

**Robert Mugabe: Political Thought and Practice as the Will
to Power**

A

Dissertation

By

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Declaration

I declare that this Thesis titled: **Robert Mugabe: Political Thought and Practice as the Will to Power** is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

Signed  on 2nd day of November 2022.

Dedication

I dedicate this work to Joseph William Mpofu, my departed Father, and first Teacher. Lala ngokuthula Bingweni, mfanomdala!!.

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Abstract

The present study examines Robert Mugabe's political thought and practice as the Will to Power. A reading and an interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical concept of the Will to Power as a spirited drive for conquest and domination is mobilised to understand Mugabe's enduring appetites for power and domination in Zimbabwe. The study that employs qualitative methodology to analyse and interpret Mugabe's words and actions assumes that he was corrupted by power as much as he corrupted it. He grew up lonely and aloof and took too seriously a prophecy about his divine commission for great leadership and developed an overwhelming god complex. Mugabe grew an entitlement to power that made him see his political opponents as sinners that must be condemned and eliminated. In his leadership he combined methods of coercion and arts of soliciting the consent of Zimbabweans to his rule. Given power and treated as a hero without strong democratic checks and balances, this study notes, any leader can become a Mugabe. In a paradoxical way he became a fighter against Rhodesian settler colonialism that once in power reproduced in Zimbabwe colonial modes of rule to the extent that he appeared like a native coloniser. Under Mugabe Zimbabwe became what Achille Mbembe noted as a postcolony that is a domain of the madness and excess of power. Mugabe became a performer for power, pretending to refined education and enacting a brave military leader in pursuit of power. He deployed tantalising rhetoric of reconciliation and statesmanship that concealed his despotism. In excitement about an emerging great hero Zimbabweans did not care about putting up measures and institutions to check the excesses of power. Mugabe's seeking, finding, and keeping power by any means necessary led him to desires of a one-party state under his life presidency in Zimbabwe. This desire led him to commit the Gukurahundi Genocide to silence opposition. The Genocide became a performance of evil in pursuit of absolute power. The study concludes by suggesting another mode of power and politics that put human liberation before partisan and personal power. Enrique Dussel's concept of the Will to Live as a philosophy of the politics of liberation is noted as thinkable alternative. More than a simple condemnation of bad and evil leadership this study is also a critique of careless followership of sycophants and flatterers that irrigates tyranny in leaders

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Chapter One

Background and Context of the Study

Beware that, when fighting monsters, you yourself do not become a monster... for when you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1968:112).

The war veterans came to me and said, 'President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an 'X' made by a ballpoint pen.' Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Do not argue with a gun!

Robert Mugabe (2008:1).

We accused and condemned the previous white minority government for creating a police state and yet we exceed them when we created a military state. We accused former colonisers who used detention without trial as well as torture and yet do exactly what they did, if not worse. We accused whites of discrimination on grounds of colour yet we discriminated on political and ethnic grounds.

Joshua Nkomo (1986:3).

War should be the only study of a prince. He should consider peace only as a breathing-time, which gives him leisure to contrive and furnish ability to execute military plans.

Niccolo Machiavelli (1962:32).

1. Introduction

This study is occupied with how “Mugabe’s rise” to power in Zimbabwe became “democracy’s demise” (Moore, 2014:302). A student of Zimbabwean history and politics, David Moore (2014: 303) describes how Robert Mugabe’s rise to the leadership of Zimbabwe against some young revolutionaries that resisted his ascendancy became “a very evil outcome indeed.” To study the political thought and practice of Mugabe as driven and also defined by what Friedrich Nietzsche

(1968) called the Will to Power has been a journey. It has been a kind of travelling into the life and work-world of an African leader who fought the monstrosity of colonialism, and in accordance with the dictum of Nietzsche (1968:112), ended up becoming a colonising monster to his own people. Mugabe's rule of post-colonial Zimbabwe became a kind of colonialism without white settlers. A kind of native colonialism where the colonisers are natives in power that use force and fraud to conquer and dominate other natives. In the thesis on how victims become killers, Mahmood Mamdani (2001) illustrates how victims of colonial forms of violence tended to become kinds of colonial victimisers to groups that were weaker than themselves in the postcolonial era. This study uses political and philosophical literature to argue that after defeating the white Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith, Mugabe and his black regime of post-colonial elites in ZANU-PF reproduced and performed a kind of colonial rule in Zimbabwe where the dominated mass of the nation could not freely and fairly oppose their rule. Whenever Zimbabweans opposed his rule and protested against his regime, Mugabe (2008:1) with much impunity laughed them off as fools that were trying to "argue with a gun" because he was always ready to command the police and the army to violently discipline and pacify them. In the use of violence to conquer, dominate and discipline dissenting Zimbabweans, Mugabe did not only imitate the colonial politics of the white Rhodesian regime but as Joshua Nkomo (1986:32) lamented, he outdid them and instituted a colonial despotism over Zimbabwe. Edgar Tekere (2007), a wartime friend and partner of Mugabe had to publicly lament that after independence from colonialism Mugabe behaved liked a colonial 'master' who did not suffer criticism well and was prepared to physically eliminate critics and opponents.

Given the way Mugabe not only reproduced but also amplified colonial technologies of domination and rule in Zimbabwe, that is governing the way colonisers do, this study also concerns itself with systemic way in which colonialism as a system of domination was fought by black African leaders, not to replace it with liberation, but to reproduce it as a form of post-colonial domination of Africans by a political elite of new black colonisers. In the description of what he calls the "postcolony" Achille Mbembe (2001:102) shows how some colonial modes of violence and coercion refused to be buried with the end of colonial rule as they were reproduced and performed by post-colonial African leaders. The reproduction of colonial modes of rule in postcolonial Africa by African leaders brings the reality of native colonialism into perspective.

The same scholarly journey into the work-world of Mugabe that this study undertakes is described by Heidi Holland (2008:1) who notes how the political life of Mugabe is “the untold story of a freedom fighter who became a tyrant.” It was as a colonising monstrosity in Zimbabwe that Mugabe (2008:1) came to embody the violent belief that power that was won through war could not be contested and negotiated through democratic elections because it was fortified and defended with guns. In the political paradigm of Niccolo Machiavelli (1962:32) that is presented in *The Prince* it is believed that to lead, a prince must essentialise war. Mugabe came to rule Zimbabwe not through democratic and peaceable means but through what Martin Rupiya (2005:117) has aptly described as “governance through military operations” where the army is frequently unleashed to violently discipline dissenting citizens. Beyond Holland and Rupiya who saw Mugabe as freedom fighter that degenerated into a tyrant and became a kind of Machiavellian prince that rules through war, in this study I go further to observe in Mugabe a post-colonial African leader that became a coloniser of his own people and country that he was supposed to have liberated.

1.1 Mugabe as a Coloniser

Right from the days of the bush war against colonialism, Mugabe dealt with political opposition to his leadership and rule brutally. Moore (2014) provides details of the elimination of internal and external enemies of ZANU-PF during the war and after. The Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) cadres that ideologically opposed Mugabe’s leadership of the guerrilla movement were brutally dealt with, some killed, and others detained. The ZIPA cadres were opposed to tribalism and the one-party state agenda. Besides the decimation of ZIPA a genocide called ‘Gukurahundi’ (the first rains that wash away the chaff) was unleashed on Joshua Nkomo and the supporters of his Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) after independence.

That Mugabe became a coloniser of Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans is an observation and argument that, as part of the introduction to this study, should be clarified. Given the large scale political violence and the economic decline that accompanied it in Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s political rule degenerated into what Samantha Power (2003:1) has called “the art of how to kill a country.” Under Mugabe the Zimbabwean polity and economy suffered collapse and decay that could be described as a death of the country. The country became a site of what Joost Fontein (2018) observed to be ‘political accidents’ where arson, poisoning, choreographed car accidents and other forms of assassination and elimination of political opponents became normalised. Covert attacks

through burning of bodies, poisoning, shootings and the manufacturing of deadly accidents are described by Peter Stiff (2001) as some among the many political methods of elimination of opponents that the Rhodesian regime perfected. That these methods and technologies of killing became normalised, if not amplified, by the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, bespeaks a repetition of colonial politics.

Some scholars have classified Mugabe together with white colonial leaders as venal tyrants. Christopher Hope (2003:1) for instance, has ranked Mugabe with such colonials as Hendrik Verwoerd of South Africa and Ian Smith of Rhodesia, as the same violent authoritarian leaders that are “brothers under the skin” who used hate and violence as instruments of political rule. That Mugabe was credibly comparable to settler colonialists, except in his black skin, signifies just how far he assumed and performed colonial politics. Colonialism, I argue in this study, can operate without a colonial state administration and a mother country. A coloniser, I insist, can have a black skin and be a native like Mugabe in Zimbabwe. That political groups that have suffered settler colonial rule can duplicate the same type of rule on their political opponents after independence is a development that, as noted above, is clearly illustrated by Mamdani (2001) in his explanation of how the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 had its rules in colonial history and politics.

That Mugabe opposed and fought against the settler colonialism of Rhodesia should not be allowed to blind this study and others to Mugabe’s own native colonialism. Mugabe might have suffered torture and detention in the Rhodesian prison, which made him a victim of colonialism, but that should not conceal that many Zimbabweans suffered the same victimisation under his rule. It seems, as this study will elaborate, that the political thought and practice of Mugabe might have opposed settler colonialism but in its own assumption of hate, violence, and domination, it failed to graduate into decoloniality and liberation. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that Mugabe’s politics was anti-colonialism that did not mature into decoloniality:

Mugabe’s politics have always been anti-colonial rather than decolonial. This is why his post-colonial practice of governance is not very different from that of colonialists at many levels. Mugabeism has embraced violence as a pillar of governance. Racism has continued despite Mugabe’s earlier pronouncement of a policy of reconciliation at independence in 1980. Tribalism became normalised and exacerbated to the extent that Mugabe’s regime unleashed ethnic violence on the minority Ndebele speaking people of Matabeleland and the Midlands regions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:2).

In the true Nietzschean political dilemma of those that fight monsters and gaze so deeply into the abyss of monstrosity and end up becoming monsters in their own right, Mugabe failed to avoid being contaminated by and reproducing the colonialism that he fought against. Anti-colonialism alone is not decolonial nor is it sufficient to lead to liberation; in fact, it easily degenerates into the same domination and coloniality that it seeks to dethrone. Ndlovu-Gatsheni insists that:

Anti-colonialism gestured towards taking overpower by black elites from white colonialists. Anti-colonialism enabled black elites to inherit the colonial state. Once the black elites inherited the colonial state, they never bothered to radically transform it. Deracialisation became conflated with decolonization of state institutions. Africanisation degenerated into nativism, xenophobia, retribalization, chauvinism, and racism. Therefore, anti-colonialism must not be confused with decoloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:1).

Mugabe did become an anti-colonialist, but he failed to overcome being a colonialist himself, in many ways, including the use of force and fraud to keep power by any means necessary. For Mugabe, as this study will demonstrate, colonialism and the cruelty that it meted on him and others turned into a school that taught and produced him as a coloniser. Instead of fighting colonial power and the colonial system in order to replace it with liberation, Mugabe turned to admire the colonial technology and infrastructure of power, and after independence in Zimbabwe, reproduced and even escalated it for his own power and dominance. The reproduction of colonial political systems and paradigms of power by black leaders that fought colonialism is a major way in which political decolonisation did not lead to liberation in the African continent. Thus, in supposedly independent Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo (1986:3), a freedom fighter and opposition political leader, could mourn that the liberation movement had replaced colonial rule with another form of colonialism, this time championed by those black politicians that had fought colonial rule, and that publicly demanded heroism for liberation politics. As noted above, Mugabe's liberation war comrade and senior ZANU-PF cadre, Tekere (2007) complained of Mugabe's colonial master political tendencies.

Mugabe, it seems, banking on his struggle against colonialism and the suffering he went through in jail and in the bush war, grew an aggressive sense of entitlement to rule Zimbabwe in perpetuity. In other words, Mugabe weaponised his liberation war credentials for purposes of seeking to rule Zimbabwe for life, in the process normalising tyranny in the country. For that reason, the

philosophy of the Will to Power, which Friedrich Nietzsche (1968) describes as a spirited drive for power and domination by any means necessary, including injuring, wounding and annihilation, is employed and deployed by this study in critically evaluating how Mugabe sought, found and kept political power in Zimbabwe. In a political journey that began on the 20th of July 1960 when Mugabe formally joined the struggle against Rhodesian colonialism (Meredith, 2002:26-7, Hill, 2003:53) to November 2017 when he was forced, by a military coup and threat of parliamentary impeachment, to resign, Mugabe fell from the grace of a promising liberator of his people to the not so green grass of an oppressor. Mugabe entered politics with a promise, educated, articulate and brave. Once in power he exhausted the euphoria that accompanied his leadership with his electoral fraud, political violence, impunity and colonial political attitude that this study discusses in detail later. As this study will show, in political word and deed, Mugabe in Zimbabwe came to reproduce and represent performances and displays of power that Achille Mbembe (1992:5) in his description of political excesses of the African postcolony calls the “commandment,” which is a machinery of power that feeds on obscene rituals and grotesque ceremonies that in their grand symbolism conceal the brute force that sustains rule. Mugabe, otherwise, became those colonised elites that Frantz Fanon (1967) described as those whose ambition was to be colonisers, and those that, as leaders, Fanon noted, became the ‘new colonialists.’

1.1.2 Definition of Key Terms of the Study

This section of the chapter delves into a definition of the key terms that the present study deploys, namely the Will to Power, Will to Life and Post-Political Thinking:

The Will to Power

The Will to Power is a philosophical concept that was generated and fleshed out by Friedrich Nietzsche (1968) in his description of a spirited appetite and passion for conquest, power and domination. The philosopher of liberation Enrique Dussel (2008:13) notes the Will to Power as a “tragic dominating tendency” of tyrannical politics that indulges in the “fetishism of power” that has infected and “corrupted” politics at a world scale. In this study the Will to Power is used as a description of a pursuit of conquest and domination in politics that is a desire of power and also a fear of powerlessness. The Will to Power is expanded, interpreted, and employed in this study to critically understand Mugabe’s drive for absolute power in Zimbabwe.

The Will to Live

In the scheme of the philosophy of liberation that Enrique Dussel advances, the Will to Power is understood as corrupting to politics and is anti-life. In the negation of the Will to Power, “the Will to Live is the originary tendency of all human beings” and is offered “as a corrective to the dominating tendency of the Will to Power of Nietzsche” and other nihilist philosophers that appeared to celebrate conquest, domination and tyranny. In this study the Will to Life is used as a mode of power that is alternative to the Will to Power in so far as it valorises power and leadership that are liberating and “obediential” (Dussel, 2008:25) to the will of the people that are led, which is a kind of political practice that Mugabe does not seem to have embraced as this study observes.

Post-Political Thinking

In the description of the political as a concept and a realm, Chantal Mouffe (2005) challenges the Post-Political vision of the world that emerged after the Cold War. This vision imagined a world without enemies under the triumphant leadership of the western neoliberal regime that would envelop the whole planet. Politics remains, according to Mouffe, conflictual and antagonistic, hence the need for democratic systems and institutions that would check the excesses of power and keep politics adversarial and not inimical, agonistic and not antagonistic. In this study Post-Political thinking is understood as the naivete or innocence of embracing political leaders as heroes and liberating political messiahs before putting in place democratic, legal and political mechanisms to check their degeneration into tyrants and despots. As this study will observe, Mugabe was rather too quickly embraced as a liberating hero and post-political euphoria accompanied his rise to power. It became a tragic scenario when his true colours as a venal tyrant and genocidal despot emerged. If from the start, Mugabe had been treated with caution and even suspicion and legal and democratic institutions put in place to check the excesses of leaders in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the genocidal tyranny of Mugabe would have been prevented if not minimised.

1.1.3 Theoretical Assumptions of the Study

The present study holds some theoretical assumptions that guide its exploration of the person, political thought, and practice of Mugabe. Mugabe was from his youth a hostile, brooding and

self-centred person (Holland, 2008). Being physically weak and the laughingstock of other boys as this study will show, he fantasised and dreamt of power. Holland notes the messianic beliefs that his mother planted into him that gave Mugabe divine delusions. He talked of revenge in the future against other boys that bullied him. Messianic delusions combined with dreams of power and revenge made him an angry and vengeful youth. Mugabe became 'toxic' from his social and political formation as a child (Tendi, 2011) Childhood anger and loneliness that was enhanced by the abandonment by his father did not prepare him for a life of a democratic and responsible leader. So, Mugabe did not become a tragically fallen leader, he grew up with seeds of the tyranny and anger that he was later to unleash on opponents in his maturity as leader of Zimbabwe. Suffering in the bush war against colonialism and in jail only deepened his anger and cultivated evil in his heart. Instead of being repulsed by the evil and cruelty of colonialism he admired it and internalised it for purposes of using it on his own political opponents and enemies. In that way Mugabe was not exactly corrupted by power but he did a lot to corrupt power that was entrusted to him. Mugabe's Jesuit education, education that encourages hardihood and belief in the self and the ability to conquer adversity (Barthel, 1984) added to Mugabe's god-complex that would make power dangerous in his hands. Mugabe's education with a series of university degrees, combined with his formation into an angry personality, allowed him to possess both cunning and crudity in the exercise of power. He could perform ideological excuses and sophisticated pretenses to the revolution, Pan-Africanism, and nationalism to cover up personal drives for power. Like other opportunistic politicians, Mugabe used the name of the people, the country, and the revolution to advance personal drives for power. Personal political opponents were generalised as enemies of the revolution, traitors of the country and reactionaries that were supposed to be punished in the name of patriotism. Mugabe had come to conflate himself with the country. Those people that happened to challenge him appeared to him like enemies of the country and of God that he was made to believe by his mother and the Jesuit priests (Holland, 2008) to be behind his political fortunes. Mugabe's 'superior' education compared to fellow leaders in the struggle against colonialism gave him a sense of proximity and equality to the white settlers and contempt for his black compatriots. Mugabe's Anglophilia (Godwin 2008, Moorcraft 2012) was a sense of equality to privileged white people that made him look down upon less educated blacks. He weaponised his education against comrades and opponents alike, calling politicians like Morgan Tsvangirai that opposed him, ignoramuses. Mugabe developed a strong respect and love for power and a

personal entitlement to it that he felt extremely offended by anyone that challenged him. In that way he also became extremely vulnerable to flatterers and sycophants that called him Gabriel the angel from God, and a son of God (Nyarota, 2018). He ruthlessly punished opponents and ridiculously paid supporters with promotions and looked aside when they engaged in corruption. In that way, behind the strongman that Mugabe acted as, there was fragility and a vulnerability that clever politicians in his party and government used for their own fortunes. His burning desire for power, will to power, made Mugabe want to win politically at any cost. If kindness would enable him victory, he used it and if violence became the only assurance, he resorted to it. Mugabe fanned the existing divisions between the Shona ethnic group and the Ndebele to neutralise the opposition of Joshua Nkomo and assure himself the majority Shona vote. For personal and partisan power, he was prepared to sacrifice grand ideals like national unity and peace. That divide and rule tendency was colonial in style and appears to be Nietzschean in its drive for power by all means necessary.

The Will to Power that Nietzsche (1968) describes captures Mugabe's kind of spirited appetite for power by any means necessary. The calculation and cunning that Mugabe frequently applied mirrors Machiavellian scheming and plotting which a shrewd politician is wont to do. Mugabe's political extremism that led him to deploy extreme and excessive violence and coercion made him evil. Extreme violence, such as in the Gukurahundi Genocide, may also be a sign not only of evil but cowardice and fear. Mugabe exaggerated, like cowards do, the size and capacity of his political opponents and tended to react to political opposition with excess. Doris Lessing (2003: 4) described Mugabe as a "terrified little man" that did a lot in politics out of fear and panic. Mugabe's will to power might have been a fear of defeat and powerlessness over and above the love for power. Stephen Chan (2007:1) described Mugabe as "Nietzsche in Harare" who was "not mad but a zealot, the most intellectual of the African leaders but not a technocrat, the philosopher who lost his way as king---Nietzsche sitting in the rubble in Harare." It is in that way that Mugabe was always not what he thought he was or who he presented himself as. There were always faults and cracks behind the solid and gallant leader Mugabe performed himself as. Nietzsche and Machiavelli's philosophies of power become useful in understanding Mugabe. Mbembe's description of a postcolony helps this study to understand Zimbabwe's as a historical time and place upon which Mugabe performed his will to power. Understanding Mugabe's will to power that led him to violence and fraud in politics leads this study to an appreciation of the politics of

the “will to life” that Enrique Dussel (2008) has advanced, which is the opposite and more liberating mode of power and leadership. The will to life negates colonialism and coloniality without imitating and reproducing it.

1.2 Design of the Study

This section of the chapter presents the qualitative design and approach of the study and demonstrates how Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Will to Power is used to illuminate the political thought and practice of Mugabe. How Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Will to Power is interpreted, expanded, and contextualised to suit a study of Mugabe’s political thought and practice is fleshed out. In the philosophy of the Will to Power, Nietzsche (1968) expands the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer (1909) who described the “world as will” in appreciation of how spirited human ambition was the driver of history in a gloomy world. As rendered by Nietzsche, the Will Power is a violently insatiable appetite and drive for power and domination that overcomes every obstacle and can grow in force to a point of tragedy if it is not turned into an art and a pursuit of beauty. As this study will illustrate, Mugabe’s political thought and practice abandoned all pretenses of persuasion and art as it degenerated into genocidal violence exemplified in the Gukurahundi genocide of 1982 to 1987 in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. In the Nietzschean sense, Mugabe’s became power without beauty and authority without art, and therefore tyranny. Mugabe might have been scheming, calculating and cunning but the resort to brute force made his rule artless and evil. Blessing-Miles Tendi (2020) narrates how, Solomon Mujuru, the retired army General that was pressuring Mugabe to retire was eliminated through being ambushed, shot and burnt to ashes in his farmhouse. Mugabe’s attempt to cover up the crime and disassociate himself from it became clumsy and tragicomic, artless.

In the Nietzschean gesture, if totalitarianism is power without responsibility, the Will to Power entails power without art. Power without art, domination that is not accompanied by persuasion and beauty, is bereft of magnificence and glory. Inglorious and maleficent has been Mugabe’s political legacy. This study shows how in pursuit of power by all means necessary, Mugabe participated in what Achille Mbembe (1992:3-37) cinematically described of the postcolony in Africa as the banality of power, a tendency to the obscene and the grotesque, the use of fables and clichés, the production of illicit political performances and dramatisation of power that included systematic dispensation of pain and distribution of mass suffering. Mbembe noted the

normalisation of excess and lack of proportion in the use and abuse of political power by postcolonial leaders that had not only become colonisers in their own right but had become sold and bought to political hooliganism and what Horace Campbell (2003:75) called “executive lawlessness.” Achille Mbembe and Horace Campbell, amongst many others, are scholars that have explored the degeneration and abuse of power in postcolonial Africa where potential liberators became present dominators. This study utilises the reflection of such scholars to expand on Nietzsche’s musings on the consuming and corrupting life of power.

Mugabe rejected all pretenses to law and order; he publicly boasted of having degrees in violence (Meredith, 2002:76) that he could unleash on any enemy, real or imagined. As he said, after all, “no judicial decision will stand on our way” (cited in Meredith, 2002:18). By design, this study pays attention to Mugabe’s language in celebration of himself and of power, as part of his bludgeoning Will to Power. According to Žižek (2001:6) the language of an individual political leader is a site where the “psychic life of power” that the leader represents lies concealed. By design, this study departs from the norm in cultural studies where power and power relations are studied in ignorance and negligence of the human psyche. In the use of psychoanalysis in studying politics and the thinking of politicians, Žižek (2003:500) emphasises the need to probe “how is the human psyche really working?” and notes that “such questions are not even taken seriously in cultural studies,” hence, this study will note, the misreading and misunderstanding of such political figures as Mugabe, whose political thought and practice has not been effectively subjected to psychoanalytical reading, which this study attempts to do. In celebrating his own power and boasting about his violence, as a Lacanian paranoiac and Freudian narcissist, Mugabe became what Žižek (1996:145) names as the paranoiac and narcissist politician who speaks with a tragically “self-enjoying voice” that also conceals his personal fragility and fear. The designed way in which this study supplements Nietzsche’s Will to Power with the psychoanalytical tools of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Žižek, amongst others, helps this study to effect a deeper penetration of Mugabe’s political subjectivity.

Political moderation and the courts as an important aspects of good governance were ignored as Mugabe put Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans through what Giorgio Agambeni (2005) has popularised as the “state of exception” where the law can be replaced with executive disorder and partisan chaos. In spectacular celebrations of power, Mugabe, in state and public events, adopted Stalinist

ceremonialisation that had such performances of power as frequently seen in North Korea (Meredith, 2002:77) where colossal crowds are bussed in and the people in their multitudes are staged to demonstrate the leader's supposed popularity. In the psychoanalytical study of the Confucian political philosophy in China, Žižek (2011:2011) isolates political and cultural rituals and ceremonies as sites of tyrannical performances of absolute power. This study, by design, pays psychoanalytical attention to the ceremonies, funeral processions and orations, memorialisations and commemorations that Mugabe used in Zimbabwe as part of his performances of power.

As noted above, for use in this study, the philosophy of the Will to Power will be expanded and modified, as it is a thought from a different time and a different place from the context of Mugabe. In this study, Mugabe's Will to Power as a violent political paradigm is contrasted to the decolonial and humanistic "Will to Live" that is conceptualised and described by the philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel as a corrective and alternative to nihilistic philosophy and politics of Friedrich Nietzsche and others:

Since human communities have always been threatened by their vulnerability to death and extinction, such communities maintain an instinctive desire to remain alive. This desire to live of human beings in a community can be called a will. The will to live is the originary tendency of all human beings, and I offer this notion as a corrective to Schopenhauer's tragic formulation and the dominating tendency of the "will to power" of Nietzsche or Heidegger (Dussel, 2008:13).

The Will to Live that Enrique Dussel adumbrates, as a philosophy of liberation, feeds from what Max Weber presented as politics, not as a domineering and personally profitable profession, but as a liberating and humanising vocation that is primarily a responsibility to others and a duty by the self to the collective (Dussel, 2008:24). Mugabe as this study observes professionalised and personally instrumentalised politics and in that way failed in the humanist and decolonial vocation of liberation. The decolonial and humanist political paradigm of the Will to Live that Dussel (2008:26) envisages confronts that of the Will to Power with its proposition that those who lead and "command must command by obeying" the will of their people that is freely expressed in democratic and fair elections, the ballot, which Mugabe rejects in his valorisation of the bullet. Enrique Dussel (2008:30) rejects as political corruption, the fetishism of power that turns leaders

from liberators to self-worshipping gods that can spill the blood of their own people for power. Notably, closer to Zimbabwe and in proximity to Mugabe, Kenneth Kaunda (1966) of Zambia preached what he called a ‘humanism’ of power where leaders did not have to kill for power and had to lead by the free will of their people.

As the theoretical framework of this study, the philosophy of the Will to Power is not uncritically applied as it is, or just imported from the time and place of Nietzsche, but it is expanded, interpreted and contextualised to suit the historical, social, and political setting of Mugabe in Africa and Zimbabwe. In its expansion, interpretation, and contextualisation of the philosophy of the Will to Power, this study will benefit from such theses as that of Hannah Arendt (1955) on the ‘origins of totalitarianism’ who studied Nazi and Soviet totalitarianisms and reflected on the fragility of freedom, the potency of propaganda, the uses to which despots put political scapegoats and how they invent enemies to create excuses for violence and war.

In the elongation and modification of the Will to Power that this study makes, Frantz Fanon is another philosopher whose work is utilised in illuminating the political thought and practice of Mugabe. Frantz Fanon (1963) could have been describing Mugabe in the essay about “the pitfalls of national consciousness” that depicts post-independence African liberation leaders whose nationalism degenerated into chauvinism, racism, nativism, tribalism, and xenophobia. Fanon (2001:148) shows how, because of their intellectual laziness and political unpreparedness, African post-independence leaders such as Mugabe were “these heads of government” that “are the true traitors in Africa, for they sell their country to the most terrifying of all its enemies: stupidity.” As this study will show, it was political stupidity to return independent Zimbabwe to the same colonial conditions and experiences that the Rhodesian regime had put Zimbabweans through. An opportunity for liberation was squandered. The design to contrast the Will to Power with the Will to live allows this study to not only condemn the political thought and practice of Mugabe but also advance an alternative liberatory and humanist politics.

The political ruminations of Machiavelli (2003) that were admired and valorised by Nietzsche (1968) are also brought into the study to evaluate the political ideas and actions of Mugabe. Machiavelli importantly reflected on how political power mongers combined force and fraud, the manly and the beastly in pursuit of a firm grip on power. The concept of the political as nuanced by Carl Schmitt (2007) is also brought in to examine how, in word and in deed Mugabe contributed

to the revaluation of the political, in how he managed political relations of ‘friends and enemies’ in dealing with supporters and opponents. Chantal Mouffe (2005) who expanded the concept of the political that Schmitt nuanced aids this study in the attempt to understand the naturalness of antagonism and enmity in politics which needs to be disciplined into agonism. In other words, the political proper always has a potential of the Will to Power and democratisation of the political entails a pragmatism of dealing with the conflictual nature of the political, where ballots in democratic elections should replace bullets that are fired in war. In insisting on the ballot and not on the bullet, Mugabe was clinging onto the Will to Power as opposed to the will to life. By design this study is qualitative and conceptual, and therefore analytical in an interpretive and deductive manner. The Will to Power as adumbrated by Nietzsche is expanded and modified using other philosophers and theories that widen it and give it a deeper panoptic view of the subject. Psychoanalysis as an analytical tool is also mobilised and deployed to give the study a wider and deeper critical edge. Theories of simulation and simulacra that are championed by Jean Baudrillard (1994) and those of performance and performativity advanced by Judith Butler (1990) are used to illuminate how Mugabe simulated and dissimulated in politics and how he performed his Will to Power.

1.2 Research Problem Statement

In scholarly and journalistic literature alike, Mugabe has been represented and portrayed in strict moral registers of good and evil. He is represented in one hand as a hero and on the other hand as a villain, and sometimes a tragic combination of both heroism and villainy. Moralism and its registers tend to depoliticise political evaluation and diminish it to ethical judgements alone. A strict distinction between the good and the evil in analysing actors such as Mugabe leaves the political unexamined and the workings of power unstudied. Heroes and villains in politics are important to understand but also important is how they are created, produced and how they perform their heroism or villainy. In that way, new understandings of the political and of power may emerge. The intervention of this study is to use the theory of the Will to Power to illuminate the complications around liberation and nationalist politics that degenerated to coloniality and domination. As a theoretical framework the Will to Power enables the study to account for the historical, philosophical, and political production of such leaders as Mugabe beyond simplistic descriptions of their tyranny, violence, fraud and tragedy. How those that fought colonialism ended

up being some kinds of colonisers is a principal query of this study. Psychoanalysis as mobilised and deployed in this study enables an understanding of Mugabe beyond good and evil, but also in deeper terms of what desires, fantasies, passions, illusions, phobias, and philiias, were traumatically produced in him and went on to form and produce him into a tyrannical and colonial Nietzschean monstrosity. In that way, this study uses the case of Mugabe to explore a theory of power and the performance of it in a postcolony such as Zimbabwe. Above, this chapter briefly surveys a theory of Mugabe and power that can be generalised to understand politicians and leaders in postcolonial Africa.

1.3 Background of the Study

This section of the chapter provides a background to studies on Mugabe, an account of the contribution and limits of the studies, and a justification for this study at this time when Mugabe has been deposed from power and eventually died. Holland (2008: xiv) is correct that “mad Bob, Robert Mugabe is concealing significant secrets and lessons for history.” I add that for the academic disciplines, not only of history, but also politics and philosophy, studying the political excesses and lacks Mugabe stands to illuminate understandings of power and domination, and of the fragility of liberation.

1.3.1 The Limits of Post-politics in Studying Mugabe

Studies of the political thought and practice of Mugabe seem to have fallen into the trap of what Chantal Mouffe (2005) has call post-politics. In the observation of Mouffe, post-politics is a mistaken optimistic belief that because of the victory of liberal democracy worldwide enemies have ended and consensual politics has at last arrived at its zeitgeist (Mouffe, 2005:1), when the political remains conflictual and violently antagonistic. The post-political optimistic naiveté and innocence about politics has misled scholars in their reading of the political violence and evil of such leaders as Mugabe. Post-politically, Mugabe’s violence and evil appear as shocks and surprises when they are a natural outcome of the failure by societies to guard against political antagonism and violence by providing agonistic platforms that transform political enemies into legitimate adversaries that can co-exist. In other words, left unchecked, many politicians can become what Mugabe became. Holland (2008: xiv) quotes Sir Ian Mckellen who studied political monsters such as Mugabe for more that forty years and concluded that “one of the few lessons I

have learnt from studying people who do terrible things is that they are all too human, and that we are all capable of doing almost anything” equally evil or worse if left unchecked. In other words, all politics and politicians should, away from the trappings of the post-political, be understood and treated with the suspicion and fear that they can degenerate into evil any moment in history.

Writers such as Judith Todd (2007:1) who optimistically believed that Mugabe was a great deliverer destined to bring light to post-independence Zimbabwe were shocked when he took the country “through the darkness” of political violence and genocide. Journalists such as Catherine Buckle (2002) that post-politically entertained the belief that the end of colonialism in Zimbabwe was to deliver unity and political happiness were disabused of their innocence when the violence that Mugabe unleashed became “beyond tears.” Many other scholars, including Andrew Norman (2004:15) experienced Mugabe as a traitor of Zimbabwe because they once had the mistaken and even dangerous post-political belief that he was going to be a messianic liberator but “instead of leading his people to the Promised Land” Mugabe “amassed a fortune for himself, his family and followers.”

The Promised Land naiveté of post-political thinking has allowed societies to nurture tyrants and prevented them from noticing the early developments of totalitarian habits in leaders. Mugabe was, somehow, allowed to develop and to degenerate unchecked. Mugabe was not going to degenerate if optimism and euphoria about the end of colonialism and reconciliation of Zimbabweans and Rhodesians had not blinded the world and scholars from thinking straight and seeing politics clearly as a dirty and dangerous game of power. The evil of “Mugabe’s killing machine” (Moorcraft, 2012:1) in the shape of the Fifth Brigade that committed the Gukurahundi genocide and the “power, plunder and tyranny” (Meredith, 2002:1) that he championed could have been avoided if post-political thinking and excitement had not taken hold of history and thought in Zimbabwe. Not only Mugabe as an individual person, but the political itself and politics should, pragmatically, be handled as “a predictable tragedy” (Compagnon, 2011:1) - a disaster that is going to befall any society if the political and the conflictual and antagonistic nature of politics and the Will to Power are not tackled with durable alternatives.

This study will note that euphoria about political change and excitement about the arrival of independence from colonialism in Zimbabwe created a post-political climate and therefore anti-political thinking in Zimbabwe. Mugabe as a monstrosity, as this study will show, became a

product of anti-political expectations and misplaced dreams. Holland (2008: xiii) correctly observes that the Rhodesian white population got excited about Mugabe's promises of reconciliation and forget that he was a fallible person whose excesses also needed to be checked. Democratic thinking and the thinking of the Will to Live that opposes the Will to Power and the fetishisation of power should be put on guard against the degeneration of liberators to dominators. Chantal Mouffe argues thus about the consequences of forgetting that politics is naturally antagonistic and potentially dangerous:

It is my contention that envisaging the aim of democratic politics in terms of consensus and reconciliation is not only conceptually mistaken, it is also fraught with political dangers. The aspiration to a world where the we/they discrimination would have been overcome is based on flawed premises and those who share such a vision are bound to miss the real task facing democratic politics (Mouffe, 2005:2).

The dream of paradisaical politics and promised land liberation from colonialism and other forms of domination leads to disappointments and genocidal disasters. Democratic politics and politics of the Will to Live should always be in place to prevent, early enough, those who fought against domination from becoming new dominators and oppressors themselves. It is a misfortune of scholarship on politics and politicians that "democratic theory has long been informed by the belief that the inner goodness and original innocence of human beings was a necessary condition for asserting the viability of democracy" (Mouffe, 2005:2). In reality, politics and especially the Will to Power in politics, can always transform innocent liberators into guilty perpetrators of genocide. It is a post-political mistake that "violence and hostility are seen as an archaic phenomenon, to be eliminated thanks to the progress of exchange and the establishment, through the social contract, of transparent communication, among rational participants" (Mouffe, 2005:3). Zimbabwe and the world were mistaken to invest hope of liberation and peace in dialogue and political settlements conducted by politicians and the business elites. In a setting where the naiveté and innocence of the post-political has not taken grip "the task of democratic theorists and politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant 'agonistic' public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted" (Mouffe, 2005:3) and there are no pretences that politicians can be angels and that politics can be a paradise.

This study aims, not just to avoid naïve and innocent trappings of the post-political regime of thinking but also to avoid simplistic notions of "right and wrong" and "right and left" that Chantal

Mouffe (2005:5) debunks as misleading about politics and politicians. Human beings, in politics and outside, are capable of evil and political conflicts make the possibility more real because “when channels are not available through which conflicts could take on the ‘agonistic’ form, those conflicts tend to emerge on the antagonistic mode” (Mouffe, 2005:5).

In other words, understanding of the political and the conflictual nature of politics entails that “conflicts must be provided with legitimate forms and platforms of expression” (Mouffe, 2005:4) such as free and fair elections, ballots and not bullets. In that way, to quickly make Mugabe a hero and invest in him paradisaal hopes of the future was to dehumanise him and to depoliticise the political, it was to prepare him for logical development and degeneration into a monster. In that way too, this study will note, simple moral registers of good and evil in evaluating politicians and assessing the political are not helpful but conceal rather than reveal political reality.

It was in post-political naiveté or innocence that Mugabe’s political intimidation and ‘terrorism’ (Meredith, 2002:10) of political opponents in the very first election in Zimbabwe, the independence elections, were ignored. That people like General Peter Walls, were ignored, when he wrote to the British government pleading that the first democratic Zimbabwean elections be nullified because they were violent, unfree and unfair (Meredith, 2002:12) was a post-political blunder. And this study will note that Mugabe was cultivated and groomed for political monstrosity by the post-political and also anti-political climate that was allowed early in Zimbabwe. True to the Will to Power, politicians as political animals are susceptible to passions, energies, desires and fantasies of power (Mouffe, 2005:6) that drive and pull them to excesses and extremes. It is for that reason that Mouffe regrets “for instance” that “more than half a century after Freud’s death, the resistance to psychoanalysis in political theory is still very strong and its lessons about the ineradicability of antagonism have not yet been assimilated” (Mouffe, 2005:3). This study, in avoidance of the negligence of post-politicalism pays attention to the tool of psychoanalysis in examining the political thought and practice of Mugabe.

This study treats Mugabe as a subject that was created and that developed, by its agency and also by social, systemic and structural conditions and circumstances. Writing of terrorism as a monstrosity in world history and international politics, Žižek noted that “we all know, in spite of the formal condemnation and rejection from all sides, there are forces and states that silently not only tolerate it but help it” (2016:3). As condemned and reviled as Mugabe may be after his

political monstrosities, beyond post-political immaturity, this study pays attention to the fact that Mugabe is a political and historical reality that was produced and permitted in the world political system and structure.

Most scholars and writers on Mugabe dwell on the tyranny, the mass murder and economic catastrophe he created and neglect the casualties and enablements that produced and permitted him, and as Oscar Wilde says, “it is much easier to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have sympathy with thought” (cited in Žižek, 2016:8). Besides condemning Mugabe and mourning the suffering and death he created, political scholarship and journalism should be able to take an analytical distance that does not allow thinking to be clouded by moral rage and pain. It is post-political thinking that gets excited about change and heroes and gets absorbed in naïve euphoria.

To dream that Mugabe, without being checked and stopped, was going ever to be an alternative of what he became may be post-political and anti-political cowardice. Thinking politically about, terror and terrorism, and the need to take a hard and pragmatic look, Žižek notes that:

The dream of an alternative is a sign of theoretical cowardice: It functions as a fetish that prevents us thinking to end the deadlock of our predicament. In short, the truly courageous stance is to admit that the light at the end of the tunnel is most probably the headlight of a train approaching us from the opposite tunnel (Žižek, 2016:108).

If Mugabe had from the start, away from post-political confusion, been understood and treated not as the bringer of light to Zimbabwe or the deliverer of Zimbabweans to the promised land, but a potential monster, the Zimbabwean catastrophe might have been avoided. There is, this study notes, a need to hold not only political vigilance but critical pessimism in understanding and handling politics, politicians and the political. In advancing his philosophy of the Will to Live that is opposed to the Will to power, Dussel warns that fetishism of power has corrupted political thought and practice. Like Mouffe, Dussel notes that the political entails the need for understand the absence of innocence in the political:

This originary corruption of the political, which I will call the fetishism of power, consists of the moment in which the political actor (the members of the political community, whether citizens or representative) believes that power affirms his or her subjectivity or the institution in which she or he functions- as a “functionary,” whether it be as president, representative,

judge, governor, soldier, police officer- as the centre of political power
(Dussel, 2008:3).

This study departs from the understanding that Mugabe came to fetishise power. He fetishised power which he centralised first in the political party and finally in himself and his family. Understanding Mugabe outside the ‘originary corruption’ of the political that Dussel describes may lead to the same concealments and confusions, and disappointments that have been encountered by post-political and naïve readings of and writings on Mugabe. Mugabe fought colonialism and also came to be produced and formed by its politics. He did not only become a producer of political corruption but was in the first place a product of it. It is for that reason that, in his understanding of the political, Christopher Hope (2003) believes that Mugabe and Ian Smith whom he fought were beyond the illusion of the skin and confusion of the post-political, brothers under the skin, rulers whose Will to Power drove them to tyranny and genocide.

Fighting for liberation therefore, for decolonists and humanists, may involve fighting domination and those that pretend to fight domination. In that logic, Žižek (2016:101) states that “our axiom should be that the struggle against Western neo-colonialism as well as the struggle against fundamentalism” and “the struggle against anti-Semitism as well as the struggle against aggressive Zionism, are parts of one and the same struggle.” Colonialism, whether practiced by the Smith settler regime or the Mugabe native regime, remains colonialism and oppression. This study departs from that understanding that fighting colonial domination is a struggle first and foremost against the Will to Power regardless of its embodiment by Smith or by Robert Mugabe. How those who fought colonial domination systematically and structurally and then tragically came about to embody and multiply it is a critical burden that haunts this study.

1.3.2 Rationale of the Study

Dedicating an entire study on the political thought and political practice of an individual politician might deserve a justification. In reference to his article on the political thought of former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, Steven Friedman (2010:163) states that “there is some embarrassment attached to devoting an analytical article to an individual politician.” An anecdotal justification for studying an individual politician in order to comprehend the history and politics of a society may be found in Machiavelli who noted that “to comprehend fully the nature of the

people, one must be a prince, and to comprehend fully the nature of the princes, one must be an ordinary citizen” (Machiavelli 1961:30). Societies and their political systems may be understood by studying their leadership as well as studying the people as a followership. As Friedman (2010:163) notes, “leadership matters” and leaders as politicians can be studied as a critical window to understanding political thoughts and practices, “the claim that leaders are simply instruments of forces they neither create nor control is largely outdated.” In particular, the political thought and practice of Mugabe may illuminate the paradox of how those leaders of Africa and the Global South who fought colonialism ended up becoming some kinds of colonisers themselves, how the self-proclaimed decolonisers became consumed in colonialism is a key preoccupation of this study. How settler colonialism did not only open room for neocolonialism, after political independence in Africa, but also led to native colonialism, is a question to ponder.

As an individual political leader, Mugabe has attracted regional and international attention that fittingly raises scholarly curiosity. In the scholarly estimation of Mahmood Mamdani (2008:1) “It is hard to think of a figure more reviled in the West than Robert Mugabe” in that “liberal and conservative commentators alike portray him as a brutal dictator and blame him for Zimbabwe’s descent into hyperinflation and poverty.” Mamdani contends that Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe with a skillful combination of “consent and coercion” and has thus managed to survive spirited efforts to dethrone him and passionate international opposition and sanctions. Mugabe’s ability over many years to overcome opposition and survive political challenges is itself an object of scholarly curiosity and the theory of the Will to Power is handy in seeking to understand his political longevity and survivalism prior to the historical breaking point of the coup in November 2017. Mugabe’s deployment of skill and coercion in his pursuit of power in perpetuity is a subject that interests this study.

In his intellectual curiosity about “the blood of experience” in “failed states and political collapse in Africa” Ali Mazrui (1995: 28) has written of African political leadership traditions from philosopher kings who want to rule with wisdom, to warrior kings that seek to use the force of arms, up to “poet presidents” (Mazrui 1990:13) that deploy oratory and poetry to charm audiences. The warrior tradition, philosophic kingship and poetic presidency, as this study will show, are all political traditions that in his will to power, Mugabe experimented with and performed. As much as Mugabe experimented with and performed these African political traditions, this and other

studies still must effectively capture and articulate what constituted Mugabeism, a question that Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) has posed, and elaborately explored in a way that benefits this study.

Studies on “personal rule in theory and practice in Africa” (Jackson & Roberts, 1984:421) also justifiably focus on forceful, prominent and survivalist rulers such as Mugabe was. The theme of “patrimonial regimes” in Africa (Vine, 1980:657) as exemplified in such politicians as Mugabe has also arrested scholarly attention and academic theorisation in the global academy. Scholars such as Jean-Pascal Daloz (2003: 271) have investigated the subject of “big men” politics and “how elites accumulate positions and resources” in Africa. The political legacy of Mugabe and his rule of Zimbabwe for more than three decades does not only make him “another too long serving African ruler” that Norma Kriger (2003:307) describes but elevates him to a fitting case study of the investigation of ideas and practices of personal rule, patrimonial regimes, and the politics of “big men” and tyrants in post-colonial Africa.

Post-colonial African leaders, instead of being the liberators that the long struggle against colonialism and apartheid promised, turned out, in the observation of Jo-Ansie Van Wyk (2007:3), to be “patrons and profiteers” in betrayal of the continent and its hopeful peoples. From Kwame Nkrumah to many African post-independence leaders that came after him, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (1991:163) has noted that political thought and leadership has degenerated to a strange personal search for “eternity, eccentricity and exemplarity” by tragic and comic figures. Mugabe’s political journey from powerlessness to power, the evil of his power, and eventually to dethronement in a coup d’état at the end of 2017 can be the true material of tragicomedy.

The leadership and political thought of Mugabe in Zimbabwe has according to Robert Lloyd (2002:219) become a textbook case of “the making of autocratic democracy” in that pretensions of liberatory and democratic rule have been skillfully used to mask tyranny, force, and electoral fraud that approach the extents of classical totalitarianism and absolutism. Such scholars as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:315) have powerfully urged those who wish to understand the degeneration in the economy and the polity of Zimbabwe to move “beyond Mugabe-centric narratives of the Zimbabwean crisis” so as not to miss the global systemic and structural causalities. In studying the political thought and practice of Mugabe as the Will to Power, this study does not only focus on Mugabe the person but also the political ideas, ideologies, structures,

and historical systems that formed, shaped, and produced him, and those like Pan-Africanism and nationalism that he performed as a fetish to mask, as this study will show, his Will to Power.

Some scholars have found Mugabe and his political thought and practice to be beyond understanding and defying conventional analysis. Sandra MacLean (2002:513) has argued that for Mugabe to stay in power that long despite his infamous rule that provoked spirited local and international opposition defies academic analysis. Such writers as Peter Godwin (2010) wrote of the “fear” that Mugabe created and predicted his “last days” in power, yet he prevailed beyond all adversities and predictions of his political demise. This study demonstrates that readings and understandings of Mugabe including predictions of his end were limited by their post-political premises and standpoints. This study reads Mugabe and his political thought and practice from what Žižek (2017: xi) has adapted from Agamben as the “courage of hopelessness,” which is a reading that abandons the temptation to assume that a politician will simply be a hero that will deliver light and liberate his people and acknowledges that he or she might be a monster coming to eat history and consume the people. Not an innocent and gallant revolutionary son of the soil that might be betrayed and be eaten by the revolution but one evil son that might eat the revolution itself. Mugabe, as this study will note beyond post-political limitations, did not only come to exercise power without responsibility but performed power without beauty in a much inglorious and genocidal way.

Beyond simple trappings and fantasies of the political moralism of judging between the good and the evil, this study, after Žižek (2011:710), regards the evil of such politicians as Mugabe as an opportunity to observe and imagine other politics that can produce other politicians and another political. This study, at its conclusion, warns against easy heroes. Some struggles against colonialism, this study will reflect, fought a dystopia of domination, and became so infected with it that they failed to represent or deliver any utopia of liberation. Not only that the anti-colonial became burdened with a colonial unconscious, where the fighter against colonialism envied colonialism and reproduced it, but the struggle between colonialism and anti-colonialism degenerated into a pseudo-struggle and a clash of fundamentalisms, hence the need for a decolonial Will to Live as the philosophy and praxis of liberation.

What this study advances as its unique dimension in the study of Mugabe and power, away from the post-political gestures of previous studies, is its tragic thinking and pagan ethos. Robert

Kaplan (2001: xxi) describes the pagan ethos and tragic thinking as “the warrior politics” of understanding politicians and politics with “constructive pessimism” and the belief that left unchecked they will commit massacres and indulge in cozenage and corruption. It was in tragic thinking and pagan ethos that American foundational politics was formed. Kaplan (2001: xxi) notes that “Americans can afford optimism partly because their institutions, including the Constitution, were conceived by men who thought tragically, before the first president was sworn in the rules of impeachment were established” and the ambitions and interests of politicians were set against other ambitions and interests, because “if men were angels no government would be necessary.” In its understanding of the Will to Power and its pagan ethos this study assumes from the start a grim view of human political behaviour, and a distrust of heroism. This study notes that figures such as Mugabe, in their Will to Power and evil present studies with an opportunity to understand power, beyond good and evil, and in its pure visibility. Mugabe’s anti-colonialism, as this study will show, did not mature into decoloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:1) as he was compromised and corrupted by power, and reduced from a potential liberator to an oppressor par excellence.

1.4 Research Questions

The principal allegation of this study is that the political thought and practice of Mugabe is fueled by a particular kind of a “Will to Power.” This Will to Power drove Mugabe from being a fighter for liberation from colonialism to being one leader that had to be fought by those that had to free themselves from his rule, a kind of colonial rule. That anti-colonialists can become colonialist is a capital allegation of this study. Pursuant to that allegation, the research questions of the study are:

- In what way is the political thought and practice of Mugabe driven by a Will to Power?
- How was Mugabe’s Will to Power formed, produced and performed?
- Pursuant to that question, how does the language and political practice of Mugabe represent, or not, the Will to Power?
- What is the liberating alternative to Mugabe’s Will to Power?

To do justice to the above stated research questions, this study will in detail elucidate its understanding and translation of the Will to Power. Further, the study will demonstrate how Robert

Mugabe's language, political practice and performances represent a will to power. Furthermore, the study will reflect on the Will to Live as the philosophy and politics of liberation.

1.5 Objectives of the study

For this study to do justice to the above stated research questions:

- The Will to Power as a philosophical concept and theory, as interpreted, expanded, and used in this study, should be fleshed out and understood.
- The political and philosophical formation and production of Mugabe biographically, socially, and historically should be explored and articulated, employing psychoanalysis among other tools.
- Robert Mugabe's performances, in word and in deed, of the Will to Power should be examined and clarified.
- Finally, it is another objective of the study to propose, at a theoretical and philosophical level the "Will to Live" as liberatory and humanist paradigm of politics that is alternative to the Will to Power.

In other words, this study intends to contribute to the proposition of a theory of power that is decolonial, humanist and liberatory.

1.6 Qualitative Methodological Approach of the Study

Qualitative research approach that pays attention to words, actions, and events, and makes observations and interpretations of the same is particularly suitable when a person is being studied (Hale, Treharne & Kitas, 2007) as a character or a phenomenon. The present study deploys the qualitative research approach to observe and interpret Mugabe's political thought and practice based on his words and actions. What Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1139) calls "mugabeism" is a collection of "political controversies, political behaviour, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have crystalised around Mugabe's political life." This study, qualitatively, will examine, analyse and interpret these controversies, political behaviours, ideas, utterances and even

events and incidents from which Mugabe's Will to Power can be deciphered and deduced. What Mugabe said, what he did, what has been said about him, and what has been done in his name politically in Zimbabwe becomes an interpretive site that can be examined as part of studying his political thought and practice. For that reason, this study is descriptive, exploratory and interpretive in its methodological approach. Such analytical and interpretive tools as textual analysis will be used as part of content analysis to tease out meaning from relevant texts, images and symbols, and psychoanalysis will be applied in reading Mugabe's behaviours and political conduct in given episodes and events of his political life.

1.6.1 Data Source of the Study

Because the present study seeks to observe and understand Mugabe's action and words as political practice, the sources of the data to be analysed are published texts about Mugabe in form of books, news articles and public events in which Mugabe participated. Such books as, *Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter who became a tyrant* by Heide Holland (2009), and *From Liberator to Dictator: An Insider's Account of Robert Mugabe's descent into Tyranny* by Michael Aurenth (2009), are part of an expanded body of literature about Mugabe and his political thoughts, statements, and practices. This study conducts a review of such texts that are published and are in the public domain. Hannah Snyder (2019) defends relevant literature in the public domain as one of the most reliable sources of data in qualitative studies that are exploratory, descriptive, and interpretive.

1.6.2 Data Analysis: Phenomenological Interpretive Analysis

The present study deploys Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) as a tool of observing, understanding, and interpreting the political thought and practice of Mugabe. IPA is suitable for observing, understanding, and interpreting life conditions and experiences (Smith, 2004). According to Hale, Treharne & Kitas (2007) the roots of IPA are in the philosophical ideas of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, philosophers that concerned themselves with human conditions, experiences, and perceptions in given settings. As such, IPA is concerned with observing, perceiving, and interpreting phenomena to arrive at certain conclusions. IPA involves the observation of the researcher and their description and interpretation of what has been observed. It follows that researchers using IPA consider that there is a link between what people

think and what people say (Smith, 1996). There is also an acknowledgement that the researcher brings their own personal experience, prejudices and underlying assumptions to the data-gathering process and interpretation process.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The purposes of this study would have been furthered and its objectives enhanced if there was an opportunity to interview Mugabe and collect in-depth responses from him on questions that this study raises. Direct responses to some questions of the study from Mugabe would have supplied this study with rich primary material and in-depth interviews would have allowed the researcher to observe Mugabe's personal reactions and body language. Despite a reputation as a thinker and scholar Mugabe has no written books or any texts, besides speeches that might as well have been written by speech writers and other aides. One of Mugabe's political opponents and critics Arthur Mutambara (2017:1) remarked that despite Mugabe's carefully crafted and guarded image as a formidable intellectual, that reputation is a façade that hides an insecure, fragile man of mediocre intellect. The absence of essays and or any treatise by Mugabe on his political ideas and practices, such as the ones left behind by African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral and Julius Nyerere, deprives this study of rich study material. However, this study will make use of speeches, literature about Mugabe by several scholars and journalists, events, incidents and episodes in Mugabe's personal and political life for its examinations, analyses and interpretations.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the study by explaining the topic and fleshing out the design of the study. How the philosophy of the Will to Power as a theoretical framework is expanded, interpreted and modified to suit the study of the political thought and practice of Mugabe is demonstrated. Theoretical assumptions about the person, thought and political practice of Mugabe are detailed. The research problem is stated, in that Mugabe has prevalently been studied in limited and limiting post-political terms and frameworks. The background and rationale of the study is articulated and the study's constructive pessimism and pagan ethos of assuming that power corrupts and treating politicians and heroes as suspects is described. The research questions and objectives of the study are fleshed out before an elaboration of the qualitative methodological posture is explained. Before

its conclusion, the chapter outlines the limitations of the study and states how these limitations are managed. The following chapter delves into the Will to Power as a theoretical framework of the study. The methodological expansions, interpretations, and modifications of the Will to Power as a Nietzschean philosophy of domination are elaborated on.

Chapter Two

The Will to Power: A Theoretical Framework

In so far as we believe in morality, we pass a sentence on existence.... War is another thing. I am by nature warlike. To attack is among my instincts. To be able to be an enemy-that perhaps presupposes a strong nature, it is in any event a condition of every strong nature.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1979:13).

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of a gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer- its guarantor. The peoples' votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins.

Robert Mugabe (1976:11).

You can vote for them [MDC: opposition political party], but that would be a wasted vote. I am telling you. You would just be cheating yourself. There is no way we can allow them to rule this country. Never, ever. We have a job to do, to protect our heritage. The MDC will not rule this country. It will never, ever happen. We will never allow it.

Robert Mugabe (2008:1).

2. Introduction

A part of Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy has been a condemnation of morality. What has been called Nietzsche's "anti-politics" (Hunt, 1985) is his stated contempt for morality that he considered as bad as "to pass a sentence on existence" (Nietzsche, 1979:13). In this study, the philosophical doctrine of the Will to Power that Nietzsche (1968) advanced to suggest a spirited drive for power and domination outside moral concerns is deployed to examine Robert Mugabe's own appetites for power that included the employment of force, fraud and evil to seek and keep power by any means necessary. In advocating for a political philosophy of liberation, "the Will to Live," in Latin America and Africa after colonialism, Enrique Dussel (2008:13) condemned "the dominating tendency of the Will to Power of Nietzsche" as the "fetishism of power" that celebrates tyranny and political domination and justifies evil uses of power. Schacht (1983: 466-469) observes that Nietzsche privileged powerful and "higher men" that removed themselves from

moral concerns of the “herd” of ordinary men and women. These higher men that cared less about common concerns could easily be tyrants and despots that trampled on the will and the rights of the people that they led, or that were less powerful than them. This study notes that Mugabe carried himself like such a leader that was insulated from common political morals to the extent of ruling using guns and dismissing democratic elections as a waste of time. This study prefers the reading of Nietzsche’s political philosophy that Dussel and other prefer. They prefer to understand Nietzsche as valorising power as domination.

To understand Mugabe’s Will to Power, this study deliberately elects to take Nietzsche’s words about the Will to Power as he stated them; even if he possibly meant the opposite as scholars such as Hussain believe. Hussain (2007) argues that Nietzsche’s celebrations of political immorality were fictions and ‘make-believe’ that the philosopher himself did not take seriously. The “illiberal Nietzsche” that Hunt (1985:12) points out is the thinker whose ideas effectively help to illuminate Mugabe’s tyranny and evil. The philosopher who said that the great master and leader is the one who “knows how to make enemies everywhere,...[He] constantly contradicts the great majority not through words but through deeds” (Nietzsche, 944), is the one that describes a typical Mugabe. The great leader that Nietzsche openly admires is “a human being who strives for something great and considers everyone he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and obstacle — or as a temporary resting place” (Nietzsche, 1966: 273). Nietzsche (1968: 962) could have been describing a typical Mugabe when he said, “a great man...wants no ‘sympathetic’ heart, but servants, tools; in his intercourse with men, he is always intent on *making* something out of them.” This study shows, later, that Mugabe instrumentalised supporters and opponents alike in his drive for power and domination in Zimbabwe. To avoid a simplification or misreading of Nietzsche’s political philosophy, this chapter pays attention to the fact that what is deployed in this study is one reading amongst many understandings of Nietzsche’s Will to Power. The reading that better explains Mugabe’s person, thought and political practice is privileged. In adopting the selective reading of Nietzsche’s Will to Power as the ‘fetishism of power’ that Dussel observes, this study can effectively reflect Mugabe’s political insanity and ‘kill to power’ tendencies.

As this study will show, in political speeches that concerned political opponents Mugabe frequently made threats, terse declarations, vows and stern oaths. He threatened the use of guns to defend his power and in much the same tone Ian Smith vowed that blacks would never assume

political power in Rhodesia, Mugabe swore that the political opposition in shape of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would never prevail in Zimbabwe. In that way, Mugabe assumed a Nietzschean amoral political posture that rhymed with the Will to Power. It is for that reason that Steven Chan (2007:1) called Mugabe a “Nietzsche in Harare” that would hold on to power against all odds and by any means necessary. Stephen Chan’s comparison of Mugabe to Nietzsche adopts an understanding of Nietzsche that this study prefers and which the philosopher of the ‘Will to Live,’ Dussel advances. In their observation of Mugabe’s spirited appetite for absolute power, Busani Mpofu and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:121) noted a “crisis of the Will to Power and the paradigm of war” where he could not help himself but resort to amoral and violent means of keeping power. Much tragically, Mugabe held onto power foul and forceful until he was removed in a coup in November 2017. The unbending stubbornness of the Will to Power, it seems, leads to such a breakage and a fall. In fleshing out this elected theoretical framework, this chapter expands and interprets the Will to Power to suit the geographic and historical settings of Mugabe as a subject that is located in African colonial and postcolonial circumstances of which Nietzsche was not aware. In his elaboration on the Will to Power Friedrich Nietzsche (1968) dismissed morality and elevated war and violence, much in a similar way as Mugabe (1976:11, 2008:1) celebrated the gun ahead of elections and votes as means political resolution. It must be stated here that this study is not the first one to seek to understand Mugabe’s tyranny in Nietzschean terms. As noted above, Mpofu and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) have argued that Mugabe exuded a Nietzschean will power throughout his political career.

2.1 The Will to Power: Justification of a Theory

More than a simple rationale, this part of the present chapter aims to provide an explanation of how and why Nietzsche’s philosophical doctrine of the Will to Power is used to interrogate Mugabe’s spirited appetite for political power and domination. This explanation is important because as stated above, there is no one simple understanding of Nietzsche’s Will to Power doctrine. Like this study, scholars such as Schacht (1983:348-349) understand Nietzsche’s Will to Power doctrine as his valorisation and celebration of power as domination that is similar to that

of conquerors, imperialists and colonialists. This is the understanding of the Will to Power that this study adopts and deploys. One of Nietzsche's extreme statements in celebration of domination is that: "This world is the will to power — and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power — and nothing besides!" (Nietzsche, 1968: 550). This assertion of Nietzsche has been questioned. Montinari (1987:103-104) has shown that Nietzsche had, in fact, discarded the passage by the spring of 1887. It was, as Montinari notes, made part of the Köselitz-Forster compilation of *The Will to Power* (the basis for the English-language edition by Kaufmann and Hollingdale) notwithstanding "Nietzsche's literary intentions." The assertion is blamed on a compiler and translator that put Nietzsche's notes together after his death. Another scholar, Maudemarie Clark (1990) argues that extreme celebration of power and domination, is not affirmed in many other works by Nietzsche, which makes it suspicious given that a second party published the book that concludes with the assertion after his demise. While there is no doubt that Nietzsche jotted the notes that were later compiled, faithfully or unfaithfully, Clark argues that Nietzsche was being ironical (Clark 1990: 212–227). If indeed Nietzsche was being ironical in valorising power as domination, and meant the opposite, then it might be unfaithful to read and understand him as a celebrant of tyranny that this study takes him as. For that reason, this study acknowledges that it has adopted a selective understanding of the Will to Power in order to illuminate Mugabe's domineering politics. Notably, this study is not admitting guilt in distorting Nietzsche because the Will to Power as understood here is published in statements that are made and that are faithfully cited as they are.

The assertion of this study is that what Nietzsche (1968) states as the Will to Power closely describes what Mugabe was, what he said and did politically in Zimbabwe. What Nietzsche said describes what Mugabe did, and what Mugabe said and did enacts what Nietzsche said. In employing and deploying the philosophy of the Will to Power as a concept, this study hopes to illuminate the otherwise largely opaque political thought and practice of Mugabe that has eluded a number of scholars and students because:

Mugabe had it all, and maybe that's why people never saw it. Maybe there was something in his unbridled power that made it almost impossible to take seriously-until the killing started- and even then people, lots of people

still could not see it. Even now, who he is and what he stands for and what he believes are mysteries (Hope, 2003:216).

Sandra Maclean (2002:513) complained that Mugabe in his infamy and ability to withstand opposition, to defy the odds, “defies systematic analysis” and escapes scientific understanding. In using a concept such as the Will to Power that goes beyond simple good and evil, this study aims to overcome the slipperiness and elusiveness of Mugabe as a subject of study. For the reason that Mugabe seemed to carry all the promise for revolutionary change and liberation in Zimbabwe, he had it all, but tragically, he delivered violence and tyranny. This study notes that there is indeed something Nietzschean in Mugabe’s political thought and practice, hence the relevance of the concept of the Will to Power in studying Mugabe as a subject. The promise that Mugabe seemed to carry and which he later betrayed was, in the view of this study, a promise that was never there; only a post-political climate of euphoria and excitement about revolutionary change and liberation blinded observers to Mugabe’s growing political absolutism, this study will note.

In the pursuit and realisation of his philosophy of the Will to Power, Nietzsche confronted and contradicted philosophy as it was known and understood in Europe at the time. A number of scholars and students have as a result failed to understand Nietzsche for what he thought and what he was because:

Nietzsche is not a philosopher; he is an anti-philosopher. This expression has a precise meaning: Nietzsche opposes, to the speculative nihilism of philosophy, the completely affirmative necessity of act. The role that Nietzsche assigns himself is not that of adding a philosophy to other philosophies, instead, his role is to announce and act without precedent, an act that will in fact destroy philosophy (Badiou, 2010:1).

Thus, in the view of Badiou, Nietzsche escapes the understanding of many because he was the anti-philosophical philosopher who sought to invent new philosophical practice. In a way, Mugabe has been the anti-political politician who has frequently escaped the understanding of many: “over the years, people black and white, high and low- have struggled to make sense of Robert Mugabe” (Norman, 2008:161). In his description of the “Robert Mugabe phenomenon” Dinizulu Macaphulana (2017:3) noted that Mugabe “is a photocopy without an original” and a phenomenon

that “cannot be repeated except by itself” because he operates differently from other politicians, predictable yet so unbelievable. To read Mugabe’s political thought and practice with Nietzsche’s anti-philosophy of the Will to Power is the aim of the present study. A philosophical negation of philosophy is used to critically study a political negation of politics, in this study, and in that way, this study makes its contribution to both the discipline of politics and that of philosophy. The Will to Power is a philosophy of the excesses of power which is a fitting framework of understanding the excesses of power by dictators, tyrants, and totalitarians.

Badiou (2010:1) emphasises that Nietzsche himself noted that the philosopher, including himself, is “the greatest of all criminals.” Badiou (2010:5) follows Nietzsche’s vaunting about politics and history including his statements such as that “the concept of politics has been completely dissolved in the war between spirits, all powers have been blown to bits, - there will be wars, like there have never been before,” and that “I am strong enough to break the history of mankind into two.” Nietzsche’s philosophical promise or threat of violence and war can be compared to Mugabe’s political boasting about his strengths and threats of political violence that are summarised in his claim to possess degrees in violence (Meredith, 2002:76). “Mugabe could be very unpleasant” said Sir Michael Palliser, head of the British Foreign Office, “he had a very sharp, sometimes very aggressive, and unpleasant manner” (cited in Meredith 2002:7). The vaunting that Nietzsche projected in philosophy as the Will to Power is projected by Mugabe in his political rants and threats to opponents.

By using the philosophical paradox of Nietzsche to study the political contradictions of Mugabe the present study escapes the simplicity of such studies as that of David Lamb (1990), Robert Kaplan (1996) and Patrick Chabal and Daloz (1999) who essentialise tyranny and abuse of power as a quality of backward African despots and not a human and a world phenomenon. This study examines power the way Hope (2003) does when he examines Mugabe, Ian Smith, Hendrik Verwoerd, Joseph Stalin and other world tyrants as “brothers under the skin,” in reference to the truth that the abuse of power is not essentially a black quality but a human weakness.

By first humanising Mugabe as a dictator amongst other dictators in the world, black and white, this study is better able to illuminate his political inhumanity not as racial weakness, but a human tragedy driven by the drives, passions, pushes and pulls, of history, ideology and power. The use of Nietzsche’s Will to Power concept allows the present study to see Mugabe as what Camus

(1953:7) calls “an unhappy intellect” and an angry mind “menacing and exposed to menace, driven by an entire world intoxicated with nihilism, and yet lost in loneliness” with a “knife in one hand and a lump in the throat.” The political and philosophical world and time of Mugabe is perhaps the same world and even if in a different time that Albert Camus (1953:1) describes as “the era of premeditation and perfect crimes,” where “our criminals are no longer those helpless children who plead love as an excuse, on the contrary, they are adults and they have a perfect alibi: Philosophy, which can be used for anything, even for transforming murderers into judges.” In that Camusian way, there is philosophical method in the political madness of Mugabe. Mugabe thought about and contrived what he did politically. He gave excuses and explanations for his deeds. He willed his actions in politics.

The Will to Power is a drive and a passion for “domination and mastery” (Jenkins, 2013:3) as much as it is a historical and political search, a spirited quest by groups and individuals to be superior and to achieve “eternal return,” perpetual “recurrence” and longevity (Heidegger, 1967:413). In other words, the Will to Power is a valorisation as well as it is a fetishisation of power and strength ahead of everything else. In all the historical currency and political purchase that the Will to Power gives to strength and dominance it appears that it may also originate from weakness and fragility, insecurity of groups and vulnerability of their individuals.

Nietzsche is not only known to have been sickly and poorly, but he admitted to his personal condition of ill-health and physical weakness. “I am a decadent” that is troubled by “my sick condition” and in the true spirit of the Will to Power “I took myself in hand, I myself made myself healthy again, I made out of my will to health, I ceased to be a pessimist” (Nietzsche, 2004:5). Knowing his sickness, Nietzsche mentally and physically simulated health and believed himself to be healthy to a point of being “healthy again.” This study will show how, in that Will to Power way, Mugabe also grew up lonely, weak, and physically fragile, carefully nursed and disciplined by his mother; he did not enjoy or endure physical fights, he suffered mockery from other boys and could only promise or threaten revenge in some day to come (Holland, 2008:4). Dinizulu Macaphulana (2017:3) argues that once Mugabe, the weak “Mama’s baby” and a “sissy”, found himself with a guerrilla army and some “rough boys from the bush” under his command, in the guerilla army and later national army, police and intelligence, he found power he never had or dreamt of and was determined to keep and use it to the extremes. It will be interesting for this study

to establish if Mugabe's Will to Power, his love for dominance did not actually emerge out of fear of weakness by an individual that had known and lived fragility before.

In apparent admission of fear, Mugabe once remarked, before a state banquet in 2000, that "I do not want to be overthrown and I will try to overthrow those who want to overthrow me" (Meredith, 2002:17). The concept of the Will to Power, therefore, permits this study to establish the way power is connected to and somehow originates from weakness and vulnerability. After this justification, the following section fleshes out the Will to Power as a theoretical framework that this study elects in critically examining the political thought and practice of Mugabe.

2.2 The Will to Power: A theoretical Framework.

In fleshing out the Will to Power, this chapter also expands and interprets it from Nietzsche's time and place in German and Europe to Mugabe's historical, geo-political and existential setting in Africa, colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. In that way, the Will to Power is not simply applied but it is also interpreted and expanded for it to be suitable and relevant to the subject. This is over and above the acknowledgement made above that there are other readings and understandings of Nietzsche's Will to Power that contradict the present.

One of Nietzsche's key arguments was that "in so far as we believe in morality we pass a sentence on existence," hence the need to think and act outside the trappings of the good and the evil (1968: 10). Nietzsche dismissed ethics as political opportunism and expediency. As a passionate drive for power and domination, therefore, the Will to Power casts away moral considerations and centers power and its achievement by force or fraud.

To Nietzsche (1968:37) "there is nothing to life that has value except the degree of power, assuming that life itself is the will to power" and nothing else. As life itself is a spirited drive and a war for power and domination, "everything done in weakness fails" (Nietzsche, 1968:28), hence those who seek life and power should act in violent strength. Nietzsche's theory of life and power became an art and a science of war and domination where "waste, decay, elimination need not be condemned, they are necessary consequences of life." Politicians that are possessed of and driven by the Will to Power are seen in the way they ignore or minimise the importance of political and

social ethics in pursuit of power by any means necessary. In that respect, this study notes the naturalisation and normalisation of force, fraud, and domination as aspects of the Will to Power where the politician habitually insulates political consideration from moral political values. Below is an elucidation of the paradigm of war as an aspect of the Will to Power.

2.2.1 The Paradigm of War

Principally, it is Dussel (2008) whose reading and understanding of the Will to Power of Nietzsche guides the theoretical focus of this study. Dussel has, as noted before, advanced the Will to Live as an anti-thesis to the Will to Power. A central part of the “philosophy of liberation” that was conceptualised and expounded by Enrique Dussel (1985) is the opposition to violence and antagonism to war as languages of politics and power. Centrally and forcefully, Dussel diagnosed the historical and political problem of the modern world as the political uses of war:

From Heraclitus to Karl Von Clausewitz and Henry Kissinger, “war is everything” if by everything one understands the order or system that world dominators control by their power and armies. We are at war- a cold war for those who wage it, a hot war for those who suffer it, a peaceful core existence for those who manufacture arms, a bloody existence for those obliged to buy and use them (Dussel, 1985:1).

In other words, Dussel finds that the powers that dominate the world economically and politically have done so through the use of war and punishment for the weak and the dominated. Politics as war and violence has, in the world, graduated into a powerful paradigm that some leaders of nation states have adopted and deploy to seek, find, and keep political and social power.

In his thesis of the philosophy “against war” as elaborated in the book by the same title, Maldonado-Torres (2008) describes the paradigm of war and condemns the Nietzschean idea that erects war in the world as a natural state of things. The notion by Nietzsche (1969:74-75) that “you should love peace as a means to new wars – and the short peace more than the long” is considered by Dussel, Nelson-Maldonado Torres and other philosophers of liberation as evidence of a decay in world politics and decline in the ethics of liberation and humanism. In defence of war as natural and as an engine of history Nietzsche noted that:

The valuation that today is applied to the different forms of society is entirely identical with that which assigns a higher value to peace than to war: but this judgement is anti-biological, is itself a fruit of the decadence of life. Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war (Nietzsche 1968:33).

For Nietzsche peace is anti-life and war is a natural part of navigating the world and negotiating power. In the modern world “with war being connected to everything else and everything else being connected to war, explaining war and tracing its development in relation to human development in general, almost amounts to a theory and history of everything” (Gat, 2008: xi); an indication that war and politics as a violent and a dirty game have been naturalised and normalised. In the African historical and political context, Ali Mazrui (1977) described the presence of “the warrior tradition” where to lead and govern meant to dispense war as a political language and violence as a technology of domination and control. Mazrui’s detection of a domineering warrior tradition in the history of African political thought and practice helps this study to expand and translate Nietzsche’s theory of the Will to Power to the Zimbabwean and African settings. The Will to Power as political nihilism is not simply a European philosophical and political pathology nor is it an African political decadence but a human weakness of power. In that way, this study becomes decolonial by resisting stereotypical simplifications and political generalisations, by putting power and its corruption in focus.

For this study, it will be interesting to observe the political production and conditioning of Robert Mugabe by the African warrior tradition. It will also be enriching to note his conditioning by the paradigm of war that was part of, and not uniquely, the colonial politics of conquest in Africa. Certain philosophers and politicians in the world at large combine both the warrior tradition and the paradigm of war to sew the nihilism of politics that adopts and is adopted in pursuit of imagining and practicing domination.

Violent and racist colonial conquest, for instance, is celebrated by Nietzsche (1968: 93, 127) who boasts that “a master race is either on top” by any means necessary “or it is destroyed,” and as masters the colonisers had to colonise and govern with iron and blood to impose Empire on those who found themselves on the underside of modernity. The tragedy is when those like Mugabe who

led struggles against colonialism eventually became some kinds of colonisers in their own right in the way they used violence and domination as technologies of rule. This study will show how the violence of colonial conquest produced victims who also became victimisers as they adopted the same colonial violence that they set out to negate with liberation struggles. Hope (2003) compares tyranny and its violence to a perfume of power that engulfs everyone and everything around it, including turning those who come into contact with it, its victims, into participants in tyranny. It is, perhaps, in that way that those like Mugabe who led anti-colonial struggles in Africa easily became some kinds of colonisers in their own right, in the way they reproduced coloniality and its violence. Under Mugabe's tyrannical rule this study will argue, Zimbabweans were under what can be understood as native colonialism.

In the canonical explication of the "concept of the political" that was generated by Carl Schmitt (1996) Chantal Mouffe described the political proper as the critical management of friend and enemy relations, where enmity is ethically reduced to bloodless rivalry that is opposed to war. Chantal Mouffe (2005) expanded the concept of the political to explain that the project of democratic politics is to turn the antagonism in political competition to agonism, to turn enemies into legitimate adversaries that can be conflicted but do not have to eliminate each other. In respect to the arguments of Schmitt and Mouffe the "Will to Power" in its valorisation of war and violence is politicidal and inhuman.

The political proper admits that there are enemies in politics, and democratic and ethical practice allows that those enemies are legitimated as adversaries that have to be engaged with, even defeated in political competition, but not destroyed or killed. Mugabe seemed incapable of legitimating his opponents or of understanding himself as an enemy: "I don't make enemies" he insisted, "others make me an enemy of theirs" (Holland, 2008:228). Putting the blame on others and awarding himself all the right allowed Mugabe the will to punish and seek to destroy others, as this study will show. Mugabe insulated himself from the blame and accountability that Schmitt suggests the political demands. Schmitt, however, has his own imbrications in the Will to Power when his support for the Nazi regime is considered. In its rejection of post-politics, this study values the weight of thoughts ahead of the moral complexion of thinkers, hence such morally compromised thinkers as Schmitt are also engaged with.

To Mouffe (2005) in particular, communication and human dialogue are supposed to be substitutes for war. In Mouffe's understanding elections and the political jostling and competition that go with them are a humanising substitution for war where every ballot cast stands in place for a bullet that was to be fired in war. For that reason, when Mugabe scorned the idea of votes as a replacement of bullets and elections as a substitution for war he spoke in the true terms of the paradigm of war and the Will to Power in politics. In the thinking of Nietzsche and his celebration of the Will to Power, even communication and speech making that are supposed to be options against war have become part of war making:

In the way men make assertions in present-day society, one often hears an echo of the times when they were better skilled in arms than in anything else; sometimes they handle assertions as poised archers their weapons; sometimes one thinks he hears the whir and clatter of blades; and with some men an assertion thunders down like heavy cudgel (Nietzsche 2004:183).

Such political demagogues as Adolf Hitler and others, when they made political speeches, as Nietzsche describes enacted war in words. As this study will show, Mugabe has been sold and bought to fiery political speeches where violence and war are not only dramatised but also celebrated. Macaphulana (2017:5) asserts that nothing is as eloquent as Mugabe is when he is cursing political enemies and scattering invective. Political communication as war and violence has found fortification amongst some theorists of war and politics, for instance, "is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thought? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself ... the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes" (Clausewitz 1985: 402, 406).

2.2.2 War by other Means

In his description of the Will to Power as the will to existence, Nietzsche (1968:148) noted that "life is will to power." Not only that, but even when a politician appears to speak and do good, behind the gestures of good and ethics is concealed the drive for power (Nietzsche, 1968:156). In other terms, gestures of humanism themselves have, in the Will to Power, been instrumentalised for power and dominance. Robert Rotberg (2010:10) observes how such ideals as peace and the

political unity that Mugabe has occasionally embraced, are utilised as strategies and techniques for tyranny and domination. As this study will later show, Mugabe has at certain moments given inspirational speeches for peace, unity and reconciliation that he later negated by resorting to genocidal violence.

In the discussion of “the tyranny of unity in Zimbabwe” Rotberg (2010:11) demonstrates how Mugabe uses the languages of peace and unity to conceal his continuing spirited drive for power and domination. Political gestures of humility, reconciliation and peace can, in the Will to Power, be opportunistically weaponised for power and domination. The Will to Power, in other words, knows how to pretend to peace and humanism, can actually use the language of peace and humanism to further the objectives of tyranny and domination in the same way in which scriptures can be eloquently abused by the anti-Christ, in the theological script of the Abrahamic faiths. In a way, that politician who uses the Will to Power or is used by the Will to Power that is an aggressive paradigm of politics as war, tends to dominate and usurp everything including the very opposite language of peace and humanism. As this study will show, underlying Mugabe’s gestures of reconciliation in the early days of Zimbabwean independence, in the 1980s of political and economic optimism, was a drive to eliminate opposition by use of unity, to achieve worldwide acceptance and political legitimacy. He enacted, opportunistically, the drive to unite all parties and achieve a one-party state under his command; he was actually not in any quest for peace and democracy as was widely understood. Under the spell of the Will to Power or the Will to Power under his spell, the tyrant can dramatise peace and love for purposes of enacting violence that is used to gain power and domination. In that way, perhaps, the Will to Power also becomes Machiavellian in the way Niccolo Machiavelli exhorted princes to make but not keep their promises, to signal to the left when they mean to turn to the right, philosophically and politically.

2.2.3 Machiavellianism as the Will to Power

There are many understandings of the philosophy of Machiavelli. Isaiah Berlin (1971:1) notes that there can be no counting the different and many interpretations of *The Prince*, and the *Histories* and *Discourses* of Machiavelli. Some scholars understand Machiavelli as an advocate of brutal and unscrupulous leadership while others note his as a devout republican. What Louis Althusser (1999: 115) calls “Machiavelli’s solitude” is a reference to how alone Machiavelli seems to be the only one who can settle the debate over what he exactly meant. Otherwise, scholars have been free

to make their own sense of his philosophy. In this study, Machiavelli is noted as a republican and a statesman whilst his stated advocacy for political guile is used to understand a part of Mugabe's will to Power.

The need, in this study, to not only lift and apply Nietzsche's Will to Power out of historical and geographical context, that is, to avoid making it a one size fits all theory, necessitates translation and adaptation. Translation and adaptation require the examination of other theories and philosophies of power that may illuminate the political thought and practice of Mugabe as a political thinker and actor in an African colonial and postcolonial setting. Machiavellianism is one such theory of power. In his extensive elaboration on Machiavellianism, Althusser (1999) has noted that in the classic, *The Prince*, that is supposed to be an embodiment of Machiavelli's ideas of realpolitik, Machiavelli might have been writing ironically, as he was a thoroughgoing republican in actuality, and not the nihilist of power that the *The Prince* projects him as. Even so, Machiavellianism has come to exist as the art of politics as war, deception and cunning. Deception and cunning in politics are, in the understanding of this study, a kind of Will to Power.

It is noteworthy that Nietzsche admired Machiavellianism in politics. In politics, Nietzsche (1968:170) observed, "Machiavellianism is perfection" and excellence. Machiavelli (2003) in articulating his philosophy of power counselled that princes or leaders should be more feared than loved: "I say that every prince should desire to be considered merciful and not cruel, nevertheless he must take care not to use his mercies badly, a prince therefore must not mind acquiring a bad reputation for cruelty in order to keep his subjects united and loyal" (Machiavelli, 2003:71). The Machiavellian princes should seek a reputation for being good but not necessarily be good or they will perish or lose power. As argued above, as a true Machiavellian, Mugabe has sought recognition for being conciliatory and peaceful and has unleashed violence when the option of ethical politics does not guarantee success. Scholars such as John Saul and Richard Saunders (2005:953) understood Mugabe to be an "arch-strategist and Machiavellian in the way he stood for everything and sometimes for nothing as long as it guaranteed power." Princes or leaders, Machiavelli insisted, should take war seriously. "A prince", Machiavelli (2003:63) argued, "must have no other object or thought, or take up anything as his profession, except war and its rules and discipline for that is the only art that befits one who commands." The naturalisation and normalisation of politics as war is central in Machiavellianism, as it has been understood from *The*

Prince. This study will later show how in his political thought and practice Mugabe has demonstrated a valorisation of war and even a celebration of violence. The valorisation of war and celebration of violence as methods in politics make Mugabe a kind of Machiavellian.

In speech, the Machiavellian princes should make promises and go on not to keep faith in their words because “one sees from experience in our times that those princes have done great things who have had little regard for keeping their word” (Machiavelli, 2003:75). The Machiavellian prince is advised to know the ways of man and those of the beast in order to secure power. The keeping of power by all means necessary, including brute force, is in line with the Will to Power where political ethics come secondary to power. In the Will to Power, guile and deception are central planks as they are in the Machiavellian science of power. Nietzsche (1968:248) also advised that telling the “truth limits power” and makes a leader weak and predictable. Truth and knowledge must be manipulated or constructed in a way that they are weaponised and instrumentalised for purposes of seeking, finding and keeping power. In that respect, the uses of deception and propaganda, as understood in this study, are part of the manufacture of political consent, and the use of epistemic violence that are still a political technology of the Will to Power. Mugabe’s monopolisation and use of the public media as well as his control and violence against the independent private media are understood as workings of the Will to Power in controlling information and knowledge in an Orwellian and Machiavellian manner. Information and communication themselves are mobilised for the manufacture of political consent and for arresting and capturing the imagination of the masses. The masses, in that context, are reduced to the tyrant’s captive audience and victims.

This study will show that part of the political language and performance of Mugabe has been the use of and appeals to ideals of the liberation struggle, self-determination and sovereignty of Africans and their right to their land and other resources. This language has given Mugabe a reputation in Africa for being a gallant anti-colonial and Pan-African hero. A critical observer of Zimbabwean history and a student of the political thought and practice of Robert Mugabe in particular, Moore (2009:49) notes “enthusiasms” that are created by Robert Mugabe’s political pretensions, even amongst such leading scholars as Mahmood Mamdani who are supposed to see and know beyond myths and fictions of power. Invoking grand popular ideals while concealing

personal and partisan political agendas is part of the Machiavellian version of Will to Power. Nietzsche explains this dissembling performance of the Will to Power in politics:

Christianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love for peace, justice, truth: All these big words have value only in a fight, as flags, not as realities but as showy words for something quite different, indeed the opposite (Nietzsche, 1968:50).

In other words, the Will to Power may assume pretenses and deploy illusions to conceal its agendas. The political leader can invoke grand narratives such as Pan-Africanism, land reform and social justice in Mugabe's case that this study demonstrates later. These grand narratives and ideas are used as flags and emblems that are weaponised in concealing the violent and even genocidal passions for partisan and personal power that the tyrant stands for. In the real scheme of the Will to Power "we see that every high degree of power involves freedom from good and evil and from the true and the false, and cannot take into account the demands for goodness" (Nietzsche, 1968:140). The willer to power, as a tyrant, keeps himself innocent and free of truth and fairness. In pursuit of power, a leader possessed of the Will to Power ignores the importance of right and wrong. Jenkins (2013:2) notes how Nietzsche thought that "might is right" and not the opposite. In valorising the bullet over the ballot, Mugabe participated in the elevation of might over right, a political gesture that sustains rather than disturbs nihilism, and that enacts the Will to Power at its political height.

The name and reputation of grand narratives and humanist ideals is adopted and deployed in the fight for power but their essence and actualisation cunningly denied and ignored. Mugabe's own Will to Power can be considered to be Machiavellian or similar. Another shred of the Will to Power that can aid this study in illuminating the political thought and practice of Mugabe is provided by Robert Kaplan (2002: xxi) who uses the ancient examples of Machiavelli and Thucydides to propose "warrior politics" that is guided by a "pagan ethos" where leaders "think tragically" and are guided by self-interest and partisan political interest in making decisions. The pagan ethos is made of a spirit of political hardihood where a leader can sacrifice others and sometimes the nation itself for his personal glory and political preservation. In Africa or in Europe, a political leader that is sold to power ahead of ethical consideration practices a kind of warrior politics or Will to Power. As part of the theoretical effort to further translate and expand the theory of the Will to Power in

time and space, this study will use Frantz Fanon's understanding of how nationalist politics in Africa degenerated to chauvinism and violence, in a way, to a Will to Power of a kind and a type in Africa. This study assumes that Mugabe as a political thinker and actor who once claimed nationalism and Marxism, cannot be fairly and fully understood without an examination of the Will to Power that is embodied in these political ideologies as, in themselves, passions and drives that push and pull politicians and that are pushed and pulled by politicians at work.

2.2.4 Nationalism and Marxism as the Will to Power.

For the reason that Mugabe and others fought colonialism under the banner of African nationalism and Marxism, it is important for such a study as the present to explore how nationalist ideology itself and Marxist thinking, had their own Will to Power. By a Will to Power, this study refers to an underside, an excess and a toxicity that accompanies what were supposed to be liberatory tropes that turned to domination and became oppressive and exploitative in their own content and expression. In a study of the "ideological formation of the Zimbabwean ruling class" Moore (2007:472) uses a Gramscian perspective of hegemony as a framework to observe how the ruling elite in Zimbabwe were pushed and pulled by ideological political drives, used both "persuasion and force" for power. Ideological force, in its pulls and also pushes, cannot be ignored in understanding the Will to Power and the way it is produced by and also produces political leaders in place and in time. Mugabe's Marxism, however, like all his other knowledge pursuits was more of a performance rather than a true passion and pre-occupation. Edgar Tekere told Heidi Holland (2008) that Mugabe's Marxism was a borrowing from one Rugare Gumpo. Tekere said, "I want to single out one man in particular who spoilt Mugabe--- Rugare Gumpo--- he was a very effective propagandist, and ideologue, he began by preaching Marxism. Mugabe liked the sound of this ideology and before long, he had completely fallen for it and begun to sing the Marxism/ Leninism song" (Tekere cited in Holland, 2008:49). Mugabe was ready to fall for any ideology or passion that suggested power.

In a forceful critique of nationalist ideology, in the essay "pitfalls of national consciousness" Fanon (1967:119) noted that instead of being a uniting force nationalism degenerated to a divisive and toxic ideology due to the "intellectual laziness," the "unpreparedness" of the educated African class of African leaders that took over from the colonial rulers. Under this class "the nation is passed over for race and the tribe is preferred for the state." As this study will show, the nationalist

government of Mugabe in Zimbabwe conducted genocide of the Matabele tribe in the 1980s in apparent degenerated nationalist chauvinism and xenophobia. The Gukurahundi genocide was conducted by a special force trained by the North Korean army, centralised around the Shona tribe and was marked by “its fanatical ideological loyalty to Mugabe” (Moorecraft, 2012:105). It was “Mugabe’s war machine.” Mugabe, as this study will reflect, failed to escape or chose to use the underside of nationalism; its racism, tribalism and xenophobia, for purposes of seeking, finding and keeping power and dominance, at all costs. In the Fanonian sense, Mugabe became intellectually lazy and politically unprepared for the task of liberation.

As will be discussed later in this study, the name “Gukurahundi is a Shona word to describe the rain that blows away the chaff” after the harvesting season (Moorecraft, 2012:105) and clears the land for a new season that is cleansed of the pollutants of the last season. The genocidal connotations of cleansing the land of political enemies as ‘chaff’ cannot be missed. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:1) argues that ZANU-PF under Robert Mugabe “deployed the ideology of *Chimurenga* (the ancient Shona spirit of war) in combination with the Gukurahundi strategy as well as politics of memorialisation to install a particular nationalist monologue of the nation.” The Will to Power prefers monologue and monomania, obsession with one big idea, to dialogue. In the perpetration of the Gukurahundi genocide, Mugabe appears to have been driving and also being driven by a toxic nationalist and chauvinist Will to Power that diminishes political opponents to “chaff” that must be cleansed off the land to create a new national purity and authenticity in the absence of those that are condemned as enemies. This toxic nationalist ideological push and pull is described by Žižek (1989:114) as “national paranoia” that is the “fear and doubt of a nation’s completeness and authenticity” in the world which compels drives for purification and cleansing of the other, political drives that are essentially genocidal. It appears to this study that Mugabe feared for the purity of the nation and the authenticity of his person and political party in the presence of political opponents.

In the understanding of Fanon, the degenerated nationalism of the new African ruling class turned them into the new colonialists that weaponised identity politics for the purposes of excluding other classes and populations from a share of the national cake. Speaking as a nationalist and a Marxist, Samora Machel (1996) is recorded to have said in Africa, “for the nation to live the tribe must die,” a political sentiment that justified the suppression of the ethnic consciousness of minority

tribes such as the Matabele in Zimbabwe. The suppression of ethnic consciousness frequently degenerates into massacres, ethnic cleansing and genocide, the elimination of certain ethnic bodies and groups that espoused other tribal identities and political sensibilities. In Marxist terms ethnic consciousness was seen as false consciousness that was unwanted and needed to be erased in one way or another. Erasing consciousness is separated by a thin line from the annihilation of bodies that embody that consciousness, in political reality.

In his critique of African nationalist and Marxist ideologies as powerful but also false, Achille Mbembe (2002: 629) noted the development of “Afroradicalism” and “nativism” as political energies. The two ideologies, Mbembe argues, had their own pulls and pushes, that were not only limited but had a toxic and fundamentalist underside that is limited and limiting to the very liberation that they set out to seek and to find. Mugabe’s political performance of Marxism, nationalism and Pan-Africanism that included the political need, he said, to “strike fear in the hearts of the white man, our real enemy” (Meredith, 2002:17) became essentially radical and nativist in a politically and historically limited way that consumed the very nation and country that were supposed to be liberated and built. Marxism and Nationalism degenerated to doctrines and dogmas that were repeated, Mbembe notes, but were not permitted the liberatory potential that they claimed. Nation and Marx, in positive essence, were left behind as the “ism” was given a front seat in politics. Ideologies became a mask for power and its many tyrannies.

In nationalist and Marxist postcolonial settings in Africa, Mbembe (1992: 3-4) describes the “Postcolony” as a political site of the “banality of power” where there is an “obscene and grotesque” tendency to excess and lack of political and social proportion. In the Postcolony there are dramatic performances of power that are characterised by a convivial “cohabitation” of oppressors and their victims and where colonial forms of political abuse are reproduced, where there is systemic dispensation of pain and distribution of suffering by the ruling “commandment.” In the Postcolony, ceremoniality is displayed, as the oppressors and the mass of the oppressed are both “zombified” by use of clichés, myths and fictions of power (Mbembe, 1992:15, 20, 25). Besides the use of crude and brute force to dominate the masses, leaders jostle to amass academic qualifications as a “codes of prestige” and recommendation to power (Mbembe, 1992:27). The academic qualifications that Mugabe continued to amass, even as he was in prison until he earned a total of seven university degrees, might have reduced education to a Will to Power and an

instrument of elitist intellectual elevation for the purposes of political domination. Mugabe's Zimbabwe and the way it imitated colonial sociality and politics, by reproducing and dramatising them, might be a typical Postcolony and a setting of the Will to Power, with its political excesses and social disproportions. "Mugabe and many of his associates" argues Daniel Compagnon (2011:4) "saw Marxist-Leninist discourse as an idiom to power" that they could use and abuse without even believing in them. This can be extended to their instrumentalisation of nationalism for power and domination in the African postcolonial settings. Socialism, democracy, human rights and black empowerment might all have been used (Compagnon, 2011:4) as Nietzschean masks and flags to conceal the real game that is the Will to Power.

In the important discussion of nations as imagined communities Benedict Anderson (1983: 144) observed patriotism as a nationalist passion to be a political energy that forces men and women to kill and be killed for the nation. In other words, nationalist ideology can be a violent ideology of othering that produces those that are not insiders to the nation into enemies that should be eliminated. Nationals as lovers and defenders of the nation become martyrs that are willing to die for man, woman and country. It is perhaps for that reason that Samuel Johnson (1775) said "patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel," an ideological enclave that is usable by tyrannical leaders in punishing dissenters and opponents the way Mugabe mobilised tribalism in disciplining his Matabele opponents that he elevated to fatal and eternal enemies.

In the view of Mazrui, (1982:22) African nationalism contributed immensely to the fight against colonialism but failed to help African leaders to build nations and it became a major contributor to the development of failed nations and failed states in the continent. For that reason, it will be important for this study to examine how nationalism as a part of the Will to Power contributed to the evolution of the political thought and leadership of Mugabe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that African nationalism that produced such leaders as Mugabe was shaped by colonialism and failed to transcend the colonial as national leaders became schooled in colonial rule, perhaps in the same way in which Nietzsche warned that those who fight monstrosities tend to become monsters in their own right:

Colonialism created African nationalism and African nationalists. Robert Mugabe was politically produced by colonialism. Colonialism was never a terrain of democracy, human rights and freedom; rather it was a terrain

of conquest, violence, police rule, militarism and authoritarianism. Stefan Mair and Masipula Sithole noted that colonialism never promoted any democratic norms and practices and it merely consolidated an incipient authoritarian psyche in the nationalist leadership. They added that: ‘The authoritarianism of the colonial era reproduced itself within the nationalist political movements. The war of liberation, too, reinforced rather than undermined this authoritarian culture (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:1144).

In other words, African nationalist rule failed to shake off the infection of colonial rule, to the extent that leaders such as Mugabe became products of colonial rule that led their countries with the Will to Power of colonisers rather than liberators. Mugabe’s Will to Power might be a product of a combination of personal drives, historical conditioning and production, and ideological passions and drives.

Such other African leaders as Kenneth Kaunda (1966) of Zambia, a river away from Zimbabwe espoused another politics that was humanist and opposed to violence, bloodletting and killing for political power. Kaunda preached politics that preserved the lives of the led and their leaders, which Mugabe did not, as he threatened the lives of the led in Zimbabwe. Below, this chapter delineates the Will to Live as the antithesis of the Will to Power. The Will to Live helps the study to flesh out a decolonial and humanist philosophy of power and politics that is alternative to the Will to Power in its centering of life and ethics in politics. In that philosophers of the Global North and also thinkers of the Global South such as Fanon, Dussel, Mazrui and others, are used in illuminating the Will to Power, this study benefits from a translation of the theory across time and space. It appears that the Will to Power itself as a passionate and spirited political drive is a product of a combination of systemic and structural forces such as colonialism and imperialism, personal inclinations of individual leaders, historical conditioning and production, and ideological drives that then produce and shape such a politician as Mugabe into a kind of monstrosity of tragic proportions. Mugabe, in his Will to Power became a politician who produced in mass, dead bodies, and occasioned “fear” (Godwin, 2010). The historical and political effect of Mugabe’s Will to Power and rule in Zimbabwe became what Catherine Buckle (2002) described as “tragedy,” pain and suffering “beyond tears.”

2.3 The Will to Live as a Philosophy of Liberation

So far, this study has indicated that the “Will to Live” is a philosophical doctrine that was generated by the philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel (2008:13) in negation of the Will to Power as a philosophical doctrine of political domination. In Africa, Kenneth Kaunda preached and practiced leadership that was closest to the politics of the Will to Live. As part of his African Humanism political philosophy, Kenneth Kaunda beseeched African postcolonial leaders to turn the dreams of independence from colonialism into a reality in their respective countries (Kaunda, 1966:84). Kaunda spelt out that leaders were supposed to resist the temptation to be lionised and worshipped by people as ‘superhuman’ political messiahs that become fascists and despots:

This lionisation puts a great strain on the character of the leader of a nationalist movement. He needs all his moral fibre to avoid the corrupting effects of great power. There must be rationality about his policies and behaviour which makes it clear to the humblest citizen that he acts not on the basis of masterful whim but as the servant of the state (Kaunda, 1966:85).

This study will observe that, Being publicly worshipped as a leader, being lionised and acting in whimsical masterful ways is exactly what Mugabe failed to resist. The humble citizens of Zimbabwe did not experience Mugabe as rational but suffered him as a despot that threatened them with guns and dismissed their voting rights as a waste of time. What Kenneth Kaunda adumbrated was another politics that is alternative to Mugabe’s Will to Power approach to power. The Will to Power valorises the same politics of conquest and domination that was practiced by white racist settler colonialists. The Humanist politics of the Will to Live is projected in this study as a liberating alternative to the Will to Power that this study identifies with Mugabe. The Will to Live, therefore, is understood as a philosophy of liberation that is opposed to conquest and domination whether by settler colonialists or native colonialists in form of African postcolonial leaders.

Enrique Dussel in 1969 conceptualised and articulated the philosophy of liberation as a body of thought against war and domination of the poor, colonised, racialised and discriminated peoples of the world. In his *Twenty Theses in Politics*, Dussel (2008) provided a direct counter to the “will

to power” as a paradigm of politics as war and philosophy of domination. Dussel condemned the “fetishism of power” that “defined power as domination” and was propounded by Nietzsche, Machiavelli and other artists and scientists of power, in preference for the “will to live” as liberation (Dussel, 2008:13). In the “will to live” as a philosophy of liberation Dussel (2008: 24) argues that politics should be liberated from its “corruption” as a “profession” and returned to its status as a noble “vocation” that is governed by ethics and not tricks and stratagems. Ethical and liberating politics is, according to Dussel, that “obediential” use of power where those who lead do so with the consent of the led, where “those who command must command by obeying.”

In this study; the “will to live” as a philosophy of liberation and paradigm of peace is erected as the anti-thesis of the “will to power” as a philosophy of domination and a paradigm of war. For that reason, the political thought and leadership of Mugabe as guided by a kind of will to power will be evaluated against the gestures of the “will to live” that propose a humanistic and ethical politics. It is in this way that this study stands to contribute to the debate and scholarship on a humanist theory and philosophy of power. Noteworthy is that, while the Will to Power carries itself with a kind of missionary spirit as argued earlier above, so does the will to live whose philosophical inspiration is traceable to liberation theology and critical humanism of philosophers such as Dussel, Paulo Freire, and for instance, the humanism philosophy of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Kenneth Kaunda (1966:10) proposed a critical political humanism that asked political leaders “to handle power without being tainted by it,” a political philosophy that condemned “leaders that have waded into power the spilt blood of their followers” (12). For politics to be liberating and for political leaders to be humanists, Freire (1993: 26, 27) advanced a political humanism that urged the oppressed to fight for a world that will liberate both the oppressed and the oppressors so that the world is not caught up in a toxic circle of revenge, hate and counter-hatred. Mugabe on the other hand seems to have espoused a politics of anger and revenge that turned what was supposed to be a liberation movement and party into a repetition and reproduction of colonialism par excellence. Nkomo (2002:72) complained during the Gukurahundi genocide of the paradox that the postcolonial government of Mugabe was outdoing the colonial government of Ian Smith in detentions without trial, the police state, torture, discrimination and other colonial modes of politics.

A politics of the Will to Power that does not espouse the “Will to Live” and does not take seriously the rehumanising value of liberation, for both the oppressor and the oppressed, collapses to the same coloniality and domination that it set out to dethrone. The Will to Power collapses would be liberators into the same oppressors that they set out to dethrone and replace. In pursuing and exercising what this study understands as the politics of the Will to Power Mugabe spiritedly moved to take “authoritarian control of the political arena in Zimbabwe”; he used “violence as a cornerstone” of “political survival,” controlled the media, annexed the judiciary, plundered the economy and created an international crisis (Compagnon, 2011). In the same partriachal bravado in which Nietzsche (2004) despised women and femininity, Mugabe demanded that his ministers become “Amadoda sibili (real men): “I do not want ministers who are in the habit of running away. I want those I call, Amadoda Sibili (real men), people with spine... our revolution was not fought for by cowards” (Meredith, 2002:223). In its misogyny and exploitative patriarchy, the politics of the Will to Power that Mugabe espoused reduced Zimbabwe into what Horace Campbell (2003) described as an “exhausted partriachal model of liberation” that negates real liberation and permits toxic “executive lawlessness” and political impunity (Campbell, 2003:76).

In its negation of liberation and denial of humanism, the politics of the Will to Power that Mugabe practiced, in the allegation of this study, seems also to weaponise not only patriarchy but ageism and what Christian Potholm (1979: 31) calls “gerentocracy” where old age and historical experience are mobilised as political resources and excuses for staying long in power. Mugabe turned his birthday, 21st February into a national holiday where his many days on earth and long years in power were recounted and celebrated as a national gift and heritage. In this ceremoniality and memorialisation, not in so many words, women and youths were bludgeoned with the weight of old age, liberation war experience, long years in prison and maturity and encouraged not to aspire for high political office. In the scheme of imperial politics, Edward Said (1993:3) notes that “appeals to the past” including claims of historical experience “are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the present.” By use of his old age, long experience and life journey Robert Mugabe advanced politics of the Will to Power that sought to monopolise history for purposes of owning power and excluding others from it. The philosophy and politics of the Will to Live that Dussel advances as the ethics of liberation restores the human, including women and the young into life and demands power that is not for domination, “fetishism of power” but is for liberation and rehumanisation, “obediential” power, that is.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has fleshed out the theoretical framework of the study. A reading of Nietzsche's Will to Power has been explained as the theoretical framework that, alongside Machiavellianism, is deployed to examine the political thought and practice of Mugabe. To avoid simplifications the chapter has explained that the Will to Power and Machiavellianism as used in this study are but certain interpretation of Nietzsche and Machiavelli's political philosophies. In this chapter, the paradigm of war, nationalism and Marxism as political ideologies and postcoloniality as a historical experience and situation are understood as part of the passions of the Will to Power. In that way, this study is able to critically approach the subject of the political thought and practice of Mugabe in a multi-faced, multi-dimensional and rounded way that Said (1993:35) described as "contrapuntal" reading that critically approaches a subject from many directions and at many layers and waves of meaning and understanding. To critically recover this study from being a simple and simplistic polemical condemnation of the politics of the Will to Power, this chapter has also fleshed out the Will to Life as the politics and philosophy of liberation that is the anti-thesis of the Will to Power as the politics of domination and death. In that way, this study stands to contribute to a theory, philosophy and politics of power that is decolonial, ethical and liberatory in its critical humanism. In attempting to read the political thought and practice of Mugabe beyond the trappings of the post-political, and beyond good and evil, this study approaches a much deeper, clearer and unlimited view of power as performed by Mugabe. The following chapter delves into the literature review of the study.

Chapter Three

Review of Literature on Mugabe

Mugabe: The Production and Understandings of the Will to Power.

It remains a provocative thought that the man, characterised by many British newspapers as a mad dictator, may be instead some sort of ruthless romantic. Romantic, ruthless, well-organised in operational issues, given to rhetoric.

Steven Chan (2003:4).

Mad Bob Mugabe is concealing significant secrets and lessons of history...humanising the monster, finding the three dimensional Mugabe instead of a cartoon villain is a process of understanding and not exoneration.

Heidi Holland (2008: xiv).

Christianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: All these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: not as realities but as showy words for something quite different, indeed the opposite.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1969:50).

3. Introduction

This chapter engages with relevant literature on the person, thought and political practice of Mugabe. The literature treats Mugabe as a tragic figure, a traitor, scholar, diplomat and as an evil figure. Hagiographies and biographies of Mugabe are examined before the exploration of the possible philosophy of Mugabeism. Over and above the examination of literature, this chapter makes some observations and arguments on the political person, thought and practice of Mugabe that foreground the chapters that follow this one.

Mugabe's political thought and practice cannot be understood without an engagement with the literature on how Mugabe was formed and produced. Mugabe's Will to Power as a combination of political desires and fears was formed; it grew and matured into a madness for absolute power.

Mugabe himself became a performer of power that could be called a ‘mad dictator,’ a ‘mad Bob’ and a pretender who was ‘showy’ and slippery in the way he simulated grand ideals of liberation when he actually a tyrant. The present chapter explores part of the wide flourish of literature on the political thought and practice of Mugabe. This study notes that most of the literature on the political thought and practice of Mugabe is sold to narratives of what Mugabe said and did politically, and that way, the literature misses how he was formed, produced and how he ended up a political performer that followed a script of the will to power. There are narratives of how Mugabe came to personify “the fear” (Godwin, 2010:1) that engulfed Zimbabwe and kept the population cowed and disciplined, especially the victims of the Gukurahundi Genocide. Other narratives are on the mournful lines of how Mugabe did what was “beyond tears” for those that were targets of his terror (Buckle, 2002:1). The story of Mugabe became a tale of “a freedom fighter” that tragically “became a tyrant” (Holland, 2008:1). For Zimbabwe and the world Mugabe defined “catastrophe” (Bourne, 2011:1) and in that way betrayed Zimbabwe and humanity (Norman, 2003) by failing to deliver to the promise of revolution and freedom that he so embodied. Contrary to the narratives of degeneration and betrayal which hold that Mugabe once carried promise but tragically turned around to deliver terror and catastrophe, Blessing-Miles Tendi (2011) notes that from the beginning, actually, Mugabe was toxic. By a large measure, prevalent understandings and descriptions of the political life of Mugabe are hostage to the binary of good versus evil; hence they fail to see how personal formations, ideological influences and the consumption of power can combine to produce monstrosities. In the understanding of this study, away from post-political simplifications, those who felt betrayed by Mugabe when he morphed into a violent political monstrosity are the same people who had naïve and innocent expectations of him. It was a post-political mistake to expect a fallible and therefore corruptible human being to perform messianic deliverances of both black and white Zimbabweans after a long and conflictual history of colonial Rhodesia.

That political ability of Mugabe to dramatise promises of good and then turn around to actually deliver evil is what this study refers to as simulation and dissimulation, the ability to reveal what is false and conceal what is true for purposes of seeking, finding and keeping political power. The “ruthless romantic” that Steven Chan (2003:4) describes and the “mad Bob” that is noted by Heidi Holland (2008: xiv) are all observations of the political persona and actor in a politician who was at once driven to, pulled by and also consumed by power. As described by Nietzsche (1969:50)

the Will to Power as a drive to superiority and domination enacts fictions and claims of grand ideals such as Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, philanthropy, peace, justice and truth to conceal its own tyrannies and evil. Once he was produced into an object and also a subject of the Will to Power, this study argues, Mugabe had to simulate grand ideals such as decolonisation and anti-imperialism. He also had to dissimulate, that is conceal his personal drives and evil intentions, as part of the drive towards absolute power. Achille Mbembe (1992) describes myths, fictions, clichés and other arts that the commandment in the postcolony deploys in its pursuit and also celebration of power. “This ability” of Mugabe “to say one thing and to do another,” the circulation of misleading myths and fictions “has baffled his opponents ever since” (Hope, 2003:77). “What counts in a tyrant” Christopher Hope (2003:73) notes “is not what he says or even how he comes across,” it is rather “to distinguish, if one is lucky, his essence” for instance “the essence of Mugabe was dissimulation, and superstitious, unforgiving malevolence.” In the same way in which Machiavelli (2003) cautioned that human beings are either good or bad, and that for purposes of politics they should be understood and treated as evil, this study reads and understands Mugabe as having been a potential monster from the beginning, not the political messiah those post-political observations and understandings made him to be.

Once possessed of and possessed by a Will to Power, the individual politician, this study notes, becomes an actor after a script of power in the same way that Rainer Stollmann (1978:47) describes how fascist politics becomes at the end of the day a true work of art where fictions, myths and illusions are produced for the image making and image management of fascist dictators and organisations. Most scholars, journalists and other writers on Mugabe and his politics seem to have concentrated on the person and missed the political persona and actor who was able to be intellectual and also to be soldierly, to be humble and also scathing and brutal, depending on the dictates of the Will to Power, and the direction of the winds of power. In that political ability to be many people and many things in one person and at once, Mugabe himself became a political product and a production in a real but compellingly cinematic way. To do justice to the literature on and about Mugabe, this chapter begins with an engagement with the production of the political Mugabe. In that way the chapter will show how prevalent readings and understandings of the political Mugabe have been post-political and therefore mistaken, innocent at some point and possibly naïve at another.

3.1 The Production of the Political Mugabe

This section of the chapter examines the literature on the political production of Mugabe. An exploration of how Mugabe was produced, which is mainly dealt with in the next chapter and is briefly treated here, helps to illuminate the real Mugabe and not the figment of post-political imaginations and expectations that many writers hold. Mugabe initially produced himself and recommended himself in politics as a competent scholar and an articulate diplomat which were credentials that were in demand amongst black Rhodesians at the time. Later, as argued below, he had to act out the role of a competent guerilla and an uncompromising warrior leader to suit the demands of the times and win the support and following of guerillas based in Mozambique. At the end, Mugabe became both a doubtful intellectual and a questionable guerilla leader who appeared to be in politics for power and nothing more. As a result, what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1139) called Mugabeism became, in a cinematic and theatrical way, productions of certain “political controversies” that were accompanied by “political behaviours” based on “political ideas” that made him circulate “utterances” that were designed by and were for his Will to Power.

The Mugabe who joined the liberation struggle as a diplomat, “eloquent, literate and intellectually rigorous” and who had “clear ideas as to what was fair and acceptable when negotiating the future of his country with Rhodesian and British politicians” (Norman, 2004:58) was to end up a product of a violent guerilla culture that not only believed in war and brutality but also boasted of it. How Mugabe ended up a leader who “entertains a superiority complex and belittles other contenders for power - especially those without higher education - including aspiring successors from his own political party” (Compagnon, 2011:6) was, it seems, a result of his production and conditioning by the allure of absolute power by any means necessary. Seemingly, as demonstrated below, the production of the political Mugabe became a true production of the will to power that combined opportunism, cunning and preparedness to use physical brutality for political advantage and success. The education and socialisation that Mugabe received found in him a person that was already driven by a hunger for absolute power, in the theorisation and assumption of this study.

3.1.1 Production of the Intellectual Mugabe

This part of the chapter uses available literature to examine the intellectual production of Mugabe. An intellectual image and reputation is one of the attributes Mugabe took full advantage of to position himself for power (Holland 2008, Meredith 2002, Hill 2003). In his *Will to Power*, Mugabe seems to have been produced by circumstances and chances in as much as he actively occasioned political conditions, historical situations and political opportunities in his favour. As a politician he appears to have been calculating and careful enough, acting according to the dictates of the direction where power seemed to be going. It is at a protest rally of the National Democratic Party in July 1961 that Mugabe formerly entered politics. As a scholar of repute and travelled gentlemen who was then based in liberated Ghana he was asked to address the rally (Meredith, 2002:26-27) and he gave an oration that impressed the crowd and the political leadership who saw in him an able and articulate spokesperson of their ideas. Mugabe made full use of his education to claim political fame and leadership much the same way that Nietzsche (1968:227) noted that “the so-called drive for knowledge can be traced back to a drive to appropriate and conquer” and dominate others. The fluent and impressive use of the English language became for Mugabe a weapon and a code of political elevation. Mugabe became “the colonised” leader that Frantz Fanon (2008:9) describes as the leader who feels that he “is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards, he becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle,” and in a way impresses and scares others into subordination to his political will. Mugabe’s accent and intonation of the English language, even at later in his old age, is that which was designed and performed to create a distance between himself and others. He invented a superior model of himself with language.

As Peter Ekeh (1975) argues, scholarship and intellectualism gave black African politicians in the liberation movements a sense of superiority over their own black brothers and sisters and a kind of equality to the white colonisers. The education, culture and “the language of the coloniser gives the colonised a sense of equality with the coloniser” (Fanon, 2008:14) and political superiority over other colonised peoples. Critically, Ndlovu Gatsheni notes that:

One distinguishing feature of the first generation of African nationalists is that they initially fought inclusion into the colonial power structures. They used personal acquisition of modern education as a justification for demanding inclusion. It was when colonialism proved to be too inflexible

to accommodate the black elite that they engaged in politics of anti-colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:1).

As part of this founding generation of African politicians that fought colonialism, Mugabe fully utilised his modern education as a recommendation to political superiority and entitlement to leadership. Peter Godwin (2010:29) notes how faced with the political challenge of the lesser educated Morgan Tsvangirai in the 2000s, feeling “hyper-educated” Mugabe dismissed his opponent as an ignoramus who must not come near national leadership. In his Will to Power and drive for dominance Mugabe began to see his superior education as a qualifying fetish for himself and a disqualifying talisman for his opponents; no doubt he also looked down upon less educated comrades and colleagues in the liberation movement, carrying himself as an anointed spokesperson and advocate.

As will be elaborated in the next chapter, Mugabe believed he was born to rule (Holland, 2008:192) based on a “prophecy” by a leading Jesuit priest. That prophecy was believed and cherished by his mother who brought Mugabe up like a chosen child. This belief in his predestined rule combined with a good education morphed into a stubborn will to power and an entitlement to dominance. Making it worse is that his supporters also seemed to believe in his divine political anointing (Holland, 2008:192). Regarding himself as the unquestionable leader and also teacher of his inferior people, at the same rally where Mugabe launched his political career he started his degeneration into senseless political populism. Mugabe’s populism led him to ask the mass of the rallied people to take off their shoes in apparent rejection of western civilisation, and they did: “today you have removed your shoes, tomorrow you may be called upon to destroy them altogether, or to perform other acts of self-denial” (cited in Meredith, 2002:29). He had begun to produce himself, and to be produced by his supporters who blindly obeyed him, into an unquestionable high priest of political wisdom, a priest and a preacher who demanded sacrifices and self-denialism from his flock.

Those that observed Mugabe closely noted that “from the beginning” there were “many worrying signs of Mugabe’s thirst for power, his recklessness, and his lack of concern for the wellbeing of his fellow countrymen and women (Compagnon, 2011:1) who he regarded as mere raw materials for building his power and not dignified people. This view differs from that of writers like Holland (2008) who believe that Mugabe was a good leader that suddenly turned rogue. Mugabe’s much

storied education became “the creation of this ideological smokescreen”, the building of “political mythology” and construction of passionately desired legend (Compagnon, 2011: 2, 5). In that way, Mugabe’s education did not become the education for liberation and humanisation, or the education for critical consciousness that Paulo Freire (1973) advocated for the colonised and the oppressed. Mugabe became educated in the same arts of dehumanisation and domination that were employed and deployed by colonialists.

Spectacularly and in a way militantly, Mugabe himself embraced western culture and relished the colonial and modern education that he received, to the extent that he became a thoroughgoing Anglophile (Godwin 2010, Moorcraft 2012, Hope 2003). In ironically and paradoxically demanding of his followers to abandon western clothing and culture when he put on Savile Row suits, spoke English fastidiously, enjoyed Graham Greene novels and was to be Knighted by the Queen of England in 1994 (Godwin, 2008:18) Mugabe was not only practising cheap populism but was also objectifying his audience and supporters as tools in the game of power, people that can be forced to do what the leader himself would not do.

The way Mugabe handled his education and learning shows that, used and politically instrumentalised for the Will to Power, even the finest education and knowledge degenerates into simplistic populism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 1141) argues that “Mugabeism” also manifested itself as “populist reason” which describes simplistic political ideas that may be misleading and opportunistic in nature. By nature, “populism as a phenomenon is marked by ideological simplicity, emptiness, vagueness, imprecision and multiclass character” (Laclau, 1978:88). In addressing his audiences as such, Mugabe treated them as what Nietzsche (1968:389, 132, 215) described as people with a “herd consciousness” that are guided by “herd instincts” and are good candidates for domination by a powerful and intelligent master who has to think on their behalf and dictate their entire life actions to them.

Contracted to a Will to Power that used populist reason in all its simplicity, Mugabe for his ideology and political insights made opportunistic and simplistic selections from different political schools of thought such Marxism, Stalinism, Maosim, Nkrumahism, Nyerereism, Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African neo-traditionalism and so on (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 1141). In that way, Mugabe produced himself and was produced into an accessory of a populist reason in politics that was “a way of constructing the political” through articulation of various interests,

demands and claims” but was also “an empty signifier, representing absence” (Laclau, 2005: ix-xi) rather than presence of a vision of liberation. David Moore (2015:30) correctly notes how Mugabe became an “intellectual Manqué” that in its pretenses of intellect was not following any solid ideas but got blown around by the winds of power to any direction that looked politically victorious.

Mazrui wrote at length and in some depth of the connection between the Pan-Africanist liberation movements and intellectualism, and opined that “we can imagine” African “intellectualism without Pan-Africanism but we cannot envisage Pan-Africanism without intellectualization of the African condition” (Mazrui, 2005:56). In other words, Mazrui saw African intellectualism as a driver of Pan-Africanism and the liberation wars in the continent. Mazrui (2005:56) defined the intellectual as “a person who has the capacity to be fascinated by ideas and has acquired the skill to handle many of them effectively.” Mugabe did act the intellectual and misled some observers who noted that “the quality most apparent” in Mugabe was indeed “his intellectual rigour” and “he had this ability to listen to argument, then dissect it, take it to bits” (Meredith, 2002:29). However all this performative and even dramatic intellectualism was not meant for the search of truths and justice but was simply instrumentalised for the search for power.

In a way, this study notes, Mugabe ended up being an informed person with many university degrees but still uneducated in that his information did not condition him in ethical leadership and liberatory sensibility. Holland (2008:46, 47, 52) notes how Mugabe ended up an intellectual face of a rogue military organisation, used educated language and mannerisms to cover up violent crimes, and possessed an intellectual veneer that concealed an unthinking mind. The political ability to possess an intellectual reputation but really not be an intellectual in justice is a quality of the will to power that can successfully deploy illusions and fictions in pursuit of power. In many ways, as this study will show, Mugabe became both a poet and a soldier for power, and became poor at both. As this study will reflect later, such tyrants as Joseph Stalin, Augusto Pinochet and Adolf Hitler all desperately struggled to be noted as intellectuals of sorts.

3.1.2 Production of the Guerilla Leader

This section of the chapter uses relevant literature to explore the formation and production of Mugabe as a guerilla leader. Being warlike and boasting of military might and use of guns became

one of Mugabe's attributes and leadership style (Meredith, 2002). As noted in the introductory chapter Mugabe laughed off the political opposition as foolish people that in challenging him were trying to argue against AK47s that he was on the ready to use to defend his hold on power. Mugabe seems to have, produced himself and also been produced by those that trusted his mind, into the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as a reluctant, doubtful, scholarly and diplomatic leader, "a doubtful political factor and even temporary leader" (Tekere, 2007:16). Ibbo Mandaza states that Mugabe and Tekere had to join the guerilla war desperately in 1975 in April as civilian onlookers (Tekere, 2007:14) as guerillas were carrying on with the war without politicians in their leadership let alone intellectuals and diplomats who had no reputation for armed struggle. Mugabe's intellectual, scholarly and diplomatic pretensions were so convincing that even David Lamb (1990:103) who is scathing of and skeptical about Africa and African leaders to a point of being racist described him as "Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the scholarly" and "disciplined" African politician.

The Zimbabwe National People's Army Guerillas (ZANLA) based in Mozambique, and Samora Machel himself and his Frelimo movement in government were reluctant to accept Mugabe as a leader of the Zimbabwean liberation movement; Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole were the known and acceptable leaders. After his release from the eleven years long detention in a Rhodesian prison in 1974, Mugabe and Tekere in March 1975 journeyed to Mozambique to join the ZANLA guerilla army that was advancing the war on the Rhodesian regime (Norman, 2004:68). Machel and Frelimo put Mugabe in "protective custody" in Quelimane (Norman, 2004:68) and prevented him from meeting with ZANLA guerillas. Tekere (2007:80) described the custody as a "detention" that arose from Machel and FRELIMO's distrust of Mugabe.

Machel was to say to Tekere: "I respect Mugabe, but he does not measure up to this scale of military operation and planning, he does not belong as a soldier." (Machel, Tekere, 2007:88). As a President of Mozambique and a guerilla leader himself Machel observed Mugabe to be an armchair and also opportunistic leader. The ZANLA guerilla commander, Josia Magama Tongogara, in "anger against Mugabe" admonished Tekere for bringing a suspicious person into the guerilla camps in Mozambique: "you are the one who brought a sell-out here!" (Tekere, 2007:89). It was with a will to power that combined perseverance, courage, skill and trickery that by 1977, Mugabe consolidated his leadership of ZANU-PF and the ZANLA guerilla army, and

this after some Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) guerillas who questioned and resisted his leadership were arrested and some of them shot dead in extra-judicial assassinations in the camps (Holland, 2008:179, Compagnon, 2011:13).

The guerilla leaders, Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) and Josia Ntongoogara used brute force to coerce guerillas into accepting the leadership of Mugabe (Compagnon, 2011). Gerald Mazarire (2011:572) notes how "the release of the members of the Dare and High Command from the Zambian prisons in late 1976 and their return to the ZANLA camps after the Geneva Conference signalled the tragic end of ZIPA" that had been strong ideologically and disciplined militarily, and this end led to "the reassertion of the old ZANLA High Command," and the elevation of Mugabe to the party's presidency. The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) was a group of militant and intellectual young soldiers within ZANLA, while Dare was the War Council of ZANU-PF made out of civilian politicians. Mugabe's final acceptance by the guerillas and his ascendancy to full leadership of ZANU is described by Dinizulu Macaphulana thus:

Mugabe entered politics as a fire-eating orator and some kind of an intellectual. He had a compelling and bewitching manner of putting arguments across and he electrified his audiences with his passion, and anger. The men of action, guerillas such as Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tongoogara needed such a person in the political wing of Zanu PF. These guerillas were men of hardihood who believed in expiring even their own comrades in arms in the name of the struggle... It was a recipe for historical disaster. The fragile Mama's Baby (Mugabe) had found some hard boys from the bush to whom human life was not more than that of a chicken. The sissy had found a "war machine" and was going to use it. Rex Nhongo first and Josiah Tongoogara next were influential in replacing Ndabaningi Sithole with Mugabe in 1974. Mugabe struggled to get acceptance from such African leaders as Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda and even Julius Nyerere who later became his fanatical backer (Macaphulana, 2016:3).

After growing up weak and angry as a sissy that was spoilt by his mother Mugabe, Macaphulana notes, finally found at his service strong and dangerous men that he could use to vent and

administer war and violence that were bottled up in him. The plan of the guerillas, which they executed was that “the party as the supreme authority” was to be “the ‘vanguard of the revolution’ and through it the revolution was to be planned, waged and prosecuted and finally consolidated” (Mazarire, 2011:574). There was, from 1974 up to the present, a tussle over whether the gun or politics was to be the most prominent weapon of the struggle for liberation as imagined by ZANU-PF. No doubt the guerillas thought they had found someone to use in Mugabe and deep inside he knew he had found an armed force to use. Mugabe became cultured into diabolic violence that made him believe in violence as a political language the climax of which later became the Gukurahundi Genocide.

As the guerillas were powerful and influential, “the gun had thus not only triumphed over the party but a new form of punishment –execution by the gun” (Mazarire, 2011:578) gained currency in the liberation movement under Mugabe’s leadership. At the time, Mazarire (2011:586) notes that the Secretary for Information Eddison Zvobgo circulated a document that described the “ZANU idea” as “the gun idea” in emphasis of violence and preparedness to shoot black and white enemies to death. Even as a pretender to diplomatic and sophisticated intellectualism, Mugabe had to act out a “gun idea” personality and deportment in order to remain the leader of the military and political movement. As Mugabe did so, a campaign was carried out to fortify his leadership:

This began with a campaign by Eddison Zvobgo in 1975. He wrote, ‘Robert (Bob) as a very intense, single minded, inflexible, unswerving and brilliant human being . . . who is the most acceptable for the job of commander-in-chief of the legions of ZANU armies’. This view flooded the pages of the Zimbabwe News before and soon after the Geneva Conference (Mazarire, 2011:583).

Mugabe was thus being successfully produced and also sold as a deserving and legitimate guerilla and political leader of the liberation movement even by such intellectuals as Eddison Zvobgo. In 1978, to produce and maintain himself as a true “gun idea” guerilla leader, Mugabe was to utter that:

The justice of our gun is the justice of our cause, and the justice of our cause is the justice of our gun. Our fight is just because our cause is just. Equally because our cause is just, our fight is just (Mugabe, 1978:6).

Clearly, the man who entered politics as a man of ideas had been persuaded or forced, pulled and also driven by a Will to Power into being an ardent gunman. Liking it or not, Mugabe had to valorise the gun and elevate the guerilla ahead of the politician in his speeches and presentations (Mazarire, 2011) because he more than any other person knew where power lay, in the hands of the guerillas. Mazarire validates Ibbo Mandaza's argument that it is the politicians like Mugabe who became desperate to join the guerillas who were carrying on with the armed struggle seemingly in no need for the leadership of politicians. Later, the need by the guerillas for a spokesperson, one who would address international audiences and give the guerilla movement the look of a government in waiting worked in Mugabe's favour.

To fit in as a convincing guerilla leader, Mugabe was to cultivate a reputation for such statements as that "genuine independence can only come out of the barrel of a gun" (cited in Lamb, 1990:335). Totally sold to the idea of the gun and war, Mugabe was opposed to the idea of a negotiated settlement in bringing about Zimbabwean independence. "Mugabe was hostile to the idea of negotiations" (Meredith, 2002:2); he needed the "joy of having militarily overthrown the colonial regime" (Meredith, 2002:6). Later, in power, Mugabe "ran the government and ZANU-PF in a strictly hierarchical fashion, military style" (Tsvangirai, 2011:85). As he was promoted by military generals into power, Mugabe was to be observed, in power, to be "captive to generals, Chiwenga and Shiri" (Godwin, 2010:122) who later removed him from power in a military coup. Towards his ouster, when his power was threatened by the military, Mugabe turned around and cried that in Zimbabwe "politics must lead the gun" (Mugabe, 2017:3) and not the other way round. Clearly, Mugabe's production into a questionable intellectual politician and unstable guerilla leader became a result of a Will to Power that coincided with forms of luck, cunning, calculation and the ability to act to the script of the winds of power and the direction whence they blew. The production of Mugabe was the production of a mind and body that knew where power lay and how to act accordingly, and had the brutality of purpose for it. Josiah Tongogara much earlier in on the 26th of December 1979 and Solomon Mujuru much later in time, in August 2011, both died under circumstances that were suspicious and Mugabe has been blamed for assassinating them (Holland,

2008:201, Nehanda Radio, 2015). A political narrative exists therefore that Mugabe could have killed the very people who made his much resisted leadership of the guerilla movement possible, and thereby, in true will to power, finding and keeping power at the deadly expense of his benefactors, promoters and producers. Paying attention to how Mugabe was produced helps the present study to keep track of the real Mugabe and avoid the imaginary figure that many writers in their post-political imagination have constructed and represented. Not so many scholars have paid attention to how Mugabe was cultured and produced into Zimbabwean history and politics. The failure to read the production of Mugabe well has led to post-political imaginations and constructions of the man and his political ideas and practices

3.2 Some Understandings of Mugabe

In this section of the chapter the study examines some scholarly understandings of the political thought and practice of Mugabe. The study holds the observation that most of these understandings became limited in the way they did not pay sufficient attention to Mugabe as a production and a construction of factors and forces that shaped and fueled his Will to Power. By scholars, journalists and other interlocutors Mugabe's political thought and practice has been understood in varied ways. This study contends that most understandings of Mugabe miss the substance and essence of his political thought and practice because they pay little or no attention to the way he was produced and the way he also produced himself and performed his production. The political and philosophical formation of Mugabe that is treated in the following chapter and his production into a kind of scholar and guerilla leader that are explored above provide a clearer understanding of Mugabe's will to power that he initially possessed and which ended up possessing him as a kind of demonic passion of which he had little or no control. Mugabe's formation and production became in him what Timothy Chappell (2005:12) describes as the "inescapable self" where his certainties and beliefs about himself became both a fortress that he used to defend himself and a prison that he could also not escape. He did not only hold convictions about his predestination and power but the convictions grew to hold him hostage and insulate him from reality.

In invoking Lord Acton's aphorism that "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" John Dalberg-Acton was close to describing the consumption of the will to power which may be possessed in the beginning and in the end, ends up possessing the politician, such as Mugabe, like a spell and drive to, first the destruction of others and later his own destruction.

Scholars and journalists have prevalently missed that the beliefs the catholic and Jesuit priests invested in Mugabe as a child of promise and destiny, the faith and responsibility that his mother placed on him as a future deliverer of his people, produced in Mugabe a self-belief and ambition that became powerfully messianic and forcefully consuming.

What made Mugabe's political messianism more compelling and consuming is that his colleagues and potential successors such as Joice Mujuru also believed and publicly spoke of his divine pre-destination to rule for life. Before a full rally and religious congregation in January 2013, Mujuru (2013) accused Mugabe's political enemies and opponents of being "bonkers" and insane for "wasting their time" contesting the leadership of one who was as early as "the age of 10" aware that he was sent of God to rule Zimbabwe until the end of his life. Mugabe's political drives and passions may not be fully understood without an appreciation of the religious myth and fiction of his pre-destination to rule which morphed into a messianic will to power that made him see his political opponents as the anti-Christ that were challenging divine will and order. Holland (2008:148) noted but did not take seriously the truth that "Mugabe believes sincerely, like his late mother, that he is some sort of saviour sent to Zimbabwe by God - and he behaves accordingly." If Holland and other had taken the fact seriously, they would not be surprised why Mugabe turned out to possess a political messianism that made him a tyrant and an oppressor instead of the expected liberator. Such loyalists of Mugabe as Didymus Mutasa who also later became an enemy forcefully circulated a political idea that Mugabe was a kind of monarch who was not supposed to be put through the indignity of leaving office but should die in power (Holland, 2008:187).

Mugabe himself believed that he did not seek power but that power sought him. He told Jonathan Moyo that "people always came to me. They wanted me without me doing anything to promote myself" (Holland, 2008:188). Many scholars, journalists and other interlocutors of the political thought and practice of Mugabe have not reckoned sufficiently with how Mugabe's belief in his divine chosenness became an imprisoning psychological mental framework that did not permit him to experience true reality of the world and politics. As noted above, Timothy Chappell (2005:13) describes how beliefs grow into certainties and that certainties, especially in politics and philosophy become a fortress against other beliefs and also graduate into a prison that confines and holds captive the believer. This study holds that Mugabe's certainty about his own political messianism started as an assuring fortress and ended up a true prison beyond which he could not

see or experience reality. He began by instrumentalising his belief in his political permanence and ended up being an instrument and a victim of the same belief.

There is, therefore, little doubt that Mugabe in seeing enemies and opponents to his rule, in imagining and inventing them, saw himself a Christ-like figure pitted against forces of darkness that he was duty-bound by the divine reality to overcome, and believed he will eventually overcome them. This Christ-like sensibility of the will to power is the same as that which possessed Nietzsche himself who in his experience of critics and opponents to his ideas understood himself as messianic and prevalently signed off his essays as “the crucified one” (Badiou, 2001:2) who dies on the cross in defense of his high truths and a kind of divine order of a Christian who did not really believe in Christ but himself, the same way in which this study notes the Jesuitised Mugabe as a Christian without Christ. The will to power, in many ways, becomes a Christ-consciousness that bends to the idolatry of self-belief and self-worship and is therefore suicidal.

Because of his own political self-belief and idolatry of self-celebration and worship, Mugabe has attracted studies and critiques that ignore structural and systemic factors that produced him and concentrate on him as a person and a subject of study. In reactions to these studies and critiques of Mugabe Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:316) warns that scholars should go “beyond Mugabe-centric narratives” that do not make visible the larger historical and systemic factors that produced his kind of political thought and leadership. Similar to Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s critical caution, Sandra Maclean (2002:513) notes that Mugabe as a subject of study has “defied systematic analysis” because scholars ignore “the political economy of conflict” and international and historical factors that have structured, conditioned and produced Mugabe’s political thought and leadership.

Richard Bourne has also emphasised the need for scholars to look beyond and further than Mugabe the person in order to appreciate his political thought and political conduct in Zimbabwe, Africa and the world: “For what happened in Zimbabwe is not just a tragedy made possible by Mugabe, or the British, or the international community” alone but “it has its roots in Africa and the rest of the world’s attitude to Africa, it is about race, land and nation building; few of those involved down the years have entirely clean hands” (Bourne, 2011:3). In that way, Mugabe can also easily be understood as a creature of the world historical and political system. This also suggests that anyone, put in the same position, can easily become a Mugabe. While this understanding of the political Mugabe that is large scale, structural and world systemic is

appreciated in this study, emphasis is placed on his will to power as an individual that fed from and fed into structural and systemic factors. Mugabe's Will to Power found systemic and structural factors and conditions that were permitting and enabling.

As this study has noted in the previous chapter and above, Mugabe was brought up, conditioned and produced, even actively produced himself into a historical and political agent. In an interview with Holland, Jonathan Moyo, an astute observer of Mugabe and a close colleague once, an enemy and opponent later, and a trusted colleague again noted that Mugabe as then a teacher, "accepted a (political) career that was not his chosen one, he becomes a shrewd and calculating politician who must develop a philosophy and a style as he hits the ground running" (Holland, 2008:182). Mugabe was a contented school teacher as stated earlier on until he was invited into the struggle for his eloquence and experience in liberated Ghana. In other words, Mugabe had to perform to a political script that was given to him but that coincided with his Will to Power.

Correctly, Holland (2008:183) notes that "a reluctant politician initially, Mugabe appears on the political stage as a puppet of other people's passions" and as "having entered politics through the persuasion of others rather than his own conviction." What, in the view of this study, both Holland the interviewer and Moyo the interviewee did not immediately note is that as reluctant as he was Mugabe carried a belief that he was chosen before birth to lead, those who came to persuade him to join politics were in his mind instruments of the divine, human raw materials of his divine anointed power. Mugabe understood himself as the puppeteer and not the puppet of the people that were persuading him into leadership.

3.2.1 Mugabe as Tragic Figure

This part of the chapter engages with scholarly views that have understood Mugabe as a tragic figure. There is a family of scholarly ideas, as seen below, that understand Mugabe as having been a tragic figure or else a creature of tragedy. Prominently, Holland (2008:1) describes the political and historical story of Mugabe as "the untold story of a freedom fighter who became a tyrant," which description advances the suggestion that Mugabe was once a liberator and declined, tragically, to a tyrant. The political story of Mugabe to Daniel Compagnon (2011) was a "predictable tragedy" that resulted in the "collapse of Zimbabwe," suggesting that there were always signs and reasons why Mugabe would end so tyrannically and badly for the country. Also

holding the tragic and the unfortunate fall from grace to grass of Mugabe is Richard Bourne (2011:1) who bemoans the “catastrophe” in Zimbabwe and asks “what happened?” in perplexity and regret of the great degeneration of a promising leader and hopeful country. In its determination against post-political, simplistic, naïve and also innocent understandings of the political Mugabe, this study notes that it was a mistake ever to invest so much blind hope in Mugabe; the optimism about his liberator status was premature and misguided.

An exploration of the literature, be it biographies or hagiographies of Mugabe, betrays a trend in which he is seen and understood as a tragic figure. Biographers prevalently observe in Mugabe an evil man who tried and failed to be good, or who started off with a promise and fell. Hagiographers prevalently observe a great man who was tragically overcame and overtaken by evil. In his essay of “the birth of tragedy” Nietzsche (1972) explains that all tragedy is made out of the great Apollonian spirit of calm, peace and good intentions and at the same time the evil and violent spirit of force of the Dionysian. In that respect Mugabe would seem to be a tragic figure in that he is on the one hand extremely admired for his heroism and on the other reviled for his evil, an Apollonian and a Dionysian conflict seems to be situated in his life, political thought and practice. This study notes that Mugabe once carried promise for Zimbabwe but gradually and later delivered violence, catastrophe and tyranny, tragically. However, the study maintains that behind the initial promise Mugabe had concealed inside him a Will to Power and Christ-like political sensibility and consciousness that was always going to be disastrous and tragic as it was not informed by anything democratic, liberatory or humanist, but was driven by a god-like will to power that was insulated from cares of good and evil. In his will to power, Mugabe was driven to power and dominance by any means necessary.

3.2.2 Mugabe as a Traitor

Related to the understanding of Mugabe as a tragic figure, who was produced by and also produced tragedy, is an understanding that he was a traitor. To Andrew Norman (2004:1) the life narrative of Mugabe is a tale of “the betrayal of Zimbabwe” where “Mugabe instead of leading his people to the promised land, has on the one hand amassed a fortune for himself, his family and followers” and also “presided over the deliberate murder, torture and starvation of those who opposed him.” Like Judas Iscariot, Mugabe is understood to have initially been a trusted insider to Zimbabwe who reneged from the confidence of his people and brought upon them what Martin

Meredith (2002:1) describes as a tale of “power, plunder and tyranny in Zimbabwe.” Much like the understanding of Mugabe as a tragic figure the notion that he betrayed holds a mistaken view that he was once a true messiah that was supposed to deliver his people to some promised land, was a trusted disciple like Judas, and then fell on the way. Norman (2003) is one writer that has emphasised the way Mugabe as a traitor ‘betrayed’ the Zimbabwean dream of liberation.

It was post-political for writers to believe that there was once a Mugabe that was a liberator. Such large scale violence as the Gukurahundi genocide of 1983 to 1987 in Zimbabwe started too early in Mugabe’s career for observers to believe in an earlier Mugabe that was a liberator. More convincing is that Mugabe was a “predictable tragedy” (Compagnon, 2011:1) and that “from the beginning he was toxic” (Tendi, 2011:1). Mugabe, it seems in the view of this study, was always burdened by what Timothy Chappell (2005:12) calls the “nightmare” of the “egocentric predicament” where even if he wished or tried, he could not overcome the beliefs and fundamentalisms inside him that became both his fortress and prison and defined his life. The belief in his chosenness and hence his righteousness became an energy and passion that drove his ego and forcefully defined him. Holland (2008: xiii) is correct in the much belated discovery that “I realise that I and other well-intentioned individuals may have helped Mugabe to become the man he is today” and “if we had reacted differently to the early signs of his paranoia, could Zimbabwe have been saved from its current abyss.” Insisting that Mugabe also became a product of white political blunders and naïve dreams, Holland (2008: xiii) is also correct to note that “if whites in the country had been more realistic and acknowledged the impossibility of shifting smoothly from a police state of their creation to the democracy of their self-serving dreams, would they have been more respectful, less provocative?” to “mad Bob.” What Holland misses is that Mugabe was not only provoked by stubborn whites into anger and a kind of reverse racism but that he became, as this study notes, attracted to whiteness and white racist power that he was keen to adopt and deploy it at his own service in his own will to power. In his Will to Power. Mugabe grew to regard his opponents as traitors to the higher cause that he believed himself to helplessly to represent.

3.2.3 Mugabe: The Scholar and the Diplomat

In the discussion and interview with Holland, Jonathan Moyo correctly notes that the teacher that Mugabe was got persuaded into politics by those that, unlike him, had always been in the struggle

against colonialism when he was not but was busy pursuing a career of teaching. Those “who invite him” Moyo said, wanted him “not because he is committed to their cause but because he is educated, he sounds good, he speaks English well” (Holland, 2008:181) and good in argumentation and respectable modern manners and character that he could stand shoulder to shoulder with any white man. Thus Mugabe was invited into the struggle for liberation from colonialism not as another political activist but an intellectual, diplomat and spokesperson that the struggle and its nationalists and Marxists at the time could use. In a way Mugabe entered political leadership as an elite figure and an opportunist rather than a willing cadre, hence Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:1, 2) opines that such leaders as Mugabe became anti-colonial but not exactly decolonial as they were also ambassadors of the same colonial system that they were supposed to overthrow. They began to fight colonialism using colonial logic hence the limits of decolonisation in the Global South.

Mugabe became a pretender to both intellectualism and militarism. Moore (2015:33) argues convincingly, as cited before, that Mugabe became an “intellectual manqué” whose intellect is more pretended and feigned than it is real and impressive, it is dramatised as intellectual weight that recommends one to leadership of the many uneducated but in actuality it is barren. As such, Moore observes, Mugabe was so drawn to the allure of England, Europe and the elite life that modernity offered, pleading with the British to house his wife when he was in detention, willing to have the law broken for this (Moore, 2015:37), demanding the same human rights for himself that he was later to deny many others. As a diplomat too Mugabe has been found to be fake and wanting. Timothy Scannerchia (2015:78) notes how Mugabe enjoyed presenting himself as an “intransigent diplomat” when in actuality he was always more than willing to appease western powers and show himself as willing to co-operate with them and be their point man in Zimbabwe and Africa. This study notes later that Mugabe worked hard to impress the West and was disillusioned when he was ignored and reduced to another African despot. Intellectualism and diplomacy became useful emblems that symbolised Mugabe’s suitability as a leader but were not his true qualities. As this study will show in the next chapter, Mugabe in many ways became a pretender to what he was not and also pretended to not be what he exactly was in typical simulation and dissimulation of the will to power. Inside himself Mugabe had a pride and a “loftiness” that “is due of course, to the prophecy of greatness his mother supposedly received from God via Father O’Hea while he was a child” (Holland, 2008:188). He was willing to rehearse and act to any script as long as that script seemed to validate the fiction of his chosenness by God.

There is a meaningful way in which in his will to power, Mugabe became fundamentally Cartesian and even more. It has been noted by Norman (2004:47) that “Mugabe would have been inspired to hear from” his key formative mentor “father O’Hea about Ireland’s struggle for independence from Britain; one which Mugabe probably noticed was achieved not with the pen but with the sword; or in this case, the gun.” The idea of a thinker who could also fight was justified in Mugabe’s mind as possible and even right. In actuality, “as well as instructing Mugabe on the catechism and Cartesian logic, Father O’Hea gave him a feel for Irish legend and revolution, describing the struggle the Irish sustained to attain independence from Britain” (Meredith, 2002:21).

Mugabe, as elaborated in the next chapter, became a child of the Catholic Church that grew up to challenge Catholicism and project himself as a god not a faithful one of God. Enrique Chavez-Arviso (1997) explains how Rene Descartes was brought up by the Jesuits who taught him the arts of meditation until he grew up to become not only a philosopher but once joined the army (x), combining militarism and philosophy until he produced the “I think therefore I am” aphorism that is a kind of will to power and belief in the self to conquer with thought and mind. Timothy Chappell (2005) observes that in the belief in himself as existing because he thought, Descartes concluded that the ultimate truth and reality belonged to God, that is perfection not an individual thinker. Descartes believed in his personal powers but still submitted to God as the ultimate authority and truth (Chavez-Arviso 1997: xvll). Unlike Mugabe, Descartes exemplified a Catholic child who credited God for his powers of the mind. Mugabe on the other hand does not seem to have tempered his cartesianism with a love or fear of God, or a respect for ethics, as this study will show. In a way, the true tragedy and treachery of Mugabe may be that he was driven to power believing that he was sent of God, when he got into power or when the prophecy seemed to be fulfilled he forgot about God, replaced God with himself in the true fall of Lucifer and other expelled angels. Like the true Lucifer who reneged against the Kingdom that created him and gave him power, Mugabe was to betray the movement for liberation of the colonised that made him the powerful man that he became.

3.2.4 Mugabe as Lucifer and a Monster

There is scholarly literature that treats Mugabe as evil. Life in Zimbabwe under Mugabe has been described by Judith Todd (2007) as a painful experience “through the darkness” of various forms

of oppression and violations. The cruelty that Mugabe has subjected his enemies, opponents and victims to has been observed to be “beyond tears” (Buckle, 2002), in the way he has punished the people and destroyed a once promising country. From the Gukurahundi genocide to the violence that accompanied land invasions and the elections of 2008, Godwin (2010) summarises the Zimbabwean political condition under Mugabe as “the fear” and terror of a “smart genocide” where people get slowly killed off behind a façade of a working and stable country. Moorcraft cites a United States intelligence cable that described Mugabe as a devil that must be given his dues:

To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant tactician. However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors: his ego and his belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive focus on the past as justification for everything in the present and future; and his deep ignorance on economic issues coupled with the belief that his eighteen doctorates give him the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including supply and demand (Moorcraft, 2012:188).

Mugabe’s belief in his “infallibility” and righteousness, and his belief that he is bigger than politics and economics has driven him to commit evil that includes the Gukurahundi genocide. Mugabe’s dramatisation of intellectual prowess that is treated above conceals basic ignorance and detachment from the real world of politics and economics, making him a kind of prince of darkness in the sense of ignorance and evil. In the narrative of *Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, Hannah Arendt (2006) demonstrates how evil can be idiotic and banal but gets covered up with pretenses to reason and high mindedness. An idolatrous god-complex and Christ-consciousness seems to have misguided Mugabe into impunity and evil: “not once has Mugabe taken responsibility for his decisions and the actions of those around him” (Moorcraft, 2012:20). One of the foundational pillars of the philosophy of Rene Descartes was the fear and suspicion that his beliefs might have been sponsored by an evil demon that was bent on misleading him, hence his surrender to God as the only perfect and supreme thinker (Chappell, 2005:10). As an intellectual pretender and also a pretender to militarism, Mugabe in his devilish self-righteousness does not seem to have subjected his beliefs and opinions to any necessary doubt and question. Belief in his own infallibility and the evil that it came with led Mugabe to make himself a kind of

monster and a Lucifer. Mugabe personified the Will to Power as that which “drives” in order to “propel to power” and “power” that is “maintained over the self and over others with cruelty, mastery and domination” (Nietzsche, 1997:1). The boast about “degrees in violence” and his “monstrous ego” (Meredith, 2002:76, 228) that does not permit him to own up to wrong doing make Mugabe politically devilish.

3.2.5 Hagiographies and Biographies of Mugabe

Early after Zimbabwe’s independence David Smith, Ian Davies and Colin Thompson (1981) wrote a flowery account of Mugabe’s humble peasant beginnings, his prison life, and education and his deserved ascendancy to power. Even then, the three admirers of Mugabe noted the sad development where Mugabe regarded the two main provinces of Zimbabwe, Matabeleland and Mashonaland as two separate countries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:11). The regard by Mugabe of Matabeleland as another country and Joshua Nkomo’s country as not part of Zimbabwe might explain the tribal hatred and genocide that government forces committed in the region. Mugabe’s passionate Shona nationalism and patriotism did not permit him to see another tribe as Zimbabwean, which is the same way in which colonisers expelled natives from full citizenship and pushed them into native reserves and homelands. Mugabe possessed a troubling xenophobia and nativism.

A narrative that supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and shed Mugabe in very good light came from David Martin and Philip Johnson (1981). The book, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014:11) notes, was so pleasing to Mugabe that he had it distributed to all schools in the country as it portrayed him as an example for all Zimbabweans, especially the school children and youth. That self-promotion and personal political marketing on the part of Mugabe might explain his later refusal to leave office and his belief that he was irreplaceable. The early years of independence were the time when Mugabe received much scholarly and journalistic affirmation and praise. Fay Chung (2006) described Mugabe as an unwavering revolutionary and far sighted visionary, who perhaps did not have like-minded people around him, or has been let down and betrayed by incapable and less gifted ministers. Mugabe as a betrayed and let down political messiah is a representation that Mugabe himself was known to relish, his failures were explained as the failure of the people around him who could not keep up with the high standards of the ruler. But as this

study will note, Mugabe carried failure inside him in that he avoided engaging with reality and clung to beliefs, fantasies and illusions of power and divinity.

The historian Terence Ranger (2003), who had earlier written favorably of Mugabe, blamed his later authoritarianism on liberation wars and nationalist struggles that demanded high handedness and authoritarianism. As this study notes in the next chapter, part of Mugabe's political conditioning was in the cruelty and suffering he endured in jail and also the violence that he became part of in the liberation struggle. A veteran of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, Wilbert Sadomba (2011), wrote of Mugabe as a cunning opportunist who usurped and appropriated the liberation struggle and personalised it in order to monopolise power, an educated person who took advantage of the illiteracy of comrades to centralise himself in the life of the country. Sandomba notes how the war slogan "*Pamberi neChimurenga*" (forward with the liberation war) was dropped for "*Pamberi na Mugabe*" (forward with Mugabe) to signal that the person of Mugabe had replaced in importance the entire national liberation struggle. When a personal legacy of an individual leader suppresses that of the collective national struggle that leader would have become significantly powerful and important, and Mugabe seems to have fully instrumentalised this prestige to the extent of competing with the country itself for importance.

Similar to Wilbert Sadomba, another veteran of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, Wilfred Mhanda (2011), portrayed Mugabe as a true villain who betrayed and usurped the liberation struggle for personal power and prestige. The image of Mugabe as an opportunist who used his western education to usurp the legacy of the liberation struggle and to overtake less educated nationalists in leadership is a prevalent representation. David Blair (2002) mocks Mugabe's vaunted educational credentials and describes him as a leader who has "degrees in violence" and whose struggle has been for personal power not national liberation. Power and violence are the true legacy of Mugabe; the rest has been a pretense in the view of Chan (2003). The prominent understanding of Mugabe as a tragic figure by both admirers and detractors betrays the Nietzschean split of the Apollonian and Dionysian force in one person, it may also reflect the Machiavellian notion that is discussed above where the leader knows how to be good and also how to mobilise being a beastly monster. The fact, however, that both the good and the bad became embodied in one person means that he selectively and opportunistically used both to pursue a drive and

therefore a will to power. How Mugabe has used his decision making to deploy either good or bad has been a question of his will, and in the view of the present study, a Will to Power.

3.2.6 A Political Philosophy of Mugabeism

Under the relevant theme of “Mugabeism and entanglements of history, politics and power in the making of Zimbabwe” Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014:1) grouped other scholars and thinkers in researching and publishing a book volume that reflected on the political and historical legacy of Mugabe. This study aims to benefit from exploring the views of the scholars. To start with, Mugabe is understood as a member of the group of first generation African leaders who used their education as a justification for inclusion in the leadership of their countries and as such, they were produced by the history of colonialism and colonial education as much as they wished to produce a history of African liberation from colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:1). In a way such leaders as Mugabe were products of the colonial intellectual and political culture, reproducing aspects of colonial political and intellectual leadership was a challenge that was not to come with much difficulty. This study argues that in the way in which Mugabe reproduced colonial and Rhodesian politics of coercion and domination in Zimbabwe, he became a kind of native coloniser. Mugabe became the native Zimbabwean leader who repeated Rhodesian settler politics of domination.

A scholar who has studied Zimbabwean history and reflected on it in impressive detail and depth, Moore (2014:30) describes Mugabe as “an intellectual manqué,” as noted above, a political thinker that either did not achieve his potential or a pretender to thought who has no tangible ideas except slogans and catchphrases. Moore fortifies his observations with detailed illustrations of how Mugabe has not produced or stood for any ideas in a consistent way besides being blown by the historical and political winds. Moore’s view, perhaps, explains the fact that unlike the African leaders of his generation, some less educated than him, Mugabe has not produced any writings or political and philosophical reflections. Mutambara that is cited earlier in this study dismissed Mugabe as intellectually unable and afraid of more capable men and women.

Alois Mlambo (2014:45) notes that Mugabe is not as extraordinary as he is assumed; he became a nationalist leader who like many others was drawn to ideas of economic nationalism, such as in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, for social justice and also political expediency and

survival. Both Moore and Alois Mlambo clearly suggest the uses of pretense and manipulation of public opinion by Mugabe to present himself as a gallant hero of his people guided by revolutionary principles. Gordon Moyo (2014:61) is more specific that Mugabe has survived for so long in politics by use of simulating nationalist and Pan-Africanist ideals when in reality he is a “neo-sultanist” ruler with deep propensities to tyranny. What, perhaps, distinguished Mugabe from other economic-economic nationalist leaders of Africa was his extremism of suddenly expelling white commercial farmers when there was no black class of capable farmers, action that collapsed the Agricultural sector and starved Zimbabweans. This became similar to Idi Amin’s expulsion of Indians from Uganda in 1972.

It appears that most observers and students of the political thought and practice of Mugabe that are not blinded by post-political imaginations, notice a way in which he simulates and pretends to grand political and revolutionary ideas and ideals. Timothy Scarnecchia (2014:78) for instance shows in detail how Mugabe acted out as an “intransigent diplomat” in his dealing with western countries, pretending not to change his positions, when in actuality he was an “insider outsider” who did everything to impress and earn the good opinion of America and Britain. In his “friendship” with the West, Scarnecchia shows, Mugabe would deploy threats when it suited him and employ solicitations when it was right, meanwhile keeping the countries close to him. Scarnecchia gives an impression of Mugabe as, in a Will to Power way, a leader who had no fixed truth but shifted positions in pursuit of advantage.

Relevant and important to this study, and worth repeating, Busani Mpofu and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014:120) observe Mugabe as a leader who was driven by “the will to power” and was entangled in the “crisis of the paradigm of war” where politics is practiced as a dangerous and dirty game. In a way that is opposed to the example of such humanists leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Mpofu and Ndlovu-Gatsheni note that Mugabe holds violence as an instrument of governance and a tool to frighten opponents and discipline allies and supporters alike. Even the language that Mugabe deploys bespeaks war. For instance in reference to Smith and other whites Mugabe said “we will kill those snakes among us, we will smash them completely” (Mpofu & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:130). Reducing political opponents to vermin and other animals is first and foremost a colonial habit not a quality of liberation politics. An example of such liberatory politics that sought

to humanise both the colonised and the colonisers was expressed by Kaunda (1966) who preached against dehumanising modes of politics.

This study will later dedicate attention and space in studying the political language of Mugabe to decipher his Will to Power. The way Mugabe allows his ministers to compare him to Jesus Christ in praise and to publicly kneel before him shows a “masculinity politics” where he treats even other grown men and colleagues from the struggle as docile women (Gaidzanwa, 2014:157). Gaidzanwa explores how even during the days of the liberation struggle, women were infantilised, treated like children, while men were feminised, treated like docile women under the leadership of Mugabe. Gaidzanwa sees in Mugabe a leader who does not only love power but wants to see his power in the way colleagues and supporters behave around him; he wants to see performances of his power and dramatisation of his authority.

Even as he dramatises power and celebrates his authority in the way he encourages flattery that approaches worship from his supporters and subordinates, Mugabe remains a colonial subject whose power and authority is constrained and limited. Using the theoretical framework of “structure and agency” Morgan Ndlovu (2014:237) observes that Mugabe was bound to imitate colonial styles of leadership and could not imagine political ideas and visions beyond the limits of the colonial paradigm of politics and leadership that produced him and his generation. Ndlovu does not dismiss that, within his limited power, Mugabe used his authority to punish and oppress those that were under him in the true way of an oppressed person that became an oppressor. Some consistent views cut across the writings of scholars that came together to investigate Mugabeism as a political philosophy. He is seen as a product of the struggle against colonialism who failed, like many others, to overcome the colonial model of leadership. He is also understood to be a kind of pretender to grand and revolutionary ideals. The pretense is used by Mugabe to conceal a spirited appetite for partisan and personal power. As a power monger Mugabe enjoys the dramatisation of his power and performances of his authority in public places. As this study will reflect in the next chapter, Mugabe in his simulations and dissimulations of the will to power made full use of ceremonies, symbols and rituals to create around him what appeared like a natural universe of power.

As noted above, prevalent studies and understandings of Mugabe failed to overcome trappings of the post-political that Chantal Mouffe (2005) describes. Most scholars and journalists that have

written of Mugabe seem to have been captive of an innocent and naïve political belief that Mugabe was naturally supposed to act in ways that are alternative to what he did. To invest hopes for a deliverer, a conciliator and a kind of political messiah in a politician is to be post-political and also innocent and naïve, which is a good background for being betrayed, sacrificed and even crucified in the dirty game of politics driven by the Will to Power.

3.2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with the relevant literature on the person, thought and political practice of Mugabe. What scholars have noted about Mugabe, such as his life as an intellectual and guerilla leader has been explored. Observations of Mugabe a tragic figure and a traitor are examined. Mugabe's image as a scholar and a diplomat is also examined as well as perceptions of him as a personification of evil and a monster. Hagiographies and biographies of Mugabe by different scholars are explored before an engagement with the possible philosophy of Mugabeism. Over and above the examination of literature, this chapter makes some observations and arguments that preface the following chapters.

Chapter Four

The Political and Philosophical Formation of Robert Mugabe

Our mother explained to us that Father O' Hea had told her that Robert was going to be an important somebody, a leader...Our mother believed Father O' Hea had brought this message from God, she took it very seriously, when the food was short, she would say give it to Robert.

Donato (2008:6).

Like the abused child who risks becoming an abusive parent, the politically oppressed have regularly turned into oppressors in countries all over Africa. Mugabe furthered his rule with the despotic strategies employed by the colonial settlers he so derided. His drive towards centralised control, for example, was facilitated by Smith's 15-year State of Emergency.

Heidi Holland (2008:83).

That's what my mother also used to say. I always had a book tucked here (gestures under his arm) when I was a young boy. Yes, I liked reading, reading, reading every little book I found. Yes, I preferred to keep to myself than playing with others. I didn't want too many friends, one or two only. - the chosen ones. I lived in my mind a lot. I liked talking to myself, reciting little poems and so on; reading things aloud to myself.

Robert Mugabe (2008:223).

4 Introduction

This study may not concretely establish what made Robert Mugabe the person and political thinker and actor that he became. What the study can achieve is to offer credible conjectures based on available evidence. One of the theoretical assumptions of this study is that Mugabe was as much corrupted by power as he corrupted power himself. As this chapter shows below, Mugabe grew up with some loneliness and anger that made him a willing vessel for tyranny and violence that would amount to evil. The political story of Mugabe has been described by self-confessed adventure

seekers such as Douglas Rogers (2019) as an astonishing and untold story of the rise and fall of a tyrant. In this study I observe that the political tale of Mugabe has been told in multiple ways by many writers but it has been little understood. This study attempts to understand the political thought and practice of Mugabe beyond the multiple post-political misunderstandings and narratives. In particular, this chapter explores the many factors and circumstances that may have contributed to the philosophical and political formation of Mugabe and that energised his spirited Will to Power.

More prominently than in his other works, in the narrative of “Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca” Niccolo Machiavelli (2007:403-4) explores the troubling question of whether leaders are born or they are made and demonstrates that a combination of “fortune,” that is destiny, and the self-fashioning of peoples produces famous and infamous leaders in the political world. Psychoanalysts such as Erich Fromm (1986), Malcolm Bowie (1991), Frantz Fanon (2008) and Slavoj Žižek (2015) just like Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud have advanced arguments that leaders as personalities with psychic lives are driven by unconscious desires, passions, fantasies, complexes, phobias and phorias that are produced by their conditioning by traumas and other experiences in society. This chapter seeks to explore the social and psychological conditioning and production of Mugabe that might have formed his political and philosophical sensibility that in turn drove his Will to Power. In exploring the social and psychological production of Mugabe’s political and philosophical sensibility this chapter will benefit from the musings of theorists, philosophers and psychoanalysts on the formation and production of sensibilities. The views of psychologists and psychoanalysts that are employed in this study to understand the formation of Mugabe are utilised without the study pretending to any expertise in psychology and psychoanalysis besides curious readings and interpretations of the researcher. As such the observations may sound speculative although they are plausible.

This chapter explores the social, historical, political and even psychological conditions and experiences, events and processes, which may have produced and shaped Mugabe’s Will to Power. Holland (2008) explored how Mugabe grew up being regarded as a special child that, by God’s word, would grow up to be a great leader. As Mugabe turned out to be a leader who fought colonialism and ended up being a kind of coloniser of his people who killed his country (Power, 2003), questions arise as to how leaders that fought for liberation came to threaten the freedom of

their countries and people. Mugabe grew up a loner who buried his attentions in books and reading (Holland, 2008:223) to the extent that his education and many university degrees are a subject of interest in understanding his political production and philosophical formation into a tyrannical leader. The question of how a political leader who grew up a Christian and a scholar turned out to possess what Richard Hofstadter (1964:77) called an “angry mind” that is hostage to the “paranoid style” of politics is central to this study. In the essay on “*Making sense of Mugabeism in local and Global Politics*” Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1139) explores how Mugabe was politically produced and shaped by leftist nationalism, Afro-radicalism, nativism, patriarchal and neo-traditional political passions that turned him into a practitioner of “chauvinism and authoritarianism.” In the study of “the ideological formation of the Zimbabwean ruling class,” David Moore (1991:472) examines how Zimbabwean political leaders were formed by ideology into leaders who employed both “force and persuasion” as strategies of seeking, finding and keeping power.

Following Moore, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Holland therefore, this study assumes that leaders such as Mugabe are not just born with certain toxic passions and violent instincts but are also produced, formed and shaped by historical conditions, social circumstances, ideologies and political influences in their life journeys. In reference to Mugabe, Blessing-Miles Tendi (2011:308) argues that from “the beginning he was toxic” and elaborates that historical and political conditions added to and influenced the political character and philosophical personality of the leader. Besides his personality and character that may have been originally toxic, “increasing domestic and international challenges to his rule” contributed to Mugabe ending up being the unforgivable tyrant who deployed “harsh means to maintain” his largely infamous rule (Lloyd, 2002:219). In other words, his Will to Power and drive to keep power by any means necessary under opposition and adversity, compelled Mugabe to desperate and most times violent measures of maintaining hegemonic control of Zimbabwe.

4.1 On the Formation and Production of Political Leaders

For this study to effectively examine and reflect on the political and philosophical formation of Mugabe into a leader who drove and was also driven by an aggressive will to power, an understanding should be made of some ideas on the formation of leaders. Various philosophers and political scientists have studied and written on the production and behaviour of political

leaders in the world at large and in Africa specifically. In his study of post-independence African leaders, for instance, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (1991:163) observed how the political leaders, in an obsessed way, were driven to a search for “eternity,” that was accompanied by “eccentricity” and pretensions of “exemplarity.” The leaders that Kirk-Greene studied seemed to aspire to live and rule forever, displayed strange and eccentric behaviour and pretended to be rare individuals that were different from the rest of their peers and followers. The post-colonial African leaders came under pressure to distinguish themselves as rare breeds:

The behaviour of independent Africa’s heads of state, be they President or Prime Minister, General or once upon a time Sergeant, exercises an unusual level of fascination on a no less unusually widespread range of readership. Their characteristics and their ideologies, their excesses, their eccentricities and their example, their often conspicuous way of living and usually brutal manner of their dying, have provided data for scholarly analysis and intellectual typologising (Kirk-Greene, 1991:163).

While Kirk-Greene simplifies the understanding of political leadership by isolating strange and excessive behaviour as an African post-colonial attribute, his observation that literature exists that points to patterns and types of leadership styles is important to this study. Mugabe’s political thought and practice will be understood as a type and style of political leadership amongst other types and a style of the will to power, not a simple example of degenerate African politics. Perhaps, in a psychic way, the hardships and humiliations by colonialism itself, the humble births and upbringing of some of these leaders injected in them a hunger for exaggerated power and grandeur. On the part of Mugabe, later on, this study advances the allegation that he grew up to admire and envy the power of the coloniser and began to imitate colonial politics in his leadership and rule of Zimbabwe.

Historical backgrounds, social conditions and political experiences, especially suffering and trauma, can inject in leaders, who prevail from humble beginnings to power, with an illusory sense of divine anointment and pre-destination. In reference to Castruccio Castracani the prince of Lucca in ancient Italy, who had a humble birth and was without parents, Machiavelli (2007:402-403) notes that:

Men who have accomplished great deeds and excelled above all others of their era were low in birth and obscure origins, or were tormented beyond compare, they were exposed to wild beasts, or had such lowly fathers that in shame they declared themselves to be sons of Jove or some other god. I

believe the lowly origins of great men is Fortune's way of demonstrating that it is she and not Wisdom who makes men great. So that Fortune be acknowledged as supreme, she shows her powers very early in a man's life, well before wisdom could hope to play a role (Machiavelli, 2003:404).

For prevailing to the leadership of their people and their countries through the tribulations of colonialism, poverty, imprisonment and suffering, such as Mugabe did, some of the post-colonial African leaders might have come to believe themselves to be the children of destiny or messengers of God. To lead political parties and to become heads of state after traumatising histories of colonial violence, inferiorisation and dehumanisation that are described by Albert Memmi (1974), such African leaders as Mugabe might have arrived at a strong but illusory sense of victory and greatness that produced delusions of divinity and grandeur.

In the discussion of the influential ideas of Marx and Freud, Erich Fromm (1970) notes that Freud proves that society does stamp its signature and influence on the psyche of human beings while Marx proves that human beings, in their thoughts and actions, create systems and structures that shape society. In other words, there is a relationship of co-production between human and history. Political leaders such as Mugabe have through their thoughts and actions produced history while history has also produced and formed their thoughts and actions. In that way, the destiny and wisdom, as in thoughtful agency of leaders, are symbiotic in their relationship, this study will note.

In the observation of how his birth and family life shaped his very being and philosophical sensibility, Edward Said (1999:3) noted that "all families invent their parents and children, give each of them a story, character, fate and even language." From the observation that birth conditions and family life invent a thinker and an activist, this study is interested in how the nature of Mugabe's birth in time and place, and his parentage and family life gave him a political character and philosophical personality that in turn gave him a Will to Power and historical fate.

For Fromm as a sociologist and psycho-analyst, understanding how people think and act the way they do became of primary importance as it is for this study to understand how Mugabe came to think and act politically the way he did. That as "an only child" Fromm had an "anxious and moody father and a depression-prone mother was enough" to spark an intellectual "interest in the strange and mysterious reasons for human reactions" (Fromm, 1986:3). In examining Mugabe's political reactions, the dispositions of his father and deportments of his mother will be scrutinised in this study to locate influences of parentage, birth and family life on his Will to Power.

Important to this study also are philosophical musings and political ruminations of Plato who aspired for the production and formation of young political leaders into philosopher kings in ancient Athens. Plato (1993:285) proposed that those that were to be formed into philosopher kings were to be taken out of society to be educated and trained into being those rare individual leaders that came from “the company of the gods.” The kind of education and training that Mugabe got and that formed him into the leader that he became is an important unit of understanding in this study. Further, Plato (1993:285) noted that some young people are driven to seek political leadership and power because of the miserable and powerless lives of their mothers that are wives to poor and powerless men. The negligence and absence of Mugabe’s father that Holland (2008:3) discusses and the misery and wishes of his pathetic mother, that made her wish for power and greatness for Mugabe, and believed him to be of God, will be examined in this study to note how they drove Mugabe to a Will to Power that became his political definition.

Amos Elon (2006) in his introduction of Hannah Arendt’s study of the passions and drives of the Nazi regime notes how tyrants and cruel leaders are sometimes produced not by strengths and power but weakness and fear. For instance, Arendt (2006: xiii) observes that Adolf Otto Eichmann, Hitler’s principal torturer and hangman became a “bureaucrat of death” because he grew up weak, afraid, pathetic and with feelings of failure and uselessness. Whether Mugabe’s own storied Will to Power arose from some strengths or weaknesses and pathos is an important question in this study, given his troubled and desperate family life.

The study of “civilisation and its discontents” led Freud (1994:7) to an investigation of how religion and religious beliefs originated in a child’s helplessness and need for a father that is not found in the biological father and is desperately sought in the metaphysical and spiritual universe. Religion, in the understanding of Freud also arose from hearts and minds that were haunted by fear and guilt feelings and seeking both punishment and protection from a higher source (Freud, 1994: 62). Mugabe’s troubled youth, his birth of a deeply religious mother who aspired to be a nun, and his own tutelage by Jesuit priests that gave him a kind of strong religiosity will be explored in this study to observe how he was produced by religious conditions and passions, into a leader with an iron Will to Power.

Influentially, as noted also above, Machiavelli (2003:25) also ruminated on how some leaders come to power by fate and fortune, that is, historical circumstances and chance can produce a

leader. Some leaders, Machiavelli (2003:33) states, come to power or are delivered to power by force and fraud and they try to invent new ways of rule or try to rule by imitating ancient or current leaders that they admire. The production and formation of a Machiavellian leader is also an idea that this study will recognise in the examination of the political production and philosophical formation of Mugabe's Will to Power.

4.2 Robert Mugabe: Family, Friends and Colleagues

In most cases those sick individuals that in turn produce sick societies are human beings who would have grown up with childhood fears and anxieties that they failed to overcome and remained bottled up in their psyche (Fromm, 1986:41). Such a psychopathology amongst individuals is usually connected to their parentage and family life as a formative site and experience. This section of the chapter examines the influence that family, friends and colleagues might have had on the political character of Mugabe, how they contributed to the formation of his Will to Power.

4.2.1 The Absence of the Father

In the discussion of paranoia, how it veils itself, and "why the paranoiac need two fathers," a biological father and a powerful symbolic father that is a kind of super-ego, Žižek (1996: 142) demonstrates how absent fathers can psychologically be replaced in a child's mind by a symbolic and psychic father that exercises tyrannical authority over the angry and lonely child, driving them to excesses of paranoia. In other words, the presence and absence of paternal love, care and authority in a child's life may determine whether they develop into a balanced individual or a paranoiac that once in power can be tyrannical and violent.

Mugabe's Father, Gabriel Matibili Mugabe abandoned his family soon after the death of one of his sons, Michael, and went to Bulawayo where he remarried and only returned many years later with three children from his second wife (Holland, 2008:3). For the reason of abandonment by the father who did not contribute to the education and upbringing of his children Mugabe developed a "pathological hatred of his father" (Holland, 2008:7) that he carried to his old age. Anger at being abandoned by his father and the hatred towards him might have developed into a psychic, social and political energy that Mugabe was to vent on opponents and enemies later in life. The search for an absent father might also have become a drive that influenced his thoughts and relationships later in life. Mugabe grew up as a lonely, angry and brooding boy who "seemed to have matters to

think about” (Holland, 2008:6) beyond what children his age were occupied with. In the Žizekian sense that is explained above, the absence of Mugabe’s father in his formative and need years might have produced in him symptoms such as “the seven veils of paranoia” (Žižek, 1996:190) where the individual conceals their fragility and psychological woundedness behind pretenses either of being too happy, possessed with a ‘father of all enjoyments,’ living by some strict unwritten rules, being out of joint with normal society, vocalising anger and hate to supplement lacks in life, having strong desires and fantasies, and pretending or trying by all means necessary to be the “Big Other” to others. Some of these behaviours and qualities, as this study will demonstrate, are evident in Mugabe.

4.2.2 The Over-Presence of the Mother

While Mugabe suffered a wounding absence of paternity in his formative years he also endured an excess of maternity. Like Hitler and Augusto Pinochet who both had mothers that adored them (Burbach, 2003:22) Mugabe grew up under a lovingly influential mother. Mothers in their attention and inattention to their children have formative influence that shapes the character and personality of their offspring. From his family life, Said (1999:7) learnt that “mothers are to be loved” as dear parents “and taken care of unconditionally” yet “because of their selfish love they can deflect children from their chosen careers” and as a result “mothers should not be allowed to get too close.” There is a way in which Mugabe’s mother was allowed to get too close and her selfish love conditioned the life of her son, this study observes.

Mugabe’s mother, Bona, intended to be a nun but was seduced by Gabriel Matibili Mugabe. After the death of their son, Michael, who she wished was going to be a priest; she started praying that Mugabe would be a Catholic priest (Holland, 2008:3) and for some time Mugabe “became an exemplary Catholic” who would become a great priest one day. As an abandoned wife, a fallen nun, to her Mugabe became the son that “set about trying to restore the light in her eyes” (Holland, 2008:3). The knowledge that his mother intended to be a nun and did not want to have children might have filled Mugabe with fear and anger at the possibility that he was not meant to be born in the first place, and also deep gratitude that through chance and failure of her mother to be a nun, he was born after all, which made him deeply love and also unconsciously fear and hate his mother (Macaphulana, 2017:3). The knowledge that one was not planned for birth may produce unhappiness and even anger.

In her interest to shape Mugabe into a great son, or in her own drive to prepare him for what she believed was the prophecy of his greatness, Bona also gave him tough love with strict discipline that he appreciated. “If his mother smacked him” Mugabe would “thank her for correcting him” and “he thanked her every time” so much so that “the other children used to tease him and he became lonely” (Holland, 2008:4) as a child. In her maternal, physical discipline or violence on Mugabe as a child, Bona might have been venting her anger on a child and children that were her shame and failure at becoming a nun, children of her sin and fall from grace.

In her holding of the belief that Mugabe was a child of destiny born to do great things his mother made him a “too good to be true” child that was going to be a priest, she made sure that he had something to eat ahead of other children if food was scarce (Holland, 2008:6). It seems that after her experience with a negligent and absent husband Bona wanted to make Mugabe into a wished for perfect man. Also, after her own attempt and failure to be a nun, she wished to use Mugabe to compensate for her own spiritual failures. In driving himself to live up to the wishes of his mother Mugabe might have pushed himself too far. For the reason that he became a loner and did not fight with other boys Mugabe developed a reputation for physical weakness and cowardice, and was mocked by other children (Holland, 2008:6), which gave him anger and an inferiority complex. “As he grew up, he got a sense of who he was from Bona, a cold, stern nun of a mother” that was keen to make him “the leader chosen by God” (Holland 2008:7) to rule over other people. In a way, Mugabe was, too early in life, deprived of a social and physical life and pushed into metaphysical aspirations of greatness, which may have underdeveloped him or overdeveloped him into a personality with a messianic sensibility and god-complex.

The growth of Mugabe between an absent father and a rather excessively present and ambitious mother possibly created psychological and social pressures that created imbalances and instabilities in his person. Mugabe’s mother, her pains and fears, might have stamped a bold signature on his person and psyche, to the extent that he carried a part of his mother in his mannerisms and public deportment, Hope (2003:21) observed Mugabe in a public rally and noted that “ certainly, as I watched Mugabe mount the platform, there was a mincing elegance; it was more than feminine, it was distinctly dainty, when he was seated he joined his knees together and seemed to reach for an invisible skirt to cover them,” a suggestion that something womanly hid in the alpha-patriarch that was Mugabe.

Mugabe's physical weaknesses and inferiority complex might also have planted a strong wish and drive to be strong and powerful one day, which is a wish that might have turned into a forceful, Will to Power. Freud (1994:10, 43) notes that children grow up wanting to love and to be loved, lack and excess of which may lead to psychotic searches for love and passionate pursuits of compensatory gratifications and escapes from pain and loneliness. The anger and hatred that Mugabe had for his absent father he might have made up for it with love for power and domineering masculinity, a drive to be everyone's father himself, and even to see his father in political opponents, challengers and enemies. In the Žižekian sense, Mugabe might have developed or underdeveloped into a paranoid personality.

4.2.3 The Wives of Mugabe

From high school headmasters through diplomats, right up to heads of states, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (1991:172) argues, the impact and influence of wives on the thought and practices of leaders cannot be ignored. In reference to Mugabe and the way his ministers feared and knelt before him, Margaret Dongo, an opposition politician, accused the ministers of being 'Mugabe's wives' (Gudhlanga, 2000:1). Mugabe in power has been observed to have been able to emasculate other men under his leadership (Gaidzanwa, 2016:200). The political metaphor of a leader who makes himself a husband over other men in Dongo's accusation points to Mugabe as excessively patriarchal, perhaps in compensation for his absent father, the husband that was not there for his excessively present mother. This section of the chapter examines the possible influence of Mugabe's actual spouses on his political thought and practice over years.

4.2.3.1 Sally Hayfrod Mugabe

Sally Hayfrod Mugabe was Mugabe's first wife who he met in Ghana, 1957 and eventually married in 1961. Sally is noted to have idolised Mugabe as a political thinker and activists that was a teaching expatriate in Kwame Nkrumah's newly independent Ghana (Holland, 2008:11). As Mugabe's wife Sally Hayfrod was supportive, patient and loyal to the extent that she waited for him all the eleven years of his detention and used to go to libraries in Europe to read books and copy notes to send to Mugabe who was studying from prison, and these notes included some quotations from books that were banned in Rhodesia (Holland, 2008: 16). Sally Mugabe, therefore became a dissident in her own right, for Mugabe and his interests and political pursuits.

The only person that Mugabe, more than his close friends and colleagues, seems to have “trusted with his feelings and even his political problems” was Sally Mugabe (Holland, 2008: 21). While many Zimbabweans understand Sally Mugabe to have been sober minded, charitable and a stabilising force in Mugabe’s leadership (Meredith 2002:96); some scholars have noted otherwise. For instance, Holland (2008:12, 25), after studying the couple closely, concluded that she was a political animal on her own and stuck around her husband to further her own ambitions that at the end included siphoning large amounts of money from Zimbabwe to her people in Ghana. Her use, abuse and instrumentalisation of Mugabe and his power might have been carefully concealed because he seems to have trusted her totally. The otherwise grave and brooding leader is noted to have become a kind of a clown when with her in privacy (Holland, 2008:18).

Sally Mugabe might have over time become another overwhelming mother figure to Mugabe who grew up under maternal tough love and authority. On Mugabe’s instructions, Sally Mugabe was referred to in the public media as “Amai” which means mother, and in her case it was extended to mean “Mother of the Nation” (Meredith, 2002:96). For Mugabe to insist on Sally being called Mother of the Nation means that he imagined himself to be the Father of the nation, an imagination which reduces the country to his imaginary family, perhaps one family that he presided over as a present father unlike his own absent biological father. Horace Campbell (2003) and Rudo Gaidzanwa (2015) are two scholars who have observed the workings of patriarchy in Mugabe’s political thought and practice in Zimbabwe. In a way, Mugabe, who had an absent and rather weak father, was determined to be a strong father to the nation, a strength that developed into a tyrannical Will to Power.

The impression from Holland’s well-argued conclusion is that Sally Mugabe might have been a woman who performed love and faith around Mugabe so that she could use him for self-empowerment and enrichment of herself and her family back in Ghana. Mugabe’s Mother, Bona “was a devout and pious woman who taught the catechism and the Bible” (Meredith, 2002:19) but had failed in her ultimate religious goal to be a nun. In wishing that Mugabe would be a priest and working on him to be that, she seems to also have tried to use her son to compensate for her spiritual failures. Abandoned by his father, used by his mother to pay her own religious and spiritual debts, and exploited by Sally Mugabe for her material gains, Mugabe appears to have been a victim rather than a beneficiary of parental and spousal family relations. The adoration and

respect that some Zimbabweans hold for Sally Mugabe might not exactly be that of appreciating her but expressing contempt for Mugabe's later wife Grace Mugabe who is perceived to have been a negative influence to his political leadership. Unlike Sally Mugabe, Grace Mugabe does not seem to have successfully concealed her selfish political and social agendas. She became flamboyant and showy, much to the anger of the poor and suffering population of Zimbabwe.

4.2.3.2 Grace Marufu Ntombizodwa Mugabe

When Sally Mugabe was still alive in 1987, Mugabe started a love and sexual affair with one of his secretaries, Grace Marufu (Meredith, 2002:96), apparently so that he could have children since Sally Mugabe could no longer have children because of illness. Sally Mugabe died in 1992 after which in 1996 Mugabe formally married Grace Marufu. Their first child was a girl who was symbolically named Bona after Mugabe's influential and overwhelming mother. The gesture suggested that Mugabe was keen to reproduce his mother and maintain her presence even beyond her physical demise.

Grace Mugabe's corruption and material greed were not so hidden as those of Sally Mugabe. Her brother Reward Marufu became one of the biggest beneficiaries of the fund that was designed to compensate liberation war veterans (Meredith, 2002:37). In research into the character of Grace Mugabe, Holland (2008: 2, 9, 59, 148, 166, 176) uncovered many aspects of her position as a First Lady that had influence over the thought and practice of Mugabe. Firstly, she was disapproved by Mugabe's family as an opportunist who came for Mugabe's power and wealth; there was doubt that she ever loved or cared about Mugabe and was described as "a thoroughly bad influence on his character". To marry Grace Marufu, Mugabe was forced to defy Catholic church rules because she was illegitimate and unacceptable as a woman that had an illicit affair with a man whose wife was alive even if she was sick, their wedding was considered too lavish and a mockery to poor Zimbabweans. Holland (2008) describes how Grace Mugabe, in an international event that gathered African first ladies, shocked other wives of heads of states by persistently asking them to say who exactly she resembled amongst the Spice Girls, a popular international musical band of female artistes. Grace Mugabe carried herself with not so concealed pretensions of pop-celebrity and magazine cover girl illusions.

Socially, Grace Mugabe seems to have been another materialist and opportunist like Sally Mugabe but she of the dramatic, spectacular and explicit type who imagined herself as an international

musical and pop celebrity. Towards the overthrow of Mugabe in a coup, in the years 2015 to 2017, Grace Mugabe exhibited her own political ambitions and desire to succeed Mugabe (Macaphulana, 2016). Arguably, Mugabe's seeming endorsement of his wife to succeed him led to his downfall when his war-time friends and colleagues resorted to a military coup to stop the unfolding of a family dynasty. From his mother to Sally Mugabe and Grace Mugabe, Mugabe seems to have been surrounded by ambitious women and mother figures that loved him for what they could do with him and his power. While Grace Mugabe's direct political ambitions seem to have been the direct cause of the coup that dethroned Mugabe, his mother in her belief that he was a gift and a messenger from God might have been the foundation of Mugabe's stubborn will to power. In combination, Sally Mugabe and Grace Mugabe appear not to have been the nuns that Bona was, the two were materialist mother figures that differently handled their materialism and political ambitions.

4.2.3.3 Friends of Robert Mugabe

Politics, in the influential understanding of Carl Schmitt (2007) may be the art and science of critically managing friend and enemy relations in the competition for power. In that way, friends and enemies are a reality that cannot be ignored but has to be understood and worked with to avoid politics degenerating to violence and elimination of one by the other. Interestingly, Mugabe, in his insulation from reality or purposeful denialism, denies ever having enemies:

I feel I am just an ordinary person. I feel within me there is a charitable disposition towards others, just as I find charitable positions towards me from others. And I don't make enemies, no. Others may make me an enemy of theirs but I make no enemies. Even those who might do things against me, I don't make them enemies at all. No (Mugabe in Holland, 2008:227).

This quote is repeated here for its centrality in exposing an important clue into Mugabe's political character; his claim to be ordinary when he lived and acted extra-ordinary. In being involved in politics which is an essentially conflictual engagement (Mouffe, 2005) and denying that he makes enemies and that he has enemies Mugabe conceals rather than reveals the political and himself. Interestingly, Mugabe also denied making friends at all: "I avoid, you know, a relationship that is far too close, with one or two individuals. Why should that happen?" (cited in Meredith, 2002:97). In a way Mugabe positions himself as one without friends and without enemies, except what some

other people make of him. This may be revealing of a god-complex or some political righteousness that appears as a denialism that depoliticises politics and seeks to dissocialise society.

After suggesting that he is an ordinary person, Mugabe goes on to seek to suggest that he is an extraordinary individual, a friendless and enemyless being, who might as well be godly. Critically, there could be some realities about Mugabe's friendships and enmities that he does not have the strength to admit and to face. To Holland (2008:223) Mugabe said "I preferred to keep to myself than playing with others," as I grew up "I didn't want too many friends, one or two only, - the chosen ones. I lived in my mind a lot. I liked talking to myself, reciting little poems and so on; reading things aloud to myself." The "chosen ones" that became Mugabe's friends were seemingly taken by him to be lucky to be favoured with his friendship and were supposed to be grateful for it, an indication of Mugabe's potential god-complex, even at an early age. In the family at home, "the Mugabes" as a family unit "had no friends" (Holland, 2008: 25) perhaps as a political strategy to distance themselves, his person and name from ordinary mortals that he sought to rule over with a spell.

This section of the chapter seeks to examine how friends of Mugabe and his friendships might have shaped him, in thought and in practice, politically. Geoff Hill (2003) narrates how Ndabaningi Sithole became friends with Mugabe when they were fellow teachers at Dadaya Mission, and where Sithole became a political mentor to Mugabe. Ndabaningi Sithole's view was that Mugabe was an "impossibly self-absorbed" individual who was charming and persuasive when he needed help from others and was stingy with what others needed from him (Hill, 2003:49). It would appear then that Mugabe as someone that had internalised ideas of him being chosen of God and being exceptional began to see friends and mentors around him not as relations but simple resources at his service. Helpful friends and mentors such as Sithole might have been, in Mugabe's sensibility, not legitimate individuals whose help was valued but political raw materials and ingredients to Mugabe's power, placed around him by destiny and God.

James Chikerema, a friend and also a relative of Mugabe, told Holland that Mugabe kept stubborn grudges and did not entertain ideas of reconciliation or compromise. His "response to criticism" from friends and relations "was to warn that he will get even one day" (Holland, 2008:7), meaning that he would get revenge. As Lawrence Vambe states, Mugabe "was always settling scores. That was his nature, even as a child" (Holland, 2008:209). Somehow Mugabe seems not to have

experienced friendships and relations as human opportunities for society and growth but as battlefields where he was supposed to win at all costs. This experience might have formed and produced Mugabe into a kind of social and political gladiator with a spirited Will to Power, to whom life was an opportunity for a fight. This might explain better why he had no friends, except few chosen ones that were able to put up with his fighting personality.

In loving Mugabe and believing in him and his chosen destiny, Lawrence Vambe thought, his mother, the school and the Jesuit priests pushed him too hard and too far to the extent that he would break trying in everything to be better than the rest, and to live up to expectations of greatness (Holland, 2008:6). A small child that gets parentally and educationally filled with big passions of a great destiny may explode with complexes of imaginary power that makes them essentially anti-social.

Mugabe might have avoided friends like Vambe in fearing that they will, in being close to him, become like him and share in his chosen destiny; he strove to be extraordinary to the extent of creating distance between himself and peers. George Kahari noted to Holland that the school and the family could have committed the social mistake of by, in its support and belief in Mugabe, conditioning him into a “too good to be true” person (Holland, 2008:7) that is unreal if not caught in delusions of grandeur and took essentialist and too “strong positions” on everything. The reputation, amongst other children, of him being a bookish coward and a sissy (Holland, 2008:6) could also have shaped and produced Mugabe into a person with a political mentality of wanting to prove too much and to overcome and compensate for many barriers and absences in his person. In starting as determined and driven, Mugabe might have ended up pushed and crashed by pressure to be bigger, better and more powerful.

For the reason that he was driven and pushed always to be bigger and more powerful than others, Mugabe was not unwilling, but “was unable to make close friends’ (Norman, 2004:165, 58) and he became a loner and solitary person. Edgar Tekere, a liberation war friend, ally and companion of Mugabe later on described him as unwilling to take even constructive criticism (Holland, 2008:58). Tekere found Mugabe to have become a new master after the colonial masters of Rhodesia had been defeated (Norman, 2004:97). Tekere’s disappointment is another sign that points to how Mugabe had rather too comfortably stepped into the shoes of the settler colonialist, Ian Smith. When Mugabe stopped communication with Joshua Nkomo and reneged from

contesting Zimbabwe's independent election as a patriotic front of ZANU and ZAPU, Nkomo complained: "I don't understand why Mugabe is doing this to me. He was my friend. We fought the war together. We have worked together. And now has cut me off" (Meredith, 2002:38). For political opportunity and power, Mugabe had grown to be able to cut off and sacrifice friends and colleagues. Mugabe had proverbially come to have permanent interests in power and impermanent friends and enemies, in a radical will to power way.

There is a way, though, in which Mugabe, as this study will show later, sought to turn some enemies of his into friends. For instance, Mac McGuinness was Mugabe's jailer and punisher, a strongly built prison warder and intelligence operative who had a reputation for cruelty. During prison time and after, when Mugabe was in power and in no need of favours and the mercy of the Rhodesian prison warder, Mugabe sought McGuinness out and befriended him (Holland, 2008:28), to the extent of pleading with him to stay on in Zimbabwe and serve his black government. In the process of being oppressed and persecuted by the Rhodesian regime, as a weak person who needed power, Mugabe seems to have grown to admire the Rhodesian machinery of power and violence, and in his will to power, wished to own and control it for himself. He would befriend an enemy if he could use the enemy's power for himself, as a new master that had his own enemies to persecute. As a colonised person, and one that suffered fighting colonialism, Mugabe came to admire the coloniser's power and infrastructures of violence.

In the elaboration on how princes and leaders should rule, Machiavelli advised that "those whom princes have as secretaries" or ministers should be chosen carefully as a leader can be judged on the company he keeps (Machiavelli, 2003:99). Added to that, Machiavelli (2003:101) noted "how flatterers should be avoided" because they blind a leader with false and misleading praise, and lead to his demise. In his relations, because of his sense of being extraordinary and destined, Mugabe seems to have failed to discourage or avoid flatters such as Minister Tony Gara who publicly described him as the "second son of God" (cited in Meredith, 2002:80). In finding such exaggerated flattery not offensive or finding it truthful Mugabe might have been carried away by false friends and flattery into an imaginary universe of his chosenness by God and which universe was essentially a wished for and not the real world. In that way, the will to power and passion for extraordinariness may be blinding. Social and intimate relations, so far, seem to have been determined to shepherd Mugabe as much away from the real world as possible, which did not

hinder but helped his escalation to delusions and illusions. He became insulated from the real and exposed to the fantastic and imaginary.

4.3 Jesuitisation of Mugabe

Jesuitism is, as understood in this study and as used by Gerald Groveland Walsh (1930), the political and intellectual philosophy of the Society of Jesus, a distinct Catholic Brotherhood of Christians trained after the religious doctrines of Ignatius Loyola. Mugabe's primary and formative education was under Jesuit missionaries at Kutama Mission in Mashonaland. The Kutama Jesuit Mission was founded by the Jesuit, Jean-Baptiste Loubiere of French origins (Holland, 2008:4). Mugabe's Mother Bona was a worker at the same mission and a devout participant in the religious activities of the mission where she became one of the preachers (Meredith, 2002:19). By his own admission and also boast, Mugabe, prided himself of having been "brought up by the Jesuits" and being "most grateful" for the way he "benefited from their teaching enormously" (cited in Meredith, 2002:19). With a mother that was a religious preacher and taught by radical Jesuit priests at school, "strict disciplinarians" that they were, Mugabe was enveloped by Jesuit religious teachings and discipline at home and at school. If the argument by Freud (1994:7) that religious belief is founded in the child inside all human beings that helplessly seeks for a mighty father in fear of fate, then this study can note that in the Jesuit Mission at Kutama, Mugabe's mother had found a husband and Mugabe a father, in the absence of the biological Gabriel Matibili Mugabe who had abandoned his family. In being Jesuitised Mugabe was fathered in a symbolic, psychic but also forceful way.

For Mugabe, in a way, the Jesuit priests had become exalted earthly fathers and God a protective and assuring heavenly father, who approvingly dispensed a great destiny for him. After the death of Loubiere, the Kutama Jesuit Mission, St Francis Xavier, was taken over by Father Jerome O'Hea an Irish Jesuit priest that had a "realistic view of the world" and quickly "broke down taboos". He became responsible for "nurturing Robert" like a true substitute for his father (Holland, 2008:4-5); like a true son Mugabe enjoyed "carrying his books and cleaning the blackboard" in class.

In the observation of Father Jerome O' Hea, Mugabe as a toddler exhibited "unusual gavitas" (Holland, 2008:6) for a young boy and possessed an "exceptional mind and exceptional heart" (Hill, 2003:48). It became clear to Father O' Hea that Mugabe was destined for great achievements in the world and he shared this belief with Bona. Interviewed by Holland (2008:6) Mugabe's elder brother Donato noted that their mother told them that "Robert was going to be an important somebody, a leader" and that Bona in her faith "believed that Father O' Hea had brought this message from God, she took it very seriously." Mugabe's mother "believed he was a holy child and she wanted him to become a priest" and as he grew up, Mugabe himself "believed he was born to rule and behaved accordingly, once the king always the king" (Holland, 2008:6, 192) was his political attitude. He carried himself messianically and accordingly, in many social ways, removed himself from the society of boys and girls his age. Clearly, Mugabe's childhood landscape was dominated by beliefs, and especially his mother's, of being a chosen one of God. So beholden did Mugabe become to the Jesuit priest that as a grown man at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, that paved his way to power, he exclaimed that "one day he would like to pray at O' Hea's grave" (Meredith, 2002:22); perhaps in celebration that O'Hea's prophecy about him was getting fulfilled. Idolising those he believed to have delivered him to power and an appetite to be idolised himself was a tendency that grew in Mugabe and that he grew up with, until it was weaponised into an idolatrous Will to Power.

Describing Jews and their belief of being the chosen people of God, Said (1999) states that such a belief can turn some people into tyrants that walk the earth with impunity. Belief in his being a chosen one of God might have injected Mugabe with an attitude of importance and impunity that followed him all his political life. Further, "the sons of St Francis Xavier" of which Mugabe was a special one at the Jesuit Mission at Kutama "were exhorted to save the heathens beyond the borders of their tight-knit community by becoming teachers" (Holland, 2008:4). They were injected with a missionary spirit to go out and save other lost natives, a spirit that might have made Mugabe feel like a superior teacher and saviour to others earlier and later in his political life. A spirit of knowing it all and of being an inspired and chosen political deliverer might have been the root of Mugabe's Will to Power.

For this study to effectively understand the power of the Jesuit philosophy and the influence that it might have had on the political thought and practice of Mugabe, a brief examination of the

doctrine of the Society of Jesus (Little, 1952:34), another name for the Jesuits is needed. Rene Fulop-Miller, F.S. Flint and D.F. Tait (1930) wrote of “the power and Secret of the Jesuits.” Appreciative critics of the book by the three authors noted that “anyone who in our days seeks the truth about Jesuitism will find more valuable help” (Walsh, 1930:338) in reading the narrative. The book reveals that Ignatius Loyola the founder of the Society of Jesus “taught that even those who did not possess the supernatural illumination, could achieve perfection by their own efforts and pains” (Walsh, 1930:339). This teaching entails that an individual even without direct inspiration from God and the supernatural can achieve great power and success. In the case of Mugabe at the Jesuit Mission, Holland (2008:8) states that the great lesson was that “from humble beginnings” with “discipline” he could “triumph over adversity” and prevail over all odds to become a “king of the castle.” After a study of Mugabe, Paul Moorcraft (2012:44) noted that the prime Jesuit principle was that “only self-discipline can allow a person to triumph over adversity” and “self-discipline was a constant feature of Mugabe until late in life when absolute power turned his original virtue into utter self-indulgence.” The unusual gravitas, exceptional mind and exceptional heart of the toddler Mugabe that Father Jerome O’Hea noted was further enhanced, disciplined and fortified into a passion for overcoming all odds and opposition, which is a Will to Power of a tyrannical kind.

The students and critics of Jesuitism note that central to its teachings is that “perfection could be attained in an ordinary manner by will and purpose more surely than by contemplative mysticism” (Walsh, 1930:339). In other words, with a strong will and a purpose a human being, Mugabe was taught, can achieve excellence and perfection over others. This teaching, added to his beliefs in being a chosen one of God should have given him the superman sensibility that is described by Nietzsche. The “secret of the Jesuits turns out to be their Pelagianism (free will and asceticism that was taught by Pelagius) and their power” was their “Protestantism, their readiness for any compromise” (Walsh, 1930:339). The Jesuits, Walsh argues, became a brotherhood that strived to come to terms with the world by mastering all forms of human expression including theology, natural science, philosophy, art, economics, constitutional law and jurisprudence.

Mugabe’s storied love for education that propelled him to achieve a multiplicity of university degrees might after all be a passion of the Will to Power imparted on him by the Jesuits. The Jesuit Christian it seems, because of the belief in free will and the agency of man, becomes a Christian

that really does not need Christ as he believes in his own power to achieve and overcome. Arguing psychoanalytically of Christianity at large, Žižek (2015:77) suggests that while the church wears an institutional mask, and exudes a conscious performance of holiness, it has a pagan unconscious which is its true reality and drive. Žižek cites G.K. Chesterton who note that:

The outer ring of Christianity is a rigid guard of ethical abnegations and professional priests; but inside that inhuman guard you will find the old human life dancing like children, and drinking wine like men; for Christianity is the only frame for pagan freedom (Chesterton, 1995:164).

Mugabe, in his will to power, came to wear the inhuman mask of the church and of Christianity and to personify its ethics and holiness, more as a performance than an actuality. The church, like a good parent was keen to be seen to have produced a deliverer for the people, a fulfilment of its mission. Even as Mugabe began to commit atrocities and to violate human rights, the “Catholic church became a protective Father that could not admit the child’s mess” (Holland, 2008:157) and continued to own him, but in his own Jesuit free will and political agency he was willing to threaten the priests who cautioned him and say that “when the church leaders start being political we regard them as political creatures- and we are vicious in that area,” (Holland, 2008:147). Mugabe used the church as a mask for his will to power and political paganism and the church used him as flag to display its ability to supply deliverance on earth. He was later to embarrass the church and threaten it with violence. He had become a true Christian without Christ, in the Žižekian sense, a real Christian with full benefits of paganism.

Mugabe’s Jesuitism that was combined with his bottled up childhood anger and belief in chosenness developed into a will to power that was willing and ready to overcome the same church that brought him up. As Christians that also believed in the agency of the self, their critics argued, the Jesuits believed that “the end justifies the means” and were willing to “influence the masses, and know how to exploit the wildest superstitions of the people for their own purpose” (Walsh, 1930:340) As this study will later reveal Mugabe did not respect ‘divine norms but the human foot rule’ that Walsh reports as the true drive of the Jesuit spirit.

It is acknowledged that “Mugabe’s Jesuit education imbued him with a spirit of discipline” (Norman, 2004:47) but that strong discipline and steel will became usable for evil. A trusted friend and personal spiritual advisor to Mugabe, Jesuit priest and head of the mission in Harare shared with Holland the lessons that the Jesuit taught Mugabe in Kutama. Mugabe was injected with

“intellectual rigour” that was accompanied by “self-consciousness” which taught an individual person to “defend his actions” and to practice talking to oneself in meditation, “listen to the heart, listen to the self”, to have no interest in personal needs, and be efficient in what one does (Holland, 2008:143).

Perceptions of one as possessing intellectual rigour can easily breed intellectual snobbery and self-consciousness and combined with the will always to defend one’s actions can breed a feeling of righteousness which is the true substance of tyrants. Meditation as dialogue with the self, and not a prayer to a higher power, can be prayer to the self that easily can degenerate into a god-consciousness that is a tyrannical sensibility. After his Jesuit education, socialisation and conditioning, Mugabe’s religiosity became complicated if not corrupted. It was:

Such-pseudo-religiosity (that) arises out of the hotchpotch of ingredients that make up Mugabe’s political creed, and which might be described as Pan-African nationalism, founded upon a base of agrarian Maoism. It remains the core belief amongst Pan-African nationalists: a philosophy in which the peasant is exalted, the land is worshipped, much in the way the Nazi’s revered the soil (Hope, 2003:16).

In other words, Mugabe’s religious sensibility became confused and complicated with secular ideologies and political passions that produced in him a tyrant of some extents, with a dangerous god-complex. As cited in Moorcraft, Andrew Young, President Jimmy Carter’s envoy in the late 1970s, remarked that “the trouble with Mugabe is that when you have got a Jesuit education mixed with Marxist ideology, you have got a hell of a guy to deal with” (Moorcraft, 2012:19). In power, Mugabe carried himself with a “semi-religious temperament” that smelt of “communism and Christianity” but had lost the best of both beliefs and passions (Hope, 2003:75). A complicated communism, one that is mixed up with personal biases and fundamentalisms, and a confused Christianity may become a toxic political ideology and Will to Power, a religio-ideologico-political fundamentalism.

4.3 The Education of Mugabe

The nature and depth of Mugabe’s education is of interest to this study. In colonial and postcolonial Africa, education and educational qualifications became instrumentalised and even fetishised by black politicians as a recommendation to power. Mbembe (1992:27) notes that “the enumeration of the slightest educational achievement is one of the postcolonial codes of prestige” where leaders

“cite the number of diplomas with great care, they show off their titles.” In observance of the same, Thandika Mkandawire (2005:24) states that there is a negative tendency amongst African leaders, for purposes of legitimation of their power, to pretend to be philosopher kings and most times present their gut feelings and opinions as political philosophy. At high school, Mugabe was determined to be a teacher (Holland, 2008:11). The dream to be a teacher took Mugabe to the Ghana of the 1960s that was already independent and under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah where, as an expatriate teacher at St Mary’s College in the town of Takoradi, Mugabe experienced black euphoria and black power (Hill, 2003:52) that were being experienced and celebrated there. Being resident and working in an independent African country injected Mugabe with passionate dreams of an independent Zimbabwe. The early sixties were the time when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had spoken of the “winds of change” and decolonisation that were sweeping across Africa. Mugabe got intoxicated with the air of political independence in Ghana. Independent Ghana gave Mugabe a sense of the possibility and feasibility of an independent future Zimbabwe.

While on a visit back home in Rhodesia in 1960 on the 20th of July, as a teacher from Ghana, as narrated earlier in this study, Mugabe was asked to address an NDP rally in Hatfield. That address became Mugabe’s formal entrance into politics (Hill, 2003:53). Mugabe was introduced to the crowd of many thousands as a distinguished scholar that had travelled the world and boasted three university degrees (Meredith, 2002-26-27). University education, travel, work and stay in independent Ghana became an important recommendation for Mugabe to the crowd that roared in applause as he clearly articulated issues and narrated anecdotes from independent Ghana (Hill, 2003:53). Superior education and travel became fetishised and instrumentalised by Mugabe as part of his Will to Power. An intellectual image, even if it was not supported by any intellectual substance, could work as serious political capital in an Africa and a Rhodesia where educational opportunities were scarcely available to black people. The few educated black Africans, at the time, were regarded as the eyes, ears and mouths of their poor and illiterate people. Mugabe became the proverbial one-eyed man in the land of the blind.

Not only in Africa is an intellectual image usable for power and prestige. Fromm (1986:15) describes how even Joseph Stalin, a tyrant who had no literary or scientific talents, or any intellectual aptitude for that matter, was forced by the wish to seem and sound educated to write books or have them written in his name. The drive to use education and intellect for the legitimation

of leadership and power has led many political leaders, in their Will to Power, to resort even to plagiarism (Fromm, 1986:76). Mugabe clearly understood the potency of superior education in the pursuit of political power. Talking about his increasing number of university degrees Mugabe said “I do it for myself and for Zimbabwe” and “I know that one day we both will need these degrees” (Norman, 2004:62). This means that Mugabe consciously invested in education as a means to political power. In an appetite for power, Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet was pushed to embarrassing plagiarism in his political effort to be known and understood as “narrator, historian and strategist” (Burbach, 2003:31).

Africans, in different countries, during colonialism, sought knowledge as an instrument of national emancipation and integrity (Nkrumah, 1964:4). Education, especially higher education in combination with Christianity, had become an important facilitator of entrance by African peoples and their leaders into modernity (Mangcu, 2008:22). Even as he was informed but not educated, that is not developed into a rounded and ethical human being and leader, but only had a veneer of it (Holland, 2008:47), Mugabe weaponised his many university degrees for power and used his oratory prowess to become a leader amongst other leaders and a spokesperson for the liberation movement in Rhodesia. Diploma and degree certificates become fetishes and passports to power for the black elite in colonial Africa.

Before he went to Ghana, Mugabe in 1949 was admitted to the University of Fort Hare, a hotbed of an intellectual space, that produced many African political leaders, some whom Mugabe personally encountered there (Hill, 2003:51). It is also at the University of Fort Hare that Mugabe encountered the writings of Marx and Engels (Hill, 2003:51) that were a kind of revolutionary bible of African liberation movements. At that stage Mugabe began to mix his Catholic and Jesuit ideology with Marxism and African nationalism (Hill, 2003:51). Encountering radical African nationalist activists at Fort Hare University and also accessing Marxist literature that was largely banned in Rhodesia at the time nourished Mugabe’s political ideas and ambition, and energised his growing will to power. Higher education, travel in Africa and contact with other African nationalist political activists did not only radicalise Mugabe but also added to his superior oratory skills, gave him an edge over other political leaders, guerillas and the black masses in Rhodesia. That was the edge that Mugabe weaponised as a Will to Power and a monumentalisation of his believed chosenness, and pre-destination to leadership and greatness.

The education that Mugabe received and prided himself with was, in many ways, still colonial and colonising education. In the case of the education of Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Bronislaw Malinowski (1938: ix) described it as “the injury of higher education” in that it turned the colonised into colonisers of their own people that were full of a sense of superiority and power. Mugabe’s vaunted higher education became a legitimisation and an energy source of his will to power, turning him into a leader who fought colonialism and also became a kind of coloniser to his people that he ruled with an iron fist. The education of the colonised, especially political leaders, became part of what cemented and also troubled the relations between the coloniser and the colonised. Education gave such political activists and leaders as Mugabe a sense of superiority compared to the mass of their people and a kind of political confidence that they could contest and replace the white colonisers as leaders, and some kinds of new colonisers to their people. The way Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe using settler colonial political approaches makes native colonialism a subject to discuss in postcolonial Africa.

4.5 How Prison formed and Informed Robert Mugabe

In his observations, arguments and conclusions on “the birth of the prison” and the penal system, Michel Foucault (1977) suggests that prison was meant to discipline and punish renegades and get them comply with dictates of hegemonic power. The prison in the argument of Foucault both punished the body and tried to reform the soul and sensibility of the imprisoned, and in many ways the jail was a kind of school that produced persons with certain sensibilities. This section of the chapter seeks to explore how the Rhodesian colonial prison sought to discipline and punish Mugabe and also how he, in a counter-Foucauldian way, instrumentalised the prison experience which became suffering that contributed to his will to power. Mugabe and other Rhodesian liberation political activists were detained without trial in 1964. “Personally” Mugabe and “other old guard” nationalist leaders “had suffered severe hardship, imprisonment, exile and isolation” (Ranger, 1980: 75). In prison, Mugabe suffered physically and emotionally as he was even refused permission by the Rhodesian regime to attend the funeral of his son Nhamodzenyika who died back in Ghana (Holland, 2008:27). Nietzsche (1969:233), as part of the enunciation of the concept of the Will to Power in Zarathustra, presented suffering as part of the wounding that is a preparation for power and overcoming of obstacles and adversity. In the scheme of the Will to Power, injury

and suffering can be turned around into a motivation, not only for recovery and survival, but also for conquest and dominance.

Mugabe took the punishment and suffering in prison as a school and an entitlement to power. Mac McGuinness, one of Mugabe's jailers and prison warders, told Holland that over and above resenting being in prison, Mugabe "regarded it as a battleground for power, which it was, we talked about that. He saw it as a battle of wits and strategy, he said, and believe you me, Mugabe had a first class brain for the job." In that way Mugabe instrumentalised and weaponised his stay and suffering in prison as a strategy and entitlement for power, over and above that it equipped him with the anger and bitterness that he was later to vent on political opponents. Mugabe said prison did not cause him personal bitterness but "you came back with the sense that you had been punished for nothing, and that you must fight for that for which you have been punished" (Moorcraft, 2012:19). In a way, the prison punishment became a reason and a prize that gave Mugabe the will to fight even those who opposed his rule. During the long years in power Mugabe reminded his supporters and opponents that he and his comrades did not stay so long in prison in order to lose but to keep power. Stay and suffering in prison became a political credential and recommendation to power in post-independence Zimbabwe.

The use by Mugabe of his stay and suffering in prison as a kind of motivation for the Will to Power is expressed in how he combined prison life with education and more learning. Notably, "in prison Mugabe returned to his bookish ways" (Holland, 2008:26). Mugabe exhorted his fellow inmates in prison not to "waste prison time" but to use it to study and better themselves as future leaders of the country (Hill, 2003:61). In this education while in prison strategy Mugabe led by example by showing discipline in prison life as he did outside (Meredith, 2002:33). He not only read and studied himself but also taught other prisoners (Meredith, 2002:34) while also, in that way, asserting his authority and superiority over them as the most educated of them all.

Ceremonially, but politically significantly, other prisoners made him the "prison headmaster" (Holland, 2008:26-27, Hill, 2003:61). Mugabe is also remembered for making fiery political speeches in prison (Hill, 2003:61) to other prisoners, probably displaying his oratory arsenal, rehearsing for power after prison and also exhibiting his superior mind that he weaponised as a strong recommendation to power before and during his years in power. In being punished and suffering in prison, Mugabe used that moment as a learning opportunity in form of studying but

also in learning how later to reproduce the same prison system and conditions in punishing his opponents and challengers (Hill, 2003:61). The imprisoned was slowly internalising the prison system that he was to reproduce and use to punish his own victims in the classic way in which those who fought colonialism later became colonial overlords who dominated their own people. Like the school and the university college, prison became for Mugabe a site for internalising colonial sensibility and preparing himself, knowingly and unknowingly, for his role as a tyrannical and violent political leader that was to use punishment as weapon of rule. Prison also probably gave Mugabe the pain and the anger that he was to vent, reproduce and transmit in his tenure as the leader of Zimbabwe.

From the long and painful school of prison Mugabe does not seem to have gained and graduated in the same education as Nelson Mandela. Prison appears to have dehumanised Mugabe and humanised Nelson Mandela. This might be an indication that other personal and idiosyncratic factors might have contributed to the formation of Mugabe into a monster besides the pain and suffering of prison life and punishment. Mugabe was in jail for eleven years while Mandela was in for twenty-seven years. Reflecting on what prison did to him Nelson Mandela said:

It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for freedom of my people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I know anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who take away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred; he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressor and the oppressed alike are robbed of their humanity (Mandela 1994:611).

Mandela seems to have suffered prison not as a personal injury but a reminder to him of the importance of human freedom and dignity. The colonial prison and its wounding sent Mugabe to the opposite direction of bitterness, anger and vengeance. Zimbabweans were supposed to be eternally grateful that he suffered for them. Mandela's humanist and liberatory lesson about and from the colonial prison led Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016) to conclude that Mandela was possessed of decolonial humanism, especially in that, unlike Mugabe, Mandela saw the need for the freedom of

both the oppressor and the oppressed as part of true liberation where revenge has no political place. Mugabe entertained revenge and carried bitterness that made him an angry and dangerous leader that was not capable of love and the political care that liberation demands.

4.6 The Nationalist and Marxist Ideologisation of Robert Mugabe

In his description of ideology, Žižek (2013:4) says it is “a set of explicit and implicit, even unspoken, ethico-political and other positions, decisions, choices, etc. which predetermine our perception of facts, what we tend to emphasise or ignore, how we organise facts into a consistent whole of a narrative,” and in that way Žižek calls ideology a strong kind of bias. This section of the chapter aims to reflect on how the nationalist and Marxist ideologies that fueled the Zimbabwean and African liberation struggles might have contributed to the political and philosophical production of Mugabe, how the ideologies became for him and others a kind of strong and blinding bias. Based on his study of Karl Mannheim’s “ideology and Utopia” thesis, Gilbert Khadiagala has distinguished between what ideologies and utopias do differently in the progression of history in Africa. Ideologies are those ideas that both maintain and also stabilise an existing order while utopias are a family of ideas that force change in the prevailing social and political order (Khadiagala, 2010:376). It is the pursuant observation of this study that the nationalist and Marxist ideologies that drove the Zimbabwean struggle for liberation in which Mugabe was instrumental turned out to maintain and stabilise rather than seek to totally overthrow colonialism and coloniality, to the extent that Mugabe in power ended up being a coloniser in a black skin to his own people. In his essay on the “struggle for Southern Africa” Mugabe (1987:311) expresses a clear understanding of colonial and imperial domination of the Global South by the Global North, and how African countries have been reduced into “spheres of influence” of western political and economic powers. In spite of that clear understanding nationalist and Marxist sensibility seem to have limited Mugabe’s ability to see and to act beyond the ideological perimeters and limits that colonialism created. In that way ideologies can be perspectively blinding and limiting to liberation.

In the critique of “the pitfalls of national consciousness” in the African liberation struggles Fanon (1961:1) observed a problem of “unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and let it be said their cowardice.” This quote is repeated here for its clear explanation of the political limitations of Mugabe and other post-independence African leaders. Nationalism produced African nationalists into racists, tribalists, xenophobes and nativists who revived rather than dethroned colonialism and colonial domination. The Gukurahundi genocide that the Mugabe regime carried out in Matabeleland is understood to have been mostly driven by ethnic and tribalist hatred (Moorcraft, 2012). That genocide continues to be a divisive event in Zimbabwean history and politics to the extent that genuine nation building has not taken place as secessionist movements and protests keep popping up, in the same way in which Fanon (1961) predicted in his condemnation of the toxicity of nationalism that has a tendency to be exclusionary, nativist and conflictual. In a way, nationalism became inherently infected with the undemocratic and violent politics of colonialism:

But perhaps there was something inherent in nationalism itself even before the wars and the adoption of socialism, which gave rise to authoritarianism. Maybe nationalism’s emphasis on unity at all costs – its subordination of trade unions and churches and all other African organisations to its imperatives – gave rise to an intolerance of pluralism. Maybe nationalism’s glorification of the leader gave rise to a post-colonial cult of personality. Maybe nationalism’s commitment to modernisation, whether socialist or not, inevitably implied a ‘commandist’ state (Bhebe & Ranger, 2003:2).

Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger note that nationalism as an ideology even before it was mixed with Marxist and socialist thinking could have had its own underside of violence and authoritarianism. The nationalist underside and its political passions of commandist leadership would have shaped and driven leaders such as Mugabe into tyranny. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002:103) notes that what has escaped observation is that nationalist struggles of Zimbabwe did not simply become “schools of democracy” that “put people first” but they also became negative schools of despotism, authoritarianism, violence and the cult of the personality of the leader, such as became Mugabe as the leader of Zimbabwe. When Mugabe infamously described himself as having “degrees in violence” he might have spoken as a graduate of the nationalist school of tyranny that Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes. At the Lancaster House negotiations, by the sidelines, Mugabe alarmed his listeners by loudly claiming that he had a ‘post-graduate degree in terrorism’ (Tendi,

2019). He could boast about his culturalisation into violence. In that way, Mugabe as a nationalist leader became a product of a violent and despotic nationalist political culture that did not prepare him for democratic leadership but shaped and energised him for a toxic Will to Power.

In his engagement with African nationalism and Marxism as ideologies that had “power” but also became “faked” philosophies, Mbembe (2002:629) advances the idea that there was forceful falsehood in the political and liberatory claims of the two ideologies. That falsehood led to nationalism and Marxism becoming the opposite of what they proposed, advancing dominance instead of liberation, and the leaders consequentially becoming tyrants and not liberators:

I develop the idea that Marxism and nationalism, as practiced in Africa throughout the twentieth century, gave rise to two narratives on African identity: *nativism* and *Afro-radicalism*. I contend that the objective of these two discourses was not only to pronounce once and for all the “truth” on the issue of what Africa and Africans is (theory), but also to chart what might or should be the destiny of Africa and Africans in the world (praxis). I state that when analyzed closely, these two orthodoxies are revealed to be faked philosophies (*philosophies du travestissement*). As dogmas and doctrines repeated over and over again rather than methods of interrogation, they have led to a dramatic contraction and impoverishment both in the modes of conceptualizing Africa and in the terms of philosophical inquiry concerning the region. Nativism, everywhere actively lamenting the loss of purity, is a form of cultural-ism preoccupied with questions of identity and authenticity. Faced with the malaise resulting from the encounter between the West and the indigenous worlds, nativism proposes a return to an ontological and mythical “Africanness” in which the African subject might once again say “I” and express him- or herself in his or her own name. Drawing its fundamental categories from a Marxist political economy, Afro-radicalism claims to have founded a so-called revolutionary politics, which seeks to break away from imperialism and dependence (Mbembe, 2002:629).

Mugabe, arguably, became a faked philosopher and faulted practitioner of Marxism and Nationalism. The Afro-radicalism and nativism that Mbembe describes make the claim to but really do not make a break with coloniality but maintain it. The nativism and Afro-radicalism that led Mugabe (2002) at the Earth Summit in Johannesburg to famously and also infamously tell the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair to “keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe” can be limiting in that while it expels imperialists from the land it also reduces a country like Zimbabwe and its people into the property of a singular dictator. In adopting Nationalism and Marxism, and also being shaped, in thought and in deed, by the two ideologies, Mugabe and others, were formed

and produced into Afro-radicals and nativists as incapable of democracy and human liberation as the same colonialism that they set out to fight. For Mugabe could to symbolically and politically expel Tony Blair back to England but to go on to erect himself as the owner of the land and the people of Zimbabwe was to produce himself into an imperial overlord with the same toxic Will to Power and domination as the colonial settlers and Empire builders.

An important reflection into the workings of nationalism is provided by Benedict Anderson (1993) who notes not only how nations are imagined communities but also how nationalism produces kinds of patriotisms that get men and women to want to kill and be killed for the nation and the country. Anderson reflects how nationalism produces new enemies, insiders and outsiders and enemies and friends in progression. In the case of Mugabe and Zimbabwean nationalism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1140) observes how Mugabe as a nationalist leader began to apply toxic nationalism and patriotism in Zimbabwe and on Zimbabweans:

After 2000 and 2002 elections in which many people voted for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the parliamentary and presidential elections, Mugabe began to divide Zimbabweans into traitors, puppets, sell-outs, enemies of the nation versus patriots and authentic national subjects. Those who had voted for the MDC became categorised as traitors, sell-outs, puppets and enemies of Zimbabwe. Only those who voted for and belonged to the ruling Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) qualified as patriots and authentic national subjects. This mentality enabled a politics of exclusion of a large number of people from the nation and the authorization of violence against those who were written out of the nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:1140).

What Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes here are the same divisive toxicities of national consciousness that Fanon condemned and the limits of Afro-radicalism and nativism that Mbembe denounced, where nationalism as an ideology of politics and power turns the nationalist leader into a divider and dominator of the nation, country and the people that he powerfully claims to represent and to liberate. Moore (2008:6) goes back to the history of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe to unearth disunity, the crushing of dissent and rebellions and uses of violence to institute hegemony of the party line.

In the thesis about “discipline and punishment in ZANLA: 1964 TO 1979” Gerald Mazarire (2011) explores and uncovers uses of shootings and cruel torture in maintaining discipline and obedience in the nationalist movement that formed and produced Mugabe as the supreme leader

who eventually became president of Zimbabwe. This history of Mugabe's nationalist and also Marxist ideological formation and political production became a history of violence and domination that could not possibly have produced a democratic but only a tyrannical leader. Nationalism as an ideology that produces political passions creates what Freud (1994:43) called narcissism of difference where those that disagree with one idea that is loved and believed are hated and must be eliminated without any compromise, understanding or sympathy.

From a world systemic and decoloniality stand point, Ramon Grosfoguel states that one of the causes of the failure of decolonisation in the Global South was that Marxist and nationalist political paradigms that were pushed by and also pushed decolonisation movements of the South were limited and incapable of delivering liberation. In that view, "the old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power" from colonial administrations "at the level of a nation-state are not sufficient, because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power" (Grosfoguel, 2011:17). In the absence of colonial administration, politically and otherwise, nationalist leaders such as Mugabe remained behind advancing the colonial machinery of power and in a way being the new colonisers to their own people. Nationalism and Marxism as ideologies that Mugabe advanced and those which also propelled him as political passions seem to have formed and produced him and his political thought and practice, into a leader with a tyrannical and violent will to power.

4.7 The Colonial Formation and Production of Robert Mugabe

Colonialism itself as a system, this study observes, contributed to the formation of Mugabe's political character. Perhaps one of the central questions in understanding the political life and thought of Mugabe has been the question of how a liberator became a coloniser and a dominator of his own country and people. This section of the chapter delves into how colonialism as a system produced Mugabe into the political thinker and actor that he eventually became. Freud (1994:16) in pursuit of psychoanalytical understanding observed that there is a way in which human beings tend to seek pleasure in those things that cause them pain. It might be possible that Mugabe found psychotic enjoyment and fulfillment in reproducing the pain and suffering that he went through. Machiavelli (2003:24) also noted that there are political leaders who find it hard to introduce change and difference and tend to rule by imitation and duplication. This study stands to observe if, in the Freudian sense, Mugabe was caused so much pain and suffering by colonialism and

colonial rule that he inevitably came to seek use of and happiness in the same political system, or that, in the Machiavellian sense, Mugabe came to unconsciously or consciously imitate and reproduce colonial rule as the only form of rule that he knew and had impacted on his psyche.

Holland (2008:110) notes that Mugabe's post-independence cabinet of ministers became full of Anglophiles, blacks that admired and loved the English and British way of life. Peter Godwin (2008) observes how in dress and cultural taste Mugabe had become thoroughly British. Behind the vitriolic and venomous speeches against the Rhodesians and the British as settlers and imperialists, Hope (2003) senses in Mugabe a tragic and perplexing anglophilia and deep admiration for the former colonisers and their political system. As this study will show, Mugabe courted the Rhodesian and British securocrats that ran the colonial administration's security and administration to remain in Zimbabwe and work with him. It is possible that as an inexperienced guerilla leader Mugabe wanted to benefit from the administrative experience of the departing colonial regime and also to demonstrate reconciliation and forgiveness of the former enemy, for international political legitimation. It is also possible that out of his own Will to Power, Mugabe admired the efficiency and power of the colonial machinery of security, insecurity and domination and wished to adopt and inherit the monstrous system for his own use and abuse against political enemies as unfolded in the Gukurahundi genocide of 1982 to 1987. In the Gukurahundi Genocide Mugabe contracted North Korean experts to train a militia that carried out the massacres. That Mugabe went on to cut secret political deals with the racist apartheid regime of South Africa behind the back of other African nationalist and liberation movements (Holland, 2008:36) may suggest the latter to be true, that he admired colonial and apartheid machineries of power and he wanted some for his own will to power.

By virtue of his education and political activism Mugabe became part of the African elite that became historically positioned to be complicit in colonialism or to challenge it and confront the white settlers. This class of Africans that Fanon (1961) accuses of treachery and laziness was a product of colonialism as much as it acted out challenges to colonialism. Peter Ekeh notes thus:

In the course of colonization a new bourgeois class emerged in Africa composed of Africans who acquire western education in the hands of the colonizers, and their missionary collaborators, and who accordingly were most exposed to European colonial ideologies of all groups of Africans. In many ways the drama of colonialism is the history of the clash between

the European colonizers and this emergent bourgeois class. Although native to Africa, the African bourgeois class depends on colonialism for its legitimacy. It accepts the principles implicit in colonialism but it rejects the foreign personnel that ruled Africa. It claims to be competent enough to rule, but it has no traditional legitimacy. In order to *replace* the colonizers and rule its own people it has invented a number of interest-begotten theories to justify that rule (Ekeh, 1975:96).

In a strong way, as Ekeh demonstrates, colonialism produced through its education system and ideological machinery, a class of Africans that might have been black in skin colour and African by nativity but were to be the new colonisers of Africa who became managers of the modern and colonial world system in African countries. Elements of the western bourgeois that colonised Africa found themselves challenged by elements of an emerging African bourgeois class that had their own elitist interests that were removed from the will and interests of the mass of Africans:

The ‘fight’ for independence was thus a struggle for power between the two bourgeois classes involved in the colonization of Africa. The intellectual poverty of the independence movement in Africa flows from this fact, that what was involved was not the issue of differences of ideas regarding moral principles but rather the issue of *which* bourgeois class should rule Africans (Ekeh 1975: 102).

The European bourgeois class of colonisers and the African bourgeois class of nationalist decolonisers were both driven by elitist, violent and domineering interests that were colonial in nature. The African black leaders became colonial in the way they happily inherited colonial modes of rule and became domineering and tyrannical. In that way, by producing through education and ideologisation, an African pretentious middle class, colonialism produced political leaders such as Mugabe who became the new colonisers of Africa that were black but used colonial sensibility and securocratic methods of ruling and misruling their countries. It is for that reason that Holland (2008:84) argues that at the end of the day Ian Smith and Mugabe needed each other in order to exist. In pretending to crush terrorism and instill civilisation and development in Rhodesia Smith found his political legitimation and in pretending to fight settler colonialism, Mugabe also found his political claim to fame, yet both of them were despots powered by an elitist Will to Power.

Not only the complicity and competition between the bourgeois colonising class and the bourgeois class of the colonised infected the emerging class of African leaders with a culture of colonial

politics. Colonial political culture seems to have infected the politics of the nationalist liberation fighters and given it a violent toxicity that haunted the post-independence era. Colonialism and its violent and authoritarian politics seem to have inevitably corrupted the political mindsets of those that were fighting against it:

Colonial authoritarianism, far from deepening a commitment to democratic norms and practices on the African nationalist elite, merely consolidated an incipient authoritarian psyche in the nationalist leadership. The authoritarianism of the colonial era reproduced itself within the nationalist political movements. The war of liberation too reinforced rather than undermined this authoritarian culture (Mair & Sithole, 2002:21).

In the bitter fight against colonialism, fighters for liberation such as Mugabe learnt toxic lessons from the enemy and were to reproduce the colonial politics upon their people and countries in the post-independence era. In truth, it appears that “Mugabe’s political education came from the autocrat Ian Smith, who had learnt his formative lessons from imperious British colonisers” (Holland, 2008: xv). What Peter Hudson (2013:263) calls the “colonial unconscious” is the way in which at a sub-conscious level, even those that fight coloniality easily tend to learn from it and eventually reproduce it. In many ways therefore, the very struggle against colonialism became a school in political violence and authoritarianism.

In the historical narrative about “discipline and punishment in ZANLA: 1964-1979,” in reference to the guerilla movement that Mugabe led and which in many ways produced him, Mazarire (2011) describes festivals of violence in form of shootings in cold blood, torture, assassinations and other inhuman forms of punishment in the guerilla camps. In his own words Mugabe graphically described the way the guerillas operated and dealt with dissent: “The ZANU-PF axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony that binds us all” (cited in Mair & Sithole, 2002:22), that is, where political persuasion failed violence and physical elimination became the only option. Coming from that political tradition of the “axe” and political culture of eliminations and assassinations, Mugabe was in actuality not formed for democracy but for tyranny and a nihilist political will to power.

So far it appears that Mugabe was conditioned by colonialism and also shaped by the liberation struggle itself into a political thinker and actor that was not ready for democracy but was charged for a tyrannical will to power. However, it also appears that a permissive international relations political climate also allowed Mugabe’s tyrannical will to power to thrive and flourish into its

bitter fruition. In reference to the post-independence Gukurahundi genocide, Timothy Scarnecchia (2011) gives details on how Mugabe was able to carry out the genocide because the world superpowers looked aside as they saw Mugabe as a pillar against Soviet communism in Southern Africa, and they were keen that post-independence Zimbabwe should be a success. At the time the white and the western world was pacified by the right political noises of peace and reconciliation that Mugabe was making (Saunders, 2000:17) and there was no simple indication that a genocide might be unfolding in Zimbabwe. At the time “Britain saw Zimbabwe as a foreign office trophy” (Holland, 2008: xiii) mainly because white people were not being attacked. As a white person that once supported Mugabe, Holland regrets that: “I realise that I and other well-intentioned individuals may have helped Mugabe to become the man he is today; if we reacted differently to the early signs of paranoia, could Zimbabwe have been saved?” (Holland, 2008: xiii). Mugabe was the darling of the western world at a time when he should have been condemned and opposed; even the queen of England knighted him well after the genocide (Holland, 2008:214). In that way, Mugabe also became a product of international relations negligence and blunders. Mugabe’s vaunted struggle against settler colonialism and western imperialism, looked at carefully therefore, becomes what Žižek (2016) called a “pseudo-struggle” where one imperial fundamentalism clashes with another fundamentalism in a struggle that is not of interest or of any benefit to the mass of the people that needed liberation most.

What Timothy Chappell (2005: 11) calls the “egocentric predicament” and “the inescapable self” is a philosophical challenge based on the truth that each individual cannot escape the problem that some of their most deeply held certainties about life might be illusions and imprisoning imaginations and fantasies. Mugabe does not seem to have escaped what Fromm (1986:1) describes as the “chains of illusion” that bind the mind to false realities and beliefs. The Lacanian narcissist that Malcom Bowie (1991) discusses is such a person as Mugabe whose superior education and believed pre-destination of greatness removed from the real world and located in a hypereality of the will to power. The paranoiac that Žižek (1996) notes as the performer that has two fathers and wears seven veils is also such a person as Mugabe whose life had to be a performance of illusions and beliefs that he wished could be realities. And after believing in his pre-destined rule for life he performed the life and world of that kind of political messiah. Even after being overthrown from power in a coup, he acted as the betrayed and crucified messiah whose opponents knew not what they were doing. In the sum of his conditioning and production by the

many and different factors discussed above, Mugabe seems to have become the Fanonian colonised and colonising native, for “the native is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor” (Fanon, 2001:41). Mugabe’s experience of life and colonialism did not, like Nelson Mandela, condition him into a liberator and conciliator but a coloniser and dominator.

4.8 On the Politics of the Will to Live

After exploring how Mugabe might have been conditioned and formed to be susceptible to the politics of the Will to Power, it is important for this chapter to examine the possibilities offered by the politics of the Will to Live. The observation of this study is that Mugabe could have been formed otherwise and become another leader that deployed a more liberating political paradigm. The cliché that politics is a dirty game unfortunately seeks to give respectability and acceptance to a current of thought that there will never be fairness and justice in politics, that politicians will always be tricksters or violent rogues. This study notes that politics and politicians, away from post-political excitements and enchantment must always be kept under democratic watch and check to avoid their degeneration into tyranny and other monstrosities. That political vigilance does not mean that there are no other politics besides colonial politics and politics of the Will to Power and its paradigm of war. This section of the chapter seeks to reflect on the politics of the Will to Live as politics of liberation that Mugabe was tragically and unfortunately not formed into.

Following the questionable wisdom of the cliché that politics must normally and naturally be a dirty game, Mugabe in all the Will to Power to which he was formed and produced, would be understood and rationalised as but another politician among other politicians in the world. Humanist and decolonial philosophers from different directions of the world have tried to propose another politics that is not the Will to Power and other politicians that are not formed into tricksters and violent rogues. Despite all his limits and ignorance of any other world besides the white European world, Immanuel Kant (1991) “in answer to the question: what is enlightenment?” attempted a politics where politicians make public use of reason and strive towards “perpetual peace” where even an enemy in politics can be trusted to respect the humanity of his adversaries and not practice the politics of annihilation. Against leaders such as Mugabe that reproduced and imitated colonial politics of violence and coercion, Fanon advocated a politics of liberation that abandons the example of imperial Europe and her settler colonialists in Africa:

Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe (Fanon, 2001:251).

What Mugabe and other African post-independence tyrants did was to engage in the nauseating imitation of colonial and violent modes of rule that imperial Europeans spread throughout the globe. Whilst Fanon does not mean that before settler colonialism Africa was a peaceful paradise, he emphasises that the political example of imperial and colonising Europe was murderous and nihilistic. Mugabe and others at best became conspirators with settler colonialism and at worst became native colonialists, by imitating and reproducing violent and coercive colonial modes of rule. Fanon delivered a grave warning and also a weighty suggestion concerning another politics in Africa; politics that like that suggested by Kenneth Kaunda (1966) put humanity in the front seat and forbade violence, bloodletting and killings for power that Mugabe exemplified. Said Fanon:

Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would almost be a caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us (Fanon, 2001:254).

This study understands Fanon as preaching the politics of the Will to Live that forbade imitating violent and bad examples of the politics of conquest, Empire-building, colonisation and domination of one by another. The politics of the Will to Live, otherwise, demands from humanity another politics that is higher and deeper than the Will to Power that valorises conquest and domination. The Fanonian question was a “question of the Third World starting a new history of Man” (Fanon, 2001:254) that will provide a future of Man and liberation.

When Mugabe threatened revenge on Rhodesian whites that he called snakes that must be killed and reduced the people of the Midlands and Matabeleland to vermin that must be destroyed he was repeating and reproducing the colonial. The colonial “European game has finally ended” according to Fanon (2001:251) because of the crimes of slavery and colonialism, “Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason, and she is

running headlong into the abyss”(Fanon, 2001:252). The Will to Power that drove imperialism and colonialism of Europe in Africa was a political bad example and as such, in the Will to Live and the politics of liberation, “ we can today do anything so long as we do not imitate Europe” (Fanon, 2001:252). The anti-colonialism of Mugabe and other African postcolonial tyrants remained imbricated in colonial politics and did not graduate into the Will to Live and the politics of liberation. It is for that reason that this study observes Mugabe to have been a native colonialist of a kind.

The politics of the Will to Live is anti-systemic and decolonial. Ramon Grosfoguel (2011:1) has proposed “anti-systemic politics” that proposes life and the human beyond “Third World and Eurocentric fundamentalisms” where “we can overcome Eurocentric modernity without throwing away the best of modernity as many Third World fundamentalists do.” The decolonial politics of the Will to Live is anti-systemic and not simplistically against European modernity and Europeans. In being nativist, for instance, asking Tony Blair to keep to England and insisting that he would keep his Zimbabwe Mugabe, who once promised that Africans will one day throw away their shoes in rejection of western culture (Hope, 2003), was practicing Third World fundamentalism that makes the world a small and inhuman place. Mugabe, according to Ian Phimister (2009) carried a ‘Zimbabwe is mine’ political attitude that was nativist and a kind of the political fundamentalism that Grosfoguel condemns. Similar to Grosfoguel, Freire (1983) proposed a politics of liberation where the oppressed, that is the colonised peoples of Africa and Latin America, did not only seek to liberate themselves but also the oppressors who were imprisoned in their being oppressors, to create a human universe:

A good example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not anti-modern fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as “commanding while obeying” or “we are all equals because we are all different.” What seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern (Grosfoguel, 2011: 36).

In his fight against colonialism, imperialism and the toxicity of western modernity and coloniality, Mugabe, as this study will show, does not seem to have managed to seek to redefine coloniality; he degenerated into affirming and confirming it the way Third World fundamentalists do. In

explaining the “miracle” of the South African transition from apartheid to democracy, a highly unexpected political eventuality, Willie Esterhuyse (2012) said the transition happened reasonably peacefully because blood enemies that were not supposed to see and talk to each other decided to make unlikely friendships and talked. Mugabe, by the foregoing, does not seem to have been formed and produced to be able to form unlikely friendships and to climb down to talk to enemies, his will to power forbade that level of humility which Kenneth Kaunda (1966) defined as African political humanism, which this study will elaborate on later on as critical decolonial humanism, of the Will to live (Dussel, 2008) that is opposed to the politics of the Will to Power. Over and above a critique of Mugabe’s politics of the Will to Power therefore, this study, at its conclusion, posits to propose a critical humanist politics of the Will to Live.

4.9 Conclusion

In summation, this chapter has explored the political and philosophical formation of Mugabe. Guided by the theoretical assumption that Mugabe as much corrupted power as he was corrupted by it the chapter uses some philosophical and psychological scholarly submissions to examine Mugabe the person, his thought and political actions. The use of psychological scholarly views to study the formation of Mugabe is done without the study making claims to any expertise in psychology to avoid pop-psychologising the subject. The narrative of the political thought and practice of Mugabe is a tale of how the oppressed can eventually become oppressors, in the same psychological way, which Holland has highlighted, in which abused children often assume a propensity to be abusive parents. This chapter has explored how leaders are not only born but are also made and produced by familial experiences, social conditions and circumstances, their socialisation, education and ideologisation. Leaders have their human agency but they grow and develop in a socially, historically and politically structured way that permits and forbids their wills. Mugabe’s largely absent father and rather over-present mother seem to have shaped him into an angry and driven individual that grew up with fear and a grudge. His wives were different, the first was outwardly humble the other openly vainglorious, but they became the same in using his power for their personal gain. The Jesuits imparted to him a kind of Christianity that has no Christ and that suggests a religious will to power that encourages an individual to believe in their power of conquest. Mugabe seems to have been educated, with many university degrees, into an individual who is informed but not really educated in being a rounded and mature person; he instrumentalised

his education to overcome and dominate others. The suffering in prison deepened his anger and he turned around to use it as a trophy and prize to get entitlement to power. He reproduced the cruelty of his punishment by punishing others when he got into power. The ideologies of Marxism and nationalism did not better Mugabe as he seems to have magnified their negative influences in becoming a kind of nativist and a fascist. In his fight against colonialism, Mugabe, gradually became a kind of colonialist himself, in word and in deed. Above all the factors, conditions and experiences that seem to have contributed to the formation of his will to power, the belief in his pre-destined rule, that was imprinted in him as child seems to have become a powerful idea and blinding belief that insulated him from reality, making him both a narcissist and paranoiac, who loved himself, feared and hated others.

Chapter Five

Robert Mugabe:

Performances, Simulations and Dissimulations of the Will to Power

You are Zimbabweans, you belong to Zimbabwe which was brought by the blood of our heroes lying here and others scattered throughout the country. Should we give it away to sell-outs here in Harare? This is our capital city. You are sons and daughters of revolutionaries. What wrong have we done you? Harare: think again, think again, think again!

Robert Mugabe (2005:1).

President Robert of Zimbabwe has emerged as one of the most controversial figures, eliciting both admiration and condemnation. What is termed 'mugabeism' is a summation of a constellation of political behaviour, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have crystalised around Mugabe's life.

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1139).

Mugabeism is a politics of reconstruction and 'return to the source', in which there is a clear and vicious selective reproduction of the people in a selectively reproduced and redistributed landscape. This landscape is a tight matrix which is more than a metaphor of the 'house of stone', is a mindset which is as inflexible as it is stony in its timelessness and imperviousness ... the Third Chimurenga is a revival of essentialist and nativist politics, something comparable to Adolf Hitler's ideal of the Aryan race.

Robert Muponde (2007:177).

5) Introduction

It is noteworthy, as Mamdani (2008) opined, that Mugabe ruled through a complex mixture of coercion and consent. He could be persuasive and appeal to the history and patriotism of Zimbabweans as well as be threatening and quick to deploy violence. This chapter aims to flesh out the interpretations of Mugabe's Will to Power. After the two previous chapters, it is perhaps a fair starting point to consider the question of whether Mugabe could have managed to overcome

what Timothy Chappell (2005:11) has called “the problem of the inescapable self.” In other words, could Mugabe have become anything else given the fortress of his ideological beliefs, political constructions and fantasies that came to imprison his entire mental and political universe? Mugabe’s early socialisation, education by the Jesuits and ideologisation into Marxism and nationalism, imprisonment and colonial subjection and suffering, in the view of this study, combined to form a political universe that he was not able to see and feel beyond.

The present chapter, which delves into a discussion, interpretation and analysis of the political words and actions of Mugabe, advances the study by engaging with ‘mugabeism’ and ‘mugabeness’ as performances of power and spectacles of the Will to Power as a passion and a desire for total domination and absolute power. Mugabe in power came to understand those Zimbabweans who opposed his rule as lost sell-outs who must urgently “think again, think again, think again!” (Mugabe, 2005:1) and return to his stewardship of the country. In saying that, Mugabe was being both persuasive, appealing to Zimbabwean patriotism, and also threatening the nation to ‘think again’ before provoking his well-understood vengeance.

In his Will to Power and blindness to his wrongs, Mugabe had become not only a personification of but also a dramatisation of a ‘mugabeism’ that was a collection of political behaviours, ideas, utterances and spectacular rhetoric (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:1139) which this study seeks to understand and demonstrate as the manifestations and performances of the Will to Power as an overcoming passion. ‘Mugabeism’ as political thought and performance became a fundamentalism that sought to reconstruct history and politics, and to reproduce people in an ‘inflexible’ and tyrannical fashion that was impervious to contrary purposes in a Will to Power comparable to Adolf Hitler’s ideal of the pursuit of the Aryan race (Muponde, 2007:177). Mugabeism as both a mental fortress and also prison became a rigid framework and script that Mugabe could only perform as a tyrannical script and a set of political commandments. In other words, Mugabeism became an inescapable and inevitable self for Mugabe, from which he could only be liberated by others and not himself. Deep inside himself Mugabe might have believed he was a gallant and patriotic Zimbabwean that had treasured traditional and historical national values to protect. His belief in himself might have prevented him from seeing his own tyranny and threats to Zimbabwe.

This chapter elects to critically read and interpret Mugabe’s words and actions as performances, simulations and dissimulations, of the Will to Power. When Plato (1993:200) condemned the poets

and artistic performers as unwanted practitioners of the politics of “unreality” in the ideal Republic, he probably was rebuking the fictive imaginism and performances of toxic power. Mugabe forcefully circulated fictions and myths of the ‘revolution’ of which populations in Zimbabwe were reminded to always think again, in spite of their experiences of tyranny and suffering under his rule. As this study has thus far demonstrated, Mugabe had come to understand and believe in the power that was in himself so much that once he was elected into power he was convinced that his political legitimacy was unquestionable except to those that are lost and mistaken and must therefore, for their own good, think again, and return to the source of right. In the “unreality” but impassioned belief of the political Mugabe, to be Zimbabwean had come to be one with belonging to him, unless one was lost or mistaken. In his mind, Mugabe had arrived at being one with the blood of the heroes and the history of the country. As Muponde (2007) states, and as this study understands, Mugabe’s will and resolve to power had become “stony” and ‘timeless’ in an unbending and imprisoning manner.

5.1) The Power in Mugabe and Mugabe in Power.

At this juncture of the chapter, it is important to recall that Mugabe, as Heidi Holland (2008) notes, was brought up believing that God had elected him to rule Zimbabwe for life. The strength of that belief as an organising idea of Mugabe’s political life cannot be underestimated. A leader that believes he is answerable to God or that he is a divine instrument on earth may be a dangerous tyrant. Once in power and entrenched Mugabe came to personally profess that he never sought or campaigned for political power and office, but power sought and found him (Holland, 2008). For that reason, and in his mind, those that opposed his rule and his lieutenants that aspired and jostled for his post were wrong. When Mugabe emerged victorious in the first independence elections of Zimbabwe whose results were announced on the 4th of March 1980, Mugabe’s mother, Bona, was the first to complain and oppose his election; she cried “he is not capable of doing it. He is not the kind of person to look after other people” (cited in Godwin, 2010:16). She had, as this study has so far shown, birthed Mugabe, nurtured his political ambitions and had him believe in his predestined and divine anointed rule, and here she had come to birth the opposition and resistance to his power that followed him until the announcement of his dethronement in a military coup came on the 14th of November 2017. Mugabe’s Will to Power was in that way born together in one with the seeds of its opposition and ultimate demise. In that metaphoric and symbolic way,

Mugabe's primary source of the Will to Power became the principal beginning of his tragic and pathetic end.

A certain apparent humility and reluctance to assume power concealed Mugabe's spirited Will to Power. In 1974 Mugabe was the Secretary General of ZANU when Ndabaningi Sithole, the president of the party, was to be dethroned through a vote of no confidence that would elevate Mugabe to the presidency. Mugabe protested the dethronement and abstained from the vote. In 1962, too, when Joshua Nkomo as leader was being ousted, by party cadres and a split from ZAPU was being engineered, Mugabe, even as the overthrow of Nkomo was to elevate him politically, was opposed to the political move and reluctant to accept the split (Holland, 2008:42). In the true nature of the Will to Power that is assured of itself and its right to power Mugabe was not being simply humble about power or being magnanimous in inevitable victory, he was exercising that humility of the Will to Power that is the same as pride which Friedrich Nietzsche (2006:99) describes. As one who believed he was born with power and believed that power was already in him he would not celebrate power as seemingly given to him by other people, his was from God. Further, as one who believed himself with power from God, the idea of any other leader being deposed from power was unacceptable as it seemed to foretell his own possible removal one day to come. In that way, Mugabe's reluctance to accept opportunities for power was not out of humility or polite reluctance but out of pride of the Will to Power, a disinterest that is indicative of a much deeper and higher interest. Mugabe in his will to power did not want to go down in history and destiny as one that was once empowered or brought to power by other mortals, and he did not want around him comrades and colleagues that believed that they can make and unmake leaders, for he was a natural leader for life, in his mind.

For the reason that he thought power was naturally and normally his, Mugabe was contemptuous of democratic elections. In his Will to Power, Mugabe had come to assume that power was in him and that even elections were not necessary in installing or removing him from power. The electoral victory that delivered Mugabe to power in 1980 had been forced using violence and terrorisation of the electorate to the extent that General Peter Walls wrote to the British Prime Minister asking that the elections be nullified as they were neither free nor fair (Meredith, 2002:12). Supporters of ZAPU, the rival political party were "terrorised" and "brutalised" while Nkomo's protestations were ignored (Bourne, 2011:98). To Mugabe the elections were a formality to satisfy international

expectations and provide a semblance of legitimacy; otherwise he already had the power in him. Mugabe's dismissive attitude to elections was betrayed in the run up to the 2008 presidential elections when he faced stiff challenge from the MDC and its popular leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Mugabe called the coming vote not only a formality but a waste of time:

You can vote for them [MDC], but that would be a wasted vote. I am telling you. You would just be cheating yourself. There is no way we can allow them to rule this country. Never, ever. We have a job to do, to protect our heritage. The MDC will not rule this country. It will never, ever happen. We will never allow it (Mugabe, 2008:2).

Mugabe exuded such arrogant impunity and negligence towards democratic processes that he considered unnecessary and a waste of time. For Mugabe and his charged Will to Power only violence represented by and symbolised in the gun was the insurance and assurance to power:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of a gun. The guns which produces the vote should remain its security officer- its guarantor. The peoples' votes and people's guns are always inseparable twins (cited in Meredith, 2002:1).

The ballot as a democratic substitute for the bullet was not in Mugabe's consideration or care. It is important for this study to reflect on how Mugabe's Will to Power ballooned to this level of impunity, arrogance and bellicosity. In his study of "human passions" Malcolm Bowie (1991) explores the work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan who both emphasise the importance of family life and conditions in the social and political formation of individuals and in giving them the phobias and phobias that drive their thoughts and actions. The family becomes a psychological "force field" that is the battery that energises and drives an individual (Bowie, 1991:5). Frantz Fanon (2008:109) also notes that the political and social behaviour of adults, in the view of psychoanalysis, can be traced to their infantile and formative conditioning in the family and lower schooling. In that way, the Jesuit prophecy about his predestined greatness and leadership which his mother instilled in Mugabe and family in his years as toddler (Holland, 2008) came to not only be an attitude of his but a total identity and an inescapable self of his, a fortress and a prison to the self.

Freud noted how the family provided the forming child with Oedipal influences that got him to overcome and symbolically 'kill his father' as he gains his own manhood and identity (Bowie, 1991:33). Lacan noted that the child goes through a "mirror stage" in the family where he receives

an image and an imagination of himself and can say “I am that” while he goes on to perform that identity (Bowie, 1991:21) to its fulfilment. Both Freud and Lacan saw “narcissism” as self-love and self-worship that can develop into a delusion and paranoia that drives a grown human being into a kind of insanity and lunacy of his own image and power (Bowie, 1991:33). The dismissal of elections and belief in “guns” and power by any means necessary became a true insanity of Mugabe who now believed in “government through military operations” (Rupiya, 2005:116). The gun, as a symbol of violence and an instrument of power, had become a possession that also possesses one as in a fetish and a talisman.

In the Freudian and Lacanian senses, it is a self-loving, self-worshipping and therefore paranoid and insane Mugabe who did not only dismiss democratic elections but also ignored court judgements and rulings in Zimbabwe:

The courts can do whatever they want. But no judicial decision will stand on our way... my own position is that we should not even be defending our decision before the courts. This country is our country and this land is our land ... They think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans, Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans (cited in Meredith, 2002:203).

These words betray Mugabe’s fundamentalist politics and view of the world. Mugabe could, with a stony belief in his own reason and truth, charged that the British and white commercial farmers did not have “divine right” because he believed that he had divine right to Zimbabwe, Zimbabweans and the land. In that way he could stand on the international and national stage of public opinion and judgement and utter the insanity that “no judicial decision will stand on our way” (Meredith, 2002:18) as those that have divine right and are not subject to democratic elections and earthly courts can say with authority.

If power and political legitimacy did not need democratic elections and court rulings then it was power and legitimacy that was in Mugabe himself as a divine appointee, which is ordinarily an insane and removed understanding of the world in the present. The guns and violence that Mugabe understood as the twin and assurance of his power were perhaps, in his view, instruments of what Walter Benjamin called “divine violence” that needs no justification as it is from God himself and human beings have to suffer it with not only stoicism but gratitude. Mugabe was insane in the extent of his removal and insulation from the real world of life and politics.

In a psychological and political way, Mugabe was driven by the power of lunacy and had become a lunatic in power that makes real his own description of the Gukurahundi genocide that he said he committed as a “moment of madness.” In the understanding of power and the will to power in its maddening effects, Heidi Holland (2008: xiv) is perhaps correct that “Mad bob Mugabe is concealing significant secrets and lessons of history,” one lesson being exactly how a human being can be driven to lunacy by appetites for absolute power. Like Nietzsche who in his own *Will to Power* in philosophy had come to “construct his own category of truth” (Badiou, 2001:2) Mugabe constructed a political universe of his own where he enjoyed god-like powers and privileges, where democratic elections and judicial decisions did not matter. In other words, Mugabe might have, in his belief that he was sent of God, become a kind of religious-political fundamentalist that could dismiss the laws of man and democratic principles.

5.2 Mugabe: Performance, Simulation and Dissimulation

Those that mistakenly take themselves as messengers of God on earth may begin to perform that role by simulating divine commission and dissimulating the reality of their fallibility as people of flesh and blood. Mugabe’s *Will to Power* might have misled him into that situation. Nietzsche (1968:3) correctly described the *Will to Power* as a desire and a passion whose drive was spirited “at a revaluation of all values” and a construction of a nihilist intellectual and political universe. In that way, Muponde (2007:177) is correct that “mugabeism is a politics of reconstruction” that is accompanied by a “vicious selective reproduction” of political values to suit Mugabe’s own *Will to Power*. To achieve the revaluation and reconstitution of the political, Mugabe had to produce and perform what Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:1139) has correctly noted as “political behaviour” and political “utterances” that sought to bring to reality his own political world that affirmed his illusions and delusions of political grandeur that were rooted in believed divine anointing and inspiration. Mugabe’s stated historical and political goal became the reconstitution of Zimbabwe into a one party state (Meredith, 2002:60, Norman, 2004:93, Smith, 1997:370, Bourne, 2011:265) under himself as the executive president for life who ruled with pretences of democracy but effectively and ultimately like a monarch with divine rights. Mugabe carried himself like a true potentate that ruled with impunity.

In many ways, to bring his *de facto* monarchy into reality Mugabe had to believe and perform the monarchy to get Zimbabweans and all others to believe and affirm it in actuality. After ensuring

that he was Head of State, Chancellor of all universities, Head of Government, Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces he allowed some ministers to call him “ruler for life” and the “second son of God” (Meredith, 2002:79). A Twenty First February Movement was created to commemorate his birthday, his dwellings were overly fortified and a huge motorcade accompanied his official limousine. With the importance of democratic elections minimised and the rulings of the courts severally ignored, Mugabe instituted a regime of executive hooliganism and disorder in Zimbabwe where his pretences to omnipotent and omniscient power became a kind of populist reason, in the observation of Ernesto Laclau populist reason works with radical disorder:

[I]n a situation of radical disorder, ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to represent their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To homogenise something is exactly to carry out this filling function (Laclau, 1996:44).

In a strong way, in the absence of order Mugabe instituted an order of his own, a disorder as the order of the day in Zimbabwe. He did not only create an absence of democratic order but also invented and inserted an order after his own sign and image as a real but actually “empty signifier” of imagined divinity. As a personalised sign and signifier himself, Mugabe had to perform, simulate and dissimulate politics to actualise his wished for and imagined power. Much like in Stalinist performances and memorialisations and performances of North Korean politics and leadership (Meredith, 2002:77) Mugabe had to mobilise activities, ceremonies, signs and rituals that represented and sought to naturalise and normalise his power. Mugabe’s performances of power are the same as what is described by Judith Butler (1988:519) as “performative acts” that produce and maintain meaning and seek to construct reality as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecies of power. Judith Butler (2010:147) further described what she called the “performative agency” of individuals and communities in the production and maintenance of political meanings, “performative politics refers to acts of self-constitution” that consist of “speech acts,” what is said and “illocutionary” or “perlocutionary” messages that name reality or seek to bring it about.

The politician, such as Mugabe becomes in one a performer and spokesperson that seeks to produce and maintain some realities. Some performances erase and silence reality while others make real and existent actually absent realities. Jean Baudrillard (1994:3) distinguished between performance of simulation and dissimulation, “to dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one

has” and to “simulate is to feign to have what one doesn’t have.” In his performances of the will to power and drive to manufacture the reality of his power Mugabe combined both simulation and dissimulation, in observation of Mugabe in a rally, Christopher Hope noted performance and manufacture of the reality of power thus:

Mugabe, on the public platform, had the role taped; he embodied its absurdity, its menace, its suffocating fragrance, its location midway between Hollywood and Hell, its supernatural pretensions, its angry self-importance. He fulfilled that strange requirement of a tyrant, expansion. Each time you looked there seemed to be more of him. More of them. Despots flowed, one into another, consorting, and merging like mercury (Hope, 2003:19).

In a way, Mugabe is witnessed to enact and produce a larger than life image of himself that is expanded and multiple and conceals his humanity while projecting a wished for divinity, that is therefore fake. Notably, Hope says, “if you look at the portraits of Stalin you see the phenomenon: it is as if someone (is) not content with the face of the man as it was” (Hope, 2003:57) and seeks to exaggerate it into that of a deity. In total, Hope (2003:73) witnessed that “the essence of Mugabe was dissimulation” which was fundamentally to effectively conceal the real man that he was and to produce an image of a metaphysical personality and a kind of one-man majority with a commanding presence. The moustache of Hitler that Mugabe wore (Holland, 2008:158) may not just have been a simple symbol to irritate prison warders but an internalised admiration of Adolf Hitler that Mugabe carried and which possessed him; it might have been part of his unconscious political universe that was framed by an aspiration to be feared and to menace the world.

A collection of performances, simulations and dissimulations, can morph into a representation and a sign on its own that may at once be revealing and concealing of reality. Simulation, notes Jean Baudrillard, does more than representation and misrepresentation as it produces hyper-reality, becomes a simulacrum that may have four significations:

It is the reflection of a profound reality;

It masks and denatures a profound reality;

It masks the absence of profound reality;
It has no relation to reality whatsoever:
it is its own pure simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1994:6).

As a reflection of profound reality the sign is good appearance that reflects the truth as it is. As it masks profound reality the sign is “evil appearance,” that hides the truth and falsifies reality. As it pretends to be appearance it is in the “order of sorcery” whose intentions evil and harmful. And as it becomes its own simulacrum it becomes pure simulation that misleads and seeks to reconstruct reality (Baudrillard, 1994:6) and bury the truth for evil purposes. Here and further this study notes that Mugabe relished in several representations that became not only an order of sorcery but were pure simulacrum.

Mugabe did not only have a “penchant for ceremony and tradition” (Tendi, 2013:965) but even as his popularity and following were non-existent, in 2013, he made sure that people were coerced and persuaded, taken by trains and buses from remote areas to create for him “colossal gatherings” that “strike fear in the competition” (Tendi, 2013:966) and project him as popular; he relished in showing the human electricity of multitudes behind him, even if they did not in reality exist. Rented crowds and school children that were forced to abandon classes (Hope, 2003) to boost the attendance of his rallies became part of Mugabe’s performances and constructions of otherwise highly questionable popularity. In November 2017, an equally rented and constructed crowd was used to force Mugabe to resign. The paradox of Mugabe the owner of colossal crowds being removed from power by the show of a colossal crowd by coup-makers brings to life Achille Mbembe’s description of the contradictions of the postcolony where:

Dictators can go to sleep at night lulled by roars of adulation and support, only to wake up in the morning to find their golden calves smashed and their tablets of law overturned. The applauding crowds of yesterday have become today a cursing, abusive mob. That is to say, people whose identities have been partly confiscated have been able, precisely because there was this pretence, to glue together the bits and pieces of their fragmented identities. By taking over the signs and language of officialdom, people have been able to remythologise their own conceptual universe while in the process turning the commandment into a sort of Zombie (Mbembe, 1992:10).

The same crowds that Mugabe constructed to perform and display his power turned around to pull down his mask, to demystify his power and re-introduce reality where unreality had been naturalised. His own fictions, myths and performances were paid back to him, in his own currency. In other words, power that ignores legitimacy and credibility of elections and judicial decisions, can one day be exposed for what it is, a performance and not a reality. The people that have been zombified have a way of claiming back their humanity and giving the tyrant his true status and condition as the first Zombie that is imprisoned by its inevitable and inescapable self, otherwise. It may take the manufactured crown to liberate the tyrant from his inevitable and inescapable self. The Will to Power involves the leader turning the led into zombies and only when the led zombify the leader does a political rupture take place.

5.3 Mugabe's Simulation of Reconciliation, Peace and Unity

As this section of the chapter seeks to demonstrate, Mugabe who seems to have always believed in total war and revenge of the will to power, had in the same Will to Power, to simulate grand ideals and practices of reconciliation, peace and unity in spectacular performances. In the argument of Nietzsche (1968:50) such grand human ideals as revolution, equal rights, love, peace, justice and philanthropy are always, in the scheme of the Will to Power, simulated and pretended as “flags” and other impressions to beguile the masses and fool them into believing that the otherwise monstrous leaders are deliverers. In the political universe of the Will to Power monsters can perform messiahs. Similar to Nietzsche, Niccolo Machiavelli (2003:71) stated that the foxy and cunning prince should always build a reputation for being good but in practice should neither keep his word nor abandon the ways of the beast and preparedness to harm his opponents. It would seem to this study that Mugabe handled his relationship with whites and former Rhodesians after independence with much Nietzschean and Machiavellian Will to Power. After his performances in “a series of conciliatory speeches, both to whites and African opponents” (Bourne, 2011:98) Mugabe enjoyed the good reputation of a magnanimous statesman and he used that reputation to attain national support and international affirmation but it later emerged that he had retained his vengeful agenda as “more recent events” went on to prove that “these speeches were a sham, a façade for a long-term Marxist manipulator” (Bourne, 2011:99). The mask was always going to

fall and it was a post-political blunder in the very first place to take a political mask for a face. Mugabe was fundamentally a performer of power.

5.3.1 An Original Intention to Revenge

Such scholars as Daniel Compagnon (2011:1) have always maintained that “from the beginning” Mugabe concealed his vengeful intentions but there were “many worrying signs” that one day the monster in him will emerge from behind his performances of peace and reconciliation to cause massive chaos. Martin Meredith (2002:7) notes that “while in exile” Mugabe “had repeatedly insisted on the need for a one party Marxist state” in Zimbabwe after independence, and that “Ian Smith and his criminal gang” of whites “will be tried and killed” while “white exploiters would not be allowed to keep an acre of land” in the new Zimbabwe. Mugabe might have pretended to prefer reconciliation and peace but his original intention to revenge and punish whites remained.

Zimbabwean independence from Rhodesian colonialism, was delivered through a negotiated settlement of Lancaster House in 1979, in the United Kingdom. Attentive historians, journalists and scholars have noted for instance that “Mugabe was hostile to the idea of negotiations”. He did not want compromise with Rhodesians with Rhodesians but an armed takeover of the state by guerillas under his leadership (Meredith, 2002:2). In his own words Mugabe regretted the negotiations: “we wanted an armed takeover of the state” in “the field” of war; it made him an “unhappy man” to talk peace (Meredith, 2002:7, 8). Lord Carrington who was instrumental in the talks and the preparations that preceded them noted that “there is no doubt Mugabe would not have signed the Lancaster House Agreement if Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique hadn’t prompted him” (Holland, 2008:61). Mugabe’s view of the Frontline Heads of States that, as this study will show, persuaded and pressured him to the talks, was that “we thought the heads of state were selling us out” (Meredith, 2002:3) by insisting on talks with the Rhodesian regime. The British-appointed caretaker Governor of Rhodesia at the time was Lord Soames whose view of Mugabe then was that of a monster driven to bloodletting: “I had the same picture that everybody had, that he was something of a Marxists ogre, and that he’d soon slit your throat as look at you. And that he was a bad man” (Meredith, 2002:11). Mugabe wanted the satisfaction of the surrender and pleas for mercy of the Rhodesians; he felt that talks let them go without the pain that they deserved from his hands. True to the ways of the Will to Power that

carries itself as “peace and innocence” to conceal its violence and “insurrectionary” tendencies, which must “conquer through extreme mildness, sweetness, softness” (Nietzsche, 1968:109), Mugabe concealed his intention to revenge and to harm behind simulations and performances of conciliatory politics.

5.3.2 Mugabe: Persuaded and Pressured to Reconcile

Researches by a number of scholars and journalists have revealed that massive persuasion and pressure from the Frontline States compelled Mugabe to reconcile and make peace with white Rhodesians that he originally intended to punish in the true revenge of the will to power. Mugabe is noted to have arrived at Lancaster House in 1979 to denounce the proposed talks and declare continuation with the armed struggle. Machel, who hosted the ZANLA guerillas in Mozambique and much begrudgingly accepted Mugabe as a leader, sent a trusted messenger to deliver the promise and the warning to Mugabe in London that “If he did not sign the agreement, he would be welcome back in Mozambique and given a beach house where he could write his memoirs, but Mozambique will make no further sacrifices for a cause that could be won on the conference table” (Meredith, 2002:8). In other words, Machel used a threat to pressure Mugabe to talk peace and to sign a political settlement document.

Even after the agreement had been signed Machel personally warned Mugabe not to antagonise the white population in Zimbabwe lest he caused further trouble for the country, its polity and economy; “don’t play make believe Marxist games when you get home” he said “you will face ruin if you force the whites there into precipitate flight” (Meredith, 2002:9). When Mugabe continued to argue on the merits of armed takeover of the state, the collective of the Frontline States, headed by Machel, Kenneth Kaunda and Nyerere insisted, in letter, that “we hear what you are saying, but we know you will hear us when we say the war must end” (Norman, 2004:76). Clearly, if the Frontline Heads of States had not used their influence and authority to persuade and pressure Mugabe to a negotiated settlement, he would have preferred a continuation of the armed struggle in hope to overthrow and punish the Rhodesian regime and the white population. By its nature as a drive that is also a desire for conquest and domination of one by the other, the Will to Power, Nietzsche (1968:347) states, derives much “pleasure” and relish in “revenge” as its “pleasure includes pain” of others, “pleasure as feeling of power” and celebration of conquest. The warning that came to Mugabe from the Frontline States was a sober wisdom from their experience

of decolonization. Machel for instance, had learnt from the angry exodus and withdrawal of whites from Mozambique between 1974 and 1975, which led to a depression in the economy of the country (Bourne, 2011:99). Mugabe was to dramatically turn that pragmatism from bitter historical experience into a fiction and an empty signifier of a kind of populist reason that was said, performed but really not meant. The reconciliation that Mugabe became a hero for was borrowed wisdom and stolen political pragmatism.

5.3.3 Mugabe Performs Reconciliation

As the Will to Power believes in “falsification” of events and the truth (Nietzsche, 1968:277) Mugabe did not disclose that the political wisdom of reconciliation that he was performing was a gift pressed upon him by wiser and much more experienced leaders. He presented and performed it as his own, with apparent disdain and a spirit of plagiarism towards those who truly owned the idea. To disclose the source of his newly found wisdom would have, in his mind, minimised his power; “perhaps he feared that someone would find out that he was not really God’s chosen one, but an ordinary little boy with defects as well as attributes” (Holland, 2008:210). The fear to be seen to be human, ordinary, fallible and correctable seems to have perpetually haunted Mugabe. True it is that “Mugabe gives the appearance of disdain because he wants to be acknowledged as superior, perhaps to get as far away as possible from the opposite, inferiority which he dreads” (Holland, 2002:62). Borrowed and even stolen wisdoms and truths were used by Mugabe to opportunistically and timeously cultivate a political reputation of a statesman that he was actually not.

The postcolony, such as Zimbabwe was and still is, becomes, what Achille Mbembe (1992:3) says is “a rather dramatic stage on which are played out” a multiplicity of mirages and facades of power, where power seeks to stage its “magnificence and prodigality” (Mbembe, 1992:7) to circulate its myths and fictions as the solution to the problems of society. In its performance of stolen wisdom Mugabe’s speech, as captured by Peter Stiff, was messianic and prophetic in form, tone and content:

Our nation requires every one of us to be a new man. If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you will become a friend and ally...it could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday, when they had power, that the blacks should oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains and evil. Our majority rule could easily

turn to inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not think like the majority of us... we will ensure there is a place for everyone in this country. I want a broadly based government to include whites and Nkomo (Mugabe, cited in Stiff, 2000:27).

That Mugabe so clearly understood the ethics of liberation and the wisdom of forgiveness and reconciliation makes all the worse that in practice he went on to do the very opposite. That he knew “evil” and the problematic of the “inhuman” and “oppression” but knowingly went on to visit the same on the people that he claimed to be his new friends and allies makes him a knowing and therefore a much guiltier offender. Being heard on radio and appearing on national television screens performing the fiction and face of reconciliation made Mugabe a true performer of cinematic extents:

In the evening Comrade Robert Mugabe strolled into white living rooms countrywide. Promising reconciliation rather than revenge, he told television viewers that he would honour the British-brokered Lancaster House Agreement, thus guaranteeing white pensions and property rights... the monster of the morning had begun to morph into a responsible leader by the third beer that night (Holland, 2008:xiii).

Even those that had long suspected and believed that Mugabe was a monstrosity changed their minds about him that evening and night. Even the Rhodesian leader, himself a monster, Ian Smith, who had always regarded Mugabe as the “Apostle of Satan”, that night confessed to have experienced him anew as “reasonable” (Meredith, 2002:15). Adding more poetry to his performance, Mugabe added that “let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, colour or creed” (Meredith, 2002:13) in the same way that the biblical Lucifer as a personification of evil recites the scripture more eloquently than the preachers and the chosen. The “new man” that Mugabe asked of every Zimbabwean was as represented in himself, a fake man, and a mere persona that concealed the true Will to Power that drove him and that he drove.

Mugabe’s performance of statesmanship and political wisdom simulated an era of hope not only in Zimbabwe but regionally and internationally. The effects of Mugabe’s performance and simulation created what Mbembe (1992:4) called “the mutual zombification” of the performer himself who acts out a ridiculous falsehood and the wide audience that is taken up and fooled by the lie. Such influential states in the world as “Britain saw Zimbabwe as a Foreign affairs trophy” (Holland, 2008: xiii) and were proud to support Mugabe’s regime in Harare:

Virtually everyone who should have cried foul looked the other way; whites because they were grateful to be out of the range of fire; the British government because it had to stand by its man up North while trying to bring majority rule to apartheid South Africa; and the international media because it had backed Mugabe to the hilt and could not contemplate its flawed judgement (Holland, 2008: xiii).

Engrossment with the prospects of Zimbabwe was so palpable that as large a figure as “Her Majesty, the Queen of England, in a personal message to Mugabe, wrote ‘it is a moment for people of all races and all political persuasions to forget the bitterness of the past’” (Norman, 2004:90) and build a better country. Using the cover of national, regional and international excitement and indeed euphoria that his performance of wisdom and simulation of reconciliation created, Mugabe committed the Gukurahundi genocide where more than 20 000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands dispossessed and displaced from the Matabeleland and Midlands areas of Zimbabwe. The genocide unfolded as “on the international stage Zimbabwe was accorded star status” and “one country after another lined up to help the new government ‘we are the darling of the world’ Mugabe told a meeting of white farmers, and since we are on honeymoon and honeymoons don’t always last too long. We ought to take advantage of it” (Meredith, 2002:46) he said, which indicates that he knew that soon enough his mask will fall away and his performances make way for the real monstrosity that he was.

In numbers, white people, especially commercial farmers were to be killed (Norman, 2004:146) during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of the year 2000 that was almost genocidal in extent. Mugabe was to “whip up hysteria against Britain in particular” (Norman, 2004:67). Not only did he ban the international media in Zimbabwe but he also exercise authoritarian control of the political arena in the country, used violence as the cornerstone of his rule, plundered the economy, subjugated the opposition political parties and created an international crisis in the region (Compagnon, 2011:8-254). The country that was once famously called by Nyerere of Tanzania ‘the Jewel of Africa’ was turned into a basket case.’ Mugabe’s monstrosity was not only ignored but also purposely incubated by world superpowers such as Britain and the United States that wanted Zimbabwe to stabilise and be usable as a pillar in the struggle against communism in Southern Africa (Scarnecchia, 2011). Britain, in particular as the former coloniser, refused to

abrogate and nullify the elections that brought Mugabe to power even as they were unfree and unfair, and Governor Lord Soames agreed to let the elections go ahead in the interests of stability in Zimbabwe (Meredith, 2002:12). There is an impression that Mugabe's victory was corruptly assisted by Britain and some of the Frontline States. Carrington states that "Julius Nyerere had earlier told me in London during Lancaster House that his man Mugabe had better win because if he didn't, the frontline states were not going to accept it" which was an undemocratic threat and "Nyerere's foreign minister had been sent to me after the election to say "Julius wants you to know he is pleased Mugabe won, but why did you let him win by so much?" (Holland, 2008:69). After all, it appears Mugabe did not really win, but was made to win; his victory was constructed and manufactured.

5.3.4 Mugabe Revokes Reconciliation

The vengeance and Will to Power that Mugabe concealed behind a curtain of conciliatory politics was to emerge as the mask of his act fell. Like in all simulations and dissimulations, behind Mugabe's performance of political wisdom and his enactment of grand ideals of reconciliation and peace were concealed the true and raw Will to Power. Concealment of the real behind the fictitious seems to have been Mugabe's stock in the trade of power. Even the way he made sure that he always was "the man dressed in elegant suit" (Holland, 2008:159) seems to be a symbolic way in which he concealed the monster in him behind civil and refined looks. In actuality, Mugabe believed that his supporters should, as he said, "strike fear in the hearts of the white man, our real enemy" (cited in Meredith, 2002:17). After the white population, some parts of it in fact, continued to back Smith in the 1985 election, and later to support the opposition MDC, Mugabe was willing in prime time to describe them as crooks and unworthy people:

These crooks we inherited as part of our population. We cannot expect them to have straightened up, to be honest people and an honest community. Yes, some are good people, but they remain cheats. They remain dishonest. They remain uncommitted even to the national cause. We would actually be happier if some country were to accept them, and since Britain said it wanted them to come to Britain, we can open our doors to them, but we will not force them out. There are some who are good, but I think the bulk of the people we would rather do without (Meredith, 2002:210).

Mugabe described white people in the tone and accent with which colonisers typically described the colonised. It was time for Mugabe to abandon Machel's sober counsel. By continuing to vote Smith the white populations were "telling the new President that their old leader Ian Smith" was their choice "white Zimbabweans as a group would not hold Mugabe's hand, they conveyed to him the decision to stick to their own kind" (Holland, 2008:114) which was possibly racism but their right to vote whomever they wanted was protected in the national constitution, and Mugabe refused to respect that right. Mugabe angrily ranted that "the voting has shown that they have not repented in any way", that whites "still cling to the past and support the very man who created a series of horrors against the people of Zimbabwe" (cited in Meredith, 2002:56). Refusing to vote Mugabe showed that the whites "they remain dishonest, they remain uncommitted even to national cause" as Mugabe says, which betrays the way he mistakes himself for the nation. Also, Mugabe failed to make the distinction between white individuals and a white system. Earlier in 1974, Mugabe had shown sophistication of understanding. Michael Nicholson, of the Independent Television News, asked him whether he had been embittered against whites by his lengthy imprisonment: "no" he replied "we are fighting a system that is wrong. We don't hate the whites; we will have no racial discrimination in an independent Zimbabwe" (Bourne, 2011:99). Yet his contempt for the whites and their free vote showed the opposite, that his acceptance of them was conditional to voting him. The performances of reconciliation that Mugabe put up had created euphoria regionally and internationally and various countries made generous financial and other donations to Zimbabwe; the post-political optimism had taken a sure grip and the Will to Power found fertile ground to grow.

Nigeria, for instance, donated a large sum of money that Mugabe used to buy media houses in order to monopolise and control the flow of information in the country. "Mugabe had already used the money donated by Nigeria to buy the South African company that controlled the majority of Zimbabwe's newspapers;" and "he had sacked the white editors and replaced them with government appointees" and the newspapers began to spin "propaganda" for the new government (Norman, 2004:91). Reconciliation was a personal gift and a political weapon that Mugabe could give and take, and use to punish the whites. In a terse speech before the election of 2000 where the white population was accused by Mugabe of supporting the opposition he said "the national reconciliation policy we adopted in 1980 is threatened, gravely threatened, by the acts of the white settlers in this country and we shall revoke that national reconciliation, we shall revoke it!"

(Mugabe, 2000:1). In his will to power Mugabe became a monstrosity that turned back to consume the very people, communities, and powers that incubated and brought it up.

5.4 Mugabe and the White Man

Mugabe's relationship with whites and whiteness at large, this study notes, is a power relationship that Albert Memmi (2003) nuanced as the clash and the dialogue between "the coloniser and the colonised," and that is characterised by troubling phobias and phobias. Fanon (2008:3) also described how in the colonial encounters, at a psychopathological level, "the white man is sealed in his whiteness the black man in his blackness" while the colonised "black man wants to be white" and the colonising "white man slaves to reach human level." In that traumatic way, the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised is a mutually dehumanising relationship. Mugabe who was formatively educated and mentored by white Jesuit priests had his colonial and love and hate relationship with white people and whiteness as a system, and this study will note that Mugabe, in typical Will to Power, tried to manipulate this relationship for political power and privilege.

Instead of Mugabe's relations with whites and whiteness leading to his liberation from being a colonial subject they seem to have led to further trauma that projected itself from his person and sensibility as hate and exaggerated nativism. In many ways, Mugabe became the Fanonian "black man" who "wants to be like the white man" because "for the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white. Long ago the black man admitted the unarguable superiority of the white man, and all his efforts are aimed at achieving white existence" (Fanon, 2008:178).

Mugabe's traumatising and dehumanising relationship with whites and whiteness is perhaps most vividly captured in an anecdotal incident where in his will to power and drive to dramatise reconciliation with Rhodesian whites after the independence of Zimbabwe, he wanted to show how far he had forgiven Smith. When Smith visited Mugabe at State House he met a friendly and forgiving Mugabe who pulled him close and said "come and seat next to me" on the sofa (Holland, 2008:86) and performed the friendliest gesture of hugging and "holding hands" with Smith. This was a most vivid dramatisation of reconciliation on the part of Mugabe who had been jailed by Smith for eleven years and during the jail term was denied the compassionate leave to attend the funeral of his only child. Perhaps dramatising his own status as a coloniser par excellence Smith

spurned Mugabe's powerful gesture; he said to Holland "well I don't like people holding my hand. So I got my hand out of his and moved to the other end of the sofa" (Holland, 2008:87). In its symbolism, this incident demonstrates how Mugabe tried to reach out to whites and to whiteness and was rejected, in the process becoming traumatised and embittered. In a "decolonial critique of Mugabe" Morgan Ndlovu (2015:237-8) uses a "structure and agency" analysis to demonstrate how supposedly "post-colonial" African leaders such as Mugabe effectively remained colonial subjects that had limited ability to restructure and reconstitute colonial power relations. Mugabe learnt of his enduring colonial subjection the very hard way when Smith dramatically and symbolically reduced him to his political size. Fanon (2008:86) illustrates the trauma of a black colonial subject that overreaches to the white coloniser and gets spurned: "what? while I was forgetting, forgiving and wanting only to love, my message was flung back in my face like a slap"; most painfully "I was told to stay within my bounds, to go back where I belonged" (Fanon, 2008:86).

It is perhaps in the blindness and even naiveté of the Will to Power that Mugabe thought his elevated education and his status as a political leader could suddenly erase his colonial subjection. In a way Mugabe fell into the existential trap of "the colonised" who imagines that he "is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards, he becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle" (Fanon, 2008:9). Simplistically this colonised person believes that "the language of the coloniser gives ... the colonised a sense of equality with the colonizer" (Fanon, 2008:14). The Mugabe that Smith dramatically and symbolically rejected is a man who espoused Englishness and white sensibility to some dramatic levels:

As Mugabe emerged from the carapace of Rhodesian propaganda, there was much to surprise us: his obvious Anglophilia, his Savile Row suits, his fastidious English, his penchant for Graham Greene novels, his admiration of the Queen, especially after she had knighted him in 1994, for services to Anglo-Zimbabwe relations, his love for tea and cricket, a game, he said, that civilises people and creates good gentlemen. I want everyone to play cricket in Zimbabwe. I want ours to be a nation of gentlemen (Godwin, 2010:18).

Mugabe did not only espouse borrowed English sensibility and finesse but he somehow sought to weaponise his colonial acculturation to elevate himself above other black people, like the colonial white man, as their civiliser and saviour. Correctly, Norman (2004:154) notes that when Mugabe

was saying “I want ours to be a nation of gentlemen, it was at that time that the notorious 5th Brigade” under Mugabe’s leadership “were ethnically cleansing, that is murdering tens of thousands of Ndebele in Matabeleland.” In a way, Mugabe had tragically become a colonising colonial subject that was unfortunately, for himself, being rejected by the same coloniser he tried to emulate and reach out to as an equal. Because of his grand education and British mannerisms that were accompanied by articulate speech, in the liberation movement, “Mugabe was trusted to stand shoulder to shoulder with whites, Rhodesian and British politicians in debate” (Norman, 20024:58). Albert Memmi (2003:59) notes how the coloniser initially admires and encourages the colonised who aspire to his status and that mimic his culture but eventually the coloniser does not permit the colonised to reach his station, he puts them back in their zone of inferiority and failure that marks the permanence of colonial relations. Even as he powerfully wished, Mugabe’s will to power could not elevate him to the station of a true coloniser; he remained only a colonising colonial subject who was to stay in his place.

5.4.1 Mugabe: White Power and Privilege

Mugabe seems to have fully understood white power and privilege within the colonial system, and in his understanding of it did not get repulsed by its cruelty and inhumanity, but in his will to power he came to admire and aspire for the same. Mugabe came to envy the immense power of the white coloniser and to wish to possess it himself. As a subject of white colonial power Mugabe noted that “we were brought up in a society which actually worshipped the white man as a kind of god” (cited in Meredith, 2002:22). Not on that but the white man had become a world that loomed large:

He was infallible. He was the rule to be obeyed. Whoever was white therefore not only had the power but also the privilege of demanding respect from every black. And so we feared the white man. After the defeat of the blacks in 1897, our parents and grandparents accepted rule by the white man as something unavoidable. There was no way we could get rid of the white man. He was power. He had guns. He had subdued everybody through the security forces. And therefore all we could do was to seek from him the removal of our grievances. If we could get some form of justice within the system, that was what people sought to be achieved. And we accepted this as youngsters (cited in Meredith, 2002:22).

It appears to this study that Mugabe might have subconsciously internalised the fear and also admiration of the white man’s power and also the power machinery of the colonial system at large. Mugabe became that Fanonian black subject who wanted to share in the superiority of the white

man. Fanon observed that in the colonial climate “white men consider themselves superior to black men” and “black men want to prove to white men at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect (Fanon, 2008:3). Mugabe wanted to demonstrate his own “richness” of thought through elevated education and also befriending and working with the white man. Smith seems to have seen this in Mugabe’s performances, and he said:

He was a very clever bloke and he worked with me for as long as he thought it was going to help him. Once again, it was just to keep himself in power. I give that answer to all questions about Mugabe because that is all there is to it. Everything he has ever done is about keeping himself in power. Dictators and fascists all over the world think like that (Holland, 2008:88)

The convincing suggestion that Smith makes is that Mugabe intended to mobilise white people like him and their power to build his own power and fortify his own hold on power. Smith was perhaps the right person to make this observation and advance the suggestion as he was another technician of power and tyranny who once publicly expressed the desire to perpetuate white colonial power for more than a thousand years in Rhodesia. It is possible that in spurning Mugabe, pulling out his hand and leaving to sit on the other side of the sofa to symbolise rejection, Smith meant to deny Mugabe the political capital and political resource of white power and privilege that Mugabe desired and which Smith represented. As a colonial politician of some hardihood himself and powered by his own storied will to power, Smith was not going to donate the capital and symbolic resource of his power to Mugabe, but Mugabe was not going to give up that easily as he was determined to be accepted as the unquestionable leader, a black strongman who was above other blacks in education, civility and gentility. Mugabe was desperate to be white.

Not every time did Smith see through and resist Mugabe’s Will to Power and performance of reconciliation. After another meeting with Mugabe, in his own words, Smith was totally bewitched and mesmerised by the performance. Smith reported that “I was welcomed most courteously” by a Mugabe who “said he appreciated the vital need to retain the confidence of the white people so that they would continue to play their part in building the future of the country” and ensuring progress:

His appreciation seemed genuine, and as he escorted me to my car he expressed the wish that we would keep in contact... when I got back home, I said to Janet, that I hoped it was not a hallucination, he behaved like a

balanced, civilised westerner, the antithesis of the communist gangster I had expected, if this was a true picture, then there could be hope instead of despair (cited in Meredith, 2002:41-42).

Smith's celebrations of Mugabe's political gestures were also for the wrong reasons that, Mugabe acted in the courtesy that Smith associates not with human beings but 'civilised westerners.' Smith was racist to attach good manners only to westerners. In a way Smith and Mugabe appear to be one person in different bodies and skins. In that way Mugabe and Smith needed each other for the fulfillment of their bigotries and fundamentalisms (Holland, 2008:84).

For some time, Smith and the white population in Zimbabwe celebrated Mugabe as "Good old Bob!" (Meredith, 2002:45). In turn Mugabe made "few changes that directly affected the white community" (Meredith, 2002:48) in a performance of fake generosity. Not only that, to appease the apartheid regime in neighboring South Africa, Mugabe made sure that there were to be no ANC camps on Zimbabwean soil (Meredith, 2002:47) in a performance that negated his vaunted anti-colonialism. Publicly Mugabe rationalised this political performance and move: "we are against apartheid" he said and we "have a duty to assist our brothers and sisters," in South Africa but "no nationalist guerilla bases would be established on Zimbabwean territory" (Norman, 2004:92). This performance that was clearly for the pleasure and comfort of apartheid South Africa was in spite of the fact that Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique had taken the risk of hosting guerilla bases of other countries including Zimbabwe. The generosity that other countries showed, at great risk, to Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle, Mugabe was not willing to extend to the liberation movements in South Africa.

Mugabe became good at publicly acting out the figure of a radical opponent of imperialism and empire but privately as Moore (2015:37) correctly notes, he was willing to seek favours and personal accommodation. Knowing that Soames, the caretaker governor of Rhodesia was the eyes and the ears of the British Empire at the time Mugabe was willing to humble himself before the governor and confess his limitations. After his electoral victory, in 1980, Mugabe made appeals to Soames: "Lord Soames's private secretary recalls a daunted Mugabe, who said "I have no experience of running a country and neither has any of my people. None of us has run anything and so we need your help" (Meredith, 2002:14). After that Mugabe made the strange request that Soames should remain in Zimbabwe for a number of years after independence, a request that Soames laughingly rejected. Mugabe was acting the clever native who knows his limits and the

limits of his people and appealed to the white man for ‘recolonisation’ even if it was couched as a request for capacity building in an immature post-independence African polity. Suddenly, to Mugabe, the face, eyes and ears of the British, Soames, “was so good a friend” (Meredith, 2002:14) to Mugabe. In performance, Mugabe did not only trust Soames the British envoy but grew to love him. “I must admit that I was one of those who originally never trusted him, and yet I ended up not only implicitly trusting him but also fondly loving him as well” (cited in Meredith, 2002:14). Knowingly or unknowingly Mugabe in expressing, real or unreal, unpreparedness to rule without white help was feeding the colonial stereotype of the “colonised” as “naturally incompetent, lazy and unable” (Memmi, 2003:123). And therefore, the black person was also naturally burdened with a “dependency complex” which meant “colonisability” (Memmi, 2003:132).

It is noteworthy that Mugabe who grew up without a father figure had suddenly found in the powerful white man a father that he could trust, love and appeal to. Through his education by the Jesuits, imprisoning by the white Rhodesian security machinery and final recognition as a worthy leader, Mugabe had become a good product of whiteness in the Fanonian sense that “white civilisation and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro” to the extent that “what is often called a black soul is a white man’s artifact” (Fanon, 2008:6). It was as a product of whiteness and white power that Mugabe could say to Mary Soames, wife of Lord Soames, over a cup of tea that “well we had the good fortune to have been colonised by the British” (Holland, 2008:71). Mary Soames was to meditate over this statement: “did he mean it, I wonder, or was it said just to pull me along? Did he fool Christopher (that is Lord Soames) who was quite a canny bird and who came to like Mugabe very much indeed?” (cited in Holland, 2008:71). In his performance of his own will to power, Mugabe had become too desperate for white affirmation and support. The British and former Rhodesians were also too pleased to receive his gestures affirming them as friends and mentors, much in the manner in which “the presence of the Negro besides the whites is in a way an insurance policy on humanness, when the whites feel that they have become too mechanised, they turn to the men of colour and ask them a little human sustenance” (Fanon, 2008:98). Not all British representatives were delighted, comforted and fooled by Mugabe’s performances. Lord Carrington observed of Mugabe that “even when he was being polite there was a sort of reptilian quality about him...Mugabe wasn’t human at all...he was an awfully slippery sort of person” (Holland 2008:63). The monster was not concealed to

everyone, even as it seemed that for feeling good and post-political delusion, everyone was willing to pretend that the monster was an angel, and that what was to be hell was a paradise.

Most scholars agree that somehow Mugabe “did everything to appease white fear of black rule” (Holland, 2008:114). What most of them do not observe is that Mugabe had another agenda beside the pragmatic politics of retaining some whites in his government to keep the confidence of the former coloniser of the international community at large; he also meant to inherit the colonial white securocratic machinery for his own use and abuse. In inviting the former Rhodesian intelligence chief, Ken Flower, to work for him Mugabe played down their enmity and the fact that Flower previously and severally attempted to kill him. Even as Flower was prepared to apologise for the attempts at his life, Mugabe played down and laughed off the remorse: “we were trying to kill each other, that is what the war was about” (cited in Meredith, 2002:42). What he wanted was not a repentant Flower but the same dangerous Flower at his service this time. If Flower had apologised and repented of his killing ways, Mugabe would have lost a dangerous tool that he needed to use against his political opponents. Flower just needed to shift his killing services from Smith to Mugabe. Flower is one of the former Rhodesian securocrats that were instrumental in the Gukurahundi Genocide.

The hard man, Mac McGuiness, who was in charge of Mugabe and other political prisoners, was also retained, and “far from trusting McGuiness as a friend, Mugabe probably wanted the former policeman to head his own intelligence network because he knew McGuiness as a ruthless person” (Holland, 2008:35) who will deal with Mugabe’s own political challengers with cruelty. In this way, Mugabe became a post-colonial leader who admired colonial power and the power of the coloniser and did all he could to inherit the oppressive machinery of the colonial system to use it in his own Will to Power.

In preference for former Rhodesian securocrats, Mugabe abandoned the guerrilla leaders that fought the liberation war. Abandoning the guerilla leaders that struggled to accept him as leader and whose acceptance made his political fortune, after independence Mugabe preferred to appoint General Peter Walls, the former leader of the Rhodesian colonial armed forces that the guerillas were fighting, as leader of the National Army. Walls was the General who had written a letter to the British government asking them not to recognise the election results of 1980 as the vote was not free and fair because of political violence. General Walls was shocked by the appointment: “I

said to him, but how can I as an avowed anti-Marxist work for a person like you? He gave me a lecture on how the principles of Karl Marx were the same as Jesus Christ” (cited in Meredith, 2002:12). Mugabe, for power, was prepared to mix and rationalise Marxism and Christianity just to be accepted by a colonial army General as his new boss. To step into the boots of Smith and be the new strong man is what also occupied Mugabe’s ego, beside the need to assure the white population of a peaceful future in Zimbabwe. An ambition to be white and to be of whites seems to have consumed Mugabe, behind all pretenses and performances. While Mugabe later earned a reputation for rebuking Nelson Mandela for bending over too far in accommodating whites after the end of apartheid, Mugabe himself seems to have bended with whites in embarrassing ways.

Keen observers have noted that Mugabe’s first cabinet after independence was “a cabinet full of anglophiles” (Holland, 2008:110) and that he did not accept his parliamentarians as Africans; even “his own dress and manners tended to mirror English rather than African norms.” Perhaps for the pleasure and approval of the British and white sensibility, Mugabe demanded that of his ministers that if they “want to be in cabinet” they must dress in suits in the way it is done in the British parliament (Holland 2008:110). Beside the white former Rhodesian securocrats who headed the army, the police, and the intelligence after independence, Mugabe appointed whites to head the ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and two other ministries (Holland, 2008:114). Besides reflecting Mugabe’s lack of confidence in himself and his war time colleagues, this shows his ambition to please the same white supremacy and fortify the same colonialism that he professed to revile and to fight.

Further, Mugabe maintained such colonial legislations as the Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act under which Smith had jailed him and his colleagues in the struggle. Mugabe’s maintenance of colonial securocrats and colonial legislations after independence betrays a troubling reality that for him colonialism was bad only when it was perpetuated by others and not him, otherwise he did not mind being a coloniser in a black skin who used the technologies of the same colonialism he fought to oppress his own people.

In all his Will to Power, after all, Mugabe might have suffered the pathology of a double consciousness which “is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity... warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois 1969:45).

White standards and colonial sensibility might have been the measure and method with which Mugabe looked at and judged himself, hence the desperate need to please the former coloniser and win his approval. After all, no matter how well they conceal it behind radicalism, “those that experience themselves as inferior often overcompensate (Fanon, 2008:167) in trying to prove their equality to the oppressor or their superiority. Fanon was condemning the drive for superiority of the will to power when he asked “superiority? Inferiority? Why not quite simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself? Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the you?” (Fanon (2008:181). Mugabe should have sought that liberating Fanonian kind of relations and engagement with whites and the British, and not to seek to be seen as superior or equal to them. He should have sought human relations, not oppressor and oppressed relations.

Like Smith in the sofa incident that is described above, the way in which Mugabe went out of his way to please whites and demonstrate lack of confidence in himself and his colleagues was always going to end in rejection and bitterness for him. As noted above his spirited attempt to please the white population did not earn him their vote, they continued to vote Smith and later the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In dismissing Denis Norman, a white man who was the Minister of Agriculture after whites voted for Smith in 1985, Mugabe expressed, not in so many words, bitterness: “you be white and we will be black” he said and “you go your own white way and we will go ours” (cited in Holland, 2008:115). First, Mugabe was wrong to appoint and please whites in order to buy their vote; that was the opportunism of the Will to Power. Secondly he was wrong to maintain a strict binary between whites and blacks in Zimbabwe; some whites voted for him and others did not and some black people did vote for Smith. Mugabe was just invoking racism for his own political ends. Importantly, in Mugabe’s tone and diction “you be white and we will be black” one can read the bitterness of a rejected lover, someone who so loved the idea of Britain and of whiteness and gets embittered when rejected, which is the sour grapes of the will to power. Mugabe’s love for whites and the British could not be concealed even by his performances of the Will to Power: “Mugabe seemed on the brink of tears as he remembered the Royal family” (Holland, 2008:235). He really missed the love and friendship of the days when he was the darling of the British. Peter Godwin notes that:

I’ve noticed that when he speaks of Britain, he subconsciously lapses in to a magniloquent sub-Churchilian cadence- betraying his agonizing

Anglophilia. “We are not an extension of Britain,” he thunders now. “I will never stand for it, dead or alive, even my ghost will not stand for it” (cited in Moorcraft, 2012:21)

Behind this vivid performance of hatred of whites and Britain observers cannot miss the cry of a baby pleading to be accepted back by its parents. Such enhanced hatred expressed in such words as “we will kill those snakes among us, we will smash them completely” (cited in Meredith, 2002:57) in reference to whites expresses deep anger and hate that can only come from one who loved so much but was rejected. “We were supposed” Mugabe said “to put the whites before a firing squad” (cited in Meredith, 2002:52) instead of reconciling with them after independence. This kind of anger and that Mugabe exudes is “fervor” which “is the weapon of choice of the impotent” (Fanon, 2008:2). This study notes elsewhere and here that Mugabe’s Will to Power was more out of fear of weakness rather than simple love for power. The weakness of being disliked and rejected, like he was by his father as a toddler, Mugabe re-lived with much anger and bitterness in being spurned by Britain and some whites. In his Will to Power Mugabe loved to be loved and the idea of being hated and rejected was traumatic to him, it invoked the injury of his rejection by his father in childhood. As Fanon (2002:180) argues that “the tragedy of the Man is that he was once a child” Mugabe seems to be dogged by his childhood traumas or to be failing to overcome the child inside him. Behind the fury and fervor of Mugabe is a demand to be loved that is at once pathetic and determined. Early childhood abandonment by his father drove him to seek the world to father and love him while at the same time his drive for power was an attempt to be everyone’s father. In whites and in the idea of Britain, Mugabe had found a symbolic father, loving and powerful, and like his biological father the symbolic father rejected him and he lost his sanity in anger and bitterness.

5.5 Mugabe and the language of Hate and Violence

Mugabe’s language, his description and naming of opponents and enemies, is one avenue of entering and understanding his political performances and his Will to Power. When boasting about his purity of blood and noble birth, in his own performance of the Will to Power, Nietzsche (2004:6) described his father as a man who “the angels must look like” but his mother and sister as the “lower rung” of humanity, with “pettiness of instincts” and such a “canaille” type of people that were “a blasphemy against” his “divinity” of birth and being. The Will to Power can be dehumanising not only in its activities of violence but also its language and expression. In his study

of Augusto Pinochet's personality, language and performance of power, Roger Burbach (2003) describes how Pinochet employed and deployed dehumanising language in naming and describing President Salvador Allende that he and others deposed in the violent coup of Chile in 1973. Pinochet described Allende and his supporters as "cocks" the "son of a bitch" whose people were "fuck heads" that were also "fools" and "bastards" if they were not "snakes" (Burbach, 2003:26) that should be destroyed. Describing enemies and opponents in animalistic and dehumanising terms cushions the political extremist and fundamentalist from the guilt of violating other human beings and gives him or her the psychological comfort that he or she is only violating animals and things, in the same way that a dog is given a bad name so that he can be hanged with a clear conscience.

The language of the political fundamentalist and extremist is an important site from which his otherwise concealed and hidden desires and agendas can be deciphered and understood. Malcolm Bowie (1991:48) states that to Jacques Lacan the unconscious is always betrayed in the language of the communicator that almost always carries clues to his deeper drives and passions. To Freud too, Bowie (1991:49) notes, language is understood to provide a clearer passage to the world of the unconscious as a universe of desires and fears: "human speech and conduct are continuously intelligible" and related. In other words, words in speech as sounds in the air and in print as signs on space, are important signifiers that carry clues to the desires, phobias and philias of the communicator, and Mugabe in the present case of this study.

Mugabe's language, that is his diction and vocabulary, are to this study an important window to his hate and violence that were representation of his will to power. Paul Moorcraft records an incident in London when Nyerere as an African elder statesman called Mugabe and Nkomo to an office seeking to mediate in their conflict and bring peace and unity between the two and their political organisations that were competing and feuding for power in Zimbabwe, and that were being encouraged to contest the important independence elections as united Patriotic Front. Nkomo was the first to have a discussion with Nyerere and left the office to allow Mugabe to also converse in private with Nyerere. Coming after Nkomo, Mugabe refused to sit on the same chair that Nkomo had sat on, and said to Nyerere: "If you think I am going to sit where that fat bastard just sat, you will have to think again" (cited in Moorcraft, 2010:20). Nyerere was depressed not just by the pettiness of Mugabe's hatred but also the vulgarity and contempt of his angry determination; he

was “utterly shocked” by the uncouthness of Mugabe’s talk. Mugabe who was to seek to symbolise his forgiveness and reconciliation with Smith by inviting him to sit next to him on the sofa and hold hands with him, a gesture that was humiliatingly rejected, found sitting on the same chair that a fellow fighter for Zimbabwean liberation was sitting on, unacceptable and offensive. To Mugabe’s Will to Power and imagination of intense enmity and his hate, Nkomo had become a pollutant and a kind of germ to be avoided and all proximity to his body and presence shunned, which is a kind of extremist hate and political imagination that drives ethnic cleansing and genocides, where opponents are seen as toxins and pollutants in the land. In the description of the racist hatred of apartheid against the black people, J. M. Coetzee (1991:24) notes how the hated blacks were understood and treated as infected with disease, demon possessed and dirty, and therefore contact with them and their clothes and bodies being a thing to be avoided like “contagion” and malady. Mugabe had degenerated, in his hatred of Nkomo, to that apartheid-like and extremist hatred. A little hateful white racist coloniser sat steady inside black Mugabe and was fond of performing its hatred now and again.

5.5.1 Mugabe’s Language of Hate

In thickness of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme where Britain expressed disappointments and appeared to side with the political opposition to Mugabe and ZANU-PF, Mugabe made many fiery and also hateful speeches. In one of them he argued “we say to Britain here and now: Hands off, hands off, don’t keep interfering, hands off” (Buckle, 2002:78). He and his supporters derived pleasure in Comparing British Prime Minister Tony Blair to a “Blair toilet” (Buckle, 2002:140) a type of lavatory used in Zimbabwe for rural and semi-urban sanitation and hygiene. The association of the political enemy and opponent with a toilet and the dirt that it is associated with speaks extreme contempt and a subconscious desire and wish to consign the adversary to the waste.

In at once interesting and also alarming poetry of anger and hate, on national television and in Prime Time, Mugabe could appear and describe the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that were disseminating messages that were opposed to him and his regime as “British Bum Cleaners” (Godwin, 2010:316), another metaphor that associated his political opponents with toilet activities and faecal matter itself. Seeing and describing his political opponents as those people if not those things that belonged to the toilet signifies a deep contemptuous and hateful political disposition. The fundamental desire of the ultimate elimination and erasure of the enemy and opponent is not

concealed where the toilets and waste matter are used to imagine and describe them. What made Mugabe's hateful speeches and imagery more forceful and effective in their suggestion and effect is that, in his 2013 political campaign especially, "his speeches reverberated long distances from the campaign venue, courtesy of a brand new crisp public address system" (Tendi, 2013:970). In that way his hateful messages were amplified and magnified through technology and other media effects. Hatred that constructs and imagines the hated in terms of toilets and toilet matter is intense hatred that builds psychological borders and fences between one and the other that are impossible to mend in as much as wasted matter that has been excreted and disposed of is not to be recovered or retrieved for any human uses or benefits, that kind and level of hate is fundamentalist and extremist in its elimination of future opportunities for human reconciliation.

Interestingly, in his language of hate Mugabe was prepared to invoke, nature, God and morality as a reason for hatred. Much the same way in which racist practitioners of apartheid regarded mixing blood and sharing space with black people immoral, unnatural and ungodly (Coetzee, 1991) Mugabe hid his hate and contempt behind self-righteous morality, naturalism and even religiosity. Mugabe described the gay, homosexual and lesbian population in Zimbabwe as people that were "immoral" and unwanted "sodomists" that were "sexual perverts" and practiced "sub-human behaviour" for which his government was "to root out the evil" because they were "worse than pigs and dogs"; he believed and said "we don't believe they have any rights at all" (Meredith, 2002:130-131). As in the biblical narrative, sodomites specifically were people to be destroyed by fire. Perverts, pigs and dogs are all descriptions of those people and animals that are dirty and must be despised. Not only to animalise and dehumanise, but also to totally erase the human rights of a population is extremist and fundamentalist to the point of being genocidal. When as powerful a leader as a head of state wishes, in the name of God and natural order that a part of the population did not exist that part of the population is endangered. Hope (2003:16) describes the "pseudo-religiosity" with which Mugabe advanced his political opinions and personal beliefs as if they were divine pronouncements. To claim to think and even to hate and be angry in the name of the godly and the natural makes one, such as Mugabe, feel insulated from human and earthly cares, and empowered by metaphysical power and the divine to do as one wishes with the other; it is the stuff of political and religious crusaders who ultimately become genocidal.

Following the treatment by Carl Schmitt of the concept of the political, Chantal Mouffe (2005) describes how the political par excellence allows that room for the political enemy to be legitimised, engaged with and even preserved even within intense political rivalry and competition. In that scheme of the political proper, the enemy becomes an adversary who is opposed but not eliminated or destroyed. Mugabe's hateful political imagination does not seek to preserve but to eliminate and erase the opponent and enemy in totality.

Of the existence and political prospects of the political opposition in Zimbabwe, Mugabe wished for total absence and erasure: "I am firmly asserting to you that there will never come a day when the MDC will rule this country- never ever" (cited in Buckle, 2002:67). To speak in vows and oaths and in curses, in the language of casting of spells and damnation, became Mugabe's stock in political trade. In the political belief that only he and his political party had the right to exist and to have a political future in Zimbabwe Mugabe had become an extremist and a fundamentalist for whom violence and the elimination of the other had become sensible.

5.5.2 Mugabe and the Language of Violence

Large scale violence such as the Rwanda Genocide of 1994 began with the thoughts and language of hate and violence and ended with physical massacres of targeted communities. In politics and in religion extremism and fundamentalism are sustained by a deluded belief in the totality of what in the view of the beholder is right and wrong. Mugabe described his political opponents and enemies as totally wrong while him and his party were totally right in their position and beliefs. This extremism and fundamentalism turned politics for Mugabe into a kind of rigid religion that is blind to all political alternatives and wide awake only to its own godly righteousness. Speaking like a true political high priest and judgement day prophet, Mugabe on the Heroes Day celebrations of 2003 asked his opponents and those of his party ZANU-PF in the opposition MDC to repent their sins:

Those who would go together with our enemies abroad cannot at the same time want to march alongside us as our partners in the nation-building efforts that are underway. We say no to them; they must first repent. There is room for them to repent, there is room for them to say we were wrong yesterday, we shall not be wrong tomorrow (Mugabe, 2003:1).

The language of repentance invokes the religious and the judgmental. Those that are judged to be wrong must either repent or be condemned to destruction and damnation. Seeing political opponents as sinners whose only chance is in repentance or damnation and destruction bespeaks the threat of violence and elimination of one by the other. The sinners and the condemned are those that must be burnt in hell and removed from among those that are holy and chosen. To add the religious, behind his otherwise human and partisan beliefs and interests is not only threatening to opponents but it also gives the fundamentalist and the extremist some comfort that their violence has the backing of the right and the divine, which makes them even more dangerous and unreasoning.

When a revolt of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) and Vashandi arose in Mozambique in the 1970s amongst the guerillas, demanding Mugabe's ouster as leader among other things, violence was threatened and carried out. After the rebels were killed and others disciplined in different ways Mugabe said: "We warned any person with the tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe would fall on their necks: Tino tema nedemo" ['We will axe you'] (Masunungure, 2004:147-92). The axing of opponents and challengers that Mugabe describes bespeaks the crucifixion and violent elimination of religious and political opponents. When Nkomo and his ZAPU party were the enemy, Mugabe stated that "ZAPU and its leader Dr Joshua Nkomo are like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head" (cited in Nkomo, 1984:2) Mugabe said. In the biblical religious narrative, the snake or the serpent by another name is the ultimate enemy that caused the fall of man in the Garden of Eden and all believers are required to not only avoid but also dutifully crush the head of the snake when it is seen. Like a true fundamentalist and extremist, Mugabe did not see moderate but only final and total enemies that were necessarily supposed to be crushed like serpents. Holland (2008:150) notes that Mugabe, caught up in violence all his life, developed an "eye for an eye mindset" of violent revenge against opponents and enemies. Describing his political fighting against opponents, Mugabe said he will "fight like a wounded lion" (Tendi, 2013:963), viciously and ruthlessly. Elections and political completion were frequently described by Mugabe as a "boxing" match and pugilistic game of inflicting injuries and avoiding punches. Not in so many ways and words, Mugabe took politics not only as a dirty game but also practiced it as such, and as not war by other means but war itself. In many ways, psychologically and politically, Mugabe was a deeply wounded monster.

5.6 The Gukurahundi Genocide as Performance of the Will to Power.

The Gukurahundi Genocide of 1982 to 1987, in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces of Zimbabwe, conducted by a special force trained by North Korean specialists on torture and mass murder, has been widely written about. What has not been widely discussed is how the genocide was a performance of evil in the pursuit of absolute power by the Mugabe and his regime. Mugabe did not only wish for an armed takeover of the country from the Rhodesian regime so that he could have total control of the country but he also deeply desired a “one party state along North Korean lines” (Hope, 2003:96) in Zimbabwe so that he could be a president for life, uninterrupted by any political opposition. Nkomo and his ZAPU party were a serious obstacle to the dream of a life presidency and a one-party state that consumed Mugabe. That was the cause for the deep hatred that Mugabe reserved for Nkomo, ZAPU and ZIPRA. The “liberation war rivalry and the contested independence election set a possibility for civil war in Zimbabwe” (Meredith, 2002:59) as ZAPU and ZANU, ZIPRA and ZANLA were pitted against each other. Mugabe’s desire for a life presidency and one party-state (Meredith, 2002:60) made Nkomo and ZIPRA a target for elimination. Meredith believes that the fact that ZIPRA was mainly composed of Ndebele soldiers and ZANLA of the Shona only added tribal fuel to the fire of animosities. Much the same way Mugabe wished to militarily conquer the Rhodesians and achieve total power, he had to find a way of eliminating ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA. In true performance of the Will to Power, the genocide had to be staged, excuses and pretexts had to be created, searched for and found to permit a military onslaught on ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA:

The real aim was to break the will of the Ndebele people to resist - and it worked. His soldiers killed, and went on killing, until Joshua Nkomo capitulated. In 1987, Nkomo signed something called a Unity Pact, he was appointed vice-president and thereafter ceased to matter in Zimbabwean politics. His physical death was a formality (Hope, 2003:26).

In the Gukurahundi genocide and its cruelty, Mugabe did not only seek to feed liberation war grudges and animosities between his party and that of Nkomo, and between the Ndebele and the Shona people, but also achieve one-party and personal rule for life in Zimbabwe. If the reasons for genocide did not exist he was prepared to invent them, and if the excuses existed but were not enough he was ready to enhance them.

The Gukurahundi Genocide became a normalisation of abnormal violence. Ordinary and everyday people became monsters that burnt others and buried some alive. In that way the Gukurahundi genocide became a political performance as much as it became a spectacle of evil. In the way it was planned, the cruelty of its execution and later the rationalisation and denialism that followed the genocide, Gukurahundi became what Hannah Arendt (2006) in reference to the Holocaust in German called “the banality of evil” that is performed with idiocy and cunning combined. What cannot be denied is that the massacres and the genocide were programmatically planned. Mugabe’s minister of police, Enos Nkala at the time said:

As from today ZAPU has become the enemy of ZANU-PF. The time has come for ZANU to flex its muscles. Our supporters must now form vigilante committees for those who want to challenge us. There must be a general mobilisation of our supporters. Organise yourselves into small groups in readiness to challenge ZAPU on its home ground. If it means a few blows we shall deliver them (Meredith, 2002:61).

The aim was to eliminate all political opposition to ZANU-PF as a party and to Mugabe as a person once and for all. The “few blows” that Nkala referred to were to be large scale violence and a true banality of evil that was later at worst denied and best rationalised by the perpetrators and their sympathisers. Evil and cruelty become banal when they are performed as normal and natural when they extreme. From Enos Nkala’s influential position in ZANU and in the government then, especially his resolution ‘from now on’ can be deduced the fact that the armed onslaught on ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA was carefully deliberated and planned.

Similar to Augusto Pinochet’s attack on Chileans that supported Salvador Allende (Burbach, 2003:43) and Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror of the Thirties (Hope, 2003:112) the Gukurahundi genocide was carefully reflected upon and planned. In spite of later denials and revisionist reconstructions of it by Mugabe himself as having been minor violence that was exaggerated by enemies of the state (Hope, 2003:118) or a “moment of madness” (Hope, 2003:127) where violence was conducted without much sober thought, the genocide and its cover ups, concealments and excuses were calculated, contemplated upon and executed with decided ruthlessness. Mugabe did not only state that “we have to deal with the problem” of Nkomo, ZAPU and ZIPRA “quite ruthlessly” (cited in Meredith, 2002:68) but he also noted that an extra-legal operation of revenge has to be carried out: “Some of the measures we shall take are measures that will be extra-legal...an

eye for an eye and an ear for an ear may not be adequate in our circumstances, we might very well demand two ears for one ear and two eyes for one eye” (cited in Meredith, 2002:65). That the Gukurahundi was to be a crime against humanity and violence was something that was clear to Mugabe from the very start. Genocidal thinking has always accompanied Mugabe and the political ethic of his ZANU party. Irritated by opposition voters that continued to vote the MDC in the 2000 and 2002 elections, a key member of ZANU and a government minister wished that all Zimbabweans would be erased and silenced until the party was left with only its members in the country. Zimbabwe, Didymus Mutasa said, “would be better off with only six million people, with their own people who support the liberation struggle” (Compagnon, 2011:51), not the rest of the population in the country that do not support ZANU-PF. Such thinking is and such sentiments are fundamentally genocidal.

5.6.1 Excuses and Pretexts for Gukurahundi

Well before the genocide, Mugabe had not only stated his wishes for a one party-state in Zimbabwe but also his deep personal hatred for Nkomo, so much of it that he would not sit on a chair where Nkomo had been sitting. As mentioned above Mugabe had already publicly mused on extra-legal and large scale violent revenge on ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA. For Gukurahundi to be carried out with some rationality and cover of legality there had to be sound excuses and pretexts to simulate threats to state security and national interests in Zimbabwe by ZAPU and Nkomo’s ZIPRA dissidents. A former Central Intelligence Organisation senior officer and therefore state security insider in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, Kevin Woods, importantly disclosed that the Fifth Brigade had a habit of disguising themselves as ZIPRA dissidents, committing atrocities and then blaming them on Nkomo and ZAPU, in the process killing innocent civilians:

Fifth Brigade were not shy when it came to dressing up like dissidents, visiting a rural homestead for food, and then returning the following day to check if any strangers had been around. And of course the locals, being terrified of reprisals from the dissidents would deny any such thing, and be killed on the spot for supporting them (Woods, 2007:70).

From Woods’s disclosure, it is clear that where genuine dissidents and terrorists were not found the state security agents were used to act as dissidents and terrorise people so that the same state agents would be unleashed on the same civilians. In that way, among other ways, the Gukurahundi genocide became a true performance of evil and that of the Will to Power, of inventing enemies

and attacks, so that revenge would be justified in the eyes of the world. For the ends of this study, it is important to demonstrate how Mugabe, in his Will to Power, constructed pretenses and excuses to commit the genocide.

5.6.1.1 The Kidnapping of Foreign Tourists

Six white and foreign tourists were kidnapped on Victoria Falls road and later killed and buried in shallow graves. The kidnappers circulated a ransom note in which they suggested they were ZAPU and ZIPRA fighters. Nkomo (1984:233-34) denied knowledge and involvement and strongly argued that state security agents staged the kidnapping to build propaganda against ZAPU and ZIPRA as dangerous terrorist organisations, especially that the tourists were western persons from different countries. ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA would lose all international standing and support if they were linked to the killing of international tourists. Nkomo (1984:234) argued that “one of the cars seen by the released women passengers to have been involved in the ambush was later used by the police to transport the driver of the damaged vehicle back to town” and Nkomo notes that “I really don’t believe in dissidents who drive about in private cars that are later used by the police,” which strongly suggests that the kidnapping was an internal state security operation designed to appear like ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA terrorism. Given the disclosure by Woods that state security agents used to simulate terrorist and dissident acts, Nkomo’s argument holds much water. Hope notes that “doubt still persists on who the real culprits were,” who kidnapped the tourists “but it hardly matters - for the kidnap of the tourists became the pretext for launching in Matabeleland one of the most sustained programmes of torture, terror, kidnapping and murder that the country had ever seen” (Hope, 2003:99). After the dethronement of Mugabe in 2017, November, a ZANU-PF former minister Patrick Zhuwawo (2018:1) and a nephew of Mugabe disclosed that to his knowledge then Minister of Security Emmerson Mnangagwa and then Commander of the National Army Constantine Chiwenga organised the kidnapping of the tourists and their subsequent murder to soil the name of ZAPU, discredit ZIPRA and get Joshua Nkomo isolated internationally.

5.6.1.2 The Arms Caches at ZAPU Farms

The other pretext and justification for the Gukurahundi genocide became the discovery, on the 7th of February 1982, of an arms cache at ZAPU owned farms, Nest Egg Farm and Ascot Farm near Bulawayo. After the discovery of the arms Mugabe publicly claimed of ZAPU, Nkomo and his ZIPRA army, “these people were planning to overthrow and take over the government” (cited in Meredith, 2002:63) and in true performance of grief his “heart was torn to pieces” by the discovery. However, the known truth is that arms caches belonging to both ZANLA and ZIPRA were a well-known fact since independence (Meredith, 2002:63); both armies hid arms in fear that the Rhodesians might renege from the Lancaster House agreement and go back to war. Nkomo admitted that while “there were weapons in those places, the numbers found were swollen by the ferrying in of arms from elsewhere by the investigators” (Nkomo, 1984:225) to simulate that ZAPU and ZIPRA were planning an armed insurgency. International journalists and other observers were ferried to the site and the weapons were displayed to the whole world to portray ZAPU and ZIPRA as armed terrorists that deserve punishment. Mugabe publicly declared that “ZAPU and its leader Dr Joshua Nkomo are like a cobra in a house; the only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head” (cited in Nkomo, 1984:2). This quote is repeated in this chapter as it vividly captures the way Mugabe purposely constructed Nkomo in terms that suggested that he was an extreme enemy that deserved destruction not another politician and leader.

In the process of collecting the arms, historical records of ZAPU and ZIPRA were also collected by state security agents. These records were later used by the Fifth Brigade to trace the homes and families of ZIPRA cadres that were to be targeted during the genocide (Woods, 2007:78). These records were also hidden and as a consequence ZIPRA war veterans do not appear in the national roll of honour. Gukurahundi became at once a genocide and an epistemicide, a theft of history and erasure of the truth. The theft of the ZAPU historical record (Nkomo, 1984:228) became part of the way in which history and information were to be managed and manipulated against ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA (Meredith, 2002:67) to rationalise and even justify the Gukurahundi genocide, which was a true performance in its simulations and dissimulations.

5.6.1.3 The Invention of the Dissidents

There is evidence that both Mugabe's ZANLA and Nkomo's ZIPRA had what could be called dissidents. Tendi (2020:149) notes that the ZANLA commander Solomon Mujuru ordered many of the ZANLA guerillas not to report to the Assembly Points after ceasefire. They remained at large in the villages terrorising villagers. After extensive archival research, Tendi established that: "a minority of Nhongo's guerillas continued to engage in banditry in the north east and eastern parts of the country. A small group of ZIPRA was also involved in lawlessness in the country's southern and northern west regions." That Nkomo's ZAPU ended up carrying the blame for all dissident activities in the country was a pure political construction that was conveniently erected to justify the genocide.

Mugabe, this study notes, had already contemplated and planned the Gukurahundi genocide. The kidnapping of foreign tourists, discovery of arms caches and dissident menace became excuses and pretexts that the state either simulated or added to. Mugabe was consumed by hate, fear and vengeance (Woods, 2007:50) and could not tolerate the existence of ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA in Zimbabwe.

Besides Richard Gwesela who remains to this day unaccounted for, one of the most infamous dissidents was Gayigusu who became known for robberies, murders and rapes. Importantly, Woods discloses that Gayigusu was a recruit and an implant of the state security system: "Gayigusu, he had been recruited, equipped, and was being deployed and moved around the province in CIO and Fifth Brigade vehicles to do the bidding of his political masters" (Woods, 2007:97) in ZANU and ZANLA. In that way, some prominent and most notorious dissidents were staged actors of the state and performers of evil.

Further, Woods discloses that apartheid South Africa trained, armed and deployed bandits to destabilise Zimbabwe and fan the civil war (Woods, 2007:91). Furthermore, Martin Meredith states that the same white securocrats that Mugabe in his performance of reconciliation inherited and retained from the Rhodesian regime became the "white CIO officers working clandestinely for South Africans" who "had already managed to fan the flames of suspicion (Meredith, 2002:64) between ZAPU and ZANU, fueling the Gukurahundi genocide. Even if it is possible that there were some ZAPU and ZIPRA dissidents at large, "the dissident problem was far smaller than the

government contended. At the time the number of dissidents in Matabeleland North was no more than about 200” and at their most they “never exceeded 400” (Meredith, 2002:66) and therefore did not justify the genocidal reaction from the Mugabe regime. The government knew this but Mugabe needed a good excuse to destroy Nkomo, his party and ZIPRA cadres, to eliminate them from the Zimbabwean political landscape and create a one party-state under his life presidency.

5.7 Gukurahundi Genocide as the Banality of Evil

For the evil intentions behind the formation of the Fifth Brigade and its cruelty to be understood it is important to focus on the force itself and how it was designed and structured. In the Fifth Brigade Mugabe created an army that was separate from the national army that was otherwise not trained for genocide. Meredith records that this was done after a “secret agreement with North Korea in October 1980” following which “in August 1981 Mugabe disclosed that a team of 106 North Korean instructors had arrived in Zimbabwe to train Fifth Brigade” to which Nkomo complained that Mugabe was creating “a special partisan army divorced from the national army for the possible imposition of a one-party-state” (Meredith, 2002:62). The Fifth Brigade was a kind of partisan and even personal militia and army that belonged to Mugabe. On record is also that “the bond between Mugabe and the god-king leader who forced North Koreans to call him the, ‘Beloved Leader’ of North Korea was strong (Hope, 2003:101) and Mugabe admired the grip on power of the North Korean leader, and wished the same for himself in Zimbabwe. Mugabe carried himself around Zimbabwe as a god-king and beloved leader, inspite of the punishment and domination he levied on Zimbabweans.

The Fifth Brigade was not trained for peace keeping but for purposes of being what Moorcraft (2012) correctly called ‘Mugabe’s war machine’ that would deal with his political enemies ruthlessly and with cruelty. Mugabe himself said about the Brigade “the 5th Brigade were trained by North Koreans because we wanted one arm of the army to have a political orientation which stems from our philosophy as ZANU-PF” (cited in Meredith, 2002:66). It was a personal and partisan army whose training Woods described as basic and consisting more of indoctrination:

Their instruction consisted of basic military tactics taught by the North Koreans and considerable brain numbing-ideology drummed in by Mugabe’s political indoctrination staff. Upon completion of their five month training they emerged as brain washed zombies, armed to the teeth,

and with blood lust in their eyes. All they needed was a convenient target and avenue to be set loose upon (Woods, 2007:50).

This was the army on whose basis Mugabe could openly threaten ZAPU, Nkomo and ZIPRA that “we will show evil ZAPU our teeth, we can bite and we will certainly bite - ZAPU is destined for destruction” (cited in Woods, 2007:70). Colonel Perence Shiri also instructed the force “from today on you will start dealing with dissidents. Wherever you meet them, deal with them, and I don’t expect a report back” (cited in Woods, 2007:51), meaning that the Brigade was not to be accountable in the manner in which all regular armies are. Their political purpose was “to nullify Joshua Nkomo” (Woods, 2007:58) and to successfully see to the “elimination once and for all of Joshua Nkomo” (Woods, 2007:59) from Zimbabwean politics, if not all political opposition at the time. After the training of the Brigade, Mugabe used symbolic language to describe their work: “the knowledge you have gained here will make you work with the people, plough and reconstruct. These are the aims you should retain” (cited in Woods, 2007:50). The genocidal work of ethnic cleansing and rebuilding of the nation, the elimination of others, were not so concealed in the language. ZAPU people had become the weeds to be weeded out in the project that sought to produce a Zimbabwe without political opposition to ZANU-PF.

5.7.1 Tribalism of the Fifth Brigade and Gukurahundi Genocide

Mugabe did not create the Fifth Brigade and conduct the Gukurahundi Genocide with any national interests in mind but with regionalist and tribalist agendas. It should be remembered that much earlier on Mugabe had suggested to Lord Soames that Mashonaland and Matabeleland were separate countries where he owned Mashonaland and Nkomo controlled Matabeleland. This was after Nkomo had complained that Mugabe’s militias were disrupting his campaign rallies in Mashonaland. Mugabe said:

Look Lord Soames, I am not new to this game, you know. That’s my part of the country, Manicaland, that’s mine. The fact that Nkomo can’t campaign there is down to the fact that I control it; I’ve had a cell there for five years. Is it surprising that people don’t turn out there for Nkomo? Would I go to Nkomo’s country (Matabeleland) and expect to raise a crowd there? Of course I wouldn’t (Smith & Simpson, 1981:181).

There is not much surprise then why the Fifth Brigade was recruited from only “Shona speaking ex-ZANLA forces loyal to Mugabe” and to be “answering directly to Mugabe” (Meredith,

2002:65). It is noted that “the strategy of the force was pursued by the establishment of a Shona, Zanu-loyal military formation which was additional to the unified army being trained by the British” (Bourne, 2011:104). In the operations of the force only the “ethnic Ndebele who supported Nkomo were killed” (Holland, 2008:199). In Mugabe’s racist, regionalist and tribalist mind “some Zimbabweans are more indigenous than others” (Hope, 2003:98) and such people as the Ndebele were dispensable and disposable.

The hateful, discriminatory, violent and impassioned ethnic, racist, tribal and regionalist politics such as that of Mugabe seems to be a central component of the politics of the will to power. Nietzsche (2004:4) in his Will to Power even regretted the ethnic, racial and regional origins of his own mother. Hope compares Mugabe to the apartheid theorist and practitioner Verwoerd who possessed “a political creed that declared not just that all countries were tribes at heart, sons and daughters of the soil, but that some tribes were more valuable because more indigenous, and thus purer by blood and breeding than those who fell outside” (Hope, 2003:36). It is for that reason that “Fifth Brigade members told the women and girls they raped that they would bear Shona babies to wipe out Ndebeles in Matabeleland (Compagnon, 2011:50). The name Gukurahundi itself meant that “the rains that blow away the chaff” in reference to Ndebele people as disposable pollutants of the land that could be dispensed with as part of national and political sanitation and hygiene. Being a force that had “fanatical ideological loyalty to Mugabe” (Moorcraft, 2012:105) in person and also being a “North Korean-trained and Shona-recruited” (Compagnon, 2011:49) the force was as tribalist and partisan as it was cruel and deadly. They “beat, killed, raped, tortured and burnt homes; they sought to make Ndebele speakers talk in Shona” (Bourne, 2011:107).

Fanon described and critiqued such tribalist and regionalist politics as that of Mugabe when he treated the subject of “pitfalls of national consciousness” in Africa. “National consciousness, instead of being all embracing” Fanon (2001:119) argued, became a “travesty of what it might have been,” the venerated “nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state” and this politics is owed to, Fanon says. “the intellectual laziness” of leaders. Fanon might as well have been writing of ZANU-PF and Mugabe when he stated that:

As far as national unity is concerned the party will also make many mistakes, as for example when the so-called national party behaves as a party based on ethnical differences. It becomes in fact the tribe which

makes itself into a party which of its own will proclaims that it is a national party, and which claims to speak in the name of the totality of the people, secretly sometimes even openly organises an authentic ethnical dictatorship (Fanon, 2001:147).

In the Gukurahundi genocide and his understanding of Zimbabwe as an essentially divided country on regional and ethnic grounds, and racial grounds when it came to punishing and excluding whites, Mugabe failed to practice nation building. Because his Shona tribe had majority numbers in the country, Mugabe saw political advantage and employed and deployed tribalism, Woods saw it thus:

President Robert Mugabe, perhaps with foresight, but almost certainly consumed by paranoia and with evil in his heart, ordered that a new full Zimbabwe National Army Brigade be formed consisting only of his staunch supporters-erstwhile ZANLA guerillas from the liberation struggle... and very strictly screened young men of the *same tribe as himself*, who were still to be trained (Woods, 2007:50).

The evil and cruelty described below is the extent to which Mugabe would go in punishing Nkomo, ZAPU and ZIPRA. Nkomo had to say in reaction “I have never done anything wrong and Mugabe knows it, I tell you this is for personal power” (Hope, 2003:99). Nkomo did not have to do anything, Mugabe was prepared to invent and construct allegations, simulate crimes and terror in order to perpetrate a genocide in pursuit of absolute power. “What Verwoerd pioneered was the way of making tribalism respectable across Africa” and “no other leader in African today more closely resembles Dr Verwoerd than Mugabe” (Hope, 2003:37). When leaders choose tribe, race and other narrow identities ahead of the nation and humanity, the way Mugabe and others have done, Fanon (2001:148) argued, “these heads of government are the true traitors in Africa, for they sell their country to the most terrifying of all its enemies: stupidity,” because the political power that is rooted in such fragile foundations as tribalism, regionalism and nativism is perishable and also violent and inhuman. Andrew Norman summarised the cruelty, evil and excess of Gukurahundi thus: “Mugabe unleashed barbaric massacres against the entire Ndebele people of the region: once again he had responded to what appeared to be a small, local problem in an entirely

disproportionate manner, rapes, beatings, torture, burnings and deliberate starvation were the order of the day” (Norman, 2004:95).

5.7.2 Gukurahundi: Cruelty and Evil

Institutionalised violence is the term that Lloyd Sachikonye (2011) used to describe the culture and tradition of political violence in Zimbabwe for the past sixty years. Similarly, David Coltart (2007) compared political violence in Zimbabwe to a disease and a malady. As institutionalised violence and also a political malady, political violence in Zimbabwe found its worst and most tragic expression in the Gukurahundi genocide. In describing Gukurahundi as having been a moment of madness Mugabe unintentionally explained his own paranoia that drove him to excessive violence. As understood by Jacques Lacan paranoia is a kind of madness in that it is “delusional fear” (Bowie, 1991:37) that can lead to excessive violence and evil. In many ways including in the Gukurahundi genocide, Mugabe became what Wallace Stevens referred to as a “lunatic of one idea” (Bowie, 1991:43) and in this case a single idea of power by any means necessary. The spirited drive for power led Mugabe into a blindness and an unthinking activity. Unthinking activity and evil make up for the banality of evil that Hannah Arendt (2006) condemned of both the extremes of Nazism and Zionism as wills to power that have led to cruelty and evil of biblical scales.

Besides the Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, Perence Shiri and Constantine Dominic Chiwenga and others, Colonel Lionel Dyck, a securocrat that Mugabe inherited from the Rhodesian regime, was a key genocide enforcer who enforced curfews (Woods, 2007:52). Hope summarised the cruelty and evil of the Gukurahundi genocide thus:

Five Brigade burned victims alive, tortured them with electrodes, drowned them, locked them in camps where they succumbed to starvation and disease, and then threw their bodies into mass graves or dump them down old deserted mine-shafts. There were times when Five Brigade exceeded its own record of cruelty. In order that families of their victims should suffer as extensively as possible-for the Ndebele find it intolerable that the dead should not be properly buried and decently mourned-Five Brigade insisted that the bodies of the executed be abandoned in the bush to be disposed of by vultures and jackals and other scavengers (Hope, 2003:101).

Along these festivals of cruelty and evil, a scorched earth policy was implemented. All forms of transportation were banned, shops were closed, farming and schooling activities were stopped, and the people starved (Woods, 2007:53). There were also incidents of biological warfare where chemicals and poisons were used to poison and kill people in large numbers (Woods, 2007:98). Both the leaders of ZAPU and ZIPRA and ordinary operatives were targeted, and the populations of civilians too, indistinguishably. Enos Nkala said of the leadership of ZAPU, “We want to wipe out the ZAPU leadership. You have only seen the warning lights. We are not yet full speed. ZAPU is a murderous organisation and its murderous leadership must be hit so hard” (Woods, 2007:71). Concerning civilians Mugabe himself announced: “Don’t cry if your relatives get killed in the process...where men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them, we do not differentiate who we fight because we can’t tell who is a dissident and who is not” (cited in Meredith, 2002:68). On the same subject of innocent civilian casualties, Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi rationalised thus: “That innocent people could well be suffering and that this was acceptable, can Nkomo identify a dissident, a dissident supporter or an innocent civilian” (cited in Woods, 2007:63). The policy was to annihilate a population and eliminate political opposition. In that way the killing of civilians was licensed. Mugabe might have failed to annihilate the Ndebele and ZAPU supporters but the intentions and method to do so were in place, it seems.

As an insider and also observer at the time, Woods noted that “one thing I did realise, very early in my CIO days was that Mugabe is manifestly evil and that his security Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was running a close second in that dubious distinction” (Woods, 2007:123). On how the civilian population was to be systematically starved, an armed to the teeth Gukurahundi operative is recorded to have said: “First you will eat your chickens, then your goats, then your cattle, then your donkeys. Then you will eat your children and finally you will eat the dissidents” (Meredith, 2002:70-1). Martin Meredith concludes that all the ministers and soldiers said these outlandish and cruel statements of evil because at the top Mugabe gave license and permission: “the author of this terror was Mugabe. His own speeches licensed it” (Meredith, 2002:75). The words and actions of powerful leaders, in politics, can give permission and licence to soldiers, party activists and militants.

Interesting but also rather typical of most genocides and other forms of large scale violence is how the godly and the religious was mobilised and deployed in the Gukurahundi genocide. “Five Brigade” Christopher Hope notes “were fond of Biblical allusions, and several of its commanders appropriated the name of Jesus, the ‘black Jesuses’ had power over life and death and they liked their terrified victims to be aware of their supernatural status” (Hope, 2003:102). The State Security Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa asked by a prisoner for audience with Mugabe said “if you want to speak to God” meaning Mugabe “go through his son,” (Woods, 2007:71) in reference to himself. Where Mugabe had become the god his ministers and soldiers became disciplines and other sons. Addressing an audience in Victoria Falls which is an area where the genocide was also at its most intense, Mnangagwa said: “Blessed are they who will follow the path of the government’s laws but woe unto those who choose the path of collaborating with dissidents, for we will surely shorten your days” (Woods, 2007:71), in clear adaptation and imitation, for evil purposes, of the beatitudes of Jesus Christ in his Sermon on the Mount teachings. Further Mnangagwa preached: “Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice for they shall find peace” (Hope, 2003:103). Mugabe had taken the place of God and his followers and enforcers of violence had become the Christs and other disciples as God had been suspended in a setting where evil had become a religion that was to be faithfully followed and implemented.

In the name of God some concerned religious ministers approached Mugabe to complain about the killings in Matabeleland, in March 1983. In true performance, “the Prime Minister listened with sympathy” and “seemed to be genuinely shocked and saddened.” Turning to the Security Minister, Mnangagwa, he asked “why didn’t you tell me?” In the whole of it “it was an extra-ordinary performance: a dissembling modesty mixed with cunning” (Hope, 2003:104-5). Mugabe promised to urgently attend to the matter, only to appear on national television lambasting the religious ministers as “a band of Jeremiahs” that was up to mischief in the country. The God of the moment of madness was himself, anyone speaking or pretending to speak for God was to be an enemy. Mugabe did not only sanction and license the killings but he immediately pardoned and freed any security officials that were brought before the courts for the violence and crimes (Woods, 2007:73). In punishing some and pardoning others, Mugabe came to act godlike. Unlike Rene Descartes, the Jesuit mentee who questioned all knowledge except the existence and superiority of God (Chavez-Arviso, 1997: xvii), Mugabe became the Jesuit trainee that developed a god-complex and came to hold contempt for the Christian church and its messengers. Mugabe, in the words

below, was prepared to accuse the Catholic Church that brought him up for colonialism but not to address his own violations of human rights:

The most insidious side of the resurgence (of colonialism) of white power came by way of the pulpit and in the human form of church figures who do not hesitate “to render unto God” things that belonged to Caesar. Especially in suburban parishes and in rural Matabeleland, prayers became full blooded politics and congregations became anti-ZANU-PF political communities united around hackneyed grievances to do with the tensions we had before the Unity Accord (cited in Meredith, 2002:193).

The church was supposed to be silent on human rights in respect of the Unity Accord that Mugabe signed with Nkomo. Political contracts between politicians, in the imagination of the will to power that possessed Mugabe, become more important than social justice and biblical calls for human rights. Silencing and erasing of other voice becomes a preoccupation of the will to power. In his god-complex of the will to power Mugabe could threaten the church ministers. In reference to the critical and outspoken Archbishop Pius Ncube who openly challenged him on human rights violations Mugabe said “we will respect him if he remains within the confines of the church but, once he shows off his political tentacles, and if those tentacles are harmful, we will cut them off” (cited in Hope, 2003:23). That human rights and social justice were within the confines of the church and a central part of the Christian religion was deliberately and conveniently forgotten by Mugabe who had become a law unto himself.

Information on and about the genocide was carefully concealed from the international media (Meredith, 2002:67). A commission of inquiry led by Justice Simplicius Chihambakwe released a report which Mnangagwa vowed “will never be made public” (Woods, 2007:83). Just as ZAPU records were hidden (Woods, 2007:78) all information on the genocide became secret which makes Gukurahundi both a genocide and an epistemicide where information and the truth had to be destroyed for purposes of power. A key result of the genocide was that Nkomo and ZAPU capitulated and signed a Unity Accord with Mugabe and ZANU (Meredith, 2002:73) resulting in a de facto one party-state in Zimbabwe. The fear that the genocide caused is still a useful political resource in Zimbabwe as the people of Matabeleland remain cowed and intimidated. Threats of violence are enough to frighten and discipline them.

Condemning international complicity in the genocide and British double-standards Moorcraft notes that “even after Mugabe’s North Korean trained Fifth Brigade had slaughtered tens of thousands of Ndebeles in the early 1980s, Queen Elizabeth awarded him an honorary knighthood” and “only much later in 2003 after the killing of a small number of white farmers” in Zimbabwe “the British Prime Minister was asked in Parliament” if Mugabe should not be de-knighted, and “in June 2008 the Queen annulled the honour” (Moorcraft, 2012:21). If Gukurahundi as Mugabe argued was indeed a moment of madness, it was his madness that had a will to power itself as a drive, a passion and a desire. In many ways the Gukurahundi genocide became non-revolutionary violence which Mahmood Mamdani describes as futile and tragic violence:

What do I mean by non-revolutionary violence? I mean by it a kind of violence in which different groups of more or less equally impoverished and disempowered people are pitted against each other. Fanon called such people the wretched of the earth. When the wretched of the earth divide into contending groups that take it out on one another, that violence is non-revolutionary. When the battle-lines are not defined by wealth or poverty, but by a difference that is not economic, such as religion or ethnicity or race, the violence it gives rise to is non-revolutionary (Mamdani, 2001:1)

The Ndebele ethnic people, ZAPU as a political party, Joshua Nkomo as a politician and ZIPRA as an army were like ZANLA, Mugabe and ZANU, oppressed entities that were supposed to emerge from a history of colonial and racist domination. The genocide became non-revolutionary violence in reproducing and repeating a kind of colonial violence of one against another in such a very large scale. The reproduction and repetition of the colonial and the racist in a post-colonial setting is an example of the tragedy and also evil of the will to power. Mugabe had, except for his skin colour, come to be totally the same coloniser that Smith was.

5.8 Mugabe performs the Nation

As noted above, Mugabe told Lord Soames that he believed Matabeleland and Mashonaland were two different countries (Smith & Wilson, 1981). Mugabe’s nationalism and patriotism were narrower than the diversity of the people of Zimbabwe. Matabeleland was outside Mugabe’s imagination and consideration of the Zimbabwean nation. Through the Gukurahundi genocide as evil and also non-revolutionary violence, Mugabe participated in poor imagination of the nation of Zimbabwe and failed in the project of nation building. With the Gukurahundi genocide, Mugabe brought to life what Fanon (2001:128) condemned as the resurrection of ancient tribal rivalries

after independence from colonialism in Africa which is as a result of the political and intellectual laziness of elite political leaders that become, like Mugabe, the new colonisers of Africa and their own people. Ndabaningi Sithole, One of the founders of the Zimbabwean liberation movement and architects of ZANU-PF bemoaned Mugabe's opportunistic tribalism and divisions of the nation of Zimbabwe:

When we formed ZANU in 1963, it was called the Zimbabwe African National Union, but by 1974 and the beginning of 1975, it had become in practice 'Zimbabwe African Tribal Union' masquerading under the respectable garbs of the ZANU of 1963. The tribalised or regional Dare (a central committee of the party) had therefore ceased to represent ZANU as we know it. It had come to represent in effect ZATU (Zimbabwe African Tribal Union) or ZARU (Zimbabwe African Regional Union) (Sithole, 1979:310).

In this lamentation of the division and death of the nation, Sithole also reflects on how Mugabe and others performed, as in simulating nation building, rather than enacting it in earnest. For political power, national unity and peace were sacrificed on the altar of opportunism and the Will to Power; power was sought, found and kept at the dear expense of national unity and justice in Zimbabwe. What was supposed to be a liberation movement led by Nkomo and Mugabe was reduced to a school of violence and hatred where cadres, soldiers and party functionaries were, in the argument of Ngwabi Bhebe, taught to hate each other and given reason for the use of violence:

The reason was very simple. These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different from the other, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the cadres were brought up to hate (Bhebe, 2004:256).

Hate which in many ways is the true oxygen of violence and evil was privileged and elevated to the status of political education and allowed to infect the liberation movement, reducing it to a movement of new domination and oppression. Where the coloniser had become absent, in true non-revolutionary history, the former colonised turned on and colonised each other and violated the nation that they meant to liberate and build. Behind this violation of the nation, Mugabe was willing to perform and simulate nation building, for nothing else but power. In his performative

words Mugabe could say: “Zimbabwe is one entity and shall never be separated into different entities. It’s impossible. I am saying this because there are some people who are saying let’s do what Lesotho did. There is no Lesotho here. There is one Zimbabwe and one Zimbabwe only” (Mugabe, 2005:1).

Indeed Mugabe had torn the country asunder and for power he wanted a reputation as a unifying leader and nation builder. Reminded of the Gukurahundi genocide that divided the nation and killed many nationals Mugabe demanded that it be forgotten and left to freeze as the dead past: “If we go by the past, would Ian Smith be alive today? What cause will there be to impel us to keep him alive? Perhaps I will be the man to go and cut his throat and open up his belly.” As supposedly a good leader he thought “but no we shall never do that. We have sworn not to go by the past except as a record or register. The record or register will remind us of what never to do. If that was wrong; if that went against the sacred tenets of humanity; we must never repeat, we must never oppress man” he said (Mugabe, 1997:1). The leader who had oppressed and killed man was paradoxically seeking to build a reputation for liberation and national unity. The Will to Power works in cruel paradoxes and crude ironies. Conveniently and also opportunistically, Mugabe dwells on the wrongs of Smith and colonialism and erases and silences his genocidal crimes against humanity, which is another ironic and paradoxical performance of the political holiness of the will to power.

In the important argument that nations are imagined communities, Anderson (1983) meant that nations as populations within such countries as Zimbabwe could be imagined, constructed and united into working and just settings. This is as Anderson had no faith in the passions that sustain nationalism and nations. Mugabe’s imagination of the nation became poor and was infected with the will to power, personal, partisan and narrow power for that matter. Where he could not build the nation he simply performed and simulated it. K. M. Askew (2002:14), in the case of Tanzania describes how the nation can be performed for the better or the worse, using music and the cultural politics of art and symbolism. In the case of Zimbabwe, Mugabe performed the nation by use of what Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Wendy Willems called “cultural nationalism” that can be abused in simulating rather than actualising genuine nation building. In Zimbabwe:

Performing the nation involved the conflation of state, nation, ruling party and the person of Robert Mugabe into one symbol of national sovereignty

that needed to be jealously guarded. It ranged from singing a national anthem to the wearing (by the ZANU-PF Women's League) of identical dresses with Mugabe's portrait emblazoned on the fabric (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009: 952).

Instead of imagining the nation and enacting its building, Mugabe imagined power and himself as the fulfilment of the nation. Mugabe became the powerful but also pathetic nationalist that Fanon described as "the leader, who once used to call for African unity" but went on to be the one who "thought of his own little family" (Fanon, 2001:148) instead of thinking of all the tribes and races of the nation beyond his own. One of the reasons suggested for removing Mugabe from power by the military junta was not that he wanted to establish a tribal oligarchy in Zimbabwe but a family dynasty where he wanted his own wife to succeed him in power.

Mugabe was fond of pretending that "national unity was his top priority" (Nkomo, 1984:203) but frequently went on to participate in racism, tribalism, regionalism and factionalism. It was surprising for Nkomo that "Robert Mugabe, whose intelligence should have set him above this faction-fighting, had become its servant" (Nkomo, 1984:217) and religiously practiced it for power. Once asked by Nkomo what the supreme body was in the Zimbabwean nation Mugabe said: "the supreme body in Zimbabwe is the central committee of ZANU-PF, my party" (cited in Nkomo, 1984:3). This was an understanding of the nation that was partisan, narrow and of poor imagination. In a working nation-state, the Central Committee of a political party cannot be the supreme organ of a country. This poor imagination degenerated to a point where Mugabe thought himself and his family were the nation. As Nkomo rightly wonders, Mugabe's storied education and vaunted intelligence could not protect him from trappings of evil and the will to power.

Mugabe's idea of Zimbabwe in its poverty of imagination became an idea of personal power. He took to ceremonies, symbols and rituals as simulations and pretenses to national unity and nation building he was supposed to actualise. Mugabe grew a "penchant for ceremony and tradition" (Tendi, 2013:965) where he performed an absent nation:

The idea of "Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans" popularized by Mugabe, for example, included the "Occidentalizing" of white citizens. In 2001 a number of "galas" and "biras" were organized to celebrate the lives of Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda, who had been co-vice presidents of Zimbabwe. Ironically, in the 1980s Nkomo, who was forced into exile in

1983, had been represented as the "father of dissidents"; in 2001 his status as "father of the nation" was granted posthumously. The commemoration of Nkomo, known as "Umdala Wethu Gala" ("Our dear old man gala"), emphasizes Nkomo as a symbol of national unity because he signed the Unity Accord of December 22, 1987, which enabled ZANU-PF to swallow PF-ZAPU and for Mugabe to pursue his objective of a one-party state. Muzenda, for his part, is represented as the "soul of the nation" and celebrated in what has become known as "Mzee Bira" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012:13).

Mugabe's imagination and performance of the Zimbabwean nation was violent in its racism, tribalism and opportunism of celebrating other heroes only when they were dead. In the nationalism of Mugabe in Zimbabwe Fanon's description of degenerate nationalism, "from nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism" (Fanon, 2001:125) came to pass. What was supposed to be unity amongst people and political parties became an opportunity to "swallow" opposition and create a one party-state under Mugabe as supreme leader. What was supposed to be celebration of heroes was the abuse of their names and legacies for Mugabe's popularity and personal political image.

The remembrance of heroes that had passed on, such as Nkomo and Muzenda was turned into a political religion used to mobilise the nation into supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Those who opposed Mugabe were imagined as sinners who must urgently repent and join the idolatry of worship and support for Mugabe. During the Heroes Day commemoration of 2003 At the National Heroes Acre, for instance, Mugabe spoke religiously to the opposition MDC:

Those who would go together with our enemies abroad cannot at the same time want to march alongside us as our partners in the nation-building efforts that are underway. We say no to them; they must first repent. There is room for them to repent, there is room for them to say we were wrong yesterday, we shall not be wrong tomorrow (Mugabe, 2003:1).

To oppose Mugabe and not to support him and his party was irreligious and sinful. In his imagination, the opposition needed to "repent" and return to the idol and the religion of his person and the party. Mugabe was possessed of an exclusionary nationalism that expelled his opponents from the nation and that isolated them as sinners that had departed from his idolatrous political religion.

The building of the Heroes Acre like Gukurahundi was constructed with the assistance of the North Koreans: “the North Koreans, the ideological godfathers of the Mugabe revolution, built the Heroes Acre in their own image” (Hope, 2003:232) and it became, in Mugabe’s own words, a shrine:

This National Shrine [Heroes’ Acre], as indeed are the district and provincial and other shrines where our fallen heroes lie, is a place of renewal and re-dedication that strengthens our resolve and pledge that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again. For, as we look at the pantheon of heroes and heroines who make our roll call today, what greater challenge, what greater patriotism is there, than to faithfully and resolutely guard that which cost us tens of thousands of lives to achieve? Where would our honour be if we were intimidated by imperialism’s tired trickery into letting go of our sacred land? (Mugabe, 2004:1).

The shrine is described in the religious language of the “sacred” and diction of a “pantheon” of gods of which Mugabe imagines himself as the god of Gods that lives after the others have died. Patriotism as a violent passion out of which men and women are prepared to die and kill for the nation (Anderson, 1983) is invoked not for nation building but for building the party and the personal political support for Mugabe. In a strong but symbolic way, by using the names and the dead lives of heroes to build his own political image, Mugabe participates in cannibalism where he eats other heroes for his own political nutrition and nourishment. In the way in which Jean-Bedel Bokassa physically killed his opponents and political competitors and as a “keen cannibal” put their parts in the fridge and “ate” them (Hope, 2003:39) Mugabe symbolically fed on their bodies and names for his own name and will to power, he profited politically from the souls of the dead in a kind of political Satanism of the will to power.

In a strong way Mugabe practiced the political Satanism of forcing ghosts of the dead to use their living names to campaign for him. The Heroes Acre as a cemetery became for him a kind of political rally of ghosts that he annually invited to join his political campaigns. Amongst the names of the departed and some living African icons and heroes that Mugabe named for special honour and remembrance at the Heroes Acre in 2005 in particular, in the celebration of Zimbabwe’s twenty-five years of independence were Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, Seretse Khama, Agostinho Neto, Leopold Takawira, Samuel Parirenyatwa, Nkomo, Muzenda and Bernard Chidzero (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, W, 2009: 956).

It might look like true political politeness or just good political marketing but the act of mobilising the popularity of living and dead African heroes to use it as a perfume to scent the soiled name of Mugabe and ZANU-PF is a kind of political Satanism and cannibalism. Political profits accrued from past and departed heroes amount to dirty gains akin to those from the violation of graves in the cemetery and the commandeering of ghost for political campaigns for the benefit of the party and the person of Mugabe.

5.8.1 The Cannibalisation of Joshua Nkomo

In observance of Mugabe's way of using the Heroes Acre as a site of political campaigns and of his poor imagination of the nation Kizito Muchemwa (2010: 504) called it "necropolitan imagination" of the nation that had as its part a strange adoration and use of the dead and their names. The dead and their names, even if they were hated and persecuted in life, like true hunted animals that are later eaten at the table, are from their graves suddenly relished and consumed as political resources and capital. Nkomo in particular was persecuted in his life by Mugabe. By Mugabe Nkomo was called a snake and therefore a candidate for death (Nkomo, 1984:2). For the Gukurahundi genocide and the way Nkomo was hunted so that he could be murdered he cried "but nothing in my life had prepared me for persecution at the hands of a government led by black Africans" (Nkomo, 1984:1). Mugabe was determined to animalise, hunt and kill Nkomo and ZAPU, Mugabe said "the dissident party and its dissident father are both destined not only for rejection but for utter destruction as well" (Norman, 2004:95). Nkomo had once been so hated by Mugabe that he would not even sit on a chair that Nkomo had sat on, as if Nkomo had leprosy or some other contagion.

When Nkomo was safely dead and peaceful at Heroes Acre, Mugabe was ready to resurrect and relish him for political profit. In a way the ghost of Nkomo was again troubled and persecuted, risen and sent to campaign and fatten the image of a party and politician that wanted him dead, when he was alive. The persecution and symbolic eating of the ghost was couched as remembrance and memorialisation. For example, in the national event to remember Nkomo in July 2002, Mugabe said:

We remember him as the Father of Zimbabwe, as the one who pioneered the struggle and one who was committed to the very end to liberate his

people and after liberation wanted the people to get their land. We also remember him as father of the family and politically, as father of all of us. But what's important now is that we should follow his steps on those things that he showed us as virtues and that he wanted done. And the things he emphasized most were, firstly, the unity of all Zimbabweans. That unity is important as the basis on which we can put our minds together, our energies together, and work as one and for the good of us all, the good of our children. The second issue is land and this issue must be resolved in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. Therefore, imperialism must never be allowed to thrive and prosper in Zimbabwe (Mugabe, 2002:1).

The name of the departed Nkomo who could not speak for himself or answer was mobilised and deployed to give respectability and acceptance to an infamous and chaotic land grab partisan political project. Mugabe also visited the local school in Nkomo's village in Matobo, Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo Primary School, a school that was named after Nkomo and made a speech that was a true symbolic eating of Joshua Nkomo. The speech came after the villagers who suffered Gukurahundi had given their political support to the opposition MDC. Mugabe berated them:

You gave your school the name Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo on your own volition. On the other hand, you say you want the MDC and Tsvangirai. What contradiction is that? Do you still have Nkomo in mind? Do you have him in your heart? I heard the schoolchildren here singing a tune that says Nkomo is still alive. That is as it should be. However, we should show that he is still alive in our hearts, in our minds, in our whole lives [...]. He taught us to be united. He also taught us to be the owners of our land and to suffer for our land; to defend our land so it is not sold to the enemy (Mugabe, 2004:1).

Nkomo was brought to life and politically consumed, and also used a stick to beat and also a meal to bribe victims of Gukurahundi to vote for the person and party that had killed some of them in big numbers. In true cannibalistic fashion and in the political satanism of the Will to Power, the population that was starved (Norman, 2004:95) during Gukurahundi and whose pregnant women were ripped open with knives were being asked to, in the name of Nkomo, love Mugabe and ZANU.

In the name of Nkomo, the victims of the Gukurahundi genocide were being asked in a religious accent and tone to make peace with their suffering and death, to forget their pain and remember to support ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The use of the name and symbol of dead Nkomo for the political profit of Mugabe and ZANU-PF was in a way a real eating of a dead political rival. It is what Jean

Baudrillard (1994:6) refers to as “sorcery” the uses of symbols, signs and gestures for purposes of inventing reality and manipulating the truth. Mugabe never respected or honoured Nkomo in his life time but after his death political “sorcery” permits Mugabe to feign and perform honour for Nkomo for political reasons and gains.

5.8.2 The Simulation of National Unity

In the discussion of “the trouble with Nigeria” as far as the polity and economy of the country was concerned, Chinua Achebe (1983) argued that unity at national and social levels was only as good as the intentions behind it, as even criminals could unite for the purposes of committing crimes. This study notes that in his will to power Mugabe used and abused the ideal of national unity for personal, partisan and absolute power. After the Government of National Unity of 2008 where the opposition MDC was brought into government after a violent and disputed election, Morgan Tsvangirai noted that “by admitting me and MDC to government he opened himself to opportunities that might help him salvage a tattered human rights record and reclaim his long lost image” (Tsvangirai, 2011:520). The political unity that was forged with the opposition ZAPU political party in 1987 was also a ploy to inaugurate a one party-state (Hope, 2003:26) in Zimbabwe by “swallowing” a formidable opposition political party and co-opting Nkomo into the ZANU party and government. Smith also noted that Mugabe was being “a very clever bloke” who “worked with me for as long as he thought it was going to help him” (Holland, 2008:88). For Mugabe, political unity at party and national levels, was always instrumentalised and even weaponised for his own power, control and domination, it seems. Mugabe almost always sang and performed the ideal of national unity but the quality and purpose of the unity he envisioned and insisted upon was for his Will to Power and quest for political dominance.

Mugabe’s political pleas and demands for national unity in Zimbabwe were couched and intoned in the tone of national political blackmail and a kind of political extortion where the people were not allowed room to choose their political options freely. To unite was always going to be to unite under ZANU-PF and Mugabe not any other party or leader. In March 2005 at the Umzingwane District in Matabeleland South, before the parliamentary elections, Mugabe said before a rally:

We are a people-oriented Government, a people-oriented party in the first place. It is the interests of the people we look at as we formulate our programmes. But we would want the people to be with us. Give us the

necessary support. It is that oneness that we require and it must be demonstrated once every five years. And now I ask: Are you going to demonstrate that unity by voting for Zanu-PF in the parliamentary elections? (Mugabe, 2005:1).

National unity and peace are a grand human ideal. However, for Zimbabweans, especially the victims of the Gukurahundi in Matabeleland, to be pressed that they should only pursue that ideal by supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF was problematic and punitive. To reduce national unity to a property of ZANU-PF was misleading especially in the background that Mugabe and the same party had divided the nation on racial, regional and tribal grounds when it suited their opportunistic political goals. It is Mugabe who “has defined certain groups of Zimbabweans as not Zimbabwean enough (Mlambo, 2014:57) and divided the nation accordingly. In spite of having caused and profited politically from national disunity before, Mugabe was prepared to falsify history and manipulate the truth to bully Zimbabweans into unity behind him and his party:

We were oppressed, but we fought that as a united people and we should fight as a united people, as our present shows that we are not united. We fought the war as a united front as ZIPRA and ZANLA and we were united against the enemy. This unity we must keep’... ‘ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU are the liberation parties of this country. We are the custodians of the independence of Zimbabwe and we will forever jealously guard that hard-won freedom’ (Mugabe, 2004:1).

That ZANLA and ZIPRA or ZAPU and ZANU had been a united front in the liberation struggle against colonialism was a falsification of history and a revisionist invention. The disunity and violence between the two parties culminated in a genocide and the persecution of Nkomo and ZAPU. Conveniently, Mugabe always asked Zimbabweans to remember the cruelty and atrocities of the colonial regime but never those atrocities that were conducted by him, his army and political party. Selective amnesia, intentional forgetfulness and deliberate ignorance seem to be qualities of the Will to Power where the politician is deliberately blind to his crimes and much awake to those of his opponents.

Without a sense of irony Mugabe confidently claimed historical custody of national unity and peace. Yet, Zimbabwean national unity and peace were that which Mugabe and his party were always ready to sacrifice and jeopardise for political power. The attack on ZAPU and Ndebele people and the isolation of white Zimbabweans for political punishment during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme became Mugabe’s strategy for political domination. Conveniently, the

disunity and political violence in the country is blamed on western countries and the political opposition:

[T]he unity among Zimbabweans has been constantly attacked by the country's detractors and those who want to manipulate its people. Western nations, particularly Britain, are now employing some devious means of dividing Zimbabweans by creating and funding opposition political parties. The funded opposition parties such as the MDC are often dangerous and are bent on dividing the people along tribal lines. The British sponsored violence in the country by funding the MDC to embark on mass protests soon after the presidential election last year. They even tried to evoke tribal sentiments by manufacturing a document alleging that the Government had hatched a scheme to exterminate the Ndebeles (Mugabe, 2003:1)

The extermination of the Ndebeles which was carefully planned, a special Brigade trained and employed for the purpose and deployed was then being claimed by Mugabe to be an invented allegation by the country's enemies. Apportioning blame to others, denialism and deliberate distortions of history became Mugabe's stock in trade as he sought to perform and simulate the role of unifier of the nation and nation builder. The Will to Power insulated Mugabe from reality and suspended him in an unreal universe.

Even in the attempt to encourage and forge national unity in Zimbabwe, Mugabe remained stuck in understandings and imaginations of the nation and politics that are exclusionary and divisive. Those that did not support ZANU-PF and opposed him are named as traitors, stooges and sell-outs that do not really belong in Zimbabwe:

We have always said we don't want stooges and puppets working day and night to effect regime change with our former colonial masters. So that's the difference between us and the MDC. Zanu-PF is a revolutionary party while the MDC are counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries. For us in Zanu-PF, the power of the Government, the President and his ministers comes from the people of Zimbabwe. For the MDC, they derive their power from Mr. Blair. So there you are. You have a choice. Where do you stand? On the side of the people, or the British? If you stand with the British, you are not one of us you are a sellout, a stooge (Mugabe, 2005:1).

The quality of national unity that Mugabe imagined was partisan and narrow. ZANU-PF and himself were being conflated with the nation and to be a true Zimbabwean and patriot was reduced

to supporting ZANU-PF and Mugabe. In failing or else resisting the important work of distinguishing the party from the nation and his person from the country Mugabe was escaping the accountability and responsibility to the people of Zimbabwe who had the ethical and democratic right to unite and rally behind a political party of their choice and leader of their own evaluation and election. In a nutshell, even as grand an ideal as national unity and nation building were, it seems, not only pretended to and simulated by Mugabe but were also appropriated, usurped and even weaponised for partisan and personal political power.

5.9 Conclusion

Mugabe is noted to have combined tools of coercion alongside a mastery of the art of persuasion to maintain his domination of Zimbabwe and political control of Zimbabweans. This chapter has explored how in his Will to Power Mugabe came to conflate the nation of Zimbabwe with himself as the original and permanent leader to whom, all opposition political parties and their supporters should think again, and return. Mugabe's political speeches and actions have been understood as the Mugabeism that was a performance of the will to power, simulations and dissimulations in pursuit of absolute power and domination. The theory of performance that is advanced by Judith Butler and that of simulation and simulacra by Jean Baudrillard is used to understand the way Mugabe performed power in simulating reconciliation, peace and unity after independence, masking his original desire to revenge and punish white people. Mugabe's language of hate and violence, his performance of the Gukurahundi genocide as a spectacle of evil and his simulation of nation building and national unity are understood as performances of the will to power. This chapter has been an attempt to answer the research question and objectives of the study that are summarised in that: Mugabe's political thought and practice have been formed and guided by a Will to Power. The next chapter concludes and provides a critical summation of the study.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Even if President Mugabe dies, he will rule Zimbabwe from the grave

Grace Mugabe (2016:117)

We are only targeting criminals around (Mugabe) who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice.

Major General Sibusiso Moyo (2017:151)

The present study began with a scholarly observation that “Mugabe’s rise” to power in Zimbabwe became “democracy’s demise” as his rule became “a very evil outcome indeed” (Moore, 2013:33). The understanding is widespread that Mugabe turned “from liberator to dictator” as Michael Auret (2009:1) puts it. That Mugabe fought against colonialism but his political life story collapsed into “the untold story of a freedom fighter who became a tyrant” (Holland, 2008:1) is perhaps the tragedy of the Will to Power where power is exercised for domination not liberation. Wherever a struggle is mounted against such a system of domination as Rhodesian settler colonialism and those such as Mugabe that fought the struggle turn around to be kinds of native colonialists the struggle itself collapses to what Slavoj Zizek (2017:iii) calls a “pseudo struggle.” The Will to Power as a spirited appetite for power and domination turns even grand freedom struggles into pseudo struggles whose outcomes can be ‘evil indeed.’ At the height of his power, Mugabe had such supporters as his wife Grace Mugabe (2016:117) vow that he was going to rule Zimbabwe even from his grave after death. Mugabe had amassed so much power and control over Zimbabwe such that claims could be made that no one was equal to the task of succeeding him. Not even his vice-presidents in the ruling party ZANU-PF were allowed to openly aspire for the seat of the President of Zimbabwe. Interestingly, the military coup that toppled Mugabe from power in November 2017 was code-named Operation Restore Legacy. Mugabe was being physically removed from the presidency of Zimbabwe but his legacy and that of ZANU-PF were being restored. The soldiers made it clear that his life and that of his family were safe, “we are only targeting criminals around the president” (Moyo, 2016). In that way, the military coup only toppled Mugabe from power physically but the political fraud and force that marked his rule were reproduced and even magnified by the regime that took over from his. Mugabe had become a

representative of political system that his removal from power in 2017 and eventual death in 2019 could not stop. In the case of Mugabe the Will to Power also became a political attitude that boasted the habit to 'kill to power' in the way political opponents were physically eliminated. The man that was ultimately responsible for Mugabe's elevation to the leadership of the ZANLA guerilla movement in Mozambique, in the 1970s, was General Solomon Mujuru (Tendi, 2020). Beginning in 2008 Mujuru engaged in a campaign to pressurise Mugabe to step down from power. Mujuru was eliminated in what private investigators discovered to be an assassination by state secret agents that shot him and burnt his body and the house he was in (Tendi, 2020:294). Blessing-Miles Tendi (2020) notes how Mugabe tried desperately but really unsuccessfully to convince everyone that Mujuru's death was an accident caused by that in a drunken state he forgot to switch off the cigarette he was smoking and dozed off. For power, evidently, Mugabe would go any lengths including the Gukurahundi genocide examined in Chapter Five and the elimination of those that helped him to power in the first place, arguably. Such incidents as the alleged assassination of Mujuru, his longtime supporter and enabler, portray Mugabe as one that would treacherously kill for power. Peter Godwin (2008) notes how soldiers such as Mujuru spent a large part of their careers killing for Mugabe to remain in power. That at the end they were not spared being killed spells Mugabe's tragic politics and rather evil appetites for power.

The theoretical assumption of this study is that Mugabe combined the traits of a leader that was born stern, lonely and hyper-ambitious and also made and shaped by social and political circumstances into a tyrant. He as much was corrupted by power as he also corrupted it and weaponised it for evil, this study notes. The study deploys a certain reading of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical concept of the Will to Power to understand Mugabe's spirited drives for power and domination. It is noted in the study that other philosophers have provided a reading and interpretation of Nietzsche's celebrations of conquest and domination as having been ironic and therefore not actually endorsing tyranny. The use of Machiavellianism to describe Mugabe's political scheming and cunning is also done in awareness that some compelling interpretations of Machiavelli's *The Prince* emphasise that in actuality he was a thoroughgoing republican that did not really endorse force and fraud as virtuous means of political rule. This study therefore deliberately elects to understand Nietzsche and Machiavelli as having meant their celebrations of power as conquest and domination through force and fraud. The study simplifies its readings and

interpretations of Nietzsche and Machiavelli's philosophical concepts in an attempt to find a fitting description of Mugabe's political thought and practice.

Notably, Mugabe as Mahmood Mamdani (2008) notes, skillfully combined the arts of persuasion and instruments of coercion to seek find and keep power and domination over Zimbabweans. While the study condemns Mugabe's evil leadership it also critiques the bad followership of Zimbabweans, both white and black, that post-politically got enchanted with his political rhetoric of reconciliation and Pan-Africanism and neglected the duty to build strong democratic institutions that would check the excesses of leadership. If Zimbabweans had practiced 'the political' as understood and described by Chantal Mouffe(2005) they would have collectively appreciated that politics is naturally conflictual and that leaders are capable of excess and evil hence the need to handle them with suspicion and caution. This critique of the negligent followership of Zimbabweans is however alive to the fact that Mugabe, in his Will to Power, had grown to co-opt the courts or simply ignore their judgements against his political excesses and crimes. Left unchecked, this study notes, any leader can degenerate to a tyrant and visit domination upon the state and the country. The Will to Live as a philosophy of liberation that is advanced by Enrique Dussel (2008) is used by the study to suggest that tyrannical leadership is not normal or is it natural. Another conflictual, competitive but ethical mode of political leadership is possible that preserves human life and respects democracy. In other words politics can be competitive and even dirty without degenerating to mass killings and monumental corruption that punishes and impoverishes nations. The study notes, however, that Mugabe by holding regular elections and allowing multiparty politics did not only simulate democratic politics but weaponised it against Zimbabweans by use of electoral fraud and political violence. Regular elections became a political ritual where Mugabe and his party pretended to democracy when in actuality they advanced tyranny. Methodologically the study is qualitative and therefore analytical and interpretive. What Mugabe said, did and what was said about him, is read and interpreted for messages and meaning about Mugabe's political thought and practice. In other words the study treats Mugabe as an actor and a political character in Zimbabwean history and politics that is available to be observed, critiqued and understood as a performer of power.

In his Will to Power Mugabe also dressed up his political acts in some ideologies that advanced an announced cause. Nationalism and Marxism were some of the ideologies that Mugabe openly

advocated and that attracted a political following for him. Pan-Africanism and the cause of black people in the world made Mugabe popular in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. His tyrannical propensities and personal consumption by ambition and power were concealed behind the flag of popular ideologies. The qualitative methodology of this study in its interpretive approach allows the study to read Mugabe and understand his political thought and practice in a multi-faced and multi-dimensional way that Edward Said (1993:35) described as “contrapuntal” in that it peels away the many layers of a subject to expose concealed meanings and hidden agendas. In a way in this study Mugabe is treated as a political confidence-trickster that was out to pretend before the population and deceive unsuspecting audiences that took him seriously as a liberator when he was a tyrant that was consumed by desires for absolute power.

In the exploration of the literature on Mugabe, his political thought and practice, this study observes that in the main are scholars and journalists that express disappointment that otherwise a great freedom fighter degenerated into a tyrant (Holland 2008, Auret 2009, Norman 2004). Other writers emphasise the fear Mugabe inspired, the political fraud and the evil he practiced (Gordon 2008, Meredith 2002, Moorcraft 2012, Buckle, 2002). Christopher Hope (2004) drives home the important point that after all Mugabe was part of ‘brothers under the skin,’ a family of tyrants of the world, not a monstrosity that was unique to Zimbabwe and Africa. There are understandings of Mugabe as a tragic figure, a great leader that fell into tyranny (Holland 2008, Norman 2004, Nyarota 2018). Daniel Compagnon (2011) is closer to the observation of this study in that Mugabe’s became ‘a predictable tragedy’ because even in moments of his grandeur when he pronounced reconciliation and pleaded for national unity he always concealed his burning desire for a one party-state in Zimbabwe and the need for Zimbabweans to unite only behind his life-presidency of the country. Most of the writers explored in this study concentrated on what Mugabe did and what he became and neglected how he was actually socialised, formed and produced into the tyrant that he became. Much like Catherine Buckle (2002), who highlights the evil ‘beyond tears’ that Mugabe practiced in Zimbabwean politics, Judith Todd (2009) observes the ‘darkness’ that Zimbabwe was enveloped in under Mugabe’s leadership. This study goes on to observe that Zimbabwe under Mugabe became what Achille Mbembe (2001) describes as a postcolony, a setting where ghosts of colonialism refuse to rest and where politics is reduced to a domain of the madness of power. Instead of understanding Mugabe as a tragic figure that fell from greatness this study also notes him as an evil person that pretended or tried to be good but inevitably failed. He

was a victim of colonialism that learnt to envy the power of the colonisers and reproduced the domination and evil of colonialism upon the people he was supposed to have helped liberate. In that way, Mugabe became a kind of native colonialist. While Nietzsche's Will to Power explains the spirit of conquest and domination that possessed Mugabe, Machiavelli describes the kind of combination of force and fraud, coercion and persuasion that Mugabe deployed in Zimbabwe. Mbembe's description of the postcolony pictures what became of Zimbabwe under Mugabe's political excesses and insanities.

This study notes most studies on Mugabe ignore his political and philosophical formation and therefore miss the point on how he became the tyrant that is the subject of this account. Mugabe's brother Donato (2008:6) confirmed to Heidi Holland that his family led by the mother believed strongly the 'prophecy' by a Jesuit priest, Father O' Hea that Mugabe was destined for great leadership. Mugabe grew up with a mental script of his divine commission. He carried himself as a son of God and performed to this script. Mugabe (2008:223) confirmed to Holland (2008) that he grew up 'talking to myself' and resisting being friends with his peers except a few 'chosen ones.' From his time as a toddler Mugabe possessed and was possessed by a tyrannical god-complex that gave him a tyrannical personality and approach to life. He easily confused his political opinions and ambitions for divine wisdom. True to Machiavelli (2003:404) most tyrants tend to forget their earthly fathers and make claims to being children of the gods with divine commission. For Mugabe this was easy to do because his earthly father had abandoned the family and he had to be educated and brought about by Jesuit priests that pressed upon him delusions of divine appointment and greatness. Mugabe, this study notes, insisted that his wives be called Mother of the Nation which implies that he saw and carried himself as Father of the Nation that saw citizens as his children. The fatherless Mugabe infantilised the population of Zimbabwe, in a way and led them like an alpha-male father with divine authority. Mugabe nodded or looked aside when fawning ministers and ambitious flatterers in his party called him the 'Son of God.' Both his successive wives, Sally Mugabe and Grace Mugabe, differently but actually used his power for their own enrichment and empowerment, this study has noted. Jesuit education and patronising ambitious wives created a social and political climate around Mugabe that blinded him to the real world and suspended him in a messianic realm that made him an arrogant tyrant. He became a 'christian that had no christ' as he saw himself as a son of God himself, this study observes. Grace Mugabe, Mugabe's second wife went to the extreme of outlandishly and publicly claiming that

Mugabe would, even after his death, rule Zimbabwe from the grave. Mugabe seems to have taken these outlandish claims with some seriousness in the way he dismissed and crushed all forms of opponents from his party and the political opposition.

This study notes that while life in the colonial prison humbled and humanised Nelson Mandela, making him thirst for his freedom and that of others including his prisoners and oppressors, the apartheid regime, it did not do the same to Mugabe. Suffering in prison angered Mugabe, and not only that, but it made him secretly admire the power and cruelty of his jailers. He was to reproduce the cruelty and power of the colonial system on his political opponents in Zimbabwe that he tortured and jailed. After the independence of Zimbabwe from Rhodesia, Mugabe retained colonial legislation and securocrats that he deployed to punish his political opponents and cow the population. It is also in that way, that this study notes that Mugabe became a kind of native coloniser to Zimbabweans. The Will to Power makes the ambitious power-monger admire the power of oppressive systems. Mugabe went a long way to court to his service colonial army Generals, police officers and intelligence operatives that were reputed for cruelty and evil, this study observes. Retaining colonial soldiers, police and soldiers that were reputed for evil was read as Mugabe's forgiving and reconciliatory spirit but it turned out that in actuality he meant to mobilise their power and cruelty for his own conquest and domination of Zimbabwe.

This study notes that at a time when few blacks were educated Mugabe weaponised his education for power. He took full advantage of his powers of oratory to speak himself to power. Political activists and leader of the National Democratic Party in 1961 found in Mugabe an effective spokesperson that challenged the white man in his own language and political game. But Mugabe's education was largely hollow. It was a pretended kind of sophistry to the extent that scholars such as Moore (2015) note that, he was actually an intellectual pretender that was blown around by the winds and direction of power and had no solid human values or principles. Guided by the script of his divine commission Mugabe; seeking desperately to be accepted by the guerrillas in Mozambique as their leader, performed himself as great military leader, boasting about guns and threatening war. In determination to retain his position as the most educated and most intelligent politician around Mugabe performed himself successfully as the 'philosopher king' that spoke like an oracle with an exaggerated learned accent that paradoxically betrayed his Anglophilia and admiration of the colonisers. In many ways Mugabe became the native leader of the people that

aspired to be white and to be a coloniser as described by Frantz Fanon (2001). In a strong way, Mugabe was formed for a tyrannical and colonial Will to Power not for the Will to Live or the politics of liberation that the democratisation of any country requires. Colonialism itself, in its cruelty and evil formed Mugabe into a kind of coloniser that was not ready for democratic and liberating leadership. This study notes that when personal ambition for power and domination led Mugabe to excesses, he probably saw himself as a dutiful servant of God that was battling against political opponents that he severally referred to as sinners that must repent (Meredith, 2002). Mugabe saw and experienced his political adversaries and enemies as forces of darkness that he had a divine duty to discipline, punish and eliminate. Mugabe's impunity is explicable in terms of his god-complex that was rooted in his believed divine commission and great destiny.

Mugabe came out of the war of independence possessed of what Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe (1997:122) called a "one-party state psychology" that did not allow him to accept multi-party political competition. The political opposition in shape of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and the minority white political party led by Ian Smith had to be destroyed first through persuasive pleas for unity under his leadership and next the coercive violence that, in form of the Gukurahundi Genocide, was unleashed to liquidate ZAPU. Blessing-Miles Tendi (2020) notes how Mugabe who had his own ZANLA bandits that were selected and ordered not to report to the Assembly Points. These he used to terrorise villagers, rape, rob and kill opposition supporters and politicians in Mashonaland. Zimbabwe's independence elections, in that way, became unfree and unfair in favour of Mugabe. Muponde (2007) notes how Mugabe became a Hitler that had a vision of one nation under the control of his iron fist where opposition was criminalised and punished. Mugabe held a rigid personal entitlement to the leadership of Zimbabwe that if he failed to achieve through persuasion he deployed coercion. His pleas for national unity were selfish and fake (Bourne, 2011) as what he desired was a one-party state Zimbabwe under his life presidency. So hateful of Nkomo was Mugabe as this study notes that he could not even sit on the same chair that Nkomo sat on. When the Rhodesians insisted on voting their own party Mugabe was angered and his original desire to punish white people boiled over. He called white people snakes that were supposed to be put before a firing squad. Tendi (2020) notes that there were indeed few ZIPRA dissidents that claimed loyalty to ZAPU and Nkomo, but Mugabe exaggerated their numbers and impact to create an excuse for a genocidal onslaught in the ZAPU stronghold, Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. Kevin Woods (2007), a former CIO operative confirms that Mugabe sent his own

security details to commit crimes pretending to be ZIPRA dissidents and create a real excuse for the genocide. The arms caches that were found in ZAPU farms were also added to by Mugabe's secret services and exaggerated to build a real picture of a state of insurgency that required a counter-insurgency operation.

Nkomo (1984) supports the account given by Woods (2007) that the armed men that kidnapped and killed European tourists were Mugabe's secret police. The intention was to build an image of Nkomo and ZAPU internationally as a terrorist organisation. The Gukurahundi Genocide became a major military operation of cruelty and evil which confirms the assumption of this study that Mugabe possessed a 'kill to power' political attitude that was rooted in his Will to Power. The dissidents existed but, as this study notes, largely became an opportunistic invention. Before the genocide Mugabe had expressed a belief to Lord Soames, the British appointed Governor, that Mashonaland and Matabeleland were two different countries (Smith & Simpson, 1981:181). The Genocide therefore, also took on a tribalist and even xenophobic turn as it was fashioned as an attack on foreigners and aliens of Matabeleland. Mugabe's Will to Power gave him a narrow kind of nationalism that was autochthonous. For power, however, Mugabe had to later pretend to statesmanship and call for national unity. ZAPU and Nkomo had capitulated into a Unity Accord with ZANU-PF that gave Mugabe his desired de facto one-party state Zimbabwe. After Nkomo's death his name and symbol were 'cannibalised' and deployed to pressure the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands into supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF. After his death Nkomo was glorified by Mugabe and his name used to rally Matabeleland and the Midlands people behind ZANU-PF. The Gukurahundi Genocide which further divided the country on tribal lines became what Hanna Arendt (2006) called the 'banality of evil' that is carefully planned but implemented in a base and crude fashion that amounts to stupidity. The genocide filled the people with fear and anger, fortified Mugabe's power and also hung over his head as a crime against humanity that he continued to deny. Mugabe's removal in a designer coup that appeared not to be a coup and that was done by his own securocrats that were implicated in his tyranny became a climax to a career of political madness and evil. That the evil, corruption and political madness continues after Mugabe's dethronement and death brings into perspective a political and philosophical alternative of what this study calls the politics of the Will to Live. It appears that Mugabe was only a personification of a political culture and political system of violence that his dethronement and death could not end. The politics of the Will to Live understands political competition and even

conflict but does not valorise killing for power that is the commonsense of the Will to Power. Mugabe is not singled out for blame and condemnation for bad and evil leadership. Bad and evil political followership is also critiqued in this study. Tyrants might be individuals but they get surrounded by enablers and facilitators of their evil that come in shape of opportunistic flatterers seeking spoils and promotions and enterprising supporters and backers that use the power of tyrants for their own political ends.

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