

Table 5.5: Black enrolments at attendance institutions and at Unisa, 1959-1970 ²⁵²				
Year	Attendance universities	Unisa	% of total at Unisa	% of African students enrolled at Unisa
1959	2 145	2 064	49	67
1960	2 377	2 004	46	60
1961	2 462	2 195	48	61
1963	3 474	2 612	43	54
1966	4 235	3 138	43	54
1968	4 730	3 875	45	58
1969	5 243	3 618	41	55
1970	5 946	3 987	40	52

As Table 5.5 shows, the numbers of black students pursuing degrees through Unisa almost doubled over the 1960s, despite the growth in student enrolments at attendance institutions. It is also notable that the proportion of African students dependent on Unisa to further their education remained high. The significance of these trends is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

252. My calculations, based on South African Institute of Race Relations (1960-1970) *A survey of race relations in South Africa*, SAIRR, Johannesburg.

Chapter 6

The creation of the University of Port Elizabeth and the Rand Afrikaans University

In the 1960s the National Party (NP) Government established two new universities for whites. These were the dual-medium University of Port Elizabeth (UPE), which opened in 1965, and the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), which opened in 1968. These policies originated in the broader Afrikaner Nationalist movement rather than within the NP Government and were adopted to promote specifically Afrikaans interests.

In the 1960s new priorities and processes emerged in Government university policy. Although the needs of Afrikaans students had been advanced in the 1950s, through the opening of a Faculty of Engineering at Pretoria University in 1955 while at Stellenbosch new faculties of Medicine, Forestry and Military Science opened in 1956 and a Dentistry Faculty was planned (which opened in 1962), it was only in the 1960s that the establishment of entirely new institutions for white students, particularly Afrikaans students, was even contemplated. Another major shift was that the initiative to establish the new white universities came not from the Government but from the broader Afrikaner Nationalist movement, with the Afrikaner Broederbond and key Afrikaner capitalists playing a central role.

6.1 Changes in the economic and political context in the 1960s

The new priorities in Government university policy were related to the challenges and opportunities of South Africa's phenomenal economic growth in the 1960s, as well as changes in the domestic and international political arenas.

The shootings of pass protesters at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 and the attempted assassination of Verwoerd less than three weeks later unnerved economic stability. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange index fell sharply and over the next months foreign capital drained away. With foreign exchange reserves

down to R153 million, the Government introduced exchange controls, which finally halted economic growth. The economic and political comeback from these days was dramatic. Verwoerd recovered his health and the Government suppressed African opposition. In May 1961 with the majority of the white electorate's support, South Africa became a Republic and subsequently left the Commonwealth. The departure of capital was stemmed by late 1961 and white emigration was soon outstripped by immigration, so that by 1974 the white population was 1.16 million up on its 1960 figure of 3 million. On average, the economy grew by 5.9 per cent annually over the 1960s, with an average annual increase in per capita incomes of 2.9 per cent. By the close of the decade, white South Africans were among the most affluent groups in the world.¹

For Afrikaner Nationalists, it must have been a particular disappointment that despite phenomenal economic advance, average Afrikaner income still trailed behind that of other whites, rising from 100:128 in the mid 1930s (shortly prior to the first *Ekonomiese Volkskongres* in 1939) to merely 100:126 in 1960. The failure to narrow the gap between Afrikaans and other white income meshed with concerns about the increasingly urban character of the Afrikaner electorate. In 1904, only six per cent of the Afrikaans population lived in towns, rising to 44 per cent in 1936 and 76 per cent in 1960. Afrikaner Nationalism had been forged in an agrarian past which was increasingly irrelevant to the urban Afrikaner electorate. This coincided with other threats to Afrikaner cohesion, such as paradoxically, the attainment of the central goal of the Republic and the emergence of a wealthy class of Afrikaner capitalists (who controlled, for example, 28 per cent of commerce in 1964 compared to eight per cent in 1939 and 14 per cent of finance compared to only five per cent in 1939).² The loss of 'Boer' identity, the central unifying goal and classless cohesion, challenged Afrikaner Nationalist leaders to preserve and reinvent Afrikaner loyalty to the NP. Widely differing approaches emerged to these challenges, with the 'liberalism' and 'internationalism' of capitalists, such as Anton Rupert, the founder of the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation and the most

1. Johnson, RW (1978) *How long will South Africa survive?* Macmillan, London, p28.

2. Welsh, D (1969) 'Urbanization and the solidarity of Afrikaner Nationalism', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Volume 7, Number 2, p270.

prominent Afrikaner industrialist of the 1960s who criticised Verwoerd over the Sharpeville crisis, on one extreme and the introspective conservatism of the 'verkrampde' tendency on the other.

Political debates over these approaches and economic development held practical implications for Afrikaner Nationalists contesting university policy. For example Anton Rupert was concerned about the skills shortage in South Africa and wrote about the need to develop 'human capital',³ which chimed with calls by the head of the University Advisory Committee, the Stellenbosch physicist AC Cilliers, that in the context of the Cold War and the Space Race, South Africa needed to keep up with scientific advance:

Any modern industrialised country ... which neglects to make timely and adequate provision for training sufficient numbers of gifted young people to fill the numerous relevant key positions, will soon find itself lagging hopelessly behind its rivals and competitors in the struggle for national existence.⁴

Political changes and the economic boom thus provided Afrikaner Nationalists with both the stimuli and resources to review the Government's provision of white university education. It was in this context that Verwoerd's Cabinet became amenable to local campaigns for new white universities on the Witwatersrand and in Port Elizabeth.

6.2 Local campaigns in Port Elizabeth and on the Witwatersrand

In late 1962, the Minister of Education, Senator Jan de Klerk, dispatched commissioners to Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth, to investigate local campaigns for new university facilities. The quinquennial review of university finances in terms of the Holloway formula was in progress under AC Cilliers,⁵ but its report was not

3. Rupert, A (1966) 'n Belegging in Menslike Kapitaal' in *Volkshandel*, May.

4. Cilliers, AC (1963) *Report of the committee of enquiry into quinquennial revision of university subsidy formulae*, Department of Education, Arts and Science, Government Printer, Pretoria, p71.

5. Cilliers was a rather controversial political maverick, described by the *Dictionary of South African Biography* as a 'restless genius'. Trained in Stellenbosch and in Germany, he adopted an eclectic range of
Continued ...

expected until mid-1963. The previous report, in 1958, had made it clear that the establishment of new universities for whites was too expensive for the Government to consider. The campaign that resulted in the establishment of RAU and UPE were both launched in this period of financial restraint, and both considered expanding and adapting existing universities to meet local needs, before changing to campaign for independent universities.

By the late 1950s the city of Port Elizabeth had outstripped its origins as a town established by the English 1820 settlers. Its early economic development had been based around the sea, but from the 1870s its proximity to the interior and good rail links to the diamond fields saw its prosperity increase. From the early twentieth century the city was often chosen as a location for factories established by European and American firms, and in the 1920s it became the centre of the country's automobile industry. While Port Elizabeth retained its predominantly English character, the neighbouring inland town of Uitenhage, which had been established by the Cape Government in the early nineteenth century as an outpost to protect trekkers, remained predominantly Afrikaans. Uitenhage's economy was largely based on agriculture, with little in the way of industry except for some services linked to the railways. From the early 1960s, the economies of both areas were boosted by the Government's policy of import substitution, which demanded, for example, that more parts for the motor industry were manufactured, rather than simply assembled, in South Africa.⁶

Although it was the largest city in the region, Port Elizabeth had no university facilities of its own. From the 1930s Rhodes University held public lectures once a term in Port Elizabeth that were very popular and well attended. As early as 1936 an NP candidate in the Port Elizabeth North constituency in the provincial

political positions, including promoting unity between Malan and Hertzog in the late 1930s, helping Havenga form the Afrikaner Party, supporting Smuts when Japan entered the War. He was a founder member of Sabra but turned against the NP when Coloureds were removed from the Common Roll in the Cape. His sister was married to the MP AH Jonker, whose political position altered almost as frequently as his own. See Beyers, CJ (ed.) (1977, 1981 and 1987) *Dictionary of South African Biography*, Volume V, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria.

6. Adler, G (1994) "The factory belongs to all who work in it": Race, Class and Collective Action in the South African Motor Industry, 1967 - 1986', unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, Chapter 3.

elections backed calls for a university in the city. Over the next two decades little progress was made. Approaches to Rhodes University to expand to Port Elizabeth foundered, possibly because, as a recent unpublished history on the University of Port Elizabeth by Theo Rautenbach implies, members of the Rhodes Council were also frequently members of the Grahamstown Town Council, who regarded any division of the focus of Rhodes University in Grahamstown as a threat to the town itself. They often referred to the way in which the Durban branch of the University of Natal had outstripped the branch in Pietermaritzburg.⁷

In the mid 1950s talk of a 'technical skills shortage' revived interest in university development in the city. In 1956 there were a spate of articles in the local press about the shortage of engineers in South Africa in general and in Port Elizabeth in particular, a theme picked up by the head of the Port Elizabeth Technical College, Professor MNS Immelman. From 1957 Immelman tried to force the issue by offering part-time lectures through the Technical College in architecture, science and accounting, but the Department of Education, Arts and Science⁸ refused to provide funding for the scheme and asked him to stop.⁹

As a second strategy, in May 1957 Immelman persuaded the mayor of Port Elizabeth, Struan Robertson, to ask Rhodes Council to approach the Minister of Education for permission to extend their activities to Port Elizabeth.¹⁰ Accordingly, in 1958 RW Wilcocks and PJ du Toit, respectively the head and deputy head of the University Advisory Committee, investigated the proposals for the Government. Wilcocks and Du Toit recommended that faculties and departments should be established that did not already exist in Grahamstown, but despite representations from the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, the Midland Chamber of Industries and the Afrikaanse Sakekamer, which all expressed concern about a skilled manpower shortage, they ruled out Engineering, Medicine and Agriculture. As a result of the investigation, permission for Rhodes to establish a division in

7. Rautenbach, T (1995) 'Die stigting en aanvangsjare van die Universiteit van Port Elizabeth', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Port Elizabeth, Chapter 1.

8. Hereafter Department of Education.

9. Rautenbach, *op cit*.

10. Currey, RF, 1970, *Rhodes University 1904-1970*, Rustica Press, Grahamstown, p145.

Port Elizabeth was granted in the Rhodes Act, No. 6 of 1960. The Act stipulated that if Rhodes operated in Port Elizabeth, it should do so with 'due regard ... to the needs of Afrikaans-speaking students'.¹¹ Classes at the Port Elizabeth Division of Rhodes commenced in 1961.¹²

At this stage, civic hopes for the further development of university facilities in Port Elizabeth were apparently based on the Rhodes branch. The Port Elizabeth City Council agreed early in 1961 to increase its annual grant the Rhodes branch and, for the sum of two Rand, gave Rhodes a 500 acre site at Driftsands to develop. But there was still a strong feeling in Port Elizabeth that Engineering should be taught in the city, so in June 1961 the Nationalist mayor of Port Elizabeth, Monty van der Vyfer, called together members of the Port Elizabeth City Council and representatives of various bodies and decided to campaign for a Faculty of Engineering, as part of Rhodes, to be established in Port Elizabeth. When approached, Rhodes responded that Wilcocks had specifically ruled out Engineering, which meant that it was unlikely that the necessary government permission to establish a new faculty would be forthcoming. Rhodes nevertheless asked De Klerk for his view, who said that even if the funds to establish an Engineering faculty could be raised locally in Port Elizabeth, there were still 1 200 unfilled places at existing Engineering faculties elsewhere in the country.¹³

In December 1960 the Rhodes Professor of Education, JJ (Koos) Gerber, had written to Vorster to warn him that 'certain Rhodes academics' at the Port Elizabeth branch had close 'PAC-ANC-Nusas' links and that they could have a 'liberal influence on young Afrikaners' attending the branch. Norman Bromberger, then a Rhodes academic in Port Elizabeth and probably one of the 'liberal influences' to whom Gerber referred (see below), recalls that Gerber was

11. Robbertse, PM and Erasmus, JA, 'Verslag van komitee van ondersoek na universiteitsgeriewe te Port Elizabeth', 22 November 1962, Pretoria, UOD 04/3/1, p4. All translations from the Afrikaans documents are mine.

12. Rhodes had counted on receiving a more generous government subsidy for its Port Elizabeth activities, in the same way as the two sections of the University of Natal, which for subsidy purposes was regarded as two separate institutions. This extra financial assistance from the Government was not forthcoming, but the City Council made up some of the shortfall.

13. Rautenbach, *op cit*.

somewhat mysterious, because of the rumours about his closeness to Vorster, having been in detention with him during the War ... and also as a bit of a joke - a huge overweight fellow, with a small high-pitched voice ... also rumoured to be a hopeless academic.¹⁴

There were some low-key rumblings during 1961 about Rhodes' sole use of English as a medium of tuition, which were taken up by *Die Oosterlig*. GJ van Vollenhoven, the local manager of the Saambou Building Society, had encouraged his staff to enrol for Commerce degrees through the Rhodes branch, but complained that they failed because tuition was not available in Afrikaans and they registered with Unisa instead. Rhodes responded that when numbers justified it, classes would be offered in Afrikaans. Gradually resentment against the Rhodes branch gained momentum. In February 1962 De Klerk responded unsympathetically to an appeal from Afrikaans parents for facilities in Port Elizabeth, saying that there were other, larger Afrikaans populations, that there were enough universities and that in any case it was too expensive.¹⁵ It appeared that the Government was not amenable to appeals for further university development in Port Elizabeth.

But in early 1962, when Rhodes published its R4 million ten-year development plan, the Port Elizabeth City Council was disappointed to learn that nothing except a larger library was planned for the Rhodes Division in the city. At the same time Immelman, who had been Dean of Studies for the Rhodes branch in Port Elizabeth, resigned, protesting that Grahamstown-based interests were 'sabotaging the Port Elizabeth efforts'.¹⁶

In May 1962 Van der Vyfer, particularly disappointed that the Rhodes plans showed no commitment to pursuing the establishment of an Engineering faculty, submitted yet another appeal to the Government after discussions with the Midland Chamber of Industries, the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce and the

14. Bromberger, N, personal communication, September 1998.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p10.

Afrikaanse Sakekamer. He also made a new appeal for a Medical faculty after consultations with the local branch of the South African Medical Association. The Secretary of Education advised Van der Vyfer that the Cabinet had decided in early May 1962 not to set up new universities. On Immelman's suggestion, Van der Vyfer then recast his submission to appeal for a dual medium, independent institution, because 'if we are going to make a success of this Republic we must bring the two white races together'. On 28 July 1962 De Klerk nevertheless responded negatively, on economic grounds.¹⁷

Unofficially, however, by this time De Klerk had been convinced that there was a need to develop a new university rather than allowing Rhodes to build on its foothold in the city.¹⁸

The exact nature of this 'unofficial' pressure, and in particular, the nature and extent of Broederbond involvement, is unclear. In *The Super Afrikaners* Wilkins and Strydom wrote that in 1961 (i.e., 'the year that the Rhodes branch was established', but they probably meant 1962),

[L]eading Broeders in the Eastern Province held a secret meeting on a Steytlerville farm. It was decided that Rhodes be closed down in Port Elizabeth and the Government be asked, for tactical reasons, to establish a bilingual university there instead.¹⁹

Pelzer's history of the organisation also states that senior Broederbonders were involved in the campaign. A central claim of Rautenbach's unpublished thesis on the University of Port Elizabeth, however, is that 'allegations that the Afrikaner Broederbond planned the new university was [sic] however false'.²⁰ Gerrit Viljoen's view is that the Broederbond played 'a limited role' in the establishment of UPE and recalled that 'quite a number of leading people there were not members of the Broederbond as far as I know'.²¹ Rautenbach's thesis is probably

17. Rautenbach, *op cit*.

18. *Ibid*.

19. Wilkins, I and Strydom, H, 1978, *The Super-Afrikaners*, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, p422.

20. Rautenbach, 'Summary' *op cit*.

21. Viljoen, GVN (1995) First Rector of Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, former chairman of the Broederbond; interviewed in Pretoria, January 1995.

strictly accurate, and that there was no formal, official campaign by the Broederbond in Port Elizabeth and the surrounding areas for an independent university. The campaign in Port Elizabeth had both a different organisational methodology and ideological goals to that on the Witwatersrand, which was without doubt a Broederbond project. However, Viljoen's description of the style of Broederbond influence fits exactly the nature of the UPE campaign:

The Broederbond tried to stimulate and influence its members to apply approaches and methods that would lead to the benefit of the Afrikaner in their daily tasks, but it didn't do the work. The Broederbond didn't do the work. It stimulated its leaders in their normal daily activity to do what can be motivated as in the interest of the Afrikaner.²²

From Viljoen's perspective, the more high profile 'Broederbond' character of the RAU campaign is ascribed to the personality of Piet Meyer. Even if the Broederbond *per se* was not officially involved in the UPE campaign, it is undoubtedly the case, as Rautenbach himself describes in minute detail, that some of the Broederbond and Afrikaner Nationalism's most senior figures in the eastern Cape threw their weight behind the campaign from early 1962.

The most prominent of these individuals was JA Delport, a Broederbond member and the eastern Cape manager of the Afrikaans financial house Sanlam. Delport was spurred to action by an 'incident' at Rhodes in early 1962. Details of this significant 'incident' are suggestively unclear in Rautenbach's account, who wrote that

The father of a certain Afrikaans lady student, probably Miss E Marais of George, refused to pay for her [compulsory fee for automatic membership of Nusas] and she was intimidated by the SRC.²³

Rautenbach points out that while a contemporaneous account (by JJ Engelbrecht, see below) gave the name of the student as Gerber, there was no student enrolled by that name in 1962. (Gerber was, however, the name of the ultra-conservative Professor of Education, who opposed both to Rhodes and Nusas.) When in March

22. *Ibid.*

23. Rautenbach, *op cit.*

1962 Delport heard of this incident from the student's hostel warden, he decided that, in Rautenbach's words, 'as Afrikaans students had it so tough at Rhodes' they should have their own institution in the eastern Cape. Rautenbach melodramatically adds that 'this decision of Delport was the first step in the establishment of the University of Port Elizabeth'. Rautenbach argues that Delport's motivation was 'Afrikaner Nationalist, financial and educationally inspired' and that he had written of 'the children of my folk who stand barefoot before the gates of General Motors, Ford and Firestone...'²⁴

Delport's first approach, whether on his own initiative or with the backing of the local Broederbond, was to PK le Roux, the Minister of Water and Prisons with whom he had dealt over the establishment of a local prison farm. Le Roux initially rebuffed Delport, saying that a university was a more expensive undertaking than a farm prison, but in June 1962 Delport met ministers De Klerk and Vorster with their wives informally at the home of Le Roux in Cape Town. Delport later described a 'breakthrough' fireside discussion with De Klerk in which he aroused the minister's sympathy with a 'heartbreaking pictures of the Port Elizabeth Afrikaners' history of poverty, unemployment and shortage of educational opportunity. On returning to Port Elizabeth, Delport was so confident that he personally had succeeded in persuading De Klerk that in celebration he sent flowers to all the women who had been present.²⁵

Delport was aware that a new independent university in Port Elizabeth, primarily for Afrikaners, could be perceived as threatening by powerful Stellenbosch interests. Rautenbach writes that a meeting of 'Afrikaners' in Steytlerville decided in 1962 that there were sufficient facilities for Afrikaners in Stellenbosch and at Unisa and that new facilities could threaten Stellenbosch numbers. Although Rautenbach does not give the source for this information or state precisely when the meeting occurred, the Steytlerville location for a meeting of 'Afrikaners' echoes the reference made by Wilkins and Strydom to a meeting of 'Afrikaners' at

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

the same place. It is an unresolved puzzle that the two meetings reached precisely the opposite conclusions. It is even more confusing because at the meeting described by Wilkins and Strydom, supposedly, probably erroneously, in 1961, the decision was *in favour* of a new independent university, while the *later* meeting, described by Rautenbach, found *against* it. If these were meetings of the local Broederbond, the argument that Delpont was acting on his own initiative is strengthened.²⁶

Besides the supposed threat to Stellenbosch, which alarmed De Klerk as no fewer than three of his Cabinet colleagues, Eben Dönges, Paul Sauer and Tinie Louw, were also Stellenbosch Council members, De Klerk was also faced with the task of reversing the Cabinet decision not to build new white universities and closing the Rhodes branch, which was then only 18 months old.²⁷

Delpont asked Gerber to provide him with 'state security' arguments to feed to De Klerk. Gerber argued that Rhodes' presence in Port Elizabeth was indeed a threat to state security as well as to Afrikaners in the city, because in contradiction to state policy, it would reinforce English dominance, so that the three largest ports in the country would be 'in the hands of those who favoured integration and taking control of the country out of white hands'. Gerber also said that the Special Branch of the South African Police said that 'some of the most dangerous opponents of the state' were in the black community in Port Elizabeth, where they had contact with some Rhodes lecturers. This was probably a reference to Norman Bromberger, who taught Economic History at the Port Elizabeth branch and was arrested in mid 1964 as a result of his involvement in the African Resistance Movement.²⁸

Working closely with Van Vollenhoven, the Saambou manager, Delpont then persuaded Van der Vyfer to submit yet another request to De Klerk. In August 1962, playing on the need for civic pride and development, and arguing that 'Port

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. Bromberger, *op cit.*

Elizabeth has been brushed aside' by Rhodes, Van der Vyfer called a meeting of local bodies and secured the approval of a broad cross-section of interests²⁹ for a separate university in Port Elizabeth, entirely independent of Rhodes.³⁰

Van der Vyfer contacted De Klerk in mid-September 1962 and asked him to investigate setting up an independent, dual-medium university in Port Elizabeth, with Faculties of Engineering, Medicine and Agriculture, faculties that would have complemented rather than reproduced those of Rhodes. The Principal of Rhodes made counter-representations, and as a result, an investigation was commissioned.³¹

The campaign on the Witwatersrand had a very different history. In late 1955 the Johannesburg Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings had set up a sub-committee under Dr PJ Meyer, at that time deputy head and later head of the Broederbond, with the aim of establishing an Afrikaans teacher-training college and an Afrikaans university on the Rand. The campaigners believed that only half of the Afrikaans matriculants on the Rand intended studying further, and that each year more than 800 potential matriculants were thought to be dropping out too early in their studies. In March 1959 the committee held discussions with the Transvaal Executive Committee (TEC) and the current Minister of Education, JJ Serfontein. The TEC announced itself in favour of the Teachers Training College, and the Goudstad Teachers College opened in February 1961.

Serfontein, however, was discouraging about the prospects of a new university, arguing that 'the time for a new university was very inopportune because the Government was at that precise time piloting legislation through Parliament for separate black university colleges'.³² It was only after Goudstad opened that the committee again concentrated on campaigning for the university. In January 1962

29. Including the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, the Midland Chamber of Industries, the Port Elizabethse Afrikaanse Sakkekamer, the Port Elizabeth Divisional Council, the Port Elizabethse Skoolraad, the Port Elizabethse Mediese Vereniging and the Port Elizabethse Publikiteitsvereniging.

30. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p2.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, (1968) 'Bekroning van 'n groeiproses: Historiese terugblik', in *Gedenkprogram: Amptelike Opening*, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, Johannesburg.

Meyer asked De Klerk for his unofficial approval for the idea of moving Unisa from Pretoria to Johannesburg and expanding the functions of the university to include a residential Afrikaans university as well as its external university role. This, he argued, would suit the Government, as it would avoid the need to establish a new university and at the same time 'fulfil the deeply-felt desires of the Rand's Afrikaners'.³³ But in September 1962 Professor Samuel Pauw, Principal of Unisa, wrote to De Klerk, saying that in terms of a Council decision taken in September 1955 the university would not be involved with the establishment of any new university institutions for whites:

The university has done pioneering work in the area of the education through correspondence for external students. Within a short period it has presented the world with an example of a new concept of university work. It believes that with its outstanding personnel it has offered a very great contribution to the development of our land and its people, by offering adults that already work the opportunity to receive a university education. The university wants to protect this work at all costs. No development of new functions should be allowed to damage the existing functions of the university.³⁴

It was the emerging conflict between the Unisa Council and the senior Broederbond lobby in Johannesburg that prompted De Klerk to send a team of investigators to the Transvaal as well.

6.2.1 'Rhodes is not a university home for Afrikaans speakers': the campaign in Port Elizabeth

In Port Elizabeth, De Klerk instructed his commissioners to perform two distinct roles. The first was to convey the views of the Government to the local campaigners: to ensure that Van der Vyfer and private sector donors fully understood that they would not be able to choose the faculties established (they would not be able to have a Faculty of Engineering and they would have to

33. RAU, *op cit*.

34. Quoted in a memorandum from Pauw to De Klerk, 'Die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika', UOD 4/3/1, Volume 9, 25 February 1963, p4.

concentrate on the social sciences) and that they were clear about the extent of the financial commitment that they were undertaking.³⁵ Second, the commissioners were to assess the merits of establishing a new university in Port Elizabeth, by considering the population, the number of matriculants and how many would not be able to afford to go to university elsewhere. De Klerk also wanted to know why the initiative had become so conflictual and to ensure that in campaigning to break away from Rhodes, Van der Vyfer had the support of the Port Elizabeth City Council and local organised commerce and industry.³⁶ Rhodes' objections to a separate university were to be clarified. The third major concern was about the financial implications for the state. This linked to problems of conflict with Rhodes, as De Klerk wanted to know whether the City Council was legally and morally obliged to let Rhodes University keep the valuable 500 acre site at Driftsands that they had been given for developing university facilities.³⁷

The commissioners visited Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown in late October 1962. Their visit was given prominent treatment in the Port Elizabeth newspapers, where anyone interested was invited to give evidence. A direct invitation was extended to Dr Thomas Alty, Principal of Rhodes, who was asked to send anyone he wanted to give evidence.³⁸

The thrust of Rhodes's submission was that the eastern Cape did not have the population to justify two separate universities.³⁹ They said a new university in Port Elizabeth would put a stop to development in Grahamstown and that the dual-medium approach would fail, and that it would have to become a single-medium institution. They asserted that they could do the work better than a new institution, but this claim failed to convince the commissioners as they had not demonstrated a clear sense of how the Port Elizabeth branch would develop, and they did not

35. Grobbelaar, P, Acting Secretary of Education, 16 October 1962, 'Ondersoek na universiteitsgeriewe te Port Elizabeth', 04/3/1.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p5.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Throughout this process both Rhodes and the government commissioners completely ignored neighbouring Fort Hare, as it had been designated for Xhosa students, and they were discussing provision for white students.

anticipate that it would ever become independent. Rhodes planned to use the Driftsands site only 'when student enrolment justifies it ... this will be a considerable operation and will involve large expenditure'. They thought this would be at least twenty years hence.⁴⁰

Once the opposition of Rhodes became apparent, the consensus that Van der Vyfer had assembled began to disintegrate. The Chamber of Commerce declared itself in favour of developing the Rhodes University branch further, with a view to independence in the long term, as they did not believe there was enough money in the region for two separate institutions. The Chamber of Industry said that it was prepared to see a moderate expansion of university facilities and were prepared to weigh up the case for having an independent university in Port Elizabeth.⁴¹

Opposition also increased in the City Council, which had never been given the opportunity to vote on the matter. By the time it was discussed before the full Council on 30 October 1962, the proposal for an independent dual medium university faced strong opposition, with some changing their minds. Again there was no vote, but the commissioners were told that most supported the idea. Initially all the City Councillors, with the exception of two who were also members of the Rhodes Council, had appeared in favour of Van der Vyfer's plan.⁴² Other support for Rhodes came from groups such as the Port Elizabeth branch of the Old Rhodian Union, the Port Elizabeth branch of the South Africa Teachers' Association, the Soroptimist Society of Port Elizabeth, the Port Elizabeth branch of South Africa Council for English Education and various individuals in their

40. According to RF Currey, who wrote a semi-official history of Rhodes: 'From time to time people, and newspapers, had been asking what truth was there, if any, in the suggestion that Rhodes, an English-medium university, did not offer an acceptable home to Afrikaans-speaking young men and women ... Rhodes felt confident that the record of a half a century and more entitled it to reply that there was no shadow of truth in the suggestion. It was now to appear that there were those who felt differently. The suggestion now became tangled up with considerations of civic pride and the natural desire for civic greatness ... Then suddenly ... the bolt fell ... no one at Rhodes could imagine that Parliament was now going to be asked by the Government to undo that which it had done, with Government support, less than two years before' (Currey, *op cit.*, p144 and p146).

41. The involvement of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry is notable in the Port Elizabeth campaign: such bodies were not active either in the establishment of the black university colleges or in the campaign on the Witwatersrand. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*

private capacities.⁴³ Their argument was that Rhodes had been asked to do the job, and was doing it well. They doubted that the region had the human and financial resources for another institution, they thought it unlikely that a dual-medium institution would work. They pointed out that Rhodes had invested capital in buildings in Grahamstown, and had counted on a continued flow of money and students from Port Elizabeth.⁴⁴

An efficient lobby was organised by JA Delpont in support of a separate university. A Mr WH Delpont presented evidence in favour of Van der Vyfer's plan on behalf of the Afrikaanse Opvoedingsfondsvereniging, the Port Elizabeth West branch of the National Party, and the school board of Port Elizabeth. Support also came from a comprehensive range of other organisations, including the school boards of Uitenhage, Alexandria and Humansdorp, the town councils of Uitenhage, Humansdorp, Graaff-Reinet and Queenstown, the Port Elizabeth Afrikaanse Skakelkomitee, the Port Elizabeth branch of the Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie, two Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk communities in Port Elizabeth, Saambou, the Port Elizabethse Sakekamer, the Port Elizabeth branch of the South African Medical Association, the Citrus Co-operative of the Sundays River Valley, Boere Saamwerk Beperk, the Divisional Council of Port Elizabeth, Old Mutual, various high schools, the Rapportryers of Cradock, as well as individuals such as the MPs for Port Elizabeth West, Uitenhage, Humansdorp and the former Rhodes Dean of External Studies, Immelman. WH Delpont was not the only individual to represent more than one organisation.⁴⁵ These promoters argued that Rhodes was not meeting its obligation to the Afrikaans people of the area and that it was unlikely in the future to make proper provision. This argument encompassed both dissatisfaction with Rhodes's language policy, and with its philosophical approach to university education and politics:

42. *Ibid.*, p7. A Port Elizabeth City Councillor commented that 'If any big industry wanted to come to Port Elizabeth we would grab it. This dual-medium University is one of the biggest industries we could get' (Currey, *op cit.*, p151).

43. *Ibid.*, p23.

44. *Ibid.*, p24.

45. *Ibid.*, p23 and Appendix A, p2.

The medium of tuition at Rhodes University is English, and the direction that the university takes is liberalist and integrationist, and therefore Rhodes is not a university home for Afrikaans speakers and conservative English speakers, and consequently Afrikaners and conservative English speakers in the eastern Cape are without a university.⁴⁶

The supporters reckoned that the human and financial support for a new university existed, but was 'not going to be mobilised for a university in Grahamstown that is so liberalist in orientation'. They said that Rhodes's shortcomings caused a great loss of student potential.

By late November 1962, De Klerk had the report of the commissioners before him.⁴⁸ They played on concerns about the 'liberalism' of Rhodes to argue that it was

in the interest of both the population groups, not only of Port Elizabeth and the surroundings, but also of the Eastern Cape and the Republic of South Africa, that an independent, dual-medium university college in Port Elizabeth, separate from Rhodes University, should be established as quickly as possible, on a conservative basis, and makes this recommendation.⁴⁹

They said that although Wilcocks and Du Toit had decided in 1958 against a separate university in Port Elizabeth and in favour of the expansion of Rhodes there, those commissioners had not wanted their 'largely negative finding to be ... a final closing of the door to future university developments at Port Elizabeth'.⁵⁰

They also referred to comments made in 1960 by BJ Vorster, then Deputy Minister of Education and who was himself from the eastern Cape, about amendments to the Rhodes Act, when he stressed that the establishment of a branch of Rhodes at Port Elizabeth would not prevent the later establishment of an independent

46. *Ibid.*, p24.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.* At De Klerk's request, Grobbelaar subsequently drew up a summary memorandum about the commission. (Cabinet memorandum about university facilities at Port Elizabeth, UOD 04/3/1/ Volume 8, undated.)

49. *Ibid.*, p26.

50. *Ibid.*, p25.

university and that Rhodes should not consider that it had inalienable vested interests.⁵¹

The commissioners had two major criticisms of Rhodes: that it was failing Afrikaans students, and that it had not developed adequate plans for the development of the Port Elizabeth branch. They pointed out that although Afrikaans speakers formed the largest language group among the white population in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area in 1960,⁵² no lessons were yet being given in Afrikaans at Rhodes's Port Elizabeth Division. Furthermore, only 23 Afrikaans speakers were enrolled in 1961 and 26 in 1962, numbers which accounted for only 19 per cent and 16 per cent of enrolments in those years respectively.⁵³ In the summary of this report presented to the Cabinet, this point was amplified: it was argued that Rhodes was failing the potential Afrikaans students of the area so badly, that where on average 52 per cent of the country's white matriculants proceeded to university, some Afrikaans schools in the area were sending as few as ten per cent of their matriculants to university.⁵⁴

The report linked the failure to meet the needs of Afrikaans students to a general lack of vision for the development of facilities in the city. The commissioners were of the opinion that

it was never the intention of Rhodes University to allow any notable development to take place in Port Elizabeth: on the contrary, massive expansion was planned for Grahamstown. The Port Elizabeth branch would serve to keep the public there quiet so that Port Elizabeth capital and students could flow freely to Grahamstown, but the Port Elizabeth branch should be used as the dummy [*fopspeen*] and Professor Immelman as the foster-mother to keep the Port Elizabeth public quiet - an obvious miscalculation on the part of Rhodes University.⁵⁵

51. *Ibid.*, p25.

52. This area had a population of 125 446 whites, of which 61 810 were Afrikaans-speaking, and 59 470 were English-speaking. The remainder were speakers of other languages.

53. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p4.

54. Cabinet memorandum about university facilities at Port Elizabeth, *op cit.*, p1.

55. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p11.

Having concluded that an independent university was desirable, the commissioners sought to diminish the threat that the new institution would pose to Rhodes (or, although this was not made explicit, to Stellenbosch) and to justify the heavy expense for the state. They asserted that after three or four years, an independent university in Port Elizabeth could draw 700 to 800 students from untapped student potential in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area, so that the future of Rhodes was not threatened. They said parents would continue to send their children to Rhodes for traditional or other reasons.⁵⁶

The costs of establishing a new institution were substantial. Until student numbers rose above 500, the university's income from fees and the state subsidy would fall short of the running costs, but the commissioners said that there was general public support for a university in Port Elizabeth, and from trade and industry.⁵⁷ Over and above this shortfall, there would be a greater burden placed on the state as the smaller the university, the greater the state's contribution would be per student.⁵⁸ Another major financial burden for the state loomed with conflict over resources which had been given to Rhodes. With R45 000 from the state and R57 000 from the Port Elizabeth City Council, Rhodes had purchased a building in Port Elizabeth for about 300 students: this would have to be handed over to the new independent university.⁵⁹ The City Council had also given Rhodes the large Driftsands site, for the nominal amount of two Rand, on the condition that university buildings were erected within five years. Although they paid the two Rand, this condition was not accepted by Rhodes, and when Rhodes' limited plans in the city subsequently became clear, transfer was suspended. Nevertheless, if at that stage Rhodes had proceeded to develop its Port Elizabeth branch and build on

56. *Ibid.*, p6 and Cabinet memorandum about university facilities at Port Elizabeth, *op cit.*, p1.

57. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p5.

58. For example, for 500 students, the state contribution would be R560, whereas at Rhodes, in 1962 the state was contributing R412 per student in 1962, a figure which would have declined further had student numbers at Rhodes continued to increase. (Cabinet memorandum about university facilities at Port Elizabeth, *op cit.*, p1.)

59. *Ibid.*

the land within five years, the City Council would have been legally obliged to hand over the ground.⁶⁰

The Secretary for Education, JJP Op't Hof, prepared a commentary for De Klerk on the report from Port Elizabeth. He warned that it was probable that neither the Chambers of Commerce and Industry nor the City Council supported the idea of a separate university in Port Elizabeth and that the report underestimated the costs for the first decade. He thought that the plans to move Unisa to Johannesburg and develop it had far more merit and should be given priority over the Port Elizabeth scheme.⁶¹ Nevertheless, he concluded that:

If a single-medium university institution at Port Elizabeth develops, either independent or under Rhodes, there will never be a place for Afrikaners and a second university will not be justifiable for perhaps the next 50 years. It will also mean that there will be three universities in the area.⁶² The only way where the needs of Afrikaans speakers can be locally provided for is through a dual-medium institution.⁶³

6.2.2 The campaign on the Witwatersrand: threatening Unisa for the ethnic ideal

While the campaign in Port Elizabeth was initially fuelled by civic ambitions and concerns about the effects of shortages of skilled personnel on the local economy, and only subsequently by the desire to meet the needs of Afrikaans students, on the Witwatersrand the campaign was motivated from the start by Afrikaans ambitions. In October 1962 De Klerk commissioned research about the 'Proposed Move of Unisa', and received a memorandum concerned more with buildings, finances, and the need to move from the limited facilities in the centre of Pretoria, than with possible political implications or opportunities.⁶⁴ De Klerk then asked three of his

60. Robbertse and Erasmus, *op cit.*, p8.

61. Op't Hof, memorandum to minister, 'Selfstandige universiteit, Port Elizabeth', 23 January 1963, UOD 04/3/1, p1.

62. Again, the presence of Fort Hare is ignored.

63. Op't Hof, letter to minister, 24 January 1963, UOD 04/3/1.

64. Memorandum from Grobbelaar, Acting Secretary of Education, to De Klerk, 'Voorgestelde verskuiwing van die Universiteit van Suid Afrika', 19 October 1962, UOD 04/3/1 Volume 9.

top officials secretly to prepare a strictly confidential report on the possible move of Unisa to the Rand and the extension of its activities.

Because of its secret nature, there were no public announcements or calls for evidence from interested parties as there had been in Port Elizabeth, which changed the character of the Rand campaign which had until then been based on broad public participation. Few details of the investigation are available, other than that in late November 1962 the three officials discussed the matter with Pauw. The reasons for the secrecy of this investigation are not immediately clear, but they are hinted at in the report:

As requested, the committee treated the matter as highly confidential, and did not share the purpose of the investigation with other people.

Nevertheless, other people such as Dr PJ Meyer, Chairman of the SABC, PZJ van Vuuren, MEC and Jack Steyl, MPC, with whom the committee had dealings, were aware of the possible move of Unisa to the Rand. They were requested to regard the matter as utterly confidential. It also appeared that the personnel of Unisa were aware of the affair.⁶⁵

From this it appears that although the Johannesburg campaigners were fully aware of the investigation, it was supposed to be kept secret from Unisa personnel. Because of the letter from Pauw, De Klerk was aware that asking Unisa to move to the Rand was controversial and likely to arouse resistance, and was therefore attempting, through this secret investigation, to clarify whether such a move was feasible and necessary, before he risked alienating the Unisa staff.

In December, the committee of three reported to De Klerk, concluding that

The establishment of a second university on the Witwatersrand, mainly for Afrikaans-speakers, but where conservative English-speakers will also feel at home, is justified.⁶⁶

65. Erasmus, JA, 'Vertroulik: Verslag van komitee van ondersoek insake moontlike verskuiwing van die Universiteit van Suid Afrika na die Rand en die moontlike uitbreiding van sy funksies', 31 Desember 1962, Pretoria, UOD 04/3/1 Volume 9.

66. *Ibid.*

In order to reach this conclusion, they had to demonstrate that there was a need for a new university for whites, and particularly for Afrikaners. They also had to weigh up the implications of moving Unisa to the Rand, and the particular location of the Rand that was most desirable for a new institution.

They pointed out that the number of white students in South Africa had increased eight-fold since 1922, when the last university for white students had been established. Since 1952, in the previous decade, student numbers had increased by 75 per cent, from 19 187 to 33 439. They considered that this was sufficient evidence to justify more universities for whites and reverse the Cabinet decision of May 1962. Further, they argued:

As there is already a University on the Rand with English as its medium of instruction, a second university will have to make provision chiefly for the Afrikaans-speaking student, and it is the student potential of the Afrikaans-speaker that will determine if a second university should be established.

The report cited figures (probably provided by the campaigners) to show that although the entire white population of the Rand was increasing very fast, the rate of increase for Afrikaans speakers outstripped that of English speakers: it had increased by two and a half times between 1936 and 1960, as opposed to one and a half times.⁶⁷ They stressed that the greatest concentration of Afrikaans speakers in the Republic was on the Rand: there were as many Afrikaans speakers on the Rand as the combined white populations of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, Bloemfontein, Grahamstown, Potchefstroom and Pietermaritzburg (which were all university towns).

They also cited figures giving the Afrikaans 'student potential' of the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging area, based on the numbers of school leavers obtaining the matriculation exemption certificate since 1946. In 1946, Afrikaans schools had produced 247 matriculants, as opposed to 504 in English schools. By 1961, the figures were 655 and 967 respectively, reflecting a more rapid increase

67. In 1936 there were over 163 000 Afrikaans speakers in the Rand-Vereeniging area, as opposed to over 258 000 English speakers. These figures increased to 402 000 and 470 000 by 1960 respectively. Erasmus, *Ibid.*, p4.

on the part of Afrikaans speakers. The projected figures for 1966 were 1 227 and 1 021 respectively.⁶⁸ They reckoned that by 1980 the area would be producing about 4 500 Afrikaans-speaking matriculants per annum. In trying to predict how many students the new university would need to cater for, they also reckoned that 'a reasonable number of English-speakers: 1 500 are regarded as conservative'⁶⁹ were expected to attend RAU.

The three officials argued that the establishment of an Afrikaans university on the Rand would not seriously affect the growth of other universities in the Transvaal.⁷⁰ They thought that Pretoria and Wits were too big to be affected, but they admitted that it would have an impact on the long-term growth of Potchefstroom. They thought that in the short term, Potchefstroom would be protected by its specific, religious character.⁷¹

With regard to Unisa, they said that moving the correspondence section of Unisa to the Rand would not cost the university or the state anything more than moving to the Fountains site, except for a small amount for buying the ground on the Rand. The officials argued that the east Rand would be the most appropriate location for a new university. The concentration of Afrikaans speakers was on the east Rand, and the point was made that the east Rand was currently delivering, and would continue to deliver, the greatest number of Afrikaans-speaking matriculants: 253 in 1961, as opposed to 218 on the central Rand, 121 on the west Rand and 63 in Vereeniging.⁷² Another factor which led the committee to favour the east Rand was land. They said that a minimum of 100 morgen was needed to build a university for 6 000 students, and they therefore recommended a Germiston site where this amount of ground was available, as opposed to the Auckland Park site, which was only 74 morgen and which they thought was too limited and would be too small within 25 years. Unisa had expressed themselves in favour of the Auckland Park site because it was in 'a good neighbourhood', because it was only

68. *Ibid.*, p6.

69. *Ibid.*, p7.

70. *Ibid.*, p30.

71. *Ibid.*, p26.

72. *Ibid.*, p6.

one mile from Goudstad and because it supposedly had the greatest concentration of Afrikaans speakers per square mile in the whole region.⁷³

The east Rand bias was supported by financial arguments. The anticipated costs for establishing a university of 2 000 students in Germiston came to R2 450 000 as opposed to R3 420 000 in Auckland Park.⁷⁴ It was commented that a new university could not be established without the help of the state, and that the university could only bear one third of the costs, and that the state should therefore provide two Rand to every one Rand but limited to R2 million.⁷⁵

6.2.3 Deliberations on the local investigations

In January 1963 Op't Hof prepared a commentary for De Klerk on the two local investigations. He said that if De Klerk followed the approach of the committees, and concentrated on local considerations, he could be criticised for setting precedents that could not be followed through for other local initiatives and failing to take account of the broader question of whether extra universities for whites were reasonable at that time. Op't Hof thought that De Klerk had to be prepared to justify the establishment of new universities, and had selected excerpts to help him do this from the forthcoming AC Cilliers review of university finances.

Op't Hof was himself in favour of the establishment of new universities for whites and considered that the scheme on the Rand had greater priority than the Port Elizabeth scheme:

The Rand, with its great population of whom most are Afrikaans speaking, does not only have first claim but there is an urgent need for a new university, primarily for Afrikaans speakers, but also with facilities for those English speakers that will enrol there.⁷⁶

73. Draft Cabinet memorandum, 10 January 1963, *op cit.*, p2.

74. *Ibid.*, p29.

75. This effectively ruled out the Auckland Park site. Draft Cabinet memorandum, 10 January 1963, *op cit.*, p3.

76. Op't Hof, 23 January 1963, *op cit.*, p1.

He dismissed criticism that South Africa already had too many universities in two ways. First, he argued that

Although after America, South Africa has the highest number of students per hundred of the white population in the western world, it must be borne in mind that, for a long time yet, whites must offer to the great mass of non-whites the services that university education delivers, and that we are developing at an unusual tempo in industrial and economic areas.⁷⁷

This argument drew on figures compiled by Cilliers:

Table 6.1: White South African and SWA students as a proportion of the white population and all South African and SWA students as a proportion of the total population, compared to seven other countries, 1959-61 ⁷⁸			
Country	Total population	Students	Inhabitants per student
USA	179 285 000	3 619 000	50
SA Inc. SWA (whites)	3 140 792	37 934	83
Canada	18 085 000	126 863	143
New Zealand	2 403 488	15 826	152
Australia	10 600 170	53 391	200
SA Inc. SWA	16 366 192	41 817 ⁷⁹	391
UK	52 675 094	114 935	458
India	410 000 000	827 000	500
Pakistan	91 000 000	91 404	1 000

Although the number of students relative to the size of the total population was still high by international standards, Op't Hof argued that there was a need for more universities because of the different language groups and because he worked with the assumption that 6 000 was the maximum number of enrolments for optimum efficiency. He said that the three larger universities, Pretoria, Wits and Cape Town, already had more than 5 000 students. He thought that the smaller universities and emptier faculties would fill up in less than a decade, and that in this context it was wise to plan for the establishment of new universities.⁸⁰

77. Op't Hof, memorandum to minister, 'Selfstandige universiteit, Port Elizabeth', 23 January 1963, UOD 04/3/1, p1.

78. My calculations, based on Op't Hof, memorandum to minister, UOD 04/3/1, 11 January 1963, pp2-3.

79. Including 3 893 black students, Op't Hof, 11 January 1963, *op cit.*, p3.

80. Op't Hof, 11 January 1963, *op cit.*, p5.

Op't Hof's idea that the ideal size for a university was 6 000 originated with AC Cilliers. In 1965 Cilliers elaborated on these views at a Unisa graduation ceremony, where he said that growth in university capacity should keep up with the country's trend in economic rather than population growth. He feared that if universities simply enrolled more students, the quality of the education offered would suffer. He said that unlike a factory, which could produce an unlimited quantity of identical goods with no implications for their quality,

a school or university's role is to deliver spiritual products, rich in diversity, with quantity without doubt a significant limitation on quality.

He believed that education involved dialogue and exchange between lecturer and student, which made very large classes undesirable. He did not specify an optimum size for a lecture group but thought that lecturers could not hold the attention of a group over 150 'day in and day out' and spoke disparagingly of classes of 400 or more where universities 'strove for the King Size format'. The number 6 000 was not arbitrary but calculated 'scientifically' to provide the optimum number of students over a wide range of faculties considering timetables, splitting large groups, accommodation and staffing.⁸¹

Op't Hof had no strong opinions about Unisa. He said that if the Cabinet approved the idea, then

the Unisa Council should be told in confidence that the Cabinet had in principle decided in favour of moving Unisa to the Rand with extended functions, and would appreciate the Council's favourable consideration of the affair, and [ask them to] lay concrete proposals before the Department of Education, Arts and Science.⁸²

It seems clear from this that Op't Hof had an idea that Unisa would need to be handled diplomatically.

81. *Die Burger*, 5 May 1965. Mr PK Morkel of the Stellenbosch Farmers' Association disagreed with Cilliers, saying that the universities should not be 'artificially' limited from outside and that the needs of the country were too great to limit student numbers (*Die Burger*, 21 July 1965).

82. Op't Hof, 23 January 1963, *op cit.*, p2.

On the basis of the investigations of his officials and the advice of Op't Hof, by late January De Klerk had decided to approach the Cabinet with two plans: to establish a new university in Port Elizabeth and to move Unisa to the Rand and expand its functions.

6.3 Cabinet decision in favour of UPE

In early February 1963, the Cabinet considered and approved 'the establishment of an independent dual-medium university institution at Port Elizabeth'.⁸³ The Cabinet was due to consider the Rand proposals in early March.

In approving the proposal for a dual medium institution the Cabinet abandoned the central principle of Afrikaner Nationalist education policy that had until then held sway: that education should be provided in the mother tongue, so that the cultural values of the ethnic group could be preserved and transmitted. It seemed to contrast dramatically with the *Afrikaanswording* campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s that had ended earlier attempts to provide dual-medium higher education.

But Verwoerd, in the aftermath of the successful campaign for the Republic, had seemingly turned his back on such notions:

We have risen above pettiness and selfishness. Patriotism, fellow-citizenship, friendship, all have become of more importance to us. The English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking sections have become like the new bride and bridegroom who enter upon the new life in love ...⁸⁴

De Klerk spelled out the implications of this general change of heart by the Nationalist Cabinet for the new university in Port Elizabeth, when he commented 'in all sincerity' that

the establishment of the new dual-medium university college should be regarded by all as the greatest opportunity yet to prove that the English and

83. De Klerk, J, Press release, 13 February 1963, UOD 04/3/1.

84. Quoted in Moodie, TD (1975) *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion*, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp285-286. Thanks to Albert Grundlingh for bringing this to my attention.

Afrikaans speaking sections of our nation can indeed work, study, live and play together. If they cannot find each other at university level, respecting each other's language, culture and traditions, it will be indeed a sorry day for South Africa ...⁸⁵

UPE was therefore to embody a new white conservatism in the Republic of South Africa. It was not a return to the bilingual university of the 1920s, where Afrikaans tuition had been grudgingly offered as a practical measure within institutions which were modelled on universal principles. UPE would actively promote Afrikaans students through positive discrimination so that they could catch up and become the educational and economic equals of their English-speaking counterparts. This would be achieved in a nationalist political environment, not a neutral, universal institution, so as to protect Afrikaans students from the 'liberal' influences of Rhodes and Nusas and also to draw in conservative English-speaking students.

The Cabinet decision left Rhodes unclear about its future in the city. Alty told the press that:

Rhodes University intends to maintain its Port Elizabeth Division unless rejected by those who invited the University to come to the City.⁸⁶

He also wrote to De Klerk in March:

It is with great regret and much indignation that we learn of your intention to set up in Port Elizabeth ... a new and independent university college ... Rhodes University is empowered by Parliament to operate in Port Elizabeth, and in the two years that the Port Elizabeth Division has been open, it has made excellent progress ... at no time has any complaint been made to the University either by the Minister or by the City Council of Port Elizabeth. The University has honourably carried out its contract and we are entirely at a loss to understand the complete neglect of our interests which seems inherent in the course you propose.⁸⁷

85. De Klerk, J to Alty, T, letter, 'University facilities at Port Elizabeth', 14 March 1963, p2.

86. Currey, *op cit.*, p151.

87. Alty, T to De Klerk, letter, 2 March 1963, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

These protests were impatiently dismissed by De Klerk, who pencilled a note for his assistants on the letter: 'This is our chance to bring our policy home to the writer and to shake him out of several dreams.'⁸⁸ To Alty, he wrote:

I wish to make it quite clear that your University will not be allowed to continue its academic activities at Port Elizabeth. It is unthinkable that the Government would allow two university institutions in Port Elizabeth competing for the same students. Your Act will, if necessary, have to be amended.⁸⁹

De Klerk was still concerned to wrest control of the Port Elizabeth assets from Rhodes without a public fight, and confidentially requested Dr AH Jonker, the Nationalist MP for Fort Beaufort and Rhodes Council member, to attend all the Rhodes Council meetings where these matters were discussed. He was hoping that Rhodes would 'deal intelligently with the matter ... and hand over the relevant assets to the new institution' in order to retain the goodwill of Port Elizabeth.⁹⁰ He asked Jonker to discuss the matter with 'other like-minded people' on the Rhodes Council.⁹¹

6.3.1 The establishment of the University of Port Elizabeth

In January 1964 the University of Port Elizabeth Bill was read in Parliament. As a university Bill it was unusual because it established UPE as an independent university *ab initio*, and did not seek to grant full autonomy to an existing university college, and so it was introduced by the Government rather than as a Private Bill.⁹² After the acrimonious processes leading to the introduction of the Bill, the debate was remarkably cordial. The Opposition congratulated De Klerk on

88. De Klerk, comment on letter from Alty, 7 March 1963.

89. De Klerk, J to Alty, T, letter, 'University facilities at Port Elizabeth', 14 March 1963, p2.

90. A municipal election was fought in Port Elizabeth shortly after the Cabinet decision, and some of the main campaigners for the new university, including Van der Vyfer, lost their seats. *The Star*, 28 January 1964, and Currey, *op cit.*, p152.

91. De Klerk, J to Jonker, AH, letter, 'Universiteitsfasiliteite te Port Elizabeth', 14 March 1963. Dr Abraham Jonker, the NP MP for Fort Beaufort, who was also a member of the Rhodes Council, said that 'agitation against the Bill' had originated from left wingers at Rhodes, led by Alty, who wanted to 'liberalise Port Elizabeth' (*Rand Daily Mail*, 28 January 1964). Rhodes denied that the university had acted for political reasons, and said it was 'inspired solely by higher educational motives' (*Eastern Province Herald*, 30 January 1964).

92. *The Star*, 21 January 1964.

introducing the Bill, and De Klerk thanked Rhodes for their support.⁹³ While the United Party did not oppose the Bill in principle, it raised objections to certain points. These included the Government's right to approve the appointment of the Chancellor and Principal, a form of state control that only existed at the black university colleges.⁹⁴ The minister also had the right to appoint half the members of the university Senate, which was not the case at any other university.⁹⁵ Because of the unusual measures for state control, the *Sunday Times* said the new institution would be 'the Turfloop of Algoa Bay' and 'a factory for indoctrinating students in political and ideological attitudes'.⁹⁶ The UP feared that the dual-medium 'experiment' would fail, and that it would become an Afrikaans institution.⁹⁷ They strongly suggested that the Bill should be sent to a Parliamentary Select Committee to allay suspicions in Port Elizabeth, but it was put straight to the vote and on 31 January 1964 the University of Port Elizabeth Act, No. 1 of 1964, was unanimously passed by Parliament.⁹⁸

The campaign to establish UPE was practically supported by Afrikaner capital. Not only were Delpont and Van Vollenhoven senior in Sanlam and Saambou respectively, but the campaign was based in offices in the Sanlam Building in Port Elizabeth, which was also furnished and equipped by Sanlam. Van Vollenhoven was seconded by Saambou to work full time as head of the fund raising committee. Another important fund raiser was Dr E Rousseau, chair of Sasol.⁹⁹

As steps were taken to bring the new university into being, the nature of the 'white conservatism' that would be promoted by the new institution became apparent.

93. *Ibid.*, 28 January 1964.

94. *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 January 1964, *The Star*, 28 January 1964.

95. *Sunday Times*, 26 January 1964.

96. *Ibid.*

97. In March 1966 UPE published statistics to show that it was fulfilling its obligations to both English and Afrikaans speaking students. Afrikaans speakers constituted 52 per cent of the first enrolment, English speakers 45 per cent and bilingual students another 2 per cent. Afrikaans was the medium of tuition for 25 subjects, and English for 18 subjects (*Eastern Province Herald*, 14 March 1966).

98. UPE, 1966, *Calendar*, UPE, Port Elizabeth, p15.

99. Rautenbach, Chapter 6, *op cit.*

De Klerk announced the membership of the first Council in March 1964. Notably, they included JA Delpont, GJ van Vollenhoven and WH Delpont, who had been so instrumental in the establishment of the institution. The Rector, the mayor and deputy mayor of Port Elizabeth were included, as well as a representatives from Stellenbosch, Rhodes, the English schools, the Afrikaans schools (a position taken by JJ Engelbrecht, who was also appointed as the Secretary of UPE and later became an MP and served as chair of the UPE Council), the Convocation and Senate, Uitenhage and the other municipalities. The Donors were initially represented by Dr AD Wassenaar, the chairman of Sanlam, and BC Brayshaw of the Industrial Development Corporation, but later in the year Brayshaw was replaced by a representative of the Afrikaans churches, who had also made significant donations to the establishment fund.¹⁰⁰ Monty van der Vyfer was not included.

Wassenaar served as the first Chair of Council, consolidating the close relationship between UPE and Sanlam. According to O'Meara, in the late 1970s Wassenaar was a 'leading light in the business agitation for rapid reforms', with his book *Assault on Private Enterprise* a trenchant attack on Vorster's style of leadership.¹⁰¹ Although little is known of his politics in the mid 1960s, he probably shared broadly similar views to those of the first Chancellor, the *verligte* business mogul Anton Rupert. Head of the Rembrandt Tobacco Corporation, Rupert was sensitive to the country's international image and had broken publicly with Verwoerd in 1958 and again over Sharpeville. After the education crisis of 1976 he co-founded the Urban Foundation with Harry Oppenheimer.¹⁰²

Wassenaar was not, however, the Port Elizabeth campaigners' first choice for the position of Chair of Council. Delpont and Van Vollenhoven had intended to appoint EJ Marais, then one of the two deputy chairs of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), to the post. They had first met Marais at a

100. Rautenbach, *op cit*. The State President also nominated Mr IG Fleming of King Williams Town for a four year term.

101. O'Meara, D (1996) *Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994*, Ravan, Johannesburg, pxxxix and p195.

102. *Ibid*, pccv.

Farmers' Union function in Port Elizabeth in October 1963 and had arranged for him to serve on the Council, mainly because of the example of the Rhodes Council, which included not only the chair of the CSIR, but also a former CSIR figure in their Principal, Thomas Alty. But on the eve of the first UPE Council meeting, at an informal meeting held at Van Vollenhoven's house, Marais announced that he would not be able to serve as Chair of Council as the CSIR felt it would take too much of his time. The gathering, where among a few others, both Delports, Van Vollenhoven, Marais and Engelbrecht were present, had intended to reach a decision about who would be offered the post of Rector. That night, the candidate who had been identified, Professor GJ Smit, a former Port Elizabeth head teacher who was then Dean of Education at the University of Cape Town, said he had been offered the post of Superintendent-General of Education in the Cape and that he was undecided about whether he would accept the Port Elizabeth offer. Marais then suggested other possible candidates from the Transvaal. In the course of the discussion, in which Marais analysed the qualities required of a Rector, Delport and Van Vollenhoven decided that Marais was himself the ideal candidate for the post. At the first Council meeting the next day he was subsequently appointed.¹⁰³

If the top leadership positions of the new university were dominated by the *verligte* elite of Afrikaner business, (a remarkable contrast to the appointments at RAU, see below), no such considerations applied in the selection of the first Senate.

According to the Act, the Senate was to consist of representatives from both Rhodes and Stellenbosch. Correspondence in April 1964 between the Secretary of Education and the newly-appointed Secretary of UPE, JJ Engelbrecht, reveals that the Op't Hof forwarded a list of the professors at both Stellenbosch and Rhodes in the departments that were to be established at UPE. On the basis of 'reliable informants' at Rhodes, Engelbrecht then wrote 'highly confidentially' to explain which of the individuals on this list were acceptable to the UPE management. From Rhodes, they ended up with just four. JL Cattaneo was accepted as Professor of French because he was a 'quiet chap that never talks in Senate. Does not take any

103. Rautenbach, *op cit.*, Chapter 6.

apparent interest in politics'. JJ Gerber, who opposed Nusas and the 'liberal' Rhodes administration and had a close relationship with the Special Branch became Professor of Education, with Engelbrecht commenting that he could 'without hesitation be accepted, but a man like PS du Toit from Stellenbosch would certainly be much more valuable'.¹⁰⁴ HM Roberts became Professor of Accounting because he had 'no liberal or progressive tendencies' although he was a 'committed UP man' and HH Smith became Professor of Commerce because he was described as a

good quiet Christian who never meddles in politics. Preaches sometimes in the Anglican church. Reasonably good in his subject. I think he is acceptable.

They also asked Professor D Hobart Houghton to become head of economics and economic history, writing that he

Serves on the executive of the SAIRR. Is therefore strongly progressive. Strongly against UPE. Nevertheless clever academic and administrator. We will almost certainly have to accept him.

As Hobart Houghton did not serve on the Senate, it appears that he refused this invitation. Other Rhodes academics who were rejected were RKJE Antonissen, who was described as an

Outspoken liberal. Normally signs all anti-Government documents and petitions first. Smart literary man and man of integrity. I don't think he is acceptable for the UPE Senate ...

Engelbrecht was very concerned that Antonissen should not be offered the position of head of Afrikaans, and that it should rather go to 'any of the Stellenbosch men' and in fact it was taken by DJ Opperman of Stellenbosch. They also worried that R Butler of Rhodes was 'an outspoken liberal and therefore strongly against Government policy' even though he was 'nevertheless a clever academic'. In the end, only four Rhodes professors were appointed, compared with nine from Stellenbosch. A comparable political analysis of the Stellenbosch professors does

104. In May 1966 Gerber corresponded with the Commissioner of Police in Pretoria about Nusas activities at Rhodes, identifying leading figures and recommending that two Rhodesians, Sprack and Lock, should be deported. See correspondence from Gerber in BJ Vorster's files on Nusas when he was Minister of Justice, MJU J21/22/1 Vol. 137: 5/66 SAP.

not appear to have been made. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the first criterion for the selection of members of the Senate was that they should be politically neutral or competent. Their academic prowess was a secondary consideration.¹⁰⁵

Both Rautenbach's account and Gerrit Viljoen's recollections suggest that the decisions about who would fill the senior posts at UPE were taken by JA Delpont, Van Vollenhoven and Engelbrecht. None of these men had any experience of academic teaching or university administration. Their presence on the Council and active intervention in the running of the institution soon caused friction with the newly appointed academic staff.¹⁰⁶

In October 1968 19 staff members resigned from UPE. Marais explained that there were differences of approach between the academic staff and the administration and Council. He denied that these differences were in any way political, or reflective of a '*verligte-verkrampde*' split in the institution. Viljoen, who points out that RAU employed many of those who left UPE at this time, confirmed that the problems stemmed from heavy-handed administrative interference in academic matters.¹⁰⁷

Delpont, who had at one stage personally pledged R750 000 to the UPE fund-raising committee and seems to have thereafter regarded UPE as a personal project, was given to extravagant fantasies about the role and character of UPE. He wanted UPE to develop departments for specialist industrial applications, such as Transport, Flight Technology and Textile Technology. During a visit to the United States in 1964, Delpont was impressed by the California Institute of Technology, and thereafter thought that rather than emulating other South African universities, UPE should stress quality of research rather than student numbers. In 1963 when Anton Rupert spoke of the need to attract promising students to South Africa, Delpont started planning an 'international' character for UPE and 'cherished great dreams that the youth of other white nations would flow to Port

105. UOD 04/4/1 Volume 14.

106. Viljoen, *op cit.*, Rautenbach, *op cit.*

107. *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 October 1968, Viljoen, *op cit.*

Elizabeth to study in the wonderful new fields of study'.¹⁰⁸ Delpont did not seem to realise that these schemes were not naturally compatible with his aim of educating poor, local Afrikaans students. These ideas reveal not only Delpont's enthusiasm but also his inexperience in university matters. None were adopted or even regarded seriously by the experienced administrators at the Department of Education.

Decisions were also taken about the character of the student body. The Cabinet considered the status of four Chinese students who were studying at the Port Elizabeth Division of Rhodes, which was about to shut down. It decided that UPE would not be 'open', and that the students would have to continue their studies elsewhere. They transferred to Rhodes, where about 20 Chinese students were already registered and accommodated in the residences.¹⁰⁹

The campaign was concerned to fill the institution with students, who had to be white, and preferably Afrikaans. In late 1963 Van Vollenhoven wrote to the Principals of 116 feeder schools, arguing that while UPE would lack established tradition, it would be more 'modern' than the 'outdated' facilities of the older institutions and would 'provide for every possible requirement of the atomic age'.¹¹⁰ Even though tuition was to be strictly divided between English and Afrikaans, there were attempts to encourage as many Afrikaans students to enrol as possible. Wilkins and Strydom describe how

the Broederbond made strenuous efforts to ensure that the bias of the campus was towards Afrikaans. It launched a campaign to fill the university as far as possible with Afrikaners. An instruction was sent to members in the monthly circular letter number 4/64/65 dated June 2 1964: 'With the establishment of a university in Port Elizabeth in mind, it is cordially requested that in particular friends (members) in the area will use their

108. Rautenbach, Chapter 6, *op cit.*

109. *Eastern Province Herald*, 26 May 1964.

110. Rautenbach, Chapter 6, *op cit.*

influence to ensure that as many Afrikaner students as possible register there',¹¹¹

When UPE opened in 1965, just over half of the students enrolled were English speaking, but the character of the institution was self-consciously Afrikaans. Van Vollenhoven had promised parents of potential students that the 'spirit and discipline of the new institution will be fundamentally sound and genuinely South African from the start', unlike Rhodes, which was 'too British and liberal'. Van Vollenhoven said that UPE would provide both an opportunity for 'nation building' and for English and Afrikaans speakers to learn about each other, and an 'own' university for Afrikaans-speaking students.¹¹² Marais later explained that he had decided that

The English cultural community is effectively and fully served by Rhodes University. I saw it as natural that the character of UPE should therefore consider the reasonable claims of the Afrikaner community on the University and that the character of the University should be acceptable to the broad Afrikaner community.¹¹³

To this end the Council exercised strict control over student activity, forbidding initiation and sport on Sunday. No political gatherings could be held on the campus, nor could political posters be brought onto university property. The Council decided that

Before approval is given for the establishment of societies or clubs, the proposed societies or clubs may be required to show, to the satisfaction of the Council, that the policies and projects of the organisation, or any organisation with which it will be affiliated, upholds the generally accepted traditions of the main cultural groups of the country, the authority of the State, the authority and discipline of the university and, where applicable,

111. Wilkins and Strydom, *op cit.*, p266.

112. Rautenbach, Chapter 6, *op cit.*

113. Marais, EJ, 1977, 'The special role of a dual-medium university', in Van der Merwe, HW and Welsh, D, (eds.) *The future of the university in Southern Africa*, David Phillip, Cape Town, p202.

that it promotes a healthy atmosphere of active enquiry and discussion in a diverse student community.¹¹⁴

In this spirit, in April 1965 the Debating Society refused to participate in a debate at Rhodes University because Fort Hare students would also be present and this was 'against the spirit of the country'. In the same month UPE students also decided that they would not affiliate to any national student body (see Chapter 7).

The 'Afrikaans' spirit of the institution was also to be transmitted through the official attitude to academic freedom. At the official opening of the first academic year, Marais rephrased ideas about the *volksuniversiteit* to imbue both English and Afrikaans speaking students with a sense of responsibility to the white South African nation. He said that in the context of the Cold War, UPE students should not be exposed to the 'dangerous, destructive influences' of 'false freedom' and argued that

Freedom does not mean dissipation, and freedom can only have meaning if duty and responsibility are taken into account ... the students will learn that the highest freedom is to serve a higher calling.¹¹⁵

Wassenaar added that although freedom was necessary in the struggle for knowledge, 'rights and privileges' should not be 'manipulated' to obtain freedom and that the 'incumbent duties' should be shouldered immediately.¹¹⁶

More than a decade after the opening of the university, Marais was asked to write an article on 'The special role of a dual-medium university' in 1977. In trying to present UPE's underlying philosophy, Marais wrote:

It stands to reason that the educational and especially the academic realms provide a promising environment for creating and stimulating the kind of forces which will assist a nation-in-birth to find its common cultural base; but these realms equally provide a venue for fostering and nurturing those intrinsic and distinctive cultural patterns inherited from a strong and virile culture and, more specifically in the South African context, from a young

114. Rautenbach, *Chapter 6, op cit.*

115. *Ibid.*

116. *Ibid.*

and virile culture of rich and varied extraction. Dr HF Verwoerd ... had this vision in mind when he agreed to the establishment of the dual medium UPE ... this venture in socio-cultural development in our country.¹¹⁷

6.4 Consequences of the UPE decision for the campaign on the Witwatersrand

The Cabinet decision in February 1963 to establish a new university at Port Elizabeth had an immediate effect on the plans for moving and developing Unisa. Until this decision, both the Rand campaigners and Unisa had worked with the principle that it was Government policy that 'existing white universities must be developed to provide for growing needs rather than establishing new universities'.¹¹⁸ The change meant that Unisa, which had harboured serious reservations about the transformation that it was being asked to undertake in the interests of the Afrikaner, now had a way out.

Pauw immediately withdrew his support for the plan. When De Klerk met Pauw on 14 February to discuss the principles that Unisa should move to Johannesburg and that it should become a teaching university in addition to its examining and correspondence functions, Pauw appeared greatly disconcerted. De Klerk was no doubt taken aback by this reaction, as his three officials had discussed the matter in detail with Pauw and given him no indication that he would receive such a reaction. (According to *Spes in Arduts*, the official history of Unisa. De Klerk implied that the Cabinet had already discussed the matter at the same time as the UPE decision was taken.¹¹⁹) De Klerk asked Pauw to treat the whole matter as strictly confidential until they met again on 25 February, when Pauw would have composed his response in a memorandum.¹²⁰

117. Marais, *op cit.*, p201.

118. RAU, *op cit.*, p21.

119. Boucher, M, 1973, *Spes in Arduts: a history of the University of South Africa*, Unisa, Pretoria, p335.

120. De Klerk, 5 March 1963, 'Kabinetmemorie: Voorgestelde oopslasing van universiteit van Suid-Afrika', UOD, 04/3/1, Volume 9.

But on 21 February, the first day of the new academic year, the chairman of the university Council, Professor SPE Boshoff, addressed the university and put out a press release criticising the 'rumours' about possible changes to Unisa's seat and functions.¹²¹ He thought that it was premature to consider these 'rumours' before an official proposal was made by the Government, which, he said would naturally 'enjoy serious and favourable consideration'.¹²² As for the university, however, Boshoff said that

No plans or desires on the part of the Council or any representative university body exist to move the university out of Pretoria, or to modify the functions of the university.¹²³

Boshoff said that because of the expansion of the university, the plan was to move as quickly as possible to the new grounds provided by the City Council of Pretoria. He said that the University of South Africa Act of 1959 defined Pretoria as the administrative seat of Unisa, and gave executive power to the Council. Boshoff said that any major change to the 1959 Act would have to be made by another Act of Parliament. In the context of mistrustful relations with the Government, he publicly defined the appropriate protocols and underlying principles:

The Council will not propose any drastic changes to the purpose of the university without the approval of the Government and believes that the Government will also not do this without the university's co-operation. The university is happy to be able to witness that its freedom has always been respected by the Government.¹²⁴

Boshoff asserted that the prime responsibility of the university was to its external students, and said that 'the university will thus only take on a residential function if it means no disruption to the work for its external students'.¹²⁵ He concluded that

Any Government proposal for a greater task elsewhere, without disruption to the great work that the university now does shall enjoy the serious attention of the Council.¹²⁶

121. Boshoff, SPE, 'Clarification by the chairman of the Council, on behalf of the executive of the Council, on the occasion of the official opening of Unisa, Thursday, 21 February 1963', UOD 4/3/1 Volume 9.

122. Boshoff, *op cit.*, p1.

123. *Ibid.*, p1.

124. *Ibid.*, p2.

125. *Ibid.*, p2.

126. *Ibid.*, p3.

Both the Rand campaigners and De Klerk were taken by surprise by Boshoff's highly public, carefully-worded announcement, which asserted Unisa's powers and right to be consulted about matters affecting it. When, as planned, De Klerk met Pauw three days later, he expressed that he was 'discontented to hear of these events'. He asked Pauw to prepare a memorandum, to present to the Cabinet on 5 March, where the matter was to be discussed.¹²⁷

In this memorandum Pauw mounted a strong defence of Unisa's dual role, as a bilingual teaching institution for external, mainly adult, students and as an examining university.¹²⁸ Pauw said that by 1962 student numbers were growing at about 1 000 each year: in 1962 they had 13 158 students enrolled, 12 000 of whom were external students and 1 158 of whom were students at the black university colleges.

Pauw argued that Unisa 'has never striven to be a residential university, neither is it in the process of developing in that direction'.¹²⁹ He denied that Unisa competed with other universities for students: he said that every student applying had to give good reasons why they were not registering at another university. As a result, the number of students under 20 was declining. Pauw attributed the overall growth in student numbers to older students or people who decided to study further. The average age of Unisa students was 27 years, six or seven years higher than at any other university, and students over 40 accounted for 11.5 per cent. Well over one quarter of the 12 000 external students were teachers improving their academic and professional qualifications.¹³⁰ The university, he wrote, wanted to be an institution for adults, who 'must have the opportunity to develop further intellectually with the current system'.¹³¹

127. De Klerk, 5 March 1963, *op cit.*

128. Memorandum from Pauw to De Klerk, 'Die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika', UOD 4/3/1, Volume 9, 25 February 1963.

129. *Ibid.*, p1.

130. Other details of the 1962 enrolment were that 1,134 were registered for PG degrees and diplomas, 1 267 were state officials, 50 were staff members of other universities, including staff members from every other university in the country, 293 were engineers, 261 were qualified accountants, 205 were ministers and missionaries and 1 190 were accountancy clerks.

131. Memorandum from Pauw to De Klerk, *op cit.*, p2.

Pauw defended Unisa's bilingual character. Students chose to be taught in either Afrikaans or English. Teachers and officials had to be bilingual, and study material was available in both languages. In 1962, the home language of 50 per cent of the students was Afrikaans, and 49 per cent chose to study in Afrikaans.¹³² Pauw cited these figures, not only to reassure the Government that Unisa was serving Afrikaans students, but also to highlight the diverse role of Unisa over and beyond the needs of Afrikaans students.

Pauw also reminded the Cabinet that Unisa was an examining university, and had been 'a very great asset for the Government' over the struggle to establish the credentials of the black university colleges. He said he was aware that the African university colleges would eventually become independent (although he thought that this was a distant prospect for all except Fort Hare), and that this role of Unisa would fall away. In this context he pointed out how complicated the examination for external students was, and argued that it would be very difficult to transfer this function to any of the other universities. (This point obviously responded to a perceived threat, which had perhaps been expressed by De Klerk in his anger over Boshoff's public comments, to the continued existence of the university. Later, in September 1963, De Klerk certainly implied that Unisa's future was uncertain).¹³³

Pauw then addressed the embarrassing public conflict that had arisen between Unisa and the Government. He said that the university had never been officially represented at any dealings, and that all dealings with the Department's committee had been highly confidential and personal in nature. Pauw had also been asked by the minister to treat the plans as utterly confidential. As a result, the executive was never aware of the plans of the Government. This had placed him in a difficult position:

When the executive became aware that the undersigned [Pauw] carried out personal, confidential discussions, they were dissatisfied. They politely

132. *Ibid.*, pp2-3.

133. Boucher, *op cit.*, p338.

request that in the future all dealings should be carried out on an official basis. Therefore, if the Government has reasons to be dissatisfied with what has happened so far from the side of the university, it should please consider this as the personal responsibility of the undersigned [Pauw] and not of the chairman of the Council, the executive, or the university.¹³⁴

According to Gerrit Viljoen, who worked at Unisa at this time, Pauw, who had been appointed Rector of Unisa in 1956, was an academic 'go getter' who was trying hard to raise standards at Unisa through appointing a better academic staff, improving funding and creating a 'seat' for Unisa.¹³⁵ The Rand campaigners' plans were directly threatening to these ambitions.

At its meeting on March 5, with this memorandum from Pauw laid before them, De Klerk asked the Cabinet to consider the following points:

The establishment of a second university at a suitable site on the Witwatersrand, primarily for Afrikaans speakers but that would also be taught through the medium of English for English speakers. If this was approved, the Cabinet should consider whether Unisa should be moved to make this provision.¹³⁶

Not surprisingly, in the context of the conflict with Unisa, the Cabinet did not approve De Klerk's plan, and the Rand campaign, which had been viewed by both the Department officials and the Broederbond as more urgent than UPE, suffered a serious setback, as neither the principle of setting up a predominantly Afrikaans university on the Rand nor the idea of moving Unisa was accepted. Furthermore, the frustrated De Klerk had to tell Pauw that

The Cabinet has now decided totally to abandon the idea that your university should move to the Witwatersrand, and also take on a lecturing function. Your university *status quo* is thus maintained with the intelligent understanding that its examining function in terms of the non-white university colleges will gradually decline.¹³⁷

134. Memorandum from Pauw to De Klerk, *op cit.*, p5.

135. Viljoen, *op cit.*

136. Draft Cabinet memorandum, 10 January 1963, *op cit.*, p5.

137. De Klerk to Pauw, *op cit.*

Later in March De Klerk wrote to Pauw to express his

Deep disappointment ... about the course of events of the university's side in this affair that is of so much concern to a great number of Afrikaans speakers on the Witwatersrand.¹³⁸

De Klerk said that he was 'greatly disconcerted' and 'strongly under the impression that I am dealing here with an unfavourable spirit'.¹³⁹ He said that Pauw should have persuaded Boshoff to wait until after February 25 to make his announcement, and that Pauw's failure to do so had caused him particular embarrassment. He concluded with the slur that

To come across such a spirit at a university which professes also to have the concerns of Afrikaans speakers close to the heart is astonishing.¹⁴⁰

The Rand campaigners regrouped and retained the support of De Klerk. In November 1963 the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteitskomitee was set up under the leadership of Meyer and obtained the support of all Afrikaans communities on the Witwatersrand.¹⁴¹ Once again, they approached De Klerk with 'a detailed and strong memorandum', but in 1964 and 1965, a second attempt to deal with Unisa to establish new university failed.

In late January 1964, when the University of Port Elizabeth Bill was in Parliament, De Klerk said publicly that the Government was not currently considering plans for the establishment of a second university on the Witwatersrand.¹⁴² The Rand campaigners told the press that they would 'mark time' on the issue because it was felt that the Government could not tackle the establishment of two universities at the same time and that the University of Port Elizabeth should first get off to a good start.¹⁴³

138. De Klerk to Pauw, UOD 4/3/1 Volume 9, March 1963 (exact date unclear).

139. *Ibid.*

140. *Ibid.*

141. Including a group promoting Germiston as the seat for the new university. Dr JJ van der Walt said that the university 'must have a Christian National basis to counteract the liberal character of the existing university on the Rand' (Wilkins and Strydom, *op cit.*, p423.)

142. *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 January 1964.

143. *The Star*, 1 February 1964.

In July 1964 Unisa, itself divided between camps favouring the Rand proposals and those opposing them, appointed two investigating committees to look into the principles and practical implications of moving to the Rand. Pauw said:

The university has agreed in principle to undertake a new service for the people of the Rand, but 101 problems lie between the decision and its implementation ... Before we could move it would require land, money, Government approval, legislation in Parliament - and the agreement of our own staff.¹⁴⁴

By mid-1965 the Rand campaigners had developed three clear demands about the future of Unisa. First, they wanted Unisa to move to the Rand. Second, they wanted the residential section to be purely Afrikaans-medium.¹⁴⁵ Third, they wanted the black university colleges to take over responsibility for correspondence tuition for black students, so that the correspondence section would be white.¹⁴⁶ (At the old Pretoria offices of Unisa, no separate provision had been made for black students, and the 1962 Departmental report had concluded that separate facilities would be 'needed' at any new Unisa premises.¹⁴⁷)

In June 1965 a meeting of all the heads of department at Unisa rejected the demands of the Rand campaigners by an overwhelming majority. They said they would consider the first demand, moving to Johannesburg, but they insisted that the university should remain bilingual, that there should be no interference with its correspondence courses, and that non-white students should be retained.¹⁴⁸

A few days later the decision of the staff was endorsed by the Senate, and subsequently by the Council, and these views were put to the Cabinet.¹⁴⁹

144. *The Star*, 21 July 1964. At about the same time the *Rand Daily Mail* was reported that there was opposition to establishing a new Afrikaans university in Johannesburg from the universities in Potchefstroom and Pretoria, which, it was said, drew between a third and half of their students from the Rand (*Rand Daily Mail*, 24 July 1964). *Die Transvaler* responded to the controversy in the press by reaffirming its support for the idea of a new Afrikaans university on the Rand, but said that no official decisions had yet been taken by the government or anyone else, and that it wasn't yet possible to say whether Unisa would move (*Die Transvaler*, 23 July 1964).

145. *The Star*, 4 December 1964.

146. *Ibid.*, 3 June 1965.

147. Erasmus, *op cit.*, p31.

The resistance of the Unisa staff requires some explanation. Many were, like Pauw, proud of Unisa's role in terms of its external students and considered that the institution made an important contribution to South Africa's development, not least through assuring standards at the black university colleges. The question of the seat, functions and medium of tuition were closely bound up. If the functions of the institution were to remain the same, there was no need to change its seat. However, if the functions were to be expanded, there was a strong feeling that tuition of external students should in no way be compromised. While many were sympathetic to the needs of Afrikaans students on the Rand, they believed that tuition in an associated attendance section through Afrikaans alone would threaten the image of the institution. Albert Grundlingh, an historian now working at Unisa, argues that

Unisa's reluctance was also driven to some extent by a sense of academic superiority on the part of certain Unisa lecturers. They had only recently acquired generally accepted status as legitimate academics and were wary of compromising hard-won gains on what was clearly the political altar of what was to become RAU. This feeling was prevalent among some English speaking lecturers, but it was not necessarily restricted to them.¹⁵⁰

Gerrit Viljoen also argues that

Unisa had an image of belonging to the whole nation, not just Afrikaners ... [Unisa] didn't want to confuse this image.¹⁵¹

Viljoen also suggested that the Government's heavy-handed approaches to Unisa threatened to fan the flames of Afrikaner academic concerns about the breaching of university autonomy and the elements of compulsion in the 1959 Acts.¹⁵² This perspective is supported by comments made by Boshoff at the opening of the 1963

148. *Sunday Times*, 20 June 1965.

149. *Ibid.*, 27 June 1965.

150. Personal communication from Albert Grundlingh, May 1998.

151. Viljoen, *op cit.*

152. *Ibid.*

academic year, that 'like all other universities, the University is jealous of its autonomy'.¹⁵³

The drawn-out campaign gave the press the opportunity to speculate that the Government would accede to the demands of the powerful Rand campaigners. *The Star* wrote in an editorial in December 1964 that

the Nationalists are not going to be satisfied with anything as South African as a genuinely bilingual university which also has more non-European students than all the other 'white' universities combined.¹⁵⁴

The *Sunday Times* summed up De Klerk's dilemma:

What is wanted from Mr De Klerk is a little more action and a little less dithering. He must at once give the green light to the Afrikaans university and resolve the dispute about where it should be sited ... His trouble has been that a decision would antagonise either the Broeders of Johannesburg or those of Pretoria ... Unhappily, Big Broeder is in Johannesburg ... on the merits of the case the Minister must give judgement against Big Broeder and keep the University of South Africa in Pretoria. Hence a certain ministerial reluctance to say anything at all.¹⁵⁵

Finally, in August 1965 De Klerk announced that Unisa would stay in Pretoria and a new Afrikaans university would be established for the Witwatersrand, with its seat in Johannesburg.¹⁵⁶ Attempts by the Rand campaigners and the Government to link the establishment of the new Afrikaans university to the reinvention of Unisa had cost the campaign three years: it was two and a half years after the UPE decision was approved by Cabinet that the equivalent decision was taken for the Rand, and RAU therefore opened three years after UPE. It is not clear why the Rand campaigners were so committed to co-opting Unisa, although the *Sunday Times* speculated that 'for political reasons they want a strong and big university immediately to combat "the unhealthy influence of Wits"'.¹⁵⁷

153. Boshoff, *op cit.*

154. *The Star*, 4 December 1964.

155. *Sunday Times*, 11 July 1965.

156. In April 1966 the Cabinet decided on the Auckland Park site 'and thereby ended the point of dispute'. The government would also provide the capital to buy the site, which included land expropriated from the Johannesburg Country Club and private householders (SAIRR, 1966 Survey, p269).

157. *Sunday Times*, 20 June 1965.

6.4.1 Establishment of the Rand Afrikaans University

Conflict then erupted over the new institution's attitude to religious freedom. UPE's establishing legislation contained the Conscience Clause, but Meyer was adamant that the RAU legislation would omit it, although he said that the university would respect religious freedom.¹⁵⁸ Gerrit Viljoen's explanation of RAU's stance is that the Conscience Clause was seen 'as part of the English rather than the Dutch or German university tradition. He argued that historically, the Conscience Clause had been introduced in England not as 'an assertion of liberal thinking' but as 'a rejection of discriminatory practice, when the universities had been limited ... to members of the Anglican Church'. The Dutch and German university tradition, to which RAU wished to lay claim, did not consider the Conscience Clause necessary, as historically they had opposed discrimination and welcomed political and religious exiles. The RAU campaigners believed that they did not need 'self correction' and that 'putting in the clause was almost a way of saying that we were guilty of discrimination'. Viljoen pointed out that there was another school of thought among Afrikaner Nationalist academics, who argued that South Africa's complex demography and 'the Nazi experience' made the inclusion of a Conscience Clause desirable.¹⁵⁹

In November 1965 the Johannesburg City Council granted R500 000 to the organising committee, on the condition that the new university would allow religious freedom. The campaigners held talks with the Jewish Board of Deputies, which was eager to support RAU, pointing out that many Jewish families 'sent their sons' to study at Afrikaans universities and comparing RAU's establishment to the founding of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which was 'just such a fulfilment of national aspiration'. A compromise was reached: instead of the Conscience Clause, the RAU establishing legislation contains a clause based on the preamble to the country's constitution:

158. *The Star*, 5 and 8 November 1965.

159. Viljoen, *op cit*.

a student, research worker, lecturer, or member of the administrative or library staff shall be admitted to the University on the grounds of his academic and administrative qualifications and abilities and on the ground that he subscribes to the principles set out in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic.¹⁶⁰

The Jewish Board of Deputies remained concerned that the 'modification' of the Conscience Clause in some way represented a weakening of commitment to religious freedom.¹⁶¹

By June 1966 two million Rand in gifts and pledges had been collected, which was enough to allow the RAU enabling legislation to be introduced in Parliament.¹⁶² The Act was passed in October 1966.

RAU's first top management had a very different character from that of UPE. Whereas UPE's first Rector was Marais, a scientist from the CSIR, RAU's first Rector was Gerrit Viljoen, a scholarly classicist who had studied at Cambridge, Leiden and Pretoria and who had been lecturing at Unisa. The first chair of Council and Chancellor at UPE both hailed from the highest echelons of the Afrikaans private sector, whereas at RAU, the first chair of Council was the Broederbond and South African Broadcasting Corporation chairman, Piet Meyer, and the first Chancellor was Nico Diederichs, the Minister of Finance. RAU's powerful Government connections were singled out for special mention by Diederichs at RAU's opening ceremony, perhaps to claim a place for the new institution alongside the famously well-connected Stellenbosch.¹⁶³ Meyer and Diederichs had both studied in Germany in the 1930s and since their return had been the dominant intellectuals of Afrikaner Nationalism, particularly in their development and use of the concept of the *volk*.¹⁶⁴

160. *Ibid.*, and SAIRR, 1966 Survey, p269.

161. *Jewish Affairs*, October 1966.

162. Act No. 51 of 1966.

163. Diederichs extended a special greeting to all other chancellors, and especially singled out those who were also Cabinet colleagues. He said that their presence was proof 'not only of our official alliance, but also of the sincere bonds of friendship that exist between us'.

164. See Dubow, S (1995) *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p253 and p261.

On the occasion of the opening of the university, Diederichs spoke about knowledge being power, and a weapon for embattled Afrikanerdom:

In a tense restless world ... more and more knowledge is sought ... that must serve as an instrument of economic and military power, whereby nations that feel themselves to be threatened can materially arm themselves with the purpose of ensuring their safety and continued existence ... our survival as white, western people and the place that we will take in the world, will be determined to a large measure by the extent of the knowledge that we acquire and apply.¹⁶⁵

RAU was intended to create an Afrikaner foothold in Johannesburg, and Diederichs argued that the establishment of RAU was 'the greatest breakthrough in an area where apparently everything was loaded against the Afrikaner':

Through the pressure of circumstance Afrikaners of earlier generations fled to the Witwatersrand in their tens of thousands to search for their daily bread. So strange and so strong were the forces against which they came up that many predicted that it would only be a short time before they lost their identity and would be swallowed up in the maelstrom of the strange ... Will the Witwatersrand, and especially Johannesburg, that is the centre of the Witwatersrand simply remain an large cosmopolitan city that is in many ways un-South African, or will it be a metropolis that is a true reflection of the people and country of South Africa?¹⁶⁶

The urban location of RAU was also significant in that RAU was also expected to contribute to the creation of a new Afrikaans identity. Diederichs said the new university would not only use the Afrikaans language, but that it would also 'serve as the bearer and interpreter of Afrikaans thoughts'.¹⁶⁷

It was here on the Witwatersrand where [the Afrikaner] had to make a place for himself in the economy ... and still remain true to himself and his character as an Afrikaner ... RAU must attempt to facilitate the extremely

165. Diederichs, *op cit.*, p8.

166. *Ibid.*, pp15-16, p24.

167. *Ibid.*, p13.

difficult task of the second Great Trek of the Afrikaner from the land to the city, from farming to business.¹⁶⁸

For the Rand campaigners, the establishment of RAU was therefore not simply about the founding of a new university. It represented both the attempt to claim the Witwatersrand for Afrikaners and to save Afrikaners from the alien culture of the Witwatersrand. For example, Viljoen is reputed to have decided that RAU would have neither a music nor a drama department as he believed that these departments 'attracted homosexuals'.¹⁶⁹

Although the campaign to establish RAU was conflictual and drawn out, the institution that was established came close to embodying the unfettered ideal of what the Nationalist Government and the Broederbond could achieve.

6.5 Conclusion

O'Meara describes the period from 1964 to 1972, when there was a great advance in white living standards in the context of political stability, as 'the Golden Age of Apartheid'.¹⁷⁰ The establishment of UPE and RAU in this period were evidence of the control wielded by Afrikaner Nationalists over the policies and resources of the state, achieving what Gerrit Viljoen has described as 'the coping stone of the Afrikaans cultural edifice'.¹⁷¹ The deployment of this power saw places at Afrikaans-medium institutions rising by 92 per cent over the 1960s, compared to 58 per cent at English-medium institutions.¹⁷²

But O'Meara also points out that this was a period of great cultural, ideological and political ferment. The attainment of the Republic in 1961 ended the *volksbeweging*, moreover, Verwoerd considered that it was time to abandon

168. *Ibid.*, pp26-27.

169. Personal communication from Albert Grundlingh, May 1998.

170. O'Meara, *op cit.*, p116.

171. Viljoen, FVN (1977) 'The Afrikaans universities and particularism' in Van der Merwe, HW and Welsh, D, (eds.) *The future of the university in Southern Africa*, David Philip, Cape Town, p176.

172. See Table 7.3 below.

Afrikaner exclusivity and appeal to English voters to create a white South African nationalism. The character of Afrikaner capitalism also changed from 1964, when the relatively small Afrikaans mining house, Federale Mynbou, took control of General Mining, breaking the 'ethnic and linguistic ghetto of *Volkskapitalisme*'. There were also fierce cultural debates over Afrikaans literature, with the authors known as the 'Sestigers' challenging accepted notions of 'official' Afrikaans culture. Finally, the launch of *Die Beeld* newspaper in the Transvaal in October 1965 undermined Verwoerdian dominance of the media in the province.¹⁷³

This study of the establishment of UPE and RAU demonstrates that even as Afrikaner Nationalists attained their highest ideals in the establishment of these universities, they were beset by differences and dilemmas about how best to serve the Afrikaans people. While both institutions were created *ab initio* by the Government to meet the economic and ideological needs of urban Afrikaners, they differed in many ways. UPE was conceptualised by eastern Cape Afrikaans financiers, who were sensitive both to the needs of the regional economy and the poor economic status of local Afrikaners. Their institution was by tactical necessity dual medium, but by choice they tried to cultivate modern, scientific and applied characteristics at UPE. In contrast, the prime mover in RAU's establishment was Piet Meyer, a dominant intellectual in the development of Afrikaner Nationalism, who refused to countenance the dilution of the *volksuniversiteit* ideal by accepting a dual medium policy.

The processes through which the two institutions emerged demonstrate the different ways in which the Broederbond influenced Government policy. It also reveals that in a period of untrammelled Afrikaner Nationalist power over the state and its resources and the heady ambition which this encouraged, the Government was sometimes called upon to play a 'ringleading' role, mediating between conflicting interests and deciding on the reasonable allocation of resources. On the other hand, the Government was itself checked when its cavalier attitude to established interests and institutions threatened not only those interests themselves,

173. O'Meara, *op cit.*, pp116 - 130.

as in the case of the confrontation with the Unisa staff, but also their contribution to long term political stability.

But state policy was not only driven by ideological fervour in this period. Ideological and political imperatives were certainly important in the establishment of UPE as an independent university, which undercut the claims of Rhodes University to establish a second campus in the eastern Cape Province, and ensured that a more conservative, Afrikaans-oriented institution was established. The establishment of RAU aimed to dilute the political impact of Wits on both Afrikaans and English students. However, ideological fervour did not translate into complete disregard for the autonomy of established universities. Although Wits and Rhodes were reviled as liberal institutions and it was thought that students needed to be protected from their influence, the National Party Government seldom took the course of attacking the universities directly. The establishment of RAU was a means to dilute Wits' influence and divert students from the institution. This policy indicates a grudging acceptance on the part of the Government of the 'liberalism' of Wits, rather than a policy of head-on interference. Nevertheless, both Unisa and Rhodes faced Government threats to their autonomy: both were affected by Government decisions taken without proper notification or consultation. Furthermore, this was a time when the numbers and capacities of universities were expanding rapidly around the world. The elite character of universities was changing: the expectation that students would leave home to reside at university was being supplemented and supplanted by the conception that more students would study while resident in their parents' homes, or while working part-time, facilitating access for poorer students.

In the 1960s the Government channelled these tendencies, through the creation of UPE and RAU, so that Afrikaner Nationalist goals were served. The following chapter examines the impact of these policies alongside that of the 1959 Acts, on the overall character of South Africa's university education system.

Chapter 7

High Apartheid and university education in the 1960s

The university system constantly evolved during the decades of National Party (NP) rule in South Africa. There were few sharp turning points: Government university policies were generally implemented gradually and they related to the slow-moving forces of changes in the school system and economic, social and demographic change. But by the late 1960s, two major aspects of Nationalist policy had been enacted and implemented, through the Extension of University Education Act and the Fort Hare Transfer Act of 1959 and the University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) and Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) Acts in the mid 1960s. Although the NP continued to modify and elaborate university policy in the 1970s and then reform and ultimately retract them in the 1980s and 1990s, by the late 1960s a high point in Nationalist university governance had been attained. The Acts of 1959 and the 1960s introduced ethnic segregation, differentiated university provision and favoured Afrikaans students. They sought to defuse political tension, but instead they confirmed the animosity between white English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking students and destroyed non-racialism as a principle of student organisation. The Government systematically jettisoned 'universal' principles and practices of governance of university education, so that the single system of South African university education fractured into multiple, ethnically-based, separate and unequal systems.

This chapter attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of the different parts of South Africa's university education system in the 1960s and to highlight some of its most important characteristics and contradictions. It examines trends in Government spending on university education, the phenomenal growth in student numbers and the related increase in staff numbers over this period. It then analyses the differentiated roles of the parts of university education system, which controlled the educational opportunities available to students of different population groups. Finally, it examines the distinctive political characteristics of the

Afrikaans-medium universities, the black university colleges and the English-medium universities.

7.1 Financing apartheid university education

From 1948 to 1970, Government expenditure on university education rose steadily in absolute terms and as a proportion of total state expenditure. Table 7.1 shows that by 1970 the Nationalist Government was spending 23 times more on university education than was being spent in 1948, and in 1970 university expenditure claimed over two per cent of all Government expenditure.

Financial year, ending March	Total estimated expenditure, Rands	Expenditure on universities, Rands	% of total expenditure spent on universities
1948	24 777 962	1 540 000	0.63
1950	288 831 474	2 061 240	0.71
1952	388 648 432	2 748 290	0.71
1954	468 545 080	4 648 130	0.99
1956	509 695 460	5 372 940	1.05
1958	565 698 600	6 326 000	1.12
1960	627 520 700	8 933 200	1.42
1962	754 836 617	11 620 679	1.50
1964	890 406 700	12 128 151	1.40
1966	1 180 137 800	17 167 048	1.50
1968	1 459 028 400	23 415 685	1.60
1970	1 700 441 500	36 141 161	2.10

These global figures reflect that the Government was prepared to spend increasingly large amounts of money on university education, reflecting the continuing significance of university education to several aspects of Nationalist political priorities. The nature of these political priorities is further revealed when the global figures are disaggregated.

1. My calculations, based on Department of Finance (1947-1970) *Estimates of the expenditure to be defrayed from revenue funds, Second and final print*, Union of South Africa, Cape Town. From 1962, figures for expenditure on African university colleges were listed separately and have been obtained from Department of Bantu Education (1971b) *Annual report for the Calendar Year 1970*, RP 94/1971, Department of Bantu Education, Pretoria, p44.

Table 7.2 shows that the Government spent far more per student at the black, especially the African, university colleges than it did on students at the white attendance universities.

Year	African university colleges	University College of the Western Cape	Salisbury Island	Attendance universities designated white
1960	2 290	n/a	n/a	299
1961	2 108	n/a	2 368	299
1962	2 091	962	891	306
1963	1 911	722	932	298
1964	1 889	1 331	776	346
1965	1 645	1 293	816	354
1966	1 627	1 229	840	391
1967	1 534	1 276	824	415
1968	1 552	1 117	803	398
1969	1 781	1 071	822	571
1970	1 751	1 094	1 027	760

These figures seemed to imply that although Bantu Education was cheap at school level, where the costs per student were very low, that at university level, Bantu Education was an expensive policy. Figures such as these were loudly condemned as evidence of the extravagance of the Government's apartheid schemes by opponents of the black university colleges. In 1961 Leslie Blackwell, Professor of Law at Fort Hare until the Government take-over, calculated that the cost per student was at least twice the amount it had been before Fort Hare lost its independence.³ The United Party's (UP) education spokesman said

one is staggered to see the extravagant amounts poured out every year in libations on the pagan altar of apartheid ... as an example of this fantastic extravagance, one has only to study the finances of the Bantu universities.⁴

In 1961 the UP MP DL Smit pointed out that the costs to the Government per student at the University College of Zululand were 13 times as high as at the University of Natal.⁵ It is perhaps not surprising that EG Malherbe, the Principal of the University of Natal who had served on the Holloway Commission, which had pointed out that

2. Malherbe, EG (1977) *Education in South Africa, Vol. II, 1925-1975*, Juta, Cape Town, pp751-754.

3. *Cape Times*, 13 October 1961.

4. HAD (1961) Col 5471, 27 April.

5. *Ibid.*, Col 5538, 28 April.

separate facilities would be very expensive, was particularly annoyed that even though they were losing the subsidy because black student enrolments were falling, they still needed £80 000 per annum to run segregated classes.⁶ In 1966 the leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaff, said that R12 million had been spent for an annual enrolment of only 1 160 African students.⁷

Nusas alone pointed out that the government was not particularly generous in its funding: it had cost £4.5 million to establish the first stage of the University of Ceylon, excluding the Medical School. The University College of Ghana had cost £3 million and started with 90 students and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland cost £1.25 million. In comparison, to the end of the 1960 financial year, £431 848 would have been spent on Turfloop and £349 937 on Ngoye.⁸

Furthermore, if expenditure on the institutions is analysed relative to the size of the population for which that group of institutions was designated, it becomes clear that spending on African students was far from generous and that white students were still overwhelmingly favoured by Government policy. This is demonstrated by Table 7.3.

Year	African university colleges, per capita of African population	University College of the Western Cape, per capita of Coloured population	Salisbury Island, per capita of Indian population	Attendance universities designated whites, per capita of white population
1960	0.07	n/a	0.10	3.09
1961	0.07	n/a	0.55	3.17
1962	0.08	0.20	0.77	3.26
1963	0.09	0.21	0.93	3.33
1964	0.11	0.32	1.24	3.91
1965	0.11	0.28	1.45	4.22
1966	0.13	0.32	1.67	4.95
1967	0.14	0.36	1.78	5.37
1968	0.15	0.36	1.88	5.44
1969	0.18	0.41	2.14	8.02
1970	0.22	0.44	2.64	11.55

6. Malherbe to Logan, 11 January 1961, KCM 56990 (174).

7. *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 November 1966.

8. *The Star*, 22 December 1960.

9. Malherbe (1977) *op cit*.

If expenditure on white attendance universities is examined more closely, it becomes clear that Afrikaans-medium institutions received a considerably higher proportion of the funds from government sources than English-medium universities received. In 1969, the Government was contributing, on average, 3.41 times the income received from fees by the white attendance universities,¹⁰ but the English universities were receiving only 2.69 times the fee income and the Afrikaans universities were receiving 4.09 times the fee income. Even excluding the Rand Afrikaans University, which had only just been established and was unusually expensive at this time, Afrikaans universities received from the Government 3.69 times the fee income raised.¹¹

In 1961 Smit commented on the low numbers of African matriculants and consequent low enrolments at the university colleges, saying that

The money that is being spent on the Government's feather-brained scheme of ethnic colleges could ... have been much more usefully spent in laying better educational foundations in the secondary schools.¹²

Confidential documents in the archive of the Department of Bantu Education reveal that in the 1960s the African university colleges were not only *diverting* funds that could have been spent on African schooling, they were also raiding the limited financial resources ring-fenced for African schooling.

During the 1960s African university education was financed separately from university education for the other population groups, and on a different, *ad hoc* basis. The white universities were funded from the General Revenue Account through the budget of the Department of Education and the amount spent on each university was calculated using the constantly modified formula developed by Holloway. The University College of the Western Cape and the University College for Indians were also initially funded through the Department of Education, but

10. Compared to 8.05 the fee income of the African university colleges in 1970, see Table 8.4.

11. My calculations, based on Department of National Education (1970) *Annual report 1970*, RP 95/1970, Department of National Education, Pretoria, p75.

12. HAD (1961) Col 5539, 28 April.

this responsibility was transferred to the Departments of Coloured and Indian Affairs respectively. It is not clear on what basis they were funded.¹³

The African university colleges were financed, from the start, through the Bantu Education Account, which had been set up in 1956 to fund African primary and secondary education. Funds provided by the Government were pegged at £6.5 million (R13 million) and any further money required was to be drawn from African taxation. When it was decided that African university education was also to be financed from this account, the Cabinet agreed that in addition to the R13 million, up to R1.5 million annually could be transferred from the General Revenue Account to the Bantu Education Account for this purpose. However, as Table 7.4 shows, expenditure on the African university colleges escalated rapidly so that the university colleges were soon draining funds, which were meant to be spent on schools, from the Bantu Education Account.

Table 7.4: Expenditure and income at African university colleges, giving shortfall drawn from funds for schools in Bantu Education Account, 1959/60-1970 ¹⁴					
Period	Expenditure	Income	Net expenditure	Transferred from the General Revenue Account	Shortfall
1959/60-63/4 (4 years)	3 868 719	341 185	3 527 534	3 250 000	277 534
1964/65-66/67 (2 years)	4 861 743	499 780	4 361 963	3 500 000	861 963
1967/68	2 002 154	395 446	1 706 708	1 500 000	206 708
1968/69	2 220 685	310 000	1 910 685	1 500 000	410 685
1969/70	2 746 000	341 000	2 405 000	1 500 000	905 000
Est. 1970/71	3 202 000	344 000	2 858 000	1 500 000	1 358 000

The Department of Bantu Education estimated that by the end of March 1971, more than R4 million extra would have been spent on the African university

13. However, according to SP Olivier, he insisted, as a condition of taking up his post as Rector at Salisbury Island, that he would be treated as he had been at UCT, which probably referred to funding arrangements. See Chapter 5. After 1 January 1960, The Bantu Education Department had to apply to the Department of Education for subsidies for the Coloured and Indian students completing courses at Fort Hare. In 1963, for example, R37 523 was transferred between the Departments for the 21 Indian students still attending Fort Hare in 1962 (UOD R2/1/1 Volume 53).

14. 'Vertroulik: Departement van Bantoe-Onderwys, Kabinetsmemorandum 2/70, Uitgereik op 23 Februarie 1970, Universiteitsopleiding vir die Bantoe: Finansiering', SBO 11/1/1.

colleges, 'apparently at the cost of primary and secondary school education'.¹⁵ They pointed out that this was preventing the improvement of school facilities and the standard of teaching and that the Bantu Education Account would require nearly R18 million from the Loan Account to cover its shortfall in the 1970-71 financial year. They recommended that the Cabinet should increase the annual maximum grant to the African universities to between R3 and R4 million. They also said that there should be a separation of university and school funding and that the Bantu Education Account should be refunded for the shortfall of R4 million.¹⁶ In May 1970 the Cabinet agreed to this and said that a formula should be developed to 'provide for a dynamic system of funding instead of the current static system'.¹⁷

7.2 Changing character of the student population

The most notable change in the character of the student population in the 1960s was that student enrolments in South Africa almost doubled, rising by 96 per cent from 42 315 in 1960 to 83 137 in 1970. This increase outstripped the rapid population growth of the decade: South Africa had 3.6 students per 1 000 of the population in 1970, compared 2.4 in 1960.¹⁸

In part, this increase reflects the Nationalists' emphasis on education and the extent to which they committed resources to both school and university education. Government policies encouraged more school-leavers to attend universities and university colleges, most obviously, through establishing six entirely new institutions in this decade. However, the impact of this policy had not yet been fully felt by 1970, and growth in the older, established universities was more significant. In 1970 more than 92 per cent of students were enrolled in institutions established

15. Speaking at the opening of Turfloop, Marea said that Africans would have to contribute through taxes to the costs of running the college (*Cape Times*, 3 March 1960). It seems that no specific provision was ever made to earmark a portion of African taxation for university education.

16. 'Kabinetmemorandum 2/70', *op cit*.

17. MC Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and Bantu Education, to Secretary of Bantu Education, 'Finansiering van Universiteitsopleiding vir Bantoe: Kabinetmemorandum 2/70', BO 15/10.

18. My calculations, based on SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p258; SAIRR, 1964 *Survey*, p290; SAIRR, 1965 *Survey*, p274; SAIRR, 1966 *Survey*, p268; SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p254; SAIRR, 1970 *Survey*, p243.

before 1960, and enrolments at these institutions had increased by 82 per cent over the decade.¹⁹

South Africa's political and economic inequalities ensured that the expansion of student numbers did not occur evenly for each of the population groups. The following table shows that African student numbers rose most rapidly, increasing by 122 per cent, while from a far higher base white student numbers increased by 92 per cent.²⁰

Table 7.5: Student enrolments at universities and university colleges, analysed by population group, 1960-1970 ²¹			
Population group	1960	1970	Increase
African	1 901	4 225	122%
Coloured	878	1 518	73%
Asian	1 602	2 668	67%
White	37 934	73 001	92%
Total	42 315	81 412	92%

These percentages give the impression that the growth in student enrolments favoured African students far more than white students, increasing the chances of an African person enrolling at university more than they did for people of other population groups. Interpreted in the context of the size and growth of different population groups, however, this impression is shown to be misleading.

Table 7.6: Number of students per 1 000 of the population, analysed by population group, 1960-1970 ²²		
	1960	1970
African	0.2	0.3
Coloured	0.7	0.7
Asian	3.4	4.2
White	12.3	19.3
Total	2.4	3.6

19. *Ibid.*

20. Malherbe wrote in 1966 that black student numbers increased because of increased funding rather than because of the application of the principle of segregation, as the Government was claiming. Malherbe said the system was 'extravagant' and 'premature' and that the increased number included many non-matriculated students (*Natal Mercury*, 8 March 1966).

21. My calculations, based on Dreymanis, J (1988) *The role of the South African Government in tertiary education*, SAIRR, Johannesburg, pp120-122 and SAIRR, 1962 Survey, p195. These figures are taken from a different source from those quoted above, and the figure for 1970 is different by 1 725.

22. Dreymanis, *op cit.*

The increase in black student numbers therefore only just exceeded the increase in the black population, while for white students, the increase in student numbers reflected a substantial increase in the proportion of the white population gaining access to university education, increasing the chances of a white person enrolling at university by 57 per cent.

The more rapid increase in the white student population can probably be ascribed, among other factors discussed below, to a combination of white access to superior schooling, mostly in the state sector, the greater material prosperity of the white population, which made supporting students and paying fees more manageable and the wider range of employment opportunities for white graduates.

The increase in white student numbers can be further disaggregated to reveal differences for the English and Afrikaans speaking sections of the white population. Statistics are not available for the numbers of white English and Afrikaans speakers, but an examination of enrolments at white-designated English- and Afrikaans-language institutions given in the next table reflects a 92 per cent increase at Afrikaans-language white universities compared to a 58 per cent increase at English-language white universities. In part, this discrepancy can be ascribed to the conscious efforts of the Government to expand university capacity for Afrikaans speakers. Besides UPE and RAU, which were new institutions primarily for Afrikaans students, existing Afrikaans universities had been enlarged. Pretoria opened an Engineering faculty in 1955, Stellenbosch opened faculties of Medicine, Forestry and Military Science in 1956 and Dentistry in 1962, and the University of the Orange Free State opened faculties of Agriculture and Medicine in 1969. Of the Afrikaans universities, only Potchefstroom opened no new faculties in the 1950s or 1960s, even though the Minister of Education, Jan de Klerk, was a graduate of the institution.²³

23. Correspondence from Registrars of the four universities, October 1997.

Table 7.7: Student enrolments at universities designated white, analysed by language, 1960-1970 ²⁴			
Type of institution	1960	1970	Increase
Cape Town	5 334	7 969	49%
Natal	3 859	6 243	62%
Rhodes	1 453	1 843	27%
Witwatersrand	5 449	9 368	72%
English-language institutions designated white	16 095	25 423	58%
Orange Free State	2 031	4 222	108%
Potchefstroom	1 781	4 212	136%
Pretoria	7 397	12 501	69%
RAU (est. 1968)	-	1 322	-
Stellenbosch	4 435	7 827	76%
Afrikaans-language institutions designated white	15 644	30 083	92%
UPE (est. 1966)	-	1 144	-
All institutions designated white	31 739	56 650	78%

By establishing new institutions and increasing the capacity of established institutions for certain population groups, Government university policies influenced the uneven pattern of expansion. Schooling and class also influenced student enrolments: both of these factors were themselves heavily influenced by Government policy.

Access to schooling was a crucial determinant of university access. By law, students could only enrol for degree-level study if they had acquired a 'matriculation exemption' certificate in their school-leaving examinations. While a market-driven expansion of the education system could have resulted in an increase in university enrolments in line with the expansion of suitably qualified school leavers, the South African Government's approach to schooling, especially for Africans, was highly interventionist and school policy was at odds with university policy. The inadequacies of Bantu Education, especially in terms of the numbers and qualifications of teachers and other fundamental resources have been extensively analysed elsewhere. Thus while the Government was creating new institutions for the university education of Africans, few Africans were matriculating with full exemption required to proceed to degree-level studies.²⁵

24. My calculations, based on SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p258; SAIRR, 1964 Survey, p290; SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p274; SAIRR, 1966 Survey, p268; SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p254; SAIRR, 1970 Survey, p243.

25. The numbers of black, especially African, students qualified to follow degree courses was very small, too low to provide sufficient students to fill the new university colleges that had been created by the 1959 legislation. At the black university colleges, therefore, a significant proportion of students enrolled were not matriculated. Three students were permitted to study only for undergraduate diploma courses. For most of Continued ...

Table 7.8: Total number of scholars passing the final year of school, and the number passing with matric exemption, analysed by population group, 1959-1969 ²⁶				
Population group	59-60, with matric exemption	59-60, total	69-70, with matric exemption	69-70, total
African	137	430	985	2 509
Coloured	206	608	394	1 361
Asian	235	413	842	1 506
White	9 586	16 885	13 616	32 246

The transition from school to university was subject to a wide range of determinants. By the mid 1960s, there was no assumption that a good performance at school would automatically lead to university enrolment. In 1963 the Department of Education found that almost 60 per cent of white students matriculating did not enrol at university the following year.²⁷ Dr EG Malherbe, Principal of the University of Natal, said in 1965 that half the white matriculants did not proceed to university for further study. He said one third of these had obtained first class passes.²⁸ These figures concerned the Government, which tried to ensure that successful white students, especially Afrikaans students, would proceed to university for further study.²⁹ On the other hand, the Government also seemed to assume, in its projections for the growth of black university colleges, that nearly all black matriculants would proceed to university.³⁰

In addition to the impact of Government education policies, a clutch of social factors also contributed to the expansion of university enrolments.

the 1960s, on average nearly a third of students enrolled at the black university colleges did not have matric exemption, and were not registered for degrees. My calculations, based on SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p259; SAIRR, 1963 Survey, p243; SAIRR, 1963 Survey, p242; SAIRR, 1964 Survey, p292; SAIRR, 1962 Survey, p195; SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p276; SAIRR, 1966, Survey, p270; SAIRR, 1968, Survey, p257; SAIRR, 1969, Survey, p215.

26. Dreijmanis, *op cit.*, pp109-112.

27. Department of Education, Arts and Science, (1963) *An investigation of the matriculants of November-December 1961 and March 1962 considered as potential university material and of the available teaching facilities of the South African Residential Universities*, No 10, Department of Education, Arts and Science, Pretoria.

28. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p278.

29. See Chapter 6. Wits had figures which showed that the number of students entering university each year was about the same as the number matriculating. They suggested that many went to the army before enrolling at university. Thanks to Bruce Murray for this information.

30. See Chapter 4.

Over this decade the class backgrounds of students entering university education changed, contributing to the expansion in enrolments. University education, once the preserve of the wealthy, who could pay tuition and residence fees, or of the very able, who won scholarships, became increasingly accessible and pursued by the urban middle classes. Both the changing geographical distribution of the population and its increasing prosperity allowed students from a broader social base to attend university. The increase in Afrikaans enrolments also reflects the increasing prosperity of Afrikaners, although the years of Nationalist Government did little to erode the economic differences between the Afrikaans and English speaking sectors of the population.³¹ This coincided with the concerted campaigns of the Broederbond to encourage Afrikaans scholars to prolong their studies.

In the first half of the century university planners had been concerned that the country needed so many institutions because of its size and the broad distribution of the population. Urbanisation not only changed the employment prospects of school-leavers, it also brought concentrations of potential students within daily commuting distance of universities, which meant that the cost to the student of university education no longer had to include a fee for residence. These considerations also influenced the planners of UPE and RAU, who realised that by locating institutions in urban areas, less affluent students would be able to stay in their parents' homes while studying and possibly also study part-time while working. Furthermore, the Government shouldered more of the burden of the costs of running the universities. In 1946 fee income at the white attendance institutions exceeded the income from the Government by a ratio of 1.04 to one. By 1955, the Government contributed 2.09 times the income received from fees, and by 1969 it was contributing 3.69 times the income received from fees.³²

Exactly the same considerations were ignored when the locations for the two new African university colleges were chosen: like Fort Hare, both the University

31. See observations by Welsh cited in Chapter 6.

32. My calculations, based on Union Education Department (1948) *Annual Report of the Union Education Department for the calendar years 1946-7*, Government Printer, Pretoria, p65; Union of South Africa (1957) *Department of Education, Arts and Science: Annual report for the calendar year 1956*, Government Printer, Pretoria, p37; Department of National Education (1970) *op cit.*, Pretoria, p75.

College of Zululand, at Ngoye and, to a lesser extent, the University College of the North at Turfloop, near Pietersburg, were developed in isolated rural areas. This meant that the African university colleges were doomed to be expensive experiments if they were to grow. Not only were students expected to reside in university accommodation, with set fees for board and lodging, but it was also very difficult for students to find part-time work to supplement their income during term-time. In an attempt to address this problem, the Government adopted at least two measures to bring university education within the financial reach of potential black students. Tuition and residence fees at the university colleges were kept very low in comparison to white-designated institutions. For most of the decade between about a third and half of the students received state bursaries.³³ The Institute of Race Relations was also involved in providing bursaries and loans on a large scale. In 1965, for example, 329 bursaries were awarded to Africans at a cost of over R24 000.³⁴ These would have assisted over one third of the students enrolled at the African university colleges that year. After a disorganised start (in 1961 none of the University College of the Western Cape, UCWC, students had state bursaries³⁵), by 1965 the Department of Coloured Affairs was providing 105 bursaries, assisting about one quarter of the students enrolled at UCWC that year.³⁶ In 1968, 266 of the 618 students enrolled, or 43 per cent, were in receipt of state bursaries. In the same year 21 per cent of students at the University College for Indians received state bursaries.³⁷

Overall, the trend from the 1940s to the 1960s was for part-time enrolments at attendance universities and university colleges to decline. In 1945 there were 7.2 full time students for every part time student at the attendance institutions, but this ratio changed to 21.5 to one in 1955 and 22.9 to one in 1963, and in the 1950s and 1960s over 40 per cent of the part time students were studying Music at UCT.³⁸

33. SAIRR, 1963 *Survey*, p243; SAIRR, 1964 *Survey*, p292; SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p289; SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p257; SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p216.

34. SAIRR, 1965 *Survey*, p281.

35. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p259.

36. SAIRR, 1965 *Survey*, p277.

37. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p215.

38. Bureau of Statistics, Republic of South Africa (1964) *Statistical Year Book 1964*, Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria and Union of South Africa (1957) *op cit*.

However, in contrast to this trend and despite the financial assistance provided by the Government and the establishment of six new attendance universities, during the 1960s enrolments through Unisa's Division of External Studies climbed by 120 per cent and claimed 26 per cent of all student enrolments by the end of the decade, compared to 23 per cent in 1960.³⁹

7.2.1 Marginal status and the increase in women's enrolments

Over the 1960s women's enrolments increased by 135 per cent, from 9 490 students in 1960 to 22 307 students in 1970, compared to 96 per cent for total enrolments. Women's enrolments therefore outstripped and were a major cause of the overall growth in student numbers. The social character of student enrolments changed accordingly, as the proportion of women to men students enrolled increased.

There were wide variations in this increase across the population groups. At the start of the decade, there were proportionally far more white women students than there were women students of any other population group. At 302 per cent, African women's enrolments increased most rapidly, followed by Indian women at 279 per cent and white women at 131 per cent. Coloured women's enrolments rose by only 54 per cent, and the proportion of Coloured women students scarcely increased over the decade.

Table 7.9: Number of women students enrolled at universities and university colleges, analysed as a percentage of enrolments in each population group, 1960-1970 ⁴⁰				
Population group	1960 enrolments	1960 %	1970 enrolments	1970 %
African	164	9	660	16
Coloured	161	15	249	16
Asian	177	11	671	25
White	8 988	24	20 727	28

It is not clear either why women's enrolments increased or why there were such discrepancies in the trend across the population groups. The increase in women's

39. My calculations, based on SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p258; SAIRR, 1964 Survey, p290; SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p274; SAIRR, 1966 Survey, p268; SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p254; SAIRR, 1970 Survey, p243.

enrolments in South Africa at this time was part of a world wide trend, which has seen numbers of women students equalising with those of men over the last three decades in industrialised and non-industrialised countries alike. Kelly and Slaughter's analysis of this trend on a global scale reveals that women's access to higher education shows no clear pattern of relationship to the numbers of women in secondary schooling or to the level of economic development of the country, except for the very poorest nations. For example, in 1990 the United Kingdom and Sweden enrolled a lower proportion of women in higher education than Mongolia, the Philippines, Barbados, Cuba or Nicaragua.⁴¹

In her study of the entry of women into higher education in England between 1860 and 1920, Carol Dyhouse criticises the 'Whiggish' theoretical framework which sees these changes as a 'gradual opening up of opportunities' and 'steady progress towards an eventual victory for equal opportunity'. Writing in the early 1980s, she pointed out that the tendency of historians to focus on explaining change means that there is usually no explanation of why there is still inequality in the universities, with few women in senior positions in the academic, administrative and political hierarchies and with women still not using universities to advance themselves in the same ways as men.⁴² Kelly and Slaughter's study shows that although there are no clear global trends to explain increased access, there are global patterns for the way in which women participate *within* higher education, which cut across a wide range of economic and political contexts and educational traditions. They point out that women's increasing participation in higher education has been accompanied by 'sex segregation by field'. It is a global trend that women are poorly represented in courses that lead to high-paying employment in technical, professional and managerial fields. They conclude that 'opening the tertiary sector to women has for the most part meant providing women with education but few skills to negotiate in a highly competitive labour force'.⁴³

40. Dreijmans, *op cit*.

41. Kelly, GP and Slaughter, SS (eds.) (1990) 'Women and higher education: Trends and perspectives' in *Women's higher education in comparative perspective*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

42. Dyhouse, C (1984) 'Storming the citadel or storm in a tea cup? The entry of women into higher education 1860-1920' in Acker, S and Piper, DW (eds.) *Is higher education fair to women?* Society for Research on Higher Education.

43. Kelly and Slaughter, *op cit*, p6.

Dyhouse argues that in England between 1860 and 1920 women's enrolment at university paradoxically '*confirmed* their deference to the male intellect and *confirmed* their lowly sense of themselves as relatively insignificant females'.⁴⁴ Her observation that university education served to reinforce a conservative femininity, educating women so that they could be 'cultured, refined and bring prestige to the family' rather than so that they could be economically independent and earn a wage chimes with attitudes to women in South African universities in the 1960s. This was made explicit at a graduation ceremony at the University of Natal in 1966, when the Honourable FN Broome, a former judge president of Natal and the vice chairman of the Natal University Council, spoke on the role of women graduates. At first he commended increasing equality of access and opportunity, saying he was pleased to see such a high proportion of women graduating and that there were few fields of employment still closed to women. However, when he tried to criticise those people, including employers, who objected to higher education for women as a 'waste' as they would simply get married and spend the rest of their lives in the nursery and kitchen, Broome used a concept very similar to those noted by Dyhouse. He said that although every woman ought to have the right to economic independence and the ability to support her family *if needed*, he said that 'the real answer' to these critics was that

when they marry, the intellectual standard of their homes will be the standard which they set ... I believe that there is a brighter intellectual prospect for the children of a university graduate mother and an artisan father, than for the children of a successful professional or business man and a mother whose intellectual horizon is the comic strip in the Sunday newspaper.⁴⁵

Broome was not the only senior university figure to speak in this way. Professor ID MacCrone, Vice Chancellor of Wits until his retirement in 1968, also revealed that he regarded girls as marginal to serious university life. He recalled that when he had first arrived at Wits in 1924 'students thought very little about matters

44. Dyhouse, *op cit.*, p57.

45. *Natal Witness*, 31 March 1966; also see *The Star*, 26 March 1966.

outside their studies, sport and 'girls' on the campus.⁴⁶ Afrikaans women students were subject to similar cultural messages through the ASB (see below) and at the black university colleges the limited provision of residence places for women students ensured that they would always be in the minority at those campuses.

Despite these pressures, however, there is evidence that women performed better academically at university than their male counterparts. Once enrolled women were more likely to succeed in graduating than men. A Joint Matriculation Board study conducted in 1963 found that 64 per cent of women in all faculties (at the white attendance universities) gained their degrees, compared to only 55 per cent of men. Women performed better in all faculties, with the discrepancy in pass rates greatest in the Faculties of Science, where 62 per cent of women gained degrees, compared to only 42 per cent of men. The JMB study argued that this was because most women enrolling in the sciences held first class matrics.⁴⁷

During the Nel Commission hearings in the late 1950s, Margaret Ballinger, herself a former academic, compared the frustration of African students at white universities to the position of women in the development of the universities⁴⁸ and there seem to be useful comparisons to be drawn between the exclusion from the mainstream and marginality of the educational experiences of both black and women students. Like many early women's educators, many of those who were drawn to teach and develop the black institutions in South Africa, for example Alexander Kerr and SP Olivier, were inspired by religious ideals. Others, such as JJ Ross and EF Potgieter, had a similarly moral, if political, commitment to service. Dyhouse considers that this sense of calling had implications for the types of values nurtured and transmitted in the institutions, and argues that learning was to be regarded as preparation for service rather than a means to personal empowerment.⁴⁹

46. University of the Witwatersrand (1968) *Convocation Commentary*, November, Wits.

47. Joint Matriculation Board (1963) 'n Statistiese studie in verband met die aansluiting tussen skool en universiteit.

48. Verbaal verslag aan die Nel Commission, Cape Town 13 January 1958. Commission K106, UOD.

49. *Ibid.*

Far more research is needed on the nature of women's and black students' experiences in South Africa's universities and university colleges in the 1960s. Some indicators of the gender and population group inequalities in staffing and access to the university curriculum follow.

7.3 Changes to the character of academic staff

During the 1960s there was an increase in the numbers employed in academic teaching posts, rising by 11.1 per cent from 5 467 in 1960 to 6 153 in 1969. This rise was the result of the establishment of new institutions, the increase in student numbers and the broadening and diversification of the curriculum. However, staff increase did not keep up with the phenomenal growth in student numbers, so the ratio of students to teaching staff plummeted from 5.9:1 in 1960 to 9.7:1 in 1969.⁵⁰ This overall ratio masks wide discrepancies. At the African university colleges in 1969, there were on average 5.9 students for every academic staff member, compared to 6.4 to one at the University College for Indians, 8.4 to one at UCWC and 10.11 to one at the white attendance universities.⁵¹ This obviously had implication for the character of the interactions between staff and students, with the educational exchange becoming more one-sided and the quality of tuition declining.⁵² This prompted reflection about teaching methods and the optimal size for a university, concerns which were widely discussed when the new white universities were established and also generally raised in the newspapers, as in an article in *Die Vaderland* in 1966 under the headline 'SA Universities are not keeping up: Teaching methods are outdated, says Op't Hof' (the Secretary of Education).⁵³

50. Bureau of Statistics, *op cit.*, SAIRR (1969) *op cit.*, Department of Bantu Education (1971b) *op cit.*; Department of Coloured Relations and Rehoboth Affairs (1971) *Report for 1/4/1969 - 30/6/1969 and 1/7/1969 - 31/3/1970*, RP 57-1971, Department of Coloured Relations and Rehoboth Affairs, Pretoria; Department of Indian Affairs (1971) *Report for period 3/8/1961 - 31/12/1970*, RP 51/1971, Department of Indian Affairs, Pretoria; Department of National Education, *op cit.*

51. *Ibid.*

52. See comments made by the head of the University Advisory Committee, AC Cilliers, in Chapter 6.

53. *Die Vaderland*, 20 August 1966.

Socially, the character of the academic staff remained overwhelmingly white and male. In 1960 over 70 per cent of academics were men. As a result of the division of governance during the 1960s reporting of statistics was undertaken by four different departments and it is not possible to say exactly how many women were employed in academic posts in 1969, because this analysis was not provided by the university colleges in the Western Cape and Durban. At the white universities, Unisa and the African university colleges, however, by 1969 the percentage of academic posts occupied by men had risen to over 80 per cent.

In 1960, 1 634 women were employed as academic teachers of all grades, accounting for 29.8 per cent of academic employment. By 1969, at the white universities, Unisa and the African university colleges there were 1 042 women employed, accounting for 17.6 per cent of academic jobs. However, women at the university colleges who were employed in state posts were not employed under the same conditions as men and they could be dismissed when they married. This was a condition that applied to all civil servants, and was extended to university college staff in terms of the Extension of University Education Act and the Fort Hare Transfer Act.

Black academics were mostly employed at the black university colleges, where it was the Government's stated policy that they should be staffed by people from their own population groups. By the end of the 1960s it had also become the Government's explicit policy to discourage the appointment of black academics at universities they had designated for white students (see below) and the number of black academics employed in these institutions was very low.⁵⁴ There were in total only eight black academics at the white universities in 1969. Six of these (one woman) were employed by Wits, and one each by Rhodes and UCT. In 1960 only 21 of the academics (22 per cent) employed at the African university colleges were black, accounting for less than half of one per cent of all academic employment in

54. NP Natal, PV 55, 2/10/1/n1/2, 1969-1972, letter from Grabe, Private Secretary, Ministry of National Education, to the Provincial Secretary, NP of Natal, 5 September 1969.

the country.⁵⁵ By 1969 there were 54 black academics at the African university colleges, but they now accounted for only 20 per cent of the staff.⁵⁶ In the same year 29 of the academics at the Indian university college were black, accounting for 21 per cent. No breakdown is available for UCWC. Furthermore, within the black university colleges conditions of employment were different for black and white academic colleagues, as white academic staff at the university colleges were paid on a higher salary scale than black staff members (see Chapter 5).⁵⁷

During the 1960s the numbers of black academics remained very low, partly because there were so few black postgraduates. In 1963 only 17, under three per cent, of students at African university colleges were registered for postgraduate degrees. By 1968 the figures had improved: by then there were 65 students taking postgraduate degrees at African university colleges, but this still only accounted for under five per cent of African students registered there. In comparison, in 1968 there were 6 121 white students taking postgraduate degrees, constituting 13 per cent of white students.⁵⁸ This proportion had risen only slightly since the end of the war, when about ten per cent of students were registered for postgraduate degrees.⁵⁹ At the end of 1969, 2 143 white students were awarded postgraduate degrees, compared to 102 black postgraduates.⁶⁰

Although the relative proportion and absolute numbers of black academics remained small by the late 1960s, Crankshaw points out that the proportion of black graduates finding employment as academics was high compared to the proportion of white graduates working as academics. Crankshaw argues that this was because teaching at a university was one of the few 'high level' occupations open to black people and segregation policies created an artificial market.⁶¹

55. My calculation, based on Bureau of Statistics, *op cit.*, Department of Bantu Education (1971a) *Annual Report for the Calendar year 1969*, RP 18/1971.

56. Department of Bantu Education (1971a) *op cit.*

57. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p260.

58. My calculation, based on SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p255.

59. Union Education Department, *op cit.*

60. My calculations, based on SAIRR, 1970 *Survey*.

61. Crankshaw, O (1989) 'African high-level employment in South Africa, 1965-1989', unpublished mimeo, NIPR, Braamfontein.

Senior positions largely retained their white, male character. In 1960 there were 537 professors. Of these, only 11, or two per cent, were women. (None of these were employed at the university colleges or Unisa.)⁶² Again, no directly comparable figure is available for 1969, but in that year there were 25 women professors at the white universities and Unisa, accounting for three per cent of all professors at those institutions. Seven of these were employed at Natal, six at Pretoria and five at UCT. There were no women professors at RAU, Unisa or UPE. By 1969, only five of the 58 professors, (under nine per cent) at the African university colleges were black.⁶³ One of these was MOM Seboni, who had been appointed Professor of Education at Fort Hare in 1961.⁶⁴ Seboni was an outspoken supporter of Government initiatives at Fort Hare and his doctoral thesis on Fort Hare, completed in 1959, had enthusiastically endorsed the transfer.⁶⁵ There were no black professors outside the black university colleges. In contrast to these low figures for senior positions, women constituted 41 per cent of academic staff in junior grades (below level of lecturer) in 1960, and black staff accounted for 42 posts, 38 per cent, of academic staff at lecturer level or below at the African university colleges in 1969.⁶⁶

7.3.1 Increased influence of Afrikaans academics

During the 1960s the range and influence of graduates of Afrikaans universities was extended. This can be seen in the appointments of senior staff. All of the Rectors or Vice Chancellors of the new institutions were graduates of Afrikaans universities, so by 1969 these Principals headed institutions attended by well over two thirds of South Africa's students. Besides the Rectors or Vice Chancellors, most of the new posts created at RAU, UPE and the black university colleges were

62. My calculations, based on Bureau of Statistics, *op cit*.

63. My calculations, based on Department of Bantu Education (1971b) *op cit*.

64. *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 March 1961.

65. Seboni, MOM (1959) 'The South African Native College, Fort Hare, 1903-54; an historical critical survey of its development and an assessment of its influence on the education of the Non-European races of South Africa in general, but on that of the Southern Bantu in particular, together with suggestions for future development', unpublished DED Thesis, Unisa.

66. *Ibid*.

taken by Afrikaans graduates. Although it is sometimes suggested that the black university colleges provided an important channel of employment for Afrikaans graduates, and that they may even have been designed with this purpose in mind, the figures undermine the significance of this line of argument. By 1969 322 whites were employed at the black university colleges (excluding UCWC, for which figures are not available), accounting for only five per cent of academic employment. These figures must be viewed in the context of a desperate shortage of appropriate candidates for academic posts, that troubled the Department of Education when the establishment of RAU and UPE was under consideration. Many of the 'academics' employed at the black university colleges had no prior experience of university teaching and were high school teachers or seconded civil servants.⁶⁷

Few graduates of the English-medium universities were employed as academics at the black university colleges (see Chapter 5). It is not clear whether this was because they were seldom selected for employment, or because they did not offer themselves for employment. In any case, Afrikaans graduates set the academic tone of these institutions. Writing in the late 1980s, AL Behr, Professor of Education at the University of Durban Westville, implied that the dominance of Afrikaans academics at these institutions was to be ascribed to a conscious boycott by graduates of the English-medium universities rather than to any factor. He described the effects:

it gave Afrikaner academics a free rein to take up teaching posts in these institutions and to imbue the students there with the insular Christian National philosophy which was reflected in much of the research and writing of those who received their education there [and this] deprived non-white students at the time of insights into the great liberal tradition of the non-Afrikaner academe.⁶⁸

67. See Chapter 5.

68. Behr, AL (1988) *Education in South Africa: Origins, Issues and Trends, 1652-1988*, Academica, Pretoria, p194.

At all South Africa's universities and university colleges in the 1960s, senior staff was predominantly white and male. Many of these came from Afrikaans universities which set a premium on loyalty and conformity. The implications of the example of the 'hidden curriculum' set by these staffing patterns require thorough investigation. It seems clear, however, that the universities would have been experienced by most black and women academics and students as the preserves of white men, where their presence was perhaps tolerated in the lower ranks but where they felt increasingly 'like a trespasser'⁶⁹ as they sought to advance in the hierarchies.

7.4 Diversity in the role of universities and university colleges

The 1959 Acts created a new system of state-controlled university colleges. As has been seen in Chapter 5, these were subject to a system of governance quite different to the arrangements for the control of the existing universities. The Nationalist Government had provided for extensive state control because it believed that it could use the university colleges to serve its political goals, but quite how the Nationalists really viewed the educational role of the university colleges is far less clear. The courses of study offered at the university colleges were far more limited than those available at the state-aided universities, which were now designated white, but whether this was because the curriculum was intended to be restrictive or because it would have been prohibitively expensive to provide an identical range of courses through segregated institutions, where student numbers were often very low, is not clear from the archival record. Even though the Nationalist Government poured resources into the university colleges, where unit costs were comparatively very high (see Table 7.2 above), by the end of the 1960s the universities and university colleges were providing distinct, unequal, educational opportunities.

69. Dyhouse, *op cit.*, p56.

7.4.1 Curricula

At the ten attendance universities, white students had access to the full breadth of the university curriculum. All the universities offered courses in arts or social science, maths, pure science, commerce or public administration, education and law. The table which follows shows where other courses were taught.

Table 7.10: Faculties at eight attendance universities, all designated white, 1961 ⁷⁰								
Field of study	UCT	Stell	Pretoriq	Wits	OFS	Potch	Rhodes	Natal
Engineering and quantity surveying	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes
Medicine	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes ⁷¹
Agriculture and forestry	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	-	-	Yes
Theology	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes	-
Architecture and fine arts	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
Music	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	-	-
Dentistry	-	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	-
Veterinary science	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	-
Military science	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-

Students were free to choose which institution to attend, so although Veterinary Science and Military Science were offered at only one institution each, any white student who wanted to pursue that course of study could apply to be considered for admission on academic grounds. The table that follows shows how students took advantage of the range of courses offered.

70. *Ibid.*

71. For black students only.

Table 7.11: Student distribution among faculties at attendance universities, all designated white, 1961⁷²

Field of study	Percentage
Arts and social science	29%
Maths and pure science	18%
Commerce and public administration	14%
Engineering, quantity surveying, architecture and fine arts	12%
Medicine and dentistry	10%
Education and physical education	7%
Agriculture and fore	4%
Law	3%
Music	2%
Theology	0.8%
Veterinary science	0.6%
Military science	0.2%
Total (percentages rounded, hence discrepancy)	100.6%

In particular, it should be noted that under 30 per cent of students were registered for courses in Arts and Social Science, and that only seven per cent took education courses.

The educational opportunities at the state-controlled university colleges were quite different from those at the universities. A high proportion of the students enrolled were not fully matriculated and were not registered for degree level courses. Although the numbers of these students declined over the 1960s, by 1969 there were still nearly a quarter of students registered at the African university colleges who had not matriculated.⁷³ There were also very few students taking postgraduate degrees: they accounted for only 3.5 per cent of students at the African university colleges in 1969.⁷⁴ The emphasis in these university colleges was therefore on teaching undergraduate diploma and degree students. The research function of the university colleges was hardly developed.

In contrast to the diversity and opportunity available to white students at the universities, black students faced very limited choices at the five university colleges. These courses had been chosen by the Van der Walt Committee, whose

72. Op't Hof, memorandum to Minister, UOD 04/3/1, 11 January 1963, p4.

73. Only 77 per cent had matric exemption. My calculation, based on Department of Bantu Education (1971b) *op cit*.

74. *Ibid*.

reasoning is discussed in Chapter 4. Some courses were available at all of the university colleges, including Afrikaans and Nederlands, English, education, history, mathematics, psychology and sociology. All the African university colleges offered courses in African languages, while Salisbury Island offered courses in Hindi and Oriental Studies. Besides these 'culturally appropriate' courses, Salisbury Island offered a number of courses not available at the other university colleges, covering an eclectic range of subjects including Criminology, French, Fine Arts, Geology, History of Art, Hygiene and Law. This provision can possibly be ascribed to the Principal, SP Olivier's power in bargaining with the Department of Education (see Chapter 5). As a legacy of its long history, Fort Hare also had a marginally wider range of courses, for example offering Agriculture and Theology, which were not available elsewhere. The University College of Zululand was particularly limited in the Sciences. Table 7.12 shows the random availability of other courses at the university colleges.⁷⁵

Table 7.12: Courses of study offered at the university colleges, early 1960s ⁷⁶					
Course	Fort Hare	The North	Zululand	Western Cape (1961)	Salisbury Island (1963)
Administration	n/a	Yes	n/a	n/a	n/a
Anthropology	n/a	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes
Biology	n/a	n/a	Yes	n/a	n/a
Botany	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	Yes
Commerce	n/a	n/a	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chemistry	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	Yes
Classics	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	Yes
Economics	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a	n/a
Geography	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	Yes
Librarianship	Yes	n/a	n/a	Yes	n/a
Philosophy	n/a	n/a	n/a	Yes	n/a
Physics	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	Yes
Physiology	Yes	n/a	n/a	n/a	Yes
Social Work	n/a	n/a	Yes	n/a	Yes
Zoology	Yes	Yes	n/a	Yes	n/a

This restricted curriculum meant that the overwhelming majority of students at the university colleges took Arts, Social Science or Education courses. In 1969, for

75. Writing about the establishment of Salisbury Island, Olivier explained that the first curriculum was assembled with reference to Van der Walt's recommendations, the 'convictions of Council' and 'obvious needs of the community', but that the initial plans were continually adapted. Olivier, SP (1962) 'Die Universiteitskollege vir Indiërs, Durban', *Journal of Racial Affairs*, Vol. 14, No 1, December, p59.

example, more than two-thirds, 69 per cent, were taking these courses (43 per cent in Arts and Social Sciences, 26 per cent in education), compared to about 37 per cent of white students.⁷⁷ Most of these were taking formative three-year Bachelors degrees, for example 27 per cent of all students were taking Bachelor of Arts courses, and ten per cent were taking Bachelors courses in Social Science. For women, these figures are even more striking: 58 per cent of women students at the African university colleges in 1969 were taking Arts courses. Only seven per cent of students were studying law, and four per cent commerce.⁷⁸ The African university colleges were therefore primarily institutions where students followed courses that would exclude them from high-powered and well-paid employment.

It is particularly striking that so many black students were studying education courses and ultimately became school teachers. Although far more general research is needed on the type of knowledge produced at South Africa's universities and university colleges during the apartheid era, some work by Peter Randall and Penny Enslin on the education courses offered the university colleges, Unisa and most Afrikaans universities has been published.

Enslin's research reveals that the 'dominant theoretical discourse in South African teacher education' at these institutions was 'Fundamental Pedagogics'. Randall contends that this field of study developed as a Christian National response to History of Education courses which commonly surveyed the development of western education from Sparta and Athens. He argues that the publication of *Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek* by the Dutch academic Langevelt in 1944 inspired a search for 'scientific pedagogics' in South Africa and that in 1958 JC Coetzee published *Inleiding tot die historiese opvoedkunde*, in which he argued that there was no 'neutral' history of education. Coetzee was especially interested in the national role of education, although he made no mention of South Africa in

76. Information from NAD Inligting, Ref. 446/13/4, university college calendars and *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 January 1960.

77. See above.

78. Department of Bantu Education, *op cit*.

his book, and he favoured a religious rather than humanist approach to education. He rejected the 'English' name 'history of education'.⁷⁹

Enslin argues that the 'science' of Fundamental Pedagogics which this work inspired was based on the 'phenomenological method' of 'radical reflection' on education. Teachers were required to reflect on the education process, but 'provisionally suspend ... extrinsic aims and beliefs', so that the only valid starting point for analysing education was the 'phenomenon of education itself, never theory or politics'. Educational doctrines, such as the 'liberal', 'Communist' or 'Christian' approach, were caricatured and tested against the 'universal structures of education'.⁸⁰ Enslin observes that this did not illuminate the educational process and excluded the political as 'a legitimate dimension of theoretical discourse': Fundamental Pedagogics, she argues, 'offers neither a language of critique nor a language of possibility'.⁸¹

Fundamental Pedagogics was an extraordinarily stultifying field of study. An example of particular relevance is the Fundamental Pedagogics textbook co-authored by the Salisbury Island Rector, SP Olivier, *A basic philosophy of education*.⁸² This book is swollen with 'facts', categories and hierarchies of education which were clearly meant to be memorised for examination purposes, but the material itself is impenetrable and obscure and does little to provide analytical insight into the processes of teaching or education. It recommends an authoritarian religious approach to education (see Chapter 5).

However, the implications of subjecting so many black and Afrikaans student teachers to Fundamental Pedagogics extends far beyond the hobbling effect on their individual intellectual development. Even if, as Enslin points out, teachers were not 'thoroughly duped' by Fundamental Pedagogics, these graduates

79. Randall, P (1990) 'Historico-pedagogics and teacher education in South Africa, 1948-1985' in *Perspectives in Education*, Vol. 11, No 2, University of the Witwatersrand.

80. Enslin, P (1990) 'Science and doctrine: Theoretical discourse in South African teacher education' in Nkomo, M (ed.) *Pedagogy of Domination*, Africa World Press, New Jersey.

81. *Ibid.*, p78.

82. Bekker, JH, Naicker, SA and Olivier, SP (1976) *A basic philosophy of education*, Perskor, Johannesburg.

proceeded to teach further generations, at the very least ill equipped to consider the political context of their classrooms and possibly transmitting positivist approaches to the learning process if not aspects of the spurious political content of Fundamental Pedagogics itself. Enslin predicts that

When the regime and its apparatus are gone, those who have been constituted as teachers by the dominant discourse are likely to remain in their classrooms exercising what Foucault calls capillary power, and constituting students as before.⁸³

One of the reasons why so many black students studied education was that by law, black students were restricted to studying at the university college designated for their population group. Special permission was needed to study elsewhere, and this permission was almost always refused if the courses were offered at the designated university college, or, especially in the case of African students, through Unisa (see Chapter 5). This meant that if a black student wanted to study courses not available at the university colleges or at the Natal Medical School, they needed to be extraordinarily well-informed and determined even to make application. In order for the application to succeed, the student needed to negotiate the maze of Government restrictions.

Many fields of study were thus closed to black students in the early 1960s. These included Engineering, Veterinary Science, Dentistry, Architecture, Fine Arts, Music and Military Science. As has been seen in Chapter 5, the Government was concerned to keep African students out of the universities, and was more likely to agree to admit Indian or Coloured students.

This distinction was reinforced in the decisions about admitting black students to training in dentistry. From 1961, the Department of Education allowed Wits to use new facilities for maxillo-facial and oral surgery at Baragwanath Hospital to offer dentistry courses to limited numbers of Coloured and Indian students. In 1962 four

83. Enslin, *op cit*, p89.

Indians and one Coloured student were admitted.⁸⁴ This still did not meet the needs of Africans who wanted to train as dentists, or in any other of the restricted fields. So in 1963, on the initiative of the Minister of Bantu Education, the Cabinet appointed an interdepartmental committee to make recommendations about degree and diploma courses at the black university colleges not offered by Unisa. Unisa was asked to prepare to examine agriculture, medicine, dentistry, engineering and veterinary courses as the need for them arose.⁸⁵ As all of these courses had essential practical components, these plans came to nothing. The Government was eventually forced to allow African students into courses such as these at the 'white' universities. For example, in August 1966 the Government at last agreed that Africans too could study Dentistry at Wits as it was not offered at the Natal Medical School or the African university colleges, although the first year of study still had to be completed at an African university college.⁸⁶

Providing African students with training in Engineering caused a great deal of difficulty for the Government. In 1960 the Wits Registrar wrote to the secretary of Bantu Education to

point out that the University is able to accept a limited number of Bantu students in the Faculty of Engineering. No facilities for training in Engineering exist at any of the non-White university colleges and, since there are municipalities who wish to sponsor the training of Bantu students in Engineering, for work in townships, it is considered desirable that Bantu persons be given the opportunity of applying for admission to the Faculty of Engineering of this university.⁸⁷

The Department replied that while each application would be considered on its merits, graduates in Engineering could only expect to be employed by a Bantu Authority and

84. SAIRR, 1962 Survey, p197, SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p253.

85. Secretary of Bantu Education to Secretary of EAS, 30 August 1963, UOD s10/1/3 Volume 459 and 'Interdepartementale komitee van ondersoek insake uithreiding van universiteitsopleiding van nie-blanke universiteitskolleges', TBS F33/864. The future relationship between the university colleges and Unisa was also on the committee's agenda, and the ending of the transitional period where Unisa was responsible for examination and awarding degrees.

86. *Race Relations News*, August 1966.

87. Duggan to Secretary for Bantu Education, Wits Archive, Sub File 1 to L. 9/6, 'Admission of non-European students', 17 October 1960.

The activities of Bantu Authorities do not, at the present time, include matters for which they need engineers.⁸⁸

They said several African technicians would need to be trained before the Government would give priority to training African engineers (this was because they could not countenance an African engineer giving instructions to white subordinates).

However, concerned about the shortages of engineers and the appropriateness of their training, the Government had appointed a commission on Engineering training in 1957. The provisional report of the Straszacker Commission, issued in 1964, concluded that the development of the homelands would require extensive engineering services. They noted, however, that there were 'not more than ten' black engineers in South Africa, and that only one of these was African. They added that 'the relative position is not much better anywhere else in the world, as far as the Negroid races are concerned'. They chose to explain this inequality with reference to only one 'cause':

It is understood that at present, at any rate, ability in pictorial depth-perception is a major difficulty for Bantu students.⁸⁹

This comment is striking because in the entire archive of material consulted for this thesis, it provides the *only* instance in which the apartheid university education is justified on the basis of an argument about the inferior intellectual ability of African students. Despite this perception of the abilities of African students, Straszacker recommended that science and mathematics teaching in black high school should be improved, that black technicians should be trained to work 'in their own areas' and, most significantly, that

Steps to train engineers by allowing and helping some of the science graduates from the non-White colleges who have passed appropriate courses and with the requisite interest and ability, to proceed to one of the 'open' universities to complete the study of Engineering.⁹⁰

88. Secretary for Bantu Education to Registrar, *ibid.*, 1 November 1960.

89. Straszacker, RL (1964) *Commission of Enquiry into the method of training for university degrees in Engineering, Report, Part I and Part II*, Department of Education, Arts and Science, Pretoria, p162.

90. *Ibid.*, p162.

In June 1966, when the final Straszacker report was eventually issued, the Department of Bantu Education recommended that the Cabinet approve this as a temporary measure, until the university colleges could provide training in Engineering. Until then, basic training should still take place at the African university colleges.⁹¹

The Wits Dean of Engineering, Professor GR Bozzoli, who served on the Straszacker Commission, had campaigned from 1954 for Engineering to be opened to blacks, because at that time skilled jobs were reserved for whites. From 1963, Bozzoli attempted to find legal ways to provide black students with training opportunities in Engineering and sponsors to fund their studies. At first he tried to arrange for black science undergraduates to transfer to Wits after two years at a black university college. In 1967, in co-operation with the Department of Education, Wits admitted two black science graduates for training in Engineering. An African student was enrolled on this basis for the first time in 1969.⁹² Bozzoli comments that

Although the scheme never grew to large proportions, it was at least a beginning and furthermore it was legal. The legality was of the utmost importance since it was the student who suffered the penalty of breaking the law, not the university.⁹³

Unlike the Straszacker report, Bozzoli himself attributed the low numbers of black students in succeeding in Engineering to poor education. There were very few black students prepared to undertake Engineering studies, so although in April 1968 Professor JJ Ross, the Fort Hare Rector, called for the establishment of an Engineering Faculty, 'in view of the crying and increasing need for technologists with the development of the border industries and industries that are bound to be initiated within the homelands',⁹⁴ as Straszacker had pointed out, it would be many years

91. *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 June 1966.

92. Bozzoli, GR (1995) *A Vice-Chancellor Remembers*, Alphaprint, Randburg, p102; and letter from Bozzoli to Vice Chancellor of Queen's University, Belfast, 18 April 1972, Wits Archive. Thanks to BK Murray for locating this letter.

93. *Ibid.*, p102.

94. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 April 1968

before the numbers of African students ready to study Engineering could justify the establishment of an Engineering Faculty.⁹⁵

In December 1964 a Fort Hare student who had completed honours in Chemistry applied to do an MSc in Biochemistry at Wits. His application was rejected because the Registrar at Fort Hare told the Department of Bantu Education that he did not consider that it was appropriate for this student to proceed in this field of study:

I cannot see for what purpose Mr Maseko wishes to study Biochemistry at this level, which I feel would normally only be taken by students wishing to proceed in medical research, nor is it clear to me what his possible field of employment could be ... students should not be encouraged to deviate from the fields of study which could be of the greatest use for them also in securing future employment and serving their people.⁹⁶

In any case, the restriction on African students registering in the Faculty of Science precluded the Minister from granting consent. The advice to the Fort Hare Registrar from the Department of Bantu Education was

That Maseko be informed that Proclamation 434 renders his request impossible and that he seek some other field of study. The alternative is to ask Unisa to examine in Biochemistry.⁹⁷

This episode also reveals that this student had a course of study closed to him by Regulation 434, as it was not offered by the institutions which he was entitled to attend, namely the university college for his ethnic group or Unisa, nor did the Minister have the discretion to allow him to enrol at any of the universities where this course was available.

95. Strasznacker, *op cit.*, p162.

96. Fort Hare Registrar to Secretary for Bantu Education, 3 December 1964, Department of Bantu Education files, 11/9/4/1.

97. PAW Cook, Deputy Secretary for Planning, Department of Bantu Education, to Secretary, 6 January 1965, 11/9/4.

7.4.2 Educational outcomes and impact on employment patterns

Table 7.13 gives the numbers of degrees and diplomas awarded between 1960 and 1970.

Year	African	Coloured	Indian	White
1960	166	59	106	5 517
1961	221	63	130	5 895
1962	187	87	159	6 522
1963	246	125	198	6 976
1964	213	98	207	7 786
1965	228	103	262	7 752
1966	263	128	275	8 316
1967	302	153	343	8 283
1968	304	141	401	8 971
1969	377	157	402	10 314
1970	459	165	486	11 283
Total, 1960-1970	2 966	1 279	2 969	87 615

Few of these successful black students had graduated from the black university colleges with degrees. Only 34 per cent of the African graduates had obtained degrees at the African university colleges, while only 17 per cent of the coloured graduates and 8.3 per cent of the Indian graduates had obtained degrees at the designated ethnic university colleges.⁹⁹ By 1970 the Department of Bantu Education estimated that there were 3 825 African graduates in South Africa.¹⁰⁰

The educational output of the university system affected employment patterns and the social class structure, but it is extraordinarily difficult to analyse these processes in detail because of the scarcity of relevant data, particularly for the 1960s and early 1970s. However, Owen Crankshaw has analysed data collected by the National Manpower Commission (NMC). The NMC uses the category 'High Level Manpower', which is defined as occupations requiring at least two years of

98. Dreijmanis, *op cit.*, p133.

99. Most of the others would have graduated at Unisa. These percentages are for the period 1960-1969. The Indian figures include postgraduate teaching diplomas. My calculations, based Department of Bantu Education (1971b) *op cit.*, p44; Department of Indian Affairs (1971) *Report for period 3/8/1961 - 31/12/1970*, RP 51/1971, Department of Indian Affairs, Pretoria, p59; SAIRR, 1969, *Survey*, p215

100. Department of Bantu Education, (1971) *op cit.*

education or training after Standard 10. This category obviously includes groups other than graduates holding degrees, but the findings are nevertheless interesting.

Table 7.14: National Manpower Commission data on employment in selected 'High Level Manpower' occupations, analysed by population group, 1965 and 1971 ¹⁰¹								
Occupation	African		Coloured		Indian		White	
	1965	1971	1965	1971	1965	1971	1965	1971
Professional engineers ¹⁰²	3	22	10	24	7	128	11 107	17 202
Physical scientists	0	3	0	0	0	1	615	863
Natural scientists	0	14	0	0	0	1	1 328	1 774
Medical professions	55	51	28	95	116	420	8 217	9 244
Auxiliary medical	136	460	42	156	41	180	5 821	7 786
Percentage of total in science-based occupations above	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.5	1	4	4
Architects and allied	9	18	0	11	8	12	4 442	6 642
Legal professions	14	26	0	27	34	51	5 424	6 944
Social scientists	249	451	129	153	5	60	1 148	4 967
Artists and allied	500	527	68	124	28	104	5 402	6 147
Clergy	614	3 990	41	758	11	34	2 102	5 900
Percentage of total in the clergy	0.6	3	0.1	1	0.03	0.05	0.3	0.7
Accountants	0	2	18	106	1	104	6 789	10 758
Top management	0	31	23	91	504	1 063	14 029	25 693
University lecturers	125	90	0	20	22	140	3 489	8 377
Nursing professions	12 543	24 919	3 718	4 077	325	1 273	20 332	23 989
Percentage of total in nursing	13	18	10	8	1	2	3	3
Teaching professions	35 593	31 791	13 147	17 024	5 228	6 384	38 607	53 302
Percentage of total in teaching	37	23	35	28	17	10	6	6
Total 'High Level Manpower'	96 256	138 357	38 008	59 963	30 141	60 853	611 841	835 290

Crankshaw points out that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, most 'professional' Africans were employed as teachers and nurses: 'professions that are unique insofar as most of their incumbents are trained on the job, or attend teacher training colleges instead of undergoing a university education'.¹⁰³ He adds that Africans have such high employment figures in teaching and nursing [because of] the State policy of separate educational and health services.

101. My calculations, based on National Manpower Commission, 1987, *High-Level and Middle-Level Manpower in South Africa: Recent Developments*, RP 98/1987, Government Printer, Pretoria.

102. A university degree is a pre-requisite for being a professional engineer.

103. Crankshaw, O, 1989, 'African High-Level Employment in South Africa, 1965-1987', unpublished mimeo, National Institute for Personnel Research, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, p2.

Effectively this has meant that a racially-exclusive market for African labour in these professions has been created by the State.¹⁰⁴

He also points out that the massive increases since the mid 1950s in African enrolments in schools, and to a lesser extent, universities, had created a demand for African schoolteachers.¹⁰⁵ Crankshaw also comments on the high levels of African employment in the clergy. He points out, however, that Africans were unevenly distributed across 'High Level' employment and that besides these areas of concentration, were numerically poorly represented.

In general, African employment was higher in semi-professional than professional employment, and higher in artistic than in scientific fields. In scientific field., African employment was concentrated in technical rather than professional employment. Crankshaw argues that

This concentration of African professionals in the arts and social sciences is at least partly a result of the shortage of good mathematics and general science training in the schools.¹⁰⁶

7.4.3 Intellectual cultures

It has been observed that 'education is what remains when you have forgotten all that you were taught', and the approaches to knowledge and learning fostered in students by the universities and university colleges probably persist as some of the most significant legacies of apartheid university education. It is, however, extremely difficult to analyse the intellectual cultures of universities, as there were significant variations in approach between departments and between academics. There is also a shortage of data on this topic, which remains an important area for further research.

Despite these problems, some clear trends emerge.

104. *Ibid.*, p5.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*, p7.

Perhaps the most fundamental criticism is that the universities and university colleges were accused of failing to inculcate habits of critical thought in their students. Many analysts have commented on the similarities between the intellectual cultures at the Afrikaans-medium and black institutions. As Balintulo wrote in the early 1970s:

The purpose of creating these ethnic institutions of higher learning - if they can be so described - is to supplement the racist pedagogy that instils a sense of God-given mission of domination to the Afrikaner youth with a more domesticating tribal-oriented pedagogy for the oppressed groups.¹⁰⁷

Balintulo argues that 'there certainly was no question of education for critical consciousness, rather education was being shaped to fit in with Government policy'.¹⁰⁸ Nkomo's study of student activism at the black institutions also concluded that

The general effect ... has been to foster a situation of intellectual underdevelopment among the new crop of educated Africans since those institutions minimise rather than maximise their potential.¹⁰⁹

Nkosinatha Gwala, then a lecturer at the University of Zululand, wrote in the late 1980s that

One can safely regard graduates of Unisa, Afrikaans and black universities as having gone through the same type of education and ideological training ... the Afrikaans universities have been described as catering mainly for the production of the governing bureaucratic elite and adhering to the conservative traditions of white racial domination, Calvinism, unrigorous neo-positivism and rote learning, as opposed to critical debate ... in the present circumstances ... Africanisation will mainly promote products of the very same style of learning and thinking.¹¹⁰

Gwala said that the influence of Unisa persisted after 1969, with Unisa lecture material widely used and Unisa lecturers acting as external examiners. The

107. Balintulo, *op cit.*, p148.

108. *Ibid.*, p151.

109. Nkomo, M (1984) *Student culture and activism in Black South African Universities: The roots of resistance*, Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut, p162.

110. Gwala, N (1988) 'State control, student politics and the crisis in Black universities', in W Cobbett and R Cohen (eds.) *Popular struggles in South Africa*, James Currey, London, p170.

curriculum was generally unchanging, with widespread rote learning of dictated lecture notes. He points out that lecturers who tried to 'discard them and encourage students to do independent reading are accused of wanting to fail students'. 'Controversial' issues were excluded from the curriculum and there was no debate in lectures. The same exam question were used repeatedly. Gwala argues that

Although it is the case that Bantu Education has created its political opposite, we should not lose sight of the fact that it has also at the same time produced academics who border on 'intellectual sterility' ... Bantu Education has failed in its politico ideological intentions [but] it has been relatively successful educationally, by controlling and suppressing the intellectual and analytical abilities of black students.¹¹¹

The intellectual tone of the African university colleges was also adversely affected by the poor standard of schooling in the Bantu Education system. As Malherbe commented, the 'impressive facade of university colleges' was at odds with the effects of the Bantu Education Act on schools, which, he said, 'deliberately jeopardised the quality of the intake into these institutions'.¹¹²

These trends were not limited to the black university colleges and Afrikaans-medium universities. In 1970 Nusas ran an 'Education Reform Campaign', which argued that the English-medium universities had used the same teaching and learning methods for decades, that put a premium on authority and obedience and penalised independence. Geoff Budlender, a former UCT SRC president, wrote that this reinforced 'white dominant attitudes' and was 'therefore impeding change': 'students and workers learn how to adjust unquestioningly to institutions, and how to exercise their critical thought only within narrow limits prescribed by the authorities'.¹¹³

111. *Ibid.*, p172.

112. Malherbe, EG 'University education for non-whites: Recent consequences of Government policy in South Africa', 25 February 1961, KCM 56990 (132).

113. Budlender, G (1973) 'Universities and social change', unpublished mimeo, Spro-cas, Johannesburg.

The stunting of critical thought and curiosity also hindered the development of an indigenous intellectual culture which focused on issues relevant to South Africa.

Malherbe argued that

What has to be cultivated at a university is the right attitude towards learning. This is more important than the mere knowledge of the facts themselves. If the attitude is right, the student will have a liberal education, no matter what subject he studies. It is what the student is moved *to think and to do about knowledge* that reveals the liberal element. The prime task of our universities is therefore to breathe that spirit into all our teaching and our methods of studying.¹¹⁴

Writing in the early 1970s, Budlender argued that

Our universities train their students to solve the problems of an elite white society. They do not train them to solve the problems of South Africa ... The university directs [the students'] attention to the problems of elite industrial society: engineers for super-highways which serve white suburbs, doctors to transplant hearts which failed from overeating, commercial practices to ensure a continued safe profit and growing income gap.¹¹⁵

Budlender wrote that although student life facilitated activism, the skills acquired at university 'encouraged fitting in to society rather than changing it'.¹¹⁶

A South African Students' Organisation pamphlet from 1972 made similar points, arguing that the black institutions were producing graduates who were out of touch with local needs:

University education for blacks has had the effect of creating a black elitist middle class that is far removed from the true aspirations of the people. Thus the result is a poor imitation of white values and they have become blurred images of their white masters. The universities have produced graduates who would never understand themselves and their people. These universities have been 'the secular refuge of mediocrity ... the safe hospital of all intellectual invalids - and what is worse - the place where all forms of

114. Malherbe, EG 'University education for non-whites', *op cit*.

115. *Varsity*, 22 March 1972, quoted in Budlender, *op cit*.

116. Budlender, *op cit*.

tyranny and insensibility found the chair where they could be taught'. You will, no doubt, agree that these are the faithful mirrors of this decadent society.¹¹⁷

Gwala commented, from personal experience, that geographical isolation affected the educational processes of African universities, as the campuses were isolated both from other campuses and from wider social phenomena so that there was a discontinuity between the classroom and the social and political environment.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, while white universities seldom reflected on the implications of segregation for their own intellectual processes, segregation also allowed them to be increasingly removed from the real needs of the country.

There was also a lack of a vigorous research culture at South African institutions, a topic which required more detailed research. In his article on 'The racial question and intellectual production in South Africa', Evans argues that the white domination of academic processes which persisted until the 1990s was not only an *effect of racial domination*, but also 'one of the objective mechanisms which sustain racial domination'. He did not argue that white monopoly of research skills necessarily produced racist research, but pointed out that the 'research culture' centred on the white, English-speaking universities and said that the black universities were 'never intended to embrace research'. He therefore found that black 'knowledge producers' were frequently *outside* the universities, and that there was a chasm between 'salaried intellectuals' and 'generators of popular discourse'.¹¹⁹ Balintulo confirms that research at the African university colleges was underdeveloped, with research projects in Anthropology considering 'such trivialities as Xhosa cosmetics' and ethnographic studies to find pure tribes and social work research which rested on the premise of 'blaming the victim'.¹²⁰

117. South African Students' Organisation (1972) 'The university: What does it mean to you?' in Van der Merwe, HW, Charton, NCJ, Kotze, DA and Magnusson, A (eds.) *African Perspectives on South Africa*, David Philip, Cape Town, p279.

118. Gwala, *op cit*.

119. Evans, I (1990) 'The racial question and intellectual production in South Africa' in *Perspectives in Education*, Vol. 11, No 2, University of the Witwatersrand, p25.

120. Balintulo, *op cit*, p151.

By the mid 1980s South Africa was producing very little research, spending 2.4 'man-years' per 10 000 of the population compared to 10.2 in Israel, 13.8 in the United Kingdom, 19.5 in Australia and 35.6 in Japan.¹²¹

Finally, over the 1960s, many academics left the country. At the same time, fewer academics from abroad came to South Africa to take up posts. As the *Race Relations Survey* observed in 1961:

During 1961 a movement which began some years ago has gathered momentum: the emigration of many of South Africa's eminent academic men, both white and non-white. It is increasingly difficult to find suitably qualified people to replace them.¹²²

Moodie points out that the 'brain drain' from South Africa is very difficult to quantify, as South Africa had always exported academics, and because the universities did not keep records of why people left. Nevertheless, the South African academics in British and American universities were mostly English-speaking and liberal or left politically, and by the 1970s those avoiding conscription had been added. Furthermore, the numbers of academics coming to South Africa did dwindle.¹²³

This was partly because as early as 1961 the Association of University Teachers of Britain agreed to 'take active steps to warn anybody contemplating leaving Britain to teach in a South African university against doing so while the apartheid policy persisted'.¹²⁴ In 1965 the Anti Apartheid Movement in the UK asked academics not to take up posts in South Africa. Dr. Robert Birley, visiting Professor of Education at Wits, opposed the campaign, and Sir Eric Ashby, Master of Clare College, Cambridge, retracted his support, saying 'it would seem to me to be treachery for academics in Britain to abandon the 'open' universities of South Africa'.¹²⁵ The 1965 Nusas conference urged overseas lecturers not to refuse appointments in South Africa.¹²⁶

121. Tober, K (1987) 'The functions of a university', Senate Special Lecture, University of the Witwatersrand.

122. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p255, p259.

123. Moodie, GC (1994) 'The state and liberal universities in South Africa, 1948-1990', *Higher Education*, No 27.

124. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p255.

125. *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 March 1966.

126. SAIRR, 1965 *Survey*, p279.

The South African academic world also became more isolated after May 1961, when South Africa left the Commonwealth. This meant that South African students no longer qualified for Carnegie grants, Nuffield Travelling Fellowships or Commonwealth Scholarships.¹²⁷ The South Africa's membership of the Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth terminated in July 1963.¹²⁸

7.5 Political cultures at the universities in the 1960s

There were two significant changes in the relations of governance of university education that followed the 1959 Extension of University Education Act. An entirely new, state-controlled system of governance was created for the management of the black university colleges and universities no longer had the right to choose whom to admit as students, with black students restricted from access to what became increasingly white universities. Apart from these changes, the governance of the universities continued much as has been described in Chapter 2, with minor adjustments of the composition of some university Councils,¹²⁹ and UPE and RAU were established on much the same basis.

127. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p255.

128. SAIRR, 1962 *Survey*, p196.

129. Cape Town, 1965: Composition unchanged from 1948 except for one more nominated by State President. The president's nominees were Louis Babro v. Johannes Francois Burger, William Ewart Gladstone Louw, Rev Abram Johannes van der Merwe and Johannes Phillipus de Villiers. (UOD 04/4/1, Vol. 16.) Natal, 1965: Composition changed from 1948. One more member was nominated by the State President. These were Dr JGM Richter, FN Broome, JJ Boshoff, CG Vorster, JLT Blebuyek and ED Adler. There were seven representatives of the teaching staff, because of the two campuses. Four representatives came from the Durban and Pietermaritzburg Councils, there were five representatives of donors or convocation, one representative of local high schools and one from the Natal Technical College. (UOD 04/4/1, Vols. 13 and 14.) OFS, 1965: Composition changed from 1948. Four more members. The four president nominees included a former minister, SP le Roux, a judge, HJ Potgieter, a doctor, JW van der Riet and Dr BJ Havenga. There were four Convocation representatives, two from the Senate, a representative of the Bloemfontein Council (a businessman), a representative of the donors (also a businessman), two from the NGK, one from the OFS Teachers Association, one from the Helpmekaar of the OFS (a minister of religion), one from the Orange Women's Association (a 'housewife') and three from the Provincial Council of the OFS. (UOD 04/4/1, Vols 12 and 13.) Potchefstroom, 1965: Composition unchanged since 1948 except for one more Senate representative. The Government nominees included JM Brink, a farmer and 'speculator', Col JJ Meyer, an attorney, Dr MA Heyns, a medical doctor, and CJ de Kock, the manager of Sentraal-Wes Kooperasie Beperk. (Letter to Secretary of Education from Potchefstroom Registrar. (UOD 04/4/1, Vols 12 and 13.) Pretoria, 1965: Composition unchanged since 1948 except four more representatives of donors or convocation. State nominees were Drs F Meyer, JC Otto, SM Naude, JG van der Wath, SP du T Viljoen and J Howell, and CL de Bruyn and SP du T Viljoen. (UOD 04/4/1, Vols 12 and 13.) Stellenbosch, 1967: Composition unchanged. State president's representatives were PO Sauer, JW
Continued ...

In addition to these changes to the statutory arrangements for governance, the character of universities and university colleges was transformed by the unfolding political tensions of the decade. African opposition was driven underground and off the streets by an increasingly repressive state that resorted to shooting at Sharpeville, the Rivonia Trial, and the bannings of the ANC, PAC and Umkhonto we Sizwe. White South Africans voted to make South Africa a Republic in 1961, and there followed a period of economic growth and a redistribution of wealth which resulted in a dramatic advance in white living standards.¹³⁰

These political and economic changes coincided with and were related to changes in the student population, the nature of the staffing and in the character and role of university education. By the end of the decade, these trends combined to create three new tendencies in the political cultures of the universities.

First, Afrikaans universities worked with the idea of the *volksuniversiteit* to support the NP in power. This was highly contested territory, and the struggles over the cultural, social, political and religious definition of Afrikanerdom spilled over into these institutions. Their resolution resulted in variations between Afrikaans universities and intensely introspective and defensive student politics.

Second, as has been seen in Chapter 5, the black university colleges were staffed and managed by loyal supporters of the Government's apartheid policies. The new colleges were, however, politically quite different from each other for a while, partly because of the skills and attitudes of the first Rectors. By the end of the decade, however, the simmering tensions of political repression in academically

Sleigh and S Theron. Convocation representatives included Anton Aspert. (UOD 04/4/1, Vol. 16.) Wits 1967: Composition changed since 1948. There were still eight state president's appointees, who were OD Schreiner, A van Heerden, S Auker, H Leon, PM Cillie, FK Marais, AJV Burger and WB Coetzee. There were now six representatives of the teaching staff, but the City Council could only nominate two instead of three members, and there were two more representatives of Convocation or donors, so with the three from the Council of Education, Witwatersrand, the total rose to 25. (UOD 04/4/1, Vol. 15.)

130 O'Meara, D (1996) *Forty Last Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994*, Ravan, Johannesburg.

isolated and second-rate institutions had caused open student defiance and the creation of the South African Students' Organisation.

Finally, the differences between the white, English-medium institutions became less marked as the compulsory exclusion of black students from the formerly 'open' universities and the parallel classes at the University of Natal took effect. Despite their criticism of Government policy, the Councils of these universities were still beholden to the Government for an increasing proportion of their funds, while the Government viewed university-trained people as vital to the economy and therefore allowed them to continue to function. On the part of the universities there was no real attempt to oppose the Government. Nusas, which had long been primarily based in these institutions, experienced an extremely eventful decade as black students were removed from its student base and the Government stepped up its attacks.

7.5.1 Afrikaans universities: Struggles over the ideal of the *volksuniversiteit* in the 1960s

As the decade opened conflicts divided Afrikaans intellectuals over the issue of implementing Christian National Education policies in Afrikaans universities. In 1961, through a private member's bill introduced by the MP for Welkom, the University of the Orange Free State attempted get the legislative permission to drop the Conscience Clause from its charter and so be cleared to apply a test of Protestant belief on all new staff members. The Conscience Clause, for example as it read in the University of South Africa Act (Act 12 of 1916, Article 12), provided that

No test of religious belief shall be imposed on any person as a condition of his becoming or continuing to be a professor, lecturer, teacher or student, or of his holding any office or emolument or exercising any privileges in,

any college; nor shall any preference be given to or advantage withheld from any person on the ground of his religious belief.¹³¹

The black university colleges were established without the benefit of the Conscience Clause (see Chapter 4), but until the 1960s, of the white universities only Potchefstroom had been permitted to break this pattern.

Because of its historic link with the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK), the Private Act of the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (No 19 of 1950) contained a clause about 'the maintenance of the Christian character of the university without the application of a denominational test':

The Council must take care in the appointment of teaching, research and administrative staff that the Christian historical character of the university is maintained: With the understanding that no denominational test is applied as a precondition of obtaining a degree at the university or to become or remain a professor, researcher, lecturer, teacher or member of the administrative staff of the university, or to hold an office or receive an emolument or exercise a right. No-one is prevented on the basis of his religious belief from becoming or remaining a student at the university or from obtaining or holding a degree.¹³²

In the heated debates of the late 1960s, Professor JAL Taljaard called for the university to be 'liberated from state domination', as the state was becoming increasingly secularised, to give it not a 'liberal freedom' but a 'freedom to obey the God-given structural principles of the university'.¹³³ In the mid 1970s the Potchefstroom Rector, Tjaart van der Walt, explained that Potchefstroom regarded itself as a Christian university, rather than a church or ecclesiastical university. They believed that all science had a philosophical foundation and that science was never neutral, and that they simply made their philosophical approach to science explicit. They nevertheless believed that 'everything must be subject to penetrating

131. Notes on the Potchefstroom University College for Christian Higher Education, AH Jonker papers, File 47, Gewetenskapsule, PV42, INCH.

132. Memorandum from JA Erasmus, Director of Higher Education, to the Minister, 'Universities: Religious Tests', 30 August 1968, 2/3/1/1/9, Korrespondensie, Algemeen, Jan de Klerk, PV35, INCH.

133. Taljaard, JAL, 'Universiteit moet los kom van staat se oorheersing', *Woord en Daad*, August 1969.

criticism, including the university itself' and that a Christian education 'never may amount to indoctrination'.¹³⁴

Although Potchefstroom provided a precedent for excluding the Conscience Clause for an Afrikaans university, and despite the more recent omission of the Conscience Clause in the establishment of the university colleges, the Orange Free State Bill did not succeed. It was placed low on the order paper and when some members of the NP's parliamentary caucus expressed their opposition, it was withdrawn before it passed its second reading.¹³⁵ The campaign did not die there, however, but was then given further impetus in October 1961, when BJ Vorster, then Deputy Minister of Education, told the Society for Christian Higher Education 'that the Conscience Clause had no place in South Africa, because it was an importation from overseas by people who did not know South African conditions'. Vorster said he regarded the Conscience Clause as 'the private property of a university' for it to do with as it pleased.¹³⁶

Vorster's views were not generally shared. In December it emerged that the majority of the members of the University of the Orange Free State's Senate were in favour of retaining the Conscience Clause.¹³⁷ The Rector of Pretoria University, CH Rautenbach, who emerged as a moderating influence at several tense times, said that he would uphold the Conscience Clause.¹³⁸ *Die Vaderland* also objected, but on the pragmatic rather than principled grounds that the university had no need to introduce the Bill because there were only Protestant staff members at the university and that it would 'be the easiest thing in the world to keep the position thus'. They said that there was not a single Opposition MP in the Orange Free State and that all that the Bill achieved was to alienate English-speaking critics

134. Van der Walt, T (1977) 'A university for Christian Higher education' in Van der Merwe, HW and Welsh, D, (eds.) *The future of the university in Southern Africa*, David Philip, Cape Town, pp207-208.

135. SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p235.

136. *Sunday Times*, 8 October 1961. He said the country's education system should be shaped by its philosophy, and that 'if it refuses to give expression to its philosophy of life in schools, it either does not believe in it or it is ashamed or frightened of it'.

137. *Die Vaderland en Sondagblad*, 10 December 1961.

138. SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p256.

within the country and abroad. They said 'the Afrikaner' should be careful 'not to draw the noose tighter' but to 'throw the net of Afrikaner goodwill wider'.¹³⁹

Inserting or removing the Conscience Clause was seen as a way for politicians and the Afrikaans public to use state power to control the political cultures of Afrikaans universities. The failure of the Orange Free State campaign to alter arrangements of governance so that a Christian National character could be imposed marked the beginning rather than the end of the matter. When the Bill failed, the NP Congress in the Orange Free State called for 'a comprehensive investigation ... into whether our education and training still stands on pure Christian-National principles'¹⁴⁰ and for the rest of the decade, whenever Afrikaans academics were identified who seemed to challenge apartheid, there soon followed calls for the Conscience Clause to be scrapped at Afrikaans universities. In 1968 Dr JS Gericke, Moderator of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk and Vice Chancellor of the University of Stellenbosch, condemned the Conscience Clause. He said that because 'Afrikaner identity' needed to be protected from 'outside world' influences, Afrikaans universities could not be neutral, just 'selling knowledge across a counter' and that they should have 'an attitude to life' that was identifiable to the parents of students.¹⁴¹ In 1966 the Nasionale Jeugbond (the youth branch of the NP) of the Transvaal passed a motion asking the Government to scrap the Conscience Clause at all universities, or at least at Afrikaans universities, to make it possible for Rectors to get rid of 'liberal elements'¹⁴² and it was also standing ASB policy to condemn the 'so-called Conscience Clause', saying that science should be practised 'in the light of God's Word'.¹⁴³ After public outcry RAU was established with a diluted form of the Conscience Clause (see Chapter 6).

Many of the external attempts to control the university concerned theology academics where, in the absence of a co-operative Government, the authority of

139. *Die Vaderland se Sondagblad*, 10 December 1961.

140. Tak Warden, INCH 3.III, Kongresse 1959-1961, NP OFS, PV 21.

141. *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 July 1968.

142. *The Star*, 6 September 1966.

143. In 1963 they further decided that they were in favour of the principle of Christian science in all branches of the sciences.

the Afrikaans churches could sometimes be brought to bear. Pretoria University was particularly affected, which probably reveals the hand of the arch-conservative Dr Albert Hertzog, then Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and his secretive group, the *Afrikaner Orde*. In 1962 Professor AS Geyser of the Pretoria University Theology department was defrocked after a heresy trial. He then resigned from his NHK-subsidised chair, and accepted an appointment at Wits, where he later defended the rights for students to protest 'to make the world a better place in which to live'.¹⁴⁴ Professor A van Selms resigned from the Theology Department in protest to support Geyser, and Dr C Labuschagne was fired. Both continued working in the Semitic languages department. (Van Selms was subsequently invited by Nusas to deliver the 1964 speech at its Day of Affirmation of Academic and Human Freedoms.¹⁴⁵)

When even the church had no authority, student and public mobilisation brought pressure on to the universities. Throughout 1964 there was a newspaper letter campaign criticising Professors Ben Marais and PV Pistorius, theology academics at Pretoria University who expressed disagreement with Nationalist policies. (O'Meara has identified that at this time letter writing campaigns, especially in *Dagbreek*, were being used by Hertzog and the *Afrikaner Orde*.) In August 1964, a student meeting was held to protest against 'unpatriotic' professors who were not 'true Afrikaners' and should not be allowed to teach. Part-time students passed a motion calling on Rautenbach to fire Pistorius, but full-time students at the meeting did not vote and wanted no part in the motion, saying that Pistorius did not bring politics into the classroom. Marais was accused of associating with the liberal Christian Institute and establishing a secret branch at the university: he denied these charges completely. He was threatened publicly and privately and defended himself in the newspapers, saying that he had often written against Communism and said that his students would confirm that he never tried to

144. Geyser said that South African students protesting in 1968 were 'merely continuing with a protest begun when the Government introduced apartheid in the universities - and intruded on traditional academic freedoms of the Western world. Our students want a fair go for everybody. They want to right matters which they feel are morally wrong'. *Convocation Commentary*, November 1968, Wits.

145. Nusas, 'Entrenched Clauses and Correlated Resolutions', Creda Press, Nusas, 1968.

indoctrinate them and was always open to different points of view.¹⁴⁶ In November a student supporter of Marais, Christo Landsman, was attacked by ten students from Sonop Hostel,¹⁴⁷ who said they stood up for 'the right and pure path of Nationalism'.¹⁴⁸ Frustrated that Marais had not been more firmly dealt with by the university, the *Transvaler* wrongly implied that the university had considered acting against Marais: this had to be refuted in the press by Rautenbach.¹⁴⁹ During the SRC elections student voters seemed to support Rautenbach's more moderate position and turned against candidates from Sonop Hostel as well as the editor of *Perdeby*, who had used the student paper to 'warn against a liberal witch hunt'.¹⁵⁰

In 1966 Pretoria University faced the same issues again when Van Selms published an article in *Pro Veritate*, the Christian Institute's publication, questioning the nature of 'God's task for the Afrikaners' and considering the future of the Afrikaner people. In the furious condemnation of Van Selms that followed, students tried to claim that he talked about politics in his lectures, saying things such as 'Afrikaners were completely politically immature' and that 'he wanted to teach Afrikaners to read the bible properly'. Once again, students called for the Conscience Clause to be scrapped so that he could be dismissed on religious grounds.¹⁵¹

Even without recourse to Christian Nationalism, Rectors of Afrikaans universities held to a very conservative interpretation of academic freedom. At the official opening of the academic year in 1965, the Stellenbosch Rector, HB Thom, said that it was possible for the freedom of thought of the universities to be 'abused'. He said the universities had a responsibility to impart the idea that 'true freedom' could only be found through the respect of the law. He said that as universities reflected society, it was not surprising that there were left-wingers within the

146. *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, 23 August 1964.

147. Marais, as chair of the hostel council, was responsible for bringing the attackers to discipline and they were suspended for a year.

148. *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 November 1964.

149. *Ibid.*, 11 August 1964; *The Star*, 14 August 1964; *Sunday Times*, 23 August 1964; *Vaderland*, 28 August 1964; *Die Transvaler*, 9 November 1964; *Vaderland*, 12 November 1964; *Sunday Times*, 15 November 1964.

150. *Dagbreek*, 25 October 1964.

universities and that society at large, rather than the universities themselves, created the left-wingers. Nevertheless, he said that the universities had a responsibility to identify and act against left-wingers.¹⁵²

Despite these conservative views of the hierarchies, there were opportunities for critical academics to speak freely. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, later a liberal politician, wrote that at Stellenbosch in the 1960s

I did experience genuine intellectual challenge and debate ... As a teacher I was genuinely free to teach what I wanted, even though I was not free to teach it to whom I wanted.¹⁵³

Adherence to conservative views was not and could not be enforced throughout every classroom in every lesson in the Afrikaans universities, but given the pervasive commitment to Christian Nationalism, most academics would undoubtedly have found it more congenial and more rewarding to conform.

Slabbert wrote that in the 1960s 'the Idea' of Stellenbosch was easily defined as

Service to *Die Volk*! Everyone knew who *Die Volk* was, and who qualified as candidates for service training. *Die Volk* was the unquestioned beneficiary of one's higher learning, Stellenbosch was the uncomplicated and charmingly oak-lined avenue of mobility to the upper slopes of *volksdiens*. One was constantly reminded that five heads of state had emerged from Stellenbosch, cradle of Afrikanerdom. The university was a force to reckon with in the affairs of state. It had Connections, and was to be taken very seriously.¹⁵⁴

The political tensions surrounding the definition of Afrikanerdom in the 1960s also troubled the Afrikaner Studentebond (ASB). The ASB acted as Afrikanerdom's principled and austere moral watchdog, alert both to threatening external influences and signs of internal decay. They also grappled with the tactical benefits of engaging with black and English speaking students, but seemed appalled at the

151. *Dagbreek en Sandagmus*, 14 August 1966.

152. *Capa Times*, 25 February 1965.

153. Slabbert, F van Zyl (1987) 'Total Immersion' in *Leadership South Africa*, p96, Volume 6, No 3, Churchill Murray Publications, Cape Town.

154. *Ibid.*

thought of diluting the ethnic purity of the organisation. Afrikaans students who felt able to consider contacts beyond the *volk* generally left the ASB.

A stern Calvinism underpinned the ASB's explicit commitment to Christian Nationalism. For example, the ASB organiser had to be a member of one of the three Afrikaans churches¹⁵⁵ and it was standing ASB policy that it would organise no dances in its name (although the head office had to ensure that some of the branches observed this rule).¹⁵⁶ Virtuous self-denial for the good of the *volk* extended to support for the policy of self-sufficiency in terms of labour: for example, in 1960 it was decided that 'congress delegates must be self-sufficient and make their own beds etc. during congress'.¹⁵⁷

The ASB also had wider concerns about influences on the *volk*: in 1965 the organisation expressed its 'distaste and misgivings' about the Christian Institute, saying it would undermine world perception of Afrikaners and that integration could possibly further the aims of Communism.¹⁵⁸ They disapproved of the explicitly critical tendencies in Sabra in the early 1960s. In 1961 they agreed to stay affiliated to Sabra (they had joined in 1954) if 'Sabra held to that for which it was originally called to life', but if Sabra continued on its 'liberal course', the ASB would end its membership.¹⁵⁹ (In 1962 the ASB declared that it was satisfied that the Sabra leadership was to 'remain true' to the terms of its establishment.¹⁶⁰)

There was a specific gender content to the attempts to define and maintain ethnic purity. From the mid 1960s the ASB organised an annual Ladies' Conference. The theme of the 1965 conference was 'The woman and her role in politics'. That year Betsie Verwoerd, wife of the Prime Minister, told delegates of rumours that at the English universities 'a club had been formed where free love was practised for monetary gain'. She warned the conference that

155. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, Ag, ASB PV148, INCH.

156. *Ibid.*

157. 1960, Kongresnotules, 1958-1959, Ab/2 Vol. 2, ASB PV 148, INCH.

158. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit.*

159. 1961, Kongresnotules, 1960-1961, Ab/2 Vol. 3, *op cit.*

160. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit.*

the moral standards of the next generation depend on the strength and purity of today's women students. If we cannot maintain our standards in the moral field, we, as a people, will not be able to withstand the foreign influences which are coming into our land.

She worried that the press and the church were disseminating liberal ideas, which was of particular concern because she did 'not feel that Communism is the sly enemy that liberalism is'.¹⁶¹ In 1966 the Ladies' Conference was held in the Domestic Science building at Stellenbosch as it was mainly concerned with refreshments and decorations for the main conference, although they invited the wife of BJ Vorster, Tienie Vorster, to speak. Topics for discussion included 'The woman: support for her husband', 'The mother and the education of her children', 'The woman as spouse and mother as a profession' and 'The marriage as a community of love'. In 1967 it was organised around the theme 'The Afrikaans lady student in the maintenance and development of the Christian National life and world-view of the Afrikaner in academic and community life'. That year they sent a card of congratulations to Elsa Vorster, the new Prime Minister's daughter and a former member, on the occasion of her wedding and they also sent their sympathies to Mrs Verwoerd on the death of her husband.¹⁶² That year a speech on 'The woman and the racial question' exhorted members to manage without servants.¹⁶³

The identity and place of Afrikaans women students was also defined in its contrast to the Afrikaans male ideal of the patriotic rugby player. In *Beyond the Tryline: Rugby and South African Society*, Grundlingh, Odendaal and Spies argue further that especially at Stellenbosch, 'enthusiasm for rugby as an Afrikaner male activity was equated with robust patriotism to the exclusion of other, perhaps more threatening, world-views'. They quote Slabbert, who concluded that 'mentally, it was not only escapist, it was a social narcotic to anything else going on in our society'.¹⁶⁴ Teachers and ministers who graduated from Stellenbosch spread this

161. *Sunday Times*, 4 July 1965.

162. Dameskonferensie, 1965-1967, ASB PV 148 An/1.

163. Referate, *Ibid*.

164. Grundlingh, A, Odendaal, A and Spies, SB (1995) *Beyond the Tryline: Rugby and South African Society*, Ravan, Johannesburg, p108.

enthusiasm for rugby across the country, and with it, a seductive, ready-packaged Afrikaner cultural identity.

Beyond the self-critical introspection of the ASB, the organisation was also quick to condemn external threats to the well-being of the *volk*. During the 1960s the ASB condemned Freemasonry (a threat to the spiritual health of Afrikaners) and the idea of a state lottery (detrimental to the country's economy). Although they stipulated that 'co-operation with different population groups of the country was a necessity', they accommodated the anti-Semitism of their membership. In 1964 they passed a motion

That, whatever our personal beliefs may be about the role of the Jews in the world and in South Africa, this is not a matter in which the ASB should involve itself.¹⁶⁵

The ASB also decided, in 1965, that religious belief should be taken into account in the selection of immigrants, with preference given to those of Calvinist beliefs.¹⁶⁶ In the same year they said that the international religious group Moral Rearmament should not be allowed to operate on Afrikaans campuses.¹⁶⁷

No enemies were tolerated within the *laager* either. In 1965 a Nusas branch was established at Pretoria University. It had 15 members, of whom seven or eight were reported to be Afrikaans speakers. The branch was formed by Thelma Goodman, in response to a challenge issued by the SRC president, Paul de Beer, who insisted that Nusas had no support at the university. Goodman said that there were more than 40 students interested in joining, most of them Afrikaans. The *Perdeby* and the national press repeatedly pointed out that 'the entire management of the new branch is of Jewish origin'¹⁶⁸ and that it was ASB policy that only student organisations founded on Christian National principles should be recognised.¹⁶⁹ In 1965 there was also a Nusas branch at Stellenbosch.¹⁷⁰

165. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit*.

166. *Ibid.*

167. *Ibid.*

168. *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, 26 September 1965.

169. *The Star*, 25 June 1966. The group could have applied to the university Council, which was bound by its constitution not to allow discrimination on grounds of religious or political belief. It was pointed out that the Wits SRC had refused recognition to the Afrikaanse Studenteklub (*Die Vaderland*, 27 September 1965).

In April 1965 between three and four thousand students from Afrikaans universities and colleges of education in the Transvaal demonstrated against Communism and integration. Nusas and the English-speaking press were labelled 'leftist', the Catholic Church was condemned for 'causing unrest' and the US and British embassies for holding mixed receptions.¹⁷¹ This demonstration was not organised by the ASB and is another sign of the influence of the extremist Nationalist tendencies in Pretoria. (In April 1964 Hertzog had tried to organise a 'volkskongres for the struggle against Communism' but his plans had been thwarted by Cape Nationalists.¹⁷²)

This mentality led to isolation internationally and a rejection of contact with other groups within the country. In 1954 the ASB broke off all contact with the International Students Confederation (ISC) because of their 'Communist colour'. This was soon reconsidered: in 1957 the ASB head office obtained permission to try to re-establish representation for the ASB at the ISC. By 1964 the ASB decided that in terms of its Christian National constitution and 'seen in the light that it does not suit the interests of the ASB to go on its knees to ask for recognition', they would no longer attempt to obtain international recognition.¹⁷³ They also declared that they therefore would never try to make any contact with the International Union of Students.¹⁷⁴

In 1965 the ASB congress passed a motion condemning the American Field Scholarships (AFS) as 'a humanistic liberalistic ideology which is a danger to the Christian National Afrikaner'. They discouraged 'youngsters' from taking up AFS offers as they said the ASB 'distinguishes between true brother love and humanistic sentiment', although this exhortation was sometimes ignored and Stellenbosch students continued to take advantage of AFS opportunities.¹⁷⁵ Where

170. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p279.

171. *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 April 1964.

172. O'Meara, *op cit*.

173. *Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965*, *op cit*.

174. *Ibid*.

175. *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 July 1965.

international contact was sought, careful guidelines, as contained in the 1965 consolidated ASB rules of organisation, had to be observed:

Where England, the Netherlands, Flanders, Belgium and Germany are concerned, the ASB must seek links with those with whom it is bonded by history and culture and strive for international recognition. Therefore it must only be attempted to form cultural links with the named countries, with a very specific limitation that no attention should be given to politics.¹⁷⁶

The ASB tried to prescribe preconditions for other sectors of the South African population. They had a Department of Racial Affairs which aimed to undertake research and 'promote good relations between the different racial groups in our country'.¹⁷⁷ For example, in 1959 the ASB asked the NAD to organise a 'little outing' for about 80 congress delegates to meet a gathering of 'Bantu chiefs' in 'a Bantu area that you recommend'. This 'outing', for a day in April, was to replace 'the usual non-white speaker' that would have addressed the congress.¹⁷⁸

But the ASB also recognised that if the terrain was not to be left open for Nusas, it had to take an active role in influencing student politics at the black university colleges. In 1962 DAS Herbst, the ASB's Director of Racial Affairs, criticised the ASB's lack of engagement at the black university colleges and presented an extended analysis how the organisation should proceed.

Herbst recommended a policy of 'social official friendly meetings to have discussions on an academic basis'. The ASB was very concerned about the integration that taking on this responsibility could mean, so Herbst set out a detailed diplomatic protocol. He said meetings would have to take the form of personal contact between students, 'in each other's presence' and not, for example, by letter or in adjacent rooms speaking to each other over microphones. To

176. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit*.

177. Reglemente: Takke, 1961, Ag. ASB P/V 148, INCH.

178. Letter from Johan Strauss, Director of Racial Affairs, ASB to CW Prinsloo, Chief Information Officer, 26 January 1959, INL 446/15/3 (7), Vol. 1/4/16.

diminish the impact of the social form of this contact, Herbst felt that it needed to be kept official: in other words, the purpose of the contact was not social, but to learn from each other. He said that in order to learn honestly, the contact would have to be friendly rather than hostile. He said that it was urgent that ASB leaders visited the black university colleges, but that it was essential that black students should be invited to ASB campuses 'in order to win their friendship and trust'. However, students at the ASB campuses might not understand these visits, and Herbst feared that no-confidence motions could be the result, as well as giving offence to the black visitors. He said that a programme of educating students should ensue, but reassuring them that the contact would always be official and that black visitors would not be invited to the hostels or dance parties. The Bantu Commissioners would have to advise about alternative arrangements.¹⁷⁹

Herbst was particularly precise in his advice about contact with Coloured students at UCWC because, he said, 'the Coloured wants social integration'. He thought that the ASB would be unwise to sponsor bursaries for individual Coloured students and that the organisation would 'achieve far more if it used psychological infiltration techniques' such as donating funds in the name of the ASB for books, sending greetings from the ASB at the start of the academic year and donating a floating trophy for a debating society, should one ever be established.¹⁸⁰

While the ASB's policies were internally contested in many areas, this paranoid racism seems to have been generally accepted. While most Afrikaans students did not bother to make contact with black students, even the supposedly *verligte* Stellenbosch students went through extraordinary contortions when considering contact with their neighbours, the Coloured students of UCWC, in the middle of 1969. The Stellenbosch SRC established a commission to weigh up the value of making contact with student leaders at UCWC, but concluded that contact was 'undesirable'. The SRC president, Pieter van Huyssteen, explained that personal contact, if established, would have to be broken off after university days, or it

179. Departement: Rasse-aangeleenthede, Jaarverslae, Direkteure en Takke, Ab/3, Vol. 1, ASB PV 148, INCH.

180. *Ibid.*

would become an 'integratory process'. After the SRC decision, over 2 000 students attended a mass meeting to consider a new SRC suggestion: contact with UCWC 'by way of correspondence'. Students called for 'responsible personal contact on an official basis between the SRCs'. The ASB president, Johan Fick, broadly endorsed this approach, but he said that contact should take place 'in a spirit of segregation' and only when there were specific matters to be discussed.¹⁸¹ The Nasionale Jeugbond was less impressed, and said that the contact should be through the Department of Coloured Affairs, rather than with Coloured students individually:

Otherwise a precedent would be established that could be exploited by liberal elements. Through the department, and books, members could gain all the knowledge they needed about Coloured people.¹⁸²

The SRC at UCWC said that it was open to any discussion on the basis of equality, but that UCWC were not anxious to have contact with the Stellenbosch students, nor could contact be considered 'if it is to degenerate into political missionary work on the part of Stellenbosch', or 'within any specified framework'.¹⁸³

Many Afrikaans students would not contemplate discussions with or in the presence of black students. In contrast, in May 1960 a student conference of Afrikaans, English and black students organised by Pietermaritzburg students failed because Wits and UCT had refused to attend if black students were not allowed to be part of their representative delegations.¹⁸⁴ The ASB consistently refused to meet Nusas or any other group if black students were present. In January 1966 Pretoria students walked out a conference of Commerce and Economics students when the conference passed a vote to make the newly-formed South African Society of Commerce and Economics Students 'open'. A Pretoria delegate commented that it seemed as though legislation was the only way to prevent multi-racial bodies. They had recommended that black students should form their own association, but when this was rejected, they left and concluded that it was Afrikaans students who would

181. *Rand Daily Mail* 13/9/69.

182. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p222.

183. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p223. See press, 5-14 August 1969.

184. *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 August 1960.

have to form a parallel body. (Pretoria was the only Afrikaans university represented, with all the other delegates drawn from the white English-language universities.¹⁸⁵)

Nusas' black members and representatives provided the first reason for the lack of co-operation between the ASB and Nusas. In 1959 the ASB decided that as Nusas was 'an integrated sectional organisation with mixed membership and as inexorable opponents of segregated gatherings' they could neither be invited to ASB gatherings, nor could the ASB accept invitations to attend Nusas meetings. Contact could be maintained through correspondence.¹⁸⁶ However, by 1964 the ASB hardened its stance to one of objection to Nusas' principles when it confirmed that it had a policy of 'passive observation' of Nusas, but decided to promote its own Christian National ideals, which it saw as conflicting with those of Nusas, more actively.¹⁸⁷

When Vorster took action against Nusas (see below) Paul de Beer, the ASB president, issued a press release 'heartily approving' the actions of Vorster against 'undermining and Communist activity' and thanking the Government for its 'rapid and effective actions to protect our land and its inhabitants'.¹⁸⁸ (This was despite the standing ASB policy, passed in 1952, which 'viewed commentary on the practical actions of the Government as outside of its area'.¹⁸⁹)

In April 1967 the Nusas president, Margaret Marshall, and the ASB president, 'Boy' Geldenhuys, addressed the Debating Union at Stellenbosch University. Marshall invited Geldenhuys and ASB students to attend Nusas conferences to promote greater contact. Geldenhuys responded that the ASB and Nusas could never unite, because in the post-war years the ASB had 'accepted the sovereignty of God in every life situation' in adopting a Christian National position and that

185. *Ibid.*, 10 January 1966, *Die Transvaal*, 11 January 1966.

186. Die ASB en skakeling met ander groepe, 11de ASB Kongres, 30 March - 4 April 1959, *Vertroulik*, Ab/3 Vol. 1, ASB PV148, INCH.

187. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit.*

188. Persverklarings 58-66, Am/5, ASB PV 148, INCH.

189. Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965, *op cit.*

this could not be reconciled with the 'liberal humanism' of Nusas.¹⁹⁰ Attitudes were even more extreme under the next ASB president, Ben de Klerk from Potchefstroom, who said the ASB would never share a platform with Nusas, as it did not want to give Nusas the opportunity to put its point of view. He said that on invitation from Nusas, ASB representatives would at most be prepared to answer questions at meetings on English campuses.¹⁹¹

By the close of the decade Afrikaans students were sometimes openly, violently hostile to Nusas supporters. When in August 1968 UCT students occupied the administration block for nine days and nights in protest at the rescinding of Mafeje's appointment (see below) they were beset one night by a raiding party of 450 conservative students from UCT and Stellenbosch who stormed the administration block.¹⁹² In Johannesburg, Wits students protesting about Mafeje along Jan Smuts Avenue were pelted with eggs, fruit, paint and whitewash by the RAU and Goudstad students opposite. (The police did not interfere with the RAU students, but they took the names of the demonstrating Wits students and confiscated their placards.)¹⁹³

The ASB made some half-hearted attempts to build the conservative white South Africanism that Verwoerd favoured. In 1959 the ASB decided that it should maintain contact with white 'other thinking' students (excluding Nusas), so long as the ASB was able to stay 'true to its own ideas' and used this contact merely as a stimulant to discussion. The ASB head office was instructed to try to arrange for a meeting between white students at least once a year.¹⁹⁴

In 1964 the ASB president told the congress that although the ASB could not work with Nusas because it was 'as hostile as ever' to the 'cultural ambitions and convictions of the Afrikaner', there were conservative English-speaking students

190. *Die Burger*, 26 April 1967.

191. *Rand Daily Mail* 26 April and 29 July 1967.

192. *The Star*, 28 August 1968.

193. SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p264.

194. Die ASB en skakeling met ander groepe, 11de ASB Kongres, 30 March - 4 April 1959, Vertroulik, Ab/3 Vol. 1, ASB PV148, INCH.

who supported the Government's policies. He did not think that they should join the ASB, but that the ASB should help them to form 'a sort of conservative Engelse Studentebond' that could work with the ASB in a confederation. He said this was a logical outcome of the country's multicultural composition. The conservatives needed to be encouraged to voice more opposition to liberalism, but he warned that their 'conversion to conservatism and love of the fatherland must be a spontaneous evolution' in which the ASB should not meddle. The SRCs of those campuses would have to persuade the students to follow them.¹⁹⁵

In September 1964 conservative students organisations from seven campuses, some of which may have been Government-initiated and funded, formed a Federation of Conservative Students (FCS), and barred black students from joining.¹⁹⁶ However, this and every attempt to create a conservative white student body failed. There was soon conflict between the ASB and the FCS: the ASB had planned to co-operate on a 'confederation' basis, but had worried that it was 'moving in the direction of an all-embracing student body in which even the ASB would be absorbed'. The ASB decided that it 'could not embrace the direction which the FCS is currently taking' and distanced itself from the organisation until its constitution, aims and membership were more apparent.¹⁹⁷

A short-lived South African Students' Union was formed in 1967. Conservative students from several universities met in Johannesburg in July that year to discuss co-operation between English and Afrikaans students and the organisation was launched soon thereafter in Cape Town. At the time, it was said to be aimed at 'moderate political attitude' and to have strong support from students at Stellenbosch.¹⁹⁸ Generally, however, conservative student groups failed to win popular support, probably because at the Nusas-affiliated campuses, student dissatisfaction with the organisation could never be roused to the pitch of

195. ASB, *Presidensiele Rede*, ASB Congress 1964, Ab/3 Vol. 4, ASB PV 148, INCH.

196. SAIRR, 1965 *Survey*, p280.

197. *Beleidsbesluite van die ASB vir die tydperk 1952 tot 1965*, *op cit.* Speakers at the FCS meeting included Jaap Marais, MP, Dr AP Treurnicht, the editor of *Die Kerkbode* and Dr JE Allen, an executive member of the 'National Council to fight Communism' (*Evening Post*, 20 July 1965).

198. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p288. (*Sunday Express*, 30 July; *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 August)

ideological fervour required to forge a conservative middle road, while at the Afrikaans campuses politically ambitious students were more likely to turn their energies to the ASB rather than fritter it on a feeble conservative 'South Africanism'. Furthermore, there were profound doubts about whether it was necessary or desirable for Afrikanerdom to be tainted by such contact at the peak of its power. At the ASB conference in July 1969 Dr Piet Meyer was rewarded with a standing ovation when he said that 'it was 'traitorous' for Afrikaners to allow themselves to be diluted in a 'broad South Africanism'.¹⁹⁹

By the end of the decade, however, the ASB had become so divided that it could not claim to speak for all Afrikaans students as in 1967 Afrikaans student politics had split along *verligte-verkrampste* lines. *Verkrampste* students, mainly from Pretoria, were defeated when they tried to take control of key positions on the ASB executive, while Stellenbosch and the Orange Free State were openly *verligte*.²⁰⁰

Stellenbosch students had been troubled by the ASB's hard line for some time. In August 1966 more than 1 000 Stellenbosch students signed a petition condemning an ASB motion praising the editor of an extreme right wing monthly journal, the *South African Observer*. The editor, SED Brown, was linked to the British fascist Oswald Mosely and the John Birch Society in the United States and had written aggressive criticism of the Stellenbosch Rector, HB Thom and the industrialist, Anton Rupert, who was also a member of the Stellenbosch Council, questioning their Afrikaner character. They said the ASB had become an uncritical 'rubber stamp' for Government policy and increasingly supported extremist views.²⁰¹ The student branch of the NP at Stellenbosch said that the Stellenbosch students should be careful to criticise individual decisions of the ASB rather than the organisation, and for a while this advice was heeded.²⁰²

199. SAIRR, 1969 Survey, p221.

200. *Sunday Times*, 9 July 1967; *The Star*, 2 October.

201. *Sunday Times*, 7 August 1966.

202. *Die Vaderland*, 9 August 1966.

When control of the ASB was resumed by the *verkrampies* in 1968, Stellenbosch students disaffiliated and barred the ASB from the campus, accusing the ASB leadership of being 'a small, autocratic clique of unemployed *verkrampies*'.²⁰³ The ASB was also criticised at the University of the Orange Free State and Goudstad. Pretoria students appointed a committee to investigate the organisation, and suggested that it should make administrative changes and broaden its brief. Organisational reforms followed in July.²⁰⁴

These reforms were too late to recapture the unquestioning loyalty of Stellenbosch students. In August 1969 an independent student newspaper, *Die Realis*, was launched there and in its first issue criticised the ASB for its failure to address the inter-university needs of students and that the ASB did not meet the needs of all Afrikaans-speaking students and criticised the policy of automatic membership. It called for a c. 'federation of SRCs to be launched'.²⁰⁵ Stellenbosch students proceeded to pursue their own political goals separately from the ASB: in May 1970 it was announced that Stellenbosch students were to establish a National Federation of South African students to promote contact between students of all colours and cultures, without trying to synthesise their political ideas and in June 1970 a referendum at Stellenbosch rejected re-affiliation to the ASB.²⁰⁶

A second important group of Afrikaans students who found a voice outside of the ASB were the students at UPE. Although dual-medium, UPE had been intended by its founders to be 'Afrikaans in orientation' (see Chapter 6). However, by the middle of 1967 students had decided that both Nusas and the ASB would be banned from the campus.²⁰⁷ This provoked a furious response from Afrikaans supporters of the university. Letters to the press condemned the 'weakness and defeatism' of the students and an anonymous letter from the 'chairman of a strong Afrikaans organisation' said he would 'feel compelled to influence my executive

203. SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p261.

204. In May a branch of the ASB was formed at the University of Natal, Durban.

205. *Die Vaderland*, 5 August 1969.

206. SAIRR, 1970 Survey.

207. *The Star*, 1 May 1967.

not to go ahead with the granting of money promised to the university'. The NP MP for the area appealed to the students to reconsider, saying

If you disapprove of the ASB it means you disapprove of its aim and principle. You therefore deny the right of the existence of the Afrikaans students' cultural organisation which stands on a Christian National basis ... you deny the right of existence of an Afrikaner culture with all it entails, not only at the university but also in South Africa.²⁰⁸

Despite this interest, the 'politically unaligned' and 'bilingual, cultural' South African Students' Organisation (not to be confused with the Black Consciousness student organisation of the same name) was then formed at the campus.²⁰⁹ The students were nevertheless staunch supporters of apartheid, and to reassure their critics, in May 1969 a mass meeting of UPE students passed a motion of full confidence in the policy of separate development. They said they passed the motion because there was a new student body whose opinion on the matter had not previously been expressed.²¹⁰

7.5.2 Black university colleges: Stresses in the state-controlled system

The new state-controlled university colleges had more limited academic autonomy than other universities. As is described in Chapter 5, the legislation that established them provided for more direct ministerial control. The Councils and Advisory Councils had less independence, the Rectors were hand-picked by the Minister for their loyalty and the academic staff and students were subject to stringent disciplinary controls.

Although the Rectors were sometimes displeased by the way they were controlled by the Government, these disagreements were kept strictly confidential and for the most part, to students at the university colleges and the public at large, the management of the university colleges and the Government appeared a seamless entity, united in purpose and in power. Any hope that students or staff might have

208. *Ibid.*

209. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p288.

210. *Die Oosterlig*, 8 May 1969.

placed in the independence of the Advisory Councils was ill-founded. Although few records are available of Advisory Council meetings, there is no evidence that they ever managed or desired to protect the students or staff from the excesses of the real authorities.

One set of minutes of an Advisory Council meeting at Fort Hare during a very turbulent period in 1966 (see below) reveals how effectively any potential of the body was neutralised. It seems worth quoting at length:

The Rector reports that ... no serious difficulties arose since the last meeting, the work continues satisfactorily. The only worry is the large number of disciplinary cases. Fort Hare is no exception. It seems to be a symbol of the times at University Institutions throughout the world that youth appear to revolt. Our attitude is that discipline must be maintained and that we insist on certain basic norms of behaviour. The Rector reports details of a few cases to illustrate the type of misconduct experienced - liquor and women prove to be the main sources of trouble. The students, however, take their punishment without trouble.

The Rector also reports on some excitement amongst the students as a result of police intervention. The police had been called anonymously. A mass meeting was refused and matters calmed down again.

Mr Nabe thanks the Rector and the Wardens for the action taken. He says it is essential to watch out against the evils of liquor and women.

Mr Nhusi associates himself with the manner in which extreme cases are dealt with. He would, however, like to know when an SRC would be elected to assist with the administrative problems getting students to face up to wrong behaviour, etc. He would like to know about hostel committees.

Requested by the Chairman, Professor Seboni replies: Hostel Committees are functioning satisfactorily. Efforts were made to elect an SRC but at the last moment they failed as a result of the action of a few die-hard opponents.

Mr Nabe expresses the hope that the hostel units will be kept small enough to manage, to have the father and son relations between the Wardens and the students.

Mr Cingo is assured that there are regulations prohibiting women from going to men's rooms.

The Chairman assures the Rector that he has the wholehearted support of the Advisory Council in these matters.²¹¹

These minutes reveal that the Rector effectively played on the paternalism and conservatism of the members of the Advisory Council to divert their attention from political to social matters.

The Government had absolute, direct control over who taught in the university colleges. Most dramatically, this control was exercised to an unprecedented extent when the staff at Fort Hare was purged at the end of 1959. The controls on staff members at the university colleges were unlike those at other South African university institutions, where staff members were employed by and answerable to the Council of the university. At the university colleges, all black academic staff members were officially employed by the Government department concerned and controlled in the same way as civil servants.²¹²

In 1965 a senior lecturer in Native Administration at Fort Hare, Curnick Ndamse, was suspended from teaching. Ndamse, who held master's degrees from Hartford and Trinity College, had been on the staff prior to the takeover in 1959.²¹³ Speaking at a Unisa seminar in February 1965 on 'Problems experienced with tuition of Native Administration at Bantu University Colleges',²¹⁴ Ndamse criticised the system of university colleges. He drew parallels between the frustrations faced by graduates of Native Administration, and the impediments faced by black academics within the university colleges:

211. Minutes from a meeting of the Advisory Council of the University College of Fort Hare, 27 July 1966, Correspondence Fort Hare, 1963-1967, S301, Unisa Documentation Centre.

212. *The Star*, 12 January 1960.

213. *Eastern Province Herald*, 25 March 1965

214. *The Star*, 4 April 1965

highly placed persons in the Government have [attempted] to prove that in African areas, and in African institutions, for the African the sky is the limit. The execution of the same policy by lesser officials has proved just the opposite.²¹⁵

The Rector regarded these statements as 'a serious breach of discipline' and Ndamse was suspended for 'insubordination, and for having behaved in a manner which was academically and professionally reprehensible'.²¹⁶ The enquiry led by Samuel Pauw, the chair of Fort Hare's Council, found that Ndamse's 'misconduct' was that he had not discussed the content of his paper with the head of his department prior to his departure.²¹⁷ After the dismissal was confirmed by the Minister of Bantu Education, in 1965 Ndamse was banned.²¹⁸ In 1966 TM Ntonga of Fort Hare's Department of Chemistry was also banned.

Conditions of student life at the black university colleges in the 1960s were characterised by isolation from students at other institutions or in student organisations, isolation from town and city life and repression. Relations between the new administrators and students were particularly turbulent at Fort Hare during the 1960s, prefiguring the stresses that would emerge in the other institutions as they filled with students and accumulated their own tense histories.

Although the Fort Hare staff was purged and politically active students were weeded out before the 1960 academic year started (see Chapter 5), the new administrators inherited an established institution which hugely complicated their task of creating a docile institution. The students had been highly politicised and worked closely with Nusas in the late 1950s. The student body was still ethnically diverse, and students enrolled in 1959 and before were still completing curricula under Rhodes rather than Unisa. The changes being introduced by the new administration were thus clear to both new and returning students. An additional difficulty for the new administration was the ongoing presence of an alternative

215. *Evening Post*, 2 April 1965.

216. *Daily Dispatch*, 22 April 1965.

217. *Evening Post*, 2 April 1965.

218. *The Star*, 4 April 1965.

locus of authority and institutional culture in the form of the Federal Theological Seminary.

When church control of hostels at Fort Hare was terminated by the Government, the churches considered that it was no longer appropriate for theological training of future ministers to continue at Fort Hare. Training continued for a few years in temporary accommodation at the former Lovedale Bible School. In 1962 the Federal Theological Seminary of Southern Africa, for students of the Congregational, Methodist and Presbyterian faiths, was established near Alice.²¹⁹ Although the seminary was not connected officially with Fort Hare, seminary students were allowed to attend lectures at Fort Hare.²²⁰ M Makalima, a former Fort Hare academic, said that the new seminary was 'a thorn in the flesh of the Bantu Education system' as it was non-racial and 'retained the liberal and progressive traditions of pre-apartheid Fort Hare'.²²¹ The seminary provided Fort Hare students with 'a window into the world', inviting 'visitors from the outer world' and 'cultural events that were taboo to the establishment' to the campus, adjacent to Fort Hare. A bitter debate about the seminary ensued and eventually it was forced to move from the site in 1975.²²²

In a crisis at Fort Hare in September 1960 key features of the new conditions of student politics were established: Nusas was barred from access to the campus, students retaliated by disbanding the SRC and more repressive regulations were introduced.

In that month a Nusas delegation (including John Shingler, the president, Adrian Leftwich, the president-elect and Hugh Lewin, the Nusas representative at Rhodes) visited Fort Hare to discuss contact between Nusas and Fort Hare students. They approached the Rector, JJ Ross, who refused to allow them to address a mass meeting on the campus, but allowed them to meet the SRC. At a 'public meeting' of students at the Toc-Hi hall in Alice, the SRC was dissolved by the student body in protest against

219. SAIRR, 1962 *Survey*, p198.

220. *Cape Times*, 5 February 1960.

221. Makalima, W (1989) Fort Hare student 1930s, teacher at Lovedale 1940s-1970s, Fort Hare lecturer 1980s; interviewed at Fort Hare, Alice, August 1989.

222. *Ibid.*

the restrictions on Nusas.²²³ According to the police report on the students, after the meeting they displayed an 'aggressive and threatening manner:

They first walked about in the town then went to the residences where each helped himself to food to his own taste. The authority of the Warden was totally disregarded.²²⁴

Ross then threatened the students with dismissal unless they undertook to accept college rules.²²⁵ The Minister of Bantu Education, WA Maree, also issued stricter regulations for admission, control and discipline at Fort Hare. Students would have to provide testimonials of good conduct and sign an agreement to accept the rules of the university college and hostel. There were new restrictions on student press statements and publications, students' movements beyond the campus, visitors and organisations.²²⁶ In the aftermath of this crisis the authorities also refused readmission, when Fort Hare re-opened in 1961, to the former secretary of the SRC, W Mhlambiso, on the grounds of 'insubordination'.²²⁷ (He later enrolled at Natal, see Chapter 5). Shortly thereafter a Fort Hare geography lecturer, Nicol Childs, resigned because he was being harassed by the security police with the co-operation of the administration: he had been stopped and searched on the road and his post and telephone conversations had been monitored. Ross told him that the investigations had been conducted with his knowledge and that Childs had been under suspicion for his 'close association with the students'.²²⁸

The entire student body at Fort Hare boycotted classes in support of the national stay-at-home call of the ANC to oppose the declaration of the Republic of South Africa on 31 May 1961.²²⁹ The administration responded by calling in the police and closing the college indefinitely.²³⁰ The closure of the college resulted in a public outcry. On 5 June Nelson Mandela, as the Secretary of the All-in-African National Action Council condemned the closure of Fort Hare and congratulated the 'intellectual youth' for their

223. *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 September 1960

224. Document prepared by SAP for Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, 10 September 1960, NTS, 484/332, Onrus: Fort Hare.

225. *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 September 1960

226. *Ibid.*, 24 September 1960

227. SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p258.

228. *Eastern Province Herald*, 28 October 1960.

229. *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 May 1961.

'courageous lead to the nation'. He said students should have the right to freedom of thought and expression, and that

Actions of this kind ... show that their institutions are meant for indoctrination, the inculcation of a spirit of servility. Only this mentality can explain such unheard-of measures as the closing down of colleges in retaliation against the students.²³¹

Rhodes University students boycotted all activities at their university for two days in protest against the closure of Fort Hare²³² and Nusas president Adrian Leftwich commented that 'students at Fort Hare are not prepared to accept the system under which they are compelled to study, nor the whole system of authoritarianism'.²³³ On 7 June Dr AB Xuma, Rev S Tema (a member of the Turfloop Advisory Council), Dr W Nkomo and Theodor Moses contacted the Department of Bantu Education to argue that a long closure of the college would turn expelled students into martyrs and confirm the prejudices of those who said that the Government had no interest in furthering black higher education. They also condemned the student boycott, without making their reasons explicit, but recommended that Fort Hare should be reopened soon with as many students readmitted as possible.²³⁴

By the middle of the month Ross said that all students would be allowed to return without applying for readmission or screening. This contradicted a notice which had been distributed earlier in the year, which had stated that if students 'irregularly and wrongfully' absented themselves from lectures or practical classes, they would be excluded from the university college.²³⁵ However Maree said that Ross's decision was subject to his own ratification and that he would endorse the decision not to screen

230. *Sunday Times*, 4 June 1961.

231. 'Statement issued by the Honorary Secretary of the All-in African National Action Council', signed by Mandela, 5 June 1961, SP Olivier Collection, 518/2794, Documentation Centre, UDW.

232. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 and 5 June 1961. Mandela thanked the 'noble' Rhodes students who had supported the Fort Hare students ('Statement issued by the Honorary Secretary of the All-in African National Action Council', signed by Mandela, 5 June 1961, SP Olivier Collection, 518/2794, Documentation Centre, UDW).

233. *Sunday Times*, 4 June 1961.

234. 'Meeting in connection with closure of Fort Hare', Deputy Secretary, Department of Bantu Education, 226/13/4(1), INL.

235. *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 June 1961

students only after consultation with the Council, Advisory Council, Senate and Advisory Senate.²³⁶

Under the new administration and with the frequent assistance of the police, Fort Hare became increasingly repressive and isolated from outside contacts, especially from its neighbour and former academic 'parent', Rhodes University.

The security police were constantly active at Fort Hare: a former Law professor from Fort Hare, Leslie Blackwell, pointed out that Fort Hare even had its own branch of the security police resident in Alice, who were in close working contact with the Fort Hare administration.²³⁷ For example, they were involved in helping to curtail contact with academics from other universities. In October 1962, when some Fort Hare students were still completing courses examined by Rhodes University, two Rhodes lecturers who went to Fort Hare to give extra lessons were escorted from the campus by the security police. The Rhodes lecturers were met by the Registrar in a security police car, who told them that no-one had the right to visit the campus without his permission. One of the lecturers, Trevor Bell, suggested that a notice about the rule should be put up for the benefit of strangers, but he was told that 'such a notice would create adverse publicity for Fort Hare'.²³⁸

Student contacts with Rhodes were also eroded: in 1965 the Fort Hare authorities barred Rhodes students from access to the campus because of their 'unfriendly' attitudes (the Rhodes SRC had recently passed a motion condemning the dismissal of a lecturer, Curnick Ndamse, see above).²³⁹

At a student dance held at Fort Hare in June 1966, students reported that the police assaulted several students 'without reason or provocation' and detained two students overnight. At a mass meeting in August students protested about the frequent police visits to the campus and 'appealed to the Rector, who they regarded as being *in loco*

236. Press Statement on Fort Hare students by the Minister of Bantu Education, WA Maseke, June 15 1961, TES F165/29.

237. *Cape Times*, 13 October 1961.

238. *Sunday Times*, 21 October 1962.

239. *Eastern Province Herald*, 13 August 1965.

parentis, for protection against such arbitrary police action. Ross replied that he had no jurisdiction over the police and instructed the students to disperse. Students then drew up a petition to be sent to the Minister of Bantu Education, demanding an end to the presence of the police on the campus and complaining about the 'unprecedented and unwarranted visitation and harassment by members of the South African police force' at the June dance.²⁴⁰ They said that if students had thrown stones at the police, as was alleged, then they should be arrested and charged. The petition also complained about 'the aggressive and threatening attitude adopted by the Rector at a mass meeting intended for students to air their grievances'.²⁴¹ Initially all the male students, except eight, signed the petition and only eight of the women students signed, but eventually about three quarters of the students signed. There was a fight in the men's dining hall among some of the students elected to draw up the petition. Two students were injured and another two were then detained.²⁴² An anonymous 'senior student' wrote to the press to complain that members of the petition group were 'Transvaal terrorists' and 'informers'. These allegations were dismissed by students who said they were designed to incite sectionalism. The petitioners were granted permission by the vice chairman of the Senate, A. Coetzee (who was acting as Rector in Ross's absence) to communicate with the press, to clarify the situation and to 'correct false impressions'.²⁴³ Ross told the students that he would not associate himself with 'irregular and unconstitutional behaviour' and he warned them that they continued with the petition at their own 'peril'.²⁴⁴

In 1967 thirty students were refused permission to renew their registration. The Registrar and Rector refused to discuss the dismissals, but according to the minister, 16 were excluded on academic grounds, and 14 'because their presence was not deemed to be in the interests of the college'. One of those dismissed had been a member of a delegation which had demanded that the Rector stop police interference on the campus. The Advisory Council had considered each of the cases and decided

240. *Evening Post*, 3 September 1966.

241. *Ibid.*

242. *Daily Dispatch*, 27 August 1966; *Eastern Province Herald*, 27 August 1966.

243. *Evening Post*, 13 September 1966.

244. *Ibid.*

that in 13 of the 14 cases there were sufficient reasons for their exclusion, but the Council excluded all 14.²⁴⁵

The excluded students could not register as external Unisa students because they could not supply certificates of good conduct from Fort Hare. Fort Hare authorities were reported to have been 'surprised' by this development, saying that previously they had only been required to provide the academic records of transferring students. They were not allowed to attend other black university colleges on ethnic grounds.²⁴⁶

1968 was another tumultuous year at Fort Hare. There was still no SRC as students feared that officially elected representatives might be failed, suspended, investigated by the security police or sent home.²⁴⁷ In the first half of the year, few student functions were permitted, and no mass meetings were allowed at all. When the new Fort Hare Rector, JM de Wet, arrived in mid 1968, slogans including 'Fort Hare for Africans not Afrikaners', 'Fort Hare not rubbish bin for Potchefstroom scum' and 'De Wet obey De Wet van die land and go to RAU' were painted on campus buildings.²⁴⁸ Almost all students boycotted the ceremony installing him and booed visiting speakers. De Wet summoned 17 students, identified them as student leaders, reminded them that he had the power to expel them and said that he would hold them responsible for any further disturbances. The 17 requested that a proper disciplinary committee should investigate specific charges, but this was refused. Instead, the security police searched their rooms and took most of them to the Charge Office in Alice for interrogation on matters such as why they were against an SRC and how they felt about the University Christian Movement (UCM, see below). Angry at the treatment of the 17, about 90 per cent of the students started a sit-in in front of the administration block, demanding that De Wet should come and speak to them. De Wet responded by cancelling all student activities, including a Dramatic Society tour, and banning the UCM. He refused to speak to the students, so the sit-in continued until the September vacation, and was resumed on

245. *Evening Post*, 23 February 1967; *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 March 1967; *Cape Times*, 24 February 1967.

246. *The Star* 12 July 1967; *Daily Dispatch*, 14 July 1967.

247. *Cape Times*, 31 October 1968.

248. *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 September 1968.

their return. The students refused to put forward a deputation, arguing that its members would be victimised. De Wet set a time-limit for their return to lectures, and for sending a deputation. Declarations that they would refrain from all forms of demonstration and submit to college rules and discipline were then circulated for students to sign: only those who signed would be allowed to remain. After the deadline elapsed, a delegation was formed, but the Rector refused to see them. The police then set upon the students with dogs and teargas. They were told to pack up and put on to trains in Alice. Many others left in the belief that the college had been closed: about 290 students went home.²⁴⁹

The students were then allowed back, if they came with their parents or guardians and signed a document acknowledging that if they broke college rules they would face immediate suspension. On 5 October De Wet said all but 21 students had been readmitted. He said the 21 could write their exams elsewhere and could reapply for admission in 1969.²⁵⁰ In September 1968 MC Botha, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, said the Government paid for Fort Hare and that it must be used only for legitimate academic purposes. He said expelled students would only be readmitted if they were genuine about their desire to continue their studies.²⁵¹ In 1969 De Wet refused readmission to a further 22 Fort Hare students who he blamed for the student unrest in 1968. On being approached by the Association for the Education and Cultural Advancement the African People, De Wet agreed to give the students certificates to allow them to register at Unisa.

No SRC was elected after the dissolution of the last SRC in September 1960, despite calls by the Rector for one to be created. The absence of an SRC led to practical difficulties for the administration, and students were aware that 'the college authorities want us to have an SRC because the student enrolment has increased to such proportions that there must be some form of liaison'.²⁵² But in 1968 students pointed out that members of the 1960 SRC had been dismissed as 'agitators'²⁵³ and said that if

249. SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p267, *Cape Times*, 31 October 1968.

250. *Cape Times*, 31 October 1968.

251. *Die Transvaler*, 11 September 1968.

252. *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 March 1968.

253. *Ibid.*

an SRC was established it would be little more than an 'entertainments committee' with no powers in matters dealing with authority-student relationships and that its members would either become 'Government stooges' or victimised or interrogated by the police if they spoke out freely.²⁵⁴ Balintulo comments that the view that SRC members would be victimised was shaped at a time of wide-scale intimidation and repression and the banning of national political organisations.²⁵⁵

Many of the features of these conflicts at Fort Hare were also experienced at the other university colleges.

For most of the 1960s, with the exception of Turfloop and later UCWC, none of the campuses had a functioning SRC. Where they did exist, they were subject to close supervision by the Rectors and denied the power to affiliate to Nusas.

In the early 1960s the Turfloop Rector, Potgieter, seems to have been able to control the limited numbers of students at the isolated campus with a lighter touch than the other Rectors were, creating an environment that felt to students like 'a boarding school, not a university'. At the beginning of 1961, he refused readmission on the grounds of misconduct to two successful first year science students, but then supervised the first SRC elections in March and slightly relaxed the regulations, so that only first year students needed permission to leave the campus.²⁵⁶ Potgieter said he would encourage contact with both white and black universities as it was 'necessary that we should not become an isolated attempt in the field of university training'. He said he wanted to withdraw from a 'paternalistic role' and added that

If students want to debate political subjects, why should I interfere? If they want to invite people from outside to address their meetings, it is their own affair.²⁵⁷

254. SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p266.

255. Balintulo, M (1979) 'The Black universities in South Africa' in Rex, J (ed.) *Apartheid and Social Research*, Unesco Press, p151.

256. SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p258, *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 March 1961.

257. *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 March 1961.

In June 1961, however, ERW Makhene, the Turfloop SRC president resigned after visiting the Wits SRC without permission and being 'severely reprimanded'.²⁵⁸

Students commented on the 'unreality' of Turfloop, where they were, as Muriel Horrell, research officer for the Institute of Race Relations, reported in 1965,

to a great extent isolated from the complexities of living in a normal social environment, more especially an urban area one, from first-hand contact with technological and industrial progress, from cultural stimuli.²⁵⁹

Cocooned at Turfloop, students told reporters that they had a 'gnawing feeling that this is not South Africa' and experienced an unfamiliar 'protection' from daily racism and apartheid insults. One student said that 'I regard my stay here as three years of sterility which I must suffer to get a degree'.²⁶⁰

By the late 1960s, however, these quiet days had passed, as students developed contacts with outside groups and the administration became more heavy-handed in its control. In 1968 the SRC was refused permission to affiliate to Nusas and students who attended the Nusas congress in July 1968 were refused permission to report back to a student meeting. The UCM was also banned. In September 1968, Turfloop students were refused permission to issue a statement about the sit-in at Fort Hare. In February 1969 the Turfloop SRC was refused permission by the Department of Bantu Education to meet the SRC of the white Johannesburg College of Education (JCE). In May 1969 students held a mass meeting and drew up a petition listing these grievances, adding that the SRC had no meaningful status or contact with the Senate. Students marched to the acting Rector's office to hand over this petition, whereupon the campus was surrounded by police who prevented any unauthorised people from entering. The acting Rector, Professor Engelbrecht, met the Nusas president, Duncan Innes, but Innes was denied permission to address Turfloop students. He was then served with an order preventing him from entering any Bantu Trust area in the Pietersburg area. Engelbrecht called a meeting of students where he told them that he was willing to listen to any student

258. *Ibid.*, 11 March 1961, 16 June 1961.

259. *Race Relations News*, September 1965.

260. *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 May 1965.

grievances. He advised them to form an African students organisation rather than continuing to seek contact with white students and Nusas.²⁶¹

In the early 1960s student politics at UCWC was also contained, mainly because, as visitors to the campus commented, there was no social, sporting or political life at the campus. Staff had attempted to run student societies, but they had foundered on lack of student interest. An SRC had been established in this way in 1961, but it hardly functioned and disbanded at the end of that year.²⁶² An ASB visitor commented that although most students spoke Afrikaans at home, many had taken their matric in English and studied in English and that it was very rare to see a UCWC student reading an Afrikaans newspaper, apart from the supplement to *Die Burger's* Saturday edition.²⁶³ In April 1967 SRC elections were organised again at UCWC. The SRC was not allowed to affiliate to Nusas. JG Meiring, the Rector, said that Nusas and its leaders were 'always in trouble' and that 'I don't think that our Coloured students should risk spoiling their futures by involving themselves with Nusas'.²⁶⁴ He said the SRC should 'learn to stand on their own feet and learn to do things for themselves'.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, UCWC students continued to elect SRCs in 1968 and 1969, but by 1969 it was considered to be a dummy body and was elected with a very low poll. No candidates offered themselves for election in 1970.

At the University College of Zululand, student numbers were very low in the early 1960s and few of those enrolled were registered for degree-level studies (see above). By the mid 1960s, however, the familiar pattern of restrictions and tensions had emerged there as well. Maré said that both Nusas and the ASB were banned from Ngoye because 'both organisations took part in politics' and he 'did not want his students to take part in politics because this interfered with his studies'. Ngoye students said they were watched by student spies, were threatened with expulsion if they went to

261. *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 May 1969, SAIRR, 1969 Survey, p225.

262. Departement: Rasse-aangeleenthede, Jaarverslae, Direkteure en Takke, Ab/3, Vol 1, ASB PV 148, INCH.

263. *Ibid.*

264. *Cape Times*, 23 December 1967.

265. SAIRR, 1967 Survey, p288.

Durban to hear Senator Robert Kennedy speak at the invitation of Nusas and were even discouraged from reading English-language papers.²⁶⁶ At Zululand 12 students were not readmitted in 1969 because of 'misconduct' during 1968.

At the University College for Indians in Durban the Rector, SP Olivier, had the unusual task of establishing a university college in the heart of an urban area where there had been high-profile and organised community opposition. On Salisbury Island students soon formed the 'Island Students Association' (ISA) without Olivier's permission. An early pamphlet read:

ISA means bite. ISA fights for academic freedom and against indoctrination of students' thought. ISA is not a secret organisation, although it is forced to work in a secret manner. ISA is *your* organisation. ISA fights for *you*. You must support and build ISA ... we may be compelled to attend Salisbury Island but we will not be indoctrinated.²⁶⁷

The ISA said it took the place of an SRC which 'would' be a stooge body consisting of 'yes men' whose members would be victimised and would not be permitted to affiliate to Nusas. Olivier had initially allowed students to attend Nusas meetings in their personal capacities, but in September 1962 he said the college could not affiliate to Nusas unless Nusas 'dropped its opposition to university apartheid'.²⁶⁸

Students resented and tried to expose Olivier's attempts to win over the community to the university college. In the early 1960s Olivier attempted to organise a compulsory 'Sports Day' and invited members of the Indian community.²⁶⁹ The ISA issued a pamphlet saying

It will be made to appear that the Indian community - despite its unanimous condemnation of the whole concept of ethnic universities - is becoming reconciled to its application at Salisbury Island.²⁷⁰

266. *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 July 1966.

267. 'Introducing the voice of ISA to all new students', SP Olivier Collection, 518/2806, Documentation Centre, UDW.

2. SAIRR, 1962 *Survey*, p200.

'Students: This is the voice of the ISA', SP Olivier Collection, 518/2855, Documentation Centre, UDW.

270. 'Sports day at Tribal College', SP Olivier Collection, 518/2894, Documentation Centre, UDW.

In 1962 the Students Action Committee of Salisbury Island called on students to stay away from lectures on March 12, in protest mainly about conditions in the hostels. They did not like the way men and women were so strictly segregated, not being able to enter each others' common rooms or even dine at the same table, food was poor and women were subject to a 6pm curfew (for men it was slightly later). Residents were being forced to pay an extra, compulsory weekly charge for laundry, and had to pay to use the ferry even though day students were issued with free passes. The second set of grievances concerned freedoms of association:

We are not allowed to form any students organisation or body, whether for social, cultural or sporting purposes except with the special permission of the Rector. We know that it is almost impossible to see the Rector in order to obtain his permission. He is unavoidably BUSY. (*No doubt he is kept busy having complaints of students' bad behaviour and gross 'demands' from specially appointed spies*).²⁷¹

Permission was sometimes granted to attend meetings too late for students to attend, or even after the event. The SRC that had briefly functioned had, they said, been turned into a 'dummy body' that could not hold committee or mass meetings without the Rector's permission and two staff members present:

WHY? Is this a case of policemen guarding *prisoners*!! Is there to be no freedom of speech? Are the authorities afraid of criticism? Are they looking out for 'agitators'? (or have the lecturers no other work to do?) This is plain intimidation.²⁷²

In this seething atmosphere, the call for the stay away had been triggered by two expulsions that were seen as grossly unfair. The student explanation was that residents had been told that they would be given coffee if they provided their own mugs, but for two weeks after the students had provided mugs, no coffee was forthcoming. When five students enquired, two were singled out as troublemakers and expelled.²⁷³

271. 'Stay away from lectures on Monday - March 12, 1962' issued by Students Action Committee, Salisbury Island, Documentation Centre, UDW.

272. *Ibid.*

273. *Ibid.*

Olivier's style of management was to keep a close watch on everything that happened on the campus, and was often seen talking to students and checking on conditions in the canteen. He presided over the 'Student Amenities Committee', which he called 'the unofficial SRC' in 1967, where, Nusas commented, with his 'gentle persuasiveness [he] dictates the issues of the day'. Olivier's knowledge of campus life was legendary:

All is known to the Rector and his efficient secretary - It is known who was holding hands with whom, and where, who is getting married and why, who was wearing a mini-skirt with netted stockings to match, who did not use a tie and was insolent to the Campus Civil Police, who was singing 'freedom' songs and where, who said what at the hostel luncheon before his stomach turned.²⁷⁴

In 1963 Olivier is reported to have said that 'the walls have ears and the winds blow words to my ears'.²⁷⁵ He was renowned for his style of inviting 'difficult' students to his office for 'psychotherapeutic counselling' where he 'diagnosed' a 'frustration complex' which caused the student to bear a grudge against the university. Olivier's relentless charm caused the ISA to write repeatedly of 'the sugar-coated tongues of the authorities'.²⁷⁶

In the late 1960s a Nusas visitor reported that 'a large minority of the students display a tendency to accept the dictates of the institute', which he ascribed to the students' respect for their parents. He said many argued that

My parents have sacrificed much to send me to 'Varsity and I can't afford to break their hearts by not achieving their ambitions for me.

The Nusas visitor also observed that

Fear is the strongest intimidating factor on the campus. This cannot be believed until it is experienced. Just to walk on the campus, permission had to be obtained and once we were on the Campus we were secretly followed by a White who obviously had 'spying powers' as he questioned students

274. Kleinschmidt, H, 'The university College - Durban', *Campus*, 14 June 1968.

275. *Ibid.*

276. 'Students: This is the voice of the ISA', SP Olivier Collection, 518/2855, Documentation Centre, UDW.

about us afterwards ... The students we spoke to were particularly hesitant in introducing themselves to us and none were prepared to give us their names. Not because they were hostile - fear kept them from talking freely on common interests. In this very aspect the whole aim of a university education has been defeated.²⁷⁷

Olivier also had to contend with the example of conditions at the University of Natal, his closest academic neighbour, where black students, enrolled at the Medical School and the remnants of the 'Non-European section' (UNNE), were able to organise an SRC, separate from the white SRCs of the Pietermaritzburg and Durban branches of the university. Although the Government insisted that the University of Natal should be internally segregated, the Council of the University of Natal permitted the Medical School SRC to affiliate to Nusas. There were conflicts between the three Natal SRCs, especially between the white Durban SRC, which tended to be on the conservative extreme of Nusas (see below) and the UNNE SRC. In 1963 the UNNE SRC president, WT Mhlambiso (previously of Fort Hare) said that although the white students said that they were sympathetic to non-racialism in principle, in practice they did not demonstrate this commitment. He warned that 'serious consequences' threatened in relations between the white and black students. He said black students were also not treated fairly by the university, being subject to restrictions in the use of lecture halls and when student meetings could be held that did not apply to white students. He said the university also did not allow integrated social functions and insisted on social segregation in such matters as the preparation of Rag floats and sport. Facilities such as toilets and hostels were segregated.²⁷⁸

The conditions experienced by black students at the university colleges and UNNE meant that the relationship between black students and Nusas changed dramatically over the 1960s. Over the 1960s Nusas became less important as a voice for black students. Students at the university colleges were unable to participate properly in

277. Kleinschmidt, *op cit.*

278. *Die Transvaler*, 10 June 1963.

Nusas decision-making, which meant that Nusas was increasingly out of touch with the changing needs of black students.

In 1960 well over two thirds of black students attending universities (i.e. excluding Unisa) were enrolled at institutions where Nusas, fresh from the campaigns of the late 1950s, was strongly grounded. Nusas had a high profile among black students and enjoyed their support. Over one third of all black students at this stage were enrolled at Wits and UCT, where they participated in SRC elections and were involved, alongside white students, in Nusas. Others were enrolled at Fort Hare and the University of Natal, which both had established connections with Nusas. In the early part of the decade, a relatively small proportion of black students were enrolled at the new black university colleges, where Nusas had no history of organisation. Furthermore, in the early 1960s, together with the legacy of the 1950s campaigns, Nusas was a home that was politically acceptable to black students. Legassick comments that

Nusas became the most outspokenly radical of the effective organs of legal opposition to the Government. In part, this was by default: other bodies were repressed, became paralysed, or moderated their stance. But the pressure of the Nusas leadership in close alliance with the non-white centres prevented the softening of Nusas policy attitudes.²⁷⁹

As the decade drew on, this constituency and the influence exerted by black students on Nusas changed. As has been seen above, students at the black university colleges that fell directly under state control were not permitted to join Nusas. For the most part Nusas leaders were prevented from visiting the campuses, and students from these institutions were not permitted to send delegations to Nusas meetings or to attend in their personal capacities.²⁸⁰ It was therefore very difficult to make contact with black students at the state-controlled institutions, let alone meaningfully adapt to the new experiences of those students. In January 1963

279. Legassick, M (1967) *The National Union of South African Students: Ethnic cleavage and ethnic integration in the universities*, Occasional Paper No 4, African Studies Centre, University of California, Los Angeles, p40.

280. SAIRR, 1961 Survey, p254.

students from Fort Hare, Turfloop, Ngoye and UCWC attended a Nusas meeting as unofficial observers. They spoke to the press, but said that they feared victimisation and asked that their names were not published. They confirmed that there was a ban on joining Nusas, and that with the exception of Turfloop, there were no SRCs. This was partly because they were controlled so strictly that students said there was no purpose in having them. Members of SRCs could be victimised both by the administration and by students. The students alleged that the college authorities relied heavily on informers and that security police activity was intensive.²⁸¹ Jonty Driver, a Nusas president in the early 1960s, recalled that

Fort Hare was the most radical and the least frightened. The others were tiny and isolated, infiltrated with police spies and totally inexperienced.²⁸²

Over the 1960s the proportion of black students enrolled under these conditions at the black university colleges increased relative to those enrolled at campuses where Nusas could consult freely with students and represent them democratically.

Table 7.15: Proportion of total black student enrolments at attendance institutions, 1960-1970 ²⁸³			
Institution	1960	1965	1970
Fort Hare, the North, Zululand	481 (20%)	939 (27%)	2 022 (38%)
Western Cape and Salisbury Island	161 (7%)	1 389 (40%)	2 253 (42%)
Cape Town and Wits	799 (34%)	615 (18%)	557 (10%)
Natal	893 (38%)	518 (15%)	537 (10%)
TOTAL	2 334 (100%)	3 461 (100%)	5 369 (100%)

This was a fundamental change in the nature of the constituency that Nusas was trying to organise. Official contact between Nusas and students at the university colleges was prohibited. Students at the four new institutions had no tradition of student organisation and only Turfloop had an SRC with which to liaise. The African university colleges were geographically isolated, making it easy for the university authorities and the police to monitor and control who visited and left the college. The new university colleges were governed differently, and Nusas had to

281. *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 January 1963

282. Driver, CJ (1998) Nusas leader, early 1960s, interviewed at Wellington College, Berkshire, 3 January 1998.

283. Derived from Tables 5.2 and 5.3.

adapt to dealing with the Departments of Bantu Education, Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs, as well as the Department of Education. The potential black student constituency of Nusas therefore shifted to new institutions where they were increasingly cut off from the organisation by political decree and distance.

For the early and mid 1960s, the history of black student involvement in Nusas was one of increasing difficulty. Driver is of the opinion that black students were 'ashamed to be at the [university colleges] because they were seen as apartheid institutions, tribal colleges' and that they were angry and frustrated by their isolation. 'You'd expect it to work toward co-operation but it didn't', Driver recalled:

There was a pride and a difficulty with white students in Nusas who didn't understand black politics. They would say, 'What can we do to help you?', the instinctive reaction, instead of 'How can we co-operate, what can we learn from you?'²⁸⁴

A key turning point in this process came at the July 1967 Nusas conference, which was held at Rhodes University. In terms of the Group Areas Act, black delegates to the conference were not allowed to attend meals in the dining halls or other social functions on university premises. This was enforced by the Vice Chancellor on legal advice.²⁸⁵ This exclusion was later considered to be the point at which some black students, among them, Steve Biko, a medical student at the University of Natal, considered that full participation in Nusas was impossible and no longer of any relevance: Nusas president Clive Nettleton said that black students 'found a dichotomy between principle and practice in Nusas' and that 'it was considered that the time had come for blacks to do things for themselves, no longer relying on the altruism of the minority of white liberals'.²⁸⁶ However, for a while, despite these frustrations, many black students regarded contact with Nusas as valuable: in September 1968 Turfloop's new SRC requested permission to affiliate to Nusas.

In 1967 Nusas was no longer the only organisational channel for contact between black students from different campuses. In 1967 the UCM was formed by the Methodist,

284. Driver, *op cit*.

285. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p284.

286. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p226.

Catholic, Anglican, Congregational and Presbyterian churches in response the conservatism of the Students' Christian Association (SCA), which had divided into four ethnic sections in the early 1960s. The UCM developed at Rhodes, where the only English-medium Theology department was located, and where students were in contact with the seminary students at Fort Hare. Despite its conservatism Peter Kallaway, who was a Rhodes student involved in Christian student organisation at the time, argues that the SCA provided 'an easy bridgehead between Fort Hare and Rhodes'.²⁸⁷ The first two presidents of the UCM were Methodists from Rhodes. The first, the Reverend Basil Moore, had been very active in Nusas and had been elected Nusas president in July 1962, but the Methodist Church did not allow him to take up the appointment.²⁸⁸

Within a year of its establishment the UCM was reported to have enrolled 3 000 members at 25 educational institutions, the majority of whom were black. At its first annual congress, about half the delegates and visitors were African. The UCM thus rapidly provided an important alternative channel of communication between the university colleges and the universities to Nusas. The UCM soon attracted the attention of the state. In 1968 Vorster threatened that he was investigating the affairs of the UCM and would approve steps to be taken against it. UCM organisers were harassed by the security police, with passports being withdrawn.²⁸⁹ In June 1968, ten white students from Johannesburg were arrested during a church service at Sovenga near Turfloop, which was also attended by Turfloop students. The whites were charged with entering a Bantu Trust area without permission.²⁹⁰ By 1969 the UCM had been banned from the campuses of the African university colleges.

287. Kallaway, P (1998) Rhodes student involved in Christian student organisations in the 1960s, interviewed in Cape Town, February 1998.

288. Driver, *op cit*. The second UCM leader was the Reverend James Moulder. *Sunday Times*, 1 September 1968.

289. *Sunday Times*, 17 August 1968.

290. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p225.

Although the UCM was primarily a religious group, and had a white leadership, it explored the ideas of Black Theology and provided an important forum for discussion among black students.²⁹¹ At the first UCM conference,

discussion centred on the theme of what the church and individual Christians could do to bring about changes in South Africa's social situation, which was considered to be intolerable.²⁹²

Students at the UCM conference also discussed problems with Nusas and black student organisation. In the latter half of 1968 Biko campaigned in support of an all-black student organisation. He organised a conference, held in December 1968, where students from the Natal Medical School, black university colleges and seminaries decided to form the South African Students' Organisation (Saso).

Gerhart comments that Biko's experiences at the 1967 Nusas conference had a profound effect. She writes that after this experience, although

undogmatic but highly disciplined in his thinking, possessed with a rare insight into human and political situations, Biko increasingly began to question the value of what he saw as the artificial integration of student politics.²⁹³

Although the majority of the members of Saso were ultimately drawn from the black university colleges, it is particularly significant that Biko was a student at the University of Natal. Not only was more freedom of student organisation and association permitted by the University of Natal, but this was the only institution that brought African, Coloured and Indian students together.

Although the UCM provided an important organisational base for Saso, its political roots reached to two black student organisations that operated in the early 1960s. Driver recalls that the African Students Association (ASA), led by Ernest Gawe from Natal, had ANC links and was most active at UNNE and Fort Hare, but the *Cape Times* reported that the ASA was formed in Durban in December 1961 at a meeting of more than 200 African students, mainly from Turfloop and Ngoye. The

291. Gerhart, G (1978) *Black power in South Africa*, Berkeley, California, p261.

292. SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p262..

293. Gerhart, *op cit*, p260.

Cape Times said that the ASA aimed to unite African students, provide contact with other students nationally and internationally and to help with bursaries and loans. Driver believes it was formed in 'opposition' to Nusas.²⁹⁴ The ASA was never particularly active, probably because it was too dangerous for students to be in any way associated with a banned organisation.²⁹⁵ The African Students Union of South Africa (Asusa) had PAC links and was most active at Turfloop, Roma and Ngoye. Driver recalls that Asusa was very disorganised and Nusas never knew who its leadership was. According to the SAIRR, these were student wings of the parent political organisations, more concerned with national politics than student issues. There is very little other information about these organisations.

An unpublished masters thesis by Bond on Coloured student politics suggests that the ASA and Asusa did not survive the banning of the parent political organisations and the repression that followed. However, Bond also suggests that some early Saso supporters had been Asusa members and were pro-PAC, but under the political conditions of the times, this lineage could not be acknowledged.²⁹⁶ Bond suggests that the Africanist influence in Saso is apparent in its black exclusivism and in the early ambivalence of many Saso supporters towards non-African, particularly Indian, participation. He also points out that some Coloured and Indian students were uncertain about whether it was desirable to align themselves with Africans. At the same time, both UCWC and the University College for Indians forbade their students from contact with Saso. However, other Saso members were inspired by the Congress alliance, which tended towards African, Coloured and Indian unity and also the Non-European Unity Movement,²⁹⁷ which stressed black unity and the exclusion of whites.²⁹⁸

Saso was officially launched in July 1969. Saso initially believed that although ideally South African students would be represented in a single national

294. Driver, *op cit*.

295. *Cape Times*, 29 December 1961.

296. Bond, DF (1984) 'Coloured education struggles in South Africa: Education boycotts in the Western Cape, 1976', unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Cape Town.

297. The NEUM heritage can also be seen in Saso's rejection of 'dummy institutions' and the use of boycotts. (Bond, *op cit*.)

298. Bond, *op cit*.

organisation, it was impossible to participate properly in Nusas, and that contact between black students could best be promoted outside of Nusas.²⁹⁹ Saso planned to organise on the same basis as Nusas, with the SRCs of the black higher education institutions affiliating, but also provided for a majority decision of students to affiliate a campus where there was no SRC, and also for individual members.³⁰⁰

At the launch conference, some delegates were concerned that it was a tacit acceptance of apartheid to organise separately. Indeed, the Rectors of the university colleges might have thought that their plans were at last bearing fruit: for many years, apartheid ideologues had argued that black students would need to form their own organisation. The Ngoye Rector, for example, had encouraged his students to form an African students organisation,³⁰¹ and as early as 1962, the ASB's Director of Racial Affairs commented that

I do not believe that the Bantu student will ever really feel at home in Nusas or the ASB as such. As their inter-university consciousness awakens, they will realise that they want a Bantu inter-university organisation. It is the ASB's task to lead them gradually along these channels so that later they can join on a confederal basis.³⁰²

An important difference was of course that Saso incorporated African, Coloured and Indian students to develop a 'black' students organisation, whereas both Maré and Herbst anticipated that African students would organise separately from Indian and Coloured student organisations.³⁰³

Saso was based on two principles: black unity and the rejection of whites. Biko wrote that

Blacks are beginning to realise the need to rally around the cause of their suffering - their black skin - and to ignore the false promises that come from the

299. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p226.

300. *Ibid.*

301. *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 July 1966.

302. Departement: Rasse-aangeleentehede, Jaarverslag, Direkteur aan Takke, Ab/3, Vol 1, ASB PV 148, INCH.

303. *Ibid.*

white world ... the biggest mistake the Black world ever made was to assume that whoever opposed apartheid was an ally.³⁰⁴

By Saso's second conference, in July 1970, the position had hardened.

the general feeling was that black students must unite in order to face the problems they have encountered, first as students, and then as members of an oppressed community.

They dropped the term 'non-white' in favour of 'black'. Saso withdrew recognition of Nusas as 'the true national union', but was to keep contact where their aims were compatible.³⁰⁵

Gwala points out that the emergence of Saso from the black university colleges was typical of

one of the fundamental contradictions of apartheid, that by bringing together commonly oppressed people in schools, townships and factories, it created conditions and a political platform for the expression of a racially based politically consciousness.³⁰⁶

Gwala points out that under the influence of Saso, student politics at the black university colleges became more focused and organised, ending the isolation of the campuses and connecting them to a broader struggle. However, in making this point, he refers to student politics at the university colleges in the 1960s as 'generally a quiet period', which seems a misrepresentation of the turbulent experiences of students at these institutions and the resistance they mounted, often at a high personal cost.³⁰⁷

7.5.3 Uneasy compromise: the English-medium universities

The autonomy of all four of the English-medium universities was infringed by the 1959 legislation. Wits, UCT and Natal were forced to close their doors to black students, although the University of Natal won a limited victory by retaining

304. Biko, S (1972) 'White racism and Black Consciousness' in Van der Merwe and Welsh, *op cit.*, pp190 - 192.

305. Gerhart, *op cit.*, p265.

306. Gwala *op cit.*, pp175-176.

307. *Ibid.*

control over the segregated Medical School. Rhodes University lost control of Fort Hare and was dealt a further blow by the establishment of UPE, which destroyed Rhodes' ability to expand and diversify in the city and thereby be sure of its student numbers and future.

The relationship between the university Councils and the Department of Education and the Government in general became politicised through these changes, with each one of the university Councils concerned expressing public opposition to the Government. Both Wits and UCT set up public lectures and took other steps to commemorate their loss of autonomy in 1959. Wits, for example, set up a triennial public lecture where it would pledge itself to this declaration (which had also been inscribed on plaques on the university's main block):

We affirm in the name of the University of the Witwatersrand that it is our duty to uphold the principle that a university is a place where men and women, without regard to race and colour, are welcome to join in the acquisition and advancement of knowledge, and to continue faithfully to defend the ideal against all those who have sought by legislative enactment to curtail the autonomy of the University. Now, therefore, we dedicate ourselves to the maintenance of this ideal and to the restoration of the autonomy of our University'.³⁰⁸

However, although relations between the university and the Government became more tense, neither party to this conflict had any interest in overstepping clearly defined boundaries. There were limits on university opposition to the Government and apartheid policies and in the 1960s the university hierarchies avoided confrontation with the Government wherever possible.

First, as has been discussed in Chapter 5, only the University of Natal ever really attempted to continue to admit black students, against the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1959 legislation. Wits and UCT responded differently. Both collaborated with the Government in the administration and interpretation of the restrictions on black students.

308. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p254.

Second, all the universities ensured that social and sporting segregation policies were observed on the campuses. In 1959 UCT students said it was a matter of principle to have mixed dances, but the UCT Vice Chancellor, JP Duminy, said that it was not in the interest of the university.³⁰⁹ In March 1963 the UCT Council confirmed a resolution it had passed in December 1958, which read

In non-academic or social matters, such as pertain to residences, sports and dances, Council records its conviction that it is most desirable and also in the best interests of the University that the University abide by the customs and conventions of the community in which it exists.³¹⁰

In 1965 the UCT Council explicitly forbade integrated functions: whereupon a majority of a student meeting of 1 200 decided not to hold dances at all. In 1969 the UCT Council applied to the Government for permission for black delegates to the annual congress of the Association of Medical Students of South Africa to use residence facilities on the campus. As all the residences were in 'white areas', permission was eventually refused by the Cabinet.³¹¹ Two Nationalist Wits SRC members informed the Minister of Education at the start of 1969 that black students were using the Wits swimming pool. GR Bozzoli, who was by then the Wits Vice Chancellor, was informed that this was contrary to Government policy and was obliged to withdraw permission for 'mixed bathing'.³¹²

Third, in their response to the 1959 legislation the universities were careful to limit their *corporate* criticism of the Government to measures which affected their autonomy. Murray argues that in the late 1950s Wits failed to mount 'a cohesive defence of the liberal university' and writes that

In the final analysis, a defensive-minded Council rooted its stand against university apartheid in the narrow principle of university autonomy, a principle that enabled it both to protest against enforced university

309. *Cape Times*, 19 June 1959.

310. JP Duminy, UCT Principal, 29 April 1963, (UCT Registrar's File F2/1).

311. *Cape Argus*, 8 May 1969.

312. Bozzoli (1995) *op cit.*, pp176-177; *Die Burger*, 8 May 1969.

segregation and simultaneously to maintain practices of racial discrimination.³¹³

In the 1960s the universities continued to avoid comment on injustices in the country as a whole. In 1965, as Murray points out, Sir Robert Birley, formerly the headmaster of Eton College and at that time a visiting Professor of Education at Wits, criticised Wits for trying to preserve academic freedom while ignoring attacks on freedom and justice beyond the university.

Finally, the universities also seemed to comply with the state in casting out politically active staff. Robert Sobukwe, who was elected leader of the Pan Africanist Congress in April 1959, had been employed as a junior Bantu Languages assistant at Wits. In May 1960 Hertzog said that Wits was 'very irresponsible' to employ him, and that the Government should consider cutting the subsidy to Wits as a result. It then emerged that Sobukwe was no longer employed by Wits: he had worked normally until 21 February 1960, when he had taken sick leave. Sobukwe resigned after his arrest and his appointment was terminated on 31 March 1960.³¹⁴ In his letter of resignation to the Wits Registrar, however, Sobukwe thanked Wits

for the attitude you adopted in refusing, in the face of terrific pressure, to interest yourself and the university in my political life.³¹⁵

In October 1964 Wits also terminated the appointment of Baruch Hirson, who was standing trial for sabotage. Although he pleaded guilty to some of the charges, Hirson had not used his position as an academic to further his aims. In court, Hirson said that he had 'recruited no-one, although in my capacity as a lecturer I had ample opportunity to do this'.³¹⁶ The Council and Vice Chancellor believed that as a result of Hirson's

313. Murray, BK. (1997) *Wits: The 'Open' Years, a history of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1939-1959*, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, p320.

314. Letter from Herholdt, A de V, Wits Registrar, to Secretary for Education, Arts and Science, 16 April 1960, UOD 36/6/5 Vol. 420: 'Bedankings, ontslae, aftredings en afsterwe: Wits'.

315. Murray (1997) *op cit.*, p241.

316. *Ibid.* In his book *Revolutions in my Life* Hirson recalls that in 1958 he addressed a packed lecture hall at Wits, condemning ethnic universities but also criticising the administration of the 'open universities' 'which had never been truly open, academically or socially'. This was reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* and Hirson realised he had 'dis-enchanted myself formally from the liberal establishment'. A special meeting of the university Council was then convened and decided that Hirson's contract would not be renewed at the end of the academic year. He met the Principal, who accused him of organising the African cleaners on the campus, which he denied. Ultimately, he compromised by saying that he had not accused individual members of the Senate of hypocrisy, but he condemned the policy as a whole. He was later granted tenure. *Continued ...*

activities, Wits was 'perceived in the white community as a haven for saboteurs', while Professor FRN Nabarro, the head of the Department of Physics, was more concerned that Wits had 'harmed its own reputation by dismissing Hirson before he had been found guilty by a court of law'.³¹⁷

UCT initially seemed to take a more principled stance, entirely blind to the political attitudes and activities of its employees. In 1960 the Department of Education asked the UCT Registrar

Whether he is in a position to state whether during the past two years any members of the teaching staff ... have been connected with the leadership of the African National Congress or the Pan African Congress; if so ... what are their names, ... in what capacities were they employed ... whether the authorities ... were aware of their political activities; and whether these persons carried out the normal duties attached to the teaching posts they occupied?³¹⁸

The Registrar, JG Benfield, replied that

I regret that the University of Cape Town has no knowledge as to whether any members of its staff have been connected with the leadership of the African National Congress or the Pan African Congress during the past two years. In fact the University does not know whether any members of the staff are members of these organisations. There have in any case, been no reports of any members of the teaching staff having neglected their duties during the past two years.³¹⁹

However, in 1967 the UCT Vice Chancellor asked the Professor of Psychology not to appoint Andrew Colman because of his political activities.³²⁰

It is interesting to note, after this history, that *Revolutions in my Life* was published by Witwatersrand University Press (in 1995).

317. Murray (1997) *op cit.*, p326. Murray also cites the dismissal, in comparable circumstances, of another Physics lecturer suspected of involvement in sabotage, Lionel Gny. (*Ibid.*)

318. Secretary for Education, Arts and Science to UCT Registrar, 14 April 1960, UCT Registrar's File F2/1.

319. UCT Registrar to Secretary for Education, Arts and Science, 22 April 1960, *ibid.*

320. Nusas, 1969, *Fact sheet: Academic Freedom, 1959-1969: 10th Anniversary of the Extension of University Education Act*, unpublished mimeo, Private papers of Mark Orkin.

These limitations on the protests of the formerly 'open' universities allowed relations between the universities and the Government to proceed smoothly. There were even congenial social contacts: Bozzoli recalls that in the late 1960s

University Vice Chancellors became part of the social scene in Pretoria and Johannesburg civic and government circles and are invited to a great number of functions.³²¹

At the same time, the Government continued to infringe university autonomy and the individual freedoms of academics.

The presence of 'subversives' in the universities caused furious uproar among Nationalists and the Government was inundated with calls to act against the universities. In 1960, when Robert Sobukwe was arrested and Philip Kgosane, a UCT student, led a PAC march in Cape Town, Hertzog railed against the formerly 'open' universities, saying they were 'busy sharpening the assegai to stick into the back of the white man'.³²² The 1964 NP Transvaal Congress requested the Government 'to prevent liberal and Communist lecturers and professors being appointed at universities' and to appoint a commission of enquiry into 'the ways whereby the so-called university autonomy and academic freedom are abused at certain universities and in particular to nurture and protect subversive elements'.³²³

There was also Government and Nationalist concern to prevent non-whites being appointed as lecturing staff at white universities.³²⁴ A controversy erupted in 1968 when an African man, Archie Mafeje, was offered the post of Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology by the UCT Council, but under Government pressure, UCT rescinded the appointment. Mafeje was well-qualified and considered by UCT to be the best applicant. Senator Jan de Klerk, the Minister for National Education, said the Government would take steps to ensure that 'the accepted traditional outlook' of South Africa was observed. The Council protested that it had never agreed that all appointments of academic staff would be white, but they nevertheless

321. Bozzoli (1995) *op cit*, p150.

322. *Cape Times*, 6 May 1960.

323. Tak HF Verwoerd, Florida, INCHI III Vol. 7, Kongresse 1964-1968, NP Tvl PV 35, *Die Transvaler*, 12 August 1964.

324. Afdelingsbestuur, Springs, INCH III Vol. 7, *ibid*.

capitulated.³²⁵ The Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Professor MWM Pope, resigned in protest.³²⁶ The Minister of Police, SL Muller, then released details about Mafeje's past, including his involvement in the Non-European Unity Movement-aligned Provincial National Students Committee in 1962 and 1963 and that he had been fined R200 or 200 days in jail in 1963 for addressing an illegal gathering in Flagstaff as secretary of the Cape Peninsula Students Union. (Both organisations had since ceased functioning.) Muller also questioned why UCT thought that Mafeje was the best qualified for the post, revealing that while Mafeje was completing an MA at Cambridge, two of the other applicants already held PhDs. He said that Mafeje only wanted to take up the post to continue his 'undermining activity' against the Government, and Afrikaans newspapers carried banner headlines to this effect.³²⁷ (At the end of 1968 a plaque was erected at UCT to record the 'restriction on the exercise of our autonomy' that occurred when the Government forced the UCT Council to rescind its decision to appoint Mafeje.³²⁸)

In July 1969 the Committee of University Principals was 'requested to ensure that no Bantu, Coloured or Indian should be appointed as lecturer at a white university'. The Minister of National Education, JP van der Spuy, said that each university would consider the request independently. He pointed out that in the absence of law concerning the race of university lecturers, the only option was to seek the voluntary co-operation of the universities concerned, although if this failed to work, legislation would be considered. Van der Spuy also wrote personally to Malherbe to request that non-white lecturers were prohibited from giving classes to white students at Natal.³²⁹

Despite these concerns, the Government seldom acted against the universities as institutions. After the international opprobrium and disquiet among Afrikaner academics that followed the 1959 Acts, it is likely that the Government was wary of inviting more criticism of the university system. It probably hoped that the 1959

325. *Die Burger*, 4 July 1968.

326. *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 July 1968; SAIRR, 1968, *Survey*, p263.

327. *Die Transvaler*, 29 August 1968; *Die Vaderland*, 29 August 1968.

328. SAIRR, 1969 *Survey*, p220.

329. NP Natal, PV 55, 2/10/1/n1/2, 1969-1972, letter from Grabe, Private Secretary, Ministry of National Education, to the Provincial Secretary, NP of Natal, 5 September 1969.

Acts, given time, would erode the conditions that gave rise to its 'problems'. The Government spoke about taking direct measures such as cutting off funding (see the threat to University of Natal in Chapter 5) and the Universities Amendment Act, No 24 of 1968, gave the Minister the power to

withhold the whole or any portion of subsidy voted, if a university Council fails to comply with any condition subject to which the subsidy was granted, after having been called upon to do so within a specified period.³³⁰

However, this Act was never used. It seems that the Government considered that some autonomy was essential for the proper functioning of the universities and their contribution to the well-being of the country. (However, CH Rautenbach, the Rector of Pretoria University, wrote that 'universities and scientists are tough things that can still attain brilliant achievements in spite of obstacles and impediments', citing scientific innovation in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as examples.³³¹) So although both Rhodes University and Wits were criticised for their liberalism at the times when UPE and RAU were established, the Government did not take direct action against either university Council, but rather created alternatives where more conservative students could feel at home.

Although the Government continued to grant the *academy* limited autonomy in the 1960s, the freedoms of the *academic* were increasingly threatened.³³² The attitude informing Government actions seems to have been that the autonomy of the institution was something entirely separate from the freedoms of the individuals who composed it. In his review of the open universities in this period, Moodie seems to agree that it is possible to separate 'academic freedom' from more general freedoms. He argues that there was

not a single case of academics being banned or detained solely and exclusively because of their academic work, whether teaching or research or their publications in academic journals ... every victim of state coercion had been involved in extra-mural, or, at the very least, extra curricular

330. SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p252.

331. Rautenbach, CH (1963) *Open discussion on closed universities*, University College of the North, Sovenga, p5.

332. This distinction was popularised by Philip Tobias. See, for example, Tobias, PV (1969) *Freedom and the universities*, Students' Representative Council, University of the Witwatersrand.

criticism of the Government and society. One suspects that this line was carefully and deliberately drawn, for it permitted those who supported the Nationalists and who believed in the concept of academic freedom to continue to do both.³³³

While this argument is factually incorrect (see details about the dismissal and banning of Curnick Ndamse above), it is also insensitive to the effects of the pervasive atmosphere of fear that increasingly characterised the 1960s. Over the decade there were new, direct pressures on individuals to conform and a new arsenal of repressive legislation was vigorously deployed. The environment of fear and caution extended to the campuses and limited the freedoms of thought, speech and association of students and academic staff. Phone tapping, burglaries, bricks thrown through windows, threatening phone calls, personal hostility, spying and social disapproval were common. In 1964, when 90-day detentions were introduced, the Lecturers' Association at Natal University said that it 'created an atmosphere of uncertainty' which made it difficult to teach.³³⁴ At the same time the Chancellor of UCT A van de Sandt Centlivres, said that there was a state campaign against liberalism in the universities. He said that the state was trying to force full conformity of opinion and that the atmosphere of fear hampered freedom of thought and speech:

The fact that the Executive has tremendous powers ... induces people to remain silent when in their own consciences they feel that there is a moral duty to speak out.³³⁵

In addition to the climate of fear, the Government used several administrative and legal measures to silence critical academics. In 1961 Walter Lutz, a Wits statistician, was refused a visa to re-enter South Africa, as was Prof 'Kurt' Danziger of the UCT Department of Psychology in 1965. In 1966 ANH Eastwood, who had held a post as lecturer in law for only 14 days at Natal University, was deported without reason,³³⁶ so was J Bishop of the UCT Department of Sociology. G Jewell, a UCT French lecturer was banned in 1962, as was Terence Beard from Rhodes in 1963, and in 1964 E Harber and S Bastomsky of Rhodes and a Wits

333. Moodie, *op cit.*, p17.

334. *Sunday Times*, 25 September 1964.

335. *Cape Times*, 11 February 1964.

336. *Natal Witness*, 12 March 1966.

psychologist, Dr G De J were also banned. G Cohen, a psychologist, and M Kalk, both of Wits, were listed and then banned in 1964. In 1965 Norman Bromberger of Rhodes was banned. In 1966 CK Hill of the Natal Maths Department was placed under house arrest. In 1965 Dr R Ger of UCT Medical School was not re-appointed by the Provincial Administration. Dr Raymond 'Bill' Hoffenberg of UCT Medical School was banned in 1967: the Government did not give reasons for the banning, but Hoffenberg's role as chairman of a Nusas advisory panel was considered to have been a factor.³³⁷

In September 1964 the Government said that from the end of 1964 'named Communists' would be banned from entering university premises. This was an initiative not of the Minister of Education but of BJ Vorster, by then Minister of Justice, who referred to Wits and UCT as 'hotbeds of Communism, liberalism and sickly humanism'. He said that the ban would be extended to school and technical college teachers, and possibly advocates. Most prominently, this affected a Wits botanist, Professor Eddie Roux, and Professor Jack Simons of UCT's Department of Comparative African Government and Law. Roux, who had taught at Wits for 18 years, had left the Communist Party in 1936 for reasons he explained publicly in the preface to his book, *Time Longer than Rope*.³³⁸ He was reported to have said 'If I were asked if I were a Communist and a Marxist, I would say no'. He had joined the Liberal Party, but resigned in 1963 when ordered by the Minister to withdraw from all political organisations. Simons had taught at UCT for 27 years. He had first been banned in 1954, and detained during the State of Emergency of 1960. In 1964 he was serving another five-year banning order, that was due to expire in 1966.³³⁹

The *Sunday Times* speculated that Vorster's real intention was to manoeuvre the universities into a position where they would be forced to defend listed Communists if they wanted to protect university autonomy. (The universities

337. Nusas (1969) 'Fact sheet: Academic Freedom', Nusas, Rondebosch; SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p286.

338. Roux, E (1964) *Time Longer than Rope*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.

339. *Cape Times*, 10 September 1964, *Eastern Province Herald*, 12 September 1964, *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1964.

avoided this trap by defending the records of individuals rather than the principle of university autonomy.)³⁴⁰ The *Sunday Times* also argued that Vorster introduced new measures to establish the principle of Government interference in university appointments. The *Rand Daily Mail* pointed out that by using new measures, rather than existing ones, Vorster was specifically claiming the power to control who could teach. As has been seen above, Vorster spoke in support of the abolition of the Conscience Clause at the University of the Orange Free State. The Minister of Education was probably less extreme in these matters: the *Rand Daily Mail* pointed out that De Klerk was silent.³⁴¹

The conservative effects of the political pressures on academics coincided with changes to the nature of student enrolment at the English-medium universities over the 1960s, with profound implications for student politics.

Entering the 1960s, black students did not form a separate caucus but were integrated into Nusas politics, participating in SRC elections and national Nusas meetings. For example, in 1961 Elizabeth Thaele, Kenneth Parker and Dennis Brutus, all black students, were elected 'head woman student' at UCT, managing editor of the student newspaper at UCT and to the SRC at Wits, respectively,³⁴² and WT Mhlambiso, a Natal student who had been expelled from Fort Hare at the end of 1960, was elected vice president of Nusas.³⁴³ In 1963 Kenneth Parker, who had been Unity Movement-aligned but was, according to Driver, 'liberal more than anything else', was elected vice president of Nusas. But as has been seen above, as the black university colleges developed and the 'open' universities admitted fewer black students, Nusas increasingly lost touch with the issues, concerns and dynamism of the input of black students fully integrated into the organisation. At the same time, it was faced with a white student body that became more cautious and conservative of temperament, apathetic and apolitical. In the context of

340. *Sunday Times*, 25 September 1964.

341. *Ibid.*, *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 November 1964.

342. SAIRR, 1962 *Survey*, p197.

343. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p254.

national repression, Nusas leaders were torn between radical ideals and an increasingly conservative and apolitical student base.

In the early 1960s Nusas tried to chart a political course based on practical plans to tackle educational problems. Nusas developed and funded programmes in support of its opposition to university apartheid. Driver argues that Nusas was

Firmly based in the notion of *realpolitik*, wanting to get things done, not just talk about things. We found the Unity Movement particularly tiresome, who were clever Trotskyites who never had to *do* anything. We felt desperately strongly that we needed to do things. That was the most powerful motivator.³⁴⁴

Nusas established funds to provide student loans, help students with fees, defend students charged with political offences and to aid their dependants if they were convicted. The organisation launched a prison education scheme with the co-operation of the prison authorities, was key to the establishment of Sached, founded in 1959 (see Chapter 5), and also provided bursaries enabling students to study for University of London degrees. Most of this activity was financed by funds generated by Nusas, rather than by donations. Driver points out that Nusas organised annual European cultural tours for '50 or 60 rich whites students' in order to generate profits that were ploughed into the education programmes. Driver recalls that Nusas leaders believed for this reason at least that they

needed a white student base ... we had to keep the 'trade union' side of it going with benefits for members, discounts, tours and so on ...³⁴⁵

In this period Nusas interpreted its political role more widely than before and was far more engaged with radical opposition than it had been in the late 1950s. Driver recalls that from about 1958 the central leadership group in Nusas was 'essentially liberal':

We avoided using the term liberal - it was pejorative. We called ourselves radical. We tried hard not to be too closely associated with the Liberal

344. Driver, *op cit*.

345. *Ibid*.

Party. I resigned from the Liberal Party when I was elected Nusas president, so I wasn't an office holder. We were way to the left of the United Party.³⁴⁶

A feature of the liberal stance was a thorough, principled opposition to Communism:

We were anti-Marxist, anti-Communist, although quite Socialist, or Social Democratic. We worked closely with the non-Communist ANC: the non-Communist bit was strong. Anyone who had read about Russia found it difficult to go on being Communist. Nusas had been dominated by Communists, but we wrested control from them. In the Transvaal we had a working relationship with the Congress of Democrats (COD) - there were large areas where we worked closely with the COD. We were on the same side on most issues.³⁴⁷

The anti-Communist approach informed how Nusas worked with black political organisations and meant that Nusas, an overwhelmingly white student body, had, according to Driver, an easier working relationship with the anti-white PAC, because it was anti-Communist, than with the ANC, despite that organisation's non-racial commitments:

The PAC was strongly anti-Communist, so we had strong links with them, and personal links with PAC people in Cape Town. We worked closely with the ANC at Fort Hare, where there were pockets of Africanists but it was mostly ANC with a strong Youth League bias. So we worked with the non-Communist ANC.³⁴⁸

The shift in Nusas' political alignment can clearly be seen through its support for calls, in 1961, for a National Convention, only five years after declining to participate in the Congress of the People. Nusas campaigned in support of freedom of speech, the press, movement and association and condemned the pass laws, forced removals, the 1962 Sabotage Act and the 90-day detention clause of the 1963 General Laws Amendment Act. In the early 1960s Nusas attempted to

346. *Ibid.*

347. *Ibid.*

348. *Ibid.*

choose honorary presidents who symbolised its commitment to mass black politics. In 1961 Nusas elected Professor ZK Matthews as its honorary president, the first time in the history of the organisation that an African was elected to the position.³⁴⁹ Matthews was obviously an educationalist as well as a high-profile member of the ANC, but the organisation moved further the following year when it elected the banned president of the ANC, Albert Luthuli, as honorary president, a position he held until 1968. Luthuli was at the time confined to the Lower Tugela district, and forbidden to attend gatherings and his speeches and writings could not be published or distributed.³⁵⁰ Nusas elected him

in view of the magnificent service of Statesmanship and self-sacrifice that Albert Luthuli has rendered to South Africa and the fact that he is an embodiment of the very ideals which this Union stands for in his belief of a non-racial South Africa'.³⁵¹

Nusas was not allowed to continue to oppose the Government in this way without response. During the 1960 State of Emergency past president Ernie Wentzel was detained, starting a sustained attack on the organisation. A key figure in this vendetta was BJ Vorster, who was promoted in a 1961 Cabinet reshuffle from his post as Deputy Minister of Education to Minister of Justice. In 1962 Vorster publicly equated liberalism and Communism and spoke out against black students on the Wits and UCT SRCs. He authorised raids on Nusas offices and officials.

The Government's campaign against Nusas escalated in late 1963, presumably because it was frustrated that Nusas and its high-profile opposition to apartheid was not dissolving along with the 'integration' of Wits and UCT. In September 1963 Vorster issued an extended statement on Nusas, explaining reasons for the Government's condemnation of Nusas. He said the organisation was 'tainted with Communism' ... 'this was proved by its opposition to both NP and UP policies. He said that almost all Nusas leaders joined the Liberal or Communist Parties on

349. SAIRR, 1961 *Survey*, p254.

350. SAIRR, 1962 *Survey*, p197.

351. From July 1963 Assembly, quoted in 'Statement on Nusas by the honourable the Minister of Justice', MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

leaving university and that he was not aware that a single one had joined the United Party. He said that all active Communists and left-wingers who attended university had 'an 'leading lights' in Nusas, and mentioned Joe Slovo, Sam Kahn, Lionel Forman, Harold Wolpe, Ruth First, Hepple, Rubin, Sachs, Goldreich, Wentzel and Leftwich to prove his point. He said Nusas believed in 'absolute integration: political, social and biological' and integration at all levels of the education system; that it had remained 'in contact' with the 'out and out Communist' International Union of Students; that Nusas was sympathetic to the ANC *and* subscribed to 'Pan African doctrines' and that it had contact with anti-South African student organisations all over the world. Nusas gave 'moral support' to 'rebel and subversive organisations' in neighbouring states, South America and the Middle East and lobbied in the UN against South Africa. It wanted South Africa isolated from international sport. Vorster said that through the compulsory membership system, subscriptions from students who did not necessarily support Nusas policy were 'used to further its cause'. (At some universities, such as Wits, students paid their Nusas membership with their fees, although they could ask for the money back in writing.) He therefore called on students to show their disapproval by resigning from Nusas.³⁵²

Vorster's appeal found pockets of support on the Nusas-affiliated campuses. In 1963 an 'anti-liberal student' topped the Wits SRC poll, although Nusas supporters retained control of the SRC.³⁵³ By October 1963, as a result of Vorster's appeal, 335 of the automatic members of Nusas had resigned, although, as Driver pointed out, at the same time individual membership (including at Fort Hare) increased, and Nusas still had over 18 500 members.³⁵⁴

Entering 1964, in addition to the English-medium universities, the University of Natal 'Non-European Section', the Medical School and JCE were affiliated to Nusas. There were individual members at the black university colleges, but the

352. 'Statement on Nusas by the honourable 'the Minister of Justice', MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas; see also *Sunday Times*, 29 September 1963.

353. *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 August 1963.

354. SAIRR, 1963 *Survey*, p244.

student bodies were not permitted to affiliate. No Afrikaans student body was affiliated, although there was a branch of Nusas at Stellenbosch.³⁵⁵ Welcoming first year students at the start of the academic year in Cape Town, Driver countered many of Vorster's allegations. He said that while individual members of Nusas might be Communist, liberal or Nationalist, Nusas was not party political. He said Vorster attacked Nusas not only because of its opposition to Government policy and international work, but because it proved that students from a range of religious, language and population groups could work together effectively.³⁵⁶

In May 1964 about 70 people attended a Nusas seminar on the aims and activities of the organisation at Botha's Hill in Natal. Driver presented a paper which commented on recommendations made by Martin Legassick, a former overseas representative of Nusas, who had recently attended a student seminar in Dar-es-Salaam and by Magnus Gunther, a former Wits SRC president and Nusas vice president responsible for international relations. At the Dar-es-Salaam seminar Nusas had been criticised for failing to respond adequately to the needs of African students. Legassick agreed that Nusas was conservative and too focused on student matters rather than general political affairs. Legassick recommended that Nusas should increase its African membership, decrease its conservative membership and become the student wing of the liberation movement, uniting all forces working towards democracy in the country. He felt the organisation should prepare to be banned, and establish a base outside the country. Driver relayed these views to the seminar. He is reported to have disagreed with some points, but agreed that Nusas 'should try to unite the various forces opposed to authoritarianism', and that its student functions were less important than its political role. Driver also presented his own views about the need for a reorganisation of power within Nusas:

We must move towards a new definition of non-racialism. There are two attitudes to non-racialism; one is the attitude which says 'we must disregard a man's race and judge him on merit'. The other is the attitude which says

355. SAIRR, 1964 *Survey*, p296.

356. 'Speech by Nusas President on 28th February, 1964, to first year students at the University of Cape Town', MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

'the ideal situation is where one can disregard a man's race and judge him on merit alone. However, in the situation in this country, everything is determined by race - and those who are oppressed must therefore lead the liberation movement. The attitude in Nusas has always been the former. However, we must now adopt the latter attitude.'³⁵⁷

After the seminar, Legassick's comments were misrepresented as Nusas policy in the press. Although Legassick resigned from Nusas straightaway in May 1964,³⁵⁸ it was not enough to prevent a conservative backlash and the Durban SRC disaffiliated from Nusas.³⁵⁹ JCE also threatened to disaffiliate and supporters at Pretoria considered withdrawing. Seizing the moment, at Wits the South African Conservative Students' Association (Sacsas, led by Anton Mostert) distributed pamphlets to draw students away from Nusas.³⁶⁰ At the University of Natal anonymous pamphlets attacking Nusas were distributed and Nusas dissidents in Durban formed a rival students' association. In June 1964 a further 1 000 students resigned from Nusas, about 400 of them in Natal.³⁶¹

But Vorster's strategy now changed: having called on conservatives to resign from Nusas in 1963, Vorster now saw an opportunity to transform the organisation and asked conservatives to stay and try to influence Nusas at its July policy conference. Vorster, however, misread the extent of conservative support which had by then played itself out and at the 1964 July Conference, although Driver was censured for allowing his personal views to be expressed and portrayed as Nusas policy,

357. *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 June 1964, *Sunday Express*, 7 June 1964, *Sunday Times*, 28 June 1964, *Sunday Times*, 7 June 1964, *Cape Times*, 29 May 1964, *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 June 1964.

358. *Cape Argus*, 27 May 1964.

359. *Die Transvaler*, 21 May 1964. When Legassick visited South Africa again, travelling on a British as well as a South African passport, he was deprived of his South African nationality.

360. Sacsas aimed to oppose 'the forces of leftism and ... any organisation which advocates a multiracial basis for the South African community' and considered its natural constituency to be students who were 'conservative in outlook, supporters of either the United Party or the National Party, patriots who put their love of South Africa above all, and opponents of integration'. Sacsas was officially opposed by the United Party, who defended Nusas against Vorster's attacks. Sacsas was rejected by some English university SRCs, but a branch was formed at UCT. (SAIRR, 1964 *Survey*, p296.)

361. *Die Transvaler*, 8 June 1964.

both the Natal SRCs and the JCE SRC accepted the explanations and actions of the Nusas leadership and decided to reaffiliate.³⁶²

No sooner had the 'Botha's Hill' crisis been resolved than another threatening storm broke. During the July 1964 conference David de Keller was arrested for activities in the African Resistance Movement (ARM). He was tried and convicted on a charge of sabotage, and sentenced to ten years in jail. Adrian Leftwich, a past president of Nusas, confessed in court that he had been a leader of the ARM, but he turned state witness and gave evidence against others, including David de Keller. It was also alleged that another past Nusas president, Neville Rubin, had been involved in ARM, but he had left the country.

In early August the Nusas leadership struggled with whether it should issue a statement condemning sabotage and discussed whether Driver should leave the country for his own safety, and whether he should resign as president before or after leaving. The security police monitored these conversations and highlighted all references to the work that Driver could do for Nuras 'overseas'.³⁶³ On 13 August Driver was arrested under the 90-day clause and held for 28 days.³⁶⁴ Another past Nusas president, Ernie Wentzel, was held for 21 days. Some students were imprisoned for blowing up pylons and others for furthering the aims of Communism.³⁶⁵

In the end, the crisis was handled with deft political skill. Maeder Osler, acting Nusas president, managed to obtain an admission from the security police that 'there was no suspicion at all that Nusas had been involved in any extra-legal activities'.³⁶⁶ Nusas leadership argued that the organisation could not be held responsible for the acts of its individual members. Furthermore, both Adrian

362. *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 July 1964, *The Star*, 15 July 1964.

363. 'Recording of Nusas meeting held at Embassy Court on 7 August 1964', MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

364. Letter from Maeder Osler, Acting President, to the Hon Minister of Justice, 17 August 1964, MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

365. *Cape Times*, 7 July 1965.

366. *Sunday Times*, 22 November 1964. See also comments by Vorster in *Sunday Times*, 15 November 1964.

Leftwich and Neville Rubin were asked to resign from their honorary vice president positions in Nusas. (Black students from Natal University criticised Leftwich as undisciplined but said that Rubin had been victimised.) By the time that Nusas had to prove its hold on student support in the October SRC elections, Nusas candidates topped the polls and retained control of the SRCs at the affiliated universities.³⁶⁷ Wits and UCT condemned violence but supported Nusas.³⁶⁸

Even in the midst of these crises, an attempt by conservatives to capitalise on Nusas troubles misfired. In August 1964 Sacsa convened a conference in Cape Town, inviting both Nusas and ASB members, but as the Nusas delegation included a Coloured student, the Afrikaans students and some of the Sacsa students left, and the conference closed.³⁶⁹

In November 1964 *Die Transvaler* ran an editorial entitled 'Give them Freedom', calling on Nusas to end the compulsory membership system.³⁷⁰ In 1965 the automatic membership system was modified in response to the 1964 crises: the system where its students joined Nusas by paying a composite fee which included tuition and membership was abandoned. From that year, SRCs affiliated to Nusas.³⁷¹ In the SRC elections later that year Nusas candidates again topped the polls at all the affiliated campuses,³⁷² and Nusas was in a strong enough position to challenge Vorster to appoint a commission of enquiry into its affairs.³⁷³

By the mid 1960s Nusas was attempting to deal with both constant Government harassment and dwindling black student involvement. Writing in the mid 1960s, Legassick concluded that 'with this leavening of non-white opinion removed, the radicalism of Nusas is likely to wither'. He pointed out that although Nusas' analysis and criticism of the Government remained radical in the mid 1960s, the organisation 'undoubtedly retreated from the limb on which it found itself in

367. SAIRR, 1964 Survey, pp296-300.

368. Legassick, *op cit*.

369. *Cape Times*, 8 August 1964.

370. *Die Transvaler*, 18 November 1964.

371. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p279.

372. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p280; *Cape Times*, 17 May and 20 July 1965; *Sunday Express*, 31 October 1965.

1964'.³⁷⁴ Driver points out that after he resigned as Nusas president the organisation had to

cope with a strong backlash. I was regarded as dangerously left-wing and the Botha's Hill speech was dangerously close to the edge.³⁷⁵

In the aftermath of the 1964 crises, Nusas' opposition to apartheid generally focused on the principle of non-racialism. This was accompanied by a shift to introspection, with Nusas preoccupied with critically examining its own practices. Legassick argues that this meant a change in the significance of the organisation, as 'non-white participation was more important to Nusas than the existence of Nusas was to most non-whites'.³⁷⁶ Gerhart comments that in this period 'verbal protest and symbolic racial mixing were seen as the outer limit of action' and draws the sweeping and unsympathetic conclusion that the liberal conviction that non-racialism was the cure to South Africa's problems became 'a sterile dogma disguising an unconscious attachment to the status quo'.³⁷⁷

A consequence of the focus on non-racialism was that Nusas also became more critical of the caution and conservatism of the university administrations. In 1956 Nusas had tacitly accepted the formula of 'academic non-segregation and social segregation' as 'the most satisfactory that can be obtained in present circumstances'.³⁷⁸ In the 1960s, however, strong opposition to social segregation in all university activities emerged as an issue to which all Nusas supporters could subscribe and this brought Nusas into conflict with university administrations and ended the united opposition of the whole university community that had been so carefully assembled and maintained during the 1959 campaigns.

During this period of realignment Nusas also turned to the international arena for political inspiration. Kallaway recalls that Nusas at this time stressed the

373. *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 June 1965.

374. Legassick, *op cit.*, p51.

375. Driver, *op cit.*

376. Legassick, *op cit.*, p43.

377. Gerhart, *op cit.*, p260.

378. Legassick, *op cit.*, p41.

importance of the initiative of individuals within a 'civil rights' discourse. He also points out that the influence of Marxist analysis had not yet been felt in the organisation and there was no concept of class informing the understanding of South African society.³⁷⁹ The July 1965 Nusas conference passed motions inviting Dr Martin Luther King to open the 1966 conference. Both he and Senator Robert Kennedy accepted invitations to attend. Nusas also passed a motion calling on 'overseas artists and playwrights not to condone segregated audiences in South Africa'.³⁸⁰ In May 1966, three weeks before Kennedy was due to speak at a Day of Affirmation of Human Freedom, Ian Robertson, Nusas president, was banned from Nusas activities and from teaching for inviting him.³⁸¹

State harassment continued in the latter half of the 1960s. The Government made high profile public attacks on Nusas, and the organisation was also the victim of a wide range of covert Government tactics. Nusas organisers began to expect constant interference, even in ordinary activities. For example, a multi-racial party at a private home in Cape Town, held after a Nusas conference, was interrupted by 31 policemen on the pretext of 'investigating noise'.³⁸²

Anonymous pamphlets were often distributed, for example in April 1965 one attacking Nusas was distributed by a non-existent group called the 'Joint SA Universities Right-Wing Students'. Pamphlets purporting to have been issued by Nusas were also circulated, such as in September 1965, when one supporting subversive activities was fraudulently distributed on Nusas paper.³⁸³ Nusas leaders were constantly deprived of the freedoms of movement and association. In 1967 Nusas president John Sprack was deprived of his South African citizenship by travelling abroad on a UK passport. Under threat of arrest, he was then deported. (In May 1966 JJ Gerber, the Rho (t) Professor of Education, had written to Brigadier HJ van den Bergh, the Commissioner of Police, to suggest that he should deport non-South African citizens and deprive them of their passports. He

379. Kallaway, *op cit*.

380. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p279.

381. *Eastern Province Herald*, 12 May 1966, SAIRR, 1967, Survey, p281.

382. SAIRR, 1965 Survey, p278.

383. *Sunday Express*, 18 April 1965 and 5 September 1965.

specifically suggested that Sprack and another Rhodesian Rhodes student, Renier Lock, should be treated in this way.³⁸⁴) John Daniel, who had been acting president of Nusas in 1966, was denied a passport to allow him to travel to the United States to take up a scholarship. When Sprack was deported, Daniel was elected president. Later he too was deprived of his South African passport when he left the country on a British passport.³⁸⁵ Duncan Innes was refused a passport to travel abroad for two months. Andrew Murray, a Rhodesian Nusas vice president had his residence privileges withdrawn. Peter Harris, a former SRC president at Rhodes, had his South African citizenship withdrawn after travelling to Rhodesia on a Rhodesian passport. Nusas leaders were sometimes detained for interrogation by the security police, and African and Indian members were 'called in' by the security police and warned to cease all political activity.

It was also widely suspected that there was an extensive spy network reporting to the security police on Nusas activities, and sometimes Nusas leaders obtained confirmation of their suspicions. It was reported in 1968 that the security police had approached students at Wits to ask them to spy on campus activities.³⁸⁶ The Wits Vice Chancellor, Professor ID MacCrone, said there were a number of such cases. He said he did not know why the police did not approach him directly if they needed information. The head of the security police, Brigadier J Venter denied the allegations, saying 'I would not admit it even if it were true, but I deny that it is true'.³⁸⁷ Bozzoli later stated that police officers were enrolled as students to act as informers and that the police also recruited students by paying their fees and a stipend.³⁸⁸ Eight students at the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of Natal, including two SRC members, and two at the Natal Training College said they had been approached in October 1968 and asked about Nusas and the UCM. They refused to co-operate, but were afraid of recriminations if their names were published.³⁸⁹ Vorster's files record that students, their parents, academics and

384. 12 May 1966, MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

385. SAIRR, 1967 Survey, p286.

386. *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 October 1968.

387. *The Star*, 22 October 1968; SAIRR, 1968 Survey, p266, *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 October 1968.

388. Bozzoli (1995) *op cit*, p179 ff.

389. *The Star*, 22 October 1968.

former students all volunteered information and assistance in the attack on Nusas. For example, in 1963, a former Kenyan farmer, C Schwentafsky, whose son was studying law at Durban 'disapproved of politics', citing a law lecturer who 'brought politics' into an explanation of security legislation. He also disapproved of compulsory membership of Nusas, but thought there was little chance of getting rid of Nusas through SRC elections:

This letter ... is NOT intended as a sort of spying business ... as my son is very interested in politics he could give a lot more information to you, should you require the same, as we are vitally interested that Your Party should remain in Power for good.³⁹⁰

The Commissioner of Police wrote to the Minister of Justice that

The writer of the letter will be contacted by a senior member of the Security Branch, Durban, with a view to cultivating his son as an informer.³⁹¹

The Pretoria advocate Tom Langley wrote to Vorster in October 1963, to congratulate him on his speech and advise him that he had met Bob Hepple and Ernie Wentzel on the Abe Bailey tour³⁹² in 1955 and that he believed that Hepple was 'the more dangerous of the two'. He was 'prepared to tell officials more about them, if needed'.³⁹³

All of these measures were adopted by the Minister of Justice and the security apparatus of the state, rather than the Minister of Education. This approach seemed to use existing security machinery to try to control student politics, which may have allowed the Government to reassure some potential critics that it was not interfering in academic freedom or university autonomy. Eventually Nusas challenged the Minister of Justice to appoint a commission of enquiry into its affairs.³⁹⁴

390. 23 May 1963, MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

391. 4 July 1963, *ibid.*

392. Ironically, the tour was organised in order to bring English and Afrikaans students together and increase their mutual understanding.

393. 30 October 1963, MJU, Vol. 137, *op cit.*

394. *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 June 1965.

In 1966, however, the Minister of Education was prompted to take action against the universities when the UCT SRC refused to allow the Conservative Students' Association to change its constitution to exclude black students. In February 1966 De Klerk said that this 'untenable' position could prompt a review of the 'open universities' policy.³⁹⁵ In August 1966 De Klerk gave notice of two bills to end social integration. They were aimed at UCT and Natal, which did not permit whites-only conservative groups.³⁹⁶ He then introduced the Universities Amendment Bill, which stated that

no person or association at any university should be prejudiced or subjected to any form of discrimination on the ground that he or it advocated, promoted or maintained any form of racial separation.³⁹⁷

The decision of the Minister of Education would be final about whether discrimination or prejudice was occurring. He could instruct a university Council to ensure that any such discrimination ceased, and he could withhold all or part of the Government subsidy if the Council failed to comply. In this way, the Minister could overrule the UCT SRC about the Conservative Students' Association. De Klerk also proposed an Amendment to the Extension of University Education Act, which would give the Minister powers to preclude black students who were admitted to the university from joining student associations, except for those composed entirely of students from the same ethnic group, or those concerned exclusively with academic matters directly relevant to the black student's course of study. These Bills were held over until 1967 after Verwoerd's sudden death.³⁹⁸

Through these Bills the direct conflict between the Government and Nusas threatened to provide another pretext for the Government to undermine the Council's autonomy. Rather than allow this to happen, the UCT Council opted to restrain the SRC itself. An independent commission, the Diemont Commission, drafted a new SRC constitution. Any student group seeking to restrict membership on the grounds of population groups needed to give reasons for doing so:

395. *Die Burger*, 18 February 1966; *The Star*, 18 February 1966. *The Star* speculated that De Klerk was dealing with the matter in public as there was an election imminent.

396. *The Star*, 3 August 1966.

397. SAIRR, 1967, *Survey*, p281.

398. *Ibid.*

permission could not be 'unreasonably' withheld. The Council would have the final decision in the matter. The Council was also given the power to rescind any act or decision of the SRC, and to terminate the period of office of the SRC. The general public and press were to be excluded from SRC and mass meetings.³⁹⁹

While the Council accepted this new constitution, students did not. Stalemate resulted as the SRC, supported by a student mass meeting, would not compromise the principle that every campus organisation should be open to all students irrespective of race, while the Council was not prepared to negotiate with the SRC about the new constitution on this basis. Conservative students asked the Principal to suspend the SRC. Students were reported to be disappointed in the Council's reaction to the principles of non-racialism and about the banning of Ian Robertson. The student newspaper, *Varsity*, became increasingly critical of the UCT Council, and in September 1967 it was suspended by the Council for its 'offensive moral and religious content', and the editor was rusticated. The Attorney General considered bringing a charge of blasphemy against him. The scheduled SRC elections in 1967 did not take place because students would not accept them under the terms of the new constitution.⁴⁰⁰ The Principal nominated an interim students council and granted it the powers and duties of the SRC under the new constitution.⁴⁰¹

These steps appear to have mollified the Government, because in February 1967 the Minister of Education said that the University Amendment Bill and the Extension of University Education Amendment Bill would not be reintroduced, as he was satisfied that the changes to the UCT SRC constitution would prevent 'a repetition of the students' unpleasantness'.⁴⁰²

Before the issue of the SRC constitution was resolved to the students' satisfaction, the UCT Council submitted to Government opposition to the appointment of a

399. SAIRR, 1967, *Survey*, p282.

400. *Ibid.*, pp282-284.

401. *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 February 1967; *Cape Times*, 28 February 1967; *The Star*, 28 September 1967.

402. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p282.

black lecturer, Archie Mafeje (see above). The UCT Council rejected student demands to reinstate Mafeje and to close the university for 24 hours in protest. In mid August 1968 Vorster, who became Prime Minister after Verwoerd's death, said that if the university authorities did not stop the student protest he would send in 'his boys' (the police) to end them.⁴⁰³

At this time the Minister of Police and Internal Affairs, SL Muller, told an NP *stryddag* in Potchefstroom that while he thought that academic freedom should be protected, this should not be at the expense of the authority of the state. He gave the names of several foreign students who he said were the ring-leaders of the Mafeje protests, and warned that they were in South Africa as guests of the Government and should not abuse their position. He called on the Jewish community, who included 'many of his best friends' to 'control Jewish students' who were also among the 'ring-leaders', adding that it was a 'hard fact' that most listed Communists and people convicted of sabotage were Jewish.⁴⁰⁴

In September 1968 Vorster met a UCT SRC delegation and gave them his views on student politics. He warned the SRC that they would have only the rest of that year to recognise racially exclusive organisations on campuses. If they failed to do so, legislation would be introduced in 1969 to make this compulsory. Vorster said that he regarded it as 'healthy' that students were involved in politics. He said students could say and do whatever they pleased, so long as they did not interfere with other students' studies and they would have to be 'co-operative' over integration. He said that students should avoid being used as 'pawns' by 'old liberals' such as Helen Suzman and Leo Marquard, and that Nusas was an 'unpatriotic' organisation that was affiliated to international left wing groups.⁴⁰⁵

In 1968 a compromise was eventually reached about the UCT SRC constitution. All parties agreed that the SRC's standing rules and orders for campus societies would prohibit discrimination on other than academic grounds, but that an appeal

403. SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p265.

404. *Die Vaderland*, 29 August 1968.

405. *Die Burger*, 30 September 1968.

against a ruling of the SRC could be made to the Council.⁴⁰⁶ *Varsity* resumed publication: the former editor was prosecuted for blasphemy, and discharged with a caution.

It was not only at UCT that students found themselves in conflict with their campus administrations. The political understanding that had united the constituent parts of the universities in opposition to the 1959 legislation was weakening around the country. Nusas-affiliated SRCs at Rhodes and Durban also found themselves in conflict with their administrations. At the Durban campus of Natal University these clashes culminated in derogatory articles about the Principal in the student newspaper, *Dome*, the suspension of the SRC and the dismissal of a junior lecturer who was a former student leader.⁴⁰⁷ In August 1968 a commission of enquiry under Mr Justice Harcourt reported and said that there had been 'a lamentable lack of communication' between students and administration. He said that student activity was being labelled 'political' inappropriately and that the administration should not have withdrawn recognition from the SRC as it did not have the power to do this, nor should it have disciplined the editor of a student publication for a broad offence such as 'bringing the name of the university into disrepute'. At Rhodes in 1968 students demanded that Senate should change its disciplinary practices and procedures.⁴⁰⁸

A decisive change in the relationship between Nusas-affiliated SRCs and the university administrations was marked by a resolution at the 1967 Nusas conference, which by 42 votes to two (with 20 abstentions) called on SRCs to do everything in their power to abolish racial segregation on university campuses. Nusas also said that censorship by university Councils of the student press was a threat to academic freedom and human rights, and said that the libel laws and controls exercised by the Press Board of Control were adequate controls on the students press.⁴⁰⁹

406. SAIRR, 1968 *Survey*, p258.

407. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p284.

408. *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 August 1968.

409. SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p285.

Internationally, this was a time of student uprising. Many attempts were made to find connections between South African student activity and student rebellion abroad. At the end of 1968 the new head of the security police, Brigadier PJ Venter, said that 'foreigners' were to blame for student unrest.⁴¹⁰ Bozzoli travelled abroad in the late 1960s and observed that in the United Kingdom, for example at the London School of Economics, students were attempting to improve conditions for themselves within the universities, while in the United States, for example at Berkeley, students protested against Council control over student involvement in party politics, university involvement in military research, especially in terms of the Vietnam War, and the favouring of postgraduates over undergraduates in teaching priorities.⁴¹¹ The Secretary for Higher Education prepared a substantial document for the Minister of Education summarising reports from the Department of Foreign Affairs about 'Student Unrest - Overseas'. It surveyed developments in the United States, Canada, France, Czechoslovakia, Germany and the 'Third World' and concluded that there were broadly three causes of student unrest: student concerns about employment after graduation, dissatisfaction with the organisation of universities and education systems generally and

uncertainty over the ultimate aim of society beyond and above material aspiration, and the desire of students to participate as adults in formulating the destiny of the university and the future community.⁴¹²

The *Rand Daily Mail* concluded in an editorial that

something more fundamental than questions of discipline was involved. It was a clash of outlooks, of values, and to some extent of tactics between an older generation of university administrators - conservative, cautious and somewhat disillusioned - and a younger, positive, and idealistic generation of English-speaking students.⁴¹³

410. *Convocation Commentary*, November 1968, Wits.

411. Bozzoli (1995) *op cit.*, pp125 - 134.

412. Erasmus, M, Secretary for Higher Education, 'Summary: Student Unrest - Overseas', 4 December 1969, MNO Z11/13 Volume 145.

413. Laurence Gandar, *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 September 1967; SAIRR, 1967 *Survey*, p285.

These conclusions were entirely compatible with the denials, by student leaders at Wits and UCT, that there was any organisational connection with international student protest.⁴¹⁴

In July 1968 the Wits SRC convened a student conference on student participation in university government. Unusually for this time, it was attended by students and university administrators from all the English-language universities and some of the Afrikaners and black campuses. Three models of university-student relationships were analysed. Students dismissed the *in loco parentis* principle as having very restricted application to university life. It was generally agreed that a 'fiduciary relationship', where staff held their positions and exercised power in the interests of students and on the condition that student interests are paramount, was preferable to the 'democratic' principle, where students and staff held equal status. The 'fiduciary' model was considered most appropriate because knowledge was considered to be hierarchical, with more experienced people 'knowing more than others'.⁴¹⁵

As relations with the university administrations deteriorated, a perception arose that the universities were not capable of controlling students. In 1968, in the midst of the Mafeje protests, the head of Neurology at Wits, Dr AV Bird, said that that if the university authorities did not put an end to the student protests, the Government would be entirely justified in intervening.⁴¹⁶ As the decade drew on, the police intervened more frequently, and with increasing use of force. In the late 1960s ordinary Nusas members, not only the leadership, faced the frustration of the police. For example, at one demonstration at Wits, the Johannesburg Town Clerk gave permission for 15 Wits students to stand on a traffic island opposite the university holding placards with approved wording. When students moved beyond these limits, police arrived and arrested six of them, including SRC leaders. Two hundred police with dogs and batons arrived by troop carriers to push back other

414. *Convocation Commentary*, November 1968, Wits.

415. *Ibid.*

416. *Die Transvaler*, 11 September 1968.

students. A few days later 19 students were arrested for distributing pamphlets on railway property.

By the late 1960s a new generation of apolitical students who were unwilling to take a personal stance against apartheid injustices had reached the universities. Nusas and SRC leaders said that students were disillusioned by the failures of protest politics to achieve results. Many were unwilling to take on the university administrations and feared that they would lose their passports or have other restrictions placed on them. More men were doing military training before attending university and were less liberally inclined during their university years. David Welsh, a lecturer in African Law and Government at UCT, commented that 'students coming to varsity now have had their entire schooling under the Nationalist Government. Even in lectures, a more conservative attitude is evident'.⁴¹⁷ Censorship also limited the information and ideas to which students were exposed as newspapers were restricted, books and people were banned. In late 1967, Nusas president Margaret Marshall confirmed that the organisation had become more moderate:

Four years ago, I was regarded as a middle-of-the roader in Nusas; today I am considered left-wing liberal. But I haven't changed my views at all in that time.⁴¹⁸

(It should also be observed that Margaret Marshall was the only woman Nusas president in the 1950s and 1960s. The preponderance of men leading the organisation was a reflection of a robust and uncritical masculinist culture in Nusas, which requires far more extensive examination. However, Driver recalls he and Biko related easily as they were both keen rugby players and that 'most of my friendships were based on drink and the pursuit of women, to tell the truth ... with the benefit of hindsight, it became rather sexist'.⁴¹⁹)

Bozzoli commented that by the late 1960s the SRC at Wits was left wing under 'responsible and serious SRC presidents' and that

417. *The Argus*, 12 September 1967.

418. *Ibid.*

419. Driver, *op cit.*

I would describe the student body at that time, between the more militant left and right wing extremes as being normally neutral, even apathetic, but strongly supportive of moves made by the SRC against apartheid and Government oppression of the underprivileged masses.⁴²⁰

In 1969 the Wits SRC commented at the end of its term in office that

This year witnessed the most monumental protest campaign ever organised by students at any South African university ... students' awareness, however, took a lot of arousing. Cold intellectual passion ... was outweighed even at the end by an apathetic complacency on the part of a numerical majority of the campus ... Mini skirts⁴²¹ collected more signatures than did a march of four hundred Turfloop students in complaint against bush college condition.⁴²²

They blamed

twenty one years of intensive propaganda and Christian Nationalised education, which have woven a cocoon round each of us as a shield against the harsher realities of a non-racial community [and] material well-being.

The political apathy of English-speaking students reflected the disengaged stance of their community and universities. Bozzoli commented in an article on 'The role of English universities in South Africa' that

English South Africans have involved themselves largely in professionalism, commerce and industry, and left government largely in the hands of Afrikaners, whose universities have always given the art and science of government a correctly important place in their academic world.⁴²³

At the Botha's Hill seminar in 1964, Nusas leadership discussed a prescient analysis by Magnus Gunther, who argued that internal South African

420. Bozzoli (1995) *op cit.*, p173.

421. Bozzoli comments that from the 1920s to the 1960s Wits students were required to wear formal clothing to lectures and that this was interpreted to mean jackets and ties for men and formal dresses for women. In the mid 1960s, new rules permitted open neck shirts and shorts with long socks for men and women could wear trouser suits to libraries but not in lectures. Women students then took up the fashion for wearing mini skirts, which was regarded as inappropriate by the university administration, but they also realised that they could not keep amending the dress code as fashion changed and therefore simply required students to 'dress decently while on campus'. (*Ibid.*, pp160-161.)

422. *SRC Report Back*, Vol. 2 No 2, Mark Orkin papers.

considerations were the most important for Nusas' future. He said that Nusas' role was that it was the last remaining vehicle of protest, that it should be a source of public education, provide practical non-racial contact and leadership training. He considered that the options facing Nusas, as it struggled to cope with the changed political context, were to dissolve the organisation rather than allow it to become conservative, to seek to be banned on favourable terms, to change into a radical organisation based on individual membership, such as ASA or Asusa, to become a clandestine organisation, to go into exile or to continue in the same way. Well aware of the problems, as the 1960s drew on, Nusas struggled with this last option.⁴²⁴

Despite its flaws, Nusas was an exceptional organisation in South African politics in the 1960s. It was outspoken in its opposition to apartheid, it attempted to initiate and maintain practical programmes to support those at the brunt of apartheid education policies and it tried to educate and organise a white student base. It faced sustained Government attacks, but managed to continue to operate, while many other opposition groups could no longer function. As a result, Nusas occupied a prominent political space, not normally filled by a student group. But stripped of its black membership, and with no legal black political organisations to serve as political allies or reference points, over the 1960s Nusas drifted from the relationships of accountability that had informed its practice at the start of the decade and increasingly looked abroad for inspiration from liberal, charismatic individuals. Legassick nevertheless concludes that Nusas acted as a conscience for South African society, that it played an important role in forming white liberal and radical leadership and that Nusas' support for the liberal, universalist tradition of universities was significant.⁴²⁵

In their study of universities in divided societies, Welsh and Savage point out that it is common for universities to become focal points for nationalism, and that in

423. Bozzoli, GR (1977) 'The role of English universities in South Africa' in Van der Merwe and Welsh, *op cit.*, p192.

424. Transcript of comments by Magnus Gunther, MJU, Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.

425. Legassick, *op cit.*, p51. Legassick said that Nusas was always reformist, and could never be revolutionary because of its membership.

divided societies they become divisive, for example in Wales and Belgium there were conflicts over language and culture, there were Czech-German conflicts at the university in Prague and Swede-Finnish tensions at universities in Finland. They conclude that with very few exceptions, 'universities have displayed little or no ability to act as agents of integration or reconciliation'⁴²⁶ and argue

That South African student organisations reflect the cleavages of the wider society is hardly surprising. It appears almost inevitable that if the universities are established and built around particular groups then they will generate student organisations that are similarly structures and centred in the same groups.⁴²⁷

426. Welsh, D and Savage, M (1977) 'The university in divided societies: The case of South Africa', in Van der Merwe and Welsh, *op cit.*, p135.

427. *Ibid.*, p142.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the complex relationship between apartheid and university education in the period 1948 to 1970. Taking the contested processes of the design and implementation of Government policy as the core thread running through the narrative, this thesis has provided a broad analysis of all of the sections of the divided apartheid university education system. Very little research has yet been conducted or published on South Africa's university institutions and it has been the aim of this thesis to contribute to this field by providing a general overview of the development of the university education system. It is hoped that the thesis will facilitate further research into areas such as the character of teaching and research in individual subjects and professions and the nuances of each institution.

This chapter draws together the major findings of the preceding chapters, and concludes by exploring the use of the term 'university apartheid'.

8.1 Major findings

Chapter 2 demonstrates that university education was already segregated and unevenly accessible to students of different population groups in 1948, when the Nationalists came to power. For their first term in office, however, Nationalists had no clear plan about how the Government should adjust the arrangements for the governance of university education to suit apartheid. Chapter 3 demonstrates that this indecision and lack of progress in the late 1940s and early 1950s can be attributed to differences among Afrikaner Nationalists both about the nature of university education and about apartheid itself. Their attempts to develop apartheid university policies provided an important forum for the airing and clarification of the principles of apartheid more generally.

Apartheid university education was based on a philosophical premise that spanned both Christian National Education and anthropological notions of 'own culture',

that held that university education was not and could not be 'universal', but should reflect and serve the culture and needs of a particular ethnic community. This was a departure from segregationist assumptions about the universality of university education. The Nationalists' 'particularist' approach necessitated the breaking up of the system and processes governing university education.

The character of the first phase of the Nationalists' policies for university development - the Extension of University Education Act and the Fort Hare Transfer Act of 1959 - was the result of the control wielded over the policy from the mid 1950s by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) and in particular, the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr HF Verwoerd. Verwoerd and his department had claimed such a position of authority over the direction of Nationalist policy that in 1958 even the Prime Minister, J Strijdom, referred to 'apartheid, as handled by Dr Verwoerd'.¹ Chapter 4 shows how, typically for policies developed by the NAD, university policy became an ambitious, modernising project, 'scientifically planned' by 'experts' and evolving into a huge and expensive bureaucratic exercise. The ethnically segregated, state-controlled university colleges created by the 1959 Acts were divided from the state-aided, more autonomous, universities, and provided different and inferior educational opportunities.

Chapter 5 shows that in terms of the 1959 Acts, the 'open' universities complied with the compulsory closure of enrolment to black students (except for with Ministerial consent). The University of Natal was less co-operative, but also ultimately obliged to comply. No student was ever compelled by the Government to enrol at an ethnic university college, but black students were obliged to enrol there, despite their discriminatory character, as there were few realistic alternatives. This *de facto* co-option saw steadily increasing enrolments at the black institutions, and, by extension, compliance with apartheid, despite continued general political opposition to the principles of ethnically-defined university education.

1. Evans, I (1997) *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p78.

Chapter 6 shows how, in the 1960s, the Nationalists poured resources into pursuing a second goal: the promotion of Afrikaans university enrolments and the expansion of facilities for Afrikaans students. It is clear that the Nationalist Government's first priority was to establish the black university colleges and that the establishment of new institutions for Afrikaners, namely the University of Port Elizabeth and the Rand Afrikaans University, was only considered thereafter, once the economic boom of the 1960s provided the resources to pursue this. The differences between these two institutions illuminate the struggles that were taking place in the 1960s over the direction and content of Afrikaner Nationalism.

Chapter 7 surveys the development of the divided university system to 1970, when the black university colleges were granted autonomy from Unisa and full academic status. It shows that the Government directed increasing resources into university education generally, resulting in a huge increase in student numbers and institutional capacity. These resources were most generously directed towards spending on Afrikaans students. Although the black university colleges were extremely expensive to establish and run, Government spending on black university education, seen in proportion to the black population, remained very low. Furthermore, African school education was literally deprived at the expense of the African university colleges. The educational outcomes of the divided university system reflected the Government's spending priorities, producing far more white graduates than black graduates. The white graduates were also qualified in a far wider range of disciplines. More broadly, however, the legacy of Nationalist governance of university education is extremely contradictory. The divided and divisive 'particularist' system was shunned internationally and hindered the development of critical thought, an indigenous intellectual culture and the research capacities of the country's universities. This affected every sector of the university system, with perhaps especially severe consequences at the Afrikaans-medium and isolated black institutions.

Politically, the Nationalist Government's helmsmanship of university policy was almost entirely counterproductive. It failed to build the white South Africanism

that Verwoerd identified as a central political goal after Republican status was attained, and, as predicted by the Government's opponents, it created the conditions which spawned the South African Students' Organisation and Black Consciousness, a new black nationalist threat to white supremacy. From the late 1960s, the facade of the consensus was shattered, and police action against students was an increasingly regular feature at the black and English-medium institutions.

8.2 Towards a definition of university apartheid

In analysing the relationship between apartheid and university education, in this thesis I have avoided using the phrase 'university apartheid', which is colloquially familiar but devoid of precise analytical content.

Many people who use the phrase will simply consider that it refers to the racial segregation of the university system. But university education in South Africa was already largely racially segregated when the National Party came to power in 1948, and segregation is only one feature of Nationalist university policy. A second common use of the phrase refers to the effects of the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. Used in this sense, university apartheid generally implied the compulsory imposition of segregation which forced the 'open' universities to refuse admission to black students. The creation of the black university colleges is also acknowledged in this usage.

Both of these uses of the phrase omit any sense of two fundamental aims of Nationalist governance of university education, namely, first, the expansion of institutional capacity which they engineered and the soaring student numbers for which they were partly responsible, and second, the deliberate favouring and promotion of Afrikaans students.

Popular explanations of the reasons for the Government's university policies are similarly unsatisfactory. Most crudely, they are dismissed as racist, which, while undoubtedly true, fails to explain why the Nationalist Government spent so much

money on expanding African higher education, delaying white, and particularly Afrikaans, claims in the process. It is also commonly said that 'university apartheid was simply an extension of Bantu Education'. However, there were significant differences and contradictions between the aims of university policy and Bantu Education at school level and in any case, university policy was not only applied to Africans. Some analysts argue that the Nationalist Government pursued policies which were 'functional to racial capitalism'. Certainly, Nationalist university policy encompassed a deliberate attempt to promote the economic power of Afrikaners and the English-medium universities were allowed to retain some autonomy, probably in the realisation that this was necessary for the universities to be able to produce the graduates required by the economy. However, throughout the period under review 'capitalist needs' were neither articulated nor directly served in any obvious way by the system of state-controlled ethnic university colleges: these considerations first became explicit after the educational crisis after June 1976.

A fundamental difficulty with trying to develop a more analytically useful definition of university apartheid stems from the lack of precision in the use of the term apartheid itself. Apartheid, or separateness, was the slogan used by the NP in the 1948 election to convey a sense of how it would approach 'the colour question'. The term was given some content by the Sauer Report, but even in the NP's first term of office it was obvious that the Sauer Report, or the slogan apartheid, did not prescribe a programme of government. Furthermore, approaches to key issues, such as the position of the urban African labour force, were simply not resolved before 1948. Apartheid was a supremely flexible concept, which allowed the evolving NP to adapt to widely changing circumstances over the next four decades.

Initially, the term apartheid referred to the relationship between population groups in South Africa, a concept is given even clearer expression in the later euphemism 'separate development'. But after Verwoerd became the Minister of Native Affairs and transformed his department with a combination of administrative genius and implacable ideological zeal into a 'state within a state', it seems that in the popular conception, apartheid became primarily associated with the Native Affairs Department's policies. Apartheid was then no longer simply a portmanteau slogan

for all the NP policies governing human relations: it was the name given to the policies imposed by the white government on black, especially African, subjects. This meant that a vast array of NP policies which were not directly aimed at the subjection of black people were not regarded as peculiarly apartheid in character. On the other hand, some materialist analysts spoke of the 'apartheid state', arguing that racial subjection was the result both of the system of racial capitalism and of the policies of the Nationalist Government. This also confirmed the tendency to regard apartheid as a system that oppressed and exploited black people, rather than a term that described the economic, political and social relations between South Africans.

As with apartheid generally, Nationalist university policies were scarcely defined by 1948 and over four decades of NP rule, the system of university education constantly evolved. Furthermore, the character of the system of university education during the high apartheid years was not only defined by Government policies, but influenced by a range of factors, including economic, social and demographic change. However, there was one sharp change between university education in the segregation years and during the years of Nationalist rule: this was a change in the philosophical principles guiding the Government's management of university education.

During the struggles over the *Afrikaanswording* of the universities in the 1920s and 1930s, Afrikaner Nationalists challenged the dominant assumptions about the universal neutrality of university education. In their experience, the 'universal' ideal was not inclusive, but implied the suppression of the Afrikaans language, and, by extension, Afrikaner identity, by a dominant English-language and supposedly British-oriented political and intellectual culture. In place of this flawed 'universalism', Afrikaner Nationalists developed a new concept of the university, which linked it to the particular character of a defined ethnic group.

Once in power, the Nationalists applied the concept of the *volksuniversiteit* to their development and governance of black university education. As Gerrit Viljoen, the

first rector of the Rand Afrikaans University and the head of the Broederbond, wrote,

The Afrikaner academic had, in the course of decades, gained the insight that his own culture is something valuable [and] that a university is essential for the full maturation of a group culture and for helping the group to maintain a better life ... for the same reason the Blacks of South Africa should also have their own universities and not remain relegated to the status of people being 'fused into' Anglo-Saxon culture.²

Similar points were made by CH Rautenbach, Rector of the University of Pretoria and the Chair of the Council of the University College of the North. Rautenbach argued that integrated universities, far from 'affirming faith in common humanity', 'violates the worth and dignity of Bantu as human beings'.³

We think that respect for the *humanum*, the common humanity in the Bantu, the maintenance and advancement of his own sense of worth and dignity, will grow and expand more readily in his own university and homeland than where he is a stranger and academic share-cropper as a member of a small minority at a so-called open university⁴ ... Africanisation ... adaptation to African cultural-philosophical patterns [is] antiquated to us, the supporters of apartheid ... [it is] the crux of our policy of separate development ... notice is being taken of other kinds of universities than the good old British model.⁵

'Particularist' philosophy is the defining characteristic of the Nationalists' approach to university education and is the key to a useful definition of university apartheid. The particularist approach helps to explain the nature of the policies adopted to meet the Nationalists' three main goals for both black and white institutions: elaborating and strictly enforcing ethnic segregation; differentiating educational content and opportunity, especially favouring Afrikaners; and defusing political

2. Viljoen, GVN (1977) 'The Afrikaans universities and particularism' in Van der Merwe, HW and ... sh, D, (eds.) *The future of the university in Southern Africa*, David Philip, Cape Town, p184.

3. Rautenbach, CH (1963) *Open discussion on closed universities*, University College of the North, Sovenga, p10.

4. *Ibid.*, p11.

5. *Ibid.*, pp4-5.

tension through moulding students' political energies in an ethnically defined environment. These can be seen as the three goals of university apartheid.

The consequences of policies adopted to meet these goals were contradictory. More elaborate segregation was enforced. Educational differentiation was achieved through the fragmentation of governance and the creation of the state-controlled system. Afrikaans students were singled out for special treatment and black students were disadvantaged by inferior facilities. However, the political and philosophical underpinnings of the ethnic university colleges were roundly rejected by the black students they enrolled and the black communities they were supposed to 'serve'. As Viljoen admitted,

The fact that Blacks did not ask for their own separate universities and actually opposed such a system, preferring admission to the 'open universities', was interpreted by Afrikaners, in terms of Afrikaans experience, as ... proof that the Blacks ... were blinded to the value of their own culture as a factor in education through the influence of British cultural imperialism in the education which had for decades 'brainwashed' the Blacks. Consequently, given the political power structure of the time, the Afrikaner academic agreed that particularistic Black universities should paternalistically be imposed upon the Blacks 'because it is to their own cultural benefit' ... What the Afrikaner intellectual nationalist, looking back in retrospect, did fail to see was that for a university to be *effectively* particularistic, i.e. Nation or group focused, it must ... be *legitimised* in the eyes and in the experience of the group or nation concerned.⁶

However, to a certain extent the 'medium was the message': while the particularistic university colleges were themselves rejected, Black Consciousness analysts turned against the universal ideal as well. For example, Balintulo argued that the universal conception of university education was 'based on the superiority of British culture' and rejected it, along with the particularist conception, as

6. Viljoen, *op cit.*, pp184-185.

ideologically supportive of white supremacy.⁷ The South African Students' Organisation's condemnation of the National Union of South African Students also represented a rejection of the universal ideal.

But the massive increase in student enrolment demonstrates that despite the high-profile opposition expressed by the English-medium universities and students at the black university colleges to the imposition of particularist university policies, university apartheid engineered the collusion of thousands of students. The alumni of apartheid universities and university colleges were profoundly influenced, in complex and ambiguous ways, by their experiences of university apartheid. Through them, the intellectual and political consequences of university apartheid live on.

7. Balintulo, M (1979) 'The Black universities in South Africa' in Rex, J (ed.) *Apartheid and Social Research*, Unesco Press, p144. More broadly, the South African Students' Organisation did not consider the universal ideal of university education as a significant political objective; they saw academic freedom as an 'intermediate goal' that was 'meaningful to whites' but largely irrelevant to blacks who were struggling for more fundamental freedoms. (Gerhart, G (1978) *Black power in South Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p268.)

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Justice (MJU) Vol. 137, J21/22/1, Nusas.
NRSN Vol. 479, N/Y/116.
MGE Vol. 74, A1/21 RAU.

Institutional Archives

Rhodes University: Cory Library for Historical Research

Mahlasela papers on African education at Fort Hare 1951-1970;
Beda Hall, Fort Hare, records 1910-1964;
Minutes of Fort Hare SRC until 1959;
Robert HW Shepherd Collection: papers on Fort Hare;
Alexander Kerr papers: papers assembled by Dr Kerr relating to the establishment
of Fort Hare, its subsequent history and its transfer.

University of Cape Town, University Archive

Registrar's papers

University of Durban-Westville, Documentation Centre

SP Olivier Collection.

University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies

Nusas collection;
United Party collection.

University of Natal, Campbell Collection

EG Malherbe papers.

University of Natal, University Registry

Correspondence files, including box on 'Admission to non-European section.'

University of the Orange Free State, Institute for Contemporary History

National Party, Transvaal
National Party, Orange Free State
National Party, Natal
National Party, Cape
National Party, Informational Service
DJ Mostert, MP
AH Jonker, MP
Japie Basson, MP
Cathy Taylor, MP
DT du P Viljoen, MP

JH Viljoen, Cabinet Minister
Jan de Klerk, Cabinet Minister
HF Verwoerd, Prime Minister
JE Holloway, civil servant
Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings
Instituut vir Christelike Nasionale Onderswys
Suid Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede
Afrikaanse Studentebond.

University of South Africa Documentation Centre

Fort Hare Accession: Senate Records from Fort Hare 1970;
JIR Jolobe Accession: Fort Hare minutes until 1975;
ZK Matthews Papers: Papers on University Apartheid until 1968;
JG Molefe Accession: Advisory Council at Fort Hare 1939-1974;
Bound volume of newspaper cuttings about the published report of the Snyman
Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances at the University of the
North;
Ntonjeni Accession: Press releases from Fort Hare 1972-1978;
Newspaper cuttings, circular, statement by the Rector in connection with unrest at
the University of the Western Cape, 1975;
SASO and BPC Collection: Microfilm of SASO trial, SASO newsletters 1971-
1973, conferences 1972-1974;
Wallerstein documents: reel of microfilm on SASO.

University of the Witwatersrand: Historical and Literary Papers

Archives of the South African Institute of Race Relations;
Press clips collected by SAIRR;
Ballinger Papers;
Nusas collection.

University of the Witwatersrand, University Archive

Correspondence relating to admission of Black students after 1960.

1.2.3 Private collections

Mark Orkin

1.3 Schedule of interviews

Beard, TVR (1989) Politics lecturer, Fort Hare, late 1950s; interviewed in
Grahamstown, August 1989
Bozzoli, GR (1992) Former Wits Vice Chancellor, interviewed in Johannesburg,
December 1992
De Bear, Z (1992) Student leader, University of Cape Town, late 1940s and early
1950s; interviewed in Johannesburg, 4 December 1992
CJ (1998) Nusas leader, early 1960s, interviewed at Wellington College,
Berkshire, 3 January 1998
Du Plessis, C (1992) Student leader, University of the Orange Free State, mid
1950s; interviewed in Pretoria, 10 November 1992

- Goedhals, B (1992) Student leader, Rhodes University, mid 1950s; interviewed in Pretoria, 11 November 1992
- Heyns, L (1992) Student leader, Stellenbosch University, mid 1950s; interviewed in Pretoria, 10 November 1992
- Kallaway, P (1998) Rhodes student involved in Christian student organisations in the 1960s, interviewed in Cape Town, February 1998
- Klerck, HP (1992) Student leader, University of the Orange Free State, early 1950s; interviewed in Johannesburg, 17 November 1992
- Kota, P (1989) Fort Hare student 1960s, Fort Hare lecturer since 1970s; interviewed at Fort Hare, Alice, August 1989
- Makalima, W (1989) Fort Hare student 1930s, teacher at Lovedale 1940s-1970s, Fort Hare lecturer 1980s; interviewed at Fort Hare, Alice, August 1989
- Mandela, NR (1993) Student leader, Fort Hare, 1939-40, subsequently ANC leader; interviewed in Johannesburg, 15 January 1993
- Marx, AT (1992) RAU student leader, interviewed in Johannesburg, November 1992
- Mashishi, K (1989) Fort Hare student 1959-1961; interviewed in Johannesburg, November 1989
- Modise, L (1992) Fort Hare student late 1970s and early 1980s; interviewed in Johannesburg, October 1992
- Olivier, NJJ (1990) South African Bureau of Racial Affairs executive member, 1950s; interviewed telephonically, April 1990
- Olivier, SP (1995) First rector of UDW; interviewed in Pennington, March 1995.
- Orkin, M (1993) Wits student leader, late 1960s; interviewed in Johannesburg, January 1993
- Pitje, G (1992) Fort Hare student in the 1940s, Unisa student 1950s, council member of the university of the North 1975 -1990; interviewed in Johannesburg, October 1992
- Rachanis, C (1992) Student leader, University of the Witwatersrand, 1950s; interviewed in Johannesburg, 12 November 1992
- Schreiner, D (1995) Vice Principal, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1960s; interviewed in Pietermaritzburg, March 1995
- Sekete-Orleyn, T (1992) Fort Hare law student 1970s; interviewed in Johannesburg, October 1992
- Tambo, O (1992) Student leader, Fort Hare, 1939-42; interviewed in Johannesburg, October 1992
- Tobías, PV (1993) Student leader, University of the Witwatersrand, late 1940s and early 1950s; interviewed in Johannesburg, 17 January 1993
- Viljoen, GVN (1995) First rector of Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, former chairman of the Broederbond; interviewed in Pretoria, January 1995
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