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China-Africa policy of non-interference in the 21st century: Opportunity for growth or exploitation



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Research Question

China-Africa Policy of non-interference in the 21 Century: Opportunity for growth or exploitation

Abstract

The 21 century has seen the dramatic increase in African-Chinese engagement, with a significant increase in both political and economic interaction. The changing international political and economic reality has seen China become the biggest economy in the world, in terms of purchasing power parity, and substantially increase its footprint in Africa. The increased developing relationship of African-Chinese interactions has brought forth both criticisms and conversations of opportunity. Both arguments focusing on understanding the nature of the relationship and exploring whether the interactions can be seen as being exploitative or a partnership in growth. A look at the importance of this relationship cannot be complete without first analysing Africa's historical and current relationship with its Western counterparts. Secondly the research paper looks at Africa's place in the current international political economy and why the new prospering African-Chinese relationship presents opportunities. This is essentially what the paper seeks to understand and discuss, looking primarily at the role the Chinese policy of non-interference can play with regards to African states development path and understanding its role in the context of Africa position in the global political economy.

Key words: Sino-Africa, Policy of Non-interference, Exploitation, Eurocentricism, neo-liberalism

Introduction

The evolving nature of African-Chinese relations in the 21st century has been a topic of much interest as African and Chinese economic and political interactions continue to strengthen. This reality has drawn much attention by international relations scholars; bringing about a large body of work that mainly focus on whether the relation is one of inherent self-interest and exploitation or whether the interactions presents an alternative that gives African states a unique opportunity to experience independent and home-grown political and economic experiences. The purpose of the essay to monitor the evolving nature of African-Chinese relations from an African perspective and detailing whether the political relationship, in particular the policy of non-interference, can be described as exploitative or a policy which presents African states an opportunity for growth.

The research paper begins by briefly explaining the history and understanding of the Chinese policy of non-interference. The paper discusses the principles underlying the policy of non-interference set down by Then People's Republic of China's Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference in 1955, being respect of sovereignty of others, non-aggression and peaceful co-existence.¹ Secondly the paper gives an in-depth discussion on the historical relationship Africa has had with China, particularly with regards to the policy of non-

¹ "Is China's non-interference policy sustainable?" <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24100629>, 17 September 2013.

interference. The paper looks at the China's model of interaction with Africa, which has no colonial past and states no explicit political agenda. I also look at China's official policy statements, with particular interest in China's "respect of African countries" choice of a political system and development path based on the internal domestic realities of that state.²

The paper then goes on to discuss the primary focus of the research, being whether the Chinese policy of non-interference within the context of the 21 century presents an opportunity for an African unique state lead developmental growth that takes domestic realities into consideration. Or whether they use of the policy of non-interference by China is primary undermining "international" efforts to increase transparency and good governance, looking at many of the Western led initiatives from the initial structural adjustment policies to the 21st century ideals of good governance. The paper essentially looks at the policy of Western led initiatives and how they continue, although not completely in rhetoric, to dictate a neo-liberal policy agenda in African states thus reducing and impacting their sovereignty and ability to make independent political, social and economic decisions.

The research paper then briefly focuses in on Sino-Sudanese relations, with the inclusion of South Sudan as a new political context. The paper explains the importance of Sudan as a case study for the understanding of Chinese relations with other various African states. Central to Sino-African relations has been Chinese policy of non-interference with domestic political affairs being seen as needing to be respected by other states. The debate around China's interaction with Sudan is a microcosm of the debate that is being had about Sino-Africa relations, being that China using its policy of non-interference as a justification for supporting authoritarian corrupt regimes for the purpose of pursuing business interests. With the other view being that the Chinese policy absence of patronising conditionality's has and gives the opportunity for many positive outcomes. Lastly the research paper argues that the debate for Sino-African relations presents an opportunity for growth and the overall positive aspects of the relations present far more benefits than the conditionality's placed by Western states and Western led International organisations.

Methodology

Definitions

Chinese non-intervention: This policy is essentially derived from the principles communicated by then Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Peace Conference in 1955. There are essentially five core principles. The first being mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in one another's international affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Opportunity for growth: Does the Chinese policy of non-intervention give African states a unique opportunity to experience independent and home-grown political and economic

² Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, *The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinaafrica.pdf>.p.g 6

experiences, giving African states the opportunity to follow a developmental path which considers their domestic realities.

Chinese exploitation: Is China's use of the policy of non-interference primary undermining Western efforts to increase transparency and good governance. And is the policy used as an excuse to do "business" with authoritarian states that violates human rights and use funds to prop up their power.

Peaceful development: The Chinese policy of peaceful development stems from a strategic choice by the government to commit to upholding world peace and promoting prosperity to all countries.³ The core idea was to characterise China as a responsible world leader that emphasises soft power and avoids unnecessary conflicts.

Independent Variable

China-Africa Policy of non-interference in the 21 Century

Dependent Variable

The essay has two dependent variables being the possible Chinese exploitative agenda and/or the opportunity for growth and development.

Operationalization

The dependent variables, being the possible Chinese exploitative agenda and/or the opportunity for growth and development, can be measured, firstly by observing whether the policy has propped up authoritarian regimes and supports political oppression and violence, therefore possibly undermining the long term prospects of its partner nation. The research focuses on the reality of African Chinese political relations in this regard. The Sudanese Chinese relationship, like that of the rest of Africa, has been described by Western commentators as being one which is exploitative, and works solely to advantage Chinese businesses. There have been many who have argued that the Chinese policy of non-interference is essentially a justification for supporting authoritarian regimes or corrupt regimes. Daniel Large explains this argument when he shares that the Chinese policy of non-interference, as seen in Sudan, has allowed business to continue with no regard to human right violation or injustices in the partner nation. What is emphasised within this debate is that ultimately Chinese support could possibly offer African politicians and leaders increasing space for preserving their own power rather than encouraging broader development.

The research secondly measures the dependent variable by looking at whether China's policy of non-interference gives African states a unique opportunity to experience independent and home-grown political and economic experiences, giving African states the opportunity to follow a developmental path which considers their domestic realities. The paper investigates China's rapidly increasing interaction in Africa, in the 21 century, and the effect on the

³ "Backgrounder: Peaceful Development is China's Strategic Choice",
<http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20110906/108368.shtml>, 9 June 2011

development path of African countries. Economic growth from Chinese investment in Africa is, to a large extent, an undisputed factor but the suitable political model underlying the economy remains contested. Western states economies have always been closely connected a capitalist democratic state system and the rule of law, and have therefore promoted these ideals for growth and expected states in which they interact with to operate in accordance with these standards. Chinese engagement in Africa has called into question the Western model of state interaction and state growth. China is a socialist single-party states that uses, what many academics call, a states-capitalist system, sometimes called capitalism with Chinese characteristic. China is also the biggest economy in the world, in terms of purchasing power parity, and the fastest growing major economy. This reality has put Africa-China relations at the forefront of many discussions relating African governance, looking at the outcome of China's policy of non-interference within African states. Western states investment in various African countries has in the past had conditionality's such as political reform with very few successes, therefore making the Chinese form of engagement which allows for a developmental path dictated by the domestic reality of the state, as happened in China, to become far more attractive than external neo-liberal and western dictated policies.

There is a strong argument that although Chinese policy on non-interference has drawn strong criticism from the Western nations and commentators with regards to lack of transparency and issues relating to human rights, they is still evidence that the policy has manifested many tangible economic and political benefits for both China and its African partners.

The last measurement that will be investigated is whether bilateral agreements between China and African governments create meaningful development. Former president of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao, increased his visits to Africa since 2005 signing so called "win-win" deals.⁴ These deals were agreements that China would be able to acquire access to raw material of the agreed party and in return China would invest in economic assistance, this assistance would predominately come in the form of large-scale infrastructure projects.

China's export mainly inexpensive labour intensive consumer goods and high technology products and African countries export exclusively raw material and mineral fuels. Most of Chinese trade in sub-Saharan Africa has only been conducted in four countries, being Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Angola, all countries who possess China's desired natural resources, iron ore from South Africa, and, of course, oil from Sudan and Angola. The dramatic growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa has been imbedded almost exclusively in two critical sectors, being resources extraction and infrastructure development.

Chinese bilateral trade has increased from 11 billion dollars in 2000 to over 210 billion dollars in 2013, showing the dramatic increase in investment within the 21 century.⁵ One of the core needs for African development has been infrastructure development, to unlock its potential thus increasing trade in Africa. China's investment in African infrastructure, which

⁴ "A Decade Of China In Africa: Win-win or Exploitation?" www.vibeghana.com, 25 July 2014

⁵ Ibid

stood at 13 billion dollars, has shown the potential to fill the void for African infrastructural development, investing far more than the World Bank's 4 billion dollars.⁶

Chinese FDI can be characterised by two fundamental characteristics. The first of these is Chinese state-owned enterprises, investing in African states. The second is that Chinese firms in Africa tend to utilise their own low-cost labour, rather than investing in the training of African workers. The question then rises to whether Chinese investors, who do not hire African workers, can be said to really benefit the African countries in which they invest. Although this reality is beginning to change, with Chinese investors becoming more aware of cultural sensitivities and the needs of the country they are investing in to improve social conditions, there is still a debate of how effective the influx of FDI in African countries is and if it does outweigh employment gains in the host countries.

The reality is that China has an incredibly large population that is in need of various resources to sustain itself. The Chinese population is in need of basic foods, energy, and industrial commodities such as grain, meat, oil, coal, and steel. With foreign currency reserves of well over \$1 trillion and an economic growth of just over 7% growth, this creates a situation in which China is firstly in great need of natural resources to maintain this growth and has the capability of spending massive sums of money in obtaining those resources. On one side there is an argument that China is using this dominance and wealth to aggressively ingratiate itself with some of Africa's most tyrannical politicians to secure exclusive access to its natural resources and is thus undermining years of effort towards democratic progress and good governance within the region. The other argument in support of China argues that the principle of entering into trade and investment relationships with no strings attached is a fundamental tenet of Chinese foreign policy. This has to a large extent been the way in which Chinese foreign policy has dealt with interaction with states, always seeking to avoid unnecessary intervention in the affairs of other states from as far back as the 1960s. The non-interference policy is also based on China's own state's experience of being able to develop according to its national context, without imposed external political and economic conditions.

Understanding which aspect best describes the relationship of Africa-China relations is of great importance for the aim of the research and for a deeper understanding of complexities of this relationship. The Chinese describe the Sino-African relationship as falling within the framework of developing country cooperation and thus argue that it would be hypocritical for it to treat developing countries differently to how it was treated. This method is argued to be much more effective than the West imposing its cultural biases upon other countries, violating state sovereignty.

Limitations of analysis

The research paper recognises the limitations of such a venture. With the vast amount of subjects and discourse around African-China relations it would be incredibly challenging task to examine the relations in its full spectrum. Therefore the research paper focuses mainly

⁶“A Decade Of China In Africa: Win-win or Exploitation?” www.vibeghana.com, 25 July 2014

on the Chinese policy of non-interference intention and outcome in African states, describing whether this interaction is one which is exploitative or a partnership growth.

Overview of Literature

There has been much literature written on the subject of African-Chinese relations, including a lot of literature on the impact and outcomes of economic and political relations, all which cannot in totality be explored here. Therefore I will focus on literature that focuses on the Chinese policies of non-interference and the Eurocentric nature of Western African engagement. Most of the literature covered on Africa Chinese relations that the research paper discusses comes from authors such as Steve Hess, Madison Condon, Large, Alula A. Iyasu and others. Many of these authors have focused on the political and economic relations with China and Africa, speaking in a positive or negative light and giving a detailed explanation of the historical and current reality of the engagement. Most of the literature has explored African states interaction with Chinese capital, focusing on the outcome of oil diplomacy and its effects on governance in Africa. Authors have researched the outcome of resource diplomacy with patronage politics present in many resources rich countries.

The essay not only looks at the effects and meaning of African Chinese relations from the perspective of the policy of non-interference but gives a strong emphasis on the relations and outcome of Western African relations. These relations are discussed through the interpretations of Authors such as Fanon, Edward Said, Gong and many others. These Authors explain Africa's historical relationship with the West, helping show the reasons of current relations between African states and Western powers. The Literature shows the exploitative nature of Western-African realities and how that rhetoric and behaviour continues to exist in different ways. This understanding thus leads us to understand the necessity of the alternative that is presented in the policy of non-interference, which the research paper discusses through the various authors and sources.

The research paper briefly explains African Chinese relations by discussing its relations with Sudan. Sudan is a defining case in China's changing relations with Africa and has been and continues to be the defining case in China's changing relations with Africa, being a key illustration of transition and convergence in China's international politics. Sudan has been seen to be the geopolitical territory where Beijing faces the challenges of accommodating its established and ideological policy with the complexity of African politics. Sino-Sudanese, like Sino-African relations have attracted much criticism, specifically from the media, governmental, and parties highlighting China's complicity in numerous human rights violations and environmental exploitations. The research paper uses literature to highlight these points as well.

Theoretical approach

The Research paper finds that within the majority of the literature on China's presence in Africa, there is an argument that there are both opportunities and threats to Africa Chinese relations. And that an in-depth analysis finds that China's engagement with Africa is based on strategic political and economic considerations and fits, to a larger extent, within the

realist explanatory framework, but that there is also great opportunity for African states to direct their future in their own unique manner because of the alternative China provides.

The paper uses to one theoretical approach for its understanding of states relations within the international political economy and the overall relationship between Africa and China, this approach being the neo-Gramscian theory. The theory is influenced by the writing of Antonio Gramsci understanding of how the state and social forces makeup dominate ideological perspectives and is able to perpetuate the existence of a global order. The theory emerged from the writing of Robert Cox in the early 1980s, in which he wrote two seminal articles which were within the historical materialistic problematic of social transformation.⁷ Cox specifically focused on the construction of hegemony and the manner in which social forces that occupy leading roles within the state established hegemony and the how this is then transcended to a global arena.⁸ The research paper uses Cox's interpretations of hegemony, being an expression of broadly-based consent, which results in the acceptance of ideas and is further supported by institutions and material resources.⁹ This interpretation thus broadens the way in which hegemony is defined, no longer being only about economic and military capabilities.¹⁰

Cox's approach within the context of this essay is crucial to the understanding of the role of neo-liberal international organisations and globalization, helping explain the reasons behind social relations of production, inter-related with state forms and global orders, underpinning the global neo-liberal hegemony. This understanding of the international political economy is vital to comprehend the importance of the potential partnership in growth that is and can be experienced within Africa-China context and the many opportunities that exists within this type of partnership. Robert Cox goes on to argue that globalization; the emergence of international institution and a border neo-liberal community has manifested an international community with the "internationalization" of production and state.¹¹ The process of internationalization results in international conformity, thus the restructuring of the role of the state and implementing neo-liberal policies.

Case Selection

The research focuses on one case study, being Sudan. The reason behind the focus on this case study stems from it being one of the biggest trade partners with China and their continuously engaged in political interactions with China. China's relationship with Sudan is based on the need for the abundance of oil. Sudan is also one of the biggest traders with China therefore bring about a reality whereby there has been much research and attention put on the political relationship and the consequences of this relationship, many arguing that

⁷ Bieler, A & Morton, A: "Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy", International Gramsci Society Online Article. January 2003. Available at: http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/bieler_morton.shtml

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Cox, R. 2005. *Global Perestroika* In Roden Wilkinson (ed) *The Global Governance Reader*, London/New York: Routledge, 43

¹¹ Bieler, A & Morton, A: "Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy", International Gramsci Society Online Article. January 2003. Available at: http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/bieler_morton.shtml

China supports authoritarian governments in the country thus damaging years of attempts by the West to transform and pressure the Sudan and many other African countries to becoming more democratic. Sudan, as stated, is a defining case in China's changing relations with Africa and has been and continues to be the defining case in China's changing relations with Africa, being a key illustration of transition and convergence in China's international politics. Sudan is also a geopolitical territory in which where Beijing faces the challenges of accommodating its policy of non-interference with the complexity of African politics.

An overview of the diplomatic and political relations between the African states and China suggest the potential for a reality of mutual development. But these relationships are also viewed with great suspicion arguing that China's engagement with Sudan is likely to bring about a reality of perpetual dependence, stemming from the fact of China engaging with states that have drastically smaller economies. The case has also been chosen stemming from the ability to monitor the effects of Chinese policy of non-interference. In states such as Sudan whereby the government of the country are argued to be corrupt and authoritarian, they argue that the Chinese policy of non-interference compounds the problem in these countries.

Chapter 1: Historical origins of China's policy of non-inference

The initial phase of Chinese formal interaction with Africa began at the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955.¹² The improving Chinese-African relations begun at the beginning of the 1950s, stemming from China's worsening ties with the then Soviet Union. This then sparked a reality in which China began looking for allies in Africa to establish a counter hegemonic collective against both the Soviet Union hegemony and Western imperialism.¹³ China also saw African states as being its natural allies because of their shared history of colonialism. The relationship developed further in the 1960s and 70s with China supporting many independence struggles and funding several construction projects. This was also a period in which China was able to promote bilateral relations with many African countries and provide aid to 30 African countries.¹⁴

The strength of this relationship began to decline in the 1980s when China began to focus on its internal economic development, a period in which, many argue, saw China's gradual departure from socialist economic development to a much more capitalist economy.¹⁵ The change in policy led to China having to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from Western states. Any attempts to strengthen China's relations with Western countries was short lived stemming from the economic sanctions and political isolations that were imposed because of the violence that occurred at the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.¹⁶ The resulting reality was one in which China was isolated and sanctioned and gave rise to a belief that it would be counter-productive to just trade and rely on Western nations for FDI as core tenant to China's developmental plan. This isolation and new understanding of the Chinese developmental plan pushed China to widen its relations in the developing world and specifically Africa.

The 1990s saw a dramatic re-engagement with African states and an unprecedented involvement in the continent. The engagement came in the form of trade, investment, development assistance, training and technology transfer.¹⁷ This new engagement was essentially based on a partnership in growth and many African leaders considered a closer economic and political relationship with China as in interaction that would bring future prosperity within a short period. This reality was fundamentally different from the Western colonialist's agenda that sort to take up the administrative governance and resources of all the countries that they colonised.

The Chinese experience and the independent manner in which Chinese created a successful development model that took its domestic realities in considerations appealed strongly to African states and continues to be an attractive model. The Chinese were able to bring hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, reducing the number of people living in poverty from 84% to 15.9% from the period of 1981 to 2005.¹⁸ And this dramatic

¹² Konings, P. China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership. *Journal of Developing Societies*, Volume 23, 3 March 2007. 343

¹³ Ayodele, T & Sotola, O: China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment, IPPA Working Paper Series, 2014. Available at: www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf, 3-4

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁸ Ayodele, T & Sotola, O: China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment, IPPA Working Paper Series, 2014. Available at: www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf, 4

development led many African states to become attractive to the type of development model used in China that primarily take into consideration the domestic reality of both the political and economic make up. China is also seen as been an attractive partner because it provides an alternative to institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The drive for more Chinese interaction by many African states also stems from the desire to depend less on Western foreign investment and development assistance.

The continuation of the Chinese policy of non-interference has been the core principles in which China has continued to interact with Africa. The policy is derived from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.¹⁹ The policy was essentially designed to reflect the solidarity among the Non-Aligned Nations and newly independent post-colonial states in Africa. The emphasis on territorial sovereignty understood from strict traditional Westphalian terms was in appreciation and understanding of the independence that African states desired thus made the interactions far more equal and respectful than previous and current interactions with Western counterparts.

The Chinese policy in the main applies to military interventions and regime change but the principles have in reality been expanded in the spheres of Chinese investment and economic interactions. The policy presented and continues to present an alternative to; in particular, the US led neo-liberal economic ideals and Western political ideals which promote a Western standard of civilisation. This US led global political economy manifested a reality in which many African states were unable to independently manage their own political and economic affairs. The reality in which Africans are no longer treated as perpetual 16 year old who continually need guidance was a fundamental reason for why African countries embraced the type of interactions presented by Chinese engagement, and this will be discussed throughout the essay in depth.

Chapter 2: Understanding African-Western relations

The Chinese policy of non-interference is a departure from the conditionality's imposed by Western engagement and the standard of civilization in which the West expected all states within the International community to abide by. The establishment of Bretton Wood institutions, structural adjustment policies, and the promotion of what was termed the Washington Consensus, and then Western ideas of good governance all make up what I describe as an international standard which has continually been used to pressure the developing world and Africa, in particular, to imitate Western ideals and thus advantage the West. The imposition of these policies have in the main been detrimental to African states and have, to a large extent, been ineffective to African political, social and economic realities. In order to understanding whether Chinese engagement is exploitative to African states or is a unique positive opportunity. It is important to analyse Africa's current and historical interactions with the West and what those interactions has meant for Africa development.

¹⁹ Iyasu, A: China's Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns, African Arguments Editor, 18 July 2013. Available at: <http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/18/china%E2%80%99s-non-interference-policy-and-growing-african-concerns/>

Therefore the essay explains and discusses Africa's relationship with the West and shows how historical and current interactions have been one of control, violation of sovereignty and exploitation.

The Bretton Woods Era

The aftermath of the Second World War brought about a reality whereby the United States found itself the indisputably dominate state in the world. This position afforded them the ability to form an institutional framework of the post-war world economy manifested the Bretton Woods Systems.²⁰ The ideals of the configuration of this new system were based on the thinking of Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes.²¹ The purpose of the Bretton Woods Conference was to formulate unifying principles that would be embedded in the institutions that comprise the Bretton Woods System. These institutions would be the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and what would become the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The principles that would guide these institutions would firstly be a commitment to trade liberalisation through multilateral negotiations and the principle of non-discrimination, secondly they agreed that the current account transactions would be freed from controls were permissible, and lastly there was an agreement that exchange rates would be fixed or pegged.²² The Bretton Wood Agreement was signed by 44 countries in July 1944 and was subsequently entered into force in 1946.²³ The primary focus on the International Monetary Fund was to regulate currency exchange rates to facilitate orderly international trade and to also assist in loaning money to member states as a last resort when the state is unable borrow money from other sources or the state is experiencing balance of payment difficulties. The purpose of the World Bank was to give loans to Western European governments, helping them rebuild their countries after war and in later years the World Bank moved towards development loans in developing countries.²⁴

The Bretton Woods system dissolved between the 1968 and 1973.²⁵ This essentially signalled the end of an economic system that had been based on the right and obligation of government to regulate capital flow and a period characterised by rapid economic growth. In August 1971 when then President Richard Nixon announced that his administration would suspend the dollars convertibility into gold.²⁶ This thus meant that the administration would unilaterally be abandoning the Bretton Wood System and saw the lifting of restrictions on capital flows. This new era has been marked by dramatically increased financial speculation and low growth. From 1975 onwards the IMF began to respond to the balance of payments difficulties confronting most of the developing world suffering from poor social and economic growth by providing concessional financing through what was known as the Trust Fund. This was followed by the creation of new concessional loan program, started in March 1986, called the

²⁰ Cornia, A. R. Jolly & F. Stewart. 1987. *Adjustment with a Human Face*. London, Oxford University Press. 10

²¹ Ibid, 10

²² Paul, Johnson. 1993. *Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon*, New York Times,

²³ Cornia, G. A., R. Jolly and F. Stewart (eds.). 1987, *Adjustment With a Human Face*. London, Oxford, University Press. 12

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Paul, Johnson. 1993. *Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon*, New York Times, 22

²⁶ Ibid

structural adjustment Facility. The structural adjustment facility was then succeeded by the enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in December 1987.²⁷

Structural Adjustment Policies

From the early 1980s the Structural Adjustment Policies were introduced to developing nations. The core aspects of the policies were based on an all embracing framework for reform to overcome the developing states historical problems of development.²⁸ Rather than helping solve the problem these policies essentially became major factors in the dynamics of crises and decline experienced in most of the developing states and even reinforced existing difficulties and introduced new ones as well. The adjustment process plays a dual role in which the International Financial Institutions enforces principals of a neo-liberal agenda in markets and economic institutions and also pressured developing states to structure and align their national governments within the limits established by the Washington Consensus. These international financial institutions became an important space in which to entrench an international hegemonic structure, which was led by the global dominate economic and political power of the United States. This gave power to a US-Western led partnership to become involved in the policy making and agenda of sovereign states, thus creating new forms of subordination and control.

Many critics have argued that SAP's have imposed harsh economic measures which have resulted in a deepening of poverty, an undermined food security and self-reliance which has manifests a reality which led to unsustainable resources exploitation, environmental destruction, and population dislocation and displacement.²⁹ Many have also argued that SAP's have increased the gap between the poor and rich domestically and in global terms. The SAP involved loans with the condition that the state would adhere to institutional reform policies as outlined by the lender and focused on long term growth. The three areas the loans were supposedly targeting was good governance, government intervention in the markets, government spending and excessive state ownership.³⁰

SAP's focused on developing states adopting such conditionality's as austerities, monetary devaluation, liberalization of trade, banning restrictions on imports and exports, opening up the national stock markets, controlling and monitoring government budgets, increasing foreign direct investment, elimination of state subsidies, private investment, and improving the rights of overseas investors through national laws.³¹ The essay argues that this was tantamount to handing state sovereignty over to previous colonising power and allowing them to structure and restructure states policies and create an economic environment most beneficial to their interests.

The World Bank and the IMF pressured developing states to enforce massive cuts in the education budget and spending cuts that reached up to 50% for some universities, and cuts in

²⁷ Cornia, G. A., R. Jolly and F. Stewart (eds.). 1987, *Adjustment With a Human Face*. London, Oxford, University Press. 37

²⁸ Ibid.37

²⁹ Lal, D. 1985. *The Poverty of "Development Economics"*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 21-22

³⁰ Ibid, 21-22

³¹ Ibid, 21-22

enrolment.³² A writer for the New York Times Magazine, Paul Johnson, described such external initiatives in his article called “Colonialism’s back and not a Moment Too Soon.”³³ The writer makes three main points; the first being that developing states are economically bankrupt, the second being that these states have found that they cannot govern themselves and lastly that they are asking the colonial powers to return to effectively run their states.³⁴ As extreme as these asserts are, they do in many ways reflect the position in which international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as they have extended their hegemony over Africa and other developing states.³⁵ Many Pan Africanist authors have argued that the central tenet to which this re-colonisation process is carried out has been through the loan system of SAP’s. Many of the state which has received SAPs saw their economies becoming entrenched in far worse economic positions and being more indebt than they were prior to taking their loans. Conditions such as massive currency devaluation diminished purchasing power of African states and increased the cost of imported products have manifested in many of these states.³⁶

The World Bank and the IMF pressured developing states to enforce massive cuts in the education budget and spending cuts that reached up to 50% for some universities, and cuts in enrolment.³⁷ A writer for the New York Times Magazine, Paul Johnson, described such external initiatives in his article called “Colonialism’s back and not a Moment Too Soon.”³⁸ The writer makes three main points; the first being that developing states are economically bankrupt, the second being that these states have found that they cannot govern themselves and lastly that they are asking the colonial powers to return to effectively run their states.³⁹ As extreme as these asserts are, they do in many ways reflect the position in which international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as they have extended their hegemony over Africa and other developing states.⁴⁰ Many Pan Africanist authors have argued that the central tenet to which this re-colonisation process is carried out has been through the loan system of SAP’s. Many of the state which has received SAPs saw their economies becoming entrenched in far worse economic positions and being more indebt than there were prior to taking their loans. Conditions such as massive currency devaluation diminished purchasing power of African states and increased the cost of imported products have manifested in many of these states.⁴¹

Countries such as Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique, Congo and Burundi have all experienced the consequences of such targeted programs.⁴² The conditions entrench these states is a US led neo-liberal Eurocentric global economic reality that only serves to benefit western states

³² Elbadawi, I. A, D. Ghura and G. Uwujaren. 1992. *Why Structural Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Policy Research, Working Papers, Washington, D. C: Country Economics Department, World Bank, 55

³³ Paul, Johnson. 1993. *Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon*, New York Times, 22

³⁴ Ibid, 22

³⁵ Ibid, 22

³⁶ Elbadawi, I. A, D. Ghura and G. Uwujaren. 1992. *Why Structural Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Policy Research, Working Papers, Washington, D. C: Country Economics Department, World Bank, 55

³⁷ Paul, Johnson. 1993. *Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon*, New York Times, 22

³⁸ Ibid, 22

³⁹ Ibid, 22

⁴⁰ Ibid, 22

⁴¹ Elbadawi, I. A, D. Ghura and G. Uwujaren. 1992. *Why Structural Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Policy Research, Working Papers, Washington, D. C: Country Economics Department, World Bank, 55

⁴² Ibid, 55-56

and showed the United Nations and its organisations as being active proponents of the re-colonisation of African states. The conditions set by western led institutions has been a way in which to induce the countries of the global South to impose economic models imported from elsewhere that do not serve the interests of the majority of the people in their own state. The IMF, World Bank and WTO agreements are merely formalise what has been reality for centuries, a Eurocentric standard of civilisation. The Laws of many developing nations have been superseded by the superior laws of the market, which also now have prior claim to their resources over and above the needs of the very citizens of the country whose existence depends upon access to those resources.⁴³

The outcome has been that the IMF and World Bank serve the powerful interests of the US and its partners. Both the World Bank and the IMF voting power of a given state is not measured in term of the size of the member states population but how much capital the specific member states contributes to the institutions and by how much power the state wields in the global community. Groups such as the G7 play a dominate role in determining the policy of the institutions. Members such as the US, Japan, Germany and Great Britain each having their own director on the institutions executive board and only 19 directors are elected by the rest of the approximately 150 member countries. The institutions are also structured in such a manner in which the president of the World band is traditionally a US citizen and is also chosen with US congressional involvement. The IMF managing director is also chosen traditionally from European states.

On the IMF board of governors the United States has an estimated 17% of the voting power, and the G7 have a combined total of approximately 46% voting power. As a result of the US being the biggest contributor and possessing a significant proportion of voting power, there are given a dominate voice and essentially at all times exercised an effective veto. The outcome has been a reality in which the developing nations that have relatively little power within the institution, become subject to programs and policies that are financed by the institution and have substantial impact throughout the local economies and societies but the actual state been impacted has little control of those measures implemented.⁴⁴

A significant aspect which shows the use of US hegemony has been that development projects that are undertaken with World Bank financing have been argued to be predominately dominated by money included to pay for materials and consulting services provided by Western countries. The US Treasury Department officials have calculated that for ever US dollar the United States contributes to international development Banks the US exporters gain more than two US dollars in bank financed procurement contracts. The reality thus becomes that the banks tend to finance bigger and more expensive projects that need more material and technical expertise of Western contractors and therefore ignores smaller scale and locally appropriate alternatives.

⁴³ Ibid, 55

⁴⁴ Chang, Ha-Joon .2010. "It's time to reject the Washington Consensus," *The Guardian*, 9 November, 46

From SAP's to Good Governance

The process of questioning policies that were termed the Washington Consensus, which dictated most of the solutions proposed by the discussed international financial organisations, was well away in the 21 century. The term Washington consensus was coined in the work of John Williamson in 1989. The ideals essentially emphasis ten recommendations 1) fiscal discipline; 2) redirecting public expenditure; 3) tax reform; 4) financial liberalization; 5) adoption of a single, competitive exchange rate; 6) trade liberalization; 7) elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment; 8) privatization of state owned enterprises; 9) deregulation of market entry and competition; and 10) secure property rights.⁴⁵ These recommendations were premised on the ideas shared at the time by political and economic circles in Washington, which included the US Congress and Administration. The same ideals were adopted by Washington based international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.⁴⁶

The failure of the Structural Adjustment Policies were recognised by the World Bank and IMF but, from their perspective, the outcome of this failure was not based on poor economic policies but rather poor governance as the main reason why developing nations where not seeing sufficient or any development. This then led to the institutions adjusting the terms of their aid on the provision that the developing states would adopt “good governance”⁴⁷. The notion of good governance, from a Western perception, entails a neo-liberal notion of political modernity. This would show that this is another way in which the West has put pressure and manipulated states into adopting political institutions which conduct themselves in what can be regarded as a similar fashion to the political institution in the West, specifically the US, who follow western framework of political institutions.

The move to discourse on good governance has been premised on the need to get governments, specifically African governments, to adopt more democratic and neo-liberal policies.⁴⁸ Good governance can be explained as being an indeterminate term used in international development literature to communicate ideas of how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources.⁴⁹ Governance is essentially the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented. The discussion on good governance has predominately centred around a comparison on the ineffectiveness of economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies. Good governance principles argue that it is the responsibility of the government in power to meet the needs of the entire population rather than a portion of it. The 21st century has seen the liberal democratic states of the US and West as being used to set the standards to compare to other states intuitions when discussing governance. Good governance is a term that has been adopted by various international development and financial intuitions but the exact definition of what it means has differed. Many authors have argued that there is a conceptual clarity

⁴⁵ Kahl, Brian. 2004. “African and the Washington Consensus” From Diversity in Development-Reconsidering the Washington Consensus. FONDAD, The Hague, December, 2004, 6

⁴⁶ *ibid*, 6

⁴⁷ Sagoe, C: The Neo-Colonialism of Development Programs, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/12/the-neo-colonialism-of-development-programs/>. August 2012, 6

⁴⁸ Chang, Ha-Joon .2010. “It’s time to reject the Washington Consensus,” *The Guardian*, 9 November, 46

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 46

when it comes to good governance and thus can become problematic for the practical outcomes that development institutions.⁵⁰

The work on the World Bank and the IMF has in general discourse on good governance has focused on addressing economic institutions and public sector management, including transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership. There have been many issues that have emphasised by various forms of governance programmes of donors, which include election monitoring, political party support, combating corruption, improved public sector reform, government responsiveness etc.⁵¹ Many of the donors explicitly emphasis the adopting of neo-liberal policies for the purpose of creating stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activities, which would include price systems, exchange regimes, and banking systems.

The replacing of the structural adjustment programs with a more policy lending approach of the World Bank has brought an emphasis on governance reform playing a significant role.⁵² The Band has stressed the important of improvements in public governance. What has hardly changed is that governance requirements demanded by developed states continue to be overly intrusive.⁵³ The continue to include inherently domestic issues such as legal framework building, corporate governance, tax reforms, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption initiatives, and have not included, to any significant extent, pro-poor policies.⁵⁴ The reality has been that the pressure the US and Western donors has put on developing states and specifically Africa is tantamount to external intervention into domestic institutions has implications for the internal democratic process. This outcome was seen with the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), which was the key framework promoted by the World Bank to address criticisms if the SAP's. Just as the SAP's the PRSPs were criticised for being externally imposed process rather than a development plan which reflected an internal policy process rather than a domestically organised development plan which would legitimately reflect internal policy processes and political priorities of the developing state.⁵⁵

The essay argues that the structural adjustment programs and the focus post-SAP's on good governance are essentially Eurocentric perspectives of the manner in which developing states and especially African states should conduct themselves and their realities. The policies have continuously intruded on developing states sovereignty and independence. The essay that these policies and programs are essentially a continuation of the level of dominations and control that have been seen in the centuries before, although taking a much different form and using different rhetoric. The governance which the US led neo-liberal policies pressure states to adapt their entire realities to imitate US-Western political and economic institution. The

⁵⁰ Chang, Ha-Joon. 2010. "It's time to reject the Washington Consensus," *The Guardian*, 9 November, 46

⁵¹ Kahl, Brian. 2004. "African and the Washington Consensus" From Diversity in Development-Reconsidering the Washington Consensus. FONDAD, The Hague, December, 2004, 6

⁵² Kahl, Brian. 2004. "African and the Washington Consensus" From Diversity in Development-Reconsidering the Washington Consensus. FONDAD, The Hague, December, 2004, 6

⁵³ Durlauf, S and Qyuaah, D. 1998. "Why do growth rates differ?" in Taylor and Woodford (eds), *Handbook of Macroeconomics*, North-Holland Temple. 126

⁵⁴ Elbadawi, I. A, D. Ghura and G. Uwujaren. 1992. *Why Structural Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Policy Research, Working Papers, Washington, D. C: Country Economics Department, World Bank, 55

⁵⁵ Ibid, 55

essay essentially argues that the US led neo-liberal agenda of the 21st century appears in many ways to be an evolution of the hegemonic and Eurocentric realities seen in past centuries. To better understand the reasons for why the current hegemonic reality has taken its form it's necessary to trace the ideals and ideas of Eurocentricism and its connection to US neo-liberal ideals.

The origins of Eurocentrism

Eurocentrism is generally rooted in Europe's colonial perception of the world being open to conquest, control and domination.⁵⁶ The ideal argued that the people of the third world were savage and weak and thus were in need of being civilised, even going as far as to deny the existence of non-European cultures⁵⁷. Examples of this Eurocentric perspective can be found in the regional names of the world which are viewed from a Eurocentric worldview and are, to a large extent, named in honour of European travellers⁵⁸. This can be seen in the naming of the Middle East, which is a description of an area that is slightly east of Europe, the Far East, sometimes called the Orient, which is east of Europe. This understanding of reality resulted in the Eurocentric self-sustaining core belief that Europe, therefore the European people, are central and the most important in regards to all significant aspects of the world's social values, and cultural heritage. The Eurocentric perspective is argued to have used ancient Greek history as an important part of fostering Eurocentric agendas and the past and present, and as a result Greek history has been fundamentally shaped by the perspective of Eurocentrism⁵⁹. The Eurocentric perspective has always treated Greek history as being part of European or Western history and is not acknowledged to be part of the continuous history of the Mediterranean over the decades and centuries. The actual history of ancient Greece was that it was part of a chain of historical evolution that starts Near East, passes Greece, then Rome, before moving to the Middle Ages and then the modern Western world⁶⁰.

This shows that Greece, being part of the Mediterranean, was not as historically significant as argued by Eurocentrism's but was rather a temporary setting for the historical chain of evolution. What Eurocentrism attempts to do is ignore the existence of a history prior to Ancient Greece therefore not accepting ancient Greek history as part of the continuous history of the geographical area⁶¹. The argument basically says that once the torch had been handed over to the next bearer, Western civilization, the history of the area becomes irrelevant. The history of mathematics, science and technology has generally been argued, by the West, to have begun in Greece, then moving to the Romans, there was then a regression to the Dark Ages, then progression and a continuation with the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution⁶². There has been very little mention of the contribution made and achievements in places such as China, India, Ancient Egypt and various Muslim thinkers in European and

⁵⁶ Titus Pop, "From Eurocentrism to Hybridity or From Singularity to Plurality," Partium Christian University, Oradea, Romania., 2000. 1

⁵⁷ Ibid, 2-3

⁵⁸ "Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History Beyond Eurocentrism,"

http://www.academia.edu/224021/Unthinking_the_Greek_Polis_Ancient_Greek_History_beyond_Eurocentrism.

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² "Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History Beyond Eurocentrism,"

http://www.academia.edu/224021/Unthinking_the_Greek_Polis_Ancient_Greek_History_beyond_Eurocentrism.http://www.academia.edu/224021/Unthinking_the_Greek_Polis_Ancient_Greek_History_beyond_Eurocentrism

American schools. The Eurocentric perspective only really mentions the Americas, Australasia and Africa when discussing colonialism, giving no reference to pre-colonial civilization, science or culture.

The Belief in European superiority can be said to have come about in the period of European Imperialism, which is argued to have initial begun in the 16th century and increased dramatically in the 17th and 18th century, reaching its peak in the 19th century⁶³. Eurocentric perspectives have always distorted reality to benefit colonizing power, arguing that the native or the “colonial other” as uncivilised and savage. Franz Fanon in his book “The Wretched of the Earth” shows how settlers often portrayed natives as the negation of values and as being the most perfect embodiment of evil, showing the thinking of settlers like Monsieur Meyer, who was a representative of the imperial power in Algeria⁶⁴. Monsieur Meyer was quoted saying, “He (the native) is the deforming element...the depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces.”⁶⁵ Edward Said support this interpretation of colonial reality in his book *Culture and Imperialism* and writes that imperialism and colonialism was not simply about accumulation but was also about the ideological support of such ventures, which included the belief that the different people and area required domination.⁶⁶ The Western belief was that “inferior” people where in need of guidance from them thus legitimising European authority in the distant lands⁶⁷.

One of the core arguments of Eurocentrism, also relating to Western supremacy, has been its belief in the superiority of Christianity. This attitude had, to a large extent, related to spread of Islam at the beginning of the 14th century in many areas of Europe; this was a threat which lasted in the memories of Europeans and was regarded as being the clash of civilisations⁶⁸. The Orient has been argued to have been discussed as a construct of Western culture, perceived as a negative yet fascinating area that serves as a mirror image which is used to cast a positive image of the West and give the Occident its identity⁶⁹. What Europe did, as it did with many other areas, was construct the East as a cultural “other” and after doing this the West would then make the “other” conform to the Western image⁷⁰. The exploration of the other through authors such as Flaubert and Marx is argued by some authors to be a project to exploit and remould what Europe saw as rich but overall a savage or shameful Oriental sphere⁷¹. An example of this can be seen when Sectary to the Board in the 19th century, Lord Macaulay, argued that India was both barbarous source of potential riches and was also a place in need of civilisation.⁷² The essay argues that this reality of domination and perception, although it has taken a significant different form, continues exist in our current reality whereby the US and West has constructed a class of otherness and set about labelling and imposing a preferred Western construct of understanding in different areas.

⁶³ Titus Pop, “From Eurocentrism to Hybridity or From Singularity to Plurality,” Partium Christian University, Oradea, Romania, 2000. 5

⁶⁴ Frantz Fanon. 1961. *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove, 43

⁶⁵ Ibid, 40

⁶⁶ Edward Said. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*, London: Vintage, 7.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 8

⁶⁸ Ibid, 43-44

⁶⁹ Ibid, 44

⁷⁰ Ibid, 44-45

⁷¹ Ibid, 46

⁷² Edward Said. 1978. *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 44-45

Neo-Liberal links to pervious Western ideology

Eurocentrism and Western supremacy both argued for the uniqueness and importance of the Europeans people in civilising the world and bring about civilisation in areas that either did not have it, such as Africa, and to develop it in Asian areas. These perspectives offered Europe as a model to all societies that had a genetic incapacity that held them back from evolving. Neo-Liberalism although different in rhetoric adopted many of the core ideals that these perspectives argued. Adapting to the new reality but still giving the West as the ideal societies that states all around the world have to adapt to. Before going into an in-depth analysis of how neo-liberalism has created a reality whereby the majority of international states have to conform to an existing western, specifically American, ideological reality in order become an accepted or recognised international player, it is important to lay out the main tenants of neo-liberalism. Neo- liberalism can be described as a set of economic policies that became prominent from the 1980s and thus became imposed by powerful financial institutions such as the World Band, the inter-American Development bank, and the International Monetary Fund⁷³. Neo- liberalism goal was to create an environment that allowed for international trade and investment, which they argued would manifest a reality by which all nations prospered and developed equally and fairly. This was the new standard set but the West and there was no alternative to this standard. There are various principles which need to be followed in order to accomplish neo-liberal goals. This includes removal of barriers to free trade such as Tariffs, restrictions to capital flow, regulations and removal of certain standards or laws. ⁷⁴

The focus was to create market based economies with no interference for governments, which is believed to be beneficial for all involved. The reality appears to show otherwise, many question the possibility of “free” trade within an international community which has hegemonic states that influence and manipulate realities. Neo-liberal policies for some have been extremely beneficial, some states experiences large growth but for the majority the policies have had a negative impact. There has been an increase in poverty and the immediate needs of many people around the world have not been met. An example of this can be seen with statistics showing that almost 3 billion people live on fewer than two dollars a day⁷⁵. There has been a new global standard of civilisation that has been modelled by the West and imposed willingly or by pressurising weaker states. This new standard of civilisation has its roots, as Gerrit W. Gong explains, in 19th and 20th century Eurocentric perspectives. ⁷⁶

One of Gong’s main focuses was attempting to answer the question of how, where and to what extent, in regards to the current global system, global standards of civilisation established identity boundaries for those included within and those who can be considered to be left outside a self-determined international society⁷⁷. Gong explains his understanding of

⁷³ Gerald Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order,” *International Organization* vol. 36 No. 2, 1982. 381

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 381-82

⁷⁵ James F. Tracy, “The Tender Tyranny of American Liberalism,” 2012, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-tender-tyranny-of-american-liberalism-redux/5305524>.

⁷⁶ Gong. G W, “Standards of Civilisation Today” in Mozaffari 9, ed. *Globalisation and Civilization*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 80

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 80

the standard of civilisation by saying that it is an expression of the assumption used to distinguish those that belong to a particular society and those who do not⁷⁸. He shows that as a result, there is now as global reality whereby those who conform to this standard of civilisation are considered insiders and thus “civilised” and progressive. Those who do not are seen as outsider’s therefore “uncivilised”. Gong shows that the standard of civilisation that the existed in the 19th century international society supposedly provided a legal way to demarcate the boundaries of “civilised” and differentiated among what they called civilised and savage countries⁷⁹. There is a connection to this 19th century standard and the international expansion of the 20th and subsequently 21st century economic and financial system, now defined as the 21st century economic and finical civilisation⁸⁰. Our current economic and financial standards are explained by Gong to demarcate a global hierarchy of “non-market”, “emerging market” and “developed market entities.”⁸¹ Gongs main argument is, helping to answering the main question the essay asks, that some standard of civilisation will remain a feature of any international society wherein there is cultural diversity and pluralism existing with hierarchy and anarchy, regardless of how close the ties between international societies become.⁸²

The West was different from any empire in the past, because they went about creating a specific philosophical, moral and scientific doctrine in their attempt to legitimise their international hegemony⁸³. The West also specific perpetuated a message by which it all states had to “catch up”, with the only way in which to do that being to follow a Western blueprint. Sophie Bessis argues that the Wests developmental ideology argues that developing states should mimic Western states, even though she argues that this is not possible because the same rules of appropriation and exploitation of land, resources and the freedom to migrate no longer exist.⁸⁴ Bessis argues that the West historically and currently covers up its own violations and generally assigns its self as being the sole protector; this is the position that the United States usually argues, and the guarantor of Democracy, modernity and human rights.⁸⁵ This message and international reality forces international societies to mould themselves into the Western, specifically American, image which is argued to be the uncontested model of a “civilised” society. This shows that there is a very evident link in the ideology and principles of Eurocentrism, Western supremacy and the current neoliberal reality. The ultimate goal of America and its Western partners is to reform and “rescue” what they have previously and currently identify as the “other,” to make it resemble them through the use of new forms of intervention.

⁷⁸ Ibid,81-82

⁷⁹ Ibid,82

⁸⁰ Gong, G W, “Standards of Civilisation Today” in Mozaffari 9, ed. Globalisation and Civilization, London and New York: Routledge, 1984. 82

⁸¹ Ibid, 82-3

⁸² Sophie Bessis, *Western Supremacy: The Triumph of an Idea?* (London: Zed Books, 2003), London: Zed Books, 2003. 119-120

⁸³ Ibid, 122

⁸⁴ Ibid, 122-23

⁸⁵ Ibid, 123

Rating Agencies

Just as the IMF and World Bank has helped solidify US hegemony, rating agencies play a similar and unique role in promoting hegemonic control. The West, led by the US, has set up international trade standards that are compulsory to follow in order to be accepted in the international trading community, which as stated before are neoliberal. The rating agencies, have played a prominent role in bring about a new financial standard of civilisation, whereby their ratings measures represent the new criteria for countries desiring to conform to the new or modern standard of, to borrow from the rhetoric of Eurocentrism and Western supremacy, “civilised” credit worthiness⁸⁶. The Banks that fulfil this role are Thomas Bank Watch, Duff and Phelps, Fitch IBCA, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s⁸⁷. The rankings rate from AAA, which is the best, to CC, being the worst and these rating agencies, to a large extent, determine the amount of Foreign direct investment a country will receive, and the agencies will only rate positively those states who have conformed to the US led economic principles⁸⁸. Four of these top five rating agencies are based in the US, New York.

The Understanding of these realities and what they mean for Western African interaction is vital to understanding why Chinese interactions with African states presents a unique opportunity for African states to develop a developmental path that takes in consideration its domestic realities and can bring about state led sustainable change.

⁸⁶ Gong. G W, “Standards of Civilisation Today” in Mozaffari 9, ed. Globalisation and Civilization, (London and New York: Routledge, 1984),

⁸⁷ Chang, H. (2003): Kicking Away the Ladder: The “Real” History of Free Trade. *FPIF Special Report.*, 34

⁸⁷ Gong. G W, “Standards of Civilisation Today” in Mozaffari 9, ed. Globalisation and Civilization, (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 88

⁸⁸ Ibid, 88

Chapter 3: Is Chinese policy of none intervention exploitative of beneficial to African states?

“No country has the right to impose its will on others, nor can it undermine or deny other countries’ sovereignty under whatever excuse. Facts have proven that such practices as disregarding other’s sovereignty, bullying the small and the weak by dint of one’s size and power, and pursuing hegemony and power politics would not get anywhere. The affairs of a country should be decided by its own people, and the affairs of the world should be handled by consultation among all countries on an equal footing.”

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a speech commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on the 28th of June 2008.

The Chinese policy of non-interference, in contrast, to Western engagement is of a non-prescriptive nature and does not impose political, social or economic ideals. It gives space for African states to create their own identity, rather than imitating, and although there are many problems that have occurred within the context of African Chinese relations, which will be discussed later. It does present an opportunity for independent growth with no externally imposed economic and political ideals and a possibility to manifest a reality in which African states develop a developmental path which can lead to social and economic growth. This has been one of the main reasons behind why African states have embraced China as their economic partner and a source for economic development. The policy emphasizes the importance of the state as a principle actor for economic development, unlike what has been argued by the West. Western states vilify the state, arguing that the state should play a minimal role and, as discussed, enhance the position of the private sector.

The policy of non-interference communicated in Indonesia at the Bandung Conference essentially to signal an important turning point for South-South cooperation and defined the appropriate method of engagement. African states met to collectively agree that the Five Principles, already discussed, would shape the agenda of the emerging Non-Aligned Movement, and is still seen as the most appropriate way to engage with partners currently by most African states.⁸⁹ The Bandung Declaration revolutionized relations between Africa and China who all adopted the Five Principles that guide their foreign relations. This unity was emphasized when then president of Indonesia Sukarno stated, “This is the first inter-continental conference of the so-called colored people in the history of mankind.”⁹⁰ The understanding was further emphasized by the Egyptian president Nasser, when he added that the two prerequisites for world peace was non-interference in other states affairs and “the right of all nations to choose their own political and economic systems.”

This understanding of the policy of non-interference is a core reason to why the research paper argues that African engagement with their Chinese counter-part presents an opportunities rather than being a form of exploitation. The vision to create partnership which

⁸⁹ Steve. Hess, “Beyond the Rhetoric Non-interference in China's African Policy”, African and Asian Studies, September 2010. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/354821/Beyond_the_Rhetoric_Noninterference_in_Chinas_African_Policy, 360

⁹⁰ Ibid, 360

does not pressure any state involved to adopt policies and realities which do not take into consideration the domestic make-up and allow states to mature and develop independently. The Five Principles adopted by the states of the Non-Aligned Movement continue to reflect the desire of African states, especially taking into considerations the impact of Western led initiatives and neo-liberalism. The closing speech for the conference captured the unity of the developing state to abide by the agreed on principles when Nehru state that:

*We are brothers not only because we are Asians and Africans, but also because we are linked by the immeasurable wish for peace, resolute resistance to all dictates, firm determination to raise ourselves from backwardness. I am deeply convinced that we have made a great achievement here, not only to the benefit of Asia and Africa, but for the whole of mankind as well.*⁹¹

The Bandung Conference represented a watershed event for initiating and strengthening developing states cooperation. And China continues to emphasis the non-interference in every interaction with other developing states, showing its dedication to the Five Principles in the face of complex emerging realities in the international political economic structures.⁹² Chinese interaction with Africa has manifested through soft power, peaceful development and a promise of non-interference, as discussed, and has in the main proven successful in gaining the acceptance of African leaders and large sections of the population.⁹³ This reality is further emphasized by a macroeconomists within the World Bank who admits that Chinese engagement in non-interference in African states internal affairs and lack of lending conditionality's on governance of fiscal management have, to a large extent, produced positive reactions from various governments.⁹⁴

African leader from across the continent have shown their support for non-interference and this rhetoric can be best summed up by the former Ethiopian president Mele Zenawi when he addressed the forum on China-African Cooperation in Beijing, from the 3-5 of November in 2006. President Zenawi state that, "China was always at the side of Africans, which created mutual trust between us. China also deserves credit for never interfering in the political affairs of the continent."⁹⁵

These same leaders are also embracing Chinese engagement because of the way in which China has upheld their promises to building railroads, highways, hydroelectric dams, roads and many other various infrastructural projects.⁹⁶ The timely manner in which infrastructure has been constructed and the fact that China does not interfere in the domestic affairs of the state has led many leaders to ignore outside criticism in whole and commend Beijing for its pragmatic approach towards Africa states. Although there is small pockets of resentment

⁹¹ Steve. Hess, "Beyond the Rhetoric Non-interference in China's African Policy", African and Asian Studies, September 2010. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/354821/Beyond_the_Rhetoric_Noninterference_in_Chinas_African_Policy, 361

⁹² Ibid, 369

⁹³ Ibid, 371

⁹⁴ Ibid, 372

⁹⁵ Ibid, 372

⁹⁶ Ibid, 372

against the Chinese by the citizens of some African states, there is in majority agreement and support for Chinese engagement and for the policy of non-interference.⁹⁷

For Africa, China's Policy of "Non-interference" is:

Country	Good Policy (%)	Basically good, but with some problems (%)	More harmful than good (%)	Quite harmful (%)	Don't know (%)
Ethiopia	14.3	50.5	16.3	11.2	7.7
Sudan	43.2	33.6	8.0	4.8	10.4
Kenya	31.1	35.8	16.6	12.4	4.1
Nigeria	17.3	31.0	14.7	12.7	24.4
South Africa	12.2	31.0	19.8	13.2	23.9
Zambia	29.6	36.2	18.9	8.2	7.1
Botswana	22.2	34.3	18.7	9.1	15.7
Egypt	34.3	23.6	19.5	7.2	15.4
Ghana	24.0	32.8	13.6	19.2	10.4

Source: Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong⁹⁸

The table above shows that more people strongly approve or approve of non-interference than strongly disapprove or disapprove in each of the countries surveyed, with Sudan showing the highest approval percentage. The reason for the high approval in Sudan could possibly be because of long period and level of economic participation in the country, and this approval exists even though there has been a high Western disapproval of the government's handling of human right violations in Sudan.

The research paper argues that Chinese relations with Africa has, to a larger extent, presented an attractive model for development, aid, investment and infrastructure development without the patronising conditionality's of Western states, thus presenting a new and more appropriate way of interacting with African states. The Chinese emphasis on mutual respect and win-win relations under the banner of non-interference has made their model of state engagement far more attractive than Western engagement and has proven, at least in the short term, to have won the favour of a large amount of African statesmen and the support of large parts of their populations.

Sino-Africa Relations Criticisms

That being said, many authors on Sino-African relations have argued that the policy has been applied selectively to suit China's interest at various times, beginning in its earliest days of implementation in the 1960s and 1970s when China supported revolutionary movements in Africa and Asia. Although China has never explicitly stayed away from their rhetoric of the Five Principles, it has frequently acted in a manner which was contradictory to what it had communicated. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong the Peoples Republic of China supported many revolutionary struggles in the developing world and even involved itself in a

⁹⁷ Steve. Hess, "Beyond the Rhetoric Non-interference in China's African Policy", African and Asian Studies, September 2010. Available at: http://www.academia.edu/354821/Beyond_the_Rhetoric_Noninterference_in_Chinas_African_Policy, 372

⁹⁸ Ibid, 173

border intervention into Vietnam in 1979.⁹⁹ China also found itself in clashes with India, Russia and in Korea with the US and the UN. China's reaction to such criticism during this period was that it existed in a global environment which made it isolated and thus had to be defensive in a reality in which it believed it was under attack from the United States and, from the late 1950s, the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰ China argues that it had to be prepared to defend itself, so not to be dragged into a position of humiliating subjugation that it had previously experienced in a "century of humiliation" after the First Opium War of 1839.¹⁰¹ This reality is thus the reason that China emphasizes when defending its historical record, arguing that when issues directly impacted their self-interest it was imperative they fought back.

China has since become a much more wealthy country and avoided any military conflict throughout the past three decades thus debates around the countries willingness to get aggressive, while communicating ideas of global peace, has substantially decreased. Although this debate has resurfaced to some extent with regards to the South China Sea disputes but this is a matter the paper does not focus on. The criticism now predominately focuses on China's investments in countries with internal conflicts and human rights problems in Africa. The Chinese policy of non-interference and China's respect for sovereignty has meant that it puts little focus on the internal realities of African states, and the possible outcomes that may arise from its investment spending. China has also been accused of initiating infrastructure projects that precipitate notorious human rights violations.¹⁰² There have been various instances as seen in Namibia, South Africa and Zambia where it had been found that Chinese managers have repeatedly ignored local minimum wage laws and affirmative action requirements.¹⁰³ Many international observers have also argued that Chinese foreign policy to Africa, and in particular their policy of non-interference, undermines international efforts to increase transparency and good governance. Many have labeled the relations as neo-colonialism and an aid for oil strategy. Writers and authors from Africa have argued that Chinese enterprises have underbid local firms, especially those within the textile industry and that many Chinese ventures do not hire Africans and thus do not transfer the necessary skills and capacity which African states desire, both arguing that China has to link human rights to business activities.

Chinese Response to Criticism

China's response to this criticism has been to say that Chinese leaders believe that there should be a primacy of economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights.¹⁰⁴ China strongly believes that economic, social and cultural rights are achieved through economic development and investment and thus disagree with any deviations from an economic growth path for civil and political rights. China has also stated, similar to what many have argued in the developing world, that they strongly believe in the non-universality

⁹⁹ "Is China's non-interference policy sustainable?" <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24100629>, 17 September 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, The Fletcher Journal of Human Security. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinafrica.pdf>, 7

¹⁰³ Ibid, 7

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 8

of human rights. The Asian value system similar to African values has culturally placed family and community before individuality, thus making Western conceptions of human rights in man and individualist, inappropriate in such spaces. The West has dictated the existence of universal norms and principles that much of the world did not have the opportunity be involved in the writing of. This thus questions the legitimacy of any claim to universal rights that take into consideration the realities of the developing world.

China has also always opposed any type of political conditionality based on its conviction of independent development growth and has seen such attempts at Western conditionality's as being a way to impose Western values on developing states which erodes their sovereignty and weakens their position. Western development minds have continuously criticized China for its interaction with states which do not integrate themselves to the standard of civilization set by the West, arguing that China should use its economic leverage as a political tool and threaten to cut off financial ties to state repeatedly violate human rights.¹⁰⁵ They go onto say that aid rewards the behaviour of dictators and play a significant role in funding the oppression of reformists.¹⁰⁶ Although this argument seems to be valid in some cases, it ignores much of the empirical evidence that shows that political conditionality exercised by the West in Africa, as explained earlier, failed to actually affect positive change.

Failure of Western Conditionality

Oliver Morrissey best explains the outcome of Western conditionality's when he surveyed literature evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality's to force change on trade policy reforms and concluded that:¹⁰⁷

*"If countries displayed no initial tendency to implement reforms of the desired type, then conditional lending appeared to have little effect in encouraging reform. The only countries that appeared to meet conditions were those whose governments favoured the economic policies embodied in the adjustment programme; it was government preferences, not aid conditions, which determined reform efforts. If interpreted strictly, specified reforms to be 'substantially' implemented within a short time period, conditionality fails."*¹⁰⁸

Morrissey shows the flaws in Western discourse on African development and aid conditionality and how it has frequently failed. There is further evidence that shows that conditionality is unethical, specifically with regards to the possibility that it may cause more harm than then good.¹⁰⁹ This argument stems from the fact that the people most in need of development assistance are frequently those who live under autocratic oppression and authoritative leaders, which is not of their own fault. Refusing development assistance and aid to these regimes would result in the suffering of communities for the wrong doings of their leaders. The other ethical argument which has been emphasised in particular by the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 9

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 9

¹⁰⁷ Oliver Morrissey, "Conditionality and Aid Effectiveness Re-evaluated," *The World Economy*, 2004, 153. Available at: doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00594.

¹⁰⁸ Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, *The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinaafrica.pdf>, 11

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 11

Chinese has been that it is a form of interventionism that violates state sovereignty and can be used to target states.¹¹⁰

The main argument, which the research paper will expand on later, has been that interference or conditionality creates more harm than good in that it impedes the natural growth process of governance.¹¹¹ What is core to what the research paper is trying to explain is that interference or conditionality has deprived African governments of the responsibility of determining their own future. It deprives them of choosing the path of political, social and economic development or evolution in which they desire. The reality is that political and economic competence and accountability stems from learning by doing, and what has historically happened is that Western intervention circumvents this mechanism.¹¹² There has been growing literature that continue to emphasise the point that the Western development plan is demanding too much too soon from the governments, with regards to their progress towards human right, transparency and democracy. Western states ignore the developmental path which they had historically taken, which had the same problems. The reality is that these demands have got in the way of economic growth, which may itself be a precondition for good governance.

The arguments for conditionality is seen as paternal and patronising by the Chinese and the question of whether to allow a generation of people from a particular African state to endure autocracy for the sake of development is believed to be the question only asked and answered by the people and leadership of the African state itself. China has had no problem with becoming involved with what many have described as the authoritarian governments of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Sudan because of its own experience has been growth first rights later. China has and continues to be a prime example of an authoritarian developmental state in which the government plays a vital role and actively intervenes in the state to promote its transition from a mainly agrarian reality to become an successful industrialised capitalist economy.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 11

¹¹¹ Ibid, 12

¹¹² Ibid, 12

Chapter 4: The Sudanese case study

Sudan is a defining case in China's changing relations with Africa and continues, to a large extent, to be the defining case in China's changing relations with Africa, being an important illustration of what Chinese interaction with Africa has been about. Sudan has been seen to be the geopolitical territory where Chinese leadership faces the challenges of accommodating its established and ideological policy of non-interference with the complexity of African politics and realities. Sino-Sudanese relations have attracted much criticism, specifically from the media, various governments, and parties highlighting China's complicity in numerous human rights violations and environmental exploitations. Before beginning to explaining the relationship, its complexities and its meaning to the African continent it is important to reiterate and explaining the formation and uniqueness of the relationship.

Sino-Chinese relations can be traced as far back as 441 AD, whereby contact was first established¹¹³. Modern relations between the People's Republic of China and Sudan began in 1959 and have since continued stable and good relations.¹¹⁴ Since then there has been various military and parliamentary governments in Sudan but relations with China has been a constant. The intensification of this relation has been in a large part due to the Sudanese oil sector and authors such as Large have argued that the strategic imperatives revolving around oil interests has been mainly responsible for Chinese policies on sovereignty and non-interference. This has been disputed by many arguing and showing that the reality is that the Chinese doctrine of non-interference goes back beyond this point and has been constant in all developing and developed countries in which it has relations with.

Chinese interaction with Sudan, from the period since it gained its independence, has been consistent with its doctrine of respecting sovereignty and non-interference. Chinese economic and technical relations with Sudan began from the early 1960s with the 1962 agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC), which remains effective to this day.¹¹⁵ The 1970s also saw the signing of a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol (CSTP) and the further cementing of the two states relations¹¹⁶. These agreements and the intensification of interaction led to a rise in project based assistance in infrastructure and public building, which in turn motivated a flow of professional staff.

The period between the 1970s to the mid 1990 saw China giving over 100 million US dollars in interest free loans for the construction of the two bridges, Friendship Hall, a 410 km tarmac road, one textile mill, a hospital and various rice cultivation and fishing projects.¹¹⁷ This essentially marked the strong ties that would exist between the two states and did well to strengthen the relationship.

¹¹³ Kabbashi M. Suliman and Ahmed A. A. Badawi, *An assessment of the Impact of China's Investments in Sudan*. University of Khartoum Faculty of Economic and S.S. 2010, page 4

¹¹⁴ *ibid*

¹¹⁵ Kabbashi M. Suliman and Ahmed A. A. Badawi, *An assessment of the Impact of China's Investments in Sudan*. University of Khartoum Faculty of Economic and S.S. 2010, page 4

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

The beginning of the 20th century saw a dramatic inflow of China based foreign direct investment into Sudan's oil sector, approximately 7.6 billion US dollars.¹¹⁸ The 1990s manifested a reality in which China became a powerful developing state, as it ascended in international political and economic spheres. This industrialisation period saw over 400 million people in the China being uplifted from poverty and a new vibrant desire for natural and fuel resources.

This rapid industrialisation period began the manifestation of what many regarded as a more bipolar global reality, with similar connotations to that of the US-Soviet relations. This new reality therefore created conditions whereby China would provide an alternative development model for less developed states. The relationship between China and Sudan has been seen through this lens and is deemed to be a good case to illustrate China's development model, as well as a space to explore Sino-Sudanese relations and Sino-African relations.¹¹⁹

Sudan has experienced a turbulent reality in both its recent and past history. Racial and religious divides in connection to its socially and economically marginalised populace has been a catalyst for successive civil wars between the North and South. This reality has also led to a horrific genocide and periods of famine and starvation. Sudan's governance, as stated before, fluctuates from periods of parliamentary democracy and military rule, with both maintaining an more authoritarian type rule over institutions and citizens, therefore nullifying any real prospect of more democratic state building. Sudan has experienced a reality in which its leadership has seen war making as a substitute for state building, rather than democratic principles.

1989 saw the end of civilian parliamentary rule with a military coup of the then ruling party-the national Islamic Front, which is now called the National Congress Party. The National Congress Party (NCP) has since then dominated the political landscape through authoritarian rule and the use of discourse of militant Islam and Arab supremacy. The NCP regime has continuously reacted to any defiance and civilian discontent with state sanctioned violence, which have led to protracted armed conflicts.¹²⁰ Chinese interaction and involvement in the Sudanese territory has been criticised because of its unwillingness to interfere in social and political realities within Sudan and essentially work with regimes that were committing human right violations.

China has become Sudan's biggest trading partner, with Chinese state owned oil companies playing a central role in the development of Sudanese oil industries. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest shareholder in the two biggest oil consortiums in Sudan, being the Petrodar and the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Chinese companies have also been responsible for building most of Sudan's oil infrastructure; this would include marine terminals, road and rails, and cross-country pipelines. Close to 70% of Sudanese imports are from China and China is also Sudan's

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 5

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 4

¹²⁰ Rose Bradbury, "Sudan, the hollow state: what challenges to Chinese policy?" *Journal of Politics & International Studies*. Volume. 8

largest purchaser of Sudanese oil.¹²¹ This reality further shows how oil is central to debates around Sudanese Chinese relations, with well integrated economic interests.

The relationship between the states has involved a mixture of personal relationships between leaders, as well as military cooperation with arms supplied, and party communications. Core to this relationship has been China's respect for Sudan's territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Many have argued that China's relationship with Sudan based on non-interference has resulted in domestic conflicts and has maintained the power of the Sudanese elite.

As stated the dynamics of the relationship between Sudan and China stems from its own reality of colonial and development reality, and the belief in the developing states agreements made at the Bandung conference. The five principles of co-existence has been core to Chinese foreign policy, with the belief that the political affairs of all nations should be the exclusive concerns of that state and its government and thus must be respected by all states. China's decision is connected to its history of foreign domination, and its domestic experience of separatist movements and territorial disputes within the Chinese territory, therefore motivating it to adhere to strict Westphalia norms of state form.

The policies of non-interference have been met with great support from most African states, as they themselves believe in the respect of sovereignty and African solutions for African problems. China's belief in unconditional aid has also suited many that are in desperate need for such aid by who do not comply with the principles set mainly by Western states or Western led international intuitions. Many of the developing states believe that Western or external involvement in domestic issues leads to exploitation. These fears are only intensified when International institutions such as the United Nations were used for regime change in Libya after the African Union and African states recommended a different path.

These concerns for interference in other states political affairs are the reason most African states oppose such decisions and why Sudan and China frown upon external interference into domestic concerns. China made this point clear in the case of Darfur when the Chinese ambassador to Sudan, Deng Shaoqin, state in 2006 that Beijing was "opposed to any intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of Sudan under the pretext of human rights violations"¹²² Western commentators have argued that China has used this as an excuse to support authoritarian regimes and to pursue business as a form of applied politics, arguing that interference in states realities is necessary when rights of the population within that state are being violated.

This inference ignores the Chinese historical use of its policy of non-interference as well as its use in not only Sudan but all states that it has bi lateral political or economic relationships with. Central to Chinese engagement in Sudan has been the guarantee of non-interference and

¹²¹ Ibid, 4

¹²² Rose Bradbury, "Sudan, the hollow state: what challenges to Chinese policy?" *Journal of Politics & International Studies*. Volume. 8

independent experiences. The People's Republic of China have emphasised that their relationship with Sudan, from the onset, would be based on respect of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is true that the intensification of ties was, to a large extent, based on China entering the Sudanese oil sector and Chinese efforts to develop an oil export industry in Sudan.¹²³ This reality stemmed from The US and Canadian companies abandoning South Sudanese oil fields in the 1990s because of hostiles that arose from North American consumers and investors about interaction with Sudan, therefore giving China the opportunity to fill the vacuum.¹²⁴ But the relationship has been consistent since the beginning and the relationship has also been consistent with China's overall foreign policy.

The topic of much contestation has been the Chinese policy of non-interference in Sudan and the effects it has had on the Chinese image and Sudanese reality. The policy has been the defining marker of difference from the West, arguing that it has detrimental effect on the reality of Sudanese people and perpetuates conflict. Many have also argued that that policy has not been abided by the Chinese in many instances, arguing that sending peacekeepers and formerly helping to persuade the Sudanese ruling National Congress Party to accept the African Union/ United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was in contradiction to the policy.¹²⁵ The argument for those calling on China to revise its non-interference policy argue that the need for resources and raw material is the reasons behind the policy and that China has been propping up the Sudanese government through investments and access to cheap capital worth billions of dollars. The example which is given stems from China investing an estimate \$30 billion dollars into Sudan, while serving as Sudan's biggest trading partner when much of the world where shocked by the human right violations and massacres taking place in Darfur.¹²⁶ They look at the period of 1999 to 2005 which was a time which includes the beginning of the Darfur crisis. They show that Sudan's imports of small arms increased by 680%, to an estimated \$55 million dollars, with China making up 90% of those sales.¹²⁷ The West and some from the developing world have thus argued that China's investment practices under the auspices of the policy of non-interference are exacerbating violence, conflict and instability in Africa which as detrimental spill over effect in neighbouring states.

On the other hand, many have also argued that African peace, internal relations and security is foremost the responsibility of African people, and that solutions to African problems are in the minds of African people. China has continuously supported African states in maintaining peace and stability by enhancing diplomatic relations and providing spaces for dialogue and peaceful resolution to conflicts. Many have also emphasised China's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, contributing both military and civilian personnel. China's recent decision to send peacekeepers in South Sudan with 700 strong contingent due to arrive early April 2015, as part of a UN mission to protect civilians in a nation which was

¹²³ Ibid, 10

¹²⁴ Ibid, 9

¹²⁵ Daniel Large, "South Sudan Looks East: Between the CPA and Independence", *Association for Concerned African Scholars*, November 2011. Available at: <http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/issue86/large/>, 2

¹²⁶ Iyasu, A: China's Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns, African Arguments Editor, 18 July 2013. Available at: <http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/18/china%E2%80%99s-non-interference-policy-and-growing-african-concerns/>

¹²⁷ Ibid

devastated by conflict.¹²⁸ Many have argued that this is in contradiction to China's policy of non-interference but the reality is that they have never transgressed from these principles. Their support of peace initiatives is been part of the support of developing states in the developing world. China also argues that economic support in states such as Sudan is designed to eradicate conflict by addressing the root cause of the conflict, being poverty. Professor Hongsheng Sheng, of the Law School of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, emphasised this when he said "Peace should parallel development and the key method to eliminating war is to eliminate the causes from which wars arise."¹²⁹

Chapter 5: African-Chinese relations opportunity for growth

*"China adheres to the development path that conforms to its own reality. There is no precedence for China's development. In case of industrialization, we can't repeat colonialism as some developed countries once did at the initial stage of individualization. In early years since the founding of PRC, we copied the industrialization model of a few socialist countries featured by prioritizing heavy industry but we failed. In the period of "great-leap-forward", we wishfully set the goal of surpassing UK and US in a dozen of years, but that only led to the serious catastrophe on our nation and people. The bitter lessons drawn from history told us that industrialization can't be carried out in the way divorced from national conditions and reality. Today China's industrialization has recorded great success. In more than 30 years the annual average growth rate of industrial added value exceeds 11 percent. Industry contributes around 40 percent of GDP and the economic growth. China at present is the biggest manufacturer in the world. In the course of industrialization, China constantly modifies its path according to the national conditions and development stages, drawing experiences and lessons from other countries. We make adjustment from partially prioritizing the heavy industry to balancing the development of heavy and light industries. Now we are embarking on the road of new type of industrialization."*¹³⁰

The global consensus today is that the Washington consensus was a failure and did not provide the condition that would lead to economic growth and social development. These neo-liberal policies pursued by the international institutes which pressured states to play a much more circumscribed role than were embraced by the most of East Asian countries that used policies associated with a developmental state.¹³¹ The need for a radical re-thinking of a strategy for development in Africa is imperative if Africans wish to create sustainable social and economic development in the global economy. This re-strategizing is even made more important when you take into consideration the extreme poverty that exists in many African countries. The economic reality of Africa is that the share of Africa in the global trade remained insignificant despite the implementation of the policies that were recommended by financial intuitions such as the IMF and World Bank. The failure of these policies highlights

¹²⁸ Denis Dumo, "Chinese peacekeepers start deployment in South Sudan", Reuters. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-southsudan-china-idUSKBN0KP1OG20150116>

¹²⁹ Iyasu, A: China's Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns, African Arguments Editor, 18 July 2013. Available at: <http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/18/china%E2%80%99s-non-interference-policy-and-growing-african-concerns/>

¹³⁰ "China's Success Story and Its Relevance to Africa- Remarks by H.E. Ms. Sun Baohong, Chinese Ambassador to Ghana at IPMATIIC AFRICA 2014" Available at: <http://gh.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t1158750.htm>

¹³¹ Chang, H. 2003. Kicking Away the Ladder: The "Real" History of Free Trade. *FPIF Special Report*. 13

the need for a paradigm shift from the US led neo-liberalism in order to achieve more sustainable development.

The essay argues that the policy of non-interference can contribute significantly in bringing about an environment that gives Africa states its desired sustainable development. China's perpetual search for autonomy and self-determination has resulted in a multilateral approach to global relationships which contrast sharply with increasing unilateralist direction the US policies have taken over the last 20 years.¹³² The Chinese policy of non-interference is the key ideal in which China interacts within the global context and has attempted to have, through multinational relationship, a new global order founded on economic relationships but, most importantly, an order which recognizes political and cultural difference as well as differences in regional and national practices within a common global framework. The success of the Chinese economy, their ability to take hundreds of millions of their people out of poverty, qualifies the Chinese to provide leadership in the formation of an alternative global order. The policy is not necessarily relevant as a direct model but rather as a new lens through which to view the world. This alternative world order allows the state to play a much more prominent role in the development of their states and dismisses universal blueprints for development imposed by external actors.¹³³

The Chinese policy in Africa, I argue, is a starting point for identifying a mode of development that is independent from US neo-liberalism or the Washington Consensus. The Chinese model of state interaction is highly valuable in the sense that the developing world's voice within the global community is enhanced. The policies of non-interference also give space to African for the first time in modern history to create economic and political domestic reality that are unique to their social and indigenous realities rather than imitating external ideal which could not be adapted to internal realities. The Chinese policy of non-interference set a desired model in which to interact with African states.

The developmental model is an economic and social model in which this research paper identifies as being the strategy which has reaped both economic and social successes, as seen in the East-Asian economies and in the early development stages in European states. The success of the developmental states emphasises taking into consideration the domestic realities of the state and the state playing a vital role in development processes. This sort of development has been the goal in many states and continues to be the ideal. Western led initiatives emphasis diminishing the states as argued before, which counters effort by the state to adopt the developmental model desired. On the other hand the Chinese policy of non-interference emphasises the state as the principle actor and thus allows at least in practices for the state to play a leading role in development and entrench the necessary policies needed to manifest a successful developmental state. This of course needs political and economic disciple and good governance. The research paper argues that giving African states the independence to solve their own problems, to believe that it is only the African people who live in each state that can sow the seeds for development is vital to allowing successful state owned development in African states.

¹³² Lammers, E. 2007. "How Will the Beijing Consensus Benefit Africa? [www.the brokeronline.eu/en/Articles](http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/Articles).

¹³³ Ibid

The reality is that basically all of today's developed states actively used interventionist trade and industrial policies for the purpose of promoting and protecting infant industries during “catch-up periods.”¹³⁴ The policies used by every state have been different across different states thus proving that the current orthodoxy advocating free trade and laissez-faire industrial policies is in contrast with the historical experience. And that developing countries that propagate such a view look as if they are “kicking away the ladder” that they used in order to climb up to where they are.”¹³⁵ Before discussing the importance of state-led development it is important to explain what a developmental state is and how it operates.

The Developmental State

The developmental state is accepted by most academic authors as being the model that many East Asian states pursued after the Second World War in their attempt to create a reality that allowed for rapid modernisation of their economies.¹³⁶ The experiment led to one of the greatest industrialisation transformations of the modern era and showed the merits of a system or model whereby the state sets specific development goals and then attempts to single-mindedly mobilise society to achieve the core objective of industrial modernisation.¹³⁷ The unique performance of the East Asian economies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore that led to extraordinary economic growth which was also consistent with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income. The experiences gave empirical evidence of the merits in using an outward-oriented model driven by market incentive and a strong private sector. The idea of a centralised state that played a significant role in regards to interacting with the private sector from a position of pre-eminence so as to manifest a reality which focused on developmental objectives became extremely attractive.¹³⁸

A large part of the literature on the dramatic industrialisation in East Asia has been attributed to a neo-liberal version of East Asian growth based on the economic benefits of trade liberalisation, private enterprise, and a restricted role for the state. But throughout the 1980s to the 21st century there has been a growing literature which seeks to refute this neo-liberal belief and replace it with a counter-critique which is generally called “institutionalism.”¹³⁹ The argument is centred around the belief that the phenomenon of late development should be understood as a process in which the realities of the East-Asian states experienced economic successes stemming from the strategic role that the state played in taming domestic and international market forces and being able to direct this ability to national interests.¹⁴⁰ The institutionalists’ version argues that the key to rapid industrialization is the constraining of market rationality for industrialization and a strong autonomous state. The state plays a strategic role in guiding the market by a conception of long-term national rationality of

¹³⁴ Chang, H. 2003. Kicking Away the Ladder: The “Real” History of Free Trade. *FPIF Special Report*. 11

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 13

¹³⁶ Gumede, W. 2009. Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa. Development Planning Division. Working Paper Series No.9, DBSA: South Africa

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 3

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 4

¹³⁹ Robert Wade. 1990. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 5

investment formulated by government officials. The fundamental reason for rapid growth lies in the ability of the state to create a synergy between the state and the market and thus manifest an outstanding development reality.¹⁴¹ All of the successful cases of what is considered “late industrialisation” have to a large extent been associated with state intervention and therefore development can be said to have come about as a result of finding the right mixture market orientation and government intervention to manifest efficient and rapid industrialisation.¹⁴²

Essentially the developmental states success is depended on a set of institutions and political arrangements that are compatible with the appropriate mix of states intervention and market orientation in the economy. The developmental state is associated with two components, being ideological and structural.¹⁴³ Ideology is the important element which substantially differentiates the developmental state from other forms of states, in that the developmental state is one which completely focuses on ensuring economic development, which is generally understood to mean high rates of industrialization and accumulation. The state essential promotes its legitimacy through its ability to sustain development through high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, this development is expect to take place both domestically and in its relations with the global community.¹⁴⁴ The factors which play a significant role in regards to the effectiveness of the developmental states are institutional, technical, administrative and political factors. The success of the developmental state is thus also connected to its ability to become autonomous from social forces so that it can use its capacities to focus and create long-term economic policies that benefit the state holistically.¹⁴⁵ This would therefore necessitate that such a state should be a strong state that is able to gain adhesion of social actors and not use its autonomy in an exploitative manner.

The developmental state makes a serious attempt at using and focusing its administrative and political resources to the goal of economic development, the way in which to measure the seriousness of the state attempt at being developmental is by looking at the state’s tax efforts and public expenditure patterns.¹⁴⁶ One of the most recognised forces seen within the developmental states is nationalism, and is usually attached to idea of catching up with developed nation’s or\and to secure resources for national defence and security. The developmental states play a pivotal role in getting the instruments necessary for development such as the connecting of formal and informal networks, forming new formal institutions and the utilisation of opportunities for trade and profitable production.¹⁴⁷ The state is also able to promote macro-economic stability which then in turn creates a reality in which institutional frameworks are established that provide aspects such as law and order, effective administration of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

¹⁴¹ Mkandawire, T. 1999. Beyond Crisis: Towards Democratic Development States in Africa. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 290

¹⁴² Robert Wade. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5

¹⁴³ Ibid, 290

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 291

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 292

¹⁴⁶ “Africa Needs a Developmental State: Opportunities and Challenges”, Economic Report on Africa, 201.1 53

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 53

Developmental State Strategies

The developmental states, as stated, has usually been associated with first and second generation of the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) of East Asia, the first generation being Japan and second generation being South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.¹⁴⁸ The actual reality is that the developmental state in practice was born long before it was labelled such, in that over time the developmental states have evolved and can be considered to characterise the growth of the Netherlands in the 16th century, England in the 16th to the 19th century and Germany in the mid 19th century the early stage of the 20th century.¹⁴⁹ Many academics have also argued that many African countries in the post-independence stage could be seen as being a form of developmental states. Authors such as Thandika Mkandawire have argued that African states showed developmental aspirations and economic performances but the adoption of the structural development plans in the 1980s and 1990s heavily diminished the role of the state in economic development in Africa and thus manifest a reality whereby the prospect for the growth and consolidation seen by many developmental states globally failed to materialise on the African continent.¹⁵⁰

The concept of the developmental state in its contemporary usage is identified as coming from Chalmers Johnson in 1982, which used it to describe the dramatic growth of the Japanese economy and the rapid industrialisation which had taken place in Japan after World War Two.¹⁵¹ His main argument was that the Japanese “economic miracle” was what he termed a planned rational state, which was a developmental state that had the ability to proactively support and promote economic development.¹⁵² The state is interventionist but through a calculated and planned process to bring about clear economic and social goals that influence the direction and pace of economic development in the country. This type of state is perceived by some to be one which authoritatively and credibly constructs institutional architecture within the state and mobilise society towards the realisation of its development programme.¹⁵³ The developmental state is able to avoid any conflict of goals by the absence of any commitment to equality and social welfare. The Market is guided with specific instruments formulated by a small-scale elite economic bureaucracy who is recruited from the best managerial talent available in the system.¹⁵⁴ This constructed reality led to a bureaucracy of competent and efficient personnel who, to a large extent, could manifest a reality which was beneficial and hugely productive, specifically in its drive for industrialisation.¹⁵⁵

It is important with regards to the conceptualisation of the developmental state to understand that processes and institutions should not be confused with outcomes and that social transformation and successful economic growth are outcomes but developmental states may

¹⁴⁸ Mkandawire, T. 1999. Beyond Crisis: Towards Democratic Development States in Africa. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 290

¹⁴⁹ Gumede, W. 2009. Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa. Development Planning Division. Working Paper Series No.9, DBSA: South Africa

¹⁵⁰ Mkandawire, T. 1999. Beyond Crisis: Towards Democratic Development States in Africa. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 290

¹⁵¹ Chalmers Johnson. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 23-24

¹⁵² Ibid, 20

¹⁵³ “Africa Needs a Developmental State: Opportunities and Challenges”, Economic Report on Africa, 2011. 52

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 53

¹⁵⁵ Chalmers Johnson. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 23-24

not generate them in all instances. The argument is that developmental state are essentially about institutions and their processes and the manner in which they are managed. This is not to say that that external factor and interactions with the international community cannot distort or have a significant impact on the states outcome but rather that it is expected that developmental states would always produce positive development outcomes given normal conditions.¹⁵⁶ There are many different types of developmental state manifestations with cultural peculiarities and thus it can be argued that there is no one size fits all developmental state system which can be subscribed by all nations attempting to use the system. Developmental states have come about in all cases through trial and error and an understanding of their own specific realities and learning the best way in which to implement developmental strategies and adapting them successfully to obtain desired results.

Benefits of more China

The reality is that the conditionality's have in many ways impeding economic growth in African states. The East Asian tiger economies development occurred in a reality in which the levels of corruption were often high during the very period whereby there was rapid growth and poverty reduction. This development also took place in a reality in which the rule of law was far from satisfactory and accountability was also far from the democratic ideals set by the West on African states.¹⁵⁷ The argument is not to condone corruption or argue that it can facilitate economic growth but rather that growth can still take place in spite of corruption. There is a significant amount of evidence and historical proof that shows that aspects such as cronyism and graft have been present in every states early stages of capitalist government.¹⁵⁸ This was seen in many of states such as the United States and the UK during the industrial revolution and is now being seen in China today. The realities which now exists in many developed state where by civil societies are empowered, corruption is reduced and there has been labour reform manifested from a long process of trial and error and was promoted primarily by grassroots process.¹⁵⁹ This reality was not forced by external forces or pressure for aspects such as transparency from the World Bank. The idea that African states have to adopt ideals and institutions which imitated Western realities is in itself a continuation of dehumanisation process and a complete disregard for the agency that African state have. They has to be a respect of the agency of African state to be able to manifest institutions, ideal and more importantly a developmental path that identifies with the reality of African people.

This is not to argue that the West should play role in the path Africa should take but rather that it is imperative that it allow African to become responsible for its future, its direction and the make-up of political and economic realities. The drive by the West to make African states adopt democratic ideal have in reality made less progress than its poverty reduction initiatives.¹⁶⁰ The historical record show those generations of people within a period of

¹⁵⁶ Robert Wade. 1990. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5

¹⁵⁷ Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, *The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinaafrica.pdf>, 15

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 15

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 15

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 15

growth had to be subjugated to poor standards of living, in a way as a sacrifice for the single minded approach for development. This was the reality in the US and Western states, and in many Asian states, including China. China has continued to emphasise, like that of East Asian state, that their experience has been that they have had the opportunity to obtain substantial economic growth without having to make major progress towards the rule of law or much respects to human rights. The West, on the other hand, have continued to argue that it does not concern them which development path would be theoretically preferable and that they believe that people around the world and desire political empowerment immediately and not at some point in the future. The problem essential stems from the core belief that political freedoms should be the primary concerns of all states part of the international community and the adoption of democratic, transparent and anti-corruption ideals is a necessary.

This core belief has thus been in stark contradiction with the experience of the Chinese and many of the East Asian states. The Chinese have made it clear that civil and political right are secondary concerns and have, within this context, been able to raise the average income of the people of China and maintained peace and stability in a country of close to 1, 4 billion people. The ability to develop and increase overtime both the standard of living of its people of the China and the global economic standing has thus attracted many African states to a model that is based on the current and historical reality of the state and its people, rather than an externally implemented ideal and Western universal applied plan for development.

As stated earlier, China has risen to be Africa's largest trading partners surpassing the United States in 2009 and African leaders have continued to ask for more interaction with China with various projects been planned in the near future in several African states, such as the R84 billion Rand South African infrastructural development of residential, industrial and commercial space by Chinese developers Shanghai Zendai.¹⁶¹ The majority of statements made by African leaders with regards to Chinese investment have been positive in various sectors, motivated by rhetoric of creating equal and mutually beneficial relationships that China advocate. Although there have been many problems experienced, as discussed, as the relationship continues to mature, there is sufficient evidence that the partners on both sides have shown commitment to ensuring this problems are resolved.

Chinese investment within the 21 century has dramatically increased as African Chinese economic relations strengthened. Chinese bilateral trade with Africa went from being 11 billion dollars in 2000 and has increased to 210 billion dollars in 2013.¹⁶² This investment has been important for the goal that all African states desire, which is to unlock their potential through infrastructure investment to increase trade both internationally and among member countries. African states have long identified sectors such as energy, water, sanitation, telecoms and transport as being infrastructure setbacks.¹⁶³ One of Africa's biggest problems continues to be energy supply, with the lack of infrastructure leading to 30 countries experiencing frequent power outages and only a little over one third of Africa's populations

¹⁶¹ "Chinese group's R84bn Modderfontein plan", <http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-property/the-r84bn-chinese-property-development/>, 11 April 2014

¹⁶² "Brics And Africa" <http://vibeghana.com/2014/07/30/brics-and-africa/>, 30 July 2014

¹⁶³ Ibid

having access to electricity.¹⁶⁴ The cost of the lack of infrastructure on African development has been significant, costing each member country an estimate 2% growth a year and cut productivity by as much as 40%.¹⁶⁵ The World Bank has stated that Africa will need an estimated 93 billion dollars annually to be able to fund infrastructure projects for the next 10 years.¹⁶⁶ This averages about 15% of Africa's gross domestic product and 60 billion dollars of this funding would be used in new projects with the rest going to maintenance of existing infrastructure.

These have been the exact investments that China has made across the African continent. And thus emphasises the opportunity that China presents for Africa and the value of their relationship in increasing both the standard of living and the gross domestic products of African states. China has become the number one investor in infrastructure in Africa, with its investment in infrastructure standing at 13 billion dollars in 2012.¹⁶⁷ This was more than three times the amount of the second largest investor in African infrastructure, being the World Bank, of 4 billion dollars. China has also promised 20 billion in loans for infrastructure development.¹⁶⁸

The West has continuously vilified the role of China in Africa, choosing to call it one of exploitation embedded in propping up authoritarian African leaders. But the reality has shown that this has not been the case, with China building much needed relationships with African states and has presented opportunities of development. There have been many African nations, both democratic and authoritarian, that have emphasised the importance of Sino-African relation to the development of their states. The president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, emphasised this point when he published an op-ed in the "financial times" that has now become a prominent piece on the website of the Chinese Embassy in South Africa whereby he praises the pragmatic approach to Chinese investment in Senegal.¹⁶⁹ He then goes on to say that...

The Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa. With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations build infrastructure projects in record time—bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, dams, legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. In many African nations, including Senegal, improvements in infrastructure have played important roles in stimulating economic growth... It is a telling sign of the post-colonial mind-set that some donor organisations in the west dismiss the trade agreements between Chinese banks and African states that produce these vital improvements—as though Africa was naïve enough to just offload its precious natural resources at bargain prices to obtain a commitment for another stadium or state house... I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank, takes three months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a

¹⁶⁴ Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, The Fletcher Journal of Human Security. Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinaafrica.pdf>, 13

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 13

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 13

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 13

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 13

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 13

*firm believer in good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions.*¹⁷⁰

The president highlights an important point which has been heard in the rhetoric of most if not all African states that have interacted with China, being that although they may be problems, Chinese engagement continues to be attractive because China continues to communicate ideas of mutual benefit and a shared colonial history. Chinese rhetoric has been devoid of all demeaning and patronising language communicated by the West and has replaced that with a language of mutual economic benefit and partnership on equal grounds. Most importantly their policy of non-interference that speaks of independent development, departing from the crippling practice of Western development program, is seen as giving African states a possibility of adopted a new approach of international interaction that can correct the damage that the West has inflicted on many African economies. The Chinese example of development is held up as a prototype of what independent development that takes in to consideration the domestic realities and implements developmental ideal can manifest. China is developing state with a colonial history, which not so long ago had 85% of its population living under the poverty line. The reality is far different now with China going through what many consider to be the greatest development process in modern history thus attracting the developing world, in particular Africa, to learn from their experience. This reality, the history of the unity of the of the non-aligned movement at the Bandung conference and the 21st century rhetoric, led by China, of South-South cooperation and solidarity repeated in Chinese speeches and conferences is fundamentally more attractive than Western interactions.

Conclusion

It is very important not to make sweeping statements when referring to Africa and the research paper has tried not to do that, giving rhetoric and realities from different African states and leaders. As the research paper has discussed, China is the largest economy in the world, in terms of purchasing power parity, and one of the biggest creditors in the world. This makes Chinese interaction almost necessary in Africa, whereby many states are in need of infrastructural and social and economic development. African states have the opportunity depart from a solely Eurocentric development program and maximise the benefits of their partnership with China. What will be vital is for African governments to articulate their own comprehensive China policy, which includes strategies for engagement that do not solely focus on natural resources.¹⁷¹ African states should create a more conducive environment for Chinese investment into the manufacturing sector thus allowing for the creation of more jobs for the native people.

¹⁷⁰ Abdoulaye Wade, "Time for the west to practise what it preaches," *Financial Times*, 24 January 2008, <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zt/thirdeye/t403970.htm>.

¹⁷¹ "Brics And Africa" <http://vibeghana.com/2014/07/30/brics-and-africa/>, 30 July 2014

African states will also have the opportunity to gain access to other Asian markets thus having the opportunity to better diversify the continents export products. The reality is that China will continue to remain an important trading partner and looks to be growing even stronger in economic strength. Taking this into account African states will need to find ways to maximise on its relationship with China to spur economic growth and development therefore creating the conditions to reduce poverty and reduce employment.

The research paper has argued that the current Western led international standard of civilisation is essentially exploitative and that the West has in many ways used democracy as a masquerade for “empire building”. African states, as well as the developing world, have been negatively impacted by Western led initiatives and programs. And almost all attempts at integrating developing states into the neo-liberal standard have failed to produce positive outcomes. Structural adjustment programs, the ideal of Washington consensus and good governance all attempted to make developing state adopt neo-liberal political and economic ideals which did not take into consideration internal realities of the state imposed with these programs. The paper went on at length to show the connections to this rhetoric with Eurocentric historical rhetoric that communicated ideas of civilising “the other”.

What has thus been attractive about the Chinese policy of non-interference is the independence and change in rhetoric that speaks of mutual development and non-interference in the state developmental path. China essentially commits to the ideals set by all developing states at the Bandung Conference in 1954 that promised to base interactions on non-interference, mutual respect and collective development. These interactions were not based on exploitation or a colonial relationship but rather they were seen as a partnership in growth. Sino-African relations have also, importantly, created a reality in which China has pressured the West to pay much more attention to African government then they have before. This was emphasised by an Angolan minister who state that:

*“Our relations with China not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it forced the West to treat us with more respect and in a less patronizing way. For that we are grateful.”*¹⁷²

China has established themselves and their embassies in more African states than the European Union or the United States, even establishing embassies in African states with no strategically important resources. This help to build the image of a China working in partnership with African states to develop a more equitable global reality. The Chinese policy of non-interference gives an alternative that pressures the West to recognise that it has not been getting development in Africa correct. The alterative of rapid growth at any cost model has been embraced by many African leaders. It gives them the independence to create their own development path based on the social, political and economic reality of their own state thus giving them a sense of ownership which has not be given before.

¹⁷² “China’s Waning Influence in Africa,” <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Africa/Chinas-Waning-Influence-in-Angola.html>. 26 August 2011

The research paper has emphasised that it is ironic that the very nations that divided up Africa and its people at the Berlin Conference in 1884 are now accusing China of acting in similar colonial fashion they once did. The reality has been that the majority of African leaders view the Chinese approach as being a far more attractive economic development model than the Washington consensus and Western ideal of good governance. China has continued to make it clear that it seeks to boost and develop its relationship with Africa. China is not only the number one trading partner with Africa but many other states around the world, estimating about 125 states around the world.¹⁷³ The question therefore arises to why the same criticism and disapproval is not raised with all the states across the world in which China has dealings with that they get with interactions with African states. China has consistently used the policy of non-interference in all state it is involved in with therefore showing that it is possible that the West disapproval of Chinese interaction with African states may not stem from policy disagreements but rather the fear of Chinese dominance and the diminishment of their standard of Western civilization which is now being questioned and challenged, and also the fear of losing the type of access they have had to African natural resources.

The research paper has continuously reiterated that the neo-liberal agenda is Eurocentric in nature and setting conditions in African states to adopt these principles integrated them into a system which was not beneficial for African states but in many ways strengthened the hegemonic advantage of the West over African states, a region with 2/3 of the world resources. The Chinese policy of non-interference creates and opportunity for African states to move away from this type of relationship and develop relationship that are fairer, more equal and take into consideration the domestic realities of the state.

There is no doubt that China's economic rise is shaping the international order by introducing a new development paradigm as well as introducing a new model of political and economic interaction with African states. The Chinese policy of non-interference has definitely created an alternative model of engaging with African states, putting into question the necessity of ideas like rule of law and democracy. This engagement has given hope and the possibility of African states developing a developmental approach that is driven by the desire to have equitable and high quality growth. China has given an example and provides an opportunity for African states in particular to develop their economies in a truly independent way and project their own political choices. The neo-liberal conditionality's set by Western states have continuously failed and have had devastating outcome in many developing states. China's policy of non-interference challenges the idea of neo-liberalism and Western imitation; it presents Africans with an alternative that they have embraced and allows them to finally engage in the process of independent state led development that takes into considerations the social, political and economic realities of the state. The Policy is thus argued to have far more benefits than disadvantages and allows the opportunity for a Sino-African relationship that can be described as a partnership in growth.

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