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The formation of a European identity in jeopardy? - The impact of Turkish European Union accession negotiations

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Introduction

The following research report is concerned with identity formation at the supranational level and it delves into the question as to whether the possible enlargement to Turkey, a Muslim country, has had centrifugal implications on identity formation at the European Union (EU) level.

Never before has European integration, enlargement and a European identity been so fragile. Unlike other accessions, whereby applicant countries merely aroused concern as to whether EU policy processes and institutions would be slowed down, the possible accession of Turkey and the commencement of accession negotiations in October 2005 is said to not only have rekindled these same concerns, but also casts a shadow on further integration, enlargement and above all, a European identity. Turkey is thus an interesting case study because it is one of the most challenging enlargements that the EU has faced thus far and furthermore, never before has the issue of a European identity been so contentious.

Turkey has long espoused membership in the Union. The Turkish political leadership has implemented a wide variety of reforms in order to satisfy the EU membership criteria and by October 2004 the European Commission finally acceded that Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria. Yet despite the decision of the European Council to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, many feel that Turkey cannot be part of Europe, the EU or a European identity. The following research report thus attempts to look at what the essence of a European identity is. How were previous applicant countries assessed when they acceded into the EU and why were they seen as part of a European identity whereas Turkey is not?

To understand the phenomenon of European identity, the following research report looks at various theoretical interpretations on identity formation at the national level and then tries to ascertain which theoretical approach is being transposed and applied at the EU level. In this respect, this particular study will be elucidated by the theoretical approach

of Constitutional Patriotism, which assumes that EU elites are promoting a rights based and civic identity. The research will thus investigate if the theory of Constitutional Patriotism ameliorates our understanding of identity formation at the EU level, whether an EU identity was burgeoning in accordance with this method of identity formation, whether these same values were being used as criterion for enlargement, and finally if Turkey's possible accession has fractured a European identity.

This work is important to the study of International Relations because theorists and political scientists often just enumerate the options that EU elites can take to forge an identity at the EU level. They either posit that a European identity can be grounded in a shared heritage and a common culture through an ethnic identity or that it could be a rights based civic identity. However, understanding how national identities emerged at the national level offers valuable precepts on how an identity can be forged at the supranational level. It also sheds light on why heads of states/state elites from the national plane, who act as EU elites in the most important and powerful institution of the EU, the European Council, eventually decided to forge an identity in the manner in which they did at the supranational level. Theorists and political scientists seem to gloss over the fact that the way in which national identities formed actually impacts how a European identity can evolve. Hence, the nation-state model on identity formation can actually illuminate why EU citizens tend to harbour a certain type of attachment towards a European identity. It can even illustrate through case-studies, the caveats of trying to create an identity which is grounded in certain principles and values. The research report will investigate whether the method, which EU elites decided to forge an identity on, was successful or not and whether the nation-state model was helpful in underscoring the problems of trying to adopt particular approaches to identity formation that once occurred at the national level, which actually may have manifested themselves during identity formation at the supranational level. The focus of this thesis is to scrutinise how attached EU citizens are to a European identity and whether their affiliation to it is conditional on the values which it is based on. This will also indicate whether Turkey is an instigating force that fractured the possible burgeoning of a European identity.

The contribution of this research report to the study of European integration, enlargement and European identity lies in the fact that it serves to investigate whether there is any validity to the argument that Turkey should be precluded from EU membership because it is too culturally different. This requires an investigation into the way in which a European identity has been framed since its inception and whether it has been reformulated at all. This will serve to illustrate whether current arguments to preclude Turkey on cultural grounds are just or unmerited. The following research report not only delves into the way a European identity has been constructed by EU elites, on the contrary, it even delves into how a European identity has been perceived by EU citizens and whether they have become progressively attached to it over time.

The following research report will be structured into five chapters. The aim of the first chapter is to scrutinise the various theoretical approaches to identity formation at the national level. This chapter will try and infer which theoretical approach is being transposed at the EU level and why this theoretical insight may explain why a European identity may have been defined in terms of the theory of Constitutional Patriotism.

The second chapter aims to illustrate how national identities emerge in practice and proposes that if a European identity is to burgeon that could supplant national identities, it would have to promote both civic and ethnic nationalism to mould the identity. This chapter also provides caveats on how an identity at the supranational level can be seen as offensive to national citizens if grounded in both civic and especially ethnic nationalism. It shows that in this day and age, civic nationalism may be enough to engender an identity at the supranational level, provided that certain steps and concessions are made.

The third chapter provides an overview of previous efforts to unify Europe and will not only explain why Constitutional Patriotism is the preferred method for identity formation at the EU level, but also why EU elites opt to forge an identity that complements rather than supersedes national identities. In other words, EU elites make concessions that national identities have a certain tinge to them which they do not intend to supplant.

Instead, they focus on promoting an identity based on civic nationalism, while complementing, rather than replacing national identities. This chapter also highlights how the theory of Constitutional Patriotism explains not only how a European identity is defined, but also how it manifests itself in the treaties and how these same values and virtues of civic nationalism are used to assess the eligibility of candidate countries for EU membership.

The aim of the fourth chapter is to test the hypothesis whether a European identity was burgeoning over time in four EU member states, namely Germany, France, Austria and Britain, and if EU citizens from these countries were continually supportive of it, before and after each enlargement and whether they buttressed enlargement as well. The purpose of this is to assess whether EU citizens felt more imbued with a sense of 'Europeanness' as the EU enlarged to other so-called European countries, which in turn, should have increased their attachment to a European identity. The plan is to assess whether there is a correlation to feeling more European and support for enlargement. The hypothesis is to prove or disprove whether any kind of euphoria for a European identity exists, at least up until October 2005 when accession negotiations with Turkey were opened. If support for a European identity suddenly dropped, one might assert that Turkey may have fractured the possible formation of a European identity. The purpose of this chapter is also to investigate how EU citizens characterise a European identity and if their definition is akin to the definition of EU elites and the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. The idea is also to take into consideration whether the caveats of trying to forge an identity based on civic nationalism, which was alluded to in the nation-state model, are relevant or not in explaining the degree of attachment that EU citizens have towards a European identity at the supranational level.

The fifth chapter questions some of the underlying reasons as to why EU citizens from these four EU member states, might want to stymie Turkey's membership in the Union and preclude it from a European identity. Based on the results from the hypothesis in chapter four, it raises the question as to what explanatory variables could elucidate why EU citizens are trying to redefine a European identity. While it is not within the remit of

this thesis to evaluate what these factors are, this research paper does provide some insight into what could be contributing to the reformulation of a European identity. It postulates whether EU citizens are really trying to protect a European identity from Turkey, or whether they are really bent on safeguarding their own national identities and interests, which may explain why they want to keep Turkey out of the Union. Hence, this chapter will look at the domestic political ramblings which are unraveling at the national level, and from this, will seek to provide some answers to illuminate this whole conundrum. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications that such diatribes are having on Turkey's prospects for EU membership.

Chapter One

Theoretical Approaches to Identity Formation

The aim of this chapter is to examine the various theoretical approaches to identity formation. The first part of the chapter looks at four radical approaches of how identities and nations emerged at the national level. The four radical approaches or theories are Constructivism, Radical Modernism, Essentialism and Ethnic Modernism. The theoretical approaches of Constructivism and Radical Modernism are analogous but their approach is entirely different to Essentialism and Ethnic Modernism. Essentialism and Ethnic Modernism are also analogous and the chapter presents their views which differentiate from that of Constructivism and Radical Modernism. What this chapter actually does is play the theories off against each other. Inspired by these theoretical viewpoints, two further adjacent theories, (namely Postnationalism and Communitarianism), which each adhere to one of the radical approaches (either Constructivism/Radical Modernism or Essentialism/Ethnic Modernism) on how identities and nations emerged and burgeoned at the national level, posit how an identity can emerge above the national level and even supplant it.

The second part of this chapter shows that no theoretical approach is entirely correct on how national identities emerged at the national level. Rather, elements of all the theories actually pan out in identity formation at the national level. This would influence the way in which a European identity could emerge at the supranational level. The theory of Constitutional Patriotism is thus presented to show how an identity can emerge above the national level but which will complement one's national identity rather than replace it. Alternatively, if national identities are to be diluted, the last part of the chapter looks at the European space of encounters scenario as well as the theory of Postmodernism which elucidate how this can be achieved.

Part One

Being European and being part of a European identity usually means living in Europe. But what is Europe? Is Europe a peninsula of Asia as the nineteenth century Russian 'Culturologist', Nikolai Danilevsky, defined it?[1] Is it a serrated and ragged end of the Eurasian landmass?[2] Does it span from the Atlantic to the Urals as portrayed by De Gaulle?[3] Hence, it appears that there is no clear-cut definition of Europe in terms of its history, culture and geographical boundaries. It is intriguing that this confusion as to what Europe is, applies to a European identity as well. By looking at theories which explain identity formation, it might be easier to clear up or conceptualise why there is so much confusion as to what Europe or a European identity is. Since identities were first formed at the national and not the supranational level, it is imperative to look at how theorists believe identities emerged at the national stage before assessing how an identity has emerged on the supranational plane. The theories of Constructivism, Radical Modernism, Essentialism and Ethnic Modernism will now be scrutinised since they provide insight into identity formation at the national level.

Constructivism

The Constructivist school of thought posits that identities are 'intellectual artifacts' or 'cultural constructs'.[4] One theorist, Benedict Anderson, believes that identities are subjective. He purports that nations are "imagined communities" (the members cannot possibly know each other).[5] Constructivists underscore that one cannot be born with inherent national characteristics. Furthermore, these characteristics are not an organic

[1] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, 'European Identity', in Nugent Neill (ed.), European Union Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.84
[2] Jacobs Dirk and Maier Robert, European Identity: Construct, fact and fiction, http://users.belgacom.net/jacobs/europa.pdf, Gastelaars, M & De Ruijter, p.1.
[3] Boxhoorn Bram, 'European Identity and the process of European Unification: Compatible notions?', in Wintle Michael, Culture and Identity in Europe, Avebury, 1996, p.137
[4] Spiering M, 'National identity and European unity', in Wintle Michael : Culture and Identity in Europe, Avebury, 1996, p.116
[5] Ibid.p104

result of soil and climate. Identities are not construed from nature; rather they are constructed, learned and nurtured.[6] Not only do state elites construct national identities, humans also rationally assess whether it is beneficial to them to be part of the identity of a nation. They are not driven by emotional, irrational factors such as religion or race.[7]

Radical Modernism

The theory of Radical Modernism complements the theoretical approach of Constructivism. A staunch advocate of Radical Modernism is Ernest Gellner. He believes that it is improbable that nations existed prior to the modern era.[8] It is only with the inception of modernisation that terms such as the nation and the nation-state became frequently used. Modernists posit that nationalism is a by-product of modernisation which engendered the need for nationhood among people.[9] The effects of modernisation meant that state elites could construct national identities.

The nation, to Gellner, is 'natural' insofar as it is contingent upon capitalism.[10] The nation only sprouted up upon the development and growth of capitalism, utilitarianism, industrialisation, economics and the market. Structural elements of modernisation, such as the economy, industry, capital and print capital seem to be instrumental elements that engender the need for nationhood among people.[11] Utilitarian benefits are, according to Gellner, an instigating factor which leads the periphery into acquiescing to become part of the nation and political participants within the state's institutions.[12]

Another advocate of Modernism, David Easton, reiterates the position of Gellner in terms of what utilitarian benefits can do with regards to fostering an attachment to an identity.

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[6] Ibid.p116
[7] Raney Tracey, An Ever Further Apart Union? National and European Attachments in the European Union, Review of European and Russian Affairs, Vol2. Issue 4, 2006, p.29
[8] Nikolas Mary Margareta, False Opposites in Nationalism: An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe, http://nationalismproject.org/articles/nikolas/title.html, 11 March 1999, p.3
[9] Loccit.
[10] Ibid.p29
[11] Ibid.p31
[12] loccit

Easton argues that specific support (utilitarian or instrumental) precedes and moulds affective identification.[13] If Modernists were to answer the question posed by the German sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies, of what came first, *Gemeinschaft* (community), or *Gesellschaft* (society), they would reply *Gesellschaft*. Tönnies defines *Gemeinschaft* as an identity which precedes political legitimacy and that this identity is based on family, neighbourhood and village. There is a deep sense of belonging; an affective identity.[14] *Gesellschaft* on the other hand, is the modern manifestation of identity, meaning that it is artificially construed by state builders' who in turn, distribute utilitarian benefits to the periphery in return for citizen loyalty to the fostered identity.[15]

The effects of the structural elements of modernisation on the periphery make it easier for the state to impose a universal 'high culture' on them.[16] For Gellner, modernisation engenders a 'cultural break' in the transition from the pre-modern agrarian era to the modern one.[17] The 'cultural break' means that if any local culture based on ethnicity ever happened to exist before modernisation (which Gellner believes is coincidental and unlikely); it will become redundant with the onset of modernisation because of a shift towards the 'high culture' forged by state elites.[18] Modernists therefore reject any emotional features of culture or that ethnicity plays any role in culture or identity in determining nationalism in the modern era.[19] Radical Modernism is a forward looking ideology which does not refer to ethnic features of culture and identity such as genealogy, biology or ancestry.[20] One theorist, Hans Kohn, would concur with Radical Modernists, since he describes nation-building as a political phenomenon which makes no reference to myth making.[21]

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[13] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p94
[14] Ibid.p85
[15] Loccit
[16] For more information on the 'high culture', please, refer to ***chapter two, pg 25**
[17] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p13
[18] Loccit
[19] Ibid.p71
[20] Ibid.p38
[21] Kuzio Taras, Nations & Nationalism, The Myth of the Civic State: 'Hans Kohn Revisited: Civic and Ethnic States in Theory and Practice', http://www.tamilnation.org, 13-15 April 2000, p.1

While imposing the 'high culture' on the periphery, radical Modernists believe that people will come together as state elites promote civic virtues. Civic components are concepts such as territoriality, civic rights or legal codes. They also introduce citizenship in its pure ideal type form.[22] This means that within civic nationalism, citizenship is accorded to people that inhabit the territorial space of the nation-state. Citizenship entails special rights and benefits such as freedom of movement within the bounded territory, residence, suffrage etc.[23] Society is politically bound and membership is politically stipulated through citizenship.[24] All these features: territoriality, citizenship, civic rights, legal codes and so forth, are supposed to encourage social and political participation and citizens are supposed to feel an attachment to the nation-state. This means that Gellner believes that civic components can coalesce a nation without having to refer to the ethnic features of culture, history and genealogy.

The imposition of a high culture at modernisation is intended to politicise culture so as to ensure that there is no cultural cleavage between the elites and the periphery. The politicisation of culture thus leads to the periphery becoming active social and political participants of the state.[25] This seems to buttress Hans Kohn's proposition that nation-states are 'civic' in nature because the state not only encourages social and political participation by the periphery, but also encourages the formation of civil societies and civic institutions.[26] These civic states are founded on concepts such as individualism, rational cosmopolitanism and parliamentary democracy.[27] The existence of civil societies not only serves to balance or challenge the actions and policies of the state, in addition they also ensure that the state does not revert to absolutism or become authoritarian.[28] This is a sign that there is a flourishing democracy because the state encourages salubrious criticism of its actions, policies and institutions. It does not repress civil society or the masses; on the contrary, it grants them civic and political rights.[29]

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[22] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p15
[23] Ibid.p36
[24] Ibid.p7
[25] Ibid.p4
[26] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p1
[27] Ibid.p2
[28] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p36
[29] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p2

It seems as if the purpose of the 'high culture' is to ensure that all citizens within the state's territory are accommodated and catered for and that the civic nation is inclusive and not exclusive since it grants political and civic values, individual liberty and tolerance to its citizens. Being an inclusive society means that the state attaches great importance to fostering cultural pluralism. The state does not ostensibly support ethno-cultural elements of any ethnic group.[30]

Essentialism

The opposing school of thought is Essentialism.[31] Essentialists do not buttress the theoretical approaches of Constructivism and Radical Modernism. According to Essentialists, identities are an integral part of 'self'. It is imparted by God and rooted in nature. Terminology such as 'national character', 'national temper' or 'national genius' are frequently circulated and promoted by Essentialists because it reinforces the 'affective identity' of the nation.[32] One theorist, Ignatieff, argues that ethnic nationalism is inherited, not chosen.[33] Those who reside within the national territory must be of the same community of blood descent (*ius sanguinis*) and as a result, ethnic nationalism has been labeled determinist and particularist (*sui generis*).[34] Hence, an individual is destined to be part of a nation where he/she shares the same blood descent of the community.

The use of historical myths, legends, folk culture, language and ethnicity reinforce primordial ties with the distant past. These myths, symbols, legends, artifacts and heroes are pivotal in binding the nation together and also serve as a collective memory for the

[30] Ibid.p7
[31] There are two other theories, namely Primordialism and Perennialism, which are basically the same as Essentialism and adopt the same underlying principles. The term 'Essentialism' will therefore be used for the rest of the thesis. For more information regarding these adjacent theories, please, read Margareta Mary Nikolas,***Introduction,** pp8-9**, *chapter one,** p9**, *chapter three,** pp47-48
[32] Spiering M, Opcit.p115
[33] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p3
[34] Jenkins Brian, 'The Europe of Nations and Regions' (ch3), in Sakwa Richard and Stevens Anne (eds): Contemporary Europe, Palgrave, New York, 2000, p.49

nations cultural past.[35] The absence of memory in the definition of identity would be cataclysmic. According to Essentialists, if there is no memory, there is neither an identity nor a nation.[36] Each nation-state must have its own collective memory and identity of who they are. If nationhood is an ethnocultural concept founded on genealogy, each nation would have its own distinct primordial ties of ethnicity, ancestry and religion. Each nation would also have its own collective memory and identity which distinguishes them from other nations. These robust primordial ties engender strong emotional bonds, feelings of belonging and mutual solidarity.

Sometimes ethnic nations engage in policies of ethnocentrism, which means that members evaluate aspects of other cultures by use of their own culture as a frame of reference.[37] Ethnocentrism can sometimes boil over into chauvinism because if a nation is continuously comparing their own culture to another, it might propagate a myth that this other culture and identity is a threat to the nation or chauvinists could foster a glorification of their national past which glorifies their identity and culture while denigrating other cultures and identities.[38]

Ethnic Modernism

The theory of Ethnic Modernism complements Essentialism since it buttresses the position that nationhood is an ethnocultural concept. Anthony D. Smith, an advocate of Ethnic Modernism, posits in his text "*The Ethnic Origins of Nations*", that the ethnic element of culture does not dissipate with the inception of modernisation and that the ethnic element of culture actually serves to unify the community into a homogeneous nation-state.[39] Hence, the ethnic element of culture which is prevalent in pre-modern times continues to exist in the modern era. There is a process of internalisation and

[35] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p86
[36] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p40
[37] Mcguinness Mike, 'Integration to disintegration? Nationalism and racism', in Angus Erskine, Mark Elchardus, Sebastian Herkommer and Jenny Ryan, Changing Europe: Some aspects of identity, conflict and social justice, Avebury, 1996, p.73
[38] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p56
[39] Ibid.p48

socialisation that precedes modernisation. The individual within the nation already has a pre-embedded culture and identity and there is a psychological need to 'identify' with others in the nation that share the same culture and identity.[40] Therefore, a unified homogeneous nation was already underway before modernisation. This is why the periphery or the masses are mobilised by the elite into forming a nation because the elites are trying to unify those with the same ethnicity into a homogeneous nation-state. The state elites foster a vernacular, autochthonous language, religion, race, gender and culture. These ethnic characteristics serve to underscore the unique features of the *'Volk'* (people).[41] This promotion of the ethnic traits of the masses is evidently congenial to them and this elucidates why the masses entrust state elites to promote their needs. There is no 'high culture' as such whereby the elite and the periphery engage in the social and political life of the state. This is a task left to the elites.

Social-psychological schools acknowledge that nationalism (the desire for autonomy, self-determination; the drive to construct nation-states) occurs at a certain phase in European history.[42] Ethnic Modernists must concede that nationalism comes to the fore during modernisation. This is because the elite and the masses realise that nations can only survive in modern societies (brought about by modernisation), that is, in a *Gesellschaft*, by forming their own nation-states.[43] The structural elements of modernisation are not the instigating factor which set off the homogenisation process. Rather, the forces of modernisation are useful because they are in 'tune' with the human 'identity dynamic'.[44] Modernisation and industrialisation just accelerate the process of an already homogenising ethnic nation. With the inception of modernisation, the *ethnie* becomes politicised and the nation-state takes on an 'ethnic' rather than 'civic' shape. It is exclusive rather than inclusive and the politicised ethnic elite are representative of the masses.[45]

[40] Spiering M, Opcit.p110
[41] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p50
[42] Spiering M, Opcit.p111
[43] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p32
[44] Spiering M, Opcit.p110
[45] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p53

Hans Kohn denounces ethnic nationalism because it rejects concepts of individualism, rationalism and parliamentary democracy. There are also no civil societies and civic institutions to challenge the state. The focus on ethnicity also means that the nation-state is exclusive to those that do not share the ethnic characteristics of the nation.[46] This approach can, and sometimes does, spark off a policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing to ensure that the nation comprises only those of ethnic origin.[47]

Civic Virtues vs. Ethnic Virtues

There is a schism between the theories which have been presented thus far. Either one is led to believe the Constructivist/Radical Modernist approach, or one is led into adhering to the Essentialist/Ethnic Modernist approach. The dichotomy is that an identity is based primarily on either ethnic or civic virtues. The Constructivist and Radical Modernist approach holds that an identity is based exclusively on civic values, whereas the Essentialist and Ethnic Modernist approach holds the opposite stance, asserting that an identity is based wholly on ethnic values. Since the theoretical approaches are dichotomised, it becomes apparent that these are 'radical' approaches to identity formation at the national level.

There are two theories that transpose these ideas onto the supranational level. The theory of Postnationalism is akin to the Constructivist/Radical Modernist approach, whereas the theory of Communitarianism is based on Essentialist/Ethnic Modernist thinking.

Postnationalism

If nation-states' national identities emerged from only civic virtues, Postnationalists believe that nation and state will become irrelevant because supranational organisations

[46] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p49
[47] Loccit

now promote these values at a level above the nation-state.[48] Postnationalists want to shift the focus from the national level to a postnational space of European dimensions.[49] The nation-state is no longer the ultimate horizon of democracy because a whole amalgam of civic virtues and values, such as international codes and conventions and laws on human rights, are being promoted and safeguarded at a level above the nation-state.[50] Postnationalists evidently hold the credence that the EU is now the vanguard in promoting these civic values and that it can do so more efficiently than the nation-state. Postnationalists focus on the emergence of a civic identity, they do not espouse to create an identity founded on a specific historical, cultural or emotional heritage.[51]

Communitarianism

The promotion of ethnicity outside the nation-state model is analogous to the Communitarianist approach. Communitarianists posit that a polity will only be secure if it is grounded in a common history or culture. For them, the EU has to promote a common language, cultural memories, a mystique, history and genealogy of Europe in order to ensure the stability of the polity and to generate a genuine sense of belonging by EU citizens to the EU.[52] The EU cannot forge an identity based on civic components.

Jean-Pierre Chevènement, former leader of the *Mouvement des Citoyens* (The Citizen's Movement), derisively noted that the formation of a European identity based on abstract principles of a civic nation, would not produce a feeling of community between citizens.[53]

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[48] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p94
[49] Rambour Muriel, References and Uses of Postnationalism in French and British Debates on Europe, http://www,tamilnation.org/oneworld/post_nationalism_rambour.pdf, 13 May 2005, p2
[50] Ibid.p6
[51] Ibid.p5
[52] 'European values and identity', http://www.euractiv.com, 2 April 2007, p2
[53] Rambour Muriel, Opcit.p2

David Miller, argues that cultural homogeneity based on common language and links between generations are some key ingredients which produce a degree of trust among citizens. Civic virtues cannot produce this same degree of trust. Furthermore, a British Sociologist, Gerard Delanty, argues that it is unlikely that a European identity can emerge if it is based on civic components and virtues[54]

Part Two

Interplay between Ethnic & Civic Virtues within Nation States

It may be erroneous to dichotomise the nation-state as promoting only one extreme in identity formation at the national level. It may be that nation-states actually promote both ethnic and civic values. A national identity and a nation-state can only be secure if it is based on both civic and ethnic values. If an identity is primarily more ethnic, they still need a state (a civic virtue) to ensure the survival of their identity.[55] The state and its institutions provide stability, order, peace, economic development, security and cater and serve the interests of the people. A nation needs a state to be legitimised and recognised by the international community.[56] If an identity is primarily more civic and construed by a state, the nation still covets an ethnic background to their identity. This provides for an emotional bond between the people and between the people and the state. Without this emotional bond or primordial tie, the state's civic identity will not be appealing to the nation.[57]

[54] Ibid.p3
[55] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p22
[56] Loccit
[57] Ibid.p21

Constitutional Patriotism

Advocates of Constitutional Patriotism subliminally acknowledge that an identity at the national level consists of both civic and ethnic virtues. However, advocates of this theory, such as Jürgen Habermas, believe that an identity at the supranational level can burgeon if focus is placed on civic virtues based on values such as universal principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, citizenship, tolerance and other similar civic virtues and values.[58] The galvanisation of the first ever legal supranational citizenship at the EU level, for example, is evidence of efforts being made to transpose civic virtues to the EU level.[59]

Advocates of the Habermassian approach are aware that nation-states have an ethnic feature of culture and identity. When they propose a European identity to EU members, however, they argue that this identity will be forged through a common political culture and that a civic identity will emerge.[60] They argue that cultural identities and religious beliefs of each nation-state should be circumscribed to the private sphere.[61] Theorists of Constitutional Patriotism do not seek to promote a single European culture, rather they would like to accommodate and cater for all of them. They also promote civic values such as the freedom of movement across borders so that EU citizens can immerse themselves in the different cultures of EU members and become more acquainted with different cultures in Europe. The idea is not to dilute national identities or ethnic ties to one's nation; rather it is to prevent any cultural misunderstandings from occurring.

While theorists of Constitutional Patriotism acknowledge a mosaic of cultural diversity within nation-states, they do not propose to uproot any cultures within the nation-states with their own overarching European culture or identity for all EU citizens. In other words, they make a conscious decision to forge an identity through civic values and make

[58] 'European values and identity', Opcit.p2
[59] Oana Dan, United in Diversity: The Determinants of European Union Citizenship, http://www.wjh.harvard.edu, p1
[60] 'European values and identity', Opcit.p2
[61] Loccit

no attempt to uproot the primordial ties that people feel towards their nations. Their object of identification is not on ethnic heritage or ethnic nationalism; rather it is on civic nationalism.[62] They focus on democratic institutions which practice and promote civic virtues and values.[63]

Ultimately, advocates of this approach believe that the introduction of a Constitution for Europe might bind Europeans together and make them feel as 'one'. Even if EU citizens were to embrace a European identity based on civic values and virtues, they will still feel ethnic ties to their nations because Constitutional Patriotism does not provide a substitute for their primordial ties. The idea is thus not to promote an ethnic identity at the EU level as well because each nation-state in Europe already has its own ethnic values based on history, culture, geography and language. It might be cumbersome to promote an ethnic identity at the supranational level which intends to replace existing ethnic identities at the national level because this could provoke an uproar as EU citizens seek to protect their own national identities. Hence, the idea is to respect one's ethnic affiliations or identity at the national level, while forging an identity at the supranational level based on civic virtues. This identity will thus complement, rather than supplant one's national identity. This means that it is doubtful that Constitutional Patriotism as a theory can truly supplant national identities, but what it could lead to is EU citizens having double identities. Some theorists think that this is an appropriate proposition. Anthony Smith believes that in the future, people in the EU may experience double loyalties or double identities. A double loyalty would entail a cultural dimension or orientation at the national level, and a supranational or European level, consisting of a political dimension or orientation.[64] Haas projects that this idea of multiple loyalties may be unfeasible. He notes that multiple loyalties would add an additional dimension to those national and regional loyalties that people already possess.[65] An additional EU identity would just be too cumbersome! It remains to be seen if the projections of Haas are relevant or not.

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[62] Caporaso A James, The possibilities of a European Identity, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue1, 2005, p68
[63] Ibid.69
[64] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p143
[65] Mcguinness Mike, Opcit.p74

European Space of Encounters

While recognising that nation-states and national identities comprise both civic and ethnic values, it may not be enough to just focus on the promotion of a civic identity at the EU level while consciously omitting the fostering of ethnocultural elements at the supranational level. As explained before, this omission is spurred on by the fear that the promotion of ethnic affiliations (in addition to the civic elements), could spark a vociferous reaction from EU citizens as they seek to protect their own national identities from a supranational one. After all, history has shown, such as in World War (WW) One or WW Two, that people are willing to sacrifice their lives for their nations as a result of their ethnic or primordial ties to it. Hence, in the European space of encounters scenario, the idea is to supplant national identities or dilute the *ethnie* through indirect measures which might not be seen as a threat by EU citizens. The plan is to promote intensified civic, political and cultural exchanges and cooperation.[66] From the untrammeled movement of people across borders (a civic value), people would interact with other cultures and their own national identities would become diluted. The European identity that might emerge would encompass multiple meanings and identifications and it would be in constant flux as people from different cultures in Europe continuously interact and hence, this identity would be continually redefined through relationships with others.[67]

Postmodernism

Postmodernists would promote the untrammeled movement of people across borders as mentioned in the European space of encounters scenario. They hope that national identities will become thinned down and that there will be a 'free market of identities'.[68] National ethnic identities will coexist on a horizontal plane with football enthusiast, yuppies and Goths.[69] The only slight reservations that one might have with this theory is

[66] 'European values and identity', Opcit.p2
[67] Loccit
[68] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p89
[69] Loccit

that if nation-states already have national identities based on ethnic values, it is uncertain that nation-state citizens would accept a loss of their national identities, nor would they want to equate their identities on a horizontal plane with 'others'. Their identities are unique and their identities are not just some mundane concept that can be chopped and changed at will. There would be a vociferous reaction and nation-state citizens would turn away from the EU project and identity. Hence, it remains to be seen if this theory is worth pursuing or not.

This chapter has looked at various ways in which identities and nations could have emerged at the national level and then provided complementary theories as to how an identity could emerge above the national level. It has also alluded to the theoretical approach that EU elites have taken towards identity formation at the EU level. Hence, the analysis of the various theoretical approaches seems to indicate that a clear-cut definition of Europe or a European identity does not exist because it is not based on ethnic nationalism, rather it seems to be one founded on civic values and virtues. It is not clear however, if a European identity is based on Postnationalism or Constitutional Patriotism. Is the EU identity, based on civic nationalism, meant to supplant or complement national identities?

The next chapter will look beyond theoretical approaches to identity formation and look at practical or 'real life' examples as to how national identities and nations really emerged. Insight into how national identities really emerged at the national level may allude as to whether an identity based on civic nationalism at the supranational level can supplant a national identity or whether it can merely complement it.

Chapter Two

Identity Formation in Practice: The National Experience

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate that an identity cannot be based purely on either civic or ethnic nationalism. The purpose of this section is to clear up the misconception that some European countries started off as being solely civic or ethnic. It shows that identities at the national level need both features of ethnic and civic nationalism to complete its metamorphosis. If a European identity is to supplant a national identity, it would have to promote both features.

The first part of this chapter shows why previous systems such as feudalism and multi-ethnic empires dissipated and why they were not appealing to the people that resided within them. The second part of this chapter shows that nation-states promote both civic and ethnic nationalism and that this combination is usually congenial to the people that reside within the nation-state. Finally, the last part of the chapter shows that even though nation-states promote both civic and ethnic nationalism, it is civic nationalism that has become more important in the 21st century. The chapter concludes with the intricacies of trying to forge a European identity based on ethnic nationalism and how EU elites, while acknowledging that civic and ethnic virtues play a part in the metamorphosis of identity formation at the national level, may take the importance and ascendancy of civic nationalism in the 21st century as a benchmark to forge an identity along those lines. However, since EU elites are not trying to break that emotional bond that EU citizens have towards their national identities, the idea may be to complement, rather than supersede national identities.

Part One

The Dissipation of Systems and Structures Preceding Nations

"Nations are not something eternal. They have begun, they will end. They will be replaced, in all probability by a European federation"
Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (1882)[70]

Ernest Renan notes the existence of nations and believes that they will be replaced. If EU elites are trying to forge an identity via civic nationalism and state structures, will this be enough to replace nations? Why is it that many European countries in the past became nation-states? How does a person's national identity (especially in Europe) emerge from this process of nation and state building? Furthermore, why is it that previous systems such as feudalism and multi-ethnic empires dissipated? What would EU elites have to do if they are to ensure that nations will end as Renan posits?

Feudalism

The dominant social system in medieval times was feudalism.[71] It was a system which was designed to engender organisation and centralisation. Feudalism was the most appropriate order because its system was structured in such a way as to ensure that anarchy could not break out in the countryside. In an ideal feudal society the king allocated land, known as 'fiefs' or 'feuds', to aristocrats and the warrior nobility in exchange for feudal services and military obligations.[72] Warriors and aristocrats who became recipients of 'feuds' also had obligations to the king and swore homeage to him.

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[70] Jenkins Brian,Opcit.p48, please note, *"Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?"* translates into English as ***"what is a nation?"***
[71] William Stubbs, Feudalism: Its Frankish Birth and English Development, http://history-world.org/feudalism2.htm
[72]'Feudalism',http://www.bartleby.com/65/fe/feudalis.html, The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2007

The recipient of the land was known as the vassal. Aristocrats and warrior knights were vassals to the king, but were also lords to their own vassals.[73] Knights for example, were lords because they had control over the peasants who toiled on their land. The peasants paid homeage to knights in return for security and accommodation from the knights. Hence, feudalism was a system that spanned from the upper echelons to the masses.

Feudalism disintegrated because of its hierarchical lay-out. The system of feudalism was not intended to be representative of the masses, rather its purpose was to secure order and quell dissidence. Feudalism was fit for this purpose because knights were lords of the peasants, but knights were vassals to a king's wills and whims. The king could order knights to quash dissidence within the periphery if the kings and knights perceived a threat. This is why kings found feudalism appealing because it was a system which enabled them to control their land and territory. The peasants were not treated equally in this hierarchical system and there was no democracy, human rights, equality and tolerance, values that are found in states today.

Multi-Ethnic Empires

The system of feudalism was not the only system which preceded the inception of nations and states. In the 18th century, multi-ethnic empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, French and British empires, held sway over Europe.[74] The multi-ethnic empire was controlled by a king, emperor or sultan. Some multi-ethnic empires did have certain features later found in nation-states (civic values of a civic state).[75] The aim was that the monarch would be representative of the people and treat large numbers of people equally within the empire. This was an idea conceived by Frederick the Great (Frederick II of Prussia, 1740-1786). He believed that fair management of people could be achieved through efficient application of the law through bureaucratic machinery. Some monarchies did centralise institutions (royal bureaucracies, state taxation,

[73] Loccit
[74] 'Empire: International Relations Theory', http://.internationalrelationstheory.googlepages.com, 2007
[75] 'Nation-state', http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nation-state, 29 August 2008

professional standing armies) and became so efficient within their territorial boundaries that some argued that a sense of 'national consciousness' was starting to develop. Some empires have thus been labeled as 'prototype' nation-states.[76]

The problem with multi-ethnic empires was precisely that they were comprised of different ethnic groups and even if empires provided the various ethnic groups with civic values or the empire was representative of the people, there was still no emotional bond to the empire. Furthermore, the ruling dynasty of the empire usually came from one of those ethnic groups and it was nearly impossible to be impartial. Even though there were a whole mosaic of linguistic backgrounds, cultures and symbols, the language of the privileged ethnic group and that of the ruling dynasty was usually the language spoken at the level of public administration.[77] Ethnic empires disintegrated because one ethnic group (that of the ruling dynasty) was favoured over other ethnic groups within the same empire. Ethnic groups within the empire felt no emotional bond or solidarity to others within the empire and there might have even been resentment of the ethnic group that was privileged by the ruling dynasty.

The emergence of nation-states in Europe from the French revolution in 1789 onwards, was no mere coincidence.[78] Nation-states in Europe were providing something more than what the systems of feudalism and multi-ethnic empires had to offer. Feudalism lacked civic values such as democracy, human rights, equality and tolerance, all of which can be found in states today. The second part of this chapter shows why nations in Europe coveted states and that this was not necessarily attributable to civic nationalism. In other words, it shows how nations in Europe yearned for their own ethnic groups to be enclosed within territories which are demarcated along ethnic lines. At the same time, however, it also illuminates that states, via its apparatus, institutions and structures, are pivotal in providing civic values and virtues to the citizenry which are also essential for the longevity of the nation-state. Hence, it elucidates that civic and ethnic values are significant factors which explain why nations and states became nation-states.

[76] Loccit
[77] Loccit.
[78] Jenkins Brian,Opcit.p50

Part Two

Case Studies of National Identity Formation

There are many countries in Europe which allege to have started out as civic rather than ethnic nations at their inception. In chapter one it was noted that with the start of modernisation and industrialisation in the 20th century, a 'cultural break' occurred from the pre-modern agrarian era to the modern one. As a result of modernisation, the state had enough leverage to 'construct' an identity (but not along ethnic lines since modernisation was supposed to have removed this pre-modern agrarian backward thinking!) Hans Kohn noted that nation-building was a political phenomenon which made no reference to myth making. The 'high culture' thus appeared as if it was akin to civic nationalism. State elites (citizens who have risen above the periphery, perhaps through education, and attained positions in the state system as representatives of the people) introduced a passport and citizenship in its pure-ideal form, meaning that this passport or citizenship allegedly had no ethnic affiliations.[79] Obtaining this citizenship did not mean that one had to prove one's ancestry and genealogy and so forth. The 'high culture' was also intended to politicise the masses so that they could become active political participants. This should not be a sphere confined to the elites. This was intended to engender a sense of 'national consciousness' and it could be achieved without any reference to ethnicity or myths of the nation.[80] Furthermore, the state would respect polyethnic rights and be civic, secular, pluralist, rational and multicultural.[81] Many European states thus argue that they have always promoted civic values such as democracy, human rights, equality and tolerance to all members within the nation. However, countries which assert this position, such as France and Britain for example, never really started off promoting civic nationalism as strongly as they assert they did. The 'high culture' was not as akin to civic virtues and values as one may think. The imposition of the 'high culture' onto the

[79] Spiering M, Opcit.p113
[80] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p25
[81] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p7

periphery was intended to engender standardised language, spelling and education.[82] As a result of the 'high culture', people would begin to speak the same language and use the same spelling.[83] Since the education system and curricula were standardised, people would also have similar thoughts or the same way of thinking about certain aspects and topics. The imposition of a 'high culture' was intended to homogenise the nation.[84]

It appears as if the 'high culture' is somewhat akin to ethnic nationalism. Some theorists, such as Gellner, would try to counter this and say that homogenisation is merely a by-product of historical events and modernisation.[85] Homogenisation is accepted because the people within the nation believe that only large homogenised societies benefit from economies of scale.[86] In any case, the Westphalian system of 1648 which brought about the creation of the sovereign state system in Europe was designed in such a way that it structurally privileged national identities and a policy of homogenisation.[87]

The 'high culture' as it was called, did not focus entirely on promoting civic nationalism. It was actually imbued with ethnic values which played a pivotal role in defining the identity of the nation. Homogenisation is not a characteristic of civic nationalism because the state is supposed to respect polyethnic rights and be multicultural. One theorist, Walker Connor, describes homogenisation as a process of both 'nation creating' and 'nation destroying'. The 'high culture' was intended to bring about cultural standardisation and eliminate local cultures.[88] This homogenisation process is very akin to an ethnic nation. It is also akin to ethnic nationalism because by imposing a 'high culture' onto the periphery, one would effectively be saying that this 'culture' is superior to that of the periphery.

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[82] Wintle Michael **(1)**, 'Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience', in Wintle Michael, Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of divergence and unity in past and present, Avebury, 1996, p17
[83] Loccit
[84] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.26
[85] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p7
[86] Spiering M, Opcit.p108
[87] Fossum Erik Jon, Identity-politics in the European Union, http://www.sv.uio.no, p6
[88] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p7

A) France

France, which sees itself as traditionally being a civic nation, was anything but this. The imposition of the 'high culture' which brought about cultural homogenisation is evident. In the early 20th century, one million people spoke Breton in France. Today, this figure has dwindled to only a quarter of this number.[89] The 'high culture' and civic nation-building engendered the destruction of the Breton identity for a vast number of people who then became French within the demarcated territory. The use of other local languages and cultures also declined such as the Normans, Provencaux, Alsations, Catalans, Burgundians and the Flemings.[90] The masses began to speak French. There was no need to remember other local languages. There was no point in learning languages of the abyss. French was the new spoken language and part of the 'high culture'. It is fallacious to believe that French and Parisian cultures have always been the norm. At the time of the French revolution in 1789, only half of the French people actually spoke in French. Furthermore, only 12-13% spoke it "fairly".[91] The French language only germinated with the imposition of the 'high culture'.

Not only were French elites trying to supplant local cultures with a more superior culture of their own, they also provided it with ethnic elements so that the masses would be drawn to this culture and identity. For example, the French provided a myth of the nation. Throughout the period of nation-building, from 1789-1984, heroes, martyrs, monuments, calendars, ceremonies were all used to appeal to one Gaullist ancestry.[92] Historical events such as the French revolution of 1789 are also vividly remembered and it is a memory which is shared and celebrated by Frenchmen and not by anyone else.[93]

The case study of France has shown that the imposition of a 'high culture' does not mean that state elites promote solely civic elements when they try to unite Frenchmen. This

[89] Loccit
[90] Ibid.p12
[91] 'Nation-state', http://www.answers.com/topic/nation-state, 2009
[92] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p11
[93] Loccit

does not mean that state elites in France did not promote civic values. As mentioned before, they politicised the masses via the 'high culture' so that French citizens could become active political participants. This was not a sphere confined to the elites. This was intended to engender a sense of 'national consciousness'. In more ethnic orientated countries such as Germany (which will be discussed shortly), the masses were not allowed to engage in active political participation. In other words, they could not partake in suffrage. Civic values such as freedom, equality and so forth, are values that developed quicker in France as opposed to more ethnic orientated nations. However, to assert that France was more civic than ethnic at its inception would be a rash statement. It is important to bear in mind at this stage that the French nation coveted an ethnic 'spin' to their identity. The state provided ethnocultural elements to French identity via the 'high culture'. This case study has shown that when the French nation was burgeoning, an identity based solely on civic nationalism would not have been amiable to Frenchmen.

B) Britain

Even though the British regard themselves as a historically civic nation, the ethnic element of culture is present within its identity. For example, citizenship is not in its pure ideal form as it is meant to be in a civic state. State elites realise that a feeling of fraternity and solidarity cannot emerge if citizenship is based in its pure ideal form. Citizenship to people is more than just a legal identity with common rights and codes for a society.[94] In order to acquire British citizenship; one has to prove that one's grandparent is/was a British citizen.[95] Using ancestry and genealogy as a criteria for citizenship is however, part of ethnic nationalism. This is just one example of how a supposedly civic nation is deviating from pure civic nationalism.

[94] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p16
[95] Loccit

Britain also has a myth of their nation. British nationalism is imbued with a myth of pre-Norman, Saxon liberties.[96] In Britain, the education system heralded English literature as 'superior' as well as its culture, ideas, tastes, morals, art and history.[97]

This rhetoric of British supremacy was used to justify the policy of homogenisation so that the British did not appear crude and abominable. Britain is notorious for its homogenising policies. In Great Britain, there are four culturally distinct communities in one political space- the Welsh, Scottish, Irish and British. In the past, these communities were not politically enclosed within their own physical or territorial space.[98] Of the four cultures in Great Britain, British culture was predominant and the state elites tried to coerce their culture onto the other communities. One example of homogenisation by the British in the British Isles was the conquest of Wales in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries. Welsh language was discriminated against and the Church of England was also imposed on the Welsh until 1914.[99]

When Ireland became a colony of the British from 1801-1922, the British regarded the Irish as 'uncivilized' and even 'barbaric'.[100] The Irish were the 'other' just because their culture was different from the British. The Irish were Catholic whereas the British were Protestant. Irish culture was stigmatised by the British and the imposition of the British 'high culture' on the Irish almost destroyed their culture. By 1981, there were only about 5,000 speakers of Gaelic remaining in Eire.[101] This proves that Irish culture and language has diminished quite considerably, considering that Ireland used to be monolingual in Gaelic. British culture is now prevalent in Ireland. One example of this is that most of the Irish have adopted English-language education and speak English as their mother-tongue.[102]

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[96] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p11
[97] Ibid.p9
[98] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p31
[99] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p11
[100] Loccit
[101] Loccit
[102] Loccit

This case study has also shown the same sort of patterns that emerged in the French case study. The idea is not to refute that Britain today promotes civic nationalism very fervently. At the inception of the British nation however, it is important to remember that while state elites in Britain might have been more intent on introducing an identity based on civic nationalism (citizenship in its ideal form), they soon realised that the British nation coveted ethnocultural elements to their identity.

C) Germany

The next case study is that of Germany. It becomes more apparent how Germany was far more ethnic than civic as compared to France and Britain. At the inception of the German nation, there was no 'high culture'. The idea of active political participation for Germans was not well (if at all) developed and liberal ideals such as liberty, fraternity and equality were largely rebuked and considered 'un-German'.[103] German writers promoted *'Volk'* culture which meant that reference was made to mythology, history and memory. These were the ingredients which were intended to germinate a national-consciousness. The emphasis was on *'Blut und Boden'* (Blood and Soil).[104] This is evidence of a focus on genealogy, ancestry and ethnicity. Many intellectuals such as Johann Gottfried Von Herder (1744-1803) proclaimed and lauded the greatness of the German national character.[105] These efforts led Germans to feel unique and feel a sense of national consciousness because of their distinct ethnic characteristics and traits.

Romanticism in the 19th century was favoured by Germans as opposed to Enlightenment thinking. Romanticism reiterated and reinforced German writers and intellectuals' ideas of the ethnic and racial origins of the nation.[106] Enlightenment thinking on the other hand espoused views of equality of all men (even Jews), rationality and equality of rights to all

[103] Winters Lynn, Our Judaic-Christian Heritage: An Inquiry into the Ideas and Forces that Link the Thought of our Time with our Religious Past, Section V, Chapter 19, 'Nazism', http://www.entheology.org/library/winters/NAZIS.TXT,
[104] Loccit
[105] Spiering M,Opcit.p105
[106] 'Our Judaic-Christian Heritage: An Inquiry into the Ideas and Forces that Link the Thought of our Time with our Religious Past', http://www.entheology.org/library/winters/NAZIS.TXT,

religions (even Judaism). Since Germans and German intellectuals' were adamant about the ethnic features of culture and identity, they were unwilling to accommodate outsiders (like Jews) within their nation. Jews were even 'outsiders' to Germans in Christian feudal Germany. The belief was that Germany could not be a true ethnic nation if it contained 'outsiders'. Richard Wagner, a famous German composer, was gripped by romantic and racial views and romanticised about the German people and their past. Wagner professed that the Jew was "the devil incarnate of human decadence".[107]

Other theorists such as Fredrich Nietzsche, propagated that evolution would engender a higher order of human species- the superman (Übermensch). Germans certainly subscribed to this view and believed that they were the true 'Aryan' race.[108] Since Germans believed in the superiority of their identity and nation, they were also attached to Darwinism.[109] Darwin's theory on 'the law of the fittest' was attractive to Germans because they believed their people to be superior and unique.[110]

It was not Adolf Hitler of Nazi Germany who concocted a story of a Jewish threat. Germans have always feared that their ethnic identity and nationality would be diluted by foreigners or *Ausländer*.[111] Hitler merely played on these fears and blamed 'others' like Jews for precipitating the demise of German greatness (even though it was probably attributable to the Great Depression of the 1930's). Hitler argued that if Germany was to be a great nation again, it would have to reclaim its territory that rightfully belonged to them. Irredentism was sparked off because of ethnic claims by Germany to countries such as Austria. There were Diaspora Germans residing in territories outside of Germany that had to be reincorporated back into the 'fatherland'.[112]

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[107] Loccit
[108] Loccit
[109] Spiering M,Opcit.p100
[110] Winters Lynn, Opcit.
[111] Hertkorn C. Michaela, Germany: How Integrated Can It Get? How Homogenous May It Wish To Stay?, http://www.aicgs.org/adaview.aspx?pageid=452, 1996
[112] 'Our Judaic-Christian Heritage: An Inquiry into the Ideas and Forces that Link the Thought of our Time with our Religious Past', http://www.entheology.org/library/winters/NAZIS.TXT,

After WW Two, the Germans reverted to promoting primarily civic values. Habermas points out that after WW Two, Germany realised that it could only remove the stigma of Nazism by promoting civic values more fervently as opposed to ethnic ones.[113] After WW Two, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) opened itself up to immigration. Immigrants swarmed to Germany from the 1960's onwards from Italy, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Spain and Turkey. They were initially categorised as '*Gastarbeiter*' (guest workers) because their stay was not supposed to be a permanent one.[114] However, Turks for example, continue to reside in Germany today and have become eligible for German citizenship. When the Social Democratic Party (SPD)/Green coalition came to power in 1998, they overhauled the citizenship code which had based eligibility for German citizenship up until then, on ethnic characteristics.[115] Citizenship has now been redefined along civic rather than ethnic lines, a clear break from the past. This new citizenship law illustrates the historical transition from *Jus Sanguinis* to *Jus Soli*.[116] Germany now accepts and accommodates a multicultural identity. One only has to look at the demographic make-up of Germany which comprises three million Turks.[117]

Insights

Up until this point, it should become ever more apparent that at the inception of many nation-states in Europe, both civic and ethnic values were pivotal in defining and shaping one's national identity. Britain and France may have been more civic than Germany was, but this did not mean that they did not promote ethnocultural elements within their national identities. This shows how important ethnic elements are in defining identity.

It is important to bear in mind that the 'high culture' is not defined in purely civic terms. However, there are cases whereby the ethnic features of the 'high culture' are also not

[113] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p2
[114] Ewald Uwe and Feltes Thomas, Multicultural Context, Crime, and Policing in Germany: Challenges After Unification, http://www.unc.edu, Issue No.7, 2003, p.170
[115] Taspinar Omer, Changing Parameters in U.S-German-Turkish Relations, http://www.aicgs.org/documents/polrep18.pdf, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2005, p.24
[116] Ibid.p25
[117] Ibid.p24

salubrious to many of the inhabitants of the nation. For example, if Yugoslavia had remained as one country, it would have been more prosperous in an economic sense. Despite this, Croats, Serbs and Bosnians wanted self-determination and did not want to be part of a Yugoslav identity and culture.[118] They did not decide to remain part of Yugoslavia because they realised that they would be better off economically by remaining united in Yugoslavia. In fact, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats who have seceded from Yugoslavia are now struggling to re-establish infrastructure, welfare and medical needs.[119] In the end, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats secede because they strive for the self-determination of their 'people'.

There are other examples such as Switzerland, where the 'high culture' and modernisation have had a positive effect in unifying the Swiss. As mentioned before in the other case studies of Britain, France and Germany, the Swiss were not wholly unified simply by civic values. A glimpse at the history of the Confederation reveals that religious civil wars engendered homogenisation of Swiss society.[120] During the French Revolution and Napoleon era, a mosaic of conflicts broke out between secessionist movements (Patriots, Unionists and Federalists).[121] Nevertheless, these break away movements were not as radical as those seen in the former Yugoslavia and were easily dealt with. All in all, civic values did have a more inspiring influence on the Swiss. Switzerland as a nation-state, formed out of a voluntary federation of Cantons or Provinces.[122] Even though many Swiss live within their own Cantons (whereby some speak German, French, Italian or Rumantsch), it is interesting that in time of crisis, the Swiss remember their civic duties towards a unit which is greater than their Canton. Hence, these civic virtues engender the Swiss to feel an allegiance to the country which coalesces them all.[123]

[118] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p35
[119] Loccit
[120] Spiering M,Opcit.p125
[121] Loccit
[122] Loccit
[123] Loccit

The purpose of the second part of this chapter thus far, was to show that at the inception of many nation-states in Europe, both civic and ethnic values played some degree in defining one's identity. The 'high culture' was not purely of civic orientation as theorists in Radical Modernism purported. Furthermore, sometimes the 'high culture' served as a unifying force and sometimes it did not. In any case, at the inception of nation-states, nations were highly attracted to the 'high culture' because of its many ethnic features which entrenched one's national identity. A pure civic identity would have been too flimsy and unattractive to the people of a nation. When the 'high culture' did not serve as a unifying force, many people tried to secede in an attempt to form their own nations. What is important is that many are driven to secede because they wanted to forge their own ethnic nation. Nations which preceded states, such as Germany, were more ethnic than nations where the 'high culture' was introduced. This is because the state was responsible for introducing a 'high culture' so as to imbue the people within the nation with a sense of identity. The German nation did not have or need a 'high culture'; on the contrary, their ethnic identity had already been fermenting before the inception of the state. In the end, it is important to remember that whether a nation-state in Europe was originally more ethnic or civic is not important here. It is imperative to remember that at the inception of nation-states, the nations coveted ethnocultural elements to their identity. How do EU elites plan to proceed? Will they try and introduce an ethnic element to a European identity? As a result, do they hope that this will lead to the dissipation of nations?

Civic Nationalism in the 21st Century

In the 21st century, intellectuals and theorists such as David Held believe that the Westphalian system is anachronistic and unpopular.[124] There are no ideal nation-states today, where every member of the nation is a permanent resident of the nation-state and no member of the nation resides indefinitely outside it.[125] In an age of globalisation and

[124] Rambour Muriel, Opcit.p4
[125] 'International Migration and Multiculturalism:Nation-state', http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/glossary_nation_state.htm, 1997

interconnectedness, people are moving across borders, living in other parts of the world outside their place of birth and are becoming more immersed in the cultures and identities of countries other than their own. Furthermore, there are heterogeneous societies rather than homogenised ones.[126] Most states today promote rationalism, cosmopolitanism and parliamentary democracy and do not have inward looking policies regarding identities and nations. This means that ethnic nationalism is less important now whereas civic nationalism has gained ascendancy. With this in mind, if EU elites promote civic nationalism fervently at the supranational level and duplicate state structures from the national level, they might be able to diminish the significance of the nation and successfully forge an identity at the EU level.

European Identity and Civic Nationalism

EU elites are enmeshed in a quagmire. This chapter has just shown that national identities are comprised of both civic and ethnic nationalism. It seems logical to conclude that the formation of a European identity cannot be based purely on civic nationalism. If a European identity is to supplant national identities and nations are to dissipate, those ethnic ties that one feels towards one's nation must be redirected towards the EU. Thus, EU elites would need to construe a 'We' narrative anchored in a common past.[127] European identity would need a 'great narrative' as Jean-François Lyotard calls it.[128] EU elites could try and construe an EU identity out of amorphous historical materials to entrench a common "Whence" (or "where we are from") for EU citizens.[129] Perhaps EU elites could try and assert that Europeans have a shared history and culture that all Europeans share and whose contents and facts can be traced back from Charlemagne to Erasmus, from Napoleon to Hitler and from Dante to Shakespeare.[130]

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[126] Fossum Erik Jon, Opcit.p7
[127] Weiler J.H.H, Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, http://www.Jeanmonnetprogram.org/, Armin Von Bogdandy, 2004, p.4
[128] Loccit
[129] Loccit
[130] Van der Veen A.Maurits, Determinants of European Identity: A Preliminary Investigation Using Eurobarometer Data, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu, March 19 2002, p4

Introducing ethnic elements to the EU identity may be cumbersome since many Europeans already have their own ethnic ties to their respective nations. Each nation's history, culture, geography, language is not the same as other nations in Europe. In history, European people usually fought against each other and each had their own national identities and nationalist fervor.[131] An attempt to suddenly rewrite history and try to unite Europeans into one overarching EU identity and political unit may be burdensome. Furthermore, an attempt to try and replace national identities and ethnic ties to one's nation for a European identity may be seen as offensive to zealot nationalists who fear a loss of national identity. This could spark a war and even end the EU project.

The aim of the following chapter is to investigate efforts made by EU elites to unify Europeans along ethnic lines. If efforts to promote an ethnic identity at the supranational level floundered, this chapter has shown that EU elites should not lose morale. After all, civic nationalism is more evident in the 21st century and while Europeans have their own ethnic ties to their nations, there is nothing impeding EU elites from forging an identity on civic values. A civic identity would be seen as less intrusive because it does not infringe on one's ethnic ties to one's nation. People are more likely to feel threatened by an identity at the supranational level if it sought to uproot those ethnic ties which are rooted in 'nature'.[132] If EU elites are acknowledging one's ethnic ties to one's nation but promote an identity based purely on civic nationalism, it becomes apparent that their main aim is to construe an identity that will complement rather than replace national identities. Thus, this identity is akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. The next chapter will gauge if this is indeed the case and seek to apply the theory to the current study of this research report and assess whether Constitutional Patriotism explains identity formation within the EU and whether it ameliorates our understanding of the main theme.

[131] Görgün Tugrul, The Impact of the European Union Upon European Identity, http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/, April 2004, p35
[132] Spiering M, Opcit.p115

Chapter Three

EU Elites and the Formation of a European Identity:

History, Identity Construction and Enlargement

The aim of this chapter is to show how and why a European identity has been shaped the way in which it has by EU elites. In other words, it illustrates that the way in which Europe has integrated and the way in which its identity has evolved, is not coincidental. There is a specific reason why EU elites have not tried to foster a unified European nation-style identity founded on a common European cultural tradition. Furthermore, this may elucidate why the EU's identity was meant to complement rather than supplant identities at the national level. This chapter will thus depict how this identity manifests itself within the treaties and how EU elites have posited and applied a civic identity akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism whereby the EU is portrayed as a rights-based entity.

The second part of this chapter will demonstrate that the same values that constitute being part of a European identity, also apply to the EU's enlargement criteria. It will thus also look at how EU elites have framed their enlargement policy towards Turkey, a country which aspires to accede into the EU.

Part One

The History of Efforts to Unify Europe

Jean Monnet, entrepreneur, planner and institutional designer for European post-war unity,[133] once remarked "If we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture."[134] It is always easier to make such pompous statements in hindsight. Whether Monnet would have ever taken this bold step is equivocal especially since Monnet did not dare to allude to any 'European' identity or 'European' culture in his political vision and project '*un vaste dessein européen' (*'a European grand design').[135] It is imperative to scrutinise past attempts of how state elites tried to cooperate more or even coalesce their political institutions before one delves into the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), forerunner and precursor of the European Economic Community (EEC), European Community (EC), and now EU. Why was Jean-Monnet's project for post-war unity successful while the efforts of the European Union of Federalists (UEF) floundered? Why did Monnet not start with culture as a way of unifying European nation-states? Thus, is there a specific reason why a European identity has been defined more along civic than ethnic lines?

From the 17th century onwards, two succinct points were made that could be derived from the works of the Duc de Sully's '*Grand Design*',[136] the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's '*Project for bringing about everlasting peace in Europe*'[137] and in '*The reorganization of the European Community'* by the French positivist philosopher, the Compte de Saint-Simon.[138] The first point was that state elites cherished the sacrosanctity of their territorial spaces and the second point was that a common culture and history neither

[133] Ugland Trygve, "Designer" Europeanization: Lessons from Jean Monnet, http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007,p4
[134] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p84
[135] Ugland Trygve, Opcit.p5
[136] Morgan Philip, 'A vague and puzzling idealism…Plans for European Unity in the era of the modern state', in Wintle Michael, Culture and Identity in Europe, Avebury, 1996, p.35
[137] Ibid.p36
[138] Ibid.p38

prevented conflict between them, nor would it engender a unified political organisation of the continent.[139] When state elites tried to unify the continent by referring to their analogous cultural affinities, one could usually identify that such initiatives were spurred by national, rather than cultural interests. It was an interaction of national interests among European states which determined the political shape of relations between states.[140] The following chapter will now proceed to elucidate how state elites were driven by national, rather than cultural interests when they attempted to unify Europeans within one political organisation.

When looking at the balance of power system in the 18th century Enlightenment period, some intellectuals and elites made explicit mention of how European nation-states shared common historical and cultural experiences. Voltaire noted that Europe was characterised as 'a kind of great Republic divided into several states', sharing the 'same religious foundation, …the same principle of public law and politics'.[141] It was a view shared by Rousseau and Montesquieu, but even Montesquieu who recognised this 'commonness' among European nation-states, did not consider the glory of Europe to be a unified political organisation, but rather insisted upon the maintenance of the freedom and independence of separate states.[142] Intriguingly, the balance of power alliances were not confined to European states alone. Despite opposition from conservative Catholic romantics to exclude Russia from the 1815 Quadruple alliance of Austria, Britain and Prussia, it was still acknowledged by state elites as politically part of Europe and a European Great Power.[143]

When the balance of power system disintegrated, numerous efforts were again made to unify Europe after the First World War. In the 1920's, Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi firmly advocated the creation of a European federation in his book *Paneuropa*.[144] Even with his cosmopolitan background, his motives for federation were

[139] Loccit.
[140] Ibid.p44
[141] Ibid.p37
[142] Ibid.p38
[143] Ibid.p39
[144] Blair Alasdair, The European Union since 1945, Pearson Longman, 2005, p.11

not necessarily to unify 'Europeans' into one political organisation based on their common European culture. Rather, his conception of Pan-Europe was geopolitical and power political.[145] He strived to unify Europe so that it could compete with other inter-continental power blocs like Britain's Empire-Commonwealth, Russia in Eurasia, Japan in Asia and 'Pan-America'.[146] The French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi, purported his own memorandum soon after in May 1930 to the European states which were members of the League of Nations.[147] A thorough analysis shows that he astutely tried to lure European states into acquiescing to his memorandum by arguing that Europe's 'geographical situation compels…..solidarity', and that there were 'ethnic affinities and….community of civilization' which binds European states into considering matters of common concern.[148] However, the memorandum's motive was not 'European'.[149] As in other proposals for European unity, its *raison d'être* lay in its official government nature. Briand was trying to promote a European security system through European institutions which would have led European countries to act as co-guarantors of the frontiers of France against Germany, which was nothing more than a mere extension of the 1925 Locarno agreements.[150]

After WW Two, the European Resistance Movement (ERM) predicted a *tabula rasa* in Europe.[151] This meant that the European Movement predicted a dissipation of nation-states as people realised that nationalism was nothing but destructive and counterproductive. They envisioned an integrated Europe, not of French, Germans or Britons, but of 'Europeans'.[152] The European Movement assiduously circulated their ideas across Europe, positing the need for a 'New Europe' whereby nation-states would coalesce for their common good.[153] Denis de Rougement and WW Two resistance fighter Hendrik Brugmans, who were authors and also founders, together with Robert Schuman

[145] Morgan Philip, Opcit.p40
[146] Loccit.
[147] Ibid.p42
[148] Ibid.p44
[149] Loccit
[150] Ibid.p43
[151] Ibid.p45
[152] Spiering M,Opcit.p99
[153] Ibid.p100

and George Villiers, of the European Cultural Foundation, often alluded to 'our European culture', 'our spiritual community', 'our heritage' and 'our common destiny'.[154] Yet despite the internecine war, European states and governments reemerged after WW Two. It was clear that state elites were not prepared to foster feelings of 'Europeanness', nor were they willing to redirect loyalties from nation-states to an omnipotent and ubiquitous European unit.[155] There was no immediate ascendancy of a Cosmopolitan European identity within the community based on ethnic lines, a European *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* (feeling of oneness),[156] rather it was Jean Monnet's project that state elites were prepared to embrace because it envisioned only a slight relinquishment of national sovereignty to a Community which did not undermine nation-states. The ECSC came to the fore in post-war Europe because Monnet had persuaded 'the six' European countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic[157] that a supranational Coal and Steel Community would not only ensure Franco-German reconciliation, but would also be conducive for Europe's economic and security interests and help sustain peace within Europe.[158] The ECSC (enforced in 1952) made no explicit mention of identity. However, the term 'Europe' is used more in the texts of the treaty establishing the ECSC as opposed to the more preceding term 'Western Europe'.[159]

The ECSC primarily aimed to accommodate the national interests of European states. For example, before the inception of the ECSC, France had continuously feared a revival of German power after WW Two. To ensure that the German nation remained in the doldrums, the French wanted to dismember and partition Germany.[160] Concomitantly, they also coveted unimpeded access to the coal and coke of the Saar and Ruhr, which would have helped them in their post-war reconstruction efforts. They were also insistent

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[154] Ibid.p101
[155] Morgan Philip, Opcit.p45
[156] Spiering M,Opcit.p103
[157] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, The Emerging European Union, New York, Pearson Longman, 2004, p1
[158] Ugland Trygve, Opcit.p12
[159] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p137
[160] Morgan Philip, Opcit.p46

that the revival of German heavy industrial production should be checked and limited.[161] However, this stance was unacceptable to the United States (US) and Britain which were jaded by France's punitive measures on Germany and reiterated that Germany's rehabilitation was essential in the fight against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The ECSC was a means of overcoming an impasse in French post-war foreign and economic policies.[162] At least under the ECSC, West Germany's economic recovery was under the auspices and tutelage of the French.[163] The Federal West German state also had the opportunity to rid the shackles of its stigma from Nazism (Italy as well) by joining the Community.[164]

States are political units and each state is entrusted with the role of performing certain civic functions such as trying to safeguard welfare protection, full employment, redistributing wealth through progressive taxation, regulating or controlling public utilities, economic development and so forth.[165] After WW Two, state elites could no longer fulfill these responsibilities as well as they had done before. If the state was to survive and fulfill the expectations of its people, it needed to somehow generate affluence for its citizenry.[166] Alan Milward would label the ECSC initiative as 'the European rescue of the nation-state'.[167] This is because state elites realised that it would make sense to delegate some responsibilities and duties from the national level to the ECSC. In this way, if nation-states worked together at the ECSC, they could also recover better after WW Two.

After the ECSC, representatives and foreign ministers of the Benelux countries provided further impetus for integration.[168] The Benelux countries urged the formation of a common market and customs union which were to engender the EEC on 1 Jan 1958.[169]

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[161] Loccit
[162] Morgan Philip, Opcit.p47
[163] Loccit
[164] Loccit
[165] Jenkins Brian, Opcit.p52
[166] Spiering M,Opcit.p102
[167] Ibid.p111
[168] The Benelux countries are Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
[169] Ibid.p24

Concomitantly, the Treaty of Rome's preamble envisioned 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'.[170] The preamble was a sign that EEC elites were trying to get Europeans to see themselves as one entity.

While some members of the Community were willing to allow certain state responsibilities and duties to be entrusted to the Community in the 1960's, others like French leader De Gaulle, were unwilling to see too many responsibilities being delegated to the Community. The empty-chair crisis,[171] precipitated by De Gaulle, ensured that the EC remained largely immobilised.[172] EC elites were thus largely enmeshed in the empty-chair crisis debacle which was only resolved with the 'Luxembourg comprise' in 1966.[173] They were probably concerned that fewer state responsibilities and tasks were being entrusted to the Community. Therefore, the likelihood that they were thinking of creating a European identity at the time is uncertain. De Gaulle would certainly have not had a problem of circumscribing any possibility of a European identity emerging. After all, he often reiterated that the Community was nothing more than '*l'Europe des Patries'* which means a Europe of nation-states.[174]

At the start of the 1970's, European pessimism and Eurosclerosis were setting in. This was due to the economic problems based on petrol shocks and the US decision to cut interest rates and suspend the dollar convertibility.[175] These and other effects offset a deleterious international financial crisis which was made even worse for European states because of their dependency on the dollar. In such tumultuous times, EC elites were not fulfilling their 'civic' duties and roles as well as they might have wanted. This may have spurred them on to introduce the concept of identity more fervently as a way to get EC

[170] Morgan Philip, Opcit.p49
[171] The 'empty chair crisis' was primarily a French refusal to participate in the Council of Ministers. The president of the Commission at the time, Walter Hallstein, proposed that the Commission should control not only the ordinary but also the extraordinary agenda of the EEC. He also proposed to direct the proceeds of agricultural levies and customs duties to the Commission for it to manage as the EEC's 'own resources'. The French were very concerned about these proposals since they envisioned an increase in powers for the supranational institutions of the EEC.
[172] Spiering M,Opcit.p102, please note that the EEC was renamed the EC in 1967 after the merger of the EEC, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the ECSC.
[173] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p37
[174] Blair Alasdair, Opcit.p33
[175] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p29

member states citizens to identify with it. The concept of identity may have been seen as a panacea for the democratic deficit that the EC faced or may even have been spurred on as a result of enlargement.[176] Whatever the case may be, it is clear that identity formation had become more important to EC elites in the 1970's.

Some like Hugh Seton-Watson also thought that the Community needed "something more exciting than the price of butter….a need for a European mystique".[177] Reminiscent of the fact that efforts to unite Europeans along ethnic lines failed before the inception of the ECSC, EC elites did not proceed to define a European identity in mythical terms. In fact, the basis of a European identity was defined along civic lines. For example, in the 1973 'Declaration concerning European identity', the declaration stated: "All were determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights."[178] This shows that the identity was a rights based identity and that it was a civic identity. EC elites did not try to foster a unified European nation-type identity founded on a common European cultural tradition. Rather, EC elites respected EC citizens' emotional bonds to their respective nations. A European identity was thus meant to complement one's national identity, not replace it. It was based on civic values and virtues that states usually promote at the national level. This reinforces the argument that the theory of Constitutional Patriotism elucidates the shape and form of identity within the EU today.

In 1974, European elites commissioned a study into allotting special rights to citizens' of the Community at a European summit.[179] This was an important step because in 1975, it seemed as if the EC was becoming more and more undemocratic with intergovernmentalism taking precedence,[180] as seen with the institutionalisation of summitry meetings and the creation of the European Council.[181] Citizens of the

[176] Wintle Michael **(1)**, Opcit.p10
[177] Loccit
[178] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p29
[179] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p30
[180] Blair Alasdair, Opcit.p48
[181] Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism are two opposing theories which try to explain European integration. Intergovernmentalism posits that nation-state elites' at the EU level still make key political decisions regarding their entities. They are still the primary actors in International Relations.

Community needed to feel that their role was important in the EC. If they felt that their role in the Community meant something, they would participate in the EC's institutions and identify with it. Just as in nation-states, EC elites felt they had to ensure that their citizenry enjoyed civic virtues such as equality, freedom of speech, tolerance, democracy, political participation and that their needs were catered for by the Community. Hence, in June 1979, the decision was taken to introduce direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). At this juncture, the EC's institutions were becoming more democratic because the EP was designed to represent EC citizens. Furthermore, EC citizens had the opportunity to directly elect who they felt should be members of the EP.[182]

Shortly afterwards, the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindeman, issued a 'Report on European Union' in 1976 whereby he said "No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. The European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in education and culture, news and communication".[183] EC elites did not want to necessarily look as if they were not being representative of EC citizens because of their focus on the institutions of the Community. This elucidates the move made by EC elites in 1974 whereby they commissioned a study into allotting special rights to the citizens of the Community. In the years to come, EC elites would continue to promote civic values and virtues and try to uphold the image of the Community as being representative of its members. This was a task which was primarily entrusted with the EP. All these efforts showed that EC elites were intent on promoting civic values and in defining a European identity along civic lines. This further reinforces the argument that the EC's identity was akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism.

Supranationalism envisions EU institutions taking decisions independent of the member states. For more information regarding these theories, please, read Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.pp11-24.

[182] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p58

[183] Edwards Geoffrey, The Problems and Possible Future Development of a European Identity in the European Union , http://www.elmhurst.edu/, Continuum, 2000

European Identity in the 1980's and The SEA

In the 1980's, EC elites were extending the role that its institutions played in the Community. EC elites were facilitating the completion of the common market through the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) which would bring about the free movement of goods, people, capital and services.[184] Introducing civic values such as freedom of movement also meant that the rights and privileges of the EC's identity were being broadened and extended. EC member state citizens could soon start to move freely and move goods uninhibited. These are rights that were once the sole responsibility of states at the national level, since they provided their citizenry the right to move around within the demarcated territory of the nation-state.[185] EC elites were offering something more attractive because freedom of movement meant the right to move across borders and not just within the demarcated territory of the nation-state.

At the 1984 Fontainebleau summit, EC elites not only advocated an ad-hoc committee to investigate measures for the adoption of the SEA, they also commissioned an ad-hoc committee to investigate the prospect of broadening the EC's identity further. James Dooge's committee was responsible for focusing on institutional matters and reforms while the Italian parliamentarian, Pietro Adonnino, focused on the EC's identity and subsequently issued a report on a 'People's Europe'.[186] During the Fontainebleau summit, the European Council underscored that "the Community fulfill the expectations of the European people and take measures to strengthen and promote the identity and image of the Community vis-à-vis its citizens and the rest of the world".[187] EC elites were thus trying to consolidate the internal identity of the Community and show that EC elites were extending the civic roles and responsibilities that the EC played. They not only guaranteed that EC member state citizens would enjoy the rights of being part of the EC's civic identity, but that the Community and its institutions would continue to fulfill the expectations of the European people.

[184] David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p57
[185] Nikolas Mary Margareta, Opcit.p36
[186] Blair Alasdair, Opcit.p57
[187] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p30

In 1985 EC elites began to introduce a wide variety of Eurosymbolism which was intended to promote a common cultural identity.[188] The EC introduced a flag in June 1985 and interestingly the shape of the flag was taken from the logo of the Council of Europe: a circle of twelve yellow stars set against an azure background.[189] The fact that there are twelve stars is not coincidental. The circle of twelve stars evokes connotations of Europeans as a chosen people in the Christian tradition.[190] Twelve is also a symbol linked with Christ's twelve apostles, the tables of the Roman Legislator, the labours of Hercules,[191] the twelve tribes of Israel or even the heavenly Jerusalem's twelve gates.[192] Other measures were the creation of a European passport and even a European anthem, which was taken from the fourth movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony- 'Ode to Joy'.[193] EC elites even decided that the 9th of May, the day on which Robert Schuman proposed the first Community, should be dubbed 'European day'. The following year on the 29th of May 1986, the flag was hoisted at Berlaymont and the EC hymn- the Ode to Joy- was played for the first time.[194] These initiatives which define the EC and the European identity are interesting because they deviate slightly from an identity based on civic values. If the flag is making connotations of Europeans as a people in the Christian tradition, European identity was not completely 'civic' or based solely on Constitutional Patriotism; rather it has some ethnocultural concepts.

In 1988, the European Council introduced a European dimension into school subjects dealing with literature, history, geography, civics, languages and music. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle wrote a book 'Europe- A History of its peoples', which contains a history of Europe covering 5,000 years.[195] Once again, it is interesting that the European Council and EC elites approved these measures because it appeared that they were endorsing an 'identity' that moved beyond Constitutional Patriotism and civic virtues. A focus on

[188] Jacobs Dirk and Maier Robert, Opcit.p6
[189] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p31
[190] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p10
[191] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p31
[192] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p10
[193] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p32
[194] Loccit
[195] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p32

Europe's history and geography for example, might mean that they were beginning to provide a 'myth' of Europe and instilling an ethnic sense of 'Europeanness' among 'Europeans'. However, EU elites did not build on this in the Maastricht Treaty. The section (Titles VII and XI) in the Maastricht Treaty which handles education, vocational training, youth and culture, made no further references as to consolidating a feeling of 'Europeanness' in school curriculums and the education systems of the EU.[196]

For much of the 1980's, EC elites mostly defined a European identity along civic lines. There was no real attempt to try and introduce an overwhelming amount of ethnic elements to this identity. For example, if reference to a European identity was made along ethnic lines, EC elites did not continue to foster or define the EC's identity along these lines in further treaties. Rather, they adhered to a more civic identity while respecting EC citizens affiliations to their respective national identities.

European Identity in the 1990's and the Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty of European Union (TEU) was signed on 7 February 1992 and engendered some of the most unprecedented changes in the EU's history with the EC now renamed the EU.[197] The Maastricht Treaty was instrumental for finalising arrangements on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (The "Social Charter").[198] It outlined monetary union by 1 January 1999 and most member states at that time agreed to adopt a common currency.[199] It was only at the start of 2002, however, that coins and bills in Euro denominations were actually introduced into circulation.[200] Nevertheless, the adoption of the 'Euro' was a milestone for EU elites in their plan to forge an identity. The 'Euro' was symbolic of a European identity because EU member states were relinquishing their own individual currencies for a common currency. While EU elites were instilling a sense of

[196] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p139
[197] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p71
[198] Ibid.p68
[199] Ibid.p1
[200] Loccit

European identity among EU citizens, some political elites, like the Irish politician Mary O'Rourke stated that "While the single currency will have the most significant impact on people's identification with the Union, there remains a pressing need to bring together European citizens on non-economic grounds."[201]

For the first time in history, a supranational citizenship was implemented legally at a level above the nation-state. It showed that EU elites wanted the EU to be regarded with more *'grandeur'* and that the EU is an organisation which is not just composed of sovereign nation-states that are geographically, economically and to some extent politically intermeshed.[202] EU elites evidently wanted EU citizens to identify with the supranational organisation. The concept of citizenship should not be glossed over and taken lightly. The importance attached to citizenship can be traced back to the 1789 French Revolution whereby the concept of citizenship became directly intertwined to the nation-state and thus "citizenship has been an important conceptual arm of nation-building and an instrument for governing the masses".[203] In the context of international law "citizenship defines the rights, privileges, and duties an individual possesses by virtue of belonging to a state".[204] By adopting citizenship at a level above the nation-state, the EU was beginning to resemble a state. EU elites also wanted its citizens to associate themselves with the European identity so as to reaffirm this status.

There are three dimensions to citizenship: the Liberalist, Republicanist and the Communitarianist dimension.[205] The liberal concept of citizenship is a juridical status allocating civil, political and social rights and duties to the individual members of a political entity.[206] The EU fulfills this dimension because *most* EU citizens[207] are allowed to live and work in any of the EU member countries without restrictions that do not apply

[201] Jacobs Dirk and Maier Robert, Opcit.p6
[202] Deflem Mathieu and Pampel C. Fred, The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification, http://www.cas.sc.edu/, 1996, p.1
[203] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p36
[204] Loccit
[205] Oana Dan, Opcit.p6
[206] Loccit
[207] Free movement of labour is not a luxury that all EU citizens can partake in. Certain restrictions in terms of labour mobility, for instance, were imposed on the CEEC's when they acceded in 2004. For more information on the topic, please, read Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p96-98

to citizens of those countries.[208] They are also allocated political rights whereby EU citizens may vote in local elections or become candidates for and serve in local elective office and be candidates for the EP in any of the member countries. Furthermore, other rights which were attached to EU citizenship were the free movement of goods, people, services and capital.[209] While EU elites stipulate the rights that EU citizens are entitled to, they do not stipulate what their duties are. This is interesting because citizenship at the national level has both rights and duties attached to it. For example, a national duty that citizens may be required to perform is military service or some alternative form of service.[210] At the supranational level, EU elites were obviously trying not to offend state elites at the national level who felt that it was their task to stipulate duties for their citizens. When EU elites introduce civic values such as citizenship to define the identity of the Union, they do so carefully and try not to offend state elites.

The Republican dimension posits that institutions be constructed in such a way as to allow political participation of EU citizens at the Union level.[211] This, however, is less developed because of the cryptic and opaque nature of the EU's institutions.[212] EU elites have attempted to increase the importance of the EP in EU decision making and are trying to get EU citizens to engage in and identify with the EP.

The most interesting dimension of citizenship is that of Communitarianism. Sociological literature has based EU citizenship in the Communitarian paradigm.[213] In this scenario, citizenship (a civic component of identity formation) is supposed to bind Europeans together as opposed to trying to unite Europeans based on any similar ethnic traits which they may share.[214] Not only did EU elites ensure that EU citizenship is defined along civic lines, they also reaffirm that they are not the guardians of distributing EU

[208] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p74
[209] Loccit
[210] 'Citizenship and National Service: Appendices', http://www.ndol.org, May 1, 1998
[211] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p14
[212] Loccit
[213] Oana Dan, Opcit.p8, please note that the Communitarianist dimension of *citizenship* is not the same as the actual theory of Communitarianism. Please refer back to chapter one, for more information on this theory, pg.15
[214] Loccit

citizenship. Part II, title II establishing the 'Citizenship of the Union', states that "Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union".[215] State leaders at the national level have control over the allocation of EU citizenship and they assess who is a citizen of their nationality before they can ever be eligible for an EU citizenship. Therefore, what EU elites were trying to do was promote two identities, one at the national and the other at the supranational level. Allowing state elites at the national level leverage over the allocation of EU citizenship was not intended to be problematic; rather EU elites wanted state elites at the national level to feel that they still had control and that their role was not necessarily defunct and irrelevant. Furthermore, a concept known as subsidiarity was also introduced into the Maastricht Treaty by EU elites. It served as a confirmation that Brussels was not the centre of policymaking and that member states could still adopt their own independent national stances on European policy issues.[216] This reinforces the argument that these measures are akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. The idea was to have a European identity based on civic values which would buttress one's national identity, rather than replace it.

Other ways in which EU elites were quite meticulous in trying not to offend state elites or EU citizens with a European identity, can be seen when scrutinising Article 128 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty which states "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity".[217] Thus, EU elites promote cultural diversity in the Union and assert that no EU member states national identity will be diluted.[218] If EU elites note that they support the 'flowering of the cultures', it becomes evident that they buttress cultural diversity in the EU and are not trying to introduce one European culture; this is further reinforced by their motto 'Unity in Diversity'.[219] Furthermore, the fact that EU elites respect national and regional diversity shows that EU elites are not trying to supersede national identities. In the section titled common provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, Article F states that

[215] Görgün Tugrul,Opcit.p38
[216] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p142
[217] Loccit
[218] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p139
[219] Wintle Michael **(3)**, 'Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe', in Wintle Michael, Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of divergence and unity in past and present, Avebury, 1996, p4

"The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy".[220] This article confirms that a European identity complements national identities.

Treaty of Amsterdam 1997

After the enlargement in 1995, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was erected to tie up any loose ends of the Maastricht Treaty, which in turn meant a focus on institutional reforms. The product of the IGC negotiations was a Treaty of Amsterdam which was concluded in 1997.[221] EU elites were primarily concerned with institutional reforms to ensure that in the case of enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC's), the EU would still be able to function and perform its duties and responsibilities effectively as an institution. Therefore, the scope of the Treaty was circumscribed and there was no 'grand theme' as in the Maastricht Treaty.[222] EU elites did not focus on furthering identity formation at the supranational level, however, they did reiterate the approach that they would adopt to applicant countries which aspired to become members of the EU.[223]

Treaty of Nice 2000

At the December 2000 Nice European Council, EU elites were bracing themselves for an imminent 'big bang' enlargement. A few months earlier, in February 2000, EU elites had opened negotiations with the second wave states of the CEEC's[224] (the 5+1 first wave had begun in March 1998).[225] An examination of the structure and design of the Treaty of Nice indicates that when it was signed by EU elites on 26 February 2001, EU elites were

[220] Boxhoorn Bram, Opcit.p139
[221] Blair Alasdair, Opcit.p76
[222] Loccit
[223] For more information on the type of criteria that EU elites imposed on applicant countries, please, refer to part two of this chapter, titled 'EU Elites and Enlargement Criteria', p.59
[224] Nugent Neill **(4)**, 'The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round', in Nugent Neill (ed.), European Union Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p37
[225] Ibid.p36

still focused on the question of institutional reform so as to ensure that the Union's institutions still functioned smoothly when new members (like the CEEC's) joined the EU.[226] Since the focus of the Nice European Council was on institutional reform, reference to the further consolidation of the EU's identity was scant.

The Constitutional Treaty

In the run up to the 2004 enlargement, a convention was set up to recommend a 'Constitutional Treaty for Europe'. The convention was chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard D'Estaing.[227] The convention, which deliberated between March 2002 and June 2003,[228] did not only discuss institutional reforms and a Constitution for Europe, the convention also made references as to how a European identity should be framed. On top of all the other civic values that EU elites have always promoted, such as equality, freedom of speech, tolerance, democracy, political participation, the introduction of a Constitution was supposed to be instrumental in binding EU citizens together. It was intended to make EU citizens aware that they constitute a single group and that they were part of a European identity.[229] This is intriguing because advocates of Constitutional Patriotism espouse precisely this, a Constitution which serves as a means to unify people. However, initially, the Constitutional Treaty was not akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism.

On opening the convention's Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (DTECE), it becomes evident that the convention was attempting to base European identity on ethnic values. One example of how the convention tried to fix a common European narrative in myth was through two lines of ancient Greek in the DTECE.[230] The image was accompanied with the name Thukydides, which is reminiscent of 'ancient

[226] Ibid.p37
[227] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p86
[228] Blair Alasdair, Opcit.p80
[229] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p7
[230] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p5

Greece'.[231] For most Europeans ancient Greece is a portrayal of a myth, reminiscent of a world that crafted eternal works of art, philosophy and science, of free and virtuous citizens prepared to fight despotism.[232] This focus on ancient Greece was an illustration on how the drafters at the convention were trying to provide Europeans with a common identity rooted in antique or medieval times. An image of ancient Greece was useful because most Europeans could identify with this image of Greece and most even argued to be ancient Greece's heirs.[233] It was a symbol which could coalesce Europeans into accepting a European identity because they share similar myths and histories. Assessing whether there is any validity to the notion that Europeans are heirs of ancient Greece is irrelevant. In fact, on further inspection, it becomes clear that Europeans have removed Greek history from its Middle Eastern and Oriental context.[234] Nevertheless, what is important is that, although the European claim to be ancient Greece's heirs is subjective, it could still serve to unify Europeans along ethnic lines because, as mentioned before, most Europeans identify with this image. This may explain why the convention used ancient Greece as a symbol which they believed could coalesce Europeans into accepting a European identity. Many philosophers would also approve of using ancient Greece as a method of trying to bring Europeans together. The Indian Philosopher, Radhakrishnan, advocates that the roots of European civilisation can be derived from their Greek-derived thinking, their Judeo-Christian sense of civilisation and their Roman talents for statecraft.[235]

The first recital of the DTECE asserted the uniqueness of the Union, portraying Europe as a 'continent that has brought forth civilisation'.[236] On further inspection, this recital is subjective and cannot be proven if one looks at historical records. Europe is not the foundation of civilisation. If anyone could claim so, Byzantium has stronger claims of being the cradle of European civilisation.[237] The purpose of the recital is really to

[231] Loccit
[232] Loccit
[233] Ibid.p6
[234] Wintle Michael **(1)**, Opcit.p11
[235] Wintle Michael **(3)**, Opcit.p12
[236] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p9
[237] Wintle Michael **(3)**, Opcit.p11

permeate an idea of uniqueness among EU citizens so that they would feel a stronger emotional bond to the European identity.

It is difficult to ascertain what motivated the convention to define a European identity and an EU more on ethnic than civic lines. A European identity based on the type of ethnic values presented by the convention in 2003, would have certainly precluded the possibility of most of the CEEC's joining. This may be because, on the whole, the CEEC's have different languages, religious backgrounds and cultural histories and interests.[238] However, the president of the convention, Giscard D'Estaing, who may have approved of these measures to redefine a European identity along ethnic lines, was probably not inspired to do so because of the imminent enlargement to the CEEC's, rather he was probably more concerned about Turkey becoming a member of the EU. At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, Turkey was accorded the status of a 'candidate country' of the EU and the European Council also declared that Turkey 'is a candidate state *destined* to join the Union'.[239] These statements *may* have perturbed Giscard D'Estaing. He is vociferously opposed to Turkey's candidacy, having remarked that Turkey was 'not a European country' and that admitting Turkey to the EU would mean 'the end of Europe'.[240] An identity based on ethnic values would have certainly precluded Turkish membership because Turkey is not part of the civilisation that the convention alluded to. The Turks or Seljuk Turks in the 11th century were the menace from the East. The siege of Vienna in 1683 by the Turks is reminiscent of a fight whereby Europeans fought to save European civilisation from the threat of the Turks.[241]

EU elites, however, did not end up reformulating a European identity along ethnic lines. For the most part, EU elites have defined a European identity and accession criteria along civic lines. The IGC thus thought it necessary to modify the convention's proposals when it adopted the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE). Besides, it would have been unwise to adopt the convention's proposals on a European identity because, if

[238] Nugent Neill **(1)**, Opcit.p10
[239] Phinnemore David, Opcit.p12
[240] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth, Negotiating Europe : the politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession, British International Studies Association, 2006, p406
[241] Wintle Michael **(2),** Opcit.p55

it had, it would be proving to applicant countries such as Turkey, that Europe is a 'Christian club' and this would have cast a shadow on the EU since it is supposed to be secular. Furthermore, EU elites stated in the Maastricht Treaty that they would accommodate cultural diversity. As a result, the TECE contained no reference to Greek mythology, rather the IGC introduced into the Convention's third recital of the preamble, the words 'after bitter experiences'.[242] These 'bitter experiences' alluded to the horrors of WW Two and that the genesis of European integration was to ensure that such catastrophes of the 20th century would never reoccur.[243]

Rather than promoting the idea of a chosen community, EU elites promoted common values. Social scientists believe that the promotion of common values is an apt way of forging an identity because they are highly abstract values and form part of the social identity of the individual.[244] Most states in the 21st century have tried to promote these values and as a result, EU elites promote these values because of their importance to EU citizens. The importance of forging common values manifests itself in Art.I-2, sentence 2 of the TECE which notes "These values are common to Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice and equality between men and women prevail".[245]

The Charter of Fundamental Rights which first appeared at the Nice summit in December 2000, was also included in the TECE and was instrumental for promoting this community of values.[246] These values within the TECE can be found in Arts I-1, para.2 and I-2 TECE.[247] They are basically universal values rather than a culturally specific definition of Europe as a community based on a set of unique and 'European' values. The preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights made it clear what these 'universal values' were when it stated: "The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values….. The union is founded on

[242] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p6
[243] Loccit
[244] Ibid.p10
[245] Ibid.p11
[246] Ibid.p10
[247] Ibid.p11

the indivisible universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law…..It seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital".[248] Evidently, these values are part and parcel of the civic component of the state and shows that the EU is committed to promoting these values.

The fourth recital of the TECE described Europe as 'a special area of human hope' or '*un espace privilégié de l'espérance humaine*'.[249] This meant that EU elites were trying to allude that the hopes of Europeans would be fulfilled more effectively at the EU level, whereas at the national level their hopes and dreams have less chance of being realised. When the TECE asserted the need to 'forge a common destiny', EU elites were covertly emphasising the inability of states at the national level to cope with the challenges of the 21st century alone. They asserted that future challenges would need to be addressed by all Europeans and not by a specific set of people within one nation-state.[250] All Europeans would have to tackle the challenges of the 21st century together. This is why Europeans share 'one common future'.[251] Through the combination of civic values being promoted and championed by EU elites and the rallying of Europeans around the EU, an EU identity could emerge.

The outcome of the Constitutional Treaty was that it was rejected in May 2005 in France and the Netherlands.[252] Whatever the causes were for the rejection of the treaty, it altered the way the EU saw enlargement and its identity. Former French President Jacques Chirac summoned a special European Council to decide whether the EU should halt future enlargement. The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who was holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers, Jean-Claude Juncker, also suggested a 'period of reflection' on enlargement.[253] European identity had been dealt a blow as well because of the failed

[248] Fossum Erik Jon, Opcit.p27
[249] Weiler J.H.H, Opcit.p9
[250] Loccit
[251] Ibid.p8
[252] Rachman Gideon, The Death of Enlargement, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006, p53.
[253] Phinnemore David, Opcit.p24

Constitutional Treaty. All these setbacks occurred before EU elites opened accession negotiations with Turkey which took place in October 2005.

Treaty of Lisbon

After the enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, the German presidency managed to secure a mandate for a new IGC in June of the same year.[254] The Treaty of Lisbon has made amendments to the TEU and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). After the debacle of the 2005 Constitutional Treaty, all reference to symbols of Constitutionalism, including flag, anthem and motto, have been revoked.[255] It is interesting that the flag was removed from the identity of the EU. The flag had made connotations of Europeans as a chosen people in the Christian tradition. The flag was thus evoking ethnic ties among European countries because it was anchoring the EU's identity in religion. With its removal, any ethnocultural elements that existed within the EU's identity were now abnegated. After the Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 by EU elites, the following year it was rejected by the Irish.[256] There is a whole spectrum of possible reasons as to why it was rejected. Ironically, one reason is that some Irish dissidents were perturbed that the amended treaties made no reference to God and the Christian roots of Europe.[257] They were dismayed that attempts were being made by EU elites to forge a European identity determined exclusively by the agnostic Enlightenment culture.[258] Even Pope Benedict XVI expressed dismay with the omission of God within the treaties.[259] Despite these diatribes as to the nature of the EU's identity, the amendments of the Lisbon treaty were not only about removing whatever ethnocultural elements may have existed to its identity, rather identity formation was

[254] Laursen Finn, The (Reform) Treaty of Lisbon: What's in it? How significant, http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/pubs.html, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol.9 No.1, January 1999, p3
[255] Ibid.p4
[256] Laursen Finn, Opcit.p3
[257] '9 reasons why a conscientious Catholic citizen should reject the Treaty of Lisbon', www.isfcc.org/pdfs/nine_reasons.pdf, p2
[258] Loccit
[259] Ibid.p1

actually dropped from the EU's agenda altogether. Besides these changes though, the Treaty of Lisbon was basically 95% the same as the Constitutional Treaty.[260]

The next part of the chapter will just briefly assess whether the same values and virtues of a European identity have been used by EU elites in assessing the eligibility of previous candidates for enlargement. It will then touch on the efforts that have been made by Turkey to satisfy the criteria for accession into the Union.

EU Elites and Enlargement Criteria

As a European identity began to take shape in the 1970's, EC elites were increasingly aware that the identity of the Community had to be based on civic values. Past efforts to unite Europeans along ethnic lines failed in this regard and surely served as a caveat to EC elites from taking this line of action. Acknowledging that Europeans did have or still feel primordial ties to their nation, meant that they set about creating an identity that would be complementary to their national identity rather than replacing it. The idea was to have double identities. A double loyalty would entail a cultural dimension or orientation at the national level, and one at a supranational or European level, consisting of a political dimension or orientation. This illustrates their adherence to Constitutional Patriotism.

As a result, EC elites also realised that it would be prudent to apply these same values to their enlargement policy when assessing the eligibility of candidates for accession into the then EC. For example, in 1962, the European Parliament stipulated membership criteria for enlargement. The 1962 Birkelbach Report stipulated that an applicant country had to be a democratic state if it were to become a member of the European Communities.[261] The fact that this was the only criterion for an applicant country, illustrates that the enlargement criteria was not based on ethnic values and virtues. From

[260] Lawson Nigel, EU Reform: Hidden Agenda, http://www.time.com/time/magazine, 26 March 2008
[261] Piedrafita Sonia, The Treaty of Lisbon: New Signals for Future Enlargements?, http://www.eipa.eu/files/, 2008, p.37

then onwards, EC elites have based enlargement criteria on those values. In the EEC treaty, Article 237 noted that "Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community".[262] Article 237 did not define a European state ethnically, culturally or geographically, rather the question has been whether applicant countries had well established democracies with robust market based economies.[263] This sort of criteria was further reinforced within the Union's *Acquis Communitaire* in 1993.[264] This kind of criterion was applied in the 1973 enlargement to Denmark, Britain and Ireland; Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, the CEEC's in 2004 as well as to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

At this late stage, it would be unfair and unjust to suddenly define an identity based on ethnic values such as Christianity and so forth, which would exclude Turkey from membership. In all previous enlargements, civic values were used to assess whether applicant countries were deemed eligible to be part of the European identity. Turkey formally applied for EC membership in April 1987,[265] but has had an Association Agreement with the EC since 1963.[266] All this time, Turkey has been harmonising its laws with EU values, norms and practices, reforming its judicial system, providing stronger protection and rights for minorities, placing greater emphasis on the importance of individual liberties, removing the death penalty, lifting its repression on the Kurds and has met the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993.[267] Since it has adopted all these civic values, one could even argue that Turkey has become 'Europeanised'.[268] EU elites should respect this and continue its enlargement negotiations with Turkey and assess Turkish application like any other candidate and act with impartiality.

This chapter has elucidated that, for various reasons, EU elites have opted to forge an identity based primarily on civic nationalism and that they do not intend to supplant

[262] Nugent Neill **(3),** 'Previous Enlargement Rounds', in Nugent Neill (ed.), European Union Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.28
[263] Nugent Neill **(1)**, Opcit.p2
[264] Nugent Neill **(3),** Opcit.p31
[265] Nugent Neill **(4)**, Opcit.p39
[266] Ibid.p45
[267] Nugent Neill **(2)**, Opcit.p16
[268] Ibid.p15

national identities, but rather complement them. In summary, this chapter has shown that when considering the actions and reasoning of EU elites, the theory of Constitutional Patriotism best describes their behaviour.

The next chapter will illustrate whether EU citizens associate themselves with a European identity and it will also illuminate whether they too define a European identity in accordance with the theory of Constitutional Patriotism.

Chapter Four

EU Citizens Support for a European Identity & Enlargement

It seems logical to assert that EU elites have defined and framed a European identity which is congenial to the citizens of the Union. After all, would it not be counterproductive to forge an identity which is not buttressed by EU citizens? The purpose of the first part of this chapter will be to undertake the task of examining precisely how EU citizens conceptualise a European identity and what it means to them to be part of it, and whether the way in which they formulate a European identity is the same as that of the elites at the supranational level. The aim of this chapter is also to try and gauge whether EU citizens have, in general, continuously defined it along the same lines or whether there have been any changes in their perception of it over time. This chapter also plans to try and find out if a correlation exists between how EU citizens define a European identity and the way in which they stipulate the eligibility of candidates for EU membership. This chapter will focus exclusively on the responses from citizens of four EU member states, namely Germany, Austria, Britain and France. The choice of case studies is deliberate because it is within these countries that an intense diatribe is raging on identity formation and enlargement at the supranational level. The responses of EU citizens to the various questions will be interpreted, examined and extrapolated via Eurobarometer polls.

In addition to scrutinising how a European identity and the eligibility of candidates for EU enlargement have been framed by EU citizens, the second part of this chapter seeks to assess whether they have displayed regular support for a European identity and enlargement over time. Hence, the focus will be to look at how EU citizens felt about a European identity before and after each enlargement in the EU's history and to concomitantly determine support levels for previous enlargements before and after they occur. Furthermore, the aim is to try and ascertain if a correlation exists between support for enlargement and support for a European identity. In other words, do high support

levels for an enlargement mean that support levels for a European identity are equally salubrious at that point in time?

Finally, the chapter will briefly look at the period at which support for a European identity was at its strongest and most robust point among EU citizens of the four countries studied here, which might provide insight into when a European identity had the best possibility of burgeoning. The overall purpose of this entire analysis will be to prove or disprove if Turkey was the instigating force which crippled the possible formation of a European identity. It also touches on some possible reasons which might explain any vacillations in support for enlargement and identity.

Part One

What it means to be European?

In June 1987, interviewers of Eurobarometer polls wanted to find out what the factors were which made EC member state citizens 'feel European' or think of themselves as 'European'. Eurobarometer (EB) 27 provides a table of different ways of 'feeling European', from which one can incur which factors make EC citizens perceive themselves as being European.[269] From the table, it becomes sonorously evident that the way in which EC citizens conceptualise a European identity is analogous to the way in which EC elites define it. The results reveal that EC citizens in Germany, Britain and France, all tend to define it along the same terms. In other words, they all tend to delineate it along civic rather than ethnic lines. For example, only 10% of Germans felt that they shared similar cultural traditions, ways of life and thought, with other EC members. Only 4% acquiesced that they shared common religious and philosophical values with other EC members. It is abundantly clear that what makes Germans 'feel'

[269] 'European Commission Public Opinion', http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm, Standard Eurobarometer 27, June 1987, (table 4), p18; please note that all relevant graphs and tables from the EB polls can be accessed in the appendix. More specifically, all graphs and tables which are referred to in part one of this chapter can be found in Appendix A, p.110

European are civic virtues such as freedom of movement (travel without difficulties at 18%) and peace, prosperity and stability (past rivalries behind, living in peace at 55%)

In Britain, only 12% of the British felt that they shared similar cultural traditions, ways of life and thought, with other EC members. Furthermore, a mere 2% agreed that they shared common religious and philosophical values with other EC members. Thus, factors which could influence the British in feeling European, were being granted privileges such as being able to travel without difficulties (16%). Another factor which made them feel European was the fact that Europeans have been able to put past rivalries behind them (such as WW Two) and hence, 50% of them considered it a huge accomplishment that they were able to live in peace with other EC members.

In France, a scant 11% of the French believed that they shared similar cultural traditions, ways of life and thought, with other EC members and in addition, a petty 2% of them concurred that they shared common religious and philosophical values with other EC members. These values are more ethnic in origin and this table illustrates that the French do not attach much importance to these values. While the percentages are low in general, the graph shows that they are more enthralled with civic values and virtues. For instance, more of them (13%) feel European when granted the opportunity to travel without difficulties (a civic value). 44% of the French also appreciate the fact that Europe has put its past rivalries aside and that they are now living in peace and harmony with other EC members. Hence, these factors make them feel particularly European. Furthermore, 23% of the French felt privileged to be part of a project or adventure which might form into a ‘United States of Europe’.

EB 27 may have provided insight into how EC citizens attached great importance to civic values, which in turn, determined how European they felt, but this Eurobarometer was, after all, carried out in 1987. Hence, a more recent Eurobarometer, namely EB 62, was analysed to investigate whether EC citizens continued to herald civic values as a defining feature which made them feel European. The results of EB 62, which were issued in autumn 2004, revealed that when interviewers asked EU citizens what the EU meant to

them personally, most of them pinned the most importance on civic values, such as the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU. In fact, they attached so much importance to this that from spring 2004 (in EB 61) to autumn of that year, these civic rights continued to feature and rank at the very top of the table. Furthermore, support for the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU increased by 2%, from 51% in the spring of 2004 to 53% in autumn that year. Once again, this only served to reinforce the argument that EU citizens cherished civic values the most. Other values which garnered support from EU citizens were peace and democracy. 36% of EU citizens from the EU15 felt that the EU has brought peace to Europe and 25% of them also agreed that democracy has been consolidated within the EU framework. All of these values feature at the top of the graph or were near to it. This was interesting because it illuminated that EU citizens did not seem to attach much significance to any ethnic values or virtues (at least not beyond their nation-state). For example, it is interesting to note that 30% of EU citizens cherished cultural diversity within the Union, whereas only 14% were perturbed about a loss of their cultural identity within their own respective countries. One reason why only a minority of EU citizens felt threatened about losing their cultural identities within their own respective countries was not necessarily because they were indifferent to relinquishing it, rather they might not have felt menaced by an identity at the supranational level because after all, it was based on civic values. An identity based primarily on civic values is hardly a threat to one's cultural ties to one's nation because a civic identity in the EU does not seek to supplant one's national cultural ties.

It is important to bear in mind that EU citizens not only harbour an attachment to an identity based on civic values at the supranational level, instead they also concomitantly recognise that the EU is culturally diverse and that each EU citizen has some sort of ethnic attachment to his/her nation or has a culture which differentiates him/her from others. This is reminiscent of the theory of Constitutional Patriotism because the idea is to promote a civic identity along civic terms at the supranational level while acknowledging the ties or different cultures that exist within the EU member states. EU citizens do not espouse an identity at the supranational level which would supplant or supersede their primordial ties to their respective nations with an overarching European

culture. If they did, they might have been more congenial to an identity which promoted both civic and ethnic values at the supranational level.

All in all, the examination of the Eurobarometer polls has indicated that EU citizens attached particular importance to civic values such as freedom of movement and peace. They do not necessarily feel that ethnic or primordial ties bind them or engender a sense of feeling European. This raises the question as to whether EU citizens use the same kind of civic values in defining the eligibility of candidates for EU membership. It would seem contradictory to define a European identity along civic lines or argue that civic values bind them together or help engender a sense of feeling 'Europeanness', and then proceed to stipulate that applicant countries which covet joining the Union should meet a criteria which is based on ethnic values and virtues. Fortunately, this perplexing situation did not manifest itself and it became abundantly clear from EB 49 of 1998 that the kind of enlargement criteria which EU citizens believed that applicant countries should satisfy before being able to accede into the Union, was very akin to the kind of values which they expressed made them feel European. In fig 4.2 of EB 49, the most important criteria which EU citizens noted applicant countries should meet before being granted accession, was respecting human rights and the principles of democracy. To be more precise, a staggering 95% of EU citizens believed that this was important whereas only 2% thought that this was not significant. The promotion of human rights and democracy is an entirely civic value, as is freedom of speech, equality and tolerance. The fact that EU citizens rate this as an important criterion which should be met, is an indication that they attach a significant degree of importance to civic values in judging whether a country should be eligible for accession or not.

Thus far, the chapter has shown that EU citizens have incessantly fixed a great deal of importance to civic values and virtues and that these same values have also influenced the way in which they assess the eligibility of candidates for EU accession. The second part of this chapter will now scrutinise whether there has been consistent support for enlargement and a European identity and whether there is a correlation between support for enlargement and support for a European identity.

Part Two

Case Studies of Public Support for European Identity & Enlargement

It should be noted that the main question that was posed by interviewers of Eurobarometer polls to EC member state citizens from 1982 to 1987 was as follows: *"Do you think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes or never".*[270] From 1992 onwards, the question was reformulated and EU citizens were regularly asked if they saw themselves as 'nationality only', 'nationality and European', 'European and nationality' or 'European only'.[271] This question was intended to ascertain more clearly how European EU citizens felt in comparison to their own nationality. Hence, although the questions regarding European identity are slightly different from 1982-87 to those posed from 1992 onwards, the overall aim of this part of the chapter is to try and ascertain whether EU citizens were in general, displaying positive sentiments towards a European identity. Assessing whether they were becoming more imbued with a sense of 'Europeanness' over time can be traced more accurately from 1992 onwards because the question is standardised.[272]

With regards to questions on enlargement, it was also only from 1992 onwards that the same questions were asked regularly. In the 1970's, there was no question in early Eurobarometer polls which asked EC citizens what they thought about the enlargement to Britain, Denmark and Ireland. Hence, the only way to assess whether EC citizens supported the 1973 enlargement was to examine their responses to the question as to whether they were in general, for or against efforts being made to unify Western

[270] Görgün Tugrul, Opcit.p48
[271] Ibid.p60
[272] Please note that all the data which is discussed in this part of the chapter, which relates to support for a European identity and enlargement, are derived from the EB tables and graphs which can be found in Appendix B, p.112

Europe.[273] One could make the logical postulation that if they were against that enlargement, they would have probably been more pessimistic about efforts being made to unify Western Europe. In other words, if they felt that these countries did not belong to a unified Western Europe, one would expect that they would have been disillusioned and disenchanted about the efforts being made by EC elites to unify Western Europe. From 1981 onwards, EC citizens were asked more directly what they thought of enlargement. For example, the focus was placed on whether they thought enlargement was 'a good thing', a 'bad thing' or 'neither one nor the other'.[274] In 1986, the question was slightly different. Now, EC citizens were asked whether they were 'strongly for', 'somewhat for', 'somewhat against' or 'strongly against' enlargement. There was also the option of 'don't know'. It should be noted however, that the overall purpose is to try and ascertain if EC citizens have in general, been supportive of enlargement. As a result, any opaque responses such as 'don't know' or 'neither one nor the other' have been disregarded in the calculations because they do not provide much insight into the findings of this research report. They do not reveal whether they are supportive or unsupportive and the respondent could be mutual, swing either way or even be indifferent. From 1992, EU citizens were basically asked in much clearer terms whether they were 'for' or 'against' enlargement.

A) Germany

Public support for a European identity in Germany has vacillated from one enlargement to the next. For example, after the 1981 enlargement to Greece, EB17 of June 1982 revealed that 75% of the Germans responded positively to the notion of thinking of themselves as European whereas only 18% gave a negative reply.[275] By December 1987, EB 30 recorded that after the enlargement to Spain and Portugal in 1986, only 52% of the

[273] 'European Commission Public Opinion: Standard Eurobarometer Archives', http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm, Standard Eurobarometer 16, December 1981 p.34

[274] Standard Eurobarometer 14, December 1980, p.24

[275] A positive response to the question: *"Do you think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?"*, is 'often' or 'sometimes'. The two percentages are combined to give an overall positive response. 'Never' is regarded as a negative response.

Germans replied positively to the same question. This meant that in comparison to 1981, fewer Germans now perceived themselves as European (-23%) and more Germans resorted to giving negative replies, rising from 18% in 1981 to 42% in 1987 (+24%). In December 1994, a month before the January 1995 enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden, EB 42 issued results which indicated that only 29% of the Germans felt 'nationality only' whereas 67% considered themselves as being somewhat European.[276] This seemed to indicate that they were quite amiable to the idea of a European identity in 1994 but this took an abrupt turn soon afterwards. After the enlargement, EB 46 of October/November 1996, underscored that now 49% of the Germans regarded themselves as 'nationality only' (+20%) and 46% now felt somewhat European (-21%) compared to 1994. What the Eurobarometers also revealed was that in 1994, Germany was above the EU average. In other words, there was a tendency to see more Germans considering themselves as somewhat European than the average EU citizen in any other EU member state. By 1996, Germany was below the EU 15 average which indicated that fewer Germans saw themselves as European than they had before and more of them affiliated themselves with their own national identity.

As the enlargement to the CEEC's was looming in October/November 2003, it seemed as if they were starting to feel more European again and that they were enthusiastic about incorporating the CEEC's into the EU. In comparison to 1996, EB 60.1 pointed out that 38% of the Germans now felt 'nationality only' (-11%) and 59% saw themselves as somewhat European (+13%). Yet, despite this amelioration in support for identity formation at the supranational level in Oct/Nov 2003, Germany was still below the EU average. In other EU member states, such as the Netherlands (NL), France (F), Denmark (DK), Spain (E) and Italy (I), there were more citizens that associated themselves with being somewhat European as opposed to their own national identity. In February/March 2004, as the enlargement drew closer, the Germans felt slightly more European than they had in Oct/Nov 2003. EB 61 showed that 38% of the Germans felt 'nationality only' (no

[276] If a respondent answered either 'nationality and European', European and nationality', or 'European only', he/she was affiliating him/herself, to some extent, with a European identity. This meant that they felt 'somewhat European'. These three percentages were combined to give an overall percentage and were compared with the more negative response, whereby EU citizens felt 'nationality only'.

change) and 60% felt somewhat European (+1%). In turn, Germany was now above the EU average in terms of its support for a European identity. After the enlargement to the CEEC's in May that year, EB 62 of October/November 2004 displayed that the Germans were more imbued with a sense of 'Europeanness'. In comparison to Feb/March 2004, 36% of the Germans felt 'nationality only' (-2%) and 62% felt somewhat European (+2%). Furthermore, the Germans remained above the EU average and in general more Germans could relate to being somewhat European. In October/November 2005, in the run up to the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, EB 64 disclosed that the Germans felt slightly less European than they had the previous year in Oct/Nov 2004. 35% of the Germans now felt 'Nationality only' (-1%) and 60% felt somewhat European (-2%). Despite this slight setback, the Germans were still just above the EU average.

Turning towards an assessment of enlargement, the Germans do not seem to have been too perturbed by the 1973 enlargement. For instance, in EB16, table 14, there was an increase in support for efforts to unify Western Europe, rising from 76% in Feb-March 1970 to 78% in 1973. If there had been opposition to the enlargement, would one have witnessed this 2% augmentation in support? On this high note, it was disappointing to register low support levels for enlargement to Greece in October 1980. In EB 14, table 13, only 43% of the Germans actually buttressed Greece's accession. This effectively meant that less than half of the Germans questioned actually thought that enlargement was a 'good thing'. On a more positive note, there was not considerable opposition to Greece's membership either, since only 8% considered it a 'bad thing'. But at the same time, it was unfortunate to note that there was not overwhelming support for Greece's application.[277] It was nevertheless interesting to note that despite low levels of support, the Germans were more supportive of Greece's accession than Britain and France were. In June 1985, support levels generally looked more encouraging. In EB 23, table 21, 66% and 65% of the Germans gave positive responses regarding Spain and Portugal's accession respectively. In addition, only 16% replied negatively in both cases to

[277] Responses 'neither good nor bad' or 'don't know' were not included in the analysis

enlargement to Spain and Portugal.[278] These results seemed more salubrious because Germans were more 'strongly for' and 'somewhat for' than they were 'somewhat against' or 'strongly against'. Interviewers of EB polls found that over three quarters of EU citizens were supportive of enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The Germans also happened to be very supportive of the 1995 enlargement. In fact, the Germans were amongst the most supportive of enlargement in 1994, along with Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.[279] After the 1995 enlargement, however, their appetite for further enlargement had largely been staunched. EB 43 indicated that only 16% of Germans were supportive of further enlargements in 1996.[280]

In October/November 2003, EB 60, fig 10.1b, showed that opposition had not abated. 42% of the Germans were against, whereas 38% were supportive of enlargement. This meant that there were more Germans that opposed than buttressed it and furthermore, German support for enlargement was also below the EU average. In February/March 2004, as the largest expansion in the EU's history to the CEEC's drew closer, even more Germans were against enlargement than they had been in Oct/Nov 2003. Now 56% of them were against it (+14%), while only 28% were behind the initiative (-10%). As expected, they remained hovering below the EU average. After the May 2004 enlargement, more Germans were suddenly tolerable of further enlargements. In Oct/Nov 2004, 36% of them were supportive of enlargement, an increase of 8% compared to Feb/March 2004. Nevertheless, one cannot dispute the fact that the majority of Germans remained unsympathetic to further enlargements. In the run up to the 2007 enlargement, they became even less tolerant of further accessions into the Union. In Sept/Oct 2006, only 30% buttressed enlargement (-6%). Strangely enough, there was an increase in support for further enlargements after Bulgaria and Romania acceded into the Union in

[278] If a respondent answered 'strongly for' or 'somewhat for' enlargement, these were considered as positive responses. The two percentages were combined to give an overall positive response. The same procedure was applied to negative responses. If a respondent answered 'strongly against' or 'somewhat against', these were considered as negative responses. Percentages for positive responses and negative responses were then compared.

[279] 'European Commission Public Opinion', Opcit.p49

[280] Please note that EB 43 did not contain a graph showing support levels for European enlargement in 1996. Rather the information was provided in writing. Hence there was no accompanying graph in Appendix B for EB 43.

January 2007. In April/May 2007, 34% were supportive of the project (+4%). Concomitantly, however, the Germans remained below par in support for enlargement since they continued to feature below the EU average.

In trying to make a correlation between feeling European and enlargement, it became evident that German support for enlargement was not related to support for a European identity. For example, most Germans thought of themselves as European in 1982, but in 1980, the results showed that less than half of the Germans who participated in the survey supported enlargement to Greece. Hence, their feeling of 'Europeanness' cannot be attributed to the enlargement to Greece. In 1987, fewer Germans thought of themselves as Europeans, but strangely enough they had been very supportive of enlargement to Spain and Portugal in 1985. One cannot attribute their loss of feeling European because of the 1986 enlargement. In December 1994, they had buttressed enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden, yet they felt less European after that enlargement. Hence, their loss of feeling European cannot necessarily be linked to the 1995 enlargement. Although they were starting to feel European in the run up to the 2004 enlargement, their feeling of 'Europeanness' was not attributable to the imminent enlargement to the CEEC's. In fact, they were actually opposed to enlargement in the run up to the 2004 enlargement. They only began to support enlargement again after the 2004 enlargement, and even then, this was only a slight increase in support.

B) Austria

The Austrians only joined the EU in 1995 and hence, determining whether they have displayed consistent support for a European identity and enlargement can only be made between the period from 1996 to 2007. In 1996, 53% of them asserted that they were 'nationality only', whereas 44% expressed that they felt somewhat European. Since more Austrians affiliated themselves with their own nationality first, it came as no surprise that they also featured below the EU average in terms of their association with a European identity. Furthermore, joining the Union did not necessarily instill them with a sense of

'Europeanness'. However, over time it appeared as if they were becoming more and more imbued with a sense of being European. For example, in comparison to how they felt in 1996, they seemed to associate themselves with a European identity more in Oct/Nov 2003. 46% of the Austrians felt 'nationality only' (-7%) and 53% confirmed that they were somewhat European (+9%). However, this augmentation in sentiments towards a European identity did not mean that they were above the EU average in terms of their citizenry relating to a European identity more than others. In fact, Austria remained below the EU 15 average at this moment of time. By Feb/March 2004, any tendency for Austrians to start leaning towards a European identity was dissipating. At this point, they felt less European than they had admitted to being in Oct/Nov 2003. 50% of Austrians now considered themselves 'nationality only' (+4%) and 47% conceded to being somewhat European (-6%). Concomitantly, Austria also remained below the EU average. Although they rapidly felt less European just before the accession of the CEEC's in May 2004, it is ironic that by Oct/Nov 2004, a few months after the 'big bang' enlargement, they suddenly regarded themselves as being more European again. 42% of Austrians now felt 'nationality only' (-8%) and 55% saw themselves as somewhat European (+8%). When the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania was approaching, they started to feel less European as seen in October/November 2005. In comparison to Oct/Nov 2004, 44% of Austrians now felt 'Nationality only' (+2) and 50% acquiesced to being somewhat European (-5%).

When analysing whether Austrians have provided consistent support for enlargement, it became clear that they never really espoused further enlargements of the EU as soon as they became a member of the Union. For example, in 1996, only 15% of Austrians buttressed enlargement and this meant that less than a quarter of them were supportive of further or future enlargements at this stage. In the run up to the 2004 enlargement, they did not feel any more enthusiastic about it than they had been in 1996. More Austrians opposed it than supported it. To prove this, an analysis of EB polls in Oct/Nov 2003 showed that 42% of Austrians were against enlargement whereas only 41% were for it. In Feb/March 2004, as the enlargement drew closer, the Austrians became more opposed to it. 52% of Austrians were now opposed to enlargement (+10%) and only 34% were

supportive of it (-7%). After the May 2004 enlargement, this pessimism continued and in Oct/Nov 2004, only 28% of them buttressed further efforts to enlarge (-6%). However, even Austrians were not consistent in the way that they opposed enlargement. Support for enlargement did not continuously follow a downward spiral. For example, as the 2007 enlargement approached, they appeared slightly more supportive of enlargement than they had been in Oct/Nov 2004. For instance, in Sept/Oct 2006, 31% of Austrians were now supportive of enlargement (+3%). They did not start to become adherents of enlargement from that point onwards however, rather they returned to shying away from supporting enlargement and in April/May 2007, only 28% of them were willing to buttress further enlargements within the Union.

The Austrians started to feel a sense of 'Europeanness' in Oct/Nov 2003. However, this cannot be elucidated by positing that they felt more European because they were excited about enlarging to the CEEC's. In Oct/Nov 2003, more Austrians were opposed to enlargement than supportive of it and hence, their feeling of 'Europeanness' cannot be juxtaposed with the imminent enlargement. They had actually become slightly more supportive of enlargement in the run up to the 2007 enlargement, yet they did not regard themselves as any more European than they had been before.

C) Britain

Of the four case studies, the British were the least likely to be attached to a European identity. Albeit, when they joined the Community in 1973, one might have thought that even though support levels among the British for a European identity were low, there might still have been a chance that they would become immersed with a sense of 'Europeanness'. This rhetoric might have persisted right up until the 1995 enlargement, because when one looks at the responses of the British in the June 1982 opinion poll (which took place a year after enlargement to Greece), it became apparent that although only a 27% minority of the British gave positive responses, the overwhelming majority gave negative responses (72%) in terms of how often they though of themselves as being

European. These figures did ameliorate by June 1987, a year after the enlargement to Spain and Portugal, which might have given the impression that the British were gradually starting to accept a European identity. In comparison to 1982, more of the British (34%) now thought of themselves as European (+7%) and 66% gave negative replies (-6%). While it was true that the United Kingdom (UK) was below the EU average with regards to their support levels for a European identity in December 1994 (which was just a month before the January 1995 enlargement), it was encouraging to note that 48% of the British felt somewhat European whereas 49% perceived themselves as 'nationality only'. Hence, it seemed that more and more of the British were willing to see themselves as being somewhat European. After the enlargement in 1995, however, all these gains were shattered as the British appeared less imbued with a feeling of 'Europeanness' by 1996. At this stage, 64% regarded themselves as 'nationality only' (+15%) and only 35% now felt somewhat European (-13%). In addition to this, the UK remained well below the EU 15 average.

Intriguingly, a change of mood, however slight, occurred as the 2004 enlargement approached. They seemed to be marginally more imbued with a feeling of 'Europeanness' again in comparison to the figures in 1996. In October/November 2003, 62% of the British felt 'nationality only' (-2%) and 36% saw themselves as somewhat European (+1%). Despite these minimal gains, the UK remained jolted below the EU average and as it turned out, was the least supportive of a European identity than any of the EU member states of the EU 15. In February/March 2004, about 3 or 4 months away from the enlargement to the CEEC's, the mood shifted once again. The British appeared to feel slightly less European than they had felt in Oct/Nov 2003. 62% of the British imagined themselves as 'nationality only' (no change) and 35% agreed that they were somewhat European (-1%). Unsurprisingly, the UK remained below the EU average and was still the least supportive of a European identity. Ironically, after the enlargement to the CEEC's in May 2004, they actually felt more European than they had felt in Feb/March 2004. In Oct/Nov 2004, 55% of the British saw themselves as 'nationality only' (-7%) and 40% conceded to being somewhat European (+5%). However, a closer examination of the EB polls also serves to dampen the mood of any amelioration in the

perception of a European identity burgeoning among British citizens. Of the four countries investigated in this analysis, it was only the British who did not have any citizens who saw themselves as 'European only'. In the run up to the 2007 enlargement, they did not appear more imbued with a sense of 'Europeanness' than they had felt in Oct/Nov 2004. In Oct/Nov 2005, 63% of the British now felt 'nationality only' (+8%) and 31% admitted to feeling somewhat European (-9%).

These inconsistencies in their support for a European identity also manifested themselves in their support for enlargement. For example, in 1981 not many of the British were likely to regard enlargement to Greece as a 'good thing'. Only 23% thought that it was a 'good thing', whereas 15% believed that it was a 'bad thing'. Although there were more British citizens who regarded it as a good rather than a bad thing, the numbers supporting enlargement were dismally low. In addition, out of the 9 EC member states in October 1980, the UK was least likely to think that Greece's accession into the EC was a 'good thing'. In June 1985, it seemed as if the British were warming to the idea of enlargement because about half or just over half of the British that were surveyed were 'strongly for' or 'somewhat for' enlargement to Spain and Portugal. 50% and 54% of them expressed positive sentiments, whereas only 20% and 13% gave negative responses to questions regarding enlargement to Spain and Portugal respectively.

In 1994, this positive trend continued as most of the British were supportive of enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden. However, after the enlargement, only 26% were willing to harbour the idea of further enlargements. In Oct/Nov 2003, they continued to be quite unsupportive of enlargement as they had been after 1995 and simultaneously, they were also below the EU average, an indication that the average British citizen was less likely to be as supportive of enlargement than citizens in other EU 15 countries. 40% of the British were against enlargement whereas only 38% were supportive of it. This meant that more of them were against enlargement than supportive of it. In February/March 2004, as the enlargement to the CEEC's drew closer, fewer of the British supported enlargement and concomitantly, they remained wedged below the EU average. At this stage, 40% were against enlargement (unchanged) and only 31%

were supportive of it (-7%). In Oct/Nov 2004, after the May 2004 enlargement, the British, strangely enough, became more supportive of enlargement. 50% of the British now supported enlargement (+19%). In the run up to the 2007 enlargement, the British returned to their more pessimistic stance on enlargement and as a result, it appeared that they were not supportive of the oncoming enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria. In September/October 2006, only 36% of the British supported enlargement (-14%). Paradoxically, they started to feel slightly more supportive of enlargement after the 2007 enlargement was completed. In April/May 2007, 41% of the British supported enlargement (+5%).

The only time when the British felt relatively European was in 1994. They were concomitantly also very supportive of the pending enlargement to Austria, Finland, and Sweden. When these members joined the Union in 1995 however, the British paradoxically felt more attached to their national identity than to a European one in 1996. Hence, their feeling of 'Europeanness' in 1994 cannot necessarily be attributed to the 1995 enlargement because it would not make sense to feel more attached to one's national identity if they felt that the enlargement in 1994 was about enriching, encompassing and consolidating the 'Europeanness' of the Union.

D) France

The French have also struggled to maintain consistent support for a European identity and enlargement. In June 1982, it initially appeared as if they were quite amiable to the idea of being European even after the enlargement to Greece the year before. 61% of the French responded positively compared to the 37% of negative replies regarding how often they thought of themselves as European. Hence, this seemed to indicate that more than half of the French surveyed buttressed this initiative of identity formation at the supranational level. By June 1987, however, the situation had reversed. After the enlargement to Spain and Portugal in 1986, they appeared to think of themselves as less European than they had in 1982. 53% of the French were congenial to the idea of

perceiving themselves as European (-8%), whereas 48% were unaccommodating to this idea (+11%).

Another change occurred as the 1995 enlargement dawned, and it seemed as if the French were more susceptible to the idea of regarding themselves as European as opposed to a strict adherence to their own national identity. In December 1994, 22% of the French saw themselves as 'nationality only' whereas 75% of them declared that they did feel somewhat European. In addition, they were also above the EU average and it also appeared that only Luxembourg had more citizens that considered themselves more European than the citizenry found in France. By 1996, a complete turnaround occurred and as a result, they appeared less affiliated to a European identity in comparison to that seen in 1994. Now 26% of the French considered themselves 'nationality only' (+4%) and 59% perceived themselves as somewhat European (-16%). Despite this hitch, the French did manage to stay above the EU average.

In Oct/Nov 2003, they were still above the EU average but a trend could be noticed. Firstly, although a majority of Frenchmen could relate to some degree to a European identity, more and more of them were beginning to become attached to their own national identity and not necessarily to the one at the supranational level. Secondly, the EB graph of Oct/Nov 2003 showed that they were no longer behind Luxembourg with the second largest amount of citizens that expressed positive sentiments about being somewhat European as seen in 1994 and 1996. The French now occupied fourth place, with Spain and Denmark surpassing them. Furthermore, in Oct/Nov 2003, they did not feel any more European than they had been in 1996 and it looked as if the imminent enlargement to the CEEC's was not instilling a sense of 'Europeanness' in them. 35% of the French distinguished themselves as 'natioanlity only' (+9%) and 62% felt somewhat European (+3%). Paradoxically, despite these trends, the French did feel slightly more European in Feb/March 2004 than they had been in Oct/Nov 2003. 29% of the French considered themselves 'nationality only' (-6%) and 68% admitted to being somewhat European (+6%). Furthermore, they now replaced Denmark as the country with the third largest amount of citizens who were more likely to respond that they felt some affiliation to a

European identity. As a result, Denmark was relegated to fourth position. After the May 2004 enlargement, the French, ironically, began to feel less European by Oct/Nov of that year. In comparison to Feb/March 2004, 30% of the French saw themselves as 'nationality only' (+1%) and 68% agreed to being somewhat European (no change). This trend continued into the lead up to the 2007 enlargement and in Oct/Nov 2005, they did not associate themselves as being any more European than they had felt in Oct/Nov 2004. At this juncture, 33% of the French considered themselves as 'nationality only' (+3%) and 66% felt somewhat European (-2%).

The French have likewise shown inconsistent support for enlargement. For instance, in September 1973, a majority of the French buttressed efforts to coalesce Western Europe. If they were perturbed about the enlargement to Denmark, Britain and Ireland earlier that year, one would have expected that they would have responded negatively to the question relating to efforts to unify Europe. In fact, there was a decline in support of 2%, having dropped from 70% in Feb/March 1970 to 68% in Sept 1973. This decrease was so marginal that it did not really alter the findings. Thus, a majority of the French appeared generally supportive of efforts to unify Western Europe. In Oct 1980, the situation looked far bleaker. Only 25% of the French thought that enlargement to Greece was a 'good thing', while 15% considered the prospect of Greece's accession as a 'bad thing'. This meant that while there were more supporters of enlargement than opponents of it, it was still dismal that only a quarter of the French surveyed actually expressed positive sentiments about the initiative. In June 1985, a change had occurred once again and by that time, an improvement in French support for enlargement could be registered. 58% of the French gave positive responses and only 28% and 27% gave negative responses regarding enlargement to Spain and Portugal respectively. It would appear that they were enthusiastic about enlargement to these two countries because over half of the French were supportive of their candidacies and only just over a quarter of the French opposed it.

This optimism spilled over into the EB of December of 1994, which indicated that the French, like most of the other EU member state citizens in Germany and Britain, were supportive of enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. However, after the

enlargement, support for this venture receded alarmingly quickly. In 1996, only 12% of the French thought that it was a good idea to have further enlargement on the EU's agenda.

This pessimism continued into Oct/Nov 2003 since more of the French were against, rather than supportive of further enlargements at that stage. 55% of the French were against enlargement and only 34% buttressed it. Concomitantly, of all the EU 15 member states, they were least supportive of enlargement. However, by Feb/March 2004, a slight improvement in support for enlargement among the French materialised. While there were still more Frenchmen that opposed enlargement than those that were behind it, it turned out that fewer of the French were opposed to enlargement in Feb/March 2004 when compared to Oct/Nov 2003. For example, now 47% of them were against it (-8%) and 37% were willing to proceed with it (+3%). Despite this however, the French did remain below the EU average in their support levels for enlargement, but this time, they were no longer the least supportive of it, instead the Germans became the least supportive of enlargement. In Oct/Nov 2004, a few months after the May enlargement of that year, more of the French became advocates of further enlargements. 38% of them now buttressed this project (+2%). Admittedly, however, their support levels were lower than the EU 15 average by 11% (which was at 49%). As the 2007 enlargement dawned, the French became less congenial to the notion of further enlargements. In comparison to Oct/Nov 2004, 34% of them supported it in Sept/Oct 2006 (-5%). At this stage, 46% of EU citizens were on average, amiable to further enlargements, which basically meant that the French were below the EU average by 12%. If one excludes the EU New Member States (NMS) such as the CEEC's, from the EU average in terms of their support for future enlargements, the results would show that only 41% of the original EU 15 were willing to provide leverage behind this project, which effectively meant that the French were still below the EU 15 average by 7%. After the enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria, they reasserted their unsupportive stance of enlargement because in April/May 2007, only 32% of them were willing to buttress future enlargements (-2%).

Only a quarter of the French buttressed enlargement to Greece in 1981 and one would have thought that with such a negative response to enlargement, that they would have been equally hostile to feeling European. However, as it turned out, a majority of the French saw themselves as European in 1982. In June 1985, most of them were quite supportive of the imminent enlargement in 1986, yet after the enlargement, fewer Frenchmen perceived themselves as European in 1987 than they had in 1982. They were also very supportive of the initiative to incorporate Austria, Finland and Sweden in the Union, yet contrary to belief, they felt less European after that enlargement took place. The incorporation of those countries did not instill them with a feeling of 'Europeanness'. Although they started to feel more European as the 2004 enlargement dawned, it should be noted that during that whole time, they were not supportive of enlargement at all. They only began to buttress it again after the expansion of the CEEC's into the Union in May 2004 was fulfilled.

Part Three

Findings

The actual foundation of this thesis resided upon the assumption that if Turkey was the instigating force which fractured the possible formation of a European identity, then steady and consistent support for it should have been recorded at least up until the point whereby accession negotiations were opened with Turkey in October 2005. Furthermore, there should have been exuberance about enlarging to countries in Europe which displayed prominent features of 'Europeanness'. The analysis has shown, however, that support for a European identity has always been lukewarm and fluctuated. In fact, it is quite fallacious and rash to assume that there has been consistent support for a European identity. It is quite interesting that many EU citizens (and perhaps some EU elites), hold the credence that there has been avid support all along for it. Conversely, the data within the EB polls reveal that if there was ever a time when a European identity *might* have been feasible, it was before the 1995 enlargement. In 1994, support for a European

identity was at its strongest point among EU citizens in France, Britain and Germany. Concomitantly, their attachment to their own national identity was at its weakest point. At that time, only 22% of the French felt a strong attachment to their national identity and 75% felt somewhat European. In Germany, only 29% felt a strong attachment to their national identity and 67% felt somewhat European. In Britain, 49% felt a strong attachment to their national identity and 48% felt somewhat European. Austria is an outlier here because Austrians did not feel a strong attachment to a European identity when they joined in 1995. Intriguingly, they felt most European after the 2004 enlargement. Hence, at any other point of time, support for a European identity has been dubious and fluctuated at generally lower levels. Support has not steadily increased as time went on.

The choice of case-studies for this research report was deliberate. The hypothesis was not only about trying to ascertain if there has been unruffled support for a European identity, instead it drew the initial assumption that EU member state citizens in Austria and Germany would be more likely to display opposition to a European identity, whereas the British and French would have been more supportive of it. This deduction could have been made on the basis that, regardless of the fact that all EU member states in the 21st century promote and foster an identity that is more civic in nature at the national level, one might have thought that a traditionally more ethnic nation, like Germany, for example, would have citizens that are less likely to associate themselves with a European identity whereas nations which were traditionally more civic, like France and Britain, would have citizens that are more amiable to a European identity at the supranational level. Furthermore, one might have postulated that the Germans, for precisely the same reasons mentioned above, would have been slightly more hostile to the formulation of an ethnic identity at the EU level, in comparison to countries which were traditionally more civic whereby the citizenry would not have attached much importance to their own primordial ties at the national level.

The results of the analysis, however, underscore that these assumptions had no bearing on the final outcome. Firstly, all of the EU member state citizens (in the four countries

analysed here) tended to define a European identity along civic lines which was analogous to the definition of EU elites. They also all believed that civic values should be used as a benchmark in assessing the eligibility of candidates for accession. Hence, unanimity among EU citizens in all four EU member states prevailed on how they perceive a European identity. Furthermore, this chapter has even served to bring out the arguments made in chapter two of this research report. In other words, it is irrelevant whether a country in Europe traditionally germinated as more ethnic or civic in orientation, rather, what is important to remember is that ethnic nationalism played some role in identity formation at the national level in all four EU member states analysed here. Hence, while civic values and virtues are in abundance today, which states at the national level promote, it is also clear that each EU citizen believes he/she has his/her own culture which should be respected and protected. This may elucidate why a civic identity, rather than an ethnic identity, is acceptable to EU citizens at the supranational level because it leaves their ethnic identity at the national level intact. The analysis of the EB polls is interesting because it shows that support for a European identity along civic lines at the supranational level is generally low. This makes sense when one refers back to chapter two, which alluded to the difficulties in trying to rally support for an identity at the national level based on civic nationalism.

In addition to the fact that support for identity formation and enlargement at the supranational level has been unsteady and unpredictable, the second part of this chapter established that there was no correlation (or a very weak one at best) between support levels for a European identity and enlargement. This means that other factors may elucidate support levels for a European identity and enlargement at the various stages of the EU's history. From the 1940's to the 1960's, European citizens may have supported European integration precisely because they were aware that cooperation among European countries was necessary after WW Two, especially because of the devastation it had wrought on the continent. This may explain high levels of support for efforts to unify Western Europe in 1970 because of the economic benefits that EC citizens and European countries were accruing as members of the Community. Hence, in this milieu, Slater noted that "public opinion was in favour of European integration, but without any

knowledge of the connected implications".[281] This is why the period from the 1940's to the late 1960's was known as one of 'permissive consensus' because ECSC/EEC/EC citizens were generally supportive of developments without questioning or challenging the events which were unfolding and neither did they contest the way in which these events were being shaped by EC elites.[282] The slight drop in support for efforts to unify Western Europe in 1973 may not have necessarily been because of the enlargement to Denmark, Britain and Ireland, (although it may have played some role), rather EC citizens may have been perturbed by the international economic crisis in the 1970's which led EC countries to adopt inward looking national policies.[283] This may also elucidate why support levels for Greece's accession were not particularly high because it was only with the nomination of the French finance minister, Jacques Delors, as the Commission president in 1985, that hope and confidence were revived because of the optimism placed in the single-market legislation which Delors helped to engineer.[284]

At the start of the 1990's, the EU's plight was uncertain. For example, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was delayed by fears that the Maastricht Treaty was engendering changes which would have lead to an overpreponderance of tasks and responsibilities being delegated to the supranational level, which thus threw into question the role of state elites at the national level.[285] This may explain for example, why the treaty was only ratified by the Germans in October 1993, since they had to resolve complaints lodged in the Federal Constitutional Court that the ratification was an infringement of the Basic Law (Constitution).[286] In addition, an economic recession was being experienced by European countries. This was offset in the early 1990's by the *Bundesbank (*federal bank of Germany) which increased interest rates in an effort to maintain the strength of the *Deutschmark* (DM) which in turn, unleashed a crisis in the European monetary system.[287]

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[281] Stefania Panebianco. **"**European Citizenship and European Identity: from the Treaty of Maastricht to Public Opinion Attitudes**" Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics**, University of Catania, December, 1996, p. 4.
[282] Görgün Tugrul, Opcit.p44
[283] Ibid.p45
[284] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol,Opcit.p57
[285] Mcguinness Mike, Opcit.p75
[286] Loccit
[287] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol,Opcit.p72

Despite these issues, the high levels of support in 1994 for European identity and enlargement may have been triggered by renewed buoyancy in the future of Europe since the Soviet Union had disintegrated in 1989, which thus brought an end to the conflict between the Soviets and the Americans. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the Berlin wall separating East and West Germans was also dismantled and consequently the Iron Curtain collapsed.[288] Furthermore, EU citizens may have been optimistic about enlarging to Austria, Finland and Sweden because they had relatively efficient market based economies and were members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).[289] Hence, there might have been widespread belief that with the addition of these members to the Union, they might add to the economic strength of the Union.

The renewed buoyancy in the future of Europe in the early 1990's might have soothed dissatisfaction with the EU's policies and processes, but by 1996, it is possible that any disenchantment which had been held in check in the early 1990's, might have finally manifested itself by 1996. In other words, there might have been a delayed reaction whereby all the dissatisfaction of the early 1990's was only unleashed after the 1995 enlargement was completed. According to Franklin, Marsh and Mclaren, these occurrences brought an end to the 'permissive consensus' which EU elites previously enjoyed.[290] What this effectively meant was that EU citizens were more wary of efforts to unify or integrate Europe and that they were not going to obliviously allow EU elites to introduce whatever measures they felt like. As the 21st century dawned, it appeared that factors such as the Constitutional Treaty may have also affected support levels of EU citizens towards enlargement and identity formation at the supranational level.

Turning to enlargement, EU citizens may have been slightly less enthusiastic about enlarging to the CEEC's because of the burden it would place on their economies. After all, the CEEC's were far less developed, both politically and economically, than previous applicants, and EU member states would have to shoulder some of the costs for

[288] Ibid.p69
[289] Nugent Neill **(3),** Opcit.p30
[290] Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh & Lauren McLaren. Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht, **Journal of Common Market Studies,** vol. 32, no. 4, 1994, pp. 458-9.

accommodating the CEEC's into the Union. The EU 15 would have to provide for redistributive policies so as to ensure that the NMS could accede smoothly into the Union without disrupting the functioning of the Union. Aid and assistance was pivotal because the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head in the CEEC's, was around 40%, while Bulgaria and Romania's were about 30% below the EU average.[291] As a result, it was quite questionable whether the CEEC's, with their restricted financial capacities, could have stamped out corruption, improved administrative capacities or safeguarded the rights of minorities and women without the additional financial injection provided for by the original EU 15.[292] For EU citizens, however, the main overriding concern was that CEEC citizens would flood into the EU 15 countries and drive down wages and social standards in the West. This would have been offset by CEEC citizens being prepared to work for lower wages or even live in inhumane conditions in the West. Evidently, EU citizens were less than enthralled about losing their jobs to the 'polish plumber' or even seeing a reduction in wages.[293] All these factors may have dampened the mood for a European identity or enlargement and perhaps even contributed to the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. This pessimism may have endured up until the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania. The enlargement to these two countries would have been less than enthralling, especially since they were the least advanced of the CEEC 10.[294] Soon after, EU citizens were bombarded with the Lisbon Treaty which hardly spurred on any enthusiasm among EU citizens, especially since public opinion in some countries, like Ireland, were belligerent of it. In addition, there was a high degree of suspicion of it, given that 95% of its contents was the same as the failed Constitutional Treaty.[295]

This chapter has underscored that a European identity has been conceptualised by EU citizens in such a way that is analogous to EU elites and akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. Hence, the idea is to promote a civic identity at the supranational level while acknowledging the cultural diversity, or ethnic primordial ties that EU citizens might already have to their respective nations. The overall plan is thus to

[291] Nugent Neill **(4)**, Opcit.p43
[292] Buonanno Laurie & Deakin Ann, Opcit.p91
[293] Rachman Gideon, Opcit p53
[294] Nugent Neill **(1)**, Opcit.p.6
[295] 'EU Reform: Hidden Agenda', http://www.time.com/time/magazine

have EU citizens associating themselves with two identities, one at the national as well as one on the supranational plane. Consequently, the aim is to have a European identity which is complementary to one's national identity. Since ethnocultural features have generally been omitted from the EU's identity, it becomes clear that EU citizens did not embrace accession candidates in the past because of their European allure in terms of similar geographies, histories and cultures and so forth.

Most importantly, however, this chapter disproved the hypothesis and widely held assumption by EU citizens and EU elites alike, that the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 was the instigating factor which threatened or jeopardised the burgeoning of a European identity. The results showed that support for it has not been consistent and steady, rather it fluctuated and has been unpredictable. In addition, this chapter also noted that other external factors (such as international financial crises, unemployment and so forth) may affect the way that EU citizens view European identity and enlargement. With this in mind, one should question the underlying reasons as to why EU citizens would be bent on asserting that Europeans share similar cultural attributes or primordial ties. Since this has not formed the foundation of a European identity, the question arises as to why some EU citizens would be propagating this rhetoric. Why would EU citizens want to preclude Turkey's membership from the Union? The next chapter will seek to unravel or present some findings as to why there might be intricacies surrounding enlargement to Turkey. It looks at the responses of EU citizens from the four case studies mentioned in this chapter because it is within these countries that the issue of Turkey's accession to the Union has been the most contentious. Since chapter four has revealed that EU citizens do not have an attachment to a European identity and have generally defined it along civic lines, it would be interesting to illuminate some of the reasons as to why EU citizens might want to try and preclude or welcome Turkey into the Union. The next chapter will serve to do precisely this task.

Chapter Five

The Question of Turkey

The previous chapter touched on how EU citizens have perceived and interpreted identity formation at the supranational level. It established that the same values that constitute a European identity have also been used in judging the eligibility of candidates for membership. The aim of this chapter is thus to examine Turkey's candidacy for EU membership and to assess what EU citizens expect from Turkey before they can ever consider them as truly part of the Union. Hence, the purpose of this section is to ascertain if the kind of expectations or conditions that EU citizens feel Turkey must meet before becoming a member, amount to the same criterion that EU citizens set for all the previous candidates.

The second part of this chapter will scrutinise why EU citizens might have been instigated to reformulate the definition and formulation of a European identity and the enlargement criteria in the face of Turkey's candidacy. In other words, the main focus of this chapter will be to engage in an investigation into whether this reformulation was engendered because EU citizens felt the need to defend a European or national identity. Are EU citizens worried that Turkey will polarise and obfuscate the underlying principles and foundations of a European identity or are they more worried about protecting and safeguarding their own identities at the national level? It also looks at how this new perception of a European identity by EU citizens has also influenced the way in which many political state elites view it and how this has contributed to the kind of domestic ramblings that are unraveling at the national level.

Part One

The Question of Turkey's Accession

In EB 64, EU citizens were questioned about how they felt about enlargement to Turkey. Interviewers of Eurobarometer polls used a series of 9 statements with which respondents were asked if they agreed or not.[296] It was interesting to note that these questions were posed to EU citizens at a time which overlapped with the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. In other words, the fieldwork of EB 64 was carried out in October/November 2005 and as it turned out, in October of that year, the European Council launched accession negotiations with the Turkish political leadership. This decision was taken at the December 2004 summit by the European Council on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission which conceded in October 2004 that Turkey had practically met the Copenhagen criteria of 1993.[297] In effect, this meant that the latter was beginning to engender democracy, protect human and minority rights, provide for the independence of the judiciary and was allowing for freedom of expression and so forth.[298] If the Turks were failing to engender democracy, for example, it is unlikely that the Commission would have recommended that the European Council start negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.

As mentioned before, EU elites opened accession negotiations with Turkey on the basis that they fully met the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria. The kind of values that emanate from the latter is analogous to civic virtues. Interestingly, and perhaps influenced by EU elites, EU citizens continued to attach great importance to civic values in defining whether a country is eligible for membership or not. For example, EB 64 showed that EU citizens from Germany, France, Britain and Austria, all believed that if Turkey was to become a member within the next 10 years, the most important criteria

[296] Please, refer to Appendix C, p.125, to view EU citizens responses' about enlargement to Turkey.
[297] Nugent Neill **(2)**, Opcit.p5
[298] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth, Opcit.p405

that it would have to fulfill was ensuring that it respected human rights systematically. In Germany, 91% agreed that Turkey should respect human rights if it wished to accede, followed by France with 89%, Austria at 86% and by Britain with 81%. In fact, the EB graph reinforced these figures found in the individual EU countries named above, since human rights (which is a civic value) ranked at the top of the graph. In general, 83% concurred that Turkey would have to meet this criteria whereas only 7% thought that this was trivial.

Part Two

Turkey and the Reformulation of a European Identity

At this point in time, it may seem as if EU elites and EU citizens were on the same wavelength regarding the criteria that Turkey would have to meet before it could ever be allowed to become a member of the Union. However, EU elites, in opening accession negotiations with Turkey in Oct 2005, were in fact conceding that they had already fulfilled the requirements for becoming a member sufficiently enough. In other words, it seems that it should only be a matter of time before Turkey accedes into the Union. EU citizens and EU elites alike can no longer use the Copenhagen criteria as an excuse to preclude Turkey's membership application and this may have sparked off a change in the way EU citizens perceive a European identity and a sudden shift in the sort of criteria that is being used to assess the eligibility of candidates for EU accession. For example, up until now, a European identity has been primarily a rights based identity akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. This meant that cultural identities and religious beliefs were circumscribed to the private sphere. Hence, it is an identity founded on common political and civic practices.[299] However, as of late, EU citizens have been reformulating the way in which they understand what a European identity is and what kind of criteria applicant countries should have to fulfill before being granted

[299] The reasons as to why it has been based primarily along civic lines can be understood by referring back to chapter three.

membership in the Union. For example, in EB 64, while EU citizens admitted that civic values were important in assessing the eligibility of candidates, they also reiterated however, that other prerequisites would have to be satisfied. This is where the analysis becomes interesting because it shows EU citizens restructuring their understanding of a European identity and the agenda of enlargement. For instance, EU citizens now argued that the EU was comprised of member states which have similar cultures and ways of life. EB 64 revealed that 78% of Austrians posited that cultural differences between Turkey and Europe were too significant to allow membership. This was a sentiment felt by the Germans (71%), the French (63%), as well as by the British (40%), albeit to a lesser degree. Hence, it appeared as if EU citizens were using the European identity as a means to preclude Turkey from EU membership. If it was based along ethnic lines, it would be underscoring, among other things, Europe's history, culture and geographical boundaries. By emphasising these European attributes which the EU-27 ostensibly share, Turkey would find it increasingly more difficult to accede into the Union because while it has fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, it does not satisfy the ethnic criteria of a European identity. For example, many Europeans hold that Turkey is not part of Europe because it is Islamic while Europe is predominantly Christian. Furthermore, they argue that Turkey is not geographically part of Europe. Rather, they allege that Turkey is geographically in Asia and has long borders with states that are either beset with crises or instability, or are belligerent towards the EU. These states are situated in the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan) and the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Syria.)[300]

Paradoxically, however, EU citizens contradict themselves when they define Europe and a European identity along ethnic lines as a means to exclude Turkey from the EU. While EU citizens feel cultural differences between EU members and Turkey are too vast, just over half of the Germans (54%) concur that Turkey belongs to Europe by its geography. In fact, this sentiment is felt by 53% of the British, 51% of Austrians and 44% of the French. In any case, it is hard to present a strong argument that Turkey is not geographically part of Europe. It is argued that western Turkey is situated in Europe. Turkey's largest city of Istanbul (once dubbed as Constantinople) is situated on both the

[300] Nugent Neill **(2)**, Opcit.p7

east and west sides of the Bosporus straits which effectively means that it spans both of what is are traditionally regarded as Europe and Asia.[301] Even if Europeans try to distort Europe's geographical boundaries and argue that Turkey is not part of Europe, it is still difficult to try and substantiate such an approach. For example, it is painstakingly difficult to provide objective facts on where Europe's geographical boundaries lie. Ideas of Europe, regarding its culture and geography, have exercised the minds of innumerable writers, politicians and ordinary people for hundreds of years. Even visual representations of Europe are opaque and cryptic since many contemporary modern maps are two-dimensional depictions of a three-dimensional reality which cannot be viewed in its entirety. Hence for the most part, Europe's geography is subjective, rather than objective, and is really widely disputed among political scientists.[302] Even more perplexing is that 39% of Austrians agreed that Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history. These similar figures are reflected in Britain (37%), Germany (35%) and France (32%). While these figures are below 50%, they are still considerably higher than expected.

In addition to the fact that EU citizens contradict themselves in trying to exclude Turkey from EU accession for geographical reasons, it should be noted from chapter three that there is a specific reason why EU elites averted the definition of a European identity along ethnic lines and why they opted for one along civic lines. It should also be remembered that chapter four of this research report showed that EU citizens also outline a European identity along civic lines. It seems strange that some EU citizens would suddenly become more vocal about defining it along ethnic lines. Are they doing this because they feel that by highlighting ethnic ties among Europeans, they can protect the EU's identity and the underlying credentials of the Union? In other words, are they doing this because they feel that Turkey will fracture everything that the Union represents, especially its identity? Chapter four made the succinct point that their attachment to a European identity has always been lukewarm and that they associate themselves first and foremost with their national identity before affiliating themselves with a European one. Hence, it seems as if the reformulation of a European identity, however contradictory it

[301] Rosenberg Matt, Turkey in the European Union: Will Turkey Be Accepted for Membership in the EU?, http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/turkeyeu.hm, March 4 2008
[302] Wintle Michael **(2),** Opcit.p53

may be, is being used as an excuse to keep Turkey out of the Union. It is becoming more apparent that EU citizens are not concerned that Turkey will fracture a European identity, rather they seem more worried about the implications that Turkey's accession will have on their own respective countries and their national identities. They probably feel that it is not in the national interest to integrate Turkey into the Union. In fact, the fears are so widespread that some EU elites or state elites at the national level have played upon these fears to garner support for their parties. In addition, it appears that the intense acrimonious and vocal public debate on Turkey's membership is influencing the way in which EU/state elites perceive the whole issue as well. In other words, it is not just about garnering support for their parties, rather they feel it is necessary to take the public's opinion into consideration. This is interesting because in previous enlargements, EU elites or heads of state at the national level were more intent on enlargement to other 'European' countries regardless of public opinion. For instance, in 2001, a Eurobarometer indicated that across the EU-15, only 43% of respondents expressed positive sentiments towards enlargement to the CEEC's while 35% were against it (22% gave no opinion). Hence, despite the fact that less than half of the respondents were for enlargement to the CEEC's, EU elites went ahead with it anyway.[303]

Up until now, the chapter has underscored that while many EU citizens have redefined a European identity along ethnic lines, it is erroneous to presume that EU citizens are truly committed to an ethnic identity emerging at the supranational level. While it may seem logical to presume that factors such as religion, culture and history could serve to unify them, especially with many EU citizens highlighting Europe's cultural features, this chapter has shown that on the contrary, it seems as if Turkey's possible accession has rekindled one's ethnic ties to one's national identity and one should throw caution on the underlying reasons as to why a reformulation of a European identity has occurred. The concluding part of this chapter will provide some insights into why a redefinition of a European identity has taken place within some of the EU member states. It is not within the ambit of this research report to provide an in-depth analysis as to the underlying

[303] Nugent Neill **(5)**, 'Distinctive and Recurring Features of Enlargement Rounds', in Nugent Neill (ed.), European Union Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p62

reasons which are stimulating this realignment of a European identity, nevertheless, this research will try and provide some clarity as to why this is occurring. The next section will look at each of the four EU member states and investigate how state elites at the national level are buttressing the approach of EU citizens and how they are using any method possible to preclude Turkey's membership from the EU, not because they fear that the future of a European identity is in jeopardy, but rather because they believe that it is not in the national interest of their respective countries to expand to Turkey.

A) Germany

"Europe is a society of peoples who have forged common values over many centuries and have freely joined together under the perception of these values being under threat. Turkey does not belong in this Europe". [304]

-Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

This is the sort of political jargon that is being spread in Germany and is filtering the minds of many Germans and thus being used to rally support for political parties. The Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) Angela Merkel and Conservative politicians such as Edmund Stoiber of the Christian Social Union (CSU) as well as Roland Koch (the Premier of Hessen), have all reasserted the position that Turkey does not belong in the EU because it does not share the same 'common values' as them.[305] The argument put forward by such German politicians is that Europe has a Christian heritage. It was only through Judeo-Christianity that Western civilisation achieved the separation of church and state.[306] Accordingly, democracy and human rights are not universal values; rather they derived from specific cultural traditions such as Christianity.[307] There is ostensibly a correlation between Christian values and European forms of democracy.[308] This explains,

[304] Wang Elizabeth, Turkey's Bid for EU Acession in a German Context, http://international.tamu.edu/eunotes/vol3_issue3b.doc, 2 December 2003, p7
[305] Loccit
[306] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth,Opcit.p409
[307] 'European values and identity', Opcit.p2
[308] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth,Opcit.p410

according to adherents of Judeo-Christian secularism, why EU member states accept cultural diversity and religious freedom. EU member states promote a civic identity within their own territorial spaces and thus, they were also able to transpose this civic identity to the EU level as well.

However, the Turks cannot respect a civic identity or secularism. Even if they tried to respect civic values and guarantee the protection of minority rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion or independence of the judiciary, they would eventually revert to allowing radical Muslims to infiltrate the public sphere with their religious beliefs, something that often happens at the national level in Turkey (after all the Turkish army had to be called in on three separate occasions (1960, 71, 80) in order to ensure that the Turkish republic remained secular).[309] Thus, once a member of the EU, they might do the same thing and Islam would permeate the civic European identity. This would confirm the American Islam expert, Bernard Lewis's prediction, that Europe will be Islamic at the end of the century.[310]

The counterargument was made by *Die Zeit*, a German newspaper, which stated:

"What is a European identity?..... Does religion unify us? The Catholic Spaniards have as much in common with the Protestant Finns as the Anglo-Saxons have with the Orthodox Greeks….. Why should the Muslim Turks not be able to take part?"[311]

The argument here is that Europe is culturally diverse and has never been defined in ethnic terms. There are a rich mosaic of cultures within Europe, from Protestants Finns, Orthodox Greeks, Jews and Muslims. There are approximately 15 million Muslims in Europe, 3 million of which reside in Germany.[312] Green Party chairwoman, Claudia Roth, noted "If you define Europe as 'Christian', that would exclude millions, millions of

[309] Loccit. Please refer to the book titled 'State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s' by Heper Metin & Evin Ahmet for an in depth analysis of the 1960, 71 and 80's military interventions
[310] Ibid.p406
[311] Wang Elizabeth, Opcit.p8
[312] Taspinar Omer,Opcit.p24

Muslims who are already in the European Union. It's the second biggest religious group within the EU already".[313]

It becomes more evident that what Germans are really worried about, is not a European identity per se, but their own national identity. Support for the CDU rides on the fear of an untrammeled flux of Turks into the country who may engulf the German national identity with a Turkish Muslim identity. The Germans have some reason to be worried about this scenario because of the 3 million Muslim migrants who are believed to be currently residing in Germany. Interestingly, Germans who fear that Turkey will try to redefine a European identity or proselytise it and make it more Muslim, are contradicting themselves because they are redefining it themselves, making it seem like a Christian Club.

B) Austria

Immigration and a loss of sovereignty have been an overriding concern among Austrian citizens and politicians for quite some time now. This may explain the surge in support for the right wing Freedom party, *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ), in the 1999 general elections. The then leader of the party, Jörg Haider, always propagated non-immigration as one of the party's policies and manifestos. It seemed to have paid off because the party won the second largest percentage of the vote (26.9%) in the 1999 elections, which meant that it only trailed the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ).[314] The FPÖ came to power in a coalition with the People´s Party (which up until then was aligned to the Social Democrats). This coalition seemed to spark outrage in Europe because a right wing party had acceded into power.[315] By 2002 however, the coalition splintered because of internal squabbles, and consequently, the Freedom Party broke-up. Its former leader, Haider, formed a new party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria, *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ), while a former protégé of Haider's, Heinz-Christian Strache, took

[313] Wang Elizabeth, Opcit.p9
[314] Halder Rüdiger, What happened in Austria? : Another victory for our people, http://amren.com/ar/2008/12/index.html, December 2008, Vol 19, No.12
[315] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p7

over the reigns of party leadership in the FPÖ. The parties of the Left, the SPÖ and Greens, expected the parties of the right to frizzle out in the 2006 elections, especially after the break-up of the FPÖ in 2002. This seemed plausible because after the party disintegrated, support levels for the FPÖ dropped from 26.9% to about 10%. Yet it seems that Strache´s election slogans were somewhat appealing to the electorate. Slogans such as 'Vienna must not become Istanbul', seem to have affected the electorate and as a result, the FPÖ´s support actually increased slightly in the 2006 general elections from 10% to 11%. Even Haider´s newly formed Alliance managed to sneak into parliament by scraping just over the 4% requirement for representation.[316]

Hence, it should be noted that the May 2004 enlargement to the CEEC's was a controversial issue in Austria. Austrians have become extremely xenophobic of late since they feel Austria is susceptible to an influx of immigrants. This fear is understandable because Austria borders four of the NMS, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.[317] Thus, the fear of immigration and the possible deleterious implications that it could have on Austrians (unemployment, loss of national identity), may elucidate why the right-wing parties did not dissipate in 2006 because of their appealing non-immigration stance. Even Austrian politicians from the Left have become increasingly aware of how opposed the Austrian electorate is to immigration. They even tried to mimic the right wings' manifesto on non-immigration in the 2008 general elections.[318] However, it is the right wing parties that have profited from the promotion of this manifesto, because the Austrians seem to hold the credence that the right-wing parties are genuinely committed to a policy of non-immigration (whereas the Left are just trying to rack up voter support). In the face of Turkey, the right-wing may have garnered additional support. They have drawn links with the past of Austria as part of the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires, historic rivals of the Ottoman Empire that preceded Turkey. This serves as a reminder of the Ottoman siege to Vienna in 1529 and

[316] 'What happened in Austria? : Another victory for our people', http://amren.com/ar/2008/12/index.html
[317] Mulvey Stephen, Why Austria was a sticking point, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4304396.stm, 3 October 2005
[318] What happened in Austria? : Another victory for our people', http://amren.com/ar/2008/12/index.html

1683.[319] The fear that Turkey will try to somehow threaten Austria again (which could be achieved through EU accession), permeates Austrian society and since 2005 more than three quarters of Austrians have been opposed to Turkish membership.[320] As a result, it should come as no surprise why the right-wing parties have faired reasonably well at election polls. Austrians are also concerned about a loss in sovereignty since the Lisbon Treaty envisions the transfer of more powers from the national level to the EU's institutions. Evidently, these are concerns and fears that Austrians have and Austrian politicians from most of the parties, the People´s Party (ÖVP), SPÖ and FPÖ, are evidently only to happy to harbour these fears so as to garner support for their political parties. Therefore it seems that in general, Austrians really have national concerns about immigration which will arise from the untrammeled movement of people across borders. Turkey just adds to these fears because so many Turks seek refuge in Europe for work, as noted in the German case-study. An influx of Turks or more precisely, Muslims, seems to be the ultimate fear of Austrians who dread that Turkish Muslims could jeopardise and overwhelm their national identity and concomitantly purloin their jobs. Why else would so many Austrians be attracted to the FPÖ´s slogan 'Our Land for our Children'?[321]

It is important to bear in mind that Austrians are not completely against enlargement. In fact, they are quite selective about who they would like the EU to enlarge to. For instance, they support enlargement when they feel that it serves the national interest of the country. For example, Austria is a main investor in Croatia, having invested a total of 2.1 billion Euros in that country between 1993 and 2003.[322] However, when it comes to Turkey, it is said that Austrian businesses have few links with them and as expected, their interest in the country is minimal. This would additionally explain (and there are other reasons of course) why Austrian political elites would be intent on enlarging to Croatia

[319] Esther Pan, What is Austria's opposition?, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8939/turkeys_eu_bid.html, September 30 2005
[320] Barysch Katinka, What Europeans Think About Turkey And Why, www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_kb_turkey_24aug07.pdf, 2007
[321] What happened in Austria? : Another victory for our people', http://amren.com/ar/2008/12/index.html
[322] 'Croatia', http://www.newnations.com/Archive/2005/November/hr.html, 27 October 2005

while they are quick to disregard Turkey's application.[323] Hence, it seems that Austrians are not overly concerned about defending a European identity per se.

C) Britain

Chapter four noted that the British have never really shown much interest to enlargement or a European identity in general. British political elites thus tend to assess whether it is in the national interest to support certain initiatives at the EU level. One only has to look at the EU's history to notice that they rationally calculate whether the benefits outweigh the costs. For example, the British did not comprise the original six members that joined the EEC in 1957. At that time, they believed that membership in such an organisation was unnecessary because they already had a 'special relationship' with the United States and Commonwealth countries. Hence, it was only when they realised the benefits of joining the Community that they finally decided to lodge an application for membership.[324] Another reason as to why they were reluctant to join the EEC was because it resembled steps towards European federalism. In other words, the British wanted to preclude the formation of a customs union and were displeased with the suggestion of an eventual political integration. This explains why the British opted for the EFTA because it envisioned a free trade area, but made no reference to an eventual federation. The situation has not changed today and it is clear that the British have always been 'wideners' or supporters of enlargement because they believe that this will slow down moves towards political union or a federal Europe. The British are aware that Turkey will cause many difficulties and challenges for the EU's institutions and they know that Turkey's membership will make the EU less cohesive because of these factors. If the EU remains primarily loose in organisational terms, it would stymie efforts to integrate the Union.

[323] Barysch Katinka, Opcit.p4
[324] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p31

D) France

Chapter two noted that the 'high culture' played an important part in the formation of the French national identity. The French, like the British, initially thought their identity to be unique (and sometimes superior) to 'others'. This probably served to justify the system of Colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the late 19th century, many Europeans engaged in a 'scramble for Africa', whereby many Europeans colonised African territories and exploited them for mineral resources and so forth.[325] Colonialisation and subjugation of Africans were justified because as noted before, many Europeans considered themselves 'superior' and believed Africans incapable of governing themselves. The French, like other European powers, evidently engaged in this venture because they wanted to protrude France as a great power and also spread their cultural attributes.[326] As a result of French influence, many French colonial territories (such as Senegal, Ivory Coast among others), became Francophone communities whereby many African inhabitants began to speak French.[327] Hence, as a result of this link that the French established with many Africa countries, many Muslim North Africans, influenced by the French and Francophonia, have sought refuge and work in France. The problem however, is that the French have struggled to integrate Muslims into French society. For example, there has been a lot of upheaval in French cities when the French legislative passed the anti-headscarf law in 2004.[328]

As a result, the French do not want any more Muslims in their country, especially Muslim Turks (about 400, 0000 residing in France) who the French consider as Arabs.[329] The reason for the uproar in French cities arises from the fact that many Muslims fail to respect French laws which stipulates the vigorous separation of religion from politics. This is akin to the *laicist* model which notes that religion should be confined to the private sphere and not be expressed in the public space since this would undermine the

[325] 'Scramble for Africa', http://www.usd.edu/honors/HWB/1999f/imperialism in Africa.htm,
[326] Kuzio Taras, Opcit.p20
[327] Tchameni Djeukam, Is France the Curse of Africa?, http://afgen.com/africa_france.html, 3/11/05
[328] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth, Opcit.p407
[329] Barysch Katinka, Opcit.p4

maintenance of secular public life.[330] Hence, the French would deem it inappropriate, for example, to allow someone to wear a headscarf in the public space. This happened in Turkey, whereby a Turkish medical student, Leyla Sahin, tried to wear a headscarf while pursuing her studies at the University of Istanbul.[331] While this occurred in Turkey, such occurrences are not uncommon in France and this is why the French felt it necessary to pass legislation which banned the wearing of headscarf's in the public space. President Nikolas Sarkozy of France, probably feels that it would be inapt to allow Turkey into the Union because it is struggling to adhere to a policy of secularisation. Hence, would it be wise to allow more Turks into France who could cause even more chaos and disruption in French cities with regard to this issue? The French are probably also concerned that if Turkey becomes a member, it will exploit the privilege of being able to move freely across borders. Thus, the French may be overwhelmed by an influx of Turkish Muslims who would vie for jobs in France. Since they fail to integrate into French societies, there is also the possibility that an overwhelming majority of Turk Muslims would try and downgrade French thinking with their own Islamic teachings.

Furthermore, the literature indicates quite strongly that the French act primarily in their own interests when they negotiate in the EU. Under De Gaulle, the French were quite complacent that he dictated policies in the Community. He wanted to control the evolution of the European Community.[332] For example, he wanted the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to benefit French farmers and when other members tried to introduce measures that would mitigate France's control in the organisation (i.e. political integration in foreign and security policy), he would simply renege on his cooperation[333] (one only has to look at the 'Luxembourg Compromise').[334] Enlargement has been a divisive issue for France as well because it apparently minimises France's influence over EU institutions and policy-making. This elucidates why the French may also be against enlargement to Turkey. Many of the French elites may feel that their country's central role in the EU is abating at each successive enlargement and that enlargement to Turkey

[330] Hurd Shakman Elizabeth, Opcit.p411
[331] Ibid.p413
[332] Wood M. David & Yesilada A. Birol, Opcit.p7
[333] Ibid.p35
[334] Ibid.p37

could engender the end of their influence in the Union and also bring an end to any federalist dream of a political Union.[335] Hence, it seems more and more evident that the French are less concerned about a European identity or European interests, rather nationalistic concerns play a big part in determining their stance on Turkey's EU candidacy.

Consequences from the Case-Studies

The fact that many state elites are mimicking public concerns about enlargement to Turkey is simply not ameliorating the dire situation. According to Sinan Ülgen, the public's perception of Turkey will not change easily if EU elites or state elites continue to sustain this negative perception that EU citizens have of Turkey.[336] Indeed, many EU citizens have become so disillusioned with Turkey's possible accession that they are no longer interested in the benefits and advantages that Turkey's accession can have on the EU. For example, Turkey is the EU's sixth largest trading partner and because of their sizeable market, the EU can accrue economic benefits from Turkey's membership in the long run. The Commission also estimates that the EU's total population will augment by a mere 2% between 2005 and 2025, with its working age population receding by 21 million. At the same time, the number of people over 65 will increase by 52.3% while the 15-64 age groups will recede by 6.8%. Hence, Turkey's membership may curtail this problem since it wields a much younger workforce than the EU's current one. Furthermore, the EU can serve as a platform to show that Islam, democracy and western capitalism can intermingle and it may also assuage the misunderstandings that exist between Islam and Christianity.[337] EU elites and the mass media should try and steer public opinion away from prejudices.

It is interesting that when EU citizens are asked why they oppose Turkey's membership, they note that Turkey does not belong to Europe or that it is totally different in its culture

[335] Barysch Katinka, Opcit.p3
[336] Ibid.p5
[337] Nugent Neill **(2)**, Opcit.p9

and above all, that it does not share the attributes which constitute a European identity. However, they are probably unaware that a European identity is not and has never been along cultural ethnic lines. They seem to generalise why Turkey should not accede into the EU and really just repeat the same rhetoric that the media feeds them. They also cannot back-up their claims with hard evidence and the fact that state elites support these prejudices against Turkey is simply making the situation worse. This is why EU elites or state elites at the national level need to launch a new initiative that will transform these negative perceptions of Turkey into a positive one.

Conclusion

The aim of this research report was to ascertain whether the formation of a European identity was under jeopardy as a result of Turkey's application for membership. It is a highly contentious issue at the present moment and many EU elites and EU citizens alike have blamed Turkey for fragmenting a European identity and have even used Turkey as a scapegoat to explain the current inertia that the EU is faced with.

This research report sought to discover whether a European identity was really burgeoning over time and whether EU citizens attachment to it was very robust or not. EU citizens seemed to infer that they had been attached to a European identity up until now but that the possible accession of Turkey into the EU had just fragmented any chance of a European identity emerging. The research report thus undertook the task of ascertaining how a European identity has been defined by EU elites and how it has been perceived by EU citizens as well. The nation-state model was particularly useful in this research report because it showed that it is quite difficult to have an emotional bond and a sense of solidarity with an identity or EU super-state, whereby the identity is based solely on civic nationalism. As it turned out from the research, a European identity was based on civic nationalism so as to avoid the intricacies of trying to forge an identity based on ethnic nationalism, a much more cumbersome task, precisely because EU citizens already have their own national ethnic identities or ties to their nations. An attempt by EU elites to try and supplant this with a European ethnic identity would have been painstaking and may have even backfired on the EU since history has shown that people tend to react violently when their ethnic national identities are threatened.

The research also pointed out from the nation-state model, that national identities are shaped by both civic and ethnic values and virtues. The state is usually responsible for providing elements of civic nationalism to its citizenry. Some of the roles, but not all civic roles, have been transposed to the EU level. The civic roles and responsibilities that are now entrusted with the EU have been used to also forge an identity, which explains the civic identity of the Union. However, since there are no real ethnic traits to a

European identity, EU elites made it abundantly clear that this identity was meant to complement, not supplant national identities.

Having discovered this, the research report aimed to find out how attached EU citizens could have been to an identity based on civic nationalism. It also sought to scrutinise whether support levels amongst EU citizens for a European identity and enlargement have been consistent and salubrious throughout the EU's history. If the results revealed that support for a European identity and enlargement had been continuous up until now, we could have concluded the hypothesis that Turkey might have instigated the collapse of a European identity. If support for a European identity and enlargement have fluctuated, then we have to negate the argument that Turkey was a threat to a European identity.

The research report then aimed to find out why EU citizens would try and reformulate and redefine a European identity based on ethnic values. It raised the question whether they were really trying to defend it from a potential candidate for EU membership who they feared might destroy it. Yet, if they never had a strong attachment to a European identity, then why would they go to all the trouble of protecting it? The research report then aimed to look at the kind of domestic politics that was going on at the national level in order to try and infer some possible reasons as to why opposition to Turkey was so steadfast and why a European identity was reformulated the way it was.

The crux of this thesis was to refute the hypothesis that Turkey should be refused membership on cultural grounds and to abnegate the idea that Turkey jeopardised the formation of a European identity. Furthermore, this research has shown that all previous enlargements were based on civic values and to turn down Turkey's candidacy on ethnic terms now for reasons of culture and religion, will not only tarnish the EU's image as a multicultural and pluralistic society, but it may even lead the Turkish people to feel as if they have been treated unfairly, and they might turn towards the East for allies. The idea of a clash of civilisations, whereby the 'Muslim World' turns against the 'Christian Club' of the EU, could actually occur if Turkey is denied membership.

This research report was structured into five chapters. The aim of the first chapter was to look at the various theoretical approaches to identity formation at the nation-level. It then looked at the way in which a European identity has been defined and thus sought to infer which theoretical approach was being transposed to the EU level. It deduced that either the theory of Postnationalism or Constitutional Patriotism was being applied at the EU level.

The second chapter aimed to show how national identities emerged in practice and indicated that if a European identity was to emerge that could supplant national identities, it would have to promote both civic and ethnic nationalism to mould the identity. The chapter also indicated the intricacies of doing so, but it did highlight how a European identity could exist alongside national identities and that this identity could actually burgeon if it was based on civic nationalism because in a globalised world, civic values trump ethnic ones.

The aim of the third chapter was to provide an overview of previous efforts to unify Europe along ethnic and cultural affiliations. It explained the difficulties of trying to unify Europeans by referring to cultural affiliations and it also highlighted the intricacies of trying to supplant one's ethnic ties to one's nation and national identities with an EU one. It thus explained why EU elites opted for a civic identity that was intended to complement rather than replace national identities. This chapter also underscored how the theory of Constitutional Patriotism defined not only how a European identity was defined, but also how it manifested itself in the treaties and how these same values and virtues of civic nationalism were used to assess the eligibility of candidate countries for EU membership.

The aim of the fourth chapter was to test the hypothesis whether EU citizens from four EU member states, namely Germany, Austria, France and Britain, where Turkey's accession has offset an acrimonious public debate, continually buttressed a European identity before and after each enlargement, at least up until the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. This analysis served to disprove the notion

that support for a European identity or enlargement has been continuous, steady, increasing over time or that a correlation existed between support for enlargement and a European identity. It disproved the widely held assumption that Turkey fractured the possible formation of a European identity. It also disproved the belief that a European identity has been based along ethnic values and that Europeans have incessantly been attached to this identity because it highlights the cultural ethnic features which unite them as one. This chapter showed that EU citizens defined a European identity in civic terms, which reinforced the argument of this thesis that identity formation in the EU was akin to the theory of Constitutional Patriotism. Hence, it illustrated that they were also more attached to their national identities and only then to a European one.

The invalidation of the hypothesis in chapter four, led to the investigations made in chapter five. The fifth chapter looked at the underlying reasons as to why EU citizens reformulated a European identity along ethnic lines and questioned the supposition that they were trying to protect a European identity from Turkey. The aim of this chapter was to take a closer look at the domestic political ramblings at the national level of these four EU member states, and to determine how national political elites and their citizenry were acting in such a way that their main concern was not *necessarily* the fear that a European identity would dissipate if Turkey acceded into the Union, rather the chapter alluded that they *may* be more worried about ensuring and safeguarding their national interests and protecting their national identities, which they believe might be overwhelmed by Turkish Muslims who will flock across the borders into their respective countries. This chapter also showed how heads of states and EU elites are mimicking the fears of the public and are not trying to dispel these concerns and fears about Turkey. They are also just as hostile to enlargement as the citizenry are, a clear break from the past where they pushed ahead with enlargement, regardless of what the public thought or not.

There are many lessons that can be drawn from this research report. It has reconfirmed the literature's review on national identity formation at the national level. In other words, a true identity can not be based purely on civic nationalism and efforts to emulate this at a level above the nation-state will not bear fruit. Furthermore, even if this identity is

complementary to one's national identity, this does not help garner more support for it either, rather EU citizens seem to just tolerate its presence, but do not feel very attached to it at all. Hence, Turkey was not the instigating force which shattered a European identity. In fact, EU citizens were not even that enthralled about the EU's civic identity. In a civic state for example, state elites use a constitution (a civic value) to try and unite the people. In Chapter three of this thesis, it was made known that the EU's Constitution was rejected by EU citizens, and this happened a few months before accession negotiations were opened with Turkey. Intriguingly, while the theory of Constitutional Patriotism has helped shed light on how identity formation has proceeded, this research report also highlighted that this method of identity construction failed. Constitutional Patriotism espoused precisely that, a Constitution, which will act as a means to bind the people of Europe. Yet this, together with all the other elements of civic nationalism or Constitutional Patriotism did not bind EU member state citizens together as such. This research report has also highlighted the dangers of trying to reformulate an identity from being primarily civic for the last 50 or so years, to suddenly trying to redefine it along ethnic lines. An identity based on ethnic terms might polarise the EU. In any case, a European identity has recently been removed from the EU's agenda, and it would be unethical to abnegate EU membership to Turkey because EU members want to protect an identity, a European one to be exact, which no longer exists. In the meantime, the kind of values that shaped the EU's identity all along (civic nationalism) should be used by EU elites in their enlargement policy, especially towards Turkey.

Last but not least, this present work may be of interest to all those that study the EU and who are interested in enlargement and identity-formation above the national level. Further research could be done as to what may revive a European identity as this research report has not delved into this. More research should be carried out with regards to the theory of Postmodernism. There were some reservations about it in chapter one of this research report, but it seems as if this theoretical approach could serve as a model for a European identity (if it is revived). The graphs of the Eurobarometers showed that in a country like Luxembourg, the free movement of people across borders has engendered cultural interactions and since this country is made up of a mosaic of people with

different cultures, it appears as if this cultural intermeshing has helped to dilute the citizenry's affiliation to their national identities. They thus tend to regard themselves as more European than anything else. This is why I think that the theory of Postmodernism could have an impact on the evolution of identity formation and this is why further research in this field is warranted.

Appendices

Appendix A

DIFFERENT WAYS OF FEELING EUROPEAN


Table 4

	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
Past rivalries behind, living in peace	23	31	55	43	29	44	35	32	64	38	33	50	41
Similar cultural traditions, way of life and thought	12	18	10	6	15	11	13	16	7	11	14	12	12
Common religions and philosophical values	6	3	4	3	5	2	5	3	3	4	7	2	4
Adventure: formation of United States of Europe	24	9			13	23	12	25	9	15	14	7	15
Travel without difficulties	27	23	18	18	17	13	28	16	11	18	19	16	17
Only a geographical fact	4	5	4	6	8	4	5	5	2	4	4	5	5
Other; none of these	1	4	1	2	2	2	1	0	1	7	2	3	2
D.k./n.g.	3	8	4	3	11	2	2	3	3	5	9	5	5
Total	100	101	102	100	100	101	101	100	100	102	102	100	101
n	1464	406	517	534	590	528	381	523	172	328	532	433	5579

338

[338] Standard Eurobarometer 27,June 1987, (Table 4), p.18


EB62: Autumn 2004



339

CRITERIA FOR ENLARGEMENT

EB49: Fig 4.2



340

[339] Standard Eurobarometer 62, Opcit.p81

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Table 16

Opinion Polls: 1982-1991

(1982)[203]	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Often	11	10	25	19	9	16	33	5	7	27	16
Sometimes	30	30	50	42	23	39	46	35	20	32	37
Never	53	55	18	37	64	41	15	57	72	35	43
No reply	6	5	7	2	4	4	6	3	1	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

341


Table 2

(1987)[205]	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC 12
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Often	10	10	11	20	21	17	7	16	19	8	12	10	14
Sometimes	36	31	41	33	38	36	31	34	41	25	24	24	34
Never	50	56	42	44	36	47	60	47	32	63	66	66	49
No reply	4	3	6	2	5	1	2	3	8	5	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

342


[340] Standard Eurobarometer 49, April-May 1998, (Figure 4.2), p62
[341] Standard Eurobarometer 17, June 1982, (Table 16), p.42
[342] Standard Eurobarometer 30,December 1988, (Table 2), p.7

EB42: Table 9.6 (December 1994)



[343]


EB 46: Table 4.1(October/November 1996)



[344]


[343] Standard Eurobarometer 42, December 1994, (Table 9.6), p.66 (***** for all the graphics; percentage 'don't know' not shown.)
[344] Standard Eurobarometer 46, October-November 1996, (Table 4.1), p.40

EB60: Fig5.1(Oct/Nov 2003)



345


EB61: Fig11.5a (February/March 2004)



346

[345] 'European Commission Public Opinion', Opcit.p27
[346] European Commission Public Opinion', Opcit.pB94


EB62 (Oct/Nov2004)



347

[347] Standard Eurobarometer 62 Opcit.p96

EB 64 (Oct/Nov 2005)



348

[348] Standard Eurobarometer 64, October-November 2005, p48

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ENLARGEMENT

FOR OR AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

"In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? Are you very much for or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?"

[349]

Table 14

Support for Western European Unification (1970-81)

Britain, Ireland and Denmark (1973)

	1970 (February–March)[2]		1973 (September)		1975–1980 (seven polls)[3]		1981 (April)		1981 (October)	
	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against
Belgique/België	66%	5%	60%	5%	65%	6%	60%	9%	69%	8%
Danmark			45	32	45	34	46	34	43	39
Deutschland	76	5	78	6	79	6	70	13	75	12
France	70	8	68	4	75	8	73	11	79	8
Ireland			52	12	62	13	59	23	62	16
Italia	78	5	70	3	82	5	82	11	82	7
Luxembourg	76	4	80	1	84	8	87	7	83	14
Nederland	74	10	73	15	76	10	80	13	74	17
United Kingdom[4]			37	30	58	21	52	29	64	21
Ellas					59	23	60	25	65	16
COMMUNITY 5	(74)	(6)	63	11	73	11	69	16	74	13

[350]

[349] 'European Commission Public Opinion', http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm, Standard Eurobarometer 16, December 1981 p.34

[350] 'European Commission Public Opinion', (Table14), Opcit.p36

Greece (1981)

"Greece is due to join on 1 January 1981. In your opinion, is the entry of Greece into European Community a good thing, a bad thing, or neither one nor the other?"[351]

Table 13

VIEWS ON GREECE'S ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	CE (I)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Out of every 100 interviewd										
A good thing										
1977 Oct./Nov.	30	21	41	23	37	42	30	26	23	32
1980 April	26	22	46	22	35	51	45	40	22	35
October	29	25	43	25	35	48	39	43	23	36
A bad thing										
1977 Oct./Nov.	13	26	9	17	14	13	16	27	20	15
1980 April	6	20	7	12	6	7	8	8	13	10
October	9	19	8	15	14	8	10	10	15	11
Neither good nor bad										
1977 Oct./Nov.	20	28	30	34	22	25	27	26	34	30
1980 April	35	25	27	37	23	20	33	30	39	31
October	31	25	29	29	22	23	41	28	43	30
Don't know										
1977 Oct./Nov.	37	25	20	26	27	20	27	21	23	23
1980 April	33	33	20	29	36	22	14	22	26	24
October	31	31	20	31	29	21	10	9	19	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

[352]

[351] Standard Eurobarometer 14, December 1980, p.24

Portugal and Spain (1986)

Table 21


	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK	GR	EC[1]
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. SPAIN											
March-April 1985											
Strongly for	33	17	25	17	20	38	44	29	18	18	25
Somewhat for	32	23	41	41	28	36	35	38	32	24	36
Somewhat against	9	11	12	19	12	6	13	7	12	7	12
Strongly against	2	10	4	9	5	3	5	5	8	8	6
Don't know	24	39	18	14	35	17	3	21	30	43	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index[3]	3.26	2.76	3.06	2.76	2.97	3.30	3.22	3.14	2.85	2.92	3.01
2. PORTUGAL											
March-April 1985											
Strongly for	32	17	24	16	20	35	43	28	20	17	24
Somewhat for	31	23	41	42	31	37	34	39	34	24	37
Somewhat against	9	10	11	18	8	6	14	7	9	7	11
Strongly against	2	11	5	9	3	3	6	6	4	7	5
Don't know	26	39	19	15	38	19	3	20	33	45	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index[3]	3.24	12.77	3.03	2.78	3.08	3.28	3.16	3.10	3.04	12.92	3.04

353

[352] 'European Commission Public Opinion', (Table 13), Opcit.p25
[353] Standard Eurobarometer 23, June 1985, (Table 21), p.36

Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995)

EB42: Fig6.2 (Dec 1994)




354

[354] Standard Eurobarometer 42, December 1994, (Figure 6.2), p.49

CEEC's (May 2004)


EB60: Fig 10.1b (Oct/Nov 2003)



355

[355] Standard Eurobarometer 60, October-November 2003, (Figure 10.1b), p76

EB61: Fig11.4b (Feb/March 2004)




356

[356] Standard Eurobarometer 61, February-March 2004, (Figure 11.4b), p.B93


Bulgaria and Romania (2007)

EB62:Aut. 2004



[357]

EB 66 (September-Oct 2006)



[358]

[357] Standard Eurobarometer 62, October-November 2004, p.152
[358] Standard Eurobarometer 66, September-October 2006, p28

EB 67 (April/May 2007)

Question: QA27.4 What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

Option: Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years

QA27.4 What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. (% for)

	EU27	NMS12	EU15
Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years	49%	68%	43%


359

[359] Standard Eurobarometer 67, Opcit.p189

Appendix C

Criteria for Turkey

EB64 (Oct/Nov 2005)



360

[360] Standard Eurobarometer 64, Opcit.p139 (QA45)

Appendix D

EU 27 Countries

B/BE	**Belgium**
DK	**Denmark**
D/DE	**Germany**
Ellas/GR/EL	**Greece**
E/ES	**Spain**
F/FR	**France**
IRL/IE	**Ireland**
I/IT	**Italy**
L/LU	**Luxembourg**
NL	**Netherlands**
A/AT	**Austria**
P/PT	**Portugal**
FIN/FI	**Finland**
S/SE	**Sweden**
UK	**United Kingdom**
MT	**Malta**
CY	**Cyprus**
SI	**Slovenia**
PL	**Poland**
SK	**Slovakia**
LV	**Latvia**
CZ	**Czech Republic**
EE	**Estonia**
HU	**Hungary**
LT	**Lithuania**
RO	**Romania**
BG	**Bulgaria**

Applicant Countries

HR	**Croatia**
TR	**Turkey**