

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT:

NIGERIA 1975 - 1979

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Johannesburg 1991

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to study the theory and practice of military disengagement with special emphasis on Nigeria's successful program from 1975 to 1979. The thesis examines the specific nature, scope and structure of the transference of federal authority from the military to civilian leadership in 1979. This transfer program represents, in its conception, execution and completion, the most comprehensive schedule of military disengagement to have emerged from post-independence and coup-riddled Africa.

This work compares and contrasts various programs of disengagement from that of Yakubu Gowon to that of Ibrahim Babangida. In addition, other examples of military disengagement which have occurred on the African continent are examined. But more significantly, Nigerian efforts are juxtaposed with the successful instances of disengagement that have occurred in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. The express purpose of this thesis is thus to ascertain the substance and intent of the transfer procedure in the light of the collective experience and theory of military disengagement.

The methods employed in pursuing this study have included, inter alia, the systematic examination of the history of military intervention in Africa in order to include various theoretical perspectives and illustrations. This initial step served as a preliminary requirement for the understanding of the subsequent dynamics of military governance and disengagement. This foundational portion of the thesis entailed library and institutional research in South Africa primarily centered in and around the University of the Witwatersrand. There was the further requirement of establishing contact with Nigerian academics which was made possible through the good offices of Professor Oyeleye Oyediran of the Department of Political Studies, University of Lagos.

While in the Federal Republic of Nigeria research was conducted at various universities and institutes. The most important sources of information were prominent Nigerian academics and the entire core of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) from 1976 to 1979. Interviews and discussions were also held with active duty officers, military

instructors and students. Finally information was gathered from newspapers (civilian and military), pamphlets, official gazettes, official government press releases, and important Nigerian publications. This emphasis on interviews, discussions, and research is supplemented by a statistical survey of all the decrees promulgated by the Federal Military Government for the period under examination.

What emerges from this study is that programs of military disengagement, and in particular that of Nigeria 1975-1979, are determined and come to completion once the dual agenda of distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, civil and military interests are established and pursued to their logical end.

This study lays greater emphasis on understanding the military agenda, given its relative obscurity vis-à-vis the much examined civilian agenda; the latter is normally identified as the overall, if not exclusive, program and schedule of military disengagement. This examination clearly shows this not to be the case.

Of further significance is the finding that a military administration, though monolithic in appearance, is subject to its own internal deliberations based upon a hierarchy of authority and an effort at ethno-religious balancing. As time goes on the ethno-religious factor looms increasingly deterministic and dangerous to national viability.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Orlando E. Pacheco

20th day of June 1991.

DEDICATION

AD MAJOREM DEI GLORIAM

&

IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER

(v)

PREFACE

The rationale for this work was to determine whether the Nigerian efforts at military disengagement from 1975 to 1979 reflect advancements in the area of what the Brazilians first termed distenssao or decompression, that is, the staged transfer of power from military to civilian rule.¹ The study of decompression or military disengagement has considerable import for those countries that have experienced military intervention. The military in power, in most instances, declares its intention of withdrawing from the control of government once certain objectives have been met. In some cases there exists a 'plan' to rectify certain inadequacies perpetrated by civilian authority and in others, if not most, there are ad hoc attempts at military governance, which means attempts at national, state, and local administration. To varying degrees the military authority will engage in efforts of social engineering, that is, reshaping society into a more responsible and correctly motivated polity. Thus decompression can be perceived not as withdrawal per se but in its essence as the fashioning of a conditional relationship between the military and civil sectors of a nation. And an effective decompression has become of paramount importance to coup plotters and leaders. For students of military disengagement there is much to be learned regarding viable withdrawal in the African context, most especially among the sub-Saharan nations.

The Nigerian experiment of military withdrawal from 1975 to 1979 warrants considerable attention. But it is best examined with a good understanding of what preceded it, nationally, regionally and internationally, as well as what has taken place since.

It is hoped that this examination of Nigeria's program of military disengagement from 1975 to 1979 will contribute to our understanding of the realities and dynamics surrounding this rather detailed and conditional conversion of military to civilian governance.

The Muhammed/Obasanjo military administration sought to fashion and usher in a new and enduring Nigerian democracy with the official transfer of power on 1 October 1979. The program was neither

revolutionary² in spirit nor essentially reformist,³ but uniquely Nigerian in its blend of military authoritarianism, ethno-religious sensitivity and international ambition in foreign policy. The Nigerian military did not emulate any other program of transition to civilian rule. However, in its desire to leave a viable democracy, it adopted, at least constitutionally, much of the American model.

Jackson and Rosberg⁴ have stated that 'in many countries the problem of establishing democracy is secondary to the problem of establishing order, stability and civility.... In more than a few African countries, this basic foundation is still lacking.' Faithful to its professional ethos, the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime pursued these basic requirements of social order. To ensure social order and progress the Nigerian military pursued its own institutional interests - the military agenda - without which Nigeria was seen as unable to attain its 'manifest destiny'.⁵

I owe an enormous debt to all the Nigerians that provided invaluable assistance during my sojourn in the Federal Republic. Among the many individuals in Nigeria that must be acknowledged are Professor Oyeleye Oyediran whose invitation to visit Nigeria under his good offices made the field research possible. Thanks go to the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, which served as my base of operations. I am particularly indebted to Babafemi A. Badejo who took me by the hand and settled me into the University and its facilities as well as introducing me to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Victoria Island.

The work was greatly bolstered by the extended meeting with the former Minister of Finance and Supreme Military Council (SMC) member Major-General (rtd) James J. Oluleye; his graciousness and hospitality will be long remembered.

Research at the Ghandi Memorial Library was greatly facilitated by Judy Ugonna who pointed out many valuable sources.

Thanks is due to the Provost, officers and instructors interviewed and with whom discussion was shared at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna. Exposure to the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, is due to Adamu Mohammed.

Of the many academics I was privileged to meet I am most grateful

to Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye of his beloved University of Ibadan who battled every single question I could throw at him while providing expert advice and a rare friendship. Professor Adekanye also advised me to approach the former Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo which I did after going through his boyhood friend and Acting Head of the Department of Sociology, Dr. Soleye. I am ineffably grateful to Dr. Soleye for his graciousness and recommendation to his old friend.

President Obasanjo was kind enough to address my queries on several occasions and urged me to see the former Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Shehu Yar'Adua and the Chief of Army Staff, Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma. I am again deeply grateful to these distinguished gentlemen for taking time from their busy schedules to address the issues posed by the visiting American.

Special thanks go to Omoloye Oyediran who provided her assistance and prayers throughout my stay in Nigeria.

And I am unable sufficiently to thank my beloved wife Rosa who persevered throughout my many months of absence - so far away although on the same continent. It is hoped that in the near future Nigeria and South Africa will have free access to one another. Lord willing it will come to pass.

This thesis was conceived on the suggestion of my mentor and friend Philip H. Frankel, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, who on a warm October day in 1987 pointed me to Nigeria and said 'go'. With hindsight I am deeply indebted to the Higher Degrees Committee for having redirected my attention to the 1975-1979 period of transition rather than the current program scheduled to terminate in 1992. Without a doubt the former example of military disengagement has proven to be more stable, for purposes of analysis, than the latter, which to date has suffered two unsuccessful coup attempts.

I am indebted to Mary Hazelton whose editorial assistance proved indispensable in the final production of this thesis. To Doreen Robinson and Jacqui Healy, many thanks are due for their typing of the often difficult manuscripts.

To my father and mother in South Africa, Vivian and Anna Pieterse, I am deeply grateful for their prayerful support and financial assistance which has seen this work come to completion.

ORLANDO E. PACHECO

Johannesburg, South Africa
September 1990

NOTES

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	-	Acción Democrática - Democratic Action (Venezuela)
ADC	-	Aide de Camp
AFRC	-	Armed Forces Ruling Council (Nigeria)
AG	-	Adjutant General
ALN	-	Armée de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
APRA	-	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana - American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Peru)
ARN or ARENA-	-	Alianza Renovadora Nacional (Brazil)
ASCON	-	Administrative Staff College of Nigeria
ASU	-	Arab Socialist Union (Egypt)
Bde	-	Brigade
Bn	-	Battalion
CAEM	-	Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Peru)
CMLN (MCNL)-	-	Conseil Militaire de Liberation Nationale (Mali)
CNI	-	Central Office of Information (Chile)
COAS	-	Chief of Army Staff (Nigeria)
COS	-	Chief of Staff
COS SHQ	-	Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters (Nigeria)
CPP	-	Convention People's Party (Ghana)
CRC	-	Constitutional Review Committee (Nigeria)
C & SC	-	Command and Staff College (Nigeria)
DIA	-	Defence Intelligence Agency (Nigeria)
DINA	-	National Intelligence Directorate (Chile)
Div	-	Division
DOPS	-	Office of Political and Social Order (Brazil)
ECEME	-	General Staff College (Brazil)
FCT	-	Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria)
FEC	-	Federal Executive Council (Nigeria)
FFS	-	Front de Forces Socialistes (Algeria)
FLN	-	Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
FMG	-	Federal Military Government (Nigeria)
FNLA	-	National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Angola)
FSB	-	Falange Socialista Boliviana - Bolivian Socialist Falange (Bolivia)
GOC	-	General Officer Commanding
GRFA	-	Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (Peru)
IC	-	In Command
IPM	-	Military - police investigations (Brazil)
MAMSER	-	Mass Mobilization for Social Justice, Self Reliance and Economic Recovery (Nigeria)
MCNL (CMLN)-	-	Military Committee for National Liberation
MCP	-	Malawi Congress Party
MD	-	Military Disengagement
MDB	-	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazil)
MG	-	Military Government
MI	-	Military Intervention (coup d'état)
MNR	-	Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Bolivia)
MPLA-PT	-	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labour Party (Angola)
MPR	-	Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (Zaire)
NA	-	Nigerian Army
NAL	-	National Alliance of Liberals (Ghana)

NCNC	-	National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Nigeria)
NCS	-	National Council of States (Nigeria)
NDA	-	Nigerian Defence Academy
NDP	-	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NEC	-	National Electoral Commission (Nigeria)
NIIA	-	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPSS	-	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (Nigeria)
NLC	-	National Liberation Council (Ghana)
NLC	-	Nigerian Labour Congress
NMS	-	Nigerian Military School
NMTC	-	Nigerian Military Training College
NNA	-	Nigerian National Alliance
NNLP	-	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	-	Northern People's Congress (Nigeria)
NRC	-	National Reconciliation Council (Togo)
NURTW	-	National Union of Road Transport Workers (Nigeria)
CAU	-	Organization of African Unity
OR	-	Other Ranks (enlisted)
PCB	-	Communist Party of Brazil
PDS	-	Partido Democratico Sociale (Brazil)
PMDB	-	Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
PNP	-	People's National Party (Ghana)
PP	-	Progress Party (Ghana)
PRD	-	Public Relations Department
PSD	-	Socialist Destour Party (Tunisia)
PTB	-	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro - Brazilian Labor Party (Brazil)
QM	-	Quartermaster
QMG	-	Quarter Master General
RPT	-	Rassemblement du Peuples Togolais (Togo)
RSM	-	Regimental Sergeant-Major
SMC	-	Supreme Military Council (Nigeria)
SNI	-	Servicio Nacional de Inteligencia - National Intelligence Service (Brazil)
SSS	-	State Security Service (Nigeria)
UDPM	-	Union Democratique du Peuple Malien (Mali)
UDV - RDA	-	Union Democratique Voltaique - Rassemblement Democratique Africain (Upper Volta)
UNITA	-	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNLF	-	Uganda National Liberation Front

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
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Nigeria

PART ONE - MILITARY INTERVENTION

EARLY COUPS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS

BACKDROP TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

African armies never conformed even loosely to the ideal model of 'politically sterile and neutral' forces committed to the defence of the civil status quo, if only due to their acute malintegrated composition and the myth of civil-military values transmitted to largely unlettered forces of coercion during the colonial era. Nor were African armies ever, for much the same reasons, complex organizational structures, the most Westernized, nationalist, non-ethnic ones in largely traditional parochial societies.¹

Taking but one crucial aspect, what can we learn about the problem of coups in underdeveloped lands? Given the instability in many of these countries, a military takeover can be viewed as a step in the arduous search for order and progress, but at the same time it may be a setback in the process of maturation.²

Military intervention in the country is a blessing. It has exposed the military to the difficulties of the society and in a way directly or indirectly, it will lead to stability in the society.³

Of the forty-five independent and six contiguous island states of Africa all but twenty have experienced at least one successful military coup d'état. Zolberg proposes that one can view a coup as an institutionalized pattern of African politics on statistical grounds since it has become the modal form of governmental and regime change.⁴ A total of seventy-three successful coups have occurred from independence through the end of 1988. Johnson, Slater and

Gowan⁵ record that thirty-eight of the forty-five countries (South Africa excluded) or eighty-four per cent experienced some form of military intervention for the period 1960 through 1982. For this same period there were fifty-six abortive coups and 102 reported coup plots. This numerical reality says little of the nature and depth of the interventions in question nor of the men and subsequent programs, if any, that aspire to change a nation. The motivational elements of military intervention is a well tried field of research and analysis.

Research into the dynamics of military intervention has yielded considerable documentation of official pronouncements of coup participants. These pronouncements, with qualification, contain much of the rationale as well as the apprehension of coup leaders; their purpose is essentially to establish ready reference and solidarity with the sentiments of society.

Intervention from its outset has been the vehicle of the rescuer. And in this capacity an interventionist and his associated cadres must pursue, in depth, the fulfilment of public aspirations with the allaying of concomitant fears.

The interventionist collective must possess at the time of entry a substantive game plan for the consolidation of power and social stability. It must be a plan that sees the short term in the light of a fleeting legitimacy, the mid term for rational coordination and direction with the almost inevitable austerity package, and the long term as bringing economic prosperity and political development.

It is not the purpose of the interventionist to guarantee the preeminence of democracy as much as the curtailment of socio economic indiscretions. In fact, it is often stated that the latter must be eradicated to provide the antecedent for socio-political stability. Samuel Decalo comments that

military rule may even be seen as possibly the most appropriate for societies in the process of modernization, where democratization has to take a back seat (being a costly luxury) in conditions of instability and underdevelopment. As Marion Levy cogently put it, the military is the organization best capable of 'combining maximum levels of stability and control'.⁶

This of course will relate more precisely, in due course, to the discernment and strategies of transition to civilian rule or demilitarization, but it is important to note that military intervention implies the forthcoming antecedents of disengagement as well as the eventual legacy of a superior order, that is, a society with a greater degree of political culture, contentious as this term has become.⁷

What interventionists further imply is that they are the competent operatives in the business of social engineering or at least at the vanguard of such an enterprise.

Now as we examine intervention we must keep in mind that intent and capacity may well fail to converge. It is also problematic in many instances to establish the soundness of interventionist intent beyond certain generalizations.

In the early post-independence period, well before the systematic study of military intervention, there was an attempt to examine armies in terms of such characteristics as size, per capita expenditures, ethnicity, and their general role as a subservient institution of national policy. Studies in the first half of the 1960s reveal that in 1963, only seven of the thirty-four independent African states had armed forces of over 10,000 men and ten had armed forces of 1,000 or less.⁸ The per capita annual military expenditure was less than \$5 in twenty-seven of the thirty-three states where data was available, and less the \$1 in eleven cases. At that time the African continent had a population of 270 million. Military expenditures totaled \$800 million compared with \$50 billion for the United States, which had a population of approximately 192 million. More than half the African total was accounted for by the expenditures of two states - the Republic of South Africa and the United Arab Republic. The totals were to increase despite the initial intent to concentrate general expenditures towards national economic development once state revenues had been allocated for the increasing number of personnel in the newly Africanized bureaucracies as well as the armed forces. Independence was to mark the advent of African-administered revenues according to African priorities. Sylvanus Olympio's assassination in Togo in January 1963 signalled but one consequence of civilian opposition to what was considered an

unacceptable and impertinent request for permission to admit seventy additional men, from the contingent of 300 former French African soldiers, into the tiny 250 men army (company size). These veterans had been released from the army, in the case of the coup leader ex-sergeant Emmanuel Bodjolle after fourteen years of service, and had been left unabsorbed and unemployed after independence.

With regards to the post-independence interregional situation, Van Den Berghe observed that:

In the first place, it seems likely that present conditions are only temporary, and that Africa will become increasingly militarized. Colonial governments fought their battles largely in Europe, and maintained relatively small garrisons in their overseas outposts, mainly for internal security purposes. Independence reopened all of the conflicting territorial claims of the colonial period, and transferred the focus of these conflicts from London, Brussels, and Paris to Nairobi, Mogadisho, Accra, Leopoldville, Rabat, and Algiers.⁹

This was seen as one of the developments of the rapid transition from dependency to sovereignty. In contemporary parlance one speaks of 'flashpoints' which have more than borne out Van Den Berghe's predictions. By the late 1980s there were forecasts of even greater levels of interregional conflicts.

The political parties and those cadres associated with independence movements held a preeminent prestige and legitimacy. The army was an unknown national quantity in its cocoon of Africanization. It had of course been associated with the powers that be under colonial rule and thus had to be shaped into a new socio-political institution firmly located under civilian control; this was the natural assumption of the politicized elite who had known no other competing groups in the years preceding independence. The army had not been in the ranks of those who had secured independence.

Military interventionists the world over have offered a plethora of rationales, which reveal inclinations varying from preservationist to personalist.

Though interventions have transpired within a spectrum of rationales, there are particular assumptions regarding the more nationalistic intentions of a military that intervenes. They are assumptions which perceive a continuity of professional ethos, as William Gutteridge observes:

Behind the majority of military interventions in the politics of tropical Africa has been the assumption, however tenuously justified, that the army stands for national integration.¹⁰

This is perhaps a reflection of what had come to be accepted, in the Latin American experience, as the emergence of a new type of military man that would become a premier force in constructive social change.¹¹ Succinctly, the perception was that the new military man was prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the objectives of social and economic development. In the socialist milieu of Cuba he would be known as the civic soldier.

As we look at the rationale of intervention it would perhaps prove helpful to provide a sampling of abbreviated interventionist logic. But first a point of clarification. Studies on military intervention have identified the following pattern in the post-independence period:

- 1) First, there were East African mutinies.
- 2) Second, there were the series of coups in which the military immediately committed itself to transition to civilian governance once certain corrective measures had been effected.
- 3) Third, the military begins to intervene without the immediate guarantee to withdraw, with an attendant feature in certain instances of the military leaders being transformed into civilian heads of state.

While not contesting the impact and significance of these events the chronology is, strictly speaking, incorrect. For a general chronology let us turn to the occurrences of military intervention in the early post-independence period and subsequent epochs.

The early post-independence period did not initially experience a series of mutinies as is commonly assumed but rather several military interventions punctuated by a series of three coups in 1963.

The first three domestic military interventions experienced on the African continent were those of Egypt in both 1952 and 1954, and the Sudanese coup of 1958. There would be a hiatus of five years before coups would occur more regularly within African politics. The 1952 coup in Egypt as well as the one that occurred in Iraq in the same year were seen by commentators such as Kitchen as nationalist-neutralist revolutions against unpopular regimes, which in the case of Egypt would depose a monarchy under King Farouk, who in 1953 had taken on the title of King of Egypt and Sudan, and place a body of military professionals at the head of government.¹² By contrast, the Egyptian coup of 1954 was in essence an internal coup in which Gamel Abdul Nasser consolidated his control of government, becoming premier in April, and head of state in November in conjunction with arresting his rival General Mohammed Nequib, who had been the commander-in-chief after the 1952 coup.

In the October 1958 coup in Pakistan, a month before the Sudanese coup, General Ayub Khan expressed the army's view that the small conservative elite which had governed the country since independence must introduce reforms to ward off 'radical developments'. This was an interesting warning and, more significantly, the precedent for developments in Africa. A military response was in the offing depending on civilian governmental performance. As will be seen this conditional response would contain criteria not solely based upon economic performance, though this factor would prove most significant.

On 11 November 1958, six days before the coup in Sudan, the independent Khartoum daily al-Ayam wrote:

Nobody will be sorry to see the present government go. It has been the worst government the Sudan has ever witnessed. It has given this country instability, misrule, disunity, and economic disaster.... But what is the alternative?¹³

This is not to give the impression that there was no

consideration of the possibility of military intervention. In fact rumors and discussions had been rife within the Sudan.

The answer to the question posed by al-Ayam was forthcoming with the coup d'état of 17 November 1958 led by General Ibrahim Abboud, a friend and former military colleague of Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil. The Prime Minister himself had distinguished himself during his thirty-four years of military service prior to his entry into the political arena at the end of World War II.¹⁴

One of the most significant political issues related to the November coup d'état involved what was considered to be Mr. Khalil's increasingly outspoken pro-western position, which was at cross-purposes with a growing popular sense of identification with the 'neutralist Arab nationalist' views epitomized by Egypt's President Nasser.¹⁵

The sense that emerges from coups up to this time (1958) is of a demand for a modicum of national leadership and direction regardless of whether the government were civilian or military. This would become evident in subsequent African political developments, most especially in the Sudan come October 1964. It is fair to say that an overwhelming consensus and predilection for civilian governance had not yet crystallized in 1958 and the years immediately following independence. Military governments were not yet disassociated from the national-social revolution and thus were not politically differentiated from the fundamental aspirations of their civilian counterparts. As late as the mid-1960s Belmont Brice observed that an African military character was beginning to emerge, and that the military was beginning to formulate a self-consciousness that its youthfulness has been unable to provide until then,¹⁶ the contention being that corporate self-consciousness has to wait for organizational practice and confidence. In this connection one may reflect on the accelerated maturity brought about by experience derived from the involvement of the Ghanaian and Nigerian armies in the Congo crisis in the early 1960s. And here we speak not solely of the administrative experience derived from the support of military operations. In the case of the Ghanaian army their interaction with their diplomatic counterparts within the same theater of operations would prove eventful with respect to the military's perception of civilians.

There was also an unquantifiable but significant influence from what had already been termed the neutralist Arab nationalist views surrounding the state affairs of those newly independent nations with a significant Islamic population.¹⁷ In nascent Black independent states the Islamic factor would not, in general, have equivalent force and thus must be seen as less central to influences that play on permissible policy formation and behavior on the part of civil-military actors.¹⁸ However, as Brice points out, the presence of Islam would continue to be felt south of the Sahara, and in the Sudan this became a question of Arab versus black African.¹⁹

Though it was not to prove a particularly strong disincentive to military intervention, one should reference the fact that the army was entirely commanded by Sudanese officers by the time of independence in January 1956. There was no issue of Africanization per se though internal adjustments were made as a result of the aforementioned southern mutiny of 1955. Consequently, the tribal pattern of troop organization was discontinued and companies began to integrate northern and tribal troops from a variety of backgrounds.²⁰

AFRICANIZATION

Africanization itself is a point of contention with regards to its relationship to military intervention. But the pace and the manner of the Africanization of officer corps present some interesting corollaries. In the Ivory Coast, for example, the commitment was made to a long-term transition in which Africans would slowly rise to the top levels of command. Mali, on the other hand, while continuing to depend heavily on French military aid, almost immediately established an indigenous officer corps.²¹ The pattern of accelerated promotions is well known and was pursued in both British-oriented and French-oriented military structures despite differing philosophies on questions such as assimilation and civilization (as exemplified by the French) and class and apoliticism (as understood by the British). Despite this divergence, the post-independence history of these two nations has seen but one coup d'état, that of Mali on 19 November 1968, in which President Modibo

Keita was deposed by junior officers and which saw Lieutenant Moussa Traore and a 14-member National Liberation Committee (CMLN) take command. In former British East Africa, particularly in Tanzania and Kenya, the relatively slow pace of Africanization meant the continued presence of expatriate officers (arguably a restraining factor to deeper military intervention) even throughout the mutinies of January 1964 (discussed below). Military intervention was thus considerably less traumatic to national political structures than anticipated but, perhaps more significantly, the precedence of foreign intervention had left an indelible mark on those civilian leaders not deposed, with attendant adjustments to the military apparatus.²² In both the Tanzanian and Kenyan post-independence experience there have been no successful military interventions. The same, however, cannot be said of Uganda, whose handling of the mutiny proved uncertain to the extent that only a handful of mutineers were punished and a number of those dismissed from the army were quietly readmitted a few months later.²³ Civilian authority over the military was considerably weak and the government gave in to all the mutineers' major demands. A further possible catalyst for military intervention was the ethnic composition of army structures not only within the lower ranks but within the officer corps as well. The pattern of future civil-military developments as well as societal conflagration was latently present before independence and subsequently intensified. The nature of the Africanization program was to have its effect on unfolding events.²⁴

THE TOGO, CONGO AND DAHOMEY COUPS OF 1963

In 1963, coups took place in Togo (January), Congo-Brazzaville (later Congo) (February), and Dahomey (later Benin) (October).

The three civilian heads of state were overthrown within a span of ten months. In the instance of Togo, President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated. The interventionists had cited the following reasons for their action of 13 January 1963:²⁵

- 1) the government's inattention to 'daily increasing unemployment';

- 2) the pervasive atmosphere of authoritarian paternalism;
- 3) the 'sterile isolationism' of Togo's external policy; and
- 4) President Sylvanus Olympio's 'profound contempt for the military'.

The 15 August Congo-Brazzaville coup, which can be seen as the culmination of the civil strife which had been on the increase, was highlighted by a general strike involving some 7,000 protesters and resulted in the forced resignation of Fulbert Youlou. At 13.05 hours, after much discussion, power was 'vested in the Congolese National Army (total estimated indigenous strength: 700) pending establishment of a new constitution and government'.²⁶ The coup was not a sudden golpe of the usual kind one might expect but a 'negotiated settlement' concluded within the confines of a national crisis.

The rebels' charges against the deposed President Youlou regime included fiscal mismanagement, extravagance in high places, despotism, inattention to growing unemployment (echoing a Togolese grievance), tribalism, and moral corruption.

In its observation of the coup the London Times made a comment related to the realities emerging from African post-colonial rule:

Whatever the outcome, it carries a warning to all African states where the incoming elite awards itself all the more of the privileges of the outgoing colonialists without achieving anything substantial for the masses that gave it power.

The writing was thus squarely on the wall for the required behavior and performance of civilian regimes, and military intervention was laid forth as a spector.

The Dahomey coup of 20 October 1963 resulted in the forced resignation of the President, Hubert Maga, after four days of strikes by workers. Here the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Christophe Soglo, took power pending new elections.

A commentary on Nigerian Radio (Lagos) on 31 October of the same year observed:

In the three crises, the disgruntled elements accused the governing regime of doing nothing to arrest increasing unemployment.... Secondly, in all three crises, there was the allegation of high-handedness in the use of power, particularly in the arbitrary arrest of opposition politicians and trade unionists. One disturbing observation about these three coups d'état is the increasing incidence of the army's involvement in and interference with politics. But they also have one revealing feature. In both Togo and Congo-Brazzaville, the army eventually returned political power to a group of politicians of their own choice. Events in Dahomey indicate that a similar approach will be adopted in the very near future.²⁷

THE ZANZIBAR COUP OF 1964

After a lapse of three months there occurred in Zanzibar the coup of 12 January 1964. Here, electoral distortions of a single member constituency system with no provision for proportional representation had permitted the Arab-led minority ZPPP party - from an Arab population comprising no more than nineteen percent of the combined populations of the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar - to win an electoral victory in coalition with the ZNP. The winners had no desire to invite the opposition into government; the scene was set for a coup that can be understood more in terms of the prevailing ethno-political cleavages.

In this instance these cleavages spoke eloquently for the political-military engineers behind the coup. Apart from "Field Marshall" John Okello who executed the military component of the coup, there were the political contributors Abdul Rahman Mohamed (Babu), who had previously been ousted from the ZNP, and the leader of the majority Afro-Shirazi party Abeid Karume, who was installed as chief-of-state during the coup. Under these circumstances the ethno-political imbalances in the representative structures of government spoke eloquently as the rationale for military intervention. In many ways the Zanzibar coup offers an atypical example of military intervention with a straightforward logic.²⁸

THE TANGANYIKA, KENYA AND UGANDA MUTINIES OF 1964²⁹

On 20 January 1964, eight days after the Zanzibar coup, the 1st Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles, stationed at Colito Barracks, mutinied against their British officers. Subsequently, these men marched into the capital city of Dar es Salaam to make their demands at State House for higher pay and total Africanization. The following day (21 January) the 2nd Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles, stationed at Tabora, mutinied as well. After several days of hiding and debate President Nyerere called upon foreign assistance in order to end what he termed a 'slight crisis' that had proved a national disgrace especially in light of the need to call upon the British for assistance rather than a preferred multinational Commonwealth force. Consequently, on 25 January British Royal Marine Commandos disarmed the mutineers at Colito Barracks in an engagement which saw three Africans killed. By noon of the same day 450 of the 600 commandos had moved into the capital to protect strategic points. British paratroopers had similar success with the 2nd Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles at Nachingwe near the Mozambique border. Order was restored and President Nyerere embarked upon a restructuring of the army as a result of these events.

On 23 January the Ugandan Minister of the Interior, Felix Ouma, was taken hostage by two companies of the 1st Battalion of the Uganda Rifles at Camp Jinja. The kidnappers-cum-mutineers released the minister under the condition that he agreed to sign an order increasing pay for the privates and establishing a ration allowance as well as promising other amenities for troops and their families. In this same action expatriate officers and NCOs were kept in detention. The privates at Jinja also staged a sit-down strike demanding immediate increases in their salaries.

On 25 January contingents of the Scots Guards and Staffordshire Regiment seized the armory at Jinja and disarmed the mutineers without any resultant casualties.

In Kenya on 24 January firing broke out among the troops of the 11th Battalion stationed at the Lanet Camp in Nakuru some 100 miles from Nairobi. 150 rebellious troops broke into the armory and refused to obey the orders of their British officers. As in the case of Uganda the Kenyan mutineers decided to conduct a sit-down strike.

At the request of Prime Minister Kenyatta, British troops broke up the sit-down strike on the same day. The Gordon Highlanders, in their counter-mutiny action, moved to secure the airport, radio station, and other key installations in Nairobi: preventive measures against any possible trouble.

One of the interesting things that emerges from this week of mutinies is the specific perspective of the respective national leaders towards military intervention and the possibility thereof. President Nyerere did not consider the Zanzibar coup d'état as a determining factor in the subsequent occurrences in Tanganyika. He believed there was no connection and thus would not adhere to what has come to be known in the literature of military intervention as the contagion theory. At the emergency meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of the Organization of African unity convened on 12 February 1964 in Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere made the following points about the recent mutinies:

- 1) There was no evidence to suggest that the army mutinies in Tanganyika were inspired by outside forces "either Communist or imperialist", and the suggestion was equally "absurd" that the mutinies were the "spearhead of a popular revolt".
- 2) It was true, however, that certain "dissident civilians" had taken advantage of the uncertain situation after the mutiny to begin conspiring with army ringleaders to encourage further illegal action and disorder, thus necessitating some civilian arrests.
- 3) The reason for calling British troops was that they were the only troops immediately available.³⁰

However, Uganda's Prime Minister Okote, anticipating that army dissatisfaction might spread to his country, dispatched loyal police to secure the airport in Entebbe and key installations in Kampala.³¹ This was a concrete response to what was perceived as a strong possibility of internal contagion in which the 'misbehaviour by a few newly recruited troops' stationed in Jinja might trigger mutinies, that is, sit-down strikes, by privates stationed on the Rwandan and Sudanese borders.

Perhaps most perceptively, Prime Minister Kenyatta had made a precautionary request for military assistance to British representatives in Nairobi in the event of a mutiny occurring in Kenya such as he had observed taking place in Tanganyika. The Prime Minister had little doubt that contagion was a real possibility. Thus when the call for British troops did come they were already on alert, status and able to arrive the same day.

COUPS D'ÉTAT AND THEIR MOTIVES FROM THE MID-1960s

Table 1.1 shows seven examples of military intervention in the mid-1960s with the stated rationale for their execution.³²

In the Ghanaian coup of 24 February 1966 President Kwame Nkrumah was ousted by the army and police during a state visit to Beijing. The army had resented Nkrumah's interference in their affairs.³³ Nonetheless, the decision to intervene was an eventful and traumatic one for an officer corps nurtured in the best traditions of British army non-intervention.³⁴

Furthermore, in this instance Afrifa, in concert with other officers, had asserted that in a one-party system - especially with a life presidency - the military became the only alternative government. In turn, the military's credibility in the role of interventionist increased in the absence of real alternatives for changing the government of Nkrumah and the CPP.

Supplemental rationale included acting in the defence of the constitution, which was replaced by the more general claim that the armed forces were acting in the interest of the people in order to remove an unsatisfactory or intolerable ruler.

The Ghanaian coup also assists one in understanding that intervention can be interpreted as societal action, which is a compelling rationale. Professor Grundy contends that the post-Nkrumah military police regime tried to de-emphasize the military character of its seizure of power and to try to convince others that it was the 'verdict of the people'.³⁵ Although Grundy argues that this cannot be substantiated because the military and police acted independently of popular protest movements in February 1966, it can nevertheless be argued that such an interventionist rationale is not

Table 1.1

Seven Examples of Military Intervention in Africa

Country	Date of Coup	Rationale for Intervention
Algeria	19 June 1965	to end Ben Bella's 'adventurism', and 'morbid love of power'
Zaire	25 November 1965	'to save the country from anarchy and chaos'
Benin	22 December 1965	'to establish a new system of politics in which people would unite around a program and not around a few personalities'
Central African Republic	1 January 1966	'to abolish the bourgeoisie'
Burkina Faso	3 January 1966	'to safeguard republican and democratic institutions and avoid bloodshed'
Nigeria	15 January 1966	'to end corruption, nepotism, gangsterism, and violence'
Ghana	24 February 1966	'to create conditions and atmosphere in which true democracy can thrive'

altogether specious. The takeover was popularly received, thus the 'verdict of the people' can genuinely be seen as one reason for intervention.³⁶

However, the Ghanaian coup can be seen in the light of a preservationist intent in counterpoise to strong professional inclinations that were insufficiently institutionalized to prevail.

A reluctance to intervene had been expressed by Army Chief General Christophe Soglo in the aftermath of Dahomey's (Benin since 1975) second coup of 17 November 1965. Soglo had announced at a press conference that the Army was reluctant when the people had called it in.

Believe me ... the intervention of the Army in national politics is not desirable.... The Dahomean Army is not Praetorian. It has no ambitions to seize power.³⁷

The rationale for intervention by Generals Soglo and Mobutu included a desire to restore a political equilibrium which personal conflicts had effectively undermined. This represents the concept of the caretaker government which affirms the eventuality and preeminence of civilian governance.

Thus General Soglo of Dahomey and (in September 1960) Colonel Mobutu of Congo-Kinshasa proposed, in effect, the existence of a corporate Cincinnatus.³⁸

NOTES

1. Samuel DECALO, 'Military Rule in Africa: Etiology and Morphology', in Simon BAYNHAM (ed), Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p.46.
2. Fred GREENE, 'Toward Understanding Military Coups', in Africa Report, February 1966, p.10.
3. As recorded in New Nigerian, 19 January 1979, p.1.
4. Aristide R. ZOLBERG, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa', in The American Political Science Review, vol.62, no.1, 1968, pp.77-78.
5. T.H. JOHNSON, R.O. SLATER & P. MCGOWAN, 'Explaining African Military Coups d'État, 1960-1982, in The American Political Science Review, vol.78, no.3-4, 1984, p.622.
6. Samuel Decalo, op.cit., p.41.
7. See S. VERBA, 'Comparative Political Culture'; and L.W. PYE, in L.W. PYE & S. VERBA, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Verba (p.513) writes that the political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics. Note its similarities with Durkheim's organic and mechanical solidarity as mentioned previously. Pye's position is that political culture incorporates both the political ideals and the operating norms of a policy (p.8).
8. See for example George WEEKS, 'The Armies of Africa', in Africa Report, January 1964, pp.5-21; and Pierre L. VAN DEN BERGHE, 'The Role of the Army in Contemporary Africa', in Africa Report, March 1965, pp.12-17.
9. Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, op.cit., p.13.
10. William GUTTERIDGE, Military Regimes in Africa, London: Butler & Tanner Ltd, 1976, p.5.
11. See, for example, J.J. JOHNSON (ed), The Role of the Military in Under-Developed Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, p.93; and M. JANOWITZ, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p.42.
12. Helen A. KITCHEN, 'The Government of General Abboud', in Africa Special Report, vol.4, no.1, January 1959, p.3.
13. As quoted in the January 1959 issue of the Africa Special Report, vol.4, no.1, p.3.

14. Prime Minister Khalil, like General Abboud, was a graduate of the Military School at Khartoum. He had served in the Egyptian Army in the Sudan and later in the Sudanese Defense Force. He became the first Sudanese to achieve the rank of Brigadier while commanding Sudanese troops against Italian troops during World War II.
15. Helen A. Kitchen, *op.cit.*, p.3.
16. Belmont BRICE, 'The Nature and Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa', in African Forum, vol.2, no.1, Summer 1966, p.62.
17. This Islamic factor in the political affairs of Black African countries was to emerge most dramatically in Western Africa and most especially with the advent of what some commentators in the West have termed the Islamic revival, which took substance after the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1979. The term 'Islamic fundamentalism' is not particularly appreciated among many Islamic scholars for connotative and semantic reasons.
18. There are of course exceptions such as Nigerian politics, in which the Hausa-Fulani north continues to wield considerable influence. Though the five military regimes have exercised the wisdom of establishing cross-cultural ethnic-religious representation, both in the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and in the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), this has not precluded linkage with inter-regional Islamic organization. In 1987 the military government under President Babangida approved Nigeria's entry into the organization of Islamic Conference, a decision which was highly criticized, for instance, by representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, the argument being that governmental preference towards one faith was now internationally established through an official affiliation. Within AFRC itself General Bala challenged General Babangida, saying that he (Babangida) had gotten them into that situation (membership of the OIC) and that he would have to get them out. Bala was dropped from AFRC in 1990.
19. Belmont Brice, *op.cit.*, p.19.
20. It is interesting to note that an attempt to prevent further military intervention took the form of changing the composition of the Imperial Guard after a palace coup attempt led by General Nwaye on 13 December 1960, which collapsed on Emperor Haile Selassie's return three days later from a journey to Latin America. In this instance a multi-tribal Imperial Guard was changed back to a more homogenous tribal guard with traditionally stronger allegiance to the royal throne.
Africanization of the military and its relationship to military intervention was a contentious issue and was thoroughly examined in the context of the Nigerian coups of 1966 by A.R. LUCKHAM, his proposition being that its rapid implementation was the cause of significant distortions to officer career progression and expectation, inter alia, thus acting as a

catalyst for subsequent interventions and internecine corporate violence. See The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

21. Belmont Brice, op.cit., p.65.
22. President Nyerere dismissed the former 2 and 26 Tanganyika African Rifles for their part in the January mutiny. At the same time he called upon the youth wing of the ruling TANU to volunteer for recruitment into the new battalions, which constituted the nation's entire army. Here the political loyalty of the army was pursued and achieved. Furthermore, after consultation between the President and the Acting General Secretary of the Tanganyika Federation of Labor, it was announced on 9 February 1964 that the TFL and its 11 affiliated unions would be disbanded and replaced by a single new trade union representing all the workers involved. See also 'The Brush on East Africa' in Africa Report February 1964, p.24.
23. See Africa Report, December 1966, p.38.
24. The Africanization of the officer corps was considerably accelerated with the dismissal of expatriate officers by August 1964 - seven months after the mutiny and in response to one of the mutineers' demands - and the promotion of Nilotic (northern) non-commissioned officers of little formal education to officer rank. There was, however, strong resentment from these up-from-the-ranks officers, who constituted the majority, of the younger Sandhurst-trained men, who were mostly of Bantu origin. See 'The Uganda Army: Nexus of Power' in Africa Report, December 1966, pp.37-39. If one cares to examine the Ugandan situation further there are striking similarities between this nation and Nigeria in the 1960s. For example, Uganda had its own latent fears of separatism and also experienced military action against an internal segment of the society - the Kingdom of Buganda - which culminated in defeat for this population in May 1966. There was also a northern-southern suspicion that correlates with that of the northern-eastern hostilities of Nigeria during the same period. And perhaps most remarkable of all was that there were chiefs of the army, in both nations, that acted as brokers of sorts amidst ethnic and social conflicts: in the case of Uganda there was Brigadier General Sabana Opolot who as an Itesot was ethnically related to the Nilotics but was culturally closer to the Bantu peoples. In Nigeria there was of course Lieutenant-Colonel Gowan, who as a Christian from the predominantly Moslem north, from the minor Angas tribe, was a compromise figure in the aftermath of the 29 July 1966 mutiny.
25. As cited in Africa Report, February 1963, p.7.
26. H.C. YOUNG, 'Austerity in Brazzaville', in Africa Report, October 1963, p.22.
27. As quoted by George Weeks, op.cit., p.10.

28. For a good overview of the events leading up to the Zanzibar coup of 12 January 1964 see Keith KYLE's 'Coup in Zanzibar' in Africa Report, February 1964, pp.18-20.
29. It should be noted that the East Africa mutinies of 1964 were not the first instances of mutiny. For example, the southern units of the Sudanese Army had mutinied four months prior to the Sudanese independence of 1 January 1956.
30. As cited in Africa Report, February 1964, p.24.
31. Africa Report, February 1964, p.22.
32. Gleaned from Fred Greene, op.cit., p.12; and William GUTTERIDGE, 'Why Does an African Army Take Power?' in Africa Report, October 1970, p.21.
33. Nkrumah had begun to limit the army's recruitment as well as its ability to procure arms and other military hardware. The greatest fear was posed by the establishment of the independent palace guard - Presidential Own Guard Regiment (POGR).
34. Colonel A.A. Afrifa subsequently wrote: 'I have always felt it painful to associate myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional government, however perverted that constitution may be. It was ... painful, therefore, to come to the conclusion that the coup was necessary to save our country and our people.' (The Ghana Coup: 24 February 1966, London: Frank Cass & Co., p.37.)
 With regards to the apolitical tradition, Greene has written that 'the apolitical military conditions of the West are of only marginal assistance as a code to keep the armed forces out of politics in other regions of the world. When the military do stay out, they tend to remain on the sidelines as aloof judges of the political leadership. In this role they often measure civilian performance against an abstract standard that lies beyond the government's reach.' (Fred Greene, op.cit., p.11.)
35. Kenneth W. GRUNDY, Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa, Short Studies and Reprint Series No. 3, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, 1968, p.12.
36. For other reasons for the 24 February 1966 Ghanaian coup see T.C. McCASKIE, Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1986, p.460.
37. General Christophe Saglo, speaking to a press conference on 26 December 1965, as recorded in Africa Report, February 1966, p.15.
38. For this virtuous farmer of antiquity, see Claude E. WELCH, 'Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics', in Michael F. LOFCHE (ed), The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p.215.

MILITARY INTERVENTION THEORY

GENERAL SCHOOLS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION THEORY

Samuel Decalo writes that:

While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity and good intentions of some military leaders (especially in the earlier phase of coups) their motives for intervention have always been complex and included personal considerations. Systematic problems have been exaggerated and personal or corporate motives camouflaged.¹

Decalo's well stated position of the significance of the personality in the military disposition to intervene and direct a nation is well documented but not meant to stand in isolation. In his account of the Russian Civil War, Trotsky wrote that 'in the unstable poise of a scale only a small weight is enough to decide'.² And in the often unstable poise of civil-military relations the individual and/or corporate will to intervene may prove of sufficient weight to reveal the insufficiency of countervailing forces.

When one examines personalist ambitions in the pursuit of power one can look at Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa who as Army head seized power and ousted President David Dacko in the Central African Republic on 1 January 1966. Colonel Bokassa declared that:

The hour of justice has struck. The bourgeoisie of the privileged classes is abolished. A new era of equity between all citizens is established.... [President Dacko had] bad associates. [He did not heed my] valuable advice [so] I decided to give the country a strong government.³

Augmenting his rationale, on 2 January 1966, Colonel Bokassa railed Dacko's aides with committing errors, wasting public funds, and forgetting that the ruling class was supposed to remain on the same level as the masses.

In addressing the question 'How important is personality?' Greenstein concludes that it is not susceptible to a general answer. Indeed, he writes that:

It must be broken down into the variety of sub-questions implied in it, and these - when pursued - lead not to simple answers but rather to an extensive examination of the terrain of politics in terms of the diverse ways in which 'the human element' comes into play.⁴

In the mid- to latter 1960s the research on personality as a determinant of political behavior was considered by Greenstein and others to be disparate but generally corralled by the appellation of 'personality and politics'. This included such terms as psychological biographies; questionnaire studies of authoritarianism, dogmatism, or misanthropy; debates on national character; and the explanation of international tensions by reference to individual securities.⁵ It is out of these investigative fields that one makes further reference to the more pathological behavior of certain personalities in the post-independence history of Africa.

Greenstein's conclusion that one is led 'to an extensive examination of the terrain of politics' could well be interpreted in the context of military intervention that personalist theory can be reasonably subsumed into the structuralist school à la Samuel Huntington to which we now turn. However, this has not been generally observed by students of military intervention.

In surveying the literature of military intervention, Decalo proposes that there exist essentially two trends. The first, proposed by Huntington, stresses societal and structural weaknesses - institutional fragility, system flaws, and low levels of political culture - which draw the military into the power and legitimacy vacuum.⁶ Moshe Lissak⁷ speaks of the incomplete institutionalization of the political framework. However, William Thompson observes that:

The situation is hardly a 'vacuum', it is simply one conducive to the coup. The military need not be perceived as being 'pulled in' by the system; they are already in, and fully capable of marching to their own drums and for their own reasons.⁸

In Latin America, several years before the reluctant recognition that military intervention is not to be considered an aberration in African politics, scholars interpreted military intervention as a political process intimately related to broader contextual phenomena.⁹ Theodore Wycoff observed that 'the political role of the military is ... a symptom of a condition of political immaturity'.¹⁰ Gino Germani and Kalamán H. Silvert held a similar view stating that 'a widening of Castrensic activities into other social domains implies a generally weakened and sick social system'.¹¹

In Samuel E. Finer's landmark study, The Man on Horseback,¹² he proposes that military intervention in politics cannot be understood by exclusive reference to the armed forces, however congenitally their professional ethos lends itself to the propensity for intervention, but rather that military intervention was inversely related to the level of political culture a country possessed.

As the 1960s progressed there arose what one could refer to as the environment of external factors thesis which included the ideas of those who believed that military interventions are characteristic of societies with low levels of economic productivity and high degrees of social cleavage.¹³

Samuel Huntington's important work Political Order in Changing Societies¹⁴ acknowledges the prevailing political disorder of third world nations and attributes military intervention to the inability of a country's political institutions to cope with rising demands emerging from political participation related to economic and social change. The level of a country's development would determine the precise role of the military. As participation increases the role of the military shifts from that of 'reformers' to that of 'guardians' of the social order.¹⁵

Samuel Decalo's interpretation of military intervention is

predicated on organizational theory imputing to African military hierarchies particular characteristics of professionalism, nationalism, cohesion, and austerity that motivate them towards political activism to rescue the nation from a perceived or actual elite class of corrupt and self-seeking individuals.¹⁶

The second general school or interpretation of coups identified by Decalo is what Morris Janowitz termed, in the early years after African independence, the military's organizational format:

The capacity of the military establishment in new nations to intervene in domestic politics derives from its distinctive military format, namely, its control of the instruments of violence; its ethos of public service and national identification; and its skill structure, which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture. (In part, this proposition is designed to help explain the greater initial political capacity of the military in comparison with other civilian groups.)¹⁷

Professor Janowitz looks for the causes of military intervention in the characteristics of military establishments of a country and relates the propensity of military intervention to the social origins, organizational careers, and the managerial versus the so-called heroic posture of professional officers.¹⁸

In opposition, Professor Terreberry is of the opinion that internal explanations provided by such authors as Janowitz essentially present the internal characteristics of the military as independent variables in order to speculate upon the role of the military in greater society. In so doing such explanations ignore the institutional, cultural, and geographical framework in which the military and the polity operate. Thus, internal explanations fail to appreciate the changing national and international environment in which the military defines its role, and more significantly, to which it must adapt in its continuous interaction.¹⁹

To the above one may add Samuel Finer's observation of Durkheim's organized solidarity, namely a system of differentiated functions

united by definite relationships, and its supplement of mechanical solidarity, which represents the organized ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group.²⁰

If one examines the Latin American milieu Martin Needler²¹ believes it sound to explain military intervention functionally rather than genetically, or in terms of factors external to the military as opposed to the internal characteristics of the armed forces. William Gutteridge asserts that 'coups took place as armies gained confidence and disillusionment with politicians became endemic'.²²

As regards disincentives for military intervention Professor Finer, for example, suggested the 'principle of civil supremacy' and the 'level of political culture',²³ as the most important factors inhibiting military intervention.

When examining these two macro schools of military interventionist thought it should be remembered that the professionalism or organizational format school is a theory antecedent to the social and structural weaknesses school and thus represents the initial point of departure from which subsequent speculations on intervention have been launched and to which they are organically related.

It is important to note what Selassie views as the watershed event against 'neo-presidentialism' as embodied in the Algerian coup of June 1965. By this he means that the military intervened in order to save the nation from political ineptitude.

The Algerian coup set an example for the political behaviour of the army in Africa which could be interpreted as a response to situations where neo-presidentialism had either overreached itself or was not able or willing to cope with critical problems.²⁴

Although this is not a school of military intervention per se, the rationale proves foundational to the subsequent wave of coups; these range from ad hoc coup opportunities due to societal dislocation to calculated ventures to save the nation, which reflect at times a fine yet real distinction. Selassie considers the

Algerian coup as marking a turning point in African politics. The military man would henceforth see license for himself to identify societal problems and enemies and apply his prescription. The three major schools of military intervention (structuralist, institutional and personalist) are perhaps best appreciated bearing this in mind.

Now let us turn to the more detailed factors organic to military intervention.

COHESION AND INTERVENTION


John Johnson and Alfred Stepan posit two hypotheses that deal with the most significant elements of cohesion and legitimacy of civilian politicians as a prelude to military intervention.²⁵ The first hypothesis correlates the propensity of the military to intervene with the cohesion of the relevant political strata, and argues that this propensity is high when civilian cohesion is low, and low when civilian cohesion is high. This can be depicted diagrammatically as follows:



Not only is civilian cohesion by a civilian regime an important determinant for the possibility of military intervention but so is intra-elite cohesion, in which various sectors of a nation including the military as one powerful interest group adhere to a prevailing or bargained political and economic dispensation. This would indicate the existence of strong control mechanisms within society to maintain the status quo. In such a situation one can identify an array of military and police facilities and strategies engaged in contending with domestic unrest and insurgency; thus one may discern a specific counterinsurgency (COIN) effort which in most instances draws on foreign expertise in this field. The point here is to recognize an additional factor in the question of cohesion; intrinsically a question of societal and sub-group cohesion which in most cases retards the prospects of military intervention.

One must also note the existence of intervening factors such as the high rate of technological change, internal conflicts and military rivalries. These items are significantly related to the degree and quality of societal stability and from this platform subsequent developments are launched, that is, the consensus and execution of a coup d'état. Military interventionists will draw directly, both in their motivation and objective legitimizing criteria, on the state of these factors and ultimately on the state of the nation, with the hope that their perception and selection of legitimizing rationale will converge with that of society as a whole.

As mentioned previously, the rate of technological change affects the societal condition and stability. Johnson contends that a high rate of technological change will result in internal conflict.²⁶ One can depict this assertion as follows:



And internal conflict, of the societal type, will effectively assail the military's institutional sensitivities vis-à-vis order. Kossok proposes and tests the hypothesis of military intervention that states that military establishments are dedicated organizationally and ideologically to the preservation of order. Order is thus valued by the military above all other 'system virtues'.²⁷ And the lack of order as represented by internal conflict which has not been institutionalized can result in military intervention.

We can depict this additional link to military intervention as follows:



Interestingly, Johnson points out that military rivalries can result in military intervention, which in turn develops into a post-coup political environment containing a weakened military

cohesion.²⁸ This state of weakened military cohesion can provide the crucible of intrigue as military leaders canvass the field for another coalition predisposed to intervention.

However, the same result - military intervention - can occur in the opposite situation where there is strong military cohesion. Johnson, Slater and McGowan state that

The presence of high military cohesion increases the probability of coups, particularly when military leadership is sociologically distinct from civilian elites. A lack of cohesion facilitates more coups after the military's first intervention takes place.²⁹


Indeed, the sociological distinction of the military is highlighted by Gutteridge who claims that officer corps appear to become cohesive entities possessing a strong national consciousness.³⁰ The units they train are the intended locus of the melting pot phenomenon in which soldiers are conditioned (it is hoped) to lose some of their regional or tribal characteristics/loyalty. This same author asserts that it is this corporateness which beyond any other factor endows the military with its political potential. With respect to cohesiveness, the likelihood of intervention is increased from a different and internal quarter. When a group within the elite has a still greater cohesion, then action leading to a coup is much more likely. It is from such instances of internal fragmentation that the internal coups and countercoups result.³¹

Johnson, Slater and McGowan thus indicate the problematic nature of cohesion as a factor in military intervention. They go on to state that

In Black Africa military cohesion is problematic because of the acute cultural pluralism of most African states. This pluralism has a number of theoretical implications. First, as suggested above, the lack of cohesion caused by cultural pluralism can inhibit the military from carrying out coordinated political interventions, if that pluralism is

reflected in the military itself. Second, lacking cohesion, actions as drastic as military coups can possibly cause the military's own disintegration by turning its ethnically differentiated members against one another as apparently happened in Uganda after the 1971 coup. Third, the extent that recruitment to the military creates a distinct military caste socially distant from the ruling civilian elites in society, the military can become a counter elite that under the right circumstances will seize state power.³²

We can depict this situation as follows:



and/or




CONSTRUCTING A SYSTEMS MODEL FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

We can venture forth with the construction of a simple systems model as a backdrop to military intervention as experienced in Nigeria (see Figure 2.1 - the codes refer to the explanations which follow).

Figure 2.1

A Systems Model of the Specific Functions of Political Interaction



Source: adapted from chapter 4, 'Political Systems', in Foreign Area Officer Nonresident/Resident Course, Fort Bragg, North Carolina: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, pp.4.1 & 4.2.

- 1) Groups and individuals express demands for policy change or continuation.
- 2) Competition for limited resources entails major policy alternatives (which may require a high rate of technological change).
- 3) This refers to civilian governance from parliamentary to central committee.
- 4) This refers to extractions from society such as taxes, jury duty or military service.
- 5) Distributions include goods and services, opportunities, and the like.
- 6) This concerns the control of the behavior of individuals and groups through such items as marriage certificates, voter registration and passports; this can be mechanically and socio-culturally problematic.
- 7) This refers to the use of slogans, flags, or political symbols to

give legitimacy to a specific ruler or to discredit another.

- 8) The mores and morals of the culture are shaped, sustained, and in some cases altered, in order for the system to function.
- 9) This entails encouraging people to fill roles as voters, taxpayers, soldiers and government officials and to take part in interest groups and political activities. Over time there is an increased selective co-option of individuals and groups owing to the strictures of resources.

Some further explanation and illustration is helpful for three of these nine items. Aggregation - item (2) above - is reduced as agents of aggregation are curtailed or banned. When party activity is permitted there is in effect a 'rationalization' of demands by society. A coup curtails this market form of rationalization. We may cite two examples of decrees issued by military ruling councils. One was Decree No. 33 announced by Major-General Ironsi of Nigeria on 24 May 1966. This decree banned political parties - of which eighty-one were in existence at the time - and more than a score of pan-tribal and cultural associations. The other was the banning of party politics in Ghana by Lieutenant-General J.A. Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council (NLC), after the 24 February 1966 coup. In this instance the NLC

imposed a ban on all party political activities so that we can concentrate fully on the solution of the most pressing national problems. We cannot at this stage afford to indulge in party political wrangles when we are confronted with the spectre of economic bankruptcy.³³

The above statement may be seen as reflecting the military version of what has become a general African suspicion of multiparty politics. The 'wrangles' are the realities of party politics so objectionable to the military (for example, the bloodletting between the government and opposition parties on the floor of the Western Regional House of Assembly in 1962 in Nigeria) while the 'market mechanism' or rationalization of demands under civilian governance is too theoretical to convince the military to stay out of the political arena.

We can recall Guillermo O'Donnell's theory of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism which speaks of the ruling order's desire to 'provide continuity for a new impulse towards the deepening of the productive structure'.³⁴ This necessitates high technological change in order to maintain social order, that is, increasing the size of the pie to rationalize the position of the dominant sectors and classes.³⁵

Borrowing from Huntington's National Security theory we can divide the policy-making process - item (3) above - into 'optional policy', which is the immediate means taken to address demands, and 'institutional policy', which deals with the manner in which operational policy is formulated and implemented.³⁶

This item is of considerable significance as we consider the subject of military intervention. Changes in public policy which represent a dependent variable tend to disrupt distributions of benefits and to modify previous levels of expectation, thus leading to disorder and inviting resistance by the military. McAlister writes that

A military establishment depends for its form, status, emoluments, and privileges on the social order that gave it existence.³⁷

A contraction of distribution - item (5) above - is often felt in certain sectors while defense expenditures increase, though there are exceptions: for example, the Nigerian Military under General Babangida has experienced reductions in appropriations and salaries of officers. Here we refer to possible mid and long term consequences of a coup d'état.

The possibility of military intervention can be tracked by establishing who actually controls such items as salary scales, promotions, welfare and retirement benefits, defense spending and the formulation of defense policy. The military institutional interest will tend to ensure, by means of pressure or capture of the state, that perceived rights are not endangered by other competing groups. Nordlinger includes within this list the important items of organizational autonomy and survival within a mass party polity.³⁸

Intervention can be precipitated in this context by the failure of effective rule by insufficiently institutionalized civil governments. To this one may add failure to promote economic development.

Perhaps a more compelling argument is that as civil governance veers away from political pluralism and democracy and towards greater authoritarianism and repression, the political centrality of the military as the principal agent of repression increases and the motivation to intervene grows.³⁹

THE ROLE OF LEGITIMACY

Another hypothesis relates the success of coups to the degree of public legitimacy ascribed to the executive and to the military. Military coups tend to be successful when, before the coup attempt, executive legitimacy is low and the legitimacy given by the relevant political strata to the military to intervene is high. According to this hypothesis, coups tend to be unsuccessful when executive legitimacy is high and the legitimacy given to the military to intervene is low.

Seymour Lipset, with regard to the stability of democratic systems, writes:

It may be hypothesized that crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (a) all major groups do not secure access to the political system early in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands; or, if (b) the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change. After a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain expectations of major groups (on the grounds of 'effectiveness') for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.⁴⁰

At this particular juncture one is dealing with the essential factor of a time constraint in establishing regime legitimacy. It

has also been observed that the crisis of legitimacy occurs in situations where a military regime endeavors to establish its political independence from civilian social forces relying on the military as a political base.⁴¹ This situation emerged in the Peruvian experiment (1968-1980) and more recently in Burma where the intensification of such a process began in earnest in 1971. The essential lack of legitimacy in the former case resulted in transfer to civilian rule in 1980, while in the latter a coup d'état occurred in September 1986, SINAMOS, SCME and BWS (prior to 1971) notwithstanding.⁴² This of course has considerable implications for the politics of the transition to civilian rule that will be discussed below.

Huntington asserts that

If the military does not develop a political structure which institutionalizes some principle of legitimacy, the result can only be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of coups d'état, and which also stands in danger of revolutionary overthrow by new social forces which it does not possess the institutional mechanisms for assimilation.⁴³


THE MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

Military intervention as a socio-political phenomenon has also been examined through a Marxian lens. Manfred Kossok provides the hypothesis that

A basic law can be formulated for the capacity and radius of action of the armed forces in the developing countries: The relative independence and capacity of the armed forces as a political factor increase in proportion to the immaturity or instability of the class relations and of the general social situation, i.e. the dialectic of army and society cannot be schematically reduced to unilateral, linear subordinate or casual relationships.⁴⁴

In this instance, 'immaturity or instability of the class relations and of the general social situation' is Marxian jargon for an insufficiently revolutionized social setting in which the institutional autonomy of the military has yet to be effectively penetrated and made subservient to the party. The hypothesis is also a reflection of non-socialist civil-military relations that have yet to establish societal consensus as to the institutional delimitation and role of the armed forces.

Julian Lider explains a typology of the armed forces that is consistent with Marxist-Leninism. In the instance of the Soviet Union, the perception of militaries is that of so-called socio-economic formations or structures, called elsewhere in Marxian literature the 'historical types of armies'.⁴⁵ This assertion can be illustrated with the following diagram:



The significance of this typology for the study of military intervention lies in the fact that it reflects the realities of the armed forces that are devised from society at large. In this sense one can establish the linkage between the type of society and the type of military. And thus the critical issue of the kind of society one would desire comes to the fore. Marxist-Leninism addresses this issue in the complete reinstruction - and destruction if necessary - of the military as an institution and component of the revolution. Thus, in order to ensure the production of a particular type of army there must be the engineering of a particular type of society, to include a subordinate type of economy. The party thus remains the vanguard of the revolution and must pursue a significant ideological symbiosis with the military. Matters are somewhat complicated, but not intractably, when one observes militaries that have emerged from a revolutionary situation apart from the fundamental direction and leadership of the party. This occurred in the Cuban revolution where the traditional communist party remained urban based and somewhat

suspect of the guerrilla movement. In the Latin American experience this has been a traditional criticism of urban based, non-militant, communist parties. A possible exception is that of the Colombian Communist Party and its leadership in the 'peasant republics' whose existence spanned, in various forms, the period from the early 1930s to the mid 1960s. In Africa, the revolutionary movements which emerged particularly from the former Portuguese possessions have also had to define and 'institutionalize' the specific party-army relationship. It is significant to note that until the independence of Angola and Mozambique, for example, the ideologues could afford to avoid incorporating guerrillas into the structures of party leadership, although their role in the formal structures of the armed forces was perhaps more participatory than can be observed in the aftermath of the Algerian civil war.

Thus as we fix our focus on army-party relationships it is most important to understand that the paramount issue remains the ideological and social transformation of society in tandem with strategies to avert purely military preeminence and the possibility of intervention. Furthermore, as Amos Perlmutter states, in a socialist milieu

Military intervention is a natural and constitutional behavior in the army-party regime. Both structures are highly political; they are tightly linked to one another. The military functions as a political party, an instrument of interest articulation, and a source for the elite's political mobility.⁴⁶

In this instance the rationale for military intervention would represent dissatisfaction with prevailing structures of interest articulation and allocation, this despite an increasing party-army symbiosis. Domínguez perceives that in this symbiosis civilian and military lives are fused.⁴⁷ Indeed, he challenges the conventional wisdom of a clean separation between civilian and military ideologues and operatives in stating that

All these characterizations, and other like them, are based

on the assumption that the two are at least potentially in conflict, that civilians are always capable of governing, and that military activity can be so strictly defined that taking over the governments of performing normally civilian functions can readily be identified and analyzed as 'unmilitary'. Thus arise such terms as a 'praetorian' polity, a 'militarized' society, or a 'politicized' army.⁴⁸

In assailing this traditional cleavage, Domínguez further states that

The facts in revolutionary Cuba contradict this dichotomy. Cuba has been ruled in large part by military men who govern large segments of both military and civilian life, who are held up as paragons to both soldiers and civilians, who are bearers of the revolutionary tradition and ideology, who have politicised themselves by absorbing the norms and organization of the Communist party, and who have educated themselves to become professional in political, economic, managerial, engineering, and educational as well as military affairs. Their civilian and their military lives are fused. In this situation, at least until recently, one could not speak of either civilian control over the military or military control over civilians. But in the mid-1970s some new trends appeared that may herald yet another change in the future.⁴⁹

This fusion becomes an ideological and 'moral' convergence as well as indicative of the military and civic roles that the Cuban armed forces have been called upon to play.

Military intervention thus becomes more problematic in terms of a ideological and institutional impetus, the centripetal forces increasingly calling and molding the military into a fundamental orthodoxy with its attendant societal role.

Reinhard Selten and Amos Perlmutter in their examination of 56 military coups in the Middle East between 1936 and 1973, as well as

Robert Jackson with African data, have presented results that indicate that party dominance is stabilizing.⁵⁰ Perlmutter relates that the elaborate military organization and the Baath party in the Middle East created a new kind of military regime.⁵¹ There existed both organizational autonomy and symbiotic relationships between party and army, which, in turn, enhanced stability in the examples of Iraq and Syria and in Castro's 'revolutionary-mobilizing' Cuba. And thus to a considerable extent the rationale and legitimizing opportunities for military intervention have been considerably reduced. If one considers the cases of Benin and the People's Republic of the Congo, one can readily observe that the 'penetration' model of civil-military relations, that specifically intends the establishment and nurturing of the party-army symbiosis, is taking route; this is so if one considers that neither country has experienced a military coup since 1972 and 1977 respectively (the latter an abortive coup which saw the assassination of Marien Ngouabi in March of that year).

The assumptions of the fathers of military intervention theory are challenged on occasion, as in Robert D. Putnam's study of the assertion that 'social mobilization clearly increases the prospects for civilian rule'⁵² and Samuel Huntington's theory of political development, which implies that social mobilization leads to military rule and that civilian rule depends on strong political institutions.⁵³ Putnam claims that neither of these propositions is confirmed by his study.⁵⁴

Mun Gu Kang has posited a theory of military intervention which draws upon class analysis. He states, after some explanation,

I propose and develop my theoretical hypotheses based upon the assumption that military intervention in politics in Third World countries occurs only when there is no constitutional or institutional mechanism that can reduce or resolve class tensions and when the middle class is willing to be aligned with the upper-ruling class for its class interest against the lower class.⁵⁵

Mun Gu Kang criticizes both the institutional interest

argument⁵⁶ as too reductionist and the argument citing socio-economic factors in political behaviour (the Bureaucratic Authoritarianism model)⁵⁷ as too economically determinist and lacking a political analysis (especially of class) of military involvement in politics. And from the starting point of the study of Third World democratic development (with its required feature of conflict resolution) which was an early focus of Third World scholars, Mun Gu Kang proceeds to posit class tension, and the creation of class alliances, particularly of the middle class with the masses, as the means of resolving political tensions.⁵⁸ If these alliances are not formed to resolve tension then a golpe (coup) can result from either wing of the political spectrum. Furthermore these alliances can be formed, as in Nicaragua in 1979, for the ousting of the dominant ruler. It is an innovative argument mindful of previous scholarship and not merely a rephrasing of the need for greater institutional development, although it has obvious implications in this respect. At this stage however it remains a theoretical framework.

As one examines the phenomenon of military intervention one begins to appreciate the interdisciplinary nature of the subject. There is an ever-increasing attempt at linkage between socio-economic-political factors so as to provide the most comprehensive descriptive model of military intervention; this ranges from motivational-corporate explanations to socio-economic determinants. Moreover there appears to be an increasing degree of sophistication of the analysis involved. My assertions, however, are rather intended to lay a foundation for the subsequent analysis of military disengagement. It is my observation that the original manner of entry of the military will determine the manner of their exit or transformation. Furthermore, I contend that all withdrawal is conditional, regardless of party or governmental structures. 'Political culture' prohibits total military withdrawal from politics.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Returning to the two major theoretical camps of military

intervention, Decalo sees these two schools of structural weaknesses and professional ethos as essentially opposite sides of the same coin. Within this theoretical framework there exists an array of attendant interventionist logic.

Let us consider a relatively early compendium of factors seen as helping to promote military intervention. Claude Welch listed the following items: 1) Declining prestige of the major political parties, 2) Schism among prominent politicians, 3) Lessened likelihood of external intervention in the event of military uprising, 4) 'Contagion' from seizures of control the military in other African countries, 5) Domestic social antagonism, 6) Economic malaise, leading to 'austerity' policies, 7) Corruption and inefficiency of government and party officials, and 8) Heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.⁵⁹ Fundamentally, these eight factors speak of social deterioration and consequent opportunities for intervention.

Compare the above with Amos Perlmutter's list of reasons for military intervention: 1) Anticolonialism, 2) Nationalism, 3) Opposition to a nationalist civilian regime, 4) Anti-oligarchism, 5) To protect the military institution from encroachment, 6) Fear of losing the military's autonomy and power, 7) Desire to promote modernization and economic development, and 8) Response to a threat from the left. In this instance the items listed are more idealistic and defensive, what has already been termed the military's organizational format.⁶⁰

In speaking of the Ecuadorian experience with intervention, John Fitch with his model of a military regime makes two fundamental assertions that impinge directly on the rationale above. Firstly, he observes the coup d'état as a political process. Secondly, he concludes that a coup is 'more than merely a symptom of political decay'.⁶¹ This goes contrary to the elaborations of such authors as Huntington and Perlmutter. Fitch argues that what has in fact transpired is the institutionalization of the coup d'état as a political system. This has become a major barrier to political development and to basic changes in social and economic structure.

Contextually, Schmitter would appear to concur in stating that:

intervention on the grounds of the military's managerial skills would depend largely on prior breakdown in the economy and social order. Such developments depend on events in society as a whole, and not on the internal evolution of the military, which creates primarily a capacity and disposition to respond.⁶²

NIGERIA: THE CONSTITUTION AS A FACTOR IN MILITARY INTERVENTION

In his work on the background to military rule in Nigeria Oyeleye Oyediran discusses and synthesizes both the 'internal characteristic' model of intervention à la Janowitz and Huntington's 'structuralist' model.⁶³ He fixes them within the Nigerian context of the 'general politicization of social forces' and the essential question of the legitimacy of this politicization where 'no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods of resolving conflicts'.⁶⁴ (In this respect the emphasis is tilted to Huntington's model although, as mentioned above, the two models are recognized as 'opposite sides of the same coin' by such authors as Decalo and Adekunle).

Professor Oyediran organizes his analysis along the following lines: the constitutional background, north-south and ethnic conflicts, minority group politics (or the politics of state creation), and finally the chain of immediate antecedents and the structural dilemmas of the Nigerian army.⁶⁵ Our attention here will be on the constitutional background. This background is examined in an attempt to address the question of when the seeds of intervention were sown.⁶⁶ And here we arrive at speculation by some analysts, who attribute it to the constitutional features peculiar to and antedating Nigeria's first experience of military intervention in January 1966. For purposes of clarity and context let us briefly review the pertinence of some of the constitutions with regards to this line of argument. The Richards (Arthur) constitution of 1946 was seen as somewhat aloof if not politically patronizing in that its features were established with minimum consultation with nationalist Nigerians. Its features included the division of Nigeria into three administrative regions, the

establishment of three regional Houses of Assembly with limited legislative and budgetary powers, the selection of membership to these regional bodies including the Central Legislative Council being essentially from existing native authorities, and the establishment of regional Houses with their attendant ratios of official to unofficial membership. Kaly Ezera⁶⁷ asserts that 'even though the constitution achieved the integration of northern and southern Nigeria in a common legislative council, it brought into force the concept of regionalism - the beginning of the process of fragmentation in the country'. Some quarters are thus convinced of an intentional policy of 'divide and rule' on the part of the British. By contrast one can consider Okoi Arilqo's conclusion that 'the policy of regionalism was directed more to administrative devolution than to political separation of the various groups'.⁶⁸ A third voice, that of Obafemi Awolowo, also criticized the constitution and called for greater decentralization of power.

John M. Ostheimer observes that 'in essence, the Richards Constitution instituted a system of [advisory councils] that would make policy recommendations at more local levels'.⁶⁹ What is difficult here is discerning clearly the distinction between the typical features of colonial rule and an earnest attempt at forming administrative structures with an eye to the eventual granting of independence. 'Nationalists' would claim, through political necessity, the former state of affairs: enlightened or 'progressive' colonial administrators would claim, for preservation of their privileged position, the latter. But whether one can observe either or both realities at play, a more significant question is whether constitutional structures can indeed 'introduce' regionalism as claimed by Ezera⁷⁰ or merely formalize a de facto regionalism. And most significantly for purposes of this study is discerning whether the seeds of intervention were actually sown by constitutional developments and if so whether the process of military disengagement actually expunges these seeds. Let it be said at this point that these are questions of extreme difficulty, that lend themselves more readily to conjecture and associations of ostensible realities. If regionalism exists and regionally differentiated constitutional structures exist then regionalism in all probability is due to

constitutions. And if seeds of intervention are sown in constitutions then a subsequent series of similar constitutions will invariably portend military intervention. This logic must be seen as more compelling than for example the possibility that if regionalism predates constitutional development then the seeds of intervention do not owe their origins to any specific constitution but can only be traced to the existing national realities and sentiments, rather than to formal constitutional and administrative structures, even though these structures can subsequently exacerbate or ameliorate such realities.

One should consider another implication of the 'seeds of intervention' argument, namely, that subsequent constitutional arrangements must somehow de-seed themselves. It has not been said how this is to be carried out. Therefore any military intervention can be theoretically linked back to primordial constitutional seeds. And thus one remains at a place of conjecture rather than hard analysis. If one pursues the seeds of intervention argument it is not made clear why it is not actually placed as far back as the Clifford Constitution of 1922 with its Legislative Council (LEGCO), and the theory of low-cost government (indirect rule). A more cogent observation is made by Ostheimer:

An obvious result of the federal colonial structure was a failure to prepare Nigeria for independence because the survival of ethnic groups was encouraged, a development that hindered the growth of a feeling of being 'Nigerians' with common problems.⁷¹

Only with the MacPherson Constitution of 1951 was there any devolution of policy making into regional hands.⁷²

The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 was the first genuine federal system with major similarities to the United States' Tenth Amendment. But ironically this apparent constitutional progress was tempered by the reality that federal constitutions, perhaps more than unitary ones, depend on the will of people to cooperate with each other.⁷³ And where that cooperation fails so does the constitution. Once again there is the implication here of relative

political culture. But perhaps more revealing in our pursuit of the rationale of military intervention is the African perspective of national structures, which differs from that of their Western counterparts. And this relates to the matter of the saleability of structures. Offheimer addresses this critical question:

African leaders regarded fundamental parts of the colonial heritage - regionalization of power, division of executive and legislative roles, independence of the judiciary, judicial review - as [subjects for experimentation] and amended constitutions wherever possible.⁷⁴

This experimentation has, in most instances, an inverse value to First World perspective and practice. However, non-intervention and stability remains a covert objective. And with the precedence of experimentation the military cannot be compelled not to experiment. In essence the inception of experimentation is squarely placed in the hands of civilian administrations and in substance can be argued to be an antecedent to intervention. The military therefore does not adhere to a societal taboo against military intervention once civilian gentlemen have ceased to be successful in the affairs of national stability and progress. And thus problematically the advent of military intervention is to a great extent but a version, albeit with arms, of unsuccessful civilian practice.

A last word must be said on the effects of the practice of constitutional amendments. And here we quote Arikpo at length.⁷⁵

The 1954 [Lyttleton] constitution was the kernel of all further constitutional changes which culminated in the establishment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1 October 1963. If anything some of the several amendments that were made intensified the strains which existed not only between the centre and the regions, but between regions, and even communities within each region. In other words not only did the separateness continue beyond independence but, what is worse, it added in its development profoundly serious strains and stresses. These additional

elements converged to destroy respect for constitutionalism and the rules of the political game.

This observation of Nigeria should be examined bearing in mind Ghanaian constitutional development, which moved in a different direction. Bereket Salassie⁷⁶ saw the 1960 Ghanaian constitution as moving away from representative democracy and economic liberalism. If indeed we have a genuine example of two nations with diverging constitutional development and philosophy they nevertheless 'converge' with their respective constitutions being suspended in January and February 1966.

As we turn our attention to military intervention in Nigeria our primary concentration will be on the first two coups d'état - those of the 15 January and the 29 July 1966. But before we do this let us briefly look at that area of Africa that predominates in occurrences of successful military intervention.

NOTES

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2. Quoted in David FOOTMAN, Civil War in Russia, London: Faber & Faber, 1961, p.305.
3. As quoted in Africa Report, February 1966, p.46.
4. F.I. GREENSTEIN, 'The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush', in The American Political Science Review, vol.lxi, no.3, September 1967, p.641.
5. F.I. Greenstein, op.cit., p.629.
6. In Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p.194, Samuel HUNTINGTON argues that 'the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and specific manifestation of broader phenomena in underdeveloped societies'.
7. Moshe LISSAK, Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma, Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976.
8. William R. THOMPSON, 'Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup', in Comparative Politics, vol.7, no.4, 1975, p.487.
9. Arturo VALENZUELA, 'A Note on the Military and Science Theory', in Third World Quarterly, vol.7, no.1, January 1985, pp.132-143.
10. Theodore WYCOFF, 'The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics', in Western Political Quarterly, vol.13, no.3, September 1960, p.761.
11. Gino GERMANI & Kalman H. SILVERT, 'Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America', in Archives Européennes de Sociologie, vol.2, no.1, 1961, p.62.
12. Samuel E. FINER, The Man on Horseback: The Role of The Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall, 1962.
13. See for example, J.J. JOHNSON, The Role of the Military in Under-Developed Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962; and Martin C. NEEDLER, 'Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America', in The American Political Science Review, vol.lx, no.3, September, 1966, pp.616-626.
14. S. HUNTINGTON, op.cit.

15. Arturo Valenzuela, op.cit., p.134.
16. Samuel Decalo, op.cit., pp.11-12.
17. Morris JANOWITZ, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp.27-28.
18. Ibid., pp.27-29.
19. As cited in Samuel Huntington, op.cit., p.207.
20. Samuel E. Finer, op.cit., p.7.
21. Martin Needler, op.cit., p.618, argues that a genetic explanation of the coup belies several overriding considerations such as the cooperation of conspirators with civilian politicians, the strengthening of potential conspirators by similitudes with and support by outside parties, and the ability, in instances, of civilians to engineer a political situation for the purpose of prompting a military one. As an example Needler cites Ecuador in 1963.
22. William GUTTERIDGE, The Military in African Politics, London: Methuen & Co., 1969, p.158.
23. Samuel E. Finer, op.cit., p.139.
24. Bereket H. SELASSIE, The Executive in African Governments, London: Heinemann, 1974, p.234.
25. J.J. Johnson, op.cit., p.262; and Alfred STEPAN, 'The Moderating Pattern of Civil-Military Relations', in Amos Perlmutter & Valerie P. Bennett (eds), The Political Influence of the Military, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
26. J.J. Johnson, op.cit.
27. Manfred KOSSOK, 'Changes in Political and Social Functions of the Armed Forces in the Developing Countries: The Case of Latin America', in Morris Janowitz & Jacques van Doorn (eds), On Military Intervention, Rotterdam University Press, 1971.
28. J.J. Johnson, op.cit., p.126.
29. Thomas H. JOHNSON, Robert O. SLATER & Pat MCGOWAN, 'Explaining African Military Coups d'État, 1960-1982', in The American Political Science Review, vol.78, no.3-4, 1984, pp.632-633.
30. William F. GUTTERIDGE, 'Military Elites in Ghana and Nigeria', in African Forum, vol.2, no.1, Summer 1966, pp.31-41.
31. Ibid., p.40.
32. T.H. Johnson, R.O. Slater & Pat McGowan, op.cit., p.633.

33. As quoted in Africa Report, June 1966, p.23.
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35. Guillermo A. O'DONNELL, 'Reflections on Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State', in Latin American Research Review, vol.12, no.1, Winter 1978, p.31.
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37. As cited by Manfred Kossok, op.cit., p.430.
38. Eric A. NORDLINGER, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977.
39. T.H. Johnson, R.O. Slater & Pat McGowan, op.cit., p.632. The authors provide this observation from Aristide R. ZOLBERG, 'Military intervention in the new states of Africa', in H. Bienen (ed), The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968; and A.R. ZOLBERG, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in New States of Tropical Africa', in The American Political Science Review, vol.62, no.1, 1968, pp.70-87.
40. Seymour M. LIPSET, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', in The American Political Science Review, vol.53, no.1, March 1959, p.87.
41. Amos PERLMUTTER, 'Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations and Achievements', in World Politics, October 1980, p.102.
42. SINAMOS stands for 'National System for Social Mobilization', SCME stands for 'The System of Correlation of Man and his Environment', and EWS represents 'The Burmese Way to Socialism'. The SCME and EWS are military creations from Burma seeking a measure of social mobilization while SINAMOS is a more elaborate socio-economic version from Peru.
43. Samuel P. Huntington, op.cit., p.242.
44. Manfred Kossok, op.cit., p.405.
45. Julian LIDER, Military Force: An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Farnborough, England: Gower Publishing Company, 1981, p.17.
46. Amos Perlmutter, op.cit., pp.113-114.
47. J.I. DOMINQUEZ, Cuba: Order and Revolution, Cambridge, Mass: The

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978, p.342.

48. Ibid., pp.341-342. See also Samuel FINER, 'The Morphology of Military Regime', in R. KOLKOWITZ & A. KORBONSKI (eds), Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, p.301, where he writes that terms like 'military regime', 'military government' or 'military dictatorship' are terms of art rather than scientific categories.
49. J.I. Dominguez, op.cit., p.342. For an elaboration of what Dominguez terms the 'civic soldier', which he asserts has long been a key political goal in Cuba, see the whole chapter 'The Civic Soldier', pp.341-378.
Subsequent scholarship on the possible alteration of civic soldier suggests that there has been an emphasis on the military expertise of this fusion in the extended military commitments of Cuba overseas - what it categorizes as 'international service' - as well as maintaining military assistance programs in at least eight other African and Middle East countries. See J.I. DOMINQUEZ, 'The Cuban Army' in Jonathan K. Adelman (ed), Communist Armies in Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, pp.45-61, in particular p.49.
50. Reinhard SELTEN & Amos PERLMUTTER, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p.165; and Robert JACKMAN, 'The Predictability of Coup d'Etat: A model with African Data', in The American Political Science Review, vol.72, December 1978, p.1273.
51. Amos Perlmutter, op.cit., pp.115-116.
52. R.D. PUTNAM, 'Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics', in World Politics, vol.20, 1967-68, p.106.
53. Samuel HUNTINGTON, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
54. R.D. Putnam, op.cit., p.107.
55. Man Gu KANG, 'Toward an Alternative Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Military Intervention in Politics in Third World Countries', in Asian Perspectives, vol.11, no.2, Fall-Winter 1987, p.333.
56. M.C. NEEDLER, 'Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America', in The American Political Science Review, vol.1x, 1975, pp.616-626.
57. G.A. O'DONNELL, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973; and 'Reflections on Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State', in Latin American Research Review, vol.13, no.1, Winter 1978, pp.3-38.
Commenting on the theory of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Claude WELCH, in No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from

Politics in Africa and Latin America, Boulder, Colorado: Westville Press, 1987, p.15, says that Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism speaks of the exclusion of the popular sectors as a requisite for assuring social order.


58. Indeed the ethnocentric character of the dynamics of democratic development is considered by Belmont BRICE in 'The Nature and Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa', in African Forum, vol.2, no.1, Summer 1966, pp.57-67. Here he writes (p.67) 'Democracy, as it is understood in the West, does not offer much in the way of a solution. Internally, the techniques of democracy only solidify the lines of conflict; externally the Western democracies are an integral part of the turmoil.'
59. Claude E. WELCH, Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 17-18.
60. Amos Perlmutter, op.cit., p.98.
61. John FITCH, The Coup d'État as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1977, p.173.
62. Philippe C. SCHMITTER, 'Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967', in M. Janowitz & J. van Doorn (eds), On Military Intervention, Rotterdam University Press, 1971, p.29.
63. Oyeleye OYEDIRAN, 'Background to Military Rule', in O. Oyediran (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979, London: Macmillan Press, 1979, pp.1-24.
64. Ibid., p.2. Oyediran states that 'no political institution or group of political leaders is recognized and accepted as the legitimate intermediary to moderate conflicts between groups'.
65. Ibid., p.6.
66. Oyediran connects this with the subsequent civil war.
67. Quoted in Oyediran, op.cit., p.4.
68. Quoted in Oyediran, op.cit., p.288, as a footnote.
69. J.M. OSTHEIMER, Nigerian Politics, New York: Harper & Row, 1973, p.23.
70. See note 67.
71. Ostheimer, op.cit., p.21.
72. Ibid., p.24.
73. Ibid., p.29. There are of course implications here for the issues of post-colonial nationalism and political culture, both

of which are strongly related to the rationale of military intervention but as critically to the process of military disengagement.

74. Ibid., p.37.

75. Quoted in Oyediran, op.cit., p.6.

76. Salassie, op.cit.



Africa's Coup Belt

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL FEATURES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

AFRICA'S COUP BELT

There are currently eleven countries almost entirely located between the equator (0°) and the Tropic of Cancer (23,5°N) and stretching longitudinally from Burkina Faso to Ethiopia (5°W to 48°E) which have experienced the lion's share of the military interventions of Africa. These eleven nations and the number of coups d'état experienced are detailed in the following table.

Table 3.1

Nations of the Coup Belt and their Coup History

Nation	Number of interventions
Benin	5
Burkina Faso	5
Burundi	4
Central African Republic	3
Chad	3
Congo (People's Republic)	3
Ethiopia	3
Ghana	5
Nigeria	5
Sudan	5
Uganda	6
Total: 47	

Though representing only twenty-one per cent of the African nations they account for more than sixty-four per cent of all recorded coups d'état. A rudimentary statistical survey reveals that in aggregate and taken according to decade (1960s, 1970s and 1980s) the number of military interventions has remained approximately the same (seventeen in the 1960s including one in 1958, fifteen in the 1970s and fourteen in the 1980s).

Historical associations prior to colonial partition indicate the coalescing of major African States and chiefdoms; current national boundaries either envelop or traverse such groupings.¹

More significant for the purposes of examining military intervention is the existence of major societal and ethnic distinctions. One can observe a definite 'north-south' demography that in most instances has ethnic and religious correlation. Sudan's current civil war mirrors the Nigerian civil war experience, in which the Moslem north confronts the Christian south, the number of Southerners being considerably smaller in the Sudanese case. Even as recently as March 1987 there were religious riots in Kafanchan in Kaduna, Nigeria, which spread; after a week of communal violence 152 churches had been destroyed and only five mosques. Fourteen churches were burned down in and around Zaria, to the north of Kaduna. In 1986 there was a dispute over land between the Tiv of the state of Benue and the Obidu of Cross River which resulted in the death of thirty people.²

One also observes ethnic animosity in the Congo between regions to the north of Brazzaville, dominated by the M'Bochii and Kouyou, and regions to the south and east populated by the Bakongo. The military has reflected this tension, with the Bakongo holding key positions in the officer corps while the other ranks were primarily M'Bochii and Kouyou.³

Uganda has seen one of the worst conflagrations of the continent with an estimated 200,000 - 500,000 killed in the Luwero Triangle. Here one observes the cleavage between the 'martial' Nilotic northerners of the Acholi and Longu tribes and a southern Bantu peasantry primarily from the Baganda tribe. Social disintegration accelerated with further cleavages between the army and police but most dramatically between an army ethnically polarized, especially in

the other ranks, and the civilian community.

We do not have the time here to expound upon the traditional animosities of the peoples of the Rwenzori Mountains (the BuKenjo and Bwamba) against the Batoro. In Burundi one observes the continued animosities between the ruling Tutsi and the majority Hutu. Ethnic violence has erupted frequently with the 1972 conflagration being the most notorious to date with over 100,000 killed. Most recently, in 1988, a further 5,000 (mainly Hutu) perished in ethnic violence with a further 60,000 refugees fleeing to Rwanda. In Burkina Faso the dominant ethnic group, the Mossi, comprises half the population, as does that of the Akau in Ghana. In Ghana the Ewe has been perceived as a 'foreigner'⁴ which results in the existence of mutual suspicions especially in national politics.

In Ethiopia (the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia since September 1987) there is the continued Eritrean and Tigray resistance to President Mengistu Haile Mariam.⁵ Nevertheless efforts continue with resettlement and ruralization, which some observers have depicted as the intentional starvation of (more accurately the withholding of relief supplies from) non-cooperative populations under the ravages of famine. And here one can recall the effects of the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s which disrupted the economies and brought rural populations to near starvation for the central and western African nations within the coup belt (see map).

My intention in citing these features of the nations involved is not to posit a causal relationship between ethnic-climatic realities and military intervention.⁶ Another possible association that one observes is that of the eleven nations in the coup belt nine are recorded by the World Bank as being among the thirty-six nations with the lowest Gross National Product per capita (what the World Bank terms low-income economies). Only Nigeria and the Congo (People's Republic) are categorized outside this income grouping, being termed 'lower middle-income' nations, which comprise the next thirty nations after the low-income economies. Thus the eleven nations in the coup belt are among the poorest sixty-one nations with regard to Gross National Product per capita. Similar ratings exist with regard to life expectancy: of the eleven nations only the Congo (People's Republic) and Ghana have life expectancies of over fifty years for a

male citizen. Health-related indicators are little better.⁷

What emerges from this collage of various data is simply a rough association between socio-economic difficulties and the proclivity of military intervention. The coup belt appears to illustrate the apparent interrelationship of socio-economic and political decay, the relationship appearing mutually supportive. There is no attempt here to claim the possibility of the inverse relationship, namely that more favorable socio-economic indicators result in fewer military interventions. There is no argument proposing a determinant relationship. We are merely describing the complexity of the state of affairs in the coup belt.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF NIGERIAN SOCIETY

Barbarus hic ego sum, qui non intelligor
illis: Here I am a barbarian, because men
understand me not - Ovid⁸

The Nigerian populace is racially Negroid while exhibiting extreme ethnic diversity. With Africa's largest population⁹ there are some 250 ethnic groups within the country's 923 768 square kilometers of territory. The Niger river and its main tributary, the Benue river divides Nigeria into three unequal geographical sectors that has long been one of the country's characteristic features.

Cattle, fishing and mineral extraction have figured prominently in the economic health of the country but none moreso than the fuel resources of sub-bituminous coal and, most supremely, the nation's petroleum reserves; the latter resource being particularly valuable due to its sulphur-free content.

The 250 ethnic groups possess a plethora of customs, traditions, languages and dialects. Although some of these ethnic groups number less than 10 000 people the ten largest comprise approximately 80 per cent of the total population.¹⁰ The larger groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri, Tiv, and Nupe in the Northern areas; the Yoruba, Edo, Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ijaw in the Western areas; the Ibo, Efik, and Ibibio in the Eastern areas (See Figure 5.1). Although English is the Lingua Franca, Hausa, Yoruba, Edo, Ibo and Efik are widely spoken in addition to having their own literature.



Figure 3.2 Nigeria: Tribal Distribution

Source: Raph UWECHUE, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: A call for Realism, London: O.I.T.H. International Publishers, 1969, p.25.

Islam has a large adherence primarily in the North. Nationally it represents 47 per cent of the population as compared to 34 per cent for Christian adherents which are mostly found in the Eastern states.¹¹ In the Western States there is a mixture of Muslims and Christians that upon closer examination contains some surprises to the non-Nigerian observer.¹² Animists represent the third largest religion with important pockets existing mostly throughout Southern Nigeria.

One's reading of Nigerian society is more fully enhanced with an understanding of pre-colonial traditional institutions. These institutions derived from well organized social systems and ordered governments would impact with future colonial administrators that would eventually effect the course and nature of Nigeria's intra-societal disposition. As we will see later the British would demonstrate preferences for the administrative-cum-political practices of a particular people.

For now it is important to expand our knowledge of some of the traditional institutions alluded to above.

The Hausa-Fulani find their origin as early as the Barber invasion of the Sudan in the tenth century. During that epoch Prince Abu Yazid, son of Abdulahi King of Baghdad, fled to Bornu, in present day north-eastern Nigeria, and then to Daura. Finding favor with Queen Daura the Prince was married to the Queen who gave birth to Bawo. From Bawo's seven sons the original Hausa States would emerge namely, Kano, Rano, Gobir, Daura, Zaria, Katsina, and Zomfara. These seven states were brought under the Fulani leadership by islamization in the 19th century.¹³

Farming was and remains the main livelihood of the Hausas while the Fulanis has been cattle-herders. Hausaland became favorably situated on the Trans-Sahara trade route. Hausa agriculture as well as craftsmanship pushed considerably this line of commerce. This had a significant effect on the cultural, economic, political and social character of Hausaland.

The Hausa government was directed by traditional hereditary chiefs until the arrival of the Fulanis with their program of islamization. When this occurred the chiefs were eliminated along with their services. In their places muslims were appointed who

fully supported the institutionalization and spread of Islam as well as pledging their loyalty to the Fulani Kings. The emphasis and intent of Islam under the Kings was strikingly similar to more recent references to the Islamic revolution as witnessed in Iran.

The structure of government contained a variety of institutions exhibiting a high degree of administrative sophistication.

Every state had a Council of State comprised of directors or ministers, local government officials or councilors each of which bore an Islamic title. The King or Emir represented the center of authority in a highly centralized administration which saw the monarch's influence descending even to village level. The Emir himself headed the Council of State.

The manner of Hausa government produced specialists of many sorts without whom efficient administration would have proven all but impossible. The Sarkin Fada was the chief palace administrator. The Galadima was the city or capital administrator. The Madawaki was the cavalry commander and royal advisor on state appointments. He was in effect the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Waziri was the political Head of State. The Maaaji was the Emir's or King's Treasurer who formulated fiscal policies and supervised the collection of revenue. The sources of the latter having to conform to Islamic standards of fiscal justice.¹⁴

The responsibility of maintaining law and order fell to the Sarkin Yan Doka or Chief of Police. he was also authorized to judge certain cases with more serious offences being referred to the Sarkin Fada. The Yari was the Chief Prisons' Officer.

The judicial system permeated the entire society no less than the system of taxation. Village elders adjudicated minor cases while appeals went from the village to district courts and then to the Emir of city courts where the Sarkin and his council dealt with all political cases. The Sarkin was obliged to consult the Alkali (The Chief Muslim Legal Advisor). Any appeals coming from the Chief Alkali went to the High Courts¹⁵ whose Chief Justice would send any appeal finally to the Emir or King.

Like the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas were and remain mostly farmers. The Yoruba claims his/her common descent from Oduduwa and dispersion from Ile-Ife.¹⁶ As Oduduwa's son Oranmiyan is

recognized as the progenitor of his people the Ooni of Ife was the accepted spiritual head. The latter's importance would be directly affected by the impact of Islam and Christianity in forging new spiritual allegiances among the Yoruba.

Yoruba culture is marked by its high degree of urbanization within which one observes an 'hierarchical organization of political administrative authority'.¹⁷ The Yoruba continues as in earlier days to have a high degree of respect for elders. The extended family remains the basic social unit especially as observed within Yorubaland.

The political organization is headed by the Oba who is assisted by a number of chiefs, elders, heads of compounds and youth leaders who represent the various branches of administration such as public works, the judiciary, law and order, and commerce. The commerce of villages and towns was directed by craft organizations and guilds. There were also secret societies like the Ogboni and Osugbo who were involved in the conduct of executive and judicial functions. The leaders of these societies were members of the Oba's inner council which decided on issues and formulated policy.

The Oba himself 'depended on his chiefs, slaves, wives and servants as means of effective communication between him and his subjects'.¹⁸ The chiefs and the representatives of the people comprised the Oba's traditional advisers who were said to have virtual control over the Oba in the affairs of state. It becomes rather clear that the Oba's political and spiritual authority was not without limits. The democratic principles operating within this structure of government proved conducive to the maintenance of commerce, law and order, and the establishment of public works. This was achieved in large part through the Oba in consultation with his high chiefs and council of elders who conceived of and enacted legislation.

The limits of power affecting the Oba's reign and the manner by which society and sovereign resolved their differences is made plain by 'Bisi Taiwo who writes:

When the chiefs and other subjects refused to co-operate with an Oba as a result of grave misunderstanding, the Oba

might commit suicide or at least go into exile. Besides, chiefs and ordinary subjects could also be banished for rebellious and other serious offences. Whenever a chief was banished or if he committed suicide or died, either by poisoning or as a result of old age, that would enable the Oba to redistribute chieftaincy titles particularly among his favourites within the family circle. The death of any Oba himself usually led to very keen competition to succession among eligible princes or the royal families. Whatever the case, the choice of the Ifa Oracle and of the people, used to be final.¹⁹

The Yoruba judiciary also had several echelons from which it administered justice. The manner of recompense or reconciliation between aggrieved parties was distinctive, if not extraordinary, from Western norms. At the village level conflicts were resolved through the combined efforts of the elders, compound and lineage heads. In relatively mild cases the guilty party was obliged to seek forgiveness which was normally granted. But in more serious cases where the offending party was not repentant the individual could be banished. By contrast, when a civil case had been settled in that the judgement of the elders was acceptable to all concerned then Kola, alligator pepper and palm wine were shared.²⁰

Serious cases were brought to the attention of the Oba if they were not able to be resolved through previous adjudication. A judgement would be rendered by the Oba and the High Council of Chiefs and Elders which acted as the Supreme Court. The court was empowered to levy fines, set terms of imprisonment, declare banishment or the death penalty.

The Ibo social and cultural norms shared certain characteristics with the aforementioned society. However, the distinctions are in some respects considerable. Among the Ibo, leadership was recognized in the age and wisdom of the individual elder. Ibo culture produced citizens that were at once egalitarian and highly individualistic.²¹ This individuality insists on the right to social participation and the rejection of obsequiousness. Social participation was seen as subject to hard work and competition.

Public esteem and reward awaited the individual who proved himself in service to his people.²²

Like the Fulani and Yoruba, Ibo society organized its youth into age-sets and sexes. This system provided for the division of labor among the age-sets which saw the older ones maintain internal and external security for the community, inter alia, and the younger ones constructing and maintaining the network of paths, sweeping public parks and markets. Justice and peace among the age-sets was maintained by the old men of the community. Discipline was nonetheless mutually reinforced among the members of the particular age-set.

Traditional Ibo government or political organization has been classified as segmentary or republican due to the 'balancing [of] small, equal groups against each other and by the ties of clanship, marriage and religious association'.²³ Ibo society did not possess the ultimate monarch with a highly centralized government as in other traditional African societies. Instead, the political system was rooted in the family group which engendered the selection of a leader for each family from among the available elders. It was incumbent upon this leader to safeguard the members of the entire family through ancestral worship and associated sacrifices.

Ibo government was organized at the village level according to wards. A ward was comprised of a number of sections while a section was made up of extended families or compounds lead by elders. Each village possessed the Ama-Ala (The Council of Elders) and the Assembly of Citizens. The former body made the supreme decisions for the community. The decisions reached by the council were issued in the form of proclamations and decrees. On issues of particular sensitivity to the community the council would summon the Assembly of Citizens to provide clarification on decisions reached.

If in the event that the Council of Elders refused to communicate with the Assembly of Citizens, despite the community's desire for such a meeting, the council's decisions might well be ignored. But it was in the best interest of all parties concerned that such a situation be averted to ensure social stability and continuity.

When the Council of Elders and the Assembly of Citizens convened the former would provide analysis on the pertinent issues. Once the

analysis was made public everyone present, with certain restrictions on the number of speakers, had the right to express their opinion. If the Council of Elders attempted to press ahead with unpopular decisions it was possible for the Assembly of Citizens to invoke the unanimity rule.

In view of what we know of the Ibo traditional political system one can generally concur with Taiwo's observation:

Looking at the system as it was operated before the colonial era, one would agree ... that the village assembly was the Ibo man's birthright, his guarantee of right and a shield against oppression - the expression of his individualism. It was the means whereby the young and progressive impressed their views upon the old and conservative.²⁴

The Ibo judiciary was well developed beginning at the ward level where the assembly of ward members was the forum in which disputes between individuals were settled by the elders. More serious matters involving an assortment of crimes were examined by the Council of Elders and the Village Assembly of Citizens in joint session. Adjudication could be sought outside of these structures if the families involved requested the assistance of reputable elders in an effort to resolve differences. If an agreement could not be reached by this means an appeal could be made to the Council of Elders.

One is impressed by the fact that the various social, political and judicial institutions within Ibo traditional society lent themselves to the actual practice of a republican system of government, perhaps the most so in West Africa. Taiwo captures the essence of this form of governance when he observes that:

As there was no Ibo state, there was no central authority to weld the people into a political whole. The village groups had no central or co-ordinating authority. Each was a republic by itself. Traditional religious leaders, civic heads, warriors and clan heads combined to administer the villages.²⁵

What we find in examining Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo traditional systems of government are varying degrees of centralization which appear greater among the theocracies of the North, less so among the monarchies of the West and least (actually nonexistent) among the villages of the East. While making these generalizations about the above traditional societies it must be remembered that without exception these peoples practiced a considerable degree of social welfare as embodied in the extended family located within the village or town environment. Furthermore, these systems of government possessed the characteristics of social justice, responsibility and accountability within a general framework of a de jure social contract. To the extent that there existed a normative divergence with regards to egalitarianism and individualism among these diverse peoples one can perhaps detect the harbinger of future intercommunal suspicion and parochialism. But as we shall see further on there were other factors that impinged on intercommunal relations and on the entire course of establishing the nation of Nigeria. The nation itself, despite the charitable and well intended views of certain authors, simply did not exist in pre-colonial times.

IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO NIGERIAN INDEPENDENCE

We have briefly discussed the pre-colonial sociology of the three largest tribal groups of Nigeria. Stephen Leacock speaks of the loose manner by which the term 'nation' is used but which 'is properly to be thought of as having a racial or ethnographical significance'.²⁶ We can therefore consider the fact that one is dealing with at least three ethnographically distinct nations that will not only perceive the ethno-religious character of one another with circumspection, if not suspicion, but whose relationships with external powers will differ. Intercommunal relations will be directly effected in as much as new social beliefs are adopted from the external power by the indigenous nations. This is particularly so in the case of religious beliefs which can prove volatile in a competitive environment where an acknowledged sovereign does not exist. It is within this backdrop of 'domestic structure' that important developments are understood and defined.²⁷

J.F.A. Ajayi concedes the difficulty in selecting the most important developments in Nigerian history. In fact, his interest lies in the identification of the most important factors in what he sees as the unification of Nigeria. These factors provide much assistance in understanding the major events which culminate in national independence. Ajayi sets forth four factors namely, Islam, Christianity, British colonial rule, and Nationalism.²⁸

In May 1804 Shehu Uthman dan Fodio declared a jihad (holy war) in Gobir in north-west Nigeria. Ajayi writes:

The Fulani jihad was the first event of a truly nationwide significance in our history. Hardly any part of the country entirely escaped its influence. Its effect was considerable on peoples as widely separated as the Yoruba, the Igala and the Kanuri. Above all, it began to knit together inextricably the histories of the Fulani, the Hausa, the Gwari, the Nupe, the Jukun, and a host of other peoples in what is now Northern Nigeria.²⁹

This jihad was declared against 'peoples who pronounce the "profession of faith" and perform the deeds of Islam but mix with them acts of paganism',³⁰ The Hausa people were considered one such offender. The declaration of a jihad was also intended to promote the idea of a state dedicated to the propagation and purity of Islam. The state itself would demand loyalty to a theocratic ideal that would exist beyond the village and extended family.

Under Uthman dan Fodio's leadership a new empire extended itself over a large portion of Northern Nigeria. The theocratic ideal that spurred on expansion, especially with the first generation of leaders of the jihad, contained the concept of a cosmopolitan state founded on Islam. Resistance to this expansion could be found among those leaders and cities that did not share in Uthman dan Fodio's vision of a purer Islamic empire. Further resistance to any sort of Islamic political and religious insistence would be strongest among those populations where organized Christianity had taken root. Given the interweaving of expansion and resistance in the social, political and religious fabric of a yet to be formed Nigeria one can see the

potential, if not inevitability, of intercommunal violence. There were, however, some signs that expansion through jihad became less imperative after several decades in that the established dynasties became subordinate to their respective Emirs and as such confined to a particular city and area. Thus by the late 19th century loyalty became very much localized and with it the concept of a cosmopolitan state weakened.³¹

The Fulani jihad must also be remembered vis-à-vis the fall of the old Oyo empire. This collapse was accompanied by a series of wars waged among the Yoruba people.

War was associated with the capture of enemies who in turn were kept or sold as slaves. The coasts thus became the focal point for the slave trade which the British government fought against most especially after 1807.

The British anti-slavery squadron captured a large number of slaves at first mostly Yoruba. But as time went on among the freed slaves were an increasing number of Hausa, Igbo, Kanuri and Nupe. Many of these peoples began to arrive in Freetown and settled down as farmers. Besides Freetown (Sierra Leone) others migrated to the Gambia and the West Indies while still others joined the Royal West Indian Regiment.

Through the efforts of missionary societies the majority of the former slaves became Christians. The significance of which would be realized among certain groups more quickly than others. With Christianity came education and the young went to school or served apprenticeships. The schooled and technically trained later would become teachers, reverends, traders, tailors and catechists, inter alia. Whether Catholic or Protestant education and training were integral to the spreading of the gospel. The more outstanding of the converts were sent to Europe³² for instruction and then returned home to fill leadership roles.

Christianity was also seen as the instrument by which the slave trade could be combated in preference to the capture of slaves at sea and their resettlement in unfamiliar lands as was the practice of the British. The objected became to persuade Africans not to sell slaves by shifting their attention and efforts to the selling of cotton, indigo, ivory and palm oil to European clients. Such men as the

leader of the British anti-slavery movement, Thomas Buxton, were convinced that this commercial redirection could be achieved 'if the government, missionaries and traders would combine to introduce Christianity, European commerce and "civilisation" into Africa through the agency of these freed slaves... beginning... on the banks of the Niger',³³ Thus Christianity, commerce and civilization became the watchword in this more focused strategy. Coordination on the ground was conducted between British officials, missionaries and the freed slaves. Many of the freed slaves, particularly the well educated converts, had come to believe that the greatness of European civilization was in fact founded on Christianity. There was therefore no moral conflict in advancing the structures and forms of European civilization in Nigeria. Christianity was soon established in Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ogbomoso, Calabar, Bonny, Brass and Onitsha. Christianity would spread further into the hinterland from these strong Christian loci. The advancement of Christianity would have the effect of creating new social and political conditions that were underpinned by values and norms that were catholic in nature. As with the Fulani jihad the expansion of Christianity was a call away from a strictly parochial mindset and allegiance. But unlike the former event which used the instrumentality of warfare and administration the latter development relied on the establishment of mission schools with their attendant educational and technical programs. Moreover, one must be careful to make further distinctions between the spread of a theocratic empire in the North and the evangelistic-cum-scholastic campaigns throughout the West and East. To side the British government with the Christian churches would be an inaccuracy as shall be seen later. The suggestions by Thomas Buxton were not fully heeding by the British government especially North of the Niger and Benue rivers. The point to be made at this point is that the theological traditions of the North and South were well established by the end of the 19th century with the influence of indigenous animism diminishing. Regardless of theological views among the various groups throughout Nigeria modernization would become inextricably linked with increased educational and vocational opportunities. The Muslim North would recognise this fact at a much later stage than the South.³⁴ National independence would bring

with it increased legislation to redress the educational and professional advantages of the South over the majority of citizens located in the North. There would be long term social and political consequences because of this dichotomous development and emphasis of Islam and Christianity throughout Nigeria in the 19th century.

British colonial rule has been the subject of controversy especially in its relationship to the establishment of multiple centers of ethno-religious influence. The expansion of Islam into the South was checked by the British in 1847. The slave trade had also been stopped by this time. Concurrently, missionary activity was promoted, particularly in the southern regions. Spheres of ethno-religious influence were thus demarcated under a general British policy of 'indirect rule'.³⁵ The British government had no intention of unifying Nigeria under the banner of political or religious reform. Instead,

They were essentially traders from abroad anxious to establish a situation favourable for the growth and development of their trade. They had naval and military power and technical ability far above anything in the country, and when the time came they were willing to use these to secure the conditions necessary for making their trade flourish.³⁶

Initially the British authorities were content with trading on the coast. By 1849 and 1851 consuls were established in Fernando Po and Lagos, respectively. Uncooperative indigenous rulers were removed and/or replaced such as the Oba of Lagos in 1851 and a King of Bonny in 1854. In 1861 Lagos was annexed and British administration ensued.

In 1879 commercial penetration of most of northern Nigeria was formalized when the British consortium United African Company (U.A.C.) was established. The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 awarded most of present day Nigeria to Great Britain. Consequently, in order to facilitate the establishment of 'effective occupation' of these territories the U.A.C. received a Royal Charter to administer the northern region on behalf of Britain.³⁷ In 1899 the Charter was

revoked in favor of direct administration by the British Government. Subsequently, northern Nigeria was organized into a single administrative entity and named the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In 1906 the Niger Coast Protectorate and Lagos colony were joined to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. On 1 January 1914, northern and southern Nigeria were amalgamated and brought under one administration. The architect of this event was Lord Frederick Lugard who became Nigeria's first Governor-General. And so began the modern political history of Nigeria.³⁸

The economic philosophy buttressing British activity both before and after the formal enactment of colonial administration would become known as the Dual Mandate. The substance of Dual Mandate was earlier expressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, in the late 19th century but more precisely articulated under Lord Lugard. According to I.F. Nicolson, Lugard's Dual Mandate was suggestive of:

neither exploitation in the selfish interest of the conqueror, nor a pure humanitarian civilizing mission, but a kind of symbiosis for the benefit of both - in Lugard's words the 'dual mandate' [was intended] to develop 'the abounding wealth of the tropical regions of the earth' for the benefit of mankind and at the same time 'to safeguard the material rights of the natives' and 'to promote their material and moral progress'.... In practice, there was a good deal of selfish exploitation at one extreme and a good deal of selfless service at the other, rather than the perfected system of mutually profitable, nicely balanced advantage...³⁹

While the Dual Mandate may be seen as constituting the economic philosophy of British colonialism it cannot be accurately equated to the mere division and conquest of native peoples. There was far more at play. Paul Bohannon states that the enforcement of Pax Britannica over its territories had 'frozen' the societies within a colony not merely in time, but in space. By this he means that British colonial administration had greatly affected an 'extremely dynamic situation

of migrations, wars, and movement' among native peoples. Whereas previous 'political territories [were] frozen in space', these 'political units were not allowed to fight one another'. Colonial administration in effect restrained certain intercommunal behavior, artificially so. In addition, 'it worked untold changes in the power and authority systems within African societies'.⁴⁰ The consequences of colonial administration would not be known until the post-independence years. While British rule had brought with it the 'certainty of the law' its absence would open the possibility of lawlessness once Pax Britannica was removed. Suzanna Cronje writes that:

Lugard insisted that his task was "to unify administrations, not peoples", and he insisted on preserving the separate identity of the two halves, despite strong advice that this would make the future of Nigeria as a single entity very difficult.⁴¹

Cronje and others would warn the observer not to conclude that Britain stood as a neutral arbiter with regards to the various societies it oversaw. Much of the Colonial office was impressed by the 'administrative genius' of the North. The region as a whole was perceived as more cooperative when compared to the Eastern and Western regions whose leaders were considered more troublesome. The Colonial Government had worked to preserve the North as an Islamic society and had prevented any serious threat to its social-political order. In large parts, 'this meant that missionaries were kept out, together with modern education which would, of course, have undermined both the traditional authority of Islam and Britain's indirect rule'.⁴² But more serious to the future character of Nigeria was what Cronje says was the decision by the Colonial Office in London to transfer power into the hands of the North as independence approached.⁴³ It is reasonable to presume that Britain saw Northern stability and administrative ability as the locus for post-independence leadership. The North was home to the majority of Nigerians while the West and South were not seen as fit candidates to direct the country. British interests and its

continued influence upon Nigeria would, logically, be better served by the North who of the three major regions had come closest to the exercise of national administration through the old empire. Clearly the North's numerical strength and capacity for sophisticated administration had greatly influenced the British.⁴⁴

Speaking from a Nigerian perspective, Billy Dudley insists that whatever motivation or intentions were behind the colonial settlement which saw the advent of independence throughout Africa colonial administration 'had built into it factors of instability which made these new states highly susceptible to crises and therefore, military intervention'.⁴⁵ And with the military intervention that eventually appeared after independence there would be the need to explore the entirely new field of military disengagement.

Thus far our examination of the major developments preceding Nigerian independence have included Islam, Christianity, and British colonial rule. To this list we must add the nationalist movement. Nationalism has been defined in both its more narrow and immediate sense as well as in its wider meaning and mechanics. In the former sense nationalism suggests 'some sort of policy framed by indigenous Africans to achieve national self-determination by the complete removal of alien rule. [While in the latter sense]... nationalism is really the sentimental as well as the practical activities directed strictly towards the achievement of independence and nationhood or statehood'.⁴⁶ Although the 19th century would see a variety of constitutional and political events nationalism as a force would not appear until during and most especially after World War II. The inter-war years were seen as the continuation of British administration with its emphasis on the maintenance of law and order, and the protection of trade routes. During this period there were no major racial or political antagonisms.⁴⁷ However, the emergence of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) from 1938 to 1941 has prompted Arthur A. Nwankwo to state that:

It is probably true to say that Nigerians came closest to true nationalism during the struggle for independence, particularly in the early 1940s.... All the nationalist forces, representing the most active elements and socio-

political formations as well as political parties, were fused into one movement - Ernest Ikoli, Kofi Abayomi, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Akinsanya, etc.⁴⁸

With pathos, Nwankwo is quick to explain that the nationalist movement was dealt a 'mortal blow' by ethnicity which surrounded the selection of the NYM representative to the Legislative Council.⁴⁹ Known as the 'Akinsanya crisis' Nwankwo contends that this controversy which ended in disagreement among the various nationalists broke the common national spirit that motivated their consciousness and collective effort. From this point on nationalism was pursued less so from the vantage point of a collective analytical synthesis and more so from the leaders' personal perspectives which meant greater ethnic identification. For the time being the increasing desire for independence would provide the glue for the nationalist movement among diverse leaders and their supporters but latent suspicions would eventually surface. The Commander of the Biafran Army, Major-General Alexander A. Madiebo, wrote retrospectively:

The growth of nationalism and the subsequent emergence of political parties were based on tribal rather than national interests, and therefore, had no unifying effect on the people's against the colonial master. Rather, it was the people themselves who were the main victims of the political power struggles which were supposed to be aimed at removing foreign domination.⁵⁰

The end of the second world war saw the colonial government with a surplus of revenue derived from the marketing boards and overseas aid which was earmarked for social and economic programs. The availability of these monies contributed to a rising level of expectations which fuelled the nationalist movement with its goal of independence. However, consistent with Madiebo's observations et al D.J. Murray writes:

Politicians encouraged expectations in order to build up discontent against colonial government and so provide

themselves with a basis of power.⁵¹

The basis of power was in fact temporal, latently conditional, and ethnically variegated. It can be reasonably argued that the nationalist leaders had throughout the pre-independence period subordinated overtly ethnic considerations and interests to the national campaign that moved inexorably towards self-rule. One can consider for example the thrust of the nation-wide campaign by the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1946 in which the leadership wanted to revise the content of the proposed constitution (Richards) which had been pushed through the Legislative Council in March 1945. The NCNC pressed on the issue of greater indigenous management. The 1946 campaign represented the first large scale attempt to reach all parts of the country, including the North, with a specific nationalist demand. Subsequently, the constitution was revised. There were consultations commencing at the village and proceeding to the District, Provincial and Regional levels. The consultations of 1948-9 were a first in the political history of Nigeria and 'a major exercise in the political education of the country and in ensuring the participation of all its different peoples in building up the new nation'.⁵²

Despite these developments, which were not without radical activity,⁵³ and the establishment of regionally and religiously based parties/associations, the nationalist movement is viewed critically by many Nigerians. It was from its inception conceived and led by a generation of men, some of whom had studied in the United States and Britain, who were able to move and direct significant portions of the populace. As we have mentioned above there was for a time the subordination of ethnic interests to the nationalist goal of independence. However, mutual self-interest and cooperation could not be identified for anything beyond the objective of self-rule. This being the case, the nationalist leaders amidst their own inability to arrive at a common understanding, cooperation and organization would turn to their respective ethnic-regional linkages. In effect Nigeria could not speak of a genuine national leadership leading to and emerging from independence. The nationalist leaders would build their constituencies and fight for

their respective interests. It is the frustration of Nigerians that a form of nationalism was unable to materialize that could sublimate ethnic interest. There would be no melting pot producing a united and prosperous society. It is perhaps in this vein that Arthur Nwankwo wrote:

Thus, Nigerian nationalism was sacrificed on the altar of power politics among the country's founding fathers.... Unquestionably, the spirit of nationalism in Nigeria was abused and misused by those who claim to have given us independence. Instead of giving us a strong, united Nigeria, they left a legacy of divisiveness, ethnic and regional chauvinism, as well as a history of political intolerance, all of which made the emergence of true nationalism in Nigeria "mission impossible" for succeeding generations.⁵⁴

NOTES

1. The following table matches modern states with major African states or chiefdoms predating colonial partition.

Modern African States	Major Pre-Partition African States and Chiefdoms
Benin	Fulani Empire and Dahomey
Burkina Faso	Fulani Empire (in east)
Burundi	Burundi
Central African Republic	none
Chad	Kanem (in west), Wadai, Darfur (in east)
Congo (People's Republic)	none
Ethiopia	Ethiopia (Shoa)
Ghana	Ashanti, Samori (in north-west)
Nigeria	Fulani Empire, Yoruba states
Sudan	Mahdist state of the Sudan (from 1885)
Uganda	Buganda, Bunyoro, Karagwe, Ankole

2. Colin LEGUM, (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1986, p.132.
3. Samuel DECALO, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1976, p.146.
4. T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications, 1986, p.460.
5. In The Problems of Communism, 1988, p.63, Richard F. STAAR relates that strongman Mengistu has steered Ethiopia towards an institutionalized communist party-state that is, however, only apparent, in that he retains his positions as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.
6. In conversation with Professor Rogerson of the Department of Geography of the University of the Witwatersrand, I had to fend off repeated warnings against attempting to make a specious association.
7. WORLD BANK, 1986 World Development Report, Table 1, p.180; Table 27, p.232; and Table 28, p.234.
8. As quoted by Jean J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract and Discourses, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1952, p.117.

9. Conservatively estimated by the World Bank at 74 120 000 in 1984, see, The World Bank Atlas 1986, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, p.8. The issue of an accurate census in Nigeria has proven notoriously problematic throughout the post independence period. Regional contentions have rendered an accurate count of the country's diverse peoples all but impossible given the current realities and previous methodologies. For example, a Nigerian residing in the city of Lagos has in the past been often double counted. This was due to technical considerations which saw the counting of the individual according to his/her usual place of residence (de jure) as well as where the person was found (de facto). While in Lagos the author was informed that it was considered one's 'patriotic duty' to ensure that he/she was counted according to ethnic/regional origin even if counted already in the de facto manner. In the opinion of one Nigerian administrator the 1973 census was 'marred by ethnic political considerations'. See Professor P.K. MAKINWA-ADEBUSOYE, 'History and Growth of the Nigerian Census', in The Valiant: Journal of the Nigerian Defence Academy, (Special Edition) Silver Jubilee 1989, Kaduna: The Nigerian Defence Academy, pp.16-22.
10. See T.C. McCASKIE, 'Nigeria: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, London: Europa Publications, p.724.
11. The Star Africa News Service: Africa 1989, Pretoria: The Africa Institute of South Africa.
12. It is not unusual to find marriages in which a Muslim is married to a Christian. One may find a family that is predominantly Christian over two or three generations but it is rare to find that the extended family itself is of one faith alone. It was also fascinating to find Muslims in metropolitan Lagos and as far afield as Kaduna who claimed there were only slight differences in the two faiths. These differences are not ordinarily considered minimal among the citizenry in the North and East.
13. 'Bisi TAIWO, Government and Politics in West Africa (A Critical Approach) Part 1. Ibadan: Book Representation Co., 1982, p.14. Much of the information on the pre-colonial traditional institutions is drawn from this work.
14. Revenue collection was drawn from customary sources. However, new taxes were periodically introduced. 'Bisi Taiwo, *ibid.*, p.15, writes:

'Some of the sources included fees charged on the use of market stalls, recreation parks, especially racecourses and other public facilities. At borders, gates, inlets and outlets to cities, towns and all villages, tolls were collected from traders. Since the movement of traders was seasonal, that was a limiting factor on the amount of revenue collected, so other sources had to be devised.'

Among some of these other sources was the Khara - a land tax based on annual yield or production rather than the extent of

cultivated land which took into account the realities of occasional bad harvests, among other things. The Jangali was a special livestock tax again determined according to amount and quality of the stock. The Lizya was a tax levied on slaves, strangers or aliens. The Zakat was a tax on all movable properties and as such was the commonest tax for every citizen and alien. Its purpose being to provide alms for the poor, the needy, the distressed and the dying. Today the Zakat remains obligatory in accordance with Muslim ethics.

15. A High Court could comprise a dozen or so judges in addition to its presiding Chief Justice.
16. The dispersion of the Yoruba people is usually associated with, and referred to as, the black diaspora which saw countless members of this ethnic group sent to the New World. Today there are such bodies as the Brazilian Yoruba society which attests to the legacy of the dispersion.
17. 'Bisi Taiwo, op.cit., p.9.
18. Ibid., p.11.
19. Ibid., pp.12-13. In instances where an Oba fell into disfavor with his people an elder of the people would present the ruler with a calabash which presented the option of drinking poison or going into exile. It is worth noting that under future Nigerian military rule the old practice of banishment would reappear in the form of banning politicians from previous civilian regimes from participating in newly constituted civilian governments i.e., those governments to which the military would return control within a program of military disengagement. See, for example, the New Nigerian 18 January 1979, p.1, in which General Olusegun Obasanjo expounds on the rationale for banning former politicians which appears to highlight a traditional Yoruba judiciary/ethical standard namely, that the offending party (old politicians) should 'show signs of remorse and penitence'.
20. Witness the sharing of Kola nuts between the commander of the 3 Marine Commando Division and the Biafran Army Commander at the end of the Nigerian civil war. Personally, I found the Kola far too bitter on my first attempt.
21. Even in contemporary Nigerian society the Ibo is widely recognized as an entrepreneur. It is quite common to see one man businesses among the Ibo combined with the desire to obtain a measure of wealth as independently as possible.
22. Honorary chieftancies are given today to those individuals that have greatly succeeded in their field of endeavor. This in turn obligates the one so honored to share a portion of his wealth with his community i.e., the one that bestows said honor.
23. 'Bisi Taiwo, op.cit., p.25.

24. Ibid., p.26.
25. Ibid., p.27.
26. Stephen LEACOCK, Elements of Political Science, London: Constable & Company, 1924, p.15.
27. As G. Aforika NWEKE points out, the definition of the concept 'domestic structure' is problematical. We are often uncertain what accurately constitutes this 'complex entity'. It remains complex given the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society. See said author's 'The Domestic Structure and Processes of Nigeria's Foreign Policy', in G.O. OLUSANYA & R.A. AKINDELE (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, Ibadan: University Press, 1986, pp.33-34.
28. J.F.A. AJAYI, Milestones in Nigerian History, Essex: Longman, 1981, p.2.
29. Ibid., p.5.
30. Ibid., p.11.
31. It has been argued by Chief Francis Arthur NZERIBE et al that Nigeria possesses a 'Northern hegemonist fundamentalism' that continues to impose its will on the nation as a whole. See above author's Nigeria: Another Hope Betrayed, London: Kilimanjaro, 1985, p.32. Theoretically, one may argue that 'Northern hegemony' may be the modern day version of the original concept of the cosmopolitan state. If so, the question remains whether the North aspires to dominate through the military and/or formal structures of government. Another question is whether the North is as monolithic as Nzeribe et al believe. There is evidence that identification among Northern peoples has shifted more closely according to ethno-religious lines rather than regional affiliation. This more so especially after the religious violence of 1987.
32. For example, Bishop Crowther was trained in a parish school in Islington, England and upon his return he became a founding member of the training college at Fourah Bay.
33. J.F.A. Ajayi, op.cit., p.16.
34. Consider the fact that in 1960, the year of Nigerian independence, 96 per cent of the schools in Nigeria were mission-operated schools many receiving government assistance but nevertheless church directed. See Paul BOHANNAN, Africa and Africans, New York: Natural History Press, 1964, p.23.
35. Paul Bohannan defines 'indirect rule' as a 'method for trying to "maintain" the power system of an indigenous society, while hooking it to a supererogatory alien system of power'. See Paul Bohannan, op.cit., p.17.

36. J.F.A. Ajayi, op.cit., p.23.
37. 'Effective occupation' meant the consolidation of alien political rule over an indigenous people that extended beyond indefinite claims of influence by the European power. 'Effective occupation' represented the legal and substantive proof of more effective European colonization. 'Indirect rule' was the mechanism by which 'effective occupation' was established. Technically speaking, 'effective occupation' initially applied to 'determining the validity of sovereignty in coast lands' while 'hinterland' theory was adopted to enable each European power to 'exercise influence for an indefinite distance inland'. As I.F. NICOLSON points out, there was a time when France and Britain claimed Northern Nigeria as the 'hinterland' of the Mediterranean and of the West African coasts, respectively. (See above author's The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960: Men, Methods, and Myths, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, p.5.)
38. Arthur NWANKWO, Civilianized Soldiers: Army-Civilian Government for Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1984, p.3.
39. I.F. Nicolson, op.cit., p.17. As well as being a watchword for British colonialism The Dual Mandate was a published work (1922) written by Lord Lugard in the years immediately following his retirement from Nigeria.
40. Paul Bohannon, op.cit., p.13.
41. Suzanne CKONJE, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-70, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972, p.5.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p.7.
44. This situation reminds one of the precision and criteria by which succession is pursued under military governments. Similar to a nation embarking upon military disengagement the British colonial government scoured the nation for the best suitors for national leadership both organizationally and personally. A prospective suitor would be helped by not having severely tested the patience of the colonial government. Both colonial and military governments would more often than not equate a suitor's indiscreet activism with radicalism and thus creating intense suspicions in the process of succession whether of a post-colonial variety or derived from military disengagement.
45. Billy J. DUDLEY, 'The Military and Politics in Nigeria', in VAN DOORN (ed), Military Profession and Military Regimes, The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1969, p.218.
46. This according to 'Bisi Taiwo, op.cit., p.152.

47. This is not meant to downplay such occurrences as the Ijemo Massacre of 1918, in which 500 men were killed by Lord Lugard's troops during a tax revolt, or the riots in the Eastern cities of Aba and Warri in 1927 and 1929 respectively.
48. Arthur A. NWANKWO, National Consciousness for Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1985, p.22.
49. The Legislative Council was established in 1922 after the abolition at the Nigerian Council which had been instituted by Lord Lugard as an advisory body in 1914. The Legislative Council was established only for the South while the North continued under more direct British legislation. It would not be until 1947 where an assembly of national scope would be established.
50. Alexander A. MADIEBO, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1980, pp.4-5.
51. D.J. MURRAY, 'The impact of politics on administration', in A. ADEDEJI (ed), Nigerian administration and its political setting: A collection of papers given at the Institute of Administration, University of Ife, London: Hutchinson Educational, 1968, p.15.
52. J.F.A. Ajayi, op.cit., p.33.
53. Here I refer to the 1950 attempt on the life of the Chief Secretary to the colonial government by a member of the Zikists who were based in the East. The Zikist movement was later banned.
54. Arthur A. Nwankwo, op.cit., p.23.

THE 1966 COUPS IN GHANA AND NIGERIA

GHANA : THE COUP OF 24 FEBRUARY 1966¹

At the time of writing, Ghana has experienced five successful coups d'état.² Both in successful and unsuccessful attempts the military either confronted particular, though not well defined, evolving ideas as in the case of 'Nkrumahism' up to the eventual 24 February coup, or actually perpetuated a 'nebulous leftist populism' as pursued under the leadership of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in 1979 and with his second entry on 31 December 1981. The perennial issues of unsatisfactory leadership and corruption would continue to be highlighted throughout this period of Ghana's post-independence experience.

It is essential as well as illuminating to consider, at length, the 24 February 1966 coup d'état in that it provides revelation and detail concerning the sensitive spots in African civil-military relations. The rationales given provide a consistent thread of logic with regard to the military corporate interest within a framework of definite professional ideas of an emotive kind that are not to be violated.

On the day of the coup, the commander of the second army brigade at Kumasi and leader of the coup, Colonel E.K. Kotoka, announced that the takeover by the Army was motivated by Ghana's serious economic and political situation.³ Greater definition and detail of this rationale would be forthcoming.

In a real sense Nkrumah committed the same indiscretion as President Olympio of Togo in that these heads of state were determined to promote their social programs, whether formulated or ad hoc, regardless of the military's sentiment. This oversight or miscalculation of civilian leaders vis-à-vis their military counterparts remained one of the most salient features of civil-military relations in the first decade of post-independence Africa.

President Nkrumah ordered the total Africanization of the officer corps on 22 September 1961 after his return from a summer spent touring communist countries in Eastern Europe. Civil-military relations subsequently underwent a considerable change as the officer corps had for four years operated under the tutelage of seconded British officers. President Nkrumah had previously been somewhat cautious of an Africanization that would produce a military not sufficiently loyal to civilian governance. A foreign presence was perceived as a buffer of sorts until a sufficiently apolitical and institutionalized military force emerged in Ghana.

In the early 1960s men like Sekou Touré of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Julius Nyerere (most especially after the January 1964 mutiny) had come to the conclusion that the military owed loyalty to the party as well as the state because the party, in their estimation, was equivalent to the state. No doubt Nkrumah's exposure to civil-military relations of communist countries had impressed him to the extent that he embarked upon an attempt to implement some of the same features of indoctrination that he had observed. This element of loyalty-cum-control, more commonly known as the penetration model, would be perceived as an unacceptable and alien ideological endeavor fundamentally aimed at controlling the military.⁴

However, seeds of discontent and suspicion had already been planted in the hearts of the military leadership. A number of experiences from 1960 to 1962 had lowered the military's opinion of their civilian counterparts. During Ghana's participation, with both army and police contingents, as part of the United Nations emergency force in Congo-Leopoldville, the Ghanaian military commanders were exposed to Ghanaian diplomats who seemed to assume that their national contiguity was a tactical political instrument.⁵ The Ghanaian military had to react to the conflicting demands of UN policy, Ghanaian diplomats in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and the Congolese Government. This was a time when policy directives were followed by military men who had come to expect a measure of coherency from their civilian superiors. Professional standards were maintained and the military adhered to the apolitical principal. What they had not counted on was that President Nkrumah would launch

a foreign policy that increasingly antagonized the Congolese and resulted in casualties of the Ghanaian police and military contingents at the hands of their Congolese hosts.⁶ The effectiveness of these contingents while still in theater was predictably reduced and a portion thereof were compelled to leave the Congo. The Congo experience, in fact, marked the beginning of the disillusionment of many serving officers with Nkrumah's government.⁷

And then there is the famous directive issued by President Nkrumah while in Eastern Europe for the seconded General Officer Commanding Alexander to select 400 cadets for officer training in the Soviet Union. Persuasive arguments were presented as to the inadvisability of mixing two opposing military traditions; moreover, only a small number of qualified cadets were available. Eventually only sixty-eight cadets of inferior quality actually spent time in the USSR, and that for only a fraction of the time originally intended, owing to cultural-linguistic difficulties.

Further civilian entry into areas that were considered the domain of the military increased the widening perspective between both these two elite groups regarding an appropriate national policy. As examples of increased civilian incursions into the military domain one can cite the following:- the shortening of the officer course at the Military Academy, government interference in the selection of personnel to receive military training abroad, the president's intention to reduce defense expenditures and mix the national arsenal with free military hardware from the Soviet Union (much resisted by the officer corps), the introduction of a civic action program⁸ entailing unit participation, and, most significantly, the attempt to bring the military into a closer identification with the Convention People's Party in June 1964. This last item was reinforced by a government directive calling for the members of the military to join the CPP. There is little evidence that many of these directives were actually fully carried out.

As early as 1958 coup plots had been identified and this launched President Nkrumah on his search for sufficient counterweights to neutralize the military as a potential political rival. The assassination attempt of January 1964 saw in its wake the

imprisonment of eight senior police officials and the disarming of the police, leaving the 9,000 man force an emasculated counterweight to the military.

Neither the unarmed Workers Brigade nor the Army Volunteer Force were conceived as counterweights to the military; this is also probably the case with the People's Militia which was formed in 1965. The only real counterweight to the institutional military was the Presidential Guard Regiment. This unit was originally under Army command, drawing its members from the regular army.⁹ In 1963, after the Kulungugu assassination attempt, the President transformed it into the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR). With the reorganization of the entire Defense establishment in July 1965, the POGR was detached from the army chain of command and made directly responsible to President Nkrumah.¹⁰ The reaction from the regular army was predictable in that its institutional norms were not adhered to. More significantly the writing was clearly on the wall that the military was sooner or later to become a penetrated institution with the CPP as its head; military autonomy was slowly being circumvented and time to act while the structure and means to act were still available was running out. This urgency to act increased amidst an atmosphere of intrigue complete with government informants in the officers mess. In a real sense the Ghanaian political situation had become a race by President Nkrumah to secure institutional subservience through encroachment while creating his own locuses of countervailing force. On the other hand the military saw it as a race in which its own time to counter this plan was quickly running out; there were simply no alternatives given by the government as to the military's ideological future nor any assurances as to the preservation of its corporate identity, let alone its autonomy.

With the establishment of the National Liberation Council (NLC) one immediately observes two items in the order of priorities. The first and second orders of business were the composition of the ruling body and the emphasis on social order. As if anticipating the severe trauma that Nigeria was to experience several months later, the members of the NLC came from diverse ethnic affiliations. Of the eight men within the council three were Ewe, two Ga, one Ashanti, one Fanti, and one a Northerner. There was also an equal distribution of

army and police members - four from each organization.¹¹ In this instance of military intervention there would be no equivalent of a Nigerian Ibo concentration among the participating officers and thus no ethnic rationale for intergroup confrontation.¹² Social order or control would involve the maintenance of law and order as well as the complete dismantling of the political system,¹³ principally by the methods of decree, and discrediting through judicial inquiry. All organs of political power under President Nkrumah were eradicated, including the Farmers' Council, the Young Pioneers, the Moslem Council, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (Winneba Institute of Ideological Studies), in addition to the Convention People's Party. Legislation promulgated under the auspices of the CPP was also abrogated. There was the repeal of the infamous Prevention Detention Act promulgated as part of the Criminal Procedure (amendment) Act, 1964, as well as the abolition of the Special Criminal Division of the High Court. There was also the amendment of the Judicial Service Act and the reactivation of the Judicial Service Commission in an attempt to restore the independence of the judiciary and to guarantee security of tenure to the members of the bench.¹⁴

Such measures are an ubiquitous feature of military intervention. The new military leadership almost inevitably embarks upon a road dismantling and/or reinstating all the features of governance, be they institutional or legislative. Factors of time and capacity amidst a specific political culture determine whether any innovation actually takes place. This process of dismantling and/or reinstating does not represent the fundamental restructuring of society and its representative structures. It is a palliative of political hope and little more, especially within the framework of a short period of military rule in transition towards civilian rule. We can further witness in the Ghanaian case another device of this political hope and technique in the reduction of the number of ministries from thirty-two to eighteen and of administrative districts from a hundred and sixty-eight to forty-seven. Party functionaries of the CPP were replaced by regional and district committees. One may recall Zaire's attempts at reduction in the 1960s under Savetu.

The NLC saw itself from the outset as a transitional regime as pronounced by Lieutenant-General Ankrah. Much of its period in power was occupied with the preparation for a return to civilian governance.¹⁵ Consequently there would be no permanent changes to the character, political culture if you will, of the means of securing representation and power in the councils of government nor to the political economy of the nation. The stage was essentially set for further disruptions of the political environment. The rationale for military-cum-revolutionary intervention or action would echo previous incursions, with the recent difference of a more revolutionary perspective and explanation of Ghanaian political realities.

NIGERIA : THE COUP OF 15 JANUARY 1966

Promulgation by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, 15 January 1966:

In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the Regional Court and elected assembly are hereby dissolved. All political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities together with all demonstration and unauthorised gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice.

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united, and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly military, but we have no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation by assisting the regime.... All treaty obligations previously entered into with any foreign nations will be respected, and we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides with enemies of the revolution and enemies of the people.... Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent, ... those that

have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers, we are not, repeat not, promising you anything miraculous or spectacular, but what we do promise every law-abiding citizen is freedom from fear or other forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency, and freedom to reach the sky in every field of human endeavor both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are Nigerian.... I wish you good luck and I hope you will cooperate to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity.

Thank you very much and good-bye for now',¹⁶

[National anthem]

With this proclamation¹⁷ began the era of military intervention and rule in Nigerian politics. Chukwuma Nzeogwu continues to be a point of controversy and speculation. And the January coup has elicited both strong criticism as well as forlorn sentiments of a lost hope depending of course on which segments of Nigerian society one speaks to.

The early examinations by Martin J. Dent¹⁸ and Robin Luckham¹⁹ are substantive and provide a sound foundation on which subsequent studies can build. This being said, these early works came relatively soon after the 1966 coups, and although commendably balanced could not reflect on the accounts of conspirators, who remained in detention until the mid-1970s.²⁰ The early chroniclers were also neither Nigerian nor exponents of particular factions; this is in strong contrast to the flurry and content of publications which appeared during Shehu Shagari's Second Republic.²¹

With the above in mind let us proceed.

Several significant themes can be identified in Major Nzeogwu's speech which appear to reflect the substantive rationale for the January military intervention. Of these one can highlight the following: the establishment of a nation free from corruption and internal strife; the method of approach - strictly military; and the revolution and its enemies. The first of these themes harkens back

to the subject of order as previously discussed. The second relates to the manner of execution - coup mechanics. The third at least implies an ideological perspective or agenda together with a description of its enemies. Subsequent revelations including conspiratorial accounts amply expound on these themes, and together with the early studies provide sufficient material for an increasingly comprehensive understanding of coup rationale.

Luckham describes it thus

To be sure, in the Nigerian context ... conditions for military intervention were provided by the weakening in legitimacy of the civilian authorities during the first years of independence.²²

Oyeleye Oyediran²³ provides a concise distillation of the rationale for military intervention:

- 1) Constitutional problems²⁴
- 2) north-south and ethnic conflicts
- 3) the issue of state creation,²⁵ and
- 4) the dilemma of the army's structure.

To appreciate the extent to which the legitimacy of civilian authority had deteriorated, and the relevancy of Professor Oyediran's list, one must keep in mind various milestones in Nigeria's pre- and post-independence history. Here we can include the constitutions²⁶ especially after the Second World War (e.g. the 1954 Lyttleton constitution and the 1960 Independence constitution); the federal election of December 1959 with the Northern People's Congress (NPC) victory and subsequent political developments;²⁷ and the Action Group Executive action of May 1962, which found the AG Deputy Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola guilty of maladministration and anti-party activities and expelled him from the party (a decision which he fought). There was an escalation of internecine conflict within the AG, namely, between the Akintola and Awolowo factions. On 29 May 1962 violence broke out within the Western Nigeria House of Assembly. A state of emergency was declared in the West by the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Chief

Akintola was restored to power by the Federal Government at the end of the state of emergency.

Meanwhile Chief Obafemi Awolowo, along with more than a score of supporters, was restricted and subsequently charged with treasonable felony - the planned overthrow of the government. Chief Awolowo and some of his co-accused were sentenced to long prison terms. There was the census fiasco of 1963 in which the initial results of a greater southern population were declared void by the Prime Minister; the new count recorded a greater northern population. After a great deal of controversy it was agreed at the National Economic Council meeting of May 1964 that these census figures should be used and that the Delimitation Commission should reallocate constituencies on that basis.²⁸

The Federal elections of 1964 did little to dispel the atmosphere of popular disillusionment with the government of the day. One observer writes:²⁹

Again the nation was disappointed but not exactly surprised at the brazen manner in which the elections were manipulated in some parts of the country in such a way as to make a mere mockery of democratic parliamentary election practices. Some political parties³⁰ were prevented from campaigning in parts of the country only to make it possible for candidates of the ruling party to be returned unopposed. In such areas of the country, more candidates were returned unopposed than those said to have been elected, even though all parliamentary seats had many contestants.

Then there was the landmark of the Western Region parliamentary elections of October 1965. The 'blatantly rigged elections'³¹ sparked off rioting and violence throughout the region.³² However, unlike the Western Region crisis of 1962, there was no State of Emergency proclaimed nor Federal Government intervention.³³

It is important to note that the politics leading to the events of January 1966 include the friendships of various high ranking officers with personages at the center of political power; Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, Commanding Officer (CO), 1st Brigade, a Yoruba,

had a close personal and political relationship with the northern Nigeria Premier, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Brigadier Ademulegun had closely associated himself with the Northern People's Congress in an attempt to be selected as Nigeria's first indigenous General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Nigerian Army³⁴ after the departure of the last British GOC, Major General Welby-Everard. This relationship and ambition would have the Brigadier circumvent Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) as on the occasion when troops were deployed to pacify the Tiv riots of 1964 in compliance with NPC desires.³⁵

What emerges from this interlocking series of events, most especially after independence, is the increasing politicisation of the army. There was a close association between the Sardauna of Sokoto and Brigadier Zakari Maimalari, GOC of 2nd Brigade,³⁶ the former advancing the latter for the post of GOC of the Nigerian Army - this was apparently resisted by the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar.³⁷ Other officers such as Lieutenant Colonel A. Largema, the commander of the 4th Battalion at Ibadan, maintained a close association with Chief Akintola and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).

These various associations and friendships notwithstanding, Luckham maintains that:

The link between the army and political structures was confined, nevertheless, to indirect liaison alone, and was in no sense comparable to the day-to-day control wielded by the premiers over their Regional Police Commissioners.³⁸

The politicking for the post of GOC of the Nigerian Army saw Ademulegun pushing aggressively with strong northern support while the bulk of the army of southern identification was split between supporters of Ademulegun and Ironsi. This struggle, eventually won by Ironsi, 'created a permanent division in the Army',³⁹

As several of the Army's prominent officers sought the favor and influence of the politically powerful the politicians continued to expose the Army to unreconciled political factions and disorder.

This contributed to the potential for military intervention. In the words of Robin Luckham:

The politicians had also contributed in some degree to the politicisation of the army.... The internal security operations in which the military was asked to play a part - most notably in pacifying the Tiv in 1960 and 1964, maintaining essential services during the 1964 general strike and policing the Western Region after the regional elections of October 1965 - made it quite clear to those soldiers who cared to think about it that the survival of the existing political order depended upon them.⁴⁰

In the context of Nigerian politics in the interval between independence and the first coup of January 1966, politicisation of the Army became tantamount to increased potential for military intervention. Ironically, this relationship was not necessarily imperative nor imminent to those personalities, both civilian and military, most intimately involved in the political intrigues leading up to 15 January 1966.

A technical note is warranted here relating to the organizational structure of the military. Quoting Brigadier David M. Jemibewon at length,⁴¹

The fact is that by the very nature of military command positions and hierarchy, the captains and majors occupy positions that are uniquely placed to plan and execute military coups. In the first place, they occupy middle-rank positions in the army and are therefore close to the top echelons while at the same time they have constant and continuous contact with the ranks below them. They therefore enjoy the double advantage of being in the know of events and programmes at the top while at the same time communicating constantly and familiarly with the lower ranks. Coupled with this double-edged advantage is the fact that the ranks of captain and major usually occupy strategic command positions in the army. Of course, it is also to be noted that these two ranks together form the majority of the officer corps in most armies throughout the world.

When the coup of January 1966 therefore came it was, in

the usual traditional pattern, spearheaded by officers in the rank of major. The majors promptly eliminated officers senior to them who might not be in sympathy with their objective. Again, this act conforms with the usual traditional pattern of military coups. Captains and majors usually eliminate officers of higher ranks whom they fear may not support their cause and it is usual again for them to bring in one or two of the senior ones who are known to be friendly and who will give credence to and buttress their cause. This is the pattern the world over.

According to Luckham, the immediate rationale for the January coup was to restore civil order in the Western Region. But, perhaps more precisely, it was staged with the immediate political purpose of forestalling the use of the military by the government to suppress its opponents (or those of the NPC and NNDP, which amounted to the same thing) in the Western Region.⁴²

By contrast A.M. Mainasara states that

The principal motive of the January 1966 military coup, was not, as is falsely claimed by its wicked perpetrators, to redeem the nation, but to dislodge what they regarded as the feudal Northern oligarchy from participation in the governance of the country which belongs to us all.⁴³

Further on this same author states that

The motive behind the coup was to get rid of certain highly placed civilian and military leaders of Northern origin and their Southern colleagues as a 'final solution' to the 'Northern menace'.⁴⁴

The killings of Brigadier Maimalari, Lieutenant Colonel J.Y. Pam, Colonel Kur Mohammed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Abago Largema in the South are seen by D.J.M. Muffett in the following light:

The killings of these four officers⁴⁵ in Lagos can only be

explained in terms of a deliberate elimination of military superiors who could not be relied on by the mutineers.

The coup itself may lend itself to the preceding observations but they fail to reveal the political shade of the conspirators/mutineers/insurgents/revolutionaries.⁴⁶ For this there must be some reference to their political agenda apart from the immediate restoration of order and the elimination of corruption and its leading protagonists. The military professional ethos, as described earlier, may explain the impetus for the restoration of law and order - not to be equated with the rule of law - which is institutionally reinforced, but is hostile to open political opinionation and any activity which is seen as inimical to professional development.⁴⁷ Hence the existence of a clandestine political/ideological agenda formulated over a period of years, this agenda being in symbiosis with the ideological 'maturation' of some of the leading conspirators. This 15 January 1966 coup cannot be accurately characterized as a straightforward grab for power or an Ibo plot (with all due respect to the Federal Military Government's conclusion in Nigeria Year Book 1966), nor essentially as a revolution. The alchemy of Nigerian political realities in the period between independence and the January 1966 coup does not allow for any of these conclusions to be representative of anything beyond factional interest. There was no national identification to speak of during the period in question. Ethno-religious identification was the ensign around and under which the people rallied. There was no class consciousness to speak of and no revolutionary cadre outside the few majors who would perhaps earn that title. More accurately the intra-civil, intra-military, and civil military amalgam was fraught with interpersonal rivalry (e.g. Sir Abubakar the Federal Prime Minister vs Dr Azikiwe, Major-General Ironsi vs Brigadiers Ademulegun and Maimalari, Chief Awolowo vs Chief Akintola) which in the rough and tumble of Western politics is normal but in the pre-institutionalized politics of the Third World proves devastating. Such politics actually within the military proves lethal, the organized military having little or no capacity to cope with overt ethno-religious-political alliances once violence has broken out and prior to strong

national identification. Even before independence 'the growth of nationalism and the subsequent emergence of political parties were based on tribal rather than national interests, and therefore had no unifying effect on the peoples'.⁴⁸

Amidst the disparate ethno-religious allegiances, which in the West are seen as a hallmark of national strength but elsewhere usually connote the opposite, there also arises an assortment of political-ideological dispositions including variations of neutrality or political indifference; these last two practically disappear in the absence of a strong national consciousness.⁴⁹

The political-cum-ideological inclinations of Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and the leadership of the 15 January 1966 coup can perhaps be best learnt from the observations of those who knew him as associate and/or friend.

In most instances Nzeogwu is described favorably. David M. Jemibewon says:

Major Nzeogwu was a true patriotic Nigerian who had certainly devoted a lot of his time to thinking of the social and political ills plaguing the nation and also of possible remedies.⁵⁰

Olusegun Obasanjo writes:⁵¹

As his friend,⁵² I knew him very well and I respected him for his nationalism and his pan-African outlook.

He then quotes another officer who knew Chukwuma Nzeogwu only briefly.

'This enigmatic personality Major Nzeogwu, at 29, is reputed to be one of the few astute soldiers Nigeria has ever produced. He is known as a nationalist who is completely detribalised. Adored in the ranks for his bravery and informality and respected (even feared) by his officer colleagues for his skill and persuasive ability - he is one soldier in Nigeria whose name at once invokes love and awe.

He is honest and dependable.'

Some years later, Obasanjo refers to the sentiments shared by himself and Nzeogwu while on station in the Congo (now Zaire) as members of the Nigerian contingent of the United Nations peace keeping force from mid-November 1960 to May 1961. He writes:

We were idealistic young men, inspired by the mood of nationalism that was sweeping through many parts of Africa at that time and as young army officers, we freely discussed the future of the Nigerian Army, Nigeria and Africa, and the condition of the black man in the world.⁵³

As did other observers, General Obasanjo considered Major Nzeogwu to be an 'idealistic and thoroughly patriotic Nigerian'.

It is during the time in the Congo that Major Don O. Okafor, one of the January 1966 conspirators, is said to have held meetings to determine the method to be followed in staging a foreseen coup - in this instance some five years in the future.⁵⁴

Incidentally, Lieutenants Obasanjo, Okafor, and Nzeogwu were the platoon commanders/leaders of B Company, 5th Battalion, commanded by Major Zakaria Maimalari who would later perish in the January 1966 coup d'état. Certainly the opportunity for Okafor and Nzeogwu to discuss the possibility of military intervention was available.

As to whether one can translate nationalism into revolution through means of military intervention is not so clear. However, Nzeogwu was familiar with Karl Marx, Mao Tse Tung, Giap, Mustapha Kemal, the Malayan insurgency, and the guerrilla activities in Algeria and in Portuguese Africa. Nzeogwu is said to have communicated with Angolan nationalists in the early 1960s. Out of curiosity Nzeogwu visited Hungary during the summer of 1959 during his final year at Victory College, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.⁵⁶ British intelligence concluded that there was no ill intent in his visit.

With regard to whether revolutionary status⁵⁷ may be attributed to the January 1966 conspirators, James J. Oluleye speaks of 'the attempt to climb the ladder to the leadership status by the self-

styled revolutionaries who were merely reactionaries,⁵⁸ and blasts military intervention in no uncertain terms:

A military coup d'état is the greatest act of cowardice as their victims are slaughtered in cold blood without a chance to challenge the assassins. Shooting of an unarmed person is not a feat of arms.⁵⁹

The above comments aside, General Obasanjo provides perhaps the most insightful observation of the motivations and aspirations of Chukwuma Nzeogwu and by extension the character of the January 1966 intervention:

Throughout his life there was no evidence that he was any kind of ideologue. He was too deeply religious to be a communist and too radical to be a capitalist. He was anti-colonialist and it did not matter to him whether one colonialist was communist or capitalist. Chukwuma in ideological terms was a liberal reformist, a closet bourgeois, who was interested in the mundane things in life, such as having a roof over his head, taking care of his parents and the extended family and having some investments against the day he would retire from the army. He was even thinking of one day building a hotel in Benin City!⁶⁰

If one is to find an ideologue among the conspirators of January 1966 it would be Major Emmanuel A. Ifeajuna, Chief Signals Officers of the Nigerian Army, who maintained wide contact with intellectuals in the Civil Service and universities.⁶¹ We may also refer to Major Adewale Ademoyega, an instructor with the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) as a 'Yoruba intellectual', who as the only survivor of the inner corps of conspirators⁶² provides an insider's commentary on the ideological agenda⁶³ and consciousness of the January 1966 coup makers.⁶⁴

In an unpublished work Major Ifeajuna sets forth the rationale for the intervention of January 1966. It is worth quoting at length for it reveals not only the military's professional intolerance of

indiscipline (here specifically of the civilian regime) but also the evident absence of both a 'corrective' and 'temporary' rationale; the perspective, as delineated, is markedly political⁶⁵ and uncharacteristic of the early practitioners of military intervention in Africa. And here I quote:

One real problem was that those who ruled us, grew larger and became more distant from the people.... If the leaders of the regime were disciplined, they might have practised less evil than what we saw them do....

Rather, they led us to the chasms of the devil.

On January 1966, the question has been asked by some, whether it was not indiscipline on our part to have taken up the arms entrusted to us without proper command? Yes, it was. But this was indiscipline to cure all cases of indiscipline.... We fully realised that to be caught planning, let alone acting on our lines, was high treason. We know, we were all aware of our actions, and we were well aware of the consequences.... We know the country had been so diseased that bold reforms were badly needed to settle social, moral, economic and political questions.... Unless the people are properly led they would go astray. And to control the people one wanted a change in the seat of power. It is those in the seat of power that we aim at replacing. Once that was done, then a social revolution. We aimed for the coup d'état. We hoped to pull in capable men to carry out the revolution.⁶⁶

Recalling his address to a group of officers recruited the day before the 15 January coup, Major Ifeajuna writes:

We were faced with a grim situation. Our country had seen so much of drift, so much of corruption. Our people were dying daily by the dozens and there seemed no end to the suffering of and peril to our people.... We have watched out leaders rape our country; we have watched them challenge all of us to action. Were we to ask no questions? Were we

not part of the country? Did we not see them prostitute our institutions? Did we not watch them employ the Army to pursue incorrect political lines?⁶⁷

Ifeajuna appealed to his brother officers for the salvation of the nation and the termination of the corporate military's use by civilian leaders' to pursue 'incorrect political lines'. This dialectic is consistent with the bulk of rationale for military intervention. It is important to note that the officers thus recruited are not told of any revolution or revolutionary program. They are addressed as officers presupposing a national and corporate interest upon which they will act.

One can thus accurately speak of a group of conspirators within which one can identify differentiated levels of politicisation and ideological convictions. The inner circle of conspirators possessed both the plan for intervention and a political agenda while the largest group were motivated and recruited by the more 'traditional' rationale of professional ethos, namely, to rescue the nation and ward off an attack on the institutional military. The latter body of officers is indispensable for a successful military intervention. Both groups dovetail with their respective rationales.

With regard to the inner circle of leaders:

One has the sense of a group of people convinced of the perfectability of man and society, who were convinced, too, of the validity of their own views, and were quite willing to override objections in pushing through their ideas for change.⁶⁸

In his forward to Adewale Ademoyega's book Why We Struck, Major-General Emmanuel O. Abisoye writes that 'Ademoyega enlisted into the officer corps of the Nigerian Army as a revolutionary, with principles affixed in his mind, to correct the social ills of Nigeria'. If this be the truth, Adewale Ademoyega, who does not claim to be the primary ideologue of the January coup, provides observations which are instructive for one's understanding of the Nigerian Army's 'apolitical' character in the early 1960s.

Ademoyega's analysis draws our attention, albeit unwittingly, to the fact that an externally directed army will produce a military that will be incapable of accurately perceiving both problem and solution amidst a setting of national decay. Furthermore, the military is ideologically impotent and rendered useless as a national vehicle for change. Military intervention becomes opportune to advance the national interest that the corporate military is incapable of actualizing due to civil-military intrigue. The state of the Nigerian Army is seen in the following description by Ademoyega:

My first impression which really distressed me was that it was not a nationalist organisation and it was far from being revolutionary. A nationalistic army would first of all be ideological. Secondly, it would be political. Thirdly, it would be patriotic. How could the Nigerian Army be ideological, when it was still more than half commanded by British commissioned and Warrant Officers, whose only purpose was a strict adherence to British norms and practices. The British Army was a monarchical army. The Nigerian Army was the same.... How could the Nigerian Army be political, when its progenitor, the British Army, had not intervened in British politics since 1660; that is, three hundred years ago. And how could the Nigerian Army be patriotic, when it was foreign-inspired and foreign-led. Actually, the British themselves saw the Nigerian Army as purely mercenary. From the colonial point of view, this was true.⁶⁹

The Nigerian Army is seen as not being nationalist, ideological, political or patriotic. The semantics used by this particular author are subject to discussion and cannot be easily affixed to any theoretical framework of political thought though the implication is that it is a revolutionary analysis. An example of this can be seen in the rationale he provides, which combines categories of military intervention which appear paradoxical and are usually viewed as mutually exclusive. He states that the purpose of 'the January 15 revolutionaries who removed the evil politicians' was to institute 'a

corrective and revolutionary military era',⁷⁰ Even allowing for the possibility of such a synthesis of rationales it becomes somewhat difficult to understand the logic of establishing a 'military era' that produces a revolutionary society. It appears as if the military would act as the vanguard of the revolution without being a military-political part or domination, accruing unto itself an increasing capacity for national representation.

This said, there is however agreement among most observers that the Nigerian Army was more absorbed with the issues of the day such as its peace keeping role in the Congo (Zaire), the implementation and effects of the regional quota system, and the indigenization of the officer corps. The relative calm after independence is displaced, by stages, with regional unrest based on ethno-political factors and aspirations. The issues of the day, as previously mentioned, become inextricably enmeshed in civil-military⁷¹ intrigue and eventually violence. The implications of the immediate post-independence issues specifically related to the development of the Nigerian Army were clearly not foreseen nor entertained by the vast majority of the Nigerian elite, especially those who were non-military. These issues were not initially seen as intimating violence for the Nigerian political system. If anything, failure to implement such policies was seen as far more threatening to the socio-political development of the nation as a truly national and independent state.

The political intrigue and machinations of the day were self-absorbing and the participants therein were not predisposed to appreciate the potential for violence that their actions contained. One cannot speak of the existence of bipartisan policy formulation nor of a system of checks and balances to diffuse the concentration and abuse of power. There was neither an appreciation of the likelihood of military intervention, until late in the game, nor any means by which to stop it.

By October 1965 rumors of an impending coup were already circulating within the country. A circular letter was passed around all army units to alert commanders to the possibility of a coup.⁷²

In military fashion, the rumored intervention took place during preparatory military exercises,⁷³ in the early hours of 15 January

1966. Operation Damisa (Leopard),⁷⁴ the code name for the coup, was envisaged according to D.J.M. Muffett at Stage I in a four-stage plan.⁷⁵ Captain Gbulie speaks, however, of three 'resolutions', the last of which stipulated that the operation was to be executed in three phases.⁷⁶ Phase One concerned the preparation, planning and rehearsal. Phase Two was the coup d'état itself, and the mopping-up action. And Phase Three would concern the reorganization of society and government.

The military mindset is reflected in Captain Gbulie's words:⁷⁷

By and large, the plotters of the coup had designed Exercise Damisa II⁷⁸ to come off as a carefully calculated military operation, prosecuted with precision, and with an element of surprise. They regarded this latter a vital principle of war and laid due emphasis on it.

The coup d'état of 15 January 1966 resulted in the killing, among others, of four prominent political/government leaders and seven senior officers, all but four of these eleven individuals being of Northern origin.

Table 4.1

Senior Officials killed in January 1966 coup

Name	Office	Region of Origin
Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa	Prime Minister, Federal	North
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello	Premier, North	North
Chief Akintola, S.L.	Premier, West	West
Chief Okoti-Eboh, F.	Fed. Minister of Finance	Mid-West
Brig. Ademulegun, S.A.	CO, 1 Ede	West
Brig. Maimalari, Zak	CO, 2 Ede	North
Colonel Mohammed, Kur	COS, Army	North
Colonel Sodeinde, R.A.	2IC, NDA	North
Lt.Col. Unegbe, C.A.	QMG, Army	East
Lt.Col. Pam, Y.	AG, Army	North
Lt.Col. Largema, A.	CO, 4 BN	North

THE COUNTER-COUP OF 29 JULY 1966

The immediate reaction to the 15 January 1966 coup was favorable as reflected by various editorial commentaries.⁷⁹ But the early euphoria turned to fear and suspicion as the list of those killed became widely known and the ethnic composition of the plotters weighed heavily with Ibos. I.B.M. Haruna reflects a common opinion that

the killings of the senior Army officers of Northern origin supported the hypothesis that the objective of the coup was to ensure an Ibo Army leadership. Having eliminated their Northern seniors, they would strike fear in all likely opposers to their plan, intimidate the uneducated Northern masses and, thereafter, dictate and dominate the future course of Nigeria's history.⁸⁰

A clear tribal delineation was perceived⁸¹ which set into motion the events of the July 1966 counter-coup.

In the revenge coup, Northern elements of the Nigerian Army plotted and executed their counter stroke against the Federal Military Government led by GOC Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi and other Eastern officers and ORs stationed most especially in the North and West of the country. Prior to this, during the latter part of May, the ARABA⁸² riots flared up in the city of Kaduna where Southerners and their property were attacked by Northern mobs.⁸³ This violence was an amalgam of anti-government and anti-Ibo reaction (the terms being synonymous at this stage) against Decree No. 34 (Unification Decree) of May 1966. Ostensibly, Decree No. 34 was promulgated for the purpose of abolishing the federal constitutional structure and transforming the country into a unitary state. Instead there was an intensification of Northern fears that General Ironsi's government intended to deprive the North of their separate identity and power.

A similar scenario of violence was played out in other Northern cities like Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Zaria.⁸⁴ Rumors of another coup were rife but the direction from which it would come, from

Northerners or Southerners, was not certain even within the ranks of the military. However the planning of a countercoup continued. The May riots evinced a dramatic deterioration in relations between General Ironsi and senior military and civilian officers of the North.

Muffett claims that there was an additional factor contributing to the downfall of the military regime. General Ironsi attempted to recruit into his government ex-Emir Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, the de facto leader of one of the two major Islamic sects co-existing in Northern Nigeria, namely the Tijaniyya, the other being the Qadiriyya - considered the more orthodox of the two sects. General Ironsi further attempted to gain the assistance of the ex-Emir to influence Sheikh Ibrahim of Kaolak to move the principal center of the Tijani sect from Senegal to Northern Nigeria. The ex-Emir's assistance was not given. This maneuvering by Ironsi was aimed at establishing a major means of control by which the regime, through Sheikh Ibrahim, could contain the North. This maneuvering was seen as meddling in a delicate situation of Islamic 'inter-denominationalism' of long standing. It contributed to the undoing of the regime.

Muffett provides the following synopsis of the elements which led to Nigeria's second coup d'état.

The diverse tensions represented by Ironsi's attempted manipulation of Moslem 'inter-denominationalism', the sense of insecurity in the Northern Civil Service, the unrest at the University, the broadening suspicion of officer against officer within the military hierarchy, ... the mounting chiefly suspicion of an attack on their status and privilege, the ever-widening perceptions of the threat of Ibo domination and a growing belief in Ironsi's own participation in the Prime Minister's murder converged inexorably during the month of July to create an environment in which plot and counterplot were rife. Inevitably, a solution one way or the other was imminent.

The blow fell on 29 July 1966.⁸⁵

Brigadier Jemibewon provides a cogent theoretical point in

supplementing our understanding of the causes of the July coup. In what he terms the 'most fundamental principle and tenet of a military coup' Jemibewon explains that coup leaders and planners should themselves assume the leadership of the government. These same men carry the rationale and agenda for the new government. Jemibewon writes:

Applying this axiom to the coup of January 1966 in Nigeria, the inevitability of the collapse of the Ironsi regime can readily be appreciated; for the majors who planned and executed the coup in the end neither assumed responsibility for the running of the government nor had a say in the appointment of Major-General Ironsi to the leadership of the military government that came into being through their action.... As the GOC, he had regarded it his duty to quell the turmoil in the army and to restore order and discipline.

Beyond that, it was obvious that he had not the slightest idea as to what to do when he assumed the headship of the federal government. By this very development the seed of a counter coup had already been planted and the fall of the January regime was clearly predictable.⁸⁶

The 29 July 1966 coup resulted in the killing of more than 235 officers and men (some 41 officers and 194 ORs).⁸⁷ The remaining Ibos in the Nigerian Army under immediate threat took flight in an attempt to reach the East; many were found and executed in transit. Migration of Ibos, and for that matter non-Ibo Easterners, had begun in earnest after the May riots. Though halted for a while due to assurances by the FMG and the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu, this migration continued with the July coup. In late September 1966 the killing of Easterners reached an unprecedented level with the massacres that occurred most especially in the major cities of Kaduna, Zaria and Jos.⁸⁸ The killings of September/October resulted in the complete migration of Ibos from the North⁸⁹ and with the resettlement an aggrieved population clamored for action.

THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR

At one time or another the various peoples of Nigeria have been said to possess particular qualities and legacies in the art of war. One can read of the 'fighting negroes from Nigeria'⁹⁰ or of the 'more warlike Moslem Hausa-Fulanis',⁹¹ and even of the 'martial glories of the Ibo race'.⁹² These appellations have been used by Nigerians and foreigners alike to inspire ethnic-political identification or as a historical statement. They do not, however, provide much insight in the initiation of the Nigerian civil war and may misdirect our attention. This caveat made we are nevertheless speaking of a devastating war which saw the pitting of peoples espousing two divergent forms of nationalism - the Nigerian and Biafran versions. And in its most extreme distillation the issue of nationalism became one of survival. It is worth quoting, at length, from John de St. Jorre's The Nigerian Civil War:

...the most striking and exciting phenomenon [of the war] was the rise of two new, virulent and diametrically opposed nationalisms. 'Survival' was the appropriately emotional name they usually gave it on each side of the line. 'We are fighting for survival', a sweat-soaked, bearded Biafran colonel once told me on the Aba front. 'If we don't fight we will be killed by the Nigerians; if we die, others will take our place; and when they go the next generation will fight on.' His men, poorly armed, in tattered uniforms and very frightened, nodded their agreement. 'We, too, are fighting for survival,' echoed a Nigerian permanent secretary in Lagos some time later. 'Not, I grant you, in the same physical sense the Ibos claim, but for the political and economic survival of Nigeria, the ultimate survival of 50 million people. If the Federation could neatly divide into three or four viable parts peacefully,' he continued, 'that perhaps would be the best way out. But we all know (the Ibos included) it would not happen like that. If Biafra secedes, Nigeria will shatter into a dozen warring fragments. It would be anarchy, far worse than the Congo.'⁹³

The threat of secession had been voiced as early as 1953 by both the Northern and Western regions due to political and constitutional dissatisfaction. In early 1965 there was public reference to the possibility of Eastern secession. Northern secession appeared imminent in the counter coup of August 1966 but was averted as the conspirators were persuaded by the reasoning of certain sectors that it would prove unnecessary and disadvantageous. The threat of secession had become in the course of Nigerian history a barometer of political dissatisfaction and suspicion. It also held out the possibility of political self-determination vis-à-vis the other regions with whom there appeared little mutuality of interest.

Prior to independence nationalist leaders had moved far apart and 'from 1954 onwards, the direction was consistently away from a strong centre towards a formidable strengthening, almost insulation, of the regional base of each major political party'.⁹⁴ The creation of new states may well have ameliorated the potential for conflict but did not take place despite its recommendation by the British. The urgency for independence possessed within itself a capacity for political oversight. These developments have prompted Olusegun Obasanjo to comment that 'with the granting of independence in 1960 all the dirt, swept under the carpet, surfaced'.⁹⁵ From this point on political events would have the cumulative effect of further fragmenting an already divided Nigeria.

After the May and September/October 1966 riots against Ibos in the North pressure mounted in the East for secession. The Ghanaian military government offered its good offices in an effort to mediate a peaceful settlement. In January 1967 the Supreme Military Council (SMC) met in Aburi, Ghana which produced decisions that effectively drew the regions apart, ostensibly to preserve the union. A further meeting of the SMC scheduled for May was not attended by the Eastern leader Lt-Col. Ojukwu. Lt-Col. Gowon imposed a total blockade on the East and on 27 May came the announcement of the creation of twelve states in Nigeria; this included three states within the Eastern Region. Three days later the Eastern Region declared itself the independent and sovereign state of Biafra. On 6 July 1967 federal troops advanced and made contact along two fronts. The Area Command issued Operation UNICORD, the code name for the 'police action' which

would escalate into a full war. The Federal Military Government had anticipated a short war if it were to come.⁹⁶ The overall plan for prosecuting the war was conceived as a four phase operational plan: 1) capturing Nsukka, 2) capturing Ogoja, 3) capturing Abakaliki, and 4) capturing Enugu. The capture of Enugu would bring about the collapse of resistance, so it was thought. But such was not the case as the war proved a prolonged agony with considerable foreign interest and assistance. The war came to an end of 12 January 1970. The civilian death toll has been estimated to be as high as several million individuals. As many as 10 000 persons died daily in the besieged East mostly from starvation induced Kwashiorkor.⁹⁷ Military casualties were approximately 100 000.

The Nigerian civil war ended with the formal surrender document presented by the Biafran delegation. The document can be viewed as the platform for future political developments as well as an affirmation of the federal character of the nation as expressed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. As such the May 1967 enactment of twelve states was the reference point and start line. The surrender document reads as follows:

I, Major-General Philip Effiong, Officer administering the Government of the Republic of 'Biafra' now wish to make the following declaration:

- (a) that the Republic of 'Biafra' hereby renounces secession and ceases to exist;
- (b) that we affirm we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria;
- (c) that we accept the existing twelve-state structure of the federation of Nigeria;
- (d) that any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by the representatives of the people of Nigeria.⁹⁸

In formal acceptance of the document the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, General Yakubu Gowon, made an extended speech which centered on 'reintegration and reconciliation' which was a genuine call to nationhood.

From purely strategic, operational and tactical viewpoints there were many lessons to be learned about the conduct of the war. There were also lessons learned in the subsequent reconstruction. But the continuation of military rule after victory was perhaps most significant. This meant the development of a professional military that became increasingly mindful of the inner workings of administrative and institutional structures in a postwar society that was, at least theoretically, more malleable and submissive to federal authority. As such a duality of interest between the national and the military's own institutional concerns would need greater definition throughout the period of military governance. This duality of interest would find its more official formulation within an eventual program of military disengagement.

The ethnicity associated with the coups of January and August 1966, more so than their mere execution, can be said to have contributed to the eventuality of the Nigerian civil war. Military intervention which averts the semblance of ethnic domination has little reason to produce a civil war. However, the likelihood of executing a coup with a balanced ethnic representation of conspirators appears problematic. Thus, as in the Ghanaian coup of 24 February 1966, the emerging ruling council must incorporate an ethnic balance regardless of whether the actual conspirators reflect such a reality.

SUBSEQUENT MILITARY INTERVENTION

The threat of military intervention would reappear most strongly after 1974 with an intensifying discontent on the part of the corporate military and Nigerians in general with the military administration of General Jakubu Gowon. The specter of military intervention emerged with the exhaustion of the goodwill and popularity that had been gained with the successful prosecution of the war by the Federal leadership as personified by Gowon himself.

The nature of future military intervention in Nigeria would be ever cognizant of ethno-religious factors, which remains to the present day the soundingboard of political and military developments.

In all prudence, future Nigerian military intervention would

require a 'federal character',⁹⁹ in the emerging leadership combined with the subsequent consent of the North, whether tacit or otherwise.¹⁰⁰ The coups d'état of 29 July 1975, 13 February 1976 (attempted), 31 December 1983,¹⁰¹ and 27 August 1985¹⁰² featured traditional rationales including anti-corruption, nation saving and corrective action with a commitment to military disengagement, laced in some instances with personal animosity and corrupt ambition. These instances of military intervention would also produce specific strategies concerning military disengagement, of which the 1975-1979 experiment stands as the only one that can be examined in its entirety. And with the increasing lapse of time since its completion it lends itself to greater historical, comparative and contextual analysis.¹⁰³

One last note on Nigerian military intervention is that although the ethno-religious factor has been treated delicately, especially after the bloodshed of the 1960s, it remains most prominently the threat that all Nigerians are keenly aware of. Despite instances in which politicians have waved tribal banners to advance personal and collective aspirations, both the military and the civilian elite are aware of the dangers of this factor, the former as previously mentioned having to balance their leadership in the event of a coup and the latter knowing full well that their activities have an inordinate influence amidst a population that is 80 per cent rural and of ethno-religious orientation. To this reality one must add that the politically active can influence the nature of civil-military relations to the point of inducing confrontation and violence in an environment of ethno-religious polarization, which some Nigerian observers fear most gravely in Nigeria's future. This inducement of violence could also originate from the military itself in an environment in which no one body of political actors possesses the capacity to initiate a conflagration.

NOTES

1. Much of this section is taken from Jon KRAUS' article 'The Men in Charge', in Africa Report, April 1966, pp.16-20.
2. Here we do not include the unsuccessful coup attempts of 15 May 1979; February, March and May 1980; and March and November 1982; nor the 19 June 1983 attempt by Ghanaian military exiles which left 17 dead in the ensuing fighting and which saw at least 26 conspirators executed by the surviving regime. See T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications, 1986, pp.458-464.
3. I. MARKOWITZ, 'Ghana without Nkrumah', in Africa Report, April 1966, pp.11-15.
4. With regards to socialism as an ideology alien to the military, one can observe President Babangida and the AFRC's decision in 1987 not to pursue the implementation of a socialist society and polity as being non-reflective of Nigerian tradition and the aspirations of the vast majority of citizens. Thus a new order with a strong component of market economics is being pursued in Nigeria's transition to civilian governance by 1 October 1992. In 1989 General Babangida would say that no socialist would succeed him. See for example the African Guardian, 7 August 1989, pp.32-33. In an article entitled 'Presidential Fire-works, IBB Takes on Leftists', Paul NWABIKWU writes that President Babangida conducted a frontal attack on Nigerian leftists and that previously he had made only negative, oblique reference to 'extremists and radicals'.
5. J. Kraus, op.cit., p.18.
6. According to A.A. Afrifa, as quoted by Dr. JONES, in Book Reviews, African Affairs, July 1967, pp.264-265, 'forty-three Ghanaian soldiers lost their lives in the 1966 coup against Nkrumah as a result of this woeful and disastrous policy'.
7. T. Jones, op.cit.
8. According to Kraus, op.cit., p.19, in June 1962 the Armed Forces Bureau was established to direct the civic action program. The Bureau would involve the officer corps in discussions of current events and the military's role in economic development. Subsequently, army engineers built bridges and the Air Force assisted in famine relief in the north of the country. The military resisted a continuous role in civic action both on the grounds of limited technical capabilities and on its judgement that such a role would reduce its ability to maintain the professional standards required of a military force.
9. This unit was originally established in the early 1960s by the GOC Alexander as a relief tour from duty in the Congo, as well as a post for older soldiers no longer fit for field duty.

10. At the time of the February coup, the POGR had 50 officers and 1,142 men assisted by Soviet security experts.
11. Members of the National liberation Council immediately after the coup d'état of 24 February 1966 were as follows: Major-General J.A. Ankrah (Ga), Colonel Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka (Ewe), Colonel Albert Kwesi Ocran (Fanti) and Major A.A. Afrifa (Ashanti), all of whom were Army officers; and J.K. Harley (Ewe), B.A. Yakubu (Northerner), J.E.O. Nunoo (Ga) and A.K. Deku (Ewe), who were members of the Police. For a detailed study of Ghanaian ethnic realities see J. 'Bayo ADEKSON, 'Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957-1966', in Armed Forces and Society, vol.2, no.2, February 1976, (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society), pp.251-272.
12. Robert LUCKHAM, in The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.49, states: 'The contrast with the Ghanaian coup of February 24, 1966, is a pertinent one. The original conspirators were also predominantly of one tribe, the Ewes. But there the coup succeeded, members of other groups were in the majority in the National Liberation Council and a successful political program was embarked upon.... Accusations of Ewe domination in the army and police did arise later, but only when the NLC had begun the return to civilian politics.'
13. J. Kraus, op.cit., p.20.
14. J.A. ANKRAH, '100 days in Ghana', in Africa Report, June 1966, pp.21-23.
15. T.C. McCaskie, op.cit., p.460.
16. Excerpt from 15 January 1966 broadcast from Radio Kaduna in A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, Stay By Your Radios: Documentation for a Study of Military Government in Tropical Africa, Cambridge: African Studies Centre, 1981, pp.67-68.
17. See Appendix 1 for complete broadcast which includes the ten proclamations in the Extra-Ordinary Orders of the Day (prohibitions against specific activities and questionable posturing, e.g. 'Demonstrations' and 'Doubtful loyalty', see proclamations numbers 2 and 7).
18. M.J. DENT, 'The Military and Politics: A Study of the Relationship between the Army and the Political Process in Nigeria', unpublished seminar paper, London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1967.
19. Robin Luckham, op.cit.
20. In what Adewale Adamuyega describes as 'jungle justice' a group of officers, himself included, were finally released from detention on 24 October 1974. (He was out of custody from Federal and Biafran activity only from 9 August to 21 September 1967).

21. During this period of civilian rule (1979-1982) it proved sufficiently safe for the publication of such books as Alexander A. MADIEBO, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980; Ben GBULIE, Nigeria's Five Majors: Coup d'Etat of 15th January 1966 First Inside Account, Onitsha: African Educational Publishers (Nigeria), 1981; Adewale ADEMOYEGBA, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup, Ibadan: Evans Brothers (Nigeria), 1981; D.J.M. MUFFETT, Let Truth Be Told: The Coup d'Etat of 1966, 1982; and A.M. MAINASARA, The Five Majors: Why They Struck, Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1982.
22. R. Luckham, op.cit., p.5.
23. Oyeleye OYEDIRAN, 'Civilian Rule for How long', in O. Oyediran (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-1979, London: The MacMillan Press, 1979, p.280.
24. This is a reference, for example, to the ambiguous relationship created between the military and civilian leadership by the 1963 constitutional dispensation, which made the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces while making the military responsible to the prime minister as head of government. Oyediran comments (op.cit., p.282) that 'the ambiguous relationship of the military with the two heads was an important issue in the 1964-5 federal election crisis'. This ambiguity would not be resolved before the January 1966 coup.
Two weeks before the coup, West Africa, 1 January 1966, p.1, contained the following: 'In Nigeria, the constitution, on which the strength of democracy depends, is constantly ignored or criticised, and the use of the army to deal with civil disturbances is now normal.'
25. An important issue which impinges on the type and character of a federal constitution. It also reflects the demarcation of deep-rooted cleavages and large populations (see Africa Research Bulletin, vol.12, 1975, p.3788).
26. The significance of the following constitutions is briefly noted: Clifford Constitution, 1922 (establishing the Legislative Council [LEGCO]); Richards Constitution, 1946 (for regional assemblies to act in an advisory capacity to LEGCO); MacPherson Constitution, 1951 (allowing policy formation at regional level with their legislatures providing federal delegates); Lyttleton Constitution, 1954 (first truly federal system); and the Independence Constitution of 1960.
27. We can include here the teaming of the NPC with the Nigerian Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) to form the government in December 1959.
28. J.D. Ojo, op.cit., p.19.

29. Alexander A. Madiebo, *op.cit.*, p.6.
30. To contest the election, the parties formed alliances. The NPC and the NNDF formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while the NCNC and the AG became the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).
31. Madiebo, *op.cit.*, p.7, writes: 'It was alleged that all the government appointed returning officers went into hiding after accepting election papers from government sponsored candidates, thereby making it impossible for AG candidates to register their candidacy. Those who registered had to discover their returning officers in their hiding places and forcibly bring them back to their constituencies to do their duties. On election day, the government began to release election results over the radio even for constituencies where voting was still going on'.
32. R. Luckham, *op.cit.*, p.19.
33. With regards to the condition of the Western region after April 1962 Adewale Ademoyega, *op.cit.*, p.27, claims 'There was no rioting of any sort and there was no general disturbance of the peace anywhere in the region. The necessity to declare a state of emergency had existed only in the imagination of those who wanted it for their own political ends.'
34. This ambition was not realized as Major-General J.T. Aguiyi Ironsi was tapped for the position in March 1964 and appointed in February 1965.
35. The Army was also called out during the Tiv riots of 1960 but in this instance the political intrigue among the political-military elite was practically non-existent. Neither was there any harbinger of destabilization of the Army due to intrigue within civil-military relations.
36. Brigadier Maimalari's roles as Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion during the Western Region crisis of 1962 is a point of controversy.
37. Luckham, *op.cit.*, p.243, notes: 'One factor that seems to have weighed in Ironsi's favour with the Prime Minister was that he is said to have warned Sir Abubakar about the talk of army intervention that was going on during the election of December 1964.'
38. Luckham, *op.cit.*, p.242. This control is attributable to the specific constitutional provision placing the Police Commissioner and Nigerian Police of each region under the operational control of the regional premier.
39. Madiebo, *op.cit.*, p.13.
40. Luckham, *op.cit.*, p.17. The second of the Tivi internal security operations was code named OP-Adam III. A personal grievance

would result: Brigadier Ademulegun replaced the Commander of the operations, Major Chris Anuforo (one of the principal conspirators in January 1966), 'after the latter had refused to release some pro-NNA politicians caught with sizable caches of illegal arms and ammunition' (see Ben Gbulie, op.cit., p.56).

Adewale Ademoyega, one of the leading January 1966 conspirators, has stated, op.cit., p.27, that after his participation in the efforts to restore peace in the Tiv division 'from that time in February 1964, the Army had become permanently involved in the Nigerian politics of violence'.

41. David M. JEMIBEWON, A Combatant in Government, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria), 1978, pp.11-12.
42. R. Luckham, op.cit., p.251.
43. A.M. Mainasara, op.cit., p.18.
44. Ibid., p.28.
45. This out of a total of 25 officers (civilian and military).
46. Various descriptions given to the soldiers responsible for the 15 January 1966 coup over the years.
47. Here of course we are not referring to the eastern or penetration model in which the military professional ethos is ostensibly imbued with an ideological/revolutionary content. However, even this professional ethos is little tolerant of non-authorized political opinion.
48. This assertion is made by A.A. Madiebo, op.cit., pp.4-5.
49. It is my view that political neutrality or indifference only exists where the brand of national identification is sufficiently strong and stable to ensure its protection under law (formally and primarily), and convention (informally). It is otherwise a fiction, aspiration, or suspicion, depending on the model emulated and its theater of application.
50. David M. Jemibewon, op.cit., p.12.
51. Olusegun OBASANJO, My Command, Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980, p.17-18.
52. In conversation with the author in Ota in November 1989, General Obasanjo exhibited great warmth and affection for the memory of Major Nzeogwu, referring to him as 'very nice'.
53. Olusegun OBASANJO, Nzeogwu, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987, p.2.
54. This assertion was supposedly made by Major Okafor while in detention in June 1969 to an unidentified fellow detainee, whose testimony was recorded on 5 September 1966, (see D.J.M. Muffett, op.cit., p.124. For a transcript of the recorded statement by the Okafor informant see pp.122-132).

55. While at secondary school Nzeogwu was already familiar with the biographies of Arthur Wellesley, George Washington, William Pitt, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and others.

56. In conversation with the author, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) T. Yakubu Danjuma expressed to me that Nzeogwu's visit to the East took place during the height of the Cold War and was considered incredible, but in retrospect he believed that it was due to curiosity and lack of awareness of possible implications and consequences, this being more or less characteristic of the youthful Nzeogwu.

When asked whether there were many Pan-Africanists in the Nigerian Officer Corps during the early 1960s, with characteristic frankness General Danjuma replied, 'I don't know what we considered ourselves; we were trying to be good officers'. As for Nzeogwu, Danjuma said that he was an extremely likeable person. He was Danjuma's superior when the latter was posted after commissioning. With regards to Nzeogwu being a Pan-Africanist, Danjuma said that he didn't know whether he was that so much as a 'confused young man'. (This was said without any detectable animosity whatsoever on the part of Danjuma, but rather with pathos).

57. In my discussions with Nigerian academics there was, generally, an inconclusiveness regarding the sort of revolutionary status ascribable to Nzeogwu, if any. At least two reasons were offered for this: 1) Nzeogwu was not theoretically well versed in either Marx or Lenin, and 2) militaries don't bring about revolutions - that it is a contradiction in terms. For a discussion of the latter issue see Yomi DUTOYE, 'Military Revolution: Contradictions and Latency', A Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association, Studies in Politics and Society, (special issue on: The Military, Social Classes, and Revolution), no.5, June 1989, pp.19-34. In his conclusion on the military and revolution, Durotoye states (pp.31-32): 'Theoretically and empirically, the realisation of the ultimate relevance of a revolutionary military organisation depends on its willingness to commit structural corporate suicide by transforming and subordinating itself to a popular revolutionary movement. And as previously argued, once it does this, the popular revolution can no longer be justifiably described as a military revolution.' See also in this same issue of A Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association, Bjorn BECKMAN, 'The Military As Revolutionary Vanguard: A Critique', pp.35-58; and J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE, 'Introduction: A Bibliographic Overview', pp.1-18.

Addressing the question of whether orthodox Marxism can permit anything like 'a military revolution', i.e. a revolution brought about in the aftermath of military intervention, Adekanye says: 'For short, there is no such thing as "revolution by military coup d'état" in orthodox Marxism. Orthodox Marxism is so categorical about the requirements for revolution.... Nor could one hope to escape these rigid requirements, by depicting a military coup d'état as a form of "revolution from above". For the very fact that it comes "from above" makes such an event non-revolutionary.' (See J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE 'The Military Aspects

of Orthodox Marxist Theory of Revolution: A Contextual Analysis', in The Indian Political Science Review, vol.xix, nos.1&2, Jan-Dec 1985, pp.135-6.)

58. James J. OLUYEYE, Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979, Ibadan: University Press, 1985, p.xviii.

59. Ibid., p.xvi.

60. O. Obasanjo, op.cit., at note 53, p.144.

61. Among some of these individuals were the poet Christopher Okigbo who was to die in the Nsukka sector during the civil war, Wole Soyinka, senior lecturer in African literature at the University of Lagos and future Noble Laureate for literature, who was detained by Gowon during the civil war, as well as the politicians S.G. Ikoku and Dr Tunji Otegbeye. Ikoku remained committed to the cause of one Nigeria and was a member of the Committee of Ibo Intellectuals.

62. Viz: Majors Chikwuma Nzeogwu, Emma Ifeajuna, Wole Ademoyega, Don Okafor and Christian Anuforo.

63. Adewale Ademoyega, op.cit., p.33, states: 'Ideologically, the core of the revolutionary officers had agreed on a programme of action to be implemented if we had successfully taken the reins of power into our own hands. This programme covered areas of politics, economy, education, social and foreign affairs.'

For Ademoyega's description of this programme see Chapter Three, The Ideology, pp.33-48. Among the agenda items that were conceived were, inter alia, the creation of 14 states (p.33), a mass political movement for 'pure democratic socialism' (p.35), a planned revolutionary system affecting artisans and tradesmen (p.37), rule of law (p.39), a planned revolutionary economic policy (p.41), and a planned revolutionary social system (p.44).

64. See Ben Gbulie, op.cit., pp. 50-51, for short descriptions of nine of the conspirators (8 Majors and 1 Captain), two of whom (Ifeajuna and Ademoyega) are referred to as intellectuals.

65. Both Ifeajuna and Ademoyega were (non-professional) university graduates, seen as more politicized than their fellow combatant officers, and more inclined to believe in the superiority of their political education and consciousness vis-à-vis the strictly military arts.

66. Quoted by General Olusegun Obasanjo, op.cit., at note 53, pp.82-83.

67. Ibid., pp.87-88.

68. Rafiq O.A. OGUNBAMBI, 'Military Intervention in Independent African States Revisited: A Review 1960-1983', in Afrika Spectrum, vol.19, no.3, 1984, p.296.

69. Ademoyega, op.cit., pp.27-28.
70. Ibid., p.43.
71. I differentiate between what I term 'elite' civil-military relations and 'non-elite' civil-military relations of which the former is applicable here. For a fuller description of my two classifications of civil-military relations please see chapter 12.
72. Madiebo, op.cit., p.14.
73. Subsequent military exercises, as practiced in the Nigerian Army, have been sparse, abbreviated, and unrealistic. There remains a considerable and overriding apprehension that a military exercise will be used as an expedient vehicle by a portion of the military against the military leadership in power. This opinion was expressed to me by former SMC member Major-General Oluleye (rtd) whose assignments have included that of Officer in Charge of the Kachia range, site of various exercises and fire power demonstrations. General Oluleye informed me that munitions expenditure is extremely restricted due in great part to cost with consequent results of crew readiness deficiencies in the artillery. Other branches are affected in a similar manner. Exercises and demonstrations thus become showpieces that bear little relationship to the actual use of men and equipment under realistic battle conditions.
74. Reportedly named by Nzeogwu, reflecting his admiration for any finely motivated and trained soldier with the qualities of a leopard. Ademoyega, op.cit., p.65, says 'in African folk-tales, a leopard could change the colour of its skin. And that was what the exercise was about.'
75. The remaining stages were purportedly as follows: Stage II, code name Kura (Hyena), entailed the elimination of selected chiefs, Stage III, Zaki (Lion), the elimination of remaining chiefs, some Native Authority Officials, and all Civil Servants above the grade of Assistant-Secretary, Stage IV, Giwa (Elephant), the carving of the country into individual districts. (See Muffett, op.cit., pp.101-102, for greater elaboration).
76. The first resolution established the scope of the coup which was to be nationwide. The second resolution established the field of operation as divided into Northern and Southern zones consistent with the two-brigade structure (the first and second brigades based at Kaduna and Lagos respectively), Ben Gbulie, op.cit.
77. Ibid., p.57.
78. Remembering that Damisa I incorporated the prelude to the coup d'état and Damisa II was the execution itself.
79. See for example the Daily Times editorial for 18 & 19 January 1966, the latter proclaiming 'that the masses have welcomed the

new order with joyful enthusiasm'. The Morning Post provided editorials for these same days, the former carrying a statement by the National Union of Nigerian Students saying 'We are happy that this salvation has come'. The editorial of 19 January carried the following: 'Nigerians today are glad and grateful that they see this day, the beginning of an era in which the agents of corruption, greed, nepotism, tribalism shall be swept away for all times.'

80. I.B.M. HARUNA, (Major-General) (rtd), 'The Military Revolution: The Nigerian Experience, 1960-1983', in T. T. T. (ed), Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria since Independence, Zaria, March 1983: Vol.III, The Civil War Years, Zaria: The Panel of Nigeria Since Independence History Project, pp.128-147.
81. In response to the evident ethnic delineation of the conspirators, Ben Gbulie, op.cit., pp.152-153, claims that 'the truth of the matter, of course, was that the January coup was a coup of the progressive elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces - an intervention clearly necessitated by the breakdown of law and order in the country. It was therefore neither an "Igbo affair" nor, for that matter, the affair of any other ethnic group connected with it.... The numerical strength of the Igbo officers involved in it was purely incidental - considering that, all along, Igbos had constituted more than half the strength of the officer corps of the Nigerian Army. They had dominated Ironsi's counter-insurgency operation that ultimately brought the coup to a halt.'
82. The Hausa word for 'secession', which was carried on placards by rioters who desired secession from a Federal Nigeria.
83. The Southerners were attacked in the 'Sabon gari' or strangers' quarter - what would be known as an ethnic ghetto in the West.
84. D.J.M. Muffett, op.cit., p.89, quotes conservative figures from The Ministry of Information (North) of 306 killed, 650 injured, and 1,006 arrested for at least nine Northern provinces (with more than thirty cities) in rioting from 28 May to 7 June 1966. The fatality figures are considered conservative because they represent only those collected and buried. Mr David Loshak of the Sunday Telegraph reported a figure of 600 killed in the riots, for which he was deported.
85. Muffett, op.cit., pp.92-93.
86. Jemibewon, op.cit., pp.14-15.
87. Robin Luckham culls this figure from the Eastern Region publication January 15th: Before and After. See Luckham, op.cit., p.70, including footnote 1.
88. The scale of ethnic violence that occurred in Nigeria in 1966 was unprecedented for Africa as a whole and not surpassed until the

Burundi violence of 1972.

89. Something of the order of one and a half million persons.
90. See Earl Edward MUNTZ, Race Contact, New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1927, p.234. For an interesting exposition on African soldiers at a later date see Rita HEADRICK, 'African Soldiers in World War II', in Armed Forces and Society, vol.4, no.3, May 1978, pp.501-526.
91. This assessment is made in 'Africa: Regional Survey' in The Almanac of World Military Powers, London: Bowker, 1974, p.237.
92. Attributed to Nnamdi Azikiwe in his nationalist speeches of the late 1940s in William F. GUTTERIDGE, The Military in African Politics, London: Methuen & Co., 1969, p.62.
93. John de ST. JORRE, The Nigerian Civil War, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972, p.370.
94. Olusegun OBASANJO, My Command, Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980, p.3.
95. Ibid.
96. The Northern Regions' military governor, prior to the formation of twelve states, and the Nigerian Army's Chief of Staff, Hassan Katsina had predicted a 'police action' lasting 48 hours. This action would become a three front war of encirclement of the Ibo heartland. The war lasted some thirty months.
97. John de St. Jorre, op.cit., p.238, describes this terrible condition:

'This is extreme protein deficiency which leads to the body cannibalising itself. The symptoms became one of the most familiar sights of the war. Tiny children were the worst hit with their soft, fluffy ginger hair and almost fleshless skulls; shoulders like miniature coathangers and ribs that stood out in delicate relief. From the breast-bone downwards, an obscene contrast began: swollen bellies and over-blown legs and ankles where the flesh had started to peel off like the skin of a tomato fresh from boiling water ... Protein, not medicine, was the cure for Kwashiorkor.'
98. As recorded by Olusegun Obasanjo, op.cit., pp.134-135.
99. 'Federal character' in this instance refers to the representative - some would say quota - requirements enshrined in both the 1979 (section 14 (3)(4)) and 1989 (section 15 (3)(4)) Nigerian constitutions. It is applied here to highlight the need for any coup not to appear ethnically weighed in favor of one group but to reflect a membership that comes from various peoples throughout the Federation.
100. It is in the nature of coup planning to sound out the possibility of military intervention from various sectors within

and outside the military. Given the reported influence of the Northern elite in the coups that have occurred and references to the so-called Kaduna Mafia one is led to the reasonable conclusion that successful coups require the previous solicitation of Northerners.

- 101.J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE, 'Military Expenditure under a Civilian Presidency: Nigeria under Shehu Shagari, 1979-83', paper presented at the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), University of Ilorin, Kwara State, May 7-11, 1985, pp.9-10, supplements our understanding of this instance of military intervention: 'The fact is that by 1983, the brazen corruption of the political class had begun to exact its toll even within the purely military sector which, until now, had been assumed to be a major beneficiary of that [Shagari] regime. It was as much to check that corruption, as to safeguard the military's interest in resource allocative efficiency in the defence sector, while maintaining the country's strong military force posture, that the military staged the coup of December 31, 1983 toppling the Shagari civilian presidency and ushering in another era of military rule in the country.'

Adekanye also refers to the 'kleptocratic tendencies of the Shagari regime ... [and] the deleterious effects of this for effective and efficient defence management. Herein lies the Nigerian military's own interest (at once independent of, and coterminous with, those of the wider society) in the December 31, 1983 coup d'état toppling Shehu Shagari's civilian presidency' (p.10).

For background and substance of the 31 December 1983 coup d'état see Lindsay BARRETT, Agbada to Khaki: Reporting a Change of Government In Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985; and S.G. IKOKU, Nigeria's Fourth Coup d'état: Options for Modern Statehood, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985.

- 102.We do not include here other attempted coups, most notably that of December 1985 by Major-General Mamman J. Vatsa, who was both member of the AFRC and Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). It was announced by Major-General Domkat Bali on Nigerian Television that 10 of the 13 condemned coup plotters were executed in March 1989. For opinions regarding the sentences passed by the military tribunal chaired by Major-General Charles Ndiomu, and comments by Vatsa himself, see West Africa for 3 & 17 March 1986. One prominent Nigerian academic informed me that it is rumored that Vatsa was not executed. Unlike the Lieutenant-Colonel Dimka attempt ten years earlier in which some 32 conspirators were executed and photographed, one photograph graphically showing Dimka's body (see 13 Years of Military Rule 1966-79, Lagos: A Daily Times Publication, 1979, by O. OJIAKO), and another named conspirator moments before with a Military Chaplain ministering to him, the 1986 executions did not have a comparable photograph of Vatsa's body, which lends credence to the above rumor.

- 103.At the time of writing the Babangida administration continues with its schedule of military disengagement intended for completion on 1 October 1992.

PART TWO - THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT: THE QUEST FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

There are three features which distinguish African armies from their counterparts elsewhere; newness, the dependence on foreign support, and lack of clearly established roles and goals.¹

Military elites in the English speaking countries of West Africa are in the process of showing that they can run their countries, but are they showing signs of an ability to govern? Can they do more than hand over power before long to their civilian counterparts, allow the revival of political parties, and intervene again when things deteriorate?²

The leading rationale for redemocratization, and the most important support for it, comes from within the armed forces, partly as a result of pressure from civilians, partly as a result of decisions within the junta. Serious threats to the institutional unity of the officer corps appear centrally important. Short of a revolutionary restructuring of society, returns to the barracks start through recognition by leading officers of the institutional need for disengagement, based on worsening fragmentation of the governing junta.... This is facilitated by the presence of civilians able to move into positions of power and willing to leave the armed forces relatively untouched while the fission and wounds of exercising power are healed.³

Contrary to the belief of some individuals, the impetus for military disengagement is more often internally generated within the

military corpus rather than externally induced by societal pressures - pressures from groups that are frequently inarticulate though not lacking zeal and sincerity. However, political culture coupled with the ideological affiliation of social upheavals wield a considerable though admittedly imprecise influence. As Welch has pointed out⁴ internal strife can prove both an incentive or disincentive for military disengagement depending on its nature and duration. And here we have in mind occurrences of strikes of various forms, student protests, and ethnic tensions, as well as the locality of these events, that is, whether urban or rural. Furthermore, as alluded to above, the presence of an ideological, more precisely revolutionary, content and structure and its relative demographic and geographic influence will most certainly elicit a specific political-military response and posture vis-à-vis the prospects of military disengagement and the use of military instruments (including the deployment of arms). In other words it does make a difference whether the military perceives internal strife to be spontaneous or organized, and whether the participants are ordinary citizens or ideological cadres of the left.⁵ Their composition and objectives do make a difference to the military though one may observe the identical manifestations of internal strife. Thus it is important to ascertain the political ethos in which policy options are formulated, tested, and finally undertaken. The situation is further complicated where policy options are limited to military managers, if they indeed exist as an institutionalized and self identified body. Otherwise one is speaking merely of a small and unstable association of men in power, regardless of political persuasion.

Internal strife can be the rationale for military disengagement or for further entrenchment of the ruling body. A chronic version of internal strife has been a prevailing rationale for military intervention and for the continuation of such intervention, that is, for the decision not to disengage or to postpone a transition to civilian rule. On the other hand where internal strife is short lived and non-systematic intervention will be less likely and the decision for and commitment to military disengagement more likely. We may depict this association between internal strife and military intervention and military disengagement in the following manner:

Table 5.1

Association between Strife, Military Intervention and Military Disengagement

Independent variable	Dependent variable
(ephemeral) internal strife	>>> no intervention military disengagement
(chronic) internal strife	>> intervention no military disengagement

There is a similar association between other factors such as poor economic performance, poor income distribution, and non-representative structures and the 'dependent variables' of military intervention and military disengagement. The emphasis here is on performance to avoid a negative result. The negative antecedent will in all likelihood be rewarded with a negative product. Thus we can substitute for example poor economic performance for internal strife in the above framework with similar results. Our attention is thus drawn to the somewhat similar forces affecting the decision to 'go in' and to 'get out'. The independent variables tend to be mutually supportive.

Staged military withdrawal is integrally related to such factors as the military's disposition, societal conditions and internal challenges, as well as to the conditions necessary for disengagement.

Samuel Finer⁶, prompted by Ulf Sundhausen, has recognized that the factors enhancing the possibility of military intervention can be 'played back' to explicate military withdrawal. Finer thus provides the following matrix for military withdrawal.

Table 5.2
Conditions for Military Withdrawal

	Dispositions for military disengagement	Societal Conditions conducive to military disengagement
Motivations	i) belief in civilian supremacy ii) threat to cohesiveness	i) internal challenges ii) external factors
Necessary Conditions	i) internal consensus to withdraw ii) adequate protection of corporate interests	i) civilian organisation to hand over to

Adherence to the doctrine of civil supremacy is difficult to ascertain apart from the evidence of an actual withdrawal by the military from national rule. This of course is not proof of a socialized standard of military subservience or the psychological acknowledgment of civil supremacy regardless of circumstances. Therefore, to believe in the necessity of withdrawing and to believe in civilian supremacy are not necessarily similar dispositions though military withdrawal is the culminating event in both instances.

The threat to cohesiveness of the military institution, especially within its leadership, has in most instances meant that fragmentation has spread from service branches to particular units, and to the very seat of military governance. What is perhaps not appreciated is the fact that military intervention is of itself the result of a coalition of military participants with not altogether compatible objectives apart from the removal of the civilian sovereign. Once in power the coalition, represented most classically by the ruling junta, will gravitate towards fragmentation if strategic objectives are not met and/or popular support is not forthcoming.

Service branch will pit itself against service branch both in and out of the junta with increasing divergence of interest and national perspective. A further manifestation of this fragmentation is that particular garrisons which may have allied themselves with junta leaders, or at least remained neutral during the process of military intervention, now begin to shift or withdraw their allegiance thus undermining the power bases of particular junta leaders; this in turn making such leaders sufficiently weak to challenge and remove from office. The resulting standard of intramilitary machinations becomes intolerable to the majority of the officer corps and withdrawal is sought from a national rule that is deemed untenable and institutionally self destructive, that is, aggravating an already desperate situation for the armed forces. It is my belief that where intra military fragmentation is a reality it will prove the more compelling force for military disengagement as compared to a belief in civil supremacy which appears ethereal in comparison.

Lack of self confidence in their ability to maintain rule and order is closely linked to the aforementioned motivation. There may be individuals within the military that would prefer the continuation of military rule but as a whole the military does not foresee the possibility of civil compliance to the military in the role of national leadership.

The social conditions conducive to military disengagement begin with what Finer terms 'internal challenges',⁷ which are in essence the existence of chronic internal strife as previously discussed. There is an increase in popular protest which does not go away. The military is thus left without a legitimate position to continue in government rule; indeed, no such position is afforded the military by the organized populace.

External factors motivating military disengagement include the withdrawal of financial resources as well as the rarer instance of the application of military force. Perhaps the most celebrated instance of the latter occurred between Uganda and Tanzania in the late 1970s. Renewed border fighting was reported in October 1978. The situation escalated in November of the same year when Uganda announced the annexation of the Kagera salient in north-west

Tanzania, comprising some 1,840 sq. km. After pressure from the OAU, Ugandan troops withdrew. Nevertheless border clashes continued. In January 1979 Tanzania invaded Uganda, along with approximately 1,200 Ugandan exiles, which culminated in the capture of Kampala on 11 April. In this instance the Ugandan exiles, members of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), became the interim government until elections could be organized in December.⁸ Tanzania had successfully managed to destroy the Amin regime and replace it with a more amenable one.

In the above case the external factor was the elimination of an unpopular regime and neighbor rather than exercising external influence for the purpose of seeing the transition from military to civilian governance; an influence that in any case was not substantial to Uganda owing to Tanzania's very limited economic leverage. Ordinarily a Tanzanian-like incursion would prove difficult to justify and bring to conclusion owing to OAU and international prohibitions against the violation of national boundaries. However, Amin's nefarious status in the eyes of the international community proved an ameliorating element in Tanzania's favor. Nevertheless, there remains a de jure sanction against such incursions.

It is somewhat difficult to differentiate between the 'motivations' and 'necessary conditions' that arise for military disengagement. Samuel Finer logically asserts that where circumstances permit⁹ there arises an internal consensus to withdraw. This consensus may well have been advanced, if not imposed, by the leading elements within the ruling military. It is in most circumstances the derivative of political necessity rather than ideological or corporate inclination. For it has yet to be established that the military has arrived at anything near to an actual belief that their political counterparts will do a better job at national leadership and administration. The internal consensus to withdraw contains the subtlety that it is most often a forced consensus derived from severe pressures¹⁰ whose result is to reinstate political cadres that are not demonstrably different in character and training from those that the military deposed in the first place. There may well be an element of caution and an actual

delimitation of administrative power exercised by these new political cadres but they remain ethnically, regionally, and ideologically little different from the ranks of banned politicians.

The military will insist on an adequate protection of corporate interests. These include individual, corporate, and powerful non-material or ideological interests. Finer identifies¹¹ three devices that the military uses towards this end, namely, the barring of particular politicians, the role of the armed forces in the new constitution, and the constitutional guarantee of immunity.

The practice of barring particular politicians from running in elections associated with the process of military disengagement was exercised in Ghana in 1969, in Turkey in both 1960-63 and 1980-83, and in Nigeria 1975-79 and 1983-1992 (as scheduled), inter alia. As will be discussed later the barring of specific individuals or categories of persons is intended not only to ensure the military's corporate interest but theoretically to enhance the viability of the new political order nurtured in the process of military disengagement.

The second device is to provide a special role for the armed forces in the new constitution. Among others there are the example of the Turkish constitution of 1963 which allows military representation in the national senate; the Malian constitution of 1974 which also provides for military representation; the trioka presidency (Presidential Commission) in Ghana in 1969; the ignored efforts of the Uruguayan military to institutionalize the National Security Council (Posena) in 1982-84; and the Brazilian military's insistence that the President continue to be elected by Congress, which they have to a large extent fashioned and in which they wield considerable influence, rather than be elected by national vote.

The third device also uses the national constitution but explicitly for the purpose of corporate protection against civilian legal action. It is the implementation of a constitutional guarantee of immunity for any actions taken by the armed forces while in office. There is the Ghanaian example of 'transitional provisions' inserted in the constitution by the Rawlings regime in 1979. These provisions granted indemnity for anyone involved in military intervention since 1966. It also stipulated that no actions of the

Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) could be challenged by any proceedings whatsoever, and stated that no penalty ruled by the AFRC could be abrogated. Furthermore, these provisions were made unamendable as the regime sought an hermetical seal on its protection and continued influence. Despite these measures Rawlings would again take power in 1981. The Argentinian military sought amnesty for its severe actions during the 'dirty war' which resulted in approximately 35,000 desaparecidos. The military's position was weakened by its defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war. However, shortly before its disengagement in 1983 it enacted a Law of National Pacification for the purpose of granting amnesty to all members of the armed forces involved in the 'anti-left repression campaign'. Military immunity would prove an extremely contentious issue with the Alfonsín administration in which demands for social justice, that is, the trial of military personnel, would have to be weighed against the survival of democracy. Certain military personalities, especially the junta generals, would not be able to shield themselves by their own amnesty device. In counterpoise, the military in the barracks has exerted sufficient pressure, if not threat, to minimize the number of personnel incriminated by the civilian authority especially among middle and lower ranking officers. The situation remains a sensitive one with no less than three isolated attempts at rebelling against the civilian administration.¹²

Some militaries have exhibited a powerful non-material or ideological interest. Such regimes include, inter alia, the Kemalist (Turkey); Justicialismo (Argentina); Anti-separatist (Burma); Propiedad Social (Peru); National Integration and the Babangida Program (Nigeria); and the Democratic and Popular Revolution (Burkina Faso). The greater the commitment and application of the military's 'ideology' or vision for the nation the greater reluctance to hand over control to non-like-minded civilian counterparts. Despite such examples as Ghana under Jerry Rawlings, Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré, and Peru under the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA),¹³ which espoused the continuance of a popular revolution, the non-materialist or ideological interest is in most instances not sufficiently strong (socialized) among the military and the populace as a whole to

postpone indefinitely a transition to civilian governance. Nor is the ideological interest sufficiently compelling not to be threatened by other competing ideologies or extreme versions within itself, as for example in Ghana in 1983, The People's Republic of the Congo in 1987, Benin in 1987 and Angola in 1977.

Finally, Finer states that there must be politically viable civilian organizations to which the military can hand over control. There are instances in which viable political parties or party systems have been present as well as instances where the military perceived no organization that it could do business with or witnessed a destabilizing political rivalry among civilian contenders for post-military national rule. Latin America provides at least two instances of the former in which political parties with their constituencies have stood ready to assume or reassume national leadership roles despite years of proscription; Accion Democratica (AD) in Venezuela and Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana - American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) - in Peru. AD had worked hand in hand with the coup d'état of 1948 but subsequently fell into disrepute with the military. The Apristas, however, were always a party inimical to the Peruvian military. Nevertheless, both AD and APRA were the only alternative national administrators realistically available to the militaries in power though the circumstances of the transition of rule were different in Venezuela in 1958 and in Peru in 1980.

An acceptable civilian organization has included the return, with or without military support, of former opposition leaders with whom the military had experienced an adversative relationship. For example there is the return, by invitation, of former Premier Nicolas Grunitzky who was installed as civilian president by Sergeant Etienne Eyadema of Togo in January 1963. For years Grunitzky had opposed Sylvanus Olympio and the party which he led, Unité Togolaise.

The military's disposition towards an acceptable civilian leadership, in this instance a former opposition leader, may change with new circumstances. On 10 April 1963 the Unité Togolaise led by Noël Kutuklui attempted to seize power but the attempt failed due to army support for the president. By 1966 Grunitzky felt that it was an appropriate moment to move towards substantive civilian rule,

which was resisted by Eyadema.¹⁴ William Gutteridge¹⁵ points out that the original coup had only a short range objective but the military leaders would run personal risks in disengaging from ultimate responsibility. The army again halted an attempted coup against President Grunitzky on 20 November 1966. However, a second military coup was successfully executed on 13 January 1967, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Eyadema, the 29 year old Army Chief of Staff, seized power. A National Reconciliation Council (NRC) was created and Colonel Kleber Dadjo was named its head. On 14 April 1967 Eyadema abolished the NRC and proclaimed himself President. In a fairly short period of time the military had concluded that further cooperation with civilian politicians would prove counter productive to inner circle interests and thus the entire experiment along with the civilian President was discarded. Instead Eyadema and his associates embarked upon the road of personalist transformation.

In Ghana¹⁶ the NLC saw itself, from the beginning, as a transitional regime. Much of its period in office was occupied with preparing the way for a return to civilian rule. With the lifting of the official ban on party politics two major contenders emerged. These were Komla Gbedemah and Dr Kofi Busia. The Ghanaian situation in 1969 cannot and should not be seen as merely the military's search for an acceptable and existing political organization for the handing over of power. The NLC as well as society as a whole were much affected by ethnic and regional factors. The NLC was ethnically diverse from its inception but not trans ethnic nor advocates of a homogenizing ideology. Political factors were indeed important for the NLC with regards to its view of potential civilian leadership but with an internal ethnic tension and suspicion that could not easily be resisted nor placated.¹⁷

Komla Gbedemah, the creator of the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), was also one of the founders of the Convention People's Party (CPP) and an author of the dreaded Preventive Detention Act. He had been a close associate of Kwame Nkrumah but had broken with him and gone into exile. Gbedemah was an Ewe whose support on the NLC was weak. Kofi Busia headed the Progress Party (PP) which had the acceptable credentials of attracting the former middle class and capitalist opposition to Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP. Busia had been

an ardent opponent of Nkrumah. He was also an Akan and enjoyed the support of the stronger Akan representation in the NLC. The political rivalry between Busia and Gbedenah was overshadowed by the ethnic regional antagonisms that characterized the ranks of the NLC.¹⁸

Elections proceeded for a new National Assembly on 29 August 1969 in which the PP won overwhelmingly. On 1 October of that same year Kosi Busia took office as Prime Minister. Thus an acceptable party and prime minister took power; but their strength would only endure, amidst a mounting economic crisis, until the 13 January 1972 coup d'état led by Lieutenant-Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong.

NOTES

1. B. BRICE, 'The Nature and Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Africa Report, vol.2, no.1, Summer 1966, p.58.
2. W.F. GUTTERIDGE, 'Military Elites in Ghana and Nigeria', in African Forum, vol.2, no.1, Summer 1966, p.41.
3. C. WELCH, No Farewell To Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, p.204.
4. C. Welch, op.cit., p.23.
5. One must understand that the political-military education of field grade, and most especially general grade, officers understands insurgency and revolutions in terms of organization with ideological indoctrination. The military does not see revolution as undefined sentiments and actions of disgruntled people nor, for that matter, do the organizers of revolutions themselves.
6. S.E. FINER, 'The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power', in Third World Quarterly, January 1985, p.23.
7. S.E. Finer, op.cit., p.25.
8. What makes the external factor more dramatic in this case is the removal of Dr Yusufu Lule, head of the UNLF and president of Uganda's provisional government, by the Tanzanians following the removal of Idi Amin. Lule's replacement, Godfrey Binaisa, in turn claimed that he had been forced to stand down by Nyerere and supporters of ex-President Obote. See J. LONSDALE, 'Tanzania: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, London: Europa Publications, p.949.
9. Internal intrigue and suspicion among junta leaders may effectively reduce the number of trusted associates in an internal struggle for power. In this instance the survival of the prominent contenders for supreme leadership takes precedence over the possibility and consensus to withdraw. In such circumstances it is difficult to assert that a consensus is actually possible. The military may announce its intent to withdraw which does not guarantee the cessation of intrigue. The attempt however remains, in most instances, an attempt to minimize internal fragmentation and to preserve its position of leverage once ostensibly withdrawn to barracks.
10. Whether internally produced among the military leaders or from societal intolerance or rejection of the ruling military.
11. S.E. Finer, op.cit., p.25.

12. On 23 January 1989 sniper shots were directed at President Alfonsín of Argentina and a soldier nearby was wounded. It was the first instance in which a 'barracks uprising' of the kind that has occurred in Campo de Mayo, included an attempt on the President's life. For an earlier example of military rebellion of civilian rule see 'Argentina Fallout After a Military Mutiny', in Time, 4 May 1987, p.25.
13. The GRFA differs from the Ghanaian and Burkinabe examples in that it sought to monopolize political activity without repression and without shutting down the existing political parties and union organizations after military intervention in 1968. It wished to avoid needless confrontation and to leave open channels of communication with other strategic groups. See Julio COTLER, 'Military Interventions and "Transfer of Power to Civilians" in Peru', in G. O'DONNELLI, P.C. SCHMITTER and L. WHITEHEAD (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.153.
14. Another such instance in which the military and political parties do not concur on the timing of the transition to civilian rule is in Chile when the Acuerdo para la Transición hacia la Democracia, a grouping of opposition parties, called for a referendum on whether civilian rule should occur immediately. This proposition proved unacceptable to the Pinochet regime in 1986. However, there would be further developments that would commit the regime to a program of military disengagement by 1992. In fact General Augusto Pinochet relinquished the presidency in March 1990 but remained the Army commander in Chief.
15. W.F. GUTTERIDGE, The Military in African Politics, London: Methuen & Co. 1969, p.46.
16. See T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History' - in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, London: Europa Publications, 1986, p.460.
17. The irony is that in ensuring an ethnic balance in the composition of the NLC, in order to avoid the accusation of ethnic conspiracy, it unintentionally created a complication for any future program of military disengagement in that any potential civilian candidate for national leadership would be assessed for his ethnic constituency and whether this would pose a threat to portions of the ruling military body whose origins were different from, if not traditionally in opposition to, that candidate. A transcendent nationalist identification was not nearly strong enough to counter ethnic loyalties and identification and mutual suspicion. Thus an acceptable politician and/or organization to which the military can hand over power results from a questionable consensus and is therefore unable to assuage ethnic rivalries and fears. In this instance the rivalry was between the dominant Akan and the Ewe (often regarded as 'foreigners' and the object of a long standing xenophobia).
18. T.C. McCaskie, op.cit.

SOME THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

THE THEORETICAL BACKDROP

It is significant to note that the body of scholarly work dealing with how coup-initiated governments rule is growing. By contrast, few, if any, academic generalizations exist for military disengagement from politics for the simple reasons that (1) most instances appear to arise from ad hoc combinations of circumstances, and (2) it is often difficult to determine when disengagement can in fact be deemed 'successful.' Unlike a coup d'état - a quick, decisive event - disengagement is a process that is often protracted, always complex and rarely analysed from within. Hence, the process (or, perhaps better, the processes) of military disengagement from politics is liable to interruption or reversal.... It behoves us to examine, in comparative fashion, the incentives and obstacles to successful military disengagement from politics.

Samuel Finer has set forth four necessary conditions for long term military disengagement: 1) the leader imposed as a result of intervention must strongly desire that his troops quit politics; 2) he must be able to establish a regime capable of functioning without further military support; 3) there must be continuing support of the armed forces by the new regime; and 4) the military must have confidence in the individual leader who orders them back to barracks.¹

These conditions address a longer period of military rule but do not appear to anticipate a military attempting, as far as possible, wholesale social engineering over a prolonged period of time. Neither do they allow for a scenario in which the national desire for

economic stability and social tranquility supersedes the preeminence of immediate democratic representation, thus contrasting with Western ethnocentricity. In other words, these conditions do not anticipate what I would term a withdrawal according to popular consensus where the program of disengagement is to a marked degree the synthesis of military and civilian opinion.² Previous analyses of penetration models have generally perceived a rift between military and civil disposition and cooperation with regards to the priorities and scheduling of military disengagement. The essential point here is that early propositions for military disengagement from politics anticipated little sophistication and political acumen on the part of the body of officers engaged in such a course of action.

The Nigerian military disengagement program of 1975-79, in Mainwaring's terminology, is a 'transition from above' as contrasted with a 'transition through withdrawal'.³ Mainwaring⁴ explains that

The critical difference between the two kinds of transition lies in the regime's ability to influence the transition (greater in transition from above) and in the degree of discontinuity in the political process (lesser in transition from above).

Nigeria's third military government exercised a 'transition from above' in which there was not an adversarial relationship between the military regime and the populace at large. We shall consider this point and others at a later time.

Claude Welch⁵ set forth the following factors as contributing variables for military disengagement. First, the commanding officers must be firm in their resolve to step aside. The second variable is the existence of a group of forceful, articulate civilians, who regularly remind the ruling juntas of their rhetoric of withdrawal. The third and most significant factor is the belief that military effectiveness would be further impaired by remaining in control.

Once again, it is doubtful whether a prolonged period of disengagement was envisaged for the simple reason that the author set forth the above variables prior to the advent and culmination of more

extended periods of transition. Military disengagement had been up to the late 1960s and early 1970s relatively short experiments lasting at most only several years and in most instances considerably less.

Focusing on the attitudes and perceptions of governing officers, Welch⁶ proposes examining 1) the cohesiveness of ruling juntas, 2) the scope of their political objectives, and 3) the relative 'fit' with a potential successor group to assess the relative likelihood of long term returns to barracks.

What emerges in the above frameworks are two essential points. One, the institutional interest of the military both during and after military disengagement is most evident in the search for suitable civilian successors vis-à-vis structures and personalities. It is important to note that this effort to secure suitable successors and institutions is as much an endeavor to see a form of representative government function and to keep the military out of politics, as most authors have noted, as it is a corporate desire on the part of the military to ensure the absence of civilian intrusion (or what is perceived as unwarranted interference by civilian authorities in the affairs of the military).⁷ Here one observes the volatility of a situation where boundaries of autonomy have yet to be solidly defined. Indeed, they cannot be so defined in the short term, as nascent civilian governments with their institutions and bureaucracies will cross military boundaries in matters of legal and operational jurisdiction, to name but two areas of mutual interest, as circumstances and events arise in a functionally amorphous political setting. Two, there is indeed an acknowledgment of civil military interaction and a need for accommodation within the political environment. Dictation without accommodation will prove insufficient for subsequent political order.

The first factor, institutional interests, remains a consistent and sensitive feature in both military intervention and military disengagement. The second factor becomes the real area of bargaining, innovation, and, if sufficient resolve and cooperation exists, experimentation in a new socio-political order, the political being far easier to tamper with than the social.

For purposes of illustration one can recall Table 5.1 and

substitute the military's 'institutional interests' as the independent variable, thus obtaining the following result:

Table 6.1

Association between institutional interest, intervention and disengagement

independent variable	dependent variable
ephemeral threat to institutional interest	>> no intervention military disengagement
chronic threat to institutional interest	>> intervention no military disengagement

The emphasis on civil military interaction is clarified with Claude Welch's⁸ dominant assumption that initial steps toward 'successful' disengagement are predicated upon mutually supportive beliefs of officers and civilians regarding the legitimacy of progressive disengagement.

Welch comments⁹ that

Recivilianization requires belief based on evidence, for both military and civilian leaders, that leading issues of domestic unrest, economic distribution and social mobilization/social heterogeneity are being relatively satisfactorily resolved - or at least approached - under the newly installed, largely civilian government. Further, it requires an increasingly strong sense that changes of government personnel should be carried out under popular and civilian auspices, rather than with the active, direct involvement of segments of the armed forces, even if these changes bring to the fore groups against which the military has been historically antipathetic.

This last point represents perhaps the reluctant acknowledgment on the part of the military that political realities will at times

not permit the elimination of historical groups antagonistic to its corporate interests. Writing in the Brazilian context, Luciano Martins states¹⁰ that

It is not (as is often supposed) the lack of political legitimacy per se that makes the authoritarian regime vulnerable to political criticism, but rather the criticism emanating from those strategic groups who have been turned into dissidents in the absence of mechanisms for representing their interests.¹¹

Although he is speaking in part on the issue of legitimacy there is considerable import for the relationship between the military and strategic groups.

The key concept here is criticism from dissident groups. As has been mentioned above the military is less sensitive to sporadic violence in the rural sector than to urban unrest which directly confronts regime authority. In the same manner one can clearly perceive that strategic groups may well wield inordinate influence in economic and social stability and continuity. These groups may well be not only intractable but, more significantly, fused into the political-economic-social fabric. Attempts at the elimination of such groups is thus replaced by more sophisticated means of cooptation and neutralization. This represents a growing awareness by both military regimes and observers of civil-military relations of a more realistic posturing vis-à-vis political realities that has come only after time and experience. In 1974 Claude Welch¹² speaks of the 'fit' of the military in power with a potential successor group; in 1987 he speaks of a military disengagement allowing for the activity of historically antipathetic groups in the subsequent political order.

Welch emphasizes¹³ that the underlying motivation for initial steps toward successful disengagement lies in attitudes, but that fully fledged decisions to disengage and remain disengaged reflect factors that are partly attitudinal, but also involve politically relevant groups in society as well as members of the officer corps.

SIX HYPOTHESES FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

Welch provides six hypotheses¹⁴ about the initial decision to disengage and the process of long term military disengagement from politics as well as attendant obstacles and incentives. These hypotheses relate to: 1) role perceptions, 2) funding and internal management of the military, 3) military mission and deployment, 4) internal strife, 5) economic trends, and 6) political conditions. Obstacles cited are general and chronic political unrest, economic deterioration, and the lack of adequate civilian inheritors to the reins of political leadership. Incentives are short-term economic difficulties, economic progress, budgetary and organizational benefits for the military, the existence of adequate civilian inheritors, and constitutional mechanisms providing for governmental change, or the existence of 'a respected senior officer willing to shepherd the political system as a whole through a protracted transition'. Here we can speak of men such as Muhammed and Obasanjo 1975-79 and Ibrahim Babangida 1985 to the present, in Nigeria, and Lamizana of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso since 1984) in both 1970 and 1977.

An elaboration of the six hypotheses follows.

1) Role perceptions refers to the analysis among senior military officers of the merits of continued direct political involvement. Here there is a consensus among civilian and military actors concerning the appropriate role of the military, which is to adhere to professional and non-political responsibilities, constitutional means for the creation and change of governments, and the authority of government personnel in the formulation and execution of policy decisions whether economic, political or social.

The adoption of professional and non political roles is directed towards a reduction of what is termed boundary fragmentation¹⁵ between the armed forces and social groups.

2) Funding and internal management of the military refers to the expectation that successor civilian governments will provide adequate financial support coupled with relative autonomy in matters such as recruitment and promotion most especially of company and field grade officers. To this hypothesis I would add the importance

of psychological 'stroking' of the military by the civilian regime. By this I mean the constant complimenting of the armed forces for their role as a critical national institution. In the case of Venezuela, since the deposing of Perez Jimenez in January 1958, the civilian authority, under both AD and COPEI leadership, has indeed provided generous compensation for the officer corps¹⁶ and has taken every opportunity publicly to laud the military's contribution to the strengthening of democratic Venezuela, and its role 'as the repository of national values'.¹⁷

3) Military mission and deployment relates to the manner and scope in which troops are physically moved and used. Here one is speaking of the military being redirected in its mission toward classic defense duties outside the capital city. This redirection is seen as enhancing the prospects of disengagement. By contrast, a strong commitment to 'civic action' or development is seen as detrimental to the possibilities of military disengagement in that it is perceived as placing the military in 'settings of potential domestic political contact and conflict, and increasing the likelihood of boundary fragmentation between the military and various social forces'. Professor Welch's concern would appear to be more valid in settings where there is an absence of counterinsurgency despite ethnic tensions. Within the context of military intervention we can recall the unfavorable response of the Ghanaian military to the efforts of the CPP regime to use the army in a civic action capacity.¹⁸ Here there is indication that what is auspicious for averting military intervention is equally so for securing military disengagement.

4) Internal strife relates to the two-edged sword of domestic unrest, which can result in either military disengagement or continued military rule depending on the duration and intensity of the unrest. The incentive here for military 'neutrality' and the move towards military disengagement is most favorably seen in societies experiencing long periods of domestic tranquility, indeed an august achievement in itself. This possibility is enhanced in the event that the military is not called upon (activated in the use of its considerable power) to support the government in quelling domestic unrest of various kinds.

5) Economic trends relates to the debilitating and unstable effects of an economy experiencing a decline as indicated by: marked increases in rates of inflation, reduction of export earnings, lowering of governmental expenditures especially in the social sector, reduction of export earnings, etc. This concept includes any situation of endemic fiscal weakness which encourages the violent removal of presidents.¹⁹ These conditions are seen as increasing the possibility of intervention while, conversely, more manageable rates of inflation and adequate foreign exchange earnings are more likely to meet the cost of major imports and provide for the possibility of more 'stable patterns of income distribution'. In the latter scenario the military is perceived as being more likely to adopt non-political roles.

6) Political conditions relates to the existence of 'a potential successor acceptable to the disengaging officers because of attitudinal, class or ethnic factors, or some combination of these'. Such a figure is most often found within the military itself and thus the stage is set for the almost classic metamorphosis from general to civil president often accompanied by a newly created party apparatus.²⁰ This repeated occurrence among various nations represents the endeavor to secure continuing law and order in governance and is not merely corporate greed and ambition on the part of the military; the third world experience does not allow for any such accurate differentiation.

Conversely, the presence of threatening political leaders or groups will reduce the incentive to disengage.

CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

I would now like to expand on the third hypothesis, that of military mission and deployment. The Latin American experience has revealed an innovative means by which to institutionalize/constitutionalize a psychological disposition towards civilian rule. This is the specific constitutional role delineated for the armed forces in supporting and defending civil government. It further represents an attempt to harness and redefine the strongly patriotic, and often nationalistic, strain within Latin societies and most

emphatically within the military. Let us look at but two examples of this from that region.

First, let us consider Venezuela's democracia pactada (pacted democracy) as reflected in its constitution of 1961. 'Article 132 declares the National Armed Forces to be a non-political and obedient institution, organized by the State to ensure the national defence, the stability of democratic institutions, and respect for the constitution and the laws, the observance of which shall always be above any other obligation. The National Armed Forces shall be in the service of the Republic, and in no case in that of any person or political party'.²¹ This article becomes essentially a declaration of non-interference and service to be observed by the military.²² The intricacies of the Venezuelan situation must be examined carefully to appreciate the exact manner in which such a constitutional dispensation was achieved, one that remains an impressive although unrealistic expectation by most nations dealing with military disengagement. The Venezuelan military continues to observe this role in a constitution now entering its third decade. Throughout this period the Venezuelan presidency has not been occupied by a former general, so Article 190 of the constitution which declares that the president is Commander-in-Chief takes on an added significance, that of the primacy of civilian leadership of government. In this instance the Western 'ideal' of civilian hegemony is more nearly approached subsequent to an extended history of military rule.

The second example concerns the 1946 Ecuadorian constitution which states that the armed forces are to be 'non-arbitrator', that is, they are not to take a supervisory role in government. The 1972 coup abrogated the 1946 constitution and reinstated that of 1945,²³ which did not have this stipulation. The Ecuadorian reality, however, does not mirror that of Venezuela, for Ecuador is a society with a less differentiated stratification system, to use Guillermo O'Donnell's description,²⁴ as well as extensive patrimonial practices and a scarcely capitalist economy.²⁵ However, having made the transition to constitutional democracy, Ecuador does not represent a pacted democracy by which is meant a representative political dispensation mutually agreed upon by a nation's strategic

groups and parties.²⁶ It is interesting to note that John Samuel Fitch has commented that Latin American countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador

are militarily as well as economically and politically more akin to Africa and Asia [than to more developed Latin American states], and these may prove the most important for cross regional analyses and for the development of a more broadly comparative theory.²⁷

Though much can be said for constitutional clauses and their linkage to stable civil-military relations it is nevertheless clear that only in a minority of cases have such dispensations not been violated. Any emphasis on having such constitutional arrangements as a guarantee against military intervention is therefore unrealistic. In Nigeria, during the 1975-79 transition period, there was considerable debate on the issue of whether specifically to prohibit military intervention in the constitution itself.²⁸ In the event no such clause was incorporated into the constitution. Most of the individuals involved in the formulation of the new constitution concluded, more realistically, that only a change in political perspective would make any difference; clause or no clause the military would go in if the will and circumstances permitted. What was needed would be what Samuel Huntington²⁹ has termed subjective civilian control in the absence of objective civilian control. In the former case we speak of the self-regulating and self-perpetuating military ethic which reflects a non-interventionist perspective and behavior. The latter - objective civilian control - refers to the actual functioning preeminence of civilian leadership over the military as an institution in finalizing domestic and foreign policy.

So as to dispel any lingering thoughts of 'constitution control' over the military it is helpful to consider the significance of the United States as a First World model. In this instance there is a constitutional absence of objective civilian control.

The United States Constitution, despite the widespread

belief to the contrary, does not provide for civilian control.... The essence of civilian control in this sense is a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities and the institutional subordination of the latter to the former. These are unknown to the Constitution, which mixes political and military functions, interjecting politics into military affairs and military affairs into politics. Present in the minds of the Framers when they wrote it and perpetuated in its provisions was an essentially subjective approach to civil-military relations. Civilian control has at times existed in the United States, but it has emerged despite rather than because of constitutional provisions.³⁰

Those who formed the American Constitution did not foresee the emergence of military professionalism and objective civilian control; at the time these were not constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the constitution did not envisage a separate class of persons exclusively devoted to military leadership.³¹ Instead it was formulated amidst normative standards of the citizen-soldier and the separation of powers. There would be a distinction between the legislature and executive and between these and the judiciary rather than a focus on 'keeping the political distinct from the military'.

It is common wisdom among many observers of civil-military relations that civilian control is optimized if the military is restricted in scope and fixed (if such terminology is possible) in a subordinate position within a structure of authority which includes its own chain of command and has a civilian supreme commander. However, the military clauses of the American Constitution do not follow this logic; indeed Huntington asserts that they provide for almost exactly the opposite. As well as determining many of its own policies the military is afforded direct access to the higher echelons of government. The framers make reference to a militia rather than an organized military institution such as one is more familiar with. This militia was tiny in proportion to its modern day counterpart.

This balance between civilian responsibility for military affairs

and military access to government can be described in the following manner:

- 1) Within the total federal system of government, the militia clauses divide control over the militia between the state and national governments.
- 2) Within the national government, the separation of powers divides control of the national military forces between Congress and the President.
- 3) Within the executive branch of the national government, the Commander in Chief clause tends to divide control over the military between the President and departmental secretaries.³²

GOVERNMENTAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

If one considers African experiments in a federal system of government the control and assignment of the militia or paramilitary forces and police has proven anything but auspicious. Ethnic and regional divisions have hampered any attempts at regional and federal military autonomy aimed at a harmonious domestic security arrangement. The contending forces have been far too severe and the central authority too strongly challenged.

The separation of powers is not a realistic objective where fragile military unity would be severely strained by being parcelled out to Potemkin institutions such as a council of representatives and a presidency. The political culture, institutional development and recognized legitimacy is simply not present in the vast majority of African states, hence the prevalence of one-party rule and the penchant, if not objective need, for a unified and autonomous military. In the light of African realities it would not be inaccurate to rate the concept of separation of powers as somewhat Utopian. Perhaps even more accurately it is perceived with considerable suspicion as indeed is the concept of a multiparty polity and liberal democracy.³³ African priorities remain primarily in the areas of order and stability, and civility.

For many of the same reasons the executive branch of government

has continued to possess the essential reins of power - both military and governmental. There may well be the establishment of a political police force under specific departmental direction but there is usually no question as to its ultimate allegiance and purpose, namely, the president and his preservation. The backdrop of the African reality is not one that provides checks and balances between the Congress (the body of representatives), the executive and the judiciary. The executive is preeminent, determining in most instances the composition and scope of other state institutions, if any.

If there is any concept of checks and balances in the African post-colonial era it has been one of counterbalancing the dominant military force with another, or at least eroding its monopoly on fire power. Typically we speak of creating paramilitary forces, special or expanded police forces and palace guards of the FOCR variety, in addition to intelligence and informant networks. Such counterbalancing has essentially nothing to do with institutional checks and balances and real power is neither checked nor balanced. Power remains primarily in the hands of relatively few men whether we speak of a military regime or a single party society.

An interesting feature of the American constitution is that it functioned within a political culture that had a lack of concern about military matters. Consequently the constitutional structure was left almost unsupplemented by statutory enactments.³⁴ By contrast the African experience with constitution development has demonstrated a marked preference for and belief in the efficacy of constitutional enactments as a means of societal development or at least in the hope of societal, including military, compliance with essentially restricted forms of behavior. In other words constitutional enactments have tended to be for the purposes of regulating societies against historical abuses of power rather than statements reflecting institutional and electoral realities. Whereas the American constitution is a somewhat inflexible document, Africa has shown few qualms concerning supplementary constitutional experimentation.

In both the 1975-79 and the current (1985-1992) programs of military disengagement the Nigerians have attempted to emulate

certain constitutional and legislative features of the American model. The scope of the Nigerian constitution of 1979, for example, tended to be wider than that of its Western counterparts and included such items as legitimacy of children.³⁵ Moreover the Supreme Military Council (SMC) had the ultimate say as to the content, as well as syntax, of the final constitutional draft. An example³⁶ is the contentious issue of the representative national composition of the armed forces which the Constitution Assembly had set forth under section 197 (2). This section stated that:

The composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces of the Federation shall reflect the federal character of the Federation based on the population of each state.

The SMC proceeded to amend this section by deleting 'based on the population of each state', the rationale being that the SMC did not want the effectiveness of the armed forces adversely affected.³⁷ This proposal was a sore reminder of the old practice of quota representation by region, now to be transposed to state level.³⁸

Significantly the more recent attempts at constitutional development have revealed that certain aspects of the 1979 constitution, which essentially served as the working paper of the most recent constituent assembly, were deleted from the draft constitution without being replaced by alternatives. In addition, some issues were not addressed at all.³⁹ The manner of formulating Nigeria's future constitutional dispensation appears to lie open to the criticism of being mildly desultory; the new constitution is probably over-extended and with no real mechanism of societal compliance. However, there seems to be a hope that the covering of all bases (items of constitutional and legislative interest) will maximize the chances of the future success and longevity of these instruments of governance.

The point that must be understood is that the constitutional element remains central to a scheduled program of military disengagement. It reflects not only the hope of a stable societal inheritance but also a general assessment of civil-military

relations. There is no illusion, among most, that a constitutional arrangement can not be swept aside by the military once again. The point to be made with regards to our theoretical study of military disengagement is that a constitution provides the legal framework or document of arbitration⁴⁰ between the military and strategic groups, setting forth the delimitation of acceptable behavior for both parties. And although this is not openly expressed, the document of arbitration has proven in essence conditional.⁴¹ The military has not been neutralized (under subjective or objective control) and returns to the barracks in most instances stronger than when it set out. Under such circumstances the constitutional arrangement must prove successful or anticipate its own elimination; there is little room for tolerance of a repeated malaise. Circumstances in the society and economy as a whole will thus anticipate whether a constitutional arrangement works. The Western observer must realize that he has the 'luxury' of adhering to an unassailable constitution which can be mythologized in time. There is however no comparable reverence for a constitutional arrangement in the vast majority of Third World societies. Thus a constitution, while occupying an almost symbolic position in the aspirations of a society in socio-economic transition, is highly important within a program of military disengagement but is not deterministic. A program of military disengagement requires this symbolic element in the hope that it will make the metamorphosis to the unassailable standard. In addition to factors of legitimacy and institutionalization we may be returning to Aristide Zolberg's observation⁴² that the most significant variable under these circumstances may well be the passing of time, which he believes is a factor often neglected in studies of regime stability in Third World countries. Clearly this bias for time has been adopted in the process of military disengagement. There are ample examples of limited and indefinite postponements of the transfer to civilian rule as well as of regimes opting for a longer period for the program of military disengagement (see Table 6.2).

Though one would be wise not to overemphasize the constitutional component within a program of military disengagement its significance as a reflection of civil-military relations was well put by Brigadier

Table 6.2

Postponements of Military Disengagement

Country	Date of Announcement	Proposed new date for Military Disengagement
Ghana	1967	1969
Nigeria	1967	1969
"	1970	1976
"	1974	indefinite
"	1985	1990, then 1992
Equatorial Guinea	1982	1989

Shehu Yar'Adua to the students of the Command and Staff College at Jaji, Kaduna, on 20 December 1978. Brigadier Yar'Adua stated that⁴³

a critical factor in the stability of our country is the nature of the civil-military relationship and whether or not that relationship is governed by rules and norms prescribed by the constitution. Of course, a stable institutional relationship presumes a clear definition of roles and an understanding and acceptance of such roles both by the military and civilian government.

MORE THEORY OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT: AFRICA

We now return to a regional examination of military disengagement. J. 'Bayo Adekunle suggests⁴⁴ that a close observation of the West African comparative situation reveals three major approaches to military disengagement: 1) the counter-coup inspired approach, 2) the military turned political pattern, and 3) the constitutional evolutionary model.

Though we have discussed most elements of these approaches it is nevertheless worth restating them in a concise manner. The first is

the ousting, for a variety of reasons, of a ruling junta which has no immediate intention of withdrawing from political rule. The second is when the leadership divests itself, at least on paper, of the control of the army and seeks a more permanent basis of rule. In the third, the military authorities do not limit themselves to mere civilianization, but seek to disengage fully from the political arena while maintaining a workable relationship between the military and civilian sectors of the society.

Adekson contends that Nigeria's first serious attempt at military disengagement after the 29 July 1975 coup⁴⁵ falls under the constitutional evolutionary model.


Referring to the literature on military disengagement of the early and mid-1970s we have Valerie P. Bennett's⁴⁶ classifications of 1) Personalist Transformation (of military leaders into quasi-civilian presidents), 2) Orderly Transition (to civilian rule), 3) Disorderly Transition (civilianization by default).

The terminology of this period may differ somewhat from subsequent elaboration but there is some continuity and much that is familiar to more contemporary analysis. Once again it is helpful to recall that prolonged programs of military disengagement would be more observable from 1975 on. Earlier works therefore offer an analysis of the shorter and less comprehensive examples of military disengagement which were most common to the period under examination.

Valerie Bennett's categories appear as generalizations of what are now thought of as more intricate, if not systematic, realities. However Bennett is quick to observe⁴⁷ that styles of military disengagement are clearly more varied than at least one other author has suggested.⁴⁸ As with the models previously mentioned there is an understanding that there are significant factors which relate directly to the disposition and kind of military disengagement one is dealing with. These include 'internal organization of the coup group' whether it be hierarchical or egalitarian; the military leadership's 'relationship with opposition party' leaders (I would observe that she is speaking more precisely here of strategic groups rather than the more limited concept of opposition party leaders); the 'level of politicization' of the intervening group; and the vital element of the 'cohesiveness of the ruling body'.

PERSONALIST TRANSFORMATION

Personalist transformation is in effect an attempt at securing legitimization of rule by a military-turned-civilian leader by means of an electoral mechanism. In such instances one may observe the appearance of political parties and civilian ministerial positions. There are however at least two essential prerequisites for personalist transformation to take place. First, there must exist an undisputed head of the ruling body and the essential absence of public agitation for a return to an untransmutable civilian governance. In essence one is speaking of the need for control and time; control of the ruling body coupled with their allegiance, and time for the transformation, attributable to an absence of a strong opposition to the process itself and conventional recivilianization. Conversely, where these two prerequisites are absent the transformation will not be allowed due to internal (junta) and external (public) objection and thus the road to military disengagement will follow other models. We may depict this relationship as follows:



If there is no personalist transformation, then there will be a program of military disengagement (either short or long term). The alternative possibility of an iron fist dictatorship does not prove feasible in the long term due to its inevitable isolation and internal dislocation (Uganda 1971-1979). Even if one examines the penetration model of civil-military relations the conclusion is drawn that it must conform in some measure to a personalist transformation and in fact there are several examples which well illustrate this, such as Benin, Congo and Ethiopia, to name but three instances from

the African continent. In Benin, Major Mathieu Kerekou was elected President Kerekou in February 1980. In the People's Republic of the Congo, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso became President Sassou-Nguesso with elections held for a People's National Assembly in July 1979. In the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam was elected President Mengistu by the Shango in 1987, with the new Marxist-Leninist party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, created under military auspices in September 1984.⁴⁹

In a word, all forms of government, whether of the (until recently) professed Marxist-Leninist variety or a multiparty democracy or something in between, must eventually implement the ostensible structures of a participatory or representative government.⁵⁰ It must also diffuse ethnic and regional conflicts amidst these structures. If not, one can anticipate future attempts at the seizure of power. Witness for example Benin's attempted coup of March 1988 led by Captain Hountountoundji and Lieutenant-Colonels Hilaire Badjogoumre and Francis Kouyami. (The latter two individuals were instrumental in Kerekou's successful seizure of power in 1972). There was apparently a resurgence of ethnic conflict within the National Executive Council. Moreover, all the officers arrested in connection with the March 1988 attempt came from the south-central region and most of them from Abomey. This event had been preceded in May 1985, and in March 1987, by violent confrontations by students of Cotonou University with the police which resulted in many arrests.⁵¹

In the People's Republic of the Congo there was opposition to economic policies which provided the springboard for Captain Pierre Anga's unsuccessful attempt to kill Denis Sassou-Nguesso in June 1987.⁵² In the Congo, all the essential military and government positions, and many party positions, are occupied by military officers, and of these a majority are northerners.⁵³ Thus protests against northern domination are not easily dispelled. And any attempts at participatory party activity will be perceived in this light by certain target populations.

Personalist transformation is an uncertain phenomenon in the event that the central figure is eliminated by other than electoral means. This is related to the degree to which institutional

structures and party mechanisms have advanced sufficiently to cope with the contingency of the ruler's absence, elimination or death. For example Zaire and Togo represent the ongoing experiment of personalist transformation. They may or may not have reason to consider themselves now among the ranks of countries with personalist rulers such as Life President Dr H. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and President Dr. Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast.⁵⁴

Perhaps one is given a harbinger of things to come by the emergence of direct military rule as occurred upon the death of Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea when reformist Colonel (later General) Lansana Conte took control in April 1984.⁵⁵ One may also examine the replacement, in November 1987, of President for Life Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia⁵⁶ by General Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali over the President's chosen successor of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, who had been reaffirmed as heir before the PSD Central Committee in March 1986. There is speculation that in Malawi, in the absence of an undisputed successor to a leader such as President Banda, there will be a struggle for power between various sectors, though indications are that the ruling MCP Executive member John Tembo will take over as head of government once the President departs.

What becomes apparent is that the issue of succession is central and by no means unassailable. Thus it would appear that personalist transformation is viable as a means of military disengagement only for the first generation, that is, the man and associates who take power and pursue the transformation to civilian cadres. The command of alliance and control by a designated successor appears too tenuous and much susceptible to military challenge. As cited above, a requirement for military disengagement is an acceptable head of state who is able to command respect and allegiance.⁵⁷ This usually means that a member of the military will emerge as the 'party's' choice as in Brazil until very recently. But it appears that Bennett's observation⁵⁸ remains accurate, namely, that it does seem improbable that the death or removal of the officer-president will lead to a further peaceful transition. Personalist transformation may merely represent a breathing space between periods of political instability.

NOTES

1. C. WELCH, 'Military Disengagement From Politics?: Incentives and Obstacles to Political Change', in Simon Baynham (ed), Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p.68.

Claude Welch defines 'long-term' military disengagement from politics as a minimum period of ten years during which 1) at least one successful 'regular' executive transition has occurred and 2) the level and nature of military involvement in politics have moved significantly from military 'control' to military 'participation', or from military 'participation' to military 'influence'. See C. WELCH, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, p.20.

There is of course a distinction drawn between disengagement of short duration and long term disengagement. The former applies to those instances of quick exit or rectifying efforts on the part of the military without comprehensive and permanent alteration of political-social realities or a staged retreat. We may cite for example Zaire 1960, Sierra Leone 1968, Ghana 1979, inter alia. Long term disengagement is more experimental having more extensive policy objectives and the ambition of instituting a less corrupt and more productive socio-economic order.

2. See D. PION-BERLIN, 'The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983', in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol.27, no.2, Summer 1985, pp.55-76.
3. S. MAINWARING & A. VIOLA, 'Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, Winter 1985, pp.193-219.
4. S. MAINWARING, 'Transition to Democracy in Brazil', in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol.28, no.1, Spring 1986, p.171.
5. C. WELCH, Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp.54-55.
6. C. WELCH, 'Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa', in African Studies Review, Lansing, vol.XVII, no.1, April 1974, pp.213-222.
7. Western norms and experience in the African post-colonial era have become insufficiently compelling for military submission. What we are observing here is essentially a political arrangement resembling a truce until continuity and legitimacy are acknowledged by both major groups of actors.
8. C. Welch, No Farewell to Arms?, op.cit., at note 1, p.20.
9. Ibid., p.21.

10. I. MARTINS, 'The "Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil', in G. O'DONNELL, P.C. SCHMITTER & L. WHITEHEAD (eds), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.80. In the case of Brazilian military disengagement one observes interests that are primarily economic in character and not directed towards a social transformation that would jeopardize actual and potential economic gains. In other words the nation's economic mechanism is not essentially in question.
11. Note that 'strategic groups' are not to be confused with 'strategic elites' as defined by S. KELLER, in Beyond the Ruling Class, New York: Random House, 1963.
12. Claude Welch, op.cit., at note 6.
13. Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms?, op.cit., at note 1, p.21.
14. Ibid., pp.21-26.
15. Claude Welch explains boundary fragmentation as a lack of clear differentiation between the armed forces and society, which results in the sharing of values. Ibid., p.22.
16. The Venezuelan government provides 100 per cent of a retiring officer's base pay after 30 years of service. By comparison the United States government provides 75 per cent for officers retiring after the same length of active service.
17. T.L. KARL, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter & L. Whitehead (eds), op.cit., p.213.
18. See J. KRAUS, 'The Men In Charge', in Africa Report, April 1966, p.19.
19. Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms?, op.cit., at note 1, p.23.
20. As representative examples we may mention Paraguay (Stroessner and the Colorado party), Zaire (Mobutu, with the MPR naming its founder president in December 1970), Togo (Etienne Eyadema and the RPT which was established in 1969), Sierra Leone (Joseph Momoh, who was elected president in 1985), Brazil (Geisel, Figueiredo, among others, and ARENA turned PDS), and Egypt (Nassar, Sadat and the ASU, dissolved 15 August 1978 with the creation of the NDP on the same day).
21. John KEEGAN, World Armies, London: MacMillan, 1979, p.789.
22. To understand this considerable achievement in Venezuelan democracy, which has been a reality for more than thirty years, one must return to the Pact of Punto Fijo and Statement of Principles and Minimum Program of Government, signed 31 October 1958 by the URD, AD, and COPEI as well as agreed to by the Venezuelan armed forces. On the strictly political side, the

Pact guaranteed that all parties would respect the electoral process and share power in a manner commensurate with the voting results. There would also be interparty consultation. The formation of coalitions and an equitable distribution of state benefits. With regard to military needs and interests, the armed forces received the state's promise to increase technology and modernize equipment, improve the economic situation of officers and enlisted men, and maintain obligatory military service. The military's role was in turn defined as that of an apolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative body (Terry Lynn Karl, op.cit., pp.212-213). An interesting feature of the arrangements of October 1958 was the 'implicit' agreement that the military would not be held accountable for its role during the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez and that no parties would seek the trials of military leaders. Instead the civil authority 'recognized the merits and service of the men who made up the Armed Forces and their important collaboration in the maintenance of public peace'. (Terry Lynn Karl, op.cit., p.212). Argentina, since the 1983 return to democracy, has echoed this desire for nonaccountability and no trials for its participation in the 'dirty war' from 1976-1983, even though in the Argentinian case there had been a more severe experience of bloody confrontation with greater national shock and a call for justice.

23. John Keegan, op.cit., p.790.
24. G. O'DONNELL, 'Introduction to the Latin American Cases', in G. O'DONNELL, P.C. SCHMITTER & L. WHITEHEAD (eds), op.cit., p.5.
25. This in light of, if not highlighted by, the fact that the economy is dependent on petroleum revenues. In fact both Venezuela and Ecuador are members of OPEC.
26. This distinction belongs thus far only to Colombia and Venezuela.
27. As quoted by Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms?, op.cit., at note 1, p.36. See J.S. FITCH, The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977.
28. O. OYEDIRAN, 'Civilian rule for how long?' in O. OYEDIRAN (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79, London: MacMillan Press, 1979, pp.280-281.
29. See S.P. HUNTINGTON, The Soldier and The State, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985.
30. Ibid., p.163.
31. Ibid., p.165. Huntington quotes George Mason at the Virginia Convention as saying 'I am not acquainted with the military profession'. Mason and others envisaged a nonprofessional officership.

32. Ibid., p.164.
33. Robert H. JACKSON & Clark G. ROSBERG, 'Democracy in Tropical Africa: Democracy versus Autocracy in African Politics', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, no.2, Winter 1985, p.305.
34. S.P. Huntington, op.cit., p.164.
35. For example, section 39(2) of the 1979 constitution bestowed legitimacy on children born out of wedlock. The now defunct Constitutional review Committee (CRC) deleted this item in preparation for Nigerian civilian rule in 1992.
36. As a matter of record the SMC altered the contents of at least seventeen provisions, see E.A. GBOYEGA, 'The Making of the Nigerian Constitution', in O. Oyediran (ed), op.cit., p.255.
37. Ibid., p.256.
38. This relates directly to the serious issue of ethnicity which remains a prominent factor in political life. The SMC contained no Ibo officer while the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) contained only one. While the Hausa-Fulani were over-represented in the SMC they were nearly excluded from the AFRC. This matter of proportional representation within the armed forces remains a delicate issue which President Babangida has addressed carefully. See C. LEGUM (ed), African Contemporary Record 1985-86, New York: Africana Publishing, p.B132.
39. O. AYENI, 'Thorny Issues in the Draft Constitution', in West Africa, 26 September - 2 October 1988, p.1775.
40. This term is not to be confused with Amos Perlmutter's distinction between two kinds of military intervention, namely, the arbitrator-type and the ruler-type. Nevertheless there is a similarity between 'document of arbitration' and 'arbitrator-type' in that both provide for a schedule of transfer to 'acceptable' civilian government. See A. PERLMUTTER, 'The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army', in Comparative Politics, vol.1, no.3, April 1969, pp.382-404.
41. The circumstances surrounding the election in Ghana of Dr. Hilla Limann and the People's National Party (PNP) provide a good illustration of a conditional arrangement. Jerry Rawlings warned President Limann on the day of his inauguration (24 September 1979) that the 'nation was watching him' but more precisely the PNP understood that it had been installed in power at the discretion of the military. The civilians were very aware that their performance was being constantly monitored and evaluated by their 'sponsors'. See T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, London: Europa Publications, p.465.
42. Aristide ZOLBERG, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in The New

States of Tropical Africa', in The American Political Science Review, vol.62, no.1, 1968, p.78.

43. Quoted by New Nigerian, 10 January 1979, p.7.
44. J.B. ADEKSON, 'Dilemma of military disengagement', in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed), op.cit., pp.212-234 (especially pp.213-218).
45. Ibid., p.216. Adekson states that the rationale for this model lies in the concept of 'political neutrality' and that its general emphasis is on constitutional and methodical procedure of military disengagement. He goes on to expound: 'It involves drawing up an elaborate timetable for a phased return to civilian rule, a procedure which features such other processes as the making of a new constitution, summoning of a constituent assembly to debate and ratify the draft constitution, lifting of the ban on political party activity, and finally the holding of national elections to determine the civilian successors to the military.'
46. See V.P. BENNETT, 'Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa', in Quarterly Journal of Administration, October 1974, pp.5-15.
47. Ibid.. p.5.
48. This is a reference to Amos Perlmutter's delineation of arbitrator and ruler type intervention.
49. Mengistu retains his positions as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and general secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.
50. If one were to gauge the participatory scope of the citizens of Benin, Congo, and Ethiopia by party membership one would find the following data somewhat revealing.

Country	Ruling party	Population (mid-1967)	Party membership
Benin	PRPB	4,339,096	less than 2,000 (0.05%)
Congo	PCT	2,082,154	9,000 est. (0.43%)
Ethiopia	WPE	46,706,229	50,000 est. (0.11%)

Source: Adapted from 'Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987', Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb 1988, p.70.

In none of these cases is party membership even 1% of the population. Moreover, figures for 1989 show no appreciable difference (ibid., March-April 1990, p.77).

At this point, of course, there arises both the question of relative participation of the population in the affairs of state as well as the debate between 'vanguard' parties, which by definition are very selective, and a 'mass base' party such as the CCM in Tanzania that has steadfastly held against the concept of the vanguard party. Despite the exclusivity of vanguard parties one has seen in the past few years an attempt to expand

recruitment into the party, for example by the PRPB in Benin. Richard STAAR comments that the main preoccupation of the ruling PRPB remains the same as in previous years: the expansion and strengthening of the party itself; see 1987 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, p.8. Staar goes on to state that: 'In a revealing article in the World Marxist Review (Aug), Politburo member Azouhiho clearly made the recruiting of new party members a priority, and he admitted that, after more than ten years of existence, the PRPB formation "has been consummated mainly at the higher and medium levels. There are no primary organizations at industrial facilities, in the services industry, in garrisons, at schools and institutions of higher learning [or] in residential neighborhoods" (ibid). In other words, there has been no real link between the party and the population, and control of the latter by the former has been shaky.' (my emphasis)

A most recent political development is recorded by Staar in The Problems of Communism, March-April 1990, p.76: 'On 7 December 1989, the People's Republic of Benin, one of the ruling vanguard revolutionary democratic parties renounced Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology.'

51. See S.I. ONWORDI, 'Rumbles of Discontent', in West Africa, 21-27 November 1988, p.2184.
52. R.F. STAAR, 'Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987', in Problems of Communism, January-February 1988, p.64.
53. M. RADU, 'Congo', in R.F. Staar (ed), 1986 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, p.11.
54. Although President Houphouët-Boigny is not a 'Life President' he has however been able to modify the constitutional provisions for presidential succession and in 1985 was able to get himself re-elected for another five-year term as Head of State.
55. The ethnic factor subsequently emerged again in the unsuccessful coup of 4 July 1986 where General Conte - seen as a member of the minority Soussou people - was challenged by members of Sekou Touré's Malinke tribe.
56. In fact Bourguiba suffered a heart attack in November 1984 which was seen as rekindling rivalry over the presidential succession. See C. LEGUM (ed), Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75, New York: Africana Publishing, p.B604.
57. In Togo this respect and allegiance is assisted by the fact that President Eyadema and the ruling RPT leadership were part of the original group that took power. And if succession is to occur the successor will emerge from this locus.
58. V.P. Bennett, op.cit., p.8.

CASE HISTORIES: BURKINA FASO AND MALI

THE CASE OF UPPER VOLTA (BURKINA FASO): A QUESTIONABLE EXAMPLE OF PERSONALIST TRANSFORMATION

A final word on personalist transformation is warranted in the light of the experience of Burkina Faso. Though Bennett¹ considers the rule of Lieutenant-Colonel Sangoule Lamizana an example of personalist transformation, a deeper examination would tend to indicate otherwise. President/General Lamizana initially took control in January 1966 amidst considerable internal disruption culminating in a general strike which brought the military into power. By December 1970 elections were held under the new constitutional arrangement. Lamizana became the elected President but retained considerable influence within the army. The new constitution provided for a civilian prime minister. This post was filled by Gerard Kango Ouedraogo who also acted in the capacity of president of the premier UDV-RDA party. Thus there was a military president and civilian prime minister. As the military moved towards military disengagement which was to result in the 'restoration' of political democracy (the army had set 1974 for the completion of disengagement), there befell an almost synchronized series of events that culminated in the announcement by President/General Lamizana, on 8 February, of the suspension of the constitution and the dissolving of Parliament. In his broadcast proclamation he referred to 'the catastrophic situation of our national life, caused by the crisis which we have experienced for some months'. He went on to say that the crisis in the National Assembly had 'paralyzed Governmental machinery and institutions'.² He was referring to the intrigues and competition between Joseph Ouedraogo, the UDV-RDA secretary-general and National Assembly president, and Gerard Kango Ouedraogo (no relation), the Prime Minister and party president. The struggle was over who would emerge as the party's choice for the next

presidential election. In this instance there was no undisputed or chosen successor, for neither was Lamizana fully transformed nor was he dealing with an army transformed into the cadres of civilian leadership.

President/General Lamizana and the military remained in a position of ultimate power brokers. The crisis was precipitated not only by interpersonal competition but by the potential for further factionalism (what I would term political spalling). To this add the army's urging that Lamizana intervene, several years of drought, scandalous corruption in the handling of foreign relief aid which involved the embezzlement of cereals by the very committee established to distribute the aid, and Joseph Ouedraogo's attempt to form an alliance with the Ivory Coast President and with former Voltaic President Maurice Yameogo. It was no secret that Houphouët-Boigny desired the restoration of Yameogo as President of Upper Volta. These events, in particular the latter, put the army on alert and resulted in direct military intervention.

In November 1977 there were elections which called for a constitution providing for a return to civilian governance by 1978. This marked the third attempt by President Lamizana's then 12-year-old military regime to hand power over to the civilians.³ The cabinet reshuffle of January 1977 brought in more civilian representation. By May 1978 there was a return to parliamentary rule and a multi-party democracy. Lamizana was elected President after a second round of voting, on 27 May. However the completion of military disengagement did not bring about a marked improvement in the political-economic environment; there remained intense regionalism, party rivalry and personal enmities within the elite.⁴ Finally, on 25 November 1980, the commander of the inter-force regiment stationed in Ouagadougou and former Foreign Minister Colonel Saye Zerbo led a bloodless coup which ended Upper Volta's three-year-old Third Republic. The coup bore a strong resemblance to the one which brought down the first civilian government of Maurice Yameogo on 3 January 1966.⁵ And the army has maintained political rule (albeit in a more radicalized form under Thomas Sankara) since that time.

By November 1980 some interesting transformations had taken place

but not of a predictable personalist transformation type. For example, former prime minister-cum-UDV-RDA president Gerard Kango Ouedraogo was the army chief of staff. More crucially the army saw President Lamizana as ineffective in dealing with 'unprecedented social and economic disturbances ... caused by the lack of a suitable, coherent and sustained policy'.⁶ Noteworthy is that the army and Lamizana had ceased to perceive and act symbiotically vis-à-vis the national political situation, a rift that was perhaps accentuated by General Lamizana's resigning his military commission in 1978 in order to enable him to stand as a civilian candidate for the Presidency under the UDV banner. Once the civilian option was taken there could be little surprise in the increasing separation of interest (executive versus institutional) and perception between the President and the army, in great part brought about by a change in constituency and allegiance. And personalist transformation theory does not allow for such a fundamental shift in the ruler's power base. In effect, Lamizana invested his political future and 'transformation' on the viability and strength of a newly created parliamentary and multiple party system; it looked fine on paper but he did not anticipate its relative weakness. And this marked the death blow to any permanent transformation.

The primacy of party and institutional control was replaced by a hope that a representative democracy would function and prove a bulwark of national stability. A coup d'état became almost inevitable as stability quickly evaporated within the new political dispensation.

MALI: MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FOLLOWING LONG TERM MILITARY RULE

Inevitably, a military government that does not propose to stay in power indefinitely must establish a schedule for an orderly transition to civilian rule after a specified period.⁷

The transformation of the Republic of Mali from 19 November 1968 to a single party system with strong military participation in March 1979 marks the longest experiment in military disengagement. The culmination of this transition and continuance of military influence can be discerned in the officially declared option for

'constitutional' rather than 'civilian' rule. And President Moussa Traoré, elected in June 1979 (running unopposed),⁸ insisted that the army could not constitute a separate body within the nation.⁹ However, the membership of the Council of Ministers and the party bodies reflected an increasing civilian influence.

The period of direct military rule lasted for more than a decade and represents not only a completed program of military disengagement but exhibits a considerable degree of personalist transformation.

Bennett¹⁰ has observed that in the scant efforts to relate patterns of military rule to patterns of demilitarisation, the policy objectives of officers have often been depicted or framed within two opposing ideal types: the broadly ideological or the fundamentally apolitical. The consequence of this alleged dichotomy produces militaries that stay in power indefinitely or 'find it easy' to transfer power to the civilians who will 'grant autonomy to the armed forces'.¹¹

The Malian military, according to Bennett, contradicts the opposing ideal types in that in the first six years of rule the military leaders did not profess any broad political ambitions or inordinate personal aspirations (the latter appeared to be 'modest'). Nevertheless the military made it known that economic recovery would be a contingent factor for any return to civilian governance. Thus no clear date was set during the first years of military rule for a handover of rule to civilians. When asked in March 1972 when a transference would occur, Traoré replied that

it was not enough to free the people of Mali from a dictatorial regime: it was also necessary to secure better living conditions for them. When that mission had been accomplished, it would be time to 'think of returning to constitutional government'.¹²

At the fourth anniversary of the 19 November coup, some eight months after the statement quoted above, Colonel Traoré said that the Military Committee for National Liberation (MCNL) - in French the Conseil Militaire de Liberation Nationale (CMLN) - (the ruling junta) was still concentrating on the economic and financial recovery of the

nation. Emphasis was laid on increasing the production of food crops, especially grain, in the light of insufficient rains in the preceding years. Industrial sector development was also stressed though it has far less economic significance for the country than agriculture.¹³

On this same occasion Traoré stated the main objectives of the day and announced a future referendum.

Fellow citizens ... the main purpose of our efforts to achieve national reconciliation and economic and financial recovery is to ensure a return to a normal constitutional life as soon as possible.... Faithful to its promise to return the country to a normal constitutional life, the CMLN is now giving particular attention to the study of the country's future institutions. It recently established a committee in charge of preparing a preliminary draft constitution. As soon as this draft constitution is adopted by the CMLN, it will be submitted to the approval of the people through a referendum. This shares the CMLN's unequivocal determination to return the country to normal constitutional life. Let me take this opportunity to reaffirm that the Army has no intention of holding on to power indefinitely.(my emphasis)¹⁴

In the same breath Traoré reiterated the objectives that had been set forth on the 19 November 1968, following Mali's only successful coup, namely: national reconciliation, economic and financial renewal, and a return to normal constitutional life.¹⁵

On 1 January 1974, Traoré announced that a draft of the constitution had been completed by the constituent assembly, and, furthermore, that a referendum would be held within six months. The draft constitution was released by the Government on 24 April of the same year and 2 June was set for the referendum.

The constitutional proposals proved extensive.¹⁶

Significantly for the aftermath of military disengagement, Traoré commented on the 1958 independence constitution, citing two principal weaknesses, namely, the major roles given to parliament and to the

party system. Consequently the new constitution limited the life of the Assembly to four years by election. It was to convene for two regular sessions annually neither of which was to surpass two months in duration. This emasculation of the legislative role thus affirmed and 'institutionalized' the political hegemony of single party rule and relegated parliament, in practice, to a near 'rubber-stamping' organ of government.

Quoting the Voltaic experience under Keita, Traoré was firmly opposed to what he saw as the failure of the multi-party system. The party is thus, under the new Malian constitution, to be viewed as 'the expression of national unity and the country's highest political authority'.¹⁷

Traoré did not abolish the parliament for the reason that 'to abolish it completely means to deny the people's sovereignty'.¹⁸ Perhaps more pertinently, the preservation of parliament represents the preservation of one organ for party and executive patronage as well as for symbolic import.

Traoré went on to expound on the centrality of the party.

The new constitution makes the party a state institution.... The one party system has become a part of everyday life, and was created in this country not by force, but through conciliation in the nation's interest. What we don't want is a totalitarian party which admits no argument.¹⁹

The new constitution also combined the offices of Head of State (President) and Head of Government (Prime Minister) in order to avoid the conflict situation of the Voltaic experience.

The presidential term was fixed at five years, with the possibility of one re-election. The process of military disengagement did not allow former president Modibo Keita re-entry into the political system. And in a practice that is followed by other programs of military disengagement the constitution, under Section XIV,²⁰ excluded office holders under the former civilian president from securing posts in the party, the parliament, the government or union organs. This exclusion or ban was to have effect

for a period of ten years.

What emerges from an examination of the Malian efforts at military disengagement are certain themes that impinge highly on continuity and regime stability.

First, there is the dispelling of the common wisdom that a program of military disengagement is of itself a linear process in which once a commitment has been made to military disengagement power relinquished piecemeal to civilians is seldom taken back. Less than a month after the 19 November coup, the military occupied only three of fifteen ministerial portfolios, albeit key positions. (This apart from the 14-man junta in control of the country). On September 13 and again on the 18th the MCNL had concluded that the civilians had been given too many positions of power and consequently two major government reshuffles occurred. Military men were given key responsibilities in the army's subsequent expanded role. Concurrently, there was a move to increase MCNL influence over civilian counterparts within the structures of government and to maintain a loyal and stable power base among the military as a whole.

Second, the efforts with the army were, in great part, aimed at precluding a counter-coup. Notwithstanding, there was a plot attributed to Captain Diby Sillas Diarra, the military head of the Gao region, to arrest the members of the MCNL in order to reinstate former president Modibo Keita. The plot was uncovered in mid-August 1969. Subsequently, three officers were given life imprisonment with Diarra reportedly dying in prison four months later.

Despite the unusually united military junta of the MCNL, tied both generationally and experientially, there were rifts within the army's officer corps - as evidenced by the abortive coups of 1969 (previously mentioned), 1971, 1976 and 1978.²¹ The attempt of 1971 saw former Head of Government²² and long time friend of Traoré, Yoro Diakité, sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor along with a member of the MCNL, Malik Diallo.²³

Third, there was the use of anti-corruption campaigns as a means of marshaling national sentiment and loyalty, and as a diversionary technique in situations of economic malaise.

The former is exemplified by the following pronouncements made by Traoré on 20 January 1972:

Everyone who has tampered with public funds or has sacrificed the interests of the government, the national organizations, or the state corporations and enterprises for the sake of his own selfish and sordid interests must be exposed and punished without mercy regardless of his rank. The people will be informed of his unpatriotic conduct.²⁴

In January 1987, Traoré announced a nationwide crackdown on corruption by public officials. To this end, Traoré urged the National Assembly to approve the 'National Charter Against Corruption'. There was also a special convention of the UDPM in March which issued strong criticisms of Mali's leaders and public servants. Resolutions were passed which included condemnations of government inefficiency and the use of patronage, and the declaration of a national campaign against corruption and profiteering.²⁵ Both the National Assembly and the UDPM supported the formation of an 18-man Commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of corruption.²⁶ By the summer of 1988 the Banako (capital) Special Court of State Security had issued two death sentences and thirty-two life terms with hard labor. In such stark terms corruption was thus shown to be a capital offence with definite consequences.

Fourth, the use of a referendum has proven a consistent element in programs of military disengagement. Mali proved no exception and on 2 June 1974, after ten years without an election, the nation voted in favour of the new constitution having deliberated for two years. Prior to this event and after the abrogation of the 1960 Constitution the CMLN had instituted a 'Fundamental Law' which meant that the CMLN and the Supreme Court ruled by decree. Rule by decree has shown itself to be a consistent feature of military rule. There was to be an election for the President, with legislative power vested in the 82-member National Assembly which would be chosen tri-annually by the UDPM. Thus the structures of one party rule had persisted since the removal of President Keita in November 1968, becoming more elaborately defined through constitutional means especially with and after the promulgation of the June 1974 constitution. The structures of governmental rule had thus been amalgamated with efforts to

enhance the regime's legitimacy,²⁷ which included the occasional use of 'adjustment mechanisms' such as the above mentioned anti-corruption campaigns and their attendant commissions and sentencing. The constitution of 1975 also allowed for a five year transition period during which the CMLN would continue in national rule. Furthermore, individuals who had held political office between March 1966 and November 1968 were ineligible for membership in the new institutions.²⁸

Fifth, at the root of any program of military disengagement the corporate and administrative unity of the inner core of conspirators has to be maintained. In the Malian case this unity has proved inordinately stable.²⁹ And here one is reminded of the inner core interests and perpetuation of leadership of Togo under Etienne Eyadema in a most enduring form.

Sixth: significantly, the manner by which the CMLN preserved a portion of its support was to resist desocialisation. By this is meant the liquidation of state enterprises that in effect represent a network of familiar and associative relationships and thus political support. In this instance one can cite the government's reluctance to discontinue underwriting non-profitable state enterprises in order to rejoin the West African Monetary Union in the mid-1970s.

And seventh, as in many African states, Mali had to address the tension between creating monetary incentives through the 'IMF austerity packages' and the ineffectual and highly subsidized status quo. And now as then, a program of military disengagement must weigh the costs which are considerable in terms of regime stability and potential public reaction.³⁰

The following table summarizes the seven themes we have just discussed and their intended objectives:

Table 7.1

Seven themes in the military disengagement process and their goals

Measure	Goal
Reshuffles ³¹	Stability and control
Corporate unity ³²	Stability and control
Anti-corruption campaign(s) ³³	Legitimacy
Referendum	Legitimacy
Inner core unity	Corporate interests and forging civilian regime
Preserving the familial network ³⁴	Regime support
Austerity package	Economic development and stability.

NOTES

1. See V.P. BENNETT, 'Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa', in Quarterly Journal of Administration, October 1974, pp.5-15.
2. C. LEGUM (ed), Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75, New York: Africana Publishing, p.B780.
3. Ibid., 1977-78, p.B798.
4. Ibid., 1978-79, p.B789.
5. Ibid., 1980-81, p.B627.
6. Ibid., 1980-81, p.B629.
7. V.P. Bennett, 'Military Government in Mali', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.13, no.2, 1975, p.261.
8. Traoré was elected the Secretary-General of the new Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM) at its constituent congress on 28 March 1979.
9. Donald B. Cruise O'BRIEN, 'Mali: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81, London: Europa Publications, p.645.
10. V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.249.
11. C. WELCH, 'The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa', in African Studies Review, Lansing, vol.xvii, no.1, 1974, p.221.
12. As quoted by V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.262.
13. And here we may refer to Mali's commitment to State enterprises that in the middle 70s comprised 27 companies and an approximate labour force of 20,000. See V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.255. By 1988, agriculture remained the mainstay of the economy, employing 85% of the workforce (largely at subsistence levels) and accounting for virtually all export earnings. Livestock rearing itself accounted for about 20% of the GDP. And the industrial sector remained small, contributing about 6% to the GDP and employing less than 8% of the workforce. See Nicolas KULIBABA, 'Mali', in The Africa Review: The Economic and Business Report 1988, Essex: World of Information, p.141.
14. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 November 1972, p.2662A, my emphasis.
15. In the Radio Bamako broadcast on November 19, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré stated that the National Liberation Committee (CMLN) had taken over until such time as 'free and democratic' elections could be held and that the army had overthrown the Government because the Government violated 'basic democratic principles and

individual freedoms'. On November 21 Radio Bamako announced the dissolution of the Union Soudanaise (Former President M. Kieta's party apparatus) and all political organizations founded under its auspices - in effect a liquidation of all former political structures including the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CNDR). See Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 November 1968, pp.1235A-1236B. On 25 November the new Prime Minister, Captain Diakité, emphasised that the new military government was provisional in nature: 'Everything possible would be done by the military to ensure a rapid return in Mali to true democracy'. The constitutions would be revised, a referendum on a new constitution would be held in the first half of 1969, and general and presidential elections would be held before the end of 1969. (ibid., p.1236A). On 29 November the announcement was made that a new written constitution would be put before the people in a referendum by the end of June at the latest (ibid.). This would not come to pass as announced in the time specified.

16. V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.264, mentions that the constitutional proposals are so detailed that it takes up two issues of the only daily L'Essor to publish them. L'Essor is published by the UDFM.
17. Article 22 of the 1974 constitution as quoted by V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.264.
18. 'Mali: New Constitution', in Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 April 1974, p.3197A.
19. Ibid., p.3197B.
20. As cited by V.P. Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.265.
21. C. LEGUM (ed), op.cit., p.B552.
22. Yoro Diakité had held the position of First Vice-Chairman, then Minister of Defense (briefly); both posts were demotions as he lost favor within the inner circle of the MCNL (CMLN).
23. For background to the Diakité-Traoré conflict see 'The Yoro Diakité affair: I', in West Africa, 20 August 1973, pp.1147-1149. Diakité would perish in the Taoudenit prison in the Sahara in June 1973.
24. Le Moniteur Africain, 7 December 1972, pp.10-12, as quoted by Bennett, op.cit., at note 7, p.257.
25. N. Kilibaba, op.cit., p.140.
26. The membership of the Commission of Inquiry was comprised of fourteen representatives of the UDFM party organs and four civilians.
27. For an earlier discussion on the issue of legitimacy, especially as related to the Keita administration, see Miles D. WOLPIN,

'Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali', in the Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.13, no.4, 1975, p.620.

28. D.B.C. O'Brien, op.cit., p.542.
29. Notwithstanding CMLN intrigue, which in July 1972 had the Minister of Defence and Interior, Captain Kissimann Tounkara, at the center of a possible split within the CMLN leadership. He was not replaced as differences were apparently settled and he emerged unscathed after the government reshuffle of May 1973.
30. For a dramatic instance of popular reaction to austerity packages one can cite Venezuela in the first week of March 1989. In three days of rioting, looting and killing there were 300 dead, 2,000 injured and 2,000 put in jail. This in reaction to the implementation of requirements for US \$4.32 billion in credits by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through 1991. The agreement promised an end to Venezuelan subsidies on various products including imported raw materials and artificially cheap gasoline (13c per gallon). Although 18 staples were exempted from price hikes there were increases of up to 25c on gasoline and an average 30% increase in bus fares. Despite the intention to provide a 30% wage increase for government workers, Venezuelans rioted. Interior Minister Alejandro Izaguirre announced wage increases of approximately \$54 per month for 5 million private-sector workers. This social upheaval notwithstanding - the worst since the overthrow of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in January 1958 - President Carlos Andrés Pérez has stated that austerity has to continue 'to get Venezuela out of economic insecurity'. See Harald Tribune, 4-5 March 1989; and Lisa BEYER, 'State of Siege: Austerity Provokes an Orgy of Bloodshed', in Time, 13 March 1989, pp.43-44.
31. Military disengagement is not necessarily 'linear' with progressive entry of civilians into the organs of national leadership. However there are variations on the rationale for reshuffles, as will be seen from this Nigerian example. On 6 February 1989, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) was dissolved by President Babangida and a new AFRC came into being three days later on 9 February with a membership reduced from 29 to 19 members. Several ministries were dropped from the council membership. A new cabinet would be announced.
Reshuffling includes the replacement of civilians already in the organs of transition by other civilians designated by the regime authority. In the case of Professor Awa, who was the chairman of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), it has been speculated that he was removed from his post 'for the sake of national unity and stability'. Though no official reason was given, one Nigerian daily said that the NEC and Professor Awa were proving too strict, in the opinion of the AFRC, on the screening of candidates for forthcoming elections and that banned politicians had exerted their influence, which on 28 February 1989 resulted in the reshuffle of the NEC and the dismissal of Awa and the NEC secretary (see Voice of America broadcast, 1 March 1989).

On 2 March 1989 the anticipated cabinet reshuffle was announced which brought no major changes.

32. There is an attempt at corporate unity and other ranks loyalty which is often tested by coup attempts.
33. For the purpose of mobilization and diversion the enhancement of regime legitimacy is attempted through commission activity, investigation, and sentencing.
34. An instance of quasi-patronage with the presence of ethnic and family relationships in the economic and administrative organs of government.

FURTHER INFLUENCES AND DYNAMICS

ORDERLY TRANSITION

Orderly transition can refer to a swift return to civilian rule as well as a long period of military governance before the transference of power into civilian hands. Both types of orderly transition are characterized by the use of timetables, the unbanning of parties and political activity, the revamping of political parties, and the establishment of an electoral system to determine an elected leadership. Bennett¹ proposes that a swift return to civilian rule is based upon the military's reticence to take on responsibility for rulership due to organizational weaknesses and a lack of administrative and political skills within the army itself. An example is the transfer of power to civilian government in Ghana by the National Liberation Council (NLC) after three and a half years of military rule; this occurred on 3 September 1969. Although the Ghanaian example is seen as a relatively swift case of military disengagement it draws one's attention to the actual extent of military withdrawal. Mr K.A. Busia was sworn in as Ghana's Prime Minister, but at the same time the former chairman of the NLC, Brigadier A. Afrifa, his Deputy, Mr J.W.K. Harlley, and the Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General A.K. Ocran, became members of the interim Presidential Commission. This commission had the task of performing the functions of the President under the new Constitution. And the members of the Commission acted as 'midwives' to the second republic until August 1970² when Edward Akufo-Addo replaced them as a non-executive civilian president. The Busia regime would proceed under severe economic constraints until the coup d'état of 13 January 1972 led by Lieutenant-Colonel (later General) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The circumstances of the Ghanaian situation of 1972 were 'eerily redolent of February 1966',³ Except for the presidency of Dr Hilla Limann of the PNP (24 September 1979 -

31 December 1981), Ghana has been under military rule since the January 1972 coup.⁴ In both the Ghanaian and Burkinabe situations economic and civil conflict recurred, culminating in military intervention. There was also a 'some at utopian view of civil-military relations',⁵ that believed that the reinstitution of the electoral process would prove the political panacea for a successful program of military disengagement and the subsequent stability of civilian governance. This hope was to prove ill-founded.

The second type of scheduled transition requires a lengthy period of military tutoring before the program of military disengagement is completed. In this instance the military embarks upon corrective measures according to the caretaker model but also proceeds with an intentional revamping of political and social organs; it represents a social engineering predicated upon the military's organizational administrative confidence, the rejection of previous civilian political behavior, and an element of solicited public opinion. In effect it represents a more 'scientific' effort to construct a more favorable structure and consciousness for subsequent civilian political activity. And to this end the military pursues a dual strategy of identification and elimination ('search and destroy' in military parlance) of corruptive elements within national political-economic-social life and the inculcation of what has been broadly termed a new political culture. Nigerian efforts in the 1975-79 period are an excellent example of this form of long term military disengagement.

The dual strategy is also akin to what has been termed the administrative state. Edward Shils⁶ identifies the military's administrative state (also referred to as a military or occupying government) as the usual form of military oligarchy. Reflecting on various nations, and exceptions,⁷ Shils observes that military oligarchies

have generally sought to conduct a polity without politics and without politicians - to run the country as if it were a large army camp. Parliamentary and consultative institutions are suspended, the civil service is put under rigorous discipline, critics are suppressed or put on

notice. Legislation is enacted through decrees, and the rule of law is dissolved. It is a regime of martial law, without the draconic punishments which usually attend that regime.

Their program is order and progress, but usually with more stress on order than progress.

In order to run a country there is, within this framework, allowance for collaboration with the civil service. However there is no question of using security forces, conducting exemplary trials and executing exemplary punishment. On the other hand, the military administration will direct the behavior and character of judiciary activity. However, as it is not ordinarily ideologically inclined, the universities and other institutions are usually left relatively free to conduct research and teaching as compared to the mass media which are closely monitored.

Though it is apparent that the military oligarchy shares some fundamental mechanical features with the military regimes engaged in the process of long term military disengagement, the differentiation is still clear.

Edward Shils comments that

the military oligarchy is not a complete regime. It has neither a comprehensive program nor a perspective into the future. Like all nonhereditary oligarchies, it has no provision for succession. It is what some of the military oligarchs themselves call a 'caretaker regime'. But its ideas about what it takes care of are rather scant and, even where well-intentioned, unimaginative.⁸

Though Shils provided his analysis before military governance, let alone military disengagement, became commonplace in Africa his observations nevertheless prove relevant to our study of subsequent regime types and the backdrop to strategies of military disengagement. Long term military disengagement has attempted to varying degrees of success to address the deficiencies previously cited by analysts such as Shils.

DISORDERLY TRANSITION

Disorderly transition speaks essentially of the destruction of the unity of the officer corps primarily within the ruling military body as well as within the outer circle of officers and other ranks.

One can observe at least three forms of this phenomenon: 1) the counter-coup to end a period of inefficient, corrupt, indecisive, or repressive military rule, e.g. Nigeria July 1975, August 1985; 2) the counter-coup to accelerate and ensure the transfer of power to civilian hands (rare), e.g. the celebrated case of Sierra Leone in April 1968; and 3) the decision by the ruling military that its corporate interests are best served by military disengagement in the light of strong and united opposition from the public sector, e.g. the Sudan, October 1964,⁹ Venezuela, January 1958.¹⁰ In the Sudanese example the military began to fragment which reflected a direct corporate threat and thus a tactical retreat was executed.

Though not listed under the three forms above it is worth noting the significance of the attempted or abortive coup, especially of the 'in house' variety. The motivations involved are for the most part the same, though one must include the recurring theme of personal ambition coupled with a perceived opportunity to take power.

The abortive coup may reflect the fragmentation of the military but not necessarily so. In the case of an attempt emerging from within the membership of the ruling military body one may indeed point to a limited network of conspirators with no linkage with the army at large. Consider the case of the abortive coup which took place in Nigeria on Friday 13 February 1976. It has been proposed that there were in fact two locuses of conspiracy; one of an association of Majors during military exercises in Kaduna in January 1976 headed by Major Dabang with an inner circle of only three officers, and the other led by the Commissioner of Defence, General I.D. Bisalla.¹¹ What emerged was a competitive situation in which the General had to preempt the Major's plot. It appears that Bisalla's principal recruit, Lieutenant-Colonel S.D. Dimka, Director of the Army Physical Training Corps, was motivated by the proposed demobilization of 100,000 men from the army. Former Head of State Yakubu Gowon, at the time a student at Warwick University, was

implicated in this plot, although without prima facie evidence. There was sporadic speculation of CIA and British involvement as well. Notwithstanding the intrigue and external actors surrounding the abortive coup, the Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, was shot dead. This is an example of a coup attempt taking place with minimal military fragmentation. And thus the attempt itself did not necessitate a quicker retreat of the military from the rule of government. In fact the spirit and scheduling of the program of military disengagement was continued under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo as he assumed power immediately after the attempt.

As was discussed above the military responds to and is sensitive to the actual degree of fragmentation within its ranks. If possible, it will move towards shoring up any divisions. And to this end it will enforce its code of conduct and discipline in response to internal threats most especially located within its officer corps.

General Bisalla, Colonel Dimka and thirty-eight other officers and civilians were executed after having been convicted in secret by the Military Tribunal.¹² If disciplinary actions, including execution, within the context of an anti-corruption campaign, afford a measure of regime legitimacy, so much more will a consolidated military exercise restore in house discipline. The motivation of the conspirators is thus essentially secondary to corporate integrity. Ergo, the severity and relative promptness of disciplinary action.

Again we can observe the character of the military body corporate, or at the least its leadership, against insubordination of any sort in another Nigerian coup plot. On 20 December 1985 (four months after Babangida's in house takeover) there was an announcement that coup plotters had been arrested. According to the Guardian, Babangida had addressed the Army Staff Training Conference in November. In this address he had stated that the major aim of his government would be to maintain order and stability, which is a consistent feature of regime management and an antecedent of any controlled program of military disengagement. However, the military leadership's disposition towards any challenge of its authority was made plain when Babangida stated that it would 'crush, with incisive professional skill, the forces of disunity and subversion'.¹³

In March 1986 Major-General Mamman Vatsa, who had been a minister of government as well as a member of the AFRC, was executed along with nine other conspirators.¹⁴ In a television announcement, defence minister Major-General Domkat Bali read out the AFRC communiqué, 'which attempted to explain Nigerian military logic to sentimental civilian minds'. Bali declared¹⁵

In the military, the punishment for treason is death.

Among those who supported the executions were Chief Abafemi Awolowo, Clement Wetkur, general secretary of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), and the Emir of Suleja. The general logic of such support from the civilian sector was best articulated by Chief Awolowo when he declared


I think they were legally tried and duly found guilty. In law, it is a just punishment if you shed blood in the execution of legal process. Crime will flourish if those found guilty are not punished.¹⁶

Therein one may observe a mutual interest in the continuity of a predictable military regime is perceived as committed to the process of military disengagement.

THE INTERACTION OF DISCIPLINE-COERCION AND LEGITIMACY

The fate of the conspirators evoked a host of legal and philosophical responses but neither the military nor society at large contested the fundamental illegality of the attempt itself; this perceptual miscalculation on the part of the conspirators proved deadly. Severe discipline, in such instances, is perceived as a legitimate act of state preservation rather than preserving corporate unity, though in essence they are the same. And so there appears to exist a conterminous relationship between a legitimate state response and a warning against would-be conspirators. In effect it represents an enhancement of legitimacy and discipline, if not fear. Both, it is hoped, will assist the process of military disengagement, the

first facilitating the second and the second reinforcing the first. Thus in a program of military disengagement one may observe the possible symbiosis between legitimacy and the exercise of regime control through various forms of disciplinary and coercive actions. This relationship can be depicted as follows.



We concern ourselves here with a successful program of long-term military disengagement. Thus, the examples having 'non-MD' as a possible result represent instances of unsuccessful long-term programs of military disengagement, that is, terminated through social upheaval and/or coup.

If one is to differentiate 'discipline-coercion' from sheer acts of suppression and brutality, which are often subsumed by the former either consciously or accidentally due to insufficient control, then an examination of the specific nature of the relationship of civil and military actors is warranted. The purpose of such an examination is to establish whether or not a civil-military polarization exists and if not, which is usually the case in long-term programs of military disengagement, almost by definition, whether civilian and

military men alike have occasion to agree that certain acts of discipline-coercion indeed enhance regime legitimacy.

Let us consider the Brazilian situation several years after the military toppled the Goulart government in 1964. Under the military rule of Costa e Silva (1967-69) there was severe internal unrest in which the May and June 1968 demonstrations by students and other civilians was met with ineffectual police repression. The aftermath of the 1964 coup had seen a purge of twenty per cent of the officer corps for 'excessively democratic or leftist views'.¹⁷ In effect this meant a less tolerant disposition by the military authorities towards actors and institutions deemed as either precipitating and/or unable to ameliorate social unrest. The 1968 crisis was thus addressed by brutal force. Additional pressure was applied by a fairly united military in order for the government to issue a new Institutional Act which closed the Congress and suspended civil rights and guarantees. In the light of such a curtailment of civil liberties a number of students and militant Catholics decided to join the ranks of the radical left which included Maoist or Guevarista organs. With this development there was a dramatic escalation of violence including a series of kidnappings and killings which did not result in popular support for the left.¹⁸ Instead the urban guerrilla war provoked a backlash against these same revolutionary movements.¹⁹ It was observed by Fernando Pedreira that the tactics of the left in effect

justified to many the build-up of a police state and the abolition of civil guarantees, at the same time increasing the importance of the organs of repression and security within the dominant military system. Adding it all up, the wave of terrorism actually tended to favor and accelerate the reconciliation between the military establishment and public opinion, in as much as, with the first kidnapping of an ambassador (which, by the way, was a Brazilian invention), it became clear that the great majority of the country repudiated the terrorists' acts and was strongly inclined to support the authorities who fought them.²⁰ (my emphasis)

It was unforeseen by the left that such a legitimizing effect of the regime authorities would take place in view of the severe exercise of state power.²¹ However, this is what occurred and thus the discipline-coercion of the regime acted as an agent enhancing regime legitimacy, the unwitting catalyst being the left and the tactics which they employed. A further result was the extension of time and maneuvering room, as well as the deepening of security structures,²² for the prospects of a controlled and long-term program of military disengagement, a program that would more clearly reflect the vision of Brazil's military-technocratic elite.

In Ghana, the nascent military government of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings conducted what can be interpreted as vengeance-cum-discipline-coercion in the execution of former military officials a mere twelve days after taking power.²³ Within the context of a nebulous leftist populism which was committed to 'house cleaning' and rooting out corruption, General Acheampong and Major-General Utuka were executed by military firing squad on 16 June 1979. On 26 June there were the further executions of General Akuffo, Lieutenant-General Afrifa (the former NLC 'strongman'), Major-General Kotei, Air Vice-Marshal George Boakye, Rear-Admiral Joy Amedume and Colonel Roger Felli. T.C. McCaskie²⁴ comments that

These executions were undoubtedly expressions of the popular will (rumours surrounding the 'slow' death of Afrifa were widely circulated and just as widely applauded). The handing down of 'popular justice' was not confined to the generals. Self-constituted tribunals, composed of army NCOs and other ranks, apprehended those whom they suspected of hoarding, profiteering and corruption, and imposed arbitrary punishment in the form of confiscations, serious beatings and even death.

The Ghanaian case is inextricably linked to the rationale for military intervention, in the first instance; however, this rationale (which legitimated initial violence, even executions) can be adapted for the purposes of periodic enhancement of the legitimacy of a regime embarked upon a long term program of military disengagement.

This is roughly analogous to the American practice of implementing tactical administrative policy in order to obtain a marked increase in popular support, most commonly registered by means of a poll. And though executions and pork barrel may appear dramatically dissimilar in substance they achieve an equivalent effect in terms of regime legitimacy, the greater difference being that the efforts of a Third World regime are directed towards literal rather than electoral survival, whilst a First World regime pursues the enhancement of popular support within an already legitimized structure of political interaction. The Third World regime does not have such a structure. Thus a substantive difference can be identified between procuring popular support and a legitimacy which is dependent on the specific socio-political setting. Ergo, and paradoxically, popular support and structural legitimacy are not equivalent in the Third World. This can be attributed not only to the often ephemeral basis of popular support but more directly, as previously cited, to the absence of a legitimized structure. Thus the question arises: why do such governments attempt to enhance their legitimacy by means of discipline-coercion where the results are so precarious and uncertain. The answer lies in what is meant and understood by the term legitimacy itself. Claude E. Welch²⁵ provides the following definition for legitimacy:

Legitimacy refers to the exercise of political power on the basis of authority, in which the political system as a whole, the pathways of political change, and the government and its policies are buttressed by widespread popular acceptance of its rightful claim to exercise this power.

This definition would appear appropriate in that there is an understanding that the 'government' (the regime, as contrasted with constitutional and legislative structures) and its policies are buttressed by widespread popular acceptance. In a First World setting, however, there is a fundamentally different situation: it is not the administration of the day that is the focus of legitimacy but rather the underpinning constitutional and legislative structures.²⁶ An administration is perceived, understood, and

constitutionally defined as transient. In the Third World, in the absence of such a legitimized institutional structure, the primacy and longevity of regime control are the de facto criteria and focus of legitimacy. Thus popular support is directed towards justifying regime control and policy. And the employment of discipline-coercion, it is hoped, will enhance regime legitimacy, in effect justifying the leaders' management efforts. Popular support and legitimacy are synonymous in a Third World political environment. The differentiation between actual legitimacy and popular support comes only in the development of institutional structures which become the stable and permanent objects of legitimacy, appropriating unto themselves the critical status of nationhood and an unshakable loyalty. Thus legitimacy clearly implies different things in First and Third World contexts. In fact Claude Welch would appear to imply this when he states:²⁷

Different levels of political legitimation exist. An unpopular government can survive if the system as a whole enjoys legitimacy. In most tropical African states, however, the system as a whole does not effectively receive such support. 'The societal environment shared by all the new African states thus imposes severe limits upon the range within which significant variations of regimes can take place', Aristide Zolberg has noted.²⁸

The 'societal environment' thus becomes the object of control through discipline-coercion with the initial entry of the armed forces into the arena of political deliberations and tutelage, most especially with a long term program of military disengagement.

Short-term control represents little more than a holding action on the part of the military in preparation for withdrawal. The reciprocal relationship between legitimacy and discipline-coercion is not, strictly speaking, 'institutionalized'. The 'institutional viability' of such an order takes on a semblance of permanence within the confines of a long term program of military disengagement, not without the possibility of an internal military challenge, as has been previously shown.

Thus, practically speaking, legitimacy in the short and mid-term can be defined as the successful muting of opposition in tandem with the establishment of domestic order and control regardless of public disposition.²⁹ And here cultural relativism³⁰ is applied to enhance our understanding of legitimacy in a Third World milieu.

MORE CONDITIONS FOR THE TRANSITION PROCESS

Our examination of the factors involved in the prospects of military disengagement now moves to the analysis of J. Gus Liebenow.³¹ This author contends that in cases where there is a 'civilianization of the military', as in Zaire, the parties created by the military do not function as 'genuine political parties'. This assessment appears an accurate one if indeed one applies an ethnocentric analysis. However, the actual existence and function of a national political organization is no mean accomplishment in Africa. Until very recently, the African predilection was for one-party rule, and not towards the more problematic Western standard of participatory democracy.³² Moreover, there is considerable debate as to the desirability of Western style liberal democracy in the African context. The record indicates suspicions of such a possibility. This issue is also related to the prospects and future development of democracy as a whole: some commentators observe that the First World sees itself inextricably linked to the advancement of democracy in the Third World.³³

It therefore becomes somewhat confusing and unhelpful to advance an unrealistic standard of First World political parties, despite recent developments in Eastern Europe. Furthermore this will be of little assistance in understanding a more 'appropriate' standard and possibility of party activity and development in a Third World setting. With this in mind let us consider Liebenow's conditions for a successful transition to civilian rule. Taking particular note of the Nigerian experience with programs of military disengagement Liebenow lists the following:³⁴

- 1) First of all, the transfer must be a genuine effort at restoring or refashioning civilian political institution.
- 2) The situations or issues which invited military intervention in

the first place should be substantially resolved prior to the military withdrawal.

- 3) If the transfer is to succeed, the military must work closely with the prospective politicians who will be expected to make the new political, economic, and social system function effectively after the transfer of authority.
- 4) Success of the civilian restoration requires that the military engage in the complicated self-denying act of consciously sharing power with other elements in the society.
- 5) (presented as a caveat) The extent of external funding and support for the military has a significant bearing on successful disengagement.³⁵

With regards to item 1), there is an emphasis on 'restoring or refashioning civilian political institutions', which invalidates the personalist transformation model discussed in chapter six. The aim is the return of civilian rule albeit possibly in a 'refashioned' form. However, it remains a somewhat problematic, if not ambiguous, condition for successful military disengagement. What exactly constitutes a 'genuine effort' at restoring or refashioning civilian political institutions? For example, is one referring to the motivational sincerity of the regime or more fundamentally to the particular institutions established at the culmination of the military disengagement process? Even allowing for both cases this condition is in essence antithetical to the personalist transformation model and any model emphasizing the 'sanctions of force rather than ... economic, educative, and other approaches to expansion of the base of popular participation in decision making'.³⁶ The difficulty here of course is that all regimes embarked upon a program of military disengagement will attempt to associate themselves with greater and more successful egalitarianism. In addition, this condition cannot easily substantiate the neat dichotomy drawn between an emphasis upon the sanction of force as compared to a greater emphasis on the pursuit of more egalitarian objectives. A Third World political environment is not readily appreciated, even presupposing the existence of such a convenient division of regime interest and direction.³⁷

The second condition has become most often in the record of programs of military disengagement the prohibition (banning) of former politicians from political participation, in other words, power. The economic and ethnic realities of a nation are considerably less amenable to this sort of political manipulation. And though an entire generation of undesirable politicians may, in theory, be barred from political office the remaining difficulties may prove sufficient cause for future military intervention. Compounding this situation is the uncertainty of whether a banned generation of politicians is actually replaced by more ethical and competent cadres. There is no empirical evidence to substantiate this view. This is due in large part to the continuity of socio-ethnic pressures across civilian and military administrations, pressures which have not entirely yielded to a national identification (if one is to define such a nationalism in terms of decreased ethnic and regional affiliations and increased loyalty and allegiance to a central authority and institutions).³⁸ Indeed one may posit that an increased level of national identification may assist in the process of military disengagement, whilst continued ethnic-religious identification may well hinder such a process.

It is therefore suspect whether one can accurately speak of substantially eliminating the causes of military intervention in order to facilitate military disengagement when the dependent variables are so varied and intractable. Moreover, the military is not a static institution and may well change its agenda and ideological content, which in turn may validate, in its own eyes, the recurrence of military intervention. As we can observe in the Ghanaian example, a radical-cum-military regime embarked more deeply on the path of social transformation to the extent that the intended and experimental (if not ad hoc) transformation takes on a greater importance than a precise schedule of military disengagement. This is more consistent with the penetration model of civil-military relations and may well resemble some of the features of the personalist-transformation model as in the case of President Mengistu in Ethiopia (especially after the events of 1987).

Liebenow's third condition is one of closer working relationships between the military and the prospective politicians. This appears a

logical requirement for a successful program of military disengagement and subsequent events. However, there is a more subtle and portentous reality at play which marks the substance of civil-military relations in the vast majority of Third World countries, namely, that it is a relationship of mutual suspicions and short term gratification. Prospective politicians may, and indeed must, cooperate with the military structure of governance during transition but there exists a two-fold perspective on the part of the politician vis-à-vis his military tutor preparing for his return to barracks. First, he looks ahead to his preeminence in the rule of government over his military counterpart. Second, his vision of society and its direction may well prove less ambitious and will, in most cases, be geared towards more immediate gains and traditional concerns. There is little evidence that the arising opportunities that the politician will face will be met with a sufficiently strong nationalist-cum-ideological socialization. Such an occurrence has traditionally been more the preserve of the penetration model. Mutual suspicion will remain in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary. The military attempts, where it can, to shape the environment of post-military disengagement political activity while tactically requiring the maintenance of certain levels of comportment on the part of prospective civilian leaders. The violation of certain standards will remain unacceptable to the rebarracked military. The issue remaining is whether the threshold of military intervention will rise with the socialization programs within the branches of the armed forces and the civilian population. The barometer for military intervention has usually been the intensity and scope of civil discontent. Presumably, the new socialization will lower both the predisposition towards civil protest and military sensitivity to its possible manifestation. These are considerable presumptions that have not been borne out in any African example of military disengagement.

But as for our concern with a greater working relationship between the military and prospective politicians, it must be observed that substantial mutual interest between these two parties has yet to arise. Africa does not have, for instance, the institutional and amalgamating influence of civil-military interests and perspectives

such as emanate from Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG).³⁹ The Superior War College as experienced in Africa has yet to establish such an amalgamated network of interest among the military, economic, political, education, and religious elite. This absence of common perspective and interest or network of professional associations makes the extent of civil-military cooperation questionable. Such cooperation, owing to the nature of the underpinning realities, is tentative and fragile. Even in Nigeria's current efforts at military disengagement the discussion is not so much on civil-military cooperation as on the division of powers between civilian and military administrators in the period to 1992.⁴⁰

Liebenow's fourth condition requires military self-denial and power sharing. Self-denial has been practiced on occasion in the process of military disengagement. Soon after the successful coup in Nigerian in August 1985, the AFRC ordered salary cuts ranging from twenty five per cent for recruits and corporals to twenty per cent for brigadiers and above. The AFRC stated that the cuts were the armed forces' contribution to the effort to save the economy from disaster.⁴¹ The Ghanaian military, under Jerry Rawlings, was also required to provide contributions for the reconstruction of the nation.

Yet, despite salary cuts, military development and upgrading is seen to proceed concurrently. For example, Nigeria established an air wing to its navy in 1985⁴² and commissioned its first two minesweepers in May 1988, which coincided with the Nigerian Navy's 32nd anniversary.⁴³ The upgrading of equipment throughout all branches of the armed forces will in turn increase the amount paid for their imported requirements.⁴⁴ And at this point there is linkage with Liebenow's fifth condition for a successful effort at military disengagement. But before we enter a discussion of the fifth condition it is important to consider the fourth condition's call for power sharing. Here one must understand the relative spheres of influence that the military and prospective politicians are 'assigned' to. It is not a case of the military operating strictly within military institutions and bases. In Brazil, for example, the National Information Service (SNI) remains effectively under military

control even after the 15 March 1985 transition to democracy. William Smith's analysis concludes that:⁴⁵

By conventional standards, Brazil joined the ranks of full-fledged political democracies. Nevertheless, a more stringent view would hold that Brazil has really only entered into a new, more complex phase of political transition in which genuine democracy has yet to become firmly established.

In the first half of 1987, the Nigerian military regime moved to create three new security agencies, coordinated in the office of the president, to take over the functions of the previous national security organization.⁴⁶ The intelligence community is thus very directly tied to an ever-strengthening executive. The test of the pudding is whether these links will be transferred to the civilian president come 1992 or remain in military hands. There may well be conditions ensuring continuity of staffing.

The relative domain of civilian political activity remains the constituent assembly and the electoral process and office. The sharing of power between the military and politicians is such that the former demarcates the domains and activities of each party from a position of strength though within a commitment to allow the restoration of civilian governance.

If one looks at the Nigerian program of military disengagement in 1979, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) decreed several amendments to the new constitution only two days before handing over power to civilian leadership. This included the complete elimination of the electoral college. In analyzing these decrees Richard A. Joseph⁴⁷ observes that:

These, when added to the seventeen amendments it had made to the draft it had received from the Constituent Assembly in June 1978, reinforced the image of the military as not only being supraconstitutional (a feature of all military governments), but able at will to intervene to correct what it considered any anomaly in the transition process.

Where a military has exercised its supraconstitutional strength it will attempt to ensure its influence as a suprainstitutional organ once the reins of government rule have been handed over to the new cadres of politicians.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND LINKAGES

As mentioned earlier, there is a strong relationship between military upgrading and Liebenow's fifth condition of the extent of external funding and support for the military. There are also various means that a foreign government can employ to influence a nation's military preparedness as well as policy dispositions. And here we shall speak at length.

Ray Cline⁴⁸ speaks of the 'intangibles' of military power such as troop skill and morale, the quality of military leadership, the outreach of forces, and even political morale, which are but some of many intangibles that are directly or indirectly affected by external funding and support. There can be a further effect on a state's manpower quality, weapon effectiveness, infrastructure and logistic support and organizational quality. And in as much as these are concerns of the military when not in a position of government rule it stands to reason that a military in power will attempt to insure that these intangibles are developed through available and acceptable sources of assistance.

Arms shipments, military training and military assistance are but three ways of creating and maintaining influence by an external party upon a state's military whether in or out of national rule. If one examines US military assistance within its own hemisphere there is an understanding that it is intended to serve a number of purposes: gain the friendship of a key political group; strengthen Latin American military capabilities for the maintenance of 'internal order'; and by preempting the military market, exclude nonhemispheric, and particularly Soviet bloc, suppliers, thereby precluding a potential threat to US hegemony in the hemisphere. To this end, large quantities of arms have been given or sold to Latin American military forces, thousands of military officers have been brought to the US for courses in military education and military training in combat

schools, and regular joint training exercises have been held.⁴⁹

In former French Africa there remain substantial military ties with respect to arms sales, military schooling of African soldiers both at home and in France, joint military exercises, and a military advisory, and a technical presence that is second only to the Cuban and Eastern European bloc contingent. As in the People's Republic of the Congo these traditional linkages have proven enduring despite Marxist pronouncements which would appear hostile to such relations. French assistance was even rendered after the attempted coup of 6 September 1987, when French troops assisted in the roundup of northern opponents.

In addressing the significance of the fifth condition for a successful program of military disengagement one can also look at the Soviet 'friendship' treaties established with such countries as Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Vietnam (1978), Ethiopia (1978), Afghanistan (1978), Yemen (1978), Syria (1988), and Congo (1980). The duration of these treaties coupled with the ubiquitous article seven (on threat to peace)⁵⁰ and twelve (on no incompatible obligations) assured until recently a measure of Soviet, Cuban and Eastern European bloc presence and direction.⁵¹

The importance of influencing the military may be one thing but the assurance of obtaining that influence is another. With regard to using arms sales as a leverage Bruce Arlinghaus writes⁵²

Arms transfers are an unwieldy instrument of foreign policy and they do not always provide the results expected.

The examples of Soviet military and technological aid to Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan substantiate this point.⁵³

The United Nations mandatory 1977 arms embargo of South Africa was parried by the generation of a successful arms industry providing near self-sufficiency in munitions, enhanced research and development and advances in other categories of military preparedness.

One can also observe the ineffectiveness of legal and economic measures in dislodging General Noriega of Panama by the United States government.

The Carter administration, in pursuing a general policy promoting human rights, acted against military regimes by suspending diplomatic relations, as well as economic and military assistance. In so doing,

the administration began a campaign for change in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, pressing ruling groups in those countries, especially the armed forces, for sweeping land reforms and free elections It ended military assistance to the worst violators, as in Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.⁵⁴

In recent years, most especially since 1983 and 1985, there has been an accelerated interest by the US government to see the Latin American continent 'go democratic'.⁵⁵ This represents an increased confidence and is a marked change from attempts to lessen the harshness of military rule during the 1970s and early 1980s. The management of external funding and support for the military was essentially aimed at fostering moderation rather than forcing a transition to civilian governance, which was not deemed a realistic policy.⁵⁶

In Africa external funding and support for the military can act as an incentive for states to pursue democratic alternatives. The military itself may well be amenable to such an endeavour, most especially when accompanied by an assurance of the continuance of external resources after the transition to civilian rule is completed. In other words, the prospects for military modernization and professional development are given priority by prospective politicians and various arrangements between the military establishment and its external counterparts are not interfered with. Liebenow⁵⁷ has asserted, however, that the long term effect of these external linkages has been to place the military at the center of the political struggle over the allocation of scarce resources.

In the late 1960s, J.M. Lee posed a rather fundamental question in the light of Africa's immediate post-independence environment, namely, to what degree does the presence of overseas military assistance separate the military and police from the society with which they are involved?⁵⁸ This is a reference to both the nature

and function of the pre-independence (colonial) security forces as well as the continued and substantial linkages with the former colonial powers. The question presumed a residual structure of relations which although affecting much of the new state apparatus was looked upon with greater suspicion when it came to the military. Lee writes⁵⁹

The former colonial powers in Belgium, Britain, and France, having created these armies, are under certain obligations to maintain them.... Those who designed the process for transferring powers to new governments did not anticipate the range of possibilities which the rise of other sponsoring organizations⁶⁰ would create. In the eyes of the former colonial powers, the major defence of any new regime was not the speed and efficiency of its security forces, at least not against external security threats, but the willingness of those in [positions of] responsibility inside the army or the police force, as well as other positions in the public service, not to alter the existing balance of power. The transfer of power was based on the assumption that it need not necessarily alter the strategic significance of the area. Any regime which rejected this assumption was admitting too many unknown factors into the situation.

Thus the external linkage becomes a potential source of domestic polarization if the newly independent security forces regard their position and ambitions as antithetical to the rest of society and more in keeping with the perspectives of the former colonial ruler. This however becomes an untenable argument with the passing of time as evidenced by the military's interest in accelerating the indigenization of the officer corps in the vast majority of newly independent states. Nevertheless, linkages were maintained with regard to military training and material, which comprised a subtler, if not imprecise, form of influence by the former metropolitan power with or without the competition of non-traditional external powers.⁶¹

Nowadays it is seldom argued that African armies are at the beck and call of their former colonial masters. Such a view all but disappeared with the military's self-assertion through intervention and its consequent positioning as the premier power broker - this within a very short time in the 1960s and 1970s. However, at least two important observations can be made with regards to the metropolitan-client relationship; first, there is a desire on the part of the external power to see the maintenance and continuation of national and regional balance of power; secondly, with regards to the process of military disengagement, it is also in the military's interests not to allow the possibility of a major alteration to the balance of power. There is a concerted effort to minimize the degree of uncertainty of a post-military regime. The rejection in 1987 of the Cookey report's recommendation to adopt a socialist platform for the process of military disengagement in Nigeria is an example of this phenomenon. The AFRC did not allow such a possibility, largely championed by labor unions and students, because of suspicions of its economic efficacy and its non-concurrence with other strategic groups. The prospects of societal and economic uncertainty became prohibitive for the AFRC. In Peru, even prior to the decision to disengage, the 'Inca Plan', conceived as a blueprint for the future of the nation in the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), was specifically aimed at forestalling future social unrest by undertaking a planned social revolution under military tutelage.⁶² In the former case there is an aversion to socialism and in the latter an attempt to institutionalize the revolution. In both cases, though apparently in ideological opposition, the military seeks a balance of power to be adhered to. Its effort is thus to stabilize the socio-economic-political situation which is characteristic of the initial stage of military intervention. The economic determinants will weigh heavily on any subsequent experimentation. Thus the pursuit of social innovations and structural alterations has consistently yielded to the priority of stability first, that is, social order and de facto economic continuity. The balance of power is the result of the tempering of the programs and ideology of the experiments that are more characteristic of a military in the midst of a long term program of military disengagement.

The second concerns the impact of external influences on these issues of the balance of power, socio-economic-political stability, and the degree and scope of social innovations and structural innovations. And such influence has been felt in the manner by which international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has extended and conditioned credits and financing for Third World nations. Even the rescheduling of a nation's debt service obligation has had tangible results in the manner by which a nation restructures or disciplines its economy. And the considerable need for external credits and/or debt rescheduling has been linked to what has been termed the 'era of privatization' throughout the Third World, including Africa. Thus one is able in 1988 to read the publication West Africa⁶³ advancing the following logic with regards to socialist Benin under President Mathieu Kerekou.

The World Bank and the IMF forced Kerekou to implement austerity measures and an era of privatisation has begun. Kerekou has described this apparent abandonment of Benin's strident socialism as a 'period of transition', a temporary accommodation with market forces which will permit the country to draw the positive benefits of liberation. State industries, once nationalised, are now being sold off.

Prior to the civil war, Liberia, because of its debt of over 140 million dollars to the United States, registered the only abstention in a United Nations General Assembly resolution which by a vote of 129-2 (US and Israel against) condemned Israel on 20 April 1989 for 'human rights abuses, excessive gunfire and restrictions of Palestinian worship'.⁶⁴ The United States had warned the Liberian government that it would oppose further credits to that nation in view of its failure to service its debt. Interestingly, President Samuel Doe responded to the situation by stating that the value of Liberia's loyalty to the United States was far greater than the money it owed.

In considering the theoretical conditions which facilitate the transition to civilian rule, Lee, Finer and Liebenow succinctly note the importance of the external factor, the influence of which has

changed from a more determinist relationship during the colonial period to a less certain and less manipulative source of leverage during the post-independence period. However, there is ample room for further investigation of the precise relationship between the external factor and the process of military disengagement.

NOTES

1. V.P. BENNETT, 'Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa', in Quarterly Journal of Administration, October, p.9.
2. T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-1985, London: Europa Publications, p.409.
3. Ibid., p.410.
4. Ghana experienced the following successful military interventions subsequent to the January 1972 coup: 5 July 1978, Acheampong replaced by Lt-Gen. Frederick Akuffo; 4 June 1979, Akuffo replaced by Flight-Lt. Jerry Rawlings; 31 December 1981, Limann replaced by Flight-Lt. Rawlings.
5. V.P. Bennett, op.cit., p.9.
6. E. SHILS, 'The Military in the Political Development of the New States', in J. Johnson (ed) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.54.
7. Shils' reflections on military oligarchy include the experiences of Pakistan, Sudan, Indonesia, Burma, Lebanon and Turkey, which he sees as moderate in their aims and scope of military rule, while citing Iraq and Egypt as exceptions to this trend.
8. E. Shils, op.cit., p.58.
9. Demonstrations had occurred in the resettlement controversy over the Wadi Halfans in 1960. In 1960 the strongly unionized railway workers demonstrated as well as students from the University of Khartoum. Again by September 1964 there were student demonstrations. Concurrently, the Gezira cotton farmers struck. A Professional Front composed of these and other groups, including old political parties, called for a General Strike. The widespread civil demonstrations divided the army; General Ibrahim Abboud handed power over to a transitional body that quickly emerged as a coalition civilian government, which by the May 1965 elections restored party government, which would last until the bloodless coup of May 1969 led by General Gaafar Nimeiry.
10. Venezuela experienced considerable social strife in the events leading to the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime in January 1958. Here again various sectors of society joined together and confronted the authorities in a popular front. Even Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal's efforts at establishing a transition body under his leadership was rejected by further demonstrations. The political cadres of the three major parties (AD, COPEI, URD) in exile thus returned and took the helm of government according to a prearranged and representative formula until the first elections could be held. For an informative account of the

events and political arrangements made surrounding the 1958 overthrow of Pérez Jiménez see Terry Lynn KARL, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', in G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp.196-219.

11. It is interesting to note that General Bisalla was under investigation for corruption and in a similar response to that of Maj-Gen. Idi Amin in January 1971, who was also under investigation and the likelihood of arrest, made a decision to attempt a preemptive action.
12. C. LEGUM (ed), Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, New York: Africana Publishing, pp.B784-785.
13. As quoted by West Africa, 'Coup plotters arrested', 6 June 1986, p.7.
14. The reported execution of Major-General Vatsa and nine others occurred less than three months after their arrest. In the annals of abortive coups there appear to be three overall fates of conspirators - quick execution, quick release from prison by other factions of the army, or death in prison. In the first instance, which is our concern here, a military tribunal rendered its verdict after secret deliberation. Major-General Vatsa's quick execution is reminiscent of the Ghanaian reaction to the attempted coup of 17 April 1967. This attempt was quickly crushed, the leaders jailed, and 120 mutineers disarmed. Lieutenant Samuel Arthur, who had hoped to be the first Lieutenant on the continent to execute a successful coup d'état, and Lieutenant Moses Yeboah, leaders of the abortive coup, were publicly executed on 9 May, less than one month after their attempt.
15. T. AGBABIAKA, 'Execution reactions', in West Africa, 17 March 1986, p.553.
16. Ibid.
17. J. KEEGAN, World Armies, London: MacMillan, 1979, p.94.
18. The chagrin of Brazil's urban guerrillas is better understood in light of classical guerrilla doctrine which asserts that when state repression, in response to guerrilla activity, is brought to bear on the civilian population this in turn broadens revolutionary support.
19. One can cite for example the deaths of former Communist party deputy and ALN leaders Carlos Marighella (killed in Sao Paulo in November 1969; author of the famous 'The Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla') and ex-Captain Carlos Lamarca, head of the VPR, which merged with Colina in June-July 1969 to form the VAR-Palmares, who was killed in a gun battle with security police in September 1971.

20. F. PEDREIRA, 'Decompression in Brazil?', in Foreign Affairs, vol.53, 1974-75, pp.502-503.
21. The severity of the exercise of state power had additional effects as noted by Pedreira, *ibid.*, p.503: 'Even the terrible excesses perpetrated within the context of suppressing terrorism had a contradictory political effect. On the one hand, they hindered eventual attempts to return to legality and contributed to the tightening of censorship, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the most brutal and shocking cases - although withheld from the majority of the public - elicited strong counterreaction within the military establishment itself. As early as 1970, the top governing group was convinced that it could not allow the indefinite continuation of a state of affairs that abetted the perpetration of such crimes under the umbrella of the power of the armed forces. This conviction resulted before long in the dismissal of the Air Force Minister and his ranking commanders'.
22. And here I include the use of constitutional mechanisms for the period in question. For example, one may cite Institutional Act No. 13, which empowered the executive branch with banishing orders; Act No. 14, amending Article 150 of the constitution, which established the penalties of death, perpetual imprisonment, banishment, or confiscation of goods for those guilty of participating in psychological, revolutionary, or subversive war against the state; and Acts No. 16 and No. 17 of 14 October 1969. The former was concerned with constitutional succession, effectively precluding the possibility of the civilian vice-president (Aleixo) from assuming the presidency. The latter provided an in-house purging mechanism by which an officer could be transferred to the reserve by the president in the event that he was seen as guilty of violating the cohesion of the armed forces. See Riordan ROETT, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, New York: Praeger, 1978, pp.143 and 151.
23. Junior officers and other ranks freed Rawlings (imprisoned by Akuffo for his part in the failed coup attempt of 15 May 1979) and with his associates seized power on 4 June 1979.
24. T.C. McCASKIE, 'Ghana: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, London: Europa Publications, p.464.
25. C. WELCH, 'The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa', in African Studies Review, vol.17, no.1, April 1974, p.221.
26. General Douglas MacArthur provided a controversial interpretation of this dispensation when he stated in 1952 in the midst of the Korean crisis: 'I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the country and its constitution which they are sworn to defend.' Quoted in S. FINER, The Man on Horseback: The Role of

the Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall, 1962, p.20.

27. C. Welch, op.cit., p.221.
28. A. ZOLBERG, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa', in The American Political Science Review, vol.62, no.1, p.72.
29. It is my contention that public disposition is quite secondary to the actual means (organization and manifestation) of opposition. This is particularly so if the regime has successfully muted or eliminated former centers of political organization. Even latent popular resentment will not find vent in the absence of these organs. Instead the regime is best positioned to present itself and its political organs as objects of national legitimacy. And the socialization of this perspective increases with the longevity of the regime, i.e. latent opposition is transformed into latent support and, it is hoped, in time into regime loyalty. Time in and of itself may not suffice, but it assists the socialization process with the adroit management of political factors by a regime.
30. Cultural relativism is the practice of interpreting and evaluating behavior by reference to the normative and value standards of the culture to which the behavior belongs. This is in contrast to ethnocentrism, which is the practice of interpreting and evaluating behavior and objects by reference to the standards of ones own culture rather than by those of the culture to which they belong. See J.F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL, Foreign Area Officer: Nonresident/Resident Course, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, pp.3-4.
31. J.G. LIEBENOW, 'The Military Factor in African Politics: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective', in G.M. Carter & P. O'Mear (eds), African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, pp.126-159.
32. See for example, R.H. JACKSON & C.G. ROSEBERG, 'Democracy in Tropical Africa: Democracy Versus Autocracy in African Politics', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, no.2, Winter 1985, pp.293-305.
33. Such authors as S. HUNTINGTON have concluded from a review of theories of democracy that 'with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may have been reached'. But in the third world context the possibility and desirability of making smaller, more immediate practical gains in the working of democratic institutions is more acceptable, see 'Will More Countries Become Democratic?' in Political Science Quarterly, vol.99, no.2, Summer 1984, p.218.
D. CHALMERS comments that 'Doubts about the "governability" of Western democracies (in which Huntington played a prominent part) have been muted, although proposals for reforms abound. Military governments in South African have taken significant steps towards democratization, calling forth sustained inquiry

into the problems of how democracies are established (or re-established). The apparent successes of Spain, Portugal and Greece have invited investigation. The new debates about democracy are not revolutionary in spirit, but reformist. Improving the working of democracies is a practical question, and one which is expected to have real consequences.' 'Democratic Theory', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, no.2, Winter 1985, p.357.

34. J.G. Liebenow, op.cit., pp.155-157.
35. For an informative source of the external connection and the implications of future Black African military development see B.E. ARLINGHAUS & P.H. BAKES (eds), African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
36. J.G. Liebenow, op.cit., p.155.
37. Regime interest and direction amidst a program of military disengagement is not static. The emphasis of a regime may indeed change with the passing of time after its consolidation. The re-examination of a program of military disengagement may result in postponement of civilian rule. As with any institutional body the regime gathers experience and periodically assesses its own interests, readjusting agendas amidst the process of military disengagement.
38. Writing in the 1930s H.J. Laski commented that 'The forms of any actual state are determined by its historical traditions, and the nice shades of peculiar emphasis which the experience of a people contributes to their life make it impossible to insist that any given system of categories is superior to any other.' See H.J. LASKI, An Introduction to Politics, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936, p.61.
39. For further reading on the ESG see J. KEEGAN, World Armies, London: MacMillan, 1979, p.90; and A. STEPAN, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971, p.267. African institutions such as the Winneba Ideological Institution during the presidency of Nkrumah (in 1963 and 1969) and the military school run by the Malagasy Republic (beginning in 1965), although emphasizing ideology, were not organs that incorporated a wide range of societal elite. The attempt was one of indoctrination of military leaders that would result in increased party hegemony and the military's identification with party objectives.
40. See 'The Powers That Be', in West Africa, 24-30 October 1988, p.1989.
41. The AFRC also asked for salary cuts ranging from two to fifteen per cent for the civil service and those employed in the parastatals. Opposition to these salary cuts was perhaps loudest from the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), whose president Alhaji Chirama gave the government a 21 day ultimatum to abandon the

plan! (see A.O. OBE, 'Alhaji Ali Chirama', in West Africa, 18 November 1985, p.2409).

42. See 'Dateline', West Africa, 6-12 March 1989.

43. In May 1988, under the rationale of ensuring the protection of Nigerian sovereignty and defending its offshore assets, President Babangida stressed the importance of a balanced fleet in order 'to meet all contingencies in the defence and protection of our maritime resources'. However in a seminar on strategic studies held in Lagos by the Nigerian Navy the consensus by all participants was that 'Nigeria could only become a military power if the Navy first made the nation a sea power'. This same seminar stressed that local production of weapons should be given urgent attention. If this can be construed as the military's attempt at ensuring its long term development, influence, and significance to the nation then there is also a political motivation. In 'Dateline' in West Africa, 16 May 1988, p.893, there is the following statement: 'Analysts think that Nigeria's military rulers are "in a hurry" to complete the military build-up and "push Nigeria into the technological age" because of the disappointment consistently expressed in some quarters that the country's past political leaders "lacked the will and failed to use Nigeria's resources, especially during the oil boom years, to establish the industrial base for shooting the country into a military power".'

44. West Africa, 21 December 1987, p.2483.

45. W.C. SMITH, 'The Travail of Brazilian Democracy', in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, p.

46. For further description of these three agencies see the section entitled SECURITY ORGANS in Chapter Nineteen.

47. R.A. JOSEPH, 'Democratization Under Military Tutelage: Crisis and Consensus in the Nigerian 1979 Elections', in Comparative Politics, October 1981, p.82.

48. R.S. CLINE, World Power and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980's, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p.121.

49. J. SLATER, 'U.S. Policy in Latin America', in J.K. BLACK (ed), Latin America: Its Problems and Its Promises, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p.225.

On the implications of these hemispheric military relations Jorge Nef states that 'continental military professionalism has become the most homogenizing bureaucratic trait. Such institutional modernization also serves as a link between U.S. and Latin America military establishments. In this sense, military modernization, especially along counterinsurgency lines, has meant the transnationalization of the officer class. This in itself is a fundamental challenge to the sovereignty of the Latin American nation state.' See J. NEF, 'Political Trends in Latin

America: A Structure and Historical Analysis', in J.K. Black, op.cit., pp.189-199.

50. Article 7 usually reads: 'In the event that a situation arises that creates a threat to peace or breaks the peace, the high contracting parties will immediately establish contact with each other for the purpose of coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat or restoring peace.'
51. Prior to the recent regional settlement leading to Namibian independence on 21 March 1990, Angola provided an interesting instance in which Soviet and Cuban influence extended to the actual command and coordination of government forces in the annual offensive against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which enjoyed South African support.
52. B.E. ARLINGHAUS, Military Development in Africa: The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p.45.
53. Each of these countries represents a reversal in Soviet efforts at securing regional influence. For subsequent Soviet as well as American posturing in Africa see pp.603 & 625 respectively in D. MARTIN & P. JOHNSON, 'Africa: The Old and Unexpected', in Foreign Affairs, vol.63, 1984.
54. J. Slater, op.cit., p.156.
55. With the coup d'état in Paraguay in early 1989, after which General Rodriguez was elected president, and the transition to civilian rule in Chile in March 1990, all the major republics on the South American continent have entered democracy.
56. Indeed, this was an era in which U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jean Kilpatrick, spoke of 'holding our nose' when dealing with America's allies in Latin America who were under military rule. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William D. ROGERS, states that 'In the United States authoritarian regimes had been accepted as Latin America's natural fate.' See 'The United States and Latin America', in Foreign Affairs, vol.63, nos.1-3, 1984, p.574.

During the Carter administration there was however a conscious effort to oust the government of Anastasia Somoza in Nicaragua, which became practically certain when the U.S. withheld its military, financial and diplomatic support.

In Africa there is the case of France's successful efforts to oust Jean-Bedel Bokassa (crowned emperor of the Central African Empire in December 1977) in September 1979.

In both these instances of external influence the domestic challenge must also be kept in mind so as not to create a determinist image of this external factor. In the former case one can observe the increased effectiveness of Sandanista forces against a weakened Guardia Nacional. In the latter case we see a successful coup executed by former president David Dacko in

September 1979 which restored the republic.

57. J.G. Liebenow, op.cit., p.156.
58. The external factor would appear to have a rudimentary affinity with an already existing dynamic. W. GUTTERIDGE, Military Regimes in Africa, London: Butler & Tanner, 1976, p.46, writes that 'the position of a military administration is always such that it is likely in most circumstances to grow apart from the country which it serves.'
59. J.M. LEE, African Armies and Civil Order, London: Chatto & Windus for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969, pp.116-118.
60. Such as Russia (Guinea: 1958; Nigeria: 1967), the United States (Ethiopia, Mali: 1961), Czechoslovakia (Nigeria: 1967), Israel (Uganda: 1965), China (Tanzania: 1964), West Germany (Tanzania, Nigeria: 1964), and Canada (Tanzania: 1964), inter alia.
61. It is generally concluded that a nation's diversification of military aid has resulted in an exercise of greater leverage and scope in a client state's policy options.
62. P. CALVERT, 'Demilitarisation in Latin America', in Third World Quarterly, vol.7, no.1, January 1985, p.31.
63. West Africa, 21-27 November 1988, p.2184.
64. The Star (Johannesburg), 21 April 1989, p.4.

LATIN AMERICA : LESSONS

LATIN AMERICA AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

As we turn our attention to the Latin American experience with military disengagement it is important to realize that the regional potential for democratic development, or the obstacles thereto, has traditionally been the more latent theme amidst the pervasive reality of authoritarian rule. There has not been an examination of viable programs of military disengagement per se, this being a more recent discipline. Moreover, there is a hemispheric legacy with regards to democratic aspiration, albeit more emotive than systematically ideological, as embodied in Bolivarian and Jeffersonian standards of liberty and self-determination. This 'democratic legacy' inherited from the wars of independence of the 19th century is not to be played down and in fact has its tangible import in the constitutional and legislative structures in effect throughout the majority of sovereign states in the region. It contains a mystical element for the citizenry and continues to be a source of national pride, patriotism and identification, which links the past with the present and in turn with any future prospects of success in whatever forms they may occur. It is a legitimizing sentiment which is evoked and which other societies, with varying degrees of success, also attempt to find or create. Such is the nature of this socialization that both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions grafted themselves, out of social and political necessity, onto José Martí and Augusto César Sandino, respectively. In the former case Fidel Castro made it clear that his nationalist inspiration was rooted in and formed by Cuba's first nationalist José Martí. Marxist-Leninism and Weltanschung were Castro's ideologies but in inseparable association with the particular realities of Cuba's legacy of national struggle.

After the wars of independence and concurrently with subsequent civil dislocation there would emerge the image and character of

military authoritarianism which at the time of this writing has only recently been replaced or is in the process of being replaced by civilian rule. It is therefore not yet possible to claim that we are now observing a watershed between the era of military authoritarianism and viable democracy in Latin America. Nevertheless, throughout the history of this region, and most especially in this century, there has existed at least a latent penchant for democracy. And the emergence or return of democratic forms of government is by no means the reflection of an aberrant predisposition. Latin Americans as a whole have always considered themselves democrats and enemies of tyranny. The impassioned activities for justice can be readily seen, from the mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires during the 'dirty war', to the United Front in Caracas in 1958, to the more chaotic tragedy of Colombia's 'Bogotazo', in which at least 5,000 lay dead in April 1948.¹ There are numerous other instances of 'democratic fervor' but the point to be made is that in assessing examples of Latin American military rule and subsequent, if not consequent, programs of military disengagement there is what one can say is an objective difference in the democratic legacy and predisposition over linear history between the societies and polities of Latin America and Africa, to take the two regions of primary concern to this study.² This has important implications for the viability of programs of military disengagement in that there may well exist a prior socialization and familiarity with democratic forms and experience in the former region while in the latter there is a relative, if not endemic, absence of these elements. Thus, demilitarization takes into account the scope and depth of popular resistance to military rule and in the case of Latin America the insistence remains for the exercise of democratic forms and the military is seen as a chronic obstacle rather than the engineer in the return to democracy. The pressure from below remains and the military has only been able to buy time through economic performance and political administration, that is, high growth rates and effective cooptation, rather than realistically entertain the possibility of indefinite rule. The latter may have been the case with Juan Vicente Gómez of Venezuela (which he considered his personal ranch) and an illusion entertained by Pérez Jiménez as late

as 1957³ but it has been eliminated as a legitimizing option for the armed forces in Latin America as a whole.

Latin America also possesses an intellectual heritage that is seen as symbiotic with democratic aspirations. There is the additional awareness, within this intellectual-cum-nationalist heritage, of the existence and significance of political economy. Within this context one can cite the words of José Martí:⁴

A country which wins political liberty without winning economic liberty will end up losing all liberty; but a people that wins economic liberty can go on to win its political freedom also.

More pedagogically, and of considerable influence to Fidel Castro, there is Martí's affirmation that 'to be educated is the only manner to be free'.

With reference to the Alliance for Progress in the early 1960s, the essential aim of which was to prevent the spread of revolution in the Western Hemisphere in the aftermath of Cuban success, Che Guevara quotes Martí:⁵

Whoever says economic union, says political union; the country that buys, commands; the people who sell, serve.

The import of these reflections is significant to the reality of the external factor previously discussed but there is a more determinist relationship based on the economics between 'buyer and seller' that remains unaltered until the advent of independence. And independence may not of itself substantially alter the continuity of prevailing economic relationships, apart from the elimination of overt extraction and repatriation of national wealth, both domestically and bilaterally; this becomes more emphatic if the newly independent state adheres to the norms of the international division of labor. The political structures and predilections of a state will be pulled into the orbit of the economic determinants and from these antecedents one will observe subsequent national development.

Our concern with military disengagement must take into account

the factor of political economy while acknowledging the persistence of the nationalist predisposition among both African and Latin American nation states. It is not a determinist relationship although appearing essentially as such among the poorer 'monoeconomies' within both continents, this despite the forcefulness of the Latin American dependencia theory.

To examine the process of military disengagement within Latin America is to examine the reemergence of democracy amidst difficult socio-economic circumstances. William Rogers⁶ writes:

Indeed, just as it was passing through its most severe economic crisis in modern history, Latin America was also experiencing a remarkable resurgence of political democracy....⁷ The coincidence of political democratisation and economic discipline and distress did not fit traditional stereotypes about Latins in the United States.

It is fair to say that this did not fit traditional stereotypes about Latins throughout the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the demand for regime liberalization and the reinstitution of democracy was real.

Democracy picked up momentum in Latin America in the early 1980s. This was more than an aberration, or a temporary swing in the pendulum. The causes were fundamental - a decade of economic advance, the containment of the subversive threats of the 1970s, in Argentina the sobering after-effects of the Falklands War, a willingness of the military to go back to soldiering, a less demagogic attitude among civilian politicians in the region.⁸ The generalizations made above can be considerably detailed and augmented.

LATIN AMERICA AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

In our previous discussion of the rationale of military intervention in Africa we included the contagion theory of the mid-1960s (particularly in the aftermath of the 1964 mutinies in East

Africa). One can speak of this in Latin America not only with regard to military intervention but also with regard to trends in military governance and the process of military disengagement.

Concerning the mechanics and inspiration for military intervention Edwin Lieuwen⁹ writes that

Militarism was contagious. The examples and techniques of Perón were observed by Major Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala and by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia.

As an example of contagion causing military intervention there is the 24 November 1948 coup in Venezuela. Previously, Major (soon Colonel) Marcos Pérez Jiménez had gone to visit Argentina's General Juan Domingo Peron, ostensibly in an official capacity, and had conversed with General Manuel A. Odría of Peru immediately before his successful military intervention of 28 October of the same year.¹⁰

Contagion in Latin America has featured an element of inter-military liaison (not only between service branches but also between the militaries of nations) which has served a 'consultative' function for would-be conspirators and their solicitation of international support. The Venezuelan coup of November 1948, which established an exclusively military government, was instantly recognized by Perón's Argentina, Peru under Odría, and the Dominican Republic under General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.¹¹

There is also the manner in which a particular military government influences neighbouring military governments. An example of this phenomenon is the military government of Peru under Morales Bermudez and Juan Velasco from 1968 to 1980 (Velasco having executed a successful palace coup in 1975). General Juan J. Torres of Bolivia, who displaced another general in 1970, is another case in point. Drawing his inspiration from the Peruvian experiment he made overtures to Cuba and invited a Soviet economic and trade mission.¹²

Ecuador, which claims jurisdiction over the Pacific Ocean 200 miles from its coast, took courage from its Peruvian neighbour¹³ and, beginning in 1968, had its naval patrol boats seize many fishing vessels from the United States within the 200 mile limit. It also

imposed fines.¹⁴

Contagion can also be identified within the region with regards to incentives for military disengagement. Within the Brazilian military there existed a body of officers known as the 'professional' group who favored leaving the political scene to politicians and resuming their professional military duties as soon as conditions permitted. The war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in the (northern) spring of 1982 had a major impact in reinforcing support for the 'professional' group¹⁵ and highlighting the military's need to preserve through military disengagement their corporate interests.¹⁶ However, this impact, if decisive, would take an additional two years to translate into an actual form of military disengagement.

If one observes the move to democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, albeit temporary, there is again the appearance of an international impetus that culminated in the overthrow of several Latin American dictators (Peru 1956, Colombia 1957, Venezuela 1958, the Dominican Republic 1961). At this time it was commonly accepted wisdom both within the United States administration with its considerable hemispheric influence, and within liberal academic circles, that military rule was a bad thing, not only morally but in terms of immediate United States interest, and that military dictatorships in Latin America encouraged Marxist revolutions whereas civilian governments did not.¹⁷

The move towards democratization ended abruptly throughout the continent by the middle of the 1960s; it only reemerged in the early to mid-1980s.

Further theoretical explanations regarding the military and its institutional character and motivations have been put forward. George Philip¹⁸ attests to the prevailing fact that during this interim period of military intervention and rule, which in part coincides with Africa's independence experience and military assertion (both new events), civil-military relations were characterized by a professional cadre of officers whose primary loyalty was to the military itself rather than to the sovereign. The relationship between these officers and the political leadership (whether military or civilian) was at arm's length. These

circumstances produced particular and limited patterns of military rule, or patterns of military-political interaction. In an attempt to represent these patterns George Philip provides the helpful caveat that follows:¹⁹

There is a dynamic in military rule which cannot be captured completely through static categories. However, it is important to distinguish at a minimum between the nature of a military coup, the post-coup regime and the political evolution of this regime. What is interesting is the attempt to specify the nature of some of the most common transitions while discussing what they reveal about general problems of military rule.

With this in mind, and drawing from Samuel P. Huntington's influential Political Order In Changing Societies,²⁰ Philip provides²¹ the following categories of military intervention and subsequent rule: 1) The Moderator Pattern, 2) Veto Coups and Authoritarian Rule, 3) Military Clientelism, 4) Breakthrough Coups and Military Populism, and 5) Factional Coups and Factional Rule.²²

In the moderator or guardianship pattern, the military maintains direct control for short periods only but retains some form of arbitrating relationship with civilian politics (Brazil 1945-64, Turkey 1960-80).

Veto coups are directed against civilian politics, as opposed to specific governments, in reaction against mass mobilization and the attendant threats to order and discipline (Chile 1973, Argentina 1976).

Military clientelism refers to the military's effort to find civilian allies. Clapham and Philip²³ state that

the essential element in the transaction is the military's capacity to attract subordinates who are on the one hand sufficiently influential to make their support worth having, and on the other insufficiently strong and dependent to threaten the military itself.

Examples of military clientelism are post-1964 Brazil, Chile under Augusto Pinochet, and Paraguay under Stoessner.

Breakthrough coups and military populism are theoretically concerned with comprehensive system transformation (Egypt, Iraq and Ethiopia) but have proved less radical in the long term in Latin America (Ecuador after 1972, Peru 1968-1975). Military populism is the societal support and form by which this type of coup and governance is sustained. Populism itself is defined by George Philip as

a policy by which a government seeks to build or maintain a cross-class base of social support by high spending politics on social welfare and industrialisation. Such a policy is mobilising but not seriously revolutionary.²⁴

Factional coups and factional rule are precipitated in a situation where tribal or ethnic loyalty supersedes loyalty to the military institution. It is a phenomenon more readily witnessed outside Latin America. In its extreme form it may prove the prelude to major political transformation. This is because if the primary loyalty of military commanders is not to the military as an institution, then this loyalty becomes something to be captured rather than a power center in its own right.²⁵ Examples in which political transformation has occurred, that is, the transformation of the political system and the congruent reorganization of the military as an institution, are Ethiopia after the September 1974 coup and Mexico during its revolution.

MI - MG - MD CONTINUUM

What becomes evident in our examination of military disengagement is that these various categories of military intervention and governance have an interlocking relationship with one another and consequently are not conveniently demarcated for purposes of analysis. However, the categories are useful and provide import to the examination of military disengagement, in particular in this chapter on Latin America. The veto coups and authoritarian rule also

tend to result in longer periods of military governance with a variety of organizational schemes or strategies. Although these categories are fairly indicative of regime type and behavior they nevertheless overlap or at times particular regimes 'jump' categories according to the period under examination.²⁶ Turning to an examination of Brazil and military disengagement we have an instance of a long continuous period of military rule (twenty-one years), though not initiated strictly in reaction to mass mobilization and the resulting threats to societal order and discipline.²⁷ Brazil, from 1964 to 1985, is not ordinarily subsumed under the veto coup category but it fulfils at least one of its features.

With this overlapping of categories and features as a given it is also important to acknowledge them within the context of what I would term the military intervention - military governance - military disengagement continuum, more simply expressed as $MI > MG > MD$ and representing a continuity of military motivation and policy as expressed throughout the life of the military in power. As one may note, of these three stages, military governance and military disengagement are more closely associated, in fact they are difficult to separate in view of their strong mutuality of operation; however, as the gradual transfer of power from military to civilian functionaries takes place, the demarcation between MG and MD becomes more apparent. Military intervention, being the initial stage, highlights the socio-political-economic starting or reference point for subsequent MG-MD analysis, operation and adjustments, all of which are subject to a consolidation of power or hegemony throughout the duration of the continuum. And legally speaking the character and thrust of one continuum will act as the operational and analytical reference point in the event of subsequent military reentry. This may be expressed as follows:

$$MI^1 > MG^1 > MD^1 = \text{continuum}^1 (\text{at successful termination of MD})$$

And with military reentry, continuum^1 becomes MI^2 , and thus the beginning of continuum^2 , and so forth.

Nigeria offers an example of a continuum^1 in the 1975-1979 period as well as an MI^2 with the military reentry of August 1985.²⁸

But for now, Brazil is the focus of our attention with regards to its experience with long term military disengagement which in turn is inextricably linked to military intervention and military governance.

BRAZILIAN MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

The Brazilians were the first to use the term of descompressao or decompression to refer to the staged transfer of power from military to civilian governance.²⁹ The study of decompression has considerable import for the many nations that have experienced military intervention. The military in power, in most instances, announces its intent to withdraw from the control of government once certain objectives have been satisfactorily met. In some instances there exists a strategy to rectify certain inadequacies seen as perpetuated by civilian authority - the so called corrective school, which is however not usually associated with the process of long term military disengagement - and in others, if not most, there are ad hoc attempts at military governance with the consequent result of uncertain programs of military disengagement as the political possibilities are ascertained, no small accomplishment of itself.

To varying degrees the military authority must engage in efforts of social engineering, that is, the attempted reshaping of society into a more responsible and correctly oriented and motivated polity, if the old order is to be sufficiently discredited and its return averted. The new order and its forums must become sufficiently preferable to the previous ones to ensure a measure of continued order and political viability to the post-military disengagement state.

It can be argued that decompression is not withdrawal per se but in its essentials the fashioning of a conditional relationship between the military and civil sectors of a nation to include other strategic groups. And an effective decompression becomes of paramount importance to coup leaders turned national administrators who have a vision for the nation's future or the fundamental fear of a disordered and chaotic society in the absence of a realistic alternative.

When one speaks of Brazilian military rule over two decades in

actuality one is referring to the administration of five successive regimes, those of Humberto Castello Branco (1964-67), Costa e Silva (1967-69), Emilio Medici (1969-74), Ernesto Geisel (1974-78) and Joao Batista Figueiredo (1979-1985). The first three administrations witnessed the consolidation of order and the redirection of national institutional life and economic strategy. The final two initiated and continued distensao, soon to be referred to as abertura (opening), culminating in the election of a new civilian president - Tancredo Neves - on 15 January 1985 and the inauguration of vice-president José Sarney as president of Brazil two months later (Neves having died in the interim) after twenty-one years of military governance.

It is worth recalling that the coup d'état of 31 March 1964 came about amidst increasing tensions between the armed forces and executive president Joao Goulart. Both President Goulart and his predecessor President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (President from 1955 to 1960)³⁰ were disfavorably perceived by the military, as having increasing leftist socio-political-economic orientations, and were generally regarded as responsible for the socio-economic disorder prior to the March 1964 coup. The plethora of strikes and mutinies, either promoted, permitted or left unpunished, had proved intolerable for the military under the Goulart administration. More critical to the armed forces was the organized insubordination and rebellion among the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the three armed services. The 'Rebellion of the Sergeants' in Brasília in September 1963 and the mutiny of the corporals and sailors in Rio de Janeiro in March 1964 had a twofold effect. First, the sergeants' rebellion drove the majority of the officer corps to turn against the president - including the Air Force which had previously been a stronghold of Goulart support.³¹ Secondly, and conclusively, the participants in neither the sergeants' rebellion or the March mutiny were disciplined, which presented a counter-institutional principle of hierarchical challenge with impunity³² and caused a consensus among the service branches to act against the source of this threat - the president and his party associates.

Riordan Roett³³ put the situation thus:

In the opinion of a majority of the officer corps, Joao

Goulart no longer exercised legitimate authority in 1964. He began to act extraconstitutionally, to threaten reform without congressional participation, and to mobilize students and laborers for direct political action. All this threatened to undermine the fragile institutional structure of the 1946 Republic.³⁴

Evidently, the first military administration under Castello Branco (formerly a Marshal of the army) did not intend to entrench itself in a long term epoch of military rule.³⁵ Pedreira³⁶ describes it thus:

Castello and his colleagues never admitted this state of affairs as anything but exceptional, destined to last only as long as strictly necessary and to be followed by the withdrawal of the military to their traditional role of a 'moderating' power, leaving the government in the hands of their civilian allies. Nevertheless ... the desire of the young officer corps to go 'to the very end' - although none of the officers could precisely say what the 'end' would be - prevailed.

The period under Castello Branco is marked by the adoption, at the outset, of a program of severe austerity, the promulgation of a new constitution at the end of his tenure in office (the Charter of 1957), a new juridical order (to endure less than two years), and the characteristic restrictions on political life of a new and consolidating military regime. Institutional Act No. 2 dissolved political parties at the end of 1965 pending reorganization to be decided upon by the military. It also declared that the elections for president due in 1966 would be indirect.³⁷ This was, in effect, an effort to shape and direct the pattern of official party politics while endeavoring to develop its own party machinery. Political supporters of the military regime were instructed to form the Alianca Renovadora Nacional (ARN or more commonly ARENA, and those opposing the regime to form the Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (MDB).³⁸ Thus the legal political structure of a

governing and official opposition had been tailored under the first military administration under the now President Franco.

The military's foundational work with the electoral mechanism would prove eventful for at least two reasons. Firstly, it allowed for the existence and maneuvering of an official opposition, a party organ not sharing the regime perspective and priorities and around which national consensus for a democratic alternative could rally. Secondly, although not intended for such use, the electoral mechanism eventually provided a ready made structure for the military to retreat to garrison and its institutional strongholds while allowing an elected civilian leadership entry into governmental rule. The electoral mechanism thus became the port for both military exit and civilian entry. It has been argued³⁹ that military disengagement requires political parties to unite themselves according to procedural democratic pacts and place social and economic issues on a delayed agenda in order to avoid divisive political contention. We will return to the electoral factor later.

The Brazilian military had a highly formulated and motivated socio-economic-political content in the post-World War II period, most frequently identified with the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and its multi-disciplinary curriculum.⁴⁰ The post-war era was also marked by an intense debate between the nationalists and the liberalists. The former were more closely associated with the maintenance of a strong state presence in the economic and social affairs of society. Locally nationalist elements could be found within both the 'hard line' officers within the military and the semi-populist politicians of the civilian regimes between the war and the 1964 coup d'état, namely the administrations of Getulio Vargas (1951-1954, his second tenure), Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1955-1960) and Joao Goulart (1961-1964), the last two administrations being particularly identified with a nationalist character although admittedly for different reasons than the nationalists within the armed forces. Nevertheless, the period from 1946 to 1964 is generally seen as the era of liberal democracy in Brazil.

As previously stated, the ESG pursued a multi-disciplinary education. Within this framework there arose within the military a

generation of increasing ascendancy that would advance economic liberalism as the means by which it would actualize its potential; this generation and grouping of officers was also determined to see Brazil obtain the status of a great power.⁴¹ Liberalism was therefore an economic creed adhered to by a stratum of officers many of whom would become technocratic administrators during Brazil's military interregnum. The Castello Branco administration placed the Economics Ministry under the leadership of Roberto Campos, who with the institutional support of the so-called Sorbonne group (ESG graduates with a mainly liberal economics viewpoint) advanced a liberalism that at first was practically translated into a monetarist economic policy. Faced with severe inflation, Campos applied a stabilization program in accordance with the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund. However, this situation of increased economic discipline/austerity proved unpopular within society in general. And thus there arose the peculiarity and distinction of Brazil's early stage of economic realignment - a realignment that would prove portentous to future political-economic development. George Philip states the situation concisely:⁴²

Economic liberalism and monetarist economics were ... unpopular within society as a whole and particularly with the nationalist Left. This unpopularity created an inconsistency. If the government was to pursue a determinedly liberal (in economic terms) programme, it could not easily liberalise politically for fear of having its policies challenged and reversed.

This situation proved a rather difficult one for the Branco administration but the commitment to the realignment with the attendant inconsistency lasted throughout the subsequent regimes. And especially with the advent of the Geisel administration one could observe a political liberalization as opposed to democratization per se. The modus operandi for the military in the political arena would be to liberalize and control.⁴³ It would be the 'liberalization of authoritarian rule' which Luciano Martins defines as

the adoption of formal democratic institutions and the simultaneous exclusion of the four principles which give to such institutions their true democratic content: consensus concerning the rules of the game, political accountability of the rules, the right to ample political representation, and alternation in power.⁴⁴

In short, 'liberalization' meant limited concessions in tandem with tight control of political results. Martins states that

The liberalization model adopted in Brazil under the Geisel administration and part of the Figueiredo government can be summarized as follows: (1) the progressive restoration of civil and political rights; (2) the reestablishment of channels of interest representation; (3) the adoption of forms of legal validation for the choice of rulers and for acts of government.

However, in order to assure regime hegemony, this quasi-program of military disengagement was accompanied by

authoritarian controls ... in order to contain the exercise of such rights and political functions within the limits imposed by the executive's authority.⁴⁵

The more overt forms of control or containment of the Brazilian polity could be witnessed through the use of, inter alia, the Institutional Act, electoral requirements and legislative maneuvering.

But before we expound on these items it is necessary to provide some additional background and clarification as to what motivated the military's decision to allow for descompressao or abertura, or if you wish the process of military disengagement; in other words to expound the incentives.

The incentives or rationale for military disengagement are a matter of debate and must be acknowledged and pursued by a sufficiently strong segment of the military hierarchy in order to

result in an actual military disengagement. It may also appear that the coalition of officers needed to actualize military disengagement is greater than that necessary to realize military intervention. While a fraction of the military may be able to execute a successful military intervention, there is no instance where only a fraction of the military pulls off a successful military disengagement. What one has instead, and that rarely, is a successful counter-coup that ensures a return to civilian hegemony (for example, the so-called Privates' Coup of Sierra Leone in April 1968). There is an institutional and operative need for consensus within the military for it to embark upon and successfully execute a more or less controlled withdrawal. As I stated above, I believe there to be a rationale continuum involving military intervention (MI), military governance (MG) and military disengagement (MD). As we examine the incentives for military disengagement it is advantageous to refer to the continuum as a whole (see Figures 9.1a and 9.1b).

Perhaps the most compelling factor in the Brazilian military's decision to liberalize politically and, by natural extension and popular expectation, to opt for military disengagement is the reality that it could indeed control the process itself. Conversely a military does not opt for a road it cannot closely monitor and shape.


Writing soon after the Brazilian military's decision for descompressao Fernando Pedreira said:⁴⁶

Brazil is now taking its first steps in what appears to be a delicate and long convalescence period that, at best, will return it to a civilian regime under the protection and tutelage - the moderating power - of the military.


Pedreira's position is that the military was not forced or imposed upon to pursue the democratic option by Brazilian civilian society. The germ for descompressao-abertura would be found among the military leaders and the ruling hierarchy itself. The Brazilian military had been exposed to the tenets and substance of liberal democracy not only within the context of the ESG's seven academic divisions,⁴⁷ which synthesized into a national security perspective, and the General Staff College's (ECEME) doctrinal

Figure 9.1 MI-MG-MD Continuum as a Bell-Curve

9.1a Normal Control Curve



9.1b Brazilian Control Curve: Accounting for Extended Period of Military Governance (MG)



Legend

- 1 Basic police services with military in garrison.
- 1-2 Increased police/military action in response to civil unrest (under civilian authority).
- 2 Military Intervention (MI).
- 2-3 Military/Police control apparatus fully employed (under military authority).
- 3-4 Decision to liberalize. May not produce immediate relaxation of state controls.
- 4-5 Increased political liberalization (incentives for military disengagement (MD)).
- 5 Military Disengagement (MD).
- 5-6 Period of democratic political activity with basic police services with military in garrison (civilian authority).
- 6 Viable democracy.

emphasis, but also throughout its professional development relations with the United States, other South American countries, and Europe. There was also a measure of critical experience gained through Brazil's period of liberal democracy. Pedreira provides two outstanding reasons for military disengagement which are predicated on what he terms 'an evolution of tendencies within the military establishment itself that took place for predominantly military reasons'.⁴⁸ The first reason can generally be subsumed under the category of the military's corporate interest in maintaining unity and concerns the question of presidential succession. Despite the apparent consensus between the military-government executive and the institutional military, in all but perhaps one instance - that of Geisel - succession itself was seen as potentially fractionalizing the military and therefore to be averted.

The second reason concerns the very nature of a closed regime which due to its inordinate dependence on the intelligence and control structure is incapable of escaping corruption and the abuse of power. As with the first reason there tends to be a cumulative effect and an exacerbation of the tensions in interservice and intraservice relations due to the institutional division of labor and subsequent competition. And as with the potential fragmentation⁴⁹ due to presidential succession the internal contradictions of a closed regime are assessed according to the military's corporate interest and must be escaped, therefore the logic for military disengagement.

Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring⁵⁰ begin their scenario with the traditional demarcation for the beginning of liberalization - 1974 - placing this decision in the hands of the regime elite, who considered the moment advantageous. Advancing nine or so incentives and disincentives for the decision to liberalize, those authors describe the immediate 1974 situation as follows:

The military had decimated the guerrilla left, the popular movements were under control, the government did not face any radical opposition, and it had significant support in civil society. The economic recovery not only bolstered regime support, it also led to a feeling that the economy

was in good hands and could withstand minor changes in the political system. These factors gave the regime confidence that it could open the system at a low risk. Furthermore, opening the system could release some tensions created by the years of tighter authoritarian control. In particular, it might help ameliorate tensions within the armed forces, which were particularly acute during periods of presidential succession.⁵¹ (my emphasis)

It is worth noting from the above that descompressao-abertura has automatically been attributed by some authors to the end of Brazil's economic boom, an argument that Scott Mainwaring says is difficult to sustain.⁵² This objection to the 'economistic' understanding of liberalization is also sustained by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos.⁵³ However the economistic understanding of Brazil's initiation of liberalization persists until now.⁵⁴

Scott Mainwaring in addition to the above observation provides his own extrapolation for the decision to pursue political liberalization.⁵⁵ He names four factors which he states were crucial; they are as follows: 1) There was difficulty in devising the appropriate symbols or discourse to win the regime widespread legitimacy; 2) the close identification between the military and the government had created divisions; 3) by 1974 the military had decimated the left, had control over popular movements and faced a weak opposition; and 4) the economic situation fostered the regime's belief that it could afford to liberalize.

Factor 1) stresses the negative symbols of legitimacy over the long term, such as the recognition and acceptance of threats arising from communism, corruption and chaos. Thus one can speak of an anti-communist, anti-corruption and anti-chaos campaign in the pursuit of legitimacy. Combined with this was the use of positive symbols of legitimacy especially beginning with the administration of Emilio Medici. The themes of efficiency, economic growth, and national greatness became the pillars of the positive symbols and can clearly be anticipated as the converse and logical development emerging from the negative symbols. But both negative and positive symbols reflect the military's desire (ultimately unsuccessful) to capture a

legitimizing myth for Brazil and thus ensure the character and longevity of regime leadership. In the Mexican context, which is often cited as the longest and strongest example of party and regime legitimacy in Latin America, Samuel Finer⁵⁶ provides the following insight:

The last forty years have provided the public with a political formula, a legitimizing myth. This is the myth of the Revolution, an epic-movement which means most things to most Mexicans, and ... has provided a consensus unbelievable in the riven Mexico of the nineteenth century.

The regimes' attempts to contextualize the elements of the legitimizing myth have included reference to the 'revolution' (a device used by military regimes in and outside Latin America, for example in Peru 1968-1980, Zaire under General Mobutu, the Central African Republic under Jean-Bedel Bokassa, inter alia), in which there is the projection of a demonstrable break with the past, with all its corruptive and ideological encumbrances, and the forging of an independent and dynamic (economically prosperous) future. But Mainwaring points out why this effort at establishing legitimacy is an uncertain one, primarily based upon economic performance:

Democratic legitimacy is based largely on procedure, even though performance and charisma may play important roles. Procedure provides a more stable base for legitimacy than efficiency because it requires mere acceptance of the rules of the game in order to survive. When legitimacy is based on performance, a regime may encounter crises when performance declines. At the same time, a continued outstanding economic performance can shift public attention away from the previous focus on economic life, and towards a deeper concern with other aspects of socio-political life.⁵⁷

The Brazilian military regimes were concerned with matters of procedure (mostly in the form of electoral management and hegemony)

and legality (legislation, however questionably employed) but the emphasis and ultimate hope for Brazilian greatness and the establishment of a legitimizing myth, without the residual 'advantages' of an actual revolution, lay in the nation's economic performance.

Factor 2) concerns the already identified concern of the military with increased fragmentation and thus can be seen as a negative incentive for liberalization.

Factor 3) iterates the observation that all effective armed and civil mobilized opposition had been either eliminated or substantially weakened, thus providing the military with what has previously been termed a situation of minimal risk, where space and time for magnanimity, innovation and maneuvering, as well as for institutional consolidation, have been obtained. In this situation the military regime retains its relative capacity to control the political situation.⁵⁸

Factor 4) represents the political breathing space secured through economic performance but is inextricably linked to factor 3) which complements it decisively.

The preceding factors or incentives involved in the decision for liberalization in Brazil may also be examined in terms of what Scott Mainwaring calls a 'transition from above',⁵⁹ as contrasted with 'transition through withdrawal'.⁶⁰ The difference between these two types of transition rests in the regime's ability to influence the transition (greater in transition from above) and the degree of discontinuity in the political process (lesser in transition from above).⁶¹ These terms have been applied to the Brazilian military administrations for the periods of 1974-1982 and 1983-1985 respectively, and reflect a fundamental difference in the degree of actual regime control. And with the uncertainty of control the charac. and emphasis of liberalization is automatically brought into question, and the regime finds itself in an increasingly untenable, that is to say, delegitimized, position. However, in the latter instance the finalization for military disengagement may well occur although the Brazilian experience is more accurately perceived with an understanding of the electoral structure and results which in effect enforce military disengagement. J. 'Bayo Adekson suggests

three approaches to military disengagement observable in West Africa,⁶² the third of which, the constitutional-evolutionary model, can be comfortably applied to Brazil. The Brazilian regimes even fulfil the author's criterion that the military leadership does not limit itself to 'mere civilianization' but seeks an appropriate arrangement in a nation's future civil-military relations, that is, that the military will secure an acceptable package of rights and responsibilities while returning to garrison.

In the Brazilian military regimes one can also observe an additional and vitally important element, that is perhaps the focus of emulation by other military regimes moving towards military disengagement. As previously mentioned, there was an increasingly influential segment of the Brazilian officer corps, the so-called Sorbonne group, which was intent on realigning the nation's economic philosophy, and so one can actually speak of an attempt to nurture a national economic ethos. One can speculate as to whether this ethos does to some extent displace political culture in view of the difficulty of securing the latter in the histories of civil-military relations throughout the world. But for our purposes here it can be argued that the apparent socialization of the new economic ethos facilitates the military's decision for military disengagement owing to the economic continuity foreseen with the advent of civilian leadership and administration. More specifically, Lucian Martins speaks of the 'social hegemony of capitalism'⁶³ the consolidation of which is under way in Brazil.

The deep penetration of a capitalist ethos within the state apparatus is a good example of this, as shown, for instance, by the adoption of a 'private' capitalist management mentality by the state enterprises. Another indicator is the fact that, although the criticism of the actual model of growth has become widespread, a socialist alternative is not the object of any political debate - not even as a utopia.⁶⁴

Just as we spoke earlier of the military regimes' success in weakening much political opposition (armed or mobilized), one can

also identify, as Martins does, the 'liquidation of a previous structure of domination and its (populist) political expression'.⁶⁵ The military was thus encouraged by the major displacement of populist economic policy and performance, the establishment of political order, and the arrival at a demonstrably productive capitalist ethos which fueled the expansion of the 'state-oligopolistic-internationalized' productive system whose foundations were laid in the 1950s under civilian rule. One sees in the cases of larger nations under military governance a perennial frustration and impatience with former civilian regimes that were unable to actualize the national potential for regional and international leadership - in a word, greatness. And the military's satisfaction and security are derived from the effective overhaul of the old political-economic dispensation. While the old dispensation does not, strictly speaking, require military rule for its existence, a new arrangement would.

Let us return to the matter and means of control as conceived and exercised by the military in power. Ironically, as indicated by Figure 9.1b, there was a considerable increase in state control as a prelude to eventual military disengagement. The intensity and the manner of applying this control also depended on the extent and character of regime opposition, whether mobilized, extra-parliamentary, or armed insurgency.

The Brazilian military would thus conduct a multiple-front campaign intended to lessen the threat from all quarters. This would include legal and extralegal means of socio-economic-political control.

One of the early barrages came in the appearance of the now familiar banning of parties and particular individuals associated with previous civilian military administrations. Legal rights of politicians were curtailed as in the case of former president Juscelino Kubitschek, who on 8 June 1964 was banned from standing for public office for a period of ten years. The dissolving of political parties was accomplished through the Second Institutional Act, which was issued at the end of 1965. To this one may add the related measure of media censorship, and purges in the military and civil service. As with other military regimes there would be the on and

off censorship of particular publications such as O Estado de São Paulo which was shut down when it attempted to cover the issue of presidential succession in 1973.⁶⁶ Censorship is thus often reapplied according to regime sensitivity concerning the issue involved.

The Institutional Act which the military issued in 1964 was intended to be the only one. But as the resolution of political problems was not forthcoming through negotiations in 1965, the regime instead issued Institutional Act No. 2; all in all, more than twenty Institutional Acts were issued. The most significant of these Acts came in 1968, a year of severe unrest, student demonstrations and urban violence. The crisis was resolved by force when the institutional or garrisoned military forced their military brothers in government to issue Institutional Act No. 5 which gave the President the power to dissolve Congress (which Costa e Silva did indeed do), suspend civil rights, that is, arrest individuals without providing any accusation, and impose press censorship. Consequently there occurred a wave of indiscriminate arrests and political purges which resulted in the removal of judicial protection.⁶⁷ Only by 1978, with the reestablishment of Congressional immunities, was Institutional Act No. 5 abrogated.⁶⁸ For a period of ten years the executive was given extraordinary powers with no semblance of checks and balances. But as de S.C.Barros⁶⁹ points out there was a paradox at play as we see during the military administration.

For the duration of his term, Geisel had at his disposal the exceptional powers granted by Institutional Act No. 5. He used these, mostly to bring more liberalisation, but in an authoritarian fashion. It sounds ironic and contradictory that liberalisation came by means of an authoritarian instrument such as the Institutional Act No. 5, but such contradictions do characterise a system like the Brazilian one.⁷⁰ By the end of his term Geisel had revoked this legislation so that his successor could start his term without such a heavy negative political inheritance. Some of the power granted to the President by the Act were maintained, albeit in a softened form, and they were

contained in the 'emergency measures' which could be issued by the government to take care of situations in which the government felt it might lose control of the political process.

As mentioned previously the Brazilian military regimes pursued the control and direction of society among multiple fronts. With the establishment of an official opposition and a government party the requirements for electoral participation remained of prime interest to the government in order to maximize its electoral support and, by implication, its legitimacy. This effort at electoral management is well exemplified by requirements for the 'provisional registration' of parties following the regime's decision to establish a new multiparty structure (abolishing the two-party system), the Pacote de Novembro affecting the electoral process, and the earlier media strictures on electoral campaigning being imposed by the Falcao Law.

The Figueiredo administration (1979-85) had committed itself to military disengagement. A multiparty structure would be strictly supervised and the certification of each party subject to the criterion that it obtained in the municipal elections of 1982 (moved forward from November 1980) a minimum of five per cent of the total national vote and a minimum of three per cent of the vote in at least nine states of the country (Law No. 6,767, 20 December 1979).⁷¹

The Pacote de Novembro, instituted by the regime in November 1981, forbade all electoral alliances in the new multiparty structure. Moreover, each party was required to present a complete list of candidates for the offices of councillors, mayors, deputies, senators and governors, with the provision that votes cast for individuals across party lines, for example, a deputy from one party and a governor from another, would be invalid. This mechanism increased competition between the now four opposing parties to the advantage of the government party.

The Falcao Law of 1976 was the brainchild of the Minister of Interior and effectively regulated media campaigning, particularly television and radio, by laying down that only a candidate's name, number, photograph and résumé could appear in broadcasts (Law No. 6,399, 7 July 1976).⁷² The result was an ARENA victory in the 1976

municipal elections and a government majority in the electoral college which would theoretically elect the new president in 1978.

THE ROLE OF SETBACKS

In our investigation of incentives for liberalization and military disengagement we identified various positive developments - positive in the view of the regimes - that spurred on the process towards eventual civilian rule. To provide a more comprehensive overview it is beneficial to mention briefly some negative developments that may well have contributed to the military's decision to pull back.

Brazil experienced economic recessions with partial recoveries in both 1974, with the Middle East oil embargo, and 1981. These recessions brought to light the international vulnerability of the national economy, which explicitly demonstrated to the military its limits in controlling liberalization and economic performance. The economic factor would be a constant point of reference, if not barometer, of the regime's relative strength, legitimacy, and disposition towards further governance, and thus indicate the military's vulnerability to forces outside of its control.

A threat to military credibility and unity arose from the scandal of early 1981 in which a captain and sergeant of the army were implicated in attempting to plant a bomb in the Riocentro stadium during May Day celebrations. Instead the bomb ignited (killing the sergeant). The intention was apparently to implicate leftist elements or to stimulate left-wing terror. The chief regime advisor, Golbery do Couto e Silva, wanted a full inquiry⁷³ which was blocked, which in turn resulted in his resignation. The loss of Golbery was the loss of the regime's chief strategist in the process of liberalization with control. And the ensuing debate within the military was not considered favorable to the military's corporate image and interests.

But perhaps one of the most significant of the negative developments for the regime came with the electoral results of November 1982 in which the PMDB captured the moderate vote (with implications for a future acceptable civilian party facilitating

military disengagement), broadened the party's political base, and created a new opposition majority in the lower House of the Brazilian Congress.

Concurrent with the electoral advance of the PMDB was the increased fractionalization of the government party (PDS). Student demonstrations had occurred at earlier stages of military rule, as cited above, and had reappeared with abertura in 1977. But by June 1983, less than two years before military disengagement, 50,000 demonstrators marched in Rio in protest against inadequate salaries and government austerity policies related to IMF guidelines. It marked the first time that civil servants and employees of parastatals had taken to the streets in protest against the government.

INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS, CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

By the early 1980s it was more commonly acknowledged that the role of the Brazilian military had changed while maintaining certain points of continuity. The primary change was that the military as an institution had become more clearly separated from the military government.⁷⁴ This distinction, by no means unique to the Brazilian military, had been accentuated by the last two military administrations, those of Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo, who initiated the process of military disengagement. The administration initiatives towards this end were more clearly associated with what appears to be a more civilianized regime, particularly the executive. The last military government insisted that the institutional military return to bases.⁷⁵ This does not imply that in substance there was a discernable antipathy between two components within the military. Indeed it would be specious to imply that the military body corporate had by the early 1980s crystalized into two separate camps. Instead one can more accurately speak of an increasing consensus in favor of military disengagement, not in terms of a schedule of military disengagement but based on a mutuality of interest within the Brazilian officer corps, regardless of institutional or governmental classification. But more critically,

the military was witnessing increased fractionalization within its party organ (ARENA turned PDS) in conjunction with the looming threat of electoral defeat at the hands of the PMDB. The primary insurance in the retreat would be the maintenance of security and information services within the hands of the military itself, in addition to an acceptably moderate civilian successor and party in Tancredo Neves

Table 9.2

Executive and SNI (Intelligence) Leadership during Brazilian Military Rule from 1964 to 1985

	President	SNI Chief	Main Political Counsellor
1964-67	Castello Branco	Gen. Golbery (do Couta e Silva)	
1967-69	Costa e Silva	Gen. Emilio Medici	
1969-74	Emilio Medici	Gen. Joao Figueiredo	
1974-78	Erhoeto Geisel	Gen. Joao Figueiredo	Gen. Golbery
1979-85	Gen. Joao Figueiredo	Gen. Octavio Medeiros **	Gen. Golbery (until 1981)

* Also Chief of the Military Household. Within the office of the Presidency there was one household in charge of civilian affairs and another in charge of military matters.

** Before the resignation of Golbery (in 1981) Medeiros was selected by Golbery and Figueiredo to stand for president in the election of 1985.

NOTE: Succession to the presidency was not derived from the occupation of traditional posts of military influence such as Chief of the Army or the Commander of a specific division, but rather depended on the consensus of the informal 'College of Generals'.

and the PMDB.⁷⁶ The military regimes had maintained from the beginning of their sojourn a symbiotic relationship between these services and the (military) executive in government (see Table 9.2). In the process of military disengagement security and information would remain essentially in the hands of the military, regardless of

the official appellation assigned them in retreat, and the underlying structure of influence and executive (civilian) dependence on said services would remain intact, at least in nascent years of civilian leadership. The existence of the Servicio Nacional de Inteligencia - National Intelligence Service (SNI) - is a case in point. Established by General Golbery do Couta e Silva after the 1964 coup, the SNI's purpose was to be a strong internal intelligence agency.⁷⁷ As a military intelligence network it was to interdict the fomenting of countercoups such as those rumored to have been discussed by the left in September 1964 and by the right on 5 October 1965.⁷⁸ Concomitantly, there was the establishment of military police investigations (IPMs) throughout Brazil, ostensibly for the elimination of subversion. However, abuses would take place.

Currently (post-1985), the SNI is a state organ autonomous of the military services but under the management of military officers who have made their careers therein. The military institution is therefore able to exercise a major political influence. This influence would also appear to be a more coherent and unified one in that a military in garrison more readily identifies and recognizes itself as a corporate whole and a mutuality of interest is more easily facilitated. And its entrenchment in the information services is more critically evaluated in terms of institutional interest and reconnaissance vis-à-vis the civilian administration.

In the African context Anton 'ebler has observed that:

In all cases the military junta completely monopolized decision-making in defense and security matters. Institutionally, this invariably was achieved by having military officers as ministers of defense, and interior and security, and as directors of internal security agencies.... The post of minister of defense usually was held ... by the junta leader himself.... Functionally, monopolization in the areas of defense and security was maintained by withholding these matters from meaningful discussions with civilians.⁷⁹

One may mention several other associated developments with

regards to a continued intelligence or security presence. To begin with there has been no significant modification of the National Security Law, thus preserving the autonomy and jurisdiction of various intelligence agencies. And as William C. Smith has indicated⁸⁰ the militarization of the Brazilian state has given the military a considerable presence in civilian administrative agencies, including twenty to forty thousand retired officers incorporated into state government as well as into the private sector, resembling the phenomenon of 'am kudari'⁸¹ as seen in Japan.

There is also the influence of the arms industry, the economic core of Brazil's military-industrial complex; Brazil is the world's fifth or sixth leading exporter of weapons. As Smith aptly puts it:⁸²

The contribution of this industry to national welfare is a substantial one that not only strengthens the hand of the military but also confers tremendous influence on issues related to national security policy, foreign trade and international economic policy, industrial promotion and protectionism, labor matters, and so on.

But perhaps more revealing with the continuity of the military's penetration and influence of future civilian regimes is the

ability of the military to limit the tempo and extent of social, economic, and political change in Brazilian society [which] has basically remained untouched by the Nova Republica.... For the foreseeable future, the armed forces most likely will seek to shape national politics by means of discreet pressure applied in conjunction with their allies in the business community, plus occasional overt warnings to civilian politicians.⁸³

Warnings are, however, not restricted to civilian politicians and institutions as can be seen in July 1987 when there was an attack by stone-throwing demonstrators on a bus carrying President José Sarney.⁸⁴ The military's reaction to this incident was one that

was based upon the military's perception of itself as societal guardians or defenders of the constitution as well as on its continued intolerance of anything resembling social disorder. On this occasion the stone-throwing was unanimously condemned by politicians, military leaders and trade union leaders. The Minister of the Air Force, Brigadier Octavio Moreira Lima, declared that the incident was 'a subversive act by a minority who disagree with the democratic process' and emphasized that the armed forces as defenders of institutions 'will not allow these groups to continue their disturbance and aggressions'.⁸⁵

Although not specifying the means by which it would enforce such a prohibition the warning was not qualified nor rebutted by civilian authorities, which speaks at the very least of a tacit understanding among the concerned parties, a circumstantial agreement and cooperation, or more likely, the relative strength and autonomy of the armed forces over matters of domestic security, a point of concern with all the parties previously mentioned.

Under military rule, the strategic positioning of the SNI within the state structure as opposed to the military government had two beneficial results. In the first place it minimized the politicizing of the military as an institution while having a high visibility in the upper echelon of the state. And secondly, it helped avoid the delegitimization of the military which is characteristic of so many transitions from military rule⁸⁶ and was thus a point of military disengagement in view of its own security requirements.

In the November 1982 elections the military government's party apparatus sustained substantial reversals, or conversely, the opposition parties experienced electoral advances; ten of twenty-two state governorships were won by the PMDB (nine) and the PDT (one) in the more industrialized states of the south. Following these elections the Office of Political and Social Order (DOPS) was adroitly transferred from state to federal control in an effort to centralize, as a contingency measure, the organs of regime control. Although the exercise of these instruments was not implemented in a decision to retain government power, the military has retained operational control in the post-military disengagement era. During military rule other agencies were drawn close to the office of the

Presidency in an effort towards strong centralization. In addition to the SNI one may cite the Planning Minister and the Secretary of the National Security Council.⁸⁷

In view of the civilian government's formidable challenge of effectively addressing socio-economic difficulties and its delicate manner in dealing with civil-military relations there is tacit acknowledgment by both parties that the status of the information and security services is for the time being effectively unalterable. This does not, however, preclude the exercise of democratic forms in Brazil. Indeed, there is ample room for the advancement of local representative institutions and increased political mobilization in and outside the more politicized and industrialized urban centers.⁸⁸ One must also consider the democratic experience gleaned from the election of a new Constituent Assembly and the construction of a new constitution, in addition to the development which arises from the transition to direct elections.⁸⁹ The issue with regards to the information and security services is that military disengagement has taken place with the effective control of specific organs in the hands of the military. The ethnocentric observer finds this cause to question the actual purity of the resulting democracy while the Brazilian has little illusion as to its military character, dwells less theoretically on the purity of democracy, and is intent on working with and on the democratic apparatus that has been gained, regardless of who controls some of the information and security services. Besides, their immediate and mid-term control by military is more the concern of the institutional military than of civilians. And this situation does not at this stage hold a deterministic or retrogressive relationship with the development of democracy in Brazil.

BRAZIL AND AFRICA: A WORD ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In recalling the Brazilian experience with military disengagement for the period 1964-1985 we have engaged in considerable elaboration of what is termed 'liberalization with control', which entailed constitutional changes and the attendant institutional act. Ostensibly, the military turned quasi-civilian regimes (especially after 1974) were moving towards more or less representative structures largely predicated on a tailored electoral system using an electoral college in the selection of the president. It was thus, and remains, committed to a healthy measure of economic liberalization.

As we compare this disposition with Africa in general, and West Africa in particular, it is helpful to recall that Africans jettisoned the dual executive system soon after independence. Practically speaking, the Brazilians, both in and out of military rule, were of a similar mind, except for a brief period in the early 1960s - from 2 September 1961 to January 1963 - when there was a president (Joao Goulart) and prime minister (Tancredo Neves). In both Africa and Brazil, for example, there was little interest in conducting national leadership with a perceived First World luxury of a Head of State who was not the effective head of government, and executive power residing in a Prime Minister and cabinet. Instead the division of national leadership would become an anachronism with one leader shortly appearing. One side effect of this decision to settle for a single leader was, as mentioned earlier, in many instances a suspicion and rejection, both in principle and practice, of multiparty politics and those forms deemed a threat to the consolidation and effectiveness of national leadership. Conversely, the decision was a formula for domestic factionalization, if not anarchy.

Within this setting one can observe Ghana introducing a Republican Constitution in May 1960 which effectively set the trend in Africa away from the Westminster model. But there was also an ideological content transmuted into an ever-increasing and vocal antithesis of Western political and economic norms. Bereket H. Selassie⁹⁰ identifies this crucial element as the polemic between a

crystalizing African nationalism and Western political-economic standards; the ideological and economic philosophy of African nationalism goes contrary to much of the Brazilian experiment. This polemic is further reflected, for example, in the constitutional forms adopted in Ghana in the early 1960s:

Nkrumah's ... attachment to a militant form of socialism with its intolerance of liberal democracy and economic practice and fear of neo-colonialism, may explain some ... features of Nkrumah's Republican Constitution.⁹¹

Subsequent Ghanaian experience with military intervention, military governance, and military disengagement reveals Nkrumah's socio-political legacy being handled in a variety of ways. Our primary concern being with military disengagement, and cognizant of this legacy, we shall proceed with a familiarization of all these socio-political histories as we turn our attention to Nigeria. Political development also refers to the potential, diminishing or otherwise, of military intervention as a function of a nation's interaction between socialization and actual civil behavior. We can depict this dynamic as follows.

Table 9.3

The Possible Effects of Socialization on Military Intervention

Socialization	Civil Behavior	MI potential
after prolonged socialization *	disobedience	no MI
during socialization**	disobedience	MI or no MI
after socialization	disobedience	MI or no MI
without socialization	disobedience	MI

* under military rule

** beyond 7 years

The possibilities of military disengagement are thus, logically speaking, enhanced with greater socialization of all sectors of society and greater civil obedience under circumstances that would normally see manifestations of civil disobedience. Socialization means, inter alia, the internalization by the citizenry of national loyalty and aversion to the use of subversion and/or violence as a means of challenging the central authority.

NOTES

1. The leader of the Liberal party, Dr. Jorge Eliécer Gaitan, was assassinated in Bogota. The populace reacted by burning the business center of the city. The Bogotazo occurred during the convening of the Ninth Pan American Conference (30 March - 2 May '948) presided over by General George C. Marshall. The work of this conference culminated with the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which in its two chapters comprised of thirty-eight articles embodies a fair reflection of Latin American's democratic lexicon and thinking (see German ARCINIEGAS, The State of Latin America, London: Cassell & Co., 1953, pp.411-415, for text of the declaration).
2. Consider R.H. JACKSON and C.G. ROSEBERG's conclusion on African leaders' predisposition towards Western style democracy in 'Democracy in Tropical Africa: Democracy versus Autocracy in African Politics', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, no.2, Winter 1985, p.305.
3. See George PHILIP, The Military in South American Politics, London: Croom Helm, 1985, p.143.
4. Quoted by Carleton BEALS, Latin America: World in Revolution, London: Abelard-Schuman, 1963, p.49. Beals quotes from Jose MARTI's Obras Completas.
5. Ibid., p.301.
6. William D. ROGERS, 'The United States and Latin America', in Foreign Affairs, vol.63, nos.1-3, 1984, p.574.
7. For a parallax view see Riordan ROETT, 'Democracy and Debt in South America: A Continent's Dilemma', in Foreign Affairs, vol.62, 1983, pp.695-720.
8. W.D. Rogers, op.cit., pp.578-579.
9. Edwin LIEUWEN, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, in J.J. JOHNSON (ed), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962, p.134.
10. In both instances of military intervention a constitutionally elected president is deposed; Rómulo Gallegos who on 14 December 1947 became Venezuela's first truly popularly elected president, and José Luís Bustamante y Rivero who was elected with aprista support on 10 June 1945. For the recorded account of President Gallegos' failed effort to persuade his would-be captors to adhere to the provisions of the constitution, see German Arciniegas, op.cit., pp.109-110.
11. Trujillo proved one of the more durable strong men in Latin

America, his dictatorship lasting from 16 August 1930 until his assassination in 1961.

12. This situation would prove intolerable for much of the military and in August 1971, Torres was overthrown by a coalition of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria - Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) - and the Falange Socialista Boliviana - Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) - led by Colonei Hugo Banzer Suarez. He in turn appointed a coalition cabinet with only two military members. His politics were right of center with exceptions such as sustaining the previously decreed nationalization of Gulf Oil and International Metals, but with the difference of offering compensation to these multinationals. See 'South America: Regional Survey', in The Almanac of World Military Power, London: Bowker, 1974, p.46.
13. This is not to imply that Ecuadorian-Peruvian relations are altogether cordial. There is persisting tension resulting from the Rio Protocol of 1942 which granted Peru territory which gave Ecuador access to the Marañon River (a major tributary of the Amazon), after open conflict flared up in July 1941 over the disputed area.
14. The Peruvian experiment was having a regional and international impact which did not preclude the Ecuadorians from recognizing that opportunities had arisen that would make national assertion internationally less hazardous especially vis-à-vis the United States and its corporate institutions.
15. See Alexandre de S.C.BARROS, 'Back to Barracks: An Option for the Brazilian Military?', in Third World Quarterly, vol.7, no.1, January, pp.63-77 (especially pp.67-68).
16. It also confirmed the long-established policy of the armed forces of developing a national arms industry in view of Argentinian shortages during the two month war. See Alexandre de S.C.Barros, op.cit., p.71.
17. G. Philip, op.cit., p.2.
18. G. Philip, op.cit.
19. Ibid., p.201.
20. S.P. HUNTINGTON, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
21. G. Philip, op.cit., pp.201-209.
22. See also Mauricio SOLAUN & Michael QUINN, Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America, London: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Solaun and Quinn provide the following categories (pages indicated are from Chapter 3, pp.44-68) in an effort to explain the phenomenon of military intervention: 1) Interclass conflict (45-50), 2) Intraclass

conflict (50-51), 3) Personal interests of a leader (51-53), 4) United States interference (53-54), 5) Military corporate interests (54-55), 6) Low levels of military professionalism (55-56), 7) Weakness of the electoral mechanisms (56-61), and 8) Governmental ineffectiveness and illegitimacy (61-63). With regards to item 7) (weakness of the electoral mechanisms) its converse, or a form thereof namely the functioning of the electoral mechanisms, however juggled to suit regime interest, evidently proved a crucial feature of military disengagement in the case of Brazil in 1985 (to be discussed shortly). Inductively, a functioning electoral mechanism should facilitate military disengagement, all things being equal and provided that the military decides to abide by its results.

23. C. CLAPHAM & G. PHILIP (eds), Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, London: Croom Helm, 1985, p.13.
24. G. Philip, op.cit., p.207.
25. Ibid., p.209.
26. This reminds one of Robert Presthus' insistence on the need for historical perspective rather than 'snapshot' analysis and subsequent conclusions (see A. BARBROOK, Patterns of Political Behaviour, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p.131). Although Presthus is concerned with community analysis, his important conclusion is that the subject under examination, in this case two communities, may indeed be seen as changing its theoretical category according to internal developments and the duration of the study. This would also appear to have obvious import for the study of military regimes.
27. The military's view of President Joao Goulart, whom it deposed in 1964, was that he had taken a sharp turn to the political left in early 1964 and that this was incompatible with the military's institutional and national view for Brazilian economic development, which insisted on low levels of political mobilization. Ergo, it was more an ideological objection that presumed the inevitable development, in the long term, of an undisciplined polity incompatible with Brazil's national potential and interest.
28. One may well argue that by ignoring the lessons of the 1975-1979 continuum Buhari actually 'violated' the logical requirements of due reference to previous operational and analytical standards, which necessarily eliminated a substantive platform for himself and undermined the viability of his duration in power, i.e. there were no stages guaranteed, no MI^2 to work with, and thus no continuum. The result would come in the form of a palace coup whose leaders would in turn acknowledge the process or MI^2 . Theoretically, one may also consider MG^1 as the conduit between MI^1 and MD^1 , which would focus one's attention on the substance of effective governance and as such relegate military disengagement to little more than a logical extension, if not residual, of military rule. Military disengagement is more

complicated and subject to a variety of forces which require additional attention. In avoiding conduit analysis there is instead an emphasis on demarcating the actual boundaries, if indeed discernable, of military disengagement and its autonomous features. The process of military disengagement is clarified and thus differentiated from military intervention and military governance.

29. See T. BRUNEAU, 'Consolidating Civilian Brazil', in *Third World Quarterly*, October 1985, pp.973-987; and W.C. SMITH, 'The Travail of Brazilian Democracy', in *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, pp.39-73.
30. Janio Quadros of the Uniao Democratico Nacional - National Democratic Union (UDN) - was president for a seven month period beginning in 1960 until his resignation was accepted by Congress, which constitutionally required that Vice-President (Joao Goulart of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro - Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)) be sworn in as president. From 2 September 1961 until the plebiscite of 6 January 1963, Brazil was a parliamentary democracy in which Joao Goulart served as president and Tancredo Neves as prime minister.
31. Fernando PEDREIRA, 'Decompression in Brazil?' in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.53, 1974-75, p.500.
32. Both Uganda and Algeria provide interesting examples of the consequences of impunity to regime authority. In Uganda there was an absence, as described earlier, of substantive discipline and dismissal of the participants of the 1964 mutinies which was a contributing factor in the subsequent breakdown of an already fragmented army. In Algeria we observe the military's disappointment in Ben Bella's attempt at reconciling himself with Ait Ahmed (leader of the Front de Forces Socialistes (FFS)), a former comrade-at-arms during the civil war who had however challenged the regime through armed rebellion. Ait had been caught and sentenced to death. Ben Bella in an attempt to find allies and amidst a crumbling support base within the regime commuted Ait Ahmed's death sentence to life imprisonment. This further eroded Ben Bella's standing in the military and coupled with his prior decision to create a militia to counterbalance the Armée de Libération Nationale - ALN (the military arm of the Front de Libération Nationale - FLN) proved his undoing, resulting in the 19 June 1965 coup led by Colonel Houari Boumedienne.
33. Riordan ROEIT, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society*, New York: Praeger, 1978, p.99.
34. The 1946 Republic with the constitution of 17 September marks the traditional beginning.
35. George Philip, op.cit., p.213.

36. Fernando Pedreira, op.cit., pp.507-508.
37. Direct elections, however, were ordered for state governor in October 1965, on schedule. In accordance with the decree for the indirect basis of the presidential elections, the elections themselves were postponed for a year.
38. The MDB would subsequently become the current PMDB also known as the partidao or 'big party'.
39. See for example, A. STEPAN, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971; and C.G. GILLESPIE, 'Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule', in G. O'DONNELL, P.C. SCHMITTER, & L. WHITEHEAD (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp.173-195.
40. See A. Stepan, op.cit.; and R. Roett, op.cit.
41. Within Nigeria, especially during the current military administration, there is a strong determination to see a similar 'great power' status actualize. There appears to exist a 'Brazilian' school within the Nigerian military that has closely examined the Brazilian experience from the standpoint of economic and political policy options.
42. G. Philip, op.cit., p.219.
43. Ibid., p.87.
44. I. MARTINS, 'The "Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil', in G.O. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (eds), op.cit., p.88. Interestingly enough while Luciano Martins speaks of a concerted effort of liberalization with control, Scott Mainwaring sees a more dichotomous situation in which there is a conflict between the push for liberalization and the tightening authoritarian controls. See S. MAINWARING, 'The Transition to Democracy in Brazil', in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol.28, no.1, Spring 1986, p.150.
45. Ibid., p.87.
46. F. Pedreira, op.cit., p.512.
47. Here we refer to the curriculum of the ESG organized as follows:
 - 1) political affairs
 - 2) psychological/social affairs
 - 3) economic affairs
 - 4) military affairs
 - 5) logistical and mobilization affairs
 - 6) intelligence and counter-intelligence
 - 7) doctrine and co-ordination
48. F. Pedreira, op.cit., p.509.
49. In fact it would be more accurate to speak of an already existing

fragmentation between military institutions, the executive, and operational units that support different 'candidates' for presidential succession. Thus we are speaking of a periodic effort to arrive at a consensus amidst shifting power bases, canvassing and ensuing intrigue, which proves a considerable strain on the military institutional fabric.

50. S. MAINWARING & E. VIOLA, 'Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s', in Journal of International Affairs, vol.38, Winter 1985, p.202.
51. Ibid.
52. In this vein S. MAINWARING, 'The Transition to Democracy in Brazil', in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol.28, no.1, Spring 1986, p.154, cites Nicos Poulantzas' work on Southern Europe, which adopts this perspective. See La Crisis de las Dictaduras, Madrid, Spain: Siglo XXI, 1976.
53. W.G. DOS SANTOS, 'A Ciência Política na América Latina: Notas Preliminares de Autocrítica', in Dados, vol.23, no.1, 1980, pp.15-27.
54. For example, see Eul-Soo PANG, 'The Darker Side of Brazil's Democracy', in Current History: A World Affairs Journal, January 1988, pp.21-24.
55. S. Mainwaring, op.cit., pp.151-154.
56. S. FINER, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall, 1962, pp.200-201.
57. S. Mainwaring, op.cit., pp.151-152. This same occurrence of introspection with regards to continued outstanding economic growth can be observed in the Japanese context and with a subsequent focus on its social welfare policy. The socio-political-cum-philosophical questions arising are for example 'What was the purpose of all the growth?' 'Should industrial expansion occur for its own sake?' See T. PEMPEL, Policy and Politics in Japan, Chapter 4, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982, pp.132-153.
58. Ibid., p.153.
59. Ibid. W.C. SMITH states that transition from above is one in which authoritarian elites stage manage their own exit from power. Initially, both popular mobilization and democratic opposition are secondary factors. See 'The Travail of Brazilian Democracy in the "New Republic"', in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol.28, no.4, Winter 1986-87, pp.42-43.
60. S. Mainwaring & E. Viola, op.cit., p.202.
61. S. Mainwaring, op.cit., p.171.

62. Namely, (a) counter-coup-inspired approach, (b) military-turned-political pattern, and (c) constitutional-evolutionary model. See J.B. ADEKSON, 'Dilemma of Military Disengagement', in O. OYEDIRAN (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79, London: MacMillan, 1979, p.214-218. As pointed out by Adekson himself, these three categories are similar to those provided by V.P. BENNETT, 'Patterns of Demilitarization in Africa', in Quarterly Journal of Administration, October 1974, pp.5-15.
63. L. Martins, op.cit., p.93.
64. Ibid., p.226 (footnote 24).
65. Ibid., p.93.
66. Although not resulting in immediate censorship, O Estado de Sao Paulo protested against new regulations governing press censorship itself in September 1972. And in 1977, O Estado began to attack the regime's economic politics, and reported, along with others, instances of torture and murder carried out by the security forces under the previous Medici regime (1969-74).
67. It should be noted the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) had developed the counterinsurgency doctrine of eliminating the theoretic support base of urban guerrillas, for example, which entailed 'indiscriminate' arrests at the universities and other locations of regime opposition. It is interesting to note that this approach of eliminating the support base of a regime opponent had been exercised in post-revolutionary Russia against elements of the intelligentsia (more commonly known as the Cadets) who were put in prison. But as Solzhenitsyn points out, 'close to the Cadets' was vague and ill-defined, and by 1919 included all scientific circles, all university circles, all artistic, literary, and engineering circles. In other words the theoretical support base became 80 per cent of the existing intelligentsia. See A. SOLZHENITSYN, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II, United Kingdom: Collins/Fontana, 1974, p.31.
68. Civil liberties would also be restored soon after. In 1979, political exiles were granted amnesty.
69. S.C.Barros, op.cit.
70. Among Brazilian scholars there appears the touting of the resilience and innovation, if not idiosyncrasies, of the Brazilian polity. See Zelia ROELOFSE, 'Brazil: A Lesson in National Unity', in UNISA Latin American Report, vol.2, no.2, 1986, p.30.
71. As cited by L. Martins, op.cit., p.225 (footnote 13).
72. Ibid., p.83.

73. Both the captain and sergeant were working for the First Army's Secret Service. A more restricted official military investigation concluded that the left had placed the bomb in the vehicle occupied by the two soldiers.
74. S. Mainwaring & E. Viola, op.cit., p.211.
75. See A. Stepan, op.cit., for the distinction between the military as government and institution.
76. G. Philip, op.cit., p.240, points out that the elderly Neves, who had served both in the Vargas (1951-54) and Goulart governments and who would die before taking office, was so moderate that the more radical opposition parties at first refused to support him. The moderates had in fact gained their electoral and strategic preeminence as a result of the November 1982 elections.
77. The SNI's task of internal surveillance was in the tradition of the Seguridad Nacional (Venezuela, under Pérez Jiménez) and the subsequent National Intelligence Directorate (DINA - established 1974) and its successor, the Central Office of Information (CNI - established 1977); the latter two organs were active in Chile under Augusto Pinochet.
78. We refer to the rumored discussion between pro-Goulart officers and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) in September 1964, and officers of the right who feared the development of factional politics and an unacceptable civilian president if the elections scheduled for 1966 went forward. Critically, Costa e Silva was able to assuage their concerns and the coup plot for 5 October 1965 was not attempted.
79. A. BEBLER, Military Rule in Africa (Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali), New York: Praeger, 1975, pp.189-190.
80. W.C. Smith, op.cit.
81. The so-called 'descent' of bureaucrats from the 'heaven' of the civil service to a second career in business (or politics), transferring previous interests and outlooks into a new office. See J. FULCHER, 'The Bureaucratization of the State and the Rise of Japan', in The British Journal of Sociology, vol.39 no.2, June 1988, pp.229-254 (especially pp.247-248).
82. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.64.
83. Ibid., p.63. Here one can refer, for example, to the eloquently veiled pronouncement by Minister of the Army General Leonides Pires Gonçalves, as recorded on 16 October 1985 in the publication Senhor (Sao Paulo), in which he peremptorily warns Congress and members of the Constituent Assembly that "the duties of the armed forces are a tradition that need not be changed".
84. See 'Brazil: Violent Protestors Warned by Military', in Latin America Weekly Report, 9 July 1987, p.2.

85. Ibid.
86. G. Philip, op.cit., p.240.
87. The concept and implementation of a National Security Council (NSC) had been borrowed from the United States and represented the establishment of an institution in response to national security deliberations. (Incidentally, the concept of a NSC was also adopted by the Chileans under Pinochet). According to Article 87 of the 1987 constitution the NSC is the supreme presidential advisory body for the formulation and execution of national security policy including general responsibility for strategic defense planning. See J. KEEGAN, World Armies, London: MacMillan, 1979, p.82.
88. It must be kept in mind that under military administration there was the successful exclusion of large parts of the populace and regions from the efforts of political liberalization.
89. Tancredo de Almeida Neves from the Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) was elected as President by an electoral college of 686 members. As late as 1984 the PMDB had supported direct elections for the presidency but as it appeared that the party could win according to the existing rules, purposely made for the advantage of the regime through the formation of an electoral college, due to the fractionalization of the ruling (government party) Partido Democratico Social (PDS), the PMDB dropped its support for direct elections. For the circumstances surrounding the PMDB opportunity see G. Philip, op.cit., pp.238-241, especially pp.240-241.
90. B.H. SELASSIE, The Executive in African Governments, London: Heinemann, 1974.
91. Ibid., p.23.

PART THREE - NIGERIAN MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

FAREWELL - MEN OF HONOUR

Who are the men of honour? Who are they
That the nation wishes the good of the day?
They are men in arms who knowing power
Have voluntarily surrendered power
Who at the face of the even have chosen the odd
Who in command of sword
Have chosen to abandon arms
And return to virgin farms
They are men of goodwill and wisdom
Who like the rulers of an ancient kingdom
Know when they have reached a chosen point
For above power dwells a saint

Farewell, farewell men of honour
Such happening of today shall sooner
Or later be history of tomorrow
Which other nations shall follow

by Brigadier Hamman J. Vatsa *
(On the Nigerian military's transfer of
power to civilians on 1 October 1979.)

* Vatsa, by then a Major-General, was convicted for his part in the abortive coup in December 1985.

The line 'And return to virgin farms' is reference to General Olusegun Obasanjo who handed over power to President Shagari on 1 October 1979. General Obasanjo is a keen farmer owning some of the largest farms in Nigeria. Among the former soldiers who became farmers are Brigadier Ogbemudia, General Adebayo, Emeka Gukwu and Bajowa.

7 - 4 DEVELOPMENT AND DIRECTION OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

FOUR COURSES OF ACTION : HUNTINGTON

According to Samuel P. Huntington¹ the military which intervenes can choose from four courses of action in terms of whether it retains power or returns it to civilians and whether it acquiesces in or resists expansion of political participation. Writing in but one of the heydays of military rule, particularly in Latin America, the author uses that region in identifying the four options, all of which impose costs on the military and the political system. The successful programs of military disengagement in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile were neither immediate nor predictable during the late 1960s.

The four options which Huntington sets forth are²

- 1) Return and Restrict (The Aramburu Option). The military returns power to the civilians after a brief rule and a purge of governmental officials but continues to restrict the rise of new groups to political power. However, almost invariably, the need to intervene recurs.
- 2) Return and Expand (The Gursel Option). The military returns power to civilians and permits the social groups which they had previously blocked to come to power under new conditions and normally with new leadership. Turkey under General Gursel permitted the legal political activation of the Peoples Party and Justice Party for the 1961 elections, his coup having taken place in 1960.
- 3) Retain and Restrict (The Castello Branco Option). The military retains power and continues to restrict the expansion of political participation. This option does not however prove static, as seen by the decisions taken by subsequent military administrations in Brazil which eventually led to military disengagement in 1985.

- 4) Retain and Expand (The Peron Option). The military retains power and permits or capitalizes upon the expansion of political participation. As with option 3) this situation cannot be sustained indefinitely; Peron was eventually ousted. His attempt at personalist transformation, that is, into a populist dictator, was vetoed by the institutional military which preferred to continue in the role of national guardian.

Of these four options the Nigerian program of military disengagement for the period of 1975-1979 appears best subsumed by option 2, Return and Expand.

As recorded earlier, Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye³ has grouped the various approaches to military disengagement into three major categories: (a) The countercoup-inspired approach, (b) The military-turned-political pattern, and (c) The constitutional-evolutionary model. Of these three groupings our interest is in the constitutional-evolutionary model, which can be applied to the military administration of Brigadier Murtala Ramet Muhammed from the 29 July 1975 coup d'état to the successful transition to civilian rule on 1 October 1979 (this despite the assassination of Murtala Muhammed on 13 February 1976).⁴

The general emphasis of military rule is on the constitutional and methodical procedure of military disengagement. Prior to this time Nigeria had experienced two coups d'état, and one abortive 'program' of military disengagement under General Jakubu Gowon.

ACCRA TALKS⁵

The Supreme Military Council of Nigeria discussed the topic of military disengagement as early as the meetings held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana on the 4th and 5th of January 1967, although one cannot speak of a program per se. Two statements made at that meeting are worth recalling. As discussion turned on politicians as a whole and their disfavourable status, the Chief of Naval Staff, Commodore J.E.A. Wey, provided the following reflection:

One thing I would like to repeat, I am a sailor and want to

remain a sailor. We were not trained to be politicians, let us run the Government, draw up a Constitution, hand over to the politicians and we get back into our uniforms.⁶

This may be interpreted in terms of Huntington's option of Return and Restrict, or in part with Adekanye's constitutional-evolutionary approach to military disengagement. Regardless of classification it is unquestionably an imposition from above.

The Military Governor of the Mid-West region, Lieutenant-Colonel David Ejoor, pointed out that despite the dislike for politicians it would however be unrealistic to keep them out of any future attempt at military disengagement. Ejoor comments:

I think when you are deciding the future of the country, you are deciding for the people and you cannot exclude any particular person from taking part in deciding his future, politicians or technicians.⁷

The Military Administrator of Lagos, Major Mabolaji Johnson, and the Military Governor of the Northern region, Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Katsina, expressed their desire to explore any way of persuading the politicians 'not to meddle in our affairs'. There is an obvious inclination for preserving military institutional interest as a function of preventing what is seen as political interference. This theme runs consistently throughout the region and throughout militaries worldwide as one of the major grievances and motivations for military intervention. Now that they were in power the military were considering the alternatives and preventive measures available; this was essentially exploratory without reference to other attempts at military disengagement. The Aburi meeting may also be observed as 'corrective' only in the sense of preventing further abuse by politicians of the military and of the nation (a clear distinction is not established).

Major Johnson suggested a timeframe for minimum military governance before military disengagement was considered more seriously, a suggestion which was seconded by Commodore Wey. He (Major Johnson) proposed:

I will say, let the Military Government continue for now and after working for six months, and we see how far we can go before we start thinking of calling these people [politicians] back.⁸

The prospect for immediate military disengagement is absent. In the intermediate and long-term, the prospects for military disengagement depend on the manner by which the politicians can be somehow prevented from doing harm and, more officially, on the developments arising from the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee, which under the military administration would be subject to 'reorganization and reconstruction' (as previously convened it was seen as a 'platform for politicians' and not of benefit to the nation).

In the communique issued on 1 January 1967 from Aburi, emphasis was laid on the reorganization of the Nigerian Army under proper administrative control. There was also agreement on the procedure for appointments and promotions to the senior ranks. The leadership of the nation was squarely fixed with the Supreme Military Council. According to the subsequent publication by the secessionist East⁹, which the Federal Government declared invalid, the decision that the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference should be adjourned indefinitely had been made during the Aburi meetings. The interests and agenda of the Aburi participants were clearly directed to military matters that were outstanding and undeniably pressing to the national interest. But by default - that is, in the absence of civilian spokesmen - it could realistically reflect no other institutional interest except that of the military. However, the Nigerian military leadership did not represent, within itself, a homogeneous body of institutional interests. There were strong regional interests that superseded both any semblance of national allegiance and a unified military outlook unquestionably arrayed against institutional fragmentation. The ethno-religious factor proved considerably stronger than national identity or the preservation of corporate integrity. This militated against a nonviolent resolution of the diverging interests and fears that characterized Nigerian affairs after 15 January 1966 but most especially after the coup d'état of 29 July of that same year.¹⁰

The Aburi meetings were intended to bring about the much needed conflict resolution but despite the accolades garnered¹¹ by the SMC members and the apparent success of that body it proved unsuccessful in averting increased tensions. Six months after the Aburi meetings Nigeria would enter into civil war.

What Aburi highlights for future endeavors at military disengagement is that a military in power pursues a definite military program or agenda as distinct from a strictly political one. But both must be pursued as a requirement for a successful program of military disengagement. This concept will be discussed shortly.

GOWON AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

From 6 July 1967 to 12 January 1970 Nigeria experienced civil war.¹² General Gowon succeeded in ending the war and preserving the Federation. Gowon himself was immensely popular as the leader and a symbol of national unity, as reflected in the wartime acronym GOWON (Go on with one Nigeria). Anticipation for a return to civilian rule mounted after the war. The mass media and their columnists had become vociferous and critical about General Gowon not working towards a hand over of government.¹³ Gowon had envisaged that a period of two years after the Aburi meetings would elapse before transition to civilian rule was effected in 1969. The socio-political context had changed considerably¹⁴ and the pressures for military disengagement by 1969 were attenuated with the exigencies of the war. However, the desire for military disengagement became more pronounced after the war and by October 1970 General Gowon revealed his program of military disengagement with a target date of 1 October 1976, in effect a six year extension of military rule. The nine-point program for transition to civilian rule was as follows:¹⁵

- 1) re-organisation of the armed forces
- 2) implementation of the Second National Development Plan and repair of the damage and neglect of war
- 3) eradication of corruption in national life
- 4) deciding on creation of new states
- 5) preparation and adoption of a new constitution
- 6) introduction of a new revenue allocation formula

- 7) a national population census
- 8) organization of genuinely national parties
- 9) organization of elections and installation of popularly elected government at state and federal levels.

By 1974 there had been little progress in the actualization of this program with the exception of the flawed National Population Census in 1973.

In the 1 October 1974 National Day broadcast General Gowon announced the indefinite postponement of the date for a return to civilian rule. The rationale for this decision, at its core, involved a shifting perception by the military of its specific role in national development.¹⁶ Valerie P. Bennett and A.H.M. Kirk-Green provide the following assessment:

There were those, and Gowon must be included among them, who had come to invest the Military Government with the much wider and more arduous responsibility of transforming thoroughly and dramatically Nigerian political culture, a conversion to be brought about by a sort of 'civil renewal'.¹⁷

In the 1 October 1974 broadcast Gowon stated:

We consider it our responsibility to lay the foundation of a self-sustaining political system which can stand the test of time in such a manner that each national political crisis does not become a threat to the nation's continued existence as a single entity and which will ensure a smooth and orderly transition from one government to another.¹⁸

Throughout the war years and up to 1974 the military had come to see itself as capable of holding national leadership but had also begun to entertain the idea, which turned to a deepening conviction, that it would effect a national transformation resulting in a heightened political culture. This political culture was envisaged as reaching appropriate levels of social order, cooperation and

competence. The military had arrived at the conviction that its activities and duties in safeguarding national defense extended legitimately and morally into all aspects of national life that posed a threat to national security, stability and general socio-economic prospects for the future. The age of social engineering by the military had arrived. Subsequent military regimes would not repudiate this perspective but would come into existence in judgement of the success or failure of their predecessor in national rule - be it military or civilian.

General Gowon's decision was not received favorably by most sectors of Nigerian society. To many, the indefinite postponement of military disengagement was unpardonable.¹⁹ In addition, indolence and inefficiency of the Gowon regime would contribute to the intensification of intra-military rivalries and a environment conducive to in-house military intervention.

On 29 July 1975 General Gowon was removed as head of the Federal Military Government (FMG) and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The Gowon regime, as with subsequent military regimes, held an additional conviction regarding the management of government. Bennett and Kirk-Greene²⁰ speak of the perception by the Gowon regime that government was to be viewed in terms of statutory administration rather than as a forum of bargaining and coalition-building. In this view politicians remained divisive, and creators rather than reflectors of societal conflict. As Huntington²¹ has stated, politics is beyond the scope of military competence and participation of the military in politics only serves to undermine their professionalism. It is therefore not altogether surprising that a military would attempt to eliminate the politics of government, as being both a threat and an incumbrance, and transform the workings of government-cum-politics into a simpler, more controlled and hopefully more predictable administrative exercise.

This aspiration on the part of the military has been broadsided by authors such as Kenneth C. Wheare²² who cites the pluralistic nature of federalism in contrast to the unitary essence of war and military organizations, and J. 'Bayo Adekanye, whose observations are more accurately drawn from within the Nigerian context. Admitting that his observations on military and federal society are initially

ideal types, the author nevertheless observes the following:²³

Military organisation and federal society are two fundamentally different kinds of political organisation. The former is based on unitary command, concentrated authority, specialisation, hierarchy, discipline, continuous communications, and esprit de corps; the latter is characterized by plural leadership, dispersed authority, separation of functions, plural relations, compromise, communications discontinuities, and cultural dissensus.

A contrast is thus made between, on the one hand, the military's intent and professional-ethical proclivity and, on the other, civil-political norms that are alien to it. Indeed the strong implication made by various observers of militaries is that there is little to no structural or dispositional capacity for the military to produce the behavioral norms of a fundamentally democratic federal society. Conversely, the military in power acts as a temporary prohibiting agent of such political activity. Civil-political interplay, the argument goes, is therefore not marked by conflict resolution and a lack of violence. It is rather that any possibility for this development to occur is prevented by military intervention and administration. The dilemma is precisely located at this juncture where civil-military norms and professional ethics are not mutually tolerant, but are mutually suspicious and see each other as mutually illegitimate in the running of a nation.

The military wants in the first instance the establishment of social and institutional order but comes to realize that it cannot realistically expect the emulation or continuity of its administrative structure and ethos by civilian leaders. There is thus a corresponding move by the military away from viewing civilian leadership exclusively with contempt to the attitude that its own interests and the national interest necessitate a revised relationship with their civilian counterparts which anticipates the eventuality of civilian rule. Meanwhile greater accommodation for civil-military interaction must be cultivated. If the military does not arrive at this conclusion then civil-military interaction will

deteriorate along with regime legitimacy.

With the interaction of the civilian and military elite in national administration the dichotomies between military and civilian regimes become less easily distinguishable. Henry Bienen²⁴ contends that this distinction is further lessened by the fact that military forces in African states have not attained a substantially high level of professionalism. This has made it practically impossible to avoid the assistance of the civilian political elite. It is also arguable that with the advent of specific military institutions of higher learning and their availability for professional development there has arisen a generation of officers not fundamentally dependent on civilian assistance in national rule. This will be discussed at a later point.

COUP D'ÉTAT OF 29 JULY 1975

The coup d'état of 29 July 1975 which toppled General Gowon represents a kind of cumulative dissatisfaction on the part of military and civilian elite, the origin of which can be identified in Gowon's role in Nigeria's second coup of August 1966. James J. Oluleye points out that Gowon behaved very cautiously in the events leading to the ousting and death of Maj-Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi. Oluleye observes:

...he [Gowon] did not take an active part in the execution. Technically, if the plan failed, he could not be roped in for trial. In short, he played safe. His choice was not as a result of his leadership role in the overthrow or an act of valour but a mere respect for seniority among officers from the North. The active plotters who conversely became the king makers sat behind the throne to dictate to him and chart his earlier political course. His disengagement from them marked the genesis of hatred and plotting despite the fact that he was still petting them.²⁵

To this add the fact that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) had become a ratifying body for Gowon. By contrast Gowon's predecessor had little use for the SMC. Under Gowon the hierarchy of command that was superimposed on the structures of government found its greatest expression within the SMC. Billy Dudley writes that:

All the members of the SMC (with the exception of the Administrator of the East Central State, Mr. Ukpabi Asika who was a civilian and former lecturer at the University of Ibadan) were either military men or members of the police force, and given the command hierarchy of the military, were under an obligation to accept the ruling of their military superior. Gowon as head of the military government of course insisted on personally presenting all federal memoranda that went before the SMC which in the nature of things presented the other SMC members with a dilemma, for to question a federal memorandum amounted to questioning a military superior. Inevitably, therefore, Gowon invariably had his way.²⁶

Such a situation exacerbated an already deteriorating relationship between the Head of State and those military elite who felt themselves marginalized. This was perceived by the latter party as an undue arrogation of power by the former and as such left little recourse for action apart from a coup.

Additional difficulty would arise with the increasing suspicion among the intelligentsia, particularly from the North. During 1973 the universities had gone on strike to protect their deteriorating economic position. This led to Gowon's ultimatum to return to work or face eviction from university housing. The protesting staff capitulated costing Gowon a further erosion of support.

1973 was also marked by the Northern intelligentsia's growing concern to what it saw as the Christian influence surrounding General Gowon which was associated with the South. The South was also seen as exercising an increasing influence through their bureaucrats which was considered antithetical to the actual interests of the North. This perceived threat appears to have resulted in the Northern

intelligentsia's decision to assist in bringing about the downfall of the Gowon regime. There was a mutual association of the military and intelligentsia of Northern origin that had been fostered by their common educational background at the secondary level. Many were graduates from the government colleges of Zaria and Keffi.

The military hierarchy became increasingly disgruntled with their own colleagues who were benefitting from their political appointments as governors. The institutional military was thus provided another reason to support military intervention. Further contributing factors to the fall of the Gowon administration included the Head of State's inability to accede to the demobilization plan of the Army, his religion, love of publicity, questionable judgement in military appointments, failure to eradicate corruption, inter alia.²⁷ Some of these factors proved more critical than others and were subsequently affixed to a specific program of military disengagement. Other factors indicated the relative weakness of institutional cohesion and submission. Western standards of institutional behavior will diminish the volatility of, for example, a commander's love of publicity, his religion or race. Unpopular appointments do not become the focus of possible coup plotting. In short, the substance of political culture is a major differentiating factor which is directly reflected in the degree of institutional stability and in the inviolability of the chain of command.

It is worth noting that the rectification of those ills which are cited as the rationale for military intervention also represents the matrix from which subsequent military disengagement must flow and demonstrate its success.

THE DECISION FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

The authors of the 29 July 1975 coup had conceived of a program of military disengagement well before their actual entry into government. The program as announced by Murtala Muhammed, who was not part of the core group of conspirators,²⁸ was determined prior to military intervention and addressed unresolved issues in both the political and military realms. And it is this demarcation of interests, I propose, which leads to what I would term political and

military programs (agendas) of military disengagement. This distinction, however, does not necessarily result in an inordinate imbalance of priorities favoring the military but it does identify political and military issues that must be resolved to advance national interest both domestically and internationally. In the realm of social engineering the military must acknowledge the importance of socio-economic and even political factors with the decision to return to civilian rule. I am not of the opinion, as is A. Olugboyega Banjo,²⁹ that the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration was essentially a 'caretaker government' nor that it was, as M.J. Dent³⁰ would have it, a 'corrective regime'. It was fundamentally more ambitious, addressing issues long unresolved in Nigeria as well as making innovations, creating institutions, and to an extent rationalizing expenditures.

Whereas the Gowon administration, especially for the 1970-1975 period, was faced with such problems as the reduction in the size of the Army, the restoration of order, discipline, and hierarchy in the Armed Forces, and the determination of the role of the military in post-war Nigeria,³¹ the Muhammed/Obasanjo government embarked upon a broader agenda, administratively pursuing two specific programs and to a great extent providing autonomy for the leadership of each. Unpredictably this relative autonomy coexisted with minimal rivalry and corporate conflict. The military as institution and the military as government would not fractionalize as in most other instances of military rule.

As previously mentioned the decision to pursue military disengagement had been decided upon by the conspirators of the July 1975 coup prior to the military intervention itself. By the time of the coup the military had ruled over Nigeria for nine and a half years. There had been ample time for the military elite to assess not only the efficacy of Gowon's administration but also of military rule as an instrument for societal change. The critical feature of success was perceived as the leader in charge. The system would move no further than the vision of an exemplary leader. The conspirators had identified Murtala Muhammed as such a person. The man himself was widely respected within the armed forces and would set the tenor of military governance and military disengagement.

The decision for military disengagement had been made in light of certain conclusions. The conspirators understood that the military's failing legitimacy was detrimental to its professional interests. Military rule did not appear indefinitely sustainable without the eventuality of societal conflict. The people had become tired of military rule. And while some of the intelligentsia had lent their support to Gowon's ousting this was not to be construed as faith in military rule. To the contrary, if military rule was to continue it would be tolerable only under the leadership of those officers more amenable to the advice of other elite groups. Indefinite military rule was not in the offing for either the military and civilian elite.

Murtala Muhammed had little interest in a 'personalist transformation' in which a political party would be created for the advancement of a greater Nigeria. However he had little qualm in using the full range of his authority to ensure and enforce the course of his reforms on the road to military disengagement. The conspirators of the 1975 coup were thus convinced that under such leadership needed reforms would take place within a set period of time. Prolonged military rule was no longer viewed as providing incremental progress. The decision for military disengagement prior to military intervention thus appears as a rather pragmatic one given the long term observations by the military on society as a whole and the advice provided by the civilian elite.

THE DUAL AGENDA OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

The military leadership during the 1975-1979 period to a certain extent enacted a decentralization of power especially when compared to the more autocratic Gowon regime. This can be seen in the increased departmentalization, specialization and expansion of the basic structure of government. Though the SMC was the leading organ of national power there was nevertheless a conscious effort to maintain an ethnic balance within all administrative bodies of government. There was an expanding dialogue with the civil elite from various disciplines and professions; the press in particular was periodically reminded of its desired role in national development.

Though this could be construed as an attempt at controlling the press, there emerged a level of debate and freedom that by any standard of military rule is liberal if not contrary to the norms of censorship under such a government. An examination of Nigeria during this time does not reveal a massive intelligence and surveillance system such as normally characterizes a police state.

The delegation of authority and the attempts at government by consensus, albeit with its inconsistencies, proved viable. The expanded role of the military as social engineer delegated authority along two fundamental lines, a political program and a military program. These separate agendas were increasingly the subject of specialized and theoretical deliberations. General Obasanjo was Head of State, Commander-in-Chief and the driving force behind the political agenda. General Danjuma was the architect of considerable institutional and professional advances in the army as the director of the regime's military agenda. There was an increasing move towards the application of specialized knowledge where feasible within the many sectors of national life including public and economic administration, particularly in areas related to national development.

The existence of a dual agenda in the midst of military disengagement is consistent with this development. One is concerned with the professional, operational and institutional development of the armed forces and the other with civil, institutional and social development (centered and embodied in the national constitution). Moreover, in order to realize a successful transition to civilian rule both the civilian and military agendas must be fulfilled. If either one is incomplete there will result either an extension of military rule, with the option of a personalist transformation on the part of the military rulers, or the weakening of a civilian administration with little prospect of survival, owing to the unfulfilled expectations of the military and increased civil-military suspicions and differences in perception on national priorities and the use of limited resources.

The political and military agendas are theoretically complimentary in assisting the process of military disengagement. This dual track is not perceived as being at cross purposes. A

measure of theoretical digression is however required at this point to highlight an important difference between the political and military agendas.

I maintain that the military agenda of a program of military disengagement is easier to obtain and manage than the political agenda, because the latter is more heavily dependent on political culture and discipline for its viability. It is often questionable whether this foundation of political culture and discipline exists. A military agenda consisting of, for example, seven points for the enhancement of the military is easier to achieve than seven points of the political agenda for the enhancement of a nation's political interactions. The military agenda is in many ways easier to conceptualize and has concrete results within relatively shorter waiting periods. For example, obtaining artillery from Sweden and the necessary training and parts package translates into enhanced military strength. The political agenda, on the other hand, is more difficult to realize because results are gauged according to social-political behavior and economic performance which improve, if at all, over a longer period of time. The prospects for a realization of enhanced socio-political-economic strength by means of a political agenda are therefore more uncertain. This has often fostered a view held by the military of their civilian counterparts as 'weak sisters' in the process of national development and the process of military disengagement. Needless to say, they are weaker in that the promulgation of a national constitution may not guarantee the observance of its contents but the purchase of weaponry with proper training can be turned on an ineffective national civilian leadership as well as on a hostile neighbor.

PRESERVING THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

However, notwithstanding that the military agenda is easier to complete, I also maintain that this depends upon an unbroken and unthreatened chain of command within the institutional military. A military is hard pressed to manage a controlled military disengagement when the chain is broken³² or under threat. In such circumstances the military agenda cannot be peaceably pursued nor

agreed upon in view of other more pressing priorities such as regime survival.³³ The regime faces instability in the corporate military and there is no assurance of any sort of institutional continuity in an uncertain socio-political environment. There may well be considerable politicization of the armed forces through ethnic-religious influence. Internal autonomy becomes an untenable position that neither the military or civilian elite can guarantee. In such a setting the process of military disengagement cannot be assured by any national actor or a combination of actors. There is a manifest lack of facilitators for military disengagement.

The military agenda must ensure the stability of the state concurrently with the stability and security of the chain of command in the institutional military as government is relinquished, as well as military continuity and internal autonomy.

The preservation of the chain of command in conjunction with de facto guarantees to the military once civilian rule comes are facilitators for a stable military disengagement. On the other hand, the affairs of state embodied in the political agenda are important in the process of military disengagement but not primary in ensuring that it takes place.

MURTALA MUHAMMED AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

Commenting on the new military regime of 29 July 1975, Chief Obafemi Awolowo said:

Our military administration must be recognized for what it was originally intended and proclaimed to be: an essentially corrective and not a reconstructing administration with ready and lasting answers to all our political and economic ills.

It would be too much of a risk for it to attempt to undertake the massive and never-ending task of rebuilding or reconstructing our body politic. It would be too much of a risk because the army would then be embarking on a venture for which it is not by tradition and training equipped, and which by its very nature is an ever-recurring phenomenon in any healthy progressive state.³⁴

However the instated military administration perceived a different role for itself. Brigadier Murtala Muhammed's first nationwide broadcast on 30 July 1975³⁵ emphasized the need to restore collective responsibility among federal leadership, which had been lost during the Gowon years. Interestingly, Muhammed pronounced that 'this trend (non-collective responsibility) was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime.' After announcing the retirement of Gowon administrators and various new appointments the General explained the reorganization of the structure of Government, integral to the subsequent pursuit of political and military programs. The reconstituted SMC was announced as well; among the twenty-two members were the architects of the coup. Muhammed stated that the political program would be reviewed and announcements made in due course. In reality much of the review had already taken place and the stage had been set for the announcement of the actual program of military disengagement.

The fifteenth Independence Anniversary broadcast of 1 October 1975 carried the much anticipated announcement regarding the return to civilian rule. General Muhammed revealed the five-stage program whose 'ultimate aim is to forge a viable political system which will be stable and responsive enough to the needs and realities of this country.' The timetable for military disengagement in Nigeria, 1975-1979, was as follows:

- Stage I Creation of new states by April 1976; drafting of constitution (October 1975-September 1976).
- Stage II Reorganization of local government, nonparty local government elections; constituent assembly (partly elected and partly nominated) to deliberate on draft constitution (September 1976-October 1978).
- Stage III Preparatory stage for elections; lifting of ban on political activities and parties (October 1978).
- Stage IV State level legislative and executive elections.
- Stage V Federal level legislative and executive elections; completion of military disengagement by 1 October 1979.

This schedule for military disengagement outlined by General Muhammed represented the political program of the new military

regime. No references to a military program or agenda were incorporated in the above timetable. Instead the military agenda was addressed more precisely and formally along official military channels. The reconstituted SMC placed Brigadier T.Y. Danjuma as Chief of Army Staff (COAS); he was to spearhead efforts in this area of vital corporate interest.

The military administration of Murtala Muhammed placed considerable emphasis on the constitution that was to be formulated. In his address to the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee on 18 October 1975 General Muhammed imparted the collective sentiments of the SMC regarding a future civilian government. Emphasis was laid on:

- a free, democratic and lawful system of government,
- a stable system of government through constitutional law,
- the creation of viable political institutions,
- maximum participation and consensus,
- an orderly succession to political power,
- a free and fair electoral system, and
- a depoliticized population census.³⁶

The SMC reflected on Nigeria's recent political experience and concluded that any constitution which is drawn up must prevent:

- cut-throat political competition based on a system or rule of winner-takes-all,
- institutionalized opposition to the Government in power, developing instead consensus politics,
- over-centralization of power in a few hands, decentralizing wherever possible to diffuse tension.

The SMC further concluded that Nigeria required

- genuine and truly national political parties with specific criteria to limit their number,
- an executive presidential system of government³⁷ with a cabinet.
- an independent judiciary
- a Corrupt Practices Tribunal and a Public Complaints Bureau.

General Muhammed stated that the SMC had 'tended to place more emphasis on the political arrangements at the center in our deliberations'. These political arrangements represented a compendium of Nigerian political deficiencies. The SMC hoped that the new constitutional arrangement would go a long way in institutionalizing safeguards against civilian political behavior. Not only was the SMC hoping for the emergence of new political institutions but it perceived a population that desired the same and was motivated to ensure the success of a future political dispensation. The linchpin in these programs is the realization of a heretofore non-existent political culture with its content of discipline and non-partisanship. The politicians were seen as the perpetrators of many of the problems and were therefore to be contained. Potential abusers had also to be contained if at all possible. The extent of this desire was seen in General Muhammed's elaboration on the requirement for genuine and truly political parties, in which he stated:

Indeed the Supreme Military Council is of the opinion that if, during the course of your deliberations and having regard to our disillusion with party politics in the past, you should discover some means by which Government can be formed without the involvement of Political Parties, you should be free to recommend.

The Constitution Drafting Committee would not find the elimination of party politics possible, let alone concur in its desirability. More seriously, at it transpired, the ambitions of the SMC as set forth in these guidelines were not fulfilled because a concurrent increase of political culture did not occur, most especially among the emerging party leadership. The former Chief of Army Staff, Major-General (rtd) T.Y. Danjuma, expressed to me in conversation³⁸ that the SMC thought that the politicians would have been tired of military rule and would thus ensure that their behavior would be more responsible in the new civilian era. General Danjuma exclaimed, 'We had no idea of their capacity for mischief,' - this in reference to the discredited Shohu Shagari administration which

received the reins of government from the military in October 1979. There existed a hope within the SMC that a combination of proper administration, institution building, constitutional safeguards and popular support would prevent a future need for military intervention. This, however, was not a certain conviction that a future political-cum-constitutional dispensation would succeed. In short, the SMC hoped that the political arrangements (or political agenda) would prove sufficient to check and balance an abused political heritage. The political will of the citizenry was for the most part presumed. Political culture and ideology were separated as a means of supporting the political agenda. In the same speech to the Constitution Drafting Committee on 18 October 1975 General Muhammed explained that the SMC was not willing or predisposed to impose any overt indoctrination or ideology.

Past events have, however, shown that we cannot build a future for this country on a rigid political ideology. Such an approach would be unrealistic. The evolution of a doctrinal concept is usually predicated upon the general acceptance by the people of a national political philosophy and, consequently, until all our people, or a large majority of them, have acknowledged a common ideological motivation, it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular philosophy or ideology in our Constitution.³⁹

General Muhammed ended his address of 18 October 1975 by saying:

For our part, the Federal Military Government is committed to ensuring the smooth implementation of its political programme, and I trust that you realize that your assignment is central to the programme.

Central as the constitution was perceived to be in the political agenda, this was in fact a misperception in the temporary political context of military administration in the midst of military disengagement and in the uncertain political milieu that would follow the completion of military disengagement. The SMC anticipated the

following sequence for the ratification of an acceptable constitution:

Drafting Committee —> Constituent Assembly —> SMC Decision

The deliberations of each would determine the final constitutional product. There was considerable debate, in fact unprecedented in Africa, regarding constitutional arrangements and political orientation, as witnessed in a myriad of political forums throughout Nigeria. But the SMC had the final say on the constitution. This is not proof of duplicity on the part of the SMC so much as the prerogative of power.

General Muhammed's initial phase of military governance addressed, most vigorously, a virtual backlog of national problems beginning with the core of the military elite and moving through the public and civil service sectors. There were military and political deficiencies to be corrected before new structures could emerge, as reflected in the scheduled program of military disengagement. The rectification of these deficiencies should be judged quantitatively and symbolically given the very short period of time in which action was taken.

The new military leadership began with the Supreme Military Council altering its own structure by excluding state governors. At the same time senior service officers were given greater participation in the deliberations of the SMC.⁴⁰

A second issue of military importance to be addressed was the demobilization of the army which one source puts as high as 270,000 for 1975.⁴¹ Army demobilization would remain an in-house concern of the military and the premier objective of its agenda. It was not an issue to be resolved through public scrutiny.

'Operation Deadwoods' came several weeks after the July coup. It was a radical purge of the public services. The purge affected senior federal civil servants, permanent secretaries, senior diplomats, university staff, public servants, military officers (mostly Army),⁴² and police officials. This operation was executed over a period of three months ending with the press release of 21 November 1975,⁴³ a remarkably short period of time for the number

of individuals affected, in this case both civilian and military.

There was also the proposal for the relocation of the federal government from Lagos to Abuja.⁴⁴ This proposal moved away from the purely corrective measures against waste and corruption and into more ambitious programs of national development. This major proposal for urbanization in the Nigerian heartland was part and parcel of the regime's political agenda. All in all, the various initiatives of the Muhammed regime met with strong popular support from throughout the country.

The Muhammed administration was also marked by the continuity of projects put into motion by the Gowon regime.⁴⁵ These included the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Project,⁴⁶ the Peugeot (Kaduna) and Volkswagen (Lagos) automobile plants inaugurated on 14 and 21 March 1975 respectively, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established in May 1975, inter alia.

In foreign affairs, the Federal Military Government led by General Muhammed granted formal recognition to the MPLA Government of Angola. Previously, the FMG had maintained a policy that there should be reconciliation of the warring parties in Angola. Recognition of the MPLA Government was granted because of South Africa's support for the FNLA and UNITA.

The continuity of essentially economic projects and the reversal of a foreign policy issue were seen as essential for the prospects of national development and an increased regional and international role for Nigeria. Furthermore, they were ancillary to the viability and direction of the program of military disengagement. They were also some of the focal points of the FMG's administrative attention and were therefore factors concerning military governance. Although, strictly speaking, these projects are not immediately associated with the rationale for military intervention (MI¹-see p.216) they are nevertheless examined for that possibility, because of their waste and corruption.⁴⁷ When military intervenes it has to evaluate the legacy left by these projects and render a decision on their value. Military intervention leads into and affects military governance which in turn affects the program of military disengagement. The Gowon regime provides a good example, in the various projects that were subsequently continued by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime, of a

continuum that is picked up to become the MI^2 (in this case an in-house 're-entry').

NOTES

1. Samuel HUNTINGTON, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
2. Ibid., p.233.
3. In 1981 the Professor effected a legal name change which dispensed with the Anglicized Adekson and reestablished the Yoruba Adekanye. The Professor was kind enough to show me the documentation involved.
4. Incidentally, among the seven point strategy of the coup planners was civilian rule by 1978, instead of General Murtala Muhammed's target date of 1979; this was apparently in an attempt to win popular favor.
5. The meeting was held in Aburi, Ghana, located some 22 miles N-NE of Accra, on the invitation of Lieutenant-General J.A. Ankrah, the Chairman of Ghana's National Liberation Council (NLC).
6. Quoted by Robin LUCKHAM, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.290.
7. Also quoted by Robin Luckham, op.cit., p.291.
8. Ibid., p.290.
9. Here I refer to The Meeting of the Supreme Military Council: Nigerian crisis, 1966, Enugu: Ministry of Information, 1967.
10. There were other factors that worked against a peaceful resolution. In general, it has been observed that Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu had entered the Aburi meeting in an effort to buy time and advantage in the Eastern regions' plan for secession, urged upon him by the civil-service, academic and political elite who had a strong support base among the Eastern populace. Ironically, among military officers of Eastern origin succession was seen with far greater apprehension and less desirability, mostly from an assessment of the balance of power. However they would fight.
11. On the front page, under the headline 'Military Rulers Reach Agreement', the Daily Times (Nigeria) for January 6, 1967 writes: 'It has been a hectic two days of hard bargaining.... It was arduous and only men devoted to the cause of peace could perform such wonders as these Nigerians have done.' The same issue states: 'Today marked the dawn of a bright new day in inter-regional entente.... It was victory for the Nigerian's proverbial maturity.... They did us proud in a foreign land, these military rulers.'
 Their Ghanaian host Lieutenant-General Ankrah is recorded as expressing 'his happiness that this happy event had taken place

in his Ghana. He hoped the participants would behave like true military rulers by honouring pledges made as the historic meeting religiously.' Despite a photograph showing Lieutenant-Colonels Yakubu Gowon and Odumegwu Ojukwu (the two primary contenders for power) in 'a warm handshake with smiles' war was not averted. There would be subsequent accusations of fraud by both parties. This same issue has the final communique of the Aburi Meetings on page 3.

12. The Eastern region declared secession on 30 May 1967. The civil war began in July with the first Federal forays east.
13. See James J. OLULEYE, Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979, Ibadan: University Press, 1985, p.157.
14. See E. Alex GEOYEKA, 'The Making of the Nigerian Constitution', in O. OYEDIRAN (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79, London: Macmillan, 1979, p.242.
15. 'Nigeria: Programme for Return to Civilian Rule', in Africa Research Bulletin 1970, p.1898. For a brief analysis of the nine points see Valerie P. BENNETT & A.H.M. KIRK-GREEN, 'Back to the Barracks: A Decade of Marking Time', in S.K. Panter-Brick (ed), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, London: Frank Cass, 1978, pp.19-22. Of the nine points these authors identify three items (the fourth, fifth and ninth) as 'integral steps in the restoration of civilian politics', the others being to a large extent 'unavoidable' or related to 'moral imperatives'. The latter are not required to effect military disengagement but are most certainly elements that bear on the longevity of subsequent civilian rule given Nigerian socio-political realities.
16. This is not to ignore the factors of corruption among regime members and lack of political will in pursuing program items, all of which contributed to the decision to scuttle the 1976 date for military disengagement.
17. Bennett & Kirk-Greene, op.cit., p.22.
18. See Nigeria Today, no.50, October 1974, for the full text of the 1 October 1974 broadcast.
19. Major-General James J. Oluleye (rtd), who was a member of the SMC under General Gowon, related to me in conversation that during discussions before the 1 October 1974 announcement Gowon became very angry when Oluleye said to him: 'If you cancel military disengagement you should give the citizens an idea of when it will take place. You just can't cancel and leave it at that. It is also a matter of popular support and legitimacy.' Despite this admonition the decision went forward without an alternative date for return to civilian rule.
20. Bennett & Kirk-Green, op.cit.

21. Huntington, op.cit.
22. See Kenneth C. WHEARE, op.cit.
23. J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE, 'Military Organisation and Federal Society', in The Quarterly Journal of Administration, October 1981/January 1982, p.3.
24. Henry BIENEN, Armies and Parties in Africa, New York: Africa Publishing Company, 1978.
25. James J. Oluleye, op.cit., p.161.
26. Bill DUDLEY, An Introduction to Nigerian Government & Politics, London: Macmillan Publishers, 1988, p.91.
27. See James J. Oluleye, op.cit., pp.161-166.
28. Neither Murtala Muhammed nor Olesugun Obasanjo wanted to get involved in military intervention, although one can consider them as passive participants in that they had prior knowledge of the coup and contact with some of the planners. The coup planners and active participants were Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels such as Joe Garba, Ibrahim Bubangida, S.M. Yar'Adua and virtually all subsequently assigned governors. The coup planners, as distinct from participants, totaled six in number.
29. A. Olugboyega BANJO, The Potential for Military Disengagement from Politics: A Nigerian Case Study, (Monograph Series No. 6), Lagos, Nigeria: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1980.
30. M.J. DENT, 'Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective', in K. PANTER-BRICK (ed), Soldiers and Oil, London: Frank Cass, 1978. In p.114 Dent writes: 'For the first time Nigeria experienced genuine corrective government. Issue after issue which had been pending for the last six years was taken up, enquired into systematically, and dealt with effectively by decree or administrative action.'
 While not debating the above, my objection to the term 'corrective government' is in its association with other militaries that have intervened in politics but have not come near to the Nigerian initiatives in scope, depth and intent. My objection concerns semantics and what I would consider the improper application of an oft-used term. How can one speak of 'correcting' political-economic structures that did not prove stable to begin with? 'Restructuring' may be perceived as more appropriate. West Africa, 21 December 1987, p.2479 records: 'one remarkable thing about military regimes in Nigeria is their ostensible claim to being merely "corrective" and not a substitute for democratically elected government.'
31. Chuba OKADIGBO, Power & Leadership in Nigeria, (Issues in Nigerian Development, Series No. 6), Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1987.

32. Military intervention has proven the usual manner by which to break the chain of command. Former COAS T.Y. Danjuma, writing in The Guardian, 20 July 1986, p.10, comments that 'No civilian who has never served in the Army can adequately gauge the kind of volcanic traumas that coups can inflict upon the Armed Forces.' The traumas include death, imprisonment, forced and often arbitrary retirements, and the fear of uncertainty.
33. In addition to facilitating military disengagement, an unbroken chain of command implies that the military is able to continue with its system of military schooling, e.g. NMS (Zaria) and NDA (Kaduna), as well as pursuing the establishment of institutions of advanced military studies, e.g. C&SC. Both of these elements of military education represents institutional stability, continuity and development.
34. See Daily Times, 21 and 22 August 1975, for full text of the press statement. Cited by Oyeleye OYEDIRAN & Alex GEOYEGA in Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975, Ibadan: University Press for NIIA, 1980, p.10. This was not Awolowo's first such statement on the propriety of military administration. In May 1967 a similar message had been pronounced to a military regime soon to be preoccupied with the prosecution of a civil war. Chief Awolowo's adjuration would find only selective military receptivity. On the whole it was all but ignored.
35. For text of this broadcast see Oyediran & Geojege (eds), op.cit., pp.216-219.
36. Ibid., pp.223-227.
37. In June 1977 the stated position of the Obasanjo regime was that the SMC would not press for an Executive Presidency and it would not influence the proposed Constituent Assembly to recommend Executive Presidency in the new Nigerian constitution. This assurance was given in London by the Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph Garba. See New Nigerian for 21 June 1977, p.34.
38. Personal interview, November, 1989.
39. In the Nigerian context, especially among the military, 'ideology' is synonymous with Marxist-Leninism. In conversation with me, U. Joy Ogwu, Associate Research Professor at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, said that she has a hard time with the word 'ideology'. She preferred the word 'orientation'. Ogwu, who instructs at the Command & Staff College (C&SC) at Jaji, stated that for the military the only ideology around is Marxism: 'What other ideology is there?' Thus when the military says that it does not want any 'external ideology' imported it is referring to Marxism. There is an earnest pursuit among both the military and the political elite, including academics, to function from a fundamentally Nigerian perspective and this perspective considers it anathema to have what it sees as external influence on or interference in its