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State Formation and State Consolidation in Post Colonial Southern Africa

Tom Lodge

Post colonial southern African states are distinctive for their relative administrative capacity and their fairly effective governance. Analysis of African states has identified a prevalent set of weaknesses: uncertain territorial jurisdiction, underperformance, overconsumption of restricted resources, external dependency, corruption and the privatisation of public resources by unproductive ruling groups[1]. No southern African state is entirely free of these shortcomings but they affect the functioning of government less in this region than elsewhere in Africa. Southern African states differ characteristically from most African post-colonial states in having stronger or at least longer established traditions of legitimation and political continuity. In several countries the formation of the modern state has been facilitated by the congruence of frontiers with precolonial political boundaries: Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and in certain respects, South Africa have benefitted from this. In the cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe especially, complete sovereignty or at least considerable political autonomy for most of the century, has enabled their administrations to develop a degree of social impermeability. State autonomy is also facilitated by what are in African terms quite well developed capitalist class structures in relatively diversified economies; in especially South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland, the state is less significant than elsewhere upon the continent as a nexus of class formation and hence can function more independently of specific social forces. These qualities reflect the comparatively sophisticated bureaucratic development required to administer a labour repressive mining economy which evolved at the turn the century, fairly extensive secondary industrialisation in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and sharply differentiated social structures which include large and well organised working classes and correspondingly vigorous industrial, commercial and agricultural bourgeoisies.

What follows is an elaboration of this argument which will examine in turn the salient characteristics of all the southern African states considering their functional disposition and effectiveness before discussing their social orientation and their relationships with the societies they govern.

With its 1.7 million employees[2] South Africa's public sector is the largest in Africa and its division until 1994 into five notionally sovereign separate entities and further ten ethnically or racially designated administrations made it one of the most bureaucratically fragmented. Its growth was fastest in the 1950s and it began to slow and even shrink in some sectors in

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[1]See: Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance, Cultural Change and Empowerment", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30, 4 (1992), pp. 543-567; Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and prospect", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 2 (1990), pp. 179-198; Joshua B Forrest, "The Quest for State "Hardness" in Africa", *Comparative Politics*, July 1988, pp. 423-441; Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Modern African State", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 4 (1987), pp. 25-47.

[2]This figure includes half a million employees of parastatal corporations. The civil service proper included in 1994 the 420,000-strong Public Service of South Africa, 170,000 teachers, 431,000 employees of homeland governments and 70,000 in "other services" (Source: *Infospec*, 4 August 1995, p. 9). 65,6 per cent of employees in the public service in 1994 were black.

the mid 1980s. It's expenditure represents less than a third of GNP, relatively low for an African state[3]. Like other African states, it employs a significant share of the economically active population, 15 per cent[4], though in comparison to other African countries public employment share of the modern sector is quite limited is quite limited. State-owned corporations have made an important contribution to economic development, beginning with the formation of ISCOR in 1927 but only six of the top forty firms in South Africa are nationalised, these include the post office, the transport system and electricity supply[5] and their 100,000 or so employees represent a small fraction of the industrial workforce. State intervention within the economy has had mixed effects but without state initiatives and controls its is extremely doubtful that South African would have as large or as advanced manufacturing sector as it does today. Some of the most internationally competitive sections of South African industry are linked to state initiatives[6]. An indication of the South African state's administrative capacity is the share of its revenue derived from personal taxation; at forty per cent in 1995 much higher than is the case with most Africa governments which chiefly finance themselves through customs receipts. Other good indicators of administrative reach or state penetration into society are primary school enrolment and social security coverage: most South African children attend at least a few years of school and all adults over 65 are entitled to a very small pension though access to education and other state services is historically racially skewed. Up until the 1980s, the state's coercive capacity was formidable, manifest in its control over the geographical mobility of black South Africans and the annual conviction and imprisonment of about 300,000 "pass offenders"[7] as well as the forced resettlement of nearly three million people between 1960 and 1980. During the 1980s, confronted with rising levels of popular rebellion as well as perceived external threats the state underwent a degree of militarisation; soldiers increasingly assumed administrative and policy making functions and security forces received a larger share of the budget. Military expenditure as a proportion of GDP remained modest by African standards, though. Diminishing administrative capacity in the 1980s was signalled by the abolition of the pass laws in 1986 once it was obvious that an overburdened "influx control" system had become ineffectual. Other signs of bureaucratic degeneration included from 1979 a series of major financial scandals affecting high levels of government. Petty corruption had long been a feature of lower echelon administration particularly in the rural homelands and in black

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[3]Francis Wilson, "Poverty, the State and Redistribution: Some reflections", in Nicoli Nattrass (ed.), *The Political Economy of South Africa*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990, p. 231.

[4]Annette Seegers, "Towards an understanding of the Afrikanerisation of the South African State", *Africa*, 63 (4), 1993, p. 41.

[5]Duncan Reekie, "The Parastatals" in Charles Simkins and Merle Lipton (eds.), *State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1993, p. 130.

[6]E.g. telecommunications. For details see David Kaplan, "State policy and technological change - the development of the South African Telecommunications industry", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15, 3, 1989, pp. 565-580.

[7]In the year ending June 1978 313 850 people were prosecuted under the pass laws (South African Institute of Race Relations, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 301-302).

townships but large scale venality in central government was a relative novelty[8]. For white South Africans, since its inception in 1910, the state's legitimacy rested upon legally guaranteed privileges and a liberal constitution; executive power was strengthened considerably in 1983 simultaneously with the extension of representative government to Indian and coloured minorities and from the 1950s the scope of judicial independence and authority was substantially curtailed. Black acquiesence to this order resulted from the absence of obvious alternatives to state power and, between 1950 and 1980, the successful creation of an regimented residential environment for a growing working class. By the mid 1970s the progress of guerilla insurgency in the region and public housing shortages and overcrowded schools all detracted from the state's authority. In the eighties unprecedented levels of local authority corruption and a fiscal crisis removed whatever shreds of legitimacy had to that date been retained by local state structures in black townships. Nation wide localised insurrections in 1984-1985 prompted the construction of a parallel local administration led by soldiers under the direct of a National Security Management System until its dismantling in 1990[9]. A new constitution in 1994 established nine new regional governments in place of four provincial administrations and ten ethnic homelands, granted universal suffrage and made executive and legislative institutions subordinate to a presidentially appointed constitutional court. Central government retains the power to overrule most laws made by regional assemblies.

The bureaucracy which has presided over these developments has in its upper echelons since the 1930s been chiefly recruited from white Afrikaans speakers; in the 1950s promotion and recruitment policies discriminated in favour of supporters of the ruling National Party[10]. Seegers has noted that from the 1940s the bureaucratic elite came from an Afrikaner culture which contained "infantilising family dynamics", an "in built tendency to divide" and "an organised religious life (which) bequeathed a curiously non assertive and reactive leadership style based upon a lifetime of conformity and propriety"[11]. From the 1970s, black employment in senior civil service ranks increased especially as a consequence of the establishment of separate services for independent and self governing homelands, though in the central government of 3,239 "top public servants" in 1990 only 15 were African[12]. By the 1970s entry into the administrative ranks normally required a university degree but remained uncompetitive. Traditionally, senior civil servants were recruited from a narrow

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[8]Albert Venter, *South African Government and Politics*, Southern Books, Johannesburg, 1989, p. 76

[9]Annette Seegers, "Extending the Security Network to the Local Level" in Chris Heymans and Gerhard Totemeyer (eds.), *Government by the People*, Juta, Cape Town, 1988, pp. 119-141.

[10]Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa", *American Political Science Review*, 57, 1963, pp. 75-87.

[11]Annette Seegers, "Toward an understanding of the Afrikanerisation of the South african State", *Africa*, 63 (4), 1993, p. 486. Bureaucratic reformers in the 1990s have argued that from an international perspective South African public management is unusually "authoritarian, highly rigid and inflexible" (Patrick Fitzgerald, quoted in Jovial Rantao, "For a more civil service, *The Star*, 8 November, 1994).

[12]Job Mokgoro, "Reincorporation of the TBVC states" in Fanie Cloete and Job Mokgoro (eds.), *Policies for Public Service Transformation*, Juta, Cape Town, 1995, p. 66.

range of institutions, notably the Universities of Stellenbosch and Pretoria, and this helped to strengthen the corporate identity of a specialised administrative class. A Public Service Commission was meant to ensure against nepotism and political favouritism: during the 1950s its recommendations began to be habitually overruled. Patronage, however, was strategic rather than personal, geared to Afrikaner Nationalist social objectives. This degree of integrity may not have been maintained in the 1980s when corruption within one central government department prompted an official enquiry to comment that "billions" of had been lost through theft, fraud and incompetence with the complicity of senior management[13]. Since 1994, efforts to socially diversify senior ranks may have increased the scope of political and personal patronage[14].

Bureaucratic corruption in the 1980s was attributable to a growing culture of official secrecy as well as an increasing embourgeoisfication of the Afrikaner governing class. Until the 1980s, though, the South African state had a well demonstrated capacity for removing itself from the influence of specific social classes. This has been explained by Yudelman as being caused by the relative strength of a "legitimation imperative" arising from the institution of democratic politics (for whites) before the creation of an industrial society[15]. This helps to account for the state's extraordinary attentiveness to the needs of farmers until recent decades and the ambiguities in its relationship with big business. In its early development, revenues derived from gold-mining taxation enabled it to develop the bureaucratic apparatus needed to channel and control the flows of cheap labour required by different sectors of the economy, embark upon a programme of secondary industrialisation, and incorporate an enfranchised white labour aristocracy. Each of these tasks both required and reinforced the state's autonomy from narrow sectional interests. In more modern times the extent to which the South African state's decision's have been governed by the imperatives of maintaining white supremacy or the less restricted dictates of industrial modernisation remain academically contested; either of these, though, suggest a governing elite possessing, in African terms, a remarkable freedom of manoeuvre.

In stark contrast to this relative power are the constraints confronting any government seriously contemplating social reform in Namibia. Under the South African mandate Namibia was in many respects governed as an integral part of South Africa. 100,000 white settlers enjoyed parliamentary representation in Cape Town from 1950 and even before then had been the beneficiaries of developmental policies which have resulted in modern Namibia

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[13]Danny Sing and Malcolm Wallis, "Corruption and Nepotism" in Fanie Cloete and Job Mokgoro (eds.), *op cit*, pp. 142-143.Homeland governments as well as those central government agencies which interfaced with them were particularly susceptible to financial misbehaviour. In 1995 the Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry drew attention to a R177 million power station which had not produced a single unit of power and which duplicated facilities already available: altogether the Commission found that the Mangope administration had misused or misappropriated R200,000 of public funds ("Bop power station called 'biggest fraud in SA history'", *The Star*, 9 October, 1995).

[14]This may be especially the case with tendering by the new provincial governments. For reports of allegations of corrupt tendering in the Northern province and Mpumalanga: Adam Cooke "Allegations of corrupt deals in Mpumalanga tender board", *The Star*, 9 October, 1995 and Adam Cooke, "Corruption talk hits a tender nerve", *The Star*, 18 October, 1995.

[15]David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1983.

having one of the best communications infrastructures in Africa. South African tax, credit and pricing policies more or less ruled out any local manufacturing or processing and favoured livestock ranching and mining; as a consequence, Namibia's economy is externally oriented to a degree unusual even for a developing country. Most public services were directed at settlers inhabiting the "police zone": in 1973 592 state schools accommodated 138, 890 African pupils while 23,154 white children attended 1,233 schools[16]. In 1975 African secondary school enrolment at 3,654 was about a quarter of white high school attendance. Most health facilities used by Africans were run by missionaries with the help of government subsidies. In general, for black Namibians access to government services in the 1970s was lower than in relatively much poorer African countries such as Tanzania. Rudimentary "homeland" bureaucracies developed in the northern reserves; these employed 1050 chiefs and headmen in 1972. Repressive state capacity, though, was evident in such regulatory mechanisms as the "influx control" which as in South Africa governed the mobility of contract workers between jobs and the northern labour reserves. Counter-insurgency in the 1980s represented a formidable extension of state power. From 1980, at least 70,000 South African soldiers would be stationed in Namibia as well as a newly created local army, the SWA Territorial Force, mustering at its peak 30,000, and South African military expenditure would well exceed South West African government revenues. 50,000 civilians were compelled to live in strategic hamlets, gaining access to a broader range of state benefits (primary school enrolment doubled in seven years) but more exposed to a soldiery whose violence against civilians was increasingly routinised. At the same time, consociational political reforms delegated welfare administration to eleven ethnic governments prompting the growth of a new black elite of about 40,000 households led by politicians, senior civil servants and professionals but also considerably extending the scope of official venality[17]. These governments spent about forty per cent of SWA revenues, devoting a portion of this expenditure to subsidising the development of a new class of black politician-farmers who took over former white owned cattle ranches. Increasing public expenditure was financed through loans, mainly from South Africa and South African revenue transfers. Direct South African military expenditure may have concealed significant sums directed at "strategic" civilian projects[18].

Independence and fuller democratic government was secured in 1990 through constitutional undertakings which include the maintenance of property relations and the retention of civil servants on their existing salaries and benefits. Consequently Namibia has one of the best paid civil services in sub-saharan Africa[19]. 50,000 returning exiles have helped to prompt

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[16]Reginald Green, Marja-Liisa Kiljunen and Kimmo Kiljunen (eds.), *Namibia: The Last Colony*, Longman, Harlow, 1981, pp. 107-108.

[17]Chris Tapscott, "War, Peace and Social Classes" in Colin Leys and John Saul (eds.), *Namibia's Liberation Struggle*, James Currey, London, 1995, p. 157.

[18]Wolfgang Thomas, "The economy in transition to independence" in Robert Rotberg (ed.), *Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects*, David Philip. Cape Town, 1983, pp. 59-70.

[19]For an impressionistic and favourable evaluation of the quality of senior echelons of government see John Saul and Colin Leys, "The Legacy - an afterword" in Saul and Leys, *op cit*, p. 198.

an expansion of the bureaucracy from 43,000 in 1990 to more than 70,000 four years later[20]. Ethnic governments have been absorbed into a second layer of thirteen regional administrations. The administration also includes a 10,000 strong Namibian Defence Force recruited from former combatants in the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and SWATF veterans under the command of Solomon Hawala, ex-chief of security at SWAPO's main base in Southern Angola. 13,000 other PLAN cadres have been placed in "Development Brigades" stationed in old army bases near the Northern border[21]. Aside from spending nearly half its revenues on renumeration the government has devoted large shares of public expenditure to education (29 per cent in 1995 and health (17 per cent). Despite new demands upon the budget, government spending as a share of GDP remained at about a third between 1992 and 1995[22]. Meanwhile, though, through the nineties, gross capital investment has declined so the prospects of school graduates finding jobs have deteriorated steadily. In 1995 social security legislation extended state benefits to all employees, of whom 40 per cent work in the public sector[23]. More modestly, a very cautious land reform programme resettled 16,000 families on state purchased farming allotments. State revenues are closely tied to mineral prices; until its fifty per cent purchase of de Beers, the most important component in the government's revenue was company tax, mainly derived from the mining corporations. Poor prices and sluggish external investment have limited the government's capacity to institute major social reforms; its budgets remain conservative and planning is secretive rather than consultative. The appointment of a Malaysian financier to the new Reserve Bank set up in 1990 signalled the government's commitment to business friendly policies. As the governing political party SWAPO's own authoritarian traditions help to explain the "arrogance of power" discernable to some observers[24] and manifest in such actions as the purchase of presidential and prime ministerial aeroplanes, the assignment of fishing quotas to cabinet members, and the expenditure of drought relief for drilling boreholes on politicians' farms[25]. This latter allegation may reflect a significant continuity with the social predisposition of the mandate regime which afforded huge subsidies in times of need to the 5,000 white ranchers who monopolised the territory's commercial agriculture[26]. A 70 per cent victory in Namibia's second general election gave SWAPO's leadership the power to alter the constitution; unless an economic upturn supplies the

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[20]"Small but determined", *Financial Mail*, 28 September, 1994.

[21]Economist Intelligence Unit, *Namibia Country Profile, 1992/1993*, London, 1993, 10; Simon Shikangalah, "The Development Brigade: The Namibian Experience" in Jakkie Cilliers, *Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 1995, pp. 70-71.

[22]*Finance Week*, 11 May, 1995.

[23]Chris Tapscott, "national reconciliation, social equity and class formation in Independent Namibia", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19 1 March 1993, p. 33.

[24]John Saul and Colin Leys, "The legacy - an afterword" in Saul and Leys, *op cit*, p. 203.

[25]See reports in *The Guardian*, 9 December, 1994; *The Citizen*, 22 June, 1995; *Finance Week*, 11 May, 1995.

[26]For analysis of "unusually generous" state aid for economically marginal white agricultural settlers in the 1920s and 1930s see A B Emmett, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South West Africa/Namibia, 1915-1966*, Ph D Dissertation, Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand 1987, pp. 153-157.

incentive to keep the political rules unchanged the future of liberal democratic consolidation in Namibia seems unpromising, to say the least.

As with South Africa and, to an extent, Namibia, relative bureaucratic efficiency is also a feature of the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. Self government from 1923 prompted the growth of regulatory mechanisms within the economy which encouraged local capital accumulation. As in South Africa, state capital in the 1930s was responsible for the first moves towards industrialisation with the establishment of an iron and steel corporation and the Cold Storage Commission[27]. From the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 to the installation of a majoritarian government in 1980 state capacity was considerably expanded through the requirements of counter-insurgency and sanctions evasion. State expenditure grew by thirty per cent a year between 1969 and 1978: by 1980 more than a third of this spending was militarily oriented[28]. Income tax, mainly extracted from the white minority, contributed the largest share of revenue, 44 per cent, followed by sales tax, accounting for nearly a quarter of the government's financing[29]. Half a million inhabitants of "protected villages" and the rapid growth of secondary industry under a strict import substitution regime testified to the extension of state power during the UDI period. By the late 1970s this power was fraying at the edges; by 1979 guerillas had closed 1,500 rural schools, one third of the total and more than a quarter of the protected villages[30]. Ninety one elected African Councils, the local authorities in rural areas, had been compelled to suspend operations. In 1964, the civil service employed 40,000 people; by independence in 1980 its numbers had nearly trebled, partly a consequence of a rapid expansion of education as well as militarisation[31]. By 1983, the upper echelons were predominantly black as senior white administrators either retired or emigrated. For some analysts, continuing state effectiveness is evident from the progress of a land reform programme which within ten years had undertaken the resettlement of 50,000 peasant households on serviced plots as well as from successful initiatives in the provision of rural primary health care and primary education[32]. These achievements seem all the more remarkable given the scope of administrative dislocation in the final years of the war. About sixty per cent of Zimbabwean babies are now born in government facilities and the distribution of these 450 centres is evenly spread

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[27]Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990, p. 19.

[28]Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe', *Political Science Quarterly*, 95, 3, 1980, pp. 445-446.

[29]Bratton, *op cit*, p. 450.

[30]Bratton, *op cit*, p. 453.

[31]Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe", *Political Science Quarterly*, 95, 1, 1980, p. 447.

[32]Herbst, *op cit*. Primary school enrolment increased from 719,000 in 1979 to 2.2 million in 1985 while the secondary school population rose from 79,000 to 500,000 (Jonathan Moyo, "State Politics and Social Domination in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 2 (1992), p. 316. Zimbabwe now takes more children, proportionately through ten years of non-vocational schooling than any other country in the world (Norman Reynolds, "Lessons for South Africa from the First Decade of Zimbabwe's Independence", Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 14).

throughout the country[33]. Relative state autonomy can be discerned in the government's ability to resist urban pressures for cheap food and the maintenance of pricing policies which are broadly favourable to farmers[34]. State controlled crop marketing boards remained through the 1980s comparatively efficient and have continued to channel their surplus into agricultural investments rather than as in many African instances serving mainly as a mechanism for transferring rurally generated resources to the cities and industrial sectors[35].

However, since 1980, white farmer lobbies have lost the political influence they acquired during the UDI period[36] and the government policies attempt to promote the fortunes of peasant producers. Government controls over the direction of foreign investment capital had been, by 1990, rather successful at making the heavily protected domestic manufacturing more competitive, a reflection of the highly sophisticated financial regulatory structure which had developed during UDI[37].

Critical reviews of post-colonial Zimbabwean politics suggest that strong continuities of class bias exist between the Mugabe administration and its predecessor, pointing to the gradualist implementation of land reform, the entry into the large scale landowning class of members of the political elite, the continuing influence from the UDI period of the Reserve Bank in economic decisions[38], and the high level corruption revelations which followed the 1989 Willowgate scandal[39]. Class predispositions of the civil service are probably mainly attributable to the technocratic bias of a bureaucracy whose officers continue to be heavily influenced by an anglocentric educational system as well as the inherited norms and routines of the settler government. Electoral evidence suggests that peasants and older people find it easier to identify with ZANU and the state than young townsfolk, in the case of the former

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[33]Christine Sylvester, *Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991, p. 128.

[34]Herbst, *op cit*, p. 82.

[35]Tor Skalnes, "Group Interests and the State: An Explanation of Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policies", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27, 1, 1989, pp. 90-91

[36]During the early 1970s annual government subsidies and loans were worth $8,000 per capita (Colin Stoneman (ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, Macmillan Publishers, London, 1988, p. 8.)

[37]Howard Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power in Africa: Debt Management Policies in Kenya and Zimbabwe', *African Studies Review*, 35, 2 (September 1992), p. 19.

[38]Norman Reynolds, "Lessons for South Africa from the First Decade of Zimbabwe's Independence", Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 8.

[39]For press reports on official Zimbabwean corruption: Michael Hartnack, "Zimbabwe's media is silent over Minister's order to commit fraud ", *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 11 June 1995. Christopher Clapham contends, though, that "Corruption, given the wealth of the economy, has remained discernibly lower than in Kenya, let alone Nigeria" ("Mugabe captains ship, often in stormy winds", *The Star*, 2 May, 1995).Corruption and maladministration are considered to be especially rife in the expanding parastatal sector which became in the 1970s the major source of political patronage (see: Jeffrey Herbst, "Political impediments to economic rationality: Explaining Zimbabwe's failure to reform its public sector", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27 1 (1989), pp. 67-84).

a reflection of the government's priorities in distributing food-aid[40] as well as lingering sentiment originally generated in the predominantly rural *Chimurenga*[41]. One conspicuous carryover from the UDI period is the state's authoritarian susceptibilities[42]. Nominally liberal representative democracy co-exists uneasily with the hegemonic aspirations of a political elite inclined to conflate party and state structures[43]. Regimented trade unions and a tightly disciplined publicly owned press help the government to deflect social pressure as does a brutal but generally well organised security establishment. In the 1990s the Zimbabwean state may find it difficult to match its early achievements: recession, debt, and structural adjustment have curtailed its resources and its coordinating and managerial capacities look increasingly questionable. The strength of the Zimbabwean state is historically the product of intense social and regional conflict; during the last decades of colonialism international isolation and a war economy served as impetuses in the consolidation of administrative reach. As conflict has receded so has the competence of an increasingly indebted government, compelled to cede sovereignty to multilateral lending agencies in return for the resources needed to fund social services.

Not all of southern Africa's "hard" states owe their formation to settler colonialism. The peculiar characteristics of Batswana governance are traceable to an unusually successful application of indirect rule precepts to an advanced tributary social formation. This facilitated a smooth transfer of power from the colonial administration to a cattle ranching aristocracy. Even in comparison with other African colonies British administration in Botswana was negligent (significantly, its headquarters was located in South Africa) and this helps to explain unusually low rates of urbanisation and literacy during the colonial period; in the run-up to independence modernist nationalist challenges to the moral authority of Batswana chiefs were comparatively weak. Chiefs themselves were accumulators of considerable wealth Through individual ownership of cattle and water boreholes, as early as the 1930s they constituted a recognisable rural bourgeoisie[44]. Their power was also attributable to a historic pattern of nucleated settlement in very large villages as well as the

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[40]John Fleming, "The Zimbabwe election that never was", *The Star*, 20 March, 1996, p. 23.

[41]Though the dynamics of rural political affiliation were complex: see Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerilla War: Peasant Voices*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. On class structure and electoral choice: Richard Saunders, "Life in Space - The New Politics of Zimbabwe", *Southern African Review of Books*, January-February, 1993, p. 20.

[42]With regard to managerial style these may have strengthened. Norma Kriger in a critique of Jeffrey herbst's book describes "senior bureaucrats (who) often seek permission from superiors before granting interviews... nobody is willing to make even minor decisions; hence minutiae get passed up the hierarchy to the politicians at the top" (Norma Kriger and Richard Saunders, "Through a Glass Darkly", *Southern African Review of Books*, March-April 1963, p. 21).

[43]Moyo, *op cit*, pp. 325-326.

[44]Kenneth Good, "Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30, 1 (1992), p. 72.

population's increasing dependence upon pumped subterranean water[45].

Mainland Africa's oldest liberal democracy, the continuities in Botswana political history are the effect of conservative fiscal and social policies pursued by a governing elite. Very slow rates of bureaucratic "localisation" has helped to socially insulate the state apparatus and may explain the relative absence of official venality[46]. In 1985 one third of senior administrative positions in Botswana were held by foreigners[47]. The political elite has used the state as an instrument to consolidate its wealth and social dominance but in contrast to many sub-Saharan the state has not served as a primary vehicle of capital accumulation for its governors. State intervention in the economy is restricted, selective, and judicious. Rapid economic growth has been facilitated by the discovery and exploitation of diamonds which through a joint equity agreement with de Beers yields substantial revenues. These enable the government to maintain a budgetary surplus and implement welfare policies which promote social control without checking the income inequalities accentuated by economic policies which have effectively concentrated cattle and land ownership. Drought relief was one welfare dimension of government quite well developed under colonialism: in 1965 "food for work" programmes reached 65 per cent of the population[48]. Today Botswana maintains what are by African standards unusually high levels of social security for its rural citizenry: critics note that this is the main form of government expenditure in the countryside aside from election-linked improvements in rural infrastructure[49]. Educational provision has raised literacy levels from ten per cent in 1965 to 35 per cent three decades later, a calculatedly modest performance[50].

About eighteen thousand people are employed by central and local government, about a third of those employed in the private sector[51]. In rural areas many of the administrative structures of colonialism remain. District commissioner supervise chiefs, function as security officers and review the operation of customary law courts. Chiefs exercise limited legal authority and considerable informal influence through traditional community assemblies, kgotlas.

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[45]Richard Vengroff, *Botswana: Rural Development in the Shadow of Apartheid*, Associated Universities Press, Cranbury, New Jersey, 1966, p. 15.

[46]M Wallis, *The Institutional Response to Drought*, Study Paper no. 5, Food Studies Group, Oxford, 1990; N. Raphaeli et al, *Public Sector Management in Botswana*, World Bank, Washington, 1984, Adrian Leftwich, "Bringing Politics back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State', *Journal of Development Studies*, 31, 3, 1995, p. 414.

[47]Mpho Molomo and Brian Mokopakgosi (eds.), *Multi-Party Democracy in Botswana*, Southern African Political economy Series, Harare, 1991, pp. 30-37.

[48]Louis A Picard, *The Politics of Development in Botswana*, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, 1987, p. 235.

[49]Good, *op cit*, p. 77; Roger Charlton, "The Politics of Elections in Botswana", *Africa*, 63 (3), 1993, p. 342.

[50]Molomo and Mokapakgasi, *op cit*, p. 8.

[51]Picard, *op cit*, p. 161.

Elected local government administers programmes which have increasingly privatised public commonage. Real power in setting and implementing policy is held by a small political and administrative elite numbering at most a few hundred. Sophisticated and competent administration, controlled and discriminating social investments, fiscal rectitude and economic good fortune have been the chief ingredients in the development of Botswana's strong state, a state formed around an unusually stratified precolonial social order. Rising social inequalities, accelerating urbanisation, increasing electoral challenge, and a growing incidence of corruption in high places[52] suggest that some of the threads in this tightly knit political system are beginning to unravel.

Like Botswana, the formation of the modern Swazi state owes much to a decolonisation process in which pre-colonial political authority emerged politically ascendent, its legitimacy enhanced by the monarchy's struggle to resist land alienation to white settlers. The presence of the settlers themselves ensured the growth of a sophisticated large scale commercial agricultural sector which in the 1950s benefitted from $79 million invested by the Colonial Development Corporation[53]. During the 1950s monarchists and settlers formed an alliance based on constitutional power-sharing. South African private sector support and chiefly power over land allocation within the royal domain helped the monarchist Imbokdovo national movement to prevail over weakly articulated democratic nationalism. King Sobhuza's denunciation of strikers in 1962 won British government approval and multinational corporate backing; a British army battalion flown in from Kenya guarantied a decorous transition to independence in 1968.

The contemporary Swazi state is a hybrid affair, a modest conventional bureaucracy, employing 8,000 in 1981, 3,000 of whom were teachers and as many soldiers[54], and a royal parastatal corporation, the Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, a shareholding enterprise which deploys the revenues paid to the royal house by companies which operate within the royal domain, about half the territory[55]. These funds are kept separate from the government budget which is chiefly derived from the income generated by the Southern African Customs Union[56]. R13 million customs revenues were lost in a major corruption scandal, one of several during the

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[52]Kenneth Good, "The Ends of the Ladder: Radical Inequality in Botswana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31, 2, (1993), pp. 225-227.

[53]Christian Potholm, *Swaziland: the Dynamics of Political Modernization*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p. 34.

[54]Robert Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, *The Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile*, Zed Press, London, 1985, p. 43.

[55]Davies, O'Meara and Dlamini, *op cit*, pp. 17-21.

[56]Alan Booth, *Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1983, p. 103.

1980s[57]. Eight per cent economic growth, largely a consequence of manufacturing investment by foreign companies barred by sanctions from direct involvement in South Africa, helped the government to balance its books despite official malfeasance; in 1993 the first appearance of a budget deficit prompted efforts at bureaucratic reform[58]. Comparative development indicators suggest that the state has been reasonably successful in broadening public access to services and welfare: excluding Indian Ocean islands Swaziland has the fourth highest UN HDI rating in sub-Saharan Africa (after Botswana, South Africa and Gabon, the third highest secondary school enrolment (after Botswana and Zimbabwe) and is in the top ten African countries for child immunization rates (98 per cent)[59]. From 1978 a nominated parliament and cabinet take their marching orders from the king's council, the Liqoqo, a body which became very powerful indeed during the lengthy regency which succeeded Sobhuza's death in 1979. Factional struggles within the Liqoqo led to several purges of potentially disloyal civil servants. Notwithstanding the accession to office of a personable and popular young king, Mswati, continuing secrecy, intrigue, and the patrimonial privatisation of national resources are likely to hamper any public sector housecleaning.

The modern Basotho state was also built around a precolonial monarchy but during the colonial period the erosion of those institutions which sustained royal power, *matsema* labour service and *mafisa* cattle loans, as a consequence of growing land shortage and labour migration left the royal house in much less commanding position than the Dlaminis in Swaziland. Nationalist claims to leadership were divided between a protestant educated elite and junior chiefs who had lost formal office through colonial administrative reforms. The chiefs' Basotho National Party won the pre-independence election in 1965 with support from the South African government and local Roman Catholic clergy and presided over the Basotho polity for the next thirty years, filling its senior echelons with retired South African civil servants[60] until it could replace these in the 1970s with its own loyal cadres. The BNP's leader, Leabua Jonathan Molapo, was a senior representative of a cadet branch of the Basotho Royal House and this lent a dynastic dimension to tense relations between the King and the government. From 1970, BNP rule was unconstitutional, upheld after an annulled election by the Police Mobile Unit, Lesotho's fledgling army. Recruitment to this force quickened in the 1980s and within it BNP membership became compulsory under the "sephepechane" system, notwithstanding the government's constitutional pretensions to embodying an "all-party" democracy.

Lesotho's economic dependence was reflected in its rulers' administrative and fiscal reliance on foreign powers; this has posed a particular problem for state legitimation as well as causing sharp oscillations in government policy particularly with respect to relations with South Africa. International aid to Lesotho increased sharply in the 1980s and after customs

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[57]Davies et al, *op cit*, pp. 66-67.

[58]Christina Lamb, "Wind of change blowing through Africa's Ruritania", *The Star*, 10 June, 1995.

[59]Pieter Esterhuysen and Madeline Lass (eds.), *Africa at a Glance*, Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1995, p. 24; The Global Coalition for Africa, *African Social and Economic Trends 1994*, Washington, 1995, pp. 61-63.

[60] For a list see LBBJ Machobane, "Perceptions on the constitutional future of Lesotho", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 26, 2, July 1988, p. 200.

receipts dispensed from Pretoria became the second source of government income. Arguably, this may help to explain the irresponsibility which characterised the management of public finance during the BNP regime and its successor. An officially suppressed auditors report on public accounts between 1975 and 1978 found that lethargy, inefficiency and dishonesty permeated every branch of the civil service[61]. Bad management of public accounts predated independence but the bureaucracy's weaknesses were accentuated by the systematic removal from its ranks of relatively well qualified BCP supporters after 1970. To be fair to Jonathan's administration, the dismissal of BCP loyalists from the civil service was partly justified by hostility and obstructionism to his government within the bureaucracy openly manifest well before 1970[62].

Whatever its shortcomings, Leabua Jonathan's government presided over a considerable enlargement of the state's authority between 1966 and 1986. This was not difficult given the unimpressive legacy of colonial state building. Even by British standards, the colonial bureaucracy was modest in scope, delegating responsibility for almost all education to three missionary organisations who between them achieved the proportionately highest primary enrolment in Africa[63]. Traders were given the responsibility of maintaining "Class C" roads, 400 miles out of a total network of 960 in 1965[64]. Per capita state expenditure was about one third of Swaziland's in the early 1960s, and despite the recent availability of greater quantities of development aid half of the state's revenues were absorbed by salaries[65]. One indicator of the limitations of colonial state reach was the efficacy of personal tax collection; in 1960 officials believed that tax yields were about a third of their potential level[66]. Nearly two thirds of government revenues for 1965/66 derived from British aid, an unusually high proportion even in colonial Africa[67]. From the end of the Second World War much of this aid was expended on anti erosion measures, involving the construction of 26,717 miles of contour terracing, the main effect of which was to concentrate water so as to considerably expand its capacity to remove top soil at specific points in the landscape[68]. From this modest base line the post colonial state's administrative scope and economic embrace expanded to

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[61]Paul Wellings, "Making a fast buck: capital leakage and public accounts in Lesotho", *African Affairs*, 82, 329, October 1983, pp. 495-507.

[62]Gabrielle Strom, *op cit*, p. 89.

[63]*Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland: Report of an Economic Survey Mission*, HMSO, London, 1960, p. 251.

[64]*Report of the Secretary General on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, United National General Assembly, New York, 25 August, 1965, p. 130.

[65]John Bardill and James Cobbe, *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*, Wetsview, Boulder, 1985, p.49.

[66]*Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland*, pp. 218-219.

[67]Bardill and Cobbe, *op cit*, p. 49.

[68]Kate Showers, "Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15 2 January 1989, p. 285.

include the direct administration of education from 1976, the creation of a commercial land market after the revision of traditional land tenure in 1979, and its foreign aid supported developmental role in the countryside. The 1969 revision in the Customs Union significantly boosted public revenues enabling Jonathan to build up army and extend the field of public patronage through the proliferation of parastatals. Local tax collection was improved with the institution of a local PAYE system in 1970. By 1984 public sector employment had reached 21,000, three times its 1971 figures[69], and there were over fifty public corporations[70]. In 1968 the BNP administration abolished elected local government, removing official sanction from the 3,000 or so bodies which had been established during the terminal colonial phase and which had begin to assume the control over land allocation hitherto exercised by chiefs. During the early 1970s the local state was reconstructed around bureaucratically appointed committees under chiefly chairmanship[71].

By the 1980s Basotho political leadership was fragmented by intense factionalism caused by the competing claims of different sources of state legitimacy, rival sources of foreign patronage, and ideological feuds within cabinet reflecting these. Jonathan's promotion of an armed party youth wing and ascendency within his cabinet of a radical anti-apartheid faction prompted a South African induced takeover by the Defence Force, a body now strongly linked through kinship ties to the royal family. Rifts between the soldiers and the King became evident in 1988 after an especially humiliating display of military incompetence in which South African commandoes had to be summoned to rescue a hijacked busload of pilgrims during a papal visit. Weakened by a series of corruption scandals the military government finally conceded democratic elections in 1993, won by Leabua Jonathan's rival, Ntsu Mokhehle, once an ally of the South African ANC, and later, through the interplay between Basotho and regional politics, a beneficiary of Pretoria's destabilisation policies. A heavily politicised army returned to its barracks but its internecine feuding in Maseru in January 1994 and subsequent attempted deposition of Mokhehle's government underscored the divisions which exist inside and between different state institutions in Lesotho.

In contrast to Swaziland and Lesotho, pre-colonial formations have had little impact on the modern Zambian state: north of the Zambezi local polities at the end of the nineteenth century were "recently formed, divided, and fluid"[72]. As with Lesotho, the colonial bureaucracy represented weak foundations for state building: the copperbelt companies developed their own style of paternalism towards a fairly settled labour force. The construction of relatively attractive company towns made forced labour recruitment a less important aspect of government policy in Northern Rhodesia than elsewhere in Southern Africa; it also precluded the development of official welfare services. White farmers along "the line of rail" supplied most marketed crops and hence the tiny Northern Rhodesian

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[69]Gabrielle Strom, *Migration and Development: A Study of Lesotho*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1986, p. 87.

[70]1996 figures, cited in *Business Day*, 17 April, 1996.

[71]Gabrielle Strom, *op cit*, pp. 80-84.

[72]Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics" in William Tordoff (ed.), *Politics in Zambia*, Manchester University Press, 1974, p. 69.

bureaucracy had little time for peasant farming and rural development schemes, even after World War Two[73]. As a consequence of its subordinate position in the Central African Federation, Northern Rhodesia was hardly affected by post war reforms in British colonial policy and it attained independence in 1964 with less educated manpower than any comparable British territory[74]. High rates of proletarianisation and urban growth, a result of the mining economy, were reflected, though, in a surprisingly powerful nationalist movement, the United National Independence Party, one which through the continuing social linkages between urban workers and their rural families managed to penetrate deeply, if unevenly through the countryside. Four years after independence, UNIP could muster 463 branches in Luapula province, one for every 350 adults[75].

Ensconced in power through a modified Westminster constitution which invested huge powers in an executive presidency, filled from independence by former schoolteacher Kenneth Kaunda, UNIP lost no time in implementing an ambitious programme of state expansion. Primary school enrolment doubled in four years to 600,000 and new secondary schools enlisted another 200,000[76], enabling the authorities to "Africanise" the civil service quite rapidly, though whites continued to predominate in the senior ranks through the 1960s. High copper prices and subsequent revenues permitted the state to spend generously: public expenditure leapt from K91m to K553 between 1963 and 1971[77]. Copper revenues also enabled the government to purchase majority shareholdings in 26 foreign owned companies in 1968, the two main copper corporations in 1969, and building societies and insurance firms in 1970. These nationalisations created a vast parastatal sector which employed about a third of the wage earning workforce. Though many of the seventy or so state companies continued to be managed by their former owners under political direction they became increasingly less effective commercially, serving as reservoirs of patronage, and, more worthily, investing in government industrial decentralisation projects as well as supplying heavily subsidised services and commodities[78].

Until 1972 Zambia was a multiparty democracy, with party rivalries mainly reflecting the historical variations in the timing and degree of integration of different regions into the central economy. Even during the First Republic (1964-1971), UNIP began to assign political office bearers to positions customarily held by civil servants, most notably through the creation of a new political head of the civil service, the Secretary General to the Government. Political appointments helped the civil service to grow from 22, 561 in 1964

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[73]Stephen Quick, "Bureaucracy and rural socialism in Zambia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15, 3 (1977), p. 381.

[74]William Tordoff, "Introduction" in Tordoff, *op cit*, 1974, p. 8.

[75]Molteno, *op cit*, p. 99.

[76]Molteno, *op cit*, p.103.

[77]William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, "Government and Administration' in Tordoff, *op cit*, 1974, p. 243.

[78]Ben Turok, "Zambia's system of state capitalism", *Development and Change*, 11, 1980, p. 470.

to 51,497 in 1969[79]. UNIP subscriptions were collected through government machinery, enabling the party to develop its own paid bureaucracy, and, more significantly, a substantial property portfolio[80]. In December 1971, a one party constitution was adopted, a response to growing opposition to UNIP in the Southern and Western provinces as well as internal party tensions. During the Second Republic the Office of the President expanded its powers further, running several ministries directly, appointing UNIP central committee members, constitutionally, the supreme policy-making group, and through nominations and party vetting, playing a decisive role in the selection of parliamentarians. Party/state fusion reached its furthest extent in the 1980 local government reforms when party structures replaced elected district and municipal representative bodies.

During the 1970s, authoritarian reflexes in government already visible in the First Republic became accentuated with the quickening incidence of preventative detention, state takeover of the press in 1975, and academic repression. Even so, UNIP rule never represented systematic tyranny. Kaunda's preferred way of dealing with his opponents was to give them jobs, maintaining his popularity at the expense of an increasingly bloated bureaucracy. Despite government efforts to control them, trade unions successfully resisted incorporation, and both newspapers and parliamentary back-benchers functioned as a loyal opposition through the Second Republic, extending their criticisms to include not only abuses but precepts of official policy. Limits to authoritarianism were also defined by the state's restricted reach. This was especially the case in the countryside. Colonial indirect rule authorities were dismantled in 1965 leaving the 250 or so paid traditional chiefs with mainly ceremonial functions. In the place of colonial native authorities in 1971 the government installed a hierarchy of development committees. Three years later researchers found an "institutional vacuum" at village level with less than ten per cent of the Village Development Committees functioning in certain districts[81]. More recently, it has become evident in the countryside, especially in the western region that the state's moral authority is mainly dependent upon revitalised ethnic lineages, boosted in certain areas by agricultural schemes launched by parastatals[82]. State reach was also consolidated from 1974 by the system of uniform producer prices and transport subsidies instituted by Namboard, the state marketing authority for maize; these generally benefitted peasant farmers in the most remote areas[83].

Zambian state development was fuelled by booming cooper revenues. When the price of copper fell after 1971 foreign loans replaced copper revenues as the mainstay of government expansion: by 1985 the IMF had lent more to Zambia than any other African state, partly as a consequence of its perceived strategic significance in Southern African regional

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[79]Tordoff and Molteno, *op cit*, p. 273.

[80]William Tordoff and Ian Scott, "Political Parties" in William Tordoff, *op cit*, 1974, p. 126.

[81]Michael Bratton, "The social context of political penetration: village and ward committees in Kasama District" in William Tordoff (ed.), *Administration in Zambia*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1980, p. 237.

[82]Wim van Binsbergen, "Aspects of democracy and democratisation in Zambia and Botswana: exploring African political culture at the grassroots", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 13, 1, 1995, p.

[83]Hans-Otto Sano, "The IMF and Zambia", *African Affairs*, 87, 349, October 1988, p. 574.

conflicts[84]. Compelled to embrace a harsh structural adjustment programme that year, including the removal of consumer and producer subsidies state authority underwent sharp contraction, signified in the growth of cross border smuggling, labour protest, middle class disaffection, and the virtual collapse of rural government in many regions: by 1988 half the 55 district councils had ceased to function as had most of the agricultural processing parastatal enterprises. Public social expenditure declined by one third in real terms between 1984 and 1991[85]. Policy oscillations between conformity, defiance and then again conformity with IMF prescriptions engendered party revolt and the formation of a Movement for Multi-Party Democracy by a coalition of former UNIP notables, especially from the West, businessmen and trade unionists. Constitutional revisions permitted multiparty elections in 1991 and an MMD victory; since then ex-trade unionist Frederick Chiluba has presided over a programme of state divestment[86] and deindustrialization, with 70,000 retrenchments in the parastatals[87]. However Chiluba's administration has been unable to afford the cost of large-scale dismissals in the civil service whose numbers today stand at 180 000[88]. While social services contract a new Zambia Revenue Authority has been established with the intention of collecting 22 per cent of GDP through income tax and a new introduced 20 per cent VAT[89].

The Zambian state system's social orientation helps us to understand both its shortcomings and its merits. Its predominance in the political economy of the First and Second Republics was mainly a consequence of an unusually stunted class formation at independence. Inheriting a particularly weak colonial administration, Kaunda's governments built their authority through expanding programmes of public employment, welfare, and subsidies. A new class of entrepreneurs developed around senior bureaucratic echelons in the civil service, increasingly immune from challenge by party populists after the 1971 constitution replaced politics with government. The state ideology of "Humanism" while helping to promote the allocation of public resources to the countryside did little to check accumulation at the centres of administrative power. Civil servants ignored the official leadership code to combine public office with private interest. Kaunda's own predisposition for personal intervention inhibited the development of institutionalised checks on corruption, waste and inefficiency as did his habit of controlling elite factionalism and checking aspirant rivals through the constant reshuffling of appointments and positions. In Chiluba's Third Republic liberal democracy has at best served as a partial brake on senior echelon misbehaviour: in 1993 several ministers were implicated in the private diversion of credits from state institutions.

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[84]Kenneth Good, "Debt and the one-party state in Zambia", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27, 2, 1989.

[85]Peter Burnell, "Poverty and politics in Zambia's Third Republic", *Third World Quarterly*, 16 4 1995, p. 676.

[86]To date privatisation has been concentrated in export agriculture, retail, and tourism, the sectors most likely to attract foreign investment (Duncan Guy, "Locals finding economic medicine hard to swallow", *Business Report*, 6 December, 1996, p. 9).

[87]Burnell, *op cit*, p. 678.

[88]"Zambia shelves retrenchment plan", *Business Report*, 25 March, 1995, p. 12.

[89]Guy, *op cit*.

The existence of a large and well organised working class manifestly capable of independent mobilisation helped for thirty years to restrict the scope of government bullying and ensure a reasonably equitable distribution of public resources: this force is now diminishing rapidly.

No such social restraints checked the accumulation of state power in post-colonial Malawi, for here historical patterns of proletarianisation have taken place chiefly through migrant labour export to Zimbabwe and South Africa. Malawi's thirty year dictatorship built upon a colonial system of administration which it kept virtually unchanged. A brief reformist era in government policy was rapidly brought to a halt under Hastings Banda, a former general practitioner in London and a presbyterian church elder, who invested in the executive even greater powers than it had enjoyed under colonialism (when it allowed a modicum of political representation to the 7,000 settlers and after 1948 to educated Africans). After the pre-independence elections of 1964 (in which all the candidates of the Malawi Congress Party were unopposed) no further polls were held until 1978 when each candidate had to be approved by Dr Banda. Constitutional laws in 1966 and 1971 instituted a one party state and conferred upon the president powers which would allow him to nominate nearly half of parliament and appoint his cabinet from outside the legislature. In 1971 legal reforms expanded the capacity of neo-traditional courts and gave to the president the authority to determine what constituted traditional law[90]. Four years earlier a land law made the president the ultimate landowner of all Malawian land.

Post-independence patrimonialism echoed colonial policy. In contrast to neighbouring Zambia, the Malawian state allocated meagre resources to welfare and instead concentrated expenditure on economic activity and infrastructure. By 1980, next to Somalia, Malawi had the smallest proportion of its children attending secondary school in sub-Saharan Africa but its national gross capital formation, mostly attributable to state activity, was relatively for Africa very high. Deliberately slow "Africanisation" of senior civil service ranks helped to maintain policy continuities. Most investment was in and around agriculture in which both the state and parastatals were busy boosting the fortunes of an African rural bourgeoisie who inherited the ownership and management of the tea and tobacco plantations maintained previously by settlers (excluded from the countryside in 1979). As a financial manager the Malawian state gained a reputation for efficiency among foreign donors and investors[91] and indeed corruption was limited to the semi-institutionalised spoliation of public resources by Banda and his inner circle. State extension services also helped a yeoman farmer group to prosper, a continuity in emphasis from British development programmes in the fifties, but only reached twenty per cent of the poorest group of peasant producers. Independent marketing cooperatives, dating from the same period were quickly absorbed into state controlled marketing authorities and the communal lands in which the most lively peasant organisations existed were chosen to accommodate the Malawi Young Pioneers' agricultural settlement schemes. The structure and composition of rural production remained unchanged from the 1950s and government marketing boards ensured that richer groups enjoyed

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[90]T David Williams, *Malawi: The Politics of Despair*, Cornell, Ithaca, 1978.

[91]Denis Venter, *Malawi towards multiparty democracy*, Political Science Association of South Africa Research Colloquium, Broederstroom, 8-9 October, 1992, p. 3.

production monopolies in the more profitable export crops. Many of the 9,000 bigger commercial farms were owned by Press Holdings, the business wing of the Malawi Congress Party, in effect a presidential private estate, others were shared by senior bureaucrats and Mps. In 1967 a special fund was instituted to finance purchases of land leases by these groups. A mainly publicly owned manufacturing sector concentrated upon the early stages of agricultural commodity processing, its operations facilitated by anti strike legislation and very low state-prescribed wage levels. State industrialisation policies were cautious; Malawi did not promote import substitution vigorously and levels of tariff protection for infant manufacturers were by African standards very low. The formal government bureaucracy expanded slowly growing by a modest 70 per cent between 1969 and 1989 (general wage sector employment trebled in this period). In 1988, government employment totalled 88,000 including 7,000 soldiers and 5,000 policemen, representing twenty per cent of the wage earning population[92]. State finances depended increasingly upon indirect taxation, forty per cent of revenues in 1980[93].

Expanded production and good prices facilitated high growth rates until 1980 helped to ensure that few popular challenges emerged to Banda's authority[94]. This was in any case upheld by a an organisational complex with a capacity for social penetration which has been characterised as totalitarian. The Young Pioneers played an important role in this respect beginning in 1964 when they helped to suppress a civil service pay mutiny. Thereafter they were armed and equipped with both powers and exemption from arrest. Trained originally by the Israelis and modelled on the Ghanaian youth movement and employed as agricultural demonstrators and ancillary teachers they constituted a most intimidating national network of spies and informers[95]. For a predominantly rural society nationalist organisation during decolonisation achieved a quite unusual degree of mobilisation - the MCP managed to persuade two million voters to register in the week before the 1964 election - and this may help to explain the subsequent extent of state reach[96]. The state's capabilities were evident also in the high proportion of the population with access to state primary health care facilities - 80 per cent in 1991, according to the UNDP, though household poverty and government parsimony ensured that general health standards remained low[97]. An expanding domestic working class, much of it located in private agriculture, worsening terms of trade, declining

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[92]Economist Intelligence Unit, *Malawi Country Profile*, 1992/1993, London, 1993, p. 14.

[93]All the information in this paragraph is derived from Guy C Mhone (ed.), *Malawi at the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Political Economy*, Southern African Political economy Series, Harare, 1992.

[94]To discourage potential rivals in the governing class Banda recycled his cabinets twice a year and himself held the four most important ministries.

[95]Richard Hodder-Williams, "Dr Banda's Malawi", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 12, 1, 1974, pp. 102-103.

[96]Though why the MCP was so relatively strong has yet to be explained fully.

[97]Infant mortality was on the increase in the 1990s though this was attributable mainly too the spreads of paedriatic AIDs and chloroquin resistant malaria rather than the limitations of the government's facilities. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Malawi Country Profile*, 1992/1993, p. 7.

crop yields, growing land shortages, and Banda's deteriorating health each contributed to the unravelling of state authority. In early 1992, protest by the Roman Catholic hierarchy (half the population is Catholic), student demonstrations, labour unrest, and riots directed at shops owned by Press Holdings helped to prompt a limited liberalisation through the rest of 1992, a referendum on the one party state in May 1993 and elections the following year. These removed the MCP from government and confirmed its status as a regional party. With the enforced disbanding of the Young Pioneers by a mutinous army in December 1993, the work of dismantling Banda's "authoritarian leviathan"[98] had already begun. More systematically, Bakili Maluzi's new government withdrew the public subsidy from Banda College and instituted free primary education. Classroom demand prompted an expansion of the teaching force, much of it fictional as educationists and civil servants paid themselves double salaries by creating "ghost workers" at schools. World Bank pressure prompted the administration to announce 30,000 retrenchments from the public service, estimated to total 105,000 in 1992[99]. To enforce cut-backs the Reserve Bank transferred ministerial accounts to foreign private banks to take advantage of their strict supervision pf overdraft facilities and a new regulation imposes dismissals on officials signing bad cheques[100]. Meanwhile the government has economised on the food subsidies instituted by the Banda administration during the mid-1980s recession and has established an Anti-Corruption Commission. The existence of this body did not deter Maluzi's cabinet from authorising the distribution of $3,200 to each of the ruling party's parliamentary representatives, using funding earmarked for poverty relief. On a more positive note, press criticism of such excesses (in eleven new newspapers) and the rising incidence of rural crime suggest that the repressive predisposition of the Malawian has diminished considerably.

Until the 1960s Portuguese colonial state structures in Southern Africa were skeletal. In Mozambique, outside the main towns until 1933 the authorities often delegated administration and development to the British concessionary companies which predominated in the North and the Zambezi valley. 43 districts, or *circumscricaos* were each split up into between two and six posts, each managed by the most junior ranking Portuguese official, a *Chefe de Posto* and his African subordinates, the *regulos* and *cabos*. *Chefe de Postos* collected taxes, dispensed justice and supervised agriculture: each had up to 40,000 subjects under his jurisdiction[101]. White settlers elected advisory municipal governments as well as a consultative legislative assembly with corporatist representation. Railway profits and capitation fees on South African migrant labour contracts provided the basis of colonial public finance: these did not allow for lavish expenditure particularly under the monetarist Salazar regime which had as its first colonial priority in 1933 the reduction of huge government debts run up by its predecessor. Official parsimony helped to confine the scope of government authority despite the totalitarian dimensions of the highly centralised Salazarist state: these included secret police, censorship and rigid state control of education. Coerced

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[98]The phrase is Guy Mhone's, *op cit*, p. 8.

[99]*The Star*, 24 January, 1996.

[100]*Weekly Mail*, 23 February, 1996.

[101]Harold Nelson, *Mozambique: A Country Study*, Department of the Army, Washington, 1984, p.40

cotton cultivation and forced labour represented more conventional manifestations of authoritarian colonialism: all adult males of working age had to undertake six months of paid labour. Given the low ratio of officials to the local population the intensity of the labour regime varied; in the case of cotton cultivation each employee of the state's *Junta da Exportacao de Algoada* was entrusted with the supervision of 10,000 growers[102]. In the 1950s government social expenditure began to rise with the introduction of primary health care and immunization schemes[103]; however public expenditure on development remained relatively modest even when directed at recently established white rural settler communities in the Zambezi valley. The colonial civil service was historically corrupt and poorly paid and only began to acquire a degree of prestige after reforms instituted in the 1950s. By 1963 the bureaucracy employed 115,000 people, half of them Portuguese [104] State reach expanded with the onset of counterinsurgency in 1964. In the next ten years the road network doubled, one million peasants were crowded into fortified villages and school enrolment nearly trebled, to thirty per cent[105].

Decolonisation and settler exodus created a political vacuum which was only partially filled by the new FRELIMO leadership. Within the civil service remaining white functionaries, many of them communists, at first held disproportionate influence, while in the factories and other enterprises abandoned by their former owners self-appointed "dynamising groups" of activists exercised managerial control[106]. By 1977 and its Third Congress, FRELIMO was ready to reimpose centralised direction with the help of freshly trained party cadres. However most state functionaries remained badly under-trained; in the late 1980s only 15 per cent had any post-secondary education and a third had only attended primary school. In the countryside the African subordinates to the departed *Chefe de Postos* were brushed aside as

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[102]Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa, Longman, Harlow, 1981, p. 184. Newitt believes that "in general...the picture is one of a very inefficient and partial (labour) mobilisation" (*op cit*, p. 115). Other authorities contend that the Portuguese administration was quite successful in forcing people to work: in Zambezia, for example, during the 1950s, 85 per cent of the male labour force worked on plantations (Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, Zed Press, London, 1984, p. 19). Zambesia may have been exceptional and coercion may not have been the only inducement for during the 1950s peasant living standards were higher there than in other provinces.

[103]By the 1960s the health care network included 60 rural hospitals and 82 outstations. 200,000 people a year were being treated in hospitals for malaria. A 1964 vaccination programme immunised over one million against small pox and mass campaigns against typhus were conducted in the main cities in 1966 and 1967. Even so, Mozambican colonial health remained by comparative standards: for example bilharzia infection rates in the late 1960s were the highest in Africa (Alison Herrick et al, *Area Handbook to Mozambique*, US Government Printer, Washington, 1969, p. 120; Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, Rex Collings, London, 1978, pp. 146-147).

[104]Alison Herrick et al, *Area Handbook to Mozambique*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969, p. 261.

[105]Henriksen, *op cit*, pp. 194-208.

[106]Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, *Mozambique: The Troubled Transition*, Zed Press, London, 1995, p. 29.

traitors, irrespective of any local legitimacy the *regulors* or *cabos* may have retained[107]. In the place of colonial judicial arrangements a hierarchy of courts was established with 800 people's tribunals at its base which elected their own judges. These attempted at first to administer a more humane form of rehabilitative justice but efforts in constructing a new legal order were undermined by the powers of imprisonment given to the new security agency, SNASP, the introduction of flogging in 1983 and the summary expulsion of 50,000 unemployed from the cities[108]. SNASP, established in 1975, with 1,500 East German trained officers, was claimed to command by 1984 a network of "People's Vigilance Groups" numbering 300,000[109].

The Congress adopted Marxism-Leninism as a state ideology and vanguardist modes of party organisation and recruitment. Whatever autonomous associations existed were replaced with a party-sponsored range of functional organisations. A People's Assembly was appointed which lent support to a programme intended to tap rural resources through collective production so as to accumulate the surplus for investment in heavy industry. In effect, Frelimo's state-led agricultural development succeeded merely in concentrating resources under the control of state structures incapable of deploying them effectively. In the process "middle peasants" who had been minor beneficiaries of the last decade of colonial rule were dispossessed and alienated, often themselves constituting a discontented and corrupt bottom layer in the management of the state's agricultural projects. In 1981 not one state farm was profitable[110]. Meanwhile the failure of government efforts to persuade peasants to form producer cooperatives in the northern areas which during the war had been most thoroughly penetrated by FRELIMO guerillas also signalled the limits of the state's capacity for social engineering in the countryside: only five of the five hundred or so former liberated settlements formed producer cooperatives: by 1982 a meagre total of 37,000 peasants participated in such efforts[111]. Peasants were further demoralised by a state marketing

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[107]A range of commentators believe that the dismissal of these functionaries was a mistake. See William Finnegan, *Mozambique: A Complicated war*, California University Press, Berkeley, 1991, p. 118; Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique, Who Calls the Shots*, James Currey, London, 1991, p. 25; Gervase Clarence-Smith, "The Rise of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution', *Southern African Review of Books*, April-May, 1989, p. 7.

[108]See Albie Sachs and Gina Honwana Welch, *Liberating the Law*, Zed Press, London, 1983. A figure of 75,000 inmates of reeducation camps is cited in David Hoile's *Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis* (Claridge Press, London, 1989, p. 36) but this seems very inflated. Usually both hostile and sympathetic commentaries estimate the numbers held in reeducation camps as totalling around 10,000 (for example, Harold Nelson, *op cit*, p. 65). Flogging was abolished in 1989. 62 convicted criminals were publicly executed between 1979 and 1983 but after 1986 the death penalty was not imposed (William Finnegan, *Mozambique: A Complicated War*, California University Press, Berkeley, 1991, p. 123).

[109]Such claims (Nelson, *op cit*, pp. 293) should be treated with circumspection. Hanlon (*op cit*, 1984, p. 39) gives a more modest figure of 100,000. The vigilance network was concentrated in towns, well away from areas of RENAMO infiltration, and probably directed much of its energies against people who did not represent serious security threats; for example, the six university students flogged in 1983 for starting up a subversive association (see Nelson, *op cit*, pp. 279-293).

[110]Joseph Hanlon, *The Revolution under Fire*, Zed Press, London, p.101.

[111]Clarence-Smith, *op cit*, p. 7. The history of the Northern Cooperatives under the Frelimo administration is traced in Judith Marshall and Otto Roesch, "The Green Zones Agricultural Cooperatives of nampula City: A New

monopoly which paid them low prices for their produce and failed to maintain the rural retail outlets left behind by the departing Portuguese. In fairness, attempts to reorganise production were accompanied by a considerable expansion of health services and education: primary and secondary school enrolment had by 1982 doubled school attendance in 1973 and a WHO survey suggested in the same year that 62 per cent of rural children had been vaccinated against TB[112] South African-backed RENAMO units repeatedly attacked rural schools and clinics and these figures began to decline thereafter.

Democratic centralism and eastern European administrative styles (the East Germans helped to reorganise the secret police) merely reinforced the authoritarian bureaucratic tradition created by the Portuguese. Intensifying villagisation, affecting 1,800 000 people by 1982, accompanied by campaigns against "feudalism, obscurantism and tribalism" help to generate rural support for the RENAMO insurgency[113]. The first major wave of village formation was facilitated by floods in the late 1970s. Thereafter homestead-burning and the withholding of food aid helped to swell the number of village population. As the numbers of villages increased it became increasingly difficult for the state to provide their inhabitants with goods and services. Land shortages created through the concentration of farmers and their removal from land assigned to state farms helped to intensify the traditional social domination of lineage elders. Civil war destroyed the rail links, helping to shrink a revenue base already depleted by the contraction of migrant labour employment in South Africa and increasingly depleted by military expenditure. Government policies helped South Africa's proxy armies find their recruits and the Mozambican military proved to be most ineffectual in combatting them. Reorganised along Soviet lines in 1979 in anticipation of large scale hostilities from South Africa its miserably treated 30,000 conscripts deserted en masse and most of the effective fighting was undertaken by soldiers from the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian armies. In 1985 Portuguese counter-insurgency experts joined forces with the Zimbabweans and the Mozambicans in combatting RENAMO[114]

Phase in the Mozambican Cooperative Movement", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19, 2, 1993. Around Nampula the peri urban cooperative membership ballooned in 1983; joining these bodies protected people from the mass deportations to the countryside organised under the auspices of "Operation Production". These cooperatives organised very little effective farming on the land expropriated by the state for them from hitherto quite successful "middle peasants".

[112]Hanlon, 1984, *op cit*, p. 58 and p. 278.

[113]Most of the villages were concentrated in three provinces, Cabo Delgado, Gaza, and Nampula in which either the incidence of former Portuguese fortified villages, or floods, or refugee populations facilitated the task of village formation (Nelson, *op cit*, p. 101).

[114] Former guerilla combatants participated in a mutiny in December 1975 and many were dismissed. The mutiny itself was prompted by the issue of new disciplinary regulations which sought to curb guerilla abuse of civilians. Formal ranks were introduced in 1979 but neither these nor the elderly 200 T54 tanks significantly improved army performance. In 1984 1,500 *antiguos combatentes* were re-enrolled but these were retired in 1988. Underfed and underpaid, Mozambican soldiers were compelled to sustain themselves by preying on the civilian population. The 20,000 Zimbabwean solders were reported to have refused to participate in joint operations with the Mozambicans. British training and administrative reforms 1988 were beginning to have some impact by 1990. See: Harold D Nelson, *Mozambique: A Country Study*, Department of Army, Washington, 1984, pp 262-264; William Finnegan, *Mozambique: A Complicated War*, University of California, Berkeley, 1991, pp. 56-58).

FRELIMO's Fourth Congress acknowledged shortcomings in agricultural policy and the larger state undertakings began to be dismantled. However despite the policy revisions which resulted from the Congress[115], the shrinking of the state farm sector was very slow. In 1986, the official magazine *Tempo* reported an angry meeting between peasants in Gaza and the provincial governor: "what kind of state is this which takes away our lands and gives them to state farms which do not even cultivate them", the governor was asked. The same year the government began to enforce export crop cultivation in Nampula: "Producing cotton or cashew nuts is not a request but an order from the state"[116]. Bureaucratic predispositions to commandist methods were strengthened by the entrenchment from 1979 onwards of a upper bureaucratic echelon of technocrats, concentrated in the secretive and powerful National Planning Council, who had decisive influence over investment decisions as well as enjoying together with other senior civil servants significant material privileges including official cars, access to special shops, and private hospital wards. From 1987, a structural adjustment programme followed IMF prescriptions: these measures included a quartering of the education budget and the elimination of food subsidies. Social services were reduced from a quarter of the government's expenditure to 3,2 per cent while military spending rose to 35 per cent of the budget in 1990. Overall state expenditure had already in the period 1981-1986 contracted by 58 per cent[117]. Shrinking revenues and World bank prescriptions checked state expansion: in 1990 the civilian public service numbered 105,000, smaller than the colonial service and the public impact of government services was only 70 per cent the average for Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa[118].

In 1990 a new constitution introduced multiparty democracy and the task of uncoupling state and party structures began, facilitated in some cases by highly personalised forms of privatisation of public assets by senior officials and politicians. A series of financial scandals suggest an increasing scale of bureaucratic venality; in one government department, the main agency interfacing with foreign donors, misappropriation of funds may have represented fifty per cent of income [119]. An array of new foreign funded NGO's often staffed by former public servants now replace state agencies in supplying services and developmental resources

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[115]On the decisions of the Fourth Congress and their implementation: Merle Bowen, "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 2, 1992, pp. 255-279 and Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic factors in the Transformation of FRELIMO", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31 2, 1992, pp. 309-337.

[116]Both quotations from Clarence-Smith, *op cit*, pp. 7-8.

[117]Judith Marshall, *War, Debt and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique*, North/South Institute, Ottawa, 1991, p. 12 and p. 29;Jens Erik Torp, L M Denny and Donald I Ray, *Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe: Politics, Economic and Society*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, p. 38.

[118]Marshall, *op cit*, p.50.

[119]More generally, though, levels of corruption in the FRELIMO administration remained relatively modest. William Finnegan met a Greek businessman in maputo in 1988 who was trying to obtain a fishing license. The minister who was prepared to lease a fleet of trawlers at $3,000 a day requested a mere $10 daily commission (William Finnegan, "Drawing beads on Mozambique", *South African Review of Books*, March-April 1991, p. 18). See Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: Who calls the Shots*, James Currey, London, 1991, pp. 228-238 and Hand abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, *op cit*, p. 156 for more general corroboration of this point.

in the countryside[120]; meanwhile the state itself is heavily subsidised by the foreign aid which also pays for 80 per cent of the country's imports. As a consequence of both externally instigated civil war and policy mistakes two decades of independence have failed to substantially extend the Mozambican's state's administrative capacity or its political authority as well as demonstrating alarming continuities from colonial autocracy[121].

The history of the Angolan state has close affinities with Mozambican experience. The Portuguese bureaucracy was relatively smaller than in Mozambique, employing only 41,000 in 1965[122], including contract workers, and delegating to a rather greater extent the provision of welfare services, health and education to private agencies, including missionaries and concessionary companies. As in Mozambique, with the onset of insurgency in the 1960s, the state became rather more energetic in these fields as well as spending $100 million on smallholder settlement schemes[123]. These latter were as unsuccessful as their counterparts in Mozambique and fewer than 800 European families remained in them by 1968. However, in displacing African peasant communities from their land on the Benguela plateau to accommodate the schemes, the authorities succeeded in mobilising a popular following for UNITA, one of three different regional nationalist organisations whose rival struggles for supremacy would prolong the liberation war for the two decades following the Portuguese departure. Official reforms which promoted a coffee growing African peasantry in the North and the entry into the civil service of larger numbers of *assimilados* and *mesticos* helped to enlarge the social bases of the two other insurgent organisations, respectively the mainly Bakongo FNLA and the more urban-oriented marxist MPLA[124]. As a consequence of its control of Luanda and its capacity to enlist powerful external allies, the MPLA assumed command of the bureaucracy left behind by the Portuguese. Though depleted, much of this, the MPLA's critics[125] allege, was retained intact, notwithstanding the new government's formal adoption of Leninist protocols. Old hierarchical habits may have been reinforced by the presence within its ranks of 7,000 *retornados*, former Portuguese colonial officials recruited from Lisbon[126]. Before 1974, the MPLA's guerilla army never exceeded more than 5,000 combatants. The movement's ranks swelled massively in 1975 but worker restiveness

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[120]For debate on the relative efficacy of foreign NGOs compared to the state see Marshall and Roesch, *op cit* and Hanlon, *Who calls the shots*.

[121]For elaboration of this point see: Bertil Egero, *Mozambique: A Dream Undone*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 1990, pp. 186-189.

[122]David Abshire (ed.), *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, Pall, London, 1969, p. 170.

[123]Gerald Bender, "Planned rural settlements in Angola", Franz-Wilhelm Heimer (ed.), *Social Change in Angola*, Weltforum Verlag, Munich, 1973.

[124]W G Clarence-Smith, "Class structure and class struggles in Angola in the 1970s", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 7 1 1980, p. 113.

[125]Ronaldo Munck, "Angola: Results and Prospects", *Critique*, 15, 1981, pp. 130-131.

[126]Timothy W Duke, "Angola and Mozambique: Institutionalising Social revolution in Africa", *The Review of Politics*, 24, 44, 3, 1982, p. 429.

and subsequent disputes between the predominantly *mestico* leadership and an "Africanist" faction led by a former Minister of the Interior, Nito Alves, prompted the purge of all but 16,000 of the MPLA's 110,000 membership of 1977. Afterwards state functionaries predominated in the party until the army's growth in response to repeated South African invasions supporting the UNITA insurgency shifted power in favour of the military.
In contrast to Mozambique, state politics in Angola have been most fractious. Internal conflicts within the party and the bureaucracy were publicly attributed to the presence within the new state of proto-bourgeois groupings or have been explained in principally ideological terms[127]. An alternative view is that for the last twenty years competing creole elites with their roots either in the Portuguese civil service (mainly *mestico*) or in the colonial army (largely African) have struggled for control of the Angolan state; from this perspective historical continuities are more significant than ostensibly revolutionary ruptures and the new state's inherited "softness" and "bureaucratism" more important than its guerilla credentials[128].

As in Mozambique the abandonment of enterprises in the exodus of 300,000 settlers led to a rapid expansion of the public sector composed of state farms and factories which was to be managed with conspicuous waste and dishonesty. Its own insecurity and internal divisiveness may help to explain the MPLA's adherence to an especially intolerant and dogmatic marxism-leninism: the various organs of representative government had an even more perfunctory existence than their counterparts in Mozambique. "Transmission belt" trade unions helped to promote social discipline and supposedly brought 600,000 workers within the organisational embrace of the party/state. In the late 1970s the new state could claim impressive advances in public health and education but the expansion of military hostilities by South Africa and UNITA in the next decade would quickly eliminate gains. During the 1980s, military expenditure absorbed about half the country's export earnings[129]. This could be sustained because despite the contraction of the state's effective authority - in 1990, marketing authorities obtained only about 5 per cent of the maize crop - its main source of income was offshore. Sensibly enough, the most skilled personnel were concentrated in the management of the oil parastatal, SONANGOL[130]. An almost wholly externally derived revenue doubtless encouraged increasingly ostentatious behaviour among members of the senior administrative caste: by 1989 the annual bill for official journeys abroad equalled the money expended on industrial material and food imports. By this stage the state was rapidly divesting itself of its responsibilities, turning state farms over to the workers for whom it could not afford wages to form cooperatives and inflating the local

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[127]See, for example, Keith Somerville, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter, London, 1986, pp. 61-62.

[128]For elaboration of these arguments: David Birmingham, "Angola revisited", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15, 1, 1988; Catherine Scott, "Socialism and the soft state in Africa: an analysis of Angola and Mozambique", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26 1 1988.

[129]For detail on the impact of the war and the source for the statistics cited in this paragraph: David Sogge, *Sustainable Peace: Angola's Recovery*, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Harare, 1992.

[130]Tom Young, "Angola: Peace at last", in Larry Benjamin and Christopher Gregory (eds.), *Southern Africa at the Crossroads?*, Justified Press, Rivonia, 1992, p. 38.

currency to pay its 120,000 conscript soldiers. The 20,000 Cuban soldiers and technicians who supplied the most reliable underpinning of the state's authority were paid for with real money, from the oil earnings. In 1990 the MPLA's abandonment of Marxism-Leninism followed Angola's admission to the IMF and the World Bank and the pace of bureaucratic disintegration accelerated.

Four criteria are helpful in assessing state capacity in developing countries: institutional autonomy, social penetration, legitimate authority, and bureaucratic rationality. Autonomy refers to the extent to which the state is distanced from society and can determine and implement its policies unrestrained by particular social interests. Social penetration is evident in the degree of control the state can exercise over society, its extractive capability, and the extent to which it meets social needs. Authority can rest upon ideological and legitimating devices as well as the effectiveness of repressive agencies. Bureaucratic rationality is expressed in the relative absence of corruption, the existence of an institutional corporate culture within state agencies, and the levels of professionalism and competence of civil servants.

Until recently, racial exclusiveness helped to reinforce the state's autonomy in South Africa as did a degree of social and cultural distance between political and economic elites. In relatively economically diversified Rhodesia the state has also been able to maintain a balance between the interests of different sectors of capital, notwithstanding the powerful influence exercised by settler farmers; in certain respects the ascendency of a African nationalist governing class in 1980 has strengthened state autonomy. Much the same argument can be developed with respect to Namibia where former African guerillas inherited a colonial bureaucracy with a similar social orientation to Rhodesia's. With respect to Botswana, the social connections of a landowning rancher class and the political elite are very intimate; here the state's measure of social insulation is a reflection of the idiosyncratic preferences of a ruling group whose economic base was well established before decolonisation. Retaining the services of a large group of ex-patriate technocrats helped to protect the bureaucracy from social pressure. Several of the structural predeterminants of Botswana state autonomy were present in early post-colonial Malawi and Swaziland, notably the existence of a landowning class: the possibility of capital accumulation outside the state already existed. However, in these two countries, unlike Botswana, state power was employed to create huge patrimonial estates in which the distinction between the private and public domain became very blurred indeed. In Lesotho an extreme degree of external fiscal dependence tightly constrains state autonomy; for over two decades after independence, though, a government representing junior chiefs consolidated the fortunes of this group through adroit exploitation of donor agencies' susceptibilities to accord Lesotho a special rank in their priorities. Of all our case studies, though, Zambia resembles the most stereotypical "economy of affection"[131]. In this country, the state served as the main motor of indigenous class formation and a swiftly expanding public sector supplied a generous field of political patronage. In Angola and Mozambique violent decolonisations allowed insurgent elites to capture political power. In both cases the ruling groups were ideologically and culturally distinctive and their initial policies suggested a freedom from the communal and moral restraints which bound other African states to prevalent social conventions. Even without the force of external military

[131]For definition see Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*, London, Heinemann, 1980, pp. 18-19.

aggression, though, the frail and permeable foundations of state power in these two territories would have made the revolutions from above contemplated by their governments impossibly ambitious. In each of the four territories in which the state's internal freedom of manoeuvre was quite limited, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, their governments developed extreme degrees of foreign indebtedness which today detract significantly from their sovereignty.

With the exception of the former Portuguese territories, state reach in Southern African countries is extensive either because it reflects substantial bureaucratic systems of repression and control developed during the colonial period in quite diversified modern economies (as in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa) or because of the very small size of the territories (Swaziland and Lesotho) or the relative density or concentration of population and social networks (Malawi and Zambia). In the cases of Lesotho and Malawi state penetration was chiefly manifest in the power of repressive agencies which were built along earlier networks of pervasive nationalist mobilisation which themselves reflected the depth of proletarianisation through migrant labour. State access to mineral wealth permitted the expansion of subsidies, welfare services, and social security on a considerable scale in Zambia during the 1960s and early seventies and, more recently in Botswana. Relatively efficient state distributive networks in Botswana dated from an unusually effective colonial famine relief system, an institutional response to an especially harsh climatic environment. In Zambia, Lesotho, and Malawi shrinking resources and foreign indebtedness has led to a geographical contraction of the state and its effective disappearance from remoter rural areas. Counter-insurgency campaigns in Rhodesia and Namibia during the 1980s and the 1990s encouraged colonial states to reorganise settlement and expand welfare services to an extent well beyond the normal reach of colonial states elsewhere in Africa. Counter-insurgency in Mozambique and Angola also strengthened state capacity and supplied some of the impetus for post colonial social engineering efforts in former "protected villages". Civil wars and South African "destabilisation" put paid to any efforts to expand the scope of state institutions in Mozambique and Angola and in contemporary peacetime Mozambique the administration's fiscal helplessness has led to a direct usurpation of its functions by foreign NGOs.

Obviously state authority is closely tied to the effectiveness of its repressive and welfare components. To be sure, that authority can be considered legitimate simply if the majority of a repressive state's subjects perceive no conceivable alternative to its rule; outside of South Africa before 1976 and Rhodesia before the inception of peasant-based guerilla warfare, no Southern African state has possessed coercive power on a sufficient scale to rule without ideological forms of legitimation. Even in South Africa, racially limited representative democracy and accompanying liberal institutions was a significant component of state rule and probably affected values and expectations amongst a large section of the disenfranchised. Liberal democracy has shaped the post colonial histories of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe and in the case of Zambia the existence of a strategically placed and very well organised labour movement quite independent from the control of the ruling party compelled the state to invest heavily in ideological activity and to allow measures of freedom and choice within the constraints of one party politics. In Swaziland traditional patrimonialism and in Lesotho and Malawi neo-traditionalist discourses help to sustain the state's authority but in these cases ideology probably has had less to do with the long survival of autocratic government than the relative ease of governing geographically small countries, and, in the case of Swaziland, the kingdom's relative wealth. In Angola the state's

ideological legitimacy was contested from its inception and it has yet to obtain territorial hegemony: this reflects an especially fragmented expansion of colonial society in three distinctive regions within the country. In Mozambique the post-colonial government might have fared better had it not adopted ideologies and programmes so much at odds with the beliefs and aspirations of most rural people.

To what extent has post-colonial Southern Africa been administered by effective and rule regulated bureaucracies geared to developmental ethics? South Africa, Namibia, settler Rhodesia, and modern Botswana evolved professionalised and technically competent bureaucracies and direct political interference remains in each quite limited. In Malawi as well the long period during which ex-patriate experts were retained helped to socially insulate the civil service. Relatively slow rates of bureaucratic expansion have helped to maintain bureaucratic quality. Civil services have been least effective where their functions have been replicated by party or parastatal structures and where political leaders have prevailed in recruitment and promotion: Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola are all cases in point. In South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, and more arguably, Malawi and Namibia, the state has been rather effective in promoting local accumulation of capital both within and outside the public sector; in Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and Angola the state's deployment of resources has tended to be more wasteful, geared either towards consumption or to warfare. In all these territories the factors which are generally held to cause political corruption - the persistence of pre-colonial tributary obligations, the status insecurity of emergent as opposed to established elites, institutional expansion and proliferation, and comparatively undifferentiated social formations[132] - have been less of a feature of the political system than elsewhere in Africa and hence bureaucratic venality has generally been less pervasive.

At the beginning of this article it was suggested that the historical roots of modern states are deeper in this region than elsewhere in Africa; as well as this the existence in the region of diversified and complex capitalist economies as well as the bureaucratic requirements of large scale labour mobilisation help to explain the evolution of comparatively resilient and effective state structures in Southern Africa. To this might be added, notwithstanding its damaging effect on the former Portuguese territories, the impact on state formation of militarisation and warfare, as well the integrative role played by fairly vigorous working class mobilisation, and relatively early development of state programmes of legitimation arising from the presence of enfranchised settler minorities. Finally, the existence of developmentally effective states in the region seems to more or less coincide with those societies in which early modern state formation was closely linked to the consolidation of a local agricultural bourgeoisie. Southern African state hardness is derived from structural features of the region's political economy and historical characteristics which distinguish it quite sharply from the rest of post colonial Africa.

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[132]Goran Hyden, *No Short Cuts to Progress*, Heinemann, London, 1983, pp. 100-102; Victor Levine, *Political Corruption: The Ghana Case*, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1975, pp. 79-98; William Brownsberger, "Development and Governmental Corruption - Materialism and Political Fragmentation in Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21 2 1983, pp. 215-233.