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RESEARCH REPORT

**AMALGAMATION OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE COMBATANTS WITH THE
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**

**Submitted in partial fulfilment of the Master of Management (MM) degree
in Security**

BY

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
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PLAGIARISM STATEMENT

I **Prince Nkitsing Mokotedi** do hereby declare that the work that is entailed herein is mine and unaided, and has not been submitted anywhere else for evaluation or assessment. I, have, to the best of my abilities gave credit to the authors that I have referred to or gleaned from their published work, and have given them credit in terms of the applicable rules. I embraced the IPA as a method of reference in this paper. I understand that plagiarism is wrong and unacceptable, and accept that the University may institute disciplinary measure against me in the event there is prima facie evidence that there is unacceptable levels of plagiarism in my work.

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ABSTRACT

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes are usually implemented in post-conflict situations as part of broader Security Sector Reform. In South Africa, following the demise of the apartheid government, combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), were amalgamated with the South African Police Service (SAPS) in 1995 as one of the key elements of the agreement for a new peaceful and democratic state.

The SAPS was established in terms of the provisions of the interim Constitution of 1993, and was comprised of the former SAP, which had the largest number officers, and 10 former Bantustan police forces. There was an expectation that there will be tensions during the amalgamation of MK with SAPS because of the historical bitter enmity between the combatants of MK and the members of the former apartheid police forces.

Members of MK were expected to adapt and adjust to a new environment which had command structures as well as organisational culture that was alien to theirs. This study investigated the acculturation strategies of the former combatants, and evinced that MK combatants had strong military identities and that police was resistant external factors. The study found that these cultural incompatibilities made it difficult for MK combatants to effectively amalgamate with SAPS.

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To God be the glory!

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People Liberation Army
AZANLA	Azanian National Liberation Army
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
BSAP	British South African Police of Rhodesia
COIN	Counter insurgency
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
CPR	Certified Personnel Register
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPCI	Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation
DSO	Directorate for Special Operations
IAM	Interactive Acculturation Model
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
IPA	Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
IPID	Independent Police Investigative Directorate
FNLA	Front for National the Liberation of Angola
MCW	Military Combat Work
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MKMVA	Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAMPOL	Namibian Police
NCCS	National Crime Combating Strategy
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NP	National Party
NPA	National Prosecution Authority (South Africa)
NSF	National Statutory Forces
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress

PLAN	People Liberation Army of Namibia
RAR	Rhodesian African Riflemen
SAC	South African Constabulary
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SANAB	South African Narcotics Bureau
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SDU	Self Defence Unit
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWAFT	South West African Territorial Force
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
SWAPOL	South West African Police
SPU	Self-Protection Units
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

CHAPTER 1

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The British occupied the South African territory in the mid nineteenth century, and in 1900 established the South African Constabulary, the first police agency to operate in the entire territory. The constabulary was mandated to serve as a police agency during peacetime, and was deployed to execute military duties during periods of war (Lamb, 2018). The Constabulary was dissolved in 1908 because it had become the face of British repression in the Boer Republics.

In 1910, the Union of South Africa was established following the peace treaty that was entered into between the two British colonies, namely Natal and the Cape Colony as well as the two Boer Republics, namely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Spencer, 2013). The Union government then formed two new separate national police agencies, namely the South African Mounted Riflemen and the South African Police (SAP) in 1912 and 1913 respectively (South African History Organization, 2019; Moran, 1997).

The provincial police forces that existed in these four provinces, namely the Natal Mounted Police, the Cape Mounted Rifles, the Transvaal Police and the Orange River Colony Police were demobilised and the officers, including those of the erstwhile South African Constabulary, were integrated into these two new national police agencies (Moran, 1997).

The SAMR was dissolved in the 1928, and some of the members were integrated into the SAP. As early as the 1920s, the SAP was also deployed alongside the newly formed Union Defence Force (UDF) to suppress the white miners' strikes in the Witwatersrand, and the straddling of the roles between the military and the police became a pattern and normal practice throughout the twentieth century (Fourie, Grundlingh, & Mariotti, 2017; Hamann, 2001).

When South Africa declared itself a Republic in 1960 and moved out of the Commonwealth, the SAP was already at the forefront of enforcing apartheid laws in South Africa, and had started to execute counterinsurgency activities against national liberation movements (NLMs) (Newham, Masuku, & Dlamini, 2006;

Cawthra, 1993). In 1990 when the apartheid government unbanned the NLMs, the SAP had accumulated almost ninety years of experience of amalgamating with other police forces, had developed a resilient military culture and identity, and had become the face of repression. In 1995, the combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) were brought into the newly formed South African Police Service (SAPS), and there was an expectation that the amalgamation will not be easy because during the armed struggle against apartheid “MK did not fight the SADF but the SAP” (Ngculu, 2003, p. 247).

This research project investigated the acculturation strategies of MK during amalgamation with SAPS in 1995 and beyond. The study drew qualitative data on the ‘lived experiences’ of MK combatants who are currently serving in the SAPS, and also on those who retired from the policing service after amalgamation.

1.2. BACKGROUND

There is a renewed academic interest in the battles that the former apartheid forces fought against the ‘armed wings’ of the national liberation movements (NLMs) in the neighbouring Southern African states from 1960s to 1990 (Wessels, Half a century of South African "Border War" literature: A historiographical exploration, 2017; Velthuisen, 2016). There is also global interest in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes that were implemented in the post conflict situations on the African continent in the early 1990s by various international bodies (Knight, 2008).

In the Southern African region, the South African Police (SAP) and later the South African Defence Force (SADF) were at the forefront of the conflict which destabilised the region for almost three decades (1960 – 1990) (Moran, 1997). In 1977 the South African government officially adopted the ‘total national strategy’ for defence through gazetting a White Paper on Defence Force. The apartheid government reckoned that they “were in a war whether we [they] wished to accept it or not” (Simpson, 2016, p. 221).

The cooperation between the military and the police in executing cross border operation took place as early as 1919 when the Union Defence Force (UDF), the predecessor of the SADF, occupied South West Africa in 1919, after the League of Nations gave South Africa the mandate to oversee the territory. The two forces also cooperated in suppressing the various miners' strike in the Witwatersrand in the 1920s, though the SAP suffered heavy casualties (Scholtz, 2006). The cross border war that began in the 1960s was referred to as the 'Bush War' or 'Border War', and was ignited when members of SAP were deployed to Ovamboland in South West Africa (now Namibia) where they attacked a base that was used as a springboard by combatants of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) to infiltrate the country (Scholtz, 2006).

The independence of Namibia brought an end to the 'Bush War' in 1990, and the various warring parties had to cooperate to construct a post conflict peaceful transition to democracy (Saney, 2014; Scholtz, 2006). The key pillar to peacebuilding process in the post conflict situation was to create new security structures that were intended to replace both the colonial forces and the 'armed wings' of the national liberation movements (NLMs) (Mashike & Mokalobe, 2003). Political agreements were entered into in order to facilitate the amalgamation of these forces, which in most cases was preceded by a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the former combatants of the NLMs (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

DDR in South Africa is largely seen to have been unsuccessful (Mokalobe, 2001). It has been criticised for being poorly planned and ineffectively implemented. A significant number of MK combatants were not accommodated in any of the security sector institutions, namely, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Force Defence (SANDF) (Maringira, 2015; Evaratt, 2007). Some of the combatants who were integrated in the new structures were dissatisfied and voluntarily resigned. In 1997, combatants of MK left their bases because they were dissatisfied with the conditions under which they were treated by former SADF members and they returned to their bases after they were nudged by the then President Nelson Mandela (Mashike & Mokalobe, 2003; Mokalobe, 2001).

A poorly conceptualised and executed DDR is very likely to threaten the peacebuilding process. However, DDR is challenging as most of the former combatants only know military environment and they find it difficult to adjust to civilian life (Evaratt, 2007). Combatants may also be shocked by the reality that they now had to work side by side with their former enemies. This research project investigated the acculturation strategy of MK combatants during amalgamation with the South African Police Service.

1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

In post conflict situations the amalgamation of combatants of former national liberation movements (NLMs) and colonial forces is viewed as a catalyst for peacebuilding and democratisation processes towards a new envisaged government (Dzinesa, 2008). During the peacebuilding process Security Sector Reform is prioritised in order to avoid a situation where the country slips back into conflict because combatants and war veterans whose interests are not adequately addressed in the developmental objectives of the new regime, may resort to violence (African Development Bank Group, 2011).

The weakness of the DDR process in post conflict situations is the failure to reintegrate the combatants into civilian life or to be absorbed into new security structure. In situations where combatants were amalgamated with their former colonial forces, the structures of the colonial forces formed the backbone of the new amalgamated force (Evaratt, 2007). In these instances the former combatants of the NLMs feel that they are being tolerated and not adequately accommodated in the new security structures mainly because of differences in cultural differences (Mokalobe, 2001).

In South Africa, DDR was implemented from 1990 following the demise of apartheid. The national liberation movements (NLMs), mainly ANC and PAC, and their military wings, MK and Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) were unbanned (Mashike & Mokalobe, 2003). As part of the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, a total of eleven police forces were amalgamated, namely, the South African Police (SAP), Transkei Police, Bophuthatswana Police, Venda Police, Ciskei Police, KwaZulu Police, Kwandebele Police, Kangwane Police, Lebowa Police, Qwaqwa and Gazankulu in order to constitute

the new South African Police Service (SAPS) (South African Police Service, 2014).

The official documents on the amalgamation of the SAPS do not make any reference to the amalgamation of MK during this period. The recently published Green Paper on Policing which provides policy directives on transformation of the SAPS, refers solely to the amalgamation of the eleven polices that existed during the apartheid. Some of the credible articles on police reform in post-apartheid South African also do not reflect at all on the integration or amalgamation or presence of MK in the new police service (Pruitt, 2010).

The early indication is that the amalgamation of MK combatants was not regulated officially through legislation, policy, or national instructions (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2013). However, in contradistinction with the military, the amalgamation of the former SADF and MK and the former Bantustan forces were regulated by various legislation and policy provisions. Needless, the amalgamation of these police forces with MK combatants meant that the former enemies with diverse cultures were bound to work side by side in a new paramilitary agency, the South African Police Service (SAPS) (Newham, Masuku, & Dlamini, 2006).

The first National Commissioner of the new SAPS, Commissioner George Fivaz, a former senior police officer in the SAP, waived some of the requirements for entry into the SAPS in order to accommodate ex-combatants who would not have ordinarily made it into the SAPS due to age, qualifications and experience (Rauch & van der Spuy, 2006). It is asserted that since amalgamation, the organizational culture and the structures of the erstwhile South African Police (SAP) basically remained intact. The new South African Police Service (SAPS) simply mirrored the structural design as well as command and control of operations of SAP (Rauch & van der Spuy, 2006; Eloff, 2006).

This study therefore investigated the extent to which military identity as expressed in the conduct and attitudes of MK combatants impacted on the acculturation process during the amalgamation into SAPS which had its own resilient paramilitary culture. The study embraced a qualitative approach, namely, Interpretative Phenomenological Approach because it offers the research participants space to ventilate individualised 'lived experiences' of participation

during the armed struggle and also in post conflict situation where they had to work with former enemies (Charlick, Pincombe, & Fielder, 2016).

1.4. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study was to understand the factors that impacted on acculturation of MK combatants during the amalgamation with their erstwhile arch enemies, the South African Police (SAP) especially since the former had strong military identities and latter have almost a diametrically opposite political, ideological and cultural orientations (van Tonder & Soontiens, 2014). The purpose of studying acculturation is to understand how people are able to cope and manage in different societies to the one in which they were not raised in or accustomed to. The acculturation studies help to understand how people who have developed strong identities and lineage to a particular society can still be able to cope in another society (Berry J. W., 1997).

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study intended to research the dynamics of acculturation between two paramilitary forces that were arch enemies in the past. There is generally a dearth of research on the acculturation experiences of former combatants in post-apartheid South Africa especially with regards to how they were affected by the amalgamation process into newly established forces, especially in the police service (Rauch & van der Spuy, 2006).

There is a study, needless, that was conducted on the acculturation among the police members at national head office (Nchabeleng, 2008). The context for the study, however, is that the SAPS became a culturally diverse institution after 1994 following the implementation of affirmative action and other programs that were promoting diversity. The purpose of the study was to investigate various coping mechanisms of the individual SAPS members at head office in a multicultural and diverse institution (Nchabeleng, 2008).

This study generates new knowledge on the amalgamation of MK into SAPS and further opens a door to further studies on the acculturation of police officers during the amalgamation process from management and policy perspectives. The study also generates further research interest in the role of group identities

and culture in mergers and acquisitions in the public and corporate sector. The study furthermore sheds light into the understanding of members of MK within the SAPS on how the DDR process affected them.

1.6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.5.1 Key questions

- a) What is the key acculturation strategy that MK members embraced during the amalgamation process?
- b) What are the outcomes of the acculturation strategy that MK combatants embraced during amalgamation with SAPS?
- c) To what extent did the military identity of MK members serve as a determinant in their choice of acculturation strategy during amalgamation with SAPS?

1.7. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aims and objects of this research project are the following;

- a) To determine the acculturation strategies of the members of MK during the amalgamation with South African Police (SAP) and former Bantustan police forces.
- b) To determine how the military experiences of former combatants shaped their social identity, and in this context, their 'military' group identity.
- c) To determine the impact of group identities, namely, military identity of the MK members on the acculturation outcomes during the amalgamation process.
- d) To determine the experiences of members of MK on the dynamics, nature and extent of their interaction with other members of the SAPS.
- e) To determine the perception and experiences of MK members on the culture and values of the SAPS as they impacted and affected their acculturation process during amalgamation.

1.8. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.8.1 Acculturation

1.8.1.1 Defining Acculturation

Acculturation is defined as:

“those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in original culture patterns of either or both groups” (Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits cited by Berry (1997, p. 7).

In this context culture refers to shared norms, beliefs, values and attitudes that affect individual's behaviour within a defined group (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017).

Acculturation takes place through social encounters which includes neighbourhoods, schools, universities, places of worship, marketplace where the migrants will have an opportunity to interact with the hosts. Accordingly, the place of work, where a person spends considerable time, also provides a social context where the acculturation can be constrained or facilitated (van Tonder & Soontiens, 2014; Adams & van de Vijver, 2017).

1.8.2 Social Identity Theory

1.8.2.1 Introduction

Social Identity Theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979, and was used to explain the psychological basis for groups to discriminate against each other when they come into contact with one another (Agbibo, 2015; Sam & Berry, 2010). Therefore, the natural disposition of individuals to classify themselves or to discriminate other groups provides a psychological basis for members of that particular segment of the society to classify others, and also for the members to classify themselves in the society (Bonache, Langinier, & Zarrage-Oberty, 2016; Sam & Berry, 2010; Adams & van de Vijver, 2017).

SIT has been used to understand relations between groups that are hostile to each other and among those that use violence to achieve various aims (Agbibo, 2015). It can be applied in everyday or routine group identification such as being

a fan of a football club to more serious situations where, for instance, a person joins a secret organization or a criminal gang. In other instances, SIT was used in studying extremist groups, attitudes of citizens towards immigrants, and adaptation of immigrants to new cultures (Adams & Van de Vijver, 2017; Agbibo, 2015; Sam & Berry, 2010)

1.9. RESEARCH DESIGN

1.9.1 Introduction

Mouton (2001) makes a distinction between research design and research methodology. The author defines research design as a plan or blueprint that a researcher intends to follow when conducting research (Mouton, 2001). There are two main types of research designs, namely, empirical studies and non-empirical studies (Welman, Kruger, & Mitchell, 2005). The former would include studies such as surveys, experiments, case studies, and ethnographic studies. The latter would include studies such as philosophical analysis and theory building (Mouton, 2001). According to Mouton (2001) research methodology focuses on the actual research processes and the type of tools and procedures that are to be followed.

According to Berry (2009), studies on acculturation have largely been empirical and can be classified into psychological and cultural studies and that both would require different methodological approaches. Psychological approaches usually take the quantitative approach whereas the cultural studies follow qualitative approach. However, the polarization of the studies into the two distinct approaches “seriously limits the possibility of attaining a comprehensive knowledge of the processes and outcomes of acculturation” (Berry J. W., 2009, p. 362).

1.9.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)

The aim of IPA is to “reveal and interpret the embedded meaning in a lived experience” (Charlick, Pincombe, McKellar, & Fielder, 2016, p. 207). The most distinct feature of the phenomenological approach is that the researcher is enabled to observe and record the ‘lived experiences’ of the research participant. The method provides a safe space for ‘bonding’ between the researcher and the

research participants and allows the research participants to tell his or 'her lived experience' without hindrances (Wagner, Kawulich, & Garner, 2012, p. 55).

IPA is the most relevant qualitative approach to apply in this study because each research participant offers a unique 'lived experience' with regards to their participation during amalgamation process with SAPS but also bring a unique military identity which impacted on their reintegration into civilian life. The personal 'lived experience' is important in this study because this study is the first to investigate the amalgamation phenomenon as well as acculturation experiences of combatants.

In this study the experience of the members of MK with regards to the amalgamation process is expressed therefore in the outcome of their experience of acculturation, in particular, through their strategy to find space within a dominant and authoritarian culture. This study amplified the voice of the members of MK who were amalgamated into the SAPS about their own understanding and experiences of acculturating into the SAPS. The members shared their strategies of acculturation, their experience of the 'host' culture and how they viewed the response of the 'host/acquiring culture'.

1.9.3 Sampling

A sample is a small group of research subjects that has been drawn from the larger population, and is representative of the characters of the large population from which it has been drawn (White, 2004). It is essential, therefore, that the selection of the sample should be directed and influenced by the content of the research questions because the research subjects should have knowledge and experience of the phenomenon that is being studied. The sample must be comprised of informed participants (McNabb, 2015).

In this study a purposive sampling method was used to select 12 research participants from members of MK who were amalgamated into the SAPS. The research participants were selected through referrals in instances where the participant declined to participate or took too long to complete the questionnaire that was sent to him or her. The research sample ended with 13 participants because the participants who were replaced responded later and were accommodated in the study.

The study focussed in Gauteng primarily because the province has proportionally a large number of ex-combatants which included members of informal formations such as Self Defence Units (SDUs) and Self Protection Units (SPUs) which were aligned to the various military wings (Everatt & Jennings, 2006). The sample included both the current serving ex-MK members and those members who are retired.

1.9.4 Data Collection

The study was intended to collect data by means of in-depth interviews with the research participants. However, the Covid_19 pandemic made it difficult for research participants to accede to face-to-face interviews. It was only three research participants who agreed to be interviewed on a face-to-face basis. The Ethics research committee had also endorsed the use of questionnaires in this study. Since the IPA is adopted as an approach, the questionnaires were to a large extent open ended.

There are ethical issues that the researcher had to mitigate, and these included seeking information that would have been sensitive and might have caused possible prejudice to the research subject (McNabb, 2015). The researcher was conscious of his position with respect to the various issues and thus he maintained objectivity and to eliminate bias in the collection as well as during analysis of data.

1.9.5 Data Analysis

Data was interpreted in way that allowed to extract meaning out of the 'lived experiences' of the participants. In qualitative studies, data is often in the form on interviews notes or records (White, 2004). A systematic process to analyse data was embraced whereby the responses from the research participants were categorised in a way that the responses extracted themes from which narratives were then drawn with respect to challenges and outcomes of their acculturation experience (Burnard, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008).

According to McNabb (2015) the process of analysing qualitative information include the following steps; to seek out patterns, coding the information, comparing responses for similarities and contrasts, unbundling of constructs,

reordering of codes, critical interpretation, and development or confirmation of theory from the analysis.

1.10. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The researcher had some interaction in the line of duty with MK combatants who were amalgamated into the South African Police Service (SAPS). The researcher interacted with MK combatants during the struggle against apartheid, and was active in student movement and participated in some underground activities during that period. However, the researcher is not part of the Non Statutory Forces nor is he active in MK Military Veterans Association (MKVA).

The methodological approach that is being embraced in this study is qualitative research, specifically, the Interpretative Phenomenological Approach (IPA). This approach is designed to mitigate against prior knowledge that the researcher may have on the phenomenon that is being studied or the research subjects (Charlick, Pincombe, & Fielder, 2016). Therefore, in this project, the prior knowledge of the researcher about the research participants was mitigated because the IPA approach affords the research participants the space and liberty to communicate their personal 'lived' experiences of their acculturation during amalgamation with SAP from their own perspective.

There was, therefore, no influence from the side of the researcher on the formulation and articulation of perspective of the research subjects regarding their experiences. The identified members who were part of the initial amalgamation process have retired or about to retire and they have no inhibitions nor apprehensions to share objectively their 'lived experiences' in the SAP and their challenges and success that they experienced during the acculturation process.

1.11. LIMITATION OF STUDY

The limitation of the study is that it cannot be generalized to other police forces that were amalgamated at the same time as the MK in 1995 nor to any other amalgamation process in the corporate or public sector primarily because the SAP and MK had a bitter and an antagonistic relationship before amalgamation took place. However, the lessons learnt in relation to the management of merging or amalgamation of forces or organization that had or have cultures that are

apparently hostile to one another, the coping mechanisms of the 'incoming group' at the group level including the coping mechanism at the individual level in respect of the affective, behavioural and cognitive levels, can be valuable to instances where people from different or hostile organizational cultures are brought to work together.

1.12. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 1: Introduction

This Chapter provides the introduction and background to the research project. The chapter also introduces the concepts of Acculturation and Social Identity Theory. The basic elements of the methodological approach which is embraced in this study, namely, the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, are also discussed. The chapter also outlines the Problem statement, Purpose of the research, aims and objectives, limitations of the study as well as the Ethical considerations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter explores literature on Police Amalgamation Process and draws important lessons from countries and jurisdictions that include United States, Canada as well as England and Wales. The chapter further introduces the concept of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as a necessary precondition for peacebuilding and amalgamation of forces in post-conflict context situations. The role of the United Nations (UN) and other interagency institutions in the implementation of DDR is elaborated. Lastly, the chapter draws lessons on DDR and amalgamation of military and police forces in Namibia and Zimbabwe into new institutions, as well as on amalgamation of military forces in South Africa into a new security structures.

Chapter 3: Umkhonto we Sizwe and South African Police

The history of Umkhonto we Sizwe is studied with a view to highlight the elements that characterise the nature and culture of the organization. Similarly, the history of the SAP is discussed with a view to highlight its cultural tendencies. The purpose will be to assess the extent to which these cultures made it possible for the two institutions to amalgamate.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter the Social Identification Theory (SIT) Models and the Acculturation Models are discussed with a view to apply these in the analysis of data. The model provides a Framework to understand the formation of social identities, especially military identities.

Chapter 5: Research Design and Methodology

This chapter discusses the various phases of research design, and the different phases of IPA methods and its relevance to this study which is aimed at analysing the amalgamation of two forces which were previously hostile to one another.

Chapter 6: Data Presentation and Analysis

In this chapter data is analysed using the IPA model. Furthermore, the themes are developed and supported through using direct quotes by the participants.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

In this sections conclusions are made following the findings on the lived experiences of the combatants. Recommendations are also made to address these findings.

CHAPTER 2: AMALGAMATION OF POLICE FORCES AND THE DEMOBILISATION, DEMILITARISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) OF COMBATANTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

2.1 AMALGAMATION OF POLICE FORCES

2.1.1 Background

In most Western countries amalgamation of police forces is motivated by a myriad of factors which include, the need to improve service delivery, reduce crime rates, share expertise, create economic efficiencies, diversify the workplace and comply with legislative provisions (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, Petrunik, & Melchers, 2016). Most studies that were conducted on amalgamations or mergers and acquisitions mainly focussed on the advantages of economies of scale of the new amalgamated entity, and not many studies have investigated the role of socio-cultural factors during and after the amalgamation process (Roberts, Wallace, & Moles, 2010).

The main reason for neglecting cultural factors during amalgamation of institutions in Western countries is that the merging companies usually have common cultural aspects such as language, values and norms (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Similarly, police forces in these countries have common cultural factors, and also that these countries are relatively homogeneous and therefore the socio-cultural factors are neglected during amalgamation of forces.

Amalgamation of forces in United States of America, England and Wales as well as in Canada is discussed in the following sections. The factors that were considered in the selection of the countries or jurisdictions were; the history of amalgamation, legal frameworks that regulate amalgamation, as well as the nature and complexity of policing structures or framework.

2.1.2 Amalgamation of police forces in the United States of America

Policing in the United States is highly fragmented, with roughly 18000 police agencies that operate at local, regional, provincial and national level. It is also reported that 12500 of these agencies are standalone municipal agencies (Johnstone, 2017). In the state of Pennsylvania, for instance, there are roughly

1000 different police agencies, and in one of the counties in the state, Allegheny County, there are 120 police agencies which are operating within an area of about 750 square miles (195000 hectares) (Juris Magazine, 2018).

Amalgamation in the US takes different forms, including the form where two or more adjacent local police agencies merge into a regional police agency. In some cases, it would be the agencies in the same local area that combine their forces, for example, where the Sheriff's office would amalgamate with the municipal police agency. In some instances, local police agencies that are situated in adjacent towns would amalgamate into a regional police agency (Johnstone, 2017; Juris Magazine, 2018).

The US, however, established specialised federal law agencies as far back as 1789 when the US Marshals was created. The federal law enforcement agencies fall under two main Departments, namely, the Department of Justice and the United States Homeland Security. Agency that fall under the Department of Justice include the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the United State Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (Erickson, Carr, & Herbert , 2007).

The 9/11 tragedy in the US ignited momentum and urgency for the Federal government to reconfigure the institutional arrangements regarding the existence of different agencies. Through the Patriot Act (Uniting America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) which was a key pillar of the 'war on terror', a number of agencies were brought under Homeland Security which became the biggest agency with the largest number of officers in the US. These were from US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Secret Service, US Border and Protection, US Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The 'war on terror' also infused a culture of interagency cooperation between the FBI and other agencies to create the Joint Terrorism Task Force (Erickson, Carr, & Herbert , 2007).

At the state or regional level, the key drivers of amalgamation of police forces are the fragmentation with regards to training standards, remuneration disparities, funding, police-community relations, and gaps in information sharing (Johnstone, 2017). Needless, there has not been any conclusive observations regarding

whether or not the amalgamation of small forces into regional ones results in operational efficiencies, cost-cutting, economies of scale (Juris Magazine, 2018).

The key drivers in the US to amalgamate forces especially at national level are the operational efficiencies to combat external threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and lately, cybercrime. The amalgamation of police forces in the US is, therefore, driven by national security imperatives. However, despite the drive to amalgamate forces, there is a small chance that a national police force will be established in the United States because the tenth Amendment of the Constitution accords policing responsibility to the states and not to the federal government (Johnstone, 2017).

2.1.3 Amalgamation of forces in England and Wales

In United Kingdom, the amalgamation of police agencies has been a matter of debate as early as the nineteenth century. The Police Act of 1964 in England provided for the amalgamation of police agencies of small or adjacent towns. The state announced that the amalgamation of police agencies in England and Wales will be voluntary, however, it will be made mandatory in circumstances where the municipalities are resisting to merge the police services where it is deemed fit.

By the turn of the twenty first century England and Wales had 43 police forces and there was now pressure to restructure these agencies into fewer and effective bigger agencies (Mendel, Fyfe, & den Heyfer, 2017). However, further rationalisation of these 43 police forces in these territories was supported by the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Lord Blair, who expressed a view that the government should prioritize the restructuring of these agencies into fewer regional police agencies (Mendel, Fyfe, & den Heyfer, 2017).

Three models were proposed for England and Wales, namely, that the local municipalities may initiate on their own to merge local police agencies into regional or bigger police agencies, the mergers should be coordinated to form 10 regional police agencies, and lastly, that the police agencies should merge into a single national police agency. Consequently there was no agreement on the model because the discussions were influenced by the lack of consensus on the factors such as governance and accountability, economies of scale, operational

efficiency, size and structure, roles of the different police units and delivery of service at local level (Mendel, Fyfe, & den Heyfer, 2017).

2.1.4 Amalgamation of police forces in Canada

The dominion of Canada was birthed in 1867 out of a confederation of several colonies which had some form of independence. The colonies were brought together through the British North American Act, 1867 which was basically a compact between France and Britain to establish an independent country, namely, Canada. The federal system resulted in both the national and the former government of former colonies having more or less the same responsibilities and authority over the territory. The federal government after lengthy negotiations among the colonies ended up with relatively more power than the provincial governments (Lithopoulos, 2015).

The federal system and concurrent powers of national and provincial governments led to the formation of police agencies at these different levels of government. As early as 1957, the smaller municipalities in Ontario, consolidated their police agencies to establish a larger and better resourced, Metropolitan Toronto Police Force. Through this process of amalgamation, the municipal policing agencies were reduced from a total of 153 in 1962 to 11 regional police agency in 1996 (Lithopoulos, 2015; Kiedrowski, Melchers, Petrunik, & Ruddell, 2016).

The establishment and reconfiguration of regions and municipalities in the 1980s also necessitated the amalgamation of police forces so that they are properly aligned with the new boundaries. In Quebec amalgamation was enshrined in the Police Act of 2000 which made provision for smaller municipalities to close down their policing agencies and to amalgamate them with the regional agencies (Lithopoulos, 2015). Some municipalities were encouraged to contract the regional policing agencies for law enforcement duties. The process of consolidation of police services resulted in the reduction of total number of agencies from 109 in 2001 to 30 in November 2012 (Lithopoulos, 2015).

2.1.5 Conclusion on the amalgamation of police forces in the Western countries

In the public sector, the merging of government departments and especially police agencies is a common phenomenon in the developing world. The motive to merge or amalgamate government institutions is mainly to address the economies of scale, to improve efficiencies and also to reduce the bloated public service wage bill. The key drivers for amalgamation of police forces are economic and operational factors.

In some of the countries, the existence of several police agencies is related to the political history and the development of those nations. Some of these nations were initially small federal and independent entities which had their own police services, and when these entities developed into nation states, the police forces were amalgamated and rationalized.

Invariably the consequence of amalgamating different police agencies is that different organizational cultures are brought into contact with one another. If the process of the acculturation is not properly managed it may lead to undesirable consequences and eventual failure of the amalgamation.

2.2 AMALGAMATION OF FORCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE DDR PROCESSES

2.2.1 Introduction

At the end of the twentieth century, most of the countries on the African continent had attained independence from colonial rule, and had established new governments, embraced multi-party systems and were relatively peaceful or were engaged in peacebuilding processes. The key factor in the negotiations for peace in these countries was the dissolution of the former armed forces of the national liberation movements (NLMs), and amalgamating these forces into the new police and the defence forces in order to serve the new postcolonial government.

During the negotiations process for independence, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of the former combatants was a principal pillar for the

peacebuilding process (Dzinesa, 2006). Authors agree that DDR is important because uncontrolled former combatants pose a threat to peacebuilding as they are trained to use arms, they usually maintain their organized structures beyond the independence, and also that they are prone to use violence in order to achieve their goals (Banholzer, 2014; Evaratt, 2007).

Colonial governments insisted on the demobilisation and disarmament of the combatants as a major prerequisite to initiate and engage in negotiations for peacebuilding and reconstruction and development in post conflict situation because they did not trust the bona fides of the National Liberation Movements (NLMs).

2.2.2 Defining Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration

The United Nations (UN) and other international organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) began in 1990s to actively participate in peace-building efforts in post-conflict situations all over the world (International Organization for Migration, 2019). The threat to peace and stability in post-conflict situations has been the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and as well as trained former combatants who have not been disarmed nor integrated into civilian life, especially on the African continent (African Development Bank Group, 2011; Knight, 2008).

It estimated that in the last half a century there has been close to six million fatalities on the African continent as a result of civil wars or some other kind of armed conflict between the state and armed groups. It is further estimated that there are about 50 million AK47 rifles that are circulating illegally on the African continent and these tend to find their way to the areas where there is conflict (Knight, 2008).

The aim of DDR process is therefore to “contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin” (Knight, 2008, p. 28).

DDR is defined as:

“an operation that consists of the assembly and cantonment of ex-combatants, consistent with the provisions of a peace agreement, with a view to collecting their weapons, disbanding their formal military framework, and assisting them in reintegrating in the society, either as civilians or formal members of national armed security (e.g., national police, gendarmerie) forces” (Ayissi, 2021, p. 171)

In Southern Africa, the role of the colonial armies and the police forces was in most cases blurred during the fight with the liberation movements. The police forces would in most instances take the responsibility of fighting the national liberation movements (NLMs) inside the borders of the country whereas the military would conduct cross-border raids (Gear, 2002). During the Apartheid era, the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the SAP (South African Police) were the major forces against the liberation movements in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), Namibia (South West Africa), Angola, Uganda and South Africa (Williams, 2006).

However, in post-independence era, it was envisaged that the warring forces would be dissolved and the new security apparatus, which includes the military, the police and intelligence, would be formed out of the amalgamation of these erstwhile enemies (Dzinesa, 2006). It is against this background that the amalgamation of police services in this research project is discussed within the context of the demilitarisation, demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of the colonial state security forces and the liberation movements in these countries.

2.2.3 Amalgamation of forces in Namibia

The South African government invaded the South West African (now Namibia) territory during the First World in order to secure the interests of the British government against Germany. The Union Defence Force (UDF) invasion was later led General Louis Botha and they easily defeated the poorly equipped German forces in that territory. The UDF maintained presence from about 1915 to about 1920 in the territory (Hamann, 2001).

South African government was given formal authority to oversee the South West African territory on behalf of the British through the Mandate Act No.49 of 1919. The League of Nations, after the First World War, also endorsed in 1919 the temporary authority of the Union government to oversee and administer South West African territory, now known as Namibia (Andries, 2012; Hamann, 2001).

The South African Police (SAP) had taken over the role of the South West African Police in 1939, however, South African government maintained very low presence of the SAP and the SADF in the territory (Moran, 1997). In 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nation (UN) revoked the authority of South Africa to rule South West Africa and the Security Council supported the annexation in 1969 (Cawthra, 1993).

The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) which was formed to resist the occupation of Namibia by South Africa, opted for armed struggle when the non-violent approach to resolve the withdrawal of South African presence in the territory was resisted by the Apartheid government (Nathan, 1993). SWAPO initially attacked the apartheid forces from their bases in Angola using guerrilla tactics. However, they were easily defeated because the territory in that part of the country was largely dry and sandy thus the guerrillas were easily exposed (Hamann, 2001).

The SAP and the SADF gathered intelligence on the training and attacked it in through helicopter raids in August of 1966, and this sparked the beginning of a devastating battle in Namibia (Scholtz, 2006). SWAPO retaliated by attacking two white families in the area a few weeks later. The SAP and SADF then conducted a swoop and arrested many members of SWAPO who were taken to Pretoria and charged for various crimes including sedition. About 20 were given life sentences and the rest were given long sentences on a basis of a law that was rushed through and applied retrospectively (Cawthra, 1993, p.90).

The SADF was formally deployed in Namibia in 1972, and the SAP members were redeployed back to South Africa and others to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). By 1975 the onslaught against the South African Units had escalated so severe that the SAP members were recalled to provide support. The South African

government then recruited members of the local communities to join the special commandos that were established to fight SWAPO guerrillas (Dzinesa, 2006).

In 1981, the South West African Police (SWAPOL) was officially created and the senior officers of the SAP took charge of the command of the force (Nathan, 1991). Members of the commandos were formed by the apartheid government to fight combatants of SWAPO, were later absorbed into South West African Police (SWAPOL). The new force was focussing primarily on riots and crowd control. In 1985 the SAP handed over to SWAPOL a counterinsurgency unit officially referred to as Operation K, and commonly referred to as Koevoet which means crow bar (Cawthra, 1993). The Unit was constituted by about 300 white officers from SAP and was formed in 1979 (Nathan, 1991). Koevoet members were paid bonuses on the basis of the number of insurgents that they killed (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998; Cawthra, 1993).

The attack on SWAPO bases spilled into Angola, however, the South African Army suffered losses because the Angolan government was supported by the Cuban and the Russian force. The most devastating and decisive battle was fought at Cuito Carnavale. The military setbacks and the international pressures forced the South African government to accede to a UN led negotiation process which paved way for the independence of Namibia in 1990 (Hamann, 2001).

A new police force, Namibian Police (NAMPOL) was established following the independence of Namibia. However, this new force was basically created on the core structure of SWAPOL (Freeman, 1992; Cawthra, 1993). The new government was faced with “an acute shortage of trained police”, and amalgamated former SWAPO combatants (Nathan, 1991, p. 16). About one third of the new national police service were former combatants, and the top leadership consisted mainly of white officers of the dissolved SWAPOL (Nathan, 1991).

The formation of the new defence force in Namibia following independence took a different configuration than that of the police force. The new defence force was an amalgam of People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the South West African

Territorial Force (SWAFT) which was fighting side by side with the South African Defence Force (SADF) (Mashike, 2008).

Equal number of ex-combatants from each of the forces had to be integrated into the new force, and the process of amalgamation was guided by the British Military (Freeman, 1992). Following the independence, the majority of the Koevoet were demobilised and others joined the South African Police (SAP). Some of the Security Branch members stayed behind to serve the new SWAPO government (Nathan, 1991).

2.2.4 Amalgamation of forces and DDR in Zimbabwe

The British South African Police (BSAP) was established by Cecil Rhodes in 1889 through proclamation by the British in order to protect the British Settlers who were migrating further north from the South African territory. The BSAP functioned as both police force and a military unit, and fought during the Second Anglo-Boer war as well during World War 1 in Tanganyika (Dzinesa, 2006). In the 1960s and 1970s during the Ian Smith's regime, the BSAP was leading the fight against the armed forces of the national liberation movements (NLMS) during the "Bush War".

The British South African Police of Rhodesia (BSAP) played the role of a defence force because (Southern) Rhodesia did not have a regular army until the 1940s (Dzinesa, 2006). Africans were recruited in the BSAP as early as 1900s, and a considerable proportion was initially recruited from other British protectorates, such Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Bechuanaland (now Botswana) (Stapleton, 2010). In 1967, ZIPRA forces together with MK engaged BSAP, SAP and the Rhodesian African Riflemen (RAR) in the Wankie campaign that was intended to open routes for guerrillas to enter South Africa from Zambia through Zimbabwe (Dabengwa, 2019; Gear, 2002).

The ZIPRA and ZANLA forces had serious tensions prior to independence and their animosity persisted beyond the amalgamation process, and this contributed to the low intensity post-independence civil war (Maringira, 2017). At independence in 1980, the BSAP force had roughly 9000 regular members, and

the majority of senior officers were white, and Africans made up the junior ranks (Gear, 2002).

The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) was established in 1980 following independence from Britain. The ZRP was an amalgamation of the BSAP, ZIPRA, ZANLA, Rhodesian Front and new recruits. The process of democratization, which was referred to as Africanisation, was implemented and led to most of the senior white officers being retired and replaced by African police officers. The first black Commissioner, who joined the police force since 1960, was appointed in 1982. The BSAP formed the core structure of the new Zimbabwean police service, and the leadership was mainly the former members of BSAP. The combatants of former NLMs had to be taken through orientation programs and accelerated officers' courses.

The police approach remained largely paramilitary although policies were adopted to reform the police service so as to instil a culture of transparency and accountability and human rights. The ZRP was criticised for cooperating with the army and the Central intelligence Organization to clamp down on the protests that took place against the petrol hikes in 2018. However, it has been observed that community trust in the police is steadily increasing (Afrobarometer, 2019).

In Zimbabwe the different warring parties during the "Bush War" were demobilized following the independence of the country in 1980. The new government in Zimbabwe had to amalgamate at least three different forces into the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The amalgamation of the forces were conducted under the guidance of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (Maringira, 2018).

The new government in Zimbabwe implemented various demobilisation and re-integration programs for ex-combatants into the society (Mashike, 2008). However, the demobilisation of the forces and their integration was not very successful in Zimbabwe as numerous ex-combatants were not absorbed into the new army nor were they successfully integrated into the society. The ex-combatants therefore remained a threat to the stability of the country decades after independence (Lamb, 2006).

The former combatants in Zimbabwe were not properly disarmed following the post-independence negotiations and were also not adequately integrated. This resulted in the former ZANLA forces engaging in violent attacks in the Matebeleland and Midlands and engaged the government forces in combat in the period following independence, from 1981 - 1987 (Maringira, 2016). The government forces responded by deploying troops that were trained by the Koreans known as the *Gukurabundi*. The conflict led to about 10 000 civilian deaths and was stopped following the peace accord signed in Midlands between ZANU and ZAPU (Lamb, 2006).

2.2.5 Amalgamation of forces and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in South Africa (The Experience of the formation of the South African Defence Force)

MK was officially demobilised in 1990, although the majority of ex-combatants were left out during the demobilisation process (von den Steinen, 1999). However, the ANC was running a secret operation, Operation Vula which was intended to infiltrate the leaders such as Mac Maharaj, Simphiwe Nyanda, and Ronnie Kasrils, among others, in order to set up structures that would mobilise 'peoples'war' and to seize power by violent means from the apartheid regime in the event the negotiations with the apartheid regime disintegrate (Maharaj, 2008).

Operation Vula was to be "kept as an insurance policy to be activated if the ANC was not able to achieve what it wanted at the negotiation table" (Hamann, 2001, p. 184). Operation Vula failed and the operatives were arrested and the network was exposed. In 1991 the African National Congress passed a Resolution at its National Conference that was held in Durban that it will suspend the armed activities.

The Resolution was intended to clarify that the armed struggle was not abandoned. The ANC resolved that MK will continue to exist until the negotiations have been concluded and the members of the various armed forces have been integrated into envisaged defence force (African National Congress, 1991). The declaration had no effect because the apartheid regime had significantly infiltrated and dismantled the underground structures of MK (Barnard, 2015).

The leadership of the SADF initiated the discussion with MK in 1992 regarding amalgamation of the two forces. SADF was represented by General George Meiring, General Steyn as well as Neil Barnard who was the Head of the National Intelligence Service at the time. In 1993 the negotiators from South African Defence Force (SADF) and the military wing of the ANC, MK engaged directly in a structured process to negotiate for amalgamation or integration of the armed forces (Williams, 2000).

According to Mokalobe (2001, p62), the SADF initiated the discussion so that they can “gain control of the future defence force”. The approach was in line with the “Total Strategy” which provided that the apartheid government should never negotiate from a position of defeat but from a position of power. The apartheid strategists had planned long before, when it became inevitable that the future of South African will be negotiated, to take control of the negotiation process and significantly determine the outcomes thereof (Barnard, 2015).

Needless, the negotiators from both sides agreed that the new security forces will be inclusive and their operations will be directed and based on principle of respect for human rights, and also that the newly established security institutions will themselves undergo transformation and rationalization (Mokalobe, 2001).

During the negotiations, special attention was given to the transformation of the old South African Defence Force (SADF) and legislation was passed to ensure smooth transition (Williams, 2000). However, not much attention was paid to the integration of the MK combatants into the new police service (Rauch, 2000). Accordingly, the envisaged defence force in the new South Africa would be an amalgam of the old South African Defence Force (SADF), the defence forces of the various homeland governments as well as the military wings of the various liberation movements. The major hurdle in the amalgamation process was that the number of Non Statutory Force (NSF) members, that is, MK and APLA was unknown and could not be confirmed (Mashike & Mokalobe, 2003).

The members of the liberation movements who were integrated in the SADF were immediately taken through an adjustment training programme as they were not from a conventional army. The members from the former Bantustans did not have

to go through this programme because they were directly or indirectly trained by South African Defence Force (SADF). The core structure and practices of the new SANDF were principally those of the SADF and it was widely perceived that the NSF and TBVC members were absorbed into the SADF (Dzinesa, 2006).

A register, referred to as the Certified Personnel Register (CPR), of ex-combatants of the liberation movements was compiled for purposes of demobilisation and integration into the SANDF. There were roughly 28000 members of MK on the CPR, however, members of AZANLA were not integrated into the SANDF during the initial phase of integration (Stott, 2002). AZANLA members were not included in the initial CPR because they did not participate in the negotiation process. The Department of Defence and Military Veterans was ordered by parliament to finalise the integration of AZANLA combatants by the end of 2014 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2014).

The members from the Bantustan defence forces did not have to go through the orientation programme because they were directly or indirectly trained by SADF during the apartheid years. The core structure and practices of the new SANDF were principally those of the SADF and it was widely perceived that the NSF and TBVC members were absorbed into the SADF (Dzinesa, 2006). However, it is estimated that between 1995 and 2000 more than half of the ex-combatants who joined the SANDF quit the force citing reasons such as racism, poor integration model, conflict and suspicion. Evidently, the MK combatants struggled to acculturate into the SANDF. There is an expectation, therefore, that MK combatants who integrated into SAPS will have similar acculturation challenges (Stott, 2002; Williams, 2006).

In South Africa, MK combatants are generally considered as war heroes and they have established an exclusive veterans' association, Umkhonto we Sizwe Veterans Association (MKVA) even though a Department for Military Veterans has been established to look after the interests of all war veterans (Evaratt, 2007). The MKVA members have largely been absorbed in the military as well as in the intelligence sectors, and relatively few have been amalgamated with the SAPS. During the rationalization of the new defence force, a number of MK combatants

were released from the defence force, and it is the members of this group that have been struggling to make a living beyond the demobilisation process (Mashike, 2008; Mokalobe, 2001).

2.2.6 Amalgamation of forces and establishment of the SAPS

The new South African Police Service (SAPS) was established in 1995 following the demise of apartheid government. The police service was a product of the amalgamation of the SAP with 10 other police forces of the former Bantustans and homelands. At this stage the SAP already had a century of experience of amalgamating with other forces, especially paramilitary forces. The natural disposition of the SAP had concretised into a paramilitary force.

The first National Commissioner of the new SAPS, Commissioner George Fivaz, rolled out a process of transforming the new institution, and embraced a three step approach, which are, rationalisation, amalgamation and change. The National Commissioner defined amalgamation as

“the process of integrating other apartheid-established policing structures and creating a single national policing service” van Kessel cited in Newham, Masuku, & Dlamini, 2006, p. 8).

It was apparent, therefore, at that stage that the integration with NLMS including MK was not conceptualised nor operationalised as a priority for the new SAPS. It was indicated in Chapter 1 that the SAP was an amalgam of different forces since its inception in 1913, and as recent as 1986, the SAP integrated with the South African Railway Police Force (SARPF), and also absorbed 256 municipal police forces which had about 9000 members (Maluleke, 2010; Rauch, 2000).

The municipality forces were established to police the urban black areas in the 1980s primarily to quell unrests, and were known for their brutality and enforcing the dehumanizing apartheid by-laws in the townships. Some of these units were referred to as *Kitskonstables* (which means instant constables) because they were trained for a period of about three weeks and were then deployed in the townships (Cawthra, 1993).

With this vast experience of integrating with other forces and by the time the new democratic government was established decades later in 1995, the SAP had in its DNA the resilience to integrate with other forces. The amalgamation of these forces into the new SAPS is described by a former MK combatant as a:

“Frankenstein monster, a patchwork of the old South African Police and ten homeland police forces; a Babel of eleven separate police statutes, communicating in eleven different languages; and with a separate but unequal distribution of resources” (Veary, 2021, p. 22).

The strength of the former Bantustan police forces and the SAP in 1994, and the new amalgamated South African Police Service is indicated in the table below (South African Police Service, 2014).

Table 1: Numerical strength of police forces in 1994

Territory	Sworn police officers	Civilian personnel	Other personnel	Total Personnel
Transkei	4993	96	288	5377
Bophutatswana	6002	577	353	6932
Venda	1803	164	46	2013
Ciskei	1599	267	0	1806
Gazankulu	803	140	69	1025
Kangwane	747	46	0	793
Kwandebele	1034	171	0	1205
Kwazulu	5241	531	33	5805
Lebowa	2805	358	194	3357
Qwaqwa	789	156	87	1032
South African Police (old)	94267	17790	0	112057
South African Police Service (1995)	120083	20236	1070	141389

Source: (South African Police Service, 2014)

2.2.7 Amalgamation of former Non Statutory Forces into SAPS

It is not clear from the current literature as to when and how exactly were the MK and APLA soldiers formally integrated into the SAPS, as some members were brought in when SAP was still in existence between 1990 and 1994. Combatants who were not former members of any of police forces, including those of the Bantustans were referred to as Non Statutory Forces.

With regards to the amalgamation of former MK combatants, the SAPS formal communication explains that Mr Gary Kruser, former Head of ANC security, was appointed by the ANC during the transitional period to liaise with the South African Police (SAP) for the integration of former members of the Non Statutory Forces (NSF) into the police structures. Gary Kruser and other combatants were absorbed into the SAP Static Guard Unit during the transitional period (SAPS, 2018).

Gary Kruser ascended through the ranks, and resigned at the level of Lieutenant General around 2018. Needless, during the amalgamation process, there was no Certified Personnel Register (CPR) for the combatants of MK into SAPS. Literature on the amalgamation process and formal documents that seeks to explain the process in detail is scarce. Rauch (2000) asserts that about 200 (two hundred) body guards from MK were 'incorporated' into the SAPS VIP Protection and some members from the ANC intelligence unit were incorporated into the newly established Crime Intelligence Unit, whereas the former Self Defence Units and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) Self Protection Unit were brought in as special constables.

The former National Commissioner of Police, Riah Phiyega estimated that about 1200 police officers are former MK combatants (Sole, 2014). The Non-Statutory Forces (NSF) Committee that was established in 2013 to address the re-ranking of the NSF members was only able to identify 950 officers as former MK and APLA members in their submission to Court during litigation in the case of

Solidarity vs National Commissioner of Police and Others, 2018). The court in the Solidarity case further noted that the main concern of the NSF members is that their previous experience and skills were not considered when they were initially integrated into the SAPS, and they were given marginal roles such as providing static guard (Solidarity vs National Commissioner of Police and Others, 2018).

The SAPS is a product of the amalgamation of erstwhile enemy forces which came with different military cultures and identities. The process of amalgamation suggests that the structures of the former SAP were left intact and that the culture of the SAP was dominant, and the other forces, especially the NSF were forced to acculturate (Evaratt, 2007; Newham, Masuku, & Dlamini, 2006).

On the 17th of April 1997, the former President Nelson Mandela official instituted a medal referred to as the Amalgamation Medal for the South African Police Service. The Warrant of the Medal stated that:

“Whereas I deem it desirable to commemorate the unification of the eleven police agencies from 29 January to 15 October 1995, and I deem it appropriate to distinguish the members of the said agencies in a suitable manner (South African Police Service, 1997).

The Amalgamation medal was a celebration of a successful unification of the various police services that existed during the Apartheid era, namely the SAP and the 10 other Bantustan police agencies. The amalgamation of MK and APLA combatants with the SAP or SAPS was not given the necessary attention was, therefore, not celebrated or recognised in the warrant of the medal. It is against this background that this studies investigates the amalgamation process

2.2.8 Conclusion

The amalgamation of the NLMS and the colonial forces to form the new army in post-conflict situation in Southern African was better structured, more resourced and prioritized as compared to the amalgamation of forces to establish the new police agencies. The most plausible rationale for the prioritization of the army over the police service is that combatants of the NLMS viewed the total seizure

of power and total control of the new army as the sign of victory over the colonial forces.

Enlistment in the army was seen by the combatants to be more prestigious than enlisting in the police. The unintended consequence of the prioritising the army over the police is that in the three countries Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the structure of the old police remained basically intact, and only an insignificant number of combatants were enlisted in the new police service. The former leadership of the colonial police remained at the helm of the new police forces.

However, in these post-conflict countries, there is a tendency among the formerly oppressed populations to give the ex-combatants hero status and treat them as such long after gaining independence from colonialism (Gear, 2002). Masike (2008) asserts that when former combatants are treated as a distinct group in post-conflict situations they will consequently identify themselves as a separate group, and will consequently also struggle to integrate socially and psychologically in the society. Often the combatants feel alienated, especially when they are not able to make a living or are poorly funded (Ayissi, 2021).

The major weakness of the DDR processes on the African continent is that the process focussed on the former combatants rather than on the broader society within which these combatants are expected to integrate and live beyond the conflict situation. This approach has created conflict between the communities and the combatants, and often frustrated the peacebuilding process. In some instances, combatants of one of the armed groups are favoured over other groups, and this contributed to the volatile peace process. The civil wars in post conflict situations is attributed to the unresolved tensions between the armed groups where one of these became the ruling party.

However, DDR has largely succeeded in respect of demobilising and disarming the combatants, but has failed in respect of reintegrating the combatants back in the broader communities. Therefore, on the African continent, "Reintegration remains the Achilles of DDR programs" (Ayissi, 2021). The success of the DDR process is also dependent on the broader social and economic and reconstruction, and development of the state in post-conflict situations. It is

important, therefore, that an open and all-inclusive process should be initiated and should be carried out under a neutral international or regional body or a group of eminent people that the warring factions can trust (International Organization for Migration, 2019).

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ACCULTURATION

3.1 Introduction

Theoretical framework is regarded as a blueprint for the research study, and should be constructed on existing theory in order to guide the study (Adam, Hussein, & Ageym, 2018). In qualitative research, theoretical framework plays a dual role, first, it should be able to respond to the problem that the study is probing and, secondly, it should explain the rationale for embracing the methodological approach that has been applied in the study. In this regard, theoretical framework in qualitative studies may be developed during and after data collection so that the researcher is 'bracketed' from forcing the preconceived theories into the findings (Lederman & Lederman, 2015).

The important element of theoretical framework is to guide literature review, expand on the constructs that are being examined, and also explain the rationale for the study that is being undertaken. The framework is intended to interlink all the aspects of the research so that the researcher does not deviate from accepted and tested validated theories (Adam, Hussein, & Ageym, 2018).

In this study, two constructs, namely, acculturation and social identity theory (SIT) are embraced as theoretical framework to explain the amalgamation of MK combatants with the South African Police Service. These construct have been applied in social psychology and other disciplines in order to explicate intergroup conflict. Since the Second World War theorists have applied theoretical models which include relative deprivation theory, authoritarian personality theory to understand the growing global tensions as well as migration patterns at the time, and social identity theory has since been accepted as a theory to study intergroup conflicts (Niens, Cairns, Finschilescu, Foster, & Tredoux, 2003). Acculturation models have also been applied to study migration as well as how one group fits into the cultural milieu of another group, especially of the latter is a dominant group (López, Escoto, Moford-Dent, & Padro-Steiman, 2011).

3.2 Defining Acculturation

Acculturation takes place when the group (out group) comes into contact with another group (in group) in a defined location includes, neighbourhoods, schools, universities, places of worship, marketplace. The early studies on acculturation were focusing on social encounters between migrants and the host country in setting where the migrants will have an opportunity to interact with the hosts. Accordingly, the place of work, where a person spends considerable time, also provides a social context where the acculturation can be constrained or facilitated (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017).

Acculturation is defined as:

“those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in original culture patterns of either or both groups” (Redfield, Linton and Herskovits (1936) cited in (López, Escoto, Moford-Dent, & Padro-Steiman, 2011, p. 22)

The definition of culture is an important key to understanding the concept of acculturation. In this context culture refers to shared norms, beliefs, values and attitudes that affect individual's behaviour within a defined group (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017). Accordingly, culture is defined as the totality of values, belief systems, norms and traditions that describes the way of life of a community. Therefore, key features of the two cultures that are coming into contact with one another must be fully identified and described before the interaction in order for one to comprehend dynamics of the acculturation process (Sam & Berry, 2010).

There is also a distinct definition of police culture, which has been characterised by value and norms such as solidarity, cynicism, and isolation (Sihlobo, 2020; Mokotedi, 2010). In this regard solidarity is defined as the tendency to concrete that bonds police together, and it “sustains group identity and marks the boundaries”. Isolation is a behavioural aspect of a group that keeps them away from other groups. Cynicism is deeply entrenched emotion in the psyche of the

police, and is expressed by the feeling of hopelessness and worthlessness (Sihlobo, 2020). Although authors agree on whether the culture within the police is monolithic or there are several sub-cultures within the major dominant culture, there is a consensus that police culture is distinct, and warrants to be recognized as such. In this study, there is an expectation that the culture of the in-group, the police, will be dominant whereas that of the MK will be subservient albeit a militarised culture.

The two groups bring with them cultural features which may go through some changes during the interaction and may also bring about a new culture that may enable better intergroup relations or stifle further relations which may result in hostility. However, acculturation is not only a process that takes place when two groups interact with each other or when an individual is introduced into a group; it also experienced when an individual or individuals who are introduced into a new culture (López, Escoto, Moford-Dent, & Padro-Steiman, 2011).

3.3 Introduction to Acculturation Models

In this study, five Acculturation Models are critiqued for purposes of identifying the most appropriate model that can better explain the acculturation strategy of MK during the amalgamation with SAPS. The Acculturation models that are being critiqued are the following: a) Berry's Acculturation Model, b) the Acculturative Congruence Model, and c) Acculturation Gap-distress Model.

3.3.1 Berry's Acculturation Model

Berry's model was the first to systematically describe the process of acculturation when two cultures come into contact with one another. According to this model, there are two dimensions that are affected when two cultures come into contact with one another, namely, the retention of the culture of 'acquiring group', and the acquisition of the culture of the host or 'acquiring culture'. Members of the acquiring group would either score high or low with respect to retention of heritage culture and high or low in respect of acquisition of the host or acquiring culture.

When these two dimensions are crossed, four cultural categories emerge, integration, assimilation, separation and isolation.

Table 2: Bi-dimensional model of Berry

Retention of the in group culture	Acquiring of the host culture		
		Low	High
	High	Separation	Integration
	Low	Isolation	Assimilation

The new modes of acculturation defines the strategy that different parties to the amalgamation process embrace to adapt to each other. It is suggested that the characteristics of the parties contribute towards determining the type of strategy that they will embrace (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). The four strategies of acculturation, namely, integration, assimilation, separation and isolation/marginalization (deculturation) are briefly discussed below. Sam and Berry (2010) cautions that the four strategies outlined below are not static and they may change due to other environmental factors.

a) Integration strategy

The members of the acquired organization embrace integration in circumstances where they would like to preserve their own culture although willing to be integrated into the new structure. During integration there is definite structural assimilation of the two organizations but very little cultural assimilation. The members of the acquired group wish to maintain some cultural integrity while at the same time they participate in the larger community (Ward & Geeraert, 2016; Sam & Berry, 2010).

Basically, the structures of the two institutions dissolves and form a new structure although the cultures of the two institutions remain intact. There is no loss of identity from the merging institutions (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Integration is achieved when the acquiring or dominant group is open and willing to cultural diversity (Berry J. W., 1997). The integration concept is generally used to describe the amalgamation of MK with the SAPS.

The integration strategy is also referred to as *biculturalism*, and it is often the strategy that result in favourable psychosocial outcomes for the members of the acquired group. They tend to adapt better and in a more favourable position to embrace positive elements from their own heritage culture and from the acquiring culture as well as to navigate around the competing elements of both cultures. Integration occurs when both groups accept that they need to leave side by side as culturally diverse groups. There must be mutual accommodation of cultural diversity (Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010; Berry , 1997)

b) Assimilation strategy

With regards to assimilation, members of the acquired organization are willing to adopt the culture and identity of the acquiring culture. Assimilation is a unilateral process, and the members of the acquired group give up their own practices in lieu of the acquiring or host culture (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017). They do not wish to retain their cultural norms and values. Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) posits that assimilation usually takes place where the acquired organization failed to perform in its previous form and its members are of the opinion that their organization was dysfunctional.

In assimilation there is, therefore, a stronger inclination towards the settlement (acquiring/host) culture. Accordingly, the merger will result in structural as well as cultural assimilation of the acquired organization, and it will therefore no longer exist both culturally and structurally (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Ward & Geeraert, 2016).

c) Separation strategy

The separation strategy suggests that members of the acquired organization seeks to preserve their own culture by remaining separate and independent from the acquiring group. The acquired group place a premium on their cultural identity and avoid interaction with the new group (Sam & Berry, 2010). Members of the acquired organization resist by all means to be part of the acquiring or host group. There is a stronger orientation to the settlement culture (Ward & Geeraert, 2016). Total separation will result in a situation where the two entities operate independently.

d) Isolation (Deculturation) strategy

The Isolation strategy is embraced where the members of the acquired organization not only reject the culture of the acquiring organization but also relinquish their own. The members of the acquired organization do not value their own culture and do not wish to be assimilated into the acquiring organization. They have little interest in maintaining their own culture and having little relations with others. It is a rejection of both the settlement (acquired/immigrant) and the (acquiring) host culture (Ward & Geeraert, 2016).

The result hereof is that the acquiring organization disintegrates as the members are collectively and individually experiencing high levels of confusion and feelings of alienation and loss of identity. The members of the acquired organization experience high levels of acculturative stress (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Berry (1997) asserts that marginalization is not an option that the acquired group willingly choose, but it occurs when the acquired group is forced by the acquiring group to assimilate.

Isolation strategy partly reflects the feeling of some of the individual members of the MK especially those who have not been able to rise through the ranks and hold the view that neither MK nor the SAPS cares about their interests.

3.3.2 The Acculturative Congruence Model

The Acculturative Congruence model was developed by Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988), and it is based on the premise that the merging organizations (acquiring and acquired organization) should agree to some degree in respect of the mode or strategy of acculturation in order to reduce the level of acculturative stress and resistance to the amalgamation by either of the merging organization. The success of the amalgamation depends on the choice of the mode or strategy of acculturation and the degree of congruence of the mode of acculturation.

The level of incongruence or disagreement with regards to the mode of acculturation will inadvertently lead to disruption to both the acquired and acquiring organization (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). The leaders from the merging institutions may choose to leave where the level of incongruence is too high and the conflict that arise out of the amalgamation remains unresolved. However, the depth of congruence will lead to a smoother amalgamation process. Most amalgamations fail because the acquired firm is expected to adjust or adapt culture of the acquiring organization.

The authors posits further that the model is dynamic in that also suggests that the mode of acculturation, the implementation and the result of the merger will impact on the culture of the two organizations (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). The implication of this dynamism is that the preferred acculturation strategy may be affected by the outcome of the amalgamation and thus the extent of compatibility of the two cultures may also change and ultimately result in reviewing the strategy. It is important therefore that in order to minimize the post-merger conflict, there should be some level of congruence with regards to the mode or strategy of acculturation (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988).

The model is not appropriate in this study because preliminary literature indicates that there was no formal process of amalgamation and therefore there was no plan in place to assess cultural compatibilities. The MK combatants were brought in almost as individuals into the host or acquiring organisation, namely, South African Police Service (SAPS).

3.3.3 Acculturation Gap-Distress Model

This model is applicable primarily to immigration communities where the parents and the children both go through the acculturation process. The basic assumption of this model is that the children of immigrant population acculturate quicker to the new host culture than their parents, and this result in a conflict between the parents and the children (Telzer, 2010). The differences in the rate of acculturation between the parents and the children is referred to as the acculturation gap which then causes family distress.

The model might be applicable in the SAPS context in that the different age groups within MK members may acclimate at different paces which may result in distress between the younger members and the older ones, especially since the older ones have spent some time in exile and had an opportunity to engage the enemy in direct combat whereas the younger ones were mainly active inside the country and did not really engage in combat with the SAP.

The model provides for variations, for instances, there may be situations where the parents or older generation acculturate faster than their children or younger generation. In this case, one may find that the older MK members acculturate faster than the younger ones. It is also found that in some cases the children might be similarly oriented to their native culture, as in the case of the Chinese children in the US who embrace their Chinese identity and values in the same degree as their parents (Telzer, 2010).

On the periphery, the model seems appropriate given the age gap between the 1970s generation and those who only joined MK in the late 1980s and some even beyond 1990. However, both the young and the old combatants have acquired intense military identities that neutralizes the age gaps, thus rendering this model inadequate.

3.3.4 Conclusion

There are various models that explain the acculturation process of minority cultures into dominant cultures. In this study the Berry's Model will be applied to determine the acculturation strategy of the MK combatants into the SAPS. The model seems to be appropriate because it provides a continuum and variation of strategies that could cover the differences of the individuals within the MK as they sought and continue to seek to be part of the bigger organization.

3.4 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

3.4.1 Introduction

Social Identity Theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979, and was used to "explain the psychological basis for intergroup discrimination" (Agbiboa, 2015; Sam & Berry, 2010). Therefore, the natural disposition of individuals to classify themselves or to discriminate other groups provides a psychological basis for members of that particular segment of the society to classify others, and also for the members to classify themselves in the society (Bonache, Langinier, & Zarrage-Oberty, 2016; Sam & Berry, 2010; Adams & van de Vijver, 2017).

SIT has been used to understand relations between groups that are hostile to each other (Gibson, 2006) and among those that use violence to achieve various aims (Agbiboa, 2015). It can be applied in everyday or routine group identification such as being a fan of a football club to more serious situations where for instance a person joins a secret organization or a criminal gang (Samuel & Lasisis, 2019).

3.4.2 Dimensions or Components of Social Identity Theory (SIT)

There are various authors who postulates on the dimensions of Social Identity Theory. Social Identity theories broadly seeks to explain the rationale and factors that influence members of one group to be together as against members of other groups (Feitosa, Salas, & Salazar, 2012).

SIT explains social factors such as cohesion among members of a particular group, discrimination between members of different group and differentiation (Hogg & Reid, 2006). SIT provides rationale to understand why one group may be open to interact with another or accept members of other groups. However, different authors on SIT expounds some of the dimensions of social identity over others depending on the nature of the groups that they are observing and the extent of the relations with other groups (Hogg & Reid, 2006).

3.4.3 Three stage theory (Magnum and Block)

In this paper the SIT model by Mangum and Block (2018) was used to analyse the social identity formation of MK combatants. The model is relevant because it accommodates the military context within which these identities were concretised, the antagonistic relationship with the out-group during the struggle, and the coerced contact with the out-group due to the amalgamation.

The Three Stage Social Identity Theory has three elements that explains the bases for social identity formation, namely, a) social classification, b) social identification and c) social comparison. The three elements of SIT are elaborated in the following paragraphs.

a) Social classification/categorization

Social classification serves a dual purpose; firstly, to provide the psychological basis for members of a group to systematically define others, and secondly, to empower individuals so that they are able to position themselves in the social environment (Ashford & Mael, 1989). Categorization and membership to a particular group provides members with 'structure for self-reference' and it is therefore an important aspect of identity (Agbibo, 2015). Through social classification, individuals decide, almost naturally, to choose the group to which they want to belong, and they put others in groups that are different from theirs. Social categorization therefore "lies at the core of social identity approach" (Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 9).

b) Social Identification

Social identity is defined as a psychological process by which an individual associates himself or herself as a member of a particular social group. Members of a social group have common values, norms, beliefs, culture and language, and these impact on the individual's sense of personal identity (Mangum & Block, 2018). Since social identity is a perception, an individuals within a group do not have to do anything to contribute to achieve the aims and objectives of the group that they cognitively identifies with. Individuals place themselves cognitively within a group in which they share similarities and also that distinguishes them from other groups.

c) Social Comparison

Members of the in-group tend to engage in social comparison with the outer group in order to ensure distinctiveness of their group. It is asserted that members of a group tend to develop strong sympathies towards each other and antipathies against other groups. Members of a group tend to have favourable bias and emphasize positive qualities of their group members (Sam & Berry, 2010). The in-group members tend to think positively of themselves and negatively of the outer-group. When the members of a group feel strongly connected to the ideals of their group, they seem to be more inclined to negatively discriminate against members of other groups (Gibson, 2006).

3.4.4 Group and Military Identity of former combatants

The concept of group identities is a consequence of individuals identifying and classifying themselves as a distinct group, and further comparing themselves with others who are seen to be different. This concept helps us to understand phenomena such as collective behaviour, prejudice, stereotyping and in-group favouritism (Milanov, Rubin, & Paolini, 2014; Ashforth & Mael, 1989).

It is asserted that the identification of the soldiers or guerrillas of the liberation movements as former combatants gives them a respectable status in the

community, and they also derive some form of capital from this group identity. It is this distinct categorization of 'freedom fighter' as combatants that further enhances their military identity (Maringira & Brankovic, 2013). Ex-combatants define their group identity in terms of their military experience, skill and affiliation.

The main components of the military identity among ex-combatants in Post-apartheid South Africa are,

“the capacity to use arms, social networking among the ex-combatants, maintaining particular protocols and hierarchies in the within the group members, loyalty to the group, mindset of vigilance, ideological commitment to a particular cause” (Maringira & Brankovic, 2013, p. 5).

This form of group identity is referred to as military identity, which is an extension of the Social Identity Theory (Maringira & Brankovic, 2013; Agbiboa, 2015). The military identity is a process of turning a civilian into a soldier, a freedom fighter, and it involves inculcating a new identity into the recruit through training and changing the mind-set, which ultimate transform the him or her into a 'warrior hero' (Maringira, 2015). The acquisition of military identity is forged during the training and concretised on the battlefield. The essence of military identity is that

“[it] celebrates the difference between soldier and civilian and views soldiers as having superior rights to citizens” (Maringira, 2015, p. 74).

The combatants of NLM on the continent uphold this military identity which accords them entitlement to superior civil services in post conflict situation above other citizens. Accordingly, the construct of military identities will be appropriated as a form of social identity that the ex-combatants of MK embraced during the amalgamation with the South African Police (SAP) as part of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program that was put in place during and after the negotiations for a peaceful settlement during the 1990s and throughout the transitional period.

3.4.5 Conclusion

Social Identity Theory is relevant and the most appropriate theoretical framework to explain the conduct as well as behaviour of former combatants. This group places high regard to their 'lived experiences' as liberation fighters and value loyalty to the group as the primary norm. Combatants have strong intergroup positive bias and have acquired military identities and maintain these even beyond the peacebuilding process. The combatants tend to think of themselves as the primary beneficiaries of the liberation struggle and that they are entitled to benefits that are not accessible to other members of the society. It is this deep sense of self that contribute towards their struggle or inability to acculturate with other groups, and adding to volatility of the peacebuilding process (Maringira & Brankovic, 2013).

CHAPTER 4: MILITARY CULTURES OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE AND THE SAP

4.1 Introduction

There are two views that explain the decision by the African National Congress (ANC) to turn to violence and embrace the armed struggle. The dominant view is that the escalation of repression on the liberation movement by the apartheid government, since the National Party came to power in 1948, prompted the ANC to engage in the armed struggle (Maharaj, 2008; Kasrils, 2016). According to this view, the passive resistance culture and the religious orientation of the ANC leadership contributed to resistance to the formation of MK within the ANC. Initially, the ANC NEC rejected the proposal by Nelson Mandela for the ANC to embrace armed struggle. It was only on the second attempt that the proposal to engage in the armed struggle was accepted (Maharaj, 2008).

The ANC had planned to continue with passive resistance into the 1960's and had intended to launch a countrywide Boycott Campaign wherein the communities were going to be mobilized to resist the Pass Laws in the month of March 1961 (Cherry, 2012). The planned boycott was, however, thwarted by the aftermath of the killing of 61 protesters by the police on the 21st of March 1961 in the black township of Sharpeville. The protestors were part of a group that was marching towards a police station in the area and were shot dead by the police (Simpson, 2016).

The National Party (NP) government following the Sharpeville massacre, responded further by arresting leaders of the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) as well as the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) during pre-dawn raids all over the country (Kasrils, 2016). The government declared a state of emergency and also banned the ANC and the Pan Africanist (PAC) in April of 1961. It was now apparent that the passive resistance to the oppressive apartheid government was not yielding the intended results as the government was more brutal in its response to any form of resistance (Cherry, 2012). The leadership of the ANC and the SACP decided then to establish an independent armed wing in

order to respond to the increased violent suppression of the resistance movement by the Apartheid government (Simpson, 2016; Williams, 2006; Motumi, 1994).

The second view that explains the turn to violence by the ANC is that the Youth League of the ANC in the 1950s was already involved in discussions regarding engaging in an armed struggle against apartheid government, and that the Sharpeville incident provided the ANC with a viable reason to engage in violent struggle (Ellis, 1991; Laurence, 1988). As early as December 1954, the ANC sent delegates to China to meet with the leadership of the Youth League of the Communist Party in that country in order to explore the possibility of the Chinese government supporting the ANC in case it opts for armed struggle. The delegation of the Chinese Youth League pointed out that the armed struggle will not be a viable option for the South African liberation movement (Simpson, 2016).

It is contended by some authors that the communists within the ANC apparently had intention long before 1960 to establish a military wing and to use sabotage and other violent means to wage a war against the apartheid government (Landau, 2012). The intention was apparently not known to Chief Albert Luthuli who was the President of the ANC at the time. Chief Albert Luthuli was propagating non-violence and was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1960, and ironically, the first sabotage attack was launched on the day that he had returned to the country after receiving the Nobel Peace prize (Landau, 2012).

4.2 The Launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe

MK was officially launched on the 16th of December 1961, and this guerrilla army was created as an independent “People’s Army”. Nelson Mandela was the first Commander-in-Chief and Joe Slovo was the deputy Commander-in-Chief of MK which already had about 250 operatives (Nduli, 2017). MK was initially funded by the SACP, and the association with the ANC was kept a secret. The open association between the ANC and MK was announced in Botswana at a conference that was held in the town of Lobatse in 1963. It was emphasized at this conference that the ANC will provide the political direction while MK will deal with the military strategy (Maharaj, 2008; Williams, 2006).

4.3 Sabotage Campaign (1960 – 1963)

During the launch of MK in December 1961 its manifesto was distributed in public places throughout the country. The manifesto went in depth to justify the turn to armed struggle and to convince the masses and the international world that the formation of the military wing was a natural and logical response to the brutality of the apartheid government. The catch-phrase of the manifesto in this regard states;

“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom”
(African National Congress, 1961).

The first recruits of this military wing were members of the ANC Youth League, which included Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu as well as Joe Slovo who was a member of the SACP. The initial recruits of the guerrilla movement were about 250, and Nelson Mandela was elected as the first Commander-in-Chief of MK. He went for military training in Algeria and Ethiopia as well as in the Soviet Union (Williams, 2000).

At the beginning, the nature of the armed struggle was in the form of sabotaging electricity and rail operations as this was the first of the four phases. The other three phases of the armed struggle are guerrilla warfare, insurrection and revolution (Motumi, 1994). According to Nelson Mandela, it was the intention of MK not to inflict too much damage or cause too many casualties so that the apartheid government could still be persuaded to come to the negotiation table. Mandela reckoned that any sabotage activities that could lead to civil war should be avoided (Maharaj, 2008, p. 13).

There were about 200 acts of sabotage that were carried out by MK in the first three years of its existence and there was not a single casualty that was reported

(Cherry, 2012). However, the ANC was aware that engaging in guerrilla warfare was going to be difficult for MK because;

“South Africa’s topography, lack of a friendly border, large white population rooted in the country, huge security apparatus, powerful resources backed-up by Western supply and support, speedy communication network and level of development by no means suited classical guerrilla war” (Kasrils, 2016, p. 16).

It was apparent from the beginning that total seizure power through military takeover was going to be mission impossible for MK (Maharaj, 2008). The Sabotage Campaign did very little to push the government to a negotiation table. The various structures with the liberation movement mooted now to turn towards guerrilla warfare and to escalate violence against the apartheid government following the apparent ineffectual sabotage campaign in so far as its intention to draw the apartheid government to the negotiation table (Ismail, 2013).

4.4 Rivonia Trial

The apartheid government crippled the underground structure of the African National Congress (ANC) when they arrested the High Command in Lilies Farm in Rivonia in Johannesburg in 1960. The arrest of the high command was led by Lieutenant Willem van Wyk of the Special Branch of the South African Police (SAP) and the trial of these leaders went on for about three years. The leaders of the High Command were charged with treason, and in 1963 they were sentenced to life imprisonment, most of them were to serve their sentences at the Robben Island.

The arrest and subsequent sentencing of the leadership of MK as well as the increased clamp down of the activities of the organization by the apartheid government, forced the leaders to intensify the external mission of the organization. Several leaders such as JB Marks, Joe Slovo and Moses Mabhida were encouraged to leave the country and to rebuild the organization externally for both military and political purposes (Kasrils, 2019).

4.5 Wankie and Sipololo Campaign

A large number of countries on the African continent gained independence in the 1960s, and this phenomenon encouraged national liberation movements (NLMs) in other countries to heat up the fight against colonial governments. The British Prime Minister in his address to the South African parliament in 1960 aptly stated that:

“the wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”
(Macmillan, 1960).

In Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), the Ian Smith government was fighting against the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and ZANLA forces. The South African government supported the Rhodesian government with technical and other resources (Hamann, 2001).

In the mid-1960s the external mission of the ANC had established its Head Office in Tanzania. At that time MK had recruited and trained about 500 combatants in military combat and were ready to fight. The combatants were based at the Tanzanian camps which included Kongwa, Mbeya, Bagomogo and Morogoro (Dabengwa, 2019). At the same time, ZIPRA forces were also being trained in the country and were also ready for combat. It was apparent that the leadership of the two military groups had to deploy these forces to go fight with the enemy forces back in their respective countries (Dabengwa, 2019).

A joint military command was established and constituted by commanders from both MK and ZIPRA. The joint force was named Luthuli Detachment in honour former ANC President, Chief Albert Luthuli, and was commanded by John Dube, and Chris Hani was appointed as the Commissar (African National Congress, 1986). The Wankie Campaign was carried out in 1967 and was intended to infiltrate the MK cadres across the Zambesi River from Zambia into Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). The Luthuli detachment engaged in a number of direct combat battles with the BSAP and RAR in August of 1967.

The Sipololo campaign was a follow up campaign was executed by the “Pyramid Detachment” in December of 1967, and had similar intentions as the Wankie except that the combatants crossed the Zambesi river at a different location. The Sipololo campaign was also intended to establish a permanent presence of the ZIPRA forces within the Zimbabwean territory who were meant to assist both ZIPRA and MK with reconnaissance (Dabengwa, 2019).

The Luthuli and Pyramid Detachments fought bitterly during the two campaigns and “proved the lie of the invincibility of the Rhodesian and South African racist and apartheid regimes” (Dabengwa, 2019, p. 10). However, both MK and ZIPRA suffered severe casualties during these campaigns. It is estimated that in both campaigns half of the detachment were killed by the apartheid and Rhodesian forces. However, the Wankie and Sipololo campaigns are hailed as the most daring combat by MK combatants wherein they directly engaged the apartheid forces (Motumi, 1994).

4.6 Morogoro Conference, 1969

In April 1969 the African National Congress (ANC) convened a conference in Morogoro, Tanzania, and was attended by delegates of the ANC, and MK as well as representatives of the Indian and Coloured working class movements (Ndebele & Nieftagodien, 2005). The conference deliberated extensively on issues that were faced by the ANC and the Congress Alliance which included the integration of the various racial groups within the structures and leadership, the relationship between the political and the military structures as well as the creation of a new leadership core to advance the external mission (Ndebele & Nieftagodien, 2005).

Among the outcomes of the conference was that a Revolutionary Council (RC) should be established and must be accountable only to the leadership of ANC and the SACP. The RC was chaired by the President of the ANC and was given the responsibility for the overall planning and execution of operations of MK within the country (Motumi, 1994). The conference also adopted the “Strategy and Tactics” document which was a guiding policy document for the execution of the

armed struggle and the political mass mobilisation in South Africa. This was the first policy document since the Freedom Charter that was expressing the position of the organization in relation to the armed struggle (Lesetja, 2007; Legassick, 2002).

The “Strategy and Tactics” document was criticised for being oblivious to the material conditions on the ground in country. According to South African military experts at the time, the document was “naïve, hopelessly optimistic and completely out of touch with the situation MK faced in South Africa” (Hamann, 2001, p. 51). The most worrisome issue for the conference was the high casualties of the combatants as well as the high number of combatants who reported and handed over to the police within the black communities, especially in the rural areas (Simpson, 2016).

4.7 Education and training

The ANC always maintained that the operations of MK will be subjected to the political leadership. The armed struggle was therefore not meant to be a programme on its own but was carried out and meant to be one that supports the other pillars of the struggle. In this regard, political training was always an integral part of the military training of MK combatants. The President of ANC articulated the objective of training MK combatants as follows:

"In building our own popular army we aim therefore not only at the overthrow of the fascist regime, we aim also at building up a politically conscious and revolutionary army, conscious of its popular origin, unwavering in its democratic functions and guided by our revolutionary orientation" (Kasrils, 2016, p. 8)

The main aim of the education and training of MK combatants was to drill in them that they are a Revolutionary army which is engaged in a “People’s war” (Kasrils, 2016). Combatants of MK were trained in both politics and military tactics, and the key elements of these were configured in the Military Combat Work (MCW). Combatants were trained to be conversant with the basic policies of the ANC,

and also to maintain a high moral ground on the battle field. Combatants were trained to act with restraint and so as to avoid the unnecessary loss of lives and to treat prisoners with dignity (Cherry, 2012).

The report on the Operation of MK that was submitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) states that the trainee combatants were offered courses in military topography, military engineering, military tactics, physical training, march and drill, firearms, artillery, political education, first aid and anti-war weaponry. The length of the courses ranged from 3 months to 9 months and depended on the task and mission that the trainee is assigned to do post the training period (Kasrils, 2016).

An MK Combatant who was 'integrated' into the SAPS narrated in his memoir that when he arrived at the transit camp in Angola, they received both military and political lessons. With regards to political education, he says that;

"I became interested in the dictatorship of the proletariat, which I found quite interesting. I became engrossed in the concept of a classless society and the idea of worker owning the means of production. I became transformed from a capitalist-oriented person to a socialist-oriented one" (Toka, 2012, p. 31).

4.8 Angolan War and Umkhonto we Sizwe

In April 1974 the Portuguese authoritarian government of Estado Novo was toppled through a military coup which resulted in a prodemocracy and an anticolonial government in Portugal. The new government acceded to the demands of the national liberation movements (NLMs) in the African colonies, and ended the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe. In Angola, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA signed an agreement in January of 1975 to clear the path for independence in Angola. The MPLA with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba ascended to power and constituted the ruling government in post-independent Angola (Hamann, 2001).

The war in Angola was a strategic epicentre of the “Bush War” in the Southern African region and invariably determined the outcome conflict that engulfed the region. The SADF launched Operation Savannah to destabilise the armed wings of these NLMs from their bases some of which were deep in the Angolan territory (Saney, 2014; Scholtz, 2006).

Operation Savannah was abandoned in 1976 and the rebel forces in Angola, UNITA and FNLA, were left to their own devices, as South Africa was now focussing on its own challenges as the many students joined the liberation movements following the 1976 uprisings. UNITA and FNLA were advised by the South Africans that they should resort to guerrilla tactics (Hamann, 2001).

Under the MPLA government, Angola, became known as the ‘firm trench of the African revolution’ because it provided support to MK and other NLMs such as People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) as well the Zimbabwean People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (Kwhela, 2003). Angola opened its territory to the MK to establish military camps from 1976 at a time when many of young people and students from South African left the country to join MK. Mzwandile Piliso was appointed as the commander in charge of all the MK camps in Angola. A transit camp, Quibaxe, was established in 1977 to accommodate the 1976 generation (Saney, 2014).

In 1983 the South African government redeployed troops back to Angola, which was now backed by Cuban and Russian forces. During this second wave of attacks, MK combatants were deployed to fight on the side of the Angolan government, especially to push back the UNITA rebel forces which were attacking from the ‘eastern front’ in the Malenje district (Kwhela, 2003). Chris Hani was the overall Commander of the MK brigade which was deployed specifically to pursue UNITA rebel forces. MK was led by experienced MK combatants, Lennox Zuma and Timothy Mokoena who were veterans of the Wankie and Sipololo campaigns (Kwhela, 2003).

A list of MK camps that were established in Angola was presented to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) by the ANC. Most of these camps were opened between 1976 and 1980, and were closed in 1989 when the military structure were moved from Angola to Uganda and Tanzania. President Oliver Tambo made this announcement and reported that the move was to facilitate the independence of Namibia (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998).

4.9 People's War

In 1978 the ANC sent a high powered delegation to Vietnam to study the urban guerrilla tactics. Thabo Mbeki had commented that the landscape in South African is not suitable to engage in traditional guerrilla warfare, where the combatants can hit the targets and escape back into the bush. The delegation, which included Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani and Joe Slovo developed a revolutionary strategy that was aimed to counteract the apartheid's government 'total onslaught'. The lessons that were drawn from the Vietnamese experience was that mass mobilisation is a prerequisite for urban insurrection (Simpson, 2016). The strategy that was developed following the Vietnamese experience was outlined in the "Four Pillars of a Revolution – A Strategy for People's War" (Hamann, 2001, p. 123).

MK established the Special Operation Unit in 1979 in order to intensify the armed offensive of the new strategy, and its activities increased dramatically in the 1980s as many of those who joined following the June 1976 uprisings were now being infiltrated back into the country (Mokalobe, 2001). The former Minister of Justice in the Apartheid government, Mr Jimmy Kruger, lamented after the bombing of the Moroka police station in 1979 that "they are entering the country in ever-increasing numbers to carry out sabotage" (Braam, 2004, p. 200).

The most lethal operation that was carried out by the Special Operations Unit was the car bomb blast that was set off at the SAAF Head Quarters in Pretoria in May 1983. The incident resulted in the death of 19 people, including 11 air force members, and several others who were injured (Ismail, 2013, p. 35). The President of the ANC at the time, Oliver Tambo took political responsibility for the

deadly incident. Two MK combatants also died in the incident. Tambo explained that the rationale for attacking the military and the police directly was that the apartheid government could not hide the armed struggle activities that the MK was carrying out inside South Africa. The leadership of the Special Operations Unit were Joe Slovo, Aboobaker Rashid, and Montso Mokgabudi who reported directly to Oliver Tambo. The unit was named the Solomon Mahlangu (Ismail, 2013).

In this section, the research makes reference to the activities of a few units that were infiltrated in the country because these units were the first since the 1960s to target the South African Police (SAP) facilities and the military and other strategic installations. The students who left the country in the mid-1970s, following the aftermath of the 1976 uprisings, included Solomon Mahlangu, and were trained in the newly established camps in Angola. Mahlangu was infiltrated back into the country with, Themba Nkosi, Richard Chauke and Masuku, through Swaziland, and while they were in Johannesburg, they were accosted by the police (Ismail, 2013).

During the skirmish with the police, two civilians were killed. Solomon Mahlangu was arrested, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of the two civilians, although it was not him who pulled the trigger. He was found guilty through a principle that is referred to as common purpose South Africa, following the hanging of Mahlangu by the apartheid government in 1979.

In the period between 1976 and 1979 MK carried out 37 armed actions against the apartheid forces (Simpson, 2016; Ismail, 2013). One the most successful units that was infiltrated in South Africa by the MK High Command was the G5 Unit of the Transvaal Urban Machinery. The unit had highly skilled fighters who used urban guerrilla tactics, and some the members included Solly Shoke who later became the Chief of the Defence Force in post-apartheid South Africa. The G5 unit also attacked Orlando Police Station, and were reinforced by MK combatants from Swaziland, including, Gordon, who became known as the "Lion

of Chiawelo” was killed during an altercation with the police (Ismail, 2013; Braam, 2004).

The G5 Unit also attacked Booysen Police Station which was located in a formerly white suburb, and this was the first time that an RPG-7 was used against a government institution during the armed struggle. Three other members of the unit were later arrested in December of 1981 in Hammanskraal near Pretoria, namely, Marcus Motaung, Jerry Msololi and Thelle Mogoerane (Simpson, 2016; Ismail, 2013). They became known as the “Moroka Three” and they were arrested in June 1982, convicted and sentenced to death. The “Moroka three” were executed in Pretoria Central Prison in June 1983 (Braam, 2004).

Ismail (2013) reported that one of the members of the G5 unit committed suicide before they were deployed to South Africa. The G5 team was finally released and the commissar of the unit joined them a day later to issue them with the ammunition that was stashed at a dead letter box (DLB). The Commissar also operated the RPG-7 that was used during the attack at the station. He was never arrested but he was part of the MK cadres that were granted amnesty after fully disclosing their activities at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

One other unit that were deployed into the country that attacked the police and civilians was the Dabulamanzi Unit which was led by Rodney “Baduza” Toka and his commander Meschack “Mainstay” Maponya. They infiltrated through Botswana and were assigned to work around townships in Pretoria (Simpson, 2016). The Unit was involved in a number of skirmishes with the South African Police (SAP), and in one incident the combatants fired at a group of police men who were at a tavern in Atteridgeville near Pretoria. Three police officers were killed at the scene, and one member of the group was accidentally shot by the other combatants (Toka, 2012). Meschack Maponya, the commander of the group, died from an explosion while he was planting a limpet mine near a Cinema in the city centre (Simpson, 2016).

The Security branch of the SAP arrested nine members of this unit a few months after the incident. The combatants escaped from prison in 1990, and resurfaced

in Lusaka where they were welcomed by the ANC leadership during a press conference (Toka, 2012; Simpson, 2016). During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing one of the members of the Unit, Ernest Ramaite, who was the fourth accused during the trial, was unable to give evidence because he suffered mental injuries apparently due to extensive torture he was subjected to by the Security branch of the SAP. One of the members of this unit was amalgamated into the SAP and retired as a Major General (Toka, 2012).

In his memoir, Toka lamented that it was recklessness and overconfidence by the members of the Unit that ultimately led to the arrest of one of the most effective MK units that was operating in the country. He stated that:

“We had made many mistakes, we had grown cocksure [cocky] because of our successes; people were not thoroughly screened; I should have never taken Mpuni to my base and let down my guard; celebrating with booze and having a good time; Such weaknesses and others resulted in the successful crackdown of one of the most powerful structures of Umkhonto we Sizwe ever to operate in Pretoria, the belly of apartheid” (Toka, 2012, p. 71).

The activities of MK increased dramatically in the late 1980s inside the country. The presence of MK combatants was a catalyst for mass mobilisation, and somewhat encouraged the younger generation that the apartheid government is not invincible. In 1983, a broad based mass democratic movement was formed in Cape Town, the United Democratic Front. The UDF presented a home to diverse anti-apartheid groups which included, the labour unions, the youth organizations, faith-based organisations and human rights organisations. Most importantly it became a cover for the underground structures of the ANC as well as for MK combatants (Maharaj, 2008).

There were many other attacks that are worth mentioning during the 1980s that were carried out by the MK combatants but the most daring was the attack of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant in Cape Town in 1982. The

significance of the attack was that the nuclear power plant was regarded as impenetrable and, the workers were deemed to be loyal. The mission was carried out by a white couple, Rodney Wilkinson and his wife, who planted limpet mines at the facilities and caused huge damage that amounted to R500 million and resulted in the nuclear project to be delayed by more than a year (Ismail, 2013, p. 35). The combatants who carried out the mission were only made known long after the liberation was attained. They were hired to work at the National Intelligence Agency immediately after the unbanning of the NLMs.

4.10 Kabwe Conference, 1985

The mass mobilisation that was taking place inside South Africa which resulted in the formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983, and the resistance to the Bantustan Administrations motivated MK in the mid-1980s, once more, to review its strategy and tactics. The Second National Consultative conference was held in Kabwe, Zambia around to June to coincide with June 16 commemoration services. At the Conference, the Politico-Military Council of the ANC adopted the Military Code of Conduct which defined MK as “a People’s Army organized and dedicated to waging a war for the liberation of our country” (African National Congress, 1985).

The thrust of the resolutions at the Kabwe Conference was that the ANC must increase both political and military offensive against the apartheid government. The ANC had to intensify its strategy on engaging in ‘People’s war’ that was waged primarily in the urban areas so as to render the apartheid government unworkable. The Conference resolved, among other things, that the MK should recruit and deploy more White, Coloured and Indian combatants, and that all ANC members must undergo military training. It was also further resolved that the choice of targets for operational purposes should not be determined by the risk of civilian casualties (African National Congress, 1985 (2)).

In 1985, Oliver Tambo released a pamphlet that was titled “Take the struggle to the white areas”. In the pamphlet the ANC urges the combatants who were inside

the country to target white areas because the apartheid regime has made life difficult for black people in their areas whereas white people are living in comfort (Simpson, 2016). The recruitment of other races as foot soldiers soon bore fruit as was reflected by the arrest of young white recruits in 1986, Eric Pelser who resisted mandatory conscription and joined MK, and Marion Sparg, a former journalist. The two were sentenced to 8 and 25 years, respectively (Laurence, 1988). The critical resolution of the conference was that the urban insurrection must be increased and that MK cadres should train the recruits within the country. The conference also resolved that cadres who referred themselves to as 'Marxist Tendency' must be expelled from the ANC.

4.11 The road to transition

In the 1980s it became apparent that the apartheid government will not be able to curb the mass mobilisation drive and the concomitant violence within the country. The ANC was mobilising the masses under the slogan 'we shall be ungovernable'. The international community was also pressurising the apartheid government through economic sanctions and cultural boycotts to negotiate with the ANC. The first salvo was thrown by PW Botha in 1985 when he announced that he was prepared to release Nelson Mandela provided he denounces violence and the armed struggle (Hamann, 2001).

The National Intelligence Service was granted permission to engage in secret talks with Nelson Mandela. The government then moved him from Robben Island to a house that was in a prison precinct in Cape Town (Barnard, 2015). The NIS secretly engaged with Mandela on possible 'talks about talks', whereas the apartheid government initiated overt talks with the leadership of the ANC in exile. At the same time, the Afrikaner business as well as academic community also met with the ANC in exile, beginning with a meeting that was held in Dakar that was facilitated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA).

PW Botha was replaced by FW de Klerk as the leader of the National Party and the apartheid government. De Klerk continued with the negotiations with Nelson Mandela who demanded that his release from prison shall be unconditional. In

February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison and various political parties and NLMs were unbanned. The ANC decided to unconditionally suspend the armed struggle, and MK was therefore demobilised in 1990 (Maharaj, 2008).

4.12 The role of SAP in the civil conflict in South Africa and Southern African States

During the apartheid era the South African Police (SAP) was regarded as the most militarised and brutal police force in the world (Cawthra, 1993). From 1996 to 1990, the SAP was involved in an intensive battle in the Southern African states, namely, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Angola, Swaziland and Mozambique. The battle in the northern borders was referred to as the “Border Wars’ or ‘the Bush Wars”. South Africa became involved in South West Africa when the League of Nations gave it a mandate to oversee the territory following the victory against Germany in the First and Second War. South Africa wanted to annex South West Africa as its fifth province (Wessels, 2017).

The SAP culture is a military culture manifested by the use of military ranks and insignia, command and control, hierarchical structure, and the reluctance to transform. The pillars of Military culture are “loyalty, teamwork, leadership, obedience and hierarchy” (Greene, Buckman, Dandeker, & Greenberg, 2010, p. 958). The authors opined the distinctive “feature of a military culture is that it demands the subordination of the self to the group” (Greene, Buckman, Dandeker, & Greenberg, 2010).

Ostensibly the South African Police (SAP) was at the front of this war until the PW Botha government gave the SADF a leading role in the Security Council, and thus the SADF was then deployed and took charge of the operations in the frontline states (Hamann, 2001; Moran, 1997). It was argued that the National Party did not trust the SADF with the responsibility to fight the insurgents primarily because the force was dominated by the English speaking and British trained senior officers. It was only when the leadership of the SADF was dominated by former Broederbonders was the government comfortable to deploy them and lead the fight against the insurgents (Cawthra, 1993).

The SAP established the Security Branch, also known as the Special Branch, to lead the fight against internal political unrests and to hunt down members of the armed wings of the liberation movements and their supporters. The Security Branch (SB) was supported with tactical intelligence by the Bureau of State of Security (BOSS) which was formed in 1969 to collect intelligence on internal security matters. BOSS was headed by General van den Bergh who previously headed the Security Police (Sanders, 2006).

In 1979, BOSS was dissolved following its role in a political scandal wherein the government was alleged to have sponsored the formation of newspapers. After the dissolution of BOSS, some of the experienced members were absorbed into the Security branch of the SAP. Needless, on the backdrop of this scandal, the apartheid government gave the police a further responsibility to track and trace members of the liberation movements who were exiled in neighbouring countries and even those who were based overseas (Steinberg, 2014).

The most notorious operative of the Security Branch, de Kock, recounts that he learned about the skirmish between the SAP and the 'terrorists' along the Zambesi River in 1967, and that his father encouraged him to be transferred to SAP and to the unit that fights the 'terrorists' (de Kock, 1998). De Kock had earlier volunteered in the Police Anti-terrorist Unit (PATU) to participate in Rhodesia so as to gain experience in fighting in the Bush War. He claims that there he was trained by the British Military, and did nine tour duties in Rhodesia. By the time that he transferred to Namibia, he had already garnered sufficient experience. De Kock had earlier indicated that when he was young his father taught him and his brother how to handle firearms, and they both became dangerous marksmen (de Kock, 1998).

De Kock explains that the one of the incidents that affected him was the capture of SAP members by the ZIPRA forces. He recounts that whereas two were summarily executed the others were kept for some time and killed later after they were severely tortured. The incident apparently affected his attitude towards the Geneva Convention because he had believed that a captured prisoner of war must be treated in accordance with the provisions of the convention. However,

his fellow officers were murdered at a time when the President BJ Vorster was negotiating with Zambian President Kaunda for a peaceful settlement. De Kock (1998) lamented that he was never trained on the Geneva Convention when he was a member of SAP.

In 1989, Mr Butana Almond Nofomela, a former member of the Security branch, submitted an affidavit to the Lawyers for Human Rights wherein he made confessions that he participated in a number of assassinations of political activists. Nofomela was, at that stage on death row after he was convicted of murdering a farmer, and he was hoping that he would be released by his former commanders. He decided to speak after he received a note from Eugene de Kock that he must 'take the pain'. The former Commander of Vlakplaas between 1980-1981, Dirk Coetzee, confirmed the allegations, and he was assisted by journalists to go into exile to join the ANC.

The Vlakplaas unit established in 1979 and its main function was to trace the members of MK and other NLMs. The methodology that they used was to 'turn' the captured combatants of these NLMs into collaborators called Askaris, and they would go with these Askaris to the taxi ranks, bus stops and train stations to try to identify any combatants who might have infiltrated the country (Simpson, 2016). The Vlakplaas unit was officially known as the C1 Unit and reported to Brigadier Schoon of the Security branch. The unit was also known for distributing arms and ammunition to some groups within the community that will unleash violence in the black communities (Moran, 1997).

President de Klerk appointed the Harms Commission to investigate the allegations that were made by Nofomela and Dirk Coetzee. The allegations were that the Vlakplaas unit murdered, among others, Griffith Mxenge and Eastern Cape attorney, among the many murders that they committed. The Commission reported that it could not conclusively state that a unit existed to exterminate MK combatants and other NLMs. The existence of Vlakplaas unit, which was officially referred to as C1, was officially recognised that it existed during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) later in 1997. A number of MK combatants

were kidnapped from the neighbouring countries, and if they refused to be turned into Askaris, they were murdered there.

4.13 Policing in the Post-Apartheid era

The new South African Police Service (SAPS) was established in terms of the provisions of the Interim Constitution of 1993 and was created out of the amalgamation 11 security agencies which were composed of the members of the old South African Police, members of the police forces of the Bantustans and also combatants of the non-statutory forces (Govender, 2012, p. 9). There was a need, therefore, for a leadership that would steer the complex reform and change management processes that were intended to create a seamless institution with a single vision from erstwhile political enemies with different management cultures.

The SAPS embarked on a change management process in the mid-1990s that would not only affect institutional arrangements but also to impact on the ability of the service to combat crime, which at that stage was very high (Faull, 2011; Masiloane, 2007). During that period, the country was reeling from politically motivated crimes such as massacres, train violence as well as common law violent crimes including, car hijacking, killing of police officers, killing of farm owners and workers, bank robberies and cash-in-transit robberies.

In the mid-1990s South Africa was facing a new enemy from within, namely, violent organized crime. The police management and leadership were not prepared to tackle this form of new crime, especially at the magnitude that it was taking place (Newham, Masuku, & Dlamini, 2006). With the establishment of a new democracy, border control became relaxed and South Africa became a haven for those who were seeking a better life, but also criminal syndicates used this opportunity to ply their business in this country. Organized crime syndicates turned South Africa into both a transit state and market for narcotics because of the geographical position and the advance infrastructure development that allows for easy movement of goods (Ryan, 1997).

The SAPS management and leadership also had now to deal with the corruption within its own ranks (Marks, 2005). The inability of the police organization to reduce crime was attributed to the levels of corruption within the police service, the police complicity and police criminality. The communities were losing trust in the police and the incidents of mob justice were increasing as the communities were taking the law into their own hands. By 1996, the police management established, at that early stages, mechanism to combat corruption within the organization.

The SAPS appointed a renowned business executive Mr Meyer Khan, the former CEO of the South African Breweries (SAB), as the CEO of the SAPS while the new National Commissioner, Mr George Fivaz, would focus on the operations. The SAPS rolled out management and leadership training in order to fast track the paradigm shift from “command and control” supervisory management style that resonated with an oppressive state to a leadership style that was supposed to resonate with transformational agenda of the new democratic state (Eloff, 2006). The ethos for the police organization was changed from that of a police force to that of a service to the community. Programs for the demilitarisation of the new police service were implemented which included the disuse of military ranks to civilian ranks (Govender, 2012).

Operationally, the police implemented a number of programs that were aimed at combating the new forms of criminality. The crime fighting strategy that was adopted in 1996 was referred to as the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). This was a multi-departmental strategy that was inclusive of the participation of non-governmental organizations in crime prevention (Govender, 2012, p. 7). In 1999, as the crime was escalating and seemingly unabated, the SAPS adopted a new internally driven National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS).

The projects that were executed under the NCCS, included the High Density Operations and the Presidential Stations Projects. The objective was to identify problematic areas and then flood these with police officials in order to reduce the

levels of crime in that area, and once the area is stabilized, the police will then move to the next area (Governder, 2012). SAPS established specialised units such as the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) and a number of Serious and Violent Crime Units to react to these to the drugs and violent crimes.

The early reform process ensured that the foundations were created for a vibrant police leadership that would steer this new battleship through the treacherous waters of transformation and high crime levels. However, almost all of the subsequent National Commissioners were removed from their positions on the basis of ethical breaches or that their integrity was questioned (Newham, 2015). The office of the National Commissioner of Police has become the proverbial poisoned chalice.

Commissioner Fivaz was replaced by National Commissioner Selebi who was appointed in 2000, the first civilian to be appointed as the head the police. During his second term of office, Selebi was put on extended leave from office in 2008 by former President Thabo Mbeki after the National Prosecuting Authority put charges of corruption. Commissioner Selebi was later convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, and he died whilst on medical parole in January of 2015 (Newham, 2015).

General Bheki Cele was appointed on the 2nd August 2009 taking the reigns from the late Commissioner Selebi. General Cele was also removed from office in October 2011 on the basis that he mishandled tender processes amounting to R17 billion. The allegations against General Cele were investigated by the Public Protector which made adverse findings against him. A board of inquiry into his fitness to hold office was appointed and chaired by Judge Moloi. The board recommended the removal of General Cele from office (Newham, 2015; Montesh, 2014).

The first female National Commissioner, Riyah Phiyega was appointed on the 12th of June 2012. She appeared before the board of inquiry into her fitness to hold office following allegations of impropriety in the way that she dealt with the police involvement in the killings and deaths of 39 miners in mines at Marikana.

The board of Inquiry was chaired by Judge Claasen and she was found not fit to hold office because she breached her duty to manage the office with honesty. General Phiyega was suspended from office in 2015 with full pay until the end of her contract in 2017 (Newham, 2015; Montesh, 2014).

Twenty five years since the amalgamation things have not changed much, management style is not different, the service has re-established military ranks, and corruption with the police ranks is still pervasive. In 2016, the Acting National Commissioner of the SAPS, General Phahlane, called for a 'back to basics' approach to policing in order to address both leadership and operational issues.

General Phahlane has since been fired from the SAPS and he is facing serious corruption charges in 2020. His co-accused include the former Deputy National Commissioner of Police, General Bonang Mgwenya and the former Provincial Commissioner of Gauteng, General Deliwe de Lange (South African Police Service, 2020). The current National Commissioner of Police, General Khehla Sitole and two his deputies have been found guilty by the High Court in that they refused or resisted to assist the Independent Police Directorate in its investigation of possible tender rigging in the purchasing of electronic equipment that was going to be used for interception of cell phones. It is highly likely that the President will institute an Inquiry into his fitness to hold office (Dolley, 2021).

There has been a leadership crisis at the upper echelons of the South African Police Service since the dawn of democracy. The reasons are quite complex and deep seated. However, one of the main reasons to the crisis is the lack of proper executive and parliamentary oversight, and undue political intervention in the operations of the police (Newham, 2015; Montesh, 2014).

4.14 Conclusion

The ANC and SACP decided to establish MK as an independent armed wing in order to wage a guerrilla warfare against the state. The apartheid reacted by arresting the High Command of the ANC and this forced the ANC to establish an external wing. Nelson Mandela and others were appointed to negotiate with other

countries to support the ANC on its decision to wage a guerrilla war. In the 1960s very little was activities of MK were executed.

The external ANC and MK were boosted in the early 1970s when the Black Conscious Movement began to organise in the Black communities. In 1976 the students all over the country engaged in class boycotts which the led to mass uprisings. The regime responded harshly and many students were killed during this uprising, and many decided to leave the country and to join MK and other NLMS in exile. MK had established training camps in Angola and most students were absorbed and trained in those camps (Kwhela, 2003).

In the late 1970s and in the 1980s the South African Police and MK combatants clashed with each other more frequently with increased numbers of casualties on both sides. The SAP and the MK combatants were, however, not aware that the leadership had initiated a process to negotiate a peace settlement (Barnard, 2015). The possibility of a ceasefire was seen when the FW de Klerk released Mandela and unbanned the NLMS in February of 1990s.

Political violence escalated to unprecedented times between 1990s and 1993. The violence was fuelled by the remnants of the Security branch who were providing arms and ammunitions to groups that were opposed to the ANC and other liberation movements (Moran, 1997). It was in 1993 when the former commander of the MK, Chris Hani was murdered that the apartheid government and others, and the other parties were nudged to engage in the second wave of negotiation for peace and to call for open and democratic elections in 1994.

The SAP and MK had to work together to ensure that the first democratic elections take place under peaceful environment. MK had to demobilise and the combatants were amalgamated into various state security institutions including the South African Police Service.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

There are a number of methodological approaches that fall within the qualitative methodology, such as the Phenomenology, Discourse Analysis, Grounded Theory and Participatory Action Research. Qualitative Research approaches have now been used and acceptable in areas such as organizational behaviour and business management and are no longer the preserve of disciplines where they were originated. Qualitative research is “defined as a process where the research problem is studied in its natural sitting rather than having subjects studied in a laboratory” (Creswell, 2007 cited in Akinyonde & Khan, 2018, p. 164).

The challenges with qualitative research methods is that there has not been a single over-all technique on data collection and analysis. Every research project seem to provide a unique technique for collecting, summarising and analysing the data. Accordingly, a researcher who engages in qualitative research ought to explain in detail the process or technique that was used in the collection, summarising and analysis of data in order to allow for transparency.

5.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

5.2.1 Introduction

The Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was developed by John Smith in the field of psychology, however, it has since been firmly established as a qualitative methodology. The aim of Interpretative Phenomenology is to highlight and expose hidden meaning of the experiences of the research participants (Charlick S. , Pincombe, McKellar, & Fielder, 2016, p. 207). Through IPA, the researcher is able to identify the issues that would have been left out, ignored, or glossed over if other methodologies were used. IPA is about gathering the ‘lived experiences’ of the research participants and the meaning to those experience (Alase, 2017).

IPA methodology has been influenced by phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography. In this context, the objective of phenomenology is to enquire about a ‘lived experience, hermeneutics brings in the element of interpretation, and

idiography challenges the researcher to focus on the individual (Charlick, Pincombe, & Fielder, 2016). There are a number of features that distinguishes Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) approach from other qualitative approaches in that during the interpretation phase the researcher is more likely to bring in their preconceived ideas into the interpretation of the phenomenon, and also that the researcher and the research participant will experience some 'bonding' during the research process.

IPA is, therefore, concerned with capturing of the 'lived experiences' of the research participants in manner that it is not diluted by the position of the researcher nor predetermined by categorization of the elements. The research participants are provided with the space to narrate their experiences (Alase, 2017). The philosophical underpinning of the approach is that knowledge is socially constructed, and that there are as many realities of a phenomenon as there are individuals who are conceptualizing that phenomenon (Burnard, Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008).

5.2.2 Research paradigm

Interpretative Phenomenology Analysis (IPA) is underpinned by hermeneutics, a study of interpretation which seeks to place the researcher in the position of the subject so that the researcher can make sense of what the subject seeks to interpret. Therefore, IPA consist of a dual process of interpretation which is referred to as double hermeneutics (Charlick, Pincombe, & Fielder, 2016; Moodley, 2009). During the first step the research participant interprets the world or phenomenon as he or she lived and experienced it, and in the second step the researcher interprets the world of the researcher as the research participants has observed it. In this regard the researcher should observe reality from the position of the research participant (Alase, 2017).

One other important dimension in the Interpretative Phenomenological Approach (IPA) is that the experience of the research participant is intertwined with the content of the object of research and that his/her view of the appearance of the

object is influenced by his/her space, time and context as against that of the object.

5.2.3 Selection of participants

There are basically two broad categories of sampling methods, namely, random and non-random sampling. In qualitative research non-random sampling is often used to select participants because the researcher would be interested in specific phenomena that might be experienced by certain individuals only (Welman, Kruger , & Mitchell, 2005). The object of IPA is to record 'lived experiences' of research participants who will provide data that is 'rich' and 'in-depth' and the group must have shared a common experience. Therefore, in IPA it is acceptable for the researcher to look for a research participant who has gone through specific life experiences.

In IPA it is preferable that the research participants should be a homogenous group because it accords the research output with a combined albeit an in-depth impression of the 'lived experiences' of the research participants (Charlick, Pincombe, & Fielder, 2016). Therefore a smaller group of research participants is preferable when applying IPA methods, and usually the number is between 2 and 25 (Moodley, 2009; Alase, 2017). In this study, it was purposed that 12 research participants would be selected, however, 13 were participants took part in the project.

In phenomenological studies the key question that dominates the research in selecting the participants is whether the research participant has the experience that the research seeks to investigate. Therefore, the researcher ought to find the research participants who have some idea of what the phenomenon that is being studied is all about (Englander, 2012). The researcher ought to find a "research participant who not only have had a particular experience that is being investigated but must also be able to articulate it" (Hycner, 1985, p. 294). The researcher himself or herself ought to have some knowledge of the phenomenon but should be able to reserve this in order to allow the research participant to

elucidate on their own experience of the phenomenon, constrained within the parameters set forth by the researcher's prior knowledge (Englander, 2012).

In this study, the potential research participants were approached directly as most are commonly known and easily identified. Most of the former MK combatants are clustered in two units, namely, the Crime Intelligence Unit as well as the Protection Service. The MK combatants are also members of the Non-Statutory-Forces group which has been bargaining or campaigning with police management on a number of issues. Therefore, in this study, the coordinators of the Non-statutory Forces (NSF) were also approached to assist to identify members who are willing and able to participate in the research project.

A total of ten (9) former combatants that are currently serving in SAPS and four (4) former combatants who retired or left the SAPS completed the questionnaires on their own. Two combatants who are currently serving and one who were agreed to be to participate in the research. The questionnaire was used as a guideline for the interviews and it was populated by the researcher.

5.2.4 Research Questions, Data collection and instrumentation

In qualitative research data is usually collected through interviews, diaries, or focus groups. The data collection process and the instrument or method should be open-ended and flexible. In the Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis method the researcher should endeavour to capture the 'lived experience' of the research participants, and the instrumentation that is used should facilitate instead of rigidly inhibiting the process of data collection (Akinyonde & Khan, 2018). The questions in IPA should be open and exploratory. The questions should be semi-structured in order to allow for deeper interaction between the researcher and the research participants. The questions in IPA are "concerned with the *how* than the *what* of a given phenomenon" (Miller & Minton, 2016).

Although data in IPA must be rich in content, it is permissible, however, to use instrumentation and methods that may shorten the description of the

phenomenon that is being studied. Giorgi quoted in Englander (2012) makes the salient point that:

“The face to face interview is often longer and thus richer in terms of nuances and depth. The shorter written description are useful for the undergraduate research projects for workshop material. Although one could extend the number of subjects in collecting shorter description to compensate for many nuances usually gained in the longer face-to-face interview” (Englander, 2012, p. 27).

5.2.5 Bracketing in IPA

The data collection process requires that the researcher should work with rich in-depth data, and preferably with transcripts that are verbatim. The purpose of data collection in IPA is not meant to test a hypothesis but to record the lived experiences of the participants. The research is not supposed to bring his or her own preconceived knowledge and ideas but should allow the research participants to share their experiences of the phenomenon that is being studied. The process whereby the researcher withhold his or her own ideas regarding the phenomenon being studies is referred to as ‘bracketing’ (Chang, Fung, & Chien, 2013).

The researcher is advised to conduct literature review only after data has been captured in order to minimise the chances of bringing his or her own knowledge and themes into the data analysis process. However, authors recognise that the researcher may be faced with a dilemma if he or she had to postpone the literature review because the Committees that approve research proposals usually require that the researcher should have done some literature review in order to indicate some form of mastery of the subject matter that is to be investigated (Chang, Fung, & Chien, 2013).

In this study, however, data was captured in two ways, firstly the questionnaires were distributed to the potential participants to complete. The respondents were requested to provide as much information as possible and to regard the

questionnaire as open-ended and a guide. The respondents were allowed to fill in the questionnaires themselves because it was not possible to conduct a face-to-face interview with them due to restrictions that were placed on meetings due to COVID19 pandemic. The second method of data collection was to interview the participants and the questionnaires were coupled by the researcher as the research participants were responding.

Where the participants opted to be interviewed and the researcher was taking notes of the responses, the interview session took about three to four hours. In the instances where the participants chose to respond by the filling in the questionnaire themselves, the earliest took one day and the longest took three weeks. It must also be indicated that the initial proposal that went to the Ethics Committee had a list of questions to guide the interview session, however, the committee ruled that a questionnaire should instead be developed for the purposes of the research project. Data was collected from the month of February 2021 to June 2021.

5.2.6 Location of the participants

Nine research participants who are currently serving in the SAPS, and four who are retired or resigned from the SAPS consented to participate in the research project. The responses by the research participants who are currently serving in the SAPS were coded from CM1 to CM9, and those who retired were coded RM1 – RM4.

Most of the SAPS members who participated in the research project were from the Crime intelligence Division, and the rest were from the support service, detective service as well from the specialised units. There was one participant who, unlike the others, indicated that he had a short stint at a police station. The majority of the participants were older than fifty years and those who left or retired from the SAPS were over sixty years.

A brief description of the research participants is provided in the table below. The purpose of providing the background is to illustrate the extent of homogeneity within the group of research participants because this is an important element in the application of the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis method (Hycner, 1985).

The items that have been lifted from the questionnaire are;

- a) The date in which they joined MK;
- b) Whether they were recruited or volunteered;
- c) Whether they were in exile or operated internally;
- d) Whether or not they had any military training;
- e) Whether or not they engaged in direct combat with SAP or SANDF or other hostile force;
- f) Whether or not they operated in a cell or any structure.

Table 3: Descriptive data of research participants

	DATE OF JOINING MK	RECRUITED	EXILED	MILITARY TRAINING	Engaged in combat with apartheid forces	Belonged to a Cell
CM1	1985	Yes, recruited by Kagiso Njebele	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
CM2	1991	Recruited by cousin	No	Yes (trained internally)	Yes (around the lowveld area in former East Transvaal	No
CM3	1982	Left the country on own accord following harassment by security branch	1985	Yes (Kibashe Camp)	Infiltrated country and arrested in 1988	Trained in Sarajevo

CM4	1988	Joined through association with other people	No	No	No	Yes (Cell leader)
CM5	1989	Formally recruited by Mtu Swili	No (trained internally)	Yes (trained internally)	Indirectly	No
CM6	1986	Joined voluntarily	Yes	Yes	No	No
CM7	1988	Yes, recruited by Mshoshovi	No	Yes	Yes (battle of the Titans)	Yes (Mastrov Cell)
CM8	1986	Recruited by Wilson Monoto	Yes	Yes	Yes (with SAP)	Yes (Cell leader)
CM9	1992	Recruited by Peter Karel Tlhomelang	Imprisoned at Robben Island	Yes	No	Yes
RM1	1981	Former police officer recruited whilst member of security branch	No but went in and out of the country	Yes	Yes reported to Malaza	No
RM2	1988	Recruited by Steve Matlala	No	Yes	Yes, we were 3 in a cell	No
RM3	1975	Joined voluntarily	Yes went out through Swaziland	Yes received training at German Democratic Republic	Yes the structure was called machinery and I was the Commissar	Yes involved in combat with SAP details are with TRC
RM4	1985	Recruited by Joe Monoto	Yes went through Botswana	Yes trained in MK camps in Angola	Yes member of the Special Operations	Combat with SADF and UNITA forces

5.2.7 Recruitment into MK

The majority of the participants joined or were recruited into MK in the 1980s. The earliest was recruited in 1975 and the most recent joined MK in 1991, just after the unbanning of the African National Congress, MK and the other political parties

as well as military formations. A significant number was recruited in 1985 and 1986.

The participants indicated that they were recruited into the MK by members who were already in the movement. One participant indicated that he joined the police service in 1979 and was recruited while he was in the security branch of the SAP by another police service member who was already operating in the underground structures of the MK. The member also indicated that his father was a police officer, and when he was expelled from school for student activism, he was prompted to join the South African Police.

Another research participant indicated that a security branch member warned him to leave the country as he was after him and will kill him or arrest him. One combatant indicated that he was arrested for student activism prior to joining or being recruited into MK. He was motivated by the arrest itself to join MK and engage the 'enemy forces' at a higher level.

Several participants went into exile. One of these who went to exile indicated that he first went in 1982 to one of the African countries and that he had to return because the UN Office wanted to send him to school but he had the zeal to join the military wing. He came into the country and only in 1985 did he go back and was then absorbed into the military structures of MK. The member indicated that he arrived in the neighbouring country in the same week that the apartheid forces attacked the bases of MK and killed several cadres. He had left the country with eight other recruits.

5.2.8 Readiness to engage in armed struggle

In general, the members felt that they were ready to fight the apartheid regime because of the atrocities that they were witnessing in their localities. The combatants also stated that they were noticing that the MK cadres were beginning to attack the apartheid forces and that gave them the courage to fight and participate in the armed struggle. One participant indicated that he was encouraged and motivated to join MK by the arrest and hanging of Solomon Mahlangu in the late 1970s. The participant was also encouraged by the

messages from Radio Freedom which was broadcasting from Tanzania, and the pamphlets that were distributed clandestinely in the townships. Some of the members were also motivated by the departure of the local activists who left to join MK in exile.

One participant indicated that he was working at the notorious Vlakplaas, a farm that was used by the security branch to detain and interrogate MK cadres who were captured by the police. The participant indicated that he was tasked by the security branch to identify MK cadres who had infiltrated the country. The participant reported that and he was using captured MK cadres who were turned into security branch operatives and were referred to as 'Askaris'. The research participant further indicated that he was recruited by a fellow colleague at Vlakplaas to work with the ANC underground structures.

5.2.9 Experience in Exile

The recruits who went into exile indicated that they were first vetted before undertaking military training when they arrived in the camps. A participant indicated that he received military training first in Angola in the Quibaxe camp. The training involved political education, Military Combat Work (MCW) (way of survival), military artillery, topography, and tactics. The participant indicated he further received specialised training in the former Yugoslavia in artillery, firearms, engineering (explosives) and booby trapping, however, political education was always primary. He also underwent a course on chemical reaction.

One other participant who was already serving in the police service, reported that he was notified by a colleague that the ANC in exile would like to meet with him. He then went to meet with them in Swaziland and agreed there that he will work with them. He was given a contact person to report on the activities that were taking place at Vlakplaas, a farm that was used by the Security Branch to interrogate captured MK combatants or to convert them into spies for SAP. The MK combatants who were converted into SAP spies were referred to as Askaris.

5.3 Conclusion

The research methodology that was applied in this research was qualitative research and utilized the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This method was deemed appropriate because the phenomenon that was investigated and the related constructs required a method that would allow the research participants to share their 'lived experiences' without hindrance of the narrow approach of other methods that constrain the participants to the pre-defined theoretical models and knowledge of the researcher.

The research participants were able to provide in-depth information that was based on their 'lived experiences' and could be analysed and interpreted through identified models. It was important during this stage that the important elements of IPA with regards to data analysis were adhered to and observed. The research participants were to a large extent homogenous in that they admitted that they were MK combatants, they were engaged in the armed struggle, they were trained politically and militarily, they value that label of MK combatant, and also that they were amalgamated into SAPS.

CHAPTER 6: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Thematic content analysis is the most common method of data analysis in qualitative studies such as ethnography and phenomenology (Burnard, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008). The authors Morrow, Rodriguez & King (2015) present a seven step model that was drawn from Colaizzi, one of the outstanding figures in the application of phenomenology in Psychology. In this study, the steps by Colaizzi were compressed into five steps because there were some overlaps and repetitions during the period analysis. The five steps that were applied are a) Familiarization b) formulating meanings c) identifying and clustering of themes d) Structuring the analysis and e) Construction of cohesive narrative (Morrow, Rodriguez, & King, 2015; Charlick, Pincombe, McKellar, & Fielder, 2016).

a) Familiarization

The first step in data analysis is to peruse the responses of each research participant in order to be familiar with the data and to know the account of each respondent well. The researcher is expected to immerse himself or herself in the original data and begin to select significant statements, sentences or quotations in the response questionnaire or interview transcripts so that he or she is then able to later include these in the research report (Morrow, Rodriguez, & King, 2015; Charlick, Pincombe, McKellar, & Fielder, 2016).

In this study, the researcher developed a spreadsheet wherein the respondents were listed from second column to the fourteenth in the first row, and their responses were captured verbatim from the 2nd row to the 44th row. The capturing enabled the researcher to visualise at a glance the responses of all the research participants. The research participants were labelled from CM1 – CM9 for the participants who are currently serving and RM1 – RM4 for the research participants who have retired. The questionnaires were reduced into a matrix of

16 columns and 44 rows of data. The last column, the 16th, included the summary of key statements that the respondents made.

b) Formulating meanings

In this phase, the researcher identifies meanings that are relevant and associated with the phenomenon that is being studied. The researcher should suppress his or her own 'experiences' and preconception about the phenomenon that is being studied in order to avoid a situation where he or she influences the direction that the theory is pointing towards. In this study, statements that are relevant to constructs such as integration, identity and culture were identified and highlighted by using different colour markings in order to indicate those statements that have common meanings and are relevant to the construct.

c) Identifying and Clustering of themes

During this phase, the researcher puts together the statements that have the same meaning or refers to the same construct and labels major and minor themes (Morrow, Rodriguez, & King, 2015). The researcher illustrates identification and clustering of themes below. The participants' responses to various items in the questionnaire were summarised and lifted from the spreadsheet. The researcher then drew meaning from the responses and then brought together those that contribute towards a theme. Clustering is demonstrated in the paragraph below.

d) Structuring the analysis

The researcher in this phase selects statements and quotations from the transcripts and inscribe so as to reinforce the themes. At this stage the researcher may discard any theme that is not well supported.

e) Construction of a cohesive narrative

The researcher then builds a narrative from the themes and the quotations.

6.2 Development of the themes

In accordance with the model that was developed by Colliazi, a number of items in the questionnaire were selected and clustered according to their relevance so that they are able to bring common themes. Three themes were developed through clustering of the questions and responses in the questionnaire, and these are; a) social identity b) amalgamation c) acculturation.

6.2.1 Development of the Social Identity theme

Social identity is the desire of an individual to be associated with a particular group. It provides the psychological basis for members of one group to identify themselves as different from others. Social Identity is also applicable among groups or formations that use violence as means to achieve their objectives (Berry J. W., 2009). The themes were analysed by appropriating the Social Identity Theory that was developed by Mangum and Block (2018). According to these authors, SIT has three components, namely, social categorization, social identification and social comparison (Mangum & Block Jr, 2018).

In the process of developing the Social identity theme, items which explains the participants' desire to be part of MK, were chosen from the questionnaire and their responses clustered. Questions 2, 4, 5, 8, 19 and 32 were relevant for the development of the Social identity theme.

6.2.1.1 Social Identification of Umkhonto we Sizwe Combatants

Social identification is a process wherein as individual aspire to share a common identity with others through embracing the groups' values, norms, culture and beliefs (Mangum & Block Jr, 2018). Labelling plays an important role in the social identification stages, especially among groups that use violence as a means to achieve their goals, and these includes extremist group, gangs and military formations (Agbiboa, 2015). MK combatants have a very strong social identity which is founded on its legacy of political activism and the leading role it played in carrying out the armed struggle. The paragraphs below elaborates on the elements that contributed to the strong social identity as these are derived from the participants' responses.

Members of MK embrace the term “former combatants” as well as “NSF members” although they are generally not active within the MKVA structure. The former combatants also appreciated and places high regard on their participation in the ‘armed struggle’ and they wish for such to be recognized by both the SAPS and the community. The former MK combatants were placed in the same unit, namely, the Crime Intelligence Unit as well as the VIP Protection Service during the amalgamation.

The placement in these units cemented group solidarity as they were going through the same experiences. A retired former combatant who was recruited from within the SAP during the apartheid era, indicated that he acted as the “pillar of strength for the others” because of his knowledge of the inner workings of the SAP.

The implication of the amalgamation with SAP was that the MK combatants had to work closely with their former foes or enemies. The MK members were trained in both political and military work, and were therefore politically conscious and indicated that the former SAP and Bantustan Police loathed them because they were “taking up the crucial positions and were preferred for promotions more than them”.

MK combatants were eager to be identified as combatants and to be identified with MK. They were resilient to maintain the label of “MK combatant” or any other label that identifies them as freedom fighters who participated in the armed struggle.

6.2.1.2 Social Categorization of MK Combatants

Social categorization provides a psychological basis to define ‘the other’ and also provides a framework for the individual to adjust to the environment (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This aspect of Social Identity Theory, also provides the individual with a ‘fit for purpose’ rationale for aspiring to belong to a particular group. When individuals share a common experience, they naturally wish to belong together (Sam & Berry, 2010). The most relevant items with regards to the Social

Categorization of MK members relate to the reasons for joining MK and the prior experiences in the struggle.

There are various circumstances that led the participants to join MK. Most of the participants indicated that they were student activists and then were recruited into the MK and the underground structures. One participant indicated that he was politically conscious in the late 1970s already. The participant further indicated that he was 'handled' by some university students, and was tasked to recruit other high school students to join the student movement. Two of the participants indicated that they were expelled from their high schools.

One participant indicated that he was operating in the underground structures of the ANC and was reporting to ANC members in a neighbouring country who were then reporting to Lusaka. Another participant indicated that he joined because his house was petrol bombed by the security forces and his sibling were hurt and his parent passed on during the blast.

The MK combatants had indicated that their experiences were not adequately considered when they were amalgamated and they were given lower ranks than they deserved. One of the Mk combatants remarked that 'he was highly trained and was a member of the special operations of MK during exile. He was, however, obliged to undergo basic training within the SAPS.

6.2.1.3 Social Comparison of MK combatants

Social comparison refers to the natural tendency of one group to compare itself with the other groups. The members of a group tend to support one another and to hold a perception that others are inferior and 'worthy to be persecuted' (Gibson, 2006). It is usually the dominant or in-group that tends to perceive themselves as better than the out-group.

The table below illustrates the development of all three levels of Social Identity theme, namely, social identification, social categorisation and social comparison.

Table 4: Development of the Social Identity theme

QUESTION	RESPONSES	THEME (SOCIAL IDENTITY)
Q2 How did it come about / what influenced you to join or become a member of MK?	1. Harassment by apartheid forces 2. Murder of close family members and relatives; 3. Continuous boycotts in the schools; 4. Getting arrested; - Participation in the Mass democratic movement; 5. Active Mk recruitment after 1991 6. Coming from a family of activists	Combatants were influenced to join by being personally harassed by the security forces; the death or killing of close family members by apartheid forces; others were actively recruited by those who were operating in the underground structures.
Q4 Prior to joining were you active in anti-apartheid activities, were you a member of of any political movement? Please explain	Prior to joining MK the combatants were involved in various activities including: 1. Student activist and members of COSAS, SASCO. 2. Participated in Black Consciousness movement at varsity level. 3. Police officer and was recruited by fellow police officer 4. Not a student activist but participated in marches	Before joining MK, Combatants were previously mainly student and community activists. However, there are exceptions including a police officer.

Q5 Were you arrested for any political prior to becoming a member of MK? Please give details, if possible	1. Never arrested 2. Arrested for school boycotts 3. Arrested under state of emergency 4. Arrested in terms of terrorism Act and sentenced to jail 5. Served time on Robben Island	MK combatants' prior experience regarding arrests ranged from those who were never arrested to those who were convicted for terrorism and serving time on Robben Island.
Q8 Did you at the time that you joined ready to fight the apartheid military forces?	1. I felt that I ready. Incidents of attacks in the media made me believe that we can win. In the late 1970's with the execution of Solomon Mahlangu, there was medium that was bringing us the news. 2. In 1976 3 guys from my hometown left the country for exile. 3. I felt ready the only thing I needed was the grill to fight; I was ready to lay my life for my country; 4. I was extremely excited, I wanted to fight the apartheid forces; 5. I knew that the only way to win was through the armed struggle; 6. The cruelty of oppression, racist killings and massacres of our people.	Combatants were encouraged to join the fight against the apartheid military forces by the reports of insurrection; reports of the massacres or attacks by apartheid forces; they were also encouraged to join by seeing their neighbours and peers who joined the underground structures before them.

Q19 Do you appreciate the label of MK veteran? Please explain	Responses were as follows: the label is appreciated as the coming generations will learn that there was a guerrilla movement that fought against apartheid. The label is appreciated because the determination and selflessness with which the combatants executed the armed struggle made MK a brand of its own. The label is further appreciated for as long as it is not abused for personal gain. The general population always held MK combatants in high regard. Participation of the member was appreciated a lot; The community was grateful that a former special branch member turned into MK. One member felt that the community was not politically matured as they only appreciate if your participation suits them. members also felt that the divisions and the various factions and grant corruption demoralised the general public	The combatants generally appreciated the label of MK veteran. The label provides them some level of respect and hero status in the community. The combatants want to be known as those who participated in the armed struggle and fought with the oppressive apartheid government.
Q32 You are referred to as former MK members or NSF, how do you feel about that identity - Is it benefiting you? Do you feel ostracised	-Do not feel well with the label; No benefits; Feel ostracised; -There was fear within SAP and lies spread that former	The combatants' experience with regards to the NSF or MK label contributed to them being separated from others or ostracised. One member stated that when the NSF

by the label? Did this feeling change over time?	SAP members were not going to be promoted; In other provinces NSF members were never accepted; -We were not integrated but swallowed in the SAPS; we were called haasman; -Personally feel good about the label because it clearly defines who I am and reminds others of contribution to democracy; We are ostracised - reality is that top SAPS management is filled by former SAP force and Bantustan police members; Ostracising became more acute overtime and very visible.	members were integrated, there was 'fear' among the statutory force members. But with time, the fear dissipated, and the former statutory members realised that NSF is toothless. There was no real shake up.
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6.2.1.4 Conclusion on the social identity theme

The data that was presented and analysed in this section indicate that MK combatants place high regard for being categorised and identified as war veterans. The combatants also place high premium on being compared and separated from officers who were not involved in the armed struggle as well as those who served in the police during the apartheid era. The combatants have little or no aspiration for being associated with the SAPS. They have been placed in two units that are in the periphery of regular policing duties, and they seem to prefer to work together. Very few combatants have transferred on their own accord to other units within the SAPS. The combatants, therefore, display strong social and military identity.

6.2.2 Development of the Amalgamation theme

The SAPS and some authors seem to use the term Amalgamation and Integration as well as some research participants also seem to be using these constructs interchangeably. However, amalgamation in this study refers to the process of joining or bringing two or more organizations together into one. There are various permutations in business or government institutions with regards amalgamation of one or more institutions.

The construct amalgamation is relevant because in this case, we had members of MK who were brought together with members of 11 other police forces into the new South African Police Service (SAPS). Admittedly, there are instances where there will be a dominant group during amalgamation of two or more institutions, and as it was indicated in the literature review that the former SAP was the core of the new organization. The table below illustrates the development of the Amalgamation theme. Questions 20, 21, and 22 were considered in the development of the theme.

Table 5: Development of the Amalgamation theme

QUESTION	RESPONSES	THEME (AMALGAMATION)
Q20 When did you integrate in the SAPS	Combatants indicated that they integrated into SAPS in 1995, one indicated that he formally enlisted in 2000, another in 2004. One other combatant joined in 1979 as police officer then integrated after serving sentence in Robben Island. Some first joined the army and they were later integrated into SAPS. The latest to join was in 2004 after serving in the army and the Secretariat of Police.	The SAPS and former combatants use the terms integration and amalgamation interchangeably. However, the common trend is that the combatants were brought into SAPS officially on the 1 st of April 1995. There were some who came in later into SAPS, and one who was a member of SAP when he joined underground structures. He was re-enlisted after serving term in prison.

Q21 At what rank were you integrated within SAPS?	The combatants were given the Constable ranks at integration in 1995, others were integrated at the level of Lt Colonel and Full Colonel. One who joined later in 2004 was integrated at the level of Lt General.	The combatants were given the special constable rank in order to fast track the administration process of bringing them into SAPS. The ranking took place later although some were given higher ranks at the very beginning.
Q22 Were you satisfied with the rank? If no, what rank would rather have been integrated at, and Why?	The combatants' responses to whether they were satisfied with the rank that they were awarded, were; Not satisfied with the rank, I would have preferred inspector rank; a rank higher than that of a Major; I was in the senior ranks of MK and was a training official and felt no recognition of it. One was satisfied with the rank that he was awarded at integration and the other indicated that he was not concerned with the rank as he was more focused on doing the work at hand	The combatants who were awarded higher ranks were content with the level at which they were brought in. Those with lower ranks complained that their previous experiences were not taken into consideration. Some of the combatants were in the military and then transferred to SAPS later at their military ranks.
23: Describe the process that led to your integration of SAPS? Was there a call-up? Was there a committee? Were you part of any committee?	Responses to Q23 are listed below because of the extensive volume.	
	We were taken from the VIP protection unit to Potchestroom to form the new democratic Internal Security	Members were placed in units that were previously involved in the enforcement of

	which was aimed at working with the current government instead of killing the citizens of the country; - I joined SAPS like any other ordinary South African. After I have joined I made it a point that I look for members who integrated and made enquiry as to how I can make it known that I am a member of NSF; - A group of Generals from the SAP came to Shell House (head Office of the ANC in Johannesburg) and met with the leadership of the ANC. They said we have a military in SA and the possibility of an external insurrection will not be in the next 100 years. Our biggest challenge is crime. You took most of the cadres to the army and the intelligence, we are hated by the communities. Bring in some into the SAPS so that we can be acceptable in the communities. Commissioner Radu was given the responsibility to do it until his unfortunate death in 1997;	apartheid brutality and were feeling misplaced. The members were also feeling that they were being isolated from their comrades. They felt dislocated because of the strong military identity which demanded group identity. - The MK combatants felt powerless because they were not in charge of the amalgamation or the integration process. The amalgamation was initiated by the former SAP senior officers. The MK was on its back foot. - The call up was motivated by the fact that the SAP top brass wanted to atone through the camouflaging with the MK soldiers who were at the time had high moral ground.
	- There was no call-up; I was not part of any Committee though I knew that a committee existed; I was dismissed after I was arrested. After unbanning I	- There were no formal processes to amalgamate the MK forces. The process was piecemeal at best and haphazard at worst.

	was called by the unit I was operating with in Swaziland; - We were part of DIS at Shell house. My task was to establish information networks. During negotiations we were first integrated at the NIA (National Intelligence Agency), then the Deputy President identified a group of us to go to the police; - There was a call-up; I was not part of a committee and not sure if there was one or certain individual were tasked to do the call-up. I was supposed to be integrated with the 1994 group, not sure what happened; - The National Commissioner of the SAPS requested me to take up the post of the Inspector General of the Police when it became vacant as the person who occupied the post was going on pension;	
	- The integration in SAPS was forced by circumstances surrounding the protection of our leaders. From the ANC, we protected our leaders and after the election, we then learned that SAPS is a mandated body responsible for the protection of the executives. The ANC compiled a list of all those	The combatants were integrated into SAPS because they were doing guard and protective duties to the leaders of the ANC. They were then absorbed into the SAP.

	who were working as personal protection and the list formed part of the integration into SAPS. I was not part of the Committee	
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6.2.3 Conclusion on the amalgamation theme

With regards to the process that led to the combatants being integrated into SAPS, each combatant had a unique experience. One participant indicated that he joined the SAPS voluntarily and then found his way into the NSF community. Most, however, indicated that they were active within the ANC Security or other structures and were then deployed to the SAPS. They indicated that the move to SAPS was not voluntary. One of the former senior MK members indicated that he was requested by the National Commissioner to head one of the SAPS investigation units as an indication that the new police service is transforming and embracing diversity.

The responses of the research participants indicate that there was no clear process which was laid out by the ANC nor the government of the day to amalgamate MK combatants with the SAP. The ANC and the government of the day focussed on the amalgamation of MK and the former South African Defence Force (SADF) as well as MK and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Amalgamation of MK combatants into SAPS was clearly an afterthought by the ANC.

One respondent indicated that there were no clear guidelines as to where the members of MK who must or are eligible to be integrated into the SAPS should converge. Unlike with the military, all the MK soldiers had to converge at the two barracks, one in Bloemfontein and the other in North West. The senior members of the SAP at the time apparently approach the leadership of the ANC and requested the ANC to avail some combatants to be integrated and amalgamated with the SAPS.

The SAP leadership at time argued that the police had a bad reputation in the community and therefore it will be important that they are seen to be working with people who were involved in the liberation movement so that the new SAPS can be trusted and gain legitimacy in the communities. One senior member of SAP was alleged to have said that South Africa will not be attacked by any external force in the next 100 years so the enemy is crime and it will need both the former apartheid forces and the MK who have respect and legitimacy to work together to fight crime.

With regards to the amalgamation of combatants from the Western Cape, Veary (2021) a former combatant and body guard of Nelson Mandela in the early 1990s, explains in his memoir that on the 1st of April 1995 he led a group of twenty members to integrate into the SAPS. He laments that there was no clear program from the ANC with regards to the process of integration of former combatants into the SAPS, and therefore they “had to raft the whitewater without any paddles” (Veary, 2021, p. 19). The former combatant, who was also imprisoned on Robben Island for ‘terrorism’, categorizes the group of former combatants that he led into the new SAPS into three, namely, those who were “seasoned ANC underground cadres”, others were “overt activists” and the rest “had never seen military or covert action against the enemy” (Veary, 2021, p. 19).

In a follow up interview with a research participant, he indicated that he was part of a contingent of MK combatants from the North West and they were led and coordinated by the late General Baduza Toka, the author of one the books that was cited in this study. The participant reported that Toka compiled a list of 116 (one hundred and sixteen) members and submitted the list to the SAPS North West Provincial Head Office which was at Potchestroom town, now known as Tlokwe. Toka was part of an MK Unit that was arrested for the bombing of various state and commercial buildings in Pretoria in the late 1980s, and was charged for the murder of three police in Atteridgeville. Toka and his co-accused escaped from Modderbee Prison in 1990 and surfaced in Zambia (Toka, 2012).

In the Northern Cape there were 8 (eight) former MK combatants who were integrated into SAPS. The group was led by Joey Kers, who had served about 8

(eight) years in prison on Robben Island after he was convicted for ‘terrorist activities’ in terms of the Terrorism Act of 1967. He was jailed with four others in what was termed the “Galeshewe Terror Trial” which ran from 1981 to 1983 (Kers, 2017). He was released with many other political prisoners just after the unbanning of political parties. Kers is currently the Head of Crime Intelligence in the Northern Cape and is a Major General.

In his autobiography, Kers (2017) contests the use of the concept of integration with regards to the manner in which MK combatants came into the SAPS in 1995. He contends that

“we were assimilated into the same Internal Security (Security Branch) that all political activists, alive and dead, had been victims of during the heydays of apartheid” (Kers, 2017, p. 237).

Kers firmly prefers the term assimilation and went to say that “we were assimilated as constables, this being the lowest Police rank and entry into the Police and when you are a Constable, nobody forgets to remind you that about that and you will not be forgiven for forgetting!” (Kers, 2017, p. 238).

The experience of other countries like Namibia and Zimbabwe is similar in that the police service were not affected by the DDR process as much as the defence forces were affected. However, in South Africa the SAP played a leading role in the fight against the armed struggle as it was waged by MK combatants.

6.2.4 Development of the theme on Acculturation

6.2.4.1 Acculturation models

In this research the Berry’s Acculturation model is used to explain the acculturation process of MK in the SAPS during amalgamation process and beyond. The model offers four alternatives for the incoming group with respect to the culture of the dominant group, and these are a) integration b) assimilation c) separation d) isolation (Sam & Berry, 2010).

The table below illustrates the building of the Acculturation theme. An analysis of the responses will be discussed in the paragraphs below by appropriating the Berry's Model of Acculturation. Questions 24, 29, 28 and 32 were clustered and analysed to develop the acculturation theme.

Table 6: Development of the Acculturation theme

QUESTION	RESPONSES	THEME (ACCULTURATION)
Q24. How did you feel about the environment at the time of amalgamation/integration?	The responses of the combatants is that; - I hated it for specific reason. We were told that the system was going to change, but when we integrated we were placed at the internal Security unit. - It was awkward to be placed in such a unit; - I felt vulnerable; - I was uneasy especially because I did not understand the environment I was going into; - I was well known in the police, I was accepted by former colleagues; - Hostile as we were treated as if we had leprosy, it was us -and them situation. We were told that it is wishful thinking to think that we will transform SAPS. - I hated the police and did not want to see me as part of the police. I thought I will deploy at the intelligence. - The SAPS environment was toxic and full of former special branch operatives.	With regards to how they combatants felt about the environment in SAPS, they were expectedly emotional. Some of the respondents indicated that they 'hated' being in the SAPS. The factor that took most of them aback was that they were placed within the Security branch, which was the very unit that was used as an instrument to fight them. This clearly created an awkward situation for most of the combatants. The general response was that they were treated with disdain and mistrust.

Q29: Is your experience as a combatant appreciated by former SAPS or members of other statutory members?	-Not all of them, other are keen to learn from us; - No, they felt that we did not deserve to be in the service and we were labelled illiterate, lazy or terrorists of after derogatory names; never appreciated, people saw us as coming to take up their jobs; - We were ill-treated because of this; - Most of the experiences that I have achieved as NSF member are not well appreciated within the present hostile SAPS environment by many at the top and middle layer management structure, hence one has been overlooked for promotion in order to share knowledge and experience to younger members. - One has been a Captain for over 18 years without been considered for promotion by majority former apartheid SAP managers within Crime Intelligence. - There was professional jealousy; - We had proper networks in the townships and our counterparts were not happy with our successes. These criminals were known and the police were collecting claiming that they are paying informers. - My experience was appreciated more than expected as I	The combatants generally feel that their experiences are not being appreciated by the former SAP and Bantustan members. The combatants also are of the view that they mistreated by the other members, and that they are being regarded as lazy, illiterate and are never appreciated. The combatants also indicated that they are being overlooked for promotions. One member indicated that his experience was generally appreciated more than he had expected.
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	mentioned earlier that we were more superior than the old guard;	
Q28. Do you think that the experience as former combatant help you in your daily work in SAPS? In what way?	- yes as an operational commander, new members are learning a lot through my knowledge and skills pertaining to problem solving - Our training and experiences as former combatants of MK provided us with an immense knowledge of understanding society in general and international dynamics which are the contributing factors in global organized crime has a local impact too. -Yes, mainly as an MK operative was Intel gathering operating covert therefore it came as second nature to be a SAPS operative When I joined SAPS I realised that we were far superior than the old police men. The old guards were surprised as to how professional we were and how we discharged our responsibilities. We earned the respect. - Yes, mainly as an MK operative was Intel gathering operating covert therefore it came as second nature to be a SAPS operative.	The combatants were of the view that the experience they gathered during the struggle enabled them to deal with the work. As most of them have been placed in the Crime Intelligence Unit, they reckon that they are better suited to interact with the communities and identify criminality and the criminals who are perpetuating crimes. The combatants hold the view that the communities trust them more than the former apartheid police officers. Their experience is a facilitator rather than an impediment in executing their duties. To that extend, they are better assets to the organisation than a liability.
Q32 You are referred to as former Mk members or NSF, how do you feel about that identity - Is it	--Do not feel well with the label; No benefits; feel ostracised;	The combatants experience with regards to the NSF or MK label exposes them to be separated from others or

benefiting you? Do you feel ostracised by the label? Did this feeling change over time?	-There was fear within SAP and lies spread that former SAP members were not going to be promoted; In other provinces NSF members were never accepted; -We were not integrated but swallowed in the SAPS; we were called haasman; - Personally feel good about the label because it clearly defines who I am and reminds to who do not know about our contribution to democracy; We are ostracised - reality is that top SAPS management is filled by former SAP force and Bantustan police members; ostracising became more acute overtime and very open	ostracised. One member stated that when the NSF members were integrated, there was 'fear' among the statutory force members. But with time, the fear dissipated, and the former statutory members realised that NSF is toothless. There was no real shake up.
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6.2.4.2 Application of the Berry's Acculturation Model

Berry's Model provides four alternatives as strategies for the incoming group with regards the culture of the dominant group. The MK combatants have indicated largely that they felt ostracised within the new SAPS. The numbers of combatants who were brought over to the SAPS were very small compared to the size of the SAP and the former Bantustan police forces. The actual number of the combatants who came into the SAPS cannot be confirmed anywhere. Seemingly, in each province of the major provinces, the ANC appointed an individual to coordinate the lists of members who would be part of the contingent that would be amalgamated with SAPS. The MK combatants did not have the necessary critical mass to make any meaningful change in respect of the broader policing strategy, and on the structure of the new organization.

The participants described the culture within the SAP at the time of amalgamation as hostile and non-accommodative. The Black people were behaving subserviently to their white counterparts. The participants felt that the culture of the SAPS has not changed, black officers were still afraid and treated white people as superiors. Certain privileges were reserved for white officers and Blacks were still ill-treated. It was the view of the participants that affirmative action benefitted mainly white female officers, and to a certain extent Black female officers.

Some of the members indicated that they never participated in any extra mural activities in the SAPS. However, they had an opportunity to undergo courses such as the Special Weapons and Tactics. One member indicated he has never been promoted since he integrated at the level of lieutenant colonel and that he decided that he will never apply for promotions again. Members indicated that they received medals but the manner in which such medals were awarded was not 'dignified in the military sense'. There no parades and the medals were simply put in their mail boxes.

However, the combatants were comfortable their experiences as combatants puts them in a better position to execute their functions better their counterparts because they understand the communities better, and also the communities hold them in high regard. They are able to penetrate the syndicates much easier because they are familiar with the territory. The fact that they are able to produce helpful intelligent products causes tension between them and the former SAP members. Ultimately this contributes to the vicious cycle of 'us' and 'them'.

6.2.4.3 MK Acculturation strategy

MK combatants had a strong social identity that they brought with and continued to maintain beyond the amalgamation process. In the beginning, the euphoria with regards to the amalgamation disguised the deeper challenges of acculturation. The organization was going through transition and restructuring process and thus the issues that MK had were rendered invisible by the immediate transformation priorities for the organization.

The MK members were not properly orientated into the SAPS, and most were taken through the adjusted basic policing programs. The MK members were also placed at the periphery of the normal policing duties, most of them were enlisted in Crime Intelligence and others in Protection Services. Quite a number were placed in overt operations and were really never surfaced until they retired. It can therefore be concluded that the MK combatants grouped together, wittingly or unwittingly, and held onto their identities but also rejected the culture of the SAPS.

In terms of Berry's model, the MK had adopted a Separation strategy. The Separation strategy occurs when members of the acquired organization actively preserve their own culture and resist to be part of the acquiring group. It is observed that the members of MK were not necessarily reluctant to embrace the dominant culture. They felt rejected and not welcome into the new SAPS by the members of former police forces that were amalgamated.

Most of the MK combatants also did not go through the various training courses that are offered in the SAPS. Combatants indicated that they attended some adjusted basic policing courses, but very few attended advanced police commanders or management courses. This could have assisted to expose the MK combatants to the culture of SAPS, and could have eased the process of embracing the dominant culture.

The members of the SAPS were also not exposed to the MK culture because the numbers of combatants that were absorbed were very low to make any meaningful impact on the dominant culture especially since these members were confined to two units, namely Crime Intelligence and Protection Services. There was therefore no critical mass that was necessary to make the MK culture appeal to others. The culture of MK was not only alien but also inaccessible.

The acculturation outcome of the MK combatants was that they struggled with adjustment and remained separated from the entire organization. There was an expectation that they will embrace the culture of the dominant group while, to some extent, retaining theirs. This would have allowed for assimilation or integration of the members within the new structure in accordance with Berry's model of acculturation. The separation strategy resulted in a situation where MK

became an organization within an organization, namely, SAPS. This explains why almost thirty years since amalgamation they still engage in normal labour bargain process as a separate group, the Non Statutory Force (NSF).

6.3 CONCLUSION

An adapted five step model that was developed by Colaizzi for data analysis and presentation was applied in this chapter. The model was the most appropriate to present and analyse in-depth qualitative data on the 'lived-experiences' of MK combatants. The model also made it easier for the application of the framework, in that three constructs, acculturation, social identity and amalgamation were identified, and it was demonstrated that the participants observed these constructs through their 'lived experiences'. The analysis through themes confirmed that the research participants had strong military identities, were amalgamated into SAPS and also experienced acculturation.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

In post-apartheid South Africa, former combatants were absorbed into various newly formed security institutions as part of the Security Sector Reform process that was implemented after the formation of a new democratic government in 1994 (Rauch, 2000). The ANC and the government had put in legislative framework and processes for the demobilisation and disarmament of MK and combatants of other NLMs. The new government of unity integrated MK combatants into the new security structures such as the SANDF and Intelligence (Modise, undated).

The new SANDF went further and implemented a rationalisation process where soldiers who were absorbed were given an option to leave the defence force. However, the integration of the MK and other members of NLM was not smooth (Mashike & Mokalobe, 2003). Some members left voluntarily, and others resorted to the use of violence to vent out their frustrations with the manner in which they were treated by former members of the SANDF (Mashike, 2008).

However, the amalgamation of Umkhonto we Sizwe combatants with the SAPS was moribund. The combatants had very strong group and military identities, and they retained their culture, which is expressed by loyalty to the political principals, war heroism, solidarity with fellow combatants, and closing boundaries to non-combatants. The SAP on the other hand, had a strong paramilitary culture which has elements of solidarity, cynicism and authoritarianism. The combatants were placed in the same units that aggravated their disposition to isolate. Therefore, in accordance with the Berry's Social Identification model, the combatants adopted the separation strategy.

7.1.1 Legislative and policy framework for the amalgamation of MK into SAPS

The amalgamation of MK combatants with the SAPS, however, took a different trajectory as compared to that of integration into the military because it was an afterthought by both the ANC and the apartheid government (Veary, 2021). After

the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the leadership of that movement preferred to be guarded by MK combatants. The process of amalgamation was initiated by former SAP Generals who made contact with the ANC to consider deploying some of the combatants at the SAPS. The management of the SAPS at the time was concerned with the legitimacy crisis it has mainly within the black communities (Eloff, 2006).

In the early 1990s when the ANC leadership was released from prison and others returned from exile, they preferred to be guarded by members of the NLMs. At that time the ANC also sent some of the former combatants to be trained outside of the country on VIP duties. There was a contingent of combatants that was sent to Zimbabwe in the 1992/1993 and were trained by the British Secret Service, and these combatants formed the core that guarded Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC at the time (Veary, 2021).

The research participants indicated that on completion of their VIP protection training in Zimbabwe and other countries, the ANC then negotiated with the government of the day that these members should be provided with police identity cards and other equipment. Later some of these members were then moved officially to SAPS following formal establishment of the amalgamated police service in 1995.

There was no formal processes that were put in place within the South African Police Service (SAPS) to integrate members of the NLMs, which were referred to Non Statutory Forces. The ANC submitted a list of members from each province and appointed a coordinator who liaised with the provincial office of the SAP to receive the combatants. At Head Office, the most senior ranking officer of MK was given the rank of Assistant Commissioner (Major General), Mr Tim Williams. There were only a hand full of other Umkhonto we Sizwe members who were deployed at that senior rank during the integration in 1995.

During his inauguration speech on the 09th of January 1995, Commissioner George Fivaz introduced his deputies and outlined the priority issues for his management team which was constituted by his deputies, namely, Commissioner Mike Bester (white), Commissioner John Manuel (coloured),

Commissioner Zolisa Lavisa (African) and Commissioner Morgan Chetty (Indian) (South African Police Service, 1995). All the Deputy National Commissioners served in the former SAP or surrogate Bantustan police, and were intended to be reflective of the rainbow nation that the Government of National Unity was trying to forge. None of the four deputies to the new Commissioner was a former MK combatant or a member of any NLM.

Commissioner Fivaz listed the priority issues for the new top brass of the SAPS, and among these included the “amalgamation and rationalization of the existing eleven police agencies into an integrated SAPS” (South African Police Service, 1995). The existing police forces at the time were the South African Police (SAP), Transkei Police, Bophuthatswana Police, Venda Police, Ciskei Police, KwaZulu Police, Kwandebele Police, Kangwane Police, Lebowa Police, Qwaqwa and Gazankulu. In his speech, Commissioner Fivas made no mention to the integration of NLMs.

The amalgamation of NLMs or NSF was therefore not part of the initial grand plan for the management of the SAPS, either conceptually or operationally. Combatants of MK came in dribs and drabs and were amalgamated into the provincial structures of the SAPS, especially in the newly reconstituted Crime Intelligence and the Protection Services. Each province dealt with the NSF members in ways that were most practical and convenient for the police administration.

7.1.2 Leadership commitment and competence to drive amalgamation of MK of Combatants

The MK combatants who were placed at the SAPS were largely left on their own to work through the acculturation process. There was no change management program that was specifically meant to address the unique situation relating to the amalgamation of SAPS. MK and APLA combatants who were amalgamated were incorporated directly from a war zone into a police institution which was almost a hundred years old and had a very strong culture.

Most senior officials within the SAPS at the time were white and were scared about the transition and their future prospects within the police (Kers, 2017). Some of the participants reported that one of the senior ANC cadres, Ncebo Radu was given the responsibility to facilitate the integration of the MK combatants into the SAPS at Head Office. He was given the rank of Assistant Commissioner (Major General). The research participants lamented that Radu apparently facilitated the integration until his untimely death in 1997 and the process went into disarray. There was not enough leadership commitment and competence to drive the amalgamation of Umkhonto we Sizwe with SAPS from both the institutions.

7.1.3 Strategic objectives for amalgamation

There were no clear goals and objectives for MK combatants to address their training, career progression, and acculturation into SAPS. A group of combatants was taken through a four week orientation course in 1996 at the old Detective Academy at Silverton in Pretoria. Some of those who participated in the course included the late Bobby Tsotsobe who was integrated at the rank of a Captain in the SAPS. The research participants who attended the course regarded it as a waste of time.

Each combatant had to find his or her way through the rigid and entrenched culture of the SAPS. A great number left the police because they could not adapt to the organisational culture but also to the cumbersome administrative framework to which the combatants were not familiar with, and were not thoroughly oriented.

A few combatants of MK were able to break through the proverbial glass ceiling, and these were combatants who were known for their heroic acts during the struggle. The majority of those who rose to higher ranks were combatants who were either in exile, were imprisoned on Robben Island or were part of a unit that executed a mission that received media attention. Some of these members include; Len Rasegatla who was Commissar of the G5 group, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General; Anwar Dramat who was the youngest cadre to be imprisoned on Robben Island, he was appointed as the Head of the

Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation; Peter Jacobs and Jeremy Veary also rose to the rank of Major General, both were members of the same unit in the Western Cape and imprisoned on Robben Island; Toka who was promoted to rank of Major General, was a member of a Pretoria MK unit that detonated limpet mines in Pretoria, his group was arrested and they escaped while awaiting trial and went to exile in the 1990s.

The research participants indicated those were neither on Robben Island or known for some heroic deed during the armed struggle were overlooked. Most of the combatants indicated that they were promoted once or twice since they were amalgamated into SAPS. One participant indicated that he has not been promoted for over 17 years. There was clearly no career pathing for most of the rank and file members as they were stuck to the VIP section and Crime Intelligence Units.

7.1.4 Compatibility of military and group identities

The MK combatants were bound to clash with their SAPS counterparts, and that should have been expected. On one hand, MK combatants have a very strong military identity and were bound to show their political allegiances because they were trained that the military forces are subject to political authority. On the other hand, long serving and senior members within the SAPS who were non-NSF are used to a rule based, conservative and authoritarian culture that is often slow to embrace change. These two cultures are strong and adversarial and would not automatically yield to one another. There ought to have been a program that deliberately mitigated against the strong military identities of the former enemies, and also to facilitate a new post conflict identity.

The treatment of the MK combatants resulted in the group being isolated and separated from the in-group. Although the choice of their placement might have been fortuitous, they were comfortable to be in a group where they are in the majority or have a critical mass.

The SAP had a long history of amalgamation dating back to the turn of the century when the South African Constabulary was established in 1900. Over the years,

the SAP had amalgamated and integrated with other forces, and had developed resilience to alien cultures and military identities. Umkhonto we Sizwe combatants were swallowed into the SAPS, and as Veary (2021) poetically says in his memoir that the combatants walked 'into the dark waters', and were swallowed. In the next five years or so, there will be no MK combatant left in the SAPS, there will be no trace or footprint that they were ever there, they left no indelible mark either to change the status quo or excelled in anything (Veary, 2021).

Leadership failed to assess the strength of cultural and group identities of both groups, and further to design a cultural sensitivity and induction program that could have raised the consciousness of the groups to their own self and group identities and how those affects organisational cohesion, if they are not dealt with intentionally and aggressively.

7.1.5 Past hostilities and trust deficit

The reception of the MK combatants was lukewarm to hostile at the beginning, and became more hostile as time went on. The combatants were mistrusted and were largely seen as incompetent or lazy. One research participant indicated that his white supervisor gave him a task to profile some of his comrades. He regarded this with disdain as he thought that the supervisor was testing his loyalty to the new SAPS. Some research participants also queried that they were not given challenging tasks or responsibilities that could have exposed them to broader complexities of their job functions. Some of the members indicated that they were deliberately placed for too long in undercover operations, and they therefore missed out opportunities on rank promotions.

It was indicated that the majority of the members were placed at units on the boundaries of police work, namely, Crime Intelligence and Protection Services. Police officials in these two units rarely use ranks and they also do not wear police uniform. This physical separation from the rest of the core group, contributed to perceived mistrust and discrimination by other members. One research participant indicated that they are referred to as 'haasman' which means civilian, and in police circles the term is used to demean others.

Past hostilities between the groups were never dealt with and therefore the trust gap remained as wide as it was when the groups were still fighting each other during the apartheid. The trust deficit and past hostilities created an environment of 'us and them' with potential to sabotage each other and the organisational as information flow would be disrupted by the trust deficit.

7.1.6 Due diligence

The amalgamation of the MK combatants was done in a piecemeal fashion. It began with the security personnel when the political then leaders of the ANC returned from exile and had to be provided with static and mobile security. MK combatants were deployed for these duties, however, the challenge was that the weapons that they were carrying were not licensed, and therefore not legal. The ANC negotiated with the apartheid government during the transition that these security personnel should be awarded police certificates.

Due to political expediency there was no elaborate process to count the arms and ammunition that was in possession of the MK combatants, and also during formal amalgamation there was no proper hand over of the arms and ammunition that was in the hands of the combatants who were amalgamated within the SAPS. There was also no verification of other assets that combatants of MK had in their possession when they were enlisted. One combatant commented that his colleagues from the former apartheid structures were irked by the fact that he was carrying a firearm that was issued by the British when they were trained in Zimbabwe (Veary, 2021). There was therefore no due diligence conducted on the strength of the combatants, assets, weaponry, skills and capabilities.

7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

7.2.1 Introduction

Combatants have the propensity to destabilise any institution because of their experience to organise, to work clandestinely and around a purpose, their willingness to sacrifice, as well as predisposition to close ranks. It is important therefore that the amalgamation of combatants with any security establishment

requires a clear program, with a determinable set of objectives. There must be a concrete change management process to drive and assess their amalgamation.

Furthermore, most of the MK combatants are in the mid to late fifties, and are therefore left with a few years before they are all out of the system through natural attrition. The SAPS management have very little time left to rectify any systemic or any other issues that were found to be constraining the effective amalgamation of MK with the SAPS.

With this background in mind, the following recommendations are meant to address the deficiencies that were identified in the amalgamation process of MK with the SAPS.

7.2.2 Establish the numerical strength of MK Combatants

A head count of the members of the Non Statutory Force (NSF) structures must be conducted with immediate effect. The list must then be reconciled with the Certified Persons Register (CPR) that was compiled in the early 1990s. A formal process must be rolled out to call up MK combatants, past and present, so that a proper roll call can be established. This will also include members of other NLMs. The Department of Military Veterans should be involved in the verification process so that those who were not able to claim for other benefits can do so.

7.2.3 Needs assessment of former MK combatants

The needs of the combatants within the SAPS is usually reduced to the issues of rank, and they are often not listened to because they are perceived to be spoiled and pampered by political principals. The MK combatants have other needs peculiar to former members of NLMs. These include professional training in police management courses, generic management courses, as well as basic police training. Some of these members never received any form of debriefing or psychological assessment as they may have been traumatised during the struggle, and also the integration itself as they now have to work with former enemies.

A debilitating fact is that some of the research participants indicated that they had to report to some of their former torturers, and this could be quite traumatic for

anyone. Veary (2021) reported that on the first day of duty on the 1st of April 1995, he had go report for duty at the same building in which he was tortured the last time that he visited that building.

Some of the research participants are concerned about their pensions as the SAPS failed to recognise their previous experience. It is important therefore to create a platform where they can be allowed to express their needs properly.

7.2.4 Rationalisation and de-centralisation of MK combatants to other Units

The combatants of MK must be given a choice to be transferred to other units in order to expose them to the various aspects of policing. They are over concentrated at Crime Intelligence and Protection Services. This move can at least provide them with an opportunity to serve their last days in SAPS in other units. The combatants have now created a little Bantustan in crime intelligence unit and VIP Protection Services, and they have formed a network of victims of circumstances that make them not to see beyond the perceived victimhood. Among the research participants, only one had a short stint at a police station, and one is now with a specialized investigation unit. However, the former head of Crime Intelligence, Peter Jacobs, was at some point appointed as a station commander of Khayelitsha in the Western Cape and that gave him exposure and better chances for promotion. Accordingly, exposure to policing at station level exposes members to core functional policing, and combatants must be exposed to the uniform branch albeit they are about to retire.

7.2.5 Design an Accelerated Commanders or Management Course

An adjusted basic commander's or police management course must be designed and the combatants who are not yet commissioned officers must be taken through the course. Combatants will then be better qualified and validated for promotions within the SAPS. Most of the combatants are now in their mid to late fifties and there is not to enough time for the regular career management process to redress the situation. Some cannot wear uniform because they did not do the basic police course which is a requirement for anyone to be able to wear uniform. Although some might have done the two or three week lateral entry course, the

new three months basic police training course is pitched at the same level as the 9 months basic training for young recruits who join directly from school.

7.2.6 Accelerate the re-ranking process

Most of the MK combatants must by now be in their mid-fifties and are about retire, the re-ranking process must therefore be prioritized. The latest senior MK combatant to take early retirement is General Yolisa Mokgabudi (previously Matakata) who was the Deputy Head of the DPCI for about five years. She was then appointed in early 2021 as the Divisional Commissioner for Crime Intelligence, and served only for seven months in the post and retired in 2021. In the recent past, the highest ranking MK combatant was a Deputy National Commissioner of Police, and sadly passed away in July of 2021.

Former Robben Island prisoner, Major General Joey Kers, who also amalgamated as part of the NSF, is currently the acting Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Cape, and he will probably retain the post in an Acting capacity as he will be retiring soon. Other than General Wally Rhooode who is appointed as the Head of Presidential Protection Unit, a political appointment, there is a few other MK combatants who are occupying senior strategic positions.

These are only a few of the NSF members who were able to break the through and attain higher ranks. Therefore, a deliberate process to promote former combatants through a re-ranking process must be implemented. In next 5 years there will be no NSF members left in the SAPS.

7.2.7 An inquiry to be established to address the perception or reality that combatants are targeted

Management must address the perception that members of the NLMs and MK are targeted for disciplinary process with the intention of getting them dismissed from the service. An enquiry must conducted into the disciplinary processes and transfers of former MK combatants to verify whether the pattern is deliberate or merely coincidental. Although only a few combatants indicated that they have not been personally formally charged in terms of disciplinary regulations, they feel

that they are being monitored and unfairly disciplined by their superiors who are former members of SAP.

One research participants indicated that he had been charged so many times that he had lost count. Research participants do feel that they are being unfairly targeted by management and some of their fellow combatants were unfairly dismissed. Research participants mentioned that some of the senior MK members are unfairly transferred from their strategic positions to occupy less important ones. They mentioned that at least three former senior combatants were removed from their strategic positions to less important ones.

For instance, Len Rasegatla was removed from his position as the Secretary of Police to be the Head of the Inspectorate in 2005; Shaun Tshabalala was removed from the position of the Head of the Protection Services also to be the Head of the Inspectorate, and he unfortunately passed on in his office. Now recently in 2021 General Peter Jacobs was transferred from the position of the Head of Crime Intelligence also to occupy the position of the Head of the Inspectorate, a unit that is generally referred to as the 'dumping ground' for those who are no longer needed in the SAPS.

Jacobs is facing a litany of disciplinary charges and will most probably leave sooner rather later as these processes exhaust one's appetite and passion to continue to serve. Veary has since been dismissed from the SAPS and is contesting his case in the courts, and by the time the matter is resolved it will be moot since he would have turned 60 years (Dolley, 2021).

7.2.8 Medallion Parade for the MK combatants

Some of the combatants indicate that they received medals but they were never awarded in a properly arranged parade. Medallions play an important role in making the members of the military or paramilitary organization feel that they belong to the establishment. Therefore, a special parade to award former combatants with the outstanding medallions should be conducted. A special

medal for them to recognise their amalgamation in the SAPS should also be considered.

Most of the combatants indicated that they received their medals in brown envelopes that were shoved under their doors. Veary (2021) indicates that he has never worn any of his medals and will probably never wear them. He was, however, at some point serving in the uniform branch and it is worrisome that he never displayed any police medal.

7.2.9 Special de-briefing for individual and group session

MK combatants are frustrated and some are deeply hurt. They feel that they have been given the short end of the stick during amalgamation. There is a need to de-brief the combatants as some of the causes lie deeper than what they verbally expressed. Toka bemoaned;

“Alas, our army was put together by compromises and concessions made to the architects of apartheid. We paid the price. The ANC leaned backwards to accommodate the enemy and reconcile with it...I found myself in the invidious position of being employed in the VIP Protection Unit with the task of protecting those I regarded as enemy collaborators – the people who directly or indirectly contributed to the death of so many comrades and the intolerable suffering of millions of our people” (Toka, 2012, p. 131).

7.2.10 Formal dissolution of the NSF status

The status of NSF should be formally dissolved and that a formal integration must also be announced. The SAPS should develop policy or issue National Instructions on the amalgamation of the combatants of the National Liberation Movements or Non-Statutory Force. The policy or National Instructions must articulate the background to the integration of the NSF members and the way forward in respect of the criteria for admission, rationale, orientation, training, benefits, ranking, placement, and pension. These are within the scope of the National Commissioner and the Minister of Police to execute, without extensive consultations with external stakeholders.

The National Instructions will provide an opportunity for those NLM members, irrespective of their age who were never reintegrated in the society and have over the years demonstrated their dissatisfaction with regards to the manner in which the liberation war veterans were handled in post-apartheid South Africa, especially those who held lower ranks. But this will also provide the SAPS with an opportunity to cleanse itself of the misdeeds of the past, and the manner in which it treated the NSF members.

A timeline must be put in place for the end of the recognition of the NSF status within the SAPS. It has to a large extent stigmatised those who were trying to work themselves up the ranks. A participant remarked that he has been in the service more than 25 years but still he is not regarded as a career policeman by the colleagues and the political principal simply because he is regarded as former member of NSF or NLMs. The participant further indicated that he is also himself uncomfortable to regard himself as a career policeman as the label that he was carrying all along was that of “former MK combatant”.

7.2.11 Concluding Remarks

The amalgamation of Umkhonto we Sizwe with the SAPS was a failure. From the time of the amalgamation in the early 1990s till to date, there exist two organisations in one; on one hand, there is the former SAP which has had swallowed other Bantustan police forces, and on the other there is MK combatants and members of other NLMs. MK adopted a separation strategy for acculturation during the amalgamation process with the SAPS. The resisted to be part of the SAPS and were also locked out of the SAPS by former SAP members. In military parlance, the MK combatants were seen and treated as a rebel group.

The strong group and military identities of MK combatants was the greatest impediment to the amalgamation with SAPS. However, the strong police culture within the SAPS was resilient to any alien cultures, and the former apartheid senior officers held their positions for some years beyond the amalgamation process. The cultural incompatibilities forced Umkhonto we Sizwe combatants to

embrace the separation strategy, they retained their identity and rejected the culture of the SAPS.

In a few years there will be no traces, legacy, or footprints that will show that the former MK combatants were ever amalgamated into the SAPS. Literature on the amalgamation and transformation of SAPS rarely mention MK combatants, if they are mentioned it will be in a single line or footnote. There was really nothing significant that MK contributed to the transformation of the institution or policing strategy. The one Unit in which they were concentrated, Crime Intelligence, has been hit by one scandal after another, and has really failed to provide necessary intelligence to assist to combat serious crime in the country.

The remaining high ranking MK combatants feel embattled and some have expressed their wish to quit the police service because of the unfair and cold treatment they receive from their counterparts who were not part of the NSF. Now recently the senior combatants of the MK within the CI environment are at each other's throat, and the division among them almost reflects the factional battles within the African National Congress (ANC). The lower ranking combatants have lost all confidence in their fellow combatants who rose to senior ranks because they believe that these senior officers have done nothing significant to alleviate their situation.

The reality is that MK combatants will never be adequately compensated materially, because it is too late. The outstanding court case wherein the re-ranking of the combatants is challenged, will be a mountain to climb, as it is heavily being contested by a well-resourced civil society organisation. However, the SAPS leadership should symbolically embrace them and make them to feel that they are welcome, and that the years of exasperation are over. They must be assured that things will change for the better for them and for those will come after them. In essence SAPS must genuinely prioritise the issue of diversity and multi-culturalism (Nchabeleng, 2008).

MK combatants rejected the culture of the police, wittingly or unwittingly, and their rejection is aptly expressed by Jeremy Veary in his book titled, *"Into dark water: A Police memoir"*. He is currently fighting to be reinstated into SAPS after he was

expelled in 2021 apparently following comments he made on social media. His representative in the disciplinary process, Peter Jacobs, who is also facing disciplinary proceeding relating to procurement of equipment, is also a former MK combatant (Dolley, 2021).

General Veary says, melancholically, almost speaking on behalf of all the MK combatants who were amalgamated into the SAPS;

“There are eight unpacked police medals in a brown envelope at the bottom of my drawer. I have never worn them and probably never will. If I die before retirement, a police officer will present them to Bernice [former wife] with a police cap and a South African flag. The lone bugler will then sound the Last Post and I will become an official memory” (Veary, 2021, p. 193).

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ANNEXURE 1

ACCULTURATION STRATEGY OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE IN SAPS

QUESTIONNAIRE

A. BACKGROUND

1. When did you become a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)?
2. How did it come about/what influenced you to join or become a member of MK?
3. Were you recruited? And if so, by who?
4. Prior to becoming a member were you active in anti-apartheid activities, were a member of any political movement? Please explain
5. Were you arrested for any political activities prior to becoming a member of MK? Please give details, if possible
6. Were you in exile? Please give details of the camps, etc or countries that you were in during the period of exile.
7. Will you describe how you left the country?

B. IDENTITY FORMATION

8. Did you feel at the time you joined that you were ready to fight the Apartheid military forces?
9. Did you receive military or any other kind of training within MK? (whether inside or outside the country)
10. Describe the content of the training you received when you joined and were a member of MK?
11. Were you sent on any internal or external missions?

12. Did you belong to a cell? If so, How was the command structure within your cell?
13. Were you involved in any direct combat situation with the SAP or SANDF during the time that you were exiled or operating within the country? If so, please explain
14. Did any of your close comrades pass away during the armed struggle?
 - a. How did you feel when your fellow members passed away?
15. How did you define or determine the “enemy” or your “targets”?
16. When did you come back from exile? If you were not exile, when and how did you surface or make known that you were an MK combatant?
17. How were you received by the family, community after exile or when you resurfaced or made known that you were an MK Combatant?
18. Do you think the community appreciated your participation in the struggle then? What about now?
19. Do you appreciate the label of MK veteran? Please explain

C. INTEGRATION IN SAPS

20. When did you integrate with SAPS?
21. At what rank were you integrated within SAPS?
22. Were you satisfied with the rank? If not, what rank would you rather have been integrated at, and why?
23. Describe the process that led to your integration of SAPS? Was there a call-up? Was there a committee? Were you part of that committee? Please explain
24. How did you feel about the SAP environment the time of integration?
25. Was there an orientation program for the NSF members, if so describe key features of the program?
26. Where were you placed when you integrated? Was it your choice or first preference?

27. Was your experience as former combatant taken into consideration where you were given a rank within SAPS?
28. Do you think that your experiences as a former combatant help you in your daily work in SAP? In what way?
29. Is your experience as a combatant appreciated by former SAPS or members of other statutory members?

D. ACCULTURATION IN SAPS

30. Were you taken through any training program by SAPS at the time that you integrated?
31. What has been your general experiences to your relationship with other members of the NSF?
32. You are referred to as former MK members or NSF, how do you feel about that identity – being referred to as NSF or former MK? Is benefiting you? Do you feel ostracised by the label? Did this feeling change over time?
33. How do you describe the culture of the SAPS when you were amalgamated with SAP?
34. Do you think that the SAPS culture has changed since you were amalgamated? Please explain
35. Do you think that Affirmative Action policies of the SAPS benefit you or other NSF members? Please explain?
36. Are you active within MKVA? Please explain why or why not?
37. What has been your general experiences with regards to your relationship with members who were not NSF? Did this experience change over time?
38. Were you ever charged internally for misconduct, and what happened to happened to case? What are thoughts about that particular case?
39. Are you involved in any extramural activities within SAPS? Do you participate in any sport or other types of competitions within SAPS?

- 40. Have been to any other type of training since you were integrated?
- 41. Have you been promoted since you joined SAPS? If yes, how many times?
- 42. Have you received any medals or awards since joining SAPS? Please explain
- 43. What is your level of interaction with other SAPS members? (WhatsApp group, social activities, sports)

ANNEXURE 2

Participant Information Sheet

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Prince Mokotedi and I am a Masters student at Wits University in Johannesburg. As part of my studies I have to undertake a research project, and I am research topic is “***Acculturation Strategies of ex-combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe during the Amalgamation process with SAP in Gauteng***”. The aim of this research project is to determine the factors that influenced the ex-combatants of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* to adapt to, assimilate or embrace the culture of the SAP during the amalgamation process and beyond.

As part of this project I would like to invite you to take part in an interview where I will give you an opportunity to share with me your experiences during the armed struggle and your experiences of integration into SAPS. I will like to know the reason for identifying yourself as an MK combatant, and what this identity means to you. This interview will involve taking notes and will take around 60 minutes. With your permission, I would also like to record the interview using a digital device.

You will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, and there are no disadvantages or penalties for not participating. You may withdraw at any time or not answer any question if you do not want to. Your participation is not completely confidential and anonymous as I have contacted the NSF Committee to assist me to identify possible participants for this research. However, the information you give to me will be held securely and not disclosed to anyone else. I will be using a pseudonym (false name) to represent your participation, in my final research report.

Should you experience any distress or discomfort, we will stop the interview or resume another time. If you need some support or counselling services following the interview, these are available free of charge at SAPS Employee Health and Wellness desk. The Department of Military Veteran also assists, the veterans who are retired, with counselling services.

If you have any questions afterwards about this research, feel free to contact me on the details listed below. This study will be written up as a research report which will be available online through the university library website. If you wish to receive a summary of this report, I will be happy to send it to you upon request. If you have any queries, concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (non-medical), telephone + 27(0)11 717 1408, email Shaun.Schoeman@wits.ac.za

Yours sincerely,
Prince Nkitsing Mokotedi

Researcher's particulars: Prince Nkitsing Mokotedi, princemokotedi@gmail.com
071 481 3274

Supervisor's particulars: Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk,
Anthoni.VanNieuwkerk@wits.ac.za 011 7173927

Consent Form For Research Participants

Acculturation Strategy of Umkhonto we Sizwe Combatants during Amalgamation with SAPS in Gauteng

I agree to participate in this research project.
The research has been explained to me and I understand what my participation
will involve.

I agree that the information I provide may be used YES NO
anonymously by other researchers following this study

..... (signature)
 (name of participant)
 (date)

ANNEXURE 4



Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/48 Mokolodi

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROTOCOL NUMBER: H20/07/20

PROJECT TITLE

Acculturation strategies of Umkhonto we Sizwe combatants during amalgamation with the South African Police in Gauteng

INVESTIGATOR(S)

Mr P Mokolodi

SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT

Wits School of Governance

DATE CONSIDERED

24 July 2020

DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE

Approved
Permission letter required from SAPS before data collection can commence
Risk Level: Low

EXPIRY DATE

14 December 2023

DATE 15 December 2020

CHAIRPERSON



(Professor J. Knight)

cc: Supervisor: Professor A van Nieuwkerk

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, Senate House University. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Non-Medical).

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/We are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.


Signature

Date 17/12/2020

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES