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DISCUSSION

EDUCATION AND SCHOOLING IN AFRICA

Wally Morrow

As Maureen Friedman's paper so clearly illustrates there is a tendency in thinking about education in Africa to run together two distinctions which ought, for the sake of clarity, to be kept apart. One is the distinction between 'Western' and 'African' education, and the other is the distinction between 'academic' (sometimes 'formal') and 'practical' (sometimes 'industrial' or 'agricultural' etc) education. There is no reason to suppose that 'Western education' is necessarily 'academic' nor that 'African education' is necessarily 'practical'. These distinctions should be kept apart because each raises a different range of problems requiring different kinds of solutions.

The former distinction, that between 'Western' and 'African' education, raises problems about the cultural presuppositions of education, about whether there could be such a thing as education which is not bound to one or other culture or tradition. It is clear that along this route we rapidly find ourselves in a debate about knowledge and in particular whether what counts as knowledge is dependent upon the prior acceptance of a paradigm, cultural tradition, form of society or something like that. Of course if there is no such thing as education *per se* then no matter how convincing the rhetoric, for those of one cultural group to set out to 'educate' those of another group is for them simply to be engaging in a kind of cultural imperialism. I suspect that it is this kind of consideration which underlies some attempts to 'Africanise' education, to establish a system which respects and capitalises upon African culture and

heritage. (However, even this way of talking is strange, it is not clear that there is an identifiable 'African heritage' rather than a multitude of sometimes radically various 'tribal heritages'.)

The latter distinction, that between 'academic' and 'practical' education, raises problems about the functions and purposes of schooling; such problems as the morality of using schools as an instrument of social policy or seeing pupils as 'passive manipulated robots', and about the relevance of debates about the function of schooling in affluent societies (existing in conditions of settled peace and in which starvation, disease and natural disasters are relatively rare or at least handleable) to societies in which starvation is a permanent feature and the elementary conditions for health and leisure simply do not exist. Debates about 'needs-based schooling' (see Dearden (1), Wilson (2), White (3) and others) take a different hue if one is thinking of impoverished and struggling communities living in conditions in which fundamental needs are simply not satisfied.

To put the matter succinctly: The former distinctions raises problems about the concept of education - about which predicates (if any) can appropriately be applied to 'education'; the latter distinction raises problems about the morality, and thus about the functions and effects of schooling, and about how all these things might be related to other matters such as the nature of the society (and its heritage) and the conditions in which it exists.

The kind of muddle we run into when we fail to keep the two distinctions apart is well illustrated by ambiguous attitudes, clearly articulated by Maureen Friedman, towards Tuskegeeism. Tuskegeeism came to be seen as a possible starting point for developing an educational policy appropriate to the needs of Africa. But agreement at this level turned out to be empty, as rapidly becomes clear when we inquire into what various people meant by the 'needs of Africa'. Some saw Tuskegeeism as a way of preserving the 'true nature' of Africans; as a way of resisting Western cultural imperialism. Those who saw it thus had a positive attitude towards Tuskegeeism as an educational policy in Africa. By contrast others saw it as a trap; a device for preventing political growth and reinforcing the economic subservience of Africans. Those who saw it thus had negative attitudes towards Tuskegeeism in the African context.

In my terms what has happened is that some people understood

Tuskegeeism as a theory of education while others understood it as a theory about the functions of schooling. Those who understood it in the former way saw it as potentially radical, a way of breaking the stranglehold of Western culture and education and opening the way for the emergence of an authentic African education. Those who understood it in the latter way saw it as profoundly conservative, as taking for granted current political and economic arrangements and simply working for the best advantage of blacks within that system.

I have done little more than start more hares but my view is that short of chasing those hares and recognising that they run in various directions, we can get nowhere in tackling the issues which have riddled thinking about education in Africa. The concluding point I wish to make concerns the intimate relationships between what one takes education to be and the justification one offers for its pursuit.

What did Jomo Kenyatta mean when he spoke of education as 'opening out a man's head'? Did he mean (as Maureen Friedman seems to imply) that 'Western and academic education' should be preferred to substitutes because only by getting such as 'education' could his people enter the economic system with an equal chance of success to the whites? Did he mean that the way forward for his people lay in accepting the dominant economic and political system and trying to achieve positions of influence within it? Or did he, perhaps, mean that education, properly conceived, emancipates or liberates a person from dominance by any system, that education is never 'Western' or 'African' (although schooling may be), that it is not concerned with any particular heritage or culture but rather with achieving a measure of autonomy from any culture or heritage? The former interpretation suggests that Kenyatta is trapped by a failure to distinguish between questions about the nature of education and questions about the functions of schooling; the latter interpretation allows that he does make this distinction and is a fellow traveller with those who see education (not schooling) as the symbol of 'hope and emancipation'.

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EDUCATION AND CHANGE

Stanley D Kaplan

This short note explores a few ideas drawn from apparently unrelated fields that are relevant to the two subjects contained in this title.

The name of the game is to change the existing 'world view' of a person. An educationist presumably tailors his efforts according to his 'client's' level of knowledge, maturity, attitudes, interests, etc. His activities have to do primarily with presenting information, providing convincing proof and examples, followed by exercises in application. We can regard this process as being a normal one when it takes place within the context of accepted and expected practice. In this situation the student expects certain behaviours from the teacher, the syllabus is clear and the methods of teaching are predictable.

There are cases however where the client does not know that he needs education or even that he has a problem. If he is aware of his need he may not know in what way he has to change in order to solve the problem. This is the case where behaviour and decision-making processes have become inadequate because they are not receptive to the changes in the environment. For example, a commercial organisation's management may have grown complacent and self-satisfied due to its affluence thus reducing the alertness and responsiveness of its executives to changes in their business environment. As a result they may start to lose out in various areas of their business. Similarly, in a clinical situation a client suffering from a psychological abnormality may not recognise the need for change in his behaviour. Again, until recently engineers concentrated on their main tasks without thought of the secondary effects of their technology on the environment. We have organisational structures in institutions and government where there is no feed-back to show whether they are succeeding or not. In some cases the criteria for assessing success may indicate the opposite effect, e.g. measuring the effectiveness of a department by the number of employees.

There is a generalised problem to do with creating awareness of the need to change, and motivating change: decision makers are often out of touch with their environment and

thus make inappropriate decisions. A solution to this problem could be for an agent to present to the decision makers the anomalies between their intentions and the results of their decisions, and to make these anomalies public.

An example that illustrates this is the following: A number of construction failures took place in the timber industry in South Africa within a fairly short period. A construction failure is a perfectly clear example of an anomaly, and self-evident to all! By some adroit persuasiveness the timber industry was influenced to allow these failures to be researched. Our research examined not only technical factors but also organizational ones. We found a number of clear causal relationships indicating that organisational factors were as responsible for the failures as any shortcomings of the individuals involved or the technology employed. The realisation of this, coupled with a clear presentation of actions which could be taken to rectify the situation, had a remarkably motivating effect. It resulted in a change of attitude plus a commitment to new activities arising directly from the altered perception of the problem.

The principle seems to be that if one can challenge a person by showing him publicly that what is happening in practice as a result of his efforts is in direct opposition to what he is supposed to be achieving and claims he is achieving, then he is forced to try to change his approach.

M P Follett in a paper called "The Giving of Orders" presented in January 1925, shows how exhorting, reasoning, or trying to convince people intellectually is unlikely to change their behaviour. He shows that you have to change the habit patterns of people and you do this by:-

1. Building up new attitudes
2. Providing for the release of these attitudes
3. Augmenting the released response as it is being carried out.

This process is clearly a description of what took place in the events following the construction failures described above.

There is useful analogy in a completely different area. In rural development, the agriculturalist is today a highly sophisticated scientist, but the person in the field is

relatively uneducated and has a worldview completely different from that of the scientist. The problem is accentuated in this country where we are often dealing with tribal people. Classic manifestations of the problem in the history of this country are those to do with soil erosion and contour ploughing.

The practical way in which this problem is being successfully dealt with overseas, is through "extension services". These are provided by extension officers who regularly visit their clients in order to see that they are carrying out their farming activities correctly. These clients will have been educated either in the field by the officer himself, or by attending a course or receiving literature or instruction in groups. In one case in the Ciskei an irrigation scheme is being initiated by about a dozen African farmers and a commercial service organisation. This organisation is both managing the scheme and educating the farmers. Each week the farmers come together for a period of instruction which is directly related to the activities they have been advised to carry out during that week. The supervisors then go into the field and ensure that each farmer is working in line with the instruction given.

So in order to accomplish the third requirement of Follett, viz. to augment behaviour alteration, we can draw on this analogy of the extension officer. In the University the closest analogy is the tutorial. The student has been given instruction and is then required to apply it under direction. It is interesting to speculate how the principle could be applied in fields outside the formal educational system. One could have itinerant supervisors following up an educational course by visiting the place of work and directing the client's practical application of his knowledge; or one could examine the educational process as an integral part of the functional organisation.

So for instance if one were to be training Black car mechanics one might first train the mechanics who will be supervisors in the workshops. They would be trained in supervision, shown the sort of education that is to be given to the trainees and advised on how to monitor the results for maximum effectiveness. This means that instead of preserving the educational function for formal educational institutions, one would spread this function into the community so that the process of education becomes an integral part of the on-going activities in every field of operation.

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To return to the rural example, if one look at the communication process involved one can determine the number of stages necessary to accomplish effective communication between e.g. the specialist scientist at the one end of the continuum, and the illiterate farmer at the other end. We might then posit the following model:

- (1) A rural community with a majority of members with little education would include a few members who have some education and who have attended a formal course on the elements of agriculture and rural development. These members would act as catalysts in the community either formally (as leaders) or informally.
- (2) The extension services officer who visits the community once a week would communicate with the local trainees. He would know what education these trainees have had and he would have participated in a course for such trainees.
- (3) The extension services officer would be attached to a university or research centre as well as to his operational organization. He would be in constant touch with scientists and academics providing them with feedback from the field and obtaining information and advice from them.

Within such a feedback system, communication channels have a chance of working. The processes of building up new attitudes, providing for the release of these attitudes and augmenting the released response as it is carried out, could be facilitated.

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SOME COMMENTS ON "PARTICIPATING IN EDUCATION"

Don Margetson

In his paper "Participating in Education" Wally Morrow expresses two main objections to my "Participation, Democracy and Education" ⁽¹⁾. These are (i) "In general my view is that there is a lack of developmental perspective in Margetson's approach" (p.43), and (ii) "I do wish to argue that it simply avoids the crucial and central problems in relation to participation and education" (p.43). It seems to me that both objections arise because Morrow and I were discussing slightly - or, maybe, very - different matters. Perhaps I could attempt to express the difference in the following way. I was attempting to articulate some of the conceptual relationships that exist between participation, democracy and education in the central case of a normal adult. In contrast, Morrow seemed to be thinking of education in the sense of educating, or possibly at times only schooling, children; at various places he talks about schools and teacher-pupil relationships, for example, which suggest this. I had in mind only the central case of a normal adult since, in the limited space available, some narrowing of the scope of the somewhat vast subject matter seemed necessary. I should have expressed the limitation of scope in the paper more clearly. Of course, in a comprehensive account, all that might loosely be called "education" in the growth of an individual from infancy to adulthood would have to be considered, and in such an account both the developmental perspective and the problems which Morrow rightly mentions would find a more central place. Nevertheless, I think that Morrow has raised some important and interesting questions, and that there is sufficient overlap on substantial problems in our papers to merit further comment.

I referred above to what might loosely be called "education", and the disagreements Morrow and I appear to have might be traced back to this perennially problematic concept. Possibly sharp and clear distinctions between education, schooling, training, socialization, and indoctrination would result in the resolution of apparant disagreements. If these concepts could be distinguished sufficiently clearly and exclusively of each other (and whether or not they could be is itself problematic, so I emphasize the "if"), then many of the problems which Morrow raises might be seen to be concerned more with schooling and training than with education. On such a view the possibility of the education of a person would arise only after his training and schooling had progressed substantially. In this case the problems, for example, which Morrow raises concerning the adoption of partly rather than fully participant attitudes towards persons would disappear. For it could then be said that the adoption of partly participant attitudes is appropriate towards those who are still being trained or schooled, while fully participant attitudes become appropriate only at the higher level at which education occurs. However, I doubt whether these problems could be dissolved this neatly and easily; let us turn to the problems which Morrow has raised (p.43).

The first of these concerns degenerate forms of participation. He argues (p.44) that an end can justify the means used to achieve that end—that is, means which in themselves would be regarded as undesirable, become acceptable if they are needed to bring about a desirable end. In general, of course, this is an extremely dangerous principle to adopt because the distinction between means and ends has a disastrous tendency to become blurred so that the means become themselves the ends. In less extreme cases, means and ends remain distinct but the end is simply never achieved so that one finds oneself living with undesirable means as though they were in fact ends. In the specific example which Morrow gives it is doubtful whether the undesirable means referred to are necessary, or even the most effective possible. The example concerns a leader and his followers in dangerous circumstances, which "...might involve a leader in being insincere, in deceiving others as to his emotions, in pretending to hold views he does not really hold.... And by these subterfuges he might inspire his followers to be of good heart - thereby improving everyone's chance of success, maybe even survival" (p.44). But, in contrast to this, it seems likely that a leader who expresses some degree of emotion appropriate to the situation, without panicking or being otherwise overcome by it, and who continues to lead others in doing what needs to be done in the circumstances, will be more, not less, effective as a

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leader. For his followers will see that the leader has both an accurate appraisal of the situation and the ability to overcome it. Morrow's leader who is apparently unmoved in a situation which is terrifying may in virtue of his behaviour be thought to be unaware of the actual dangers, or superhuman and therefore impossible to follow. These possibilities are likely to decrease his effectiveness as a leader rather than increase it. In terms of attitudes, the leader who expresses appropriate but not excessive emotions is treating his followers in a fully participant way. The leader who resorts to subterfuge, on the other hand, is guilty of adopting objective attitudes to his followers.

The application to teaching of the achievement-by-subterfuge argument seems to be no more plausible than in the extreme case involving dangerous circumstances. Morrow says "There are occasions on which to be able to further his educative purposes the most fruitful strategy is for the teacher to pretend to hold views he does not, to put forward a strong case in favour of a position which he thinks unacceptable and so on" (p.44). Is there any necessity for pretence or insincerity here? If the teacher is an educative teacher he will surely put forward as good a case as he can regardless of whether it is for or against the position in question. Why should he only pretend to put forward a case? Would this not suggest that he is not really open-minded in regard to the counter-case? If he is sincerely open-minded he will surely put forward good cases as convincingly as he can, if only because he may in doing so come to see matters in a way which he has previously missed, and consequently modify his views. There is a parallel between the leader/follower example and this teacher/student example as regards personal relationships. Just as the leader's position may be undermined by insincerity, so might the teacher's. Could students who discovered their teacher to be insincere be blamed for adopting a suspicious and wary attitude towards the teacher?

The notion of pretending occurs again in the example concerning experts arguing with each other or with a novice, and again it appears to provide problems. The distinction Morrow wishes to draw is between genuinely arguing and pretending to argue. I would not deny that there is a distinction, but I do not think that this is the correct distinction to draw in the example in question; the correct distinction seems to be one concerning different levels of argument, all equally genuine. The arguments two experts would use in a specialist sphere might embody such features as sophisticated terminology, issues which presuppose considerable familiarity with the subject, and so on. The

arguments which an expert might use in teaching a novice would embody more elementary terminology, require less familiarity with the subject and so on. But why should these arguments be thought to be any less genuine? If the novice made a logical error or misused terminology could the expert not argue the novice out of his error? Although this would indeed occur at a relatively elementary level compared with the level of argument used by experts, the argument is genuine throughout: good reasons are used to make a difference in what people think. Possibly Morrow would want to rest his case on the notion of practical difficulties he refers to: "But the distinction between being brave and pretending to be brave is often in practice difficult to draw..." (p.44). This will of course not do. The fact that a distinction is difficult to draw in practice does not mean that the distinction is not sharp. It may, for example, be difficult in many cases to tell whether persons are in pain or not, but the difference between being in pain and not being in pain is sharp enough. It is in any case not clear to me what can be gained by blurring the distinction between participant and objective (or detached) attitudes, but what can be lost is something that Morrow and I appear to agree on: proper human relationships.

The second of the three problems Morrow refers to concerns participant attitudes and morality. Certainly I was arguing that there is "some kind" of relation between the two; I was suggesting that the adoption of participant attitudes was a necessary condition of acting morally. If this is the relation between the two then I could not agree with Morrow that we must "...hesitate about (making) too close an identification between participant attitudes and morality" (p.45). I think there is an error in Morrow's view here, and that the error lies in his division of participant attitudes into two classes, positive and negative, with morality associated only with positive participant attitudes and not with negative participant attitudes. Participant attitudes can be so divided, but it is a mistake to think that morality is associated only with positive participant attitudes. For if this association were correct, a consequence would be that negative participant attitudes would always be immoral. But this is surely not so. Is it immoral to feel angry with a person wantonly hurting an animal? On the contrary, wouldn't it be immoral to fail to feel anger in this instance, for would it not show a lack of sympathy for beings which can feel pain? And sympathy is precisely what is necessary to someone's being moral, as the quotation which Morrow gives from Williams indicates (p.53, note (2)). Moreover, to show a lack of sympathy is to adopt an objective

rather than a participant attitude. I would not wish to deny that participant attitudes can be immoral if carried to excess. Appropriate anger which becomes blind fury is not moral because it is unlikely to promote the welfare of persons. But positive participant attitudes can suffer equally: excessive sympathy can become maudlin and unlikely to promote the welfare of the person concerned. The crucial point seems to be that if a person's relations with others are to have a moral dimension then the person must adopt participant attitudes; which such attitudes, positive or negative, will be appropriate in a given case will depend on the exact nature of the case. Consequently I cannot agree with Morrow"....that the principle of respect for persons requires in some cases that we (temporarily) abandon towards them our participant attitudes" (pg 46). To abandon participant attitudes towards persons is to treat them as objects rather than as persons, and is to abandon the principle of respect for persons.

Morrow goes on to argue that the nature of education is such that it"..... is incompatible with 'fully participant attitudes'" (p.46). This, too, I cannot accept (even though I have asked myself "the meaning of the words 'true', 'right', and 'beautiful'" (p.46). The disagreement on this point stems perhaps from problems in the notion of decision-making. In the political sphere people have (or, Morrow says, might have) an "equal right to decide for themselves what kinds of life they would like to lead" (p.46), but in the educational sphere this "requires modification" (p.46). The main justification given for this is that "the possibility of education is based on the presumption that some people know and understand more than others" (p.46), so that those who know and understand more - the educators - engage in "a kind of benevolent manipulation" of others. But what does the presumption on which education is based commit us to? That some persons do know and understand more than others cannot be disputed; but that this gives them some kind of right to manipulate others (however "benevolently") is a drastically more dubious proposition.

One way of approaching the problem is to ask whether the political and educational spheres are as isolated from each other as they appear to be in Morrow's argument? Suppose, for example, that someone x decides that one kind of life he does not wish to lead is an educated life, but instead wishes to retreat to a remote monastery, tend the local vegetable garden, and meditate. Now, this decision falls clearly into the political sphere, since it concerns the kind of life a person would like to lead. Consequently this decision must be made by x. However, the decision

also concerns education where, according to Morrow's argument, decisions must be taken by experts; consequently x cannot take this decision. Is there an escape from this dilemma in which x appears both to have to take and not take a certain decision? Perhaps one way out is to distinguish between different kinds of decision along the lines of the means-ends distinction. That is, there are decisions E which concern ends; the crucial feature of these ends is that they are intrinsically justified - there is no other end in terms of which they are to be justified. They are valuable in themselves. Then there are decisions M which concern how ends are to be achieved; that is, they concern the means to ends. The crucial feature of decisions about means is that they must be appraised in terms of the ends towards which they are means. Means are effective or ineffective insofar as they do or do not achieve the end to which they are means. (This is not the only way in which they can be appraised; they can, indeed should, also be appraised morally as I argued earlier.)

Decisions about the kind of life a person wishes to lead are of type E; this is an expression of the Kantian view that persons are to be treated as ends in themselves and not as means to ends. The only way to deny that decisions about the kind of life a person wishes to lead are of type E would be to resort to some kind of transcendental argument. E.g. that the kind of life a person should lead is to be discovered by finding out what God's will on the matter is; or that it is in our cultural heritage that we are to discover what the most valuable kind of life is and that this provides us with an end towards which we should strive (R S Peter's image of children as barbarians at the gates of the citadel of civilization is a singularly odd expression of this, and should make us think twice about it). But the crucial problem is: where is there an adequate transcendental argument? In the absence of one, what higher good is there than the moral one of respecting each person's decision about the kind of life he or she wishes to lead? To accept this is of course not to deny that problems arise when the ends which two or more persons have conflict in some way, finding ways of resolving this kind of problem adequately is a matter for ethical theory. It is also not to deny that persons can and should seek advice about the kinds of lives they are living and may wish to change. But what it most certainly does deny is that some should have any right to impose their views - whether blatantly or by manipulation - on others. Even "benevolent" educators have no such right, if only because the notion of benevolence is open to widely varying interpretations. No doubt the Bantu Education Department in

June 1976 considered itself to be engaging in benevolent manipulation, but, as events in Soweto that month showed, the people subject to this treatment did not share the Department's view and had good grounds for not sharing it. The problem of the "benevolent manipulator" is as old as the problem of Plato's benevolent dictator. The all-wise, all-knowing, perfectly good dictator is likely to provide much better rule than a committee or a democracy of not so wise, somewhat ignorant, and fallible human beings. This being so, it would seem sane to give all power to the dictator. But the problem is, of course, that such a god-like dictator has yet to appear, there are difficulties concerning how he could be recognised even if he did appear, how he could come to have total power, what would happen when he died, and so on. Consequently we have to make the best of the situation in which we find ourselves, one which lacks the comfort of an all-seeing guru on whom we could shed our burdens. We should seek the advice and help of those who seem wiser than us, but to give them powers of manipulation is excessive. For manipulation is not merely a strong form of advice, it is a different kind of beast altogether, and one that thrives on objective rather than participant attitudes.

Decisions about the kind of life a person wishes to lead are, then, of type E and as such each person must be the final arbiter on these matters (which is not the same as saying that a person should consider only himself in reaching these decisions, or that he is thinking in terms of a subjective theory of morality). The matter in regard to the responsibility for decision-making in the case of type M decisions is different. These concern technical questions, questions of means, and it is here that the expert has his proper place. If a person had a pain he wanted diagnosed it would be folly to go to his non-medical friends and take a vote on the probable cause. The proper person to see would be a competent medical doctor for both a diagnosis and advice on a cure if there is one. But of course the decision about whether to act on the doctor's advice is still a matter for the patient to decide. The dangers of a move away from insistence on this point are all too plain in totalitarian societies such as Soviet Russia where political dissidents are non-voluntarily institutionalised for psychiatric "treatment" (and no doubt these psychiatrists also consider themselves to be engaged in benevolent manipulation).

The third problem mentioned by Morrow concerns "an untenable form of individualism". Certainly, as he points out, there

are a multitude of answers to the general question "What is it that we participate in when we are said to participate?" I should have made clearer that I was not concerned with the general question, but with the more limited one concerning what participation could mean in the political context? Perhaps there is no disagreement on this point, and I could pass on to his succeeding points about the connection between education and "learning how to engage in certain kinds of rule-governed activity", and about the centrality of "the conceptual schemes in terms of which we understand ourselves and our world". I agree that there is this connection and this centrality, but do not see how the views I expressed on participation conflict with this, or why these lead to an untenable form of individualism.

Clearly it is reasonable to accept that the meaning of participation is not limited to "participation in the making of decisions which affect one". But even if its meaning were limited to this formulation, so that participation was understood in a very narrow sense, it is not clear why "the risk of committing oneself to an untenable form of individualism" arises. For the notion of participation is itself necessarily social: one takes part, with other persons, in the process of making decisions which concern each person. Decision-making must normally be a rule-governed activity and can be made only in terms of the conceptual scheme we possess; indeed one characterisation of what it is to have a concept, is to say that it is to follow the rules peculiar to the concept in question and to correctly judge which instances fall under the concept. These are necessarily social matters since concepts can have meaning only if there is intersubjective agreement on what they do mean; there is no other way in which they could come to mean anything. Intersubjective agreement is not the only requirement, although it is a necessary one. But of course it is still individual persons who make decisions, even though the terms in which they make their decisions are necessarily social, and each individual is responsible for the decisions he makes. One sense in which he is responsible is, of course, that he is responsible to other persons for decisions which he takes and which affect them. It is individual persons who make decisions, but persons are not the kind of individuals which can be understood apart from their social dimensions. Individualism can be a risk here only if the social dimensions are ignored.

In section 2 of his paper Morrow proposes a distinction between two kinds of participation as a solution to the problems he has discussed. I think he is right to suggest that the notion of participation is complex, but the

distinction he proposes seems problematic. Why does it make no sense to subject "to a cost-benefit analysis his participation in language"? (p.49). The Indian in the novel "One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest" did something very much like this. Certainly his action "presupposes participation in language" (p.49) and a human community, but then so does the "conflict resolution" and the negotiating and bargaining mentioned in connection with participation (a). The notion of the "perfect self-interest utility maximiser" (p.48) is as applicable in the sphere of participation (b) as it is in participation (a), as the given example of the activity of rock climbing could illustrate: a climber could think in terms of this notion to consider participating in an expedition for the 'value' in terms of the publicity it could bring him, and perhaps, of the actual cash value that might result from such publicity. It seems, then, that participation (a) is a subclass of participation (b) rather than a different kind of participation. If there is a difference between the two matters Morrow refers to as participation (a) and participation (b) it would seem to concern attitudes rather than kinds of participation. That this is so is suggested by the use of words "tool" and "perfect self-interest utility maximiser" in connection with participation (a). These words suggest an instrumentality which is characteristic of objective rather than participant attitudes. This is reinforced by the association of participation (a) with the way "one talks about worker participation in industry": precisely what is wrong with talking about workers in this way is that it reflects objective rather than participant attitudes towards them. Instead of workers being seen as human participants in the making of decisions which affect the kinds of lives they lead, they are instead seen as objects which function as "perfect self-interest utility maximisers". At best the attitude expressed in such a view could be described as pseudo-participant in nature.

In support of his distinction between participation (a) and participation (b) Morrow mentions "the attempts to democratise the Dutch sociology institutes ... The Dutch example is instructive" (p.49). What are we to learn from the example? That democratization in education is bad? But it should be remembered that the student unrest he refers to in Europe and the U S A in the late sixties, and, it would be pertinent to add, the student unrest in Soweto and elsewhere since 1976, was itself a result of a lack of opportunities for participation in the policies of the educational institutions concerned, on the part of those who were being manipulated by these institutions. One

would need to know a good deal more about the Dutch institutes than Morrow has mentioned before one would know exactly what lessons the example offers, especially since there are counter-examples even at the school level. I have in mind A S Neill's Summerhill School, for instance. The way in which Neill's school was able to succeed may be explained by Polanyi's point mentioned by Morrow (p.50); one implication of such an explanation would be that it undercuts Morrow's belief that "education is a kind of benevolent manipulation" (p.46). One way to express Polanyi's point would be to say that we can sense, as it were, what direction we should go in without knowing where that direction leads; we can in Polanyi's words "have an intimation of coherence in hitherto not comprehended particulars" (p.50). Polanyi is talking about research workers recognizing original research problems, but why should not the principle that persons can have "intimations of coherence" be applied in other spheres? In particular, why should not this capacity be thought to explain in general how it is that people can become interested in and study matters which as yet - by definition - they do not know about? If the capacity can explain this, then the manipulation of persons in education would be redundant, for persons would pursue their intimations in educational areas because they felt these to be valuable - there would be no need to manipulate persons in their pursuit of education. But there would be place for guidance in the non-manipulative view of education, and where Morrow talks about guiding the learner (p.52) I think he is using language which is much more appropriate to the concept of education. For a guide is essentially someone who offers advice in an area in which he is an expert, and listeners may or may not take his advice, as they wish. It would usually be foolish to reject a guide's advice, but, nevertheless, this is a decision which must rest with each listener. An implication of this is that the notion of guiding a learner does not require us to deviate from holding fully participant attitudes, in contrast to the notion of manipulating a learner which does require a partial abandonment of participant attitudes in favour of objective ones. Perhaps, then, the problem is not so much one of considering to what extent we should deviate from our participant attitudes, as one of considering how our social institutions (including the major one of education) would have to change if we were to exercise fully participant attitudes. And (moving from participant attitudes to participation) perhaps the problem here is not so much that we need different notions of participation in order to talk about the status quo, as that we need to think of how our social institutions would have to change

if they were to take on the more humane forms to which the concepts participation, democracy, and education commit us.

Note:

- (1) Both papers appear in Perspectives in Education. Vol.3, No.1, March 1978.

EDUCATION: AIMS AND APPETITES

Louis Peters

This paper is based on a study of the writings of R S Peters. In the first section (I) we will deal with the statement that Education can have no aims beyond itself. This will require an analysis of both the concept of education and that of aims. In fact a consideration of what an educational process implies will give us the key to understanding the statement under discussion in this section. The second section (II) will take further what has gone before. On the basis of our understanding of education and educational aims can anything be said about when man's quest for satisfaction is going to end, or if there is going to be an end at all? In Section III we will see how the issues in Section I and II are related and, as a natural corollary, point to the 'incompleteness' of instrumental justifications of education as outlined by Peters.

I EDUCATION AND ITS AIMS

"Education ... can have no aims beyond itself."

a. The Concept of Education

When one uses the word "education" one thinks of school, and when one thinks of school one thinks of preparation for some function in society. The school is not seen in any way as a place where certain activities take place which are worthwhile pursuing for their own sake. Perhaps it is true that many schools can only be justified in their existence just because of that. But this does not say anything yet about education being solely a means to an end. When we speak in this paper about education we do not intend it to be equated just with what happens at a school.

Education in many ways defies proper definition. First of all education is not a univocal concept such as e.g. a circle or triangle. It rather points to a whole range of

activities which all to a greater or lesser extent and to a greater or lesser intensity combine a number of similarities. Furthermore, "education" does not refer to one particular type of activity. It is true that the term "education" does point to something definite happening, but for it to be education leaves open the way to a multitude of activities. What allows all these activities to be called educative are criteria to which these activities must conform.

This means that what is being said in this paper can apply to both so called formal and informal education, with no condition as to numbers and time or place. What is important is that all these activities reflect certain characteristics of content and procedure.

What are these characteristics? Peters mentions the following, which with some greater or lesser variation occur constantly throughout his books and articles:

1. Education implies the (usually intentional) transmission of what is worth-while to those who become committed to it.
2. Education involves knowledge and understanding and some kinds of cognitive perspective which are not inert.
3. Education requires that the transmission of what is worth-while is wittingly and voluntarily engaged in by the learner (though learning can take place in a way which is not necessarily consciously acknowledged as a learning situation). (2)

The three characteristics or criteria to which activities must conform in order to be educative refer both to the achieving of them and to the attempt of people to bring them about. In fact there is no clear cut distinction between the two (the achieving and the attempt to come to this achievement). There are certain instances where the achieving and the road towards it are more clearly distinguished. Looking for something finds its actual point of rest in finding it. In education this is not the case. Any form of achieving is at the same time a way to achieving something else which in its turn is a way to something else again, etc.

What we are trying to say is that the very activities which lead us to achieving something in education were once themselves achievements in relation to other activities.

This can be said in a different way namely that the task and achievement aspect of education are inseparable. One implies the other, and the final way to express this relationship is to describe it as analogous to the dialectical relationship between becoming and being.

This last consideration leads us into the second portion of this section.

b. The Aims of Education

Much confusion has arisen about talk concerning aims of education. The principal reason for this confusion is that the norm which is built into the concept of education has come to be considered as an extrinsic end. Hence the aim of education is considered to be outside the realm of education itself. In this case education in itself is a neutral process and its worth will be determined by whether it brings about what it sets out to do. In concrete terms this means that the norm, which is the bringing about (intentionally) of worth-while states of mind in a manner which is morally unobjectionable, is seen as lying outside education itself but is characteristic of that which is achieved as a result of the educational process.

This way of assessing the aims of education, as an extrinsic end, meets immediately with a difficulty which is given with the description of the norm of education. Part of this description is that the end result of education is reached in an unobjectionable manner. This of course holds good for any form of "forming" people. For instance training a motor mechanic has to be done in an unobjectionable manner. However, if mechanical theories are adhered to, even training motor mechanics in an objectionable manner does not need to diminish their skills as motor mechanics and does as such not come into the exercise of the mechanical skills, which are the desired end of the training program. However, in the case of education this is different. For instance, conducting an educational process while encouraging people to cheat through their exams, does not enhance the chances that people will develop the attributes of truthfulness and honesty which could be seen as some of the aims of education.

In other words if the intended results of certain processes lie in the area of the development of insight and understanding, of the development of character and concern for life's major issues then these results lie within the processes which lead up to them. Say, that the results just mentioned

are appropriate descriptions (next to possible others) of the intended result or 'aims' of education, then it must be said that the aim of education is intrinsic to it. Only when somebody would develop along the lines of the result mentioned, will the end result ensue.

This situation as regards the aim (or aims) of education is due to the peculiar character of the intended result of education. In the case of the motor mechanic the intended result is a well circumscribed skill which is limited in scope and the possession of which does as such not say anything about that person's outlook on life, insights etc. In the case of the intended result of education, however, we talk about a whole range of attitudes and activities which control the very heart of the developing being which a person is. Hence the intended result is at the same time the most apt description of what characterises the processes leading up to it. Hence, it is true to say that education can have no aims beyond itself.

An analysis of the concept of aim would have led us to a similar conclusion as above. To ask what the aim of something is, is in fact to ask for a more precise description of what one is doing. It also points to the necessity to concentrate on what one is doing and the possibility of failure. To ask for the aim of my running between Pietermaritzburg and Durban on 31st May is not just asking for something extrinsic to that but more precisely describes what I am doing (running the "Comrades"). It explains my obvious concentration on the job, and also confronts me with possibly not making it. Even more so in education where the aim of any educational process is the very matter which describes what this process is actually about.

c. What does an Educational Process imply?

From the above it will be clear that being educated is not only something which says something about the end result of a process but also exemplifies the process by which we have become educated. In other words education is a never ending process, and an ever involving activity. There is never a state where the educational process can be said to have come to an end. The next question we have to ask ourselves then is what are the characteristic kinds of activities which man will engage in and which are constitutive of his being educated?

II WHAT IS THERE BEYOND THE NECESSARY APPETITES?

"... what are men going to do, how are they going to think, what are they going to appreciate when their necessary appetites are satisfied?" (3)

Is there anything to look for after man has brought to fulfilment his necessary appetites? And what are these necessary appetites? This leads us to a consideration of the following issues. What is understood by Natural Appetites and why should man go beyond them? What are the activities which go beyond these necessary appetites and what makes us say that these activities are worth-while for man? Finally, what has this got to do with education?

a. Man's Necessary Appetites

Man's necessary appetites are usually understood to mean those desires which are connected with the fulfilment of man's nature. These include obviously the area of food, sexual activity, shelter, but also those of belonging, recognition and happiness with its ultimate quest for infinity. The scholastics spoke of the "Natural appetite for the vision of God" the "appetitus naturalis ad videndum Dei". And there are good arguments that many people saw man's alleged fulfilment in God as a matter of the satisfaction of man's natural appetites. Is there then nothing beyond this type of satisfaction? (This goes clearly beyond what R S Peters understands by natural appetites, but the argument is fundamentally the same.) The important question here is to establish whether the "ought" of man's activities can be deduced from the "fact" of man's nature. In other words does a generalised account of man's nature dictate by power of deduction what activities man ought to engage in?

It may be that an analysis of man's nature can give one strong clues about what man ought to do. But if that is the case this is not so because of some form of logical deduction. For the force of the argument would finally lie in an assumption which is formally speaking only given in the conclusion reached. Arguments such as the ones described here are usually called: "naturalistic", which basically means that they dictate human behaviour on the strength of what is allegedly natural to man. Their strength lies in their objectivity and in the close connection they reflect between human nature and what man ought to do. But

their great shortcoming lies in the fact that they fail to do justice to the autonomy of moral discourse. They do not give a moral reason why men ought to do this rather than that. Hence, in order for man to safeguard the autonomy of moral discourse, the fulfilment of his natural appetites, even as understood in the sense we have explained it here, does not explain why man ought to do certain things. What is more, it explains what man can do only in terms of a generalised nature, it never reaches the level of Person, where the question can indeed become why ought I to do this rather than that?

b. "Worth-while" activities

From above it appears that man must look for activities which go beyond the satisfaction of the natural appetites. Peters in several places, but particularly in his 'Ethics and Education' (4) goes into the question of the justification of certain activities rather than others.

What makes a man do this rather than that? It is said that for many people the guiding principle in their activities is the question: what can I get out of it, or where does it lead me to? In other words for many people the principal question is related to the instrumental value of activities that is, their value as a means in the pursuance of some goal. This is part of the consumer mentality of man, characteristic of the consumer society in which we live. But it is also part of a consumer mentality which makes man avoid activities which can only be justified in that they by being done and being committed to slowly uncover the worth of human living.

One of the problems with justifying activities solely on the basis of their instrumental value is that they shift the question for the reason of doing them to other activities or states, which they lead to. In both cases it can be asked whether these activities or states are again instrumental to others or done for themselves. For even in the case of states which certain activities may lead to, they can never be a point of rest because they are exercised in the mode of activities in that a desired state in man always implies the active engagement of one or more of man's operational faculties (e.g. loving, knowing). In the end man must find some activities which are done for their own sake, or as R S Peters calls them, are "worth-while activities" (5) unless man allows himself

to be driven into a 'reductio ad infinitum', which is ultimately, in a real existential sense, a 'reductio ad absurdum'.

From the above it can be concluded that in order for man to make it worth-while going beyond the satisfaction of the necessary appetities, there must be certain activities that are worth-while in themselves. Hence the question what makes them so and what are these activities?

One of the ways to find out what activities are worth-while is by the process of initiation. This means that one person makes another see and appreciate what in the end is independent from both. Crucial in this context is that these activities "have standards written into them by reference to which it is possible to act, think and feel with varying degrees of skill, relevance and taste". (6) It is undeniable that initiation, because of its social values, exercises a strong influence on one's judgement of what is worth-while and what is not. However, it does as such not explain why certain activities are worth-while and others not.

Is it possible to say and answer the question, why do this rather than that, by pointing to man's wants or to the experience of pleasure or happiness resulting from these activities? In both cases doing this will at least establish that certain activities are done for their own sake. However, in both cases the final reason why certain activities are worth-while must be found in the characteristics of these activities themselves. People may after all want things or derive pleasure from activities which are not worth-while, perhaps even positively harmful.

The question of worth-while activities can be approached from two sides. First of all there is the very question "why do this rather than that?" The posing of the question already indicates that there is in the one who asks himself this question the necessary attitude of disinterestedness and non-instrumental approach to certain activities. This means that he is able to look upon certain activities as worth-while in themselves. Moreover it also implies that these activities are worth-while not just merely subjectively but according to objective standards. This is finally explained by the fact that the question: "why do this rather than that?" is in the mode of a question an affirmation of there being something worth-while in man's consciousness of himself as integral part of reality.

Secondly this type of transcendental analysis of the question "why do this rather than that?" can only be understood when made concrete in the form of certain definite activities. In other words the question "why do this rather than that?" can only be made explicit by doing some concrete activity. But only by asking this question, that is, by being committed to its implied quest for meaning, did it reveal that there was something worth-while in life for its own sake. Likewise, only by being committed to certain activities can we understand their worth-while character for their own sake.

The last question then remains "what characteristics make such activities worth-while?" The answer to this will ultimately be that they are worth-while to the extent that they make explicit the worth-while character of man's unending quest for meaning. The particular activity which allows man to become explicitly aware of his quest for meaning as worth-while, thereby becomes itself a worth-while activity, sought after for its own sake. It gives concrete content to what is ultimately worth-while to man. At the same time each concrete activity which is experienced as worth-while in this sense shares in man's experience that the answer to what is worth-while can only be found if he has the courage to continue his quest as and when he has found what is worth-while in his life. This is what lifts man out above the level of the satisfaction of the necessary appetites.

c. Worth-while Activities and Education

The question may be asked "what does the above have to do with education?" In short it can be said that those activities which usually make up the curriculum of educational institutions concern the areas which cover the type of activities which are worth-while in themselves. Curriculum activities, therefore provide at least an important part of the concrete content which, though often in a somewhat formalised manner, give filling to man's experience to there being something worth-while, going beyond the satisfaction of the necessary appetites. However, as soon as curriculum activities become too formalised they are in danger of losing their character of being worth-while. For in that case they lose their character of opening up man's vision to a wider context of insight and understanding.

III AIMS OF EDUCATION AND WORTH-WHILE ACTIVITIES AND THE NON-INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH TO EDUCATION

The first two sections of this paper were devoted to an analysis of the following two statements:

education ... can have no aims beyond itself.

... what are men going to do, how are they going to think, what are they going to appreciate when their necessary appetites are satisfied?

The question now arises how these two statements relate to each other. After that we will say something about the 'incompleteness' of instrumental justifications of education.

a. Aims of Education and Worth-while Activities

Perhaps the most characteristic feature which links the two above statements is that they both point to activities which are not only done for their own sake but are constitutive of what a person is.

What do we mean by saying that these activities are constitutive of what a person is? Basically it means that by engaging in these activities a person becomes who he is supposed to be. This can be spelled out in various ways.

First of all when we spoke about the concept of education we found that the idea of education does not refer to one particular type of activity, or thing, but rather to certain characteristics to which an activity both in content and procedure must correspond. These characteristics made up the aim of education which as we saw is intrinsic to the educational process. We also saw above that education is concerned not with one particular skill or narrowly defined area of knowledge, but with a whole range of attitudes and a breadth and depth of knowledge and understanding which altogether can be seen as interpretative of much of what human living is about. Similarly the worth-while activities we spoke about are such for similar reasons in that they operate on the level where persons come face to face with the ultimate quest for the meaning of their lives.

Secondly, our analysis of the aims of education showed that education is a never ending process. Similarly, worth-while activities which go beyond the satisfaction of the necessary

appetites are taken up in a dialectic of quest and answer about the meaning of life which is never ending.

Thirdly, the aims of education provide an intrinsic norm of what education should be like. Similarly the worth-while activities also provide an intrinsic norm as to their truthfulness and character of worth-whileness. In this context it is important to stress the difference with those activities which satisfy man's necessary appetites. Strictly speaking they have no norm built into them in that they are the necessary outflow of what is natural for man. Their normative character lies outside them in that it is only in the context of man's ultimate quest for meaning that we have criteria by which the satisfaction of the necessary appetites can be regulated.

The last point just made points to a fourth and last link between the two statements under discussion. Actions which are fulfilling the aims of education, which are worth-while activities, are performed for their own sake. This basically means that within these actions man can give expression to what is meaningful in his life and is aware of the demands which life is making upon him as a person.

b. The Non-Instrumental Approach to Education

According to Peters the instrumental justifications of education are 'incomplete'. (8) In view of what has been said so far this is not very surprising. Both when speaking about the aims of education and about worth-while activities it became clear what is truly educative is not to be seen as a means to an end. In other words any explanation of education as being instrumental in relation to the achievement of something else is at best incomplete.

Peters in one of his works (9) outlines the incompleteness of instrumental justifications of education. But before he does so he first gives arguments in favour of instrumental justifications of Education. (10)

The most common and obvious way, according to Peters, to look for the justification of something in a consumer type society is to look for its use in terms of the community or the individual. This is also possible with education. Peters shows that knowledge and understanding which are two of the essential characteristics of what it means to be educated can be looked for not just because of what there is in them, but also for extrinsic reasons.

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These reasons can be connected with the use which can be made of knowledge and understanding for the functioning of society in many different ways. The same holds for breadth of understanding or, what is called by Peters in similar contexts elsewhere, 'cognitive perspective'. (11)

When we talked about aims of education we found that one of the characteristics of education is that it is done for its own sake, or, that it is non-instrumental in character. But even here one can give an instrumental justification of the non-instrumental approach to education. Namely, it can be said that persons who approach their area of competence for its own sake, and not for the sake of, say, financial gain, are often of better service and use to the community. This clearly implies an instrumental justification of education on the presupposition that the competence at stake here reflects values of an educational character.

In spite of all this Peters thinks that the instrumental justification of education is incomplete. The substance of his argument runs somewhat as follows. (12) First of all Peters states that the instrumental justification of certain activities in terms of the social benefit they bring can be easily changed in terms of the individual's benefit. For if an individual's competence is socially beneficial, it is likely to come back to him in terms of earnings, prestige or various types of reward. Moreover, these instrumental types of justification are incomplete. For if the instrumental type of justification of activities of an educational character is valid at all, one must ask why they can be seen as instrumental. Or, to put the last question in another way, one must ask what there is in the states of affairs in relation to which the activities of an education are instrumental.

People who would maintain the instrumental justification of education in terms of some further benefit they bring (which is then extrinsic to education) are bound to give an answer in terms of consumer values of some sort or another. These are values which are measured by the criterion of what gain (of whatever kind) I can get out of the things I do. This gain can be formulated in terms of approval, financial profit, rewards, or something similar. But they all involve some kind of satisfaction, pleasure or even experience of happiness as part and parcel of what is achieved.

But if this is the case, then we are saying nothing more than "what is achieved is done for its own sake". And the immediate question one can ask then is why educational activities cannot as much be performed for their own sake (indicated by the pleasure they provide to at least a number of people) as those other activities which were seen as an end in relation to educational activities.

We have come now the full circle in outlining Peters' argument. We would have to start again with analysing why e.g. knowledge and understanding are worth-while in themselves.

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- (1) R S Peters, Ethics and Education.
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- (2) cf. R S Peters, Ethics and Education p.45.
- (3) R S Peters, 'Education as Initiation.' In:
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London, Kegan Paul, 1965. pp.87-111
- (4) Chapter V, pp.144-166
- (5) *ibid*
- (6) R S Peters, 'Education as Initiation.'
- (7) See e.g. R S Peters (Ed.), The Philosophy of Education,
246-247.
- (8) *ibid*.
- (9) O.c. pp.242-246.
- (10) E.g.: Ethics and Education, p.31.
- (11) The Philosophy of Education, pp.246-247.

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Black training and job advancement policies and programmes

The following lay questionnaire on black training and job advancement policies and programmes in South Africa was presented to white individuals working in the field. They were asked to respond to some or all of the questions either directly, or to use the questions as starting points to make related comments. There was no correspondence between respondents.

Each question is printed with the answers received following it.

Readers' comments and additional information are invited for publication in a subsequent issue of Perspectives in Education.

Patricia Morris

Respondents:

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| Dennis Beckett | - Manager: <u>The Voice</u> . |
| Sue Blignaut | - Institute of Race Relations |
| Bernard Chalmers | - Fine Spamer Associates: Consultants in Human Resources. |
| Alan Kemp | - Professor, Structural Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand |
| Margaret Meyer | - Language Laboratory, University of the Witwatersrand |
| Edward Nicholson | - Guardian Liberty Life |

Question 1

Aside from what is offered by government sponsored Bantu Education, what training is offered blacks by the government, and to what purpose?

All training institutions for Africans fall under the Department of Education and Training. In-service training is also provided by government departments such as the Post Office, South African Railways, and quasi-government organisations such as Iscor.

Sue Blignaut

If you include the substantial tax incentives offered to private industry for training Blacks and in-service training centres, I am not aware of any other training sponsored by Government, besides that done under the auspices of Bantu Education. This of course excludes the training which the Government does itself for its own employees.

Bernard Chalmers

Question 2

What trade or non-academic training facilities are available for blacks

Engineering Technical Colleges and Colleges of Advanced Technical Education (e.g. Madikoti near Pietersberg) exist and are fulfilling an important function in training black apprentices, draughtsman and technicians. A new C.A.T.E. is under construction at Mabopane (near Pretoria). These colleges often need assistance in finding suitable job opportunities and vacation work for their students, particularly in the homelands.

Alan Kemp

There are:

- 15 trade schools
- 5 technical secondary schools
- 2 Colleges for advanced technical education
- 8 departmental industrial training centres (these provide practical tuition at school level in various trade courses, each centre catering for schools in its area)
- 8 public in-service training centres
- 1 private in-service training centre
- 7 state-run ad hoc border industrial schools
- 20 private ad hoc border industrial schools

Sue Bignaut

Question 3

What scope is there for blacks to move into higher wage categories without using the routes provided by a Bantu Education matric and university training?

There is quite a lot of scope for Blacks to educate themselves into higher wage categories, without using the aids provided by Bantu Education. For example, there are numerous training courses offered by correspondence, by organisations such as the Institute of Personnel Management, C I S, I C S, and so on.

Secondly a large number of companies provide in-company training. In a survey conducted recently by ourselves, 167 companies, we found that in the past 12 months, 72% of all semi-skilled technical training done by these companies was done for blacks. At the skilled level 55% of all the training was given to Blacks. 22% of Clerical skills training was given to Blacks and 44% of Supervisory skill training was given to Blacks. Thirdly, private institutions offer all kinds of training for Blacks, for example in secretarial skills, computer programming and so on. Fourthly, on a lower level, many Church organisations

offer training in cooking, literacy, reading, and so on and then of course, in the in-service training centres, there is the formal training offered for Blacks and I believe, there are some efforts being made to use the in-service training centres in the evenings for offering commercial courses and so on, for Blacks.

Bernard Chalmers

Most engineering companies have training programmes for black personnel which enable them to achieve higher wage potential. These are frequently directed towards a single trade (e.g. machine-operator, crane driver, operator-welder, painter, etc.) but would often include supervisory training for more senior black employees. The primary limit to the level of skill which is offered is determined by the decisions of the Industrial Council in each industry. Thus, since boilermaking is reserved for trade union members and blacks may not be trade union members, boilermaking would not be included in the training programme except in the homelands.

Alan Kemp

A black employee's opportunities in a commercial organisation (i.e. not necessarily in engineering, mining or manufacturing environments) are fairly numerous on the clerical (operational) levels of the organisation rather than on supervisory levels.

Opportunities for advancement are influenced by:

(1) Basic educational level:

A black employee with a Standard 8 will not generally qualify for job advancement beyond the existing positions of messenger, filing clerk, despatch clerk, etc.

(2) Economic or financial gain for the company:

In some instances an employer can profit by employing a black in a white's job. For example, the average white matriculated 21 year old female will stay with the company for 1-2 years, whereas in the same job a well-matriculated 28 year old black male will stay with the company for about 6 years. Because of high cyclical turnover costs associated with these whites (e.g. pension benefits, training, acclimatization,

administrative costs) it can be more advantageous to employ a black.

(3) Conflict situations:

Existing black employees within an organization can sometimes pressurize management into creating improved conditions by using the employer's paternalism, social conscience, and political anxiety for the employee's advancement.

(4) The racial mix of the organisation:

Certain race groups are favoured for specific jobs, e.g. Indian males are recruited ahead of black males as computer operators; Coloureds are preferred as punch card operators; Coloured female typists are sought as replacements for white typists; Indian females are preferred to black males as clerks. As yet few black females are employed in commerce.

Edward Nicholson

Question 4

Which companies place emphasis on literacy programmes, and why?

There is a cynical view amongst some blacks, usually people who are not in line for or in need of literacy programmes themselves, that the motivation is often to create better labour units. Some of the literacy programmes concentrate on employment-oriented literacy and lend themselves to this accusation.

For whatever reason companies offer literacy programmes, there is very little opportunity for in-house education at an intermediate standard. Most of the effort is focused on the extremes - literacy teaching on the one hand, and specialist courses for senior black employees at the other. The large middle area is left mainly untouched. The ordinary industrial or commercial worker with a formal

education reaching to between Std 4 and Std 8 has little opportunity to find further educational opportunities, and in general doesn't get much employer support even when he does find them.

Dennis Beckett

Literacy Projects

There are a number of literacy projects in Johannesburg and elsewhere, some of which award certificates to successful learners. It is a matter for speculation (or perhaps a subject for research) whether the certificates enable the holders to obtain better jobs. Literacy projects often depend on voluntary workers, many of whom may be untrained or only partly trained. Those interested in pursuing the matter further should contact some of the following:

Bureau of Literacy and Literature, 313 Dunwell House, Braamfontein, 724-5151

Operation Upgrade (their headquarters are in Durban)

Domestic Workers and Employers Project, c/o Mrs Leah Tutu, Box 97 Johannesburg 2000

Domestic Workers' Project, c/o SA Council of Churches, Diakonia House, Jorissen Street, Braamfontein

Learn and Teach, c/o Martin Prinsloo, 201 Rainer House, 33 Upper Railway Road, New Doornfontein, phone 618-2885.

Institute for the study of English in Africa, PO Box 94, Grahamstown, 6140.

English Academy, Ballater House, Melle Street, Braamfontein

Human Sciences Research Council, Private Bag X41, Pretoria

Centres of Concern

These are usually a type of community centre run by churches mainly for domestic workers. Their activities often include literacy classes, dressmaking, typing, cooking, and some centres are able to prepare students for

examinations. Their teachers may or may not be trained. Enquiries should be directed to Mrs Sue Gordon, Domestic Workers' and Employers' Project, Box 97 Johannesburg 2000.

Margaret Meyer

Quite a large number of companies do provide literacy training for their Blacks. As far as I know, their reasons are twofold. Firstly by providing the literacy training, it makes it easier to upgrade the blacks, makes them more productive and so justifies the higher wages which are more or less being forced upon employers at the moment. Secondly, there is quite a lot of evidence which suggests that there is a fair amount of social consciousness in companies at present and part of the programme for upgrading non-whites and improving their quality of life, would be to provide them with literacy training.

Bernard Chalmers

Literacy programmes are not stressed within commercial industry as the most sought after non-white applicant is the high potential black male. Literacy programmes are of more value to primary industries, as basic literacy has more operational value for the technical (hand manipulation) than the commercial (cognitive) businesses.

Edward Nicholson

Question 5

Is there more or less black training offered by government companies (IsCOR, Escom, Sasol, S.A. Railways etc) than by private companies, and if there is a difference what are the ideological or commercial reasons for the difference? How does white training differ?

I believe it is impossible to answer this question accurately when it is considered that the Railways alone employ over a quarter million people, it does not seem feasible to me to make any assessment of whether they do more training than other companies in the private sector. It is relevant however, that a great deal of training is

being done by the S.A.R. by the Post Office, by ISCOR, ESCOM, SASOL and many of the others and that Blacks are advancing into more senior positions in these organisations. It is interesting to note in this regard that in the South African Railways 22 000 Non-whites are today performing work that was traditionally undertaken by whites. That is almost one in seven jobs. These figures are quoted from a talk given by Mr J Venter, the Chief Superintendent of Personnel of the S.A.R. & H, to an N.D.M.F. Conference.

Bernard Chalmers

Question 6

How extensively do companies investigate black attitudes to training programmes devised for them, and is there a difference in approach here between government and private companies?

In commercial enterprises black attitudes are investigated before instigation of programme. This is usually conducted on an informal, non-scientific basis. Management is more concerned with possible reactions to its own suggestions and "improvements" than with trying to ascertain what blacks actually want beforehand. As its main source of information ("Tell us what they are thinking now"), management will refer to the so-called white experts, a few black consultants, the liaison committee, and the personnel officer systems.

Edward Nicholson

To the best of my knowledge, very few companies investigate Black attitudes or White attitudes, for that matter, either to the company or training, or anything else.

Bernard Chalmers

Question 7

How are blacks in the general population made aware of training facilities available to them?
Are there career guidance bureaux for blacks?

The black community is in dire need of increased awareness of career and training opportunities. The Department of Labour via the Bureau of Labour Control, provides the following legislation:

- (1) Regulations for the Administration and Control of Townships in Bantu Areas (1962)
- (2) Regulations for Labour Bureaux at Bantu Authorities (1968). The enforcement of these regulations provides facilities for job placement, which are however rather primitive. The image of this Department is not very high. (A manager was recently overheard saying: "I don't want to see him. If he comes from them he must be a criminal or lazy".) The problem of accurate and valid job market information is a major unsatisfied need of the black township dweller.

Edward Nicholson

There is very little vocational guidance at school level. Vocational guidance officers apparently visit post-primary schools. Information about various careers is published in the Bantu Education Journal (now known as Educamus!) and was also published in The World. The Education Information Centre (attached to the Institute of Race Relations) provides some information and is hoping to expand this service. The Institute for Social Development also provides a service.

Sue Blignaut

I have no doubt that there is a considerable lack of career guidance for Blacks in this country. Some consulting organisations do offer career guidance for Blacks on the same basis that they would offer it to Whites, but in general, I would say that there is a great need for this. The training facilities that are available to Blacks, certainly on a commercial basis, are advertised in the

press and of course companies who offer their own in-service training make known to the Blacks, what is available to them.

Bernard Chalmers

Question 8

Are there secretarial colleges for blacks, especially women, and how easy is it for them to obtain secretarial or clerical work?

There are colleges, at least in Johannesburg. It is not easy to obtain secretarial/clerical work. The general employer attitude is: Get a White if you can afford one, otherwise go for a Coloured or Indian. One of the big problems is that some of the colleges for Blacks hand out diplomas to anyone who pays the fees long enough. This devalues the diplomas and adds to the difficulties facing capable blacks. It also tends to fortify the most negative aspects of the widespread, more or less tentative and reluctant "well, we'll try it once and see how it goes" attitude of employers. Frequently, an employer takes on a single black "pioneer" in a job which has previously not been held by blacks. If that individual fails, many employers assume that "blacks can't do it". In the case where, say, a black woman pitches up with a fancy gothic diploma and then turns out to be seriously inadequate, the employer tends to be prejudiced not only against future applicants with the same diploma, but also against applicants with diplomas from other black colleges, and against black applicants per se.

Dennis Beckett

Besides Chamdor there are a number of private colleges, but the quality of their courses is not certain. Probably any skilled black would have no problem finding work.

Sue Blignaut

Question 9

Do blacks in fact maximize on the (few?) opportunities available to them for improvement of skills and wages?

Of course some people maximise opportunities and some people don't, in any population group anywhere. The problem in SA is that too often for blacks at intermediate employment levels - i.e. anywhere between literacy and the select upper crust with conspicuous management potential - knowledge improvement is not seen as bringing wage or responsibility advances. Messenger A spends time, effort and money on a course, passes, maybe gets a nice pat on the back from the personnel manager, but frequently just stays a messenger. Messenger B sees this, and figures he may as well spend his time and money on pursuits more enjoyable. Of course it doesn't always work like this. Some firms make considerable efforts to encourage private advancement. When they don't it is not always because the company isn't interested, or couldn't be bothered to do a bit of restructuring to create a suitable spot, or because a leg up would have to mean a desk in a roomful of white women (who "aren't yet ready for it") or whatever. It is also because the courses which go-ahead individuals find for themselves are often irrelevant or simply bad. They put a lot of earnest effort into courses which they take on in good faith and in the belief they're being educated. In fact they often end up with not much more than interminable lists of obscure Latin abbreviations, finicky niceties of irregular verb forms for which no-one has any practical need whatsoever, and an intimate knowledge of set-works such as Allan Quatermain and Pilgrim's Progress and a consequent belief that "good reading" is a painful and onerous occupation. The same thing happens in fields other than English.

It also happens that even where the courses themselves are good or reasonable people misapply their energies desperately. (In one case I know of, the student went to great trouble to acquire and read everything referred to in the bibliography of his first supply of lecture notes, including a 30-year old textbook and a 40-year-old set of public accounts).

The end result is that the eager student comes out of his course in the belief that the sweat and the midnight oil has advanced him immeasurably, but frequently it has in fact given him no practical benefit.

Dennis Beckett

In my experience, Blacks do capitalize on the opportunities made available to them for the improvement of their skills and wages

Bernard Chalmers

Whites generally see blacks as being keen to start any development opportunity, but loathe to stay the pace. This can be explained in terms of discrepant perspectives of what constitutes responsible behaviour, (e.g. time usage, regular attendance, use of dead-lines, quality of work, persistence, etc.) On the whole, however, the gap between perceptions of intention and behaviour is closing, and more and more blacks are behaving as "responsibly" as their "responsible" white counterparts.

Edward Nicholson

Question 10

Does a black garbage collector earn more than a black clerk?

It is true that the wage curve, at least in the cities, and excluding the poles, is extremely flat. It does happen that labourers in well-paying outfits are sometimes paid more than clerks in others. Even within the same company, the difference between the bottom and top quartiles is often very low. There are no increasing opportunities at the topmost extreme, but there is very little incentive for the lower-middle man to try to make it to the upper-middle.

Dennis Beckett

Question 11

What is government attitude/policy concerning the employment of blacks by blacks in private enterprise in S.A. and if it is not encouraged, why not?

I am certainly not aware that the Government in any way discourages the employment of Blacks by Blacks, in private enterprise in South Africa. Discouraging such practices would in my opinion be contrary to the many statements that have been made by government in recent months.

Bernard Chalmers

Question 12

Do companies have constitutions which include an interest in the public good? Or, How far does the concern of a company for its employees extend?

In a survey of approximately 500 senior executives of organisations, all but a very few of them felt that the company did have a social responsibility and indicated that the social responsibility should be discharged in many different ways, for example, in housing, providing training, improving the working environment, making it possible for Blacks to improve their own position within the company and within the community in which they live. I would say for many companies, certainly the concerned companies, the concern for the quality of life of their employees, extends far beyond the workplace and into their own home environment.

Bernard Chalmers

THE NEED FOR LITERACY IN COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (1)

K L Baucom

I would like to talk to you today as, primarily, a person representing industry and a person very much concerned with educational needs in industry and commerce within this country.

My paper will consist of an analysis, as I see it, of the needs for literacy in industry and commerce. The analysis will fall into two parts --- the needs of the company and the needs of the individual employees. I will, however, make no attempt to say that I can represent to you fully what the motivations and needs of the employees are. I am not an illiterate adult and I acknowledge that fact.

The needs of the company relate primarily to having a supply of employees with those skills which are necessary for the profitable outcome of the company. The needs of the individual worker relate primarily to self actualization and self development. The two needs of company and employees are not conflicting but are mutually reinforcing.

Let us begin by looking at the needs of the company. As mentioned above, the employer's concern for education centres around having a sufficient number of people with those job skills required at the present time and which will be required in the future. The nature of those job skills varies at different places within any company, and thus the educational needs of a company are also different at different places within the company.

In order to give us common terms of reference, I shall discuss job skills in industry and commerce as they relate to job evaluation. I will use one system of job evaluation which is becoming very popular in South Africa these days, a system called the Paterson Plan of job evaluation.

The Paterson Plan of job evaluation looks at the work that people do and evaluates that work according to one basic criterion - what types of decisions are made in the job. It may not seem to you at first that job evaluation by decision making has much to do with literacy, but I hope that I will be able to make the relationship clear. The Paterson Plan divides jobs into six bands that are labelled A through F, A being the lowest level of decision making, F being top management decision making. Let me just briefly describe these decision making bands.

A is what is called a defined decision. A person doing jobs of this type has all his decisions defined for him by some other person or set of rules. He knows immediately when he comes in contact with a situation what he has got to do. Thus he has no free decisions of his own and makes, as I mentioned above, only defined decisions.

The person in B band makes automatic decisions -- decisions which may take some skill and some training. The person makes these decisions himself, but the decision responses are automatic. An example often given of B type decisions is that of a person driving an automobile. The person has to have training and know-how. But when he comes to a stop street or a red light he makes an automatic decision to stop. He does not weigh up the pro and cons but makes an automatic decision.

The C band consists of routine decisions. A person is not making automatic decisions but has some choice. He weighs up the pro and cons and uses his own judgement. Making the proper decision normally implies previous training and/or experience.

The D band is the middle management type of decision. Such a person receives decisions of programme and policy which are made by his job superiors and interprets these for action.

The E decision band is that of the programmer who sets large policies in motion. And the F band is that of top management -- those people who set policies and make long term decisions which affect large numbers of people, and the total progress of the company.

Now we bring these concepts of decision making bands to the question of literacy and the needs of the company in terms of literacy. Analysis to date of jobs in South Africa (as this appears true for jobs all over the world) is that bands C through F will require at least the equivalent of a South African Standard 10 education. Of course there will always be notable exceptions of individuals who do well and reach bands C through F despite not having such a level of education. But basically the situation exists in South Africa that if a person is going to be able to do the work related to job categories C through F, he will have at least a Standard 10 education. Such a level of education is normally outside the scope of literacy organisations and literacy workers.

Now that leaves bands A and B to be considered. And it is within the jobs of bands A and B that there is a confusion in the minds of most people about the value of education in the work situation. Let us recall that band A, the lowest band in terms of decision making and also pay categories, is that of defined decisions. This band does not simply consist of manual labourers. This is the major confusion which exists in the minds of many. Defined decision types of jobs are not automatically assigned to illiterates. The A band also includes categories such as copy typists. A copy typist who does not do lay-out but who simply types exactly what is presented without making any changes is in fact making defined decisions. Thus the A band category will also include filing clerks if filing codes are already given and the clerk simply puts marked paper into correspondingly marked files.

It is important to understand the following:

at the lowest level there are some illiterate manual labourers and there are some people who have education of at least Standard 8 and perhaps Standard 10.

Within all basic bands, including band A, there are sub divisions. Copy typists or filing clerks would be in one of the higher sub divisions and manual labourers in a lower sub division of band A.

At band B level, automatic decisions, there are some educated people and some uneducated people. The supervisor of a manual labourer would go into band B even if that supervisor himself were illiterate. The supervisor is not making defined decisions. He would make automatic types of decisions.

I do not believe that I need to go into more detail about these bands as I am using them only as a frame of reference. The important point is that from the view point of industry and commerce, the need for education is not quite so simple or perhaps so simplistic as many of us have thought in the past. For within the lower two bands of job categories there are some fairly well educated people and some totally illiterate people.

Any of you who have tried to implement literacy programmes in industry and commerce or who have had some involvements in such programmes may have wondered why all the illiterate employees do not flock to literacy classes. For surely, we think, we are giving a valuable opportunity to people. We are giving them the opportunity for job advancement, more

money, etc. But illiterate people are realistic enough to know that these advancements will not necessarily come about. For illiterate people in industry know quite well that an illiterate supervisor of manual labourers can earn a higher salary than a Standard 8 typist. Thus to say to a man that he should come to literacy classes and that this will make it possible to advance in his job does not necessarily mean much to that man. For he knows better the reality of the situation than does the literacy worker.

Thus, I repeat, the role of education in industry and commerce is not quite so simple as most of us have believed. And the pay off from attending literacy classes is neither so great for the employer or the employee as most of us have maintained.

Let us look further at what education does mean in industry. We will use the framework of Paterson's band A through F again. It is possible for people with no education at all to be at the top of band B but they will never get into band C. You will remember that band C requires a minimum of Standard 10. This means that a person without education is trapped within the lower two bands and cannot rise.

On the other hand the Standard 10 copy typist in A band can very well hope to move up to B or C or beyond. There is the possibility of mobility. There is flexibility and trainability for the educated person. Thus the educated person in the lower bands has all possibility of upward movement. The uneducated person in the lower band, even though fairly well paid, has no possibility of further upward movement.

Some of you may have wondered why industry has not responded better to calls for literacy programmes. The reason is that people in industry are aware of the nature of the situation that I have been describing. For the most part they treat with scepticism the suggestions made in the past by literacy organisations that all one has to do is teach all one's workers to read and write and then wait for productivity to increase.

You may ask them why we hear so much about the need for a better educated and better skilled work force in South Africa. Is the situation I have been describing valid? The answer to this question lies in the composition of the South African work force.

Notice the estimated composition of the work forces of South Africa and Canada in the table before you.

% of work force	Decision Making Bands					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
S. Africa	40%	48%	← 12% →			
Canada	10%	65%	← 25% →			

Notice that about 40% of our South African work force is in the A band. This figure includes both commerce and industry. There are 48% in the B band. Notice also that there are more people in B band than in A. The other top 4 bands altogether only make up 12% of the work force. Notice furthermore that the great majority of those in A and B band cannot possibly move into upper bands because of lack of education and training. I know that comparisons between countries are not totally valid and I do not mean to suggest that the South African situation must be the same as an overseas situation. But notice that in Canada the work force in the A band is 10%, as opposed to the South African 40%. In Canada 65% of the work force are in the B band. In Canada there are 25% of the work force in the bands C - F, as opposed to 12% in South Africa.

The educational problem for industry in South Africa is that someone must provide education so that many of our A people can get into the B band and many of our B band people into the C band. Many people at the moment cannot move from B to C because of lack of education. (This is not, of course, the only factor). Our ratio of A level people to B level is too high. And our ratio of C through F (that is skilled workers and managers) to A and B levels is too low. (And unfortunately, the level of education attained in literacy classes is not high enough for assuring movement from A to B, much less from B to C.)

Now may I change direction to our second concern? Let us look at the educational needs of the individual within industry. In doing this I am still taking management's view for, as I said earlier, I do not pretend that I can express adequately what the illiterate worker sees as his own needs.

An individual will only learn something that meets one or

more of his needs. Management and literacy organisations can make decisions all they want as to what people should learn. But if our educational objectives do not meet one of a man's needs he will not learn them. In the past, the individual worker's need, most often cited by literacy organisations able to be met by literacy classes, is job promotability. Literacy organisations have appealed to security needs, suggesting that a man go to a literacy class so that he will be promoted. But we have seen earlier in this paper that literacy does not mean promotion. In fact we find that job promotion does not appear to be the reason given most often by people in industry who enter literacy classes. It is one reason, but it is not the major one. Illiterate people are usually realistic, and quite frankly, the majority of people who go to literacy classes in industry will not get promotion for so doing.

What needs are there then, for the individual to go to literacy classes?

Two big influences in the last decade in management style in South Africa have been the works of two industrial psychologists, Maslow and Herzberg. These two men have been concerned about employee needs and motivation. Maslow posits a hierarchy of human needs and suggests that the lower needs tend to be physical types of needs and the higher needs psychological ones, such as the need for self actualization. Maslow suggests that people, having met lower needs, tend to move up towards fulfilment of higher needs. Thus on a crude level when I am hungry my major concern is for a lower level need. But as soon as that hunger is filled and I am satisfied I move on to a higher need. The needs of the employees tend to move towards the psychological end of the continuum.

Herzberg suggests that in a job situation there are certain factors which cause dissatisfaction if absent. Thus if I do not pay my employees enough money they will be dissatisfied. If the working conditions are not safe or hygienic they will be dissatisfied. But if I fulfil those conditions, it does not mean that employees will be satisfied. The opposite of dissatisfaction is not satisfaction; the opposite of dissatisfaction is lack of dissatisfaction. Herzberg suggests that the factors which give satisfaction are not those which prevent dissatisfaction. The factors which give satisfaction tend to be factors of self actualization, self concept, self esteem. Please remember that I am not talking in terms of the welfare worker. I am talking in terms of the two best known

personnel management theories in South Africa. Both of these theories emphasize psychological needs such as self esteem as playing a major role in the work situation.

I believe that for the most part management accepts that if we are going to have a work force which has its needs met within the work situation, there will have to be the opportunity for self development, for self growth, for higher self esteem. We must meet the psychological needs; we must supply a situation which provides the satisfiers.

You have just heard the same thing expressed by the Honourable Chief Minister, Mr Mopeli. Mr Mopeli expressed the view that the role of literacy programmes is not just the accumulation of reading and writing skills, but it is in part the role of literacy programmes to provide self growth, self actualization. The manager seeks to meet the needs of employees because the manager knows that to have a better run industry and to make greater profits, the work situation must meet the needs of his employees. And literacy programmes can play a part in meeting the psychological needs of employees in the work situation.

In summary, when we talk about the needs for literacy in industry and commerce it is necessary, I believe, to get away from the simplifications that have been used in South Africa over the last eight or nine years. The basic value of literacy programmes is not that they will develop all the skills necessary for industry, but rather that if we can provide a work situation which meets both the needs of the company and of the individual then both the well being of the individual and of the company will prosper. I believe that literacy programmes can play a role in providing that situation in which needs of the employee are met.

Note:

- (1) This paper was read at the Human Sciences Research Council conference on literacy, July 11, 1978.

THE NEED FOR EXTENSION RESEARCH AND OBJECTIVE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN LESS DEVELOPED AREAS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

T J Bembridge

In the majority of low-income countries which comprise two-thirds of the world's population per capita, food consumption has ceased to increase and is showing signs of decline. This situation brings with it hardship and social stress as numbers of growing urban and rural populations compete for scarce food. According to FAO statistics even if the exceptionally bad drought years are disregarded, per capita food production is no better than static in any region, with Africa faring worse than average.

Rural development strategies in the past have rested on the belief that it is possible for the rural economy to provide for improvement in the welfare of its own population and to supply the finance, food and labour for urban industrialisation and consumption. The record suggests that this is not the case. Often the needs of rural populations (the chief of which is a secure food supply) conflict with policies which promote the use of manufactured inputs and the marketing of outputs in support of urban objectives. A realisation that this conflict exists, goes some way to explain the resistance of small farmers to 'modernising' technologies and policies. So long as their food supply is not secure, farmers are sensible and quite rational in avoiding risky dependency on supplies of industrial inputs and on distant, sometimes unpredictable markets. Under these conditions reliance on proven traditional technologies and social arrangements is a sensible strategy. The inference here is that the first step is to improve traditional technology through research and extension education, to achieve self sufficiency in basic food crops and livestock products.

Settlement schemes have been a feature of government intervention in Africa for the past fifty years. With few exceptions, their performance has been negatively linked with the cost per settler. The most expensive have received the most attention and had the least success, whilst the cheapest have passed almost unnoticed whilst settling very large numbers of people. The reasons for schemes are varied, but as a generality it is true that

many have been expensive failures simply because fundamental constraints on production have been misinterpreted and have therefore not resulted in the changes that were sought. This has occurred simply because planners were unaware of the problems at 'grass roots' level. For example, an expensive mechanisation scheme involving the use of tractors for a cotton growing scheme in Uganda resulted in a lower yield per acre and per labour unit compared with animal draught power, because the planners failed to appreciate the real farming bottleneck of weed control and harvesting!

The lessons from past experience must be that national objectives can only be achieved by engaging the goodwill, potential and creativity of rural populations. This in turn implies policies which serve rural people on their own terms rather than assuming the existence of 'modern' solutions to rural problems. It follows therefore that the solution of rural socio-economic problems must be based on empirical research.

So much for rural development generally. Agricultural extension is of course part and parcel of rural development and must not be looked at in isolation. The following quotation aptly illustrates the theme of my paper: "As scientists we claim that we are seekers after truth; as agricultural scientists we seek the truth concerning agriculture. Let us ensure that we do not waste our efforts by failing to implant that truth to good effect". This is the challenge of extension today.

How effective are we at implanting the truth? Making due allowance for application of experimental results at farm level, a considerable gap exists between farmer production and potential production. It is no exaggeration to state that crop yields can at least be trebled and livestock production increased by at least one-third in a comparatively short period of time simply by improving traditional farming systems. Considering that the Homelands, Transkei and Baphuthatswana are largely dependent upon agricultural production, the gap is far too wide and must be closed to a considerable degree, both nationally and in the interests of individual producers. If the gap between the most progressive and the average farmer's level of production can be closed at least the problem of subsistence and nutrition can be solved.

What are the problems? In most cases unfortunately we can do no more than make guesses and assumptions, simply

because we have no empirical research to guide us. Today in Southern Africa, there is a pressing need to develop the science of agricultural extension. Extension workers in the field have to deal with a host of social and psychological problems and up to now we have had to rely on the hard school of experience and intuitive ability in human relations. Scientific investigation and training are essential if these problems are to be overcome. The formation of a Department of Agricultural Extension at Fort Hare University will I hope go some way towards fulfilling this need.

It is worth stressing that extension and education are primarily concerned with people. Ideas cannot be projected satisfactorily without an understanding of those with whom one is trying to communicate.

In their preoccupation with the physical and biological sciences, both in extension work and formal schools of learning, agricultural scientists tend to ignore the fact that education and extension are subjects equally worthy of study. It is sometimes easy for agricultural scientists to forget that others are responsible for ensuring their efforts are brought to fruition.

Firstly, this paper discusses the basic assumptions as to why we need extension research. Secondly, to illustrate this need, some research findings and their implications will be briefly discussed.

It is useful and realistic to consider agricultural production and extension as a system (Fig 1). By definition, farmers are working with the environment to produce food and fibre for national and international consumption. Extension and servicing organisations, comprising Government and commercial extension services, commercial firms and industry, all contribute directly or indirectly to the farming industry.




Fig. 1: Structure of the Agricultural Industry

In any social system, one crucial requirement is a complex of information, knowledge and understanding of the system so that it can be maintained, evaluated and developed. Basically the system exists in order to bring about some kind of improvement within itself, and especially among farmers, as a means of satisfying the objectives of research, extension and servicing organisations.

What do we know about the functioning of this system in Southern Africa? As regards environment, an accurate assessment of the agricultural potential of an area of individual holding is an essential prerequisite for the achievement of objectives in terms of optimal resource utilisation. Already a good deal is known about the agricultural potential of Independent States and Homeland areas and, with the aid of research, some norms have been established in different agro-ecological areas. Our main concern is thus with farmers, or more appropriately farm families, and the extension and servicing organisations but more specifically, the inter-relationships between these two systems.

What do we really know about our farmers?

- (1) What do we know about farmers' knowledge, perceptions, values, attitudes, needs, potential and norms?
- (2) What do we know about the social structure of our farming communities?

Too often knowledge of farmers and communities is presumed to exist among extension workers, but this is rarely systematic and usually partial and superficial in character.

Such knowledge could undoubtedly lead to more specific and purposive contacts, and the communication of research information to farmers. In order to work effectively with any community these unknown quantities must be understood.

What do we know of the relationship between field extension workers, specialists, research workers and farmers?

- (1) What channels of communication are being used to communicate information to farmers?
- (2) What is the content or 'message' of such communication?
- (3) How do farmers receive information?
- (4) What confidence have farmers in extension officers, commercial advisors, research workers and in the information provided?

Such intelligence is vital if decisions are to be made on which future extension action can be based. Extension workers often pose the question "How can I get through to farmers more effectively?", which implies that they realize they are not as effective as they could or should be. Communication experts maintain that a "two-way flow of information" is required for effective communication. In the less developed areas of Southern Africa, to what extent are the publishers of various farming publications, bulletins, leaflets etc. aware of

- (1) what farmers think of these publications; and
- (2) what impact the different articles have on agriculture? The same question may be asked of other channels of communication such as radio broadcasts, farmers days etc.

Have we ever looked at the system in terms of quasi-economic terms of an input-output function, with extension and research work as a composite item of "intellectual investment", or in terms of cost-benefit analysis or allocation of resources? Is the balance between expenditure on research and extension a correct one?

For example, would it not be worthwhile spending say, two per cent of the research and extension vote of less developed areas to investigate some of the problems I have mentioned?

There is also a need to assess the efficiency of extension services. After all, this is a factor which is easily changed. Assessment is necessary to

- (1) evaluate the performance of extension workers;
- (2) critically consider work plans (if they exist); and
- (3) examine methods being used, and relate these to the objectives of extension services and the expectations of farmers. Such critical action research is vital if improvements in the planning and operation of extension activities are to occur.

It is with questions such as the foregoing in mind that extension research is necessary in any systems approach in developing the agricultural and human potential to the full. Briefly, I will discuss some actual findings from my experience in Rhodesia and their implications for extension workers:-

Exploitation of the human potential is fundamental to the development of the agricultural industry. Management is a function of man, and personal and socio-psychological factors exercise an influence on the complexity of human beings and, consequently on farming progressiveness. The first question any new extension worker asks is "what are the farmers like?" Fig. 2 shows a population distribution according to age and sex. The general distribution trend shows a relatively large percentage (56 - 63%) of the population as being under 20 years of age, which has important implications for future educational development and economic policies. Also, the large size of family is an obvious constraint in moving from a subsistence to a cash economy. Fig. 3 depicts educational standards of farmers and their wives. Whereas 67 per cent of farmers wives could in this instance be regarded as practically illiterate, this was the case for only 55 per cent of the farmers. The implications of this for communication of information are obvious. These are an example of just two factors - there are many others to be considered.

AGE GROUP




Fig. 2: Age-sex pyramid of a Rhodesian peasant farming population




Fig. 3: Educational standards of farmers and their wives in a Rhodesian peasant farming area

Another important factor concerning extension workers is the current efficiency level of farmers and the potential for increasing efficiency. Farm production level per unit is the most important expression of farming efficiency. The higher the yield the greater the profit per hectare. Fig. 4 indicates the relative success or failure of farmers according to five year average maize yield, and shows the distribution to be positively skewed towards the lower yields. Furthermore, comparisons between farmer maize yields and those obtained from farm demonstrations showed that 94 per cent of farmer yields were below the known potential (Fig. 4).

The next question is why are yields so low - some of the answers to this are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The agronomy situation in a Rhodesian peasant farming area

Variable	Per cent farmers
<u>Soil fertility status</u>	%
Good	14,7
Fair	61,3
Poor	24,0
<u>Continuous cropping period</u>	
0 - 10 years	11,5
11 - 15 years	11,7
Over 15 years	76,8
<u>Plough in poor condition</u>	38,4
<u>Unsatisfactory depth of ploughing</u>	53,2
<u>Poor ploughing techniques</u>	53,2
<u>Failure to plough early</u>	36,3
<u>Use of poor seed</u>	40,0




Fig. 4: Distribution of five year average maize yield 1972-76

It is obvious from Table 1 that low fertility status of the soil because of continuous cropping, poor condition of ploughs resulting in poor land preparation, failure to plough early and use of poor seed, were in this instance some of the constraints to production - there were others constraints too.

Armed with information on the personal characteristics, socio-psychological attributes and leadership patterns, together with data on production levels and adoption or non-adoption of important practices, the extension worker is in a position to plan a sound extension education programme. The data in Table 2 illustrate success achieved with co-operator farmers comprising one-third of total farmers, over a two year period, in improving the situation shown in Fig. 4 and Table 1. The data I have given are from a neighbouring country, but my observations indicate that a similar situation probably exists in the Homelands and Independent States of Southern Africa.

My aim in this brief paper has been to indicate that research work of a social science or behavioural kind is a necessary part of effective and objective extension, and the functioning of the whole system of agricultural production. It needs to be a kind of research which succeeds in applying the notions and methods of formal social science research into the extension system. In this it is akin to market and advertising research; both cases in which the economic value of such research has been amply demonstrated. From personal experience I have no doubt that the effort and resources devoted to extension research will bring rewards of at least equal significance to the research and extension system, to the ultimate benefit of both extension workers and farmers.

Of equal importance to the knowledge arising from extension research is the interpretation and uses made of research findings in deciding how extension strategy may be improved to increase the flow of information and the adoption of improved practices. The latent managerial aptitude of farmers must be developed to the full.

NOTICES

Table 2: Comparative co-operator farmer adoption rates of conservation and maize growing practices 1975-77.

Practice	No. of adopters		% increase in adoption 1976-1977	% adoption rate 1977
	1976	1977		
	No.	No.	%	%
<u>Conservation</u>				
Adequate land protection	152	171	13	87
Adequate waterways	134	138	3	70
<u>Land preparation</u>				
Adequate ploughing depth	44	99	125	50
Autumn ploughing	70	116	66	59
<u>Agonomic</u>				
Using fertilizer	33	54	64	27
Using adequate fertilizer	14	21	50	11
Using manure	164	185	13	94
Using adequate manure	73	100	37	51
Use of improved seed	100	164	64	83
Early planting	86	108	26	55
Adequate plant population	35	81	131	41
Adequate weed control	77	100	43	51
Adequate stalk borer control	60	73	22	37
Sound crop rotation	42	65	55	33

NOTICES

MORALS DRAWN FROM DISASTER

Every academic has the same recurring nightmare. It has to do with the disappearance, dematerialization, rendering into invisibility, abduction, or simple loss of the incorporeal leaves on which he records his arduous or ardourless research and raison d'etre.

A more recent fiery disaster to which a colleague's paper on Participation was subjected, struck a bolt of steel into the plump heart of the academic world. Appeals were made to some sharers of the nightmare to commit (not suicide in sympathy) to paper their Thoughts on the Matter, and to have them published before they could be filched by those irrational goblins of flood and fire.

Herewith some valedictions:

- (I) A paper on "Participation"
Turned into a great conflagration;
The author, it's said,
Has taken to bed,
And is thinking up some explanation.

Moral: Education is inflammatory

Caution: This is one story that should never be used
twice.

Hilary Semple.

NOTICES

(II) SOME RESTORED FRAGMENTS OF THE MISSING PAPER

In this last quarter of the twentieth century there is very little which science cannot do. It was Newton who discovered the law of the conservation of matter, but it was left to the twentieth century to discover a way of reconstructing burnt material. The charred remains of this illustrious paper were treated according to the latest advances in combustiology, thus resulting in the restoration of some precious fragments of earth-shattering importance which are here recorded and thereby preserved for posterity. Words and phrases printed in parentheses represent editorial reconstructions.

(The) parameters of participation constitute an immanent modality of transcendent significance for an understanding (of the) characterological orientation implicit in the underlying organic hierarchized entity ... (It is to be surmised) that the pertinent periodization of the structuralist problematic (is embodied in the) incipient alienation utilized by the totality of contemporaneity, as established in the model constucted by Schnautzenbecker in his seminal study, Einleitung zur Verbindungsqrenzungsweise (1972).. The determinants of stabilization...

M.T.W. Arnheim

(III) A Thought from a Sociological Kubla who wishes to remain anonymous:

The moral of the story is that all original work should be microfilmed, which said microfilm should be lodged in the safe deposit box at your friendly Barclay's Bank. If the research is for degree purposes the friendly bank manager will lend you a friendly R1 200 @ 5%. This will more than cover the friendly rent of the safe deposit box.

Conclusion: If you must fan your flame, do it under cover.

Anon

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Volume 3 Number 3

M T W Arnheim	Professor, Department of Classics University of the Witwatersrand
K L Baucom	Director of Literacy Programmes Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa
Dennis Beckett	Manager, <u>The Voice</u>
T J Bembridge	Professor, Department of Agricultural Extension University of Fort Hare
Suzanne Blignaut	Research Officer Institute of Race Relations
Bernard Chalmers	Fine Spamer Associates Consultants in Human Resources
Stanley Kaplan	Department of Civil Engineering University of the Witwatersrand
Alan Kemp	Professor, Department of Structural Engineering University of the Witwatersrand
Don Margetson	Department of Education University of Tasmania
Margaret Meyer	Language Laboratory University of the Witwatersrand
Wally Morrow	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand
Edward Nicholson	Training Department Guardian Liberty Life
Rev Louis Peters	Director College for Theological Education
Hilary Semple	Department of English University of the Witwatersrand

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Paul Beard	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand
Huw Davies	Department of Educational Studies Johannesburg College of Education
Peter Kallaway	Department of History University of the Witwatersrand
Patricia Morris (Acting Editor)	Department of English University College London
Wally Morrow (Editor)	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand
Ben Parker	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand

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