



University of the Witwatersrand

THE 'HEART' AND 'MIND' OF RACISM

by
Nathalie Tasic

Supervised by
Professor Edwin Etieyibo

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in
Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, School of Social Sciences,
Department of Philosophy

2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

HONOUR PLEDGE.....	III
ABSTRACT	IV
CHAPTER ONE	1
1.1. BACKGROUND	1
1.2. THESIS STATEMENT	2
1.3. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY	3
1.4. METHODOLOGY	4
1.5. RATIONALE AND RESEARCH IMPACT.....	5
1.6. RESEARCH OUTLINE.....	6
CHAPTER TWO	7
2.1. INTRODUCTION	7
2.2. PROBLEMATISING RACISM	8
2.2.1. <i>Individual and structural frameworks</i>	9
2.2.2. <i>The location problem</i>	11
2.3. SOME CONSIDERED CONCEPTIONS OF RACISM	14
2.3.1. <i>Garcia's volitional account</i>	14
2.3.2. <i>Shelby's ideological conception (the "mind" of racism)</i>	21
2.4. CONCLUSION	31
CHAPTER THREE	32
3.1. INTRODUCTION	32
3.2. INDIVIDUAL AGENCY AND RACISM (PREMISES 1 AND 2)	34
3.2.1. <i>Some considered examples</i>	35
3.3. GARCIA AND SHELBY ON RACISM (PREMISES 3 AND 4).....	37
3.4. LIMITATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC VIEWS (PREMISE 4).....	38
3.5. LIMITATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS (PREMISE 5).....	40
3.6. GAP IN UNDERSTANDING RACISM'S INTERPLAY AND THE PROPOSED DUAL-MODEL (PREMISES 6 AND 7)	42
3.7. THE DUAL-MODEL: THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (PREMISE 8)	42
3.8. DEFENCE OF INTEGRATION (PREMISE 9)	43
3.9. CONCLUSION	44
CHAPTER FOUR.....	45
4.1. INTRODUCTION	45
4.2. MILLS' AND SHELBY'S OBJECTION ARGUMENT	45
4.2.1. <i>Social structures ("does")</i>	45
4.2.2. <i>Beliefs and categorizations ("thinks") vs. individual feelings ("feels")</i>	46
4.3. RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION.....	47
4.4. CONCLUSION	48
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52

WITS
UNIVERSITY



HONOUR PLEDGE

I, **Michelle Tasic**, a registered student for the degree **Master of Arts Philosophy** at the University of the Witwatersrand with student number **1797649**, pledge that the assessment task that I am submitting as part of **PHIL7020 Research Report** is entirely my own work, except where I have indicated that I obtained information from other sources, such as books or internet sites (where allowed). I pledge that I have not consulted with anyone else, including other students, while completing the assessment task or copied information from any source without referencing it.

I acknowledge that if I am found to have cheated in any way or plagiarised other people's work, I will be subject to disciplinary action, which may lead to suspension or expulsion.

MICH

Signed: _____

Date: 29 March, 2024

ABSTRACT

Jorge Garcia argues that racism is an affective phenomenon rooted in the “heart,” characterised by vicious race-based attitudes, and is thus a moral vice. In contrast, Tommie Shelby's ideological account situates racism as an cognitive ideological error of the “mind,” sustained by systemic structures that are constructed on false beliefs. While Garcia's volitional and Shelby's ideological theories diverge, both remain foundational for understanding the complex nature of racism.

In this thesis, I argue that neither Garcia's noncognitive affective model nor Shelby's cognitive model alone sufficiently explains racism. Instead, I propose a dual-model that integrates both the vicious race-based attitudes of the heart and the false beliefs of the mind to suggest a more comprehensive account of the interplay between individual and institutional racism. This synthesis deals with a key limitation in existing individualistic accounts by demonstrating how individual racism connects to institutional structures.

By reconciling the affective and cognitive elements, the dual-model reveals how the convergence of racist attitudes and faulty beliefs becomes institutionalised. Methodologically, I utilise an “armchair analytical” approach, focused on comparatively analysing key texts, supplemented by insights from social scientific studies, allowing for a philosophically rigorous yet empirically grounded framework. This dual-model approach reconciles the theoretical limitations of Garcia's volitional conception and Shelby's ideological view, and provides new insights into the complex interplay between individual and institutional manifestations of racism.

This dual-model approach advances beyond current conceptions by closing the explanatory gap between individualistic and systemic understandings of racism, and thus offering a more comprehensive account. Future research can continue to refine, expand and apply this integrated approach in real-world contexts to see how it can inform anti-racist efforts that supports a more holistic response to racism at both its individual and institutional levels.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Racism is fundamentally a crime against humanity—it functions to deny people their individuals their rights and dignity.¹ Forcibly implementing racial oppression through various cultural, economic, political, and psychological structures has, moreover, precipitated what scholars have increasingly identified as a public health crisis.² Racism is divisive and manifests both in intentional, overt acts and in more insidious systemic forms that can often be unintentional or unconscious.³ While governments have made strides in dealing with racism through mechanisms like affirmative action policies or the Bill of Rights, the persistent classification of people into racial hierarchies that privilege some while oppressing others continues to widen disparities across the domains of healthcare, criminal justice, employment, education, and more.⁴ Thus, despite its well-documented legal, moral, and health implications, racial discrimination endures in undermining human dignity and moral worth across various individual, institutional, and structural levels.

The long-lasting negative harms of racism continue to be felt by its victims, underscoring the urgent need for effective anti-racist interventions. To treat racism effectively, a philosophical inquiry into clarifying its root causes has been sought. Among many views in the literature, two seminal positions stand out for their conceptual depth in interrogating the nature and origins of racism: Tommie Shelby’s ideological approach and Jorge Garcia’s volitional accounts. While not exhaustive views, due to space constraints, I have chosen to focus my research on these two views.

Garcia characterizes racism as a moral vice rooted in the “heart,” as noncognitive attitudes, feelings, and intentions. By contrast, Shelby grounds racism in beliefs, attributed to

¹ United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed June 11, 2024, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

² Public Health Association, “Structural Racism Is a Public Health Crisis: Impact on the Black Community,” accessed June 11, 2024, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-structural-racism-is-magnifying-the-public-health-crisis>.

³ Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Random House, 1967), 2; Joshua Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” *Ethics* 120, no.1 (October 2009): 64.

⁴ Mikaila Corday, “Research Guides: Racial Justice Resources for Activists, Advocates & Allies: Structural & Systemic Racism,” accessed 11 June 2024, <https://guides.libraries.uc.edu/racialjusticeresources>.

a cognitive ideological error of the “mind”.⁵ These opposing views, exemplify a central debate in our philosophical understanding of racism. However, choosing one over the other runs the risk of strengthening a false dichotomy. In other words, we are asked to frame the question in binary terms: is racism rooted in the “heart” or the “mind”? In the literature, these views have been treated as *prima facie* mutually exclusive, which obscures the complex interplay between individual and institutional racism and raises concern that this binary division oversimplifies a complex problem. Garcia argues that “racism is not primarily a cognitive matter”,⁶ but one of vicious attitudes, while Shelby defends the claim “that it is beliefs that are essential to and even sufficient for racism”.⁷ Instead, in this thesis, I propose an alternative dual-model in which both attitudes and beliefs are jointly necessary and sufficient conditions to account for the interrelation between individual and institutional forms of racism. This research thesis focuses on elaborating and defending this integrated view.

1.2. Thesis statement

In this thesis, I argue that neither the affective nor cognitive models alone adequately explain racism. Neither vicious attitudes nor false beliefs, as separate views, sufficiently account for the complex interplay between individual and institutional racism. Therefore, I propose a dual-model of racism, where the combination of the volitional “heart” and the cognitive beliefs of the “mind” is both necessary and sufficient for racism. Jorge Garcia correctly locates the source of racism in vicious attitudes of ill-will and disregard, but he underestimates the role of beliefs as inessential to racism. Tommie Shelby rightly claims that beliefs are essential for racism but is mistaken to posit that they are sufficient. I take Shelby’s ideological model to offer the co-constitutive missing element needed to render Garcia’s volitional model sufficient for institutional racism. This dual synthesis of vicious attitudes and racist beliefs bridges the explanatory gap left by each account in isolation. This dual-model addresses the key limitations of individualistic accounts by demonstrating how individual racism becomes institutionalised through the convergence of racist attitudes and false beliefs.

⁵ J. L. A. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 7, no.1(1996): 6; Tommie Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33, no. 3(2002): 414. Shelby does not use the “mind” metaphor; however, I use the metaphor to capture the sense of the brain's cognitive/doxastic/rational thinking elements or physical processes of acquiring knowledge.

⁶ Garcia, 12.

⁷ Shelby, 414.

By reconciling Garcia's affective and Shelby's cognitive aspects, this dual-model deepens and advances our philosophical understanding of racism.

1.3. Limitations of the study

I argue that when treated as two separate views, neither Garcia's volitional heart nor Shelby's cognitive mind is sufficient in providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the complex interplay between individual and institutional racism. However, this is not to claim that integrated attempts have not been made. Scholars such as Charles Mills, have developed compelling accounts of structural racism, yet, as I will go on to show in subsequent chapters, even his model indirectly relies on Garcia's heart elements and Shelby's mind elements. Thus, my contribution is to demonstrate how this heart and mind dual-model can be brought into a fruitful discussion and synthesised into a more complete framework of understanding of racism.

This research is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of all the available views of racism within the literature, rather, it is deliberately narrowed to focus on the two seminal analyses of racism: Garcia's affective model and Shelby's ideological account. This work can be considered a therapeutic engagement with these pivotal views, and by extension, an argument for the intervention aimed at offering an alternative dual-model of racism. It may not constitute a completely established theory of racism; however, it is an attempt to resolve the tension between racist attitudes and false beliefs by synthesising these opposing views, filling the explanatory gap between individual and institutional racism. Future research would be required to develop a more comprehensive theory of my proposed dual-model, and it would need to be tested empirically and practical inquiry into anti-racist efforts.

By placing a narrow comparative focus on Garcia's volitional and Shelby's ideological accounts, this approach attempts to reconcile each one's limitations and strengthen individualist frameworks by addressing institutional concerns. Recognising the co-constitutive nature of both the heart reveals how racism operates at individual and institutional levels, resulting in the advancement of contemporary socio-political and moral discussions. I acknowledge there are many important individualist conceptions and structural concerns that I cannot adequately address here. Moreover, further empirical research would be needed to test this dual-model in real-world applications and how it intersects with other forms of oppression, like sexism and classism. However, placing a narrow research focus on a comparative analysis of Garcia's volitional elements and Shelby's cognitive dimension allows one to recognise a

possible way to reconcile the limitations of individualist frameworks which fortifying them against institutional concerns.

This dual-model strengthens the moral and explanatory importance of racism at the individual level, by adequately explaining how “individuals infect the reasoning, decision-making, and actions of individuals not only in their private behaviour but also when they make and execute the policies of those institutions in which they operate.”⁸ The synthesis of vicious attitudes and false beliefs in perpetuating racial oppression at individual and institutional levels offers new insights for policies aimed at reducing racial injustices. I agree with Garcia that racism is always immoral and prior to belief; however, I also agree with Shelby’s claim that beliefs cannot be immoral. I resolve this impasse by departing from Garcia’s narrow claim of the injustices of racism, as I find his approach—of morally condemning individual vices—unhelpful in healing a racist heart.

1.4. Methodology

To make a case for the above argument, I utilize an “armchair analytic” approach. By “armchair,” I refer to the fact that the research does not rely on experiments or qualitative data collection. Instead, the focus has been on conducting a thorough review of argument-driven literature on racism, specifically Garcia and Shelby’s views on the nature of racism. The analytical method, as applied in this thesis, involves critically examining Garcia and Shelby’s ideas and arguments. The objective is to shape and refine my own proposed model while adopting aspects of their views.

Thus, the analysis involves critically examining both Garcia’s foundational account, “The Heart of Racism” (1996), that grounds racism in non-cognitive volitional states, and Shelby’s influential work, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” (2002), that argues for a cognitive approach, focusing on the doxastic elements of racism. I assess the strengths of both Garcia’s affective model and Shelby’s cognitive approach, and the limitations of individual frameworks of racism. I contrast Garcia’s definition of racism as rooted in vicious attitudes with Shelby’s assertion that racist beliefs are primary.⁹ I investigate their conflicting views on the nature of racism. Garcia asserts that racism is a moral failing as it goes “against the virtues of benevolence and justice”.¹⁰ Shelby rejects the inherent immorality of racism because beliefs

⁸ Garcia, 11.

⁹ Garcia, 11; Shelby, 413-414.

¹⁰ Garcia, 10.

cannot be immoral, and instead, suggests a morally neutral approach that can demonstrate the morally significant role of beliefs in perpetuating racial injustices.¹¹ Further, I compare Garcia and Shelby's use of an "infection model" to explain how individual racism features in the production of institutional racism.¹² For Garcia, institutions are extensions of the non-cognitive vicious attitudes of its racist founders and the individuals running its operations, whereas Shelby contends that individuals indoctrinated by racist ideologies unconsciously infect institutional operational systems and policies.¹³ This comparative analysis highlights the explanatory strengths and the necessity of both the volitional and cognitive aspects of racism. It also illuminates the inadequacies of (on the one hand) vicious attitudes without the need for beliefs, or (on the other), racist beliefs without the need for attitudes, in explaining institutional racism. These unresolved limitations leave us with an incomplete image of racism, leading to a synthesis of the heart and mind of racism, and the proposed dual-model of vicious attitudes and beliefs to satisfactorily explain institutional racism.

1.5. Rationale and research impact

This research illuminates how Shelby's view is morally significant since it serves as a treatment to disabuse oneself of false beliefs about race, which can bring about a change in how a racist feels. To treat the more fundamental racist attitude, we should discard the deeply mistaken belief underpinning all racist ideologies: namely, the false belief in the existence of races. In doing so, a racist would come to recognize that all their rationalisations and justifications turn out to be predicated on their deeply mistaken belief in race, and that to continue holding on to their false ideologies of hierarchy in the face of evidence and reason is unintelligent and importantly, unwise.

At an institutional level, this comprehensive understanding of racism can be applied to educational programmes, aimed at disabusing ourselves of false doctrines, incorporating techniques like meditation to help teach empathy and positive attitudes about equality, diversity and inclusion. Moreover, understanding the root causes of racism and its mechanisms through this comprehensive dual-model allows for an effective strategy that incorporates and integrates AI as a powerful tool that can aid in combatting structural racial injustices and prejudices.

¹¹ Shelby, 413.

¹² Garcia, 11; Shelby, 416.

¹³ Garcia, 11; Shelby, 418.

The integration of the heart and mind and the provisional suggestions for anti-racist efforts do face challenges; however, recognising that for individual racism to spread through institutions, both vicious attitudes and beliefs are required. This dual-model offers a more comprehensive framework that goes beyond current conceptions with the aim of practical applications in real-world contexts.

1.6. Research outline

This thesis is structured in three parts. Section 1 is the introduction, containing all the content discussed thus far.

In Chapter Two, I critically examine the main arguments of Garcia's volitional conception and Shelby's ideological view and highlight their limitations in explaining institutional racism. I comparatively analyse the core disagreements between the affective and cognitive approaches, namely, the tension of locating the primacy of racism in the heart or mind; the moral nature of racism; and the role of vicious attitudes and racist beliefs in institutional racism. I critically evaluate the strengths and limitations of each view.

In Chapter Three, I propose a dual-model, that aims to reconcile the explanatory gap between the affective and cognitive frameworks by integrating the heart and mind of racism. This model offers a more comprehensive framework that can adequately account for institutional racism. I argue that Garcia's explanatory limitations are a result of excluding the necessity of racist beliefs. Shelby's account alone is inadequate without recognising that affective states are the building blocks out of which racism is constructed. Garcia cannot adequately explain how racist attitudes infect structural operations without the cognitive components of Shelby's view. It is the confluence of individual racist attitudes and beliefs that allows "infected" systems to operate, maintain, and defend institutional racial oppression and domination. This proposed dual-model resolves these limitations, deepening our understanding of the origins and mechanisms of racism, and has more explanatory force than Garcia and Shelby's views do on their own. The integrated approach has implications for changing our understanding of the root causes of racism, which impacts how we intervene regarding racism and how we develop effective, practically applicable, anti-racist strategies.

Lastly, I offer the conclusion to the research and some considered recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

SOME CONSIDERED VIEWS OF RACISM

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is a literature review of the research, and I start by critically examining the general complexities and challenges inherent to understanding the nature of racism (problematising racism). I highlight several key issues and conceptual ambiguities surrounding racism and provide the foundational context for the subsequent narrowed focus in this chapter on Garcia's volitional account and Shelby's cognitive approach. Each view provides a fundamental aspect essential to providing a comprehensive understanding of racism. Garcia's affective model offers a compelling account of racism's essence as underlying vicious race-based attitudes that oppose being benevolent or just. His view captures the moral reprehensibility of racism in the heart, in one's attitudes, desires, and intentions, rather than beliefs. Garcia's view powerfully shifts the focus of racism from mere cognitive distortions or factual mistakes to the moral quality of one's character, emphasising human agency and responsibility to help explain why racism is always wrong. However, Garcia's affective model needs to be supplemented by Shelby's cognitive view to fully capture the complex nature of racism as a social phenomenon.

Shelby's view rejects the primacy of racist attitudes and argues that beliefs are fundamental in defining racism. Shelby's ideological approach captures the systemic nature of racism and its operations beyond individual attitudes, which helps explain the persistence of racism even when overt displays of racial hatred are socially unacceptable. However, beliefs alone fail to account for individual moral accountability of racism, thus necessitating the heart as its origin point. Shelby's mind view complements Garcia's heart conception by explaining how systems of oppression are sustained by implicit racist beliefs absorbed from a racist culture.

Mills' critique challenges and highlights the limitations of both these individualistic approaches and reinforces why neither Garcia's nor Shelby's views alone suffice. To overcome these limitations, I propose the dual-model in Chapter Three, which integrates the affective and cognitive elements to adequately explain the interplay between individual and institutional racism. This synthesis of the heart and mind explains how institutions become racist through individuals, as opposed to Mills, who argues that individual racism is derivative and explained by institutional racism. Given the space constraints, Garcia and Shelby are scholars who, in my

view, represent the most influential individualistic views that are foundational to understand and addressing the interplay between individual and institutional racism. Mills presents a rigorous critique of individual racism necessary to provide a comprehensive analysis that lays the foundations for the dual-model proposed in Chapter Three.

2.2. Problematising racism

Different philosophical approaches to understanding the nature and origins of racism have evolved over the last several decades, as Blum notes, “the concept of racism has undergone substantial changes in both academic and public discourse.”¹⁴ Like any other social concept, no one can dispute the fact that there must be a time and place when a concept came into use in human society. Garcia traces the term’s first use back to the 1930s when it was popularised by social thinkers to describe and condemn Nazi political and racial ideologies that emphasized German superiority.¹⁵ These false racial ideologies were underpinned by pseudo-scientific claims about biological essentialism developed in the sciences of biology and anthropology.¹⁶ At the time, many Germans had adopted these sets of false beliefs, believing themselves to be descendants of Europeans, “pure bloods” that belonged to a biologically superior “Aryan” race.¹⁷ Underpinning these false beliefs is the view that Germans had stronger competing abilities and dispositions than all other people not classified as Aryan, justifying their self-proclaimed assertions that they were better than all other so-called races.¹⁸

The deeply anti-Semitic, nationalist, and racist ideologies were implemented by the National Socialist Movement through policies that claimed a right to rule over Jewish people, Black Europeans, Slavs, Romas, and other marginalized people perceived by German Nazis to be weaker.¹⁹ These belief systems of racial superiority were fuelled by hatred and this led to the economic, political, and social exploitation of these marginalized groups by the Nazi (racist) regime. The undesired consequence of acting on this belief was the extermination of over six million Jewish people and over eleven million non-Jewish people, all considered to be

¹⁴ Lawrence Blum, *“I’m Not a Racist, But...”: The Moral Quandary of Race* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 27.

¹⁵ Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” 5; Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But...”, 3-4; Lawrence Blum, “Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t,” *Studies in Philosophy Education* 21, no. 3(2002): 210.

¹⁶ Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But...”, 3-4; The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Nazism summary.” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, November 11, 2021.

¹⁷ The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Nazism summary.”

¹⁸ Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But ...”, 3-4; The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Nazism summary.”

¹⁹ The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Nazism summary.”

subhuman.²⁰ These bankrupt ideologies of racial superiority and associated, violent race struggles continued to prevail, influencing other systems of racial oppression like the South African apartheid regime and European colonialism.²¹ Regardless of the rejection of inherent genetic differences of races as something without any scientific merit (rejected by anthropologists, sociologists, biologists, etc.), racism continues to pervade all levels of society. Racism remains one of the major social problems affecting human relationships and warrants a deeper understanding to address the root of the problem.

In contemporary social, political, and moral discourse, racism is analysed at various individual, institutional, and social levels.²² All these analyses are attempts to understand the nature of racism, and the main difference in the focus of analysis is over whether racism is located in personal attitudes, beliefs, or actions, or is a matter of systemic beliefs of racial hierarchies entrenched in institutional policies and practices designed to racially oppress.²³ I strongly believe that the approach a person takes when it comes to these levels of conceptual analysis has an impact on their understanding of the nature and, by extension, effective means of addressing racial injustices in private and public life. In what follows, I discuss the different frameworks of understanding or analysing racism.

2.2.1. Individual and structural frameworks

As mentioned above, central to racial discourse—and, more importantly, in philosophy (a discipline dedicated to the questioning and analysis of the nature of concepts)—is defining and analysing the phenomenon of racism, which has occurred for centuries. Like most concepts (and by extension, conceptions), certain conditions ought to be met. It is these conditions that describe the concept, such that any account (or conception) of the concept, might focus on discussing a few (and in rare cases all) conditions in question. Therefore, in understanding racism, one ought to focus on the conditions that are constitutive of racism.

One of the principal desiderata employed by most philosophers is to capture how we typically use the term in everyday language.²⁴ The point here is that one ought to understand how racism is portrayed in the daily life of the people, and one way of understanding this view

²⁰ The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, “Nazi Party | Definition, Meaning, History, & Facts,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last modified March 17, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nazi-Party>.

²¹ Blum, “Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t,” 210.

²² Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” 6.

²³ Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” *Ethics* 120, no. 1 (October 2009): 65–67.

²⁴ This is at least true for some of the classical views I mention, such as Garcia, 8; Shelby, 413; Mills, 32; Glasgow, 64.

is to discuss how racism manifests at the individual and institutional levels. Key figures in this debate, such as Jorge Garcia, argue that to give an adequate account of racism, we must answer:

What, in applying the term [racism], we are we saying about the things to which we apply it. To find this out in light of the origins of the term ‘racism,’ and to sort out various inconsistencies and misunderstandings in the ways people use it, is the most promising path to discovering what racism is.²⁵

Thus, for Garcia, one way of understanding racism is to consider folk psychological beliefs about (the everyday use of the term) “racism”. Along this line of thought are multiple levels of analysing racism in the discourse, with the assumption that it permeates the individual, manifesting variously as beliefs, attitudes, and actions.²⁶ An extension of the individual view is the analysis of how institutions treat certain individuals or groups of individuals, that is, multiple structural levels of racially oppressive behaviours across various institutional and cultural domains.²⁷

Since racism permeates both the individual and institutions such individuals belong to, it follows that an adequate account of racism should explain what the relation between individual and institutional racism is, assuming there is one.²⁸ For Garcia, the moral and explanatory force of racism is rooted in the individual “heart”, characterised in terms of vicious attitudes.²⁹ Institutional racism develops from individuals who believe in racism but carry out racist actions through institutions, manifesting racism through policies and laws.³⁰ That is when racist attitudes infect individuals’ actions, corrupting their ability to perform their duties and make good decisions about policies they have control over within the system.³¹

Shelby, along this line of thought, argues that the explanatory importance of institutional racism is rooted in racist ideologies that motivate individuals to act on racist beliefs affecting the operations of institutions. This enables institutions to perpetuate racial oppression.³² Identifying racist ideologies is morally important as they affect operational

²⁵ J. L. A. Garcia, “Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 28, no. 2(1997): 6.

²⁶ Ibid., 5–6; Glasgow, 69; Charles W. Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism,” *The Journal of Ethics* 7, no. 1(2003): 30; Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” in *Racism in Mind*, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2004), 72.

²⁷ Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack,” 60–61.

²⁸ Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” 11.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 11–12.

³¹ Ibid., 12.

³² Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” 416.

processes. Racial ideologies held by individuals or groups of individuals are the driving force behind racist policies that inform institutional practices, resulting in systematic racial oppression. Since these beliefs are rooted in false ideas about certain groups of human beings, racial oppression is “an unnecessary, systemic, and undeserved burden that is imposed on one group as a result of the actions of another.”³³

What one notices from the above views is that the discussion seems to emphasize the individual and attempts to extend the actions of the individual to the workings of institutions. However, scholars like Charles Mills defend a less personal, left-wing structuralist view of racism, arguing that scholars who emphasize the individual (such as Garcia) reverse its moral and explanatory importance. Mills argues that racism is a social phenomenon where individual racism is the impetus, insofar as it perpetuates and sustains systemic racial oppression.³⁴ Racism can be explained by systemic patterns of power entrenched within institutions and can function without explicit individual racist attitudes or prejudice.³⁵ This view suggests that the immorality of racism is not predetermined by racist attitudes, beliefs, or structural practices, but rather, by judging the harmful effects of perpetuating and sustaining systemic racial injustice and oppression.³⁶

Regardless of whether one focuses on the individual or on institutions, I believe that a comprehensive framework is needed to understand this complex, multi-faceted phenomenon at both individual and institutional levels, and that this is a better way of effectively addressing its negative impacts on society.

2.2.2. The location problem

While the above analysis dealt with discussed whether racism is an individual or institutional phenomenon, another way of understanding racism is by looking at what is essential to the definition of racism. Here, the focus is not on whether it is an individual or institutional problem, but on what defines a certain individual or institution as racist. That is, what is common to all actions of individuals and institutions that are considered to be racist.

Thus, attempting to capture the nature of racism as one unified account leads to a central, heavily disputed problem of locating it, which Glasgow terms the “location problem”.³⁷

³³ Ibid., 419

³⁴ Mills, “Heart Attack,” 60; Garcia, 10–11.

³⁵ Mills, 30, 61–62; Glasgow, 72.

³⁶ Mills, 61.

³⁷ Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” 65.

The location problem arises from the “categorical plurality” of racism, a term Lawrence Blum uses to describe the irreducible nature of racism to one location or account.³⁸ For Blum, racism has a complex and diverse nature which takes on many distinct forms—such as utterances, beliefs, symbols, practices, feelings, acts, propositions, policies, attitudes, cultures, etc.—which manifest in such diverse ways that it cannot be reduced to a single element.³⁹

Blum thinks that our ordinary usage of the term varies too widely to capture its “true meaning” in a useful way, and instead emphasises the importance of finding ways to better use the term in everyday language and discourse.⁴⁰ He attempts to resolve these limitations by locating all forms of racism in inferiorisation or antipathy.⁴¹ He argues that the “core meaning” of racism can always be traced back to the unfair treatment of people perceived to be inferior because of their race, or to racial antipathy resulting from prejudice toward a targeted racial group.⁴² On the other hand, Glasgow contends that Blum’s disjunctive analysis disallows other manifestations that we commonly recognize as racism.⁴³ For example, expressing ignorant but well-meaning statements like, “Asian people are more intelligent than any other race,” or, “Black people are naturally the most athletically gifted,” would *not* be considered racist on Blum’s account because positive stereotyping does not reduce to forms of inferiorisation or antipathy.⁴⁴

For Glasgow, we ordinarily consider stereotypical statements, even if well-intentioned, to be racist because they homogenise entire groups of people as having inherent racial qualities.⁴⁵ These counterexamples of *positive* homogenisation reveal instances where racism does not trace back to inferiorisation or antipathy. Glasgow suggests that Blum could remedy his account if he added more disjunctive variations of racism; however, he argues, this results in the inclusion of an endless set of elements, further complicating the location problem.⁴⁶ One way to reconcile the pluralities of racism is a cluster-style analysis which identifies multiple independent properties that can be distinctly sufficient for racism.⁴⁷

³⁸ Ibid., 77, 81; Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 72.

³⁹ Glasgow, Racism as Disrespect,” 77; Blum, 72.

⁴⁰ Lawrence Blum, “*I’m Not a Racist, But...*”, 7–8.

⁴¹ Glasgow, 70, Blum, 8–9; Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 72.

⁴² Blum, 8–9; Glasgow, 70, n.19. Glasgow summarizes what Blum is aiming for in his account of racism; J. L. A. Garcia, “Book Reviews—Lawrence Blum, *I’m Not a Racist, But ...*”, *Philosophy Review* 23, no. 5(2003): 332–37; Tommie Shelby, review of *I’m Not a Racist, But...*, *Ethics* 114, no.1(2003): 124–26. I used Garcia and Shelby’s summary of Blum to help me understand his position.

⁴³ Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect”, 70.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 70–71, n.21. Glasgow provides a similar example of positive stereotyping.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 70–71.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 70.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 70–71, n.24. I use Glasgow’s broad definition of a cluster-analysis.

In contrast to a cluster analysis, Glasgow offers a monistic analysis that does not require racism to have a fundamental location.⁴⁸ He defines a monistic concept of racism as: “A property or conjunction of properties that details necessary and sufficient conditions for membership.”⁴⁹ Glasgow aims to accommodate ordinary usage of the term in better ways than others, all things being equal, but this requirement does not mean people will not use the term incorrectly.⁵⁰

He argues that we can avoid this problem of specifying one central location of racism which discounts all others, or of specifying multiple sets of common locations that exclude instances that we intuitively perceive as racism, by adopting a *location-neutral* position.⁵¹ A non-specific location allows for a monistic account that can unify all common manifestations of the different categories of racism when perceived as a form of “racial disrespect”. He defines the “Disrespect Analysis” roughly as the following: “A ϕ is racist if and only if ϕ is *disrespectful* toward members of racialized group R as R s” (emphasis added).⁵² Glasgow prefers using the term “*racialized groups*” over “*rac*es” which he defines as, “Groups of people who have been identified and treated as if they were members of the same race.”⁵³ Racism is reduced to an abstract form of disrespect that can manifest in a variety of racist beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, institutions, and more.⁵⁴ Glasgow asserts that racism viewed as racial disrespect captures the most common forms of individual and institutional racism, and thus, reconciles the location problem.⁵⁵

The reason I am including the location problem here is that the discussion of the two accounts below seeks to address what they consider to be an essential condition for explaining racism. While Garcia locates racist actions in attitudes and shows what is essential to attitudes that count as racist, Shelby locates racist actions in beliefs and shows the kind of beliefs that can be considered racist. I discuss these views below.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 80.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 71, n.24.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 65–66.

⁵¹ Ibid., 80.

⁵² Ibid., 81. (Glasgow uses this variable ϕ to stand for any individuals, beliefs, attitudes, actions, policies, countries that are racist).

⁵³ Glasgow, 81.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 80–85.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 82.

2.3. Some considered conceptions of racism

The philosophical challenges of defining and identifying the conditions for an adequate account of racism illuminate the persistent complexities of trying to capture racism's true nature within a unified account. The above discussion is meant to show the sense in which the accounts I discuss in this section talk about racism, that is, how they capture the relationship between the individual and institutions, or in terms of locating racism (the necessary or sufficient condition of racism).

As mentioned in my introductory chapter, this thesis narrows the focus to two significant views that I consider to be fundamental to understanding racism. I draw this narrow focus to Garcia's *volitional* account as it is foundational in revealing the true source of racism, "the heart", characterized as that which holds race-based ill-will and disregard. Apart from this view, and following its limitations, I consider a counterpart, Shelby's cognitive "mind" view, in which "the mind" holds false beliefs about races.

A review of these accounts is meant to highlight the limitations of each account, such that in my analysis, I offer a model that combines both. Under this model, I argue that this integration of the affective dispositions and cognitive processes is necessary to provide a more complete image of racism, as neither alone is sufficient, providing a deeper understanding of the nature and origins of racism. This proposal of a nuanced dual-model of the heart and mind offers a more comprehensive framework for understanding racism, allowing for new insights into developing anti-racist strategies against individual racial prejudices and institutional racial oppression. But again, a discussion of this model is undertaken in Chapter Three. In this chapter, the task is to simply offer a discussion of the two accounts.

2.3.1. Garcia's volitional account

One place to start a discussion of the accounts of racism is to consider Garcia's volitional account. He highlights historical and sociological inconsistencies in defining racism, arguing that beliefs, actions, or systems of oppression alone do not capture racism's primary contemporary use as both evaluative and descriptive.⁵⁶

Garcia defines racism as:

⁵⁶ Garcia, 5–6.

fundamentally a vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people. In its central and most vicious form, it is a hatred, ill-will, directed against a person or persons on account of their assigned race. In a derivative form, one is a racist when one either does not care at all or does not care enough (i.e., as much as morality requires) or does not care in the right ways about people assigned to a certain racial group, where this disregard is based on racial classification.⁵⁷

His view locates the inception of racism in the “heart”, a metaphor for non-cognitive elements of interracial antagonism.⁵⁸ Mills points out the double significance of this metaphor, as the traditional seat of emotions, where the essence of racism can be found within the heart of a racist.⁵⁹ Garcia argues that beliefs, actions, or structures of domination are racist by virtue of springing from vicious attitudes.⁶⁰

While Shelby and many others agree that individuals necessarily depend on racist beliefs to rationalize their vicious race-based attitudes and actions, Garcia argues this reverses the order.⁶¹ While it might be true, says Garcia, that an individual may *psychologically* rely on beliefs about their racial superiority to validate their feelings of antipathy, it is not true that such beliefs are *logically* necessary for racism to occur.⁶² He maintains that vicious race-based attitudes necessitate racist beliefs, rather than the reverse.⁶³

Garcia's attitudinal understanding of racism satisfies his immorality requirement. It helps to think of some of the common expressions we use to describe “good” people when we say things like, “She has such a big heart,” “He has a heart of gold,” and so on. We are familiar with describing a kind-hearted person as being loving, gentle, kind, friendly, good, compassionate, caring, or sensitive, with all these qualities emanating from the inside out (from one's attitudes or goodwill and manifesting in action). Sincerity, genuineness, honesty, and faithfulness—what we usually consider virtues—come from within or are cultivated within a person. We do tend to have a moral sense of right and wrong concerning human dispositions.

This can be understood through common expressions describing “good” and “bad” people, with virtues emanating from within a person. We tend to describe “bad” people as being hard-hearted, haters, angry, malicious, vengeful, or uncaring. We often say of such people things like, “He is rotten to the core (the heart),” “She's ugly on the inside,” and so on. Like a

⁵⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁹ Mills, 30.

⁶⁰ Garcia, 11.

⁶¹ Ibid., 9, Shelby, 413–414.

⁶² Garcia, 9, Shelby 413–414.

⁶³ Garcia, 9, Shelby 413–414.

bad apple cannot be claimed to be good, a racist heart cannot be good. Just as the bad apple rots from within, racist attitudes come from bad wishes, desires, and attitudes of the heart, infecting one to move under the influence of race-based disregard, cruelty, and malice. Racism is not just a factual error about racial hierarchies; it is personal and unavoidably a moral character trait, emphasizing the importance of developing the right virtues like “goodwill, caring, and well-wishing” for positive interracial relations.⁶⁴

The heart that becomes institutionalised

Garcia asserts that “institutional racism begins when racism extends from the hearts of individual people to become institutionalized.”⁶⁵ He argues that institutional racism stems from vicious race-based attitudes and occurs when they “infect the reasoning, decision-making, and actions of individuals not only in their private behaviour but also when they make and execute the policies of those institutions in which they operate.”⁶⁶ He emphasizes,

What matters is that racist attitudes contaminate the operation of the institution; it is irrelevant what its original point may have been, what its designers meant it to do. If it does not operate from those motives [...], then it does not embody institutional racism [...].⁶⁷

Garcia adopts an “input-centred model” or “infection” language to explain how racist volitional hearts become institutionalized.⁶⁸ This model specifies that “an action is wrong because of the moral disvalue of what goes into it rather than the nonmoral value of what comes out of it.”⁶⁹ The primary moral and explanatory importance of institutional racism is located in vicious race-based *attitudes* against other races that plague the systemic aims, policies, and practices of the institutions which their racist functionaries operate.⁷⁰ Garcia’s infection model can be contrasted with consequentialist models that focus on the bad effects of institutional racism.⁷¹

In the same way “a bad apple rots the whole bunch,” a current R1 functionality (using Glasgow’s terminology) of an institution, with internalised vicious attitudes towards R2 individuals for being the R2 group, will corrupt the collective thinking and institutional policy

⁶⁴ Garcia, 11.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 12.

⁶⁶ Garcia, 11.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 12.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 10–11, 32.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 11–12.

⁷¹ Ibid., 11.

decisions for how R2 group members are treated, which corrupts the aims and practices of the organisation.⁷²

Garcia views “morality primarily as a matter of suitably responding to other people and to the opportunities they present for us to pursue value.”⁷³ Individuals and institutions that act in reckless and negligent ways, which actively harm others based on their race, go against this kind of morality. No person or institution that respects, cares, and treats other people with equal regard and goodwill would want to intentionally mistreat or harm others for racially motivated reasons. This input-centred model causally explains how immoral, vicious race-based attitudes of individuals toxify the environment, systemic operations, and practices at an institutional level.⁷⁴ The infection model aligns with Garcia’s volitional conception, offering insights into how the moral and explanatory importance of institutional racism can be traced to racist attitudes.⁷⁵

Some considered strengths of the volitional account

A strength of Garcia’s affective framework is that it explains the moral reprehensibility of racism by shifting focus from beliefs or actions to the moral quality of vicious attitudes.⁷⁶ We don’t tend to think of people who deny the moral virtues of others (like goodwill, care, or equality) because of their supposed race as good people. It is not good to wish bad for others, have ill-intent toward others, or desire harm upon them on racial grounds. It seems intuitively correct to say that non-racists would not want to feel any hostility, resentment, or contempt for another human because of their supposed race, even if such vicious attitudes were never outwardly expressed. The confessions of “recovered racists” often reveal deep regret, shame, and remorse about harbouring racist attitudes.⁷⁷

Garcia argues that racism is a vice because it displays a lack of virtuous character traits like benevolence and justice.⁷⁸ Similar to alcoholics in recovery, being a recovering racist is a lifelong, daily conscious effort to control one’s own negative dispositions, desires, and attitudes. Alcoholics who stop drinking will report that it is not so much the external influences

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁵ Garcia, 10-11.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁷ Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” 67, n.13. Glasgow does not use this term “recovered racists” but he talks of ignorant racists who have recognised that their racist beliefs are false and correct them.

⁷⁸ Garcia, 9.

of being raised in a “drinking culture” that make it difficult to stop drinking; rather, it is their own uncontrollable desires, wishes, and feelings that make recovery difficult. Alcoholics know they are slowly killing themselves, yet they continue to drink anyway, not because they want to die but because they cannot help themselves from drinking. Recovering from racism is not a matter of knowing that racism is bad—most today know it is unacceptable, or to put it differently, hold the belief that it is a lie and that racial beliefs are false—rather, it is a matter of deconstructing the hatred and disregard in one’s racist heart, of changing one’s attitude.

Garcia contends that when an individual intentionally harms someone based on race, their actions are infected by internalized hatred and a lack of regard.⁷⁹ For example, when an R1 individual assigned to an R1 group attempts to intentionally harm a person(s) assigned to an R2 group for being an R2 individual, their actions will unavoidably be infected by internalised hatred and lack of regard for the R2 group.⁸⁰ An R1 individual who harbours this kind of vicious racial disregard for others is likely to treat R2 individuals in unjust, inequitable ways. The R1 individual’s hatred, left unchecked, will escalate in harmful ways, such as the willingness to block the rights and opportunities of an R2 individual, whether in public or private spheres. If an R1 individual’s wishes, wants, and desires are motivated by their hatred of those assigned to the R2 group, it is reasonable to assert that the R1 is a morally deficient person.⁸¹ R1 individuals’ undesirable actions are brought about by their racist tendencies, and consequently, the immorality of racism cannot be separated from the term itself.

Garcia’s view aligns with historical understandings of racism, such as Frederick Hertz’s use of “race hatred” in the 1920s to describe German hostility towards Jewish people.⁸² Garcia asserts that “hostility towards Jews is the heart of antisemitism.”⁸³ What lies at the core of Nazi ideologies and political theories is not merely a cognitive error, but a deep hatred toward Jews because they are Jewish.⁸⁴ This view challenges common conceptions of racism by emphasizing that racism is “not primarily a cognitive matter”⁸⁵ and that prejudice is neither necessary nor sufficient for racism.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ Garcia, 15, 17; Mills, 31.

⁸⁰ Garcia, 9-10.

⁸¹ Ibid., 10.

⁸² Ibid., 39. n.12.

⁸³ Ibid., 8.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 12-13.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 13. n.17. Importantly Garcia clarifies his use of the word “disregard” to mean disaffection or malice that do not involve beliefs.

Garcia's approach makes a distinction between racist discrimination and race-based discrimination.⁸⁷ He illustrates this with examples from South Africa, a country with the highest racial income inequality in the world: 10% own more financial assets and resources than 85% of the people.⁸⁸ With a population of 60 million, 3,500 elites have accumulated more wealth, capital, and consolidated power than 32 million of the majority Black population, living in abject poverty.⁸⁹ With over 90% of South Africa consisting of Black people, millions of the poorest are forced to rely on a "microcredit model" to survive. Instead of helping ease their financial burdens, this model has resulted in a situation in which the poorest own less, owe greater debt, and at the same time have to endure dehumanizing living conditions imposed on them by White domination.⁹⁰ A World Bank report notes that "race remains a key driver of high inequality in South Africa, due to its impact on education and the labour market".⁹¹

Garcia's view accounts for cases like South Africa, with its long history of White supremacy, where prolonged racist beliefs and attitudes reinforce each other. Racial "discriminatory" practices such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), aimed at the economic racial transformation of Black South Africans, are not rooted in disadvantaging White South Africans by racially discriminating against them. This kind of race-based discrimination that favours Black South Africans would not be considered racist in Garcia's view.⁹² On this view, racial prejudice must be underpinned by racial disregard for an individual, separate from the prejudice itself, to be considered racist.⁹³

Furthermore, thinking of racism as vicious, race-based attitudes is closely related to familiar kinds of inter-group animosity.⁹⁴ For instance, though we have seen a rise in Black elites as a result of anti-racist policies, there have been very small structural or attitudinal changes. White South Africans remain over-represented in top management positions and are often unconscious of their role in perpetuating anti-Black racism.⁹⁵

Despite the vast amounts of data, evidence, and the historical facts of the impacts on Black South Africans by a racist White Apartheid regime, the majority of White South Africans

⁸⁷ Ibid., 31.

⁸⁸ Antony Sguazzin, "South Africa Wealth Gap Unchanged Since Apartheid, Says World *Inequality Lab*." *Time*, August 5, 2021.

⁸⁹ Al Jazeera, "South Africa Most Unequal Country in the World: Report." *Al Jazeera*, March 10, 2022.

⁹⁰ *LSE Research for the World*, "'Unsustainable': Tackling Reckless Lending in South Africa | LSE Research," November 3, 2023.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Garcia, 14-15.

⁹³ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁵ East Coast Radio, "Whites Still Dominate South African Executive Jobs: Study," last modified 26 June 2021, <https://www.ecr.co.za/news/news/whites-still-dominate-south-african-executive-jobs-study/>

still feel, think, and continue to express their antagonizing anti-Blackness, unaware of the historical racist legacy that has fostered their deep racial hatred.⁹⁶ Garcia's view captures cases where prolonged racist beliefs and attitudes reinforce each other, like that of South Africa, well.⁹⁷

It is common to hear White South Africans say things like: "She only got to where she is because of BEE—she didn't have to work for her success," or: "We (Whites) can't get jobs now because we are the wrong colour." Common sentiments among White South Africans, such as criticisms of BEE, reflect this racial intergroup animosity, manifesting as a collective response of "White rage" to perceived threats of Black empowerment. Many White South Africans are unaware of the vicious attitudes that underpin their racist beliefs, making them unintentionally racist. Garcia argues that prejudiced racist beliefs and stereotyping are typical extensions of underlying racial disregard and malice, perpetuating racial oppression.⁹⁸

African American scholar Carol Anderson defines this interracial antagonism as "the operational function of White supremacy. It is the fear of a multicultural democracy."⁹⁹ Another reason to think racism is rooted in the heart is by considering an individual who can secretly harbour volitions and feelings of ill-will, hatred, and desires, wishing the worst for others based on their assigned race, without ever expressing their racist sentiments.¹⁰⁰

Garcia makes an important point that these kinds of secret racists can pervade societies or communities where there is little or no discriminatory, harmful behaviour or structural racial oppression present. He contends that racism can be rooted in the heart, considering individuals who secretly harbour ill-will and hatred based on race without expressing these sentiments, implying that an individual can be racist without explicit prejudiced beliefs or discriminatory behaviours.¹⁰¹

In cases of racially motivated violence, such as a hypothetical hit-and-run involving a trans Black woman, Garcia's view emphasizes the importance of internal emotional and psychological states in assigning moral blame.¹⁰² Garcia's conception of racism relates closely to intolerance, underpinned by racial antipathy and unwillingness to accept groups with

⁹⁶ Garcia, 8–9.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁸ Garcia, 22.

⁹⁹ Fabiola Cineas, "Carol Anderson Says White Rage Is a Function of White Supremacy and Won't Just Go Away." *Vox*, January 27, 2021.

¹⁰⁰ Garcia, 13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Amherst College, "Kwame Anthony Appiah: 'What Is Racism? One Story,'" YouTube video, 2021, 14:00; 15:30, <https://youtu.be/IIPfYlXJyU?si=CM6g6NV3JX6nMZ0H>.

different beliefs and practices, which also aligns with other forms of intolerance like xenophobia, antisemitism, homophobia, and sexism.¹⁰³

A considered limitation of Garcia's volitional account

While Garcia's account correctly locates the source of racism in the volitional heart, characterising it as ill-will and disregard based on perceived race, it does miss the necessary role that beliefs and ideologies play in institutionalising the racist heart. This exclusion limits the explanatory power of Garcia's affective heart model.

Shelby refers to individuals who lack vicious attitudes but passively contribute to systemic oppression as "innocent racists."¹⁰⁴ He argues that we are inescapably part of human institutions that shape our cognition and beliefs, where racism is a self-operating machinery, and environmental factors play a key role in perpetuating racial dominance.¹⁰⁵ The attempt to address this problem involves reconciling this explanatory gap by supplementing Shelby's ideological account to resolve the limitations of institutionalizing the heart.

Mills' structuralist critique of Garcia's moralist view highlights limitations in the "infection model" of institutional racism, arguing that an overly moralized emphasis on individual vice fails to capture the complexities of systemic racial oppression.¹⁰⁶ Mills thinks structures are driven by impersonal systems of power as opposed to being motivated by vice or the "differential lack of goodwill."¹⁰⁷ He contends that individualist analyses fail to account for cases where impersonalized racist structures exist without racist hearts, where power is the driving force.¹⁰⁸ He argues that structural analysis does not require recourse to individual attitudes or beliefs, as racist structures can have effects detached from intentional emotional or cognitive states.¹⁰⁹

2.3.2. Shelby's ideological conception (the "mind" of racism)

Shelby shifts the emphasis of racism from individual vices of the heart to the cognitive processes of the "mind", attributed to false beliefs about races.¹¹⁰ He argues that beliefs are

¹⁰³ Garcia, 8–9.

¹⁰⁴ Shelby, 418.

¹⁰⁵ Shelby, 416.

¹⁰⁶ Mills, 51.

¹⁰⁷ Garcia, "Current Conceptions," 29; Mills, 59.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 30.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 30–31.

¹¹⁰ Shelby, "Is Racism in the Heart?" 414.

logically posterior to noncognitive attitudes and behaviours, and psychologically necessary in making a person racist.¹¹¹ Vicious attitudes toward certain racial groups are caused by corresponding negative beliefs about those groups.¹¹² For instance, beliefs and stereotypes such as “R1 group members are racially superior in intelligence, courage, and honesty to other races” explain and justify racist attitudes, behaviours, and ideologies.¹¹³

Shelby claims that “racism is an ideology,”¹¹⁴ made up of “widely accepted illusory systems of belief that function to establish or reinforce structures of social oppression,”¹¹⁵ making racist beliefs necessary and sufficient for racism.¹¹⁶ He follows Garcia's infection model to illustrate how racist ideologies infiltrate operational systems to become culturally sanctioned practices.¹¹⁷ Activist Paul Kivel captures the dynamic nature of ideologies premised on White supremacy and anti-Blackness, stating, “Whiteness is a constantly shifting boundary separating those who are entitled to have certain privileges from those whose exploitation and vulnerability to violence is justified by their not being White.”¹¹⁸

Shelby argues that racist ideologies, including European colonial imperialism and apartheid, are grounded in beliefs about biological races that hierarchically categorize human beings based on physical attributes.¹¹⁹ During the 17th century, European colonial powers established systems of hierarchical beliefs about races to rationalize and justify the subjugation and exploitation of African and Native American people.¹²⁰

For Shelby, institutions that perpetuate and maintain racial oppression are racist in virtue of discriminatory ideologies fundamentally rooted in false beliefs about races.¹²¹ He assumes that racist attitudes are not necessary in explaining how individual racism relates to institutional structures of racial oppression.¹²²

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Shelby, 415.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Shelby, 414.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 413, 417.

¹¹⁸ National Museum of African American History and Culture, “Historical Foundations of Race.” n.d., <https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/educators/teaching-and-learning>.

¹¹⁹ Lawrence Blum, “*I’m Not a Racist, But...*”, 5–6.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 111–112; “Historical Foundations of Race.” n.d.; Erin Blakemore, “What Is Colonialism?” *National Geographic*, Culture, October 6, 2023.

¹²¹ Shelby, 419.

¹²² Ibid., 411.

Methodological requirements: another crucial distinction between the accounts

Inasmuch as the discussion so far has been about contrasting the two theories in terms of attitudes and beliefs, a further distinction can be made in terms of the methodological requirement. By this I am referring to the moral nature of racism. Here one would question whether Garcia's appeal to attitudes or Shelby's appeal to beliefs makes the relevant account treat racism as moral/ethical or social/political.

The contrast between Garcia's and Shelby's theories extends to their methodological approaches, particularly regarding the moral nature of racism.¹²³ Shelby opts for a morally neutral theoretical reconstruction of racism that can explain its "history, structure, psychological mechanisms, and social consequences."¹²⁴ He argues that it is sufficient for a moral analysis to show what is morally significant about racism without necessarily demonstrating its inherent immorality.¹²⁵

The problem is that Garcia has pre-theoretically assumed racism's immorality without properly arguing for it.¹²⁶ Shelby and Mills both argue that Garcia must either be engaged in a commonsense, thick conceptual analysis or a stipulative approach.¹²⁷ A thick conceptual approach seeks to improve our agreed-upon ordinary linguistic use of the term "racism" to refine why it carries strong negative connotations.¹²⁸ Shelby argues that determining what is precisely wrong with racism depends on an agreed affirmation of its ordinary use "to justify the generalizations that all manifestations are morally problematic."¹²⁹

Shelby and Garcia agree that the term "racism" is commonly used in ambiguous and indiscriminate ways, leading to misinterpretations in identifying its referent and disagreements about its immorality.¹³⁰ He warns against reinterpreting the term to accommodate an immorality requirement, as this could allow for arbitrary stipulations of new meanings.¹³¹

Shelby acknowledges that Garcia would not accept that racism is not conventionally used in a morally charged way.¹³² However, he opposes Garcia's claim that racism is commonly used in everyday language as a morally loaded term, mentioning that other terms like "slut"

¹²³ Ibid., 411-412.

¹²⁴ Shelby, 415.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 413.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 411; Mills, 34.

¹²⁷ Shelby, 411-412; Mills, 32-24.

¹²⁸ Shelby, 412.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Mills, 33; Shelby, 412-413.

¹³² Shelby, 413.

are commonly used in morally condemnatory ways without it being a vice.¹³³ He suggests using a morally neutral definition that can then be evaluated.¹³⁴

Shelby suggests that Garcia may be discounting the necessity of beliefs in his account to avoid a category mistake, as acknowledging such a necessity would undermine his claim that racism is a moral vice.¹³⁵ Beliefs about races can be false, intellectual errors, but not immoral, even when such beliefs have bad effects.¹³⁶ Shelby makes the point that if a racist individual is guilty of holding racist beliefs, they are not morally blameworthy.¹³⁷ He points out that conceiving racial beliefs as immoral could compromise freedom of thought and expression, fundamental principles of free societies.¹³⁸

He proposes that his moral significance requirement can adequately capture what is morally significant about racism without the immorality requirement.¹³⁹ Racist ideologies rooted in false and misleading beliefs about races are engineered to misrepresent reality and colonize our collective conscience.¹⁴⁰ Our collective misapprehension of what it means to be human is often a consequence of the society we are raised in, and the systems we are embedded within that utilize methods like mass cultural propaganda to shape our beliefs and attitudes about reality.¹⁴¹ Often, we are so deeply entrenched within our cultural and social identities that we tend to accept these ideas and systems of beliefs without much interrogation or pushback—as its engineers intended—even when our racist beliefs result in mass racial inequality, discrimination, and inhumane injustices perpetrated by one race against all others.¹⁴² As Noam Chomsky stated, “Very few authoritarian structures continue to exist when they are challenged; they only exist because they are not challenged.”¹⁴³ For Shelby, racist ideologies hold moral importance because they justify and perpetuate social oppression. We can condemn racist attitudes, behaviours, and institutions that are infected by racist beliefs, and this permits us to weaken the immorality requirement without losing the term’s explanatory and condemnatory

¹³³ Ibid., 412.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 413.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 418.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 416-417; Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 38:00–40:00.

¹³⁷ Shelby, 416.

¹³⁸ Shelby, 416.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 415.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 416.

¹⁴¹ “False Consciousness in Sociology: Definition & Examples.” *Simply Psychology*, n.d. I have adapted this idea from Marx’s ideas on false consciousness.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ wonkmonk. “Noam Chomsky: Wage Slavery Is Totally Contrary to Classical Liberalism and Enlightenment Values.” YouTube video, 2021.

force.¹⁴⁴ Thus, for Shelby, showing that racism is inherently immoral is not required to provide an adequate account of racism.

To identify a person as racist is to refer to them in a negative light, and racism is something no one wants to be accused of. Even racists know their racism is unjustifiable, or at least socially unacceptable, as they tend to go to great lengths to conceal, deny, or lie about it to avoid being labelled as racist. The term “racism” inherently involves value judgments for Garcia, and it would be misleading to suggest that we can define it objectively as something separate from the wrongdoer.¹⁴⁵

Garcia, drawing on Appiah, maintains that racism is inherently immoral, not a “moral doctrine.”¹⁴⁶ Appiah importantly argues that even if some people think racism is not a moral problem, we need a better understanding of what is wrong with racist beliefs, attitudes, and actions, as its bad effects are evidence that racism is deeply problematic and pervasive as a social phenomenon and needs to be treated.¹⁴⁷ Racism always results in harm or the intention or attempt to harm others based on race. Desiring to hurt people for no good reason, as in the case of racism, is always wrong.¹⁴⁸ Appiah notes that it is uncommon to hear anyone say, “That’s racist and what’s wrong with that?”¹⁴⁹ Overall, Appiah argues for a better understanding of what’s wrong with racist beliefs, attitudes, and actions, given their pervasive negative effects.¹⁵⁰

To turn back to Shelby’s account now, like the accounts I discussed above, I would like to consider some of the strengths and criticisms levelled against it.

A considered strength of Shelby’s ideological account

Shelby’s ideological conception highlights the limitations of Garcia’s overly moralized approach by focusing on how people are conditioned into racist systems of oppression without personal fault.¹⁵¹ He argues that Garcia’s volitional heart model fails to capture the full

¹⁴⁴ Shelby, 415.

¹⁴⁵ Garcia, 10; Shelby 413.

¹⁴⁶ Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” 6; Appiah, “Racisms,” 13.

¹⁴⁷ Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 16:13–17:00.

¹⁴⁸ Garcia, 6.

¹⁴⁹ Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 19:11–19:17.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 18:00–18:49.

¹⁵¹ Shelby, 418–419.

complexities of racism, as placing its locus in individual vice excludes important aspects of how racism operates at societal levels.¹⁵²

Shelby's approach captures how social, economic, and political systems establish and sustain racial hierarchies through ideological systems embedded at the institutional level, without requiring personal emotions or will.¹⁵³ This avoids having to show that every instance of racism is immoral while maintaining that it is morally significant, allowing for a more objective historical understanding of racism as a social phenomenon.¹⁵⁴

This more neutral approach can account for Shelby's claim that racism can stem from economic motivations that enable racial oppression and exploitation, without requiring hatred or ill-will towards people because of their race.¹⁵⁵ Shelby's cognitive mind view is attractive in its explanatory power to show how faulty systems of beliefs can perpetuate themselves and how people with no racist beliefs or explicit ill-will can participate in and benefit from systems of racial oppression.¹⁵⁶

A considered limitation of Shelby's "mind" view

Shelby raises a central problem with Garcia's moralized volitional conception, highlighting how individuals can be complicit in racial oppression without personal fault.¹⁵⁷ Anthony Appiah terms such phenomena "extrinsic racism,"¹⁵⁸ describing contexts where individuals hold racist ideological beliefs due to socialization in a racist culture. Though such beliefs can lead to negative effects, extrinsic racists should not be morally blamed for having racist beliefs, as this for Shelby is an intellectual mistake, but it is not immoral.¹⁵⁹

Shelby provides an example of an extrinsic racist: a child assigned to the White group, without vicious race-based attitudes, but indoctrinated to believe in White superiority.¹⁶⁰ This child, entrenched in a White supremacist culture, internalizes negative stereotypes about Black people without questioning these beliefs.¹⁶¹ In this scenario, Black people are attributed with negative traits like a proclivity to violence and a lack of intelligence, and these are identified

¹⁵² Ibid., 412–413.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 415.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Shelby, 415–416.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 419.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 418.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid Amherst College, "Kwame Anthony Appiah: 'What Is Racism? One Story,'" YouTube video, 2021, 38:14–38:27.

¹⁶⁰ Shelby, 418.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

as dangerous threats to her safety; the effect is her belief that she should fear Black people.¹⁶² However, she never questions her own racist beliefs because she loves and trusts the ones reinforcing ideas of racial superiority, leading her to internalize ideas that Black people have undesirable traits that make them less worthy as people.¹⁶³

According to Garcia's moralized concept, this child is not racist as her beliefs result from prejudice, not vicious racial disregard.¹⁶⁴ However, Shelby argues her beliefs are racist, likely leading to racial discrimination.¹⁶⁵ He illustrates this with an example of the child growing up to become a police officer, acting on internalized beliefs about Black people's predisposition to violence.¹⁶⁶ Such beliefs could have been reinforced (but not limited to) by social data that reflects that Black people make up 33% of the prison population in America, even when they only make up 12% of the population.¹⁶⁷ This is contrasted to the data that her White counterparts only make up 30% of the prison population, while being a majority, 67% of the American population.¹⁶⁸

Shelby finds it unreasonable to suggest that such beliefs are not racist, despite the absence of vicious race-based disregard, as they lead to racially discriminatory actions.¹⁶⁹ He proposes abandoning Garcia's moralized volitional conception, arguing that beliefs are sufficient for racism.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, Shelby retains Garcia's infection model, adjusting it to state that "Racist ideology is a virus that people can catch and spread through no fault of their own and without (fully) knowing that they are contaminated by it."¹⁷¹

Although Shelby's extrinsic racist example challenges the necessity of the heart in racism, further investigation supports Garcia's claim that "racism is rooted in the heart"¹⁷² and is a vice. Appiah has since revised his position on "extrinsic racism," reframing it as "negative racialism," defined as "the belief that people of one racial identity are less worthy than others because its members have traits that would be unworthy in anyone."¹⁷³

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Garcia, 13; Shelby, 417-418.

¹⁶⁵ Shelby, 417.

¹⁶⁶ Amherst College, "Kwame Anthony Appiah: 'What Is Racism? One Story,'" YouTube video, 2021, 38:52–39:09.

¹⁶⁷ Bridges, Khiara M. 2020a. "The Many Ways Institutional Racism Kills Black People." *TIME*, June 11, 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Shelby, 418-419.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 418.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Garcia, 7.

¹⁷³ Amherst College, "Kwame Anthony Appiah: 'What Is Racism? One Story,'" YouTube video, 2021, 39:35.

Appiah, like Garcia, now agrees that racism is a vice and a moralized concept.¹⁷⁴ He argues that negative racialism can be corrected when an individual realizes their racist beliefs are wrong.¹⁷⁵ She could become aware that American cops speak to Black drivers in more disrespectful ways compared to White drivers.¹⁷⁶ However, he cautions that disregarding evidence countering negative racist beliefs constitutes “intrinsic racism,” defined as “The belief that people of one racial identity are not entitled to decent treatment, simply because they are of that race.”¹⁷⁷

The cop would be considered an intrinsic racist if she fails to recognize she is intellectually mistaken about her racist beliefs, continues with her racial prejudices against Black people, and persists in racially discriminating against them.¹⁷⁸ Intrinsic racism is considered a vice, as it involves irrationally held false beliefs motivated by self-interest to obtain social advantages through a system that encourages police brutality and racial discrimination against Black people in America.¹⁷⁹ Shelby notes that White people have often accepted racist beliefs due to “unacknowledged desires or fears.”¹⁸⁰

Appiah includes “feelings” in his definition of individual racism, terming it “emotional racism.”¹⁸¹ This element, as “emotional racism,” he defines as “Hatred, contempt, or other negative emotions directed against people of one racial identity.”¹⁸² This aligns with Garcia's volitional conception, which states that “prejudiced-based beliefs are racist in that they *characteristically* either are rooted in prior racial disregard, which they rationalize, or they foster such disregard.”¹⁸³ In this way, I claim that Appiah's intrinsic racism supports Garcia's heart-based conception, as it suggests that the inability to correct racist beliefs through rational means alone is driven by an uncontrollable, vicious disregard for people based on their race.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 38:14–39:28.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 39:53–40:06; 40:20–41:31; NBC News, “Report: Black People Are Still Killed by Police at a Higher Rate Than Other Groups,” *NBC News*, March 4, 2022, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/report-black-people-are-still-killed-police-higher-rate-groups-rcna17169>.

¹⁷⁶ NBC News, “‘Cars Into Caskets’: New Study Confirms Police Bias Towards Black Drivers,” *NBC News*, July 30, 2021, <https://www.yahoo.com/news/black-drivers-receive-less-respect-100138746.html>.

¹⁷⁷ Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 41:45–42:30.

¹⁷⁸ Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 41:45–42:47.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 43:35–44:12.

¹⁸⁰ Shelby, 415.

¹⁸¹ Amherst College, “Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘What Is Racism? One Story,’” YouTube video, 2021, 43:10–43:22.

¹⁸² Ibid., 43:28.

¹⁸³ Garcia, 13.

Addressing the immorality of racism by rooting it in the heart of individuals, connects to ethical theory, and fulfils Garcia's aim of advancing practical social philosophy and virtue ethics.¹⁸⁴

Another considered limitation: the necessity of the heart

Shelby argues that identifying racist intentions or actions requires recourse to beliefs about races and he uses the example of a White man named Stephen hating a Black man named Andre to illustrate this point.¹⁸⁵ He argues that without identifying Stephen's beliefs, we cannot determine if his hatred is racially motivated or due to other reasons, such as jealousy.¹⁸⁶

Garcia might respond that Stephen's hatred could be volitional if he made a racial distinction in his heart toward Andre based on perceiving him as Black, without prejudice.¹⁸⁷ However, Shelby rejects this argument, contending that Stephen's racial distinction necessarily involves identifying Andre as a member of a different race, which presupposes the belief in races.¹⁸⁸ He argues that racially categorizing Andre involves underlying background beliefs about races (that Stephen has been socialised into), and we would need to identify if those beliefs are racist to know if Stephen's hatred is racially motivated.¹⁸⁹

Shelby argues that Stephen's hatred is free-floating and unintelligible without being grounded in background beliefs influenced by a racist culture.¹⁹⁰ He illustrates this with a further example of Peter, a White man who hates Andre, a Black man, for dating a White woman, stemming from Peter's pro-Black radical beliefs.¹⁹¹ Shelby contends that we cannot label Peter as racist solely based on his racial antipathy; determining the nature of Peter's hatred must be underpinned by its correlating racist beliefs.¹⁹² He argues that simply hating someone for no other reason than their phenotypical traits, like hair and skin colour, would be unintelligible without recourse to racist beliefs that make sense of their hatred.¹⁹³ He finds these kinds of "visceral" racist attitudes to be unintelligible without deeper meaning, suggesting that in its absence, such a person would have to be "psychotic."¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 6.

¹⁸⁵ Shelby, 414.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Shelby, 414.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 417.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 414.

¹⁹² Ibid., 415.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

However, Shelby acknowledges that “unacknowledged fears” drive beliefs of racial superiority and social illusions.¹⁹⁵ This admission inadvertently supports the idea of visceral racism, where individuals can have immediate aversive emotional responses towards members of a perceived race, independent of informed beliefs about race.¹⁹⁶ This form of visceral racism involves automatic aversion, characterized by gut-level reactions, unaccompanied by articulated racist beliefs or ideologies.¹⁹⁷ This illustrates how Peter could automatically harbour racist prejudices against Andre that he is unaware of having entertained.

I argue that there is a connection between visceral racism and psychotic behaviours, characterized by actions disconnected from reality and contrary to reason.¹⁹⁸ Psychosis involves alterations in thoughts and feelings, leading to experiences that are disconnected from rationality and reality.¹⁹⁹ Visceral racism bypasses cognitive processes and operates on emotions, which is akin to psychotic breaks in reality that lead to irrational behaviour.²⁰⁰ Visceral racism and psychotic behaviour both involve a disconnection from rational reality, leading to belief systems disconnected from reality. Thus, I can reasonably connect visceral racism (which is akin to some forms of psychosis) with Garcia's affective model. This suggests that racist attitudes are driven by negative emotional responses, which represent a failure of rational thinking, leading to faulty belief systems.

While Garcia does not make this claim, I think my defence here supports his focus on noncognitive attitudes by emphasizing the emotional roots of racist actions that bypass rational thought, similar to how psychosis involves a break from reality. I have shown how Shelby's example fails, as I have demonstrated how racist actions can stem from irrational emotional states, even in cases where systems of beliefs about racial hierarchies appear to play a primary role. Moreover, my claim that visceral racism is related to psychotic behaviours supports Garcia's view that racist ill-will leads to inappropriate social behaviours that go against common virtues.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “Visceral,” accessed July 11, 2024, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/visceral>.

¹⁹⁷ Collins English Dictionary, s.v. “Visceral Reaction,” accessed July 11, 2024, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/visceral-reaction>.

¹⁹⁸ “Psychosis,” in *Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences*, ed. Virgil Zeigler-Hill and Todd K. Shackelford (Cham: Springer, 2020), accessed July 11, 2024, https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_934.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ “Psychosis,” in *Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences*.

²⁰¹ Garcia, 16.

2.4. Conclusion

In Chapter Two, I presented a literature review of the research and demonstrated how Garcia's affective model and Shelby's cognitive model each fail to independently account for the interplay between individual and institutional racism. I have demonstrated how Garcia's volitional conception aligns with virtue ethics that emphasises one's character; however, it neglects the role of false beliefs in perpetuating systems of oppression. Garcia's volitional conception alone cannot fully account for institutional racism, thus necessitating Shelby's cognitive approach. Shelby's claims that racism is an ideology offer a valuable counterpoint that shows how racial oppression can persist even as overt racist attitudes improve. However, it neglects individual moral failings to focus on belief structures, thus necessitating the integration of Garcia's volitional dimension of racism. Mills' critique shows how individual vice alone fails to fully explain how institutions remain racist even when individual attitudes improve or when overtly racist attitudes are absent. Thus, these limitations demonstrate the necessity for an integrated dual-model approach that I propose in the next chapter. The limitations identified in the affective and cognitive models of explicitly necessitate the dual-model to bridge the explanatory gap between individual and structural levels and provide a more comprehensive analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PROPOSED DUAL-MODEL

3.1. Introduction

In Chapter Two, I presented some critical limitations in Garcia's and Shelby's views, alongside Mills' critique of individualistic approaches. I stated that neither vicious attitudes nor false beliefs adequately explain the interplay between individual and institutional racism. This naturally leads towards an integrated approach of Garcia's affective model and Shelby's cognitive model for a more comprehensive explanation of the interplay between individual and institutional racism. I address these limitations by proposing a dual-model that synthesises both the affective heart and the cognitive mind aspects that together are necessary and sufficient for racism.

I begin by discussing some of the main intuitions about the limitations of individual and institutional racism that arose in Chapter Two. I show how Garcia's volitional heart conception and Shelby's belief-centred cognitive mind view are both central to understanding racism, but at the same time contend that each faces limitations as independent (separate) accounts.

I attempt to reconcile this explanatory gap through a proposed dual-model approach of the heart and mind of racism that demonstrates how individual racism becomes institutionalised.

The dual-model of the affective states (the heart) and cognitive processes (the mind) I propose can be expressed in the following steps (premises and conclusion):

1. Individuals are considered rational, autonomous actors in the world (with a resulting moral capacity). Institutions are shaped by the collective actions of individuals.²⁰²
2. Policies and practices engineered by individuals in powerful positions (i.e., policymakers, corporate leaders, etc.) can lead to institutional racism (or racist institutions).²⁰³
3. Consequently, individual racism, through the interlinking of attitudes and beliefs, contributes to the establishment and perpetuation of institutional racism.

²⁰² Anne-Marie Mohammed, Sandra Sookram, and George Saridakis, "Rationality," in *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, ed. Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello (New York: Springer, 2019), accessed August 24, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_404.

²⁰³ Shelby, *Racism in the Heart?*, 418.

4. Existing accounts, such as Garcia's volitional conception and Shelby's cognitive ideological view, fail to adequately address this relationship between individual and institutional racism.
5. Similarly, Mills' structural approach to racism overlooks the role of individual agency.
6. An adequate account of racism needs to address both its individual and institutional dimensions and their interplay (from 4 and 5).
7. Therefore, there is a gap in the above-mentioned models, as they fail to adequately connect the individual and institutional dimensions of racism.
8. The dual-model integrates both individual and institutional dimensions of racism and explicitly addresses their interplay.
9. This integration is better at explaining the relationship between the two than models that only address one dimension.

.....

Therefore, the key to understanding this dual-model is the interplay of racist beliefs and attitudes. By integrating Garcia's focus on racist attitudes with Shelby's emphasis on racist beliefs, we can better understand the connection between individual and institutional racism.

In the sections below, I offer a fuller discussion of the above premises and how they lead to the conclusion. Note that the main claim in the conclusion about the interplay between individual and institutional racism depends on an understanding of some key elements of racism, and this is the role of beliefs and attitudes. To understand the role of these key elements, one needs an understanding of Shelby's and Garcia's (individualist) accounts and how the two relate. This is the central focus of the dual-model. In other words, the interplay between Garcia's "racist attitudes" and Shelby's "racist beliefs" allows us to understand the interplay of individual and institutional racism.²⁰⁴

The discussion below will follow the logical structure of the premises above. I consider the argument to be deductively valid for the following reasons: when one looks at each premise, one will find that each builds upon the previous without introducing assumptions that are not explicitly stated. Furthermore, by the definition of validity, if all premises are true, then the

²⁰⁴ The word "interplay" is highlighted to show the second step in understanding how racism connects to institutional forms. The first step is what I consider to be the interplay of key elements of individual racism.

conclusion necessarily follows, as it directly restates the logical consequence of premises 8 and 9.

In giving content to the premises, I will discuss some in combination in a given paragraph—premise 1 may be discussed together with premises 2 and 3, for example, but that is because I consider the latter premises to be a direct implication of the first.

3.2. Individual agency and racism (premises 1 and 2)

In premises 1 and 2 above, I stated that individuals have the capacity for rational agency and can decide to act in ways that either shape institutions to become racist or take (affirmative) action to dismantle racist institutions. Considering human beings as active participants in society with the capacity for rational decision-making is key to understanding the important role they play in constructing our social reality and human institutions.

I adopt this intuition from ideas in social contract theory that institutions reflect the collective consent, whether implicit or explicit, of individuals to establish a society.²⁰⁵ In this way, examining social issues like racism, one can conclude that racist institutions are not merely imposed on us from the top down, but emerge as individuals collectively arrange society in particular ways.²⁰⁶ This is not an evaluative claim of racism as good (since assuming one human being has the right to take away others' human rights is always wrong). Rather, it offers an explanation of the individual agency behind racist institutions, which aligns with Garcia's moralised view.

Viewing humans as rational agents actively participating in society is important for understanding how individual actors shape our social reality and human institutions. One way to understand individual agency is through Immanuel Kant's argument that our rational ability gives us autonomy to act on principles, rather than being led or dragged around by our impulses.²⁰⁷ This suggests that individuals can act in self-motivated ways based on personal biases and ethical values, thus making us moral agents.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ Stuart Rachels, "Social Contract Theory." In *Ethics Unwrapped* (University of Texas at Austin, 2022).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Anna Magdalena Elsner, and Vanessa Rampton. "'Accompanied Only by My Thoughts': A Kantian Perspective on Autonomy at the End of Life." *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 47, no. 6 (2022): 688–700; 690.

²⁰⁸ "Moral Agent," *Ethics Unwrapped*, accessed August 24, 2024, <https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/moral-agent>.

Rational agency enables our ability to reason, make decisions, and intentionally plan to achieve goals based on personal choices and moral values.²⁰⁹ This implies that humans are not passive individuals or mere victims of dominant social structures, hypnotized into false consciousness with limited autonomy. Rather, we possess the capacity to make decisions and act in ways that influence policies and shape social structures. Therefore, as implied under premise 2, and in alignment with Shelby's notion, institutional racism logically arises from policies and practices ultimately engineered by individuals (policymakers, corporate leaders, etc.). However, structuralist views, such as Mills', contend that an overly moralized focus on individuals neglects the historical processes and systemic nature of racism, which can occur without explicit prejudices of current functionaries involved in decision-making processes.²¹⁰

I briefly address this structuralist critique below. My discussion supports premise 1 and its logical implication in premise 2: institutions, including racist ones, reflect individual actions and personal choices. The example below amplifies our basic intuition about our capacity for rational agency.

3.2.1. Some considered examples

The actions of individuals in positions of power have repercussions on institutional practices, as they willingly use their power to either reinforce or dismantle divisive policies. A simple way of framing this view is to think of the common phrase, "behind every policy is a policymaker" who has the rational capacity to make decisions to harm or help people. The ability for individuals to make rational choices and have some control over their actions makes them morally accountable.²¹¹

To illustrate how the actions of individuals in positions of social power have repercussions on systemic policies and practices, we can look at the policy-makers behind Project 2025.²¹² This policy blueprint is constructed by groups of individuals, intentionally making rational choices aimed at harming Black America.²¹³ As Lauren Pearlman and Rayna Young write, "at its core, Project 2025 seeks to erase vital protections that have bolstered Black

²⁰⁹ Mohammed, Sookram, and Saridakis, "Rationality."

²¹⁰ Mills, *'Heart' Attack*, 60.

²¹¹ Mohammed, Sookram, and Saridakis, "Rationality."

²¹² NAACP, "Addressing the Disastrous Impacts of Project 2025 on the Black Community," accessed August 24, 2024, <https://naacp.org/resources/addressing-disastrous-impacts-project-2025-black-community>.

²¹³ Lauren Pearlman and Rayna Young, "Black Americans Sound the Alarm on Project 2025," Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, accessed August 24, 2024, <https://www.cbcfinc.org/blog/black-americans-sound-the-alarm-on-project-2025/>.

advancement in this country.”²¹⁴ The Heritage Foundation and over 100 conservative groups are responsible for developing the Project 2025 plan, and over 140 former Donald Trump staff members have contributed to its creation.²¹⁵ The European Americans (policymakers) behind Project 2025 have rationalized their irrational implicit biases through pseudo-scientific ideas about racial hierarchies and misused their positions of social power in an attempt to create a statutory framework designed to systemically harm marginalized groups.²¹⁶

These policymakers actively choose to undermine principles grounded in social equality and intentionally use their power of rationality to pursue discriminatory practices.²¹⁷ “Project 2025 poses a profound authoritarian threat to democratic governance and our vision of a just, equitable, and multi-racial democracy,” writes Race Forward.²¹⁸ The agenda crafted is an attempt to dismantle civil rights enforcement, federal diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA), women’s reproductive rights (which disproportionately affect Black women), and environmental protections.²¹⁹ The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights writes that, “Project 2025 would empower the federal government to keep Black citizens overrepresented in the criminal legal system.”²²⁰

This Project 2025 policy blueprint example illustrates how individuals can use their power of rationality to pursue racially oppressive ends and the devastating impact such decisions will have.²²¹ Recognizing that individuals have rational agency aligns with Garcia’s emphasis on placing the immorality of racism in individual vice, as individuals possess the ability to reflect on how their choices will impact social structures, and helps us to understand how individuals can be the driving force behind racist institutions.

In the previous chapter, I defended the idea that the moral and explanatory power of individual racism is reflected by individuals’ attitudes and beliefs. I will not provide a detailed discussion of these views in this chapter. Instead, I will provide a summary of the main claims.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ American Civil Liberties Union, “Project 2025, Explained,” accessed August 24, 2025, <https://www.aclu.org/project-2025-explained>.

²¹⁶ Race Forward, “From Project 2025 to Project 2029: How We Resist an Authoritarian Takeover and Turn Public Administration into a Force for Equity and Justice,” accessed August 24, 2024, <https://www.raceforward.org/resources/toolkits/project-2025-project-2029-how-we-resist-authoritarian-takeover-and-turn-public>.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ NAACP, “Addressing the Disastrous Impacts of Project 2025.”

²²⁰ The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, “Project 2025,” accessed August 24, 2024, <https://civilrights.org/project2025/>.

²²¹ Ibid.; Earthjustice, “What Project 2025 Would Do to the Environment—and How We Will Respond,” *Earthjustice*, last modified November 12, 2024, <https://earthjustice.org/article/what-project-2025-would-do-to-the-environment-and-how-we-will-respond>.

3.3. Garcia and Shelby on racism (premises 3 and 4)

The claim that individuals are active participants in the world, bearing responsibility for establishing social institutions and arrangements, supports Garcia's idea that institutional racism is a product of individual racism.²²² He argues that racist attitudes infect institutional behaviours when people in powerful operational positions determine an institution's aims, plans, and practices.²²³

Garcia's affective "heart" model—characterising racism as vicious race-based attitudes, feelings, and dispositions—aligns with neuroscientific studies showing amygdala activation unconsciously manifesting racially biased behaviours (even in people who reject racist beliefs).²²⁴ There is a familiar human experience of acting regrettably without thinking or in the "heat of passion." I adopt Cheryl Staats' definition when she speaks of "the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner."²²⁵ These and other kinds of unintentional or unconscious behaviours and irrational tendencies cannot be rationally explained unless we appeal to underlying implicit racial biases, which are noncognitive attitudes or stereotypes.²²⁶

Garcia's volitional view, discussed in Chapter 2, can explain instances of racial profiling by law enforcement officers, where implicit biases drive racist actions. Alang et al. argue that "Blacks are almost five times more likely than are Whites to have a police intervention-related injury."²²⁷ The violent murders of innocent people like George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Sonya Massey, were committed illegally, by the very people hired to uphold justice.²²⁸ The disproportionate racial violence against Black Americans by law enforcement officers illustrates Garcia's placement of the primary moral

²²² Garcia, *The Heart of Racism*, 11.

²²³ Ibid., 12.

²²⁴ Ibid., 6; Elizabeth A. Phelps et al, "Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 12, no. 5 (2000): 729–738; 729–730.

²²⁵ Cheryl Staats, Kelly Capatosto, Robin A. Wright, and Danya Contractor, *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2015* (Columbus: Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, The Ohio State University, 2015), 29–33.

²²⁶ Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy, "Implicit Bias," *Climate in Philosophy*, accessed August 24, 2024, <https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/climate-v2/climate-issues-in-academic-philosophy/implicit-bias>.

²²⁷ Sirry Alang, Donna McAlpine, Ellen McCreedy, and Rachel Hardeman, "Police Brutality and Black Health: Setting the Agenda for Public Health Scholars," *American Journal of Public Health* 107, no. 5 (2017): 663.

²²⁸ Janelle Okwodu, "The Killing of Sonya Massey Is a Tragic Reminder That Police Violence Against Black Women Continues," *Vogue*, July 19, 2024, <https://www.vogue.com/article/sonya-massey-death>.

responsibility on individuals acting with racist intent, against the virtues of justice and benevolence.²²⁹

Shelby's cognitive approach focuses on the primacy of faulty beliefs about racial superiority and inferiority.²³⁰ He argues that beliefs are essential for sustaining systemic oppression and exploitation.²³¹ Alang et al. argues that "the impact of police brutality is much broader than simply affecting the individuals who have experienced racialized violence. It is a constant reminder of the historic and current devaluing of Black lives."²³² This view aligns with Shelby's emphasis on how ideologies of racial dominance become legitimized through legal frameworks and cultural practices.²³³ As Alang et al. write about the ongoing systemic racist policing targeting Black people: "racially disparate use of force indicates that White supremacy—supremacy—the systematic positive assessments of Whiteness that go hand-in-hand with the devaluation of blackness—permeates the US law enforcement system."²³⁴ These historical examples of police brutality that disproportionately affect Black people illustrate how racism is rooted in systemic racism, echoing Shelby's claim that racist beliefs sustain broader ideological systems of racial oppression.²³⁵

The widespread public outrage over individual acts of police brutality and the systemic racist policing that disproportionately targets and kills innocent Black people on a "presumption of guilt" demands a need to address racial profiling at both the individual levels.²³⁶ These examples argue for the view that institutional racism arises from policies and practices engineered by functionaries (policymakers, corporate leaders, etc.), supporting premises 1 and 2.²³⁷

3.4. Limitations of individualistic views (premise 4)

Garcia's affective heart model captures the moral reprehensibility of racism but neglects the role of false beliefs in perpetuating structural racism even when individually vicious attitudes are not present. This view can explain instances, for example, the overt collective

²²⁹ Garcia, 11.

²³⁰ Shelby, 416.

²³¹ Ibid., 415.

²³² Alang et. al., 663.

²³³ Shelby, 415–416; Liz Mineo, "Solving Racial Disparities in Policing," *Harvard Gazette*, February 23, 2021, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/02/solving-racial-disparities-in-policing/>.

²³⁴ Alang et. al., 662.

²³⁵ Shelby, 419.

²³⁶ Mineo, "Solving Racial Disparities in Policing".

²³⁷ Shelby, 418–419.

hatred and ill-will of White South Africans that drove the Group Areas Act of 1950 to be implemented, legally separating them from Black, Coloured, and Indian South Africans.²³⁸ However, it falls short of capturing the ongoing impact of historical systemic segregation policies in South Africa, which continue to affect the majority of Black South Africans in dehumanising ways, despite overt or even improved racist attitudes.²³⁹ Overlooking the primacy and essential role of Shelby's cognitive processes of the mind (needed to institutionalise the heart) limits the explanatory power of Garcia's volitional heart. While I agree that the origin of racism is in the heart (characterized as ill-will and disregard for the welfare of others based on race), I disagree that it is sufficient to fully capture institutional racism. Therefore, the racist heart requires racist beliefs to become institutionalised.

Shelby's cognitive process model argues that Garcia fails to capture how racism functions at a societal level, missing the fundamental role of false belief systems in reinforcing systemic racism without individual motivations.²⁴⁰ He argues that social oppression is the product of widely held ideologies rather than individual vice.²⁴¹ This belief-centred approach offers valuable insights into capturing systemic manifestations that can operate beyond personal biases. However, it undermines the role of individual agency in perpetuating or dismantling systemic structures of oppression. Excluding the essential, primary role of racist attitudes limits the explanatory power of Shelby's approach, as beliefs alone are insufficient for racism. Therefore, racist beliefs require racist hearts to exist.

While Shelby argues that beliefs cannot be immoral, we can say it is unintelligent to build social structures based on false ideas about reality.²⁴² Racists justify their actions through false beliefs about racial hierarchies, leading to policies and practices based on false assumptions.²⁴³ This results in a false representation of the world, which can be viewed as an "intellectual vice of arrogance" at both individual and institutional levels.²⁴⁴ In discounting individual vice, Shelby also discounts individual virtue (one's ability to willingly choose

²³⁸ South African History Online, "Group Areas Act of 1950," accessed August 24, 2024, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/group-areas-act-1950>; "Group Areas Act and the nature of Apartheid," *JSTOR*, accessed August 24, 2024, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44461355>.

²³⁹ "Group Areas Act and the nature of Apartheid," *JSTOR*.

²⁴⁰ Shelby, 416.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Alessandra Tanesini, "Intellectual arrogance: Individual, Group-based, and Corporate," *Synthese* 201, no. 6 (2023): 1-22, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04224-0>.

benevolent and just actions), undermining the power of individual moral courage to challenge racially oppressive policies and practices.²⁴⁵

There are examples throughout history demonstrating individual acts of moral courage in defying pressures to conform to unethical dominant social norms or cultural values of that time and instead deciding to act based on their own convictions of justice.²⁴⁶ I adopt Josephine Ganu's definition that "Moral courage is not a group affair; it is a personal commitment to stand for what is right despite the potential threat."²⁴⁷ The Montgomery Bus Boycott, initiated by Rosa Parks in 1955, exemplifies how individual acts lead to the dismantling of systems of oppression.²⁴⁸ As Ganu highlights, "Moral courage also involves the capacity to overcome the fear of shame and humiliation in order to admit one's mistakes, to confess a wrong, to reject evil conformity, to denounce injustice, and also to defy immoral or imprudent orders."²⁴⁹ This belief-centred approach underplays the moral failings of individuals with racist attitudes in perpetuating systemic ideologies of racial hierarchies.

3.5. Limitations of institutional views (premise 5)

Mills and other left-wing structuralist approaches attempt to explain the relationship between individual and institutional racism by focusing on the latter.²⁵⁰ He rejects Garcia's claim that institutional racism can be rooted in individual vice, arguing that structural racial oppression and inequalities can perpetuate themselves across multiple institutions without individual ill-will.²⁵¹ This section demonstrates how Mills' structuralist approach fails to adequately explain the interplay between individual and institutional racism.

Mills contends that Garcia's view has limited explanatory power, neglecting instances of "innocent" individuals contributing to racial oppression at systemic levels.²⁵² His structural understanding of racism offers valuable insights into complex systemic forms of power that

²⁴⁵ Garcia, 9.

²⁴⁶ Mary C. Gentile, "Giving Voice to Values: Building Moral Competence," in *Moral Courage in Organizations: Doing the Right Thing at Work*, ed. Debra R. Comer and Gina Vega (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), 117-129.

²⁴⁷ Josephine Ganu, "Moral Courage: The Essence of Ethical Leadership and Followership." *Journal of Applied Christian Leadership* 12, no. 1 (2018): 42-53.

²⁴⁸ John Louis Recchiuti, "The Montgomery Bus Boycott," Khan Academy, accessed November 25, 2024, <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/postwarera/civil-rights-movement/a/the-montgomery-bus-boycott>.

²⁴⁹ Ganu, "Moral Courage," 43.

²⁵⁰ Mills, 30.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 31-32.

²⁵² Ibid., 61.

have developed and been maintained over time, regardless of individual racist intent.²⁵³ However, Mills neglects the primary role individuals hold in sustaining and perpetuating institutional forms of racism.

Contemporary examples that reflect the complex interplay between individual and institutional racism can be seen in the National Football League (NFL) race-norming practices in their concussion settlement program, which only ended in 2021.²⁵⁴ This policy disproportionately denied retired Black players payouts for injuries similar to those in which White players received up to \$5 million, despite the fact that the majority of NFL retirees are made up of Black players.²⁵⁵ These race-norming policies, underpinned by outdated, scientifically unsupported claims (that date back to the 15th century) alleged that White players have a higher baseline cognitive function than Black players, and thus, Black players are entitled to less compensation in dementia-related settlement claims.²⁵⁶ This example illustrates how Mills' advocacy of structural approaches is important in showing how institutional racism can operate through seemingly non-racist individuals.²⁵⁷

However, it also demonstrates the limits of Mills' critique against individualist accounts, as human agency was involved in sustaining these pseudo-scientific race-norming policies. More importantly, it shows how individual malice and bias can infect institutional policies that create systemic racism, and how it takes individual action to challenge its persistence. Garcia argues that the bad ideas involved here stem from "our deep need to justify our actions to others, ourselves, and perhaps God."²⁵⁸ Racists try to make what is unreal (races) real by rationalizing their irrational tendencies and creating "illusory systems of belief that function to establish and reinforce structures of social oppression."²⁵⁹ The race-norming example demonstrates how individual biases play a key role in sustaining and perpetuating systemic racism, and the personal power of functionaries in either sustaining or dismantling such practices.²⁶⁰ This suggests that behind every racist policy is a functionary whose personal biases influenced its creation.²⁶¹

²⁵³ Ibid., 53.

²⁵⁴ Nova Sports Law, "Race-Norming in NFL Concussion Settlements," January 28, 2022, <https://www.novasportslaw.com/post/race-norming-in-nfl-concussion-settlements>.

²⁵⁵ Nova Sports Law "Race-Norming in NFL Concussion Settlements."

²⁵⁶ Katherine L. Possin, Elena Tsoy, and Charles C. Windon, "Perils of Race-Based Norms in Cognitive Testing: The Case of Former NFL Players," *JAMA Neurology* 78, no. 3 (2021): 267–269.

²⁵⁷ Mills, 61.

²⁵⁸ Shelby, 414. I use Shelby's poignant capturing of Garcia's idea.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 415.

²⁶⁰ Garcia, 10.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 11.

3.6. Gap in understanding racism’s interplay and the proposed dual-model (premises 6 and 7)

The limitations of both the individualistic and institutional approaches highlight the need for a more comprehensive framework of racism that accounts for both its individual and institutional manifestations. The proposed dual-model of both the heart and mind of racism can resolve this explanatory gap by offering a novel explanation of how racism manifests in individuals and becomes institutionalized. The disconnection between individualist and institutional approaches has implications for effective, practical anti-racist strategies. A limited theoretical understanding of racism can potentially limit the effectiveness of practical anti-racist efforts.²⁶²

3.7. The dual-model: The integrated framework (premise 8)

The integration of Garcia’s volitional heart conception and Shelby’s cognitive processes of the mind view is needed to overcome these limitations. Garcia’s volitional conception is limited by its inadequacy in connecting to institutional forms of racism. Racist attitudes require the synthesis of Shelby’s “faulty beliefs” to institutionalize the heart. But Shelby’s ideological approach is limited without recognizing that racist beliefs are a ramification of racist attitudes. The integration of Garcia’s affective heart model and Shelby’s cognitive mind model can resolve this gap, showing how both views are complementary rather than opposed.

This dual-model challenges structuralist approaches that view individual racist attitudes, beliefs, and actions as derivative of institutional systems of oppression. The synthesis of the heart and mind of racism explains how institutional racism is an expression of individual racism, aligning with Garcia’s view that the moral and explanatory importance of racism is in the human heart.²⁶³ The examples of racial profiling by police officers, racial segregation, Project 2025, or the race-norming practices of the NFL and their legitimizing of racially discriminatory practices, reinforce the interplay between individuals and institutions, highlighting the need for an integrated approach. The dual-model recognizes the need for simultaneous anti-racist efforts on both individual and institutional fronts.

²⁶² Garcia, 6.

²⁶³ Ibid., 11.

3.8. Defence of integration (premise 9)

The dual-model process of the “heart and mind” demonstrates how the affective and cognitive processes mutually depend on each other to reconcile the conceptual gap between individual and institutional levels of racism. The application of this approach emphasizes addressing individual root causes of racism while dismantling systemic ideologies embedded at institutional levels. The dual-model captures the complex interplay between multi-level manifestations of racism.

This integrated dual-model can better explain phenomena like the dehumanizing conditions in Red Onion State Prison in Virginia.²⁶⁴ Inmate and journalist, Rashid Johnson, has reported on Black prisoners brought to the utter extremes, such as self-immolation, in desperate attempts to bring attention to the brutally racist conditions they are subjected to.²⁶⁵ This dual-model can explain both individual feelings of hatred driving prison staff behaviour and systemic aspects whereby prison labour and solitary confinement practices are forms of modern-day slavery.²⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch has reported on human rights violations at Red Onion, stating that the “Virginia Department of Corrections has failed to embrace basic tenets of sound correctional practice and laws protecting inmates from abusive, degrading or cruel treatment.”²⁶⁷

The dual-model can inform ways to intervene in relation to efforts to reduce racial prejudice and discrimination perpetuated at both individual and institutional levels. Moreover, a serious negative impact of police violence on Black communities that Alang et al. point out is that “the excessive police force and inadequate prosecution of perpetrators might increase feelings of powerlessness in the Black community, diminishing perceptions of gains made by the civil rights movement.”²⁶⁸ This reconceptualization provides a more complete picture of racism and the mutually dependent relationship between individual and institutional racism.

²⁶⁴ Solitary Watch, “Two Men Attempt Self-Immolation at Virginia State Prison—and Other News on Solitary Confinement This Week,” November 13, 2024, <https://solitarywatch.org/2024/11/13/two-men-attempt-self-immolation-at-virginia-state-prisonand-other-news-on-solitary-confinement-this-week/>.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Kevin Rashid Johnson, “Prison Labor Is Modern Slavery. I’ve Been Sent to Solitary for Speaking Out,” *The Guardian*, August 23, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20221124061310/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/23/prisoner-speak-out-american-slave-labor-strike>.

²⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Red Onion State Prison: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Virginia,” April 1999, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/redonion/Rospfin.htm#P59_713; 59.

²⁶⁸ Alang et. al., 663.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter analysed how individual racism becomes institutionalized and the complex interplay between the two domains. I proposed a dual-model that integrates Garcia's "volitional heart" and Shelby's "cognitive processes of the mind", offering a more comprehensive explanation of how individual attitudes lead to discriminatory actions that perpetuate institutional structures. The dual-model emphasises that institutions are shaped by rational and autonomous individuals with moral capacity, whose beliefs and attitudes form the basis for systemic practices. By bridging the gap between existing models, this integrated approach provides a superior framework for understanding the relationship between personal and systemic racism extending beyond singular approaches.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSIDERED OBJECTION AND CONCLUSION

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I briefly address an objection to my argument centered around premises 3 and 5 (that considered from a structural point of view, individual “hearts” are not the source of racism). I start by presenting the argument made in Chapter Three and highlighting what part of that argument the objection attacks and how it undermines it.

4.2. Mills’ and Shelby’s objection argument

4.2.1. Social structures (“does”)²⁶⁹

Racism has led to systemic injustice towards people without requiring individual vice.²⁷⁰ As mentioned in previous chapters, Mills and Shelby argue that Garcia’s individual social ontology—focused on hearts filled with ill-will and vicious attitudes—is not the essence of racism.²⁷¹ The heart fails to capture the reality of “innocent racists,” where many Whites for instance, have taken racial inferiority for granted without racist malice or antipathy, yet have still benefitted and contributed to systemic racial oppression.²⁷² Both argue this view is too narrow and overlooks the ways in which seemingly well-intentioned people can perpetuate institutional racism.²⁷³

The most significant and impactful forms of racism, in terms of scale and oppression, are social-systemic (reproduced through socialization and economic organisation), rather than individual.²⁷⁴ Mills argues that individual vice or racial hatred cannot explain or track the immorality of major historical examples of racial oppression and exploitation, since “dominant socialization patterns, will largely determine people’s beliefs and moral psychologies.”²⁷⁵ In other words, the individual heart cannot be the root of racism because the way society is

²⁶⁹ Mills, 35. I am using the phrase that Mills adopts from Garcia in the way he uses the phrase of “thinks, does, and feels” to describe the main ways people describe the nature of racism.

²⁷⁰ Shelby, 416; Mills, 60.

²⁷¹ Shelby, 414; Mills, 61.

²⁷² Shelby, 414-415; Mills, 61.

²⁷³ Shelby, 419; Mills, 57.

²⁷⁴ Shelby, 415; Mills, 60–61.

²⁷⁵ Mills, 60–61.

organized economically and socially tends to shape people's beliefs and feelings, rather than vice versa.²⁷⁶

4.2.2. Beliefs and categorizations (“thinks”) vs. individual feelings (“feels”)

Mills echoes Shelby's claim that people raised in a racially exploitative society will “innocently” contribute to that systematic oppression, as in the cases of Native American expropriation, African slavery, and European colonialism due to the perpetrators' beliefs about the moral status of certain humans, rather than out of viciousness toward humans.²⁷⁷ This systemic injustice is based on beliefs that people have different moral status because of their race, not on vicious race-based ill-will or disregard.²⁷⁸ The belief in White moral supremacy (i.e., in the higher moral and social standing of Whites) has had detrimental consequences for people not perceived to be White (i.e., those with a lower moral and social standing), even though these beliefs were not viciously motivated.²⁷⁹

Most White people have historically taken for granted their unconscious racial bias of perceived moral and social superiority over Black people—a bias that has justified racial oppression, resulting in tremendous wrongs and injustices to groups of people, even though most people complicit in these racially discriminatory behaviours do so “innocently.”²⁸⁰ It is not that White racists choose to ignore human rights out of hatred, but that they don't even consider other racial groups as possessing such rights because they have been categorized as having less human worth.²⁸¹ In other words, we have been socialized to believe that people not categorized as White have less humanity. Such kinds of racist beliefs reproduce systemic oppression and injustice, but these beliefs are the products of socialization that have shaped both “hearts and minds”.²⁸² Mills suggests that racism understood as a social phenomenon, where its larger “vice” is racial exploitation within social systems, is superior.²⁸³ Therefore, systemic oppression and injustice is not necessarily the result of individual vice or ill-will.

²⁷⁶ Mills, 60–61.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 61.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 60.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 60–61.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 60.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid., 62.

²⁸³ Ibid.

4.3. Response to the objection

While the objection raised by Mills and Shelby highlights an important aspect of how racism operates at structural levels in society, it ultimately fails to undermine the dual-model proposed in the premise. The objection presents a false dichotomy between “vicious racists” and “innocent racists.” This oversimplification ignores the complex interplay between individual attitudes and institutional structures outlined in the dual-model. The concept of “innocent racists” conflates ignorance with innocence.

My response is adapted from Barabara Applebaum’s view of “White complicity,” which challenges the notion of “innocent racism,” arguing that claims of racial ignorance or good intentions do not absolve White individuals of moral responsibility in their complicity in perpetuating racism, even when they are not consciously racist.²⁸⁴ She argues that “White people, through the practices of whiteness and by benefiting from white privilege, contribute to the maintenance of systemic racial injustice. However, the claim also implies responsibility in its assumption that the failure to acknowledge such complicity will thwart whites in their efforts to dismantle unjust racial systems and, more specifically, will contribute to the perpetuation of racial injustice.”²⁸⁵

Even if individuals are not driven by explicit racial hatred, they still do hold some degree of moral responsibility for their participation in and benefit from racist systems. The term “innocent racist” is self-contradictory, much like “innocent rapist.” It fails to acknowledge the cognitive dissonance involved in benefiting from racial oppression while claiming ignorance or innocence. This echoes Applebaum’s claim that wilful ignorance of systemic inequalities is itself a form of racist attitude.²⁸⁶ She uses the example of students’ denial of being complicit in perpetuating racism by pointing out that “White students believe that they are justified in denying their complicity because they claim that they do not have any ‘bad intentions’ or any ‘causal connection’ to the harms of systemic racism. Often white students refuse to even engage with the possibility that they are complicit. Most white students see themselves as good people and take the charge of complicity as a serious affront to their moral being.”²⁸⁷ I would extend Applebaum’s claim to include the cognitive dissonance of Mills and Shelby’s idea of innocent racists who still benefiting from racial oppression.

²⁸⁴ Barbara Applebaum, *Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, White Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 38–39.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 3.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 3–4.

In many cases, “innocent” racism involves wilful ignorance of systemic inequalities. As Karyn Freedman highlights: “the subject has at minimum a hint of an unwelcome truth but, with varying degrees of self-awareness, avoids it.”²⁸⁸ This wilful ignorance is itself a form of racist attitude, as it is “an active effort not to see”.²⁸⁹ As Applebaum notes, “systematic white ignorance will be shown to be a form of white knowledge that is upheld by denials of complicity. One way that I have found to explain to white students how they are complicit is to link systemic white ignorance and denials of complicity to the type of benefits that protect their moral innocence.”²⁹⁰

My proposed dual-model emphasizes individual agency in perpetuating institutional racism since participating in racist institutions, even passively, is an act of agency. Thus, individuals bear moral responsibility in institutionalizing racism. This dual-model can account for both individual attitudes and systemic structures, as it acknowledges that racism can operate through discreet, systemic means without requiring explicit racist attitudes from every active participant.

4.4. Conclusion

The objection raised by Mills and Shelby, while highlighting important aspects of how racism operates, does not successfully undermine the dual-model proposed in the premise. Instead, it reinforces the need for a comprehensive framework that addresses both individual and institutional dimensions of racism. The dual-model, by integrating volitional and cognitive aspects, provides a more nuanced and complete understanding of racism than accounts that focus solely on either individual attitudes or institutional structures.

The above response defends the premises by demonstrating that the dual-model is capable of addressing the complexities of racism, including the phenomenon of “innocent” racists, without resorting to contradictory terminology or absolving individuals of moral responsibility for their participation in racist systems.

The dual-model framework has significant implications for policy-making and education. By addressing both personal biases and systemic structures, policymakers can develop more effective anti-racist policies that target both levels simultaneously. In conclusion,

²⁸⁸ Freedman, Karyn L. “Knowing Better: Motivated Ignorance and Willful Ignorance.” *Hypatia* 39, no. 4 (2024): 492–509, doi:10.1017/hyp.2024.3; 493.

²⁸⁹ Freedman cites José Medina's definition of White ignorance here.

²⁹⁰ Applebaum, 6–7.

integrating Garcia's and Shelby's theories offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the complex interplay between individual and institutional dimensions of racism. This synthesis not only advances philosophical discourse but also informs practical interventions aimed at dismantling institutional racism.

CONCLUSION

In this research essay, I have argued for the dual-model of the “heart” and “mind”, where the integration of Jorge Garcia’s affective states and Tommie Shelby’s cognitive beliefs and ideologies are necessary and sufficient for racism. I argued that the combination of the heart and mind was necessary to explain the complex interplay between individual and institutional racism. That is, instead of viewing the affective heart and cognitive processes of the mind as separate and opposing views, we should rather see them as complementary. Integrating the volitional and belief states to form the dual-model advances beyond these singular approaches, allowing for a more comprehensive framework of understanding of how racism operates and perpetuates itself across different levels of society.

The “armchair analytic” approach I employed in this research has demonstrated that neither Garcia’s affective heart nor Shelby’s cognitive mind models alone are sufficient to explain the complex interplay between emotional attitudes and systemic beliefs. Through comparatively analysing both views, I have shown that Garcia has correctly located the source of racism in the heart as vicious attitudes of ill-will and disregard. However, he is incorrect to claim beliefs are inessential, as I have shown that the cognitive processes of the mind are necessary to institutionalise the heart of a racist. Moreover, Shelby is incorrect to posit racist attitudes are unnecessary and insufficient for racism, as I have shown how affective states can precede beliefs.

While my critical analysis highlights the explanatory strengths and the indispensable volitional and cognitive aspects of each approach in defining racism, it also reveals the limitations of each when viewed as mutually exclusive accounts. In other words, Shelby’s cognitive processes of the mind (beliefs and ideologies) is the missing piece needed to make Garcia’s volitional heart (ill-will and disregard) sufficient for institutional racism, as they are not oppositional in nature but rather complementary. This illuminates the inadequacies of (on the one hand) vicious attitudes without the need for beliefs, or on the other hand, racist beliefs without the need for attitudes, to explain institutional racism, leaving us with an incomplete image of racism.

Recognising the need for an integrated framework necessitates interlinking them, as neither Garcia’s affective nor Shelby’s cognitive processes alone can sufficiently explain the complex interplay between personal and structural dimensions. This dual perspective captures both the affective dispositions and the cognitive processes of racism, which is essential for a

comprehensive understanding of how racism manifests and is sustained. The synthesis of Garcia's and Shelby's theories adequately addresses this explanatory gap that limits individualist views in explaining how racism becomes institutionalised.

Furthermore, Garcia's focus on individual vices, highlights the importance of moral responsibility in addressing personal bad racist attitudes, while Shelby's emphasis on systemic racist beliefs illustrates the need for institutional reform. Together, their integration illuminates how individual attitudes can influence institutional practices and vice versa. This dual-model shows how Garcia's focus on individual moral responsibility also complements Shelby's emphasis on dismantling ideological structures of oppression, forming a comprehensive framework for addressing racism at both levels.

My dual-model advances beyond current conceptions by offering a more comprehensive framework that bridges individualistic and structural accounts. This dual-model approach contributes to the philosophical discourse on racism by offering a novel framework that bridges the gap between Garcia's affective elements of the heart and Shelby's cognitive elements of the mind. This reconciliation underscores the necessity of considering the dual-model in any comprehensive account of racism. Bridging the gaps in these existing models by acknowledging the interplay between individual agency and systemic ideologies offers an insightful explanation of how vicious attitudes interact with systemic ideologies to perpetuate institutional racism.

Viewing racism as a matter of the heart and mind provides the robust foundations needed for developing anti-racist strategies that can simultaneously address personal attitude problems and structural reforms. This integrated approach not only reconciles the limitations of Garcia's volitional conception and Shelby's ideological approach, but its application has the potential to extend beyond philosophy and inform practical strategies for anti-racist education and policy initiatives. This dual-model approach can help to understand that addressing the emotional roots of racism requires more than just changing one's beliefs. By synthesizing the opposing heart and mind of racism, this essay provides a more nuanced conceptual foundation for understanding and dismantling racism in a more holistic approach, designed to raise awareness of personal moral responsibility and systemic changes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Al Jazeera. "South Africa Most Unequal Country in the World: Report." *Al Jazeera*, March 10, 2022.
- Alang, Sirry, Donna McAlpine, Ellen McCreedy, and Rachel Hardeman. "Police Brutality and Black Health: Setting the Agenda for Public Health Scholars." *American Journal of Public Health* 107, no. 5 (2017): 662–665.
- American Civil Liberties Union. "Project 2025, Explained." Accessed August 24, 2025. <https://www.aclu.org/project-2025-explained>.
- Amherst College. "Kwame Anthony Appiah: 'What Is Racism? One Story.'" YouTube video, 2021. https://youtu.be/IIpIFyLXJyU?si=Q6y9LZ2c_v26ZsuU.
- Applebaum, Barbara. *Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, White Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010.
- Bandura, Albert. "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3, no. 3 (1999): 193–209.
- Blakemore, Erin. "What Is Colonialism?" *National Geographic*, October 6, 2023.
- Bloomberg, Antony Sguazzin. "South Africa Wealth Gap Unchanged Since Apartheid, Says World Inequality Lab." *Time*, August 5, 2021.
- Blum, Lawrence. *"I'm Not a Racist, But...": The Moral Quandary of Race*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- . "Racism: What It Is and What It Isn't." *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 21, no. 3 (2002): 203–218.
- . "What Do Accounts of 'Racism' Do?" In *Racism in Mind*, edited by Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, pp. 56–77. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Bridges, Khiara M. "The Many Ways Institutional Racism Kills Black People." *Time*, June 11, 2020.
- Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. **Black Power: The Politics of Liberation**. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Cineas, Fabiola. "Carol Anderson Says White Rage Is a Function of White Supremacy and Won't Just Go Away." *Vox*, January 27, 2021.
- Corday, Mikaila. "Research Guides: Racial Justice Resources for Activists, Advocates & Allies: Structural & Systemic Racism." Accessed June 11, 2024. <https://guides.libraries.uc.edu/racialjusticeresources>.
- Earthjustice. "What Project 2025 Would Do to the Environment – and How We Will Respond." *Earthjustice*. Last modified November 12, 2024. <https://earthjustice.org/article/what-project-2025-would-do-to-the-environment-and-how-we-will-respond>.

- East Coast Radio. “Whites Still Dominate South African Executive Jobs: Study.” Last modified June 26, 2021. <https://www.ecr.co.za/news/news/whites-still-dominate-south-african-executive-jobs-study/>.
- Elsner, Anna Magdalena, and Vanessa Rampton. “‘Accompanied Only by My Thoughts’: A Kantian Perspective on Autonomy at the End of Life.” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 47, no. 6 (2022): 688–700. doi:10.1093/jmp/jhac026.
- Freedman, Karyn L. “Knowing Better: Motivated Ignorance and Willful Ignorance.” *Hypatia* 39, no. 3 (2024): 492–509.
- Ganu, Josephine. “Moral Courage: The Essence of Ethical Leadership and Followership.” *Journal of Applied Christian Leadership* 12, no. 1 (2018): 42–53.
- Garcia, J.L.A. “Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy.” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 28, no. 2 (1997): 5–42.
- . “The Heart of Racism.” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (1996): 5–45.
- . “Racism and Racial Discourse.” *Philosophical Forum* 32, no. 2 (2001): 125–145.
- Gentile, Mary C. “Giving Voice to Values: Building Moral Competence.” In *Moral Courage in Organizations: Doing the Right Thing at Work*, edited by Debra R. Comer and Gina Vega, 117–129. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011.
- Glasgow, Joshua. “Racism as Disrespect.” *Ethics* 120, no. 1 (October 2009): 64–93.
- Human Rights Watch. “Red Onion State Prison: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Virginia.” April 1999. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/redonion/Rospfin.htm#P59_713.
- Johnson, Kevin Rashid. “Prison Labor Is Modern Slavery. I’ve Been Sent to Solitary for Speaking Out.” *The Guardian*, August 23, 2018.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Mills, Charles W. “‘Heart’ Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism.” *The Journal of Ethics* 7, no. 1 (2003): 29–62.
- Mineo, Liz. “Solving Racial Disparities in Policing.” *Harvard Gazette*, February 23, 2021.
- Mohammed, Anne-Marie, Sandra Sookram, and George Saridakis. “Rationality.” In *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, edited by Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello, New York: Springer, 2019. Accessed August 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_404.
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). “Addressing the Disastrous Impacts of Project 2025 on the Black Community.” Accessed August 24, 2025. <https://naacp.org/resources/addressing-disastrous-impacts-project-2025-black-community>.
- National Museum of African American History and Culture. “Historical Foundations of Race.” Accessed August 24, 2024.

- NBC News. “‘Cars Into Caskets’: New Study Confirms Police Bias Towards Black Drivers.” July 30, 2021. https://www.yahoo.com/news/black-drivers-receive-less-respect-100138746.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLnNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAL5ExR8p-IMGKxM8ZliXS4A5A1VyEIOW0kwN6UAAc4eifnqQfaw9djz_7RFq_oZxrTQmbHqwuTGRhwW1byJ49irrhTclHzuJXuTBGmJ_Mmih6Uphig4n7zv84QGnpVxhK6BNsEG7lWK4pt7qgCOihDozM4-wnsNDpEjo52Q1eI3.
- . “Report: Black People Are Still Killed by Police at a Higher Rate Than Other Groups.” March 4, 2022.
- Nova Sports Law. “Race-Norming in NFL Concussion Settlements.” January 28, 2022. <https://www.novasportslaw.com/post/race-norming-in-nfl-concussion-settlements>.
- Okwodu, Janelle. “The Killing of Sonya Massey Is a Tragic Reminder That Police Violence Against Black Women Continues.” *Vogue*, July 19, 2024.
- Pearlman, Lauren, and Rayna Young. “Black Americans Sound the Alarm on Project 2025.” Congressional Black Caucus Foundation. <https://www.cbcbfinc.org/blog/black-americans-sound-the-alarm-on-project-2025/>.
- Phelps, Elizabeth A., Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie Funayama, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. “Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation.” *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 12, no. 5 (2000): 729–738.
- Possin, Katherine L., Elena Tsoy, and Charles C. Windon. “Perils of Race-Based Norms in Cognitive Testing: The Case of Former NFL Players.” *JAMA Neurology* 78, no. 3 (2021): 267–269.
- “Psychosis.” In *Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences*, ed. Virgil Zeigler-Hill and Todd K. Shackelford. Cham: Springer, 2020. Accessed July 11, 2024. https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_934.
- Public Health Association. “Structural Racism Is a Public Health Crisis: Impact on the Black Community.” Accessed June 11, 2024.
- Race Forward. “From Project 2025 to Project 2029: How We Resist an Authoritarian Takeover and Turn Public Administration into a Force for Equity and Justice.” Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://www.raceforward.org/resources/toolkits/project-2025-project-2029-how-we-resist-authoritarian-takeover-and-turn-public>.
- Rachels, Stuart. “Social Contract Theory.” In *Ethics Unwrapped*. University of Texas at Austin, 2022.
- Recchiuti, John Louis. “The Montgomery Bus Boycott.” Khan Academy. Accessed November 25, 2024.
- Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy “Implicit Bias,” *Climate in Philosophy*. Accessed August 24, 2024, <https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/climate-v2/climate-issues-in-academic-philosophy/implicit-bias>

- Shelby, Tommie. "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33, no. 3 (2002): 411–420.
- Simply Psychology. "False Consciousness in Sociology: Definition & Examples." Accessed August 24, 2024.
- Solitary Watch. "Two Men Attempt Self-Immolation at Virginia State Prison—and Other News on Solitary Confinement This Week." November 13, 2024.
- South African History Online. "Group Areas Act of 1950." Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/group-areas-act-1950>.
- Staats, Cheryl, Kelly Capatosto, Robin A. Wright, and Danya Contractor. *State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2015*. Columbus, OH: Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, The Ohio State University, 2015.
- Tanesini, Alessandra. "Intellectual Arrogance: Individual, Group-based, and Corporate." *Synthese* 201, no. 6 (2023): 1–22.
- The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Nazism summary." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, November 11, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/summary/Nazism>.
- The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. "Project 2025." Last modified August 24, 2024. <https://civilrights.org/project2025/>.
- United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Accessed June 11, 2024. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.
- University of Cape Town. "'Unsustainable': Tackling Reckless Lending in South Africa." *LSE Research for the World*, November 3, 2023. <https://www.lse.ac.uk/research/research-for-the-world/economics/tackling-reckless-lending-and-indebtedness-in-south-africa>.
- Wonkmonk. "Noam Chomsky: Wage Slavery Is Totally Contrary to Classical Liberalism and Enlightenment Values." YouTube video, 2021. <https://youtu.be/qukhE47-IhU?si=HV3dK9LGPOCFmwbM>.