. For Neocosmos, the 'fear of politics' is 'the unwillingness or inability of popular politics'—and he notes 'a few exceptions'—'to break away systematically from a state politics of fear' rooted in exceptionalism, indigeneity, and xenophobia, and 'passive citizenship'.[42] Instead, categories of

[39] Noor Nieftagodien. 'Xenophobia's Local Genesis: Historical Constructions of Insiders and the Politics of Exclusion in Alexandra Township'. In Landau, *Exorcising the Demons*, p. 132.
[40] Ibid, pp. 109-112; 128.
[41] Neocosmos, *From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'*, pp. 15-18.
[42] Michael Neocosmos. 'The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics: Reflections on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 43(6), 2008, pp. 587; 592

difference, which he argues emanate from the state, are adopted to establish boundaries of belonging and to legitimise violence.

These two studies provide useful insights for the historical study of xenophobia. Like Nieftagodien, I am concerned with local particularity and the historical fluidity of belonging and of constructions of the foreign. The various political directions in which colonists took foreignness and the foreign speak to this fluidity and the necessity of careful contextualisation. The colonial archive has also revealed an at times contentious interplay between state policies and categories and the politics mobilised by Cape settlers, the latter neither determined nor fully delimited by the state. Governance logic and law were adopted, adapted, and contested in the course of Cape colonial politics, and not only in its xenophobias. Like Neocosmos, I develop my periodisation from politics. I discuss this more in Chapter 2 and in the concluding chapter, but suffice it to say, here, that the overlapping, trans-national, and shifting character of Cape colonial modes of xenophobia defies norms of periodisation. These politics related to changes in local circumstances and to local and global events, but in complex relation, too, to ideas and histories that were neither immediate nor determinate. Rather, British settlers selected, politicised, and gave meaning to concepts and categories in subjective, indeterminate, but still historical ways. I also draw on Neocosmos's 'fear of politics', but rather than treating this only as the lack of a popular, affirmative alternative—which then demands of 'the people' that they creatively fill that lack—I ask whether the 'fear of politics' itself can animate a politics, the intention of which is precisely to circumscribe, suppress, or expel specific, 'Othered' discourses and mobilisations. As I elaborate in the chapters that follow, fears of politics were common and overt in Cape colonial discourses, and they cohered around the identification of 'Other' politics: other in content as well as practiced by 'Othered' categories of people, including those designated as 'the foreigner'.

This study employs a different method for understanding xenophobia through the discipline of history, and a different way of calling xenophobia 'historical', than the insufficient one through which I compared Grahamstown in the mid-nineteenth century and early twenty-first. It differs markedly from existing literature that cannot escape history as a discipline of determinacy. I ask several questions. How do we think historically about xenophobia without identifying historical roots and continuities, but rather historical modes, meanings, and mobilisations? What were some of the historical discourses and practices through which xenophobia operated? What were specific political contexts in which xenophobia was articulated, and what connections are revealed? What do these politics, articulations, and mobilisations reveal about historical worlds? How should we account for the theoretical

significance of the mobilisation of inclusive or anti-xenophobic politics, which demonstrate that xenophobia is not an inevitable outcome of history? These questions, I argue, require a reconceptualisation of xenophobia. We need to theorise xenophobia as a historical politics: as ways of framing political problems and solutions, and of mobilising responses, uniquely located in historical context, which does not only need to hinge on the nation-state, or nationalism, or immigration law, or global capital. Put another way, I want to historicise xenophobia, but when historicisation is not a task of theorising xenophobia as the 'end point of a historical dynamic' (to use Mahmood Mamdani's phrase),[43] but rather a project that sees xenophobia as one historical dynamic in relation to other historical dynamics. The point is not to develop something trans-historical, but instead to locate xenophobia within historical context, as told from within specific subjective positions, and to theorise that historically. In so doing, I am suggesting a method for the historical study of xenophobia in other contexts, including the present one.

THE CONTEXT AND ITS CONNECTIONS

The Cape of Good Hope became a colony of Europe in 1652, when the Dutch East India Company established a small, fortified victualling port to service the sea route to India. Over the next century and a half, the slow but steady enlargement of a pastoralist European population and the gradual conquest of the indigenous Khoikhoi and San people incorporated them into a dispersed, agricultural, slave-holding economy and society centred on the port at Cape Town.[44] In the midst of wars in Europe, in which the British Empire fought successively against revolutionary and counter-revolutionary France, the colony was occupied by the British between 1795 and 1803, reverted briefly to the Dutch Batavian government, and then became a British possession in earnest from 1806.[45] This study primarily concerns the period after 1806, when British colonial administrations sought to govern and British settlers to establish themselves in southern Africa.

In 1811, the British military administration embarked on a campaign of conquest in the eastern part of the colony, the 'Zuurveld', where competition for land between the African chiefdoms and European, mainly Dutch, farmers had been stirring up armed strife for about

[43] Mahmood Mamdani. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 32.
[44] For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Cape colonial history, see select chapters in Elphick and Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society*.
[45] British possession of the Cape was formalised in 1814.

forty years. It was during this campaign that Graham's Town was named, writes the historian Norman Etherington, 'in honour of the region's destroyer'.[46] The British forces led by Colonel John Graham, and including the indigenous Cape Regiment and Dutch irregulars, 'cleared' the fertile region between the Sundays and Great Fish Rivers of its amaXhosa and amaGqunukhwebe inhabitants, the people of the chiefs Ndlambe and Chungwa. It was a campaign and 'clearance' which Graham undertook, in the words of then Governor of the Cape Colony, John Cradock, with 'a proper degree of terror'.[47] The extent of the violence that drove thousands of people eastward over the Great Fish River is captured in Cradock's admiring phrase.

Before ten years were out, the government undertook a settlement scheme to consolidate British hold on the recently 'cleared' region. Some five thousand settlers were sent out from Britain in 1820, who would form a core of British population at the Cape of Good Hope, centered around Graham's Town in the east and Cape Town in the west. As these settlers established themselves, their desire for imperial goods and to export their produce (increasingly, wool), led to a colony progressively more integrated into the global and imperial markets of the nineteenth-century. Most of the Khoikhoi laboured in a serf-like state in the white colony, or formed mixed polities beyond its borders. The Xhosa, too, were expelled but not gone. The heartland and traditional hierarchies of their society were not yet intruded upon, and their social structures remained intact. Some of the chiefs who lived nearest the Europeans—responding, in fact, to the traditional, cattle-driven chiefly needs to spread out—steadily sought to recover the good pasturage west of the Fish, whether simply by disregarding colonial claims to it, or through armed resistance. Others sought accommodation or alliance, in the process creating an ever more complicated mixture of colonial and Xhosa politics; some, without the power of chiefs, entered into waged work arrangements in the colony. Relationships with the indigenous people of the Cape, whether Xhosa or 'Khoisan', were frequently referred to through the colonial politics of foreignness and xenophobia, as Bowker's speech demonstrates.

Interestingly, there appears to have been some tension between the population of pre-1820 'colonists' and the new 'settlers'. Only a couple of hints point to this. Perhaps it relates to the ethnic differences between Dutch and British colonists, but this is not clear. A letter from 'Indicator', published in the first independent newspaper in Cape Town, the *South African*

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[46] Norman Etherington. *The Great Treks* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), p. 64.
[47] Quoted in Ben Maclennan. *A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape's Eastern Frontier* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p. 128.

Commercial Advertiser, speaks of 'prejudice against the Settlers', but how the 'older Colonists found instead of more successful competitors for the favour of their rulers, that they are best friends…united with them in a common cause by the surest tie—a community of interests'. The colonist/settler division was alluded to again, later that month.[48] Not only does there appear to be an anti-immigrant attitude to overcome, but the prescribed antidote is political: 'common cause' in 'a community of interest'. There were other tensions, too, early on. John Fairbairn and Thomas Pringle, editors of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*,[49] fought a running battle with the colonial government through the 1820s over the matter of a 'free press', which they ultimately won. Despite their liberal outlook, the *Commercial Advertiser*, 'Ha[d] one word to say about "Politics"' in one of its early numbers, 'As South African Colonists, and as Editors of a South African Newspaper, we disclaim the prejudices, and disown the name of either [the Whig or Tory party]. More decidedly still do we disclaim the name, and detest the principles of Radicals or Levellers'.[50] About one month later, the Advertiser was temporarily shut down (for the first time) for publishing material critical of government. Within a few years, these upright editorial detesters of party politics and radicalism would be denounced relentlessly by a rival editor, Robert Godlonton, along with sundry other 'fanatic partizans', for their too-liberal points of view about Africans. Godlonton decried 'that hydra-headed monster, PARTY', while Franklin, the editor of the *Cape Frontier Times*, thought 'political agitation' was 'much to be deplored'.[51] Colonial society, from censorious, military administration to the bourgeois free press, had a vigorous suspicion of politics. Notwithstanding their public condemnation of politics, the Cape's newspapermen were active in the colony's politics, their papers serving to spread word of problems, meetings, quarrels, and theories that garnered colonial attention and involved many people. They were at the heart of many of the political movements, some of which involved concepts of the foreign as threat, which I discuss in the following chapters. It is important to note, at this early stage, that historiography was, for a long time, unduly absorbed with the thoughts and actions of white colonists, and particularly white men. That has changed in more recent histories. I do not promote the colonists here as the sole legitimate figures of history; rather, I concentrate on them as people who offer us insights into historical politicisations of foreignness. The limits of the archive in terms of the obscuring of indigenous,

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[48] George Grieg. *The South African Commercial Advertiser, NO 1 January 7 1824 to NO 18 May 1824, Together with Facts Connected with The Stopping of The South African Commercial Advertiser* (Cape Town: South African Library, [1824] 1978), pp. 75; 115

[49] Pringle left the paper in 1824.

[50] Grieg, *The South African Commercial Advertiser,* p. 97-98.

[51] *The Graham's Town Journal*, XII (591), 30 March 1843; *The Cape Frontier Times*, XI (597), 4 November 1851.

black, and also women's narratives are evident, but reflective of a world in which British men manufactured exclusion as routine. This, of course, extends to the exclusion of those deemed 'foreign'.

These British imperial subjects often dealt with their local circumstances by relating what they encountered or imagined there to a broader context in which they felt themselves to belong. Their perceptions and knowledge shaped how their context shaped them. With this in mind, the British Empire provided many important elements of their experience, including policies, governments, people, language, and political, economic, social, and religious connections. In the words of Elizabeth Elbourne, this history cannot 'be neatly folded within the embrace of so-called "national" history. It might rather be seen as a product of intersection of several "local" histories and of global interaction that cut constantly through the local in unexpected ways'.[52] Politics in the Cape Colony did not begin or end at its tenuous, contested boundaries or at its coastline, but relied on knowledge and perceptions that looked further afield and related what was 'seen' there to the local conditions, expectations, and status quo. Trajectories of human mobility that incorporated the early nineteenth-century Cape colonial peoples helped shape the politics of xenophobia, with regard to collective knowledge and to the reaction to certain forms of mobility by certain people deemed 'foreign'.

The Cape of Good Hope was a junction in what scholars have referred to as 'imperial networks' or 'networks of empire'. Kerry Ward situates the Cape within broader systems of global movement in Dutch East India Company's empire in the eighteenth century. She theorises 'empire' as the 'multiple material networks' that 'exist simultaneously as paths of circulation for people, goods and information'. As an imperial node in the Company's empire, the Cape of Good Hope intersected with and evolved within particular circuits of the networks on which it touched.[53] In *Imperial Networks*, Alan Lester makes a similar point, more relevant to the period and experience of Cape settlers after 1820, with regard to settler identity formation in the connections and frictions between Great Britain and the Cape.[54] Isabel Hofmeyr has situated South Africa at the juncture of the 'black Atlantic' and the Indian Ocean worlds, with consequences for thinking of its place in a history of connections.[55]

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[52] Elizabeth Elbourne. *Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, [2002] 2008), pp. 20-21.
[53] Kerry Ward. *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 10-11.
[54] Alan Lester. *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in nineteenth-century South Africa and Britain* (London: Routledge, 2001).
[55] Isabel Hofmeyr. 'The Black Atlantic Meets the Indian Ocean: Forging New Paradigms of Transnationalism for the Global South – Literary and Cultural Perspectives'. *Social Dynamics* 33(2), 2007, pp. 3-32.

People moved through the colony from other regions of the British Empire or from Britain itself. As the historians Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker demonstrate in their influential book, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, the movement of people around the Atlantic world of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries—between Africa, Ireland, Britain, the Caribbean, and North America—created numerous channels and interactions through which ideas and politics were shared. These interactions and exchanges were often forged in a 'subaltern' world of revolutionary politics, in which circulated knowledge of rebellion and freedom, and even revolutionaries themselves.[56] Nicole Ulrich has brought the Cape Colony into Linebaugh and Rediker's world of subaltern Atlantic connections with regard to the Cape's 1808 slave revolt, inspired in part by two Irish sailors and carried out through the efforts of a diverse group of enslaved and indigenous people.[57] In *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire*, David Lambert and Alan Lester theorise a different kind of mobile or circulating life, of those historical figures—governors, missionaries, administrators—participating in processes of constructing colonial power. They write, '"imperial careerists" own comparative insights give us a more objective view of colonial relations', and their 'life geographies…constituted meaningful connections across the empire in their own right'.[58] Many of these lives touched at the Cape of Good Hope.

The point is that we cannot treat the historical context of politics of the foreign as the territory of the Cape Colony in isolation. While the political, social, and economic conditions that obtained in that territory should not be divorced from the broader context with which they connected, I am particularly interested, here, in the *subjective* connections that influenced the way xenophobia was framed and foreigners were imagined in the Cape Colony. As I discuss at length in Chapter 4, and throughout the other chapters, ideas and political insights from England, Ireland, and the West Indies all found a purchase in local politics at the Cape. Importantly, they did so in the minds of their colonial interlocutors; it was about what made sense to people struggling with their local problems as they understood them. In this, subjective networks were forged between the Cape Colony and its imperial context, both past and present.

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[56] Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker. *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).
[57] Nicole Ulrich. 'Abolition from Below: the 1808 Revolt in the Cape Colony'. In Marcel van der Linden (ed.) *"Humanitarian Intervention" and Changing Labour Relations: Long-term Consequences of the British Act on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 193-222.
[58] David Lambert and Alan Lester. 'Introduction: Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects'. In David Lambert and Alan Lester (eds.). *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2.

As I opened the analysis of xenophobia at the Cape to an expanded context contingent on these sorts of networks, it became clear that the research, its conclusions, and the histories it draws upon must be understood as circulating and transnational. Xenophobia at the Cape was not occurring in isolation, but the political nature of xenophobia means that its integration into transnational or global history was of a special and idiosyncratic kind. The lens of 'Atlantic history' is useful, a framework which historians have collectively developed in recent decades in the exploration of the range of connections between and among the four continents and their peoples surrounding the Atlantic Ocean.[59] There are compelling reasons for this specifically 'Atlantic' approach, and not one oriented east towards the Indian Ocean, or else one more generally 'global' or 'imperial'. Notably, the entirety of imperial experience does not appear in the frames of reference colonists used. I keep in mind David Armitage's conception of 'cis-Atlantic' history, which 'studies particular places as unique locations within the Atlantic world and seeks to define that uniqueness as the result of interaction between local particularity and a wider web of connections (and comparisons)', or, more simply, 'regional history within an Atlantic context'.[60] It is important, though, that the history I relate does not *need* to be 'Atlantic'; it is not a structural condition. The 'Atlantic' historical lens is as artificial and as shot through with contradictions and problems as any. However, the 'frames of reference' that emerge from Cape Colonial discourse itself—Atlantic slavery, Ireland, the West Indies, British politics—make this history 'Atlantic' in scope. There is an 'Atlantic' subjectivity at work. That is to say that an 'Atlantic' frame is a useful tool for situating the political discourses encountered in the Cape colonial archive within broader, transnational histories. This 'Atlantic' serves not only as a geographical marker but also as a mode of periodisation. Because it emerges here as a subjective frame, its temporality is neither neat nor linear.

Following archival pathways into these broader histories has led to a roving sort of history that visits and draws insights from sixteenth-century Ireland, from the slave plantations and maroon communities of the West Indies, and the workhouses of England before settling on the eastern 'frontier' of the Cape Colony in the 1820s. These environments served nineteenth-century Cape colonists as epistemological supplements to their problems of the 'frontier', 'vagrancy', immigration, and 'convictism'. They serve us by putting meat on the bones of colonial political-subjective discourse and proffering signboards for thinking through colonial

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[59] See, for discussion, Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (eds.) *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[60] David Armitage. 'Three Concepts of Atlantic History'. In David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (eds.). *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 21-22.

politicisation of foreignness. This is guided by the archives (see Chapter 3). In certain ways, I have adopted what Ann Laura Stoler calls 'an ethnographic sensibility' that takes into account the 'breadth of global reference and span of lateral view that colonial regimes unevenly embraced…not in ways that display confident knowledge and know-how, but in disquieted and expectant modes'.[61] In other words, colonial thinkers and practitioners of politics (not only the 'regimes') looked for answers in different places. Taking instruction from the people whose ideas are preserved in the archive, we consider not only the 1809 'Caledon Proclamation', which constrained mobility and labour relations in the Cape Colony, but also, for example, the social and economic theories devised by Thomas Malthus, which considered population and poverty from the perspective of an imperial metropole. We attend public gatherings in Graham's Town manifesting a 'politics of the frontier', but also Daniel O'Connell's 'monster meetings' in Ireland calling for Repeal of the Union. All of these intersected in the Cape colonial politics that defined the foreigner as a threat.

While here the central engagement is with South African—more specifically, Cape Colonial—history and historiography, this trans-national, 'Atlantic' spatialisation of empire and exclusion means that this research will ultimately form part of a multi-regional study. The nineteenth-century Cape Colony provides an initial glimpse; a geographical, political, and temporal location from which to proceed; and an opportunity to elaborate the methodological and theoretical bones of that broader research. I address some of the directions for expanding this research in the concluding chapter. The point is that this study begins the process of mapping a history of the politicisation of foreignness as threat in archives of the Anglo-Atlantic world.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

The three chapters that follow form an extended introduction that clarifies this method of historicisation and provides important historical background to some of the concepts arising in the archive. Chapter 2 develops theoretical tools for interpreting the history of the 'foreigner' in the context of the Cape Colony as a subjective, political, and politicised concept. It proposes a historical theorisation of xenophobia, deploying facets of the anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus's notions of 'historical mode politics' and 'site' of politics. The focus is on how the

[61] Ann Laura Stoler. 'Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form'. In Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michele Pickover, Graeme Reid, Razia Saleh (eds.). *Refiguring the Archive* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2002), p. 100.

'foreigner' can be interpreted historically, while thinking in terms of political subjectivities. Correspondingly, Chapter 3 introduces the colonial archive that I have accessed, and how I read it in relation to my theoretical positioning and the question of the 'foreigner'. It focuses on 'reading politics in the archive', and assesses the types of archives and information used here, and the limitations as well as strengths of working with a colonial archive the excluded many people and is shot through with racism. Importantly, for this study, it argues that colonial archives can 'speak' about more than just the conceptual assemblage through which we have come to understand 'colonialism'. Here, I also deal with the problems of the colonial archive: its inherent biases, its elisions, and its pervading racism, all of which have consequences for how we can use its sources.

Chapter 4 elaborates on the connections that appear in the colonial archive and which provided 'frames of reference' from other historical, political, and geographical contexts. This engages the networks of knowledge I mentioned above. The chapter focuses on three concepts that were important in the construction of foreignness in the Cape Colony, and which also provide us handy tools for thinking about foreignness. These are the Pale, which relates to colonialism in Ireland and establishes boundaries of difference; the Maroon, stemming from Atlantic slavery, which relates to mobility and autonomy; and the Vagrant, a look back to England's poor laws, which implies both mobility and control. The point here is to think of the repoliticisation of these (political) concepts for the purposes of the Cape Colony, and more specifically, for the purposes of specific political movements at the Cape.

The next four chapters look at specific aspects of the construction of foreignness and the foreigner as threatening in those Cape colonial political movements. Chapter 5 analyses the establishment of a colonial boundary and the ways in which settler and official discourse legitimated it in the years between c. 1810 and 1840. I draw a distinction between structural 'frontier-zone' (what I prefer to call a 'marchland') and the subjective positioning of the 'frontier', showing how the latter was the basis of a settler politics in which Africans and African polities were cast as foreign and, frequently, as threatening to settler interests. This was articulated in framing interactions in terms of 'international relations', and through expositions on the meaning of chiefly power and Xhosa politics that existed 'beyond the pale' of the colony.

Chapter 6 introduces a discussion of mobility and autonomy in the Cape Colony through histories of the various 'vagabonds' of the Cape of Good Hope from the British takeover at the turn of the nineteenth-century up to mid-century: including military deserters, runaway slaves, maroons, and other indecently mobile people. It shows how colonists imagined 'vagabondism' as a threat, and argues that 'vagabondism' and foreignness were closely linked ideas in how

colonists viewed the problem of mobility. Colonists saw, or thought that they saw, ‘improper connexions’ between different categories of vagabonds, foreigners, or ‘foreign’ politics, which correlated the perceived problem of ‘vagabondism’ with issues of the frontier and the pale.

Chapter 7 continues the conversation about mobility, but this time looks at efforts of control exercised by the colonial government and appropriated or politicised by settlers, focused on the 1830s and ’40s. The discussion focuses on ‘vagrancy’ and the colonial regime of labour, the settler calls for vagrancy legislation, the fluid nature of legitimacy and identity in relation to categories of worker and the foreign, such as so-called ‘Fingoes’, and ‘Native Foreigners’. It shows how ‘foreignness’, in such a context of fluid identity, was politicised in the course of disabling ‘Others’ in relation to belonging, autonomy, and mobility.

Chapter 8 recounts a xenophobic mobilisation and its trans-national connections. During the 1830s and 1840s, settlers frequently called for labourers to emigrate to the colony. The chapter considers how problems of labour, population, immigration and emigration, and demography were discussed in the colony, in a period of determined Malthusian logic. At the same time as colonists wanted immigrants, they only wanted immigrants of a certain kind. The problem manifested itself quite clearly in the 1849 ‘convict crisis’: the popular mobilisation against the designation of the Cape Colony as a penal settlement, and specifically against the landing of a shipload of British and Irish convicts at Cape Town. The same population that practically begged for ‘British labor’ rejected these particular ‘British’ laborers, casting the convict as the ‘foreigner’. Existing research treats this episode as a stage in the development of liberal democratic self-government in the colony, rather than as a popular xenophobic mobilisation. I look at the latter. The episode also presents an opportunity to discuss the importance of Ireland as a frame of reference that connects anti-convictism and the politics of the frontier.

The concluding chapter reflects on each of these different themes in relation to the question of politicised foreignness, the historical study of xenophobia, the consequences of this research for our understanding of historical worlds, and avenues for further inquiry that would shed light on constructions of the foreign as threat and on historical frames of reference that subjects accessed to explain their local circumstances and political problems. These insights are valuable for the study of xenophobia in historical contexts ranging from the distant past to the present. It examines three key observations emerging from the research: the importance of political frames of reference, the perception of an ‘outside’ (‘foreign’) site or source or mode of political power, and the dialectical relationship between this outside site and the ‘foreigner’ given shape in xenophobic politics.

I genuinely hope to encourage different ways of thinking historically about xenophobia. Because xenophobia pervades so much of our present politics, the mere word arouses an array of images and ideas drawn from our own experience. As I write, asylum seekers are detained in atrocious conditions along the southern border of the United States, and, in the same moment that I read the anti-foreign tracts of two centuries ago, I heard the crowds that looted 'foreign-owned' shops in central Pretoria, South Africa. I am convinced that understanding historical modes of xenophobia has a bearing on how we think about it in the present. Examining what is peculiar about the threat of the foreigner posited in ideas about the frontier, vagrancy, and anti-convictism in the Cape Colony suggests ways of thinking that are relevant to other historical contexts.

Writing about Europe's so-called 'refugee crisis' in 2018, Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe sees an 'old spectre returns to haunt people's minds with invasions of hordes from overpopulated lands', for which the solution runs, 'We must close the borders'. Mbembe continues, 'It is not only the way in which they appear among us that plunges us into a chronic, existential anxiety. It is also the matrix of their being, of which we suppose they are merely the mask, that plunges us into a state of agitation and radical uncertainty. After all, what really lies behind what we can see?' That is the basic question that animates this research, the question of what people see 'behind' the figure of the foreigner, and how that is understood and expressed, discursively and in political mobilisations. Asking this question, we confront histories of the intersection between mobility and difference, in which, to use Mbembe's word, the 'fantasies' that drive collective fears take historical form.[62]

Despite its moving cog-work, the argument developed through the following chapters is quite simple. First, we look at the modes of politics that cast 'the foreigner'—shorthand for the diverse ways that people have politicised 'the person who does not belong (here)'—as threatening. Second, the ways in which that person and that threat were depicted and rationalised, and the logics through which foreignness and threat were associated subjectively and politically in the Cape Colony, often making references to a vast, fluid, and different geographical, political, or historical context. For contemporaries, these references served to give content and personality to 'the foreigner' and to the threat he, she, or they posed. For us, they afford a portrait of xenophobia in the Cape Colony: an interpretation that reveals the meaning and the colour of politics of a historical place and period.

[62] Mbembe, 'The Great Riddance', np.

2.
HISTORY AND THE FOREIGNER:
ELEMENTS OF A HISTORICAL THEORY OF XENOPHOBIA

THE FOREIGNER

In the previous chapter, I mentioned that Cape xenophobes shared a consciousness of the 'foreigner' as threatening to the social order or to specific social, political, or economic objectives, and the certainty that this 'foreigner' did not belong in the colony. Some definition of the person who does not belong and is threatening to society is common to different xenophobias. If it is indeed the foreigner around which xenophobia is structured as a politics, then the foreigner requires close scrutiny. The first necessary point is that the foreigner is not static, but political. Today's nearly universal understanding of both xenophobia and foreigners as 'national'—the former emerging from nationalism and the latter having to do with national origin—has not been germane throughout history. Yes, certain historical ideologies and modes of belonging might be theorised as 'nationalisms', but that often would mean divorcing the concept from the historical nation-state as well as making the unnecessary demand upon history that where there is xenophobia there is also nationalism. I argue that it is the foreigner rather than the nation which lies at the crux of xenophobia. Moreover, that foreigner is politicised in the course of unfolding historical context. Thinking with 'the foreigner' instigates a discussion of how to write histories of the foreigner that do not proceed from *a priori* definitions of xenophobia. This forms the second issue of this chapter, in which I theorise how xenophobia can be studied as occurring in historical time and located in a historical context, as contingent and political, and expressive of particular historical assumptions that subjectively delimit political and historical possibilities. The chapter follows two intersecting tracks, using a discussion of 'the foreigner' as the historically contingent political concept central to xenophobia, and via a theoretical foray into the tension between the historian E. P. Thompson's 'historical materialism' and the anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus's 'anthropology of the name'.

Emphasising context does not mean that, according to certain contexts or as a result of certain histories, a xenophobic response or ideas about the foreigner as threat necessarily emerged. Such an argument undermines this project from the beginning. Rather, the importance

of context comes into play in discovering where and when, in the course of thinking and acting in relation to political problems, people identify a foreigner and cast that foreigner as a threat. This project is an extended elaboration on how that worked in one historical context; this chapter provides a theoretical approach to the problem. It is important that context need not refer only to structure or empirical fact, for context is also subjective. The imputed history of the 'foreigner', the nature and meaning of the threat he or she poses, the problem or set of problems his or her foreignness and threat are related through, and the teleologies upon which he or she intrudes are the stuff of context. As a politicised category, the foreigner derives its meaning in the course of political thought and activity; that is to say, the political content of the foreigner is contingent and historical.

The Irish historian Nicholas Canny correctly observes that historical theorisation of xenophobia addresses the question of the 'othering' of people, that is 'representing people with whom [a group] frequently live in close proximity as being on a social or cultural level proximate to that of other people (real or mythological) considered inferior to themselves'. 'This "othering"', he continues, 'could then be used to justify the employment of harsh measures to bring them up to par; citing real or mythological precedents'.[1] Canny's work on the English conquest of Ireland elaborates such a situation, precisely. Frederik Barth, a Norwegian anthropologist, has done influential work on the manufacture and maintenance of boundaries of ethnic difference. He challenges the views that 'boundary maintenance is unproblematical and follows from the isolation which the itemized characteristics imply: racial difference, cultural difference, social separation and language barriers, spontaneous and organized enmity'. While he points to the easily grasped context of colonialism as a situation of ethnic, cultural, and group interaction, where historically and culturally different groups come into contact, he also suggests that we emphasise the emergence of difference within a context, rather than simply pre-existing difference. He contends that boundary maintenance—social boundaries, not only territorial—is a process of local, collective prescription. At times, this generates forms of 'others', which he calls 'pariah groups', the boundaries of which are 'most strongly maintained by the excluding host population'.[2] These scholars make important points about 'othering', whether general or specific to historical location. However, it is important to note that I am not speaking about all modes of 'othering'. I am not addressing ethnicity, as such, nor colonialism as a historical type, in which 'others' were universally

[1] Nicholas Canny. Personal Correspondence, 16 November 2018.
[2] Fredrik Barth. 'Introduction'. In Fredrik Barth (ed.). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, [1969] 1998), pp. 11; 15-16; 30-3.

categorised and boundaries created and maintained. I am specifically speaking about 'othering' whereby people are represented as 'foreign'—a precise (if complex) form of non-belonging—and their 'foreignness' is contingent upon local politics, which can but also might not deploy categories like ethnicity. Mahmood Mamdani's study of the Rwandan genocide historicises an instance of 'othering', or the production and maintenance of difference, in this case through violence, which introduces important element of the collective politicisation and racialisation of members of the Tutsi ethnic group as being essentially 'foreign', which provided justification for their exclusion and, ultimately, for killing them.[3] While Mamdani's primary effort is to theorise and historicise genocidal violence, I concentrate on the problem of 'foreignness' itself, and the all-important 'foreigner' that is marked by and bears this distinctive label of 'the other'.

We can look to K. D. M. Snell's work on rural England between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries as an example of historicising the foreigner. In a sympathetic critique of E.P. Thompson's work on working class consciousness in England and the body of historiographical work it has inspired, Snell examines the 'different kinds of boundaries' and a 'culture of local xenophobia' that existed among the 'labouring poor' at the level of the parish.[4] Significantly, Snell uses history to complicate xenophobia as a concept: while it still 'means fear or dislike of things foreign or strange', he does not refer to 'anti-foreigner sentiments in the usual, modern, national sense; a "foreigner", even until the 1940s, could mean someone from another parish or locality'. For instance, the poet John Clare, writing in the first half of the nineteenth century, 'referred to the area and the people beyond his parish as being "out of the world", "the world's end", beyond "the brink of the world", "out of my knowledge", "the inhabitants of new countrys [*sic*]", "another country", "a foreign land to me"'.[5] Several characteristics of that 'local xenophobia' are useful for thinking about historical context and about the foreigner as a politicised figure.

During the long period Snell considers, the parish bore many of the responsibilities that we now attribute to local government, concerning rights, entitlements, and 'development' that 'had implications for the village poor', including 'pauper settlement, militia balloting, the duties of constables, registration of births, marriages and deaths, burial entitlement, liability for tithe, church and poor-law rating, the limits of commons and wastes, access to fuel, rights of way or

[3] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.
[4] K. D. M. Snell. 'The Culture of Local Xenophobia'. *Social History* 28(1), 2003, p. 3.
[5] Ibid, footnote, pp. 3; 5-6.

the responsibility to repair roads and bridges'.[6] This is especially true for the eighteenth century. Today, many forms of politics are oriented to the local state, including xenophobia, as the example of Grahamstown in 2015 shows. However, the parish politics relied upon historically and contextually specific institutions, social and political organisation, and set of assumptions about the world. While the parish functioned as a local form of the 'state', it was a different kind of 'state'. For one thing, the parish was an institution of local and country-wide religious structures and power, rather than secular 'government'. Elements of parish-level politics, specifically commons or 'commoning', which today have come to signify modes that challenge state power, were part of the politics of 'state' (parish) boundary-making. Poor and working people actively participated (and not only through xenophobia) in the structures that maintained the parish as a locality. 'Perambulations' were frequently organised, in which local people walked and learnt the boundaries of the parish; and, in disputes, whether regarding boundaries, poor-rates (taxes), or entitlements, the local people often testified in court, based on their knowledge of the area and the people in it. However, 'Inhabitants also acted to protect marginal local resources against outsiders, out-townsmen, squatters or the depredatory poor of surrounding parishes, often enforcing by-laws regulating who had a right to share communal resources'.[7] This is not radically different than some of the xenophobic mobilisations of the present, but the political context is crucial.

In the course of this local 'defense', Snell shows, stereotypes were formulated about 'foreigners', 'faction fighting' became common, and the employment of 'foreigners' was often condemned. Each of these is important to us. Stereotypes and factions reveal the construction of difference, and then the enactment of violence based on difference. In addition to physical features and virtually any other real or imagined characteristic, religious denomination or accusations of witchcraft were used to identity difference and as reasons for the mobilisation of parish xenophobia.[8] According to Snell, 'faction fighting', which could last 'over centuries', 'usually involving youths and young men, was extremely common between parishes'. For our purposes, it is not only or most importantly the actual violence between parish inhabitants, but rather the politicisation of difference—the politicisation of both 'those who belong' and of 'foreigners'—that such mobilisations involved. One such faction fight 'between the Thriplow "Royalists" and the Fowlmere "Roundheads'" which went back to the [English] Civil War', and came with the political monikers to match. In another fascinating example that actually

[6] Ibid, pp. 6; 8.
[7] Ibid, pp. 7-8; 25-26.
[8] Ibid, pp. 9-14.

invokes the Cape Colony, Snell writes about the feud 'between Coneyhurst Hill and Ewhurst and Rudgwick over the Sussex border', 'with its rival terminology of "Kaffirs" (i.e. Cavaliers) and "Roundheads" ricocheting back to Civil War disputes, with an imperial (Bantu) vocabulary superimposed'.[9] There, not only were the political commitments of a time long-past still in use as political identifiers for difference, one group of 'foreigners' was also explicitly racialised, thus emphasising and demeaning their foreignness, as well as incorporating imperial knowledge and history into politics (an important point in this research). In another example with imperial significance, Snell writes about 'anti-Irish sentiments' and the popular rejection of Irish labour in certain parishes: 'There were frequent fights against the Irish…and the antipathy to 'blackleg' labour (the term itself had Irish famine connotations), and the extreme violence often used against any form of such labour, calls to mind an associated range of anti-'foreigner' attitudes.[10]

A 'blackleg' referred to a 'scab' or strike-breaker, which situates this history within the context of political mobilisation by workers. Again, a nativist defense of work and employment is often seen to be part of xenophobia in the twenty-first century, but that should not be read to say that xenophobia *always* hinges on such a dynamic. Other aspects of labour were raised in local xenophobia. Snell raises the English working-class divisions based on trade, skill, and guild, which involved the charge of foreignness affixed to outsiders.[11] As we shall see, xenophobia in the Cape Colony did fasten onto the matters of work and foreign labourers, but through a local politics of vagrancy aimed at controlling worker mobility. The guild and the vagrant expand and complicate the historical meanings of 'foreigner'. Snell writes, 'Such broader anti-outsider subjects, whether relating to labour disputes or popular *mentalité*, put into context but go beyond my concentration upon inter-parish xenophobia'. He also notes:

> I am also deliberately not extending my discussion to opposition against in-coming tenants to vacant farms, which was frequent in Wales...and hostility to other classes of 'outsider', such as coloured [*sic*] people…some Anglican clergy…Catholics, Quakers, Methodists, Jews, non-resident landlords, toll-pike keepers, bailiffs, gamekeepers, police, poor-law commissioners, relieving officers and guardians, press gangs, excise officers, eviction agents, election campaigners, gypsies [*sic*], drovers, vagrants…pregnant single women, and so on. All these relate closely to my theme here of local xenophobia….[12]

[9] Ibid, pp. 17-19.
[10] Ibid, p. 15
[11] Ibid, p. 3.
[12] Ibid, pp. 15-16.

Indeed, they do relate closely; and such a sweeping list of the unwelcome indicates that 'local xenophobia' in England embroiled numerous political and historical trajectories. A diversity of meanings of the foreigner are reflected in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, where we see that 'foreigner' does not only refer to 'a person born in a foreign country, one from abroad or of another nation; an alien', but also the more open-ended meaning of 'one of another county, parish, etc.; a stranger, outsider. In early usage *esp*. one not a member of any particular guild, a non-freeman'.[13] While Snell probably needed to limit the scope of his point, or else risk writing a history of England over two and half centuries, there is a way in which he, too, has delimited the concept xenophobia, while opening it to investigation in different historical contexts. We can ask, in what ways were 'other classes of outsider' implicated in foreignness as threatening, how was their foreignness and its threat explained, and how did this relate to unfolding historical context? What can the histories of such foreigners tell us about xenophobia?

Obviously, the identification and conceptualisation of foreigners as the underlying political requisite for xenophobia relies on a great deal more than simply the appearance of the word 'foreigner'. There can be xenophobia where the word foreigner is non-existent, and English is not the only language of difference and of the expression of xenophobia. The 'stranger' and the 'outsider' offer a vocabulary less burdened with a 'national' meaning and not necessarily dependent upon the existence of a state. The phrase, 'outsider to the community', constructs a political relationship in which outsider-ness and the community are both open-ended and the result of political subjective processes. Throughout this study, I use the word 'foreigner', but with the historical meaning of 'outsider to the community', however that community is defined, *not* to mean only national difference in national context. The reason for retaining the word foreigner despite the possibility for this confusion is two-fold. First, it was a word which the English-speaking and -writing historical actors I encountered frequently used. They did not usually say 'stranger' or 'outsider', let alone a phrase as sterilised as 'outsider to the community'. Secondly, confronting the word foreigner as historically contingent, political, and politicised, rather than as a static concept, speaks to the broader effort to understand xenophobia as historically situated. We will see how other words—'vagrant', 'native foreigner', 'convict', 'K—r', 'vagabond', or 'maroon'—often branded the bearer of foreignness. The person-who-is-represented-to-bear-foreignness-as threat is fundamental to

[13] 'Foreigner', *OED*, Vol. VI, p. 52.

xenophobia. Through one word or another, xenophobia identifies a foreigner, politically defined and historically unique.

Earlier, I mentioned how Neocosmos understood post-apartheid xenophobia through the notion of 'fear of politics', and proposed reading this fear differently: as political reaction rather than as political inertia. Connecting this with the discussion of the foreigner suggests some further ways in which we can begin to think about the political and historical content of the foreigner in xenophobic politics. For now, I want to explore one historical example that generated many of the ideas behind this study. It gives additional historical meanings to 'foreign' and 'foreigner' than those we encountered in Snell's study of England, and relates these to the notion of fear of politics.

In the 1790s, white societies around the 'Atlantic World' feared that the spirit and knowledge of 'revolt' would spread from Caribbean Africans to the enslaved Africans of American plantations. In *Confronting Black Jacobins*, Gerald Horne, an important scholar of African-American history, meticulously documents United States reaction to revolution by enslaved Africans in Haiti. 'A specter', writes Horne, alluding to Marx, 'was haunting the slave-holding republic'.[14] Mingled with concerns about revolutionary France and a growing population of French (often mixed-race) slaveholders fleeing the Caribbean, both popular and official responses in North America were racialised and xenophobic. The reaction included deportations, influx controls, removal schemes, and heightened surveillance. Horne recounts how, in 1793, the Governor of South Carolina 'ordered all free foreign Negroes who had arrived with the past year to depart—quickly—from the state'; and how a decade later, 'Mainland leaders were so concerned about the real and imagined threat from Haiti that [they] sought to expel a number of U.S. Negroes'. In 1795 Philadelphia, an outbreak of yellow fever inspired xenophobic anxiety that white North Americans succumbed in greater numbers than African, French, and mixed-race migrants from the Caribbean.[15] Accounts of 'depredations' against white property-owners in the Caribbean circulated in the United States and influenced American foreign policy in the Caribbean and in Europe.

Revolution in Haiti and France also inspired xenophobic reactions from British colonialists. Horne quotes an official in St. Vincent, who, in 1794, was 'circumspect…in regard to admitting French people into this colony from the total subversion of every species of Government which at presents reigns throughout the French Islands'. A year later, quotes Horne, 'restraining the

[14] Gerald Horne. *Confronting Black Jacobins: The United States, the Haitian Revolution, and the Origins of the Dominican Republic* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2015), p. 7.
[15] Ibid, pp. 55; 75; 116.

admission of French and Mulattoes and Free Negroes' and eventually 'foreigners of every description' from entering St. Vincent was deemed necessary in light of '"aliens and foreigners" […] holding "illegal meetings," sponsoring "clubs and affiliations" and engaging in "illegal and treasonable correspondence with divers[e] persons in the French islands"'.[16]

These attitudes and policies did not result from a simplistic racism. The slaveholders' preoccupation with 'Haiti' as an event was not spurred only by the possibility that slave uprisings would end in death or destruction of property, but by real and perceived French and Haitian-African political commitments to 'Jacobinism', a radically anti-hierarchical politics. Writing in 1938, C. L. R. James, groundbreaking historian of the Haitian revolution, recounts how events in Haiti had radicalised the revolution in France: 'The workers and peasants of France…were striking at royalty, tyranny, reaction and oppression of all types, and with these they included slavery'.[17] Underlying American reaction was the threat posed by Haitian revolutionaries and others to the system of enslaving Africans, spread like a contagion along the lines of mobility of politicised persons. For white supremacists in 1790s North America and Britain's American colonies, revolution was 'foreign', and certain types of 'foreigners'—black and Francophone—were its fomenters.

Horne's history of reaction to revolution in France and by enslaved Africans in the West Indies shows that in a certain political and historical context, the 'foreigner' was defined by their connection, real and imagined, to a set of threatening political ideas and activities. It is worth further exploration that not only 'foreign' people, but also autonomy and politics, were contributing factors in the impulse to fear and to exclude 'others'. It suggests that, at times, xenophobia relates to a fear of (other) political commitments or (other) politics, when they are attached to and seen to emanate from the mobile foreigner. That 'the foreigner' is a person is critical. The person's or a group's potential for generating history through their difference nourishes the root of their foreignness and the threat they are perceived to pose. The 'foreigner' is historical, as a signifier and as an actor. Xenophobia distinguishes between people who do belong, and those who do not, and casts the foreigner-as-person as subversive.

In contemporary, liberal-democratic terms, this distinction lies between citizens and foreigners. The latter status entails an abrogation of the rights, protection, and dignity owed, at least rhetorically, to citizens. Hannah Arendt's 'right to have rights' is a useful formulation.[18]

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[16] Ibid, pp. 62-64.
[17] C. L. R. James. *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, [1938] 1989), p. 120.
[18] Hannah Arendt. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland: Meridian, [1951] 1958), pp. 296; 298.

Rendered outside of citizenship (belonging), 'foreigners' cannot participate wholly or even at all in civil society. Barring Indian immigrants or people of Indian origin from the franchise, in order to protect the political interests of a particular racially-defined community, as white settlers did in colonial Natal, exemplifies this form of exclusion in connection with foreignness.[19] Furthermore, politics outside the structures of citizenship—popular mobilisations, often by marginalised people, which do not conform to civil society norms and can sometimes challenge formal political power, which otherwise-excluded 'foreigners' might have recourse to—are frequently criminalised and rationalised as 'anti-social'.[20] Foreignness can delegitimise. The 'foreigner', lacking the rights to politics, is not political. By such logic, political thought and action by foreigners appears as subversive. In his study of West African migrants in Brazzaville, the anthropologist Bruce Whitehouse observes what he terms 'the strangers' code', one principle of which is that migrants should not be, or should at least not appear to be, political. More than half of the Congolese citizens he surveyed believed that West Africans were too involved in the Republic of Congo's politics.[21] However, unlike a 'foreigner', a *person* is capable of political thought and action. Xenophobic politics relies on and exploits the contradiction between being human—capable of politics—and 'foreign'—not belonging and subversive. In other words, foreigners are threatening to power because they are people; rendering them 'foreign' delimits their ability to be political. However, as several scholars, not to mention historical popular mobilisations and liberation movements, have shown, those rendered 'other', 'outside', and 'foreign' were and are still capable of politics.[22] This is why, in Europe today, 'The purported threat of the Muslim community inside the country' factors in securitisation anxiety, 'even though it does not logically follow from any external threat that the Islamic world may pose'.[23] There are, of course, modes of exclusion that do not rely on 'foreignness' as a discursive label; but we will see that foreignness was a historically important one, including in the Cape Colony, and was sometimes melded with racist and classist teleologies and notions of belonging.

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[19] Klotz, *Migration and National Identity*, p. 66.
[20] Richard Pithouse. 'The Shack Settlement as a Site of Politics'. *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 3(2), 2014, pp. 179-201.
[21] Bruce Whitehouse. *Migrants and Strangers in an African City: Exile, Dignity, Belonging* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 138-139.
[22] For example, Frantz Fanon. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, [1961] 1963); Partha Chatterjee. *The Politics of the Governed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Pithouse, 'The Shack Settlement'.
[23] Raymond Taras. *Xenophobia and Islamaphobia in Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 116.

With 'the foreigner' in view as a political and politicised figure in history, unique to historical and political context, it remains to make sense of how to use history to study the perception and mobilisation of the foreigner as a threat in xenophobic politics. In what kind of history are we locating the foreigner? Answering these questions demands a discussion of the relationship between history and politics and of history as method of inquiry into politics. We will first look at E. P. Thompson's historical materialism and then Sylvain Lazarus's anthropology of the name.

A Theoretical Tension

This thesis tangentially engages debates on the discipline and methodology of history and the question of historical narrative. Many of the key issues in these debates were summarized several years ago by Hayden White in the essay, 'The Question of Narrativity in Contemporary Historical Theory',[24] which examines the problem of history as a 'science' and the approaches taken in Anglophone and Francophone schools of historical studies to 'solve' this problem, in order to 'save narrative history for "science," on the one side, or consign it to the category of "ideology," on the other'.[25] Elsewhere, White points out that 'history differs from the sciences precisely because historians disagree, not only over what are the laws of social causation that they might invoke to explain a given sequence of events, but also over the question of the form that a "scientific" explanation ought to take'.[26] The individual chapters that follow engage in narrative in the course of explicating constituent elements of the politics of foreignness in the Cape Colony. That these narratives are fragmented, at least across their collective span, linked not by chronology or causality but rather gaining coherence through the repetition of discursive, politicised themes, speaks significantly to the question of causation. In certain ways, this exhibits a form of history writing adopted by those historians whom White says do not tell

> a story with well-marked beginning, middle, and end phases; they did not impose upon the processes that interested them the form that we normally associate with storytelling. While they certainly narrated their accounts of the reality that they perceived…to exist within or behind the evidence they had examined, they…did not impose upon it the form of a story.[27]

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[24] Hayden White. "The Question of Narrativity in Contemporary Historical Theory." *History and Theory* 23(1), 1984, pp. 1-33.
[25] Ibid, p. 17.
[26] Hayden White. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination of Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 12.
[27] Hayden White. *The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 2.

I do not think it is impossible to tell a story about the politics of xenophobia in the Cape Colony, but the archives point to a story in which the "beginning, middle, and end phases" are not in neat, chronological order.

The specific elements of the debates raised by White that matter here focus on this issue of causation and the related problem of periodisation. Although there are numerous scholars whose work considers these themes, I address them here by looking to the English historian, E. P. Thompson, a proponent of a deeply contextualised historical process and causality, whose influence in South African social history has been pointed out (and contested) recently.[28] Attention has been called to the shortcomings of Thompson's historiography, particularly around race and gender,[29] and the purpose here is not to propose Thompson as a model for historical method, but to proffer him as a point of reference with respect to causation in historiography. Against this I situate the later work of Sylvain Lazarus, which offers another contentious and well-argued position on the question of history as a discipline, historical method, causation and periodisation. More than that, both of these viewpoints, which emphasize context and which disrupt the formulation of historical narrative, respectively, are useful to the type of history writing that the study of the politicisation of foreignness in the Cape Colony—focused on the appropriation, generation, and mobilisation of politics—entails. Further, Thompson and Lazarus, in different ways, contribute meaningfully to a discussion of subjectivity, which is central to the reading of politics in this study.

Writing in 1978, E. P. Thompson, famous historian of the English working class, set down, as a thoughtful practitioner of 'historical materialism', the principles of his profession, arguing that all propositions of historical materialism depend upon the 'observation of historical eventuation over time'.

> This observation is not of discrete facts seriatim but of sets of facts with their own regularities: of the repetition of certain kinds of event: of the congruence of certain kinds of behaviour within differing contexts: in short, of the evidences of systematic social formations and of a common logic of process. Such historical theories as arise (not of themselves, but, at the other pole of the dialogue, by arduous conceptualisation) can not be tested, as is often supposed, by calling a halt to process, 'freezing' history, and taking a static geological section, which will show capitalism or class hierarchies at any given moment of time as an elaborated structure. In investigating history we are not flicking through a series of 'stills', each of which shows us a moment of social time transfixed into a single eternal pose: for each one of these 'stills' is not only a moment of being but also a moment of becoming: and even within each seemingly-static section there will be found contradictions and liaisons, dominant and subordinate elements,

[28] Stephen Sparks. 'Special Issue on South Africa'. *Social History* 45(4), 2020, pp. 407-411.
[29] Ibid, pp. 407-408.

> declining or ascending energies. Any historical moment is both a result of prior process and an index towards the direction of its future flow.[30]

Here, Thompson highlights 'fact', 'process', 'time', and 'contradiction' in making sense of history. Against this understanding of what history and the study of history entail, consider the words of the French anthropologist Sylvain Lazarus on the historical conception and category of 'revolution'.

> The conception of revolution as passage, based on a structural problematic [as a disruption of what came before and bridging to what came after]…has another consequence aside from the retrospective outlook, namely the general extension of the name 'revolution'. Indeed, as a general historic category, the term 'revolution' is used as much for 1789 [France] as for Cuba or Iran, regardless of the nature of the singular events. The same is true of the great revolutions—the October and the Cultural Revolution—even though they are not revolutions in the sense of the French Revolution. We see the very formal character of using the term 'revolution' in these three situations, each singular. The only way out of this generalization is to qualify each of these situations with regard to the processes of the politics that it develops and terminates…. Whenever revolution takes on a structural sense, which is the case in history, the category becomes inoperative as far as the process of analysis of politics is concerned.[31]

We see that Lazarus calls attention to 'politics', 'category', 'singularity', and the explanatory failure of 'structure'.

These two excerpts sink us in a thick theoretical tension. Where Thompson emphasises contextualised repetition, Lazarus counters with the notion of singularity. Where Thompson sees analysis via process as precisely why history is illuminating, for Lazarus, process is why history is problematic. For Thompson, history is both a set of events (in which an event includes its complexes of cause and context) and the subsequent interpretation of these, while Lazarus understands history as a flawed analytical method. The tension hinges on Thompson's view that historical process is a human phenomenon, derived from the thinking and action of people; whereas Lazarus asserts that to corral the thinking and acting of people into the field of history proposes, in fact, only structural process. 'Historicist history', for Lazarus, is a method 'which connects consciousness and structure through the mediation of time, is a notion that is at once objective and subjective: objective by the counting and subjective in that consciousness is ultimately conceived as capable of grasping structure, that is, history'.[32] His solution is to register human thinking and action within politics, rather than history. Against 'eventuation' he sets 'prescription'. Politics, for Lazarus, does not have to do with 'time but, rather, with the

[30] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 64.
[31] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, pp. 178-179.
[32] Ibid, p. 120.

prescriptive'.[33] (The major contribution of Neocosmos has been to show that xenophobia depends upon a certain way of thinking about the world, upon a certain politics—he argues, a state politics—, thus placing it in the order of the prescriptive.)

This tension between history as process in which 'certain kinds of event' emerge, can be repeated, and become subject to our historical investigation, and political events as singular events, which are not repeated, the singularity of which is occluded by historical investigation, frames the historical theorisation of xenophobia proposed here. I do not intend to resolve the tension emerging from comparison of Thompson and Lazarus. Rather, I embrace it. In this chapter, I elaborate the argument that we need to reconceptualise xenophobia as historically-contingent-and-located discourses and practices in which political problems and their solutions are framed around 'the foreigner' as a threat. The aim is to propose a method for answering the question of how we historicise xenophobia. With this in mind, I draw on the important concepts that Thompson and Lazarus introduce—fact, process, time, contradiction, eventuation; politics, category, singularity, prescription—and proceed with the understanding that the tension between them is essential to the study of history. We need to be able to conceptualise xenophobia as something that can be examined through the discipline of history; but, at the same time, we recognise xenophobia as something political and prescriptive. This rejects xenophobia as a natural and inevitable consequence of specific conditions, such as 'biological difference' (ahistorical), or in which xenophobia is grasped as the rational and inevitable consequence of a linear history, as seen in 'path dependency' of immigration laws (historicist). The core of a historical inquiry into xenophobia is not what xenophobia was or is, but the historically-specific ideas, references, vocabularies, discourses, categories, actions, and movements through which xenophobia as a historical politics frames what 'ought to be' in history.

E. P. Thompson and Historical Experience

The word 'historicist' may have revived memories of E. P. Thompson's well-read diatribe, *The Poverty of Theory*. The greater part of the book comprises a comprehensive critique of a certain reading of Louis Althusser's critique of 'historicism'. Thompson's basic complaint is that Althusser abuses the distinction between empirical knowledge and the ideology of

[33] Ibid, p. xxvi.

empiricism,[34] thereby throwing out historical knowledge as impermissibly gained through the investigation of real things. The ideas about history that Thompson outlined four decades ago in *The Poverty of Theory* are worth revisiting briefly here, because they relate to the tension around the method of history.[35] Thompson's defense of the discipline of history and, in his case, historical materialism, involves an in-depth discussion of the method of history. The question of a historical theory of xenophobia is in part a methodological one. Although written four decades ago, and subject to intervening critique and the development of new ideas, Thompson's conception of history and historiography as method is still useful. In more recent instalments in the Marxists' debate—specifically between Michael Neocosmos and Mahmood Mamdani[36]—history and politics and the question of the objective and the subjective in historical analysis remain key and contested concepts for thought. While investigating certain of Thompson's ideas about historical method, we are also laying the groundwork for a critique. Several of the concepts I consider are then qualified, either immediately or else in the course of the chapter.

For Thompson, historical materialism entails the 'investigation of process', and approaches process as the elementary property of what we call history. This relies, according to Thompson, on the interrogation of 'discrete facts', often 'as value-bearing evidence', often 'as links in lateral series of social/ideological/economic/political relations', or 'as links in a linear series of occurrences', and the linear series is 'an essential constituent of the historical discipline, a pre-requisite and premise of all historical knowledge'. Furthermore, historical materialism approaches a 'total history of society' and 'offers to show in what determinate ways each activity was related to the other, the logic of this process and the rationality of causation'. Linear narrative construction is '*essential*', with Thompson's emphasis.[37] Thompson's purpose is to argue that history cannot be deduced through theoretical means alone, but must rely on historical detail gleaned through the imperfect means available to historians, whether the

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[34] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory,* pp. 14; 44.

[35] I draw on the work of several Marxist scholars in this chapter. I do not intend to be faithful to any of them, nor to anything specifically Marxist. Instead, I find that their work best enables the theorisation of xenophobia in history as something more than a defined, normative, trans-historical, and ultimately *known*, 'fear of foreigners'. Marxist thought, as we see in the exposition of our tension, engages very seriously and closely with the concept of history, and with the relationship between history and politics. This is evident in some long-standing debates—even quarrels—about history and politics among Marxist scholars.

[36] See, Michael Neocosmos. *Thinking Freedom in Africa: Toward a Theory of Emancipatory Politics* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016); Mahmood Mamdani. 'Place, Interest, and Political Subjectivity: Some Questions for Michael Neocosmos'. *CODESRIA Bulletin* (2), 2018, pp. 9-17; Michael Neocosmos. 'The Academic Intellectual as Knowing Subject and the Reason of the Excluded: A Response to Mahmood Mamdani'. *Social Dynamics*, Published Online 19 April 2020, DOI: 10.1080/02533952.2020.1749434 [accessed 21 April 2020].

[37] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, pp. 39; 61; 95.

interpretation of documentary archives, or the interpretation of memory in oral histories, etc. However, according to Gregor MacLennan, 'Thompson's defense of historical facts was not a question of "empiricism" in any hard sense…. [H]e will not abide the idea that one can draw up historical "laws" in any "pure" theoretical form. We can bring these two "refusals" together by saying that in the first instance, Thompson's "method" is to attend to and to rationalise the particularity of historical experience'[38]. Thompson's method is not 'logical', but historical, in that the construction of historical narrative depends upon the experiences of people participating in history, not only on the sense that a historian can make of them.

Thompson writes of experience in the following terms: '*experience* – a category which, however imperfect it may be, is indispensable to the historian, since it comprises the mental and emotional response, whether of an individual or of a social group, to many inter-related events or to many repetitions of the same kind of event'.[39] It is experience that moves history from a procession of statutes, transactions, or structures, to history as human processes. This of course is the best contribution of Marxist thought to the study of history: that people are the collective agents of history. It is through experience that Thompson mounts his critique against 'historicism', which he identifies with the concept of 'progress', 'which can only acquire meaning from a particular position in the present'.[40] MacLennan writes on Thompson's approach to experience as the 'self-perception of individuals' and 'whatever socially impinges on self-perception'.[41] There is, then, a dialectical relationship between 'self-perception' and the context in which it is forged. 'Experience' is the concept through which Thompson introduces human agency, as well as human subjectivity, as critiques of structuralism. 'Experience arises spontaneously within social being', he writes, 'but it does not arise without thought; it arises because men and women (and not only philosophers) are rational, and they think about what is happening to themselves and their world'.[42]

Laurence Cox and Alf Nilsen allude to Friedrich Engels in the title of their book, *We Make Our Own History*. They propose a 'Marxist theory of social movements', in which understanding people as the movers of history means 'an approach in which social movements are conceived of ontologically as the animating forces in the making and unmaking of

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[38] Gregor MacLennan. 'E. P. Thompson and the Discipline of Historical Context'. In Richard Johnson, Gregor MacLennan, Bill Schwarz, and David Sutton (eds). *Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 107.
[39] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory,* p. 9-10; emphasis original.
[40] Ibid, p. 57.
[41] MacLennan, 'E. P. Thompson', p. 117.
[42] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 10.

structures of needs and capacities, and thus of social formations as such'.[43] It is essentially a scientific rendering of Frantz Fanon's more poetic (and still Marxist), 'Man [*sic*] is what brings society into being'.[44] The making of specific social formations entails the conservation of hegemony by dominant movements (often consolidated in the state) contested by movements that 'grow out of people's experience of a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities, and from their attempts to combine, organise and mobilise in order to do something about this'.[45] For Cox and Nilsen, this means conservation of hegemony by dominant movements, which are often consolidated in the state, contested by movements that 'grow out of people's experience of a concrete lifeworld that is somehow problematic relative to their needs and capacities, and from their attempts to combine, organise and mobilise in order to do something about this'.[46] As just one clear example, Bonner, Delius, and Posel argue in regard to the historiography of the apartheid state, 'apartheid [was] shaped simultaneously by struggles from below and interventions from above'.[47] These ideas of contestation and conservation, and the dialectical relationship between them, are important, because they show what might be entailed in historical process. However, this arguably reduces politics and mobilisation *only* to material needs, which would be historically inaccurate. The experience, to reiterate Thompson's concept, of what is 'somehow problematic' does not need to depend upon the observable or the 'real', even when goals are indeed material. But experience—what people have thought about in relation to their context—moves conservation and contestation.

The consequence of proceeding from experience is that ways people used to think about the world are the necessary interest of historians. 'The facts are "there",' Thompson writes, but 'historians must work hard to enable them to find "their own voices." Not the historian's voice…*their own voices*, even if what they are able to "say" and some part of their vocabulary is determined by the questions which the historian proposes'.[48] The way I read Thompson on 'facts' is that he argues that what a historian can know through archives, once expressed, in the time of its creation, a historically-specific representation of reality. It is then a historian's task

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[43] Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), p. 54.
[44] Frantz Fanon. *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann (London: Pluto Press, [1952] 2008), p. 4.
[45] Cox and Nilsen, *We Make our Own History*, pp. 59-60; 72.
[46] Ibid, pp. 59-60; 72.
[47] Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel. 'The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradiction, Continuity, and Popular Struggle'. In Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel (eds.). *Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press and Wits University Press, 1993), p. 3.
[48] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 41; 57; emphasis original.

to attempt to understand what was being 'said', which might or might not be strange or familiar, but which is never to be assumed. A 'fact' does not 'speak', but a historian encounters facts of a person or people who spoke or wrote or acted (or a combination of speaking and acting filtered through writing). For example, the labels 'native foreigners' or 'vagrants' published in the *Graham's Town Journal* in the 1830s and 1840s are historical facts in the sense they were printed and are the bearers of subjective valuations and linkages, but not historical facts as pointing to empirically observable 'native foreigners' or 'vagrants'. These categories, and others, are developed through the experiential relation of people with their context. The reality of 'native foreigners', 'vagrants', or 'the foreigner' is a function of the important historical interplay between experience and context that Thompson stresses.

This discussion links with what Cox and Nilsen call 'Marx's radical this-worldliness', the idea that social movements reflect the material conditions in which people find themselves and about which they have thought.[49] In Thompson, experience is the concept that introduces the questions of the subjective and subjectivity. The way people think about the real world in which they find themselves is as powerfully 'history' as the conditions of that real world. Experience is not dulled reception of external fact, but a subjective process. The question of rationality, further, does not hinge on *accuracy* of thought, but on entirely subjective understandings of what is appropriate to their context. MacLennan remarks:

> In order to fully register the marxist view that 'men [*sic*] make their own history', Thompson severs that motto from its overstressed counterpart in marxist doctrine: that they do so in circumstances not of their own choosing. For Thompson, the latter dictum (in some hands) can imply that history is *never* made by conscious choice.[50]

The thinking that produced the categories 'native foreigners' or 'vagrants' was not necessarily 'rational'. The realisation—in the sense of making real—of 'native foreigners', 'convicts', or 'vagrants' did not depend upon an accurate or reasoned process of thought on the part of Cape colonists pondering their environment. This is to say that the reality which a historian engages in encountering the facts of historical experience is not an *inevitable* reality. People had ideas, and they speak ultimately and only for themselves, not for a category or process that can be demarcated in 'History'. Thompson's point is that the construction of linear historical narrative through facts must be about understanding the process of structure through the machinations of historical people, and not vice versa.

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[49] Cox and Nilsen, *We Make Our Own History*, p. 30.
[50] MacLennan, 'E. P. Thompson', p. 109.

This approach is not unproblematic, however. Neocosmos posits a critique of the social sciences that encompasses the discipline of history. On the work of Ranajit Guha, a key historian in the Subaltern Studies Collective, which sought to approach history 'from below', by attending to the 'political consciousness of the subaltern', and that consciousness as 'the object of the discipline of history', Neocosmos writes, 'This leads the Subaltern Studies project into an impasse, as the discipline of history…comes up against the limits of its own scientism'. He draws on Spivak: 'the subaltern cannot speak from the confines of history; her voice cannot be heard without transcending the discipline of history itself, as history cannot identify political subjects, only bearers of social location'.[51] What is at issue is what Neocosmos sees as Guha's reliance on 'peasant consciousness' to understand historical subjectivities: 'peasantry' stands in for an investigation of how people thought of themselves, and 'it follows that a subjectivity is sought that conforms to or deviates from what the investigator conceives a "peasant consciousness" to be'.[52] Even a seemingly radical method of doing history, 'from below', is, in Neocosmos's analysis, historicist. However, while Neocosmos remains critical of history as a discipline, distinct similarities can be identified between his evaluation of the social sciences' categories and Thompson's argument against 'static, ahistorical categories'.[53] The difference is that Neocosmos insists on political-subjective categories while Thompson relies upon historicising the categories that we deploy. This difference is taken up in debate between Neocosmos and the Ugandan political scientist Mahmood Mamdani. In his book on the Rwandan genocide, Mamdani argues that to 'understand the dynamic that polarizes political identities, we need to look at polarized identities as the end point of a historical dynamic, rather than positing them as its starting point'.[54] He critiques those analyses that proceed from a static—both ahistorical and apolitical—view of Rwandan society, and African societies in general, by ascribing violence to timeless tribal hatred or 'the dead weight of cultural traditions that demand conformity to power'.[55] This analysis centres both history and politics by historicising the process of politicisation of the ethnic categories that became embroiled in conflict and genocide. Mamdani can be read as taking an approach similar to Cox and Nilsen, in which social movements make history through contestation and the changes that result.

Where Neocosmos finds fault with Mamdani's work is in his 'concerns…with the political, the anatomy of power, so to speak, whereas what I maintain is required today…is a concern

[51] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, p. 99.
[52] See Ibid, pp. 99-107.
[53] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 62.
[54] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 23.
[55] Ibid, p. 199.

with politics as subjectivity, as a thought-practice' that is 'lived' and 'affirmed'.[56] Mamdani's responds similarly to Thompson's 1978 critique of Althusser, arguing that Neocosmos makes a 'religious' argument rather than a scholarly one.[57] In general, argues Mamdani, Neocosmos seeks a universal at the expense of the particular, while also positing generalities about the 'African state' at the expense of attention to historical realities. The critique is not unexpected, since much of Mamdani's work has been devoted to conceptualising the state in Africa through historicisation. Mamdani contends that, in attending to history, the state, and society, his analyses have not neglected the possibility of popular agency and subjectivity, but rather take proper account of their determinants. 'On what ground', he asks, 'can we stand if not location and history?'.[58] Mamdani's concern is with 'historical eventuation', à la E. P. Thompson. Neocosmos argues that this introduces the problematic of historical necessity.

The problem of 'determinants' is a key one. We saw history as a determinant in the analyses of xenophobia that I critiqued in the Introduction. (Indeed, these analyses ignored the *empirical* experience of people who are not xenophobes and people who have mobilised against xenophobia contemporaneously with xenophobic discourses and violence.) Whether one posits history, racism, global capital, nation-statehood, or some combination of them all as the cause of xenophobia, the 'cause' is not determining of political choice and subjectivity. Thompson enjoins us to understand 'determinism' 'by replacing "law of motion" by "logic of process", and by understanding determinism, not as pre-determined programming or the implantation of necessity, but in its senses as the "setting of limits" and the "exerting of pressures"'.[59] Even in rejecting empiricism, Neocosmos does not reject the 'socially located experiences or singularities that give birth to [political subjectivities]'.[60] This dialectical understanding does not diminish the role of the subjective. While internal and unmeasurable, and not reducible to structure or process (because they can be about things that do not exist) subjectivities are themselves determinants, in that politics are thought and mobilised through subjectivity. In thinking historically, both politics and the political are significant. This is not merely to say that 'structure' and 'agency' both have consequences for history, but rather that history most properly attends to both politics as subjective and the political as the organisation of power. Contestation and conservation are clearly embroiled in both.

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[56] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, pp. 9; 14; 488.
[57] Mamdani, 'Place, Interest, and Political Subjectivity', p. 14; Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, p. 44.
[58] Mamdani, 'Place, Interest, and Political Subjectivity', p. 13.
[59] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, pp. 148; 214.
[60] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, p. 42.

This discussion relates to existing historiography of the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century. In one of the important book-length studies of the colonial eastern Cape, *The Making of the Colonial Order*, written at a time of revived interest in the subject in the early 1990s, Clifton Crais is concerned with the 'creation of structure' and the 'emergence of identity' in the historical processes that formed the colonial state. In this, he is interested in history as a method for understanding the construction of power, in the tradition of Foucault. While Crais emphasises the participation of African agents in the historical processes that produced 'colonial order', his book is premised on a version of the question: How did racial minority rule develop in southern Africa? Crais seeks to identify those most important processes from which 'order' emerged. It is a history of the state, and Crais frequently does speak of 'the colonial state' as a historical actor. 'The colonial state', for example, 'remained concerned with constructing a firm line of settlement between Xhosaland and the colony'.[61] That particular concern, however, was at times hotly contested between different political factions within the colonial state, between settlers and different wings of the state, and between the British imperial state and the colonial state or colonists themselves, not to mention the challenges or re-interpretations made by different groups of Africans. Statist 'order' was thus a fleeting consequence of political disorder. If history is characterised more by politics than by order, then we might think differently about how to study history. According to Crais, 'The "rule of law"', with which the British governed the Cape, 'ultimately repudiated the colonial patriarchy upon which the identity of the master rested…. Slavery and peonage thus increasingly became a "problem". For the British both were considered inimical to economic growth, human progress and social stability'.[62] The 'problem', however, only existed from certain political perspectives, not from a 'British' perspective. We cannot assume that wool dealers and indentured servants, however British they all might be, shared the same political objectives (nor can we assume they did not). As Crais himself shows, many British settlers were intent to preserve conditions of slavery or peonage, often in contestation with the state and its order, or even from official positions within the state. The practices, knowledge, economies, and logic of slavery remained important frames of reference in politics, even if they were sometimes outmoded or created a problem for governance.

In Crais's work, which 'explores the ways in which various peoples with radically different ways of perceiving the world around them participated in the constitution of an unequal and

[61] Crais, *The Making of the Colonial Order,* pp. 11; 58; 78.
[62] Ibid, p. 60.

racially divided colonial society',[63] the question of the subjective is eclipsed by the search for colonial order. He is correct to write about a 'decisive shift [that] emerged not simply with the appearance of British rule in the Cape Colony, but also in the actions and perceptions of the British settlers who conquered the land and people of the Eastern Cape from the beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century'.[64] However, where he sees that shift in terms of process, structure, and order, I would see it as political and subjective. The 'actions and perceptions' of British settlers, which usually were oriented towards their own economic and political 'needs', had to do not only with the state *as it came to be*, but more with the relatively changing or stable circumstances in which they found themselves. They were more about what 'ought to be' than what 'came to be'. It is obvious that, throughout history, many things people believed 'ought to be' did not become part of the social order. (Crais sidesteps this problematic by including Africans as agents in the making of the colonial order.) The conclusion I draw from this is that politics 'in history' do not necessarily find themselves in histories of order, structure, identity, and the state. It is essential to the current project that what people thought about the world did not necessarily manufacture 'the present', or even any 'stages' in between 'then' and 'now'. People's ideas may have had little influence on any material historical process of change in state or social formations. The demand that historical ideas do satisfy the course of 'History' undergirds historicism. But historical politics that do not assist us in rationalising 'order' are still political, still historical, still form part of the historical context in which they are thought and acted in relation to that context. Studying them means looking differently at history: not focusing on the 'most important' processes and trends, but on how people endeavoured to explain what they were doing and what they thought ought to be.

In contrast to Crais, Elizabeth Elbourne interrogates Cape colonial history not by seeking to establish its 'order', but through a specific movement—the evangelical missionary movement—and the ideas and transformations linked to it. The expeditions mounted by such organisations as the London Missionary Society were instilled with historical and political meaning, conjoining spiritual and historical frames of reference. In the eighteenth century, Elbourne explains, 'evangelicals imposed their *own* universalist and teleological…narratives about change, history, and progress upon their historical period'. This is precisely what I am interested in. She explains how this 'protestant narrative…described the actions of God and the response of nations and individuals to his unfolding purpose' in the attempt 'to explain the

[63] Ibid, p. 1.
[64] Ibid, p. 87.

upheavals and new possibilities alike of the late eighteenth century in terms of a divine plan for mankind'. '[Evangelicals] used long-standing Protestant narratives about chosen communities and God's grace…to explain change'.[65] Interactions between Africans and Europeans are still central to the historical narrative she crafts, but those interactions have a different sort of historical significance than they do for Crais. The ideas motivating a historical movement of European missionaries in southern Africa, and the ideas and motivations generated by the adoption and adaptation of Christianity by Africans, are subject to ambiguous and unmeasurable ideas about reality and what ought to be, stemming from such subjective positions as religious faith and divine intervention. Historical and political experience, in this instance, tightly articulated with religious experience. The 'order' which Elbourne examines was not determined by its empirical outcomes but by the subjectivities and usages through which Christianity was mobilised in the Cape Colony. Indeed, Elbourne shows that missionaries played an ambiguous role in the formation of the colonial 'order'.[66] Her study, like this one, does not attempt to pick out a 'most important' or 'defining' trend, process, or structure of Cape colonial history, but to understand a facet of daily reality in colonial history. We will see Elbourne's book again, but for the moment our attention will continue to build on the concept, 'experience', and remain with the question of how history is used here in the study of Cape colonial xenophobia.

HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO POLITICS

If xenophobia is political, and not a natural, reactive consequence of history, then how do we historicise politics? The tension introduced above hinges on two discordant theories about the relationship between politics and history, between different kinds of historical sense-making. The first, associated with Thompson's approach and discussed here through the work of Cox and Nilsen, says that politics is part of the 'making' of history, while the second, following Lazarus and Neocosmos, separates politics from history. It is an epistemological distinction, in which either we can understand politics through a study of history (by asking which political ideas and movements emerged, consolidated, and changed a society or societies) and history through politics (history is 'made' in those movements); or we cannot learn about politics through history, because the historical narrative of emerging, consolidating, and changing

[65] Elbourne, *Blood Ground*, p. 27; emphasis original.
[66] Ibid, p. 14.

vacates the subjective and unique character of politics by placing it into a subjective schema which does not originate internally but externally.

I mentioned in the Introduction how Neocosmos makes a historical argument about the politics of the end of apartheid, namely the shift from popular to state politics, which may explain or contribute to people's adoption of xenophobic solutions to political problems in post-apartheid South Africa. Neocosmos's *Thinking Freedom in Africa* attempts to theorise the possibility of what he calls 'emancipatory politics', as well as to theorise how to think about those politics. Neocosmos agrees with Lazarus that politics must be understood as purely subjective, and not derivative of social location, and further that 'emancipatory politics' relies on politics 'in excess' of state thinking and 'interests'. Neocosmos argues that the social sciences, as they are organised and practised today, are unable to exceed the framework of 'state politics'. The consequence is twofold: popular political struggles are not apprehended in the social sciences through their own terms, which indicate specific political subjectivities, but through state (social science) categories—culture, history, identities, class, and so on—and, therefore, such struggles are recognised not for their political content, but, rather, as determined by these categories; their politics are not understood as, to use Neocosmos's phrase, politics 'as such'. Movements, goes Neocosmos's argument, need not only be social (rooted in location, interests, state categories); they can be 'asocial' in the sense that they propose ideas which are not social products but are purely subjective: political prescription. For him, the possibility of 'emancipatory politics' relies on this 'asocial' thought.[67]

Lazarus or Neocosmos argue that politics is necessarily disruptive of history. In this case, 'history' refers specifically to a historicist conceptualisation that delimits politics by what has happened or who did it, rather than what has been thought and how. For them, politics is not ongoing but momentary. As Lazarus expresses it, politics is '*sequential*, that is to say…non-permanent and rare'; it is a 'singularity', which does not conform to 'generalization' or 'totalization'.[68] In this view, the social movements theorised by Cox and Nilsen may not always cohere around a political subjectivity. They may be engaged in contestation, while not in politics; that they exist in history does not denote politics. Unlike 'social movements' à la Cox and Nilsen, which gain expression in the reality of social relations, politics in Lazarus's sense do not necessarily have any bearing on objective reality. Politics can have historicity—it exists

[67] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, pp. 534-535; Michael Neocosmos. 'Navigating the Pitfalls of State Democracy: Thinking NGOs from an Emancipatory Perspective'. Seminar Paper, presented at Unit for the Humanities at Rhodes University, 9 March 2016.
[68] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, p. 4; emphasis original.

and can be recognised—without the framework of linear historical narrative. The consequences for thinking historically, without the benefit of continuity, are serious. This should lead us to ask what is involved either in the movement to conserve or the movement to contest, where 'movement' means either the organisation of collective agency or a shift in collective thinking.

Unlike Thompson, Lazarus announces almost immediately that 'the subjective does not reflect the material conditions of existence'.[69] He is absolutely not a historical materialist. In *Anthropology of the Name*, Lazarus attempts to outline 'a discipline whose purpose is to establish and identify subjective singularities'.[70] The two primary axioms of such a discipline must be, he argues, 'people think' and 'thought is a relation of the real'. The first statement, of course, centres the matter of subjectivity, while the 'real' of the second statement, Lazarus maintains, is a subjective 'real', which does not depend upon knowledge of the empirical world to either (a) be thought or (b) be real—hence the 'relation'. Lazarus is abstruse to a fault, and gives the impression that he finds his ideas too delectable to be taken with salt. There are points, which I will explain, at which I diverge from Lazarus. However, the purpose here is to address the question of what people think, and Lazarus's *Anthropology* is extremely useful in that regard, particularly with respect to (i) a method of inquiry into politics and (ii) the concept 'historical mode of politics'.

In the introduction, I used the phrase 'historical modes', when I asked, *can we think historically about xenophobia without identifying historical roots and continuities, but rather historical modes, meanings and mobilisations*. One possible meaning is simply to look at the ways in which xenophobia manifested in the past. However, Lazarus, has a very specific understanding of what 'historical modes of politics' refers to. He argues, 'Politics is not a permanent instance of societies; it is rare and sequential and is manifested in *historical modes*'.[71] As he explains in the preface to the English translation of *Anthropology of the Name*, a historical mode of politics 'identifies the politics that has taken place (*ayant eu lieu)* or that is taking place (*ayant lieu*) as rare and sequential, that is to say, as existing for a lapse of time that is datable. A historical mode of politics begins and ends'.[72]

Remember that Lazarus proposes the separation of politics and history. He does so in the following terms: 'The objective conditions are not what delimits the space of consciousness. Herein lies the de-historicization. Consciousness is not so much an historical space as a political

[69] Ibid, p. 3
[70] Ibid, p. xx.
[71] Ibid, p. 72; emphasis original.
[72] Ibid, p. ix.

and prescriptive space'.[73] This is to say that consciousness does not rely on process, structure, change, or an understanding of those concepts. In fact, for Lazarus, real politics is the introduction of ideas un-governed by historical logic, because 'history is a thought relation of the State'.[74] History cannot help but reconcile and resolve various modes of subjective and prescriptive thought into the recognisable and harmonious logic of what came before and what came after. Lazarus rejects the practice and understanding of history as the 'science' of politics as a series of 'actions' generative of change (think Cox and Nilsen).[75] He argues that by inquiring into politics as thought, we cannot think in terms of history, but only in terms of 'historical modes'.

Anthropology of the Name postulates a method for approaching politics as thought and for theorising subjectivity without resorting to what he calls 'scientism', or dependence on the objective. Politics, for Lazarus, is not choices based on material conditions but rather 'prescriptions' in thought. Because he states that 'thought is a relation of the real', such prescriptions are about the real but not necessarily mirrored in the real. Prescriptions are about possibilities that may not be reflected materially in the world. The upshot of these ideas, for a historical inquiry, is that what people think about the context in which they live may not derive from the objective conditions of their existence. I say 'may not', because Lazarus makes a distinction between politics 'in interiority' and 'in exteriority'. The former is politics 'thinkable from within itself' and the latter is politics requiring 'at least one external referent', which nevertheless remains a 'specific form of subjectivity'.[76] This is as much about how people think politically as about how a scholar should inquire into their politics. Both are relevant.

Following Lazarus, Neocosmos proposes a method of historical periodisation based on subjective political sequences. He argues, 'the core of the organising principle of periodisation must be distinct sequences of 'state' or 'excessive'[77] subjectivities, along with the socially located experiences or singularities that gave birth to them'. Therefore, political history is 'discontinuous', and not 'defined by a particular state form'. It is possible, for instance, to think of a '"precolonial" colonial form of domination', which in turn 'suggests a postcolonial [colonial] one'.[78] Political sequences, Neocosmos explains, 'are governed by modes of thought, discourses, and names that are hegemonic and more or less contested'; they can be rooted in

[73] Ibid, p. 44.
[74] Ibid, p. 102.
[75] Ibid, p. 13.
[76] Ibid, p. 73.
[77] Excessive of state subjectivities and over existing political and material conditions (see Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*).
[78] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, p. 42.

'modes of politics constructed beyond the state', or 'more commonly…defined by and altered at the level of the state itself''. They may, additionally, combine state subjectivities with non-state (universal) ideas in a dialectic. Thinking of the Cape Colony, we are dealing with a colonial subjectivity, but, keeping Neocosmos's point about colonial 'state forms', we will not be calling this 'colonial subjectivity' in reference to the colonial state, but rather because the historical people themselves—settlers, in this instance—understood themselves to be 'in' the colonial and 'of' the colonial. They had as their referents 'colonial', 'colonists', and 'the Colony', with which they designated themselves and their world. For example, this statement of October 1837, 'What is most to be deplored is the gross hypocrisy which is displayed by those colonial agitators to whom we are opposed…. The anti-colonial faction, who have been the means of reducing this fine colony to its present state of confusion and degradation, and who have driven thousands of our plodding industrious, and loyal fellow-colonists into unwilling exile'.[79] More than simply pointing to an identity, these and other referents, which frequently invoke colonial history and reflect colonial subjectivity, are how many European settlers of the Cape Colony understood the problems of politics and the ideas through which they framed possible solutions. Most importantly for the present research, political sequences 'indicat[e]…how political problems and solutions… are organized in thought and deployed in practice'.[80] When considering political sequences, we are asking, what do people identify as the problems for politics, and how do they conceive of the solutions?

Lazarus, Neocosmos, and others, such as Alessandro Russo, have spent time working out specific sequences of 'historical modes of politics': for example, in Lazarus, the '[French] Revolutionary mode' and the 'Bolshevik mode'; in Neocosmos, who attempts to think in these terms about politics in Africa, we find the sequences of the 'National Liberation mode' and the 'People's Power mode'. In the present inquiry into Cape colonial history, I am not interested to identify the beginning or the ending of specific political sequences. I do not find it a compelling project, since the three scholars mentioned here are firmly attached to historicising formulations of Marxist thought from within a Marxist or post-Marxist perspective. I am not. Firstly, Marxist thought was not current in the Cape Colony of the first half of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the approach would require investigating subjectivities in a way that could take us quite far away from the politicisation of foreignness. It would require asking, if Lazarus,

[79] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (302), 12 October 1837.
[80] Michael Neocosmos. 'The Nation and Its Politics: Fanon, Emancipatory Nationalism, and Political Sequences'. In Nigel Gibson (ed.) *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 188.

Neocosmos, and Russo are taken as examples, what was the defining political question of the day, to which we can put a name? I am not arguing that xenophobia was the most important aspect of politics in a certain context, let alone the defining one, but choosing to and finding it relevant to focus on xenophobia, nonetheless. Furthermore, the identification of unique political sequences is patently negligent of various other political ideas that were contemporary.

For example, Russo argues, 'The main novelty of the sixties', understood by Russo as a political sequence and not the period from 1960 to 1969, 'was the radical re-examination of solutions that had hitherto appeared to be the most consolidated – namely, the promise that the communist parties and the socialist states guaranteed the political existence of workers'.[81] This is certainly of prime significance to someone reflecting on the history of the thought of socialism, or to people who have participated or are participating in political movements that made such a re-examination, but in fact it appears to be no less artificial a delimitation of political time than the more standard formulations of historians like 'Atlantic history', 'post-apartheid', or 'the long nineteenth century'. It accedes to 'historicism' in that it makes claims that 'what they were actually doing and thinking was such-and-such'. Did all Marxists participating, for example, in anti-colonial struggle share the same concern with questions of the party? Did people who were unfamiliar with Marxism unwittingly participate in Russo's re-examination? Russo's discussion of Marxist history may be astute, but it is generalised and Euro-centric.

However, these theories put standard periodisations into perspective, and challenge us to think differently about how we demarcate historical time and what is important in making decisions about 'when' we are talking about. The attention to historical modes shows, at least, how politics can be the basis for thinking about historical time, even with the problems I have pointed out. What is attractive in Lazarus's ideas about history is that they beg similar questions to those that guide this research: how can we do history and think historically without seeking out that continuum and that progression, from 'x' to xenophobia? How can we think historically about xenophobia without searching for its origin in the past? In proposing an answer, I look to another important concept from Lazarus, upon which the 'historical mode of politics' relies: the 'site'. This returns us to the idea of the 'foreigner'. Lazarus writes:

> *Historical mode* is the category authorizing the identification of a politics from within itself. We arrive then at the following thesis: the mode is the relation of a politics to its thought. Thus we can no longer speak of politics in general. There are only modes, and every mode configures,

[81] Alessandro Russo. 'The Sixties and Us'. In Alex Taek-Gwang Lee and Slavoj Žižek (eds.) *The Idea of Communism 3: The Seoul Conference* (London: Verso, 2016), p. 141.

> through its places, the space of the unnameable name of this singular politics. The category is the mode and it is nameable. In every mode, one or more sites appear that identify the singularity and prove to be the sites of the name.[82]

Clarifying the issue of unnameable names will not occupy our time here, except to say that it is through this rather cumbersome device that Lazarus separates 'category' from 'politics', the former being something of 'the order of knowledge' and the latter not.[83] The 'site' or 'place' are where we can identify modes of politics. An example from Lazarus is the Party for the 'Bolshevik mode'. Site and place are obviously not only spatial or physical referents. Perhaps the most important point adopted from Lazarus here is this: 'A site is not a name; it is a prescription, which is to say that it is a subjective site'.[84] A site is a prescription. When we look, therefore, at xenophobia in terms of historical modes of politics, we are looking to identify the sites/prescriptions in which it can be apprehended. I argue that xenophobia is contingent on 'the foreigner' as its site: the foreigner is a subjective prescription. This would signify, for Lazarus, a 'mode in exteriority' in that it 'requires at least one external referent', which is, remember, 'nonetheless…a specific form of subjectivity'.[85]

Recall the excerpt from Lazarus on revolution. One may disagree with Lazarus's argument that only the French Revolution (and even then only from 1792 to 1794) can be called 'revolution' and the politics 'revolutionary', while still accepting the point that there is something singular about politics in each of the historical moments deemed 'revolution', which is glossed over in the application of 'revolution' as a structural category denoting change. In fact, I do disagree with the former and accept the latter. What Lazarus proposes is that we not only look to the historical context in which revolution occurs to understand it: that is, understanding it does not mean transposing the concept revolution into different contexts. Instead we must look at what was internally and politically unique about the politics that were singularly of that context. Revolution then depends neither on structural referents nor historical ones, at least when historical also refers to the structural. Let us think of xenophobia in the same fashion as 'revolution'. That way, thinking historically signals not only 'revolution in the context of class struggle', or 'xenophobia in the context of nation states' or 'post-apartheid South Africa'. These reflect history read from the present, as Thompson pointed out. It proposes instead an inquiry into the prescriptions on politics, on history, and (perhaps I diverge

[82] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, p. 139; emphasis original.
[83] Ibid, p. 138.
[84] Ibid, p. 144.
[85] Ibid, p. 73.

from Lazarus) on the material world that obtain, subjectively, in relation with context. Neocosmos articulates this with respect to political subjectivity, writing of xenophobia as one possible 'set of ideological parameters within which solutions to our pressing problems are being conceived'.[86] The word 'xenophobia' can signify something that requires conceptualisation in relation to context, not a definition to be dropped into context.

Let us preserve xenophobia as a category, but not a category that denotes specific structural conditions. It denotes only that a mode of politics has a site that expresses 'the foreigner', which is threatening. The example of the English parish is worth mentioning again. Such structural factors as the end of apartheid or global capitalism do not function for that context. The end of apartheid is simply irrelevant. Global capitalism might glance against the parish, during certain times, but it does not initiate the parish as an institution or the subjectivities associated with the parish. Nationalism—which Snell suggests may be relevant, appearing at different times in local aversions for the Irish or the French—does not always structure the problem of 'foreigner', unless we reconfigure 'nationalism' to refer, for much of three centuries, to the English parish.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, the argument has been made to me that 'xenophobia' is a 'liberal' concept, which originates in post-apartheid conditions; that, instead, another concept such as 'foreignness' should be used. I do not hold with that (entirely). Xenophobia cannot continue to be thought in terms that make it the special product of South Africa, vintage 1994. More importantly, replacing the concept with another will never safeguard us against anachronisms. 'Foreignness' is not a stable concept, nor does it always signal a fear or threat. I preserve the concept xenophobia, because it signals modes of politicising the foreigner as threatening. This is distinctly different than defining xenophobia. Xenophobia must only be a category for inquiry, in the way Lazarus understands 'politics' as a category, and not for a trans-historical definition beginning with 'xenophobia *is*…'. In this, I agree with Lazarus, as far as his argument that 'Whenever revolution takes on a structural sense, which is the case in history, the category becomes inoperative as far as the process of analysis of politics is concerned'.[87] The inquiry must take 'the foreigner' as its starting point, because xenophobia can only have meaning where 'the foreigner' posits a subjective threat. And that is key, as well—that it is a subjective threat, not necessarily or only a material threat. Neocosmos makes the point well in regard to recent xenophobic mobilisations in South Africa: 'poverty can only

[86] Neocosmos, 'The Politics of Fear', p. 592.
[87] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, p. 179.

account for the powerlessness, frustration and desperation of the perpetrators, but not for their target'.[88]

XENOPHOBIA AND HISTORY

Lazarus proposes a method of inquiry into politics. Because he theorises politics as thought, he is also suggesting an approach to the fact that people think, and that their thinking sometimes entails prescriptions, or ideas about what ought to be or what ought to have happened. In a moment of philosophical melodrama, he announces that 'the real…erupts into thought as that which will be at stake and in question, for thought to think'.[89] 'Ought' involves, of course, a question of the subjective 'is'. If, as we shall see, European settlers in the eastern region of the Cape Colony thought that Africans from beyond the colonial frontier ought not to have access to 'colonial' land and cattle, then this is not the result of there being Africans, a frontier, or colonial land and colonial cattle, but of a specific and subjective understanding of how circumstances ought to be and how relationships ought to unfold. This is not an argument about 'constructs'. It does not suggest that the cattle, the land, or a 'frontier' were not real, or that differences did not exist between Africans and Europeans inhabiting space in southern Africa. It is also not to say that they should be seen as somehow compromised as concepts by the existence of ideologies. It simply relates the fact that, in politics, real things take particular places in how people think about what ought to be and what is. 'Ought' and 'is' have historical referents and are historical.

What does this mean? As I have been critical of the approach to twenty-first century xenophobia, which, deploying history, says 'it has happened because of another thing in the past', I will not apply the same approach to politics in the Cape Colony between 1800 and 1850. I will not say, 'this politics exists because of something that came before'. An important aspect of this historical theory of xenophobia is that, while it deploys the important historical concepts, process, period, politics, and subjectivity, it does not seek to locate Cape colonial xenophobia's place in linear history. Process, here, does not demand that xenophobia changes how we conceptualise the narrative of the Cape Colony, of African resistance to colonialism, or the longer history of South Africa. It does not argue that a proper analysis of South African history centers xenophobia as the driving force of Cape Colony politics. Likewise, it does not

[88] Neocosmos, 'The Politics of Fear', p. 588.
[89] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, p. 62.

propose a 'decade of xenophobia' or some other periodisation that refers to a history of xenophobia; nor does it attempt to argue that xenophobia defined Cape colonial politics, although the empirical material does show that xenophobia was an important feature of those politics. This remains a project of thinking about xenophobia through history, by employing politics as the framework for thought.

The necessary clarification, however, is when people, relating their understanding of the world, make prescriptive statements about 'why it is this way'. This appears in *their* use of specific historical referents, not in a historian's ability to draw continuous lines between historical events or processes. This emerges in the ideas and words given by these historical people. There are, as will be discussed, clear referents to English colonial experience in Ireland—'Ireland' and 'the Irish' take on historical meanings through which settlers read their present and future: a particular historical teleology. This articulates history with what Cox and Nilsen frame as 'dominant groups' attempts to represent the existing social order as natural, purposive and legitimate'.[90] For the historian, it does not mean a narrative along the following lines: English colonialism in Ireland, whether from the twelfth or the sixteenth century, produced certain categories of thought which, between two and three centuries later, provided the reasons why English settlers in the Cape Colony were xenophobic. Nor is it: the rebellion of the United Irishmen in the closing years of the eighteenth century engendered a xenophobic colonial outlook among the English. Although 'closer' to the English settlement of the Cape in terms of historical time, making connections rather more rational than over six or three centuries, this latter example still depends on an origins story. The Elizabethan conquest and the United Irishmen are not so many cattle on the Cape frontier. However, for settlers on that frontier, Ireland offered one of the frameworks through which they identified the problems of the frontier, the 'problem' of the Xhosa, and the solutions. The same is true of 'vagrants' and 'vagrancy', which use the historical references of the English poor laws. Again, it is not because the historian decides—with good evidence—that it is so, but because the Cape settlers referenced what were for them the historical problems of the poor; *historical* in the sense that what ought to be was comprised and compromised in that problem. 'Vagrants', like 'immigrants', do not naturally induce disgust, and neither is disgust structurally induced. Vagrants are intruders not on a specific piece of property *only*, but into a teleology of history. By intruding on history, they become a threat.

[90] Cox and Nilsen, *We Make Our Own History*, p. 93.

I do not think this suggestion is flippant. I anticipate the argument that crops trampled by colonial 'vagrants' cattle, or the sight of 'labour' wandering about free and unexploited, mattered more to the Cape xenophobe than any subjective position in relation to history. I also anticipate the critique that I am stuffing long-deceased minds with ideas about history when in fact they were concerned with their property and their livelihoods. But then do not property and livelihoods become more structures, eliciting xenophobia from unwitting ranchers? Somewhere between that and (our conception of) history falls the fulcrum. The intermediate question must be about 'experience', as Thompson understands it. Neocosmos writes that 'socially located experiences or singularities give birth' to subjectivities, which can either 'express' or 'exceed' the politics of the state (or do both in dialectical relationship).[91] Consider the understandings of history related in the following to quotations.

In 1845, the *Graham's Town Journal* reprinted a column published in England in the *Quarterly Review*, in which the 'Irish question' could much better be called the 'Irish certainty': 'You may talk, indeed, of separating the nations; but nothing—and even the mutual massacre of all the British in Ireland, and all the Irish in Britain—could separate the people.'[92] There is no history—despite the 'grand nostrums now in vogue—Independence, Repeal of the Union, and Federalism', despite even extermination—apart from the history of Union of British and Irish people. This is nothing if not a prescription on history. No variety of Irish political activity aimed at some other historical eventuation is even possible.

Take another example, from a *Graham's Town Journal* editorial in 1849: 'Vagrant laws and poor laws are, it has been observed, indications of civilized freedom. Under feudal systems, or in slave countries, the vassal or the slave is viewed as the property of the upper classes, and looked after the same as the goods and chattels of the party interested. Where a people are rationally free, the State takes upon itself this supervision and provision, and laws suited to the circumstances of the country are enacted accordingly'.[93] This is not only a historical argument in that it refers to times past, but a historical argument in that makes a prescription on what ought to be. Here we see a teleology of 'civilized freedom', from which we can gather a number of other characteristics about the economy and the state. Why is the vagrant law an indication of this history? Because 'the vagrant' threatens this history, by suggesting 'another history' is possible.

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[91] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, p. 42.
[92] *Graham's Town Journal*, XIV (712), 31 July 1845.
[93] *Graham's Town Journal*, VXIII (907), 28 April 1849.

Both vagrancy and Irish politics will be discussed in later chapters on the Cape Colony. For the moment, we can look at another example of 'ought' in historical terms. The Haitian philosopher Michel-Rolph Trouillot considers the eighteenth-century narrative of West Indian slave owners that a peaceful slavery could and did exist. It was an 'ontology' he writes, based on the idea that enslaved Africans could not 'envision freedom', and that the 'possibility of revolutionary uprising in the slave plantations, let alone a successful one leading the creation of an independent state' did not exist.[94] This mirrors the historical impossibility of Irish independence, and the certainty of 'civilized freedom'. This 'ontology' was no less subjectively real because of the fact (a historical one) that enslaved people did not acquiesce to the narrative, and thought and acted in ways that disrupted it. Therefore, historical context is not only the objective reality that a great number of enslaved people, throughout the duration of enslavement in the Atlantic system, resisted their oppression, but also the subjective reality that their resistance intruded upon and threatened. The reaction to this intrusion, of course, should not be understood to be 'xenophobic', except where it represents the threat through the figure of 'the foreigner' and his or her 'foreignness'.

Trouillot asks, 'can historical narratives convey plots that are unthinkable in the world within which these narratives take place? How does one write a history of the impossible?'.[95] Here, the questions are about the boundaries placed on the possible, but also the reasons that people create those boundaries. It was not out of racist ignorance, but racist fear, that the possibility of slave revolt leading to independence was denied historical possibility. I am thinking here of Stoler's formulation that what, in her study, Dutch colonialists 'did not know' was as important as what they 'knew'. What they 'did not know' shaped their responses to the world they lived as much as any of the observable, empirical information they encountered.[96] People can fear what they do not know—be it plots by slaves, the Irish, the Xhosa; or daily questions of the economy, cattle, or land—as readily as what they do know. They depend upon a certain idea—a prescription—of what the future ought to be. And the two, knowing and not knowing, are most often intertwined. The resistance of oppressed people can be known, even while it is denied: 'The Negroes are very obedient and will always be'; 'You may talk…of separating nations; but nothing…could separate the people'. These are clearly subjective prescriptions on the real, as Lazarus would say. Even in such denials we can observe the fear

[94] Michel-Rolph Trouillot. *Silencing the Past*: *Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), pp. 72-73.
[95] Ibid, p. 73.
[96] Ann Laura Stoler. *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 19-21.

of historical eventuation, as Thompson would say, that does not match up with what 'ought' to be or simply 'is'.

Trouillot's argument, that the Haitian revolution was a 'non-event', 'unthinkable even as it happened', and Stoler's point about fear of the unknown are crucial. A historical theory of xenophobia takes account of fear of the 'historical unknown' or 'historical stranger' or the 'historical foreign', which is associated with certain people who are understood to represent a threat to the historically known, the historically admissible, and historical continuity (i.e. History). Plenty of people can threaten History who are not perceived to be 'foreign', who cannot be represented in that way. However, there are times when they most certainly are, when 'foreignness' is the language of threat and 'the foreigner' is a site of political discourse. The argument can also be made, of course, that people will invoke 'the foreigner' strategically. It is difficult to say what is fear of the foreign or simply a ploy, as in the case of a United States judge in the 1830s, who argued that 'artificial combinations' of workers were 'of foreign origin and…mainly upheld by foreigners'.[97] This particular judge may not have been personally afraid of foreigners. However, the accusation of foreignness—the politicisation of foreignness—served to convey the threatening, impermissible character of 'combinations' of workers. *This* is the historical fact that interests us. Likewise, even if the fear of slave uprisings was the key in United States and the British Caribbean, it was through the 'foreignness' of Haitian or Francophone slaves, of Haitian and French ideas that fear was expressed and became sensible to people. The politicisation of foreignness would not work strategically unless it meant something to people. In certain historical contexts, 'the foreigner' is a site in the thought of people seeking to contest or conserve the conditions in which they live.

This brings us back to Thompson and 'process', which, in his historical materialism, forms the basis of historical inquiry. Process involves the movements for contestation and conservation, whether we mean movements as organised interests or not. It is important that conservation and contestation do not signify ideological positions. The desire to conserve and Conservatism are not the same thing. Nor is this only about antagonism between classes or other elements of society expressing relative power. That certainly exists and has existed historically, leading Cox and Nilsen to speak in terms of social movements from 'above' or 'below'. Politics, however, is much too complex to be only that. The settler community of the Cape Colony between, say, 1820 and 1850, had conflicted attachments to political ideas around

[97] Howard Zinn. *A People's History of the United States, from 1492 to Present*. (London: Longman, [1980] 1996), p. 218.

what we can call nationalism, constitutionalism, colonialism, separatism, imperialism, liberalism, capitalism, and even feudalism: a muddle, to be sure, that does not even begin to address the question of national origin, whether English, Dutch, French, Irish, (not to mention the non-settler, indigenous population of the colony) or class, whether landowner, indentured servant, or military aristocrat. Furthermore, the political decisions people made did not always conform to how we can expect 'the English' or 'the' indentured servant to behave. It is too complex to designate a generalised 'above' or 'below'. The Xhosa, although under duress and losing land to the colony for a century, hardly represent a movement 'from below' except when viewed from a later date after we know what happened in the course of European colonialism. Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe touches on this when he argues that African being and African history have been read through the de-subjectifying lens of slavery, colonialism and apartheid.[98] Whether in the colony or outside it, people thought and acted, sometimes organised and mobilised, to conserve or contest aspects of their conditions, and not only framed around the historical antagonism between 'colonialism' and 'resistance'. The South Africa historian, Dan O'Meara, critiques historiography that makes such assumptions. He writes, 'the nature, trajectory, and scope' of change is not 'already contained in the crisis as it develops'.[99] Thompson's formulation speaks more closely to the matters of the subjective and the contingent: 'For any living generation in any "now", the ways in which they "handle" experience defies prediction and escapes from any narrow definition of determination'.[100] Nevertheless, for these two historical materialists, the root of history is process.

'Process' captures the thinking and movement of conservation or contestation: it places politics in history as the thinking and movement of people. As process for conservation and/or contestation, xenophobia relates to the fear of a threat, the site of which is 'the foreigner'. The 'fear of politics' is a way of thinking of the threat of people as historical beings, capable of politics, capable of thought or action that are disruptive of the hegemonic 'ought' and 'is' of teleological history. Therein lies a transient reconciliation between politics making history (people acting and changing their world) and politics separated from history (subjective prescriptions 'on the real'). Thinking with Stoler, or Trouillot, we can see how the subjective is part of historical process. In developing a historical theory of xenophobia, I am inclined, with Thompson, to defend historical knowledge and the discipline of history but also to

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[98] Achille Mbembe. 'African Modes of Self-Writing'. Translated by Steven Rendall. *Public Culture* 14(1), 2002, pp. 239-273.
[99] Dan O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994* (Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996), p. 486.
[100] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 230.

recognise, with Neocosmos or Lazarus, that investigating historical politics must not proceed from reducing politics to a consciousness derived from 'social location', but rather from attempting to understand the dialectic of location and thought inherent to political subjectivities, in their own terms.

Meaningfully, Neocosmos opens *Thinking Freedom* via a critique of Francis Fukuyama, with the statement that 'to assert the end of history also amounts in fact to asserting the end of thought'.[101] Despite Neocosmos's critique of history as a discipline, there remains a way in which history, politics (as thought), and people are all interrelated. The thinking of politics entails the possibility of change made to history and substantiates historical contingency. For Cox and Nilsen, 'It is human thought and action which makes it possible to change how the social world works; any serious movement for change starts from some version of this realisation, but it remains a challenge to think and act from this broad perspective of possibility'.[102] They are more concerned with movements of contestation 'from below', but the facts of thought and action remain for conservation, as well. All of the scholars referred to in this chapter have expressed some version of people thinking as historically significant and necessary to politics. Xenophobia, whether a mode of contestation, conservation, or both, is a historical process of thought and activity aimed at 'realisation' of notions of history based in political prescription. This is the core *historical* part of a historical theory of xenophobia: the effort to think of conservation and contestation as subjective political positions in relation to (or emerging in the mobilisation of) historical processes.

The theoretical tension around history and politics that has framed this chapter provides a useful way to think through the problems of process and subjectivity as they relate to history. The questions we asked about history's relationship to politics are better situated inside this tension than on either side of it. We saw that Thompson emphasised process, while Lazarus or Neocosmos pointed to subjectivity. But despite this theoretical divide, Thompson's historical materialism required strict attention to context and experience, and Lazarus discussed political subjectivity as singular, unique, and momentary. I understand both of these positions as necessitating close attention to historical context and contingency. As taking place in history, xenophobia requires that contextual attention; as politics, xenophobia is contingent and subjective, and the whole of it cannot be understood from external context alone. Neocosmos diverges from Lazarus by theorising the dialectical relationship between 'excessive' and

[101] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, p. xvi.
[102] Cox and Nilsen, *We Make our Own History*, p. 31.

'expressive' subjectivities. That is to say that the thinking of political subjectivity relates to the extant—what for a historian becomes context—while not being limited to thinking what already exists. Thus, political movements express contradictions while also having the capability of overcoming social contradictions.[103] This goes some way to bridging the role of 'experience' of the material in Thompson with the thought of the purely subjective in Lazarus. It also allows us to think of 'process' without necessarily being preoccupied with before-and-after, or the impact that certain ideas or mobilisations had 'on history'. This all has to do with conceptualising xenophobia as particular and historical, rather than normative and timeless.

The chapter began with a discussion of 'the foreigner', a brief look at the politicisation of different historical 'foreigners'. We saw, after a discussion of Lazarus's theory of politics, that 'the foreigner', when conceived of as a threat was the 'site' at which we can investigate historical modes of xenophobia. This history of xenophobia in the Cape Colony seeks to understand how 'the foreigner' has been identified historically, and how the threat seen to be posed by the foreigner was explained. Moreover, I show that 'the foreigner' emerged in the Cape Colony as a political and politicised concept in the process of subjectivity and movement, understood in terms of the key concepts of this chapter: 'experience', contestation-conservation, thought as a 'relation of the real', politics as prescription, and history.

[103] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, pp. 40; 152; 540.

3.
READING POLITICS IN THE ARCHIVES

This study is also historical in the sense that it relies on the interpretation and analysis of historical materials: the archival records of the Cape Colony. My interpretation of these archives is concerned with the question of politics, as I explained in the previous chapter. In certain ways, it moves forward from Ann Laura Stoler's point that 'if colonial documents reflected the supremacy of reason, they also recorded an emotional economy manifest in disparate understandings of what was imagined, what was feared, what was witnessed and what was overheard'.[1] It is about what historical subjects 'knew' empirically and what they 'knew' politically, and the intermixture of the two. Methodologically, this involves what we can glean from the archive about how some people in specific historical contexts thought about and understood their situation. This means that subjectivity is at stake in my reading of the archives. I identify political movements in which subjectivities are evident. These movements are the subjects of the following chapters, but, in brief, they are the politics of the frontier, the politics of vagrancy, and anti-convictism. This chapter focuses on the archive I have used and how I have read these politics in the archive.

Any historical study that uses colonial archives should take seriously Norman Etherington's attempt to write a history from a vantage point that challenges the 'pernicious tradition of viewing South African history through the eyes of white colonists'.[2] However, the perspectives probed in this research are white, colonial ones, complete with their perniciousness. That alternative vantage point Etherington advocates is not easily possible. Still, in examining colonial narratives and probing the perspectives of colonists, we do not have to accept the propositions or prescriptions that their narratives entail. I am reading this archive not as 'South African history', but as the evidence of the multiple political projects and commitments that British colonists brought into or made within the Cape Colony, in the early- and mid-1800s. Within that frame, I am reading for the colonists' understanding of foreignness as threat, and for signals of how they collectively thought and addressed that perceived and politicised foreignness. I have searched for the history of *that*, not of the Cape Colony itself, and not, certainly, of the place-period called 'South Africa'.

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[1] Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, pp. 92-93.
[2] Etherington, *The Great Treks*, p. xiii.

I am taking seriously settler politics because we can learn something from them about the politicisation of foreignness as imagined threat, not because their histories are inherently more important than any indigenous histories, practices, or discourses. Whether the Xhosa or other Africans facing colonisation were 'xenophobes' is not a question I think worthy of consideration. Others have made such arguments: for example, that Haiti after its independence in 1804 failed to flourish because of a xenophobia that hamstrung its international trade,[3] and it reads like what it is: laying blame with targets of North American and European economic racism for not acceding to free trade capitalism in partnership with their oppressors. That Africans in the nineteenth century had vocabularies of difference or foreignness is assumed. South Africa historian of the eastern Cape Jeff Peires notes the evolution of Xhosa terms for the European people in their purview from 'the polite term *abantu abasemzini* (people of another house)' to '*amagwangqa* (pale beasts) or even *amaramncwa* (beasts of prey)', for a people who, through preserving their separateness and generally behaving with hostility, remained 'outside the moral community'.[4] Of course, this was in the context of conquest, atrocity, deceit, and expropriation by Europeans; generally, Xhosa politics of the period are framed as 'resistance', and I see no cause for thinking differently. Here, the focus is the politicisations of foreignness that emerge in Cape Colony settler politics.

Following these politics in the historical sources has often meant doing what some scholars of the archive find a bit unfashionable: approaching the archive as something of an excavation site, from which to 'extract' tidbits of information, still caked in the dust of newborn 'facts'. As Verne Harris notes, 'Research in archives is not only about painstaking unearthing of all records relevant to one's research topic'.[5] Because 'xenophobia' has not been a lens through which Cape colonial histories, politics, or archives have been approached, a certain amount of excavation and extraction have been necessary. This is an old-fashioned project of rummaging rather than of meta-analysis of the archive. Showing and interpreting Cape xenophobia in its modes, meanings, and mobilisations first means unearthing it. Still, rummagers can reflect.

The 'Cambridge School' of contextualist historians offers some guidance in this reflection. As Mark Bevir has observed, the Cambridge School comprises diverse and sometimes

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[3] Robert K. Lacerte. 'Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843'. *The Americas* 37(4), 1981, pp. 499-515.
[4] J. B. Peires. *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1981] 1982), p. 44.
[5] Verne Harris. *Exploring Archives: An Introduction to Archival Ideas and Practice in South Africa* (Pretoria: National Archives of South Africa, [1997] 2000), p. 21.

conflicting approaches to the theory of historiography,[6] but a brief discussion of key ideas from two of its most prominent figures, Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock, is worthwhile. Writing in 1969, the British historian Quentin Skinner pointed out two competing historical methodologies relevant to the readings of texts: a first which seeks to derive the meaning of a text from its context, and a second which saw the text as independently able to convey its meaning.[7] (Here we are also once more in the territory of Hayden White, who explored the problematisation of 'the' text, hinging on the 'undecidability of the question of where the text ends and the context begins and nature of their relationship'.[8]) Skinner observes two clear problems with the reliance on the text alone, which are the historian's introduction of anachronism by identifying lineage where there is only similarity (lack of historical context) and the related issue of 'too readily "reading in"' an idea that a historical author 'had no intention to convey'.[9] The importance of Skinner's work to this study is that he was concerned with intellectual history and with a methodology of intellectual history that parallels, in certain ways, the discussion of the preceding chapter, which is critical of reading historical ideas from the position of what they are expected to address, or else as a 'history of thoughts which no one ever actually succeeded in thinking, at a level of coherence which no one ever actually attained'[10] (the intellectual version of early nineteenth-century British colonialism operating through the same concerns as twenty-first century analysis of twentieth-century apartheid). Contextualisation of historical texts and statements, according to Skinner, must involve engagement with the 'relations between various different statements within the same general context'.[11] A second and even more important aspect of Skinner's critique is in using an 'idea' as 'an appropriate unit of historical investigation'.[12] This relates quite closely to the discussion of 'the foreigner' in the previous chapter, which demonstrated the historical mutability of the word and the category. To quote Skinner at length:

> if we wish to understand a given idea, even within a given culture and at a given time, we cannot simply concentrate…on studying the forms of words involved. For the words denoting the idea may be used…with varying and quite incompatible intentions. We cannot even hope that a sense of the context of utterance will necessarily resolve this problem. Rather we must study all the various situations, which may change in complex ways, in which the given form of words can logically be used - all the functions the words can serve, all the various things that can be

[6] Mark Bevir. 'The Contextual Approach'. In George Klosko (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 11; 14.
[7] Quentin Skinner. 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas'. *History and Theory* 8(1), 1969, p. 3.
[8] White, *The Content of Form*, p. 186.
[9] Skinner, 'Meaning', pp. 7-10.
[10] Ibid, p. 13-15; 18.
[11] Ibid, p. 47.
[12] Ibid, p. 36.

> done with them. The great mistake lies not merely in looking for the "essential meaning" of the "idea" as something which must necessarily "remain the same," but even in thinking of any "essential" meaning (to which individual writers "contribute") at all.[13]

The method of archival reading used here was not only to seek out instances of the word 'foreign' and deduce xenophobia from them. As I note in Chapter 5, the most common usage of 'foreign' in colonial documents was actually in reference to trans-oceanic trade: foreign goods or foreign ships. In many cases, foreignness was conveyed through different terminology, highly dependent upon local political contexts, and various categorisations of people took on the role of 'the foreigner'. I am not so much concerned with an 'idea' of the foreigner and its movement or transformation through history but with its politicisation in discourse and mobilisation in historical context. Skinner is also critical of certain contextual approaches (and these parallel the differently framed argument typified by Lazarus and Neocosmos in Chapter 2), which attempt to show 'how far' a historical author 'accepted and so reflected the new social structure'.[14] I am also not seeking to find that coherence—for example, what is 'colonial' about the colonists' politics—but rather to elaborate and contextualise specific historical political developments.

Skinner's fellow Cambridger J. G. A. Pocock's discussions of language are particularly relevant here and in the following chapters, as we explore and historicise the inventory of political categories and concepts that Cape colonists deployed. According to Pocock, '[People] think by communicating language systems; these systems help to constitute both their conceptual worlds and the authority-structures, or social worlds, related to these'.[15] I do not share Pocock's desire to identify the paradigms in which historical actors and authors were able to express themselves; the discussion of the previous chapter should signal clearly that I do not approach the archive from the position that 'paradigms (or languages) constitute the meanings of texts, since they give authors the intentions they can have'.[16] Instead, I reverse this assumption, and show how the Cape Colony's political movements and discourses gave words the 'intentions' they can have. The 'vagrant', for example, was uttered with new and unique intent in the course of colonial politics in southern Africa, which constituted a historical and political departure; it was not paradigmatic, but inventive (if utterly reactionary). The importance of Lazarus and political subjectivity to this study must temper any use of

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[13] Ibid, pp. 36-37.
[14] Ibid, p. 41.
[15] J. G. A. Pocock. *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 15.
[16] Bevir, 'The Contextual Approach', p. 17.

'Cambridge School' theory or methodology, because of the preeminence assigned to subjectivity in the making of politics. I do not adhere to Skinner's methodology in which, 'The essential question which we therefore confront, in studying any given text, is what its author, in writing at the time he [*sic*] did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate'.[17] A historical author could have been intending to communicate anything, whether sensible to even a careful scholar of context and meaning or insensible even to contemporaries. That the texts consulted in the course of writing this study *do* offer evidence of coherence with a history and knowledge of empire and of mobility does not negate this difference in approach. Nonetheless, I am appreciative of the deep attention to context and the importance of the interactions between context and text and vocabulary and history that are perhaps best elaborated by the Cambridge contextualists. With that in mind, we can turn to the archives themselves.

I rely on a set of primary sources produced between the last decade of the eighteenth century and the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. Four newspapers—*The Graham's Town Journal*, *The Cape Frontier Times*, *The Cape Town Mail*, and *The South African Commercial Advertiser*—form the backbone of this archive. What was written in these periodicals laid out the patterns with which I read other sources. The value of weeklies, or, in the case of the *Commercial Advertiser*, a bi-weekly, is that a longer arc of trend, public interest and activity, or at least editorial interest, can be quite easily identified. Through a kind of 'quadrangulation' across these papers, we can get a sense of what mattered more to some editors, less to others, and what mattered to all of them. We see when particular issues were on the colony's mind, and what explanations of local problems were commonplace. These papers are supported by the official records of the colony collected by George McCall Theal at the turn of the twentieth century, covering the years 1793-1831. These offer an often-technocratic counterpoint to the more opinionated output of the newspapermen, yet biases, trends, and individual perspectives sometimes shine through the formality of imperial correspondence. These are supplemented, on occasion, with government documents and correspondence not compiled by Theal. Journals and letter collections by colonists or officials at the Cape form the last group of texts from which this history is assembled. In different chapters, different combinations of these sources take precedence. Because the newspapers are the most often cited sources here, some discussion of how I have used them follows.

[17] Skinner, 'Meaning', pp. 48-49.

Robert Godlonton, printer by trade, stepped into Graham's outpost in the hollow in the hills in the year 1820, one of between four and five thousand new British settlers to the Cape Colony in that year. The printing press that Godlonton had brought over from England had been confiscated by the Governor of the Cape Colony, Donkin, for fear that printers and newspapermen would resort to 'scattering firebrands along the Eastern frontier'.[18] The governor's fear is ironic, in hindsight: ironic because within two decades Godlonton became one of the Cape Colony's foremost conservative voices of the interests of colony and commerce, who doused firebrands in baths of lead articles, wherever he saw a spark. Yet Donkin's effort to hinder political conversation in the colony points to a broader fear of subversion, which marked colonial discourse from the governor at Cape Town to the Frontier Farmer far to the east.

In 1834, Godlonton, working as a clerk for the government, took up with the young L. H. Meurant, printer, editor, and publisher of the three-year-old *Graham's Town Journal*. Thereafter, Godlonton worked as the paper's editor. His was a vehement conservatism, colored deeply with racism, but its vehemence was tinted to what must have been considered acceptable hues by a written style sonorous with patriarchal certainty, patriotic common sense, and rational, English commercialism. In the *Journal*, he complained to his fellow settlers about the government, and to the government about the Africans. His fulminations against government generally stemmed from policy too indulgent to Africans for his taste (which was nearly all of it); and his railing against Africans from their tenacity in being on the land. Godlonton does not cut an attractive historical figure: he was a land-hungry racist, alternately avid and coldly analytical, a vengeful competitor, a media monopolist, a cunning marshal of straw men, and generally contemptuous of dissenting views. Xenophobia came easily to him. But then, to undertake to historicise something like xenophobia will tend to throw up disagreeable figures. Godlonton's prose darkens many of the following pages because he was also, as B. A. Le Cordeur's styles him, an 'architect of frontier opinion', whose 'pen was seldom idle'.[19] As Alan Lester puts it, 'Robert Godlonton was a central figure' in the emergence of a settler community after 1829. He cultivated the 'invention of a shared past, relying on imageries of a landscape being civilised through mutual endeavor': 'Not only did his newspaper…provide

[18] B. A. Le Cordeur. 'Robert Godlonton and the Newspaper Press of South Africa' (Grahamstown: 1820 Foundation, 1982), p. 4.
[19] B. A. Le Cordeur. 'Robert Godlonton as Architect of Frontier Opinion, with Special Reference to the Politics of Separatism, 1850-57' (MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1956), p. 1.

settlers with a public political voice and an arena for the shared representation of settler "enemies", but his writing of history constituted a collective biography of the settlement'.[20]

Godlonton was just one of the editors plying their inky trade at the Cape of Good Hope. Another one, who becomes especially important in Chapter 8, was the Scottish immigrant and school teacher, John Fairbairn, of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*. Fairbairn, a failed medical student in his early thirties, was invited to the Cape by Thomas Pringle, with the opportunity to work as an educator in Cape Town. He became co-editor of the *Advertiser*, and after its nineteenth issue he was the author of all editorials. He was staunch Liberal: he was an abolitionist; he thought vagrancy a social ill, but also thought that it could be stemmed by increased wages; he believed legislation should be non-racial; he was at the centre of colonial conflicts over press freedom and, later, of representative government.[21] In the 1840s he became a powerful figure in the colony, not only in his role as editor of Cape Town's leading newspaper, but also as the most important leader of the anti-convict movement. In the course of that movement, he used his influence to shape, reflect, and amplify colonial viewpoints and discourses on immigration, immigrants, government, colonial society, and, indeed, the 'foreigner'. While not all editors were as influential as Godlonton or Fairbairn, the space the editors collectively carved themselves in the print world of the colony suggests a busy readership. If they were not actually 'architects' of colonial views, they were at least an important filter for them, and, for us, important archivists of colonial politics in the sense that they represent some of the 'layers of intervention and interpretation' in the course of Cape history, and their work was one way in which 'exercise of power has shaped the record'.[22] The brief glance into Godlonton's biography exposes two issues that we must account for in reading the archive produced by all of these media chiefs. One involves the problem of just what their papers represent of colonial ideas and politics, and how accurately that is represented. The second, looking back to Etherington, is the racism that permeates their columns.

The late Irish historian Benedict Anderson famously located the formation of 'imagined communities' in the historical development of a technology, the printing press, and its association with the dissemination of ideas in vernacular languages (both ideas and languages constituting elements of community).[23] British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has words of

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[20] Lester, *Imperial Networks*, p. 46.
[21] H. C. Botha. *John Fairbairn in South Africa* (Cape Town: Historical Publication Society, 1984), pp. 1-5; 11; 17; 64; 97-98.
[22] Harris, *Exploring the Archives*, p. 21.
[23] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, [1983] 1991).

caution. 'Fortunately', he writes, 'social historians have learned how to investigate the history of ideas, opinions and feelings at a sub-literary level, so that we are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, editorials in select newspapers with public opinion'.[24] Both of these historians were writing about nationalism, and because this is not a study of nationalism, it should be briefly observed that any community imagined here is not 'national' in character but nevertheless sometimes achieved coherence. My reading of colonial newspapers involves their coherence with different movements that were going on around them.

While it owed much to its editor, the *Journal* did not rely on Godlonton's pen alone, but also on correspondents and informal reporters among the settler community. 'To read *The Graham's Town Journal* of the 'thirties and early 'forties', writes A. L. Harrington, 'is to learn what the majority of the English speaking people of South Africa thought about their country and the events of their time'.[25] Whether that 'majority' is real or imagined is arguable, but it is clear from the letters to the editor ('Original Correspondence') that a large number of people either agreed with Godlonton or appreciated his views. Even the supposed alternative forum of the *Frontier Times* was sometimes indistinguishable in spirit. Of the papers I used, the *Journal* and the *Times* include the most 'Original Correspondence', and put the most stock in it, but the *Advertiser* also printed numerous letters. The *Cape Town Mail*, subtitled *and Mirror of Court and Council*, included very little commentary, focusing mostly on court proceedings and shipping news; but it also ran interminable transcripts of Legislative Council debates and, in 1849, of anti-convict meetings. These, like letters, provide alternative voices to the editors', if often of like-mind and addressing the same topics.

More important than the participation of different settlers in producing the ideas that went into the newspapers is the fact that much of what was written there is corroborated in other forms of participation, such as public meetings. The *Mail'*s material is just some of the examples of that. In these public meetings, the minutes of which sometimes appeared in the papers, or else the petitions and 'memorials' they produced (the material outcomes of the meetings), we can identify the elements of political movements. Sometimes these were dispersed and uncoordinated, as in the movement against vagrancy; others, they were highly organised and observed a common manifesto, as in the anti-convict movement. The frequent

[24] Eric Hobsbawm. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1990] 1992), p. 11.
[25] A. L. Harington. '*The Graham's Town Journal*—its Founding, Early History and Influence'. *South African Historical Journal* 1 (1), 1969, p. 25.

involvement of European farmers in para-military 'commandos' and in individual cattle raiding are ways in which people were participants, not only receptors of editorial wisdom, but agents in a politics of the frontier. The papers represent to their contemporary readers, and to us, more than a century and a half later, the collective participation of colonists in politics. For us, this augments or affirms the importance of much of what Godlonton, Franklin, or Fairbairn wrote and printed. What they wrote and printed articulated well with what their neighbours were doing and voicing—not all neighbours, but enough that we can point beyond the Editor when it comes to reading his newspaper. According to Eric Hobsbawm, the 'ideologies of states and movements', often found in newspapers, 'are not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters'.[26] This research does not focus on the ideology of states, but it does consistently emphasise movements. What I have read in the colonial papers shows us one set of ways in which those movements were interpreted. Participants in any kind of organisation or political movement today will recognise the problem of trying to understand that movement through its media presence: even the published writings and views of fellow members can be wildly at odds with the daily discussions or even the public platform of the movement. Nevertheless, what is printed represents *a* perspective about those politics, and, through the external and historical frames of reference that appear in the papers, certain ways of explaining those politics. These may be, at times, inaccurate, but they are true in and to their inaccuracies. Harris, again, on archives: 'even if there is "a reality", ultimately it is unknowable'.[27]

The political world of the Cape, as it is represented in the colony's papers, was categorically male. It was white. That the content of the papers was British, capitalist, racist, and bourgeois is indisputable, but, in that, it speaks to what the male, British, capitalist, racist, and bourgeois population was up to. What they were usually up to was gradually depriving Africans of land and employing that land in the production of a British, capitalist, racist, and bourgeois society. Local indigenous people, Mozambican slaves, some indentured Europeans, a few European missionaries, and probably a handful of the farmer-settlers, too, were not part of that movement or the papers that represented it. Colonial women were all but invisible in it, whether they supported it or not. In this archive, we very occasionally hear from women or indigenous people, their words strained through the sieve of their male and white oppressors, and we hear not at all from people of colour whose origins are not within the colony or on its immediate

[26] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 11
[27] Harris, *Exploring the Archive*, p. 22.

borders, but whose lives took them there: Africans 'liberated' from slave ships, for instance. The limitations to the set of views embraced by this archive are further delimited by the sexism and racism of its manufacturers.

It is also important to note that, while the editor of the leading Cape Town paper, John Fairbairn of *The South African Commercial Advertiser*, was the avowed political adversary of the frontier settlers, his paper also reproduced a male, British, capitalist, racist, and bourgeois view of the world. This reinforces the necessity of thinking in terms of politics and movements rather than identities or issues. It is not the so-called liberalism, or what Godlonton would call 'philanthropy', of the *Commercial Advertiser*, which concerns us, nor that it was based in an urban seaport rather than a rural military-outpost-*cum*-agricultural-centre. Rather, the point here is what political movements can be seen in its pages. The pages of all the papers show significant overlap in terms of the movements in which male, British, capitalist, racist, and bourgeois people were involved, including the instances in which constructions of the 'foreigner' were politicised. The papers hint at the politics of others, but in disparaging terms that afford little insight into the content of those politics. They are pernicious, after all.

The additional sources—journals, letters, and official dispatches—complement the newspapers in different ways. From different political positions, both of the 'big' papers, the *Advertiser* and the *Journal*, were often critical of the colonial government. Yet, the archives of the government, often communicating with London, show a similar approach to the problems of foreignness in the colony. In general, troublesome 'foreigners' were identified—such as 'vagabonds', or the Xhosa—and these were often (though not always) the same as those identified or feared by the public. Thus, these documents serve to expand our view on modes of xenophobia in the Cape Colony. Perhaps more importantly, the frames of reference upon which colonial officials drew were frequently the same as those that were deployed in newspapers by editors or correspondents (see Chapter 4). Cutting across the day-to-day disagreements between government and governed, we see agreement, then, not only about the threat of foreigners but in the ways that these threats were explained. These official documents are important angle from which to view Cape colonial society, showing where official fears matched or diverged from those given voice in newspapers and letters. The most obvious divergence was during the 'convict crisis', in 1849, when the Cape's governor dithered between London's directives and a rioting local population and did not adopt the convict as a 'foreigner'. But similarities are more apparent than differences, and official communiqués, notices, court records, and laws show this clearly. In the matter of 'vagrancy', colonists actually appropriated government vocabulary in the course of contesting an issue that they deemed government often

did not treat seriously enough. The archive shows mutual give and take, and above all a reinforcement of the politicisations of the foreigner at the Cape. Other journals and letters by Cape colonists have mainly been used to flesh out the media and official sources, to seek other points of view, if they existed, and to provide other language or ways of expressing colonial sentiments and ideas. The collection of Bowker's papers, already referenced, has been the most important of these, but not the only one. Apart from the writing of a minority of missionaries, who were already a small part of the European population, these generally reinforce the viewpoints found in the media and government. Though it is an important part of the Cape colonial history, I do not discuss missionary archive, here, because it did not offer much clear information on the matter of foreigners and foreignness in the colony. Where clear political differences did exist, as in the journal of the soldier Charles Lennox Stretch,[28] who attempted to deal fairly, in his estimation, with the Xhosa and who was castigated by other colonists, there is still an interesting and I believe historically important agreement in terms of the broader references he made: in his case, Ireland (see Chapter 8).

As with the newspapers, these additional archives are almost exclusively the written word of white, male, British, literate, and middle- or upper-class historical figures. In a couple of places, I have been able to quote a colonial woman, but that is hardly significant against the bulk of the material collected and analysed. We still cannot really know what most colonial women thought. These sources are also noticeably worse for finding out perspectives of black or brown people in the colony. Where the papers occasionally printed something spoken by or attributed to a Xhosa Chief or a 'Coloured' resident of the Kat River Settlement, the official sources do not. While racialised people appear in court records that I have used, these remain impersonal and abbreviated accounts. The archive is not only 'white' in authorship, but also 'white' in outlook.

This archive is replete not only with racist attitudes and arguments, but also racist words. Some of these speak to the 'Othering' of different groups of people, both racially and territorially: for example, 'in the K—r country' or 'the verge of Kafirland'.[29] As inappropriate as it is, this language had an important function, historically, which was not only to degrade the humanity of people against which it was used, but also to demarcate difference, often between 'nations' or 'races'. Indeed, the word 'nation' is used more frequently than 'race' in documenting difference, throughout the colonial sources of the first half of the nineteenth

[28] Basil A. Le Cordeur (ed.). *The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1988).
[29] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (272), 9 March 1837; *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (205), 18 April 1844.

century. The colonial authors do not refer to so-called 'Hottentots' as so-called 'Kafirs', for example. The word 'Kafirs', in the context of the early nineteenth-century, at least, referred most often to Xhosa people, and sometimes to related groups; other 'ethnic/national' designations like 'Basutas' (Basotho), or 'Zoolas' (amaZulu) were usually employed to distinguish between the Xhosa and other Africans living in the region. This is very clear, for example, in *The South African Commercial Advertiser*, where articles about 'Caffre depredations' are juxtaposed with articles about 'Mantatees' (Batlokwa, so called after a Queen Manthatisi), 'Bechuanas' (Batswana), and 'Hottentots'.[30] Godlonton himself remarked, in the course of a public meeting in Graham's Town, 'Those who are fully acquainted', as he no doubt intended himself to be, 'with Kafir affairs, would know that the appellation of Kafir, applied not only to Amakosae tribes [amaXhosa], but also to the Tambookies [Thembu] on the north and the Amapondas [amaMpondo] to the east'. His contemporary from across the political spectrum, Pringle, concurred that the word 'denote[s] the three contiguous tribes of Amakosa, Amatembu, and Amaponda'. 'These three tribes', he continued, 'though governed by several independent chiefs, are decidedly one people'.[31] The point they render in racialised terms is that the word refers generally to Xhosa-speakers. These words and names matter: after 1835, when the colonists coerced captive and defecting Xhosa into becoming laborers in the colony, they harped upon the national, ethnic, and cultural differences attributed to these so-called 'Fingoes' as opposed to the 'Kafirs'. The importance of that as a political distinction, and in place in frontier politics, forms part of Chapter 7.

The most appropriate route is to replace offensive words from archival sources with non-racialised, accurate language, e.g. '[amaXhosa]', or '[African]' where general terms are called for.[32] However, this conceals an important aspect of colonial discourses of 'Othering', and not only racist ones, but also discourses of foreignness. The derogatory '*amakwerekwere*' (foreigners) in present day South African usage is another example of the latter (which we are content to commit to print); or 'Chink' to refer to Chinese people, beginning in late nineteenth-century North America. That 'Kafir' and 'Hottentot' (and 'Chink' for that matter) have had lasting racist usage, along the same lines as 'Nigger', has generally obscured their earlier (equally racist) connotations that delineated different groups of non-European peoples, or in the case of 'Chink', a migrant of a certain origin. That these words are historically and

[30] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser,* p. 17.
[31] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (181), 13 June 1835; Thomas Pringle. *Narrative of a Residence in South Africa* (Cape Town: C. Struik, [1840] 1966), pp. 265-266.
[32] This is the approach taken by Jeff Peires in *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, [1989] 2003), p. 15.

politically significant and can convey important information does not excuse their bigotry. I will not repeat them endlessly, as citing the colonial sources would require, so I have chosen to proceed with the suitably Victorian 'K—s', or 'H—t'. It is a thin guise, but it allows us to be reminded, constantly, of both the white supremacy and the other forms of collective 'Othering' being written into these colonial texts.[33]

I have not changed the text where the territorial name, 'Kafirland', is used. This colonial naming of a 'country' is clearly significant to settler understandings of political boundaries and to the manufacture of the 'foreign'. It speaks to Alan Lester's point that 'within the British governmental imagination, all attempts possible had to be made to render political and national subjectivity congruent with territoriality'.[34] This 'country', of course, had no basis for naming except through racist conquest and the expropriation of land from African people; but that process and its implications have been explored by a long lineage of critical, anti-racist scholars. I am invested in looking at a different aspect of the boundaries generated by colonial politics, specifically 'foreignness', which, at least in the politics of the frontier, was unambiguously racialised. The settler view was that, beyond the border, which their British forces had created, there existed another country, peopled in the words of the missionary James Clarke, writing in 1827, with 'foreign tribes'.[35] There were other politics in which the 'foreigner' was not the bearer of either racial difference or epithets, but the following chapters also explore how the different modes of foreignness were interconnected.

Premesh Lalu's *Deaths of Hintsa* reads the Cape colonial archive around the killing of the Xhosa chief, Hintsa, in 1836.[36] The book not only reflects critically on the process of reading the archive, but specifically on the archive I have used: the one produced by settlers and officials in the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century. Lalu makes two crucial points. The first has to do with South African historiography, in which 'colonialism is often thought of as a point of assemblage of the racial foundations for later forms of segregation, apartheid and capitalist accumulation…a stepping stone to more recent installations of systems of oppression'. 'At best', Lalu continues, 'when histories of colonialism emerged they contained an anticipatory narrative of what was to follow.'[37] This is important, because it points to a distinction between historical and teleological realities. Colonialism, by which we have to

[33] This applies to the various spellings encountered in archival sources, e. g. 'C—s'. Because these cases occur so frequently, I have dispensed with brackets.
[34] Lester, *Imperial Networks*, p. 22.
[35] Clarke to Stockenstrom. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XXXIV, p. 442.
[36] Premesh Lalu. *The Deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the Shape of Recurring Pasts* (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2009).
[37] Ibid, pp. 103-105.

mean a set of not-always-coordinated events and subjectivities in time and place, cannot (only) be read from the position of what happened 'afterwards'. 'Too often', Lalu writes, 'settler histories are thought of as merely racially exclusive histories of *whiteness*'.[38] In light of the racism and exclusion written into the Cape archive, this is a ready analysis. It is an archive of a white people promoting white superiority in the context of their contrived white society. But Lalu continues, 'Such views…neglect to address the forms of subjection and their articulations that are necessary for settler histories. Diminishing our sense of the processes of subjection in settler histories undermines the possibilities of understanding what we mean by colonialism'.[39] At times, perceived political difference eclipsed, or was at least equal to, supposed racial difference, in designating the 'foreigner'. Fluid and ambiguous patterns of 'Othering' combined with various processes of subjectivation—of 'the frontier', of 'the colony'—in the midst of colonial political movements.

Importantly, Lalu reinvigorates the colonial archive by allowing it to say something historical and real about that which it is able to reflect (the subjective world of colonists), but he does not go far enough. The 'colonial' archive—more accurately, those who produced it—were able to think and write about more than colonialism. This seems to be the basic limit of Lalu's book, which sets out to critique the linear, teleological history of what-rested-on-colonialism by elaborating on subject formation, but in which he attempts to figure out how colonialism (as an archive in which subjectivity is evident) articulates with post-apartheid history writing. Not allowing historical actors and their ideas and movements to exist independently of either 'colonialism' or 'post-apartheid', as Lalu does not, negates the historical aspect of those people and imposes their historiographical aspect instead. In this they are not subjects of colonial history, at all, but objects of a specifically South African history that includes colonialism. 'I believe', says Lalu, 'that the challenge to historians reading the colonial archive is to point out the inconsistencies…in the story of colonialism and to mark them as sites where another story may have taken place'.[40] The fact is that the colonial archive records things that have to do with more than colonialism. This archive can speak of other matters, too; and, when it comes to settler subjectivity, those other things are important. Colonialism as a historical category (even of knowledge) does not sufficiently capture all that occurred 'in the colony' or is recorded in the 'colonial' archive.

[38] Ibid, pp. 102-103.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, p. 62.

This is not to argue for the expurgation of the criminal destruction of and manifestly violent and racist character of European settlement in southern Africa (or in the rest of the continent, or the Americas, or the Pacific, or Asia). European settlers participated in that, in ways great and small. They do not warrant acquittal, and this is not a matter of sidestepping the issue of colonial brutality. Rather, it is to argue that even *while that was happening*, humans identified and addressed all sorts of problems that might or might not have had any bearing on the future of the state/condition we define as colonialism. Colonial people raised and addressed problems that we do not include in the normative history of colonialism. We can learn from these histories. These include the histories of the politics of the 'foreigner' as threat. The discussions of xenophobia in the Cape Colony that follow are not inherently 'colonial', in the sense that they are necessarily aspects of colonialism, in southern Africa or anywhere else. These politics are responses to common conditions of colonies, but, because they are political, they are unique. I do not extrapolate from the history of the Cape to make claims about a 'colonial xenophobia'. 'Colonial' is a subjective positioning, not only or always an objective location. John Mitford Bowker expressed a colonial subjectivity clearly: 'My lot is cast in this colony, and not mine alone, but that of eight brothers and two sisters; and when I know that our prosperity depends upon the prosperity of the land of our adoption, I cannot coolly look on and see all things going to ruin under the present system…'.[41]

Lalu also makes the error of conflating a 'public sphere' with politics, and history with textual forms. Historically speaking, 'history' was 'written' before it was written down in ink, because it had form in the political prescriptions made by settler participation, not only in a public sphere of discourse, but in movements. In those movements, 'colonial' political subjectivities developed. The texts are (or can be, or sometimes are) the residues of historical movements and politics. To reiterate: the politics of the frontier or of anti-convictism were generated not only in print, and mobilised not only in sentiment, but also in participation by settlers in meetings that were genuinely in the public (i.e. public meetings). My reading of the archive entails, where possible, connecting the words and discourses to these examples of public participation and debate, or, at least, to the records of such meetings, the reports of such meetings, or the fact that such meetings had happened. This imperfect process of reading combines the discourses and narratives with the events and collectives that generated them.

When it comes to reading the print media, journals, and letters of colonists, it is important to bear in mind that what colonists were good at describing was how they saw the world. Even

[41] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, *& Selections*, p. 38.

where their writing is consumed by bias, or where they doctored their narratives or lied, their political influences and frames of reference are visible. These frames of reference, as I discuss in the next chapter, tell us much about the world as Cape colonists saw it. 'Every narrative construction of the past', writes Harris, 'is by definition creation, a work of imagination', in which the narrator 'is bound to represent what he or she has sufficient evidence for believing are "actual" events, processes, structures, and characters'.[42] This is true of the history I have written as well as the narratives of colonists from which I have drawn. I am lucky to not be writing about what actually happened—not how 'foreigners' endangered society—but about how certain people saw and interpreted what happened; not seeking the truth about 'foreigners' from the limited and biased sources but rather seeking the truth about what colonists thought, represented, felt, or claimed about 'foreigners'. This study is not about historical 'fact' but about the fact of historical politics. These are perfectly able to be true in their untruth.

[42] Harris, *Exploring the Archive*, pp. 84; 86.

4.
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMES OF REFERENCE: THE PALE, THE MAROON, AND THE VAGRANT

NETWORKS AND SUBJECTIVITIES

'Oh we are so huddled up and cut off from the world in this little corner', wrote Emma Rutherfoord to her sister in India in February, 1855.[1] Despite this young Capetonian's complaint, global news and knowledge reached the Cape Colony and influenced how people thought, there. The colony was interconnected with other parts of the British Empire and the globe. But these connections stretched further than the nineteenth century's other ports of call. The Cape of Good Hope was a receptacle for knowledge, concepts, and ideas, as well as a recycling centre, where this knowledge could be repurposed for local conditions. One of the noteworthy aspects of the colonial archive are the ways in which settlers adopted and adapted ideas from other historical contexts in the making of local politics. Taking these seriously, this chapter engages with the circulation of political concepts that animated historical worlds.

Verne Harris observes, 'Every narrative construction of the past…recalls references which in all their particularity, their uniqueness, are irrecoverable, and which flow in chaotic open-endedness'.[2] The purpose here is to attempt a recovery of certain historical references that were important at the Cape. Indeed, their appearance in Cape colonial politics already exhibits a 'recovery', a process in which the references' 'particularity' and 'uniqueness' were developed. In historical context, they were not used chaotically, at all, although the fact that they got where they did might be the result of unscientific and definitely open-ended processes. Working through the settlers' archive of constructions of the foreigner and the foreign as threatening, three specific references emerged that give some shape to colonial politics. These are the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant. Each of these was a political and historical concept re-appropriated and repoliticised for the new context of the Cape Colony, where (among other things) problems of mobility and the foreign were being rationalised. These three ideas connect the Cape Colony to histories in Ireland, the West Indies, and England. They ask us to think,

[1] In Joyce Murray (ed.). *In Mid-Victorian Cape Town: Letters from Miss Rutherfoord* (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1968), p. 73.
[2] Harris, *Exploring the Archives*, p. 84.

respectively, about colonial boundaries of political difference; slavery, mobility, and the making of autonomy; and regimes of labour and control. They also pose problems for conventional periodisation and norms of historical boundary-making, problems which I elaborate further in the concluding chapter. Here, I develop these concepts in the course of showing the global interconnections of the Cape Colony, and give historical context to the political ideas that colonists deployed, which are described in the next four chapters.

Ireland, the Caribbean, and England were important sites in the British Empire, through which people frequently moved. David Lambert and Alan Lester write of 'colonial subjects', who, 'as they "careered" across the empire and beyond,' were 'involved in the introduction of certain modes of gendered, raced and classed thought to new contexts, where these ideas were modified and sometimes rejected in new spaces and circumstances'. They challenge the notion of 'export' of ideas and modes of governance from the metropole to the periphery, showing evolution 'across multiple spaces, especially as attempts were made to transpose and translate them through comparison and generalisation'.[3] In addition, mobility through imperial spaces influenced continuous identity formation, equipped and inspired individual imperial careerists to draw comparisons and connections between different imperial locales, and shaped the articulation of colonial power and colonial interests. These migratory lives and processes have significance to historians studying empire and colony, and 'can inform a research agenda that goes beyond comparison and looks for actual historical connections and disconnections between different sites of empire'.[4] Three of the biographies included in *Colonial Lives* reveal connections of significance between the Cape Colony and elsewhere. The missionary, Reverend William Shrewsbury, lived out connections between England, various points in the Caribbean and the Cape Colony in the course of his Christianising mission. The Governor Richard Bourke linked Ireland, New South Wales, and the Cape Colony, and George Grey likewise connected experience in Ireland with governorships in New Zealand and the Cape Colony. All of them also had strong ties with England.

Importantly, the 'colonial lives' these characters lived were political: not only in the manner that each of these men influenced colonial governance or relations, but in the ways in which politics travelled with them or in which they involved themselves in colonial politics. In the West Indies, Reverend Shrewsbury became embroiled in debates and conflicts surrounding slaves, slave revolts, and missionary societies; at the Cape, he drew explicit comparisons

[3] Lambert and Lester, 'Introduction', pp. 2; 25.
[4] Ibid, pp. 25-30.

between the West Indies and southern Africa, and eventually assimilated into the settlers' politics of the frontier. Bourke, for his part, was heavily influenced by a formative political life in Ireland, which remained a point of reference throughout his colonial career. Grey, too, drew on experiences and knowledge of Ireland in his imperial career.[5] These are important observations because Ireland and the West Indies both supplied key frames of reference in the Cape Colony.

It is not a surprise that this should be the case. Taking a set of well-documented Cape colonists (albeit some who resided only temporarily in southern Africa and had atypical experiences there), out of the first sixteen governors and acting-governors of the colony (covering the years 1797-1847), five were born in Ireland, seven had military or administrative experience in Ireland, and seven in the West Indies. Two brief examples make the point: John Cradock, the Cape's governor from 1811-1814, was born in Dublin, the son of the Anglican Archbishop, commanded a regiment in the West Indies in 1790, served the next year as the Acting Quartermaster-General in Ireland, returned to the West Indies and was wounded at Martinique in 1793, returned to the Irish administration, where in 1798, 'his local knowledge was invaluable to Lord Cornwallis in the suppression of the Irish rebellion; he was present at the battle of Vinegar Hill and the capture of Wexford;…he was wounded in the affair at Ballynahinch.' He was a Member of the Irish House of Commons for four different locales between 1785 and 1800, and 'in parliament he always voted as a strenuous supporter of the government'.[6] He also served in India, and as governor at the Cape oversaw Graham's 'clearance' of the Zuurveld. Another governor, Benjamin D'Urban, whom we will have occasion to meet again on the Cape frontier in the 1830s, fought in the British invasion of Saint-Domingue during the Haitian Revolution, held posts in Ireland after the Union with Great Britain (1801), served as governor of the island of Antigua in 1820, governor of Demerara and Essequibo in South America in 1824—'then in a disturbed state owing to a rising among the slaves'—, and as the first British governor of Guiana.[7] The movement of people through these 'mainstream' networks of imperial administration, occupation, conquest, and war comprises an obverse realm for the exchange of ideas, experience, and knowledge to the subaltern one

[5] Alan Lester and David Lambert. 'Missionary Politics and the Captive Audience: William Shrewsbury in the Caribbean and the Cape Colony'. In Lambert and Lester, *Colonial Lives*, pp. 88-112; Zoë Laidlaw. 'Richard Bourke: Irish Liberalism Tempered by Empire'. In Lambert and Lester, *Colonial Lives,* pp. 113-144; Leigh Dale. 'George Grey in Ireland: Narrative and Network'. In Lambert and Lester, *Colonial Lives*, pp. 145-175.
[6] Leslie Stephen (ed.). *Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, Vol. 9* (London: Elder Smith & Co., 1887), pp. 27-29
[7] Leslie Stephen (ed.). *Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900, Vol. 16* (London: Elder Smith & Co., 1888), pp. 249-250; for events in Demerara see Michael Craton. *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 267-290.

depicted by Linebaugh, Rediker, or Ulrich.[8] We know that such migrations were not the experience only of colonial governors but also of active and retired soldiers, civil servants, missionaries, and even land- and slave-owners. It was not only governors with extensive and powerful imperial careers who linked the Cape Colony to Ireland or the West Indies. At different times, newspapermen, diarists, correspondents, and politicians all made these connections, deploying knowledge, commonplace, stereotype, and politicised portrayals of other imperial contexts in the course of making political arguments for local circumstances in the Cape Colony. It should be noted, too, that in a parallel process, knowledge of the Cape Colony formed a frame of reference in other parts of the empire, such as through British soldiers' writings circulating in the metropole, 'held up as exemplars of pragmatism and "fact"'.[9] This is an interesting historical lead, in thinking of the circulation of political ideas, but the focus here is on the ideas revamped for colonial use. The aforementioned John Mitford Bowker, colonial xenophobe, affords an introductory example to the incorporation of 'foreign' knowledge in the Cape Colony.

Bowker, writing to 'A Friend in England' in 1836, began by reflecting on politics in the metropole. He observed that the Whig party, 'whom [he] formerly considered much nearer perfection than the Tories…have sadly degraded themselves' by taking up with '[Daniel] O'Connell and his tail, [Sir Thomas Fowell] Buxton and his saints'. The two named men stand in for issues of policy: O'Connell, an Irish Member of Parliament, for the matters of Catholic emancipation in Ireland in the 1820s and later for Repeal of the (Act of) Union between Great Britain and Ireland at the time of Bowker's letter; and Buxton may be better known, for he was one of the leading abolitionists in the British House of Commons. 'A radical ministry I fear worse than a Tory one,' wrote Bowker. 'I begin to think…that God Almighty never intended the rulers of kingdoms of this world to be anything but rogues'. Bowker's English friend was then apprised of recent developments in the Cape Colony, and of another rogue, 'no novice in the Machiavelian [*sic*] art', the Lieutenant-Governor, Andries Stockenstrom: in Bowker's estimation a malicious bungler of affairs whose recently concluded treaties with Xhosa chiefs ensured that the settler community was at the mercy of Africans. 'If the British Government should again attempt to govern this country without protecting it, men who have hands to work and heads to think, will think deeply before they begin to labour to re-stock their plundered farms, and to toil for the remainder of their days to enrich settlers', wrote Bowker. Indeed,

[8] Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*; Ulrich, 'Abolition from Below'.
[9] Marian Baker. 'Military Writers and Their Readers: The Transnational Circulation of Campaign Narratives of the Eastern Cape Frontier Wars between 1834 and 1853'. *English in Africa*, 44(2), 2017, pp. 32-33.

'hundreds of Boers [colonists of Dutch descent] … [had] retired beyond the pale of civilization in disgust and despair'. John Bowker, working a comparison, supposed that 'the charge of cruelty fixed upon our West Indian planters', no doubt by the likes of Buxton, 'has originated more in cant, helped out by a few solitary instances of cruelty…than in anything else'. 'England, instead of protecting us, accuses us'.[10]

Bowker's letter to a friend in England was written from and for a geographical, experiential, and shared world that can usefully be understood as 'cis-Atlantic'. According to David Armitage, cis-Atlantic history 'studies particular places as unique locations within the Atlantic world and seeks to define that uniqueness as the result of interaction between local particularity and a wider web of connections (and comparisons)'.[11] Bowker's ideas about the circumstances of the Cape Colony are tied in with his knowledge and ideas about the wider British Atlantic world. He writes about politics in England and Ireland, and identifies with the 'plight' of slave-owners of the West Indies, all the while relating these things to his local circumstances in the rural east of the Cape Colony. This is exceptionally important. It is also significant that in the course of a two-page letter the four contexts Bowker referenced were England, the Cape frontier, the slave colonies, and (via O'Connell) Ireland. References to Irish politics and to experiences of slave society beyond southern Africa are abundant in the archive and clearly represent important frames of reference for settler experiences at the Cape (in the same way, it might be added, that they did for slaves revolting at the Cape in 1808, but with different consequences). Significantly, Ireland and the West Indies often afforded colonists frames of reference for articulating colonial politicisations of foreignness.

There were several overlapping worlds fashioned from international connection: Elbourne writes about a 'Protestant internationalism' that emerged in eighteenth-century Europe and crossed oceans with missionaries, including to the Cape of Good Hope.[12] As she writes,

> Like so many others, the story [of Christianity in southern Africa] is not one that can be neatly folded within the embrace of so-called 'national' history. It might rather be seen as a product of intersection of several 'local' histories and of global interaction that cut constantly through the local in unexpected ways. One of these 'local' histories inextricably bound up with the 'global' is that of Christianity in South Africa.[13]

The local-global worlds that interest us here are those accessed in the course of political discourses of xenophobia at the Cape. What becomes clear is that the politics of the early to

[10] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, pp. 5-7.
[11] Armitage, 'Three Concepts', pp. 21-22.
[12] Elbourne, *Blood Ground,* pp. 41-44.
[13] Ibid, pp. 20-21.

mid-nineteenth-century Cape Colony were regularly given political substance through such transnational connections. However, the connections that interest me are not only the concrete ones—the fact of human and material linkages between the Cape Colony and various other corners of the nineteenth-century world. I am also looking at the subjective connections, or the ways in which people like Bowker and other British settlers of the Cape Colony *made* connections to other places or contexts in the process of explaining their circumstances, naming the problems that they faced, and proposing solutions to those problems. These subjective connections were manifested at the level of what is known and thought, not always or only related to material connections. That is, the outcomes of these connections might not be the same as or what is expected of material connections; they may, and did, leap time and space in purely subjective ways. Such connections were drawn in the midst of claim-making about the foreigner and foreignness.

I want to emphasise the *historical* and *politicised* aspects of these concepts, particularly the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant. Firstly, they relate to historical processes, institutions, political movements, and events: the Pale, to English colonisation of Ireland in the sixteenth century; the Maroon, to resistance to Atlantic slavery beginning in the sixteenth century; and the Vagrant to England's Poor Laws and the debates around them, also beginning in the sixteenth century and going through a crescendo in the early nineteenth. Secondly, because they are political ideas, the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant are prescriptive; not only do they refer to a bounded territory, a runaway slave, and a 'classed', illegally mobile person, but they also signal beliefs about historical trajectories and the organisation of society. Importantly, the prescriptions communicated through such words are not fixed in their original, sixteenth-century locales, but are mutable over time and in relation to political context. Thirdly, as an example of such re-appropriation, they are historical and political with respect to the Cape Colony in the first half of the nineteenth century, where they were invoked as frames of reference for local political movements and political questions. In that context, they were accessed and deployed in locally- and politically-specific ways. In this, they forge subjective links across temporal, geographical, and political contexts—historical contexts—in the course of making new prescriptions.

In the remainder of this chapter, I develop these three concepts on two levels. Firstly, I provide brief histories of the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant, to indicate what Cape colonists might have known or might have understood in the course of using these historical and political words: that is, I give a sense of the historical worlds that they drew on. Whether settlers drew on these contexts accurately, erroneously, or something in between is not important, because,

regardless, they succeeded in generating political meaning. Secondly, I draw out what might be useful to us in thinking historically about the foreigner as threat and suggest why these ideas were given meaning and bearing in the course of arguments about the foreigner as threat. This is not an effort to produce normative concepts of the Pale, Maroon, or Vagrant that will be true of any historical period of context. The whole point is that these were deployed politically, dependent upon subjective, 'particular', and 'unique', historical interpretation. Rather, I provide some direction for how we think about these concepts in relation to politics in the Cape Colony.

IRELAND AND THE PALE

In the very first number of the *Commercial Advertiser*, in its New Year's message for 1824, Ireland was called 'an object of dearest interest' and represented as a land of 'commotions', 'excesses', the 'madness of party', and 'violence'.[14] Throughout the second quarter of the century, the Cape newspapers frequently reported on Irish news and even ran some lead articles on Irish affairs, usually political. I discuss more the significance of Ireland as a contemporary frame of reference in Chapter 8, while here the focus is on the Pale as a political idea that emerged from colonialism in Ireland.

In the Cape Colony, settlers and officials often described the extent of British authority and settlement in southern Africa through the phrase 'the pale'. This, as I relate in the next chapter, was usually in connection with questions of the colonial boundary or 'frontier', which had clear roles in the representation of the 'foreign'. While the Pale accesses metaphorical idiom of the English language, it also accesses a particular history, that of English colonisation in Ireland in the sixteenth century. Significantly, the Irish historian Nicholas Canny has argued that the partial and disordered conquest of Ireland under Queen Elizabeth established a 'pattern' for subsequent English colonisation overseas.[15] I do not seek to establish direct linkages between Ireland in the sixteenth century and southern Africa in the 1830s; whether colonisation in Africa followed a pattern of earlier centuries is not the point. But I do think it historically important that the Pale had political meaning in both contexts. Regardless of a colonial pattern, an idiom and institution that came to explain one political situation was deployed in another to explain difference. Thinking with the Pale asks us to think in terms of boundaries of political

[14] Greig, *Commercial Advertiser,* p. 2.
[15] Nicholas Canny. *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576* (Hassocks, UK: The Harvester Press, 1976).

difference. In both cases, the Pale was political in the sense that it articulated subjective prescriptions. A 'pattern' need not imply a straightforward linear connection—as with distinction between material networks and subjective ones—but a pattern for political thinking. This is not the place for a thorough investigation of the sixteenth century in Irish history, for which I recommend Canny's *Making Ireland British*.[16] Instead, the point here is to historicise the Pale and to develop the Pale as a concept in relation to ideas of foreignness.

In 1542, an English physician named Andrew Boorde wrote in his *Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge*, 'Irland…is deuyded in ii. partes, one is the Engly[sh] pale, & the other, the wyld Irysh'. The English Pale was 'a good country', where people 'be metely well mannered', and the 'wylde Irishe' meant a land 'wast and vast', where the people 'lak maners & honesty, & be vntought & rude'. Boorde, whose nineteenth century editors remark on the 'jocoseness', even 'buffoonery', 'of his style', was quotable enough to have his words find their way into the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*), as a representative use of 'pale'.[17] The definition of 'pale' that Boorde used was 'a district or territory within determined bounds, or subject to a particular jurisdiction'. In addition to Ireland, an English pale was also to be found in France, at Calais (1347-1558), and another English pale in Scotland (1545-1549). The last example, of a later usage, which makes a shift from a space of incursion to a space of containment, refers to the 'pale of settlement', the zones specified for habitation by Russian Jews from the late eighteenth century until the overthrow of the Tsars.

The Pale, as a bounded territory, in Ireland and elsewhere, acquires its name from other meanings of the word 'pale': originally, a 'wooden stake' (hence the gruesome cognate, 'impaling'), and then as a 'fence' (hence 'palisade'), an 'enclosure', or a 'boundary', in which limits could either be literal or figurative.[18] These last three usages develop in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, alongside the development of territorial pales. Writing of England's young Virginia colony in 1614, the colonial administrator, Raphe Hamor, could write about 'a Pale of two miles in length, cut ouer from river to river', and of lands 'already impaled, with bordering houses all along the pale'.[19]

While English settlement in Ireland had been going on in some manner since the twelfth century, it was in 1488 that a statute passed by the Parliament of Ireland in Dublin, the legislative body under the English monarch, outlined the borders of the 'four obedient shires'—

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[16] Nicholas Canny. *Making Ireland British, 1580-1650* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
[17] Andrew Borde. *The Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge* (London: R. and A. Taylor, [1542] 1814), p. 23.
[18] 'Pale', *OED*, Vol. XI, p. 91.
[19] Raphe Hamor. *A Trve Discovrse of the Present Estate of Virginia, and the successe of the affaires there till the 18 of June, 1614* (London: William Welby, 1615), pp. 30; 32.

the modern counties of Dublin, Meath, Kildare, and Louth—or the territory over which the Dublin Parliament could claim to enforce its authority.[20] In 1495, tenants residing on the marches of these 'obedient' lands were obliged by another statute to construct a double ditch around lands 'that [joineth] next unto Irishemen'. A loose series of fortifications were constructed by the border gentry to consolidate the hitherto indefinite boundary of English settlement and authority in Ireland and to present an obstacle to Gaelic raiders when they came into the Pale to run off cattle from the settlers' herds.[21] It was at the same time as these constructions that the designation 'English Pale' came to refer specifically to the land of English settlement around Dublin. For the historian Steven Ellis, this 'constituted a significant value judgement', by defining those lands as 'English', both separate from the 'Irish' and in the midst of rather fluid and uncertain political circumstances.[22] That is, it was a political statement or prescription relating to the real world.

The Pale in this context suggests a boundary between different groups of people, as well as defense against those 'rude' people beyond it, who could be American Indians in Virginia, Scots in Scotland, or Gaelic cattle raiders in Ireland. It suggests, in certain ways, the enclosure of private property, a process that was taking off during the same decades as Ireland was 'impaled'. Of course, what the Pale as separation, defence, and enclosure also suggests is the expression 'beyond the pale'. This figurative usage—"'*within (or outside) the pale of*, in which the senses "limits", "bounds"…and "area" or "region"…become indistinguishable'—emerged in the fifteenth century, according to the cataloguers at Oxford, contemporaneously with the maintenance of the pales in Ireland, Scotland, and France. Thinking historically, people, and their activities, their ideas, their customs, livelihoods, and social formations could exist beyond the Pale, or within it. What I wish to emphasise is that the Pale demarcated and symbolised a set of political questions. In spite of actual fluidity, politics prescribed clear demarcations. I look at the context and then the politics framing it.

Speaking broadly, two different ways of life did exist within and beyond the Pale. Christopher Maginn has written about the utility of the concept of a 'frontier' in Irish history.[23] In the centuries following the Norman settlement in Ireland (from 1171), a differentiated

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[20] David B. Quinn. 'The Bills and Statutes of the Irish Parliaments of Henry VII and Henry VIII'. *Analecta Hibernica* 10, 1941, p. 84.
[21] Quoted in Steven Ellis. *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 24; Francis Elrington Ball and Everard Hamilton. *The Parish of Taney: A History of Dundrum, Near Dublin, and Its Neighbourhood* (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, & Co., 1895), p. 8.
[22] Steven Ellis. 'The English Pale: A "Failed Entity?"'. *History Ireland* 19(2), 2011, p. 16.
[23] Christopher Maginn. 'Gaelic Ireland's English Frontiers in the Late Middle Ages'. *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature*, 110C, 2010, p. 175.

relationship to the land developed. Gaelic areas tended towards pastoralism and English areas to sedentary agriculture. Where land was sparsely populated and not suited to cultivation, Gaelic culture was 'preserved', and Gaelic lords continued to exercise political authority autonomously.[24] Gaelic political authority in the sixteenth century was largely decentralised, creating numerous 'nations' or 'countries' led by lords associated with particular clans and 'elected' by vassals of the clan.[25] English areas, by contrast, developed urban areas, home to English culture, language, and modes of dress. English common law and discriminatory laws against Gaelic law, language, and dress also characterised the areas 'within the pale'.[26]

Stepping out of usual colonial perspectives, Maginn examines Gaelic perspectives on the Pale, boundaries of difference, and the settler community in Ireland, and identifies both a cultural and a political 'frontier'. For the Gaels in Ireland, the boundary was between a loosely defined cultural *Gaedhealtacht*, the Gaelic-inhabited and culturally Gaelic areas of Ireland, north and western Scotland, and islands, and the English colonial *Galltacht* (*Galldacht*).[27] In Gaelic sources from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries the word '*galldacht*' could refer to 'foreignness', meaning specifically English customs and fashions; or to the people themselves: the English settlers in Ireland; or to the foreign territory: the 'district occupied by the English: in Ireland The Pale'.[28] The roots are in the word '*gall'*, which had designated various foreign folk from the most obvious Gauls through Scandinavian raiders to the Norman and English settlers of the twelfth century onward.[29] It is worth noting, too, the politicised differences: the *Gaill* were specifically English colonists in Ireland, while the *Saxain* were English from England.[30]

However, the marches of sixteenth-century Ireland did not delimit an unambiguous bifurcation. The Pale, and the divisions of Ireland more generally, were part of a complex political situation. Many of the Old English ('Anglo-Irish') lords mixed Gaelic and English cultural practices, intermarrying with powerful Gaelic families, and adapting aspects of Brehon (Gaelic) Law in their lordships. Agricultural practices were shared across 'English' and 'Irish'

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[24] J. A. Watt. 'Gaelic Polity and Cultural Identity'. In Art Cosgrove (ed.) *A New History of Ireland*, *Vol*. II: Medieval Ireland, 1169-1534 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 331-332; Colm Lennon. *Sixteenth-Century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest* (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan Ltd, 1994), pp. 1-4; Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest,* pp. 1-3.
[25] Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland*, pp. 11; 50-57
[26] Margaret Murphy. 'Parliament'. In *Medieval Ireland, An Encyclopedia*. Seán Duffy, Ailbhe MacShamhráin, and James Moynes (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 366; Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland', p. 184.
[27] Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland', p. 177.
[28] 'Galldacht'. *Electronic Dictionary of the Irish Language*. Available at dil.ie/25322 [accessed 10 June 2019]
[29] 'Gall'. *Electronic Dictionary of the Irish Language*. Available at dil.ie/25308 [accessed 10 June 2019]
[30] Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland', p. 183.

space. Gaelic, English, and Scottish soldiers all fought for Gaelic or English Lords.[31] Moreover, Ireland in the sixteenth century involved numerous overlaid contestations of authority, between the King of England and 'English rebels' or 'the King's Irish enemies', and Old English and Gaelic lordships.[32] The tendency of Old English and New English landlords to flout the law and keep Irish tenants (who tolerated higher rents), and for tenants throughout the country to depart English landlords for Gaelic or vice versa, further troubles the demarcation of clear boundaries.[33]

Drawing on post-colonial theory, John Morrisey critiques the idea of a 'frontier' and shows how the English-Irish/Gael-Gall dichotomy is better rendered in terms of hybridity and fluidity, and the notion of the 'contact zone', thus 'destabiliz[ing] dominant colonial representations by emphasising the interconnections as well as the conflicts of ostensibly bounded geographical worlds'. He observes that the sense of clear division reproduces the claims found in archival sources—think of Boorde's stark divide—but obscures the interconnections. 'Gaelicisation', according to Morrissey, occurred alongside a process of 'anglicisation'. He suggests, and correctly, 'that in reality such rudimentary labels [of ethnic difference] functioned more as terms of reference (particularly amongst the powerful elites on both "sides") than as markers of static, self-enclosed ethnicities, territories or polities'.[34]

Contemporary accounts were politicised and did not represent this fluidity. In 1517, the Italian papal nuncio, Francesco Chieregato (sometimes Chiericati) journeyed to an island on an Irish lake where it was said pilgrims could glimpse Purgatory inside a cave. The priest described Ireland to a woman friend on the continent, noting how 'The King [Henry VIII] owns only the third part of it, that is the places on the sea-coast. The rest is in the hands of diverse lords, who are little more worthy of honour than our peasants. They say that the Pope is their King'. The most important point here is the perceived bifurcation between centralised (or centralising) government and decentralised government, if that be understood as government at all, since 'peasants' had more class than the Gaelic lords. The reference to the Pope raises another political point. Chieregato's letter predates, by a few months, the hammer-and-nail publication of Dr Luther of Wittenberg's famous Ninety-Five Theses that inadvertently inaugurated the Protestant Reformation. Debate within Catholicism notwithstanding, the

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[31] Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland*, pp. 44; 65-66; 74-77; 148; Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland', pp. 183; 186-187; D. B. Quinn. '"Irish" Ireland and "English" Ireland'. In Cosgrove, *A New History of Ireland*, p. 636.
[32] See Cosgrove, 'The Emergence of the Pale, 1399-1437'. In Cosgrove, *A New History of Ireland*, pp. 533-556.
[33] Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland*, p. 46; Canny, *Making Ireland British*, pp. 145; 150; 152-154.
[34] John Morrisey. 'Cultural Geographies in the Context one: Gaels, Galls, and Overlapping Territories in Late Medieval Ireland'. *Social & Cultural Geography* 6(4), 2005, pp. 552; 554; 556; 561-562.

religious divide between Protestant and Catholic that, by mid-century, came to shadow political divides in Ireland did not yet exist. A few years after his pilgrimage, Chieregato would be an envoy of the Vatican in Germany, sent to motivate the princes there against Luther's movement; so it seems very unlikely that he rejected the Pope's authority.[35] Still, the papal nuncio found it odd—perhaps even humourous—that these remote people thought of the Pope, or so he claimed, as their king. It was an idea that definitely struck him as 'beyond the pale', and perhaps even subversive (if not heretical).

Chieregato's journey proceeded perilously through lands 'full of robbers and rascals' to where 'the rule of England ceases'. [36] Interestingly, he observed that the Irish 'do not regard theft as a crime, and do not punish it. They say that…they live in accordance with nature, because all things ought to be in common'.[37] Gaelic society was not egalitarian, with land and power controlled by ruling families and a lord-tenant relationship based on exploitative exaction, and marked by a lack of social mobility.[38] It did, however, operate along different social and economic lines than English society. For one thing, there was likely not a 'rigid division' between landowners and other classes, and chiefs were 'elected', which has less to do with democracy and more to do with succession politics and intra-lineage power relationships.[39] It is the perception, however, not the truth, of the differences Chieregato observed of Gaels' political and economic practices that is important. Chieregato makes a political argument when he claims that Irish thievery is the consequence of different, and seemingly misguided, views on property and ownership. The 'fact' of separate zones was apparent to him.

Having traveled through England en route to St Patrick's Purgatory, and bearing a letter from Henry VIII, we must wonder how Francesco Chieregato's English hosts might have educated him on Ireland. Although Colm Lennon says Chieregato's is one of the few accounts available from the sixteenth century that is not written by an English person, with English biases,[40] it reads little differently. More solemn-penned than Boorde, Chieregato's account still relies on tropes of savagery in his description of Gaelic people and customs. But as the priest

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[35] Charles G. Hebermann, Edward A. Pace, Condé B. Pallen, Thomas J. Shahan, John J. Wynne (eds.). *The Catholic Encyclopedia: An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church*, Vol. III (New York: The Encyclopedia Press. Inc., [1908] 1913), p. 658.
[36] Francesco Chiericati. 'Francesco Chiericati's Letter to Isabella d'Este Gonzaga'. Ed., J. P. Mahaffy (University College, Cork: Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT), [1517] 2010). Available at https://celt.ucc.ie/published/T100081.html [accessed 23 April 2019], np; emphasis original.
[37] Chiericati, 'Francesco Chiericati's Letter', np; emphasis original.
[38] Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland', pp. 183-184.
[39] Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland*, pp. 49; 51.
[40] Ibid, p. 42.

saw more than just savagery, Boorde's introduction to the Pale implies much more than the ditch, the thorns, and the cattle raiding. It draws numerous distinctions between 'Englishness' and 'Irishness', with regard to manners, people, and lifestyles, and it depicts the 'Irishman' as 'car[ing] not for [his] master'.[41] There is no mistaking that this is a political observation. In a feudal and colonial context, caring not for one's master meant the upset of established hierarchies.

In *A View of the Present State of Ireland* (written in 1596, but first published posthumously in 1633), by Edmund Spenser, the Elizabethan poet and landowner in Ireland, the Pale, the barrier against cattle raids, was 'also a gall against all rebels and outlaws that shall rise up in any numbers against government'.[42] Although English people were likely enough, in the sixteenth century, to rise up against masters and government—in England and Ireland, both—Boorde's and Spenser's insinuations are that such activities are essentially Irish. Indeed, for Spenser, the decline of the Old English in Ireland was signaled by their reaching down to the level of the Gaelic 'rebells and outlaws'. Spenser conveyed the idea that rebellion was both figuratively and objectively beyond the Pale. This patently political claim is made more obvious because it depended on the historical inaccuracy that said 'civil' English folk were property respectful of masters and government. It is political in that it denotes a way of thinking about the world and a claim about existing conditions. The very carving of the Pale from the 'obedient shires' around Dublin set up the boundary not only as that between English/Irish but also between the political distinctions of Obedient/Disobedient, or Loyal/Disloyal. The ditch digging reflected not only practical purpose—mitigation of cattle raiding—but was a material reflection of political purpose.

Unlike the pilgrim Chieregato, Spenser was an important voice in a movement—plantation in Ireland orchestrated by landowners and courtiers in the Pale and in England—that positioned itself and its interests in opposition to Gaelic people and politics. For many contemporaries, explaining a shifting political situation in terms of the encroachment of 'Irishness' rationalised the political movement to settle (plant) Ireland. Spenser was among others in English colonial society in Ireland who wished to see the social and political conditions beyond the Pale dramatically changed, through force if necessary—force that, according to Canny, 'did not threaten properly ordered societies such as England', within the pale. Canny explains how Spenser and the pro-colonisation crowd in England sought defense of the Pale, the

[41] Borde, *The Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge,* p. 22.
[42] Edmund Spenser. *A View of the Present State of Ireland.* W. L. Renwick (ed.) (Oxford, the Clarendon Press, [1633] (1970), pp. 83; 101.

establishment of 'English authority in all parts of the country', and saw 'the first responsibility of government in Ireland as to curtail or eliminate the power of existing leaders'.[43] For this reason, English observers condemned 'coign and livery', basically the maintenance of standing private armies quartered at the expense of a lord's vassals and tenants, whether practiced by Gaelic or Old English lords. However, Spenser attacks more than just military concerns, using the medium of a fictional debate between the naïve Eudoxus and the more worldly Irenius. The latter decries the 'great use among the Irish to make great assemblies together upon a Rath or hill, there to parly', because 'in these meetings many mischiefs have been both practised and wrought…

> For to them do commonly resort all the scum of loose people, where they may freely meet and confer of what they list, which else they could not do without suspicion or knowledge of others…. As for these meetings…it is very inconvenient that any such should be permitted, specially in a people so evil minded as they now and diversely show themselves…. [D]angerous are such assemblies…they were best to be abolished.[44]

Nowhere is it clearer that the people beyond the Pale constituted a collective threat to the Pale, based on their potential for political activities understood in opposition to the political ideas, movements, and authorities within the Pale.

Boorde and Spenser both write about the 'wylde Irishe', which invites another turn to the Oxford lexicographers. The meanings of 'wild' range and overlap across a spectrum from the mere observation of savagery to the explicitly political. The depiction of the bestial, of course, is obvious, but Boorde also spoke of the 'wast and vast' land as 'wylde', which implies the 'uncultivated or uninhabited; hence, waste, desert, desolate'. This follows the contemporary English view that living by semi-migrant pastoralism was barbaric, in contrast to settled agriculture as practiced in southern England and extended across the Irish Sea into the Pale. 'Wild', though, could refer to people who were 'uncivilized, savage; uncultured, rude; also, not accepting, or resisting, the constituted government; rebellious', which are certainly political representations. The editors of the OED direct us, specifically, to see '*wild Irish*'. 'Wild' had numerous political meanings: 'Not under, or not submitting to, control or restraint'; 'acting or moving freely without restraint'; 'resisting control or restraint'; and 'not submitting to moral control; taking one's own way in defiance of moral obligation or authority; unruly, insubordinate'. We can also see a figurative affinity with the Pale and its emergent meanings,

[43] Canny, *Making Ireland British*, p. 57; 62.
[44] Spenser, *A View*, pp. 77; 79.

in the sense of 'undertakings, actions, notions, statements, etc.: Going beyond prudent or reasonable limits'.[45]

Steven Ellis has defended the utility of seeing the situation in sixteenth-century Ireland in terms of 'international' boundaries.[46] We must be careful, however. Thinking in terms of national and international boundaries runs the risk of assigning modern understandings to past circumstances: it is simple to think of the boundaries of political difference as national, political subjectivity as national, and xenophobic fears as international. The Pale, however, in its literal sense of a defensive boundary and its figurative meaning concerning boundaries to the permissible, cannot be limited to understandings of national difference. The power struggles of the sixteenth century elites in Ireland did not play out along purely 'national' or even 'ethnic' lines, nor did the harder-to-observe struggles of the Old English, New English, and Gaelic Irish tenantry. 'Gealdom', says Maginn, did not imply a corporate identity so much as an area of cultural continuity.[47] By contrast, English plantations in Ireland during the Elizabethan period were part of a specific (and complex) political project that, at times, imputed collective meaning to 'Irish' and 'English', or depended on those meanings to formulate prescriptions about what ought to be. The Pale, as a concept, assists us to understand the ideas of boundary, difference, and indeed threat, in its political context.

Later political theorists have thought through the meanings of such political boundaries. In *Liberalism: A Counter-History*, the Italian philosopher, Domenico Losurdo, writes about the Liberalism's demarcation of 'sacred' and 'profane' space. He writes, 'By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space'.[48] Losurdo's discussion of liberalism is simultaneously useful and distracting. Losurdo's conception of a 'sacred' and a 'profane' space certainly has meaning in connection with the Pale: the profane, by default, is beyond the pale. It is a useful distinction even outside the framework and tradition of political Liberalism. It demonstrates quite well the operation of the Pale within a specific political tradition.[49] Yet Losurdo's depiction of the profane space

[45] 'Wild', *OED*, Vol. XX, pp. 330-331; emphasis original.
[46] Ellis, 'The English Pale'.
[47] See Maginn, 'Gaelic Ireland'.
[48] Domenico Losurdo. *Liberalism: A Counter-History*. Translated by Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, [2006] 2011), pp. 309-315.
[49] The ideology or practices of Liberalism were not relevant to sixteenth-century Ireland, when Anglo-Norman feudalism, Gaelic lordship, and Tudor-style centralising monarchy were the predominant modes of governance, and belonging was made with reference to the authority of lords and lineages. John Locke would not author the foundational manuscripts of Liberalism for over a century. It was the contestation or conservation of the authority of the monarch of England as Lord of Ireland, and, after 1541, as King of Ireland, which underlay much of the political ideas and struggles of the sixteenth century in Ireland.

neglects to account for the acknowledgement, by those within the pale, of the political potential of those beyond the pale. Boorde might characterise the Irish as 'savage' and 'wild', but this apparent closeness to nature did not mean their societies had no political potential. Spenser, exhibited great concern about assemblies of the Gaels. It was not the impossibility of political activity among those who dwelt in the profane space beyond the pale, but the very real possibility of political activity by the 'wild' people that was threatening.

In the mid-twentieth century, the Martinican political theorist, anti-colonial soldier, and psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon, famously wrote in 1961 that 'The colonial world is a world divided into compartments…a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers, are shown by barracks and police stations'. It is a 'Manichean' world.[50] The specific colonial relationship of division that Fanon wrote about was between 'the settler' and 'the native', categories with racial meaning: the division between 'Arab' and 'European', in the Algerian context in which Fanon wrote. What he describes in these 'compartments' can be thought of with reference to the concept of the Pale—both what is within and what is beyond it. However, I read Fanon in a specific way, in relation to the likes of Spenser. The world understood from the point of view of colonialism, from a colonial political subjectivity, is a world divided into compartments. This does not render the divisions any less real, nor make the barracks vanish. But it requires political ideas and a political project—for example, that Gaelic society is problematic, and that plantation of English people and society in Ireland, extending English common law and the authority of the English king, are desirable historical outcomes—to give meaning to the sixteenth-century conditions of Ireland, and to render some people, practices, and politics beyond the Pale. Political boundaries do not necessarily conform to what is 'real'.

The Pale asks us to think in terms of boundaries of political difference and reminds us that political projects or 'movements', like the call of Spenser's ilk for plantation in Ireland, are as important to defining that difference as are empirical or institutional differences. When Andrew Boorde wrote, 'Irland…is deuyded in ii. partes', the one 'wyld' the other 'well mannered', he projected a political understanding of Ireland that left out a partially hybrid world, and did not account for other forms of mobility. His stark bifurcation was rooted in ideas about how society ought to be organised, and about what threatened that organisation. This does not make Boorde's conceptualisation less real, as a political prescription. The Pale—the theorisation of a boundary of difference and the admissible as part of a political project—was used to structure, explain, and justify the projects of different political actors. The people and those political

[50] Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, pp. 37-42.

possibilities that have been identified as problems in certain perspectives would be intruders on the territory of the Pale as on the teleology of history. The Pale marked out the boundaries of the foreign in the context of a political-subjective worldview. Indeed, the meanings of 'foreign' shade towards the Pale. In one sense, foreign might mean, 'Alien in character; not related to or concerned with the matter under consideration; irrelevant, dissimilar, inappropriate'. That is to say, the foreign is beyond the pale. Consider the 1671 use of pale in, 'Nothing within the pale or verge of Reason, or the fancy or imagination of any' alongside the Jonathan Swift's 1701 use of foreign in, 'This design is not so foreign from some people's thoughts'.[51] We saw, too, that the Pale speaks to historical experiences and political prescriptions on history. We heard from Spenser, whose ideas reflected plans for the organisation of society in Ireland, in which he had a personal stake, and from Chieregato, who advanced specific ideas about kingship and, by disparaging what he saw, or heard, or interpreted of Gaelic ideas about the same, advanced a notion of how political (and religious) power ought to be organised. Certain notions about society and about necessary historical outcomes mark what lies inside the Pale.

How precisely has this discussion been relevant to the history of the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century? As the next chapter shows in relation to the Fish River Marches and the politics of the frontier, the invocation of the Pale related closely to the demarcation of foreignness and the identification of threatening traditions and practices of political organisation by those 'beyond the pale'. Despite numerous similarities—colonial plantation, the centrality of livestock raiding, the construction of a loose line of fortification—my point is not strictly comparative. A political and politicised concept that developed in the context of sixteenth-century colonialism in Ireland was borrowed and reconditioned by colonists of the early nineteenth, in southern Africa. But I have been intent to show that, crucially, the Pale is about more than the forts, the settlements, and the cattle. The importance of the Pale is in the delimitation of the foreign and how this delimitation forms part of political projects and of broader political subjectivities.

Spenser's condemnation of meetings on 'a Rath or hill' drew attention to 'all the scum of loose people' who 'commonly resort[ed]' to such gatherings. This was not idle vilification. Just before the midpoint of the sixteenth century, when the well-being of the Pale was of special interest to English administrators, the bellicose Sir Edward Bellingham was sent to Ireland as the king's Lord Deputy, where he fought to secure the marches of the Pale against recalcitrant

[51] 'Pale', *OED*, Vol. XI, p. 91; 'Foreign', *OED*, Vol. VI, p. 51.

Gaelic lords on its border. Bellingham's military officials were charged with 'booking', or registering, the inhabitants of Gaelic lordships: those who were not claimed by the local lord—the 'masterless men'—could be deported or executed.[52] Leaving Ireland, we turn to patterns of 'masterlessness', ideas about the 'masterless', and their place in the politics of the foreign.

SLAVERY AND THE MAROON IN THE WEST INDIES

In the 1620s, a nephew of the English mariner, Sir Francis Drake, published a thirty-year-old manuscript recounting his uncle's exploits. The book, written by Philip Nichols, included an episode on the coast of Panama, where Drake's crew heard from some black sailors of 'the Symerons (a blacke people, which about eightie yeeres past, fled from the Spaniards their Masters)'. These early sixteenth-century fugitives, had 'since grown to a Nation, under two Kings of their own: the one inhabiteth to the West, and the other to the East of the Way from Nombre de Dios to Panama'.[53] These 'Symerons' were more properly *cimarrónes*: maroons. 'The term *maroon*', writes Neil Roberts,

> derives etymologically from the vocabulary of indigenous Arawaks and Tainos in the Caribbean. The Spanish word *cimarrón* developed on the island of Hispaniola in reference initially to Spanish colonialists' feral cattle, which fled to the hills, then to enslaved Amerindians seeking refuge in those areas, and ultimately (by the early 1530s) to enslaved Africans seeking escape from chattel slavery beyond plantation boundaries. The introduction of *cimarrón* into written language led to the coinage of the French and Dutch word *marron* and the English *maroon*, each word garnering regular usage in political vocabulary by the Age of Revolution.[54]

At its most abridged, this is the history of both the word maroon and the people to which it came to refer. It encompasses their flight from slavery as well as the creation of independent societies with political structures and boundaries. Before going into more detail about the Maroon and the political history involved, I should point out the relevance of slavery to understanding the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century: slavery not only as a system of labour and political economy, but more particularly as a frame of reference for colonists interpreting local problems and for their ideas about foreignness as a threat. A thorough discussion of slavery at the Cape is impossible, here, but it is worth a little consideration.

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[52] Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest*, p. 35; Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland*, p. 165.
[53] 'Maroon', *OED*, Vol. IX, p. 383; Philip Nichols. *Sir Francis Drake Revived*. In Charles William Eliot (ed.). *Voyages and Travels: Ancient and Modern*, *Vol*. 35 (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1909-1914; Bartleby.com, 2001) Available at: https://www.bartleby.com/33/34.html [accessed 15 February 2020], np.
[54] Neil Roberts. *Freedom as Marronage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 4; emphasis original.

Historians have noted that slavery at the Cape of Good Hope never reached the scale that it did in the plantation societies of the Americas from Brazil to the Caribbean to the southeast of North America, nor, for that matter, did slave resistance. It has been acknowledged, nonetheless, that one and three-quarter centuries of slavery had consequences for the Cape colonial societies in which it was practiced, as well as for historians seeking to understand them.[55] Clifton Crais argues that slavery was important in two ways: first, with regard to the integration of South Africa 'into the world-economy' of the Atlantic world, in which were practiced 'various forms of unfree labour of which slavery became the most conspicuous'; and, second, in terms of the racial division of labour and of colonial identity formation in reference to whiteness.[56]

More than just these important processes, slavery and the experience and knowledge of slave society also provided some of the key ideas through which Cape colonists (and, of course, slaves) understood their world. These were found in the perspectives of slave-owners, in abolitionist and 'humanitarian' political and moral impulses, in resistance to oppressive labour regimes by appealing to abolitionist sentiments, as well as in the manner in which racism was thought and practiced. Crais has emphasised the importance of master-servant relationships in the development of a patriarchal colonial identity and culture at the Cape,[57] but it is important here to think in terms of why this mattered in colonial politics, when both 'colonial' and 'politics' are taken as subjective reference points. Slavery, whether underlying Bowker's sympathetic self-identification with West Indian planters or the abolitionist commitments of many missionaries, was one crux (of many) in the formation of political subjectivities. In other words, many settlers not only understood themselves through, and every-day interaction and symbols were not only structured by, slavery, but problems, solutions, and 'what ought to be' were also framed in part through slavery. This was slavery, too, with particular geographic and historical indices. Even though most of the slaves at the Cape, during the entire period when slavery was practiced there, would have come from somewhere in the 'Indian Ocean world'—Mozambique or other points on the East African coast, Madagascar, Indonesia, or India[58]—I argue that the logic of slavery and its influence on British Cape colonial subjectivities was

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[55] Nigel Worden and Clifton Crais. 'Introduction'. In Nigel Worden and Clifton Crais. *Breaking the Chains: Slavery and its Legacy in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press), p. 1; Robert Ross. *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 3-4; 6. James C. Armstrong and Nigel A. Worden. 'The Slaves, 1652-1834'. In Elphick and Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society*, p. 109.
[56] Crais, *The Making of the Colonial Order,* pp. 1; 35; 92.
[57] Ibid, pp. 33; 44.
[58] Ross, *Cape of Torments*, p. 13; Armstrong and Worden, 'The Slaves', pp. 110-122.

predominantly 'Atlantic'. In particular, slavery and slave revolts in the West Indies served as a point of reference for many British settlers, soldiers, and officials in southern Africa. Several references to the sugar colonies appeared in both official and public discourses.

Two examples illustrate this point and its importance to the present discussion. It was reported in the *Commercial Advertiser* that, in a case of brutality by a master against slave, which went to trial in 1824, the advocate for the defendant argued that it 'behoved the Court to watch narrowly the conduct of slaves in the Colony, and not to listen too readily to complaints', or else face dangerous consequences in the attitudes of the enslaved. 'He then adverted to the rebellious conduct lately exhibited in the West Indies', the same sort of conduct lately overseen in Demerara by the Cape's future Governor, Benjamin D'Urban. The court overturned the conviction against the master. A critique from 'Justice', printed the next week, read that 'the learned Advocate has been peculiarly unfortunate in his allusion to Demerara', which had resulted rather from the ill-treatment than in leniency towards slaves.[59] For different points of view, then, both slavery and slave revolt in the British colonies of the Americas served as an important frame of reference. It was relevant enough to sway court decisions.

A more important example is from *The Graham's Town Journal*, almost twenty years later. It was argued there, with suitably modern anti-slavery feeling and a significant nod across the ocean to the West Indies where racial conflict had led to the 'brink of ruin', that 'coloured labour' was but a short-lived boon. Where black slavery 'has most extensively prevailed there are the greatest difficulties to be overcome, as well as danger to be apprehended arising from that excess of black population, which is not pressing heavily on the means of subsistence, and exciting fears for the stability of property'. With 'considerable uneasiness' pervading the colonial border with the Xhosa, what was needed were more European labourers, not more black ones liable to give their loyalty to a foreign and 'barbarian' polity.[60] This call for white labour is part of Chapter 8; here the important point is the persistent awareness of slavery and the connections that European people at the Cape of Good Hope drew between the slavery (and its abolition) and the issue of foreignness as threat. The mention of Maroons is another example of these connections.

Maroons were a consequence of every slave society in the Americas: in the Caribbean islands, in the southeast of what became the United States, and in Central and South America

[59] *The South African Commercial Advertiser*, I (11), 17 March 1824; I (12), 24 March 1824.
[60] *Graham's Town Journal*, IX (453), 3 September 1840; XI (540), 7 April 1842.

(and in southern Africa, as I relate in Chapter 6).[61] The scholarship on maroons typically divides the practice of 'marronage', running away into two categories—*petit* and *grand*—that distinguish between temporary and solitary acts of fugitivity and long term or permanent running away that led to community formation. According to Richard Price, 'It was marronage on the grand scale, with individual fugitives banding together to create independent communities of their own, that struck directly at the foundations of the plantation system', by 'presenting military and economic threats'.[62] Interestingly, the communities forged by maroons in Cuba were known as *palenques*, because of the hidden palisades behind which the maroon villages were built.[63] This recalls the lessons of the Pale, the making of boundaries of difference, as well as the Pale's defensive connotations. Through the collective creation of autonomy, maroons rendered themselves beyond the pale of plantation society.

Historians and other scholars of maroons invariably regard marronage as acts of resistance to slavery: for Price 'the antithesis of all that slavery stood for', for Roberts, marronage was 'antithetical to the ideals of enslaving agents', and for Sylviane Diouf, 'From the slave society's perspectives maroons were outlaws in more sense than one. Since they were someone else's property, by absconding they committed theft. Additionally, they were considered to be rebelling against their enslavers'.[64] Importantly, 'marooning' had political consequences. Neil Roberts's *Freedom as Marronage* is probably the most thorough theorisation of the significance of maroons and marronage. 'Maroons', writes Neil Roberts, are people 'cultivating freedom on their own terms within a demarcated social space that allows for the enactment of subversive speech acts, gestures, and social practices antithetical to the ideals of enslaving agents'.[65] Roberts's theorisation is useful in two ways: firstly, he focuses on the act and process of flight in the making of freedom; secondly, the fact that the processes of flight and freedom generated difference.[66] Particularly significant are Roberts's ideas about 'grand marronage', 'the mass flight of individuals from slavery to form an autonomous community' which 'intended to sustain an ongoing community with defined borders'. This, he argues, involves 'spatialization':

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[61] See Richard Price (ed.). *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Sylviane A. Diouf. *Slavery's Exiles*: *The Story of American Maroons* (New York: New York University Press, 2014); Roberts, *Freedom as Marronage*, p. 4.
[62] Richard Price. 'Introduction: Maroons and Their Communities'. In Price, *Maroon Societies,* p. 3.
[63] Francisco Pérez De La Riva. 'Cuban Palenques'. In Price, *Maroon Societies*, pp. 49-59.
[64] Price, 'Introduction', p. 2; Roberts, *Freedom as Marronage*, p. 4; Diouf, *Slavery's Exiles*, p. 230.
[65] Roberts, *Freedom as Marronage*, p. 4.
[66] Ibid, pp. 9; 99-100.

> geographies of distance, denotation of territorial boundaries, and capacity for movement inside the isolationist territorial boundaries…. The teleology of maroon societies is unequivocal in spite of challenges to their formation and longevity: freedom as existence away from slavocracy in the farthest hardest to reach expanses of states.[67]

The introduction of space, of course, reflects certain kinds of 'difference' accompanying the creation of autonomy through marronage, one that involves the demarcation of a pale (territorial), while 'teleology' invests that pale with political difference stemming from communal projects. Furthermore, as Roberts discusses 'two kinds of grand marronage' in Jamaica, linked to mobility and rebellion on the one hand and 'isolationism' on the other,[68] we can begin to think of maroon communities in terms of process and period, understood through political ideas.

Roberts, however, invests maroon communities with 'too much' teleology, for example when he writes that 'The problem with grand marronage in Saint-Domingue was its abridged radicalism. Isolationism and recognition could only take the political community and its dwellers so far'.[69] There is no historical necessity that marronage produces anything particular in terms of political subjectivities; these will always be local, particular, and unique. In seeking a 'trans-historical' purpose in marronage,[70] Roberts sometimes drifts away from history. Grand marronage was not always 'mass flight', to use his term, but also the result of collected individual flight—that is to say it was not always imbued from the start with collective meaning or purpose (although sometimes it was). The fact that some maroons, including those in Jamaica, held slaves, either captured from plantations or re-enslaved runaways, or, as in Cuba, participated in illegal slave trading,[71] also puts a check to Roberts's purported teleology, *but not to the manufacture of autonomy, difference, and spheres of politics*. According to Kathleen Wilson, 'Jamaican maroons were not merely sociological types or utopian symbols; they were distinctive cultural and political actors within a Jamaican and transatlantic social order'. This is to say that they were historical. Writing about 'the Maroons' boundary crossing and multifaceted modes of resistance', Wilson continues, 'The kinds of power, sovereignty, and subjection organized by this transnational colonial space produced complex enactments of the categories of slave and free, British and non-British, and civilized and savage'.[72]

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[67] Ibid, p. 99.
[68] Ibid, p. 100.
[69] Ibid, p.103.
[70] Ibid, p. 4.
[71] de la Riva, 'Cuban Palenques', p. 56.
[72] Kathleen Wilson. 'The Performance of Freedom: Maroons and the Colonial Order in Eighteenth-Century Jamaica and the Atlantic Sound'. *The William and Mary Quarterly,* 66(1), 2009, p. 48.

Here, too, the focus is on the political import of marronage: not on the 'radical' character of maroon societies but the making of political difference. Roberts provides a useful phrase to think through the basic political import of maroons: 'agency with potentiality'.[73] In exercising agency, maroons had the potential for creating political difference, no matter what that difference entailed and no matter if its content was 'radical' or otherwise. That rested on what a certain group of maroons thought and did. Without knowing what historic maroons thought about the world in the course of individually or collectively seeking change through flight, our insight into those politics are limited. However, what other actors thought about maroons gives us some insight into how maroon political agency and potential were viewed.

Sir Francis Drake had many encounters with maroons while in South America, and would not be the last English person who did. In the English world, the Jamaican maroons took a central place, and their history is useful for thinking through the concept of the Maroon, here. With respect to the idea of political difference and autonomy, patterns of maroon leadership and the striking of treaties between maroons and the British Empire in Jamaica serve to historicise some key points. In 1655, when the English captured the Spanish colony of Jamaica, more than a thousand slaves who were not taken away with the Spanish retreated to the mountains, where 'they would prove a thorn in the sides of the English', according to a contemporary and pessimistic English soldier. These maroons 'remained in their retreats within the mountains; where they not only augmented their numbers by natural increase, but, after the island became thicker sown with plantations, they were frequently reinforced with fugitive slaves'.[74] Through processes of continual 'forming, growing, fighting, and merging', says Barbara Kopytoff, 'two large polities' emerged among the maroons by the 1700s. These were the culturally, politically, ethnically, and geographically distinct groups known as the 'Windward' and 'Leeward' Maroons, in the eastern and western ends of the island, respectively.[75] Although the geographical distinction remained, Michael Craton observes that 'the differences between Windward and Leeward Maroons [by 1730] had been eliminated by their adaptation to a common environment, by the exigencies of a mutual struggle for survival, and by recruitment from a common pool of disaffected slaves'. Kopytoff chalks up the shift towards similarity to the effects of treaties with the English colony.[76] Differences in maroon

[73] Roberts, *Freedom as Marronage*, p. 17.
[74] Bryan Edwards. *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies, in Three Volumes, Vol. I, Third Edition* (London: John Stockdale, 1801), pp. 522-524.
[75] Barbara Kopytoff. 'Jamaican Maroon Political Organization: The Effects of the Treaties'. *Social and Economic Studies* 25(2), 1976, pp. 87-88.
[76] Craton, *Testing*, pp. 76-78; Kopytoff, 'Political Organization', p. 90.

political and social organisation and collective activities could still exist from one maroon town to another.

From a colonial viewpoint, the writer R. C. Dallas captured the process of the formation of collectives among maroons; for him, desertion led to leadership led to 'depredations'.[77] Maroon leadership was often influenced by African patterns of authority and leadership, rooted, in the case of one Nanny of Nanny Town, in ritualistic and spiritual authority, or in assertions of kinship (whether real or fictive), in the case of Cudjoe and his 'brothers' in the 1730s.[78] Kopytoff also makes clear the existence of at times inharmonious internal political landscapes, encompassing factional and leadership disputes and possibilities for conflict resolution.[79] Escaped slaves and existing maroons thus manufactured polities out of known, or sometimes half-known, traditions of political organisation, adapted to their situation; part of the process of manifesting autonomy was for maroons to both create and maintain collective structures and practices that were distinct from colonial society, and which could aspire to collective objectives and ways of life sometimes at odds with neighbouring societies (the plantation colony). Thus, maroon livelihood became 'depredation' for Dallas. According to Edwards, another colonial voice, maroons forming communities 'introduced among them what the French call an *esprit de corps*, or community of sentiments and interests', which 'taught them to feel, and at the same time highly to overvalue, their own relative strength and importance'.[80]

This creation of distance and difference led not only to different lifeways, but also to several decades of violent conflict in Jamaica—the 'Maroon Wars' (1690-1740 and 1795-96)—and additionally to the striking of treaties between British authorities and maroon leaders. Colonial authorities struck treaties with maroons throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean, and these went beyond the tacit acknowledgement of societal difference in the 'subtle entente' that maroons forged with settlers.[81] In Jamaica, treaties were entered into in 1663, 1739, 1740, 1773, 1794, and 1795. Both Kathleen Wilson and Barbara Kopytoff note that the Jamaican treaties did not establish the maroons as 'sovereign nations' but as special subjects of the British Empire, accorded some rights and owing some obligations. They could not, for one thing, be enslaved. For Wilson, 'the treaties performatively transformed rebels into

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[77] Robert Charles Dallas. *The History of the Maroons, from Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone: Including The Expedition to Cuba, for The Purpose of Obtaining Spanish Chasseurs; and The State of the Island of Jamaica for The Last Ten Years: with a Succinct History of that Island Previous to that Period, in Two Volumes, Vol. I* (London: T. M. Longman and O. Rees, 1803), p. 293.
[78] Craton, *Testing*, pp. 78; 81.
[79] Kopytoff, 'Political Organization', p. 101.
[80] In Wilson, 'The Performance of Freedom', p. 61.
[81] Craton, *Testing*, pp. 64-65.

subjects, allies of the plantation system, and turned former allies – the enslaved – into enemies'.[82] This last refers to the obligation on maroons to hunt down runaway slaves for the planters. However, while they did not create or confirm 'nations' of the maroons, the treaties effectively affirmed the collective and autonomous character of maroon communities: they could be uncontrollable and continue as military antagonists, or they could be semi-controlled through an alliance and the guarantee of freedom. Kopytoff writes about the different meanings with which the treaties were imbued by colonial and maroon societies. For the British, they were legal arrangements made between two parties—acknowledging the maroons as 'legally encapsulated societies'—while for the maroons they came to constitute what Kopytoff calls 'sacred charters' of the maroon communities, 'expressing and embodying to them their origin and corporate unity'.[83] Kopytoff observes,

> For the maroons, the entire span of their history before 1739 is especially important because it was the only time when they were able to develop political institutions outside the sphere of influence of the colonial society. In the subsequent history of the maroons, the most important constraint turned out to be the relationship with the colonial government initiated by the treaties of 1739. The treaties recognized the free and separate existence of the maroon societies…. [But] the unintended effect of the treaties was to transform the two maroon polities, reducing the differences between them and undermining the traditional political organization of both of them. Ironically, the era of maroon independent political development was ended by the treaties that were supposed to ensure the independence of their societies.[84]

Ambiguous and contradictory, the treaties nonetheless recognised the difference, and a certain right to difference, of the maroon communities, created through acts of marronage.

Despite the treaties, colonial depictions of maroons in Jamaica focus on them as fierce and wily fighters, and enemies of the planters' colony. Bryan Edwards, an Englishman writing in the 1790s, whose 'Observations on the Disposition, Character, Manners and Habits of Life, of the MAROON NEGROES of the Island of Jamaica' is mainly a litany of their attacks on colonists and plantations, described the maroons as 'savages' who 'continued to distress the island for upwards of forty years, during which time forty-four acts of Assembly were passed, and at least 240,000 *l*. expended for their suppression'.[85] Edwards's contemporary, Dallas, thought that they were 'idle', on account of too much 'wandering from place to place'; and 'it was impossible to coop them [i.e. the maroons] up in limits: like the wild creatures of a forest, they

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[82] Wilson, 'The Performance of Freedom', p. 61.
[83] Barbara Kopytoff. 'Colonial Treaty as Sacred Charter of the Jamaican Maroons'. *Ethnohistory*, 26(1), 1979, p. 59.
[84] Barbara Kopytoff. 'The Early Political Development of the Jamaican Maroon Societies'. *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 35(2), 1978, pp. 306-307.
[85] Edwards, *The History*, p. 525-526; emphasis original.

found issues at every point'.[86] Indeed, the maroons were sometimes referred to as 'Wild Negroes',[87] which, as discussed in relation to the Pale, carries connotations of both the bestial and the politically uncontrolled. The treaties, in creating bounty-hunters of the maroons, also created enmity towards maroons amongst the still enslaved. As Dallas notes, in certain areas 'the majority of [slaves] were actually the determined enemies of the Maroons: whereas in Clarendon, whence the Maroons originally came, a degree of family connexion was still acknowledged among them'.[88] But this apparently did not preclude the possibility of Maroons involved in slave revolts. Edwards shows them in 1795 'tampering with the negroes on numerous and extensive plantations', 'endeavouring to seduce them' and 'prevailing on the negro slaves to join them' in 'their hopes of creating a general revolt'. He called their violence against British forces and colonial whites a 'dreadful example to the negroes in servitude'.[89] Indeed, in some times and places, slave revolt and marronage were strongly connected.[90] Appreciating the different meanings ascribed to maroons merits deeper exploration of not only colonial or planter views, but also the views of slaves or free blacks living in West Indian towns, of indentured whites, American Indians, and others who might have had thoughts on the subject of political difference and boundary-making. This is a project for another time. However, one more interesting episode in the history of Jamaican maroons stands out: their transportation to Nova Scotia after the maroons' surrender in the conflict of 1796.[91] After a proposal was made and then ditched for forced migration to the British colony of Upper Canada, the group were sent to Nova Scotia. Although the 'conduct' of the Maroons settled in Nova Scotia 'gave general satisfaction', a surprise in light of the 'bloodthirsty' tales that had preceded them to Canada, the northern winter did not suit the maroons and plans were laid to move them somewhere else. The maroons were, apparently, keen to be employed as soldiers in the Cape Regiment in southern Africa, but British officials believed this was a ruse that would enable the maroons to 'murder and plunder the Inhabitants, if they could only live in the Woods all the Year round'. The Canadian archivist, Douglas Brymner, glossed, one hundred

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[86] Dallas, *The History*, *Vol*. I, pp. 127; 244-245.
[87] Kopytoff, 'The Early Political Development', p. 294; Wilson, 'The Performance', p. 63.
[88] Robert Charles Dallas. *The History of the Maroons, from Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe at Sierra Leone: Including The Expedition to Cuba, for The Purpose of Obtaining Spanish Chasseurs; and The State of the Island of Jamaica for The Last Ten Years: with a Succinct History of that Island Previous to that Period, in Two Volumes, Vol. II* (London: T. M. Longman and O. Rees, 1803), p. 143
[89] Edwards, *The History*, pp. 549; 567
[90] See, for example, Craton, *Testing*, pp. 125-139; Leslie F. Manigat. 'The Relationship between Marronage and Slave Revolts and Revolution in St. Domingue-Haiti'. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, *292*(1), 1977, pp. 420-438.
[91] See Dallas, *The History*, *Vol.* II, pp. 194-231; 477-505.

years later, 'to turn such a body of men loose at the Cape with arms in their hands would be dangerous to the community'.[92] The colony of Sierra Leone in West Africa, where black loyalists of the American War of Independence had been settled, was floated as a different resettlement location, but the Sierra Leone Company 'did not respond with warmth; in fact, showed a great unwillingness to undertake the charge of these people'. The 'mutinous' behaviour of the loyal blacks settled in Sierra Leone had been enough for the Company, who did not care for 'another body of negroes whose reputation could not be held to warrant such a step' as putting them in a situation to 'make common cause with their brethren in colour'. Eventually, the Jamaica Maroons did end up in Sierra Leone.[93] The upshot of this history of repeated forced migration and imperial indecision is that no one really 'wanted' the maroons. They were outsiders to be feared.

The understanding we can draw from all of this is that colonial whites were apt to treat maroons, and refer to them, as a corporate unit, whether of a specific town, following a specific leader, as an enemy, through treaties, in relation to and different from enslaved Africans, or as a group being transported. This is manifestly the result of maroons organising themselves collectively; indeed, it is one of the potential consequences of marronage that a distinct society or polity emerges, which in different ways—ontological, martial, political—might pose a challenge to another society. This historical process traces deserting slaves towards the creation of autonomy, or, from a different perspective 'foreignness'.

Importantly, we can think about the Maroon and marronage beyond the context of slavery and beyond the local, regional, or hemispheric context of the Americas. Although a majority of maroons were African or African-American, the concept of the Maroon should not only be racially defined. Not all maroon communities were exclusively black—indeed, some of the most successful maroon groups in the Caribbean world were black and American Indian[94]—and the possibilities for marronage were not limited to black people. Marcus Rediker's study of the political economy of eighteenth-century Anglo-American mariners lists the 'marooning life' alongside piracy and labouring ashore as alternatives to being exploited onboard ship. He calls it 'a conscious withdrawal from the imperial economy and culture to a non-accumulative

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[92] Wentworth to Portland, 7 May 1797. In 'PAPERS Relative to the Settling of the MAROONS in His Majesty's Province of Novia Scotia', 22 February 1798. Library of the Public Archives of Canada. Internet Archive, 28 March 2011, p. 3. Available at: https://archive.org/details/cihm_46051/page/n7/mode/2up [Accessed 6 March 2020]; See also, D. Brymner. 'The Jamaica Maroons—How They Came to Nova Scotia—How They Left It'. *Transactions of the Royal Canada Society II*, 1895. Internet Archive, 2009, pp. 88. Available at: https://archive.org/details/cihm_02111/page/n5/mode/2up [Accessed 6 March 2020].

[93] Brymner, 'The Jamaica Maroon', pp. 88-90.

[94] Craton, *Testing*, p. 61; de la Riva, 'Cuban Palenques', pp. 55-56.

life on the world's periphery'. 'Perhaps the most important group of marooners', according to Rediker, 'were the "Baymen," or logwood cutters' of Honduras or Belize, who, driven by 'the abuses inherent in the wage system', 'created independent communal settlements around the Caribbean' and 'fundamentally different ways of life on the margins of the world'.[95]

The recent book, *A Global History of Runaways*, makes the argument that, throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth-century worlds, from South Asia to the West Indies, from Louisiana to the Cape Colony and Australia, running away was a ubiquitous mode of resistance to forced labour. The book focuses on running away—'workers' mobility'—as resistance to capitalist exploitation, which, argue Leo Lucassen and Lex Heerma van Voss, 'de-exoticizes the experiences of African origin maroons in the New World', because marooning was a reaction of 'bonded and indentured laborers inside and outside of Europe, whether they were employed as sailors, soldiers, servants, artisans, or agricultural workers'.[96] Some of these, including liberated Africans in the West Indies and escaped convicts in Van Diemen's Land, New South Wales, and Norfolk Island (all part of present-day Australia),[97] were figures that tied this 'global history of runaways' to Cape colonial politics, through the knowledge and discourses colonists accessed and created for local problems. This raises another point, too, which has to do with the importance of connecting workers' modes of flight with migration history, particularly the history for forced migrations. Accepting paradigms for migration that do not rely exclusively on 'international' frameworks opens up potential for fruitful analysis of workers' mobility.[98] This is especially true when thinking in terms of maroons whose patterns of mobility and collectivity resulted in the making of new polities. Migration—mobility in general—generates new configurations, some of which, from certain political perspectives, must be unwanted directions for social, economic, and political relations. Mobility thus involves the potential for the realisation of 'foreignness', in nearly any context, especially when difference is staked out and maintained through autonomous and 'antithetical'

[95] Marcus Rediker. *Between the Devil and The Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 146.
[96] Leo Lucassen and Lex Heerma van Voss. 'Introduction: Flight as Fight'. In Marcus Rediker, Titas Chakraborty, and Matthias van Rossum (eds.) *A Global History of Runaways: Workers, Mobility, and Capitalism, 1600-1850* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), p. 17.
[97] Hamish Maxwell-Stewart and Michael Quinlan. 'Voting with Their Feet: Absconding and Labor Exploitation in Convict Australia'. In Rediker, Chakraborty, and van Rossum, *A Global History of Runaways*, pp. 156-177; Anita Rupprecht. 'He says that if he is not taught a trade, he will run away: Recaptured Africans, Desertion, and Mobility in the British Caribbean, 1808-1828'. In Rediker, Chakraborty, and van Rossum, *A Global History of Runaways*, pp. 178-198.
[98] Lucassen and van Voss, 'Flight as Fight', pp. 15-16.

practices. Historically, the Maroon was one concept through which the real, the potential, or the imagined manufacture of political autonomy was explained.

VAGABONDS AND VAGRANTS

Marronage was one way people could become 'masterless'. To be vagabond was another, as the historian Christopher Hill explains in his discussion of 'masterless men' in seventeenth-century England.[99] The word 'vagabond' was first descriptive: one could be vagabond, 'roaming or wandering from place to place without settled habitation or home'. To be vagabond, or soon, *a* vagabond, was and remained something socially reprehensible. In 1576, 'The dogge defend[ed] our houses from theeues, vagaboundes, [and] lewde fellowes'; in 1605, it could be exclaimed, 'For shame, betake you to some honest Trade And liue not so as a Vagabond'; and in 1833, there was a biblical 'issuing forth as a vagabond to spread the infection of idleness and vice'.[100] The concept of the vagabond also has significance for later periods and other contexts, including the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century (see Chapter 6). A movement also emerged in the 1830s around one type of vagabond, the 'vagrant', that made reference to vagrancy laws in England (see Chapter 7).

If the Maroon was a vagabond who, through desertion, achieved some measure of autonomy from the dominant social formations and practices, and could 'make' himself or herself 'foreign', the Vagrant was a vagabond whose non-belonging was defined by the state. The Vagrant in the English world had a long history, beginning with medieval legislation against runaway serfs and criminal gangs. By 1350 had come to target 'labourers who refused to work for statutory wages or who begged'.[101] It is important that the Vagrant is not merely a neutral, descriptive term, but a politicised description that places its object in a rational pattern, and which reveals something about the politics of the collectivity or individual using the word. In England, vagrancy and the Vagrant were categories of legal modes of politicising and criminalising the mobile poor of England, which changed over time. The Vagrant also had a unique meaning in the Cape Colony that accessed knowledge of that political history while reinventing it for local problems. As with the Pale and the Maroon, this is not the place for an exhaustive discussion of vagrancy in England, or the related Poor Laws, but a look at the history

[99] Christopher Hill. *The World Turned Upside Down Radical Ideas during the English Revolution (London: Temple Smith, 1972)*, pp. 32-33.
[100] 'Vagabond', *OED,* Vol. XIX, pp. 392-393.
[101] A. L. Beier. *The Problem of the Poor in Tudor and Early Stuart England* (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 3.

of the political concept of the Vagrant that colonists could have drawn on, in knowledgeable or ignorant, accurate or inaccurate, political ways to explain their own situation.

The English Vagrant was codified, to a great extent, during the Tudor dynasty, continuing with the Stuart kings: 'from 1485 until 1649 Parliament passed over two dozen statutes dealing with the poor'.[102] These 'poor laws' addressed two related conditions, first that the poor were becoming poorer through the sixteenth century and, second, the English élites' anxieties about rebellion being incited or carried out by the vagabonds.[103] The 'problem' of the poor was addressed by dividing the poor into different categories. According to A. L. Beier, 'Statutes distinguished the disabled and the able-bodied, but it was more complicated than that. Instead we may divide them into the *settled* and the *vagrant* poor, contrasting groups receiving different treatment. The first were eligible for relief under the poor laws, but the second were treated as criminals'. This distinction was explicitly tied to labour. An Act of 1531 defined vagabonds as 'any man or woman whole and mighty in body and able to labour, having no land, master, nor using any lawful merchandise, craft, or mystery whereby he [*sic*] might get his living'.[104] The poor laws were designed 'to punish the "willfully idle" and to relieve the disabled', the former 'to be whipped' and the latter to be 'relieved'. As John Pound notes, this division could not accommodate the person trying unsuccessfully to find work.[105] That person, who might find migration a means to escape poverty (as about one-third of English town-dwellers did each decade in the seventeenth century)[106] would likely find themselves violating the law as a vagrant. 'To the extent', writes Beier in another article, 'that vagrants most commonly worked at the precarious and common jobs…it becomes hard to distinguish them from casual labourers, except that vagrants were homeless, on the move and subject to the rigours of the state'.[107] These rigours included whipping 'until bloody', forcible return to a purported 'place of origin', jailing, and, in the event that nothing else worked, permanent banishment under pain of execution.[108] There were also specific trades that, when practiced by a vagrant, were understood as threatening to the status quo, which included 'pedlars [*sic*] and tinkers; all types of entertainer, from fiddlers to actors; soldiers and sailors; healers; students and clerics; and

[102] Ibid, p. 1.
[103] Ibid, 7; John Pound. *Poverty and Vagrancy in Tudor England* (London: Longman, 1971), p. 44.
[104] Beier, *The Problem*, pp. 5; 30.
[105] Pound, *Poverty and Vagrancy*, p. 44.
[106] Beier, *The Problem*, p. 8.
[107] A. L. Beier. 'Vagrants and Social Order in Elizabethan England'. *Past & Present* 64, 1974, p. 13.
[108] Pound, *Poverty and Vagrancy*, p. 53.

wizards'. It was understood that the movement of such persons might constitute or lead to an active threat to state authority.[109]

The Elizabethan Poor Laws were rounded out in 1598 and 1601 with the imposition of universal 'rates' (taxes) to support the deserving poor, to be collected and disbursed at the level of the parish. According to Boyer, able-bodied adults were to be put to work, children put into apprenticeships, and the 'impotent' to be supported from the rates. This system provided the basis for poor laws until 1834. Innovations during the more than two intervening centuries included attempts to regulate the movements of the poor. The 'Settlement Act' of 1662, 'formalized the notion that each person had a parish of settlement, and which gave parishes the right to remove within forty days of arrival any newcomer deemed "likely to be chargeable" [against the rates] as well as any non-settled applicant for relief'. Some of the foundation for parish-level xenophobia, as we saw in Snell, relates to this process through which the state demarcated belonging and entitlement. The year 1723 saw the Workhouse Test Act, which made parish relief contingent upon willingness 'to enter the workhouse'. It was not until 1795 that the 'Removal Act' 'amended the Settlement Law so that no non-settled person could be removed from a parish unless he or she applied for relief'.[110] The end of the eighteenth century saw further changes, both in administration and in theorisation of the poor laws. From the middle of the century, expenditures on 'poor relief' were higher than ever before, a shift was made from workhouse to 'outdoor relief' (not in the workhouse) in response to the changing labour conditions, and debates on the poor laws focused on the 'supposed disincentive effects on labor supply (and the subsequent effects on wages, profits, rents, and morals) created by the policy of granting outdoor relief to able-bodied workers'.[111]

Vagrancy remained a matter closely associated with the poor laws. A Vagrancy Act in 1744 consolidated several anti-vagrancy laws already in existence. It divided people into the 'disorderly', 'rogues and vagabonds', and the repeat-offenders: 'incorrigible rogues'. The first group were tied explicitly to the poor law, and encompassed those who 'threaten to run away, and leave their wives and children to the parish; all person who unlawfully return to a parish from whence they have been legally removed', and those who would not work and those who begged. The second group included those who actually did 'run away and leave their wives and children chargeable to the parish', the various categories of traveling entertainers,

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[109] Beier, *The Problem*, pp. 30-31.
[110] George Boyer. 'English Poor Laws'. EH.Net Encyclopedia. Robert Whaples (ed). 7 May 2002. Available at: http://eh.net/encyclopedia/english-poor-laws/ [accessed 12 February 2020], np.
[111] George Boyer. *An Economic History of the English Poor Law 1750-1850*. (New York: Cambridge, 1990), pp. 1; 43; 51.

'Egyptians' ('Gypsies'), fortune-tellers, gamblers, unlicensed peddlers, 'all persons wandering abroad and lodging in alehouses, barns, outhouses, or in the open air, and not giving a good account of themselves', those pretending to be soldiers or sailors, and 'all other persons wandering about and begging'. It made provision for the apprehension of these mobile folk, outlawed the harbouring of vagrants, stipulated that vagrant children be apprenticed, and outlined punishments for vagrancy.[112]

From the 1780s, 'a debate raged', amongst important political theorists including Thomas Malthus, Edmund Burke, and Jeremy Bentham, who developed 'a sustained critique of the Poor Law'. A distinction was drawn between 'poverty' and 'pauperism', the former a natural condition and the latter a 'moral as well as economic problem'. Malthus and others argued for a complete abolition of the poor law on the basis that it hindered self-reliance; and Malthus remained a key figure and point of argument in debates around reform and abolition of the law.[113] In fact, John Fairbairn, editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, applied these ideas to the condition of Ireland in the 1840s, claiming that destitution, crime, and various insurrections were to be chalked up to the operation of a poor law in Ireland, which threw the wrench of dependence into the economy.[114] As Alan Kidd puts it, these arguments were 'nothing less than the application of market values to the ancient traditions of poor relief'.[115] Upon these arguments, and because of an uprising of agricultural labourers in 1830-1831, the 'Old Poor Law' was reformed in 1834.[116]

Vagrancy entered these debates on poor law reform and remained an issue after 1834. Sir William Young, a late eighteenth-century MP, believed that the power to provide poor relief only on condition that people would go into a workhouse was 'the very pandar [i.e. panderer; pimp] to vagrancy and its succession of idleness, vice and crime'. 'Indolence', he said, 'a carelessness of life and character…oppress and vitiate this poor man's heart. Finally, he leaves his wife and children a lasting burden on the parish, to—he knows not whither; to do—he knows not what'.[117] The amelioration of the Settlement Act, mentioned above, was partly in

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[112] George Nicholls. *A History of the English Poor Law in Connection with the State of the Country and the Condition of the People, Vol. II, 1714-1853* (London: P. S. King & Son, 1898), pp. 34-40.
[113] See J. R. Poynter. *Society and Pauperism: English Ideas on Poor Relief, 1795-1834* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
[114] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2252), 10 January 1849; XXV (2261), 10 February 1849; XXVII (2314), 15 August 1849.
[115] Alan Kidd. *State, Society*, *and the Poor in Nineteenth-Century England* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Pres, 1999), pp. 19-21.
[116] Ibid, pp. 24-25.
[117] In Michael E. Rose. *The English Poor Law 1780-1930* (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & Charles, 1971), p. 25.

response arguments by the likes of Adam Smith that it hindered labour mobility. In 1806, in the course of demarcating the distinction between 'poverty' ('a most necessary and indispensable ingredient in society') and 'indigence' ('the evil'), Patrick Colquhoun, a Scottish essayist, wrote that the object was 'restoring the culpable indigent to at least a useful condition in society'. This included former prison inmates, people of 'low character', sex workers, 'the race of gypsies [*sic*] and others imitating their manners:—to vagrants of all descriptions'.[118] An Act of 1824 reaffirmed the sixteenth-century divisions of the mobile classes and logic that an able-bodied person who did not work was a criminal against society. George Nicholls, Poor Law Commissioner and Secretary to the Poor Law Board at the end of the nineteenth century, observed that the '*idle and disorderly, rogues and vagabonds*, and *incorrigible rogues*' were 'the class of persons usually coming under the superintendence of the parish authorities, in connection with the Poor Law'. The 1820s saw several laws that governed how legal 'settlement' could be acquired in any given parish, to counter 'demoralisation and fraud'.[119] With somewhat different concerns, the mobility of the poor was part of the debate about what to do with them, as it had been in the 1500s. In the late 1840s, after reform had been passed, vagrancy—indeed, a 'continual and rapid increase of vagrancy'—was still on the official table. It was felt that 'casual' poor relief 'must diminish the risks and privations of a vagrant life', and thus 'tempt' people into it; it was 'the principle cause of the extension of vagrancy'. Once again, the problem and its solution were to divide the mobile poor through a 'sound and vigilant discrimination in respect to the objects of relief' to prevent 'abuse of relief indiscriminately extended to every stranger who may represent himself as destitute'.[120] Twenty years later, there was still 'public concern about the problem of vagrancy' and one English police Inspector recorded several 'notices' written by vagrants on walls as evidence of criminal conspiracies.[121]

The upshot of this history is that southern African British colonists of the early and middle nineteenth century had historical and contemporary knowledge and arguments to draw upon in relation to vagrancy (see Chapter 7). In fact, it was this history and its ongoing developments that provided them with the concept of the Vagrant. In England, this was politicised in certain ways, which had to do, as Beier puts it, with 'social order' and 'threats to the state',[122] as well as with the changing demands of an industrialising economy and the theories of society that accompanied capitalism. Vagrant—and vagabond, rogue, etc.—were legal categories, but they

[118] Ibid, pp. 47-48.
[119] Nicholls, *A History*, pp. 196-199.
[120] Rose, *The English Poor Law*, p. 208.
[121] Ibid, pp. 210-212.
[122] Beier, 'Vagrants and Social Order', p. 26.

also signified important 'value judgements', in Ellis's phrase, rooted in politics. In the Cape Colony, the Vagrant was appropriated and given local meanings, often racialised, that drew on these other politicisations. The question remains, what does this have to do with the construction of foreignness? Chapter 7 addresses this for the Cape Colony, but there are some general ideas worth considering, here.

Kunal M. Parker's *Making Foreigners* considers citizenship and immigration law in America from the seventeenth century to the present. Parker interprets a process of 'rendering insiders foreign' through legal limitations on political, legal, and property rights, on citizenship and belonging, revealing 'the manipulability of the border between "citizen" and "alien," and the relationship between subordination and foreignness'. In different ways, this affected American Indians, black people, women, poor people, convicts, servants, and political dissidents whether they were born inside or outside the colonial or national territory. Not everyone, argues Parker, had '"full" social or political membership or rights to presence and mobility throughout the community's territory'. [123]

During the first two centuries of Parker's study, what became the United States was part of the British Empire, and the poor laws of the American colonies and the subsequent United States were derived from those of England. Again, we should think of Snell and the modes of 'local xenophobia' at the parish level, and the different political meanings of 'foreigner'. According to Parker, 'Within this system, outsiders or 'foreigners' were understood in terms of settlement in a town rather than in terms of membership in the community of allegiance'. Local practices were influenced by this view, for example in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century New England, where 'warning out' of migrants, the institution of town 'passports', and efforts to return people to where they 'belonged' were common. So too was the splitting of towns to remove responsibilities to the poor. This, writes Parker, 'made foreigners out of one's former neighbors. Even if…not rendered aliens in the formal legal sense, vis-à-vis the new town that had emerged, they lost their rights of residence and could be denied poor relief'.[124] If, in the British Empire, 'immigration restriction…was a thoroughly local affair' that victimised the mobile poor, after American independence, 'as in the colonial period…the governing logic of 'immigration restriction exercised by states derived from the poor laws. As such, it was directed at citizens *and* aliens, insiders *and* outsiders, the native-born *and* the

[123] Kunal M. Parker. *Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600-2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 4-5; 22-23; 225.
[124] Ibid, pp. 43-47.

foreign-born'.[125] The argument links mobility, belonging, foreignness, and legal disabilities in provocative ways.

In conclusion, the Vagrant did not did not necessarily originate or flee beyond the pale, but moved within it; but for various political reasons surrounding issues of labour, state authority, criminality, and the territorialisation of interests, different actors perceived that the Vagrant did not fit into society as he or she ought. The identification of the mobile non-belonging population as 'vagrants' represented a mode of governing them, their mobility, and often their labour in order to assert a prescribed status quo. The political charge of non-belonging—'foreignness'—was instrumental in recognising, chastising, and controlling the Vagrant. This language and logic of control that obtained in England influenced politics in the Cape Colony, including through the political category of the Vagrant.

BEFORE MOVING ON

The linkages posited by the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant are troublesome to the empirical demands of historical study; how these concepts got to where they were used is not easy or even possible to pinpoint, and exactly how they allude to sixteenth-century Ireland, slavery in the West Indies, and English anti-poor jurisprudence is imprecise. The historical 'truths' they communicate are abstract. But these 'value-bearing' words, to revive Thompson, are relevant because historical subjects used them, and because of the political meanings with which they were imbued in relation to historical context. Although only two (known) Cape of Good Hope sources used the word 'Maroon', they used it because it meant, or they presumed it could mean, something to their readers, just as much as the continual use of 'Vagrant'. Expanding the words with these abridged histories gives but an impressionistic sense of what people 'knew' or might have known, and how they might have fit such knowledge into arguments about the foreigner and the foreign. What people think cannot be rendered in solid lines. However, it is clear from the Cape's archive that these specific concepts *were* worked into colonial arguments about the foreigner and the foreign, the sketching of political-subjective boundaries of difference, the manufacture of autonomy, and modes of governing mobility. They were present in explaining the fears that difference incited, and the modes of control that were prescribed for the fearsome symptoms borne by the 'foreigner'. This chapter has saved us lengthy digressions from the Cape Colony in the following sections, but its insights move throughout the histories that we

[125] Ibid, pp. 10; 73; emphasis original.

turn to now, covering frontiers and vagabonds, vagrants and foreigners, and the fears that begot political movements at the British Cape of Good Hope.

5.
THE FISH RIVER MARCHES: BOUNDARIES OF DIFFERENCE IN THE POLITICS OF THE FRONTIER

FRONTIER POLITICS IN THE FISH RIVER MARCHES

In early June of 1835, probably in the cool of eastern Cape winter, a public meeting convened in Graham's Town to deliberate over the consequences of a recent war fought between the Cape Colony and the Xhosa. As it was reported in *The Graham's Town Journal*, a Mr. E. Norton proposed, and the meeting resolved, '*That it is the deliberate opinion of this meeting, founded on the results of experience, that the boundary hitherto maintained between the colonial and K—r territories is perfectly indefensible against the predatory incursions of the nation*'. The meeting at Graham's Town included a Dr. Atherstone, who chaired, Mr. Rutherford, the Rev. Mr. Murray, Mr. C. Maynard, Mr. W. R. Thompson, the aforementioned Norton, Mr. R. Godlonton, who reported on the proceedings, Mr. R. Southey, and Mr. W. Cock. There were also Mr. Gray, Mr. Jarvis, Mr. Wright, and Lieutenant C. Campbell. A letter from Dr. Campbell was read aloud. This group of settler men lamented at length the terrors of African 'depredations'; they considered the practicability of different natural boundaries: the Great Fish River, or the Kei; they bemoaned the stupidity of their 'old and inveterate enemy', John Fairbairn, the editor of the *South African Commercial Advertiser*; and they resolved to elect a five-man committee to draft a thank you note to the Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, for what they depicted as a quite heroic rescue of themselves, their families, and their farms, in a desperate hour of need. They especially appreciated D'Urban's move to annex all of the territory west of the Kei to the Cape Colony as 'Queen Adelaide Province'.[1] I record the list of attendees' names in order to begin to show, for those of us interested almost two centuries later, the extent of participation in what can be called a politics of the frontier. We learn that, publicly at least, and typically for its century, this was a male-dominated politics; moreover, based on the surnames represented, it was a British-dominated politics. Importantly, their resolutions

[1] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (181), 13 June 1835; emphasis original; IV (182), 19 June 1835.

and deliberations raise many of the foremost concerns that settlers brought to their participation in politics, in a 'Traveller's' words to the *Journal*, on 'this unfortunate frontier'.[2]

In the introduction I spoke of historicising xenophobia as one within an interconnected set of historical dynamics. The 'frontier' is one such set of dynamics, in the context of the Cape Colony, in which xenophobia was thought and practiced. However, I argue here that the frontier was not a structural condition, but rather a political, subjective reference through which many settlers constituted their political selves and framed political problems. Thus, a distinction must be drawn between the *politics* and the *issues* of the frontier. To describe the context (but not the politics), the concept of the marchland or 'marches' is useful. The English historian Steven Ellis defines a marchland as 'a militarised borderland with shifting boundaries',[3] which captures a great deal of truth about the historical conditions of the lands lying on the eastern and western banks of the Great Fish River. The marchland conveys not only the 'shifting' nature of boundaries, but reminds us that European conquest and colonisation were not completed processes in the eastern Cape in the first half of the nineteenth century. The politics of the frontier during that period were more about interaction with largely independent communities who were constituted as different or 'foreign', rather than about modes of control of conquered subjects.

The British men who participated in the politics of the frontier articulated foreignness and foreignness as threat in specific ways that knitted together with the specific issues of the Marches like those raised at the public meeting in Graham's Town. With the voice he had, in meetings and in print, Robert Godlonton, editor of *The Graham's Town Journal*, was pivotal to the development and propagation of political discourse on the marches of the Cape Colony, including a local discourse around the foreign. This chapter deals with four aspects of this rendition of the foreign: First, how the land 'beyond the boundary' was treated as another country after the fashion of European states through the invocation of international law; second, the labelling of African people from outside the colony 'foreigners'; third, how the society on the other side of the border—specifically Xhosa society—was represented, particularly with regard to its political practices, institutions, and authorities; and fourth, how colonists represented and participated in what was 'inside' the colonial boundary, within the pale of 'British Civilisation'. Here the primary questions are: how was a boundary drawn, who was 'outside' it, who was 'inside', how were these different people represented, and what were the

[2] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (485), 15 April 1841.
[3] Ellis, 'The English Pale', p. 16.

practices and the rhetoric that drew those boundaries? These questions allow us to begin thinking in terms of political difference and, most importantly, how the issue of 'fear of politics' developed with regard to the Xhosa inhabitants of the Marches.

A (British) politics of the frontier is a development of the early decades of the nineteenth century, and especially after the planting of British settlers in the Fish River Marches from 1820. In 1809, a young Lieutenant-Colonel, Richard Collins, travelled east from Cape Town to investigate and make recommendations with regard to the rural east of the colony. His report to the colonial Governor, the Earl of Caledon, is a key text in the history of the British at the Cape of Good Hope, which I will turn to more than once in this history. Certain tenets of the politics of the frontier can be located in this report. Collins identified 'the weakness of the population of the eastern frontier', the 'continuance of the K—s within or near the boundary' and 'the facility thereby afforded to trade, beg, and plunder' as principal problems. The officer continued:

> I consider as a maxim of the first importance to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, that all intercourse between the settlers and the K—s should be scrupulously prevented, until the former shall have increased considerably in numbers…. It appears to me that the steps necessary to be taken for the permanent tranquillity [*sic*] of the eastern districts are to oblige all the K—s to withdraw to their own country, to oppose insurmountable obstacles to their return to the colony, and to remove every inducement to their continuance near the boundary.

To rectify these problems, Collins proposed a scheme of intensive settlement in the Fish River Marches, a 'no-man's land', a treaty with the Xhosa that recognised the authority of their chiefs and stipulated the settlement of the Xhosa exclusively in their 'ancient territory…beyond the Keiskama'. He thought infringement of the boundary should be punishable by death during periods of hostility. 'Permanent tranquillity', however, was disingenuous, for Collins always envisioned expansion of the colony into Xhosa lands. 'I think', he wrote (despite the 'anxiously looked for' acquisition of more land by the colonists), 'that until the colony is completely inhabited [by whites] as far as the present limits, no extension of boundary should be made except from political motives'. When colonists were sufficient in number that Africans '[found] it impossible to make any impression', then expansion would be appropriate. He was explicit about this: 'The next extension of boundary, which, however, cannot be necessary until a very remote period, will naturally bring the colony to the Orange River'.[4] In Collins's ideas we can see the ideas of a hard, colonial boundary, the notion of a 'Xhosa country' beyond it, territorial

[4] 'Report of Lieutenant Colonel Collins to the Earl of Caledon'. In Theal. *Records*, *Vol.* VII, pp. 99-105; 137-138.

representations of Xhosa political authority, the impermissibility of crossing the boundary, and the ultimate project of bringing more land into colonial possession. As Ben Maclennan notes, 'Every one of Collins's recommendations was eventually implemented'.[5]

When the 1820 settlers arrived into the Fish River Marches, the epicenter of their activity became Graham's Town. In the wake of Graham's 'clearance' of the Zuurveld, the town was the symbol in wood and stone and European lifestyles of what Mostert has called the 'first great "removal" in South African history.[6] As Mostert writes, 'By finally succeeding in drawing this line between Xhosa and colony, the Cape government had rolled its power right up to the west bank of the Fish', and 'this military achievement created a new reality by emphasizing separation of the races as a divide between natural enemies and irreconcilable cultures, the only solution for which was complete severance'.[7] While the political situation spanning the Great Fish River after 1812 was not nearly as definite as Mostert's characterisation portrays, a long-unsuccessful colonial project of creating a border with the Xhosa had finally been achieved, nonetheless. In delimiting the eastward boundary of the Cape Colony, the river traced an (official) line west of which were colonial subjects of the British crown, east of which lived people who were not. While some thirty fortifications were built along the river-boundary to guard against 'inroads' into the colony, thousands of words printed off Godlonton's presses in the coming years would be dedicated to theorising that border.

In 1819, fresh conflict and the near erasure of Graham's Town by a Xhosa army led by the prophet-soldier Makhanda (variously Makana, Nxele, or, in colonial sources, 'Lynx') complicated the boundary situation. The Fish River remained the eastern limit of the Cape Colony, but a 'neutral' territory stretched east twenty to thirty miles beyond the Fish to the banks Keiskamma River. According to yet another Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, the ceded territory would serve as something of a 'no-man's land', a buffer between the European and Xhosa polities. This was rather a sham, however; white farms were settled beyond the Fish, and in 1829, the land was annexed to the colony as the 'Ceded Territory' and a settlement of Khoi and 'Coloured' people established in its northern reaches on the Kat River, against Xhosa claims. Until the 1840s, the control of that annexed territory was often uncertain, however.

The settlements of British folk in the Fish River Marches allowed for the problems identified in Collins's report to become animated in political discourse and participation. It was

[5] Maclennan, *A Proper Degree of Terror*, p. 65.
[6] Noël Mostert. *Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and The Tragedy of the Xhosa People* (New York: Knopf, 1992), p. 389.
[7] Ibid, pp. 389-390.

then that a politics of the frontier (distinct from *policies*) could develop. The label 'frontier' is as important to these politics as the issues it addressed, or as Godlonton's paper, which espoused them. In the 'eastern districts' of the Cape Colony, a self-awareness as people of the frontier developed among the British settlers of the 1820s. Correspondents wrote into the *Journal* as 'A Frontier Farmer', and referred to themselves as 'Frontier inhabitants', spoke of 'this frontier', and were persistently preoccupied with 'frontier policy'. John Mitford Bowker addressed a meeting in 1844 to his 'Brother Frontier Farmers'.[8] They participated in this politics of the frontier, not only at public meetings, but as irregular soldiers, correspondents to and readers of the local press, and holders of colonial office. We will treat their frontier perspective as part of settler political subjectivity: 'the frontier' is their understanding of the situation in which they lived, rather than an objective fact of economic, social, and political interaction.

This is a necessary distinction to make. The word 'frontier' is so often used in the historiography of the nineteenth century eastern Cape that it is easily ignored, a commonplace rather than a concept. As early as 1972, the important South African historian Martin Legassick reviewed 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography' and emerged critical of the collective argument of South African historians up to his day that the condition of a frontier had, *a priori*, necessary consequences rooted in 'social isolation'. The distance of the 'frontier' from more 'civilised' zones, he argued, did not explain racism and racist violence and the development of hardcore 'group consciousness'.[9] Legassick's critique was also one of the earliest to show the complexity of the 'frontier'. He writes of the South African historiographical 'tendency to move between the idea of frontier as isolation from the parent society and the frontier as meeting point of black and white cultures, peoples, and societies. The two are not necessarily the same. Moreover, there is an implication that it is to the effects of <u>inclusion</u> rather than <u>exclusion</u>, which we should look as influences on subsequent behaviour'.[10] 'The' frontier was not so stark a divide as it had been imagined, whether by historians or by the group of men motioning, seconding, and resolving in Graham's Town, 1835. While we are not concerned, here, with how to think about subsequent behaviour, nor to measure the significance of inclusion against exclusion, Legassick's point that the frontier is,

[8] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, p. 116.
[9] Martin Legassick. 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography'. *Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies* 12 (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1972), pp. 12; 20.
[10] Ibid, p. 13; emphasis original.

at least, complicated and fluid, should be kept in view; and the idea of the frontier as part of a narrative, as something political, subject to debate, is essential.

However, if the frontier did not have explanatory power for Legassick, it still had structural significance, as conceptualised by Legassick as well as by Hermann Giliomee. For the former it was 'a fluid region of social transition, relatively autonomous from both colonial base and the indigenous social systems, but dependent on both'. The latter defined the frontier as 'an area where colonisation takes place' and proposed a process from 'opening', in which competing claims to authority prevail, to 'closed', when one authority achieves hegemony.[11] The frontier was thus a period in process from one set of conditions and relationships into another.

In contrast, the idea of the Fish River Marches keeps in view the contested nature of the boundary, rather than its hard establishment. It is descriptive, in a way that can apply to all the people living in the region, rather than accepting of the colonial notion of a border. It allows 'frontier' to represent what it meant from the colonial perspective; that is, it treats the word as historical rather than as explanatory *or* structural. The idea of the march also acknowledges another aspect of the colonial boundary: that it moved. The Fish River was the nominal boundary of the colony by 1780, but it did not hold until Graham's onslaught thirty-five years later; in 1819, the 'neutral territory' was established, creating a wide borderland marked in the east by the Keiskamma; in the following decade, European, indigenous (Khoi), and mixed (European-Khoi) people from the colony settled that land despite its ostensible preservation as a buffer; after the war of the mid-1830s, the land between the Keiskamma and the Kei was briefly annexed as Queen Adelaide Province, but despite official administrative control by the British, the territory was primarily inhabited by Xhosa people organised along, or close to, traditional lines. After months, it reverted by a new treaty to Xhosa control, bringing the boundary back to the Fish; then by the late 1840s, the same land was re-organised as the colonial protectorate, 'British Kaffraria', instituting indirect rule. The point is, although the Great Fish River did not remain the official boundary for long, lands east and, in times of conflict, west of the river remained contested over a long period of Xhosa resistance and colonial consolidation. John Fairbairn in Cape Town reflected on the shifting policies towards the Xhosa, 'Sometimes they were allowed to feed their Cattle and erect their Villages on one side of an Arbitrary or Imaginary Line, over which they were as suddenly driven at another

[11] Martin Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to c. 1840: The Rise and Decline of the Griqua People'. In Elphick and Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society*, p. 360; Hermann Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812'. In Elpick and Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society*, pp. 426-427; 449.

time…and their villages burned'; how they were represented alternately as friends or enemies, who 'if found within the Boundary' could be shot; how trade was forbidden and then 'the door was thrown open'. He believed that it was 'Not only the interests of the Border Colonists, but of the whole Colony, call loudly for a *Settled Plan*'.[12] The back and forth of policy, settlement, and warfare on the one hand, and the increasing rate of admixture of economies and societies on the other, are why we can refer to this part of the world, from at least 1811 until circa 1850, as a marchland. So, here, the label 'frontier' will represent the settler point of view, while for the sake of description, we will refer to the Fish River Marches. Among the colonists, the 'frontier' perspective was the first facet in the schema of belonging and difference in which foreignness and a settler xenophobia become apparent.

THE 'COUNTRY ADJOINING OUR OWN'

The notion of a border between European settlement and Africans was not a development new to the nineteenth century in southern Africa. The demarcation of boundaries had begun in the first years of Dutch settlement. In the mid-1650s, Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope expressed that they wished 'H—s' would 'erect their huts…a little further off', or that they would 'keep a little further off', and they saw the land they occupied as a European sphere in which Africans enjoyed European protection. A canal was proposed to separate the Dutch settlement from African societies. In 1657, recommendations were made that the best ways to deal with nearby Africans were to build a line of forts to keep them out, or 'to make a clean sweep of all the local H—s by seizing them and banishing them from the country', and only lastly to come to terms with them, although this was considered the cheapest alternative.[13] But the politics of the British settlers of the Fish River Marches, the politics of the frontier, were unique to their context and to the British subjectivities of the settler participants.

The boundaries of the colony were a permanent topic in the pages of the *Graham's Town Journal*, making an appearance in nearly every edition of the weekly. What becomes plain in those pages, quite yellow now, is that the Keiskamma border required propping up with a great number of justifications and reiterations. This was especially true in the earlier years of both newspaper and settlement in the 'Eastern Districts', when the boundary was closest to Graham's Town and its maintenance least certain. The suggestion by Legassick that the

[12] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, IX (573), 8 December 1832.
[13] I. D. MacCrone. *Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical, Experimental and Psychological Studies*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 25; 27; 33.

'frontier' changed in nature and became more strongly a dividing line between different societies after 1812, appears to be accurate;[14] and this process relates specifically to the development of a frontier politics amongst recent British migrants to the Fish River Marches. From the early 1830s, the *Journal* ardently promulgated that frontier politics, rooted in the perspective that there were frontier people whose lives were distinct from those in the west of the colony and decidedly intertwined with the fate of the border. A great deal of journalistic energy and settler angst was expended on subjects like 'The Frontier System', and mostly the ways in which it was damaging and dangerous to Europeans living near to Africans.

Always, 'difference' was communicated. Sometimes these statements were mundane, when the Xhosa were called 'neighbours', or theirs was the 'country adjoining our own'; in the mention of 'labours of the missionary beyond the boundary of the colony'; or the report of 'tranquility on both sides of the border'. We have already seen territories differentiated in Norton's resolution. In one lead article in 1834, a time of tension in the Marches, there are four statements, referring to the 'line of the colonial boundary', the 'natives beyond our borders', the 'marauding bands which hover on our boundary', and that is not to mention the 'merciless banditti which infest the country beyond our north and east frontier'.[15] The *South African Commercial Advertiser*, a paper often castigated in the *Journal* and the *Times*, shared enough of the frontier perspective to also write of the 'wild tribes bordering the colony'. The *Cape Town Mail*, too, did not propose any framing other than 'frontier'.[16] Thomas Pringle wrote about the 'colonial boundaries' and the 'C—r frontier'.[17] This widespread acceptance of the knowledge of a boundary and a frontier shows that, for most settlers who identified with the colonial community, the boundary was real, even if they disagreed about the actions and policies that had instituted it or maintained it, or quarreled about the treatment of Africans on one side of it or the other. This idiom of border and difference, deployed endlessly, served to normalise the Fish River boundary, and subsequent riverine borders, as well.

The foreignness of Africans was expressed in frontier politics in connection with the day-to-day circumstances of the Fish River Marches—in terms of economy, war, politics, or mobility. It was not, therefore, purely rhetorical or discursive: it derived from a context of human action and interaction, placed certain problems at the centre of that interaction, and

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[14] Legassick, 'The Frontier Tradition', p. 18.
[15] *Graham's Town Journal*, II (103), 12 December 1833; IV (170), 27 March 1835; III (153), 27 November 1834; XII (585), 16 February 1843.
[16] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser,* p. 25; *Cape Town Mail*, II (94), 17 December 1842; II (97), 7 January 1843; III (125), 22 July 1843.
[17] Pringle, *Narrative*, pp. 307; 326

recommended certain solutions, too. This is to say that the foreignness of Africans was part of the frontier politics in which many colonists participated and through which they understood their conditions. The main events of the mid-1830s—the war that precipitated D'Urban's annexation of 'Queen Adelaide Province', the repudiation of D'Urban's actions by the Colonial Office in London, and the subsequent negotiation of the 'Stockenstrom Treaties', loomed large in the settler debates. Debates, too, about acquiring laborers were ongoing (see Chapters 7 and 8). These all encompass aspects of the problem of the foreign in the frontier politics of the Fish River Marches.

With nauseous regularity, however, the settlers identified *the* problem as cattle theft, and the 'solution' was for the government to arrange things so that there was less cattle theft. There is no doubt that cattle raiding was a central feature of the eastern marches, and thus the protection of livestock against raiding (on 'both sides' of the boundary) was a primary concern for people living in the Marches. Virtually every number of the *Journal* or the *Cape Frontier Times* included the settler complaint against 'depredations' committed by the Xhosa, which except in the rare event of an alleged murder, referred to livestock theft. A particularly bloody and probably hyperbolic example from the *Times* involved one farmer, Niland, who 'was robbed of 36 head of cattle by K—s, by *whom his herd was brutally murdered*'.[18] Likewise, almost any page in the collected papers of the colonial farmer and agent, John Mitford Bowker, mentions stock theft.[19] Treaties were drafted and signed the provisions of which were designed to address stock theft, and sometimes little else. That the colonists were stock thieves—the 'Brereton Raid' of 1818 ran off 10,000 head of cattle, and tribute in stock was extorted from many chiefs—is not in doubt, but it was rarely admitted by the frontier crowd. Pringle, however, who lived three years on the Marches, was not shy to condemn the 'barbarous system of commandoes…by which…the frontier chiefs are oppressed and ruined, the colonists are not protected, and none are gainers but the most profligate class of border boors [*sic*], whose trade is to promote disturbance and to enrich themselves by plunder'.[20] Against this, 'testimonials' from chiefs were sometimes cited to claim that no Xhosa cattle had ever been stolen.[21] Timothy Stapleton's biography of the chief, Maqoma (1798-1873), is one of the better sources for capturing the extent of pillaging and extortion by colonists and their military forces.[22]

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[18] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (205), 18 April 1844; emphasis original.
[19] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections.*
[20] Pringle, *Narrative*, pp. 307-308.
[21] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, pp. 5-6.
[22] Timothy Stapleton. *Maqoma: Xhosa Resistance to Colonial Advance 1798-1873* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1994), p. 50.

Regardless of the truth about of livestock raiding in the Fish River Marches, the colonial accusation of African cattle theft was a central point in the politics of the frontier.

Since the year 1817, based on a verbal 'agreement between Lord Somerset, the Governor of the colony, and Ngqika, highest ranked chief of the Rharhabe Xhosa, the matter of stock theft in the Marches had been governed by the 'Spoor Law'. This was a one-sided system of retributive justice, in which settler farmers complaining of stolen livestock could procure the aid of military patrols to track the stock to African 'kraals', or homesteads, and there 'retake or recoup themselves'. The entire system relied upon 'supposed guilt', and even contemporary observers noted that many innocent homesteads paid in cattle for both real and concocted thefts.[23] That this 'patrol system' gave Africans no such recourse against colonial cattle thieves, and indeed, ensured that they would incur reprisals by seeking the same retribution from settler herds, made it the basis for exploitation for almost twenty years until the Spoor Law was done away with between 1836 and 1844.

It is in this context of frontier politics and the issue of stock theft that 'A. B.' wrote a letter published in the *Graham's Town Journal*, attacking the 'abettors of robbery and murder', that is, the 'philanthropists' of Cape Town, who did not agree with the practices of the 'patrol system', who argued, according to A. B., that '"You must not make reprisals against the nation, you must find the individual thieves"'. In his defense of the patrols, A. B. first historicised and legitimated the contemporary boundary. In 'the war of 1819 in which every tribe in Cafferland was either directly or indirectly leagued against the Colony', '[t]hey were ultimately defeated, driven within their own boundary'. 'Subsequently', A. B. wrote, peace was concluded, and neither party have a right to go beyond this period to look for cause of grievance'.[24] A. B. then introduced someone who appears more than once in the pages of the *Graham's Town Journal*, and in the *Frontier Times*, as well: Emmerich de Vattel. Vattel was an eighteenth-century Swiss lawyer, who in 1758 published four volumes under the titular paragraph, *The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury*. It was an influential text in European and North American political circles during the eighteenth century.[25] Apparently, a couple copies of Vattel's treatise were to be found among the settlers

[23] MacMillan, *Bantu, Boer, and Briton,* pp. 77-79.
[24] *Graham's Town Journal*, II (76), 6 June 1833.
[25] Emer de Vattel. *The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury (LF ed.)* [1797]'. Béla Kapossy and Robert Whatmore (eds.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), p. ix-xx; 'Emmerich de Vattel'. *Encyclopedia Britannica* (2019). Available at https://www.britannica.com/biography/Emmerich-de-Vattel [accessed 29 April 2019].

of the Fish River Marches, or else possibly the editors and the contributor, A. B., shared the texts. In the letter, A. B. was concerned with the duty of government to protect its citizens. As he wrote, 'Let us hear what Vattel says on the subject':

> "One of the ends of political society is to defend itself with its combined strength against all external insults or violence. The nation ought to put itself in such a state as to be able to repel and humble an unjust enemy…."—*Vattel, Book* 1*, Sec.* 177.…

In rather Old testament style—'Here ye perverters of facts!'—A. B. then produced two more quotations:

> "Every nation as well as every man has therefore a right to prevent other nations from obstructing her perfection and happiness – that is to preserve herself from all injuries."—*Book* 2. *Sec.* 49.…
>
> "Finally there is another cause where the nation in general is guilty of the crime of its members. That is when by its manners, and by the maxims of its government, it accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscriminately to plunder and maltreat foreigners, *to make inroads into the neighbouring countries, &c. &c…. The princes whose subjects are robbed and massacred, and whose land are* [*sic*] *infested by these robbers, may justly level their vengeance against the nation at large."—Book* 2. *Sec.* 78.…

A. B. related these ideas to the context of the Marches, and specifically to the problem of livestock theft:

> It is in the power of the C—s to avoid all conflict with the colony by merely *staying at home*. But if they will *foray*, upon them be the guilt and the consequences of it. Law and equity are on our side…. The frontier will no longer submit to breed cattle for the benefit of C—e robbers or their "cheerers on."[26]

This letter introduces some important ideas. First, there is the self-awareness of being 'the Colony', and a membership in it: a sense of colonialism which was also cultivated in Godlonton's editorials. According to Lester, 'the 1820 settlers became remarkably consistent in defining themselves against the same shared threats, and in replicating those central tenets of an identity constructed around notions of racialised class, gender and nationhood'.[27] A. B.'s personification of the frontier points out that not only an identity is at stake, but a political subjectivity that emerged in relation to the British and colonial state and the specific concerns of frontier settlers in the Fish River Marches. It very evidently defined shared threats, and these were in part the basis of a nation-hood, not nationalistic in character, but cohered around the

[26] *Graham's Town Journal*, II (76), 6 June 1833; emphasis original.
[27] Lester, *Imperial Networks*, p. 48.

common livelihoods and concerns of the eastern colonial community. A. B. could very well have opened Vattel in the middle of the public meeting that introduced this chapter; in his letter he was speaking to his peers about the political problems they shared: philanthropists and cattle thieves.

The 'country adjoining', or 'Kafirland', was the result of a political investiture in the affairs of the marchland, in things like the pervasiveness of stock theft, through which colonists settled on notions of belonging, difference, and boundary to structure their approach to problems and politics. This is to say that the boundary was not only political in the sense that it separated political systems, but political in the sense that it was part and parcel of a politics, which involved the contestation and conservation of lived conditions in a prescriptive framework of what ought to be. It sought to identify a state amongst its 'enemies'. A. B. wrote of stock theft as an 'external' problem, against which settlers are entitled to claim the protection of their government (which is not the government of stock thieves). Therefore, the use of Vattel, a well-known theorist of international law, has significant consequences with regard to colonial subjectivity and to the border.

In a manner of speaking, a different country did exist adjacent to the British Cape Colony. It is probably accurate, in fact, to speak of multiple 'countries', or polities. People pursuing very different modes of economy and sociality, speaking different languages, and following different political traditions inhabited the land that had not been settled by Europeans, put to use in their economies, and governed by their standards, traditions, and forms of power. In one sense, contemporary colonial references like 'their country' gestured to this fact, and described the objective balance of predominate ways of living. This objective difference, the fact that differences obtained, is not what is at stake, however. What makes the settler representation of 'the country adjoining our own' interesting is the political content leant to the boundary, and to what fell on either side of it. In moments like A. B.'s quotation from Vattel, the idea of separate countries is given more powerful meaning than simply the acknowledgement of different lifeways. The colonial name, 'Kafirland', and, in much the same way, the modernised, 'Xhosaland', correspond to A. B.'s view. The boundary gained particular meaning in the course of a colonial project; and here I do not only mean 'colonial' in the sense of a territory settled by Europeans and governed, in essence, by a hardly-cushioned military dictatorship, but also colonial in how the colonists thought of themselves. There may have been shifting frictions between what Lester identifies as the political inclinations of 'governmentality,

humanitarianism, and settler capitalism',[28] and mutual hostility between the likes of hardline A. B. and Godlonton on the one hand and Pringle, Fairbairn, and their 'philanthropic' ilk on the other, but the latter were at least in agreement that they were 'colonists' and acknowledged the existence of and difference of 'the wild tribes beyond the boundary'.[29] A. B.'s quotations served to set up the border as one between 'nations', members of which were 'foreigners' in each other's lands, and their interactions were subject to the common sense laws, theorised in Enlightenment Europe, that governed different states. The 'foreigners' were attached to or belonged to a 'state'; in this way the international framing of the boundary and interactions filtered down from 'the state' to individuals and groups.

The designation 'foreigners' is not merely extrapolation from A. B. and Vattel. Rather, Africans were frequently labelled 'foreigners' in the settler sources. A note appearing in the *Journal* in 1833 ran as follows: 'ERRATUM – In the letter on the Kat River Settlement, inserted in our last number, instead of—of whom more than 600 are "paupers"—read 600 are "foreigners." After correction the original letter reads:

> From the best information on the spot [the population] does not consist of more than two thousand eight hundred souls, of whom more than six hundred are **[foreigners]**. The C—s have of late made great encroachments, and that impunity with which they have been permitted to do so has tempted them to construct their huts within a few yards of the high road, where they are now residing. The greater part, however, of these aliens, are destitute people of the Bechuana [Batswana] tribes, usually designated by Frontier farmers as "Mantatees." These have been permitted to establish themselves here without "let or hindrance," and they have roamed hither, as to another Eldorado, from all parts of the colony.[30]

Here, various Africans, some who had apparently already spent some time within the colony, were labelled as 'foreigners' and 'aliens'. In 1834, it was 'aliens, natives of Kafirland', who 'were speaking of the injustice of not being permitted to roam at large through the colony', while at the same time—and here it seems Godlonton was keen to raise a contradiction to expose injustices—'Pensioners on the Government were talking of starvation'.[31] Editorialising for the benefit of a new governor of the colony, Sir George Napier, who had replaced the darling of the frontier, D'Urban, Godlonton linked African foreignness, criminality, and the duties of British government:

> His Excellency's first duty will be to clear the country of *foreign intruders*. This may sound startling, but it is nevertheless true. Bands of K—s have passed into the colony; some of whom

[28] Ibid, p. 4.
[29] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser*, p. 25.
[30] *Graham's Town Journal*, II (77), 13 June 1833; II (78), 20 June 1833; emphasis added.
[31] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (143), 18 sept 1834.

> rove from place to place; while others have taken up their residence far within the colonial boundary, keeping up a constant communication with their countrymen in Kafirland, and plundering the surrounding neighbourhoods…. These marauders must be driven out of the country.[32]

A murder in 1841, for which 'suspicion rest[ed] with a gang of vagrants' elicited from Godlonton the starkest language with regard to the foreignness of Africans. 'Let it be borne in mind', he wrote, as though to remind the government, 'that the K—s, Bechuanas and Fingoes, are *foreigners*, and that they have entered the Colony on the sole plea of engaging in the service of the Colonists. Failing in this, they should be sent across the boundary;—for if they will not labour, surely they ought not to subsist upon the fruits of those who do'.[33] Similar sentiments were printed again in 1849, with regard to the practicality of a 'RURAL POLICE. For want of [which] the whole Frontier is infested with Vagrants, K—s, Fingoes, Bassoutas, and numerous other aliens—who roam about the country under the most flimsy pretences [*sic*], and plunder the stock farmer with absolute impunity'.[34] I have indicated that the questions of 'vagrancy' and labour, both indigenous and immigrant, will be handled later on. For the moment, let it suffice that Africans were, with Godlonton's emphasis, '*foreigners*', loathe to work and prone to plunder. We see that the politics of the frontier was a politics that designated certain people—Africans—as not belonging and whose presence and actions comprised a threat to the project, persons, and livelihood of the colony.

In 1834, Godlonton elaborated on 'the policy which should, we conceive, be maintained by this Colony with the various tribes inhabiting the country beyond its boundaries':

> Whilst we have maintained that the K—s are an independent people, and ought in common justice to be treated as such, we have at the same time extended that cases might occur in which the Government of the Colony would be fully justified, and should be required to enforce, redress for aggressions on the persons or property of British subjects….
>
> We have always said—"Treat the K—s as an independent people. In our political and commercial intercourse make all the chiefs—not any particular one, unless he be delegated by the others—a party; and then act upon that understanding in unswerving fidelity."[35]

The argument for Xhosa independence was not based in kindness, nor a liberal political commitment—indeed, Godlonton was relentlessly critical of representatives of colonial officialdom, like Andries Stockenstrom or Charles Lennox Stretch, who advocated anything

[32] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (334), 7 June 1838.
[33] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (483), 1 April 1841; emphasis original.
[34] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (922), 11 August 1849.
[35] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (135), 24 July 1834.

remotely liberal in content—, nor even on his Wesleyan sentiments, but rather from a commercial mindset that saw the stability of the Fish River Marches as conducive to trade. For, he wrote in March of the same year, 'The K—r Trade is the main prop of the Frontier at the present moment'. It might have been 'customary to depict [the Xhosa] as the bane of the Colony', and not least with Godlonton's own pen, 'but the Colony has now become more sensible of its real interests….

> For some time after the formation of the District of Albany [1811], it was deemed so essentially necessary to maintain a system of non-intercourse with [the Xhosa], that an obsolete Proclamation was revived, which awarded the punishment of *death* to those convicted of crossing the boundary without special permission; yet, in spite of this prohibition, a trade was commenced, which has ultimately saved the frontier from ruin, and the new Settlement from absolute dispersion….

There were, he concluded, 'undeniable proofs of the advantages to be derived from an intercourse with the Native Tribes', and what remained was to 'obviate the ills which spring from the defects of the system under which that intercourse [was] conducted'.[36] These arguments show a dual commitment: firstly to the border and separateness as a means through which property and settlement could be protected, but secondly to the border as a means through which trade could be controlled.

Godlonton, on behalf of the frontier society, argued against the recent imposition of import duties on trade with 'the Native Tribes', because 'commerce' was the mainstay of the colony, and the route towards its even greater future prosperity. 'Who for instance will undertake to decide', he asked, 'whether the hide or skin of an animal offered to a trader at Graham's Town, Somerset, or Cradock, was flayed from the carcass on this or the other side of the Keiskamma or the Stormberg Spruit? and by what distinguishing mark shall the merchant know whether the hides, horns, and skins in his possession are colonial or foreign'. He compared the trade to that with American Indians in Canada. He suggested that because the Xhosa had no duties on British manufactures, it violated the principle of 'reciprocity', as well as enforced an unnecessary protection against 'foreign rivalry'.[37]

The issue did not go away. In 1848, a Thomas Hancock, 'a trader of St. John's River in the territory of K—r Chief Faku' requested that 'the Trade, carried on by the Countries lying between the Buffalo and Umzimkulu Rivers with the Ports of Cape of Good Hope may be placed on the footing of a Coasting [domestic] trade'. By the late forties, the colonial boundary

[36] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (118), 27 March 1834.
[37] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (151), 13 November 1834.

had been changed multiple times, as expansion and land expropriation continued, then demarcated by the Buffalo River. The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury in London responded that Hancock's request could not be granted, as 'Foreign goods, as well as certain goods not being the Growth, Production, or Manufacture of the United Kingdom, or the British possessions abroad, are subject, upon their import into the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, to the specific and rated discriminatory duties of Customs'. They were quite precise:

> We have to state that the most easterly port of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope is East London, on the Buffalo River, while the Umzimkulu River forms the Western Boundary of the British Possession of Natal, that the Country on the line of Coast intervening between East London and the Umzimkulu, and in which the St John's River is situated, is neither a British Possession, nor within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but the Territory of the K—r Chief Faku,—the paramount Ruler of the Amaponda Nation, consequently the produce of that Chief's Country cannot, with reference to the provisions of His Majesty's Order in Council of the 24th April 1847 … upon importation from the St John's River into Cape Town, be admitted duty free, as being the produce of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, or at the lower discriminatory rates of duty, to which Goods the produce or Manufacture of the United Kingdom or some British Possession abroad are subject….

The Governor, Sir Harry Smith, had recommended that because of existing treaties with Faku, Hancock's request could be granted. However, the Lords Commissioners provided the following rationale as to why this could not be the case, because 'such a concession might give rise to considerable embarrassment and inconvenience with those foreign powers', like the United States of America, who had good trading terms with Great Britain, but would 'no doubt proffer claims, which could not…be resisted' to be put on the same terms with 'the Foreign State, or Territory, of which [Faku] is the Chief'.[38]

Indeed, the most common use of the word 'foreign' in British Foreign Office and Cape Colonial officialdom was in regard to trade, as in foreign goods, markets, wines, brandies, vessels, 'bottoms', to name the most frequent foreign things. 'Powers' and some people might be 'foreign' as well, but mostly in connection with commerce.[39] However, the official denial for coasting trade status affirmed the frontier settlers' 'international' framework for British colonial relations with the Xhosa, ironically, against some of their wishes. It also points to the view of African chiefs as the heads of a foreign state, ascribed to by the pen pushers of London. Mightier pushers of pens, such as the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, agreed with them, in that 'Important matters affecting the general interests of both nations should be

[38] In Grey to Smith, 7 June 1849 (National Archives of South Africa, Western Cape Archives and Record Service [hereafter KAB], GH 1/201/334), pp. 128-146.
[39] For example, see Theal. *Records*, *Vol.* XVII, pp. 116; 128; 131-133; Theal. *Records*, *Vol.* XXVII, pp. 32; 35; 158-164; 454-455; 516.

brought before the highest Council known among the K—s, which is composed only of the principal Chiefs of each Tribe'.[40] That view was less straightforward in colonial administration, colonial warfare, treaty negotiation, or indeed in the politics of the frontier organised by the likes of Godlonton, the Bowkers, and their compatriots. Trade definitely complicated frontier politics, but what we can see is that the establishment and maintenance of an effective border (rather than a tenuous marchland) served both the 'keeping out' (of people) and the 'opening up' (for trade) concerns of the settler community. This depended upon specific understandings of Xhosa chieftaincies as the source of political power across the rivers, but also made particular demands upon the meaning of chiefly power.

The chieftaincy was also a major ingredient in the settler perception of African persons as a threat; that is, the 'foreignness' of Africans was linked, in the logic of frontier politics, to African political systems and actions. About a year after A. B.'s ireful resort to Vattel's assistance, a 'Frontier Farmer' wrote into the *Journal* with a rather typical complaint: 'What a precious picture do the events of the last thirteen years present. The subjects of a great and mighty nation murdered, plundered, and maltreated by hordes of rascally K—s'. The Farmer makes two points. First is that while the 'sufferers—both Dutch and English—are held up as a tyrannical, oppressive, and unjust sort of men',—think Pringle on the 'profligate border boors'—the Farmer claimed that the actual circumstances were quite the reverse. The second point has to do with the manner in which stock theft and 'depredation' more generally are undertaken, tying criminality to chiefs: 'We have (even) British subjects plundered and massacred year after year by lawless K—r robbers, acting with the approbation and connivance, and very often by the express orders of their chiefs…. The Councillors [of Ndlambe] told Landdrost Stockenstrom, that 'Gaika [Ngqika] stole,—his chiefs stole,—and his people stole; and when the people stole, the chiefs always shared in the plunder'.[41]

What we have seen so far, taken together, points to some key aspects of settler community's frontier politics in the Fish River Marches. Interactions with the Xhosa, including the stock theft issue, were addressed in terms of international boundaries, and the originators of stock theft were the political authorities on the other side of the border. In the words of 'X. Y.', corresponding with the *Journal*, 'the chiefs are… exposed to the necessity of submitting to all the consequences of the responsibility'.[42] Indeed it was the chief Maqoma who remarked, 'The

[40] Rice to D'Urban, 14 October 1834 (KAB, GH 1/102/1477), p. 34; emphasis original.
[41] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (116), 13 March 1834.
[42] *Graham's Town Journal*, II (100), 21 November 1833.

people plunder and you hold the chiefs responsible for everything'.[43] This theme is one that Godlonton took up energetically. Two weeks after the Frontier Farmer said his piece, Godlonton reiterated his points.

> The chiefs are equally shrewd and unprincipled,—cunning is the characteristic of the savage in all countries—and is especially so among the K—s…. With regard to the *Chiefs*, we may with confidence remark, that stolen cattle are scarcely ever driven into Kafirland without the connivance of one or the other of them…. We find the grand obstacle is the want of a definite and well understood arrangement with the K—r chiefs collectively…. "*Divide and Conquer*" is, we are aware, a maxim in high repute amongst politicians in general; but we are of opinion that, with regard to the K—r Tribes, the very reverse of this will be the policy most directly tending to the advantage of this colony.[44]

If the problem was the chiefs, then it must be through the chiefs that a solution was reached. There is not proof here that chiefs were in fact the authors of 'depredations'; what is important is that many settlers believed that they were. Godlonton's suggestion in this extract amounts to a reorganisation not only of existing agreements, but would also serve to firm up the 'international' nature of relationships between the colony and the Xhosa through policies that applied to everyone east of the Keiskamma. In Godlonton's view, the Xhosa could be 'treated as an independent people' if they constituted themselves in a manner that was acceptable to social and political organisation of England and a European tradition more generally. Ideally, they could be treated as a corporate, centralised foreign power. Unify, he proposed, and conquer. In Cape Town, Fairbairn agreed with the corporate approach to relations with Chiefs.[45] This, from a settler perspective, would normalise both the political and economic life of the marchlands.

QUEEN ADELAIDE PROVINCE AND THE 'STOCKENSTROM TREATIES'

Ironically, the period in which an 'international' relationship tilted towards functional in the Fish River Marches was precisely when Godlonton and his associates were most dissatisfied. This was the very moment of their public meeting. The war of 1834-1835—the 'Sixth Frontier War', as it is called—first gave the settlers the great boon of 16,000 square miles of land, and then took it away again, and even took back the 'Ceded Territory'. The Great Fish River again won the honours of official boundary. The title of Godlonton's quickly compiled volume of

[43] Quoted in Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p. 60.
[44] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (118), 27 March 1834; emphasis original.
[45] Botha, *John Fairbairn*, p. 104.

articles and dispatches originally published in the *Journal*, *Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into The Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, A.D. 1834-35*, leaves no guesses as to his analysis of the war.[46] However it was the annexation of 'Queen Adelaide Province', the subsequent retrocession, and the treaties struck by Lieutenant-Governor Andries Stockenstrom that occupied the colonial pundits, and for years to come.

Before the war, D'Urban had received word that the Secretary of State, Rice, was 'by no means disposed to agree' with 'the propriety' of 'the exercise of a political interference in the concerns of the C—s'.[47] D'Urban proceeded to interfere to the point of subjugation, the declaration of martial law, and the declaration of the Xhosa west of the Kei as British subjects. Yet as Mostert observes, 'within a month [D'Urban] was to be warned by his Chief Justice that only the British Crown could authorize him to naturalize aliens'.[48] In December of 1835, the governor received a one hundred fifty page letter in which the new Secretary, Lord Glenelg, expressed the (accurate) view that the war had been caused by settler 'encroachments' and 'incursions', suggested a newer, bigger frontier was unwise, and conferred to D'Urban a gentlemanly but unmistakable scolding and the order to 'prepare the publick minds' that Queen Adelaide Province would be 'resigned by the end of the year 1836'.[49] The consequence was that in 1836, Lieutenant-Governor Andries Stockenstrom negotiated new treaties with the Xhosa, and using the 'wide discretion' of his office, drew the boundary at the Fish River. W. M. MacMillan explains that, 'Abrogating anything resembling the old "commando system", the treaties threw on the chiefs the onus of keeping the peace and of checking cattle-thieving; British authority in Kaffirland was no longer to be represented by magistrates, but by mere Agents with only "diplomatic" powers'.[50] The Xhosa would station their own agents at fords of the Fish to discourage and track thieves. One of the Bowker brothers (John Mitford B. was to be one of the Agents), wrote a letter summarising the 'tremendous long treaty', the main points of which were:

> No one to enter Kafirland armed without permission from the chiefs. Cattle spoor to be given over to the police when traced to the boundary. No notice will be taken of any cattle that may be stolen, unless an armed herdsman be with them, or in a strong kraal…. Any K—s found stealing in the colony to be shot, and K—s found in the colony without passes to be taken up and sent to their chiefs, who are to punish them *according to K—r law*…. [T]he man who has lost cattle the cattle to make an oath before the agent of the number and value of cattle stolen.

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[46] Robert Godlonton. *Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, A. D. 1834-35* (Graham's Town: Meurant & Godlonton, 1835).
[47] Rice to D'Urban, 14 October 1834 (KAB, GH 1/102/1477), p. 5.
[48] Mostert, *Frontiers*, p. 749.
[49] Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 December 1835 (KAB, GH 1/107/1588 1835), pp. 10-164.
[50] MacMillan, *Bantu, Boer, & Briton*, pp. 184-185.

> He is to have no more than his own or the value of them back; the thieves are to be fined—the fines go to the K—s. Cattle stolen, and not followed the first day, or the next morning if stolen at night, no notice will be taken of them.

Article 16 of the treaty also dictated that any British subject in the territory of a chief (and not part of a military post), would be subject to Xhosa laws, 'so long as they remain in the said territory'. The Chief Tyali, brother of Maqoma, remarked that 'he was glad there was to be no more patrols allowed—they should not be afraid of having their houses burnt over their heads as they used to be'.[51] For his part, Godlonton spent most of his time up to 1844 in blasting Stockenstrom and his system, 'which first entices the natives to cross the border, tempts them to commit crime, and then has a special law annexed thereto, to which the natives are no parties, that legalizes the shooting of those who give way to temptation'; while 'no principle of international policy', he wrote, 'can be sound which is not based on reciprocal advantage'.[52] James Collett's letter indicates that he took similar umbrage as Bowker: 'While K—r thieves constitute K—r Courts of Law, I am sure few Colonists will ever sacrifice their time in suing there for mercy'.[53]

Contemporaries like the missionary John Philip were convinced that the frontier colonists had provoked the war to get access to more land. Charles Lennox Stretch, who would become the diplomatic agent to the Ngika chiefdoms, 'saw the land hunger of the wool farmers, speculators and merchants of Grahamstown as the real problem'.[54] Preempting the annexation, Godlonton had written in February 1835, 'There are few who will venture to charge us with a disregard to the just claims of the neighbouring tribes, or to an indifference either to their political or national rights' (although there were many who did), but he also asserted that '*Cession*' and '*Conquest*' were the 'two methods by which a nation may extend its territorial possessions', the latter 'arising out of a war, commenced on fair and unquestionable principles of right, and prosecuted for the purposes of self defence or to punish uncalled for and wanton insult or aggression'. The mutually beneficial co-existence and trade he wrote about a year earlier was no longer possible, he argued, 'and there is nothing that remains to us but the complete subjugation of the K—r invaders….

> The arbitrary powers of the Chiefs must be destroyed, British Rule and British customs must supersede the horrors of imputed witchcraft, the cruelties of paganism, and the despotic feudal sway of rival interests. The K—s have now forfeited away all claim to be recognised as an

[51] In Bowker, *Speeches, Letters, & Selections*, p. 10-17; emphasis original.
[52] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (389), 6 June 1839; IX (457), 1 October 1840.
[53] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (394), 11 July 1839.
[54] Legassick, *The Struggle,* p. 44; Mostert, *Frontiers*, p. 860.

> Independent People, and if ever this frontier be reoccupied, the K—r country must be held by the British Government as a Conquered Province. The manners and the customs of the K—s represent an insurmountable bar to the progress of civilization among themselves, and to the peaceful occupation of this frontier, and hence, there is the best grounds to believe that the termination of their political existence will be the means of removing a grand obstacle to the extension of that intercourse with the interior of this continent to which the inhabitants of this colony have a right to look as a principle source of future prosperity, and as a fertile field for future labour and enterprise.[55]

Several ideas overlap in this article: the practical and political issue of the land; the discourse around an 'international' relationship between the colony and the Xhosa; representations of Xhosa politics (witchcraft, despotism, feudalism); the colonial economy; and the question of the 'right' to political independence. It seems of great significance that Godlonton referred to the 'political existence' of the Xhosa, however badly he misrepresents that existence. Independence, in his view, was no longer suitable for the progress of colonial interests—land, commerce—but it was in the moment that it was insupportable that political difference was most clearly defined: between a lawful, Christian, British tradition and the 'despotic', pagan rule of chiefs. Where a year earlier, the chiefs were the key to successful relationships in the Marches, they had become the 'grand obstacle'. That this view of chiefs comprises a political argument is confirmed by the fact that, even after the 1835 war, Godlonton could write about 'the friendly tribes of PATO, KAMA, COBUS, SUTA, UMKAI [*sic*], and some of the minor chiefs who have proved their fidelity to the colony during this trying crisis'.[56] The problems and solutions advanced with regard to African foreignness—indeed, that foreignness, itself—were dependent upon the political and economic concerns of specific movements, so to speak, assuming that Godlonton did represent, as so many have argued, a broadly-accepted strand in Cape Colony politics. Africans were foreign, and that foreignness acquired different meanings and significance, depending on their relationship to politics both 'inside' and 'outside' the colony.

'BEYOND THE COLONIAL BOUNDARY'

And what lay, as it would say in the colonial archives, 'beyond the boundary'? Because the foreignness of Africans was tied, in the politics of the frontier, to their leaders, practices, traditions, and institutions, we will take some moments know to consider the politics and political structures that obtained in Xhosa regions of the Fish River Marches. This is not the

[55] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (164), 13 February 1835.
[56] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (182), 19 June 1835; emphasis original.

place for a thorough analysis of chieftaincy or African political traditions or subjectivities. Still, because African politics were seen as variously problematic by settlers (subject to settler needs and caprice), and linked to the question of foreignness as threat, it is important that we gain some sense of those politics and how they related to the colonial representations. The point is that politics were happening outside the boundary that either were not those of the frontier, and were or were imagined to be inimical to those of the frontier.

Colonists, excepting perhaps certain missionaries and deserters, typically depicted the Xhosa as a 'barbarous' society. Godlonton saw them as 'barbarians with no moral restraint on the worst passions of the human heart'.[57] When Governor D'Urban proposed a 'Code for the government of the K—s', Glenelg imagined socio-political differences to be so stark that he replied, 'I fear that it would be found in practice scarcely possible for the Legislature of a civilised country to devise and promulgate a Code fit for the government of a barbarous people. If not accommodated to their habits of thought and action it would be at once unjust and inefficient, and if so accommodated, it must involve a compromise of many principles which we justly regard as sacred'.[58] We have also seen that the power of chiefs was understood and represented in specific ways. Bowker, in a letter of October 1837, referred to the manner in which 'rule [was] subdivided amongst an almost innumerable host of petty chieftains'.[59] In 1824, the South African Commercial Advertiser analysed Xhosa political structures in terms of 'clans', under a 'feudal superior, or *King*, as we are accustomed to style him'. The colonial practice of negotiating with individual chiefs, rather than this 'King', 'is very congenial to the general wishes and political constitution of those tribes, who cannot be persuaded that there is either treason or injustice in the other Chiefs levying war upon their nominal liege lord'.[60] This emphasises a few points about the way Xhosa politics were understood: firstly, politics was tribal; secondly, chiefs and kings were linked by 'feudal' relationships; and lastly, 'disloyalty' was common. This all illustrates well what Terence Ranger calls the 'invention of tradition', when the European gaze fell upon African political practices. 'When Europeans thought of the customary in Africa', Ranger writes, 'they naturally ascribed to it' the same 'inflexibility' which characterised their own traditions. This 'totally misunderstood the realities of pre-colonial Africa', in which custom was 'valued' but also 'infinitely flexible'.[61]

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[57] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (172), 10 April 1835.
[58] Glenelg to D'Urban, 17 February 1836 (KAB, GH 1/108 1836), pp. 116-117.
[59] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, p. 51.
[60] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser,* p. 26; emphasis original.
[61] Terence Ranger. 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa'. In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds). *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 247.

From the 1820s into the 1850s, the chief named Maqoma was one of the most important Xhosa actors in the events of the Fish River Marches. Born in 1798, he was the son of the king, Ngqika, and the great-nephew of Ngqika's former regent and habitual competitor, Ndlambe, who were the two key figures among the Rharhabe[62] branch of the Xhosa in early interactions with the British colony. The elder two Rharhabe chiefs had died by the end of the twenties, when Maqoma's authority was waxing. He was known as a warrior. In the marchland wars of the thirties and fifties, Maqoma and his followers harried and outfoxed the colonial forces, fought vicious guerilla war in the Waterkloof, and defended their forested refuge in the Amathole Mountains. On the other hand, while the 'Stockenstrom Treaties' were in effect between 1836 and 1844, Maqoma was constantly active in upholding them and maintaining the tenuously balanced relationship between the Xhosa and the colony. Fairbairn wrote that he 'is a man of ability and sound sense, and the undoubted Legitimate Prince of a Nation'.[63] Because of his centrality to the period in question, Maqoma's life is a useful basis for exploring the institution of the chiefship: his interactions with colonial power illustrate some of the ways Xhosa chieftaincy could muster resistance to the colony, as well as the ways in which it was cast as a threat in colonial sources. While this discussion of the polity 'beyond the boundary' ranges beyond the individual experience of Maqoma, I reference several episodes from his life, mostly sourced from Timothy Stapleton's 1994 biography, *Maqoma: Xhosa Resistance to Colonial Advance*, as well as representations of Maqoma in colonial sources (in which he was usually called 'Macomo'). In the latter, he represents the archetypal enemy chief, for as Miles Bowker wrote into the *Journal*: 'I know the man well, and am convinced, from his daring reckless character, he will not long patiently submit to have the absolute power he once wielded over his subjects diminished and taken from him by British law'.[64]

In *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa*, Paul S. Landau critiques the idea of the 'tribe'. As he writes, 'Europeans had *always* thought in terms of tribes, from the very start of their familiarity with the agrarian chiefdoms of South Africa'; differences were, in this view, 'writ forever, in people's bloodlines, with in-migrations and in-marriages peripheral to their continuities'.[65] This parallels Ranger's work, which argues that 'there rarely existed in fact the closed corporate consensual system which came to be accepted as characteristic of "traditional"

[62] The Rharhabe lived west of the Kei, and the Gcaleka, east; the 'paramount' of the Xhosa was the Gcaleka king.
[63] Quoted in Pringle, *Narrative*, pp. 315-316.
[64] *Graham's Town Journal*, V (230), 19 May 1836.
[65] Paul S. Landau. *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 124.

Africa…. Most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities'.[66] What is particularly useful about Landau's approach, compared to others, is that it emphasises the politics that animated African societies. The charge of barbarity levelled by many settlers and the concepts of tribe and tribalism were representations that tended to obscure, while also picking up on some aspects of, the existing political traditions among Africans. (It should be noted that when I speak of 'political traditions', it is not to characterise Xhosa or other African politics as 'traditional' in the way that word is most often used—e.g. 'traditional authorities'—but in the same way one could speak of an English or a Chinese political tradition or traditions.)

Landau's *Popular Politics* makes several challenges to common (and often that means colonial) narratives of South African political history. Primary among these challenges is that 'the political' was 'born deep in South Africa's past'[67], not introduced by or dependent upon various actors acceptable to Eurocentric and racist political and historiographical projects. Landau challenges, and meticulously deflates, the durable idea that 'tribe' and 'tribalism' were essential to South African societies. 'By tribes', writes Landau, 'one means affiliations that are taken as primary, inalienable birthrights, uniting culture and blood, and providing a total blueprint for behavior'. Indeed, stasis is basic to the idea of the tribe. A key example from the place and period considered here is the purported difference observed by colonial society between the 'Fingoes' and the Xhosa. While relying on the understanding of tribal permanence, the distinction also depended in a major way upon the political projects of the colonists. As tribe evolved as a concept, it deployed racialised assumptions about biology to determine tribal belonging; it was 'naturalised'. Rather, Landau argues, we should 'speak about [people] in terms of what they were doing rather than how Europeans came to know them'.[68] Now, there is something of a contradiction here, because we have seen in the settler newspapers that politics were definitely credited to Africans. The settlers saw political structures and practices, and political difference. However, Landau's point is that explanations of these political traditions advanced by colonial observers was depoliticising, rendering static what was mobile, permanent what was politically complex and fluid. This practice—more reactionary, c. 1835, than deliberate—is evident in the constant attempt to fix political relationships in international terms, as we have seen. This involved trying to pinpoint a central authority and to render collective and corporate the somewhat flexible polities that were found 'beyond the boundary'.

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[66] Ranger, 'Invention', pp. 247-248.
[67] Landau, *Popular Politics*, p. xiv.
[68] Ibid, pp. 123-124; 129; 161; 249.

Landau is writing with the benefit of knowing the outcomes that neither the European nor African societies of the 1830s could know, with knowledge of the discourse and logic of indirect rule and, later, of apartheid, when both 'tribe' and chiefly power took on new meanings through the development of colonial modes of governance. He is also writing for our benefit, those of us exposed to that knowledge. In the period considered here, especially up to the very late 1840s, *interaction* rather than *rule* was the political conundrum facing colonials on the Fish River Marches. This does not ignore the desire some harboured for conquest and expansion; but Godlonton, in 1835, could only call for an end to Xhosa 'political existence', and was forced to acknowledge the fact of their independence. There were dabblings in rule in the temporary Queen Adelaide Province, and relationships did move towards unequal footing in favour of the colony. However, this was a far from foregone conclusion. It also does not ignore that a great many indigenous people, and people of European and Asian origin as well, living between the Cape of Good Hope and the Fish were subjected to European rule, including through slavery up to 1834, and that the boundary was porous and involved movement into and out of zones of different legal and political frameworks (to the extent that these were enforceable). These considerations will form the basis of later chapters. For the moment, we will look, as Landau says, at 'what people were doing', and how politics and political society worked outside of the colony.

Two forms of mobility were important. The first is economic, and simple: a form a pastoral transhumance in which herds were moved to better pasture depending on the season and climatic conditions. This type of movement defied the establishment of rigid borders, once Europeans set out to do so. According to Jeff Peires, 'The Mbalu chief, Langa, was "in the habit of moving away for a short time each year and then resuming his stay among the Christians." One traveller found the Mbalu chiefs west of the Fish River while their homesteads were maintained in perfect order east of it…. The Gqunukhwebe chief, Chungwa, alarmed the Colonial authorities every year by moving closer to Uitenhage, the seat of the local administration'. These seasonal migrations into lands under another political authority were commonplace, even between lands controlled by different chiefs.[69] Pastoral and migratory livelihoods were among the practices that colonial authorities, settlers, and missionaries sought to quell, each in different ways, and was often seen as a trait of barbarity. Here, the main question has to do with political mobility.

[69] Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp. 7-10.

Landau's work on societies of the Highveld region is useful for its theoretical sophistication, while Peires's study of Xhosa history and society is specific to the region of the Fish River Marches and the people who lived there. Landau discusses the political tradition of the 'House', what he describes as 'an ancient tradition of association, inheritance, and unity, at the root of all farmers' politics, embracing all their elements'. Vital to this form of association was that 'it involved reciprocal rights in people, rather than in land. It opened the possibility of settlement to immigrants willing to subordinate themselves to a ruling chief of an alliance of farmers and to alter their communal identities'.[70] Inherent to this political system was the ability literally to move, to change location, to occupy new space and new political relationships within that space. Groups of people could move, and, in doing so, redefine themselves politically. This is precisely what Maqoma's adult son, Kona, a chief with followers of his own, attempted in the early 1840s, seeking land for their herds and his authority to flourish, startling the colonists into outcry in the process.[71]

Landau is careful to show that this did not mean constant conflict, but rather a situation of political opportunity in which there was also continuity. He writes, 'masculine political space, based on cattle transhumance, ancestry, alliances, and chiefs, could remove itself from towns, farmlands, and the women and children bound to them. But […] on the other side of the spectrum of political behavior, successful chiefs built in stone or defended towns for several generations at a stretch.'[72] The more permanent settlements and polities were legitimated through the notions of the House and hierarchy. The practice of political mobility also interacted with the House system. People, usually, did not simply leave their homes and leaders to occupy empty space as a new political entity; moving groups entered into relationships, often through the 'twin court' structure, in which both traditional house rankings as well as practical power of groups sharing the same space were respected. Junior houses could be the more militarily powerful or cattle wealthy, for instance; in other cases, newcomers took the junior role: 'the elephant that crosse[d] the river [became] a little elephant'.[73]

Very similar processes of continuity and the possibility for mobility were practiced in the Fish River Country around the time that Europeans began to enter the region. Continuity was understood in terms of patrilineal authority and hierarchy, traced back to the founder of the Xhosa polity, Tshawe (born in the 1670s): chiefs were all of a single lineage, and the Xhosa

[70] Landau, *Popular Politics*, p. 49.
[71] Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p. 126.
[72] Landau, *Popular Politics*, p. 91.
[73] Ibid, pp. 34; 66.

'king was head of the lineage, as the chief most closely related to Tshawe himself…. The rights of the other chiefs derived from the king'.[74] The chiefs were involved in complex relationships among themselves that recognised both lineage hierarchy as well as practical power. In the early 1800s, the two most important Xhosa chiefs in the Fish River Country, the 'regent' Ndlambe and his royal nephew, Ngqika, demonstrate this well. Their shared and conflictual leadership of the House of Rharhabe suggests a 'twin-court' structure like that which Landau describes, as do the relationships of several other pairs of Xhosa leaders: Gcaleka and Rharhabe, Phato and Chungwa, Hintsa and Bhurhu, Maqoma and Sandile. Though Ndlambe and Ngqika were sometimes at war with each other (and British interference in their conflicts came to be ceaseless), Julia Wells argues that there was 'simultaneously another dynamic operating, which was far more co-operative and supportive' in a manner that 'should be viewed as a particularly African dynamic of maintaining cohesion among leaders'.[75] It is with reference to Ngqika and Ndlambe that one of Peires's informants remarked, 'The chiefs were never at variance with each other except for a little misunderstanding at home (*amakhaya*) because they are people who were born chiefs as a single lineage…. They never had wars like when nations (*izizwe*) [*sic – amazwe*] differ with each other, because they are chiefs of the same lineage'.[76] Though Wells argues that this represents a 'particularly Xhosa-style of leadership',[77] Landau's work on the Highveld suggests a more expansive political tradition that was similar among several southern African groups, and indeed stretched further north in Africa.[78]

The authority of chiefs was also legitimated by their followers. Peires argues that the primary contradiction and struggle in Xhosa society was between the 'chiefs' and 'commoners'. As on the Highveld, people were able to change their allegiance in order to work out better situations for themselves. Peires uses the highly descriptive and emotive word 'desertion' to describe this process: 'Desertion or the threat of desertion was the most common and probably the most effective means of resistance open to commoners… Chiefs were therefore constantly preoccupied with the problem of maintaining the loyalty of their followers'. The most basic means of retaining followers was through cattle: the chief technically owned all of the cattle of his people, so they had acquired theirs through their connection with him. It was a system of redistribution of the most important social and

[74] Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp. 27-29.
[75] Julia C. Wells. *The Return of Makhanda: Exploring the Legend* (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press, 2012), p. 102.
[76] Quoted in Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp. 29-30.
[77] Wells, *Return of Makhanda*, p. 101.
[78] Landau, *Popular Politics*, pp. 51-53.

economic resource that legitimated existing power structures while also ensuring that mechanism for preventing destitution existed. A person without cattle could enter into patron-client relationships with either cattle-wealthy 'commoners' or with a chief, while the chief could also repossess cattle to ensure his redistributive powers.[79] Sometimes, too, the political-economic power (in cattle) of a rival or a disloyal follower could be challenged or curtailed through repossession, often through accusations of witchcraft. Indeed, because cattle and people were the twin measure of his power, Maqoma was doubly threatened by the raiding of the colony and the increasing number of Xhosa who, bereft of cattle, were moving into the colony as laborers in the prelude to the war of 1835. At the same time, because cattle were scarce, Maqoma did not have the redistributive means to prevent scarcity amongst his followers.[80]

Chiefs could, of course, gain followers as well, including followers of different ethnic origin. Indeed, it was through assimilation that many Khoi groups in the near west to the Xhosa were absorbed into different chiefdoms and became Xhosa. Often a generation or so of 'economic subordination' was necessary for people thus assimilated came to be on an equal footing, but there was no permanent 'second class citizenship'. In many ways it was not only 'possible', as Peires shows, 'to reduce social distance', but also the principle upon which Xhosa political interaction was based. 'For the Xhosa', writes Peires, 'this was most satisfactorily done by the incorporation of the alien group into the Xhosa nation where it would become bound and protected by Xhosa law and customs. Nations that were not incorporated could, however, establish kinship links through marriage', for example with Sotho, Mpondo, and Thembu people. He continues, 'The Xhosa succeeded in drawing most of their neighbours into a network of reciprocal social relations. They were not successful with the Colonial government or its white subjects who would not intermarry with them, would not share their wealth with them, would not even accept their common humanity'.[81]

The 'primary contradiction' between commoners and chiefs, which forms the basis of Peires's analysis, and which leads him to characterise the kingship/chieftaincy as the Xhosa 'state', is somewhat obscuring of the importance of 'commoners', or 'followers'—in short, ordinary people—in legitimising the authority of the chiefly lineage. It is similar in many regards to the colonial logic of 'international relations' with the chiefs at the head of the Xhosa state. His word 'desertion' evokes the 'disloyalty' seen by Europeans (although it is possibly

[79] Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp. 32; 36-37; 39
[80] Stapleton, *Maqoma*, pp. 102-103.
[81] Peires, *House of Phalo*, pp. 22-24; 42; 44.

how Xhosa chiefs saw it, too). The notion of 'state power' should be balanced with the notion of 'popular power', as seen in Landau's work. To take just one example, the war of 1835 was predicated not only by the assault by Europeans on chiefly power, but also on the fact that Xhosa people, including Maqoma's, pressured their chiefs into fighting to preserve their herds and access to pasture lands.[82] Before the colonial project curtailed mobility and delimited the meaning and scope of politics amongst Africans, people actively participated in practices of polity-formation and legitimisation. Political belonging, in this context, was linked to the political choices people made, not only the physical territory they occupied or the chief that ruled it. In the African traditions of both the Highveld and Fish River Country, political power expanded by the inclusion of more people into relationships with leaders rather than in exclusion of people from land. 'Chiefship', writes Landau, 'was an incorporative institution, and its success lay in bridging differences among varied constituencies. The word for the landed polity…meant everyone living in the big meeting, everyone living together, not all blood relations'.[83]

That colonists—both officials and settlers—had an understanding of Xhosa political systems is clear. In August 1835, Godlonton lectured his readers on the importance of missionaries, Christianity, and literacy in subduing the Xhosa. (Missionaries, it should be observed, were fine by Bob, unless they revealed colonial atrocities and injustices to the English press or to Parliament.) The article read, '*Witchcraft* and their *feudal system* have been the grand hindrances to the march of improvement; but these will now be swept away by the late measures; or at least will be so far neutralized as to have in future but little effect, where before they presented the most formidable obstruction'. The 'late measures' were D'Urban's annexation.[84] One of the consequences of that annexation was to undermine chiefly authority, but the reversion of the land to Xhosa control had reestablished the legitimacy of the chiefs along traditional lines.[85] That Godlonton saw an 'obstruction' posed by witchcraft and feudalism was not merely a matter of religious and civil 'improvement', but a rhetorical attack upon the institution of chiefly power, and on Xhosa politics more generally.

Again, Maqoma affords a good example, in a contest for power with his younger, higher-ranked brother, Matwa, who had attached himself to a missionary, Laing, and courted colonial alliance. When Matwa fell ill with headaches and nosebleeds, Maqoma sent some of his people

[82] Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p. 86.
[83] Landau, *Popular Politics*, p. 11.
[84] *Graham's Town Journal*, IV (190), 13 August 1835; emphasis original.
[85] Stapleton, *Maqoma*, p. 101.

to accuse Matwa's richest supporters of sorcery. Many of these supporters consequently lost their cattle and 'fled to the colony or sought refuge in Laing's home'. According to Stapleton, 'Undoubtedly the confiscated animals included cattle that Matwa had lent his subjects on the increase-sharing basis. [Maqoma] was thus absorbing a portion of his pro-colonial sibling's royal herd, thereby reducing Matwa's ability to attract new followers'. At another point, Maqoma possibly feigned illness to have another problematic individual banished, while managing to maintain belief amongst the missionaries that he did not hold with the whole 'witchcraft' practice, at all.[86] It is worth recalling, too, that the near destruction of Graham's Town in 1819 was led by the holy-man, Nxele, who had combined elements of traditional Xhosa spirituality and Christianity in a political movement to expel the Europeans from the land west of the Great Fish River. The potential for 'pagan' elements to underpin powerful moments of unity and resistance amongst the Xhosa would be well-remembered in the colony, reminding colonists of the danger of the political uses of religion 'beyond the boundary'. The possibility became manifest again in 'Mlanjeni's War' of 1850-1853, in which a prophetic movement amongst 'commoners' again pressured the chiefs to fight.

In an article that is rather cleverer than some of the material in the *Journal*, the editor of the *Times*, J. G. Franklin, made connections between that leading concern of frontier politics, livestock theft, and the practices of politics among the Xhosa: witchcraft, the importance of cattle, and the power of chiefs.

> Of course the chief men of the kraal known when stolen property is brought into Kafirland, and so do the K—r chiefs—but those who do not share in the plunder dare not repress it lest the followers of their less scrupulous brother chiefs should be augmented. An honest K—r chief would have few followers, and would soon become a very insignificant personage in Kafirland. A case of witchcraft would probably soon be got up against him—he would be plundered of all his cattle, and would perhaps have to fly for his life.[87]

Of course, this subscribes to the stock lie of frontier politics, in which settlers were not the chief thieves of the region, responsible for the need of Africans to either seek or to reclaim their cattle in the colony. More significantly, it links chiefly power and frontier politics.

Despite the constant harping on the power and responsibility of the Xhosa chiefs, the settler community equivocated when it suited their purposes. The missionary William Shaw was of the view that 'in theory the [Xhosa] Government is a pure despotism. The [king] of the tribe is regarded as sole lord and proprietor of its lands, its people and their property',[88] while in the

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[86] Ibid, pp. 72; 77.
[87] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (210), 23 May 1844.
[88] Quoted in Peires, *House of Phalo*, p. 33.

Journal, they chiefs were the 'despotic sovereigns of their respective tribes'.[89] However, when it came to treaties—and in frontier politics this often meant 'Stockenstrom's'—the settlers held a different view. In an 1838 letter on 'Treaties' published in the *Journal*, one 'Vigilans' wrote:

> One circumstance which our wise rulers, both at home and here, seem entirely to have overlooked ; and that is, whether the K—r chiefs *have* the power to maintain the provisions of a treaty. What the nature of allegiance between them and their people may be, I know not; but it would appear to be of a loose description, as they frequently shift it from one chief to another. In civilised countries, where large standing armies are kept afoot, the rulers have the power to observe and enforce the treaties they may make; but what power does a K—r chief possess over his people to make *them* obey the stipulation of a treaty? Among these people there is no supremacy, no distinction as to dress, or in any other way, between the chief (so called) and his subjects. They mutually partake in the spoil or plunder; and supposing a chief honest enough to set his face against these marauding excursions, he would soon be left without subjects. This is, I believe, no exaggerated statement.[90]

'Vigilans' clearly has a better understanding of Xhosa politics than let on in this letter, but the questioning of the legitimacy of chiefs and the extent of their powers—indeed, a reversal of the view that interaction in the marches was a matter of international relations—was echoed in other moments. A few months earlier, for example, Godlonton had written that while 'treaties with uncivilised people' were permissible and possible, if based on good faith, he thought that the treaties '*have not been executed between parties duly empowered to act*.—The K—r Chiefs, of themselves, are not authorised by the ancient usage or polity of the nation to enter into any such important engagement with a foreign power'. We see the international relations framework still in effect, but then Godlonton turns to his interpretation of 'Xhosa law' to challenge the basis of agreements not suitable to his point of view: 'These treaties, as far as regards the K—r *people*, are mere waste paper; for no chief is permitted, by the constitution of the country, to take any important step affecting the public interests without the advice of his *pakati* or council; and hence any measure which is taken without such sanction is deemed by K—r law perfectly nugatory'.[91] It was certainly Godlonton's hope that the same treaties would be deemed perfectly nugatory according to English law, as well.

By 1843, Godlonton was editorialising on 'political ethics' and 'the state of natural liberty':

> The natives have nothing among them that is worthy of being called government. They are split into fragments—and though they live to some extent in communities—yet they are without any

[89] *Graham's Town Journal*, XV (774), 10 October 1846.
[90] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (339), 12 July 1838.
[91] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (323), 8 March 1838; emphasis original. Lord Glenelg, back in London, made a similar argument about the past relationships with Ngqika: 'We forced on our Ally a Treaty, which, according to the usages of the K—e Nation, he had no authority to conclude'; see Glenelg to D'Urban, 17 February 1836 (KAB, GH 1/108 1836), pp. 28-29.

> actual organization—they roam the wilderness either in search of subsistence or to destroy; where there is power, it is the power of despotism and cruelty—it is not exercised for the maintenance of right, but to oppress and to devastate. This too, be it remembered, is as applicable to the white man as to the black. The colour of the skin does not change the natural character of man. Where the mind is undisciplined; where there exists no law, no government, but where the unruly passions are allowed free exercise, man will ever be an oppressor of his species.[92]

The twofold consequence of this argument that Africans had no government, no order, and existed in a state of barbarism was the implicit comparison to British government, law, social organisation, freedom, unity, and rights and the obligation to impose that British society and authority upon 'the natives'. While a 'natural' condition of lawlessness might exist, the existence and authority of the British state had 'disciplined' 'white men' to freedom and social life. The international framework that relied on two 'states' as parties to interaction, managed by laws, came to be superseded, when it suited, by this unequal opposition between a state and the stateless. How did the English settlers in the Fish River Marches conceive of their British side of that opposition?

THE 'PALE' OF BRITISH CIVILISATION

At another public meeting convened in Graham's Town, in 1841, colonists met to 'consider the state of our relations with the Border Tribes and the working of the existing frontier system'. In the following week's lead article, Godlonton avowed that 'as British subjects we will not be satisfied with less than a due participation in British justice. It is a fact too notorious to be denied, that for the last seven years, the home government has been trying *experiments* with the Native Tribes and Colonists, which the public voice has pronounced quite icapposite [*sic* - inapposite] to the case'.[93] We see here how the politics of the frontier were mobilised under the assumption of British authority, and participation in the British imperial polity. While conservative in this regard, at the same time, these assumptions were deployed in order to contest the 'impolitic' policy that had governed the frontier. With more melodrama, and writing not about the boundary but rather the 'want of labor', 'T. J. C.' wrote in to the *Times*, 'will the British Government remain deaf much longer to the importunate cries of her faithful subjects, and withhold from them that succour which loyalty deserves?'[94]

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[92] *Graham's Town Journal*, XII (628), 14 December 1843.
[93] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (498), 34 June 1841; emphasis original.
[94] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (201), 21 March 1844.

The British colonists at the Cape, irrespective of their ideas about how best to confront Africans both inside and outside the colony, whether John Fairbairn or Robert Godlonton, shared a common idealisation of Great Britain and, more particularly, the British system of government. 'Protected', waxed Pringle or Fairbairn on the *Commercial Advertiser*'s first ever published page, 'Protected by the invaluable ramparts of her unrivalled Constitution, and guided by Councils of justice and moderation, Great Britain has added another year of peace and gradual prosperity'.[95] According to Lester, 'settler men endeavoured to stake their claims as British subjects through public political representation', and, at the same time, settler women participated in cultural activities that 'were vital to the maintenance of "British-ness" within domestic space'. These were not merely the inheritances of earlier life in Britain, for 'that "British-ness" in turn was vital to the settlers' claim to metropolitan protection and support'.[96] Living 'under the protection of British law and authority', according to the *Times*, afforded the 'advantages and blessings' of 'an organised social system.[97] In an article of February 1841, Godlonton affirmed that, as colonists, 'as a community, we claim and will never cease to demand at the hands of the parent country, a full participation in *all* advantages of British subjects—an equality with every other portion of the British Realm'.[98] This is a claim to political belonging, at the same time as it is constitutes a challenge to those who might or might be perceived to deny the rights of British subjects, as well as a further construction of political difference against those-who-are-not-British. The matter of British subjecthood was often on the proverbial table in the Fish River Marches.

Mary Ann, the wife of John Mitford Bowker, prefaced the 1864 publication of her late husband's papers with a problem and a dichotomy. The problem has to do with government, and the dichotomy with people. She related it through that fixation of the politics of the frontier, what her husband called the 'Epitome of Frontier History': the betrayal of the D'Urban system by the 'philanthropists'. She believed that John's papers would demonstrate how 'the British Government failed to protect the Settlers, brought out by them and placed on an exposed frontier, from the marauding propensities of their savage neighbours'. She hoped the book would show how the British Government was led, by truckling to a party at home, to adopt a policy founded on the false and calumnious statements made by interested parties, by which their protection was, in fact, withdrawn from the loyal subjects of their Sovereign, and

[95] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser*, p. 1.
[96] Lester, *Imperial Networks*, pp. 73-74.
[97] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (210), 23 May 1844.
[98] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (478), 25 February 1841.

bestowed rather upon a set of lawless savages'. The problem itself makes plain the dichotomy between 'the natives themselves, and…the loyal subjects of the Crown of England'.[99] Not only did the participants and authors of frontier politics stake claims to Britishness, but defined African others as unworthy of British beneficence.

This dual gesture of claim and denial emerges in the figurative language of 'the pale'. 'A Frontier Farmer' wrote via the *Journal* to the new governor, Peregrine Maitland, beseeching him to undo the ills of the previous administrations that had undone D'Urban's brilliant handiwork. 'The Frontier farmers', wrote their representative, 'have long considered themselves almost without the pale of the British Constitution; though loyal, peaceable, obedient to the laws and upholders of the institutions of the mother country…they have neither the privilege of a representative government, nor security of life and property'.[100] When many Dutch families left the Cape Colony beginning in the middle 1830s—the 'emigrant farmers' in the English papers, or the 'voortrekkers'—the *Journal* spoke of those 'willing to quit the pale of civilization', or who 'pass with their wives and their little ones without let or hindrance beyond the pale of British jurisdiction'.[101]

Those 'without the pale', and without the natural claim of loyal subjects, could be brought into it: Pringle contentedly observed in the early '30s that 'because of the 'meritorious labours' of missionaries, 'the three chiefs of the Gunuquenbi [Gqunukwhebe] have embraced Christianity, and…there is every prospect of that clan being speedily brought entirely within the pale of civilisation'.[102] But 'Othering' was flexible. Against Pringle's sincerity stood the manipulation of humanitarian emotions by Godlonton, whose defense of D'Urban's annexation claimed that 'nothing more is or ever was, intended than to bring the tract of country in question within the pale of civilization' and 'to drive out the banditti which has [*sic*] so long infested the colonial borders from their strongholds and fastnesses'. Thereafter, 'friendly tribes' could be placed in circumstances which they have long desired; they will be under the paternal care of the British nation'. Not only would 'British influence…scarcely fail in their case to have a most salutary' on the Africans, but the benefits would accrue to the colonists as well, for 'by wise and prudent government they will form an impassable barrier to the tribes beyond; and thus the colonists may indulge in the pleasing hope that in future years, by this humane and salutary measure, they will enjoy in peace and comfort the fruits of their industry'.[103]

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[99] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, pp. iii; vi-vii; 1-5.
[100] *Graham's Town Journal*, XIII (668), 19 September 1844.
[101] *Graham's Town Journal*, V (220), 10 March 1836; XIV (707), 19 June 1845.
[102] Pringle, *Narrative*, p. 326.
[103] *Graham's Town Journal*, XI (574), 1 December 1842.

An extract from the Cape Town paper, *Ware Afrikaan*, was reprinted in Graham's Town with similar arguments in favour of D'Urban's policy, for the Stockenstrom system '[shut] the K—r out from the pale of civilization and dooms him to a continuance of his predatory barbarism', and makes the standard statement that the 'K—s should be brought under the influence of British rule and British law', but finishes with a different sort of argument, both more practical and in line with the earlier tenets of frontier politics: for 'anything short…will always prove mere political patchwork liable at any moment to be rent asunder'.[104] This begins to relate the question of the pale, what lay beyond it, and the 'organised social system' within it, to the matter of fear of politics, and the constitution of threat in frontier politics.

For example, 'The mere removal of the Boers beyond the pale of British jurisdiction was one thing; the setting up where they now are of an Independent Republic is another'. Godlonton also expressed concern over reports from the north country that 'there were thousands of British subjects, now resident in that country, over whom it was impossible to exercise control so long as they were impressed with an idea that by stepping across the limits of this Colony they were beyond the pale of British jurisdiction'. [105] Most telling of all was the manner in which 'the pale' was related to the contemporary political problems in the Fish River Marches, at least as identified by protagonists of a politics of the frontier: the political system of the Xhosa. 'Paul Pry, the Second' wrote to the *Journal* against a system of 'Native Villages', modelled on a colonial practice in India. 'Fingoe and H—t villages, to be established…beyond the immediate pale of civilization…in Kafirland would become mere cities of refuge to all the rascals of the Colony, would becoming formidable in numbers would be much more likely (ten years hence) to join their "kith and kin," the K—s, in plundering'.[106]

What I have shown here is the first, and the most straightforward, of the ways that 'foreignness' was identified and constituted as a threat by participants in a 'frontier politics' of the Fish River Marches, which sometimes overlapped with official and more 'liberal' political viewpoints. Bound up with the project of colonial expansion, embraced by the likes the Godlonton or Bowker, and the daily matters of land and livestock raiding, it relied on the claim that two—sometimes more—distinct countries occupied the region, and that Africans were 'foreigners' in the colony or outside it. Whether stock theft was a mere justification for extractive raids for land, cattle, and laborers against the Xhosa—and much evidence suggests that this was often the case—the politics of the frontier nonetheless spoke in terms of the

[104] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (502), 22 July 1841.
[105] *Graham's Town Journal*, XI (574), 1 December 1842; XVI (802), 24 April 1847.
[106] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVI (797), 20 March 1847.

foreign, indeed, the criminally foreign. The political leaders and systems of the ‘foreigners’ were invoked to demonstrate their very foreignness while also aiding in the depiction of them as threatening—barbarous, pagan, savage, and violent—precisely because those political systems were the basis of much of the independent activity on the part of Africans. Against the foreign depredations and depravity was set up the justice and the inviolability of ‘British Civilisation’, the defense of right and rights, the rule of common law, the freedoms of property and commerce. These are, of course, political ideas, which did reference existing institutions, but also looked forward to the better consolidation of those institutions as part of and in service of a colonial political project, given shape by settlers’ participation. Colonists of the Fish River Marches came to think of themselves as living and acting ‘within the pale’ of British authority, in which they might rightfully make demands on British protection, and beyond which lay an opposing and foreign political realm.

6.
'IMPROPER CONNEXIONS':
VAGABONDS OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH VAGABONDS

While Lieutenant-Colonel Collins was off on his survey of the rural frontier in 1809, formulating the proposals that would lead to Graham's conquest of the Zuurveld, the institution of the Fish River as the colonial boundary, and the settlement of a British community on its western bank, he met an 'extraordinary man'—'a Maroon slave, a native of Malabar'. This unnamed slave had recently been recaptured, and was brought to Collins in chains in order to give him 'some information respecting the country which I was about to enter'. Collins recounts how 'the poor fellow had been six years in this unfrequented tract', after his solitary companion had died.

> [The Maroon] had cleared at least two acres, which he had converted into an excellent garden, containing vegetables, tobacco, and fruit-trees, well watered by a fountain…. The dung of elephants and buffaloes, which are both exceedingly numerous in this quarter, had served him for manure, and a heap of their bones and of those of eland, boschboks, and other antelopes, of whose skins he had manufactured good clothing, cut according to the European fashion, manifested…his ingenuity in contriving pits and snares to catch these animals. His industry had even extended to the baking of earthenware; and this new Robinson Crusoe had contrived by his own exertions to unite in his solitude almost all the comforts that are enjoyed in civilized and social life.

Except that the man was running from enslavement, and ultimately ended up enslaved again, Collins aptly captures (or perhaps invents) the romantic quality of this tale with his allusion Crusoe and a lonesome life amidst exotic abundance. His apparent sympathy and admiration notwithstanding, Collins ordered the man sent west to the Cape to '[be] exchanged or otherwise disposed of', lest he escape again and 'draw other Maroons to the difficult country which he had lately inhabited'.[1]

The encounter with the native of Malabar emphasises an important theme of Collins's report to Caledon: the problem of 'deserters' and 'Maroons'. Including the example just cited, Collins makes reference seven times to one or the other brand of problematic person. Of the region

[1] 'Report of Lieutenant Colonel Collins to the Earl of Caledon'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* VII, pp. 127-128.

around ‘Zitzikamma [Tsitsikamma]’, he remarked, ‘Its occupancy would be a public benefit, not only by completing the communication along the coast between the extremities of the colony, but also by preventing Maroons from taking refuge in it’. Of the ‘quarter of the Kouwgha [Kouga]’, he observes, ‘It is blank now in the midst of cultivation, and is not resorted to, except by deserters’; and ‘of the country situated between Plettenberg Bay and Zitzikamma, there was no better information. A few Maroon H—s had traversed it some years before I went there’ but ‘the white people had gone no further than its skirts’ in ‘seeking for servants who had absconded’.[2]

Then there was MacDaniel. In Xhosa country, Collins had slept on the floor of an ‘Irishman’s hut’ at a place where ‘the shore…was lined with breakers, upon which the sea dashed with great violence’. It was a ‘retreat of exiles’, deserters from the colony.

> The first person that we saw was a white man, whose only covering was a ragged jacket and a pair of breeches. He seemed much alarmed, and spoke in Dutch; but his accent soon discovered that he belonged to another country. We told him that we had not come to do him harm, but on the contrary, to offer his Majesty’s pardon to him and the other refugees in K—r Land, provided they would return, without delay, to the colony. He returned thanks, in English, for the favour; and the history he told us of himself is as follows:—
>
> His name is Henry MacDaniel; he was born in the county of Clare, where his father is an innkeeper, was irregularly enlisted early in the last war, embarked for foreign service, was captured, kept four years in a French prison, for which time he has not received any pay, was exchanged, and sent out again with some recruits for the Cape, from whence he deserted a few months after his arrival. He evaded telling us his regiment, but added that he had lived some time with the farmers near the Zwartkops River, had gone from thence to Kafferland, in the hope of finding a passage to Ireland, and resided several months in Gyka’s [Ngqika’s] territory, and had been nearly a year with one Loghenberg, a young Dutch farmer, and a few H—s and slaves, at the place where we found him. He said that Hinsa [Hintsa] had treated them with such great kindness, and lent them some milch cows….

Hintsa himself related to Collins and his companions that ‘the exiles had come into his country as had been practised by other persons from the colony, to whom his territory was always open’, although the Xhosa chief allowed, agreeably, that he would suggest that they return. Theal later glossed that MacDaniel and the young Dutch farmer ‘could not be induced to return to the colony.’[3]

The native of Malabar and the Clareman are different examples at the Cape of Good Hope of the central character of this chapter, the Vagabond, or what we might think of as the indecently or dangerously mobile person. In the view of the Governor, Lord Somerset, contemplating a certain group of ‘Mozambique Negroes’ in 1817, ‘we have most to guard

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[2] Ibid, pp. 126; 128.
[3] Ibid, pp. 57; 63-66; Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. X, p. 407.

against here, from the scanty means we possess of suppressing it when it occurs, vagabondizing and marooning'. We have seen how marronage leads us to think in terms of the manufacture of political autonomy and, by extension, foreignness. Here we will look at that process (and, more so, the fear of it) and the bearing that 'vagabondizing and marooning' have for thinking in terms of xenophobia in the Cape Colony. The chapter ranges from the earliest days of the British occupation of the colony, in the dim ages before independent newspapers belched on the Marches or lectured nattily from the city, to the early 1850s. Two periods of 'rebellion', from 1799-1803 and 1851-1853, in which vagabonds played important roles, serve as bookends. During that long period we will see how the idea of the Vagabond forging 'improper connexions', to borrow Collins's phrase, appeared in the official discourse of the colony's military administration and then became a recurrent fear, closely linked to foreignness and xenophobia in colonial politics as thought and practiced by settlers.

THE VAGABOND: CRIMINALITY AND MOBILITY

The twin charges of idleness and criminality lay at the derogatory heart of the charge of vagabondism. Now, the native of Malabar was certainly not idle, but his labour was improperly spent, for, along with many other enslaved people of the Cape, he '[took] no interest whatsoever in the welfare of [his] Masters' and would not be 'confine[d]…within the pale of [his] duties'.[4] For his part, MacDaniel from Clare abandoned his duties to King and Country and went vagabond, fleeing beyond the pale of the King's authority and taking up with others of vagabonding disposition, in a land ruled by wandering herders. Both had fled 'social life', in the view of Collins. The vagabond, or 'vagabondizing' as the action was known in the Cape colonial record, was also legally unacceptable. In 1827, a Commission of Inquiry reported on Criminal Law and Jurisprudence in the colony. It summarised that 'returns of crimes and offences tried by the Provincial Courts between the years 1818 and 1823 inclusive, those of the most frequent occurrence are the desertions of slaves and Hottentots from their Masters' service, vagabondizing and theft, and the complaints of these two classes against their Masters for ill-treatment'.[5] Somerset was not exaggerating when he had written that 'vagabondizing and marooning' were most pressing concerns.

[4] Denyssen to Cradock, 16 March 1813. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. IX, p. 144.
[5] 'Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry to Earl Bathurst upon Criminal Law and Jurisprudence', 18 August 1827. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXXIII, p. 10.

For the years recorded in the Commission's report, 'vagabondizing' was convicted 596 times throughout the Cape Colony. Two facts make this figure confusing. First is that only Cape Town has records for 1814-1823; the rest begin in 1818, 1819, or 1820, and the Albany District only includes three years. Second, crimes were labelled differently or grouped differently in different locales. Sometimes 'Vagabondizing' was grouped with 'Desertion' or 'Cattle Stealing' or 'Theft'. It appears, though, that because 'Cattle Stealing' or 'Theft' are recorded on separate lines than Vagabondizing *and* something else, that this is not a matter of lumping them together but of crimes committed specifically by vagabonds. So—acknowledging that there is no safe way to periodise these statistics or ensure they are complete—we see that, in four areas, 'Vagabondizing' was the most commonly convicted crime by significant margins. In Cape Town, it was over 30% of all crime and 19% higher than the next most common crime, 'Burglary and Theft'. In Graaff-Reinet, it was 38% of all crime and the most common by almost 30%. In Cradock, where there were relatively few convictions of anything, it was 45% of all crime and the most common by 33%. In Beaufort it amounted to exactly half of all crime and was the most common by 37%. All told, convictions for crimes falling under the label of 'Vagabondizing' was just over 20% of all criminal convictions in the colony. However, if 'Desertion', 'Desertion (H—s and Slaves)', 'Harbouring deserted Slaves and H—s', 'Aiding the escape of Prisoners, 'Harbouring H—s under contract', 'Settlers deserting from the service of their Masters', 'Employing Indentured Servants', 'Settlers illicit traffic with the C—s', 'Deserting and Resistance', 'Harbouring H—s without passes', 'Shooting "Runaway Bosjesman"', 'Allowing Prisoners to escape', 'Crossing the Boundary of the Colony', 'Harbouring runaway Slaves', 'Desertion of European Indentured Servants', 'Harbouring Runaway Slaves', 'Desertion and Petty Theft', 'Encouraging Servants to desert', 'Releasing Persons condemned to work in irons', 'Aiding the Escape of a Convict', and 'Illegally returning from Banishment' are taken into account, then 717 convictions, or one quarter of all convicted crimes in the Cape Colony between 1814 and 1823, were identified as or were very closely related to desertion and vagabondizing. With these other labels included, Graaff-Reinet, Cradock, and Beaufort finish with totals of 40%, 56%, and 59% of all crime. In Clanwilliam and the Cape District, 'Desertion' was the most convicted crime, at 19% and 25% respectively. The fact that most of the convictions in the report came between 1818 and 1823 means it was probably even more frequent.[6]

[6] Ibid, pp. 326-329.

This litany of crime evokes the work of historian Peter Linebaugh, who has already been mentioned in relation to the idea of Atlantic history, specifically revolutionary communications in the history of trans-Atlantic crossings during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In *The London Hanged*, Linebaugh constructs a history of working-class resistance and elite repression in England through the records (and some songs) of crime and punishment in the eighteenth century, centering both the crime and the punishment in the development of capitalism.[7] The Vagabond is a central figure in Linebaugh's histories. He is interested in 'the fluidity and the social dynamics that set' the different categories of vagabond (of which there are many) 'in motion'. He maintains that, 'Besides masterlessness, what characterized these groups was their mobility, their freedom, and their footlooseness'. Often as not in that period, the leaders of religious and political dissent were drawn from the vagabond population and were the purveyors of different versions of what he calls an 'antinomian democracy'. 'Of course', Linebaugh makes clear, 'not all of the trans-Atlantic British, Irish, and Scottish migrants were revolutionary sectaries and schismatics. However, *some* were and others *had been*'.[8] Significantly, the possibility that they were, had been, or could be political agitators meant that they were often perceived to be just that by the practitioners and beneficiaries of state, imperial, colonial, and economic power. We will see this clearly in the history that follows. This stemmed not only from pragmatic inclinations, but also formed part of subjective understandings of the status quo and how society ought to be organised. Thus, vagabonding was thought in opposition to 'social life' and the name of 'vagabond' bore an essential indictment of individual or group activity, which was easily recognised by people within the pale of social, political, and economic relationships.

Allowing for continuities, the vagabonds of the Cape Colony after the turn of the nineteenth century were not the same vagabonds, in time, place, or politics, as those whose histories Linebaugh has recovered. Still, the idea of vagabonds and their potential politicisation has meaning in the present study because it still (or also) had currency in the historical context and subjective world of the Cape Colony. Where Linebaugh writes that 'laws against vagabondage provide us with a Foucault-like index of the growing attack on the corporal person', and goes on to describe some of the brutal penalties for vagabonding in England,[9] I would rather take the conversation in another direction. I am interested in how the Vagabond was not only

[7] Peter Linebaugh. *The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Verso, 2003).
[8] Peter Linebaugh. 'All the Atlantic Mountains Shook'. *Labour/Le Travailleur* 10, 1982, p. 95.
[9] Ibid, p. 100.

rendered *legally* problematic, but was seen to be a political problem, as well. Where Linebaugh has been concerned primarily with the control or punishment of vagabonds and other classes of the poor (coercive state power), and especially with the power of these classes to challenge state coercion through organisation and revolt (subaltern power),[10] I am interested instead in the influence that the figure of the vagabond had, as something real or imagined, on perceptions of political threat and in his or her relation to the notions of foreignness and the foreigner as threat that underpin xenophobia.

It was not chiefly the Foucauldian 'corporal' person, but the social and political person, that was the object of reaction. As we will see, this reaction gestured often towards the modes of difference that existed beyond the pale and to the real and imagined danger of connections forged by indecently mobile persons. The world of subaltern solidarity and interaction which Nicole Ulrich has described for the Cape Town region[11] also had significance on the colonial marches, but with the additional ingredient of the relationship between those 'subaltern' people and existing 'foreign' polities, movements, or centres of political power. When it comes to vagabonds, the perception of what is threatening blurs the lines of internal and external, of coming and of going. Nevertheless, the vagabond, like the foreigner, 'does not belong', at least not where he or she is; the vagabond properly belongs someplace else. The problem of vagabonding—a 'problem', bear in mind, from the perspective of a colonial, imperial, and slave-holding status-quo at the Cape; from a 'statist' perspective more generally—not only recalls the subjective importance of the frontier and the boundary, but also foreshadows aspects of the discussions of 'vagrancy' and convict transportation that are looked at more closely in the following chapters. Thus, an intricate correlation between different facets of Cape politicisations of foreignness and Cape xenophobia begins to become visible.

MAROONS AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

In 1735, a colonial official in Cape Town complained of the 'creeping evil' of marronage. Robert Ross has written some of the history of the 'longest-surviving and largest…maroon community' at the Cape. From the 1720s, several different groups of maroons lived at Hanglip, the mountainous rocks of the north-east shore of False Bay, near Cape Town. They were often connected to other runaways on the slopes of Table Mountain and to an illicit economy in Cape

[10] See Linebaugh, *The London Hanged*; Linebaugh, 'Atlantic Mountains', pp. 96-98.
[11] Ulrich, 'Abolition from Below'.

Town itself. Despite discontinuities of group members resulting from recapture, leadership conflicts, and the passing of generations, a maroon community lived at Hanglip into the nineteenth century, living off the sea, the land, and the provisions of waylaid farmers. By 1800, they had achieved some stability and a number of children were born among the thirty or so people living at Hanglip. In the 1820s, a captured slave reported that three distinct groups of men, women, children, former slaves, and some Khoi or San, totaling about seventy people, were living by highway robbery in the passes above Hanglip.[12] More recently, and contrary to Ross, Nicole Ulrich has argued that escaped slaves at the Cape were likely to work collectively 'in order to assert their autonomy'.[13] Collins seemed not to have heard about any maroons at Hanglip when he passed nearby in 1809, and only noted, 'No inhabitant has yet proceeded completely along the shore' there; but neither did he, because of 'representations made by the boers of the great difficulty of the undertaking'.[14]

But Collins had reason to speak of maroons, when he did. His early military service had been in the West Indies, in Santo Domingo during the black revolution in that island. He was an officer in the West India Regiments, the black and sometimes slave regiments recruited to fight His Majesty's tropical wars, when those units were fighting rebels. He was wounded in the 'Brigands War' fighting African-American maroons known as 'Black Caribs', the French, and rebel slaves across the Windward Islands. Furthermore, the regiment in which he served at the Cape of Good Hope had fought the Second Maroon War in Jamaica at the same time Collins was fighting French Republicans and Toussaint L'Ouverture's ex-slaves in Santo Domingo.[15] No doubt some survivors of the Caribbean's fevers still served, who could recount the guerrilla war to the young Lieutenant-Colonel. Service in the West Indies would certainly have conferred some knowledge of maroons. At the Cape of Good Hope, Collins referenced this knowledge in relating his apprehensions of the Cape's various vagabond people.

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[12] Ross, *Cape of Torments*, pp. 55-70.
[13] Nicole Ulrich. '"Journeying into Freedom": Traditions of Desertion at the Cape of Good Hope'. In Rediker, Chakraborty, and van Rossum, *A Global History of Runaways*, p. 117.
[14] Report of Collins. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. VII, p. 133.
[15]'Help on Richard Collins'. Napoleon Series Archive, 2007. Available at: http://www.napoleon-series.org/cgi-bin/forum/archive2007_config.pl?md=read;id=71254 [accessed 9 August 2019]; Brevet-Major Jarvis. *Historical Record of the Eighty-Second Regiment, or Prince of Wales's Volunteers* (London: W. O. Mitchell, 1866), pp.4-6; Richard Cannon. *Historical Record of the Fifty-Third, or The Shropshire Regiment of Foot. Containing an Account of the Formation of the Regiment in 1755 and of Its Subsequent Services to 1848* (London: Parker, Furnivall, & Parker, 1849), pp. 10-12; *Memoirs and Services of the Eighty-Third Regiment, County of Dublin, from 1793 to 1907, Including the Campaigns of the Regiment in the West Indies, Africa, the Peninsula, Ceylon, and India* (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1908), p. 14; for 'Black Caribs' and Brigands' War see, Craton, *Testing*, pp. 145-153; 193-202

Marronage at the Cape of Good Hope took on a specific character in what Ulrich calls 'borderland bands' of the eighteenth century. These were armed and multi-racial groups, that included large numbers of mixed-race ('*Bastaards*' or '*Oorlam*') people, which developed in the context of livestock raiding against the Khoikhoi and sometimes against the colony, largely in the marchlands in the colonial north. These bands became 'pre-existing communities that included—sometimes actively welcomed or recruited—runaways and vagabonds', which found their livelihoods in raiding, whether Khoi or colonists. Some of these groups 'evolved into independent communities in their own right', such as the ones organised around the deserted sailor Jan Bloem, or else Klaas Afrikaaner, which attracted Khoisan, mixed, and Xhosa people.[16] At the turn of the nineteenth century, several hundred 'Bastaards' established a definite polity at a place called Klaarwater, which quickly formed ties with the London Missionary Society and became the basis for the new 'Griqua' identity. According to Legassick, 'This Griqua community was formed in the crucible of the frontier zone and shaped by the institutions of the commando', and broke down the distinctions between mixed people of primarily colonial descent or indigenous descent. From the second decade of the 1800s into mid-century, the much-divided Griqua 'state' moved from conflict with the European colony to (contested) alliance, in which the Griqua fought external raiders and internal rebels while leaders accessed colonial political support in ambiguous ways.[17] The importance of these 'borderland bands' and the temporary, fragile Griqua 'state' relates to the discussion of marronage in which desertion could lead to the manufacture of collective autonomy outside of, partially outside of, or in shifting relation to colonial politics and authority (see Chapter 4).

Against the background of European raiding and capture of indigenous Khoikhoi or 'Bushman' people as labourers in effective slavery, Susan Newton-King has theorised another type of maroon and marronage at the Cape.[18] She writes about the 'enemy within', referring to both the master (in indigenous society) and the slave (in colonial society). For the slave, 'it was not simply in a negative sense—by virtue of his [*sic*] alienation from the community of the conquerer—that he was the enemy within, it was also in a positive sense—by virtue of his kinship with the still existent (albeit damaged) community of the conquered'. The point is important, but a few historical quibbles are necessary. Firstly, as Newton-King herself points out, 'the majority of these captives were women and children',[19] so the historical 'enemy

[16] Ulrich, 'Traditions of Desertion', pp. 126-129.
[17] Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier', pp. 376-395.
[18] Susan Newton-King. 'The Enemy Within'. In Worden and Crais, *Breaking the Chains*, pp. 228-239; 242-243.
[19] Ibid, p. 234.

within' she refers to may not always have conformed to the gendered language she uses. More significant to this discussion is that the 'kinship' of the slave or the vagabond with indigenous society makes an assumption about who and what marronage involved. While Newton-King is correct that captive Khoi or Bushmen would have 'had access from the outset to an alternative symbolic universe and to a living cultural heritage' and were 'not obliged to create a new community on foreign soil', others—neither Khoi nor Bushmen—were capable of creating or joining communities as well, and did. It is a mistaken reading of marronage that leads Newton-King to write, 'Only communities of former slaves, such as Free Blacks in the Americas, or outlawed maroon bands, might be expected to shelter the recalcitrant slave. Where slaves were drawn from a conquered group, however, runaways would be welcomed as heroes…'. 'Kinship' would certainly have provided colonists and slave-holders with reason for suspicion, but we have already seen that others—Europeans and Asians—were participants in marooning. Nonetheless, Newton-King's transposition of maroons to the context of the Cape Colony is important. Independent indigenous society 'on the fringes of the colonized domain', 'like the maroon community', 'rendered the master's hold over his slave critically insecure'.[20] As I will illustrate shortly, flight to the Khoi, and especially the Xhosa, was an important facet of Cape colonial 'desertion'. Both slavery and frontier supplied important orientations in the Cape colonial comprehension of the Vagabond. The many fears surrounding indecent and dangerous mobility were often conjoined in the dreaded 'improper connexions', which, I argue below, formed a key strand in Cape colonial framing of the foreign as threatening.

'DESERTERS, RUNAWAY SLAVES, &C.'

Both 'deserter' and 'Maroon' are ambiguous in Collins's report to Caledon. Deserters could have come from military units, and in that case could have been white, black, or brown, foreign (English or not), or indigenous; but desertion could also refer to labourers, servants, convicts, or slaves who had absconded from service. Each of these possibilities appears in the historical record. Collins's mention of 'Maroon H—s' leaves it unclear if the people in question were former slaves or labourers (hence 'deserters'), or whether he means simply an independent group of Khoi. However, we can be sure that the twin issues of slavery and desertion from slavery were important ones in Collins's mind, as he made his survey of the Cape Colony in 1809. He did not write much about slavery directly, but it certainly framed some of his ideas

[20] Ibid, p. 245

and decisions—in particular the order to send the man of Malabar away from his master's farm, to prevent further instances of marronage.

Desertion had, as in all slave societies of the Atlantic world, begun with the importation of slaves to the Cape of Good Hope. The first shipment of Angolan slaves to be landed at the Cape in 1658 included five who immediately ran away north and became lost to the colonial records. More of the Angolans ran away, as did slaves from every 'batch' landed at Cape Town, even though many were recaptured. 'Often', writes Richard Ross, 'a group of runaways were able to establish themselves in some fastness, acquire a certain store of arms and commence a regularized system of robbery on the nearby farms…. A full-scale commando had to be called out to proceed against the runaways'. In addition to commandos to recapture or kill runaway slaves, the colonists developed measures to prevent slaves from organising, from fraternising with transient sailors, and from deserting, often by deploying brutal violence. [21] Into the nineteenth century, desertion remained a preferred mode of resistance to unfree labour, and violence the preferred mode of punishment. 'A common history of desertion', according to Ulrich, was rooted in social connections that emerged from common experiences that could, and did, transcend ethnicity, nation, race, and even gender'.[22] Violence against real or imagined 'vagabondage' was frequent in the eighteenth century, when 'wandering Khoi who came at night to a farmhouse [could] be caught and whipped', when pass laws were instituted against Khoikhoi and slaves, deserters were 'savagely beaten', and 'Khoikhoi unattached to a master ran the risk of being captured or shot if they strayed into the pastures of colonists.[23] The clear connection to regimes of labour will be dealt with in Chapter 7; here the focus is on the deserters and vagabonds, and how they fit (and did not) into colonial society and colonial politics.

Collins's observation of deserters—whether soldier or slave; whether European, indigenous African, or imported African or Asian—may have found motivation in the recent history of the Cape colony: whether in the marchland war fought from 1799-1803, to which he alluded more than once, or in the slave uprising of 1808. We will deal more closely with the former. This war was a typical marchland affair in which two Boer rebellions against British rule mingled with a Khoikhoi rebellion against Boer dominance and with a Xhosa and Khoi-Xhosa war against Boer and British intrusion. From the 1760s, Boer expansion and raids had forced many of the Khoikhoi into unfree labour relations working for the Europeans. Desertion

[21] Ross, *Cape of Torments*, pp. 11-12; 19-21; 36.
[22] Ulrich, 'Traditions of Desertion', p. 118.
[23] Susan Newton-King and V. C. Malherbe. *The Khoikhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape (1799 - 1803)*, Communications 5 (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, [1981] 1984), pp.7-8.

was a major problem, from the perspective of those white farmers dependent on Khoikhoi labour and invested in a racially stratified society. According to Crais, 'Throughout the 1790s Khoikhoi were also "daily absconding" [along with slaves] and turning to raiding white farms. Refugees often joined the Xhosa'.[24] The war beginning in 1799 brought both the matters of desertion and of joining the Xhosa to a head.

One of the Khoi 'captains' of that war, Klaas Stuurman, explained the reasoning behind the rebellion of the indigenous people of the Cape: 'Restore…the country of which our fathers were despoiled by the Dutch and we have nothing more to ask…. We have lived very contentedly…before these Dutch plunderers molested us, and why should we not do so again if left to ourselves?'[25] The first step in winning this restoration was desertion. Newton-King and Malherbe write that the 'desertion of servants can only be described as "wholesale"' and that 'farm workers deserted in droves'. Stuurman and the rebels were said to go farm to farm encouraging desertion, and the British Governor, Dundas, feared that 'every H—t in Graaff-Reinet, Swellendam and Stellenbosh' would join the rebels. The Governor may well have been right, since Crais relates that 'virtually the entire black population from Bruintjeshoogte and the Zuurveld and as far west as Swellendam rebelled'. These 'deserters' brought out not only themselves but also guns and horses to the rebel bands that coalesced around several important Khoikhoi 'captains'.[26] At one point, after first claiming protection from the British against the Boers, "'a great number' of Khoikhoi', unable to get British officers to commit to protecting their independence, 'suddenly left the [British] encampment and…joined the Xhosa in the country between the Sundays and Bushmans Rivers', where some seven hundred rebels were already moving.[27] Alliances between Khoi and Xhosa were central to the war, especially between the rebels and the most western Xhosa chiefdom, the Gqunukhwebe, historically an admixture of Xhosa and Khoikhoi people. The alliance first emerged when bands of Xhosa with 'vagabond H—s' raided colonial farms, was both important enough and shadowy enough to frighten the Europeans, and only when it broke down did the war come to an end.[28]

Desertion not only from Boer farms but from British military service also cropped up during this war. Major McNab writing from 'Near Algoa Bay' in autumn of 1799 was 'sorry…to have been informed that 14 British deserters have joined a Rascal named Conrad Buys [i.e. Coenraad de Buys], a principal person of the refractory, who is hard at work now

[24] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, p. 49.
[25] Newton-King and Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion*, pp. 16-17.
[26] Ibid, pp. 22; 80; Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, pp. 50-51.
[27] Newton-King and Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion*, pp. 17-18; 25-32.
[28] Ibid, pp. 15; 29; 47-55; 79.

collecting a force of C—s to assist him'.[29] De Buys, the Dutch trekboer, intermittent consorter with Xhosa chieftains (who married into Ngqika's family), and according to Lord Somerset, 'a Colonist long known for his rebellious disposition and bad habits', and 'distinguished character amongst the disaffected on the frontiers', 'had absconded from this colony in the Dutch time, residing ever since like a Vagabond among the C—s on the other side of the Groot Vis [Great Fish] River'. Taking all of this into consideration, 'the present Government would not admit him into this Settlement, …but considered him as an Outlaw and a Vagrant'.[30]

Deserters joining up with De Buys was rather different, and more concerning from a colonial perspective, than just running off; vagabonding, for those fourteen deserters, involved forging connections with a movement or potential movement of Britain's enemies. In 1799, at Graaff-Reinet, there were 'considerable depredations…by a number of H—s who had run away from their master and joined a band of Vagrant C—s', and 'the Inhabitants in the more remote parts of that District [were] terrified by their Numbers and the Cruelty of their proceedings'.[31] The same year, the Landdrost of Stellenbosch related vagabondage to notions of 'conspiracy', criminality, and the existence of a known leader of vagabonds. Wrote Lanndrost van der Riet,

> the Fieldcornet…at the Lower Bokkeveld has also reported to me that he has discovered a conspiracy among his H—s, who designed to murder him and his family and also the whole neighbourhood in the Bokkeveld, and after having taken away all the horses and mosquets then with all the H—s there and with their booty to join the band of a certain Africaander [*sic*] skulking in the Hantam…. Having detected the said conspiracy, whereupon the said vagabonds had endeavoured to save themselves by flight, [the Fieldcornet] has pursued and properly killed all of them.

Van der Riet asked then for 'Gunpowder, Lead, and Flints' to deal with the 'Vagrant Bands', for 'the Inhabitants of [Hex River, Mosterd's Hoek, and Bokkeveld] [were] entirely destitute' of such gear.[32] For another example, of those Khoikhoi who sought safety with the British military, 'around 100 of the younger Khoi males had been enlisted as soldiers', under somewhat dubious circumstances, and their eventual departure was, among the British, 'widely viewed as actual desertion'.[33] It is even possible that some of the deserters of the 1799-1803 war were those living in Hintsa's country when Collins came there in 1809.

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[29] McNab to Dundas, 12 March 1799. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. II, p. 384.
[30] Mostert, *Frontiers*, pp. 238-239; 316-317. Somerset to Bathurst, 23 January 1817. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XI, p. 256. 'Criminal Claim and Conclusion made and Demanded by the Fiscal versus Marthinus Prinslo and his Accomplices', August 1800. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. III, p. 220.
[31] Barnard to Dundas, 14 September 1799 in Theal, *Records, Vol*. II, p. 462.
[32] Van der Riet to Fraser, 10 August 1799. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. II, pp. 464-465.
[33] Newton-King and Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion*, pp. 77-79.

Desertion, the colonial awareness of desertion, and the apprehension of deserters was not only a feature of the earliest 1800s and the period of the rebellions. The colonial archive abounds with records that deal with desertion. Several examples, drawn from letters, journals official Ordinances, and court cases, illustrate different aspects of the problem. In 1806, Sir David Baird, the Cape governor we have seen proclaiming against the evils of strangers, observed in another official proclamation that 'whereas there [were] still several Deserters from His Majesty's Forces wandering about in the remote Districts of this settlement', pardon would be extended to them if they turned themselves in after a timely fashion.[34] Furthermore, 'several H—s, Deserters from the Cape Regiment, have been harboured in the Country Districts' and an official advertisement reminded 'Inhabitants' of the 'pains and penalties established by Law for the harbouring or concealing of Deserters of any other Description, whether Military or Naval, from his Majesty's Service'.[35] Published instructions to the Landdrost of the Cape District provided that all 'persons to be apprehended and taken into custody who have no fixed abode in this Colony', who 'continue as Vagabonds in his District, as also all Deserters without Exception'. Further, it was for 'the promotion of harmony, good order, and Justice' that Landdrosts should cooperate in 'the apprehension of Deserters, Vagrants, &c., wandering about from District to District' and that upon 'grounded suspicion that any Inhabitant or Stranger is dangerous to public tranquility and welfare of this Colony, without there being any cause of action against such a one', the governor should be informed 'of the reasons of [the Landdrost's] suspicion'.[36] One Landdrost explained in 1814 that local taxes subsidised 'the forming of commandos in pursuit of deserters, runaway slaves, &c.'.[37]

In August 1818, the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, writing about 'the pursuit of some C—s' and his 'increasing…suspicion with respect to an illegal communication between the Colony and the Bastards and Coenraad Buys', also wrote about how deserters from farms settled at the place of one missionary named Anderson, with 'their cattle, horses, and arms'. 'At least fifteen hundred men capable of bearing arms' were already there, and more on the way. For his part, Anderson was 'convinced of the impropriety of harbouring such runaways', but he 'had no

[34] 'Proclamation of Sir David Baird', 16 March 1806. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* V, p. 421.
[35] 'Advertisement', 6 February 1807. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. VI, p. 84.
[36] 'Instructions for the Landdrost of the Cape District'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* VI, pp. 475-477.
[37] 'Report and Opinion of Sir John Truter on the Memorandum of Sir John Francis Cradock, Dated 26th May 1813, Respecting the Taxes which Are Paid by the Inhabitants of Cape Town and of the Respective County Districts'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. IX, p. 378.

way of sending them back'.[38] This relationship between desertion and missionaries will be discussed in detail, below.

Ordinance No. 9 of 1825, issued by Governor Somerset, which dealt with the 'apprehension of deserted convicts, and Gangs of Vagrants', who 'disturb[ed] and infest[ed] the peaceable Inhabitants of the Colony' and 'seduc[ed] Slaves and H—ts to join their Gangs', allowed, 'upon the discovery of one or more Persons known to be Deserted Convicts or notoriously to belong to such Gangs of Plunderers, in case of obstinate refusal after three repeated Calls "TO STAND," to shoot any such Person or Persons with Small Shot; provided they take aim at the legs', and offered a reward of 50 rixdollars for the return of a deserted convict.[39] That convicts appear in the question of vagabonds is interesting, given colonists' later rejection of convicts entering the colony (see Chapter 8).

Acting Governor Bourke's Ordinance of 1827 punished 'as Vagrant' those who 'willfully' remained behind in the colony when their ship sailed, as well as ordered that 'sufficient time may be given to search for Deserters or Runaway Slaves', by making it illegal for any vessel to sail from Cape Town 'due notice…given in Writing…Two days previous to her sailing'.[40] The same year, Bourke wrote to London with information on court cases between slaves and masters (during a period when the reform of slavery was in political vogue). In Graaff-Reinet alone, of thirty-six cases in 1826 and 1827, in which an enslaved person was the defendant, twenty cases dealt with desertion. A few specimens: The slave Alexander was convicted of desertion and condemned to receive 'a domestic flagellation'. Allart, for 'continual desertion', would work six months in irons. Abram had harboured another slave, named Mey, plead guilty, and was sentenced to received thirty-nine lashes.[41] Three further convictions are of interest. In Cape Town, Michiel, an enslaved man, was convicted of 'deserting about three years since…whilst a convict, and for being since absent, and at large, vagabondizing and committing various acts of robbery in the district of Stellenbosch'. He was, moreover, a maroon: 'It appeared that after the prisoner had deserted from the Buck River, he secreted himself amongst the Klein Drakenstein mountains, where he became the leader of a gang of run-away Slaves, who committed numerous acts of burglary'. In a separate record, Michiel was

[38] 'Extracts from a Letter from the Landdrost of Graaff Reinet to the Colonial Secretary, dated 27th August, 1818'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XII, pp. 35-36.
[39] 'Ordinance of His Excellency the Governor in Council, For the more effectual Apprehension of Deserted Convicts, and Gangs of Vagrants', 29 August 1825. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXIV, pp. 354-356.
[40] 'Ordinance of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, For making Regulations for the Conduct and Proceedings of the Masters and Crews of Merchant Vessels arriving in the Ports of this Colony', 27 November 1827. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXXIV, pp. 152-153.
[41] Enclosed in Bourke to Bathurst, 2 July 1827. In Theal, *Records, Vol*. XXXII, pp. 112-121.

said to have 'Head[ed] different gangs of vagabonds, and disturb[ed] the peace of the district'. 'Government', the court record notes, 'by proclamation, had offered a reward of £20 sterling for the apprehension of said convict.' There was also the enslaved woman, Francina, who was in court to claim the freedom of herself and her children. 'Said Francina having (together with several other Slaves) been brought to trial…for vagabondizing, burglary and theft, declared on her defence that she was illegally detained as a slave'. [42]

Importantly, desertion also entered into the official relationship between the colony and Xhosa. In the aftermath of the turn-of-the-century war, the Dutch governor, Janssens, insisted that slaves who had joined the Xhosa during the conflict should be returned. Ndlambe and other chiefs agreed, but Ross finds only one slave who was returned to the colony.[43] The issue was still there when the colony was British once again. In the journal he kept during the 1809 expedition, Collins recorded a conversation with Ndlambe, whose people lived on the Zuurveld. The 'partial light' of the moon, the poetic Collins wrote, 'served only to increase the solemnity of this interview'.

> *Zlambie* [*sic* – Ndlambe]. What business took you to Hinsa?
> *Commissioner* [Maynier? – interpreting]. To claim some persons belonging to the colony.
> Z. Did you get them?
> C. They promised soon to follow me, and Hinsa engaged to send them if they should persist in remaining, as also any other persons of that description, whether Christians, slaves, or H—s, who might afterwards come into his territory.
> Z. What took you to Gyka [*sic* – Ngqika]?
> C. A desire to renew the friendship…as well as to speak to him about stolen cattle and deserters, and to apprise him that we could not any longer permit his people to rove among the inhabitants.
> Z. Did you obtain what you wanted?
> C. We obtained some cattle, and a promise that the deserters should be collected and sent to the colony.[44]

Interesting here is that deserters are not all of a kind, and that the recovery of them was important enough to be part of the audience with Ndlambe. The related issue of Ngqika's people 'roving among the inhabitants' points to another sort of vagabonding and the issue of establishing boundaries to mobility. The same themes appeared ten years later, when plans for the end of the war of 1819 discussed how 'the terms to be required from the C—s must be the giving up of all deserters, whether whites or blacks' in addition to important elements of what became the politics of the frontier: 'an acknowledgment of Gaika's [Ngqika] superiority',

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[42] Ibid, pp. 81; 97; 125-126.
[43] Ross, *Cape of Torments*, p. 85.
[44] 'Continuation of Lieutenant Colonel Collins' Journal, Being Notes Made on a Journey to the Southern Branches of the Rivers T'Ky and through Kaffraria'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. VII, pp. 89-92.

removal 'beyond the Keiskaama' and 'no blacks to be suffered hereafter' into the colonial territory.[45]

There was, then, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, a significant effort made by the colonial government to curtail desertion by labourers of different stripes, whether soldiers, slaves, sailors, or serfs. It was not, however, only their status, value, or role as labourers that made their desertion and vagabondage problematic, but also the potential they created for participating in dangerous interactions with other vagabonds or with 'foreign' groups of people. If Baird saw evils arising from strangers, it was Andries Stockenstrom, then Landdrost of the Graaff-Reinet District, who wrote in 1816 of the evils of desertion:

> The many desertions of slaves and others from the Colony having at length become a subject of general apprehension and complaint throughout this district, I have been under the necessity of taking some very serious steps of late to prevent their continuance, and a plot having been lately discovered on the Sneeuwberg, in which it appeared that several slaves were on the point of leaving their masters to take refuge among the kraals of Bastards on the Orange River, three of which actually put their plan into execution…. [An informant, a returned deserter] also saw two more slaves (deserting from this Colony) in the Kraal of Hans Piquer, who pointed them out and mentioned their owners' names, adding that there was another a little lower down the river, a native of Madagascar… I have…authorised [the Field Cornet] to apprehend any deserter from this Colony he may find and bring them prisoners to me…in order to prevent the irregularities and evil consequences which must result from a continuation of such desertions….[46]

However, it was Somerset, writing to London, who provided something more than vague 'evil' with reference to desertion. Somerset's anxious letter lumps together foreigners, military deserters, slaves, the 'lower classes', and the Xhosa in the demographic crucible for danger to maintaining order in the colony. Enter the troublesome 60th Regiment, its 1st Battalion comprised of 'all foreigners except 14 deserters from other armies',

> Restless in their characters, anxious to return to their own countries or at any rate to be removed from the sameness of this distant establishment, men so circumstanced, looking so wistfully for change, without attachment to the Government which supports them, appear to be ill calculated for associating with the lower class of inhabitants of a recently acquired country, whose principles are not yet by any means fixed…. It is impossible to disguise from ourselves that the questions with respect to slavery which have been agitated and canvassed in all societies of late years have excited feelings in the Black population here not antecedently adverted to, nor can I omit stating to your Lordship that the recent occurrences at Barbadoes have caused this town a strong sensation…. The Black population amounts altogether to 48,000 souls, not dangerous perhaps if assembled and marching to the capital, but extremely so if ever instigated by disaffected foreigners or others to add their strength, or any considerable portion of it, to that of the savages who are already so troublesome to our borders.

[45] Enclosed in Rogers to Willshire, 2 March 1819. In Theal, *Records Vol*. XII, p. 159.
[46] Stockenstrom to Anderson, 12 December 1816. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. IX, p. 224.

No doubt the local slave uprising of 1808 cast its shadow, but so did the West Indies, not merely in light of the major uprising by the enslaved of Barbadoes, just three months earlier, to which Somerset adverted, but also in his fears of 'how much more numerous the blacks are than the whites'. It is the same menace we saw cited in the *Graham's Town Journal*, with the West Indies as the primary exhibit for racial paranoia. What is more, Somerset's interesting comment on unfixed principles points to the possibility of political commitments, ideas, or movements that were not 'colonial'. Most fantastic of all is how Somerset bundled the foreignness of soldiers and the Xhosa, desertion of soldiers or slaves, the foreignness of anti-slavery ideas, and the possibility for colonial disaster. He was firmly of the opinion that, with this bomb fused and potentially lit, and with the 'encroachments, assassinations, and depredations of the savage hordes of the Border', he was 'daily more and more impressed with the necessity of' the Cape being manned by a force 'of *British* troops'.[47] Somerset, like Bowker more than twenty years later, understood both the problem and its solution in the xenophobic idiolect of foreignness as threat.

The 60th did not go away, for in 1817 Somerset again appealed to his handlers in the homeland for fresh troops. Desertion was 'so easy' and 'would carry with it the greatest evils', and the 60th was 'still composed of foreigners, deserters from all nations, grumblers, and of general desperate and bad characters. To these are now to be added 500 British deserters…'. Once more, he bleated about the growing population of enslaved people, 'the spirit of insubordination in [that] class', and reminded London of the events of 1808. To top it all, the reinforcements intended for the 60th had plotted mutiny.[48] The potentially revolutionary underworld historicised by Linebaugh, Rediker, and Ulrich was vivid for Somerset. Sure enough, five months later, Major Fraser reported from Graham's Town that 'four soldiers of the 60th Regiment having deserted with their arms and ammunition into Kafferland… I am fearful of the serious consequences which may arise in the event of the K—s harbouring these people'. He feared that 'it may become more alarming' still, for 'from the apparent disposition of the Troops, there is great reason to apprehend that others will follow the example'.[49] It was not until early in 1818 (and the revelation of 'atrocities' committed by the soldiers of the 60th having reached the King) that Bathurst wrote to Somerset that haste would be made in

[47] Somerset to Bathurst, 19 September 1816. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XI, pp. 186-187; emphasis original. For the rebellion in Barbados, see Craton, *Testing,* pp. 254-266.
[48] Somerset to Bathurst, 21 June 1817. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XI, pp. 354-355.
[49] Fraser to Rogers, 29 November 1817. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XI, p. 423.

providing a 'British Regiment of good Composition and Character…and by adopting hereafter some Measures for preventing any addition to the Number of Deserters now serving in the Colony'.[50] These examples, which encompass different facets of the Cape Colony's daily circumstances, serve to show just how important the threats of desertion and of vagabonding were perceived to be, in the colony.

'Improper Connexions'

Significantly, the articulation of desertion and vagabonding with the politics of the frontier and the problem of 'foreign' peoples characterised the problem of vagabonds in the Cape colonial context. Persons deserting the colony to join up with groups of independent Africans or associate themselves with African political authority, as MacDaniel had done, were seen, as Collins put it, to be forging 'improper connexions'. The implication is political: that is, fashioned and understood from within a set of certain political needs and problems. It is also an implication *about* politics: specifically, the fear of politics 'happening' beyond the pale of the status quo or the territory in which it is seen to be preserved.

From the days when the Dutch East India Company had ruled at the Cape of Good Hope, runaway slaves had attempted to reach African societies. Initially, this often meant running to nearby Khoikhoi or to the Nama further north, but as colonial society conquered the Khoikhoi and fostered animosity between them and slaves, fugitives turned increasingly to the Xhosa and creolised frontier peoples such as the Griqua.[51] Ross provides examples of individual slaves or groups of slaves making east to join with the Xhosa (or at least planning to make such a journey) from 1738, 1742, 1760, 1786, and into the nineteenth century.[52] Successful runaways would then encounter political systems and relationships that obtained 'beyond the boundary' (see Chapter 5) and could participate in the modes of incorporation of diverse peoples into Xhosa chiefdoms. People entering into relationships with chiefs or other Xhosa patrons had access to cattle (livelihoods) and protection, while in turn chiefs increased their political following and client-base and could sometimes obtain stolen livestock and gunpowder weaponry. Ross writes, 'it was not long before the escaped slaves were able to acquire kin within Xhosa society, and thus become full members of it'. He makes the claim that this form

[50] Torrens to Goulburn, 15 January 1818. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XI, p. 448-449; Bathurst to Somerset, 5 February 1818. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol.* XI, p. 457.
[51] Ross, *Cape of Torments*, pp. 39-40; 43-44; 81.
[52] Ibid, pp. 19-20; 36; 67; 81; 87.

of desertion, and then the mere fear of it, were enough to diminish the enslaved population of the eastern marches of the colony.[53] Such desertions, then, were not only a form of resistance against enslavement and the withdrawing of labour from the colonial economy, but also had a distinct political character that involved entering into relationships with 'foreign' powers, and perhaps bringing them guns and insider knowledge of the colony to boot.

The twin notions of vagabonds and their 'improper connexions' appear in both of the Graham's Town newspapers. For the most part, vagabonds surface there as Africans from outside the colony (rather than as white, African, or foreign deserters). We saw two examples of this in the previous chapter: those Xhosa who '[kept] up a constant communication with their countrymen in Kafirland', and the allegation that the Fingoes would take up with their 'kith and kin' in robbing the colonists. We can also look to 'T.''s letter to the *Times* in late 1850, which objected to 'K—r vagabonds', or the petition from 'Sheep Farmers and others residing in the vicinity of Sidbury', published in the *Journal*, who had the same complaint in early 1849.[54] In June of 1844 the *Times* was worried about connections between African labourers in the colony and the 'coloured' people settled on the Kat River. Seven years later, in the midst of a violent rebellion, it was the 'common cause' found between the Kat River people and the Xhosa against their 'lawful government' that revealed a deeply improper connection.[55] There was also the language of 'receptacles': The 'removal [of 'the Bastards'] from the immediate precincts of the boundary will be a great blessing to the Colony, for at present their neighbourhood is only a receptacle for the dangerous deserters and vagabonds of the Colony', wrote 'A Griqua Burger' to the *Journal* from Philippolis in the north in November 1841.[56] 'R. J. P.' told the *Times* in 1844 about 'the great evil [of] these receptacles', 'Fingo kraals established in the colony', which 'depriv[ed] farmers of servants' and were staging points for crime.[57] That they were 'receptacles' is important, because it shows that the problem moved with the vagabond people, or that the problem was the people themselves.

In 1843, the *Journal* extracted from a letter to Governor Napier written by settlers of the soon-to-be-formalised colony of Natal, who saw African vagabondage as only one of the many deleterious outcomes of forgoing the D'Urban system for the Stockenstrom treaties.[58] African migration and economic instability were much more likely the consequence of colonial

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[53] Ibid, pp. 84-86.
[54] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (545), 5 November 1850; *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (897), 17 February 1849.
[55] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (213), 13 June 1844; *Cape Frontier Times*, X (562), 4 March 1851.
[56] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (522), 9 December 1841.
[57] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (2010), 23 May 1844.
[58] *Graham's Town Journal*, XII (609), 3 August 1843.

expansion and demands for African land and labour—the first and second pillars of D'Urban's 'system'—but this only highlights how the politics of the frontier were indeed *politics*. Two further examples situate improper connection squarely into those politics. Under a *Times* headline, 'The Frontier', it was related how a prophet beyond the boundary had summoned colonial Africans to a meeting 'to take place at the full moon', and they were to bring firearms 'for the purpose of being charmed to make them effective against the colonists'. It was reported that they were 'hastening out of the colony to be present at' this meeting and offered differing possibilities for 'any plan to attack the colony between the K—s in Kafirland and those in the colony'. The *Times* could not believe that 'the departure of these people [could] be occasioned by any other cause than obedience to their chiefs grounded on a superstitious reverence for the "prophet"'.[59] Here improper connections did not only exist between two groups of people, established through dangerous forms of mobility, but related explicitly to the political traditions and structures of the Xhosa and the forms of authority beyond the boundary that in colonial politics were set in opposition to the colonial and British authorities, projects, politics, and people. Chiefs represented political authority and centres, while prophets could represent political movements, and both were dangerous. Godlonton linked the boundary, the vagabond, and the pale of civilisation and British jurisdiction in his bid for annexation of the lands north of the colony:

> The state of the country across the northern boundary is such as reflects indeliable [*sic*] disgrace upon the British name and character. It affords an asylum for every vagabond who has rendered himself obnoxious by crime to the laws of civilized society…. Why timidly stop short at an efficient measure, namely that of declaring the whole country British territory;—thus including the whole population within British jurisdiction.[60]

The manner in which these ideas were articulated to the central issues of frontier politics and to an abstract conception of the pale are truly interesting and suggestive. It is notable that these examples drawn from the frontier papers mostly come from late in the period under review, from the mid-1840s into the 1850s. They are distinctly related, in time, to accelerating colonial conquest and a growing colonial economy, within which Godlonton's invocations of the pale and the vagabond fit as the mobilisation of politicised ideas associated with a political project. They relate also to a complex discourse on vagrancy and labour, to which I keep alluding and will eventually address. However, the problem of improper connections arose much earlier in British colonialism at the Cape. It was a core point in Collins's dispatch of

[59] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (542), 15 October 1850.
[60] *Graham's Town Journal*, XI (528), 20 January 1842.

1809, that formative document of British frontier policy, but with a significant twist: it was missionaries and mission stations which were implicated in the dangerous relationships created by vagabonds.

'I mentioned in another dispatch', wrote the even-tempered Lieutenant-Colonel, 'my fears of an improper connexion between the K—s and the members of the institution at Bethelsdorp.' 'Subsequent inquiries and observations', Collins continued, 'have served to strengthen my suspicions, and the late desertion of a H—t named Hans Trompeter, a noted chief of the former insurgents, with several other members, who have since joined the K—s and committed several depredations upon the farmers, can leave no doubt upon that subject'.[61] The mission station called Bethelsdorp, nearby Algoa Bay (later, Port Elizabeth), was founded in 1803 by Johannes van der Kemp of the London Missionary Society, and by the time of Collins's visit was home to some six hundred residents, mostly Khoi. Most were not converts to Christianity, but saw Bethelsdorp as offering an alternative mode of living in the context of an increasingly European colony and increasing subordination of Khoi people on white farms. Crais notes, 'Mission stations had become a familiar symbol of refuge since the Khoikhoi Rebellion of 1799'.[62] For his part, Hans Trompetter had been a young 'captain' during the war, and moved to Bethelsdorp with his family the year after the war ended. According to Newton-King and Malherbe, however, 'His notoriety increased with the years', for he was 'arrested in 1809, tried and convicted; confined on Robben Island for nearly 10 years'. He later escaped, only to be 'recaptured, tried and executed in 1820'.[63] For Collins he was a deserter, a chief, an insurgent, and a criminal all in one—a vagabond with political history and power—who along with his companions had gone so far as to combine with wild people.

Trompetter was not, however, the foremost concern, as Collins saw things. Van der Kemp, with whom the British colonel spoke at the mission station, 'informed me that the major part of the members of his institution were connected to the K—s either by relationship or otherwise', and 'I could not but see much inconvenience from their continuance so near them, and that I should therefore recommend the removal of the institution'. He also pointed out that, 'independently of the inconvenience and danger occasioned by the connection of the people of this institution with the K—s, its existence has been the cause of the greatest embarrassment to the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts, whose servants leave them on the slightest pretext

[61] Collins to Caledon. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. VII, p. 108.
[62] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, p. 75.
[63] Newton-King and Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion*, p. 131; Harriet Deacon (ed.). *The Island: A History of Robben Island, 1488-1990* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1996), pp. 41-42.

to repair to Bethelsdorp'.[64] The twin problems of desertion from labour and improper connections were manifested by the existence—note that Collins recommended the 'removal' of Bethelsdorp—of a site organised along different lines than the rest of the colony. Missions and missionaries were not without racism and their own forms of exploitation, but they were an alternative nonetheless, in large part because they did not have the same commitments to the colonial (as a politics) as their European neighbours. The voluntary movement of Khoi and others to the mission institutions shows that indigenous people recognised this difference, even if they also saw its limitations. Collins thought it appropriate to 'signif[y]…to the Ghonaquas, K—s, and Heitehama H—s, (Bastard K—s) now residing at Bethelsdorp, that they must immediately choose between Kaffreland and the Colony', that the missionaries at Bethelsdorp 'should be forbidden from employing or otherwise harbouring K—s or Ghonaquas, or persons being a mixture of, or connected with those nations'. They must choose, in a sense, between being foreigners or not. The latter meant becoming workers on white farms.[65]

It was not just existing mission institutions or known deserters or rebels that Collins cited as dangers to the colony. Collins also said that the missionaries should not be allowed to open a new mission amongst the Xhosa and Thembu further east. He alluded to MacDaniel and his comrades who had settled as 'refugees' in Hintsa's country beyond the Kei in suggesting that new mission sites would generate future problems. 'If an institution were established near this chief', he explained, 'the inducement to deserters from the colony, proceeding in that direction, would be considerably increased, unless the missionaries would undertake to send back all persons of that description'.[66] Van der Kemp himself (and his LMS colleague, James Read) may have been part of the reasoning behind Collins not wanting a new LMS station among the Xhosa, apart from the issue of desertion. Van der Kemp's attitudes and practices as a missionary, which 'established a vivid distinction between missionary and colonist', were such that Read wrote he might be safer with the Xhosa 'than perhaps he would be in many parts of England'.[67] In short, van der Kemp's Bethelsdorp was the site of an alternative form of politics—European, no doubt, but not 'colonial', as colonists understood it. At the turn of the nineteenth century, new to the Cape and in the midst of war, the missionary's behavior and support for Khoikhoi in the colony did not endear him to colonists. During the war, he had overseen a large group of Khoikhoi gathered at the village of Graaff-Reinet 'and gradually

[64] Collins to Caledon. In Theal, *Records, Vol.* VII, p. 109.
[65] Ibid, p. 112.
[66] Ibid, p. 108.
[67] In Mostert, *Frontiers*, pp. 424-425.

came to appreciate the extent of their plight'. Although van der Kemp 'was as anxious as Dundas [the British governor] to keep the Graaff-Reinet refugees from developing "an aversion and actual separation from civilised society" and giving themselves up to "vagabonding"', his approach to the vagabond problem occasioned both the founding of Bethelsdorp and the attempted murder of van der Kemp by other colonists who did not appreciate his establishing a site of relative freedom for their workers.[68]

Early in 1817, Somerset wrote to Bathurst, Lord to Lord, and recapitulated some of Collins's uneasiness.

> Every day fresh Missionaries are arriving…. [I]t is evident that the Colony has suffered materially from those Establishments which have been set on foot beyond what are deemed the limits of the Settlement. By far the most numerous class of free labourers has been found among the people known by the name of Bastards…. These people have for some years past flocked to the Institutions without the Settlement, where they are under no control whatever…. The Missionaries settled beyond the Colony do not consider themselves liable to Colonial interference…. Runaway slaves find a welcome asylum at these places…. The Colonists know the resort of their deserters, but have no means of apprehending them….[69]

We see, then, the problem of the pale emerging within the tandem 'evil' of vagabonds and their improper connections. Beyond the pale lay escape from colonial and employers' authority. That missionaries enter into that pattern is of particular interest. Bowker, in the late 1830s, related the missionary question to changes Governor Napier was attempting to implement to the 'frontier system'—the nature of the colonial boundary and of interaction with the Xhosa—and through the issues of politics of the frontier. Apparently, the Governor had 'warned the missionaries not to interfere with politics…. Did not think Shaw or Shepstone had interfered in politics, but could not say so for either Philip or Shrewsbury'.[70]

Philip was a well-known 'liberal' voice at the Cape of Good Hope. It was he who relayed to the directors of his London Missionary Society,

> Unless [the H—s] belong to a Missionary Institution, they are compelled to be in the service of the farmers…liable to be dragged from their families to fill up the Cape Regiment or to work for months at any place in the Districts…for the most trifling wages, or no wages at all. If they are found beyond the limits of their master's grounds without passes, they are liable to be apprehended and treated as vagabonds and deserters.[71]

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[68] Newton-King and Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion*, pp. 37; 42-44.
[69] Somerset to Bathurst, 23 Jan 1817. In Theal, *Records, Vol*. XI, pp. 252-256.
[70] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, pp. 75-76.
[71] Enclosed in Hankey to Bathurst, 22 January 1827, Philip to the Directors of the London Missionary Society, November 1826. In Theal, *Records, Vol*. 30, p. 156.

In this, Read shows the question of 'vagabonds and deserters' in a different light, and highlights some its political content. Whether or not he rejected the terms vagabond or deserter, or just thought that Khoi people in the Cape colony should not be *treated* as such, is not clear.

But the mention of Shrewsbury, is perhaps more interesting. As a very young missionary, Shrewsbury had been persecuted and threatened by the planters of Barbados and finally fled from the island in 1823. After more trouble with colonial society in the island of Grenada, he returned to England in 1825. Like many Cape colonists, the white class of the West Indies did not approve of, in the words of historian Michael Craton, the missionaries' 'alternative society and refuge from the plantation ethos'. The antagonism and violence shown towards Shrewsbury had much to do with the revolt by Barbadian slaves in 1816, but even more with that in Demerara in 1823, in the course of which another missionary, Smith, was convicted of complicity with the slaves and sentenced to death (he died in prison). 'It is to be recollected', it was said in the subsequent inquiry in the House of Commons, 'that just previously…the news of the insurrection in Demerara had arrived; and many persons in Barbadoes were impressed with a notion, that the Methodist missionary there had been mainly concerned in promoting that tumult', added to which Shrewsbury had published a letter, 'which tended materially to inflame matters'.[72] Shrewsbury was found not to have been guilty of any improprieties, and was later dispatched to the Cape of Good Hope to convert a different set of black people. I have not found clear evidence that anyone in the Cape was perturbed by Shrewsbury's alleged activities in the West Indies (the *Commercial Advertiser* was much perturbed by Smith's in Demerara),[73] but Bowker's brief remark suggests he was not entirely trustworthy from the colonial perspective. (That Shrewsbury believed Xhosa should wear identifying dog-tags when in the colony makes this seem doubtful, except for those settlers, perhaps, who had not heard his local views.[74]) The question of missionaries, then, connects to the broad theme of slavery, as well as to the matter of improper connections: either providing a site for such connections or by fostering them intentionally. Missionaries were also, in a way (and here we glance back to Linebaugh), vagabonds in their own right, travelling throughout the colonial world and establishing alternative and semi-autonomous 'receptacles' for thought and practice.

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[72] Hildegarde H. Fast (ed.). *The Journal and Selected Letters of Rev. William J. Shrewsbury, 1826-1835: First Missionary to the Transkei* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1994), p. 4. Craton, *Testing*, pp. 241-242; 246-249; 288-290; 'EXPULSION OF MR. SHREWSBURY, THE MISSIONARY, FROM BARBADOES.' Hansard, HC Deb (23 June 1825), Vol. 13, cc1285-347. Available at https://api.parliament.uk/historical-hansard/commons/1825/jun/23/expulsion-of-mr-shrewsbury-the [accessed 19 November 2018]; J. V. B. Shrewsbury (ed.). *Memorials of the Rev. William J. Shrewsbury* (London: Hamilton, Adams, & Co., 1869), pp. 132-170.

[73] Grieg, *Commercial Advertiser*, pp. 41; 44; 92.

[74] Lester and Lambert, 'Missionary Politics', p. 107.

The perceived roles of missionaries in the colony, some forty years after Collins questioned it, was voiced in the *Cape Frontier Times* in a way that makes explicit the fear of politics and foreignness as threat. The context was another 'rebellion' by black colonial subjects confronting the relentless colonial labour policies and demands. This time it was the inhabitants of the Kat River Settlement, once again joined by the Xhosa. The article is worth quoting at length.

> Circumstances connected with the present unhappy war and rebellion, have powerfully drawn public attention to the character of that missionary influence which in this country has been exercised not in the cause of righteousness and truth, but to libel the British character and to screen native delinquency….
>
> We have ever been the friends of missions. We have ever been the friends of the native races. But we have also ever been the friends of our own countrymen…. We have less sympathy with those…who, to gain a spurious, political and profitable influence over this population, do not scruple to brand the character of their own countrymen, as if they were beasts of prey…. Such men are the real promoters and abettors of sedition and rebellion in this colony. They are the true and genuine rebels. They are rebels against truth—against law, order, and good Government. They are rebels against the true interest of the native classes. They are rebels against the divine authority.
>
> There is a missionary influence now exercised in colonial affairs which is not colonial. It is alien. It is political. It is irresponsible. It is secret. It is not amenable to public opinion in the colony. It is subversive of truth, and destructive of the best interests of the aboriginal races and of the white inhabitants.
>
> It is the time that this influence should cease…. All the native races must be placed under the immediate protection of the Government, and no anti-colonial or foreign interest must be permitted to exert any influence against the just rights of the colonists and the true interests of the colored people.[75]

The phrases of significance are dense, here. First is the characterisation of missionary influence: *political*, *not colonial*, and *alien*. The fear of politics is blatant, encompassing politics in general, a specific (missionary) politics, and 'foreign' politics. The subjective understanding of what *is*, in fact, 'colonial' and the colonial subjectivity this implies are tellingly opposed to the political and the alien at the same time that the 'best interests', the 'rights', and the 'public opinion' of white inhabitants are established as a political position and as elements of colonial political subjectivity. The gesture to 'our own countrymen' embraces a community that *is* colonial. 'Foreign' politics and interests are 'anti-colonial'. That these are 'seditious', 'secret', and 'subversive' heightens the feeling that they are to be feared, while making further claims on the nature of what is foreign. That the missionaries are depicted as

[75] *Cape Frontier Times*, XI (575), 3 June 1851.

making out 'their own countrymen' as 'beasts of prey', the very phrase that Xhosa eventually came to use for marauding whites, may or may not be an intentional turn of phrase that resonated with the creolised colonial community and served to imply both foreignness and improper connections.

The crux of this editorial is that the foreign is the problem. The colonial solutions (that is, from a colonial political subjectivity) are 'law, order, and good Government' and 'the immediate protection of [British] Government'. An appropriate centre of authority and legitimate source of force is thus opposed to rebellious centres and forces, real and imaginary. The perceived role of mission stations like Bethelsdorp as sites for desertion and development of anti-colonial organisation and connections cannot be ignored. The Kat River Settlement, although not initially a mission institution, was another such site, and one in which the fears of improper connexions were realised in 1851. The editor of the *Times* could make a claim to represent colonialism (as political subjectivity) via the allegation that what he identified as a politics was foreign. The empirical inaccuracy—that missionaries fomented the 1851 rebellion—does not matter. The argument was historically accurate from the viewpoint of historical prescription. 'Foreignness' was the basis for the historically and politically impermissible. In the end, the *Times* was identifying the ultimate consequences of dangerous forms of mobility.

THE VAGABOND AND THE FOREIGN

Collins's suggested remedies of 1809—the shut and bolted boundary; absolute non-interaction—aimed to keep certain people 'out' and other people 'in', and attempted to curtail the types of mobility that had endangered the colonial status quo between 1799-1803 and, in a different manner, in 1808. He also targeted the more mundane challenges to slavery (by runaways) and service (by soldiers, Khoi workers, and indentured servants), that might be grounds for cultivating bigger trouble. As Ulrich notes, 'The political threat posed by desertion was contingent and contextual…. Those deserters who committed arson, joined enemy forces, attacked masters and mistresses or the colony spread panic among elites who feared the breakdown of the existing order'.[76] However, deserters and vagabonds bore the potential for more than violence; they could also manufacture autonomy. Vagabonds were at the heart of official fear of 'other' politics and political activities taking root or being organised. Collins's

[76] Ulrich, 'Traditions of Desertion', p. 118.

concerns fit well in the politics of the frontier. Clearly, he connected his recommendations regarding the expulsion of the Xhosa and the potential vulnerabilities created by their links to the mission stations, of the dangerous relationships between different black, brown, and occasionally white people, and the matter of desertion. The rendering of Africans as 'foreigners' and even 'foreign powers', done elaborately by Godlonton and his likeminded correspondents, relates very closely to the situation as Collins understood it and relayed it to Caledon.

What is the broad relationship here to xenophobia and to the political understanding of the foreigner and foreignness as threat? The answer comes in two parts. The vagabond complicates notions of 'internal' and 'external' threat. By their homeless and masterless ways, vagabonds carried the threat of not belonging wherever they roamed; they might, like deserted soldiers or indentured servants, have once 'belonged', but they had often put themselves beyond administrative, legal, economic, racial, military, class, and other forms of establishment control. Their motives and their movements became suspect. Vagabonds were capable of 'improper connexion' with those people or polities that were understood or represented as foreign or external, whether these were independent African chiefs or 'humanitarian' missionaries. Moreover, vagabonds could, like the Maroon, arguably make themselves 'foreign'. This could be accomplished through their political associations or their collective decisions, as by MacDaniel in becoming a client of Hintsa. But it could also be a matter of process: sites like Bethelsdorp or the Kat River Settlement, which were seen to encourage 'desertion', could *result* in foreignness, in the process of constructing an alternative. This view is seen in the editorial in the *Frontier Times*. Of course, that newspaper represented the foreignness as attending the white missionaries, but, in reality, it could be developed by Africans themselves. This was, ultimately, the threat posed by vagabonding. It presented the possibility of autonomy.

The subjective understanding of political difference, we saw, was closely related to the question of existing polities, political traditions, political authorities, and political movements, and here we are interested to look closer, not only at autonomy, but at the manufacture of political autonomy—that is, marronage—with the potential for creation of or blending into polities, traditions, allegiances, and movements that were seen as foreign to the colony and colonialism.

7.
'THE EVILS OF VAGRANCY':
MOBILITY AND FOREIGNERS BEFORE THE LAW

INTRODUCING THE VAGRANT

M. Westerbar wrote from the Winterberg in late November of 1838, 'Living on the immediate border, I am, in common with other inhabitants of the frontier, greatly annoyed by the numbers of black people who roam about the country'. Some, he was 'sorry to say, are harbored by white residents', including on the farm of his neighbor, where resided 'six or eight alien blacks,—either Fingoes or Mantatees…not in his service'. His letter to the *Graham's Town Journal* was entitled 'The Evils of Vagrancy'.[1] In Westerbar's letter, several of the central precepts of the 'vagrancy' discourse and politics, as it was understood in the Cape Colony, are apparent. First is its connection to the frontier or boundary, the important political dynamics of which are familiar. Next was the connection draw between vagrancy and foreignness, and more significantly, between vagrants and foreigners. Last was the fundamental problem that the agenda of 'vagrancy' conveyed: labour and labourers. The problem Westerbar had with the black people on his neighbour's land, and perhaps at the heart of what made them foreign, from his point of view, was that they were not in the service of a white person. These are the key ideas that need to be historicised with regard to vagrancy and the debate about vagrancy in the Cape Colony. Now is the time for the long-promised discussion of how work and labour entered into Cape colonial politics of the foreigner as threat. For the first time, we are explicitly interested in modes of control, but, as with the Vagabond, it is control not only of physical persons but of their political and, here, economic potential. The politics of vagrancy rest in significant ways on the foundation of the colonial boundary and vagabondism, but it also provides historical mortar for the history of immigration and reaction that comes in the next chapter. Whereas vagabonds of the Cape Colony were diverse, 'vagrant' came to indicate a specific order of vagabond, invariably illegal and African, the legal corollary of which was a 'Native Foreigner'. The charge of vagrancy, in the context of the Cape, expressed a reaction to 'foreigners' who did not conform to a political and economic agenda—a white, colonial

[1] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (360), 6 December 1838.

economy based on black labour—while simultaneously branding legitimate participants in that economy as 'foreign'. Whether as exploited workers or as independent people, during several decades of the nineteenth century, Africans were 'foreign' in the colony.

Clifton Crais links the processes of 'capitalism, the state, and the image of the African' in the settlers' production of an 'Other'. This 'Other', according to Crais, is rendered through ideas of hierarchical stages of humanity, with British, Christian, capitalist civilisation topping the list. Labour was the lot and the role of those 'uncivilised' people, who could (and ought to be) roped into civilisation as subordinate partners to the prosperity of the society of their betters. Racism animated much of this discourse as well as the practice of its principles.[2] Although Crais articulates capitalism and racism with the daily discourses and practices of colonialism in the eastern Cape, including 'vagrancy' discourse, he neglects the significance of the 'foreign' to the idea of the vagrant. This is partially because the state is seen as the mover and shaper of colonial politics. He writes that the colonial state 'played a crucial role in the making of a colonial order', by its 'intervention in rural social relations', its 'contribut[ion] to the rise of a colonial identity', and in 'the fusing of a colonialist discourse in daily social practice'. Thus, the state 'not only helped to establish the conditions for the development of rural capitalism but determined which path economic growth would take'.[3] This approach tends to elide settler politics, which often *used* the idea, institutions, and laws of the state in the making of a rural capitalism. Settlers, not the state, pursued capitalism (as a mode of economy, not as an abstraction) through a composite political movement beginning when they landed in 1820. This relates closely to the question of vagrancy, which was a politicised fulcrum in the settler movement and in settler-state contestation through the 1820s to the 1850s. During that period, the state provided certain categories through which to identify foreignness, but it was the settler movement that gave that foreignness political meaning.

Elizabeth Elbourne's article, 'Freedom at Issue: Vagrancy Legislation and the meaning of Freedom in Britain and the Cape Colony, 1799 to 1842', is probably the best analysis of vagrancy in the colony. Elbourne makes three important moves in this article. First, she shows that the vagrancy debate was embedded in participatory politics, not only journalistic rhetoric. Like 'frontier' politics, vagrancy was the subject of public meetings around the colony, both for those who supported vagrancy legislation—Godlonton's frontier crowd were chief amongst these—and for those who opposed it, including free Khoi and some of the 'humanitarians'.

[2] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, pp. 125-146.
[3] Ibid, p. 173.

With regard to the opposition, Elbourne shows that, despite what many historians have said, the so-called 'emancipation of the H—s' from forced labour in 1828 was in fact a significant event in their lives and for their livelihoods. Their organisation of meetings against vagrancy legislation, and the arguments against it, are demonstrations of how negatively they believed that a return to conditions of servitude would affect them, even when the condition of 'free' labour was still exploitative. Last, she shows how the debate about vagrancy in the Cape Colony connected with a broader debate in the empire about freedom and free labour. The reform of England's poor laws and the imperial abolition of slavery were part and parcel of a moment that also included and influenced changes in labour relationships at the Cape.[4] Significantly for our discussion, awareness of and the logic of these developments abroad formed part of the framework for Cape politics, including the vagrancy question.

By focusing on 'freedom'—a political idea embroiled in and manipulated throughout the imperial debates about the future of slavery—Elbourne illustrates how 'vagrancy' was a political issue, and not only a screen for economic interests and the coercion of black labour. While labour has rightly been central to discussions of vagrancy, the history of 'vagabondizing' and its improper connexions, the intertwined nature of the politics of vagrancy and the frontier, and the centrality of foreignness, manifested in the 'Native Foreigner', have not been analysed. The charge of foreignness was not only a practical means of excluding or controlling certain people as part of a project of expropriation of both land and labour (a very real project). Rather, it had political meaning and resonance in the context of the Cape Colony that differentiated it from vagrancy laws in England. The importance of the label 'Native Foreigner' has not been considered against the background of colonial xenophobia and the perception of foreigners as a threat. Instead of 'freedom', here the operative political reference point in the issue of vagrancy is 'the foreign'.

This chapter looks at the interplay between colonial laws and settler activism around vagrancy in the making of politics from 1809, taking off in the mid-1830s. In the process of addressing vagrancy, settlers appropriated the legal terms 'Vagrant' and 'Native Foreigner' to their own purposes. They also drew on knowledge of vagrancy and poor laws in England to explain local conditions. Despite settler convictions that vagrancy was an 'evil', these and the other categories, like 'Fingo', which made up the settler political vocabulary, were vulnerable to enormous fluidity. The politicisation of these categories was, nevertheless, an important

[4] Elizabeth Elbourne. 'Freedom at Issue: Vagrancy Legislation and the Meaning of Freedom in Britain and the Cape Colony, 1799 to 1842'. *Slavery and Abolition* 15(2), pp. 114-150.

facet of apprehending mobility, threat, and prescriptions of what ought to be. I argue that these categories lay on a foundation of politicised 'foreignness' that disallowed belonging.

LABOUR SHORTAGE AND LABOUR LEGISLATION

The background to any investigation of vagrancy must be colonists' imperishable outlook of a shortage of labour for their growing economy. In the years up to 1807, when the slave trade was outlawed in the British empire, demands for labour had been fed, if not always satiated, by the slave trade, supplemented by Khoikhoi servitude and sometimes by the capture of workers on the marches of the colony. Here is another of the ways in which slavery and changes to the slave society had an impact in the Cape Colony. After the importation of slaves became outlawed, labour shortages had to be addressed locally or else through the importation of free or indentured workers from Europe or elsewhere in the empire. The first approach is the concern of this chapter. In seeking sources of local sources of labour, the colonists first turned to the Khoikhoi and San, and later to the Xhosa and other groups of Africans. The question of vagrancy overlaps that rough periodisation.

Susan Newton-King writes of the impact of the abolition of the slave trade, which ended the external resupply of slaves and brought the pressure of colonial society to bear on 'Khoisan independence'. She puts Collins's letter to Caledon in the context of this perceived labour shortage after the end of the slave trade. 'Collins's recommendations', she writes, 'were consistent with his general awareness of the labour needs of the east'. After Collins's report, she continues, 'British authorities introduced general measures for the mobilisation and control of the Khoisan labour supply'.[5] The Proclamation through which this was accomplished took on the name of the governor who did the proclaiming, and is known as the 'Caledon Code'. 'Whereas', reads the preamble to the Caledon Code, 'the H—t nation, in the same manner as the other inhabitants, should be subject to proper regularity in regard to their places of abode and occupations,' and 'that they should find an encouragement for preferring entering the service of the inhabitants, to leading an indolent life, by which they are rendered useless both for themselves and the community at large', the sixteen provisions of the Code addressed the contracts entered into between so-called 'H—s' and their employers, as well as the modes of life and livelihood of the Khoi. The first provision required that they should have (again, 'in

[5] Susan Newton-King. 'The Labour Market in the Cape Colony, 1807-1828'. In Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds). *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 175-176; 178.

the manner of all inhabitants'), 'a fixed abode' recorded with district officials; would require a pass to move between districts, and that 'every H—t, neglecting this order, shall be considered as a vagabond, and be treated accordingly'. A number of the provisions address the treatment of workers and the obligations of employers to workers, and the ways in which workers were 'free', but the gist is for closer control of the workers. This contradiction is captured in the fourth provision, which states that on the expiry of a contract, 'the servant shall…be at liberty, with his wife and children (if they are with him), and with all his cattle and other property…to leave his master, and enter another service, or act in any other manner the laws of this colony admit of'. This certainly did not include any exercises of liberty that could be perceived as vagrancy or vagabondizing. Elsewhere in the Code, the worker is 'bound…to behave with proper submission', liable to wage confiscations, imprisonment, 'or a more severe domestic corporal punishment', none of which alters their contract or the time they owe to the master. The sixteenth and last provision of the Caledon Code establishes a pass law, which required 'the H—s going about the country' to 'be provided with a pass…on penalty of being considered and treated as vagabonds', as, the Code reminds, had soldiers, sailors, servants, and deserters for over ten years. The law provided that 'every one is to ask a pass from any H—t that happens to come to his place, and in case of his not being provided with it, to deliver him up'.[6]

Even though the language of the bill feigned non-racialism, the provisions explicitly stipulated with respect to the 'Hottentot', who was also explicitly gendered even though women and children could also 'enter into engagements'. The consequences of the Caledon Code were directly aimed at the Khoisan, and created 'Hottentot' as a legal category. According to Elbourne, 'Using a British rhetoric about the need to compel the idle poor to work for the good of society, the Caledon Code lent moral legitimacy to the seizure of such people'. While a move to 'open up the labour market', it also made it easier to charge and punish people as vagrants, and redirect them into labour on farms or public works. She argues that 'the *legal* concept of vagrancy took the Khoisan, as it took many of the European poor, out of the community of those who were to be considered as equals…. [T]he presumed refusal to work of the vagrant – in other words, his failure to fulfill an obligation to society as a whole – negated the contingent obligations of society to him [*sic*]'.[7] Crais observes that it 'slowed' the migration to mission stations, which indicates that this avenue of achieving autonomy (or semi-

[6] 'Proclamation'. In W. Bird. *State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1966) (Reprint of London: John Murray, 1823), pp. 243-248.
[7] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', pp. 122-124; 128.

autonomy) was partially blocked.[8] For Newton-King, with the promulgation of the Caledon Code, 'it was now legal to compel any Khoisan not in government service to serve the colonists, for without a pass he [*sic*] could not legally be anywhere at all'.[9] Vagrancy was thus a crime of the unemployed, even for that person, family, or group who had a livelihood.

Despite the attack on the livelihoods and life patterns of the brown-skinned people of the Cape Colony, the problem of a labour shortage persisted from the vantage point of the colonial economy. The plantation of the British settlers in the Albany District in 1820, who could not legally own slaves, exposed as well as exacerbated the deficiency of a labouring class within handy reach; at least, a docile one. From 1817, settlement schemes of the eastern Cape included the importation of significant numbers of indentured workers—'labourers and mechanics'—to work on the land grants of the wealthier settlers, but many of these people, like many Khoi, found that the Cape Colony afforded superior alternatives to farm labour. Instead of to mission stations, though, they absconded to towns. 'The high wages available in Cape Town and the employment opportunities for artisans and tradesmen in the new settlements of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, as well as of Graaff-Reinet', writes Newton-King, 'offered ready incentives for the desertion of emigrant servants'.[10] In the previous chapter, it was some of these European workers whom we saw convicted of desertion and related crimes. The politics with which settlers surrounded the matter of European or 'white' labour will be taken up in more detail in the following chapter, but for now it should be observed that not all of the 'white' worker-immigrants to the Cape saw fit to be the panacea to the landowners' labour problems, and were therefore attacked through a form of vagrancy legislation. In 1818, Somerset proclaimed against European desertion, with punishments of fines, imprisonment, and flogging for running away, and fines and imprisonment for harbouring runaways. 'Finally', says Newton-King, 'there was a provision which was perhaps designed to delay the conversion of imported workers into independent settlers: no person discharged from his [*sic*] masters' service could claim the right of residence in the colony, except with the express permission of the governor'.[11] In its form and content, which attempted to manage the contracts between masters and servants, Somerset's proclamation of 1818 paralleled the Code of his colleague, Caledon. The proclamation does not mention 'vagrancy' outright, but the repeated assertions about 'rights of residence' in the colony signal unmistakably that a 'labourer' or a 'Mechanic' without

[8] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, p. 75.
[9] Newton-King, 'The Labour Market', p. 177.
[10] Ibid, p. 187.
[11] Ibid, p. 185.

appropriate employment was a person who did not belong: a 'Stranger' and not a 'Native of this Colony'.[12] Where the Caledon Code was racial in effect (if not in theory), the Somerset System was effectively class-based. The notion of 'making foreigners', already seen in our conceptualisation of vagrancy, is abundantly apparent.

As more groups of settlers reached the Fish River Marches, and their economic activities, which had gotten off to a dismal start, caught up with their ambitions to achieve wealth in the colony that they could not in England, Ireland, or Scotland, they outstripped the accessible sources of labour. They were denied slaves, the indentured servants were unreliable, European workers were expensive, the Xhosa were banned from the colony (although they were sometimes employed, regardless), and the Khoi were diminished. In the mid-1820s, the colonial Inspector of Lands and Woods asked,

> Where can they get free labour and replace that of their slaves? The equivalent of that labour would not be obtainable in the present state of the colony, and that which they could perhaps partially obtain, would be at a price which they could not afford to pay…. The free labour…hitherto consists only of H—s, and does not amount to anything like 8 000 males for the whole colony.[13]

In light of the continuing hindrance posed by the absence of labourers in sufficient numbers and the presence of labourers of an incorrigible sort who insisted that they were actually vagrants, a solution was attempted by Governor Richard Bourke, through the promulgation of two ordinances quite famous in the historiography of South Africa, Ordinances 49 and 50 of 1828. These two ordinances both addressed the Cape Colony's labour concerns, both had consequences with regard to our discussion of vagrancy and foreignness, and form the background to the politics that emerged around vagrancy in the 1830s. In brief, Ordinance 49 legalised the hiring of Africans (with passes) from beyond the boundary, in order to regulate an already existing clandestine practice; and Ordinance 50, sometimes referred to as 'H—t Emancipation', did away with the racially-specific laws, like the Caledon Code, that targeted people of colour, thus removing 'H—t' as a legal category'.[14]

The consequences of Ordinance 50 were not all in the colonists' favour. According to Crais, the ordinance 'resulted in an astounding number of desertions' and 'a labour shortage became a labour crisis', as those previously subjected to vagrancy laws moved to mission stations, the

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[12] 'Proclamation by Lord Somerset', 26 June 1818. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XII, pp. 14-18.
[13] Quoted in Newton-King, 'The Labour Market', p. 181.
[14] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', pp. 128-129; Newton-King, 'The Labour Market', pp. 197-200; MacMillan, *Bantu, Boer, and Briton*, pp. 16-17; 87-88

Kat River Settlement, towns, 'the edge of the white farm', or the hills.[15] MacMillan writes about the 'public outcry' generated by Ordinance 50 and the fact that 'many H—s were said to be celebrating their freedom by turning "vagrant"'.[16] Elbourne's analysis shows the emergence of a specific political objective after the passage of Ordinance 50: 'As colonists found themselves confronted with the daily sight of free Khoisan on the roads and in small communities scratching a living from the land, and as news reached the Cape of the imminent abolition of slavery, pressure mounted for the renewal of vagrancy law', spurred by the British settlers of the early 1820s.[17]

At the same time, the admittance of Xhosa and other African workers from beyond the boundary as a result of Ordinance 49 blended with the debate on vagrancy that grew out of Ordinance 50. In the midst of this blending, 'foreignness' was politicised and deployed for understanding and controlling the various black and brown people moving about the colony as labourers or else as 'vagrants'. As a politics, it not only related to the exigencies created by, first, the abolition of the slave trade and then of slavery itself, but also to the idea of the boundary and the improper connections that already spoke to ideas of the foreign. The political category of 'Native Foreigner' was possible because of the understood foreignness of Africans. Whereas vagrants or paupers in England might only be analysed retrospectively in comparison to foreigners (see Chapter 4), vagrants in the Cape Colony could be called foreigners with ease by a wing of the settler political movement. Looking at vagrancy returns us to the discourse filtered through Godlonton's *Journal* and Franklin's *Times*, and the ideas and endeavours of the 'frontier farmers' they reported on and who formed their audience. These frontier farmers appropriated the names found in colonial laws and the ideas in England's contemporary debates on the poor laws.

'NATIVE FOREIGNERS'

Ordinance 23 of 1826 and Ordinance 49 of 1828, both signed into law by Richard Bourke, established the foreigner as a legal category assigned to Africans with respect to the problem of colonial labour. Recall, though, that this was not the only mode and meaning of foreignness, since settlers had articulated the foreignness of Africans with respect to their political organisation, as well. Still, the foreigner-African framework gained legal significance with

[15] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, p. 73.
[16] MacMillan, *Bantu, Boer, and Briton*, p. 16.
[17] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', p. 133.

these two laws. Ordinance 23, designed to permit and regulate more open trade with the Xhosa through the institutions of 'Border Fairs', referred several times to a person called the 'C—e or other foreigner'.[18] It was in the context of this attempted regulation of trade that Godlonton argued for easier trading, while at the same time shifting the discussion of foreignness towards the practices and power of Xhosa chiefs. Ordinance 49, the more important respecting the problem of vagrancy, attempted to regularise the ongoing employment of Africans from beyond the boundary and to address the labour shortages, in one move. The Ordinance read, that in the interest of improving 'profitable cultivation' in the colony, and for 'augment[ing] the amount of disposable labour', it was necessary to repeal the existing bans on

> the admission of Foreigners from the Tribes beyond the Borders of the Settlement, who may be desirous of migrating to, and sojourning in, the Colony, and of entering into the service of the Colonists as Herdsmen, Field Labourers, House Servants, or in whatever capacity may be most suitable to their several inclinations and abilities….

The Ordinance addressed a long list of 'foreigners', who were 'any C—s, Goraquas, Tambookies, Griquas, Bosjesmen, Bechuanas, Mantatees, Namaquas, or other Natives of the Interior of Africa', and required that they be issued a pass permitting entry to the colony, stipulated penalties for hiring 'foreigners' without passes, or for 'foreigners' vagabondizing or not carrying passes. There was, it should be noted, a provision permitting 'foreigners' to 'repair to and reside at any of the Missionary Stations within the Colony', and another forbidding the enslavement of foreigners upon pain of seven years' transportation for the slaver. In an interesting difference from the Caledon Code, women and families were treated differently in Ordinance 49. In several places the provisions deal with 'the Foreigner…and such of his or her Family as may be present with him or her', and similar phrases. It allowed for women workers to make contracts with their employers, and apparently for women colonists to be employers, as well. This hardly suggests any radical view of women, but at least a different perception of work and workers than had governed the Code of 1809. What the 49th Ordinance of 1828 accomplished most explicitly and effectively was the creation of the category of the 'Native Foreigner', or the rendering foreign of 'natives' who were in the colony.

Crais analyses the import of the 49th Ordinance in the following terms: 'By authorizing the employment of black workers the colonial state abandoned its policy of attempting to construct

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[18] 'Ordinance for facilitating the Commerce with the Caffres, and other Nations living beyond the Boundaries of the Colony, and for consolidating the several Proclamations and Ordinances relating thereto'. In Walter Harding. *Cape of Good Hope Government Proclamations, from 1806 to 1825, as now in Force and Unrepealed; and the Ordinances Passed in Council, from 1825 to 1838, with Notes of Reference to Each and a Copious Index, Vol*. 1 (Cape Town: A. S. Robertson, 1832), pp. 339-344.

a firm line of British settlement separating the colony from' the African polities beyond the colony.[19] However, we have already seen that such separation was also part and parcel of a politics that was not simply state-imposed, that the colonists pursuing a politics of the frontier carried on that project of separation both in accordance with and, often, in contestation with the colonial state, and that the boundary was deployed in complex ways relevant to economic and political needs. This lasted well past 1828. Indeed, 'foreignness' was not abandoned with the change to colonial law, but continued to have meaning for colonists' politics as well as for the state's control of labour.

As in the politics of the frontier, it was in the political discussions and mobilisation of colonists that vagrancy and the category of the foreigner, or specifically the Native Foreigner, were given political meaning and form. At least three dozen letters published in the *Journal* and the *Times* during the 1830s and 1840s address the matter of vagrancy, Native Foreigners, the granting of passes to Africans to enter the colony, and the colonial perspective on the behavior of Africans 'roaming' (always roaming) the colony. The *Cape Frontier Times* was not yet in print when the major debate over a vagrancy law occupied much of settler politics in the middle thirties, but vagrancy is an important topic and frequent complaint in its pages, nonetheless. The *Journal*, on the other hand, was an important conduit for early settler portrayals of vagrancy and their accompanying moans. More importantly, settlers participated in public meetings against vagrancy all around the 'Eastern Districts' of the colony, from the late 1820s until at least mid-century. In 1828, it was 'Several Inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet' who petitioned Governor Lowry Cole, 'praying that regulations may be framed to remedy the evils arising from the numerous vagrants in the vicinity of the town'. A year later, colonists nearby in the Winterveld were worried about the vagrants who 'take refuge on the other side of the Boundaries'. In 1834, a group of colonists wrote to Governor D'Urban, in Dutch, against the 'vagebonderende' in the Bokkeveld. Twenty years later, Governor Smith was still getting memorials from different quarters of the colony, complaining of 'vagrants'.[20] Like the politics of the frontier, the politics of vagrancy were a participatory, not only a printed, movement. It was uncoordinated, but felt generally in the rural east of the colony.

[19] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, p. 94.
[20] Memorial to Sir Lowry Cole, December 1828 (KAB, CO, 3938/525); Memorial to Sir Lowry Cole, 15 September 1829 (KAB, CO, 3945/1011); Memorial to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, 25 March 1834 (KAB, CO, 3968/39); Memorial to Sir Harry Smith, September 1849 (KAB, CO, 4045/541).

In 1834, the Legislative Council[21] approved a Vagrant Law that was well-received by the colonial community. Lady Margaret Herschel, then resident at the Cape, wrote to England to express to a friend her opposition to the proposed legislation, which saw the law as a reaction to 'the fear that on the emancipation of the Slaves, the country will be swarming with vagrants', the remedy for which was to '[take] up as criminals' anyone without a master and put them to forced labour with landowners or the government 'thus perpetuating slavery under a worse name – that of criminals, & destroying all chance of a spirit of independence, & a pride of rewarded industry among the emancipated slaves'.[22] The opinions of Lady Herschel, who was a friend to John Fairbairn and to the Philip-Fairbairn wing of colonial politics, were not shared by the readers of the *Graham's Town Journal*. A selection of the many letters to the editors in Graham's Town set the tone of the usual settler view on vagrancy. 'A Winterberg Farmer' felt that since pass laws were ineffective and stock theft had increased along with those permitted 'to wander about the colony under the pretence [*sic*] of searching for employ', 'we more than ever see the necessity of a vagrant law'. 'A. B.', whom we have seen citing Vattel, wrote to complain that too many 'foreigners' without passes were being employed in the colony. 'A Sufferer' from Port Elizabeth corresponded about the 'progress of vagrancy', compared local conditions to those in the marchlands, and believed that the flight of the Dutch farmers (of the 'Great Trek') was a consequence of vagrancy. 'An Old Farmer' wrote from Uitenhage that the 'sudden intrusion' of 'Fingoes' into 'the Zeitsekamma' was 'adding so much to our vagrant population'.[23]

In a series of letters or columns headlined 'Vagrancy', 'A Friend to Consistency' considered the problem through a fictionalized dialogue between the worldly and experienced 'Oom Paulus' and naïve 'Neef Cobus', which very closely imitates Spenser's *View of the Present State of Ireland*. Paulus argues against Cobus's belief that 'prisoners or vagrants must first be heard', before hanging, as to 'why they prefer a vagabondizing existence rather than labor for an honest livelihood'. 'Oom Paulus', speaking from experience of the frontier, of '*border thieves'* and '*vagabond H—s*', made a double gesture that encompassed the mistaken 'philanthropy' of English public towards Africans as well as the English poor laws. 'If',

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[21] The Cape's Legislative Council was provided for by law in 1833 and instituted in 1834. It combined six appointed members (who formed the colonial government), including the Governor, and between five and seven nominated members from amongst the Cape's wealthy class, who served by permission of the colonial government. See Marian George. 'John Bardwell Ebden: His Business and Political Career at the Cape 1806-1849 (MA Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1980), p. 137.

[22] In Brian Warner (ed.). *Lady Herschel: Letters from the Cape, 1834-1838* (Cape Town: Friends of the South African Library, 1991), pp. 42-43.

[23] *Graham's Town Journal*, V (249), 29 September 1836; V (224), 7 April 1836; VI (298), 14 September 1837; VII (314), 4 January 1838.

declaimed Oom Paulus, 'the good-natured and inexperienced people of England think proper to tolerate vagrancy in their colonial possessions, (a privilege they take especial care to prohibit in their own country, where every person is looked upon as a vagabond who possesses no ostensible mode of existence, and punished accordingly,)' and would expend so much effort on charity to Africans, then those in the colony could not 'expect *better times*, or even a *vagrant law*'.[24] Not only does this support the passage of legislation against vagrancy, but also reflects on the political debate that accompanied it both in England and the Cape Colony, and positions such legislation within relatable history by mentioning the vagrant laws of England.

Another 'Friend', this time 'to Industry', wrote about vagrancy in the context of both the 'want of labour' and a conversation on immigration (see Chapter 8). This Friend welcomed labourers from Europe, but did not think their arrival in the colony would be enough to set the economy on the right foot. To this correspondent, the subject of the '"Vagrant Law" appears to be quite swallowed up in the all-absorbing topic of "Immigration"', and asked:

> Where would be the great hardship of rendering every able-bodied man, whether white, brown or black, living without evident means of supporting himself honestly, liable to be questioned upon this point by the nearest magistrate, and in the event of his being unable to give a satisfactory account of his "whereabouts," in obliging him to enter into an agreement for a term of not less than three months, to serve any master he pleased to select and who consented to hire him?

If no one would hire 'him', then the labourer could be put into service to the government.[25] Here, the vagrancy question is somewhat divorced from its usual racial context and its invocation of foreignness, but also speaks to the ways in which European immigrants might be controlled, and why they should be, when it came their role as labourers.

The Vagrancy Act of 1834 was eventually disallowed, much to the dismay of its proponents. Subsequent legislation, such as Ordinance 2 of 1837, and the Masters and Servants Act of 1841, sought to fill the gap left by the annulment of the Vagrancy Act through other means. Ordinance 2, signed by D'Urban, made it unlawful for any of the 'Natives of Africa to cross from without to within the boundary line of the Colony' bearing arms; provided that 'if any such foreigner be found within the Colony without a pass' they would be returned to their rightful employer or deported, and imprisoned at hard labour if they returned and were caught again. It allowed 'any officer of the law or private person' to 'kill or disable such foreigner'

[24] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (305), 2 November 1837; emphasis original.
[25] *Graham's Town Journal*, IX (455), 17 Sept 1840.

who resisted arrest.[26] Crais has argued that the Ordinance 'virtually amounted to a vagrancy law'.[27] However, the demand for vagrancy legislation persisted in settler attitudes and politics. Crais shows that an 1848 commission of inquiry found 'additional labour legislation and particularly a "vagrancy" ordinance' were 'strongly favoured'. He argues that 'the inquiry revealed the extent to which employers were frustrated with the weakness of the local state as well as the extent to which mission stations and the Kat River Settlement were perceived as contributing to the serious labour shortage'.[28] However, in the rest of this chapter we will be looking at how vagrancy was understood and politicised by settlers and officials of the colony, and its political purpose, not only as a means to acquire labour, but as a mode of explaining the political situation in which settlers found themselves. In particular, this has to do with the subjective perception of 'native foreigners' and 'vagrants' and the role people placed in these positions were supposed to play.

In addition to crying out continually for a vagrant law, colonists complained about the granting of passes to Africans. Three different settlers, over the course of four years, wrote to Godlonton objecting to the practices of Captain Charles Lennox Stretch. The Captain held decidedly critical views of his military and colonial compatriots, even while he participated in colonisation as a soldier, farmer, and government official. His political opinions about treatment of the Xhosa mean that complaints against him must be read with a grain of salt, but not the salt of dismissal. The biases underlying these letters also reveal some of the political machinations of the marchlands. According to the 'Stockenstrom Treaties', two 'diplomatic agents' were stationed with the Xhosa, of which Stretch was one, and the one less favoured by the frontier colonists. It is in this capacity that he was in a position to grant passes to Xhosa people seeking to enter the colony.

'Veator' of the Koonap wrote in spring of 1838 of vagrants, 'Passes to K—s', and the unloved Captain Stretch. The letter relates how its author was visited by a 'gang' of 'vagrants', headed by a woman named Casa, claiming to be a wife of the late Hintsa and armed with an expired pass signed by Stretch. It is unclear if the alleged family connection to Hintsa was meant to elicit emotions from colonial readers. 'Veator' felt that farmers were put upon to feed such visitors or risk their 'vengeance'. He also roped the 'inhabitants of the Kat River' into his argument, by saying Casa and her fellow 'visiting vagabonds' had been thieving from them.

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[26] 'Ordinance for the more effectual prevention of Crimes against Life and Property within the Colony'. In Joseph Foster, Hercules Tennant, and E. M. Jackson (eds.). *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652--1886, Vol*. II (Cape Town: W. A. Richards & Sons, 1887), pp. 2087-2089.
[27] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order,* p. 142.
[28] Ibid.

'Well might their class [the 'Bastard H—s']—the *only industrious one*—have had cause to send in their petition for a vagrant law, in the year 1834, and indeed at the moment there exists the same reason', said 'Veator', with an all but visible shake of the head. Then, the 'plundering' was laid at the feet of Stretch.[29] A year and half later, John Vaughn told a similar tale, of how Stretch had granted passes to two men to visit his farm and eat him out of house and home.[30] It is an earlier letter from Thomas Robson that is most detailed, and gives the most insight into the matter of Charles Lennox Stretch and the passes. He called for an end to 'the baneful system of granting passes, or properly speaking, *protection to spies*, to K—s and Fingoes to enter the colony'. Passes, he wrote, 'appear to be granted for no other purpose whatever than to annoy the border farmers', that Stretch signed passes at a rate of thirty to one, and gave them to 'the most suspicious' characters. 'Why does this officer grant passes to K—s and Fingoes to enter the colony, when he knows they can have no business there…. What right has Captain Stretch to inundate the country with vagrants [?]'. Robson's rant bears many of the hallmarks of frontier politics. He repeatedly summons the spectre of stock theft, he propagates the contradiction around the power of chiefs—the fear of 'spies' and the argument that chiefs should bear responsibility for the return of followers whose passes have expired—and references to the boundary. And to these he adds the issue of vagrancy: of 'all the vagabonds that [Stretch] is pleased to send… out of Kafirland' to 'prowl about the country with impunity'. He wonders whether the settlers should pay taxes at all, if they were not to receive protection from government, and worse, to be endangered by government by the 'the evil of all this pass-granting'. He sarcastically raises Stretch's 'philanthropist friends' and ideals. And he brings labour back in: 'Those who cannot get employ should retire within their own boundary'.[31]

The second diplomatic agent was John Mitford Bowker, that committed colonial and proponent of frontier politics, whom Mostert refers to as 'the antithesis' of Charles Lennox Stretch.[32] Despite this, James McNamara wrote to complain about 'K—s entering the colony' and described how he had seen at least fifty (or maybe it was one hundred) people running across his farm and heard that they were going to 'make plenty of trouble'. They were tracked to one of the Bowker clan's farms, where McNamara learned some confused news of a number of African people being sent between Bowker brothers. He wondered whether 'Mr Bowker…having influence with the K—s, can send a requisition to any K—r chief to send him

[29] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (349), 20 September 1838; emphasis original.
[30] *Graham's Town Journal*, IX (425), 13 February 1840.
[31] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (265), 19 January 1837; emphasis original.
[32] Mostert, *Frontiers*, pp. 823-824

as many K—s as he requires…? Who gave all these people passes, or had they obtained any?' He wondered who was responsible for the robbing and murdering they would undoubtedly commit, and anticipated vengeance against his property and his person for 'giving information' about them.[33] More important than McNamara's opposition to the granting of passes and to the presence of Africans in the colony, are the words of Bowker, written three years before McNamara's complaint, perhaps in response to another. 'The desire of the K—s to go into the colony to seek work, is at present great', he wrote. 'I have refused nearly fifty in a day, and, were I to grant, I could deluge the colony with them in a very short time. But I use great circumspection under that head, well knowing that the colonial border is already stocked with such servants to the full'.[34] Labour is central here, but in a negative sense: a 'deluge' of 'servants' would of course not be servants any longer, but 'vagrants' of the sort that disquieted Robson and McNamara. As granters of passes under Ordinance 49, Stretch and Bowker were practicing the manufacture of both 'Native Foreigners' and 'vagrants' for the Cape Colony, defined through the perceptions, needs, and fears of their fellow colonists. The importance of work to vagrancy and to vagrancy's position in the discourse of foreignness is illustrated in the complete version of a familiar Godlonton quotation:

> Let it be borne in mind, that the K—s, Bechuanas and Fingoes, are *foreigners*, and that they have entered the Colony on the sole plea of engaging in the service of the Colonists. Failing in this, they should be sent across the boundary;—for if they will not labour, surely they ought not to subsist upon the fruits of those who do.[35]

THE FINGOES: DEBATES OLD & NEW

The category 'Fingoes' has cropped up several times in the excerpts from the colonial archives, both here in the discussion of vagrancy and in the earlier chapter on 'politics of the frontier'. Indeed, the people known in colonial sources as Fingoes found themselves at the centre of the colonial debate on vagrancy, and their presence complicated the colonial discourse about foreigners. At an earlier stage I mentioned that the racial language of the colonists was a part of their differentiation of different groups of Africans, as they were understood by Europeans. With that in mind, the Fingoes (or amaMfengu) occupied a contradictory position in frontier politics and the 'making' of foreigners by its participants. Who, then, were they?

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[33] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (414), 28 November 1839.
[34] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters, & Selections*, p. 25
[35] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (483), 1 April 1837; emphasis original.

The standard colonial narrative of the Fingo ethnicity was compiled, edited, and elaborated by the Reverend Joseph Whiteside in 1912, based on material by his predecessor, the Reverend John Ayliff, writing fifty years earlier and based on his own reputed experience with the Fingo people. Their origins, it was said, were in the 'abaMbo' people of Natal, and they were victims of the violence generated by the 'Zulu expansion' famously associated with the Zulu king, Shaka. Ravaged by the amaNgwane, 'the survivors became wanderers, known as Fingos, and they sought refuge with other tribes, by some of which many of them were reduced to a state of servitude'.

> Many of them died on the way, and those who survived became walking skeletons…. [O]f the powerful tribe of the Abambo [*sic*], there were probably not more than 35,000 persons of all ages who survived, and most of them sought refuge with the southern tribes…. Some…settled in Tembuland, where they were kindly treated. The country was then thinly inhabited, and their arrival added to the strength of the Tembus [*sic*]. They were valued too for their skill in the use of herbs as medicine for both man and beast. The Tembus gave them all the civil rights they themselves enjoyed…. The greater number pushed into the country of the Gcalekas [Xhosa], south of the Bashee River. The Gcalekas possessed abundance of cattle, and being indolent, welcomed the newcomers as they would be useful as cattle herds. The chief, Hintsa, had however a savage temper, and he soon began to treat the Abambo with suspicion and cruelty…. When the fugitives entered lower Kaffirland, they were asked, 'Who are you? What do you want?' They replied, 'Siyam Fenguza [*sic*],' which means, 'We seek service.' 'We are destitute.' 'The word, Amamfengu,' therefore means 'Hungry people in search of work'.[36]

The Fingoes then, were an entire people of vagabonds, but, according to Ayliff, of a benign variety that sought to work, rather than to avoid it. In Ayliff's account, the Fingoes were enslaved and cruelly treated by the Xhosa. When war broke out with the colony in 1834, the Fingoes demonstrated a commendable loyalty to the British, and thus incurred the ire of Hintsa and the Xhosa chiefs generally. As a result, Ayliff interceded with D'Urban on the Fingoes behalf, by whom they were then 'delivered' from the 'lowest and worst kind of slavery, and in the true spirit of the sweeping emancipation so recently made in the Mother Country'. Some 16,000 Fingo 'refugees', apparently upon their own earnest behest, were marched into the colony under the protection of the British forces, and settled around Fort Peddie and Graham's Town. 'At a later date', says Whiteside, Mr. Ayliff held a mass meeting of all the men at Emqwashwini, half-way between Peddie and Breakfast Vlei, near a large milkwood tree, named Umqwashu', at which he extracted a pledge of faithfulness to the Christian God and the British King.

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[36] Rev. John Ayliff and Rev. Joseph Whiteside. *History of the Abambo, Generally Known as Fingos*. (Butterworth, Transkei: 'Gazette', 1912), pp. 1; 15.

Many worked as 'farm servants, cattle and sheep herds…. Numbers of them migrated to the frontier towns where they found ready employment', writes Whiteside. 'Wastefulness among them was almost unknown', and 'such was their general good conduct that the criminal roll…showed fewer Fingos than any other class of Natives'. Of course, he maintained that the change was good for the Fingoes, too, who, 'for the first time since they had been driven from Natal…enjoyed liberty and security under the protection of British law'.[37] Thus the foundational myth of the Fingoes wove loyalty to the British empire, to the Christian God, and to the colony, and a humble willingness to labour into a fabric of difference in which the Fingoes represented a distinct fiber suitable to Victorian fashions and malleable to colonial needs.

Primary among those needs, as we have seen, was labour. However, the involvement of the Fingoes in the colonial labour market has been the subject of much debate amongst historians of the Cape Colony. Some have argued that the Fingoes were simply captured Xhosa forced to work on colonial farms, while others dismiss the moral poignancy of Ayliff's story but still claim that the Fingoes originated in Natal and were indeed a mobile refugee population dispersed south and west by violence. This debate hinges on a historical revision introduced by Julian Cobbing in the late 1980s, which challenged the accuracy and importance of the period or series of early nineteenth-century events in southern Africa called the *mfecane*. The thrust of Cobbing's critique was that the 'classic' narrative of the *mfecane* as a period of African-on-African violence, as it developed in the colonial historiography, ignored the European agents of violence involved in slave raiding on the east coast of Mozambique and in taking African captives (or paying for captives taken by Griqua raiders) on the northeastern borders of the Cape Colony.[38] Some historians rejoined, including Jeff Peires and John Omer-Cooper, to say Cobbing took the revision too far.[39] In his critique, Omer-Cooper points out that the revision of Cobbing and others 'is not aimed at disputing that the processes of political change, migrations, and the state-building activities of those involved in them actually occurred', that is, what has been called the *mfecane*. 'Rather', continues Omer-Cooper, 'it directs itself to three key issues which they believe to be crucial to the concept of the Mfecane': first, the reasons

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[37] Ibid, pp. 26-36.
[38] Julian Cobbing. 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', *Journal of African History* 29, 1988, pp. 487-519.
[39] J. B. Peires. 'Paradigm Deleted: The Materialist Interpretation of the Mfecane'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19(2), 1993, pp. 295–313; Jeff Peires. 'Matiwane's Road to Mbholompo: A Reprieve for the Mfecane?'. In Carolyn Hamilton (ed.). *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995), pp. 213-239.

behind state-building; second, the 'Zulucentricity' of events; and third, the impact of the events of the period on southern African history.[40]

I am not concerned to resolve the debates on the *mfecane*, nor would this be the place for it, if I were. However, the debate involves the history of the Fingoes, so a detour into the theories surrounding them is important. Following Cobbing, Alan Webster took the revisionist history into the 1830s, focusing on the region I have referred to as the Fish River Marches, looking askance at the colonial records and finding that the population of Fingoes 'emancipated' by D'Urban with Ayliff's aid were in fact captives intended to satisfy labour needs of the colony. The emancipation narrative provided a cover story.[41] Timothy Stapleton, who carries the history of the Fingoes forward into the 1860s, builds on Webster, claiming that in the coercion of the Fingoes, 'the myth of a distinct Fingo ethnicity—separate from the Xhosa—was created'. He refers to it as a 'pseudo-ethnicity'.[42] This argument is reifying of ethnicity in a dangerously ahistorical way, and not a direction I wish to take. Peires argues that while historians 'accept the hypothesis' of Webster's work—the Fingoes were Xhosas, forced into labour by the British, and the Fingo identity was constructed—'the foundations of that identity were laid long before 1835, north of the Mzimkhulu River, later called Natal'. He reiterates that the name 'derives from a verb, *ukufenguza*, which means 'wandering around homelessly, looking for work', and that those called 'Mfengu' would have had several 'national names' such as 'amaHlubi, amaBhele or amaZizi'.[43] Peires is likely correct that *some* of the Fingoes were originally from Natal, but this does not seem to negate the strong evidence of Webster that forced labour was also being extracted from people of Xhosa affiliation. And it certainly does not preclude the changing nature of African, Xhosa, or Fingo identity in relation to colonial politics. As Poppy Fry writes in relation to the 'creation of Fingo-ness', 'It would be misleading to suggest that Xhosa-ness constituted a wholly stable or unified concept in the early nineteenth century', especially in relation to 'unpredictable neighbours' in the Cape Colony and further east in Natal. She argues that a Fingo identity emerged out of evolving and noticeably different 'lifestyle and ideology' through trade relations with the colony,

[40] J. D. Omer-Cooper. 'Has the Mfecane a Future? A Response to the Cobbing Critique'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19(2), 1993, p. 277.
[41] Alan Webster. 'Unmasking the Fingo: The War of 1835 Revisited'. In Hamilton, *The Mfecane Aftermath*, pp. 241-276.
[42] Timothy J. Stapleton. 'The Expansion of a Pseudo-Ethnicity in the Eastern Cape: Reconsidering the Fingo "Exodus" of 1865'. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 29(2), 1996, pp. 233-234.
[43] Jeff Peires. '"Fellows with Big Holes in their Ears": The Ethnic Origin of the amaMfengu". *Quarterly Bulletin of the national Library of South Africa* 65, 2011, pp. 55-62.

agricultural gender roles, and distancing from traditional practices of redistribution and political power, like 'witchcraft'.[44]

Again, it is not my intention to solve the 'Fingo problem', but I am inclined to give most attention to Fry's and Webster's accounts of the Fingoes, which emphasise, in different ways, historical process, rather than ethnicity specifically. Webster identifies four groups of Fingoes (or those who became Fingoes) who were directly linked to colonial labour in different ways: 'Fingo consisted of mission collaborators, mercenaries, refugees and voluntary labourers, all of whom were subsumed within this new identity'.[45] Webster's concern with the colonial labour market links the Fingoes to the question of vagrancy. He writes, 'The war caused a flood of "voluntary" – forced by circumstance – workers too. From July 1835, the eastern civil commissioners complained of "Fingo vagrancy"…. These were largely dispossessed and alienated Rharhabe who entered the colony in search of subsistence'. Two important facets can be developed from Webster, the first relates to the colonial effort to control these African workers, whether 'military Fingo' or women and children working on farms, was explicit, and demanded the apprehension of unemployed 'Fingoes', either to be expelled from the colony or enlisted into labour.[46] The second has to do with the controversial identity of the Fingoes. 'Fingo-ness' could have marked a developing difference from 'Xhosa-ness', as per Fry's argument; or, it could have been a re-identification of certain Xhosa (or other Africans from outside the colony) as they entered colonial labour relations; or, related to both of these, it was, like the 'vagrant'/'Native Foreigner' opposition, a way to render African 'foreigners' legitimate within the colony. Ayliff's account suggests this—not only was it a cover-up for forced labour, as Webster and Stapleton argue, but a politicisation of identities through historical narration that separated 'Fingoes' politically from the/other Xhosa. What is clear is that from the mid-1830s (and in fact earlier), black labourers entered the colony in large numbers and by various means and engaged in livelihoods of either free or forced labour, and that colonists represented such people in various politicised ways: as 'vagrants', 'Native Foreigners', often as 'Fingoes', and as combinations of these. A significant historical and political facet of this process lies in their purported foreignness and the distinction that was drawn between Fingoes and other Africans.

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[44] Poppy Fry. 'Siyamfenguza: The Creation of Fingo-ness in South Africa's Eastern Cape, 1800-1835)'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36(1), 2010, pp. 25-40.
[45] Webster, *Unmasking the Fingo*, p 256; 276.
[46] Ibid, p. 265.

That distinction, however, was as debatable in the Cape Colony as it was for scholars over a century and a half later. While 'Fingoes' were usually understood to be different in origin, and politically different than the Xhosa beyond the boundary, they were not universally accepted within the colony. People who were, or were called, or were represented as Fingoes were frequently the subjects of attacks on vagrants. 'A Correspondent' wrote to the *Times* about the 'dreadfully vagrant state of those Fingoes who are allowed to collect with large herds of cattle all over the colony', and added the belief that 'a great part of the robberies booked to the K—s are committed by these people'.[47] Likewise, 'A Villager' bemoaned in the pages of the *Journal* the admittance of 'so many savages into the very heart of a peaceful country'.[48]

In October of 1837, 'J. H.' argued in a letter on 'The Fingoes' that such people should not be sent to the area of the Tsitsikamma. 'J. H.', who was specifically critical of the policies of Stockenstrom, argued from within the 'frontier' perspective, and invoked the pale. A 'good old man', whether real or allegorical, 'burst into tears' as he foretold that in a region unfit for cattle or gardening, 'The Fingoes must starve or steal'. 'Such a policy is…downright insanity, and will ultimately cause us all to "trek" in order to seek for that security in the wilds of Africa which we cannot hope for in the immediate vicinity of our government,—a government that we have always loyally served'.[49] 'R. J. P.', probably Richard Joseph Painter, the immigrant son of a London gardener who became a vociferously anti-Fingo Justice of the Peace and correspondent of the *Times*, saw 'Fingo kraals' as 'receptacles' that, apart from representing a kind of independence as seen in the previous chapter, deprived colonists of labourers.[50] On the other hand, the missionary, William Elliot wrote from Uitenhage to refute another settler, 'T—', about the Fingoes and their penchant for robbery, and focused on their 'improvement' in modes of dress, literacy, and religious devotion.[51] 'A Colonist' wrote to another settler via the *Times*, who had complained of the number of Fingoes in the colony, to enquire, 'Is there no farmer or other person in the colony who employs Fingoes? Is their employing them not encouraging them to remain?' This correspondent also challenged the claim that Fingoes sold arms and ammunition to the Xhosa' and wondered 'whether it is more lawful for shopkeepers to sell "guns and ammunition," to those "vagrant" Fingoes, than for the Fingoes to sell them to the K—s'. The debate, then, encompassed not only Fingo habits, but vagrancy and the threat of improper connections, as well. A letter from 'R. J. P.' followed that by 'A Colonist', to

[47] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (200), 14 March 1844.
[48] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (305), 2 November 1837.
[49] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (302), 12 October 1837.
[50] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (210), 23 May 1844.
[51] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (237), 28 November 1844.

'quite agree with the writer of that letter that the dreadfully vagrant state of these native foreigners (so called) who are allowed to settle down in different parts of the colony, (particularly along the immediate border) is a serious grievance'. 'These nests of iniquity (I can assure they richly deserve the name) are a complete nuisance to all who reside in their neighbourhood', for they were staging points of robberies by Fingoes, and a 'constant traffic' in stolen goods. 'But that they should be suffered to collect in such considerable numbers on the verge of Kafirland, the Kat River, is still worse', for easing the shifting of stolen livestock. But 'R. J. P.' concluded his letter about the Fingoes with two points about labour and vagrancy: calling them first 'our working hands' and next referring to 'their wandering propensities'.[52]

We see in the debates old and new that Fingoes were *workers*. 'Fingoes' were also generally included alongside or within the category of 'Native Foreigners', as people somehow (if not always clearly) distinct from the Africans beyond the pale. The 'Native Foreigner' was, above all, legitimately present through their availability and willingness to labour in the colonial economy. 'In this colony', it was observed in a *Times* editorial, 'much has been written and sung about the indolent habits of the Fingoes, and all other classes of "native foreigners." A Fingoe, for instance, has few wants…. He, therefore, naturally passes much of his time in idleness. Give him a new want and you at once supply him with a fresh motive for industry…. And as with a Fingoe, so it is with an European'. The *Times* situated Fingoes and other native foreigners in a historical process in relation to European civilisation, instructing its readers not to have biased views of these Africans.

> In this town numerous bodies of "native foreigners" are to be seen in various stages of advancement, that is, some of them have more wants than the rest, and therefore work more. They are a most useful class of people. Their ranks supply domestic servants, besides coolies or laborers, who are exceedingly handy in many departments of useful and necessary industry…They are all, more or less, acquiring a taste for the usages and comforts of civilized life. These favorable circumstances might, without doubt, be improved by the introduction of some arrangement respecting the location of these people within the municipality, including a wholesome superintendence of their general conduct….[53]

The circumstances were shortly thereafter 'improved' by the establishment of a Fingo Location on the eastern outskirts of Graham's Town, joining an already existing 'Hottentot Location' in the development of racist urban space in southern Africa. The 'Fingo Village', as it is still called, one hundred and seventy years later, served, of course, to control the living spaces and livelihoods of Africans in Graham's Town, and this aspect of the development of 'locations' is

[52] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (205), 18 April 1844.
[53] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (260), 8 May 1845.

well-established in the historiography of South Africa. It also marked, though, a distinction between Africans ('Native Foreigners') permitted to live in the Cape Colony and the 'real' African foreigner who lived beyond the border. Stapleton shows how, in the 1850s, 'Since Fingoes enjoyed the special privilege of being allowed to reside permanently in the colony, many starving Xhosa—who would normally have had to obtain a pass to work temporarily within the colony—opted to change their legal status', and how thousands of 'strangers' of unknown African background could be designated 'Fingoes' 'as justification for keeping them in the colony'.[54] This is not, however, about the mere artificiality of 'Fingoe-ness', but about the historical and political changeability of its meaning.

What the 'Fingo Question' calls attention to is the debated meaning and identity of 'Native Foreigners', and 'vagrants', and indeed 'Fingoes'. Fingoes could be vagrants, when they were not employed by whites, could be a variety of Native Foreigners when they did work for whites, but also could be, potentially, foreigners altogether. The confusion and exasperation evident in the settler letters reveal a suspicion that, under the Fingo jacket and trousers, woolen dress, or military kit, there very well might be a Xhosa who did not belong within the boundary of the colony, and could be there only for rapine or the exercise of improper connections. Both the settlers' and the historians' debates on the Fingoes mean we have to question the contemporary categories and acknowledge their politicisation. Foreignness played an important role in the politics around categories and identities.

VAGRANCY AND POLITICS

Like the frontier and improper connections, the discourse of vagrancy also implicated 'other' politics, including of those people who were or were seen to be on the opposite side of the vagrancy debate, and those people who were understood through the vagrant-foreigner category. Frames of reference were also incorporated that connected vagrancy at the Cape of Good Hope to a wider subjective world. The position in relation to 'other' politics tended to centre on the Kat River Settlement, while the frame of reference was that of 'Oom Paulus': the Poor Laws in England.

Godlonton wrote that the draft ordinance 'for the better suppression of Vagrancy in this Colony' was a matter 'of such momentous importance' that it 'demand[ed] the most serious attention of every inhabitant in the Colony'. We can see, of course, the editorial spin in the

[54] Stapleton, 'Expansion of a Pseudo-Ethnicity', pp. 240-241.

production of ‘importance’. It was then argued, though, that an ‘enactment to check Vagrancy’ would be ‘beneficial to the colored classes themselves, and tend more effectually to raise them in the scale of society’, and moreover ‘where labourers are so few, no honest industrious man can possibly suffer from the operation of a Vagrant Law’. The arguments against vagrancy legislation were treated with some disdain: if a vagrant law was a ‘vexatious interference with personal liberty’ then it might also be said ‘that all law is an encroachment on the natural rights of mankind’, ‘and so in fact it is: but it is an encroachment which every individual of a community has agreed upon to suffer for the advantage of the whole’. Here the column turns more interesting. It looks east to the boundary, and overseas to England.

> Nothing but the lax state of the laws with regard to Vagrancy has prevented the Kat River Settlement from rising before this into a flourishing district: and to this cause may also be attributed much of that odium which has attached to the native tribes beyond our boundary. Bands of Vagrants wandering through the country with impunity are too frequently the authors of excesses which, unless timely discovered, are without hesitation charged upon the neighboring K—s.

The Kat River Settlement, the inhabitants of which were mainly Khoikhoi or ‘Bastards’ (of mixed European and Khoi background), undergoes a veiled attack here as something of a repository for the troubles of the colony. Vagrancy, it was argued, made this outpost of the ‘coloured classes’ problematic; but the Kat River Settlement is thrown in without further comment or elaboration, and we can imagine, then, that it is stands in as something of a symbol for the independent enclaves or individuals who seemed to flout the imposition of a thoroughly racialised economy. In 1834, such an economy was not a foregone conclusion, nor a historical necessity, but a historical possibility embedded in the politics of the colony. Those politics, we have seen, tended to focus on the boundary. A great duplicity is exhibited here, in saying that ‘Bands of Vagrants’—are they from the Kat River?—gave Africans beyond the boundary a bad name, when the *Journal* was one of the foremost sources of that bad name from the day of its first publication. More than any kind of coherent argument, the importance of the boundary, the people beyond it, and, indeed, of vagrancy, in the local politics is highlighted.

The look to England is more subtle. It is found in allusions to the ‘Slave Abolition law’ and to ‘Poor Laws’. A vagrant law was necessary, it was argued, in the wake of abolition that was only six months away at the Cape of Good Hope, because ‘the turbulent and vicious’ among the enslaved would ‘wander into the remote districts, and will there form dangerous associations’. Clearly, vagabonds and their improper connections had political import in the argument for constricting the freedom of free people who would not ‘continue peaceably in

service'. Furthermore, 'we are no advocate for Poor Laws, not only because of their liability to abuse, but because…the principle itself on which they are founded engenders idleness'. In contrast, 'A Vagrant Law has a very different effect, and is also dissimilar in principle. Instead of promoting idleness, it protects the fruits of industry against the pillage of the worthless, and interferes with none who have an ostensible means of honest livelihood'.[55] We saw this argument in England's poor law debates. This discourse, too, was not unique to newsprint. In 1829 a gathering of British settlers in the eastern Cape had written to the governor about vagrancy, and while they 'would be the last to call for any abridgement of personal liberty…they humbly submit that in England, the most salutary effects result from the Vagrant Laws' and hoped for a 'similar restraint' in the colony.[56] A distinction was drawn against the familiar concept of the Poor Law to show that vagrancy legislation would not entail the support of people without work, but rather their corralling into work. Opposition to the Vagrancy Act took similar lines: 'Fairbairn', writes Elbourne, 'enthusiastically upheld the New Poor Law' adopted in England in 1834 in line with current ideas about free labour. Fairbairn's 'opposition to the vagrancy act in 1834 was partially based on his comparison of it with the Old Poor Law of Great Britain: it required vagrants and the poor to be taken care of at the public expense, even if in gaol and on public works projects, rather than forcing labourers "freely" to work without a social safety net to make idleness an option'.[57] Fairbairn was not, then, a friend to 'vagrants', but believed that 'meagre or irregular wages might lead to idleness and vagrancy', which was to be averted with higher wages. His market-driven outlook also led him to challenge Ordinance 50 on the grounds that 'there should be one law for all free persons' rather than a law 'to suit the supposed prejudices or interests of particular classes'.[58] In these arguments, we see the adoption of political ideas current throughout the white British world in explaining the situation in the Cape Colony.

Almost from its founding in 1829, the Kat River Settlement came under attack through the politics of vagrancy. Crais writes, 'The discourse of the Other…became increasingly politically charged. The persistence of "illegal" communities which absorbed the dispossessed and thus contributed to the continuation of the labour crisis…demanded the promulgation of coercive legislation,' which along with the fear of 'class conflict upon the demise of slavery', led to the passage of the Vagrancy Ordinance in 1834. Along with adjacent areas known as Blinkwater

[55] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (129), 12 June 1834.
[56] Memorial to Sir Lowry Cole, 24 September 1829 (KAB, CO, 3941/16).
[57] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', p. 145.
[58] Botha. *John Fairbairn*, p. 64.

and Fuller's Hoek, according to Crais, 'The greatest "illegal" community within the colony became the Kat River Settlement'. Such 'potentially rebellious' 'refuges' for 'Africans from all over the colony' 'repudiated both the development of capitalist agriculture and the growth of the colonial state'. In this light, they were condemned with charges of vagabondising, vagrancy, and wandering, and in the 1840s colonists burnt houses and crops in efforts to destroy the communities of 'squatters'.[59] One colonial official maintained that 'during the nine years I have been here, I have always found [Blinkwater] a place of refuge for vagabonds of the C—e and Fingoe Tribes', and though it should be 'sold on account of the government and occupied by Europeans'. As Justice of the Peace at the Kat River, T. H. Bowker, the brother of J. M., said that 'numerous native Foreigners who have squatted themselves at various times in this settlement without (and even against) authority for so doing, thus forming nests of Coulored [*sic*] people composed of, Gonas, Fingoes, and others'.[60] As expected, 'R. J. P.' wrote in consternation about the connections between Fingoes and the Kat River Settlement, namely the 'H—s' renting land to Fingoes in that area.[61] The attempt to assert European rights to land by attacking 'foreigners' with words and with violence demonstrates how settlers used their official positions to advance political interests sometimes contrary to the needs of the colonial state. 'Squatting' was politicised in settler discourse with reference to foreignness, and behind that lay the actual presence of 'foreigners' who subverted, if not the colonial state as Crais claims, then the agenda of frontier settlers.

The assault on political and economic autonomy at the Kat River Settlement also involved the manipulation of Kat River residents. According to Elbourne, 'Vagrancy legislation remained a central political concern for the Khoisan and ex-slave community, for whom it symbolized the never-forgotten "old system"'.[62] In light of this, residents at the Kat River were involved in discussions about the 1834 law and about vagrancy, in general, which highlight several important aspects of vagrancy politics. Charles Lennox Stretch, so hated for his permissive pass-granting, wrote in his journal about the collusion of military and missionary figures in relation to the abortive Vagrancy Act:

> *Buffalo River, June 4th [1835]*, Some of the people from the Kat River informed me that Captain Armstrong would only allow Mr Clark to preach when he thought proper; and it appeared that he did this in order to induce them to join Mr Thompson's congregation, which they have and will resist, determined to remain with the missionaries of the London Missionary Society. Mr Thompson and Captain Armstrong advocated the signing of the memorial in favor of the

[59] Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, pp. 139; 159-164.
[60] Quoted in Crais, *Making of the Colonial Order*, pp. 166-167.
[61] *Cape Frontier Times*, V (213), 13 June 1844.
[62] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', p. 143.

> vagrant act and got 80 people attached to Mr Thompson's party to sign. This unfortunate occurrence seems to have divided *this once happy community*. However, they hope when the war is over to see Mr Read among them again.[63]

Stretch's twentieth-century editor, Basil le Cordeur, explains three political divisions key to this situation. First was the division among missionaries, with Thompson adhering to a 'strict loyalty to the state', and censorious of the 'political activism' of missionaries like Read and Philip. Second was the fact that Thompson's and Read's congregations were made up respectively of 'Bastards', 'partly of European descent', and 'Khoi and Gonah Khoi, any of whom felt a greater affinity with the Xhosa than did the Bastards'. Third was the conflict over the vagrancy legislation that split colonial opinion, with the opposed more or less aligned with Fairbairn and those in favour given voice by Godlonton.[64]

Godlonton's *Journal* ran a column in October 1837 in which several ideas were interlaced, including vagrancy, the statistics of increased 'coloured' crime since the passage of Ordinance 50 in 1828, the identification of an 'anti-colonial faction', the convening in Westminster of a Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes, and liberal notions of equality before the law. In this editorial, Godlonton cunningly conjoined the poverty of 'H—s' with the passage of the law and the increase in crime, and the likelihood of 'abject poverty and deplorable anarchy'.

> What is most to be deplored [he wrote] is the gross hypocrisy which is displayed by those colonial agitators to whom we are opposed…. The anti-colonial faction, who have been the means of reducing this fine colony to its present state of confusion and degradation, and who have driven thousands of our plodding industrious, and loyal fellow-colonists into unwilling exile….

While attacking the 'liberal' elements of British imperial and Cape colonial society as 'agitators' and 'anti-colonial' whose actions had harmed rather than helped the indigenous people of the colony—'loyal fellow-colonists'—Godlonton cast his contention for vagrancy controls in the language of liberalism. He referred to a correspondent's letter about vagrancy, but did not use the word himself. Instead, he wrote,

> [W]e never for a moment contended that the H—s, as a class, were not entitled to all the advantages which this act intended to secure to them. Our anxiety is to gain this practical result in the fullest and most effectual manner, not but throwing up the reins to every evil passion, not by separating the colored and the white inhabitants, and making them a distinct and isolated people, but by protecting property,—by punishing crime,—by promoting industry,—by

[63] In Le Cordeur, *Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch*, p. 88; emphasis original.
[64] Ibid, note, p. 186.

> diffusing knowledge,—and by cherishing all those kindly feelings, which would have cemented the various grades and classes in one solid and compact bond of social union.[65]

It was the same 'Friend to Consistency', who supplied the footing upon which Godlonton waxed so fair and rational. The matter is 'another item in the catalogue of our national grievances'—'the extent of degradation of the unfortunate aborigines'. The setting: 'a few days ago in front of the public offices of this town', 'worthy of the…inimitable etchings of Cruikshank, or the *illustrations of the anti-colonial Mountebanks at Exeter Hall*' (a reference to a centre of abolitionist and philanthropic meetings in London). The scene: a 'crowded mass of some 50 or 60 H—s, of both sexes, who much against their inclinations had been gathered' by more anti-colonial agitators. 'Many other truly wretched and degraded vagrants were clad in the most grotesque and indecorous manner'. 'In this variegated and comic-tragic costume…they were gesticulating and vociferating vengeance against the worthy field-cornet and the peaceful citizens who had been compulsorily (*not willingly*)' enlisted in 'scouring…the township to disperse this noxious nest of vagabonds and plunderers'. The 'Friend' mocks men as mimicking the dress of the 'anti-colonial' Andries Stoffels, who represented the Kat River Settlement before the Parliamentary Committee. He portrays two women, in 'ultra-fantastical' dress, fighting each other, one biting off the other's fingers. This crowd of 'somewhat Gipsey-like beings [*sic*]' made no 'honest exertions…to earn a reputable livelihood'. They were, instead, persuaded to this gathering by

> mock philanthropists who have hitherto influenced our legislature, and are still industriously and mischievously urging them to oppose…*a vagrant law*, the only effectual means (by enforcing habits of industry) of rescuing the remnant of this wretched people from the commission of the worst crimes, and their ultimate exist upon the gallows.

'A Friend' opposed 'these narratives of lamentable depravity' to the tale 'unblushingly told that the H—s are progressing in civilization'.[66] The point, like Godlonton's, was to play upon the earnest desires and ideologies of their political opponents in defense of the much-sought vagrancy legislation. We see clearly that vagrancy was a political issue, and that, like the alleged activities of 'alien' missionaries, opposition to the vagrancy position was represented as 'anti-colonial'. However, another important element to that political problem appears in scene depicted by 'A Friend'. This is the political organisation and activity of 'H—s' or 'coloured' people. Although the gathering in Graham's Town was represented as the work of

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[65] *Graham's Town Journal*, VI (302), 12 October 1837.
[66] Ibid; emphasis original.

anti-colonial colonial agitators, the most troubling imagery is reserved for the 'aborigines' themselves. Their violence is emphasised in the two fighting women. Their vagrancy is foregrounded repeatedly, not only in their barbaric and penurious appearance, but in their lack of employment, their gathering in 'nests', their comparison to so-called 'Gypsies', itself a derogatory term for Europe's migratory ethnic Roma. The refrain was, then, that such people did not belong (in Graham's Town), but also that they also do not belong in politically-motivated gatherings (Godlonton's 'deplorable anarchy').

The vagrancy faction had reason to fear the political activity of the 'coloured classes'. The Khoi and other indigenous labouring population of the colony understood the implications of vagrancy laws quite well, and embarked on efforts to protect themselves. As Lady Herschel wrote to England, the promotion and impending passage of the Vagrant Act in 1834 impelled 'hundreds of poor H—s who have been either living respectably on little bits of ground (which of course won't appear "honest means of support" to the griping farmers), or are now in the service of the farmers' to 'flock to the Missionary Institutions', 'knowing that…[they] will be turned off by the Farmers in the day of need, in order that they may be found as *vagrants* & returned on their Masters' hands as forced servants & at a cheaper rate of wages'.[67] Besides moving to the missions, people also began to organise public meetings and a popular resistance to the proposed attack on their livelihoods. Elbourne quotes two Khoi men at such a meeting in the Kat River Settlement. 'What is a nation without freedom?' asked one. 'Thus although I am really a free person, yet I am dealt with as a slave', states another, explaining how he is stopped by a field cornet who 'inquires from where and whereto I am going'. At another meeting at Theopolis, the mission state near Bathurst, about twenty-five miles south of Graham's Town, one participant said, 'we are assembled to oppose the introduction of a law, the object of which is to bring us back to slavery'.[68] Elbourne is primarily focused on the issue of freedom which these three men raised, but she also makes the following essential point: 'The impact of Ordinance 50 has been called into question by some historians, but the passionate support given to it by Khoisan petitioners in 1834 leaves no doubt as to the importance it was accorded by those whom it most directly affected'.[69]

The letter from Dikkip Wildschut published in the *Graham's Town Journal* attests to this, and probably served to reinforce settler fears. The resident of the Kat River opposed the vagrancy law, 'that infringement of our liberty', and proposed:

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[67] In Warner, *Lady Herschel*, p. 43; emphasis original.
[68] Quoted in Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', pp. 114-115.
[69] Ibid, p. 133.

> That we forthwith put forth a manifesto, shewing that we have been unjustly dispossessed of our lands,—that our ancient laws and usages have been subverted,—and that by the appointment of magistrates and other officers, and the erection of prisons and such like places of confinement, our liberty is infringed on, and we are compelled to suffer many hardships and privations from which we were formerly exempt.

Wildschut's rang the same note as Klaas Stuurman's at the turn of the century. He 'denounced the Settlers as our enemies' and described 'the Governor himself' and the 'upstart people of Cape Town' as 'interlopers and intruders on our rightful property'. 'We should, therefore', wrote Wildschut, 'request that they will be pleased to give us the benefit of their absence…and if they should demur…the country itself shall be too hot to hold them'. The letter concluded grandly: 'We are in a fair way soon to declare our entire independence, and to revel in the enjoyment of uncontrolled and glorious freedom'.[70] Unusual fare for the *Graham's Town Journal*, surely, but Wildschut's letter served Godlonton's purpose to stoke settler fears of political 'H—s' and a political movement at the Kat River Settlement. Indeed, in the accompanying editorial, Godlonton wrote about how vagrancy had hurt the residents of the Kat River themselves, economically and morally; how after five years of freedom and the use of 'the finest part of the colony', the people 'abused it' and 'prefer a wandering and an idle life to one of steady and honest labour'. Godlonton was 'led into these remarks from having perused the proceedings of a public meeting of the inhabitants of the Kat River, to consider the measure now pending for the suppression of Vagrancy'.

> [W]ith regard to the meeting itself, we hold it to be an exceedingly ill advised and imprudent proceeding. To pray that Vagrancy may be allowed, and even tolerated, by Law,--or in other words that the idle and the dishonest may be permitted to roam the country without being subject to any kind of restraint or even enquiry, is greatly to be deplored…. [W]e hold that many of the opinions recorded at the meeting are very discreditable, and not a few of them highly censurable.

The opinions in question had challenged the impartiality and beneficence of the British government. There was also a 'disreputable' settler who spoke at the meeting and received 'loud applause'. Godlonton stated that the 'growing spirit of dissatisfaction gradually spreading itself' at the Kat River Settlement' would prove costly to those 'indulging' in it, and threw in a shrewd mention of the 'aliens, natives of Kafirland', who at the same time 'were speaking of the injustice of not being permitted to roam at large through the colony'. Godlonton, though,

[70] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (143), 18 September 1834.

credited a group of counter petitioners, who were '*worthy of that station in society to which they have attained by a steady perseverance in good conduct*'.[71]

'Vagrancy', then, was not only a debate between different factions of settlers, one more liberal and the other more committed to a racialised economy. Both factions were, in fact, committed to a version of racialised capitalism, if in different ways. 'Vagrancy' was also a politicised argument with which to delegitimise the potential labourers of that racial economy as subjects, and also to delegitimise their political activity or the potential for such activity. Vagrants did not belong wherever they were, but they also did not belong as agents in politics. When they did exercise political agency, this was castigated as 'anti-colonial', which speaks both to the type of threat vagrants posed and to the subjectivity of the people identifying the threat. Laden with alarm about 'improper connexions', the political threat of 'vagrants' linked with the threat of foreigners or foreign polities, such as the Xhosa, or else marronage, as was developing at the Kat River and its surrounding communities. Foreignness, then, formed one hinge in the Cape colonial politics of vagrancy in the 1830s and 1840s.

VAGRANCY AND THE FOREIGN

The question of vagrancy in the Cape Colony has previously not been considered with regard to the deployment of categories and ideas about foreignness and the foreigner. We saw how this was also true of the differences inscribed by the politics of the frontier, which have been analysed historically as being about colonial conquest, but not about the mobilisation of political ideas of foreignness. Indeed, the vagrancy question is a facet of the same politics, but oriented not only towards the 'boundary' but also towards regimes of labour. The vagrancy *issue* deals with very important questions of labour, work, economy, and control, but the *politics* of vagrancy deployed very important ideas about foreignness and the foreigner.

At the root of these ideas were the potentially different histories, politics, and economies represented in the mobility of certain people. Not only could many mobile people sometimes evade economic exploitation, but they were also able to position themselves beyond the pale (not only the spatial boundary, but the pale of political-subjective difference), and in doing so they elicited and justified fears amongst settlers of political organisation and improper connections. 'Vagrancy' was a political mode of attack on mobility and the dangers perceived to accompany it at the same time as being a mode of labour control. Thinking within the

[71] Ibid, emphasis original.

framework of 'freedom' in the context of Cape Colony vagrancy politics, Elbourne writes, 'Essentially, the limits placed on citizenship by theorists of the social contract were rejected by people of colour claiming equal rights as the reward for their cultural integration and their full incorporation into the polity'.[72] That claim involved the specific if often tacit freedoms to 'belong' where one was and to move about where one wished, in the course of pursuing chosen livelihoods and the daily activities of life. Elbourne explains that as labour regulation evolved in the Cape Colony into the 1850s,

> In the prevailing climate of enthusiasm about free labour and the revamping of old vagrancy and poor laws in Britain itself, those many British settlers in South Africa who wanted a return to the semi-free status of Hottentot labour…were compelled to turn to broader arguments about the control of criminality.[73]

Criminality, of course, strings a common thread through the frontier, where settler urgencies were rooted in livestock rustling, through vagabondizing to vagrancy, in which charges of desertion and banditry shaded daily human mobility, to the 'convictism' which we will discuss in the next chapter. Criminality often did not stand alone, but in relation to one of these categories, 'the tribes beyond the boundary', the vagabond, the vagrant, or the convict: each of which had important connections to foreignness; each of which identified or involved a particular version of 'the foreigner'. This was a political argument. Our very first introduction to Cape Colonial xenophobia was Bowker's address on the relative difference between domestic and foreign crime, the former more tolerable on the basis that it is not committed by 'foreigners' who did not belong. Murder, of course, always results in a death and a murderer, but the murderer is subject to political interpretation. Bowker expresses that brilliantly in his fuming xenophobia. Criminality, then, is not sufficient to explain the mode of control of people as labourers that attended the accusation of vagrancy, nor the politics around it.

'Vagrancy' served colonists as a way to rationalise both criminality and foreignness within a specific political and economic movement, which drew on familiar concepts and a broader political debate of the period. On the Caledon Code, Elbourne writes that while it was based in a liberal equality before the law, 'the *legal* concept of vagrancy took the Khoisan, as it took many of the European poor, out of the community of those who were to be considered as equals', such that 'the presumed refusal to work of the vagrant – in other words, his failure to fulfill an obligation to society as a whole – negated the contingent obligations of society to him

[72] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', p. 142.
[73] Ibid, p. 144.

[*sic*]'.[74] Elbourne is right to centre freedom and the law in her analysis of vagrancy. However, what I have shown here is that 'vagrancy' developed in the Cape Colony, in the decades after Caledon's Code, not only as a legal concept but also as a political concept with which people were shut 'out of the community'. It was also associated with foreignness, not only criminality or racial difference, and not only the 'refusal' to work, that disabled claims to freedom of belonging and mobility. Rationalising difference and belonging through the politics of vagrancy meant that the 'Native Foreigner' was a legitimate 'foreigner' and the 'Vagrant' was an illegal one. Legitimacy, however, did not confer belonging, while illegality was not the opposite of belonging, but only the opposite of legitimacy. Thus, the vagrant-foreigner tread precariously on a political field of un-belonging.

A 'Remonstrance of the Farmers of Upper Albany and the Lower Division of the District of Somerset', of which R. J. Painter was a signatory, illustrates the question of legitimacy. The farmers began, 'As it is known to the government, Her Majesty's subjects residing on the immediate frontier of the colony have been subjected to the most systematic outrages by the K—r tribes since their last invasion in 1834'. They stressed repeatedly the '*crafty and treacherous*' character of the Xhosa, and asked, 'why the K—s are permitted to have it in their power to make this frontier the scene of confusion and bloodshed', which situates their remonstrance in the politics of the frontier. They called for 'immediate removal of the K—s from the ceded territory…. They have forfeited every claim to further indulgence,—they ought to be confined to their own territory'. Instead, that territory ought 'to be inhabited by H—s, native foreigners, or others, as may seem best'.[75] There we see the relative 'legitimacy' of 'native foreigners' deployed against the foreignness of the Xhosa. At about the same time, the missionary J. W. Appleyard wrote, about the 'general plan for the future settlement of the country' after the war of 1846-1847, would position 'native settlements of Fingoes, H—s, Mozambiquers [i.e. – 'free blacks'/'prize slaves'] and Kama's K—s' along with Europeans between the Fish and Buffalo Rivers. The 'country between the Buffalo and the Nxarune' would remain 'neutral' and 'unoccupied', the 'country between the Nxarune and the Kei' would 'be occupied, on sufferance, by such K—s chiefs and their people as are willing to be placed under British controul [*sic*], but 'all the other K—s must retire beyond the Kei', 'the future boundary of our British territory'.[76] The political distinctions apparent in this

[74] Elbourne, 'Freedom at Issue', p. 126; emphasis original.
[75] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters, & Selections*, pp. 191-193
[76] John Frye (ed.). *The War of the Axe and the Xosa Bible: The Journal of Rev. J. W. Appleyard* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1971), p. 94.

arrangement are clear. Those peoples with political affiliations or obligations to the colony were to be planted most within its pale; committed foreigners were to remain beyond it.

At least, that was how it was supposed to be. Interrogating 'vagrancy', though, has revealed the instability of those political divisions and the problems this caused in colonial politics and for the colonial-oriented economy. We read parts of a rather heated debate about the loyalty of Fingoes, and the ways that people of that probably diverse population were tangled in the politics of vagrancy. 'Native Foreigners' sometimes behaved more like vagrants or like foreigners than like the appropriately oppressed labourers they were supposed to be, even when inside the boundaries of the colony. At times, the 'squatters' and 'vagabonds' of the Kat River Settlement and nearby Graham's Town mounted political challenges to settler wishes, which were then contested and demeaned through the politics of vagrancy. The underpinning accusation of foreignness is explicit in the following editorial on 'squatters' printed in the *Cape Frontier Times* in 1850, which takes aim at 'native foreigners'. This piece looks back to 1828 and interprets the meaning and intention of the 49th Ordinance, while advancing a xenophobic vision of a bleak future in which the colony is swallowed by foreigners. The Mr Hutton it mentions was worried about pass-less Africans residing on his neighbours' farms, just the same as Westerbar, whose writing on the evils of vagrancy introduced this chapter.

> We cannot believe, [said the *Times*] that it was the intention of the framers of Ordinance No. 49, 1828, which regulates the admission of native foreigners into the colony, to sanction and legalize the practice of which Mr. Hutton so justly complains.
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> It would never have been designed by the framers of this ordinance, to allow farmers to establish kraals of native foreigners on their estates; or, in other words, to establish dens of thieves to become a nuisance and a pest to the whole neighborhood. The object of this ordinance was certainly not to enable farmers to procure a supply of labour at the expense of their neighbor's flocks.
>
> [I]f all farmers were to follow the bad example of those whose conduct is not the subject of reprehension, the colony would soon be converted into a huge K—r kraal, and all the stock farmers would very speedily be "eaten up."
>
> The object of the Ordinance 49 was evidently to introduce into the colony, as farm servants or herds, the uncivilized natives beyond the border, and to place them, whilst they remained in the colony, under *wholesome and judicious restrictions*. It was clearly never contemplated, that swarms of native foreigners should be domiciled in the colony without masters….
>
> The law is not framed for the purpose of *affording to swarms of native foreigners an opportunity of enjoying, unmolested, the advantages of irresponsible residence within the colonial border*. And yet this has proved to be the practical result of the working of this law.[77]

[77] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (537), 10 September 1850; emphasis original.

The politics of vagrancy fulfilled a reactionary need in the Cape Colony's politics; it rationalised 'foreigners' within the colony and attempted to implement modes of control over mobile persons whose lives crossed economic and political boundaries, and who might exist both within and beyond the pale.

8.
MOBILISING XENOPHOBIA:
EMIGRANTS, CONVICTS, AND REPEALERS

'THE SURPLUS POPULATION', THE COLONY, AND EMIGRATION

'The grand question for our farmers and landowners…is—*What is the soundest principle upon which an emigration of agricultural laborers or tillers of the soil can be conducted*', asserted a February 1844 editorial in the *Cape Frontier Times*.[1] This 'grand question', however, was not new to the politics of the frontier. Robert Godlonton had written three years earlier that in the matter of immigration from Europe, 'the question [was] not whether it be necessary…but how the object can be best obtained'.[2] Not only editors held this view, which obtained widely among the settler community. 'T. J. C.' wrote to the *Times*, 'In taking a tour lately through some of the Eastern Districts, one universal complaint met my ear—"the want of labor"'.[3] The decades after the British settlement of the Fish River Marches was marked by this ceaseless demand of the settler community for labourers. We have already seen the subject of labour raised in connection with the 'Fingoes' and the perceived threat of vagrancy, but this chapter looks at the ways in which the needs and fears of colonists were elaborated in reference to the question of immigration into the colony from Europe.

Three interrelated matters emerged in the Cape Colony during the 1820s to 1850s with consequences for thinking about immigration in relation to foreignness and xenophobia. First is the call for migrants, but this call from the colony came accompanied by clear notions about who acceptable migrants ought to be. It was not a 'coloured' labourer, said Godlonton, but neither was it all classes or classifications of Europeans, even English ones; for the second issue addressed here is the large popular reaction to the landing of convicted felons in the Colony. The third issue, which connects in sometimes ambiguous but important ways to the first two, is the importance of politics in Ireland to discourses in the Cape Colony: during the 1830s and 1840s, Cape observers paid an almost strange attention to Irish politics, which at times appeared as a clear frame of reference for affairs of the Cape Colony, not only for politics

[1] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (195), 8 February 1844; emphasis original.
[2] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (494), 27 May 1841.
[3] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (201), 21 March 1844.

of immigration but also in the politics of the frontier already discussed. Taken together, and with the histories considered in the preceding chapters, these matters deepen the complexity both of 'the foreign' and of the perceived threat it presented in the context of the Cape Colony.

These were the days of a young Charles Dickens, when that near-historical figure, Ebenezer Scrooge, declared that if the poor would rather die than go to the work-houses and prisons, then 'they had better do it, and decrease the surplus population.'[4] Dickens's money-lender did not make his pronouncement out of callousness alone, but with the authority of contemporary theories of political economy. According to Klaus Knorr, 'Theoretical discussion of the subjects of pauperism, surplus population, emigration, and colonization was prolific throughout the period from 1815 to 1850'.[5] In 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus had published the first edition of *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, which greatly influenced subsequent debates, and not least on the matter of emigration and immigration as late as the period under consideration. Over the next three decades, Malthus reworked, expanded, and published six editions of the essay. In this admixture of economics, history, and sociology, Malthus advances the basic principle that populations, unless subjected to various 'checks' on their growth, whether natural (like disease) or of human agency (like abstinence from sex), will have the 'constant tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence'. The bulk of the first volume of his 'essay' is a global and historical survey of the 'checks' on population in various societies from ancient times up to his day. Malthus elevates to a natural science the supply and demand logic of capitalism: as population increases, the food that supported a population must be stretched to support a greater one; 'the poor consequently live much worse', and, by the increased number of labourers above the demand for labour, also drive down wages, and by these labourers consuming more, drive up the prices of provisions. Such difficult times serve as a 'check' on marriage and childbearing, and the supply of food catches up with the demands of population, and balance is resumed.[6] Malthus's is a market-driven, zero-sum economics, in which an increase in wages would increase competition for, say, meat, raising the price of meat and ensuring that the distribution of meat in society remained about the same.[7]

In a context such as Malthus describes, 'the non-pauper population', writes Knorr, 'had to shoulder the financial burden of poor relief and was kept in a state of anxiety over the latent threat of social and political unrest, the augmentation of crime', so that 'to Malthusians and

[4] Charles Dickens. *A Christmas Carol and Other Christmas Books* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1907), p. 15.
[5] Klaus E. Knorr. *British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944), p. 269.
[6] T. R. Malthus. *An Essay on Population, Vol. 1* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1933), pp. 15-16.
[7] T. R. Malthus. *An Essay on Population, Vol. 2* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1933), p. 40

doctrinaire adherents to the tenets of laissez-faire,' like the unreformed Scrooge, 'any system of poor relief appeared theoretically unsound and practically mischievous'.[8] The theories of Malthus were not, however, only relevant to the urban poor of industrialised England, but to the colonies, as well. Malthus argued that 'in the case of redundant population in the more cultivated parts of the world, the natural and obvious remedy which presents itself is emigration to those parts that are uncultivated'. Emigration afforded to government a social management option, he wrote, favourable to both 'humanity and policy'.[9] In 1827, the year after the final edition of Malthus's *Essay* was published, it was the Select House Committee on Emigration that reported:

> The first and main principle is, that Labour which is the commodity of the poor man, partakes strictly, as far as its value is concerned, of the circumstances incident to other commodities; and that its price is diminished in proportion to the excess of supply as compared with the demand…. [I]t follows that if the supply of labour be permanently in excess, as compared with the demand, then condition of the lower classes must be permanently depressed….[10]

In the early decades of British settlement in South Africa, emigration—'shoveling out the paupers'[11]—afforded a perfectly legitimate means of decreasing the 'surplus population', not through pernicious poor laws and assistance (which were a drag for the non-paupers),[12] but through transferring it to a market of sustenance, land, labour, and wages that could safely absorb it.

The 1820 settlers themselves, the peers of Godlonton and the elder Bowker, were part of this shoveling scheme. Each emigrant party bound for the Cape of Good Hope was supposed to include 'mechanics, labourers, and paupers', the last of which were to be sponsored by their parishes. William Wilberforce Bird, a civil servant at the Cape and cousin of the well-known anti-slavery Wilberforce, wrote in 1822, 'The parishes, in order to get rid of ten families, advance one hundred pounds, which, when returned to them after landing, is to be their capital, for cultivating one thousand acres of African land. This is, in fact, only changing the poor-house from the mother-country to the colony'.[13]

The words of Cape colonial commentators show substantial accord with the ideas current in the metropole. In 1817, the Irish-born economist Robert Torrens, apparently influenced by

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[8] Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, pp. 271-272.
[9] Malthus, *Population, Vol. 2*, pp. 30; 37.
[10] Quoted in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, pp. 270-271.
[11] Quoted in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, p. 269.
[12] Malthus, *Population, Vol. 2,* pp. 48-69
[13] Bird, *State of the Cape*, pp. 240-241.

Malthus, prescribed, 'for the immediate relief of actual distress…no remedy, except for an extension of colonization…. A well-regulated system of colonization acts as a safety-valve to the political machine, and allows the expanding vapour to escape, before it is heated to explosion'.[14] He was echoed twenty-nine years later by Robert Godlonton, who wrote, 'Emigration, too, is a safety-valve that appears destined to save the parent country from those convulsions which, judging from recent events, there is reason to fear would, ere long, without such an outlet, rend it to the very centre'.[15] According again to T. J. C., correspondent to the *Times,* 'The industrious poor of England and Ireland, thousands of whom are starving, and many led to commit crime to get the cravings of hunger satisfied by the prison provisions, if brought to this fine healthy colony would still be within the British dominions, obtaining an honest and comfortable livelihood for themselves and families, at the same time benefiting their employers'.[16] Political distress and insurrection, as well as crime, were clearly associated with the 'surplus population', and the removal or decrease of 'surplus' persons would, theoretically, go hand-in-hand with the relief of problems of politics and security.

In the southern spring of 1839, the *Graham's Town Journal* published a series of ten articles on 'Emigration' (meaning emigration from Europe to the colony). In the first of these articles, Godlonton outlined the importance of the question for the Cape colonists:

> It concerns us in a variety of ways,… an influx of population would enhance the price of landed property,—it would add to the general security,—and it would lead, by augmenting our means and *our strength*, to the more full and speedy development of the resources of the country.[17]

The series of lead articles, which ran from October to December of 1839, shone a beguiling light upon the Cape Colony. They praised the agreeable climate, the richness of the soil, the opportunities for agriculture and grazing, the low local taxes, the diversions of the arts and horse racing, and the extent of Christian religion. One article soothed concerns about the 'Aborigines'. Southern Africa was also closer to England, and therefore better, than Australia, said Godlonton. It offered the 'shorter road to the attainment of comfort and even of independence', and, 'To an active man of business, this colony presents a good field for his

[14] Quoted in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, p. 279.
[15] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (407), 10 October 1839.
[16] *Cape Frontier Times*, IV (201), 21 March 1844.
[17] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (407), 10 October 1839; emphasis original.

exertions'.[18] If any number of the *Journal* had reached England, it was clearly hoped to entice emigrants to embark for the eastern marches of the Cape.

That Godlonton wrote 'even' the attainment of independence is a clue that the English audience of his articles were probably people of little means, who would 'come out' to the colony under indenture. Labour was, after all, above all. Godlonton went so far as to say once, 'Labour in a new country may be compared to the philosopher's stone—it transmits everything it touches into gold'.[19] But Godlonton also made the thoroughly Malthusian observation that '*Labour, like every other article, must be carried to market in proportion to the demand*. Exactly as you go beyond this will be the proportionate amount of inconvenience and suffering'. To reinforce the need for caution in emigration schemes and the danger of misleading the poor and working people to believe that emigration will lead to 'an extravagant expectation of obtaining at once to perfect *independence*', he printed extracts from a London paper excerpting American papers:

> NEW YORK.—EMIGRANTS. – Yesterday our streets were filled with emigrants…tradesmen of all descriptions…. The arrivals this week exceed 3,000 [1,200 of whom were 'steerage'—i.e. paupers]. Our city is full of labourers and workmen. On the battery, this morning, we counted 500 persons most of whom where [*sic*] out of employment….
>
> BOSTON.—We learn that within the last week eight hundred emigrants have arrived in this city, and that their situation is truly deplorable….

A quote lifted from the *Colonial Gazette* summarised the point: 'The number of persons…who should leave the country is indicated by the number of those who do not find employment'.[20]

Malthusian caution, in addition to exciting the anxieties of the 'non-pauper', also offered a rather well-paved route to xenophobia. Mathematically speaking, there were people who either 'should leave' a country, or who should not enter it, at all. When Malthus himself was questioned about the consequences of migration from Ireland to England in the late 1820s, he responded, 'I think that the effect will be most fatal to the happiness of the labouring classes in England, because there will be a constant and increasing emigration from Ireland to England which will tend to lower wages of labour in England, and to prevent the good effects arising from the superiour prudence of the labouring classes in this country'.[21] These sorts of

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[18] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (408), 17 October 1839; VIII (409), 24 October 1839; VIII (410), 31 October 1839; VIII (411), 7 November 1839; VIII (412), 14 November 1839; VIII (413), 21 November 1839; VIII (414), 28 November 1849; VIII (417) 19 December 1839; VIII (418), 26 December 1839.
[19] *Graham's Town Journal,* XVIII (898), 24 Feb 1849.
[20] *Graham's Town Journal*, XI (572), 17 November 1842; emphasis original.
[21] Quoted in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, p. 272.

arguments, as well as others about class and criminality, were current in the Cape Colony and its claims about foreigners.

These were also the years of Oliver Twist, Dickens's young, orphaned protagonist born into an English poorhouse, whose misfortunes lead him to take up with a gang of pickpocket boys and older housebreakers in London. Fairbairn himself mentioned the '*artful dodgers*' of London, after the nick name of young Twist's pick-pocket acquaintance.[22] Twist's life eventually led him to middle-class comfort, but it could easily have led him to the Cape of Good Hope. A Mr. Wilson, of the Society for the Suppression of Juvenile Vagrancy, wrote to the Colonial Office in 1832 about the 'numerous boys actually running wild about the streets of the metropolis [London] without any means of subsistence but by the commission of crime'. The fictional Twist might have been one 'specimen of many thousands of the same kind in the Metropolis'. The Society thought it 'highly desirable to have the assistance of the Government Agents in the Colonies to dispose of the Boys', by having them sent to the colonies as agricultural servants. Wilson's associate, Brenton, wrote that indenturing the wild boys in the colonies would 'keep them out of prison' and 'save those poor Children from destruction' while 'enrich[ing] and strengthen[ing] that Colony', 'by an importation of free labourers while they are in a pliant and teachable age and before they are corrupted and degraded by crime and punishment'. 'We are informed', reported Wilson, 'that such boys are likely to be sought after because they would not be so disposed to break their Indentures as Adults'. This would be 'a great benefit to society', wrote Brenton: both to the vagrant-ridden society of London and the labour-hungry societies of the colonies. Rather than 'vagrants', the boys would be useful labourers. The Secretary for the Colonies accepted this moralistic Malthusian proposal, and agreed to send twenty boys to the Cape Colony under indenture, provided they consented.

However, by May of 1834, it appeared that 'difficulties' had 'arisen at the Cape of Good Hope, in apprenticing the Children who ha[d] been sent out to the Colony by the Society'. The 'difficulties' were caused by 'the Children having refused to be apprenticed'. John Fairbairn, not only the well-known editor but also the Honorary Secretary to the Committee for the Encouragement of Juvenile Immigration, had written in February that 'the Committee have experienced great difficulties in disposing of the Immigrants'. 'Some of them', said Fairbairn in a huff, 'have positively refused to go to the only Master who applied for them, or to work at the only employment for which they were in request'. What is more, 'They also succeeded in unsettling the minds of the younger boys with whom the committee never found any difficulty

[22] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XVIII (1568), 22 June 1842; emphasis original.

before', which 'behaviour alarmed the minds of the masters of the lads'. The vagrant children of London, it seems, were not disposed to be 'pliant'. The upshot of this laughable fiasco was that the Cape's Supreme Court came to doubt the legality of the scheme, and Fairbairn requested legal opinion from London with regard to the Society's 'powers' over the immigrant children, 'and the legal mode of conveying or transporting the same power to' agents in the colony. As matters stood, Fairbairn and his associates 'very much doubt[ed] whether we could compel any Immigrant into service without his consent'. In short, the boys successfully resisted forced migration and labour by making trouble in the colony.[23]

During the 1830s, between 500 and 600 children were shipped to the Cape Colony from England, indentured, and paid dismal wages. Boys became herds in the rural areas and apprentices in town; girls were put into domestic service. An inquiry on the progress of the children reported in 1840 that employing boys as livestock herds led them into improper connexions: 'indolent and slovenly habits in association with stray H—s'. There was also an increase in juvenile crime in Cape Town, and although most indentured child immigrants did not commit crimes, as a group they raised concerns. A group of twenty girls from workhouses in Ireland found employment, but the girls were objects of suspicion in colonial society.[24]

The episode of the vagrant boys turned indentured immigrants turned colonial troublemakers highlights the demand for labour, the implementation of a Malthusian safety-valve, and the backfiring of the demographic engine under pressure from human agency. Reaction against the boys (see below) reveals some Cape colonists dead set against similar immigration schemes. Although John Fairbairn took a direct interest in projects for the importation of labour migrants to the Cape of Good Hope, and was instrumental in the matter of the vagrant boys, his enthusiasm for migrants was unsettled. He became an important leader, as I describe below, of the 'anti-convict' movement. In the matter of 'Emigration', many colonists at the Cape held Malthus in the left hand while they waved the *Journal*, the *Times*, the *Mail*, and the *Advertiser* in the right.

IMMIGRANTS OF A CERTAIN KIND

While the demand for labour-immigrants was high in the 1830s and 1840s, a concurrent discourse made it clear that only certain labour-immigrants were wanted. The Cape

[23] Goderich to Lowry Cole, 3 January 1833 (KAB, GH 1/93 136) and enclosures, pp. 74-92; Glenelg to D'Urban, 14 May 1834 (KAB, GH 1/99 1432) and enclosures, pp. 113-124.
[24] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, pp. 17-28.

newspapers, as well as the debates in public meetings and the Legislative Council, all demonstrate support for the idea that it was only immigrants of 'the right kind' that would transform the troubled Cape Colony into a prosperous imperial possession (for the Empire, as well as for the settlers, themselves). This took two directions: against migrants of colour, and against the wrong sort of migrants from England. In several editorials spanning 1838 through 1843, Godlonton made it crystal clear that Europeans were 'the right kind' of immigrant.

The 'introduction of Free Labourers from India and elsewhere has been of late in this colony and some others a subject of serious consideration', Godlonton wrote in August of 1838. Speaking for the colony, however, he continued, 'We deprecate most fervently the *augmentation* of the *coloured* population by the introduction of labourers from India or any other place while the country [continues] in its present state'. We are familiar already with that 'present state', which involved the troubled aftermath of the 1835 war, the conclusion of which left Godlonton and his like-minded colonists supremely discontented, and precipitated the lengthy and heated quarrels over the 'frontier system' and indigenous mobility framed as 'vagrancy'. For Godlonton, the question of emigration was always connected to and rendered through the concerns, problems, and perspective of politics of the 'frontier'. In the course of denouncing the London Missionary Society, the *Commercial Advertiser*, and 'political quackery' in general, Godlonton turned to the 'frontier system' and then to vagrancy. 'In this province it is not the *paucity* of working hands that is complained of, but that there are so many *idlers*, who *consume* but do not *produce*,—and who are preying upon the very vitals of the country's prosperity'. 'Let the government put down vagabondizing', he prescribed. Then, in a fit of sarcasm, he rails against the impermissibility of the word 'vagrancy', because of the influence of 'philanthropist' gate-keepers of legitimate vocabulary. 'We call for no partial or repressive laws', he claims, but, 'If then we act in this matter [of idlers] with becoming prudence, taking due care to sink that awful word 'Vagrancy', we shall soon find that we have sufficient working hands in the country, and that we need neither hill-coolies from India nor natives from the interior to bring this country into high and profitable cultivation'.[25]

What is of interest, in all of this, is the way Godlonton blends so many of the ideas we have discussed into a single harangue: taking aim at missionaries, Africans, the frontier boundary, and vagrants, if not in a single breath, at least on the same page. In doing so, he argues against the importation of brown-skinned migrant workers into the colony. Consistently, this case for immigrants of a certain kind was linked to existing political problems in the colony, and those

[25] *Graham's Town Journal*, VII (342), 2 August 1838; emphasis original.

people linked to problematical politics. In April, 1839, it was the possibility of 'free laborers' imported from Madagascar and Mozambique that sparked Godlonton's ire. 'We cannot help thinking', he wrote, 'that those who maintain there is a paucity of working hands, of the colored classes, argue on a false principle, and that the measure proposed would, if carried out, rather augment the difficulties of the country than tend to remove them'. Among the difficulties of the country, thought Godlonton, was 'extreme' liberality in the government's treatment of the black and brown population, which had produced (or provoked) 'unrestrained liberty'. New labourer-immigrants of the wrong sort would only take advantage of the lack of restraint:

> While such a notion exists and such a system is maintained, can any one suppose for a moment that an importation of *colored* people would correct the evil? Rather is it not certain that the new comers would soon shake off the yoke imposed upon them, and augment that amount of vagrancy which is already pressing with so much severity upon the resources and active industry of the country?[26]

Against the political impracticability and danger inherent in the importation of so-called 'coloured' labour, Godlonton emphasised the political expediency of 'white' labour-immigrants. This was not merely the opinion of Godlonton. In early 1841, the editor reported, 'A movement has been made', which would 'FORCE this subject [of emigration]…upon the attention of our rulers at home'. 'In Cape Town, Algoa Bay, and Graham's Town, and other places, meetings were held last year, and resolutions passed, and memorials addressed to Lord J. Russell, praying for the application of £12,000 a year from the land revenues to the purpose of free emigration.' Godlonton agreed with a scheme proposed, in fact, by Fairbairn (who had moved on from importing vagrant children), which would use quit-rent revenue to pay passages to the colony of 'the indigent poor in our native country', who 'would hasten our shores', 'to supply us with LABOR'. Properly supplied with this commodity, the colony could not help but thrive:

> We think that an annual supply of labour *of the best kind* is essential now to the actual accomplishment of the public works which His Excellency has so much at heart. The addition of 1200 Europeans annually to our British population, would be felt in every department of business. The capital of the Colony would be employed to the best advantage. The revenue would rapidly increase. The ungranted government land…would acquire a value, and produce a respectable annual revenue. The thousand and one improvements so requisite to our happiness and security as a community, would follow the addition of an intelligent population—for instance, an efficient magistracy; more schools and places of worship—suitable markets—fine roads, and sea-ports; for had we an intelligent population animated with the enterprising spirit of colonists fresh from Europe, we should soon find that the difficulties…would yield to the skilful [*sic*] application of the rapidly increasing wealth of the Colony.

[26] *Graham's Town Journal*, VIII (380), 4 April 1839; emphasis original.

Godlonton observed how the Australian colonies had favorably used free passage from Britain of 'the most desirable description of emigrants'.[27] The 'thousand and one improvements' awaiting only the influx of Europeans contrasted sharply with the envisioned vagrancy and vagabondising that Indian, Mozambican, or Malagasy immigrants would engage in as soon as they landed. A year later, the case was made again; and Godlonton was not merely preaching, but picking up on currents in colonial discourse that reached between Graham's Town and Cape Town.

> Looking at the relative positions of the white and colored inhabitants of this Colony, it seems very clear that the great want here is an influx of *European* population. No one can successfully deny the truth of the statement made by Mr. Prince [in a speech at Cape Town], that an increase in the *colored* classes will do but little in raising the Colony to that place it unquestionably ought to occupy. If we want to see our harbours filled with ships and to have produce wherewith to freight them, we must bring hither European capital and labour….[28]

The matter of 'coloured' labor did not arise purely from Godlonton's head, but was in part a reaction, felt also in Cape Town, to the 'introduction' of 'Liberated Africans' to the Cape Colony. After banning trade in slaves, the British Empire took on the role of international enforcer, and would capture slavers, whether foreign or smugglers, and impound the 'cargo'. These 'Prize Negroes' were 'forfeited to His Majesty' and distributed around the Empire as 'apprentices', or indentured labourers.[29] Such twice-unlucky Africans caused a debate in Cape Town. A public meeting in 1841 felt moved to express its gratitude that the Cape had been named as a site to deposit people captured from slave ships. They were thinking specifically of the *Anna*, which had brought in 148 ex-slaves for indenture. They sought to raise a fund to help defray the cost of bringing 'Liberated Negroes' to the Cape as labourers.[30] A notice printed six months later advertised the 'Distribution of Negroes' for indenture.[31] Half a year again, and the *Mail* published information from the Custom House respecting the indenture of over 300 'Liberated Africans'.[32] However, in the Legislative Council, J. B. Ebden—the colony's 'pioneer of private banking', and a successful entrepreneur and merchant[33]—told the Governor, 'With respect to the liberated Africans, whose introduction my learned friend has so

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[27] *Graham's Town Journal*, X (465), 4 February 1841; emphasis original.
[28] *Graham's Town Journal*, XI (540), 7 April 1842; emphasis original.
[29] See Castlereagh to Caledon, 4 March 1808 (KAB, GH 1/3), pp. 85-87; Stanley to D'Urban, 12 September 1834 (KAB, GH 1/101), p. 3.
[30] *Cape Town Mail*, I (46), 4 December 1841.
[31] *Cape Town Mail*, II (67), 11 June 1842.
[32] *Cape Town Mail*, II (103), 18 February 1843.
[33] George, 'John Bardwell Ebden'.

strenuously advocated, I can only repeat my conviction, that this is not the description of labor we want'. On multiple occasions, Mr Ebden (with support), contested the use of colonial funds to 'introduce' Africans to the colony. He and others thought that money should be apportioned instead to assist 'free passage of British labourers'.[34] The Secretary to Government in the Legislative Council remarked, 'respecting the introduction of Liberated Africans', 'I would rather see one European imported than fifty of those blacks'.[35] Mr Canstatt, who attended a public meeting about emigration in Cape Town in August of 1842, though he had 'no particular object in encouraging emigration', took it as 'self-evident that we do require European labour'. At the same meeting, Ebden opposed the introduction of Africans as well as of migrants from the colonies, insisting that only 'British laborers of good character from the mother Country' would do.[36] 'The English Farmer' corresponded with the *Mail* from somewhere in the Cape District to complain that British workers did more work than African ones, yet only black immigrants were getting hired.[37]

Meanwhile, Godlonton published yet another editorial on the subject of immigrants, critical of the immigration policy of Governor Napier, drawing an explicit distinction between 'Negroes, the worst and lowest description of labour' and 'English or Irish labourers from a British port'. The question this time was how to fill the gap left by the trekboers ('emigrant farmers') who were themselves emigrating beyond the pale of the British colony. Should it be accomplished, asked Godlonton, 'by an importation of Negroes—or by our own kith and kin from our beloved Fatherland?' But although the question relied on racism, it clarified that racism through the familiar political referent of the West Indies: 'In other words, is the Colony to become an African St. Domingo—or is to be maintained as a British colony—governed by British laws; diffusing British principles, extending British commerce'.[38] The 'relative positions of white and colored' mentioned the previous year casts a particularly threatening shade over the colony when rendered through the revolution and violence of St. Domingo as an opposition to Britishness and the pale of British civilisation.

These colonial arguments contradict strict Malthusian conventions, by drawing distinctions between suitable and unwanted labourers and migrants based on perceptions of racial, ethnic, national, class, and political background. A preference for (variously) British, white, or European immigrants often trumped the practical demand for labour. However, the principle

[34] *Cape Town Mail*, II (104), 25 February 1843
[35] *Cape Town Mail*¸ III (124), 15 July 1843.
[36] *Cape Town Mail*, II (76) 27 August 1842.
[37] *Cape Town Mail*, I (39), 27 November 1841.
[38] *Graham's Town Journal*, XII (583), 2 February 1843.

of 'immigrants of a certain kind' was not limited to racial concerns. When the emigrant ship, *Guardian*¸ arrived in September 1842, it was reported

> The steerage passengers were landed yesterday morning. Several have already obtained employment. There are some useful mechanics, carpenters, joiners, shoemakers, tailors and others, some young Scotch labourers—an excellent shepherd, &c. &c…. There appears, however, to be too large a sprinkling of the *nondescript*, with long-tailed coats, who are not exactly the class we want.[39]

The *Mail* also reprinted a complaint from the *Graham's Town Journal*, upon the arrival of the *Anne*:

> There appears again to be too large a proportion of young men who are not adapted for farming servants or laborers, and who do not follow any trade, and this is precisely the class who find the greatest difficulty in finding employment, of whom we have less need than any other description.[40]

A mode of classism appears to have been deployed, not only against those without discernible (or at least preferred) trades but also operating through remarks on the fashion of the steerage passengers.[41] These types of prejudices and their application in migration arguments clearly demonstrate that Malthusian logic was conditional upon other political desires. If emigration to the colonies served not only the colonies but the 'mother country', as Ebden argued to the public of Cape Town when he rejected African migrants,[42] then the interests of the mother country were definitely secondary in the minds of colonists.

As Fairbairn editorialised in the *Commercial Advertiser*,

> Great Britain and Ireland imagine that they are suffering from a redundant population. They have more hands than work; more mouths than meat; and this excess of the human element is said to be increasing every year with increasing rapidity…. The mother country is overcrowded; the colonies are comparatively empty. To pour the excess of the one into the deficiency of the other seems to be clearly indicated by the nature of the case. If, says the Edinburgh Review for January, it is possible 'to remove from Ireland alone every year, for four or five years to come, 400,000 persons; let all those who have the means prepare against the evil that is coming.

Fairbairn then maintained the distinction between pauper emigrants and emigrants who could afford to support themselves.[43] This discourse of pauperism and the undesirability of certain

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[39] *Cape Town Mail*, II (86), 12 September 1842; emphasis original.
[40] *Cape Town Mail,* II 92, 3 December 1842.
[41] One English ballad describes 'a good old fashion'd long grey coat' as the traditional attire of farmers, but one which was classed, in relation to the 'new-fashioned' farmers who 'Dress'd up like any lord or 'squire'. See Peter Jones. 'Clothing the Poor in Early-Nineteenth-Century England'. *Textile History*, 37(1), 2006, p. 32.
[42] *Cape Town Mail*, II (76), 27 Aug 1842.
[43] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2275), 31 March 1849.

immigrants politicises the idea of poor persons or poor immigrants as not belonging and as threatening to colonial society. Some members of the British settlers, themselves recent immigrants to the colony, had themselves proven problematic to social order at the Cape of Good Hope. Lured by 'injudicious and erroneous statements…descriptive of a climate and fertility known only in romance', 'great dissatisfaction appeared' among groups of the 1820 settlers. 'Tradesmen and mechanics' abandoned their assigned locations to find work in towns. In Clanwilliam, north of Cape Town, and the eastern marchlands, where many settlers were located, there were complaints and meetings such that the Governor at the time, Lord Somerset, issued a proclamation against 'public meetings, for the discussion of public measures, and political subjects'. The bureaucrat, Bird, chalked the trouble up to the attempt to turn working class and poor people into landed proprietors.[44] Combined with the problem of vagabondizing indentured servants and episodes such as the failed importation of vagrant boys, there is a sense that political and social disturbances by immigrants were known in the Cape Colony. While calling for labourers, British colonists at the Cape were attempting to manage the possibilities for disturbance and order by looking for immigrants of 'the best kind'.

The delimitation of white-British-European migrants by class included ideas about criminality. While Fairbairn felt that 'these strangers', the 'Liberated Africans', had worked out well, 'scarcely ever heard of by the Police', despite 'some misgivings when we saw the Liberated Africans diffused amongst our already too varied population', he did not anticipate the same success from 'a class of Emigrants hitherto fortunately unknown amongst us': 'Juvenile Delinquents'.[45] At another public meeting in Cape Town, in 1842, a Captain Van Renan was obliged to defend his position on bringing 'Juvenile Delinquents' to the colony. Several children already landed at the Cape had committed crimes,[46] and combined, perhaps, with the recalcitrance of juvenile migrants ten years earlier, the Captain was met with 'cries of "We don't want them"'. In the newspaper, Fairbairn was referring to them as 'depraved children', 'trained from the cradle to crime', 'a generation of young vipers, whom, with all their police, legal machinery, churches, schools, workhouses, and other apparatus for the preservation of morals and the protection of society, they find it impossible to control at home'.[47] But the Captain had an excuse, somewhat lame: 'Seeing that the government here have been opposed to every other plan for introducing labourers from the British Isles, I

[44] Bird, *State of the Cape*, pp. 233-241.
[45] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XVIII (1568), 22 June 1842.
[46] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 19.
[47] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XVIII (1568), 22 June 1842.

thought, rather than have none at all it would be better to introduce these juvenile delinquents'. They might not be suitable for town, but would be good farmworkers, he argued. They were, after all, at least British. Mr. Changuion, making numerous apologies for expressing himself in his non-native language, which he did at length and windily, argued, '*that delinquents of any description are objectionable as immigrants; and that, of all descriptions of delinquents, none are more objectionable than juveniles*'. Mr. Scrutton, on the other hand, did not mind juvenile delinquents, but 'if…the colony were about the inundated from one end to the other by criminals…I would join in reprobating such a measure, and would recommend such an opposition as would effectually bar any number being sent here, by refusing to take them into your employ'. Others at the meeting responded to Scrutton, 'We will!'[48]

ANTI-CONVICTISM AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

The Cape settlers' problems around immigrants of a certain kind reached a head in the so-called 'convict crisis' of 1849. In April of that year, the ship *Neptune* had departed Bermuda with a 'cargo' of convicts to be landed at the Cape. These were 'ticket-of-leave men', meaning that they could hire out rather than be assigned to masters, and they could 'enjoy a substantial measure of freedom'; in short, they were considered rather trustworthy, as far as convicts went. They included, intriguingly, the Irish political journalist John Mitchel, convicted of treason and sentenced to transportation for his activities in Ireland. The reaction in the Cape Colony was immediate and quickly well-organised.[49] By the end of May, an Anti-Convict Committee had formed in Cape Town with the object of seeing that 'requisite measures be taken, and if necessary, a law passed to prevent the landing of any Convicts in this Colony'. They 'universally condemned' the 'admission into this Colony of convicted felons holding tickets-of leave, and other criminals under sentence of transportation from the United Kingdom'.[50] In short order, the Committee had corresponded with numerous other settlements of the colony and the Anti-Convict Movement as born.

Alan F. Hattersley provides a thorough narrative of the convict crisis and the Anti-Convict Association, but he interprets it as a moment in the development of liberal democracy and 'the growth of unity' in the Cape Colony.[51] There is some accuracy to this, because the question of

[48] *Cape Town Mail*, II (72), 16 July 1842; emphasis original.
[49] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis,* pp. 2; 12.
[50] *Anti-Convict Pledge Annexures*, *Vol. I* (KAB, A535), pp. 1; 7-8; 10.
[51] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*.

'convictism' did become tied up with the simultaneous demand for 'representative government' common at mid-century in the British colonies of white settlement. The designation of the Cape as a penal settlement was part of the 'tyranny' of 'arbitrary government'. However, the analysis of anti-convictism as showcasing any modicum of democratic ideals is only possible from a colonial perspective. The events of 1849 amounted to a well-organised xenophobic mobilisation, with a strong following in white middle-class civil society but extending to include rural and racialised people, which challenged government policy assumptions about who belonged in the colony and decisively asserted that certain people did *not* belong in the colony. The Anti-Convict Association represented the most organised and militant mobilisation of anti-'foreign' sentiment in the Cape Colony during the first half of the nineteenth century. Like the other manifestations of Cape politics in which the foreigner was cast as threat, however, the 'foreign' and 'foreigners' for the Anti-Convict Association were politically unique. A specific group of people—in this case, European subjects of the British Empire convicted of crimes and sentenced to transportation—were identified as outsiders who did not belong in the colony. In light of the oft-repeated fact that the Cape Colony desired labourers, the anti-convict movement represented a politics not rooted in Malthusian calculus, but rather in subjective and political ideas about what sort of person would be deemed 'foreign' to colonial society. This highlights the point that foreignness was a political and politicised concept. The anti-convict discourse of 1849 shows the drawing of clear, politicised boundaries between 'convict' and 'free' emigrants to the Cape. This generated rising suspicion of all overseas migrants because of the perceived need to repel convicts from southern African shores. 'Convictism' was linked to local problems and ideas about the foreign and foreigners that have been addressed in earlier chapters. We will look briefly at the Cape in the history of convict transportation, then at the scope of the anti-convict movement, and last at the arguments made against the entry of convicts into the colony.

Penal transportation is yet another sixteenth-century development, proposed to Queen Elizabeth as a manner of dealing with 'idle vagabonds' in England and bolstering the labour forces of England's colonies. Although murky archival patches make for an incomplete record and uncertain numbers, Hamish Maxwell-Stewart arrives at a sum of over 300,000 people who were sentenced to transportation in the British Empire between 1615 and 1870. [52] The Cape of Good Hope had been a site of convict transportation during the seventeenth and eighteenth

[52] Hamish Maxwell-Stewart. 'Convict Transportation from Britain and Ireland 1615-1870'. *History Compass* 8(11), 2010, pp. 1221-1242.

centuries, when the Dutch had sent convicts from the East Indies to work off their sentences in southern Africa alongside slaves. In 1615, however, some forty years before the Dutch had even set up their station at the Cape, eight British convicts were abandoned there for the sakes of 'repentance and reform', in an apt exhibition of a meaning of 'maroon' not usually associated with the state: 'to put (a person) ashore and leave him [sic] on a desolate island or coast (as was done by buccaneers and pirates) by way of punishment'.[53] Of these eight maroons, four drowned, one was killed by indigenous people, and the other three were 'taken off and returned to England, where they were eventually hanged for a fresh criminal exploit'.[54] In the eighteenth century, Robben Island in Table Bay at Cape Town had served as a site of incarceration for the Dutch East India Company, and the British increasingly drew the Island into its systems of incarceration, transportation and punishment.[55] During the period of British settlement in the Cape Colony, there was an evolving official interest in penal transportation: Governor Somerset thought it was a good idea, while Napier, six governors later, thought convicts would 'have a destructive influence on the morals of the lower classes', particularly recently freed slaves. His successors, Maitland and Smith, both were willing to accept convicts as labourers.[56] The latter, however, ran up against the righteous outrage of the Anti-Convict Association.

Particularly relevant to the anti-convictism moment at the Cape, important debates were waged in the British Empire during the 1840s about the practical and moral qualities of transportation as a sentence. Those who favoured transportation believed that it was an '(1) effective and humane means of preventing crime and reforming the criminal; (2) it was economical; (3) it permanently ridded the mother country of the 'irreclaimable portion of its culprit population ']; and (4) in the colonies convict labour was turned to the best account for the public benefit and accelerated the economic development of the colonies'. Those against transportation believed '(1) transportation was inadequate as a punishment; (2) it as too expensive….; and (3) it was prejudicial to the sound development of the colonies'. Perhaps tellingly, the *Times* (of London) asked in 1849, 'If we are not to use our colonies for Convict Settlements, what is the good of a Colony?'.[57] As for those likely to suffer transportation, their antipathy to the system was often captured in song; one ballad common to England and Ireland describes the hard usage that convicts, such as poachers and sex workers, received at the hands

[53] 'Maroon', *OED*, *Vol*. IX, p. 383.
[54] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 5.
[55] Clare Anderson. 'Convicts, Carcerality and Cape Colony Connections in the 19th Century'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 42(3), 2016, pp. 433-437.
[56] Ibid, pp. 437-439.
[57] Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, pp. 389-390.

of the 'planters' (free colonists) in Van Diemen's Land, and their longing to return home to Ireland or England.[58] Transportation petered out from the 1850s to the 1870s, but in the 1840s, despite growing opposition, it was still considered cheaper than prisons and a method for removing a supposedly 'surplus population' from the metropole.[59]

An important study by Clare Anderson situates the question of convict transportation at the Cape of Good Hope within a broader, evolving British imperial context of 'carcerality'. She argues that empire-wide debates on the practice of transportation influenced local patterns of incarceration and punishment at the Cape. Importantly, in her work, we see how discourses on transportation also linked with other imperial problems, such as slavery and relations with indigenous populations. The 1820s Commission of Eastern Inquiry toured sites of incarceration in the Cape Colony and Mauritius, and produced a report for London. As Anderson writes, 'The commission's interest in abolition, convicts, liberated Africans and migration, and its understated and tacit acknowledgement of the links between them, reveals much about the early 19th-century association of punishment with other kinds of unfree labour'. In light of her study, we can see how anti-convictism at the Cape linked the colony with England, and the West Indies, and the emergent frame of reference, Australia. Another tour of investigation that included Australia, the Cape, and Mauritius also criticised transportation through comparisons to slavery.[60] With transportation up for question, the Cape Colony's anti-convict movement was forcibly entering the debate with a powerful mobilisation, but one that did not hinge on the treatment of convicted persons but rather on the dangers associated with them.

To their credit, the colonial Anti-Convict Associations seem to have reached agreement quickly with regard to what was actually wrong with the introduction of convicts into the colony. Participants seem to have been on the same page as to the problem. Therefore, their meetings (and thus the archival record) are mostly concerned with the doings and necessities of keeping the convicts out and of organising petitions to government in England. However, there are several indications as to why convicts were seen not to belong and the dangers of their migration to the colony. These are mainly delivered through the Cape Town newspapers, *The South African Commercial Advertiser* and *The Cape Town Mail*, and in the petitions and memorials to Parliament drawn up by local branches of the anti-convict movement that were reprinted in these papers.

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[58] See for example, Ronnie Drew. 'Van Diemen's Land'. *Ronnie Drew*, Ram Records Limited, RMLP 1017, 1975; see also Philip Butterss. 'Australian Ballads: The Social Function of British and Irish Transportation Broadsides, Popular Convict Verse and Goldfield Songs' (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 1989).
[59] Maxwell-Stewart, 'Convict Transportation', p. 1233.
[60] Anderson, 'Convicts', pp. 430; 433.

The basis for participation and membership in the anti-convict associations was 'the Pledge', which was quite similar to Scrutton's declaration seven years earlier. Members of the Cape Town association agreed to

> pledge our faith to each other, that we will not employ, or knowingly admit into our establishments or houses, work with, or for, or associate with any convicted felon or felons sent to this Colony under sentence of transportation, and that we will discountenance and drop connection with any person who may assist in landing, supporting, or employing such convicted felons.[61]

The Pledge was then disseminated across the colony with invitations to the people of other towns and districts to take it. Later, in November, the Pledge became a requirement for membership in the associations.[62] The association printed certificates to prove that 'The Bearer… A Native of… Has signed the Anti-Convict Pledge', with the reverse side printed in Dutch.[63] In June, the *Mail* ran a front-page advert under the headline 'CONVICTED FELONS', declaiming 'THE LAST HOPE OF THE COLONISTS…THE PLEDGE'.[64]

The records of the Cape Town Anti-Convict Association reveal a movement that extended across the colony and involved a significant portion of the white population. In response to invitations to sign petitions and to take the pledge, letters were received from towns and rural areas indicating widespread support. This correspondence came from, among other places, the communities in the hinterland of Cape Town: Wellington, Tulbagh, Caledon, Malmesbury, Wynberg, Somerset West, Groenekloof (missionary station), Stellenbosch, Paarl, Simons Town, Fransch Hoek, Sir Lowry Pass, Hottentots Holland, and Worcester; from areas further afield: Swellendam, Breede's Dorp, Riversdale, Elim, George Town, Olifants River, and Clanwilliam; from the marchlands: Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Graham's Town, Cradock, Philipton, Somerset East, Graaff-Reinet, Fort Beaufort, the Bokkeveld, and Colesberg; and even from Pietermaritzburg and Durban in the colony of Natal.[65] In addition to the letters, the *Frontier Times* reported on meetings in Port Elizabeth, Graham's Town, Cradock, and Swellendam, and petitions, including from such small or remote places as 'Winburg, Bathurst, Burghers Dorp, Oliphant's Hoek, Richmond (Graaff-Reinet district), Salem, Colesberg, Whittle sea [*sic*], Zwagers Hoek, Baviaan's River, and King William's Town'. These, noted the *Frontier Times*, were "principally from Dutch neighbourhoods', and their petitions

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[61] *Anti-Convict Pledge Annexures, Vol. I* (KAB, A535), p. 14.
[62] *Cape Frontier Times,* X (494), 13 November 1849.
[63] *Anti-Convict Pledge Annexures, Vol. I* (KAB, A535), np.
[64] *Cape Town Mail*, IX (439), 23 June 1849.
[65] *Anti-Convict Pledge Annexures, Vol. I* (KAB, A535), np.

included ‘some thousand signatures’.[66] The rejection of convicts thus stretched from their planned port-of-entry at Cape Town to the marchlands of the colony, and had at least some support across the settlers’ ethnic lines. It was not unanimous support. Robert Godlonton became fed up with ‘convictism’, after initially expressing support for the Association in the *Journal*. He felt that the Cape Town Association was overstepping and abusing its power through interfering in the Legislative Council by demanding that all members ought to take the pledge or resign, and he did not approve of a riot at Cape Town or the attacks made on individual ‘freedom’ by the Anti-Convict Association. His criticism, which came from his inherent conservatism, did not mean that he wanted convicts in the colony, and the *Journal* continued to print anti-convict material.[67] There were internal disagreements about ‘starving’ convicts aboard the *Neptune* by not provisioning the ship, which ‘broke the unanimity’ of the movement; and Fairbairn was assaulted and his house tossed around by a gang of toughs hired by an anti-anti-convict faction.[68] The movement was, nevertheless, widespread and apparently committed.

There is some evidence of women participating in anti-convict politics. ‘A Lady’ wrote to the *Times* to say that ‘the introduction of convicts should be more seriously apprehended by Women than by Men, as being less able to protect themselves’, and because their children would be surrounded by ‘vice’ if the Cape became a penal colony. ‘Let us therefore be free of Convicts’, wrote the ‘Lady’, who encouraged women to get up a petition against the convicts.[69] Whether this ‘Lady’ was in fact a woman, or a man, writing what he thought women should feel about convictism, is unclear. There are almost no examples of correspondence to the colonial newspapers written by women. On the other hand, perhaps convictism may have seemed important enough for the editor to break with the exclusion of women’s views from political debate. The letter is innocuous and sexist enough. However, we know that women did become involved in the anti-convict movement, if not clearly in Graham’s Town. In September, the *Commercial Advertiser* published a ‘Petition of Females of Hottentots Holland’ to the Queen, protesting the introduction of convicts.[70]

It seems, too, that anti-convictism was not limited to the white population. The reply from the missionary at Groenekloof to the Anti-Convict Association’s correspondence claimed that

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[66] *Cape Frontier Times*, IX (472), 5 June 1849; X (481), 7 August 1849; X (482), 14 August 1849; X (488), 25 September 1849.
[67] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, pp. 59; 65; *Graham’s Town Journal*, XVIII (923), 18 August 1849; XVIII (933), 27 October 1849.
[68] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, pp. 69-70.
[69] *Cape Frontier Times*, IX (471), 29 May 1849.
[70] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2323), 15 September 1849.

'also the names of a number of Persons, belonging to our Institution who have requested me to fix their signature to the Memorial, in order to make known to His Excellency the Governor their real opinions and wishes about this highly important matter'.[71] Similarly, the *Times* mentioned a 'demonstration' at the Kat River Settlement, 'against the making the Cape Colony a penal settlement', while the *Mail* printed the 'Memorial of Ministers at Graham's Town' of 29 May claimed to represent the 'feelings' of the 'Dutch population and colored classes'. It was also reported that, in Cape Town, the 'Malays' had signed the pledge.[72] Whether these claims are accurate (especially those made by missionaries and ministers) is suspect; it is possible that they spoke on behalf of their congregations, with or without any discussion. The resolutions of a meeting at the Kat River Settlement, published in the *Frontier Times*, certainly appear to be framed by white people, laden as they are with racist notions of improvement and civilisation.[73] (We cannot tell to what degree such ideas were internalised by people of colour). One dismissive colonial observer thought that the Kat River people were merely short on food and did not want to share provisions with any fresh arrivals in the colony.[74] However, it also appears that the fervor and arguments of anti-convictism prevailed with people of colour in the colony, too. At the Kat River demonstration, Mr. V. Jacobs spoke up to say,

> We know nothing of these sort of people. I can however form some faint idea of what they must be, when I remember some characters among the old African corps, both officers and men; a regiment which is said to have been drafted from some such medley, and I can form an idea of some of the moral effects, when I remember the conduct of many of the " Roey Batjes," ("Red Jackets")—when they lived among civilians—conduct what has often astonished the savages of Caffreland.

His compatriot, J. Isaacs, had spoken with an 'Englishman', who told him that the convicts were 'ten times worse than the C—s'. It was felt that the convicts would prey on women of colour, that they were coming to 'destroy Africa' and would 'bring a bad race of children'. Jacobs stated, 'We are a hospitable people…but when these men come, we shall suspect every poor traveller to be a Convict, and will shut our doors against all Englishmen'.[75] These are not words relayed straight from the belly, but thoughtful and cautious reactions to rumour. The report that 'Malays' took the pledge is probably accurate, but we do not know who they were, how many they really were, and for what reasons they pledged against the convicts. Were they

[71] *Anti-Convict Pledge Annexures, Vol. I* (KAB, A535), np.
[72] *Cape Town Mail*, IX (432), 9 June 1849; IX (473), 12 June 1849; IX (438), 14 July 1849.
[73] *Cape Frontier Times*, IX (473), 12 June 1849.
[74] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 65.
[75] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (914), 12 June 1849.

shopkeepers who agreed to withhold provisions? Did they sign as labourers, of their own volition or at their employers' demand? Were they motivated by a prejudice against convicts, a fear of competition for work, of arguments about slavery that were tied up in the transportation question, or the language of free government that was increasingly used to justify the movement? Unfortunately, their thoughts on the matter are not given any substance in the archive. The fact that some people of colour in the colony were part of the anti-convict movement reiterates its extent, and is especially suggestive of its political rather than identarian basis.

In late June, a subcommittee of four met to draft an address to be delivered to the Cape Town public on the ostentatiously anti-imperial date of the fourth of July. The following excerpt clarifies some of the reasoning behind the anti-convict movement.

> Fellow Colonists and Friends
>
> You are now aware that it is the intention of her Majestys [*sic*] present Ministers to use this Colony as a Penal Settlement, into which the Criminals of Great Britain and Ireland, who have been guilty of the most dangerous, hateful, and polluting offences may be transported,…and where they may be established settlers, and mixed up with our peaceable, virtuous and unsuspecting population. It is the deliberate opinion of all ranks and classes of men, that this measure, if carried out by Government, will ruin the Colony. It will make life and property insecure. It will stamp degradation and infamy on the present and all succeeding generations. It will render our community unfit to receive and incompetent to administer Free Institutions. It will convert the public Schools into nurseries of vice. It will transform the prisons into schools of crime. It will transform the Courts of Justice into pitfalls and slaughter houses for the innocent. It will generate irreligion, disorder, and violence within our borders, and by infusing the enterprise without the restrains of civilization among the barbarians and savage peoples on our Frontier, already most formidable, it will lay the foundation of cruel wars, devastation and massacre.[76]

Some points made by Messrs. Gadney, Andsell, Fairbairn, and Rutherfoord should be elaborated. First is the gesture to unity in the appeal to 'Fellow Colonists'. It sets up a community into which 'polluting' persons may be transported, continuously making the distinction between civil and convict society. Second, and crucial to the anti-convict position, is that, because of the incursion into or presence in the colony and the population of convicts, 'tremendous calamities' would ensue.[77] Third, by referring to the problems the colonists experienced with African populations, they make the convict crisis relevant to our discussions of the frontier, improper connections, and vagrants. The problem of the particular foreigners, 'convicts', interrelated with the problems posed by others perceived as foreign and threatening. Fairbairn believed that should 'convicted felons under the name of "*Exiles*"' be 'dispersed

[76] *Annexures, Vol. I*, pp. 21-25a.
[77] Ibid, p. 25a.

through the colony', 'the English character will be at once degraded in the eyes of all other classes of the inhabitants.[78] He characterised the voyage of the *Neptune* as a plan to land three-hundred felons to be 'DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE DISTRICTS' '*to mingle with the population, and to find their way to such fields of enterprize among the Native Tribes on the borders of the Colony*'.[79] They 'would lower the character of the whole *white laboring population* of the Colony, which it is of unspeakable importance to sustain and elevate'.[80] These beliefs and assessments were not unique to Fairbairn or the Cape Town crowd.

Although Hattersley claims that, outside of west of the colony, 'Unrest generally was to be attributed to the unpopularity of the colonial government, rather than appreciation of the dangers involved in the landing of ticket-of-leave men',[81] this does not seem to be true and is not reflected in the words of colonists at anti-convict public meetings. The misinterpretation serves Hattersley's bigger argument that self-government was the main point of the whole convict affair. The anti-convict facet of it, however, seems closer to many of the colonists' hearts. One speaker at a meeting in Fort Beaufort, 'one of the largest Public Meetings ever assembled in [the] district', spoke of the 'torrent of vice', another of the 'flood of iniquity', that the convicts rode towards the colony. William Shaw wrote a letter on behalf of the Wesleyans, decrying the introduction of convicts.[82] These were not isolated views. In fact, it was in the eastern marchlands that some of the most articulate (if reactionary) anti-convict arguments were made.

E. R. Bell, speaking at the Fort Beaufort meeting in June, reiterated Fairbairn's point about the 'lowering' of white society, but through racial solidarity rather than subtle class interest. 'We now ride on the highway', he said, 'and a white face is a companion; we join him;

> but let us be careful *when* Convicts are imported with whom we ride, lest they be cut purses or cut throats. We alight at an Inn; we cheerfully sit down with a white person to take our refreshment, and retire to rest. *Then* we may be the associates of burglars, highwaymen, and robbers. If Convicts be admitted to this Colony, it must dismember society, and render our present position of confidence one of doubt and suspicion.[83]

'The *Convict* question', wrote the editorial of the *Frontier Times* in July, 'still occupies the public mind in the Eastern and Western Provinces of the Colony to the almost utter exclusion

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[78] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2277), 7 April 1849; emphasis original.
[79] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2280), 21 April 1849; emphasis original.
[80] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2284), 2 May 1849; emphasis original.
[81] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 65.
[82] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (912), 2 June 1849.
[83] Ibid; emphasis original.

of all other topics'. Several petitions were published in that number. From Colesberg, more than two hundred miles north of Graham's Town, the locals complained of the 'punishment' of 'having the felon population of England let loose upon them to taint the morals of the population'. The petitioners from East London, the port city of the marches, were more specific. They argued, 'That these criminals or as they have been mildly called "Exiles" or "ticket-of-leave" men, would by their crimes and exercises dishonor the name and disgrace the character of Englishmen amongst the native tribes, weaken the influence of the Government over them and render them hostile to British rule'. They then made a remarkable point:

> That it is a well known fact that deserters from Her Majesty's Regiments and other unprincipled men have taken refuge beyond the borders of the colony, and assisted the hostile emigrant farmers on various occasions in their resistance to British rule.
>
> Your petitioners have not doubt that many of these criminals whom it is the intention of Earl Grey to send to this colony, will find their way to Kafirland and making cause with the natives, render the next K—r war more bloody, more expensive, and more difficult than the last.

A similar fear was articulated by the petitioners from King William's Town, who claimed that, 'under the circumstances [of living in 'Kaffraria', 'encompassed by numerous K—r tribes'] they justly dread the introduction…of any bad men, who have been sentenced to be transported from England for their crimes who may find their way amongst the K—s, teach them how to use their strength, and incite them to make further aggressions upon the colonists'. They feared 'the danger to which they would be exposed if desperate and unprincipled men from the gaols of the mother country were to be let loose amongst the natives'.[84] Likewise, at Fort Peddie, just across the Fish River from Graham's Town, the memorialists referred to 'consequences of the most direful character, whether contemplated in its relation to their own offspring, to the Colony at large, or to the Native tribes, with which the Colony is so closely connected'.[85] Inhabitants of Durban, on the east coast of the colony of Natal, also wrote to the House of Commons of 'the most dangerous consequences' of sending convicts into a situation where British subjects were 'surrounded…on all sides by an immense population of Native Inhabitants who would from their (at present) heathen state be likely to become victims to the dissolute and abandoned habits of convicted felons'.[86]

These petitions position convictism within the politics of the frontier, and they associate convicts with the problems of deserters and of 'improper connexions'. They mesh with ideas

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[84] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (478), 17 July 1849.
[85] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (913), 9 June 1849.
[86] *Annexures*, *Vol. II,* np.

expressed in a letter of 1839, in which a colonist had strung together the need to protect the frontier farmers, the colony's convict system, the foolhardiness of 'congregating a number of men of bad Character in one apartment' or too long together in the common tasks of hard labour, the 'corruption' of the 'Colored or lately emancipated population', the comparative sagacity of building a penitentiary, and the 'host of Vagabonds roving over [the country]'.[87] It was also known that some 'ticket-of-leave' men had run away and gone vagabondizing—become 'bushrangers'—in Australia, where, as with slaves in the West Indies, desertion was a common route through which convicted and transported men and women, criminalised forced migrants, resisted the exploitation of their labour.[88] The 1849 convicts were feared for the potential, imagined, or even likely connections they could establish with Africans, or else with the 'emigrant farmers', the Boers who had gone beyond the pale. These connections, the colonists believed, would be fraught with danger to themselves and rooted in antagonism or hostility to British authority and the British colony. These arguments make clear a perceived political difference between the colonists and the convicts, the former loyally British, the latter likely to consort with foreign polities.

In the later part of the year, the Cape papers were devoted almost entirely to anti-convict content. The *Mail* ran weekly editorials on anti-convictism, followed by updates on the 'Anti Convict Movements' around the colony and extensive notes and transcripts from anti-convict meetings, sometimes printing supplements to accommodate the lengthy speeches made there. In the *Commercial Advertiser,* Fairbairn relentlessly repeated the line that the colony would not accept convicts. Both the *Frontier Times* and the *Graham's Town Journal* were overtaken with 'convictism'. As reported in the *Times,* 'the *Convict* question still occupies the public mind…to the almost utter exclusion of all other topics'.[89]

The 'convict question' was sometimes more of a 'convict panic'. When the *Alice* 'arrived in Table Bay with 212 Emigrants, to whom in consequence of the suspicion which now justly attaches to all emigrants sent out under auspices of the Colonial Office, the Emigration Agent, Mr. Southey, has been obliged to furnish a certificate of character'.[90] Southey's 'Emigration Notice' observed that 'a report that was in circulation, to the effect that many of the Emigrants just arrived by the "Royal Alice" were Convicted Felons'.[91] When a group of boys for indenture

[87] Memorial to Sir George Napier, 2 September 1839 (KAB, CO 4002/136), pp. 611-618.
[88] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 12; see Hamish Maxwell-Stewart and Michael Quinlan. 'Voting with Their Feet: Absconding and Labour Exploitation in Convict Australia'. In Rediker, Chakraborty, and van Rossum, *A Global History of Runaways*, pp. 156-177.
[89] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (478), 17 July 1849; emphasis original.
[90] *Cape Frontier Times,* X (482), 14 August 1849.
[91] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2313), 11 August 1849.

were landed amidst anger on the part of colonials, Fairbairn observed that 'one of the evils' of convictism was that 'that suspicion falls on every body of emigrants that reaches the Cape'. 'Those lads', as he called them, were apparently not delinquent.[92] In short, rumour was working in the colony, eliciting distrust of anyone arriving from England. An extract from the paper *Zuid Afrikaan*, on a meeting of the Swellendam Association, reported that they had taken to 'advising their [district's] inhabitants not to dispose of cattle or provisions…to *strangers* without the production of a certificate from one of the Anti-Convict Associations of the Colony, or sufficient proof' that the stranger would not in turn sell the provisions to be used by convicts.[93] Not only did convicts not belong in the colony, but this evidence points to politics and political differentiation becoming the basis for suspicion of strangers in general.

Panic and suspicion were manipulated by the Association and by editors like John Fairbairn, who stirred up fear with repeated claims like the following:

> It is now certain that criminals, under sentence of transportation for every species of offence known to the law, may be on their way to the Cape of Good Hope, from Europe, from America, from Africa, and from Asia. They are on their way from the United Kingdom, from Bermuda, from Mauritius, and from Hong Kong. The Cape is to be forced open for the admission of felonry from the central kingdom and from all the dependencies of the Empire.[94]

The Cape Town Association broadcast a letter to the colony's other organisations in November, which said, 'Intelligence has just been received from Madras, so late as the 24th of September, to the effect that preparations were making *to convey Convicts from India to the Cape of Good Hope*. Their arrival may be daily expected'. This was combined with an admonition to stick to the Pledge.[95]

Fairbairn was particularly relentless in fomenting rumour and distrust. He wrote that once the convicts landed and mixed with the colonial population, '*To be an Englishman;—to speak the English language, will henceforth render every stranger an object of suspicion*!'[96] Though he considered distrust of emigrants an 'evil', he nevertheless wrote of the 'suspicion…that Earl Grey might possibly include among the laborers of good character, for whom free passage has been offered…some of a different description from the crowded penitentiaries of England, in fact, *Exiles in disguise*'.[97] One double-barreled fearmongering editorial spoke of the convicts'

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[92] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2285), 5 May 1849.
[93] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (488), 25 September 1849; emphasis original.
[94] *South African Commercial Advertiser,* XXVII (2308), July 25 1849; XXVII (2311), 4 August 1849.
[95] *Annexures, Vol. II*, np; emphasis original.
[96] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (227), 7 April 1849; emphasis original.
[97] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2284), 2 May 1849; emphasis original.

wives joining them 'to lay the foundation of a criminal community in the midst of the Cape population' and that emigrants ships would be '"*taken advantage of*," for smuggling criminals into the Cape'.[98] Fairbairn repeated the first claim at a public meeting in Cape Town on 29 September: 'We know at this moment he [Earl Grey] is sending to this colony, shipload after shipload of the vilest descriptions of men, to be followed by shiploads of abandoned women'.[99] (A letter writer from Graham's Town only identified as 'T.' also believed that 'Shipload of male would be succeeded by shipload of female convicts' to 'disseminate' 'evils upon our community'. Anti-convictism, said 'T.', was the 'cause of the true interests of the colony'.[100]) Fairbairn's sensationalism caught hold of 'The contemptible wretch who fired a pistol at the Queen' and had been 'sentenced to transportation for seven years'. Fairbairn surmised, (sarcastically, perhaps), that the man 'may possibly come here in the next Emigrant Ship!' He then asked 'By the way, should not the names of all the Emigrants, as in the case of other passengers arriving at the Cape, be published in the *Gazette?* Their names, birth-places, and callings?'[101] Fairbairn's anti-convictism consistently blurred the lines of those who did and those who did not belong in the colony, and played upon fears in the manufacturing of a political movement against a certain construction of the 'foreigner'.

The colony drew its own conclusions about the men on board the *Neptune*. From the limited information available to me, it appears that this 'shipload of the vilest description of men' were not all that vile. Apart from John Mitchel's conviction of High Treason, the life sentence imposed on the farmer William Frewin of Limerick for 'being in the company of felons', and farmer Thomas Sheridan's conviction of 'sedition', the other crimes are: one instance of theft, one of larceny, and five instances of cow, heifer, or sheep stealing, committed by a miner, a blacksmith, a publican, a stonecutter, and two labourers.[102] Livestock thieves had certainly earned the Cape settlers' ire before, but it does not appear that, with the exception of Mitchel, the convictions represented by the *Neptune* were known at the Cape. It seems unlikely that, after further investigations of court records in England and Ireland, the other 278 convicts would all or mostly turn out to be murderers. At the Cape Colony, however, it was not the truth

[98] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2310), 1 August 1849; emphasis original.
[99] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (491), 16 October 1849.
[100] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (498), 11 December 1849.
[101] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2318), 29 August 1849.
[102] Further research on the passengers of the *Neptune* might prove valuable. This would require access to court records at several locations in England and Ireland. 'Neptune voyage to Van Diemen's Land. [Originally for Cape of Good Hope, however due to anti-convict sentiment, ship eventually sailed for Van Diemen's Land.], Australia in 1849 with 306 passengers'. Coding Labs, 2020. Available at: https://convictrecords.com.au/ships/neptune/1849 [accessed 1 February 2020].

or the facts that mattered; 'anti-convictism' was a fear-driven politics depending on what the colonist population and their editor-leaders could imagine.

There ensued in the Cape Colony something similar to what Rachel Bright, a historian of Chinese indentured workers on South African mines after the turn of the twentieth century, calls a 'moral panic', rooted in rumour, sensationalism, association of a certain class/race with moral depravity and criminality, and suspicions about their political connections and inclinations. In 1849, it was the figure of the 'convict' from which the colony cooked up all manner of alarm. However, it would be wrong to view anti-convictism as simply 'moral' and simply 'panic'. Anti-convict colonists had clearly articulated reasons for resisting the creation of penal settlement at the Cape, rooted in local political concerns. 'Convict', in this instance, was politicised in three ways: First, it represented the judgement of the British legal system, which had identified certain people as criminals, itself a political category. Second, the convict was the 'outsider' in the colonial anti-convict movement, cast in the role of the 'foreigner'. Third, convictism related to ideas about political difference, which encompassed the real or imagined activities of the convicts themselves, as well as the activities of other colonists who did not support or were suspected not to support the anti-convict movement.

Bright highlights the ambiguity between a 'grassroots' and 'elite-engineered' panic.[103] Whether the 'convict crisis' was a strategic move on the part of some prominent colonists, such as John Fairbairn, to gain local political power and to pressure Parliament to accept representative government for the Cape Colony is debatable—and likely partially accurate—but the reality at the Cape was of widespread 'anti-convict' mobilisation, based on various political arguments and fears that said that convicted persons did not belong in the colony. The discourse of representative government and xenophobia were not mutually exclusive. The 'successful defence of the Colony', celebrated in the *Frontier Times* a year after the anti-convict struggle, linked the 'Convict invasion' with 'the political prospects of the colonists', with the 'attempt made by the Colonial Minister to degrade the Cape into a penal settlement', and with the 'triumph of [the colony's] political freedom'.[104] A gesture of imperial power was thus, to an extent, a matter of 'invasion' orchestrated by an 'external' government, which threatened the rights of colonists. This 'arbitrary' and 'tryannical' form of government violated what many colonists thought ought to be. Like the relationship between Xhosa mobility and Xhosa chiefly power, in the politics of anti-convictism, the convicts represented movement

[103] Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa,* p. 95-97
[104] *Cape Frontier Times,* X (534), 20 August 1850.

from beyond the pale of colonial political needs and aspirations. This point should not be exaggerated, but treated as analogous to the 'anti-colonial' politics that settlers envisioned in the missionary societies in southern Africa. Most of the colony's vitriol targeted the forced migrants, not the empire. To borrow from Loren B. Landau's work on twenty-first century xenophobia, the convicts were both 'an enemy within: an amorphously delimited group of outsiders that is inherently threatening, often indistinguishable from others, and effectively impossible to spatially exclude' and 'people whose presence came to be seen as an existential threat to' the colony's 'collective transformation', whatever, according to context, people believed that transformation ought to entail.[105]

The convict crisis as a moment of popular xenophobia reaction becomes more important to the question of the foreign as threat in the colony because of the ways in which it connected with other political problems, as identified by settlers, of the frontier, of improper connections, and of vagabondism/vagrancy. Anti-convictism did not exist in isolation from colonial issues of expansion and racism, but drew on them while targeting a non-racialised group of people from the metropole. Even more historically and politically interesting was how this linked with local perceptions or events outside the Cape Colony.

THE IRISH FRAME OF REFERENCE

One of these sets of perspectives, on Ireland and the Irish, provides some insight into how Cape colonists thought about their politics. According to Hattersley, "Fairbairn was prejudiced against the Irish', describing "'such wild and irrational uproarmakers as the Irish physical-force repealers [see below]…who glory in the name of felon'".[106] Ciarán Reilly characterises Cape anti-convictism as explicitly mixed up with anti-Irish views.[107] This appears to be an exaggeration, based on the initial willingness of colonists to receive Irish 'political offenders', as opposed to 'ordinary criminals'. They might 'condemn the language, abhor the designs, and execrate the acts of the seditious leaders in Ireland', but would 'make allowance for men worked up to frenzy by fearful wretchedness, famine, disease, and death'.[108] Reilly's claim that

[105] Landau, 'Introducing the Demons', pp. 1-2.
[106] Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 66.
[107] Ciarán Reilly. 'An Inhospitable Welcome? Emigration to the Cape of Good Hope during the Great Irish Famine. *Breac.* University of Notre Dame, 28 February 2018. Available at: https://breac.nd.edu/articles/an-inhospitable-welcome-emigration-to-the-cape-of-good-hope-during-the-great-irish-famine/ [Accessed 8 February 2020].
[108] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2317), 25 August 1849; *Graham's Town Journal*, XVIII (924), 25 August.

the *Neptune* convicts spread fears of disease—'famine fever'—in Cape Town appears to be a literal reading of (probably) Fairbairn's lurid but figurative statement that 'The Convict Ship is to be regarded as a *Pest Ship*, conveying an infectious and deadly disease'.[109] The disease, in this case, was moral, not physical. Reilly cites Irish newspapers for information on the 'convict crisis', which may include details that do not appear in the Cape archive, or which might engage in spin sympathetic to the Irish. The Cape colonial archive does not clearly indicate that the Irishness (or any other ethnic or national origin) of convicts was the primary reason for them to be rejected; rather, their exclusion depended on the politicisation of their criminality. Nevertheless, Ireland was a topic of discussion in the Cape Colony during the anti-convictism struggle.

In December of '49, both the *Mail* and the *Times* published a clarification about the convicts of the *Neptune*.

> It is not true that they are mostly juvenile culprits, from Ireland, convicted of trivial offences committed under the pressure of want. They are nearly all English and Scotch; the number of Irish is only about *forty*, and it is certain that most of these were not convicted in England of the crimes for which other denizens of English towns are usually transported. They are all full-grown men…all of them old enough to be hardened scoundrels: and such are they reported and believed to be.[110]

This report does not appear to be correct. Of the 289 passengers, 198, or just about 70%, were from Ireland, based on the sites of their convictions. Even if the report intends to make distinctions based on ethnicity rather than the place where the crime was committed and convicted, there are some 130 surnames of definite Irish origin among that *Neptune* convicts—not counting the Old English surnames and probable Scottish surnames that could well have belonged to Irish people—the owners of which were overwhelmingly convicted in Ireland. The *Neptune*'s involuntary passengers were, largely, Irish.[111] The rest of the article is rather unclear, except that it paints the convicts as deadly men. It appears, though, that Irish people committing crimes because of scarcity and need would be less frightening than Scottish and English people committing crimes out of bad character. That said, it is apparent from this incorrect correction that the ethnicity and, in particular, the Irishness of the convicts was under discussion at the Cape, if not always in full view of the print media.

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[109] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2311), 4 August 1849; emphasis original.
[110] *Cape Town Mail*, IX (460), 15 December 1849; *Cape Frontier Times*, X (500), 25 December 1849; emphasis original.
[111] 'Neptune voyage to Van Diemen's Land', https://convictrecords.com.au/ships/neptune/1849.

This may have merged with ongoing colonial deliberations about the Irish. Colonial records make it clear that Irish labourers and 'paupers' were brought to the colony under indenture. Sophia Pigot, who emigrated to the Cape Colony as a teenager, commented three times to her journal about the ship-board 'disturbances' of 'those…very troublesome' Irish people. A Mr. Mahoney plays the special brute in her narrative.[112] There were five 'parties' from Ireland among the 1820 settlers, and while a majority of these seem to have been made up of artisans and farmers, there were number of labourers among them.[113] Apparently, several of the labourers at Clanwilliam—names of Pierce, Callaghan, Mukin, Lehane, Barry, Coffee, and Begley—deserted their sites of indenture, were arrested, abused in the course of a sham of a court hearing, and returned to their locations. According to G. B. Dickason, 'so the pattern was set, vigorous protest by the indentured settler had little effect, so violence was the next resort'. 'Open rebellion' led to the servants seizing meat and bread from the government stores', and caused 'much alarm' for 'the old Landdrost, who possibly was quite unaccustomed to Irish behaviour of this kind'.[114] Dickason blends 1970s prejudices with nineteenth-century ones, but the point is taken: like the juvenile emigrants of a decade later, Irish indentured servants had not all proven acquiescent at the Cape.

By 1825, there were '4000 Irish Catholics in the interior of the country', a number which blatantly does not include Irish Protestants.[115] It is likely that this distinction was assumed, with Irish Protestants viewed as more properly assimilated. The 'heads' of parties of settlers, the Irish Protestants at the Cape that we know something about, were associated with prominent Protestant families in Ireland (if hard on their luck), were conspicuously anti-Catholic, and sought to distinguish themselves as loyal British subjects.[116] Of the other Irish in the colony, one shipload of Irish servants organised by a John Ingram in 1823 sparked a considerable commission of inquiry, when it turned out that he had not brought as many as he had claimed he would (the government was reimbursing him for their transport), and that a few dozen of the passengers had not signed any articles of indenture at all, or had only signed them after leaving Ireland. Some had either not understood or not been told the nature of their arrangement with Ingram, before embarking, and some had refused to sign indentures or had 'been forced to sign them by threats…of stopping their provisions, and with Imprisonment on their arrival

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[112] Sophia Pigot. *The Journals of Sophia Pigot, 1819-1821.* Margaret Rainier (ed.) (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1974), pp. 38; 40-42;
[113] See Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XVII, p. 309; *Vol*. XVIII, p. 58; *Vol*. XX, p. 73; G. B. Dickason. *Irish Settlers to the Cape: History of the Clanwilliam 1820 Settlers from Cork Harbour* (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1973), p. 21.
[114] Dickason, *Irish Settlers*, pp. 54-55.
[115] Enclosure in Bourke to Hay, 30 September 1825. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXIII, p. 186.
[116] Dickason, *Irish Settlers*, pp. 14-15; 24; 26; 31; 33-35; 85; 87.

at the Cape'. The inquiry shows continued judgements on the character of Irish immigrants. One witness in the inquiry, felt that the Irish labourers were 'ignorant' and 'much given to drunkenness'. There were reports that they often complained or refused to work, and that the few Dutch colonists who had hired them 'would be glad in general to get rid of them', on account of their 'not being willing to be put on the same footing' with slaves.[117] When asked, in the midst of another inquiry, if he thought 'that an augmentation of the labouring Population of Albany by the introduction of Irish Labourers would be beneficial', Christopher Thornhill, a marchland settler, replied, 'I place no confidence myself in the character of Irish labourers'.[118] For his part, W. Proctor, of the Drooge Valley, Stellenbosch District not far from Cape Town, who had hired eight Irish workers from John Ingram, said, 'I prefer the Slaves, as they do their work much better; they are more constant and more obedient'. He was willing to hire slaves at rates twenty-five per cent higher than he paid the Irish.[119]

Taking these hints from the archive, it seems that Irishness in the anti-convictism discourse probably did touch a colonial nerve, or perhaps an English or a Protestant one. I have mentioned already how the Cape papers often made reference to Ireland. Some specific aspects of this are worth pointing out, here. Fairbairn's lead articles made it clear that he despised the Irish Member of Parliament, Daniel O'Connell,[120] who had won 'Catholic Emancipation' (civil rights) in the 1820s and then from the late 1830s into the 1840s led a movement for Repeal of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Writes Kevin Nowlan, 'His Repeal Association made the claim to political independence, however limited, a serious issue in British and Irish politics in the eighteen-forties'. He was seen by English government officials as fomenting the overthrow of government.[121] If nothing else, Fairbairn agreed with the viewpoint which saw Irish politics as problematic.

More importantly for the discussion of anti-convictism, the pages of the *Commercial Advertiser* abound with implicit and explicit associations drawn between Ireland and criminality, which certainly confirm Fairbairn's prejudice and suggest underlying prejudices

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[117] Denyssen to Acting Colonial Secretary. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XVIII, pp. 185-191; 'Evidence Given to Commissioners of Enquiry by Willem Cornelis van Ryneveld'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XVIII, pp. 218-222.
[118] 'Christopher Thornhhill, Esqre., examined.' Enclosure in 'Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry to Earl Bathurst upon the Address of the Principal Settlers in the Albany District', 25 May 1825. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXI, p. 377.
[119] 'W. Proctor, Esqre., of Drooge Valley, in the District of Stellenbosch examined.'. Annexure to 'At a Council held in the Council Chamber on Wednesday the 13th day of December in the Year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six'. In Theal, *Records*, *Vol*. XXIX, p. 489.
[120] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, VIII (549), 15 September 1832; XVIII (1530), 9 February 1842.
[121] Kevin Nowlan. *The Politics of Repeal: A Study in Relations between Great Britain and Ireland, 1841-1850* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 9; 72.

in anti-convict circles. These ideas position Ireland as a political frame of reference for anti-convictism. In the same edition as an editorial referring to Earl Grey's claims about the criminal burden of Great Britain and Ireland, Fairbairn published articles on 'Irish Distress and Its Causes', the criminal statistics of Ireland, 'Prison Buildings', 'Prison Discipline', 'Criminal Seminaries' (a resort of 'vagrants'), and the 'Character of Crime' in Ireland.[122] The same number that reported the large fourth of July anti-convict meeting in Cape Town also ran an article on overcrowding in the Nenagh Gaol (County Tipperary, Ireland) and noted that '60 convicts' there were 'under sentence of transportation'.[123] The issue that reported the arrival of the long-dreaded *Neptune* in Simon's Bay, the '*convicts forced upon a colony against the wishes of the inhabitants*', also included an article on 'How Irish Paupers are Shipped to England'. This article was equally aghast at the bad conditions of the voyage for 'deckers'—the poorest who made the journey on the deck of the ship—and shocked by the thousands of Irish who went to England and the large numbers already sent back. Alongside this were more articles on 'prison discipline' and 'juvenile offenders'.[124] An article on the state of crime in Britain and Ireland in 1848 reported the most convicts 'under restraint' were to be found in Ireland, a number which had 'increased enormously'. Lest this be attributed to the upheaval caused by famine in Ireland, Fairbairn observed, 'As destitution is generally the result of bad conduct and bad character, it is always easy for the local authorities to discover, when they have a direct pecuniary motive for doing so, that the pauper is justly suspected of some crime or offence, and to commit him to the county gaol'. Thus, did sentences of transportation increase, and Fairbairn offered the information that 'the numbers sentenced to transportation last year in Ireland, were 2,733'.[125] In the same paper was the report of 'emigration wholesale' from Dublin.

The Cape papers kept their readers abreast of various 'state trials' in Ireland, first against O'Connell and later against a more strident group of 'Young Irelanders' who distinguished themselves from O'Connell by their Protestantism and willingness to use violence (thus, 'physical force repealers'). Indeed, they had fomented a failed, armed insurrection in 1848.[126] Generally, the press was bad. John Mitchel, a solicitor and journalist, was the most prominent Young Irelander, and received the most attention at the Cape, after O'Connell. The *Cape Frontier Times* printed a blurb based on intelligence from the *Boston Atlas* that ran: 'MITCHEL.

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[122] *South African Commercial Advertiser,* XXVII (2315), 18 August 1849.
[123] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2302), 4 July 1849.
[124] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2325), 22 September 1849; emphasis original.
[125] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2314), 15 August 1849.
[126] Nowlan, *The Politics of Repeal*, pp. 124; 186-187; 213

The brig "Palas," at this port from Buenos Ayres [*sic*] reports having spoken, on the 24th ult. lat. 33, 30. long. 65, the British Ship Neptune, from Bermuda, for Cape Town, Cape of Good Hope, with Mitchel, the Irish Political Agitator, on board.' Latitude and longitude perhaps provided some suspense.[127] The *Advertiser* also excerpted news of Mitchel from foreign papers, including one that thought his being barred from England, Scotland, and Ireland, but admitted to a colony, was absurd.[128] It seems, however, that Mitchel was more a celebrity than a boogie-man: he was the lone convict invited ashore in the months that the *Neptune* languished at anchor. He took a vicious delight in the commotion anti-convictism caused the British Empire, and agreed with the colonists that convicts were 'savages who are outcasts of civilization'.[129] Throughout 1849, Fairbairn reported on the Young Irelander 'State Prisoners', all of whom were eventually transported to Van Diemen's Land. On September, a week before the arrival of the *Neptune*, Fairbairn gloated over the morning's convict news:

> The Political Offenders, originally destined for the Cape, have been sent on to Van Dieman's Land. H. M. S. *Swift*, having on board four of the most distinguished state prisoners, [William Smith] O'Brien, [Thomas Francis] Meagher, [Terence Bellew] McManus, and [Patrick] Donohoe [*sic*], touched at Simon's Bay on Wednesday*, and left it early on Friday morning—no communication with the shore being permitted during the single day that she remained at anchor*.[130]

The Young Irelanders were, if anything, notorious personalities, whose presence on board convict ships could heighten the drama of such vessels and perhaps nourished the view that the Irish were predisposed to crime. For as Godlonton in Graham's Town believed, 'Unfortunately the Irish, as a people, are not remarkable for calm reflection'.[131]

The question of Irishness raised in connection to the Anti-Convict movement must remain ambiguous: the ethnicity of the convicts, the presence of John Mitchel and other 'Young Irelanders' on board the convict ships, or other specifically anti-Irish standpoints were not the primary motivations behind anti-convictism; but Ireland and Irish political and social ills were nonetheless an important frame of reference and ready comparison for fearmongers anticipating a criminal society at the Cape of Good Hope. The frequent references to Ireland during 1849, especially in the *Commercial Advertiser*, point to a broader trend in Cape colonial

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[127] *Cape Frontier Times*, X (483), 21 August 1849.
[128] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXV (2291), 26 May 1849.
[129] John Mitchel. *Jail Journal: Five Years in a British Prison* (New York: *The Citizen*, 1854), pp. 192-196; Hattersley, *The Convict Crisis*, p. 66. O'Reilly perhaps relies too much on Theal's work of a half-century after the 'convict crisis', which took a more negative view of Mitchel.
[130] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2323), 15 September 1849; emphasis original.
[131] *Graham's Town Journal*, XIII (675), 7 November 1844.

papers, diaries, and other records throughout the period. Just as convictism was related through and rejected based on arguments rooted in politics of the frontier and of the vagrancy debate, events in Ireland were also deployed as a frame of reference in local political problems. This did not amount to an 'anti-Irish' form of xenophobia, but rather an interpretation and rationalisation of local conditions, and the politicisation of the foreigner, through knowledge of Ireland and Irish politics. Like England's poor and vagrant laws, and slavery, slave revolt, and marronage in the West Indies, political violence, crime, and poverty in Ireland served as referents for British settlers in southern Africa.

One of the most intriguing uses of Ireland as a frame of reference was in the politics of the frontier. The interest in Irish politics was not limited to Fairbairn in Cape Town, but was also evident in the Graham's Town newspapers. These papers regularly reprinted extracts from English and Irish publications: on political violence, crime, poverty, famine, insurrections, and controversial political figures in Ireland. One typical example from the *Tipperary Constitutional* depicts the 'frightful condition of Tipperary', beset with murders and 'outrages', 'every hour more and more progressing towards total anarchy'.[132] Like Fairbairn, Godlonton did not approve of either O'Connell's movement for Repeal or John Mitchel and the other Young Irelanders.[133] The point is not that Ireland was troubled, but how that trouble was reported and utilised in the eastern Cape. The *Journal* reported, at one time, that it was 'truly remarked' by the Attorney-General in a debate in the Legislative Council on the state of the frontier and relations with the Xhosa, 'that the Frontier question is to the Local what Ireland is to the Imperial Government—the great difficulty'.[134]

John Mitford Bowker said at a Fort Beaufort meeting that 'Mr. Porter has described it [the frontier] as the Ireland of the Colony! He never was further wrong in his life. This province is the England of the Colony,—the Western may be compared to Scotland—and Ireland and "repale" [i.e. – Repeal; the Repeal movement] are to be found at Natal'.[135] The contradiction makes both a claim to being within the pale of Englishness and also situates a figurative 'Ireland', fit for southern African conditions, beyond it. However, more colonists seemed to agree with the Attorney-General than with Bowker. Charles Lennox Stretch, who drew colonial heat for his purported lax enforcement of pass laws, observed to his journal while campaigning

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[132] *Graham's Town Journal*, V (258), 1 December 1836.
[133] See, for example, *Graham's Town Journal*, XIII (675), 7 Nov 1844; XVII (863), 24 June 1848.
[134] *Graham's Town Journal*, XIV (725), 23 October 1845. What the Attorney-General said was 'If Sir Robert Peel's difficulty was Ireland, Your Excellency's difficulty has been the frontier' (see Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections*, p. 171).
[135] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters & Selections,* p. 189.

against the Xhosa in April 1835, 'The Governor's story about Father Murphy during the rebellion in Ireland (1798) corresponds with Lynx's conduct in 1819 – difference of nations and opportunity as to civilization. The Governor's *feelings* may be from this circumstance ascertained'. The Governor was Somerset, who had been wounded in Ireland in the 1790s. 'Father Murphy' was Father John Murphy, who led a brutal armed revolt in 1798, was eventually hanged, beheaded, and burned, but was also eulogised in song a century later: 'For Father Murphy from the county Wexford sweeps o'er the land like a mighty wave'.[136] The wave of revolt that almost destroyed Graham's Town and British settlement in the Fish River Marches altogether apparently felt, to some, much like Wexford twenty years earlier, whether they had been there or not.

It is remarkable that one of the few examples of political satire I found in the colonial press hinged on a representation of Xhosa chiefs as 'Repealers'—followers of O'Connell. 'GREAT REPEAL MEETING IN BRITISH CAFFRARIA (Communicated)', read the headline in the *Journal* in December of '48.

> On Tuesday last the feeling of hostility so long bottled upon against the Union of Caffraria with the Colonial Territory, was very decidedly manifested in a numerous and influential meeting of the principle aristocracy and leading men of the Amakosa tribes, which took place on that day at Prince Sandilli's country residence, in a romantic and savage glen of the Amatolas near Fort Cox… 30,000 are calculated to be present.[137]

The chiefs were portrayed as preposterous European politicians, Maqoma as a sentimental drunk, and it was said there were 'Peelers' (i.e. – policemen in Ireland; after Sir Robert Peel) at the entrance to the event. The piece was spitefully racist, but its humour required its readers not only to be familiar with the prominent Xhosa leaders and the issues of the frontier, but with the stereotypical style of Irish political meetings, leaders, and the movement for Repeal of the Union. It should be observed that through the 1830s and 1840s, the marchland papers of the Cape Colony printed more than a dozen excerpts or even lead articles dealing with or referring to the Repeal Movement and O'Connell.[138] An earlier specimen of Repeal satire in the *Journal* also referred to a 'MONSTER MEETING IN KAFIRLAND':

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[136] Le Cordeur, *The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch*, p. 52; footnote, p. 178; Seamus Deane, Andrew Carpenter, Jonathan Williams (eds). *The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing, Vol. II* (Derry: Field Day Publications, 1991), pp. 105-106.
[137] *Graham's Town Journal*, XVII (888), 16 December 1848.
[138] *Graham's Town Journal*, III (137) 7 August 1834; XII (616), 21 September 1843; XII (617), 28 September 1843; XII (621), 26 October 1843; XIII (675), 7 November 1844; XIV (712); 31 July 1845; XVII (866), 15 July 1848; XVII (873), 2 September 1848; *Cape Frontier Times*, V (298) [sic], 9 May 1844; V (238), 5 December 1844; V (252), 13 March 1845.

> On Friday last a large and influential Meeting of the dominant Chiefs of Kafirland was held in Sandilli's Kraal for the purpose of taking into consideration the present unsettled state of the frontier, and devising means for checking the quarrelsome and turbulent disposition evinced by the British authorities on the other side of the border.
>
> From an early hour crowds poured in from all parts of the country, so that at 12 o'clock not less than 50,000 persons were present, at least 5,000 of whom were mounted on excellent horses, and about, as well as we could ascertain, 2000 on well-trained bullocks, a great number came to the ground well armed, and a more imposing display of Brummagem [i.e. Birmingham: ill-made) guns was never witnessed.[139]

The 'monster meeting' was a contemporary feature of Irish politics and of the Repeal movement. According to Gary Owens, 'The most spectacular public gatherings in Irish history were the more than fifty-plus "monster meetings" held across the three southern provinces during the summers of 1843 and 1845 to demonstrate support for Daniel O'Connell's campaign to repeal the Act of Union'. They were 'monster' because of the numbers in attendance, with gatherings reported of over 100,000 people, some of up to half a million, and one of over a million.[140] The *Frontier Times* excerpted the report of one in September of 1845: 'a meeting of St. Patrick's ward, Dublin, was held in O'Neill's fields, on Sunday…. In extent the assemblage amounted to a monster-meeting, for Mr. O'Connell reckoned the numbers at 50,000 to 75,000. The speaking was as trite in its nature, the concourse as unanimous, as at any Repeal meeting for years past'.[141] The comparison between Xhosas and Repealers was derisive, but also showed the subjective meanings that colonialism in Ireland had for colonists in southern Africa, participants in the politics of the frontier. It offered a framework within which settlers could both mock and make sense of Xhosa organisation and leadership.

The *Cape Frontier Times* blended the colonial interest in Irish news, the logic of Malthus, and the need for emigrants, calling for a plan of colonisation at the Cape that would relieve some of the surplus population from Ireland. Obviously, this disproved any definite rejection of Irish immigrants.[142] However, the *Times*, like Fairbairn's *Advertiser*, made use of the knowledge and perceptions of Ireland that colonists might have held (and which were undoubtedly shaped by the newspapers of England and the Cape) for local purposes. In particular, the editor, Franklin, harped on Irish crime. 'The murders in Ireland seem to be getting as rife as K—r depredations lately were on this frontier,' ran one editorial, which also covered the 'evils of vagrancy'. 'It is stated by a repeal paper published in Dublin that the usual

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[139] *Graham's Town Journal*, XV (747), 28 March 1846.
[140] Gary Owens. 'Hedge Schools of Politics: O'Connell's Monster Meetings'. *History Ireland* 2(1), 1994, p. 35.
[141] Cape Frontier Times, VI (279), 18 September 1845.
[142] *Cape Frontier Times*, VIII (404), 4 February 1848.

question is "*What murders are there to day?"* …. From the frightful turn things are taking, it does not seem impossible that a great part of Ireland will have to be reconquered from the Irish'. The paper condemned 'the horrid practice of denouncing individuals from the altar', and describes the murder of one 'excellent landlord' after a priest criticised him.[143] For readers of the frontier, this Roman Catholic version of Xhosa witch-hunting and 'eating up' would have been readily understood, and the necessity for conquest stood out even more clearly.

The next week, the *Times* reported that the 'murder of Mr. Ingram by a party of K—s only a few miles from Graham's Town…is the *second* murder that has taken place in the vicinity of Graham's Town since peace was proclaimed [with the Xhosa]'. But the border was unprotected, permitting 'an almost unrestricted influx of K—s'.[144] Another week passed, and the paper complained of three murders in four weeks. There are racist hints about immigrants of a certain kind mingled with frontier exceptionalism: 'In a large and mixed population like that of the Cape, composed of liberated Africans, Malays, &c. &c., the paucity of crime is certainly surprising; but the frontier farmers, depend upon it, are not to be reconciled to have one of their number butchered every now and then by the K—s'. The same number notes from a correspondent at the *Dublin Evening Mail* how, 'The catalogue of fresh murders [in Ireland] is happily meagre this week; the newspapers, however, supply evidence of a most lamentable state of crime', causing 'gentlemen' to go about armed, fearing assassination at the hands of a 'secret council' of the natives.[145] The sudden rash of reportage on Irish murders in March 1848 seems to have been part symptom and part diagnosis of the local murders of English settlers, drawing on Ireland as a frame of reference in the process of politicising crime and criminality in the Fish River Marches. Recall that Bowker had also referred to England, and hypothetical crimes of Spaniards and Frenchmen, for the same context. Going back fifteen years, with this in mind, John Fairbairn's remarks on the 'pacification of Ireland', a question 'which effects the existence of Civil Society itself', his assertion that 'The object of all Law and Government is the Protection of Life and Property' but 'that, under *the present System, and at the present time*, neither the one or the other enjoys that Protection in Ireland', owing partly to the 'organised Bands of merciless assailants' roving the country, reveal parallels between the language of the politics of the frontier and the Cape colonial assessment of Irish politics.[146]

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[143] *Cape Frontier Times*, VIII (407), 7 March 1848; emphasis original.
[144] *Cape Frontier Times*, VIII (408), 14 March 1848; emphasis original.
[145] *Cape Frontier Times*, VIII (409), 28 March 1848.
[146] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, IX (628), 18 June 1833; emphasis original.

The public discussions of Ireland, the Irish, and Irish politics at the British Cape of Good Hope expose an interesting thread of connection between the politics of the frontier and anti-convictism. This thread differs from the blunter 'improper connexions' argument, saying less about what convicts—or Xhosa chiefs—might actually do and more about how people thought about them. Frequently, they thought about them in relation to the extremes of Ireland, and deployed Ireland as a fitting example of the society they did not want to become. Speaking in terms of political prescriptions, Ireland was clearly what ought *not* to be. Often this was subtly done, left for the reader to infer, but it was not accidental that some of the periods of densest reportage on Ireland and Irish crime come during the 1849 'convict crisis' and a series of murders on the frontier in 1848. That Ireland provided the labels for local satire shows the extent to which it was a frame of reference. So, the ambiguous position of the Irish and Irish politics in the discourse of the Anti-Convict Movement should not be dismissed. It might not involve an explicit ethnic exclusion, or even a political one, but there was something relevant, emotive, and powerful in the idea of Ireland and allusions to a real and imagined Ireland, which influenced the politics of anti-convictism and connected it subjectively with other movements in colonial politics.

The popular xenophobic movement—bordering on an uprising—in the Cape Colony, under the label 'anti-convictism', politicised the 'convict' as the 'foreigner', drew on raced and classed debates about which immigrants were wanted in colonial society, perceptions about which people were likely to forge 'improper connexions', and political knowledge drawn from other locales, namely the theories of Thomas Malthus and the turmoil of Ireland. What this demonstrates is the complexity of any one mode of politics, or xenophobia. Supporters and leaders appropriated extensively from their historical context in order to make sense of the particular problem they identified. The 'foreigner' was overladen with a spectrum of fluid fears, which competed with and complemented each other in the logic of exclusion. Anti-convictism exposes the coming together of the many moving parts that made colonial xenophobia tick, and which made it unique. Delving with any historical accuracy into anti-convictism as a politics means appreciating the constructions of the foreign in the politics of the frontier, and the politicisation of vagabonds and vagrants, and histories sifting into the mix from outside the Cape Colony, in ways both plain and subtle. With this in mind, it is time for a conclusion.

CONCLUSION:
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE DIALECTIC OF THE 'FOREIGN' AND THE 'FOREIGNER'

XENOPHOBIA AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, REVISITED

We began with Achille Mbembe's questioning of xenophobia and the figure of the foreigner: 'What really lies behind what we can see?' The histories of meanings of the foreigner explored here through the archives of the British colony at the Cape of Good Hope have yielded certain answers to that question. These answers, rather than true of all moments of xenophobia, are true for the time and place, the people and politics, which produced them. They have implicated mobility and perceptions of political difference, and both local and 'global' knowledge and frames of reference. They have demonstrated great fluidity in the political category of the foreigner, while at the same time showing constancy and agreement in the nature of the problems and the type of threat that the foreigner posed to society. The foreign and the foreigner appeared in the politics of the frontier, in the identification, manufacture, and maintenance of political difference between settlers and Africans or others claimed to be or understood to be beyond the boundary. This was captured in the concept of the Pale. In turn, this mode of difference influenced ideas about 'desertion' or 'vagabondism', the production of political difference, mobility, adoption of alternative forms of belonging, and the possibility of 'improper connexion' with foreigners beyond the Pale. The concept of the Maroon encapsulates these problems. The colonial problem of 'vagrancy', adopting similar frames to the discourse on vagabondism, showed the politics behind the call for modes of control against supposedly dangerous mobility. The concept of the Vagrant was appropriated for rendering 'foreign' mobile and dominated persons, and related to a fluid set of categories, which, over time, comprised the foreign. The idea of a threatening foreigner was most powerfully mobilised in the politics of 'anti-convictism', which carried debates on 'migrants of a certain kind' to the brink of rebellion against imperial power, and which related the 'poison' of the foreigner to the colonial population through the dangers of improper connexion, vagabondism, and political difference. In these ways, Cape colonists sought to tell their neighbours, their political opponents, their peers in other colonies, and the people and Parliament in England, 'what lies behind' the foreigner. In large part, they were listened to. Each of the problems they identified

and the answers they posed had significance during the first half of the nineteenth century, whether in mobilising colonists, generating knowledge of political issues, or precipitating political confrontation. These histories of the foreign challenge us to think about how we ask Mbembe's question in relation to history and the historical record.

Two types of conclusions can be drawn from this study of the Cape Colony. The first, and simpler, deals with Cape colonial xenophobia: its modes, its meanings, and what it tells us about that colonial history; and also deals with the relation between mobility and perceived political difference. This can be understood as the 'local' aspect of the research. This aspect speaks to a method for historians engaging the problems of local politics, and in particular the politicisation of the foreigner as threat. It is not essentially relevant to the colonial context, but there are signposts elaborated through this study of the Cape Colony than can contribute to thinking with the local and with context when it comes to other colonial societies. We are able to think through the constitution and construction of colonial society not only with regard to the structures, institutions, and hierarchies of later dates, but also through attention to the types of problems and solutions, the subjective 'oughts to be' that animated political participation and discourse in historical context. This relates to the issues I raised in Chapter 3, where I argued that colonists and their archives can know and speak about more than colonialism. As with Elbourne's study of missionaries and the multiple uses of Christianity in the Cape Colony,[1] the colonists' efforts to define and defend their society from 'foreign' threat, and the politicisation of foreignness and identification of foreigners that went along with these, are examples of alternative angles on colonial society. The second, and more complex, set of conclusions addresses how we are to understand historical time and historical geographies. This comprises the 'global' aspect of the research. In tandem, these conclusions work towards thinking about xenophobia—or mobility, fear, the foreign, and the politics of difference—in other historical contexts. They do not, however, establish any conclusions for those contexts. Again, the engagement here with settlers' idiosyncratic frames of reference is rooted in a methodological problem and approach, which is not only relevant to British colonisation in southern Africa before 1850, but also to thinking alongside historical actors in other settings, as well. The ideas and categories they used can carve different shapes from historical archives and indeed history than following process in its linear plod to the present. They introduce disruptions to time and space that make for rich historical narrative and theorisation. Mapping

[1] Elbourne, *Blood Ground*.

subjectivities, belonging, and exclusion after this fashion need not stop with the 'foreigner', but it has been a good place to begin.

Written during the years of apartheid, the South African novelist, J. M. Coetzee's, *Waiting for the Barbarians* is a story of, among other things, politicised fear of the stranger. The narrator, an aging colonial magistrate, observes that 'once in every generation, without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians'.[2] With this, he captured a seeming truth: that history presents us with numerous reiterations, in different contexts, of the fear of the dangerous outsider. In the generation and a half between 1800 to 1850, British people at the Cape of Good Hope articulated at least three, but probably more, versions of that fear. These are summarised, above. The two uniting factors across these fears, boiled down to an abstract vapor, are human mobility and a politics of real, imagined, or feared difference. The xenophobia of the Cape Colony, then, was a mode of rationalising those two factors. However, they were rationalised in ways that were subjective to the context and the knowledge base of the settler population. Therefore, mobility became invasion, incursion, vagabondism, desertion, vagrancy, emigration, immigration, and convictism. These are all political and politicised conceptualisations of human movement. Mobility that crossed political boundaries, ignored or resisted regimes of labour, but also involuntary mobility, the forced migration of convicted persons, were each imbued with political meaning relevant to problems that colonists identified. These forms of mobility were associated with threats to what ought to be. They were also associated with specific, historical, and political categories of person: 'K—r', 'vagabond', 'maroon H—t', 'vagrant', 'emigrant', or 'convict'. Each of these was cast or could be cast as 'foreign', as the stranger to be feared.

What is clear about these categories is that foreignness existed only in unstable relation to race, ethnicity, or national origin. At a certain period in the politics of the frontier, roughly the 1830s, the political difference ascribed to Xhosa and other African polities was at least as important as the racial difference. The two informed and reinforced each other. Vagabondism and Vagrancy apprehended a diverse, mobile population, while also forming part of the attempt to establish white supremacy. Anti-Convictism overrode racist, ethnic, or national categories and instead centred on a type of moral classism that rendered certain white subjects of the British Empire—'convicts', 'felons', or 'Exiles'—outside of community. At the same time, Anti-Convictism drew on the explanations proffered against black or African foreigners, and problems of African mobility, to justify exclusion of unwelcome 'countrymen'. These political

[2] Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians*, p. 133.

realities speak to ways in which colonial history can be reinterpreted. This is not to suggest that race and racism were not central and at most times deciding factors in the colonial history of southern Africa. They were. Rather, I suggest that there were times when race and the establishment of a white supremacist society were not the *only* concerns of colonial society, that 'colonialism' identified different problems and responded to different fears and needs than racial ones, and that *political* difference, as much as racial difference, was important to historical, colonial actors, racist as they were. In this, I disagree with Tafira's claim that xenophobia is 'a form of racism' (see Introduction).[3] Instead, we must say that xenophobia is *sometimes* a form of racism, but acknowledge that, historically speaking, there are other contexts in which xenophobia is a reaction to perceptions and constructions of political difference. These can be explicit—Africans beyond the Pale—or condensed in the categories deployed as foreign: the vagrant, the convict, the 'K—r'. It is clear that political and racial difference frequently have overlapped, or have worked concurrently, but that does not mean they should be conflated. 'Immigration', it was written in the Cape Town Mail in 1849, is known to be a great hope of the Colony. But the immigration must be free from the suspicion, even, of impurity and pollution'.[4] 'Impurity and pollution' are subjective, political prescriptions that can rely on very distinct interpretations of purity, which are historically and politically fluid. In the Cape Colony, European 'deserters' were sometimes the vector of pollution, while racialised 'Malays' were the political insider, uniting against the outsider-convict. These require the suspension of histories written back-to-front, and immersion in histories of the political-subjective moment. Through examining the diffuse political movements and discourses of xenophobia at the Cape, we begin to understand Cape colonial xenophobia as something in its own right, rather than proceed by importing preconceived definitions of and assumptions about xenophobia, developed in and for our context.

That attention to political subjectivity has been central to the preceding chapters and to the framing of this history. As I quote E. P. Thompson in the epigraph, 'What cannot be measured has had some very measurable material consequences'.[5] This speaks to the matter of the subjective, which I have dealt with at length in Chapter 3. Through the chapters based on the colonial archives, I have attempted to show the operation of subjectivity in multiple ways: in the political discourses which emerge—for example, 'of the "frontier"'—in the movements that have been to a greater or lesser degree organised around political ideas—most clearly,

[3] Tafira, *Xenophobia in South Africa*.
[4] *Cape Town Mail,* IX (444), 25 August 1849.
[5] Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, p. 236.

'Anti-Convictism'—in the categories appropriated and deployed—the Vagrant—but, in the most basic instance, in the specific problems and solutions explicated by settlers in relation to their surroundings. The subjective problem that I have focused on is that of the foreigner. I have not been concerned to ascertain or measure the 'material consequences' of those subjective ('what cannot be measured') prescriptions, except insofar as they have permitted the formulation of a politics or a movement, or, in the most literal sense, in their being recorded on paper with ink. I have been more concerned with meaning than with consequence. This is to say that I have not sought to establish political subjectivities' impact on the progression of history, but rather to take into account their historicity. Still, in the Cape Colony, subjective conceptualisations of the foreigner as threatening, and the prescriptions these elicited from settler groups, had both political and material consequences. All three big problems to which an aspect of the foreign was attached—the Frontier, Vagrancy, Convictism—dominated colonial discourse, whether for decades in the case of the Frontier or for several months, for Convictism. They produced directions for politics and for conflict and compromise.

Speaking locally, then, we have to reckon with a historical context in which foreignness was deployed repeatedly in relation to mobility and perceived political difference. At the Cape of Good Hope during the first half century of British colonisation, the foreigner was mobilised as a site of politics. In fact, the 'foreigner' was constructed precisely as the carrier of political difference into, out of, or across the colony in a variety of ways perceived to be threatening. It is important to note that, in these arguments, difference and threat, despite close relationships, were not only conflated with race or with class. The correlation between race and foreignness was uneven: sometimes the foreigner was a racialised figure; but sometimes the foreigner's race was secondary to the foreignness of their real or imagined political difference. 'Vagabonds' could or could not be racialised, for example. 'Vagrant', 'Native Foreigner', and 'Fingo' were fluid categories contingent upon non-racial markers even while the subjects were almost all black or 'coloured'. As far as we know, the British convicts of 1849 were white men, whose politicisation as outsiders required different arguments. Class, too, was not determinate. While a majority of the groups of 'foreigners' discussed in this history were made up labourers, Xhosa chiefs as a group, and the chieftaincy as a form of political power, formed the basis for an argument about the foreign. While it is probable that most transported convicts, apart from the likes of John Mitchel, were poor or working people, so were many voluntary immigrants to the Cape during the same years. Trades were in demand, but the presence of a blacksmith, miner, publican, stonecutter, in addition to farmers, labourers, and soldiers on board the *Neptune* shows that the batch of convicts in 1849 was a mixed group, including some skilled

workers, the same as other emigrant ships.[6] Ambiguities such as these demonstrate a political context in which non-belonging relied on unstable and subjective categories. These were fashioned according to the particular problem being addressed—be it the frontier, vagrancy, or convictism—but consistently constructed non-belonging ('foreignness') as a way to explain conditions of mobility and difference in relation to those problems.

These historical politics ask us to read the history of the British Cape of Good Hope in somewhat new ways. One of these reminds us not to subsume historical political concepts into categories and relationships, such as race and labour, which may be useful to understanding the long-term consequences of political institutions and historical processes, but which are not entirely, always, or even at all accurate to the political arguments made by historical actors. Recognising this, the claims made about foreigners and foreignness in the first half of the nineteenth-century complicate the political history of British colonialism at the Cape, while not challenging its outcomes. This also means thinking about identity differently. Indeed, it means we have to think in terms of temporary and mutable political subjectivities, not only in terms of identities, however fluid. An 'anti-convict' political subjectivity was experienced and mobilised in 1849, while a 'frontier' subjectivity was accessed from at least the early 1820s. These were not only identities—cultural, imperial, racist, etc.—but the result of politicisation of problems and conditions, and participation in movements addressing those. I am thinking here of Neocosmos's argument that politics is not reducible to 'social location';[7] that is, it emerges because of what people think about where they are, not as a natural consequence of where they are. This attention to subjectivities challenges us, as historians, to 'historicise' differently. Historical importance cannot only be measured by subsequent events and subsequent politics. As I said at the very beginning of this work, this has been a history of a world that is looking around at itself.

Of course, 'world', here, is delimited by the people I studied: settlers, colonists, mostly British, mostly born in Europe, mainly Christian, living in a southern African colony of Europe in the early- and mid-nineteenth century, in the decades when one round of globalisation kicked off by trans-Atlantic migrations, economies, and enslavement was shifted by revolutions in imperial political power. It was not the whole world looking around, but the subjective world of these settlers. Another central facet of this history has been the shape that 'looking around' took. What are the 'frames of reference' that were deployed in the making of politics by settlers

[6] 'Neptune voyage to Van Diemen's Land', https://convictrecords.com.au/ships/neptune/1849.
[77] Neocosmos, *Thinking Freedom*, pp. 4; 18-19.

at the Cape of Good Hope? I have spoken about Ireland, the West Indies, and England throughout the chapters. These frames of reference indicate some of the contours of the subjective world in which Cape politics were mobilised. They reveal not only interconnection and networks, which other scholars have carefully shown to exist in different periods and places, but also ways in which political knowledge and concepts challenge conventions of periodisation and historical boundary-making.

'Empire has created the time of history…. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history'.[8] Thus Coetzee's magistrate mused to himself, having run afoul of imperial history. This is a statement about subjectivity and a statement about 'prescription', as I discussed in Chapter 2. It reminds us that history is generated subjectively, not only materially and not only after linear fashion. It makes clear that history is also about what 'ought to be'. In the Cape Colony after it was occupied and settled by British people, empire was an important subjective contrivance with which to frame politics; not only that, but *the* empire was a source of concepts for explaining politics. I have elaborated on three: the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant. The appropriation, recycling, adaptation, and application of these political concepts in the Cape Colony scuppers the practice of linearity in historical studies. The Pale, of fifteenth-century origin, which passed into English idiom, was politicised in Ireland and repoliticised for the Cape. The Maroon, borrowed and corrupted from Spanish in the sixteenth century, was politicised in the West Indies and repoliticised at the Cape. The Vagrant, given various political meanings in Britain, was adopted in debates at the Cape alongside simultaneous debates in England. What is intriguing and also special about all of this is that it was not necessary that the Pale, for instance, had a second political life that made sense for southern Africa. It was not certain that the Vagrant or the Maroon would be words with which Cape colonists and officials explained and created political categories for people practicing 'dangerous' forms of mobility. Cape colonists reached into the varied history of empire to make sense of their present conditions. They chose concepts that had been politicised and prescriptive in other times and places of empire and gave them local meaning in political movements at the Cape.

The challenge for periodisation and boundary-making, then, is to make sense of the reaching 'back' or 'across' historical time and geographical space for knowledge that was of political relevance in the 'present'. People actively linked the Cape Colony to other places, like England, Ireland, and the West Indies, in ways that were not only material but rooted in forms of knowledge. Through political movements, the Cape Colony became a repository of history

[8] Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians*, p. 8.

and a space of prescription. The phrase 'frame of reference' perfectly captures this dynamic. Actors at the Cape referenced a shared history in order to frame local politics and prescriptions. They adapted the 'time' of Empire to their immediate purposes of the future. In doing so, they created political geographies that spatialised empire in unique ways. The attention to Ireland and the use of Ireland as a frame of reference is a good example of this: Irish politics had their local historical meaning, but had a separate and unique political and historical meaning in the Cape Colony. Here, I am looking back to Lazarus, and the idea of political sequences, the idea that politics begin and end.[9] With regard to periodisation, these chapters have addressed a 'sequence' in which the politics of frontier, vagrancy, and anti-convictism intersected in terms of both local prescription and external political frames of reference.[10] Irish or West Indian frames of reference had relevance in the course of certain prescriptions on what ought to be; in the absence of these prescriptions, the political frames of reference did not necessarily have permanent influence or meaning in southern Africa. In the moments of their relevance, however, they formed subjective linkages across time and space.

With this in mind, periodisation that begins with the colonisation of southern African by the British, or any other objective historical marker is not entirely sufficient. The specific frames of reference did reach the Cape Colony with British people after 1800, but there was no historical necessity that they deploy those frames of reference in their southern African political movements. Their origins as subjective frames of reference were in fact *in* those movements unique to southern Africa in the 1820s to the 1840s, while their histories range to a multiplicity of stages, sequences, and periods from the tail-end of the fifteenth to the middle nineteenth centuries. The spatial and temporal mapping of empire and exclusion become a layered history punctuated by sequences of political meaning. To be blunt about it, I argue that it is impossible to understand the politics of the Cape Colony without appreciating the historical and political references that gave those politics form and substance, whether figurative or practical. This is entirely different than locating the origin of Cape xenophobia in Ireland in 1495 with the bounding of the Pale, or in England in 1603 with the codification of the Poor Law, or in the first moment of slavery and resistance in the Americas, or in 1615 with the beginning of penal transportation. It permits people's thoughts about those histories, if often scattered, organic, mistaken, dishonest, and elusive, to etch the outlines of history's shape.

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[9] Lazarus, *Anthropology*, p. ix.

[10] There are signs around mid-century that white settlement in Australia, as well as consolidation of colonial power in southern Africa, effected changing frames of reference and new politics among the Cape colonists. Further research would be necessary to substantiate whether such a shift influenced politics of the 'foreign' in the colony.

'Atlantic' is one framing device that is useful in this case. The collective work of many historians has argued for a historical 'Atlantic World', delineated by processes of political, cultural, and economic interaction and change, from roughly the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-nineteenth. Investigating xenophobia at the Cape Colony has revealed a subjective 'Atlantic' world. I characterise it as Atlantic because the frames of reference employed by colonists were 'Atlantic' in scope: they integrated the Cape Colony into the history of the Atlantic World through the processes of political subjectivation. The politicisation of the Pale, the Maroon, and the Vagrant at the Cape meant that the historical and political knowledge of the Atlantic was made current in the movements of British colonists in southern Africa. These were not histories exclusive to the British Empire or to an 'Anglo-Atlantic': the Maroon brings in a history of slavery, mobility, and autonomy that spanned the colonial Americas and itself indicates a specific transmission of political knowledge from Spanish to British worlds of empire. They were given specific historical and political significance in the Cape Colony. When historian David Armitage writes about 'cis-Atlantic' history, it evokes precisely this kind of Atlantic-history-*from-here*. The theorisation of a subjective Atlantic world is preliminary, here, but the political frames of reference appropriated in the Cape Colony certainly point to the complexity of period and geography in the crafting of histories.

These historical factors are all part and parcel of the politics of xenophobia at the British Cape of Good between 1800 and 1850. Consequently, they must inform our historical understanding of that politics. Xenophobia becomes a politics integrated with local and global, historical and contemporary, material and subjective dynamics, and a force deeply complicated by its context as well as complicating of that context. Xenophobia at the Cape interrelates with the politics of the frontier, of vagrancy, and of anti-convictism, but also with appropriations of the political concepts of empire, broadly construed. Therefore, characterising xenophobia in the Cape Colony during this period requires attending to the histories of these things. It requires taking stock of the networks of political knowledge that colonists created in the course of identifying foreigners and the threat they purportedly posed to colonial society and colonial history. By taking such a 'holistic' approach, we learn that Cape xenophobia was rooted—politically, subjectively—in a long and broad history; we learn that the various, different manifestations of anti-foreign politics overlapped and were adapted into each other.

One of the most interesting and important characteristics of these different versions of Cape colonial xenophobia, the way foreignness was constructed and articulated, and the way it was explained, is that it always implicated 'outside' political power. The politics of the frontier in the eastern Cape sought to establish a political boundary, with the organisation and practice of

political power as clear factors investing the boundary with meaning. There was, on the one hand, the pale of British civilization, and on the other, the authority of Xhosa chiefs. The role and position of chiefs was central to constructing Xhosa people as foreigners, in terms of their allegiances, their practices, or the power chiefs held over them, even to explain their criminality. We saw that colonial discourses about chiefs were capricious, sometimes affirming and sometimes undermining chiefly power depending on colonial political needs, but always demonstrating difference. The problem that Colonel Collins dubbed 'improper connexion' also related to an 'outside', if often less definite, political power. Deserters, vagabonds, vagrants, and maroons—the dangerously mobile—were recognised as potentially forming political associations with outsiders, whether African chiefs, creole or maroon communities, or each other. Such associations were seen as threatening to colonial society: materially in terms of the potential for organised violence or the collapse of labour relations, but also politically, through the refutation of what 'ought to be'. This is, as I discussed in Chapter 4, the basic significance of marronage. It emphasises the Pale as not only a territorial but also a subjective, political boundary, beyond which people could realise potential for autonomy. Another 'outside' political power implicated in the desertion question was that of missionary societies. Not only were they external in the sense that they were centred in Europe (or North America), but there was a discourse that identified them as 'foreign' and 'anti-colonial'. Their interests were seen, by some, to differ (ruinously) from those of the colony. Debates on immigration sometimes subtly fastened on the political potential of immigrants in determining which groups of people should be welcome in the colony: black people were linked discursively and politically to 'St. Domingo', for example; and classism was suggestive of working-class resistance or improper connexions. These related to politics seen as beyond the pale. Anti-convictism was explicit about the potential (or the probability) that a certain group of migrants would form dangerous associations. The anti-convict movement, as it blended with colonial calls for representative government, also linked the convict invasion with the power of the British Empire, framed, in this case, as 'outside' and 'arbitrary'. The conversion of the Cape Colony into a penal settlement was a decision and a project undertaken by and benefiting an external society and site of political power. When Fairbairn wrote that 'the parishes throw their burden on the counties, the counties upon the nation, and the nation is forging schemes to throw it upon the Colonies',[11] it is clear that 'the nation' was rendered politically separate from 'the Colonies', even while it was through claims to Britishness that he and others expected the 'right' to self-

[11] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, XXVII (2314), 15 August.

government. Not only were the convicts themselves 'foreigners', but they were sent to the Cape at the will of a 'foreign' power: and it was 'foreign' specifically in its plans for the future of the Cape Colony. This highlights once again the political basis for the 'foreign'.

These constant references to politics and political powers beyond the pale suggest something important. They reinforce the argument for multilayered study of historical context around xenophobia (or other modes of politics). It brings in not only the politicisation and explanation of the 'foreigner', but also the politicised 'knowledge' of 'outside' politics, polities, societies, and power. These two forms of political knowledge worked in tandem. The 'foreigner' and the 'foreign' were dialectically related to each other, and then to the apprehension and rationalisation of what was threatening and to prescriptions of what ought to be. According to Kotef, 'Asking the question of the political meanings of movement is, perhaps, above all, asking how our bodies affect, are affected by, become the vehicle of, or the addressees of political orders, ideologies, institutions, relations, or powers'.[12] The dialectic of the foreigner and the foreign asks specifically how the movement of the 'Other' is entangled in these relationships; and, in Kotef's phrase, that Other, the foreigner, 'becomes the vehicle' for something unwanted. This point undergirds a historical theory of xenophobia, and speaks to the study of historical contexts beyond the Cape Colony. It is not, however, a matter of saying that xenophobia is always the fear of a threatening external power and its mobile agents. That is simplistic. Instead, it means that we have to look at what people 'know' about the 'foreigner', how they explain the threat posed by the 'foreigner', what, from their perspective, the 'foreigner' represents in their society, and which political problems they conflate with the 'foreigner'. How do people relate the foreigner's 'outsideness' to what is understood to be beyond the pale? What bearing does what is seen to be foreign, beyond the pale, have on the character of the foreigner? Identifying that dialectic apprehends, if not at what '*really* lies behind what we can see', then the subjective 'real' that gives the foreigner its potency.

OTHER HISTORIES OF XENOPHOBIA

Each historical-political context will present different answers to Mbembe's question. What I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this study of the Cape Colony, and what I have explained here, is a way of getting at those answers. The dialectic of the foreign and the foreigner and the frames of reference that go into concocting the foreigner are the stuff of

[12] Kotef, *Movement*, p. 4.

historical modes of xenophobic politics. This goes further than noting down the various crimes of which that foreigners are accused. It cannot begin and end with theories, however beguiling, of what people 'really' react to when the foreigner becomes their target. This is not adequate in historical research, and should not be for contemporary research, either. The conclusion I draw from working out a historical theory of xenophobia is that historical inquiry is the means through which xenophobia, as a historically-located politics, can be understood in its context. This is true for present modes of xenophobia, too. Although not directly related to the questions I have asked with regard to the Cape Colony in the first half of the nineteenth century, or the answers I have found in the archives, there are some ways that this research is relevant to xenophobia in other contexts.

One of the most interesting possible directions for this study is to explore other corners of the Atlantic world. This would elaborate on a key contribution of this study, around the circulation of subjective, political concepts that animated historical worlds. British archives of the same period would shed light on aspects of English, Irish, and Caribbean history and the historical and political frames of reference that Cape settlers deployed. More importantly, these archives would access different subjective contexts, in which, perhaps, different frames of reference were advanced in the shaping of local political movements. This would allow for a deeper exploration of the subjective world of the early nineteenth century British Empire and for the development of our knowledge of the dialectic of the foreign and the foreigner as seen in the Cape Colony. There are other contexts to explore, too, involving fears of outsiders, which are suggestive of constructions of the foreigner and which would contribute to comparative study of xenophobia in a larger Anglo-Atlantic history. Late seventeenth-century anxieties about American Indians amongst whites in Barbados, encouraged by word of Native American wars of resistance in English seaboard colonies of North America, is intriguing.[13] The history of the Cape Colony advocates that we not look only for a direct link between uprisings by an oppressed group and fear of those people, but how that fear is politicised and in relation to what problems. How was fear of this foreigner articulated, with what frames of reference, and in what local political movements? Similarly, the invocation of the foreignness of 'foreigners' in North American and British imperial reactions to the 1790s revolution in Haiti, visible in Gerald Horne's *Confronting Black Jacobins*, targeted and politicised black resistance, in a context of race and racism, slavery, colonialism, and both voluntary and forced migration. It

[13] Elaine G. Breslaw. *Tituba, Reluctant Witch of Salem: Devilish Indians and Puritan Fantasies* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 31.

was mixed up, too, with concerns about revolution in France.[14] Did this articulate with other political arguments, not only about race and slavery, but about the foreigner and the foreign? It is an interesting case, because as we have seen, Haiti or St. Domingue provided a frame of reference for arguments about migration nearly half a century later, in the Cape Colony. The particular framing of anti-Irish discourses and politics in Britain, not only in the nineteenth-century, but earlier as well, would be another angle on Atlantic xenophobia. Again, the form that historical questioning should take focuses on the subjective: the particular politicisation, frames of reference, and context that informed the construction of political relationships between the foreigner and threat, and the foreigner and the foreign.

The United States provides a rich field for comparative inquiry, as well. The history of the early nineteenth-century United States shares similarities with southern Africa, with respect to colonialism, white settlement, issues of the 'frontier', slavery, racism, conquest of indigenous peoples, and, on a greater scale than the Cape Colony, immigration. Comparative research in United States archives covering a similar period would have consequences for thinking about historical constructions of the foreign, the dialectic of the foreigner and the foreign, problems of mobility, modes of difference, and the subjective, political frames of reference that were involved. In *America for Americans*, Erika Lee makes the point that xenophobia has been a constant political ideology in American history. She chronicles the 'Othering' of different groups of people deemed foreign, and the mobilisation of xenophobia in different social, political, and economic contexts. However, Lee writes that xenophobia is 'an ideology: a set of beliefs and ideas that foreigners are threats to the nation and its people'.[15] While Lee's study is timely, important, and historically valuable, analysing xenophobia as an 'ideology', which is defined as a 'a system of ideas, [usually] relating to politics or society…adopted as a whole and maintained regardless of the course of events',[16] is another way of reducing xenophobia to something outside of the political and historical contexts in which it is given shape. The contingency of the foreigner, the subjectivity of politics, and the importance of context to each means that xenophobia cannot operate as any *one* ideology. With this in mind, there is still plenty of room for the historical study of xenophobia in the United States, which treats it differently than Lee has.

[14] Horne, *Confronting Black Jacobins*, pp. 21; 26; 55; 65; 75; 86; 116
[15] Erika Lee. *America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in The United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2019), p. 8.
[16] 'Ideology', *OED*, Vol. VII, p. 622.

Aspects of United States history articulate with my project on the Cape Colony. The example of Haiti, and slave rebellion in the Caribbean generally, afforded a politicised point of reference in colonial discourses in southern Africa arguing against the migration of people of color into the colony. In both North America and southern Africa, slavery and its abolition in the British Empire were processes of political and historical import with consequences for how labor, mobility, migration, and race were understood and how political problems were identified. But, in both places, race was central but not explanatory of the 'foreign'. Another comparison juxtaposes the nativist movement in the United States and anti-convictism in the Cape Colony, both in the mid-nineteenth century. What connections and differences emerge in the frames of reference of American anti-immigrant nativism and Cape colonial anti-convictism, or else in processes of racialisation or colonial expansion, which illuminate problems in the politics of mobility and the foreign in the nineteenth-century colonial world?

The set of questions I ask would substantially deepen our understanding of political subjectivity, mobility, and foreignness in an Anglo-Atlantic world. Investigating these other historical contexts, along the same methodological lines as this study of the British colony at the Cape of Good Hope, would provide insight into different modalities of foreignness and the political moments and movements in which they were mobilised. This would afford us insight into a certain kind of intellectual history comprising the frames of historical and political reference that were appropriated to explain mobility and foreignness. British settlers utilised the concept of 'the Pale' of British jurisdiction and civilisation in establishing boundaries of difference in the frontier zones of the Cape Colony, and some 'borrowed' the 'Maroon' to rationalise mobility perceived to be problematic; but how did their British forebears or North American or West Indian contemporaries explain what they perceived as foreign? To what sites and histories did they look in the process of identifying, characterising, or rationalising the subversive 'foreign'? Were their historical and political perspectives oriented differently, whether local or global, recent or distant past? Do such political frames ask us to adjust our interpretation of local histories in relation to 'global' connections in political knowledge? In sum, how did people politicise the people 'beyond the pale'? These are the questions I intend to ask of the archives, as I continue to study the 'foreigner' as a historically contingent, politicised concept. Each historical context permits a fuller elaboration of intersections and divergences in historical reactions to mobility and perceived difference.

This project originated in the midst of xenophobia in twenty-first century South Africa. I argued in the Introduction that studies of this xenophobia limit how we conceptualise xenophobia. I will speak briefly to this context and to some conclusions the history of the Cape

Colony suggests for thinking about xenophobia, today. It should be clear that these are theoretical and methodological conclusions, not answers to the question of why xenophobia exists, whether post-apartheid, in modern Europe or America, or in any context. These are suggestions for research stemming from the method I have used, here.

One of the most frequent arguments around xenophobia in South Africa is that the racist, exclusionary period of apartheid created in its aftermath the space and rationale for anti-foreign politics. This is largely an assumption. However, it may be that 'apartheid' is so overwhelmingly a political frame of reference that it does indeed have a role in South African xenophobia. This is certainly true of the *analyses* of South African xenophobia, usually produced by those who identify xenophobia as a social ill, which look to one reactionary politics to explain the next one. Still, the Janus-faced gestures of the South African government, and especially local governments, against xenophobic violence and simultaneously for discourses that portray immigrants as a threat, both of which leverage apartheid, suggest it is true that apartheid influenced some reasoning behind anti-foreign politics. However, what this means is that more research is needed, which treats apartheid as a political frame of reference rather than an outright, structural, 'historical' cause.

Other frames of reference might exist, too, to which we should be open. On Barry Hertzog Avenue in Johannesburg, a graffiti artist offered another answer to Mbembe's question about what is 'behind' the foreigner. Two slogans in the same hand relate foreignness to local electoral politics. On the concrete barrier they wrote: 'Foreigners a [*sic* – i.e. are] being treated like South Africans [& South Africans] like foreigners by ANC', and not far away, 'Foreigners will vote 4 ANC I will vote for EFF'. The African National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party in South Africa since 1994, while the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a party formed in 2013 that has postured itself as a radical movement that challenges corruption and comprador politics in the ANC. The graffiti is based on a falsehood—only South African citizens can vote in South African elections—but it makes two political points nonetheless, one which says that a measurable and important difference exists between South Africans and 'foreigners', and another which claims that ANC politics and the basis for ANC rule are 'foreign'. These assertions are of great interest in light of the arguments I have made here around outside forms of politics and boundaries of political difference. The solution, captured in the neighbouring graffiti and possibly painted by a different person, is 'Go Back To Your Country!!!' It is worth exploring national electoral politics in South Africa, as a frame of reference, not as a cause of xenophobia.

Other directions for inquiry may yield other frames of reference. Attacks on Zimbabweans in 2001 raise questions about South African discourses about the adjacent country of Zimbabwe at that time. In South Africa, one frequently hears 'Zimbabwe' invoked as the architype of a failed society. The turn of the twenty-first century was a period of intense transition in Zimbabwe that had rough social, political, and economic consequences. What dialectic between the foreign and the foreigner might be found in that moment? Has the figure of 'the foreigner' evolved between 2001 and 2020—not necessarily in tidy lineages—and which frames of reference have been invoked to explain the foreignness and the threat embodied in that figure? These questions seek to make sense of the connections between political contexts. They listen for politicised language that functions as Bowker's did in Fort Beaufort in 1843, which depends on foreignness and the foreigner having meaning to listeners.

Something else clearly of importance is the emergence of the 'Gatvol Capetonian'[17] movement in 2018, which made the claim that Xhosa people are not native to Cape Town or the Western Cape Province and should therefore go 'home' to the Eastern Cape Province, rather than compete with legitimate Capetonians for land and housing. 'We've been here since before the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck', said one representative of the movement, referring to the Dutch East India Company captain credited with colonising the Cape, 'and these people arrive here from the Eastern Cape…. They have no claim to this land'.[18] The historical frame of reference that identifies van Riebeeck, rather than any indigenous frames, is an interesting one, especially given Gatvol's mobilisation of indigeneity. Gatvol Capetonian also called for and supported other groups that called for secession of the Western Cape from South Africa.[19] The movement relied on racism—both racist arguments about black South Africans and the accusation that the ANC promotes racism against 'Coloured' people[20]—but it also hinged on obvious construction of foreignness that should not be ignored simply because it is spurious with respect to national borders. The political significance of that meaning of 'foreign' and the casting of Xhosas or other people from the Eastern Cape as from beyond the pale points to a shifting discourse of foreignness in contemporary South Africa that requires articulation. The

[17] 'Gatvol' is a vulgar Afrikaans word meaning 'fed up'.
[18] Raeesa Pather and Govan Whittles. '"Gatvol" Capetonians Stir up Tensions'. *Mail and Guardian*, 1 June 2018. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-01-00-gatvol-capetonians-stir-up-tensions/ [accessed 24 February 2020].
[19] Lester Kiewit. 'Cape's Race Tensions Fuel "Wexit"'. *Mail and Guardian*, 1 February 2019. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-01-00-capes-race-tensions-fuel-wexit/ [accessed 24 February 2020].
[20] 'Coloured' is an apartheid racial category with roots in the nineteenth century, comprising people of mixed and Khoisan ancestry, which still has currency in South Africa today; for Gatvol Capetonian, see Nic Andersen. 'Gatvol Capetonian: Everything You Need to Know about the Organisation'. *The South African*, 6 June 2018. Available at: https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-is-gatvol-capetonian/ [accessed 24 February 2020].

secessionist views of Gatvol Capetonian are also important in thinking through boundaries of difference. We saw that in the Cape Colony, foreignness was not always linked to 'national' difference, but encompassed fluid racial, historical, and economic arguments that spoke to other ideas about political difference than those envisioned as separated by national borders. In view of the attacks on more conventionally understood and politicised 'foreign nationals', the Gatvol movement offers a component in a multilayered historical treatment such as I have argued for here. The point is to treat the present historically, rather than as a result of history. The intellectual move involves not permitting xenophobia to be defined by the particular, but to be 'filled', given its content and meaning, by the particular. It involves positioning xenophobia within historical worlds—not only structural worlds, but also subjective ones—in relation to circulating ideas and knowledge that historical actors use to collectively create politics. Indeed, in its prescriptive aspects, politics is about the creation and rationalisation of 'worlds'. The specific modes of politics that construct the foreigner as threat can be one facet of those worlds.

Clearly, this investigation of xenophobia in the Cape Colony offers only a groundwork for thinking about xenophobia historically. It provides a point of access for understanding constructions of the foreign as threat in the Anglo-Atlantic world, and raises numerous questions for other contexts. One of the insights arising from that history, a dialectic of the foreign and the foreigner, rather than being a necessary trait of xenophobia in all contexts, offers us a way to ask about the politics that fuel xenophobia. It provides a scaffolding on which to arrange the perceived problems and the frames of reference that flesh out the skeleton of the foreigner as threat. Of the major historical and political concepts emerging from the colonial archive, which were employed in explaining the foreign and the foreigner in the historical world perceived by many settlers in the Cape Colony between 1800 and 1850, the Pale stands out with special import. In the politics of the frontier, the Pale was explicit; but the other political arguments that implicated the foreigner also drew on the Pale, either the same one as at the frontier—citing 'improper connexions'—or an implicit Pale that marked out boundaries of difference that excluded certain people. For this reason, the Pale has gained its titular honour. The Pale speaks to the dialectic of the foreign, beyond the pale, and the foreigner, from beyond the pale or moving across it. Indeed, the Pale served as a kind of dynamo to the dialectic, generating energy off passages of foreigners across its imagined boundaries. It would run contrary to my whole purpose to say that we must talk about 'the Pale' in every context of xenophobia. Other concepts and perceived boundaries will appear in other historical contexts. In some way, however, movements of xenophobia draw their strength from the rupturing of

the boundaries of difference that hold at bay invasive histories, embodied by the foreigner who originates, is engendered, is imagined, or represents what exists, beyond the pale.

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