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Posel, Deborah

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AUTHOR: Deborah Posel

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THE STATE AND POLICY-MAKING IN APARTHEID'S SECOND PHASE

Deborah Posel

The literature on Apartheid and the Apartheid state pre-'reform' is vast, but it devotes relatively little attention to the mechanisms of power and decision-making within the state, and their implications for the building of Apartheid. Policy-making processes have remained something of a black box; ideas inserted by the architects of Apartheid policy seem simply to emerge as law in much the same form as they went in. Conflicts within and between state institutions over the course of Apartheid have mostly been overlooked. And, although much has been written about the capitalist interests 'behind' state practices, far less is known about the exact roles and powers of various capitalist actors within particular state institutions.

These gaps in our understanding have much to do with the common view of Apartheid as the systematic enactment of a long-term 'grand design'. More often than not, this view is not explicitly stated or argued; its presence is felt as the dominant framework within which accounts of Apartheid's development are constructed. Thus, a wide range of literature on South Africa treats the making of Apartheid as having been a fundamentally linear, cumulative process, each step building on the successes of the last.¹ The National Party, the story goes, came to power in 1948 with a ready-made, if rudimentary, policy blueprint which directed state policy right up until the onset of 'reform' in the 1970s. Initially too weak to implement its more ambitious programmes of social engineering, the Nationalist government steadily equipped itself during the 1950s with the necessary resources and powers. By the 1960s, most, if not all, the Nationalists' long-standing plans, came to fruition. From such a vantage point, the internal dynamics of the Apartheid state seem relatively uninteresting, because the notion of a 'grand plan' has already largely accounted for the design and implementation of state policies.

There were, of course, important continuities in the development of Apartheid; and the consolidation and extension of state power was one of the striking features of this process. But by the early 1960s, Apartheid had shifted gear into a discrete, second phase, distinguished by certain new premises and objectives, inaugurated in an attempt to remedy the perceived failures of existing policies. The 'grand plan' explanatory paradigm is therefore fundamentally misleading. And that being so, it becomes all the more pertinent to examine the workings of the Apartheid state more closely.

This paper focuses on two of the key discontinuities between the first and second phases of Apartheid - the bid by the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) to restrict white

dependence on African labour in the cities, and to remove urbanised Africans' 'residential rights'. The paper examines how and why these strategies were introduced by the BAD, and the extent of the BAD's success in translating its plans into law. In so doing, it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the making of Apartheid policy must be seen as a process of ceaseless conflict, negotiation, compromise and change.²

1.

The policies introduced by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) in the early 1950s grew from the overriding conviction within the state that the preservation of white supremacy did not necessitate 'total segregation'³. The controlled expansion of the urban African proletariat was accepted as an economic necessity, which would not present serious political dangers provided the state was suitably fortified against the threat of urban insurrection. During the 1950s therefore, the construction of Apartheid was marked on the one hand, by the dramatic extension of the repressive powers of the state, and on the other, by the adoption of what the NAD considered a suitably 'practical' approach towards Africans in urban areas.

Two key 'practical' premises underpinned the NAD's policy-making. First, it was accepted that the state should impose no political or ideological constraints on the scale of 'economic integration' (ie. white dependence on African labour) in the cities. Urban employers would be entitled to stipulate how many African workers they required. The size, and rate of growth, of the urban African proletariat would thus be determined by the size of the urban labour demand. The NAD would only intervene to prevent the accumulation of 'large' labour 'surpluses' in the cities. Second, the NAD's policy-makers accepted that significant numbers of Africans had become *de facto* permanent city-dwellers, having 'become detribalised and urbanised'.⁴ These people, it was argued, were entitled to certain 'guarantees, security and stability'⁵, which included protection from removal from the urban area in which they lived if they became unemployed. Section 10(1) of the Natives (Urban) Areas Act (as amended in 1952), which formed the lynchpin of the NAD's urban policy, thus divided the resident urban African population rigidly into two groups. 'Urbanised' Africans (in the state's sense of the term⁶) were allotted the 'residential right' to remain in a particular urban area whether they were employed there or not. All remaining city-dwellers would be treated as 'temporary sojourners' liable to expulsion from the urban area in which they lived once they ceased to 'minister to white needs'.⁷

By the end of the decade, however, the BAD was poised for a radical overhaul of both its 'practical' premises. Departmental officials complained that they exercised very

little control over the urban labour market. Contrary to intention, urban labour 'surpluses' had grown, despite the fact that the number of migrant workers recruited into the cities from rural areas was also on the increase.⁸ To make matters worse, the urban townships were still cauldrons of political frustration and dissent, keeping the bogey of the 'swart gevaar' very much alive in the minds of state officials. By 1960, urban African resistance had escalated to the point where the entire Afrikaner 'volk' was convinced that the bastions of white supremacy were being besieged, and urged that NAD policy be thoroughly revised.

The wave of urban African protest which rose in the late 1950s drew its momentum partly from the shop floor. Between 1955 and 1958, the number of industrial disputes and people on strike nearly doubled over the levels of the early 1950s.⁹ However, by 1959, the main thrust of African protest came from within the townships, beginning with the squatter settlements of Cato Manor (outside Durban) early in 1959. Initially provoked by opposition to the state's plans to remove African squatters from the Cato Manor area, the disturbances raged for several months, inflamed by municipal raids on illegal beer stills. By August 1959, the Manager of the Durban NEAD called a meeting with the Minister of BAD to declare the local authority's impotence and defeat in the Cato Manor area.

The authority of the Durban City Council - the civil governmental authority for the area - has been challenged and overthrown. That statement is not an exaggeration of the facts, for it is true to say that the City Council has been defeated at Cato Manor, and cannot restore its authority without the fullest co-operation and most active assistance of the Government.¹⁰

The tumult in Durban also made the headlines in the overseas press. But this was a small sample of the more severe and damaging international censure soon to come. In December 1959, the PAC and ANC both unveiled plans for national anti-pass campaigns. Their protests took an unexpectedly dramatic turn in March 1960, when the South African Police opened fire on a crowd of PAC protestors in Sharpeville, Vereeniging. Sixty-nine people were killed and 180 injured. As the unrest spread to other areas of the country, a national state of emergency was declared, and a political storm broke. With the injustices of Apartheid now the subject of heated criticism abroad, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth. International confidence in the country's economic prospects dived, and during 1960, the country suffered a net outflow of R180 million¹¹ and a 'balance of payments crisis more severe than any experienced since 1932'.¹²

As these political and economic crises dawned, the

Afrikaner nationalist alliance was once again thrown into turmoil over the long-controversial issues of 'economic integration' and the status of urban Africans. Disagreement on these matters, which had divided competing conceptions of Apartheid in the late 1940s, had persisted into the 1950s, albeit with less of the intensity than had characterised the pre-election controversies. But by the late 1950s, conflict had escalated once more, with the Dutch Reformed Church and SABRA wracked by internal divisions (see later). The Sharpeville crisis then fanned the flames, spreading the heat throughout Afrikaner ranks. Although this political blaze extended and perpetuated the controversies of the previous decade, the lines of division between competing factions which had characterised the debates of the late 1940s, had now been redrawn - with decisive implications for the direction and tenor of BAD policy.

Responses to Sharpeville: Realignments within Afrikanerdom and the BAD

The Sharpeville shootings produced a resounding clamour, in South Africa and abroad, for 'liberal' reforms to the government's policies towards Africans in the urban areas. Some of these calls for reform emanated from within the state. In early April 1960, three senior Cabinet ministers - Dönges, Sauer and Schoeman - discreetly urged Verwoerd to do away with the reference book system.¹³ Their request was sidelined by an assassination attempt on Verwoerd on 9 April. But while Verwoerd was recovering in hospital, Sauer (as acting Prime Minister) publicly called for 'a new deal for the African' by way of a far-reaching overhaul of the legislation affecting Africans in urban areas. 'The old book of South African history was closed at Sharpeville a month ago', declared Sauer; 'we must get rid of the pinpricks which made the Native ripe for the propaganda of the PAC and ANC'.¹⁴

Sauer's pronouncements were echoed in several quarters of Afrikanerdom. The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), which had previously reserved its responses to government policies for private, behind-the-scenes negotiations, now made an overtly political intervention in the debate about urban Africans. Alarmed at the rapid decline in the country's appeal to foreign investors during the Sharpeville crisis, the AHI acted unusually assertively, taking the unprecedented step of aligning itself publicly with the primarily English-speaking Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), and Transvaal and Orange Free State Chambers of Mines. Recognising the Sharpeville disturbances as having been provoked by 'genuine grievances' on the part of urban Africans, these organisations published a joint memorandum in July 1960, of 'proposals to ease race tension'.¹⁵ These proposals were based on 'the realistic observation'.¹⁶

that, owing to education, contact with a developed economy etc., the Bantu can no longer be regarded as belonging to a single category....In large cities, there is a settled urban Bantu population which it is desirable in certain respects to treat differently from those in the reserves.¹⁷

The memorandum thus called on the government to reform its policies towards Africans living and working in the cities, by drawing

a clear distinction...between the settled urbanised Bantu who has resided for at least five years in an urban area, and has thus qualified for residence, and the migrant labourer.¹⁸

By permitting urbanised Africans greater freedom of movement and employment, it was argued, the government could stabilise the townships by securing the support of a 'loyal middle-class type Bantu'.¹⁹

The AHI, then, accepted the view of English-speaking commerce and industry, that the antidote to urban African resistance was an extension of the existing differentiation between urbanised and migrant residents of the cities. Once the state's grip over the movements and employment of urbanised Africans was loosened, it was claimed, their sense of grievance would diminish.

The call for a co-optive strategy to ameliorate the plight of urban Africans was also heard from dissident factions within the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and SABRA. Although initially an outspoken protagonist of 'total segregation', by the mid-1950s the DRC had generally thrown its weight behind the state's version of Apartheid. A more liberal faction within the DRC, however, had begun voicing criticism of the migrant labour system and its disruptive effects on family life²⁰. These murmurings quickly grew louder during the Sharpeville crisis, issuing in insistent pleas to review the effects of Apartheid on urban Africans. 'Educated Christian Bantu individuals', it was argued, should be viewed in a 'different light' from Africans in the reserves²¹. A gathering of leading Afrikaner churchmen in December 1960, the Cottesloe Consultation, echoed this dissatisfaction with existing Apartheid policies, calling for a review of the migrant labour system, job reservation, and the appallingly low wages and poor living conditions of urban Africans²².

A similar lobby was mounted by a minority faction within SABRA. Its dissatisfaction with state policy was rooted in a conflict with Verwoerd in the late 1950s over his response to the findings of the Tomlinson Commission. According to N.J. Olivier (a founder member of SABRA), the Tomlinson Commission, briefed to examine the prospects for the 'socio-economic development' of the reserves, was

appointed at SABRA's behest.²³ Tomlinson, himself a prominent SABRA figure, was joined by other leading SABRA members in collecting and presenting the Commission's findings. The report's findings were therefore couched in the language of 'total segregation', which had characterised SABRA's position on Apartheid in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Part of the Report's commitment to 'total segregation' was a call on the government to develop the reserves into economically viable entities. A figure of £104 000 000 over ten years was estimated for the task. Verwoerd however, as minister of the department responsible for the reserves, refused to allocate such a large sum of money.²⁴ His plans for developing the reserves were far more limited, aiming merely to contain the African population which was 'surplus' to the labour needs of 'white' areas. By the late 1950s, Verwoerd's powers over SABRA had expanded to the point where the dominant faction in the organisation had meekly succumbed to his view, softening its stance on 'total segregation'. The majority within SABRA now called merely for stricter controls on African urbanisation and 'economic integration', within a framework of the limited development of the reserves. Only a minority group of what John Lazar calls the 'visionaries' stood by the original SABRA prescription for thorough-going 'total segregation'.²⁵ Conflict between the visionaries and the SABRA mainstream which backed Verwoerd, came to a head at the 1960 SABRA conference (held a month after the Sharpeville massacres) which was dominated by debates over the position of urban Africans. The 'visionaries', recognising that Verwoerd's opposition to 'total segregation' was unassailable, adopted an unexpectedly - and impermissibly - reformist stance. As long as the government was not seriously committed to 'total segregation', they argued, the only effective bulwark against continual turbulence in the townships was to ameliorate the position and living conditions of urbanised Africans. As Professor Joubert, a Transvaal executive member, told the conference

thousands and thousands of Bantu with their families are settled in our urban White areas. To regard them as visitors or migrant labourers would be, from a sociological point of view, unrealistic...While they are there, life must be made economically bearable for them.²⁶

Ironically, the AHI's calls for the acceptance of an economically integrated and permanently settled urbanised African community within 'white' South Africa, received the backing of those who had once been the staunchest exponents of 'total segregation'.

This reformist thrust within Afrikanerdom and the state was blunted however, by the powers of the competing faction, calling for an eradication of the distinction between 'urbanised' and 'tribal' Africans. It was the Broederbond, recently manoeuvred into a central policy-

making role by Verwoerd, which dominated this power bloc.

The 1950s had seen an impressive growth in the size and influence of the Bond, its membership increasing from 3 662 in 260 cells in 1950, to 5 760 in 409 cells by 1960.²⁷ As the decade advanced, the organisation had become increasingly active in the ideological and cultural activities of Afrikanerdom. The Bond also exercised considerable influence within the public service, provoking frequent allegations that promotion for civil servants depended on their securing Broederbond patronage.²⁸ Still, before the late 1950s, the Broederbond was largely excluded from the sphere of party politics and policy-making.²⁹ It was Verwoerd's successful bid for leadership of the NP in 1958 that brought the Bond into the forefront of political decision-making, as a *quid pro quo* for its support of Verwoerd in the leadership contest³⁰. Verwoerd's standing in the NP had reached its nadir in 1957. Strongly criticised for his autocratic ways, Verwoerd had indicated his wish to resign his portfolio as Minister of Native Affairs³¹. But in 1958 he rebounded triumphant, with the backing of the Broederbond, and defeated T.E. Donges' bid to succeed J. Strijdom as leader of the NP and Prime Minister. Initially however, Verwoerd's position as Prime Minister was fragile, buffeted by strong opposition from the Cape NP particularly. In order to bolster his power, he therefore rapidly inserted four staunch supporters, all prominent Broeders (N. Diedrichs, A. Hertzog, W. Maree, D. Uys), into the Cabinet. More secure in the Cabinet, and assured of the loyalty of the Broederbond, Verwoerd then proceeded to expand the Broederbond's powers within the state, as an extension and instrument of his own hold over the course of state policy. Addressing a national meeting of the Broederbond shortly after his election in 1958, Verwoerd announced plainly,

I did not see it only as my privilege but as my duty to draw the ties close - the ties that always existed between our Afrikaner organisation [the Bond] and our Afrikaner government - through my personal presence.³²

As Lazar has argued, Verwoerd looked to the Bond 'increasingly... as an informal Cabinet'.³³

The Bond's extensive, well-knit organisational networks, and deep penetration of all Afrikaner institutions, became an indispensable weapon in Verwoerd's armoury, because he was able to bypass the normal political channels whenever he considered it necessary.³⁴

Poised at the helm of policy-making, the Broederbond was able to play a key role in marginalising the reformist lobby within Afrikanerdom. By the late 1950s, leading Broeders occupied top positions in the DRC, which they used to discredit the position taken by the Cottesloe

Consultation and to pressure churchmen into distancing themselves from its recommendations.³⁵ Overlapping membership of the Broederbond and SABRA allowed Broederbond members to spearhead the offensive against the SABRA 'visionaries' too.³⁶ The visionaries' calls for reformist urban policies had plunged the 1960 SABRA annual conference into 'an atmosphere of crisis'.³⁷ These conflicts persisted until the next annual SABRA conference in 1961, when the pro-Verwoerdian faction in the organisation succeeded in trouncing the 'visionaries' as the conference drew to a close, by mounting a *coup* of all the office-bearing positions in the organisation.³⁸

By 1960, the SAAU too was in the throes of Broederbond infiltration.³⁹ The Bond's foray into the Afrikaans agricultural community⁴⁰ was strongly opposed in some quarters. As an internal Broederbond circular of 1976 admitted, 'committees of organised agriculture had been captured many years ago with great difficulty and sacrifice'.⁴¹ The strength of feeling amongst Afrikaner farmers in the northern Orange Free State, for example, was sufficient to launch an alternative organisation 'to fight the Broederbond secret society and eradicate it from Afrikaner life'.⁴² But this move was itself an indication of the power which the Bond had already established within local farmers' organisations. The Broederbond's 'tight grip' on agriculture⁴³ was also facilitated by its hold over several of the agricultural co-operatives affiliated to, and powerful within, the SAAU.⁴⁴ The co-operatives played a key role in assuring farmers' survival, by providing production loans needed by most farmers to buy fertiliser, fuel and seed. The officials and directors of the co-operatives also allocated loans from the Land Bank, for farm purchases or extensions. (In 1959, £32.5 million was loaned to farmers by the Land Bank, and £320 869 paid out for seed, fuel, etc.)⁴⁵ By using their powers to assure that fellow Broeders secured better loans than non-Broeders, Broederbond members in office-bearing positions in the co-operatives were able to extend their influence and support within the co-operatives and the SAAU at large.⁴⁶

The newfound political ascendancy of the Broederbond had profound implications for the tenor of BAD policy-making. By the late 1950s, the three key decision-makers in the Department - Minister D. De Wet Nel, Deputy Minister M.C. Botha and Secretary W. Eiselen - were all Broeders and central figures in the dominant faction within SABRA. SABRA's pro-Broederbond leanings were also manifest in the BAD through its research division and the Native Affairs Commission⁴⁷, both dominated by SABRA members. Also, the SAAU's continuing prominence and influence in the BAD gave the Bond another lever within the Department. As a consequence of its infiltration by the Broederbond, the SAAU shifted its position on African urbanisation, to coincide with that taken by the Bond. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the AHI and SAAU had shared a common commitment to 'practical' Apartheid.⁴⁸ But by

1960, while the AHI remained resolutely 'practical', the SAAU had become increasingly wary of policies which unwittingly increased the size and bargaining power of the urban African proletariat.

This new alliance of interests made its mark within the BAD soon after the Sharpeville disturbances. A 'liaison committee' comprising representatives from the SAAU and BAD, established in 1944, had enjoyed a privileged hearing within the BAD since the late 1940s. Soon after the Sharpeville shootings, this committee met with leading figures in the Department to draft legislation which would considerably extend the degree of state control over Africans in urban areas.⁴⁹ The bill which emerged from these discussions - the 'Bantu in European Areas Bill' - was circulated confidentially in October 1960 to local authorities, organised commerce and industry and other interested parties, for their urgent attention.

The contents of this Bill, far more draconian than anything previously drafted by the BAD, illustrated plainly that from the BAD's point of view, the explosion of urban resistance was caused by too little state control, rather than too much. In a bid to tighten the state's grip on the urban proletariat, the BAD rapidly overturned the two principal 'practical' premises which had underpinned its urban policy in the 1950s.

The BAD's policy-makers were now extremely concerned that 'economic integration' was Apartheid's Achilles heel. As the then Minister of BAD, D. De Wet Nel put it, 'if Apartheid should fail, it would probably be due to uncontrolled economic integration'.⁵⁰ By having allowed industrial dependence on African labour to proceed unchecked, it was argued, the state was now sitting on a political time-bomb. To defuse it, the BAD would have to infringe urban employers' freedom to determine the size of their African workforce. In a radical departure from the policy of the previous decade, the 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill therefore announced that for the first time, the scale of urban African employment would be restricted by

the fixing of labour quotas or labour pools in respect of certain areas or categories of employment or in respect of individual employers, control of the movement of labour in accordance with such quotas or from such pools and the prohibition of employment other than such as determined in accordance with such quotas or from any source other than such labour pools.⁵¹

No provision was made to set these quotas in consultation with employer bodies; the decision would be wholly in the hands of state officials.

The 1960 Bill also signalled the BAD's reversal of its

previous acceptance of the 'reality' of 'detrribalisation'. The view now dominant in the Department was that in order to subvert the threat of further protest, far more drastic steps would have to be taken to curtail the growth of the urban workforce, which included removing the 'guarantees, security and stability' of the urbanised proletariat.

The BAD's change of tack regarding 'residential rights' was part of a more general ideological and policy shift, first manifest in the decision to transform the 'reserves' into 'self-governing homelands'. During the 1950s, the reserves had been treated essentially as reservoirs of labour at the disposal of whites. The commitment to 'separate development' was largely the ideological means to legitimise the denial of the vote to Africans living in the country. The reserves were defined as the permanent political 'home' of all Africans, as a means of excluding them from the polity of 'white' South Africa. But Africans had no political rights within the reserves. With the promulgation of the Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959, however, 'separate development' was vaunted as a means of allocating Africans the right to 'ethnic self-determination' in 'self-governing homelands'.

This new discourse of 'ethnic self-determination' made for a redefinition of the status and identity of urban Africans. BAD ideologues now poured scorn on their earlier view that large numbers of Africans in the cities had become 'detrribalised'. Once accepted as the 'reality' which Apartheid had to accommodate, 'detrribalisation' was now pronounced a myth. Stressing the underlying ethnic unity of Africans in the urban and rural areas, the BAD expressly rejected the idea that there were 'two kinds of Africans'⁵², those who were urbanised and those who retained ties with the reserves. As Eiselen (Secretary for Bantu Affairs) explained in 1959, 'our policy only recognises one Bantu community in its ethnic subdivisions'.⁵³ Or, as M.C. Botha (then Minister of BAD) put it in later years,

The Bantu in the white urban areas cannot be dissected from their national relatives in the homelands, not even if they were born here in the white area. The Bantu in the white urban areas and those in the Bantu homelands are linked together into one nation by bonds of language - perhaps the most important ties - descent, kinship, tradition, tribal relations, customs, pride, material interests and many other matters. The national consciousness of the Bantu is more deeply rooted than many people realise and are prepared to accept.⁵⁴

Section 10 'rights', which had been premised on the differentiation between 'two kinds of Africans', were thus denounced as an indefensible 'deviation' from the principles of 'separate development'.⁵⁵ Whereas the

purpose of 'separate development' was to allocate Africans their 'own sphere' in their 'ethnic' homelands, argued the BAD, section 10(1) had 'granted permanence...to Bantu...in European areas.'⁵⁶

The BAD therefore set out to re-route its urban policy, by levelling the status of all Africans in the cities. All would be treated as mere visitors, there for the purpose of meeting white economic needs. The Bantu in European Areas Bill thus accorded the Minister of BAD the power to stipulate when 'the number of Bantu...in an area is in excess of the area's labour requirements', and provided for the removal of those persons deemed 'excessive'.⁵⁷ The Bill stated specifically that section 10 'rights' were was no protection against removal:

any Bantu born in the area concerned or having unconditional residence therein may also be removed.⁵⁸

The Bill provoked a storm of protest. Many local authorities took strong exception to the labour quota system because it usurped their existing powers to determine the scale of industrial development in their areas of jurisdiction.⁵⁹ Organised commerce and industry firmly reiterated the stand taken in the 1960 'Proposals to Ease Racial Tensions' (see earlier) that the differentiation between urbanised and 'tribal' Africans should be accentuated, not weakened. And the idea of labour quotas was strongly condemned as 'completely against free enterprise...(one which) must be resisted to the uppermost⁶⁰'.

The BAD hastily backed down, abandoning the Bill *in toto* without even having it gazetted. But the Bill's contents signposted the direction of the Department's strategies for the next 12 or so years. And the fate of the bill presaged the conflicts and compromises which would beset the policy-making process throughout this period. The following section briefly examines the powers of the BAD, and the extent to which these were checked by opposition from local authorities and the urban business community, to both a labour quota system and the removal of section 10 'rights'.

2.

The BAD's determined bid to impose its will was orchestrated and propelled by the large and powerful Departmental bureaucracy. Already unwieldy by the end of the 1950s, the BAD's bureaucracy continued to expand throughout the 1960s. By 1968, it comprised no less than seven sub-departments: agriculture and development; housing; departmental administration; labour and identification; community affairs; and land and finance. 'Bantu affairs' in 'white' South Africa as well as in the homelands were wholly in the control of the BAD. As the

Department grew, so too did its self-sufficiency and authority within the state. Other state departments seldom participated in the BAD's decision-making, even in matters of mutual concern. For example, in 1967, when the BAD's Director of Labour, P. Van Rensburg, chaired an inquiry into existing control measures, including the control of African labour, the Department of Labour was not invited to participate in the inquiry.

As the BAD expanded, so too did the degree of support for the Broederbond and SABRA amongst the Department's personnel.⁶¹ The influence of SABRA within the Departmental bureaucracy had been established in the early 1950s, when Verwoerd (as Minister of Native Affairs) created an internal research division staffed wholly by SABRA members, to brief the Ministry on policy issues. As the Department and its research division expanded, so too had the number of SABRA members within it. The Broederbond's foothold in the BAD was similarly long-standing. As mentioned previously, throughout the 1950s, the Broederbond had pursued a strategy of inserting its members as widely as possible into the civil service. The 'Native affairs' bureaucracy was deemed a particularly important sphere of influence. It has been alleged that by the 1960s, most, if not all, the powerful positions within the BAD bureaucracy were filled by Broederbond members⁶².

The size and composition of the BAD bureaucracy had important implications for the nature of Departmental policy. Departmental legislation was drafted by bureaucrats⁶³, who thus had enormous scope to set the policy-making agenda (even if some of their schemes were later scotched or modified by opposition from the minister or the Cabinet). The attempt to remove section 10 'rights' from the statute book (discussed in more detail later) was a case in point. The memorandum accompanying the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill had made it clear that opposition to the principle underpinning section 10 'rights' was official government policy. But it was the BAD's bureaucrats who selected and instigated particular forms of attack. F.B. Du Randt (who replaced Van Rensburg as Director of Labour in 1968) said as much in a meeting with organised commerce and industry in 1968 to discuss the draft Bantu Labour Amendment Bill. Explaining why the bill contained a clause scrapping section 10 'rights' altogether, Du Randt said

he had included it in the Bill because he felt very strongly on this issue, and hoped that by doing so, the Department would be able to get some reaction from responsible people in order to establish more or less how the wind blew.⁶⁴

The minister always had the final say, but the BAD's officials had considerable powers to shape ministerial thinking itself, by controlling the flow of information in the Department. For example, the minister relied to a

considerable extent on the knowledge and opinion of his bureaucratic staff, to interpret the large labyrinth of laws and regulations on 'Bantu affairs'. Also, recommendations or complaints about Departmental policy from local authorities, capitalist lobbies or other non-governmental sources, were processed by bureaucrats, who chose whether or not to refer the matter to the minister. In the case of the business community, all communications on labour matters were dealt with by the BAD's sub-department of Labour, headed by a succession of notorious hard-liners.⁶⁵ According to S.B. Bourquin (past manager of Durban's municipal Non-European Affairs Department), the BAD's bureaucrats increasingly took decisions, received and replied to correspondence, wholly at their own initiative.⁶⁶ This direct intervention by officials became all the more common as the Department expanded, becoming 'far too top-heavy for the minister to keep control'.⁶⁷

The power of the BAD's bureaucracy was fostered too, by the fact that during the 1960s, ministerial positions were occupied by a series of men who shared the same fundamental approach to Apartheid as their leading bureaucrats. M.C. Botha, a leading SABRA member and Broeder, became Minister in 1966, with Blaar Coetzee - another Broederbond member - as his deputy. Piet Koornhof, who had replaced Coetzee by 1968, had similar political and ideological credentials. This basic ideological consensus probably allowed the ministry to feel reasonably safe in accepting the bureaucracy's considerable autonomy.

The BAD's powers were not contested, however. Ironically, the BAD was at its most rigid and uncompromising at the same time as economic growth was reaching spectacular new heights, generating enormous urban demands for labour. Between 1963 and 1968 the GDP at current prices rose by an annual average of 9.3% (compared with an average of 5.2% from 1957-1962).⁶⁸ The growth of the manufacturing and construction sectors - both concentrated in urban areas - was principally responsible for this boom.⁶⁹ The BAD was proposing to curb 'economic integration' at exactly the moment that the economic costs of restricting industry's labour supply were increasing dramatically, along with the political bargaining power of organised industry and commerce.⁷⁰ The stage was set, therefore, for a bitter battle.

Another influential constituency profoundly affected by the BAD's strategies was the municipal departments of 'Non-European affairs' (NEADs). Structurally, the interests of municipal officials concerned with 'urban bantu administration' were radically ambiguous. They were employed by, and therefore directly answerable to, elected town or city councils (which may or may not have been dominated by the NP). But their job was to implement BAD policy at a local level, and they could be removed from office by the BAD if its instructions were not followed.

To compound matters, municipalities had their own specific interests and agendas, determined to a large extent by growing budgetary constraints, particularly in the provision of African housing.

These tensions were thrown into sharp relief by the BAD's strategy of imposing urban labour quotas. The elected local authorities had a direct vested interest in the expansion of local business. Not only did it boost the employment prospects and general economic prosperity of their areas; local capitalists were also influential members of the community which elected the local authority. And the rates paid by urban businesses made a substantial contribution to the local authorities' coffers. However, economic expansion invariably accelerated the demand for African housing, often beyond the municipality's financial means. The positions taken by municipal officials on the labour quota issue varied, depending on their particular assessment of their overriding interests. For many, particularly those which had been thoroughly infiltrated and colonised by the Broederbond, the imperatives of BAD policy came first. But for most of the larger municipalities (such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town), labour quotas were regarded as an unnecessary irritant to the local economy.

The BAD could ill-afford to ignore the views of the municipalities. The Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, comprising the managers of municipal NEADs, was an invaluable reservoir of expertise and experience in matters of urban administration. And, although the BAD had succeeded during the 1950s in trimming the powers of municipal officers⁷¹, their co-operation remained essential for the effective implementation of Departmental policy⁷².

The fate of the BAD's bid to rewrite the law during the 1960s lay largely in the outcome of the three-cornered contests between the Department, urban business community and local authorities.⁷³

Struggles over the Scale of 'Economic Integration'.

The BAD was divided over the appropriate corrective to 'uncontrolled economic integration'. Some leading BAD officials favoured the wholesale 'removal of Bantu labour from urban areas'.⁷⁴ But neither De Wet Nel nor Botha advocated such extreme measures. When the 1963 Transvaal congress of the NP appealed to the government to give 'final execution to its policy of Apartheid no matter what the sacrifices',⁷⁵ De Wet Nel was unsympathetic. His reply stressed the fact that without some measure of dependence on African labour 'our mines and industries would come to a complete standstill'.⁷⁶ The BAD was unanimous however, in stressing the need to place legal curbs on the scale of 'economic integration' in the cities.

It took the BAD seven years to realise its goals. The first attempt to impose labour quotas, after the demise of the Bantu in European Areas Bill, was contained in the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill. It provided *inter alia*, for 'the limitation of the number of Bantu who may work or reside in an urban area', by 'fixing the ration which Bantu labour should bear to any other classes of labour in the area'.⁷⁷ But once again, it was principally opposition from organised business which sank the relevant clause. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce noted with satisfaction that

from a study of the 1964 Bill, which had now passed its second reading, it seems that many of the objections made by the employer bodies during 1963 have now been met.⁷⁸

The BAD was undeterred, however. Deputy Minister Blaar Coetzee issued a stern warning to the business community in 1966 that 'the government (was) in deadly earnest' about restricting the 'flow of Bantu labour to the Witwatersrand'.⁷⁹ If employers could not 'find the necessary formulae ...to restrict their employment of Bantu to the absolute minimum', he insisted, 'it will be the duty of the Government' to do so⁸⁰. And so it did, with the introduction of the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Bill (1967), designed to 'peg or reduce (the number) of Bantu workers employed in industry outside the Bantu areas'⁸¹. In terms of the bill, industrialists would have to secure governmental permission before establishing or extending factories in urban areas.

The provisions of this bill fell within the newly created Planning Ministry's sphere of operation. It was therefore the Minister of Planning who introduced and defended the bill in parliament. Yet, it was the BAD which had instigated and compiled the bill, on the grounds that the measure had important implications for the labour bureaux system.⁸² The Minister of Planning, it seems, simply went along with the BAD's proposal.

The Bill provoked strong protests from organised commerce and industry. ASSOCOM called it 'the most drastic control to be introduced in South Africa in times of peace'⁸³, and together with the FCI, called on the government to drop the bill forthwith. Their concern was echoed within the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council, most of its members opposed to compulsory restrictions on industrial development.⁸⁴ But the Minister of Planning informed commerce and industry that 'the Cabinet had decided the principle of the Bill would be enacted'⁸⁵, and the Bill was duly passed. The only concession secured by business pressure was an amendment which limited the factory 'extensions' in question to 'an increase in the number of Bantu employees'. But restrictions on African employment were after all, the BAD's principal purpose in introducing the bill.

The application of the Physical Planning Act was in the hands of the Minister of Planning, whose attitude to employers was less intransigent than the line typically taken by the BAD. After a meeting with ASSOCOM, FCI, ARI, SEIFSA and others, to discuss the new measure, the Minister announced that the scope of the law would be narrowed, to apply only to the PWV area, Western Cape, Port-Elizabeth/Uitenhage area, and all land not already zoned for industrial development.⁸⁶ The minister also gave the reassurance that the implementation of the law 'would have to evolve in the light of experience gained, and in accordance with the dictates of circumstances'.⁸⁷ But he would not go so far as to establish structures for 'continuous consultation'⁸⁸ with the business community to monitor the economic effects of the policy.

The BAD's sub-department of Labour kept a keen eye on the implementation of the Physical Planning Act, in a bid to check that the policy of restricted 'economic integration' stayed on course. But officials from the the Planning Department firmly reminded the BAD that the Act was not the BAD's direct concern.⁸⁹

The Department of Planning might have spared employers the worst excesses of the BAD's designs. But the basic thrust of the BAD's policy of limiting 'economic integration' in 'white' urban areas, remained intact. Thus, in 1970, the government's White Paper on the 'Report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Decentralisation of Industries' authorised the implementation of labour quotas (initially only on the Witwatersrand). The maximum permissible ratio of White to African industrial workers in the region was to be pegged at 1:2.5 (until 1973) and thereafter, at 1:2. Any industry exceeding the quota would be compelled to decentralise to a border area or reserve.

Struggles over Section 10 'rights'.

The BAD's onslaught on urban 'residential rights' was as determined, if less successful, than the drive to impose labour quotas. Most, if not all, the draft legislation of the 1960s affecting urban Africans, contained a clause setting out to erode or remove section 10 'rights'. And in all cases, the relevant clause was dropped before the bill became law.

The BAD was adamant about removing section 10, not simply to eliminate the ideological anomaly of a class of urban Africans with *de facto* permanent status in 'white' areas. Section 10 'rights' were a real and major obstacle in the way of the BAD's efforts to control the urban labour market and limit the growth of the urban proletariat as far as possible. As long as Section 10 stayed on the statute books, administrators would have to accommodate growing urban labour 'surpluses' at the same time as an

expanding migrant workforce."⁰

Legislation was introduced in February 1963, in line with the recommendations of an interdepartmental inquiry into 'unemployment and idleness among the urban Bantu' in 1962, headed by the BAD's deputy minister, M.C. Botha. The 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill introduced a clause which would overrule urban 'residential rights' by empowering the BAD to remove all unemployed Africans from urban areas, irrespective of their status in terms of section 10.

Business reaction was swift. Not only was the BAD trying to pare down the size of the urban labour reservoir; the proposed law also threatened to undermine the 'stabilisation' of urban labour."¹ The industrial boom of the 1960s, accompanied by the accelerating capital-intensification of manufacturing, boosted the urban demand for semi-skilled labour. The more 'stable' the workforce, employer organisations pointed out, the more cost-effective the training process. Section 10 'rights' were regarded as important source of 'stability' in the workforce, because these 'rights' allowed workers to live in the cities with their families on a permanent basis."²

The BAD responded equally promptly. By May, a new draft of the Bill had been circulated, which omitted the offending provision.

Its resolve apparently strengthened by this defeat, the BAD next proposed an even more drastic move. In 1967, Van Rensburg chaired a departmental inquiry into 'existing control measures', which recommended the wholesale removal of section 10 from the statute books. Vindicated by Van Rensburg's findings, Du Randt drafted the 1968 Bantu Labour Amendment Bill, setting out to scrap section 10. Africans' presence in urban areas would become entirely dependent on their being employed there.

Recognising that the bill's fate was strongly affected by the responses of organised commerce and industry"³, Du Randt tried to bribe support with the promise of legislation to enlarge prescribed areas. As the FCI reported,

the Transvaal Chamber [of Industries] has, confidentially, been advised that it could probably secure the integration of the Witwatersrand, or at least portions of the Witwatersrand, as a Bantu labour area, if it would support the removal of the so-called section 10(1) residential rights of Bantu so that the sole test of a Bantu's right to reside in an urban area would be whether there was work for him in that area."⁴

The FCI and ASSOCOM had long complained that the influx control system obstructed the mobility of African labour across areas which ought to have functioned economically

as single units. The influx control laws permitted an African to live and work within one particular 'prescribed area', defined by municipal boundaries. Permits or 'residential rights' to live and work in one prescribed area were not valid in another, which meant that workers who were 'legally' resident in one area usually resisted moves by employers to transfer their workforce across municipal boundaries. Despite Du Randt's promise to address this problem, however, the FCI reiterated its opposition to any tampering with section 10 'rights'. Fear of industrial 'unrest' was the principal reason. As FCI representatives explained in a meeting with Du Randt,

employers and others had been very successful in dampening down upsets in the Bantu labour force and on these grounds an appeal (was made) not to introduce the topic of section 10...Government policy was fully understood but there might be other ways of assisting in the implementation of the policy but not in such a violent manner as was envisaged by the proposed legislation.²⁶

This nervousness about upsetting the uneasy political calm of the 1960s, was shared within IANA. As Carr (manager of Johannesburg's NEAD) put it,

the one fatal mistake you can make in our sort of work is to promise the Bantu a thing, then go back on your word. That you can't do because you destroy the basis of trust which exists between us....there has never been, in all my years of experience, a better relationship between the Bantu population and the white population, that exists at the moment. And this is not a thing that we must lightly imperil or jeopardise.²⁷

Yet again, the BAD backed down, and Section 10(1) remained on the statute book. But the BAD succeeded in whittling down the substance of urban 'residential rights' in less direct ways. With tacit support from the business community²⁸, the so-called 'call-in card system' was introduced, making it compulsory for migrant workers to return annually to their districts of origin. This precluded the possibility of a migrant notching up the ten or fifteen years of continuous service in a proclaimed area necessary for the acquisition of 10(1)(b) 'rights'.

The most brutal blow to section 10 'rights' was levelled by the BAD's urban removals policy. Initiated as a national policy in 1961, this policy grew more aggressive as the decade wore on. In some cases, entire townships were relocated on the other side of homeland boundaries; but in urban areas too distant from any of the homelands, the BAD concentrated on removing thousands of individuals classed as 'non-productive'. The definition of this category grew progressively broader. By the late 1960s, it encompassed all Africans who were 'not regarded

as essential for the European labour market'¹⁰⁰ irrespective of their status in terms of section 10.

It appears that the BAD's sideways attacks on section 10 met with little sustained opposition. Organised commerce and industry seem not to have paid much attention to the urban removals policy.¹⁰¹ And many of the local authorities were strongly in favour of the BAD's urban removals policy, to the point of growing impatient with what they perceived as BAD's lethargy in implementing its plans.¹⁰²

Despite these gains, the frontal assault on Section 10 continued, although the BAD now reassessed its strategy. Taking note of the 'whole chorus of protest'¹⁰³ which greeted their plans, BAD bureaucrats decided that they could not do away with the 'very dearly held rights'¹⁰⁴ attached to section 10 without putting something else in their place.¹⁰⁵ The policy of homeland citizenship, seen by the BAD as giving fullest expression yet to its policy of anchoring urban Africans in homelands, set this new campaign in motion. In terms of the 1970 Homeland Citizenship Act, all Africans - irrespective of where they were born - would be forced to take out citizenship of one or other self-governing or independent homeland. Possession of Section 10 'rights' was not directly affected by the law. But the BAD planned to dilute, and eventually undermine, the importance attached to these 'rights' by allocating superior benefits and privileges to homeland citizens. Possession of homeland citizenship would become a prerequisite for urban employment as well as for access to urban housing.¹⁰⁶ These proposals were still-born, however. Section 10 'rights' remained intact, until the abolition of influx control in 1986.

The failure of the BAD's onslaught on section 10 in the 1970s was one of the casualties of the transition to the third 'reformist' phase of Apartheid, which had its origins in the early 1970s. By then, a more pragmatic faction within the state, which questioned some of the existing principles of Apartheid, was beginning to assert its authority. This reformist impulse was carried into the BAD, with the appointment of Punt Janson as its Deputy Minister - a strategic move by Vorster designed to check the power of the BAD's ideologues.¹⁰⁷ But these realignments take the discussion beyond the scope of this paper.

Conclusion

This paper has concentrated on the internal workings of the BAD during the 1960s, as illustrated by the fate of the two strategies which epitomised the shift from the first to the second phase of Apartheid. A number of more general points have emerged from this discussion. The making of Apartheid was not wholly linear or cumulative, in the manner suggested by much of the literature. Nor was the transition to a second phase of policy-making

prefigured in any pre-existing plan. It is explained largely by realignments within Afrikanerdom during the late 1950s, manifest in response to the escalation of urban African protest. Furthermore, this policy shift was strongly contested, within and beyond the state, throughout Apartheid's second phase. The substance of state policy during this period therefore cannot be regarded as the instrument of any one set of interests; instead, it reflected the outcome of continuing conflicts and compromises. Even when the BAD was at the zenith of its power, redrawing the very map of the country, it remained unable to rewrite the influx control laws in the manner it preferred.

The paper also belies simplistic formulations that state policy either did or did not further particular class interests. The political powers of manufacturing and commercial capital were essentially uneven. Strong enough to subvert the BAD's schemes to eradicate section 10 'rights', the urban business lobby failed to deter the BAD in its quest for limits on the scale of 'economic integration' in the cities.

FOOTNOTES

1. See for example, G. Carter, *Which Way is South Africa Going?*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 21; T. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, (London, MacMillan, 1987 edition), ch. 14; G. Frederikson, *White Supremacy* (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 240; R. Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), pp. 378-9; T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1975), ch. 3; R. Rotberg, *Suffer the Future*, (Cambridge Mass. and London, Harvard University Press, 1980) p. 41; A.W. Stadler, *The Political Economy of Modern South Africa*, (Cape Town and Johannesburg, David Philip, 1987), ch 4; F. Troup, *South Africa: An Historical Introduction*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975), ch. 6.

2. The paper does not provide anything like a comprehensive analysis of the state or the policy-making process. The emphasis is on internal workings of the BAD, with less discussion of its relationships with other state institutions. But this suffices to make the general argument that the foundations of Apartheid were radically contested.

3. For a discussion of debates within Afrikanerdom during the 1940s over whether or not Apartheid necessitated 'total segregation', see D. Posel, 'The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicts of Interests and Powers within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance', *JSAS* 14 no. 1 (1987).

4. Verwoerd, cited in A. N. Pelzer (ed), *Verwoerd Speaks* (Johannesburg, APB Publishers, 1966), p. 26. Note however, that the overall ideological defence of NP policy remained Stallardist, in terms of which Africans were treated politically as 'temporary sojourners' in 'white' areas, who therefore were not entitled to exercise political rights in these areas.

5. *HAD* 1952 vol. 77 col. 1311.

6. Section 10(1)(a)(b)&(c) of the Urban Areas Act (as amended in 1952) delimited the 'urbanised' African community as follows: a) those who had been born and continuously resident in a particular urban area; b) those who had lived and worked continuously in a particular urban area for more than ten years (if in the service of a single employer) or 15 years (if in the service of more than one employer); c) the wives and dependent children of the above.

7. This discussion of NAD policy in the 1950s is highly abbreviated. For more detail, see D. Posel, *Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid, 1948 to 1961*, (D. Phil, University of Oxford, 1987).

8. See D. Posel, *ibid*, chs 3, 5.

9. H.R. Griffiths and R.A. Jones, *South African Labour Economics*, (Johannesburg, McGraw Hill, 1980), p. 101.
10. Killie Campbell Library (KCL), Bourquin papers, KCM 55218, Durban NEAD, 'Notes for Meeting with Minister of BAD', 3 August 1959.
11. D. Innes, *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, p. 173.
12. D. Hobart Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 184.
13. B. Schoeman, *Van Malan tot Verwoerd*, (Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1973), p.201.
14. P. Sauer, quoted in *The World*, April 30, 1960.
15. *Commercial Opinion*, July 1960, pp. 6-8.
16. *ibid.* p. 6.
17. *ibid.* p. 6.
18. *ibid.* p. 7.
19. *ibid.* p. 7.
20. J. Lazar, *Conformity and Conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics in South Africa, 1948-1961*, (D.Phil, University of Oxford, 1987), p. 263.
21. J. Lazar, *ibid.* p. 266.
22. J. Lazar, *ibid.* p. 289.
23. Interview with N.J. Olivier, 5 July 1985.
24. *HAD*, 1956, col. 5305.
25. J. Lazar, 'The Role of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs in the Formulation of Apartheid Ideology, 1958-1961', in Univ. of London, ICS, *Collected Seminar Papers on The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, 1986.
26. *The Star*, 21 April 1960.
27. *Sunday Times*, 29 January 1978.
28. See for example, *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 April 1953; *Sunday Express*, 12 May 1957.
29. J. Lazar, *Conformity and Conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics in South Africa, 1948-1961*, p. 66.
30. See for example, *The Star*, 13 October 1961.

31. K. Heard, *General Elections in South Africa*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 71-2.
32. *Sunday Times*, 29 January 1978.
33. J. Lazar, *op cit*, p. 75.
34. J. Lazar, *ibid*, p. 78.
35. For more detail, see J. Lazar, *ibid*, pp. 270-5.
36. *Sunday Times*, 2 December 1962.
37. *The Star*, 23 April 1960.
38. *The Friend*, 29 June 1961.
39. Interview with Hans Strydom, 19 January 1989. See also *Sunday Times*, 15 January 1978.
40. Note that this discussion is limited by the fact that the state archives covering this period are still closed, and the SAAU claims to have no archival material going back this far.
41. *Sunday Times*, 14 January 1979.
42. *Sunday Times*, 16 December 1962.
43. *Sunday Times*, 22 May 1960.
44. Interview with H. Strydom, 19 January 1989.
45. SAAU, *Report of the General Council to the 1960 Annual Congress*, (Aurora, Pretoria, 1960), p. 14.
46. *Sunday Times*, 14 January 1979.
47. Both played an important advisory role in Departmental policy-making.
48. See D. Posel, *Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid*, chs 2 and 3.
49. SAAU, *Report of the General Council to 1961 Annual Congress*, (Aurora, Pretoria, 1961), p. 57, and *Report of the General Council to 1962 Annual Congress*, (Aurora, Pretoria, 1962, p. 53.
50. Quoted in N.J. Rhoodie, *Apartheid and Racial Partnership in South Africa*, (Academica, Pretoria, 1969), p. 98.
51. Brakpan City Council (BCC), Brakpan Municipal Records (BMR) 14/1/92, Minutes of Finance and General Purposes Committee Meeting, Item B.A.8, 10 Nov.1960, p. 10.
52. W. M. Eiselen, 'Harmonious Multi-Community Development', *Optima* (March 1959), p. 18.

53. W. Eiselen, *ibid.* p. 18.
54. *Senate Debates*, 1967, col. 2830.
55. IANA, *Proceedings of 1959 Annual Conference*, p. 27. See also Union of SA, *Memorandum Explaining Background and Objects of Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill 1959*, N.P. 3-1959.
56. Union of SA, *ibid.*
57. BCC, BMR, 14/1/92, Minutes of Finance and General Purposes Committee Meeting, 10 Nov. 1960, p. 8.
58. *ibid.* p. 8. Also, the BAD's powers to remove Africans deemed 'idle and undesirable' or 'detrimental to peace and order', irrespective of their 'residential rights', were increased.
59. Eg. BCC, BMR 14/1/92, Minutes of Finance and General Purposes Committee Meeting 10 November 1960, Item B.A. 8, p. 1.
60. ASSOCOM, Unsorted Non-European Affairs Files (NEAF), Pretoria Chamber of Commerce, Memorandum on 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill, 1960, p. 5.
61. There were signs of intra-Departmental division, however - particularly over the issue of labour quotas.
62. Interviews with W. J. P. Carr, 23 November 1984, and S. B. Bourquin, 16 April 1985.
63. Interview with S.B. Bourquin, 16 April 1985.
64. FCI, Unsorted Non-European Affairs Files (NEAF), Minutes of Meeting of Non-European Affairs Committee, 24 January 1968, p. 19.
65. P.S. Van Rensburg was succeeded in 1968 by F. B. Du Randt.
66. Interview with S.B. Bourquin, 16 April 1985.
67. Interview with S. B. Bourquin, 16 April 1985.
68. D. Innes, *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, p. 188.
69. Between 1962 and 1970, the combined contribution of manufacturing and construction to the GDP rose from 24.15 of the total to 28.2%, as compared with the declining contribution over the same period of agriculture and mining. (D. Innes, *ibid.* p.188).
70. Since the paper's principal focus is on the internal workings of the BAD, the structural and organisational determinants of business interests have not been discussed

in any depth.

71. See D. Posel, *Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid*, chs 8, 9.

72. This changed in 1971 with the introduction of Administration Boards, directly in the employ of the BAD, to take over responsibility for urban African employment and housing from municipalities.

73. The demise of the ANC and PAC, as well as the collapse of the Advisory Board system (replaced by Urban Bantu Councils, with less of a political thrust), seems to have limited the powers of African organisations to influence the legislative process. African resistance was far more effective in shaping state practices at an administrative level; but this area is beyond the scope of the paper.

74. WRAB, JMR A14/5 vol. 1, Dr. P.F.S.J. van Rensburg, 'Die Uitskakeling van Bantoe-Arbeid in Stadsgebiede', address to 1963 SABRA Congress, p.1. Dr. van Rensburg was the BAD's Director of Labour during the mid-1960s.

75. *The Star*, 4 September 1963.

76. *ibid*.

77. ASSOCOM, NEAF, 'Precis of Discussions with SEIFSA, ASSOCOM, S.A. Motor Industry Employers' Association (and others)...', 1 March 1963, p. 2.

78. ASSOCOM, NEAF, Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, 'Council Document: Bantu Laws Amendment Bill', April 1964.

79. West Rand Administration Board Archives (WRAB), Johannesburg Municipal Records (JMR) A 78/2, B. Coetzee, Address on Opening of National Development and Management Foundation of South Africa's Symposium on Effective Bantu Employment', 21 June 1966, p. 5.

80. *ibid* p. 19

81. BCC, BMR, 14/1/89, BAD General Circular No. 16 of 1968, re 'Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act 1967', para. 2.

82. WRAB, JMR A 14/2, IANA Transvaal Provincial Division, 'Minutes of Meeting... May 1968', p. 9

83. *Commercial Opinion*, June 1967, p. 6.

84. South African Institute of Race Relations, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1967, p. 113.

85. *Commercial Opinion*, June 1967, p. 6.

86. SAIRR, *op cit*, p. 114.

87. *Commercial Opinion*, February 1968, p. 6.
88. *ibid.*
89. WRAB, JMR A 14/2, IANA Transvaal Provincial Division, 'Minutes of Meeting...January 1969', p. 9.
90. For an extended discussion of the contradictions generated by section 10, see D. Posel, *Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid*, chs. 3, 4, 6, 7,.
91. See for example, ASSOCOM, NEAF, 'Special Report to Associate Members: Bantu Laws Amendment Bill', March 1963, p. 2.
92. In reality, the relationship between section 10 'rights' and the 'stability' of labour was more complex. But the present concern is with employers' organisations' perceptions of their interests.
93. Opposition to the removal of section 10 amongst many of the more powerful local authorities was also a major stumbling block in the way of the BAD's plans. But the conflicts between the BAD and local authorities are beyond the scope of the present paper.
95. ASSOCOM NEAF, FCI Secretary to Members of Non-European Affairs Committee, re 'Brief Notes on the Draft Bantu Labour Amendment Act 1968', 18 January 1968.
96. FCI, Non-European Affairs Files (NEAF), FCI, 'Minutes of Meeting of Non-European Affairs Committee... 24 January 1968', pp. 16 and 15.
97. IANA, *Second Biennial Meeting of Officials*, 1968, p. 106.
98. *ibid.* p. 18.
100. WRAB, JMR A78/6/2, Secretary for BAD, 'Settling of Non-Productive Bantu Resident in European Areas in the Homelands', 12 December 1967.
101. The Durban Chamber of Commerce suggested in 1968 that 'the removal of Bantu living in 'black spots' be investigated; but ASSOCOM did not respond enthusiastically to the suggestion. (ASSOCOM, NEAF, Secretary to Non-European Affairs Committee Secretary re 'Removal of Bantu Living in Black Spots', 18 November 1968.
102. See eg. IANA, *Proceedings of 1962 Annual Conference*,

and IANA, *First Biennial Meeting of Officials*, 1966, p. 43.

103. F. Du Randt, quoted in IANA, *Second Biennial Meeting of Officials*, 1968, p. 112.

104. IANA, *Second Biennial Meeting of Officials*, p. 123.

105. *ibid*, p. 116.

106. IANA, 1972 Annual conference p. 22 See also M.C. Botha, addressing parliament in *HAD* 1976. col. 5564.

107. See M. Chaskalson, 'Apartheid with a Human Face: Punt Janson and the Origins of Reform in Township Administration', paper presented to the ASI, University of Witwatersrand, 1988.