




UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

**Title: Choice/Freedom and Happiness/Well-Being
in a Time of Ecological Limits**

**Masters Research Report: Department of Political
Studies**

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Table of Contents

1 – Introduction	7
1.1 – Where to Now?	8
2 - 21st Century Conditions - Ecological Boundaries/Limitations	9
3 - The Philosophy of Happiness/Well-Being	11
3.1 – Introduction	11
3.2 - Philosophical Hedonism	12
3.3 - Philosophical Life Satisfaction	14
3.4 - The Emotional State Theory	17
3.5 - Desire/Preference Satisfaction Theory	20
3.6 - The Enlightenment and Moralized Conceptions of Happiness	21
4 - The Psychology of Happiness	24
4.1 - Psychological Hedonism	24
4.2 - Evolutionary Psychology	24
4.3 - Psychological Life Satisfaction	26
5 - Reflections on Happiness as a Philosophical or Psychological Phenomenon	28
6 - The Philosophy/Psychology/Economics of Choice	33
6.1 - Control - Happiness – Choice	33
6.2 - Choice - Imagination – Prediction	37
6.3 - Choice Architecture - Libertarian Paternalism	39
6.4 - Virtue - Choice: Maximizing and Satisficing	39
6.5 - Prelude to Bhutan	40
7 - The Economics/Development of Happiness	42
7.1 - Irrational Economics	42

7.1.1 - Modernization and Growth Models	46
7.1.2 - The Capabilities Approach – Amartya Sen	49
7.1.3 - Loss Aversion – Redistributive Implications	53
7.1.4 - 21 St Century Economic /Developmental Problems and Potential Solutions	53
7.2 - Concluding Analysis of Contemporary Societies and their Failings to Provide Happiness/Well-Being	53
8 - Contexts - Cultures of Happiness; Bhutan and Denmark	55
8.1 - Comparing Bhutan and Denmark	55
8.1.1 - Social Trust	56
8.2 - Exploring the Bhutanese Conception/Theory of Happiness	57
8.2.1 - Dual Process Psychology-Buddhism and the Bhutanese Concept of Happiness	57
8.2.2 - Positive Psychology and the Bhutanese Conception of Happiness	59
8.2.3 - Reflection on the Possible Influence of Dual Process Psychology and Positive Psychology in Bhutan	60
8.2.4 - Is Happiness in Bhutan Foundationally Weak?	61
8.2.5 - Choice/Freedom and Happiness/Well-Being in Bhutan	63
8.2.6 - Self-Nonfulfillment and Normothetic Happiness in Bhutan	66
8.3 - Danish Happiness	68
8.3.1 - Choice/Freedom and Happiness/Well-Being in Denmark	68
9 - Measurement of Happiness - Implementation Problems/Possibilities	72
10 - Conclusion	74
10.1 – Summary	74
10.2 - Future Areas of Research - Happiness/Well-Being	74
11 - Bibliography	76

1 - Introduction

This Research Report analyzes happiness/well-being as a normative conception and as an empirical phenomenon. This report explores happiness specifically in relation to the 21st century ecological crisis of overconsumption and overproduction. The report interrogates divergent conceptions/theories of happiness (whether normative or empirical) both in trying to understand the causes of ecological problems and in seeking a potential solution in resolving these problems. The report critiques all the major normative theories of happiness/well-being (hedonism, life satisfaction and desire/preference satisfaction). It argues that each normative theory carries structural limitations in analyzing 21st century problems and in potentially resolving them. The report then interrogates empirical-natural/physical theories of happiness/well-being. Whilst these theories are empirical many authors utilize their foundations to construct normative theories. The report argues that, overall, the emotional state theory is the most helpful in addressing happiness and development in a context of ecological crisis. The emotional state theory is essentially a hybrid normative/empirical theory, as happiness is encompassed in a person's emotional condition understood according to empirical models (emotions/affects, moods/mood dispositions and central affective states) and in the normative idea of self-fulfillment).

After the philosophical-psychological analysis of happiness/well-being this report analyzes/critiques and illustrates the complexities of choice/freedom's relationship to happiness/well-being. This report is particularly interested in choice/freedom's relationship to happiness/well-being because of the linkage of both concepts to the economic system. This report argues that the economic system at its core is a choice/freedom phenomenon. Economies are made up of individual micro choice actors and macro choice architects. The micro choice actors are individuals involved in the micro production and consumption of resources. This reports analysis of happiness/well-being particularly relates to the macro choice environment. The macro choice architects are national/global economic policy organizations/departments/officials who structure the micro choice environment in divergent ways utilizing divergent economic models/theories, such as gross domestic product (GDP) or human development/capabilities. These models create divergent environments that provide divergent choices/freedoms to attain divergent bundles of resources. Some structured environments have narrower choice/freedom sets; these require less consumption and production to achieve. Other structured environments have significantly wider choice/freedom sets, requiring mass consumption and production. Utilizing 21st century notions of ecological limits/boundaries this report argues that significantly wider choice sets are ecologically harmful and models asserting that choice/freedom sets should be continually expanded are not realizable under 21st century conditions. Furthermore this report critiques the over-emphasis on choice/freedom as a constituent of happiness/well-being. This report critical illustrates that wider choice/freedom sets do not provide choice actors with increasingly greater happiness/well-being. In fact psychological research illustrates that wider

choice/freedom sets place many burdens onto individual choice actors' cognitive system.

Finally this report utilizes two case studies, Denmark and Bhutan to analyze the relationship between happiness/well-being and choice/freedom under 21st century conditions. The reason this report selected Denmark and Bhutan is based on their vital contributions to happiness research. Since 1972 Bhutan is renown for utilizing Gross National Happiness (GNH) as their indicator for economic progress over GDP.¹ This move radically challenged conventional economic growth models. Since 2011 Denmark is regularly ranked number one in international happiness reports, particularly the UN published World Happiness Report (WHR).² A deep divergence in happiness is noted in these reports between Bhutan and Denmark. For example in 2016 the WHR ranks Denmark 1st whilst Bhutan is ranked 84th.³ In Bhutan, the report notes the over-restriction of choice freedom in favor of a culturalist conception of happiness/well-being. Instead of being free to choose which values appeal to them, the Bhutanese are rather coerced into a state endorsed value system. This report argues that this drastically affects their ability to achieve happiness/well-being. In contrast to Bhutan, Denmark does not restrict choice sets in such a demanding fashion. Instead individuals are largely free to choose a philosophy of life (pluralism) and how they spend their time. This report argues that Denmark's environment provides wide enough choice/freedom sets for individuals to achieve happiness/well-being, whilst not being so wide that the negativities associated with increased choice arise. Ecologically Denmark is also concerned in resolving the 21st century ecological crisis. Thus Denmark-Bhutan is a nice comparison as both countries are talked about in regards to happiness/well-being and ecological considerations, whilst each structures the choice/freedom-happiness/wellbeing relationship in a different way. This provides an interesting discussion that will be explored in this report.

1.1 - Where to Now?

This report argues that the ecological crisis fundamentally forces a reconsideration of economic/development practice-theory. This report analyzes choice/freedom and happiness/well-being to gain a stronger understanding of the causes of the crisis and a potentially stronger theory, based on happiness, for resolving the crisis.

¹ NDP Steering Committee and Secretariat, Happiness: Towards a New Development Paradigm: Report of the Kingdom of Bhutan, (2013): 1-2.

² John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs, World Happiness Report 2016 Volume 1 (United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2016): 19.

³ Helliwell, Layard and Sachs, World Happiness Report 2016 Volume 1: 20-21.

2 – 21st Century Conditions - Ecological Boundaries/Limitations

This report posits that ecological boundaries/limitations exist.⁴ Moreover, ecological boundaries/limitations establish the parameters within which human beings achieve (or do not achieve) happiness/wellbeing. To flourish human beings need commodities that are supplied and/or created by materials located in the environment.⁵ If the ecological crisis worsens, human beings' ability to exist and flourish (achieve happiness and well-being) will be drastically diminished.⁶ The 21st century ecological crisis already affects the most vulnerable human beings as changing weather patterns are already affecting their livelihoods and their ability/capacity to achieve happiness/well-being.⁷ The Happy Planet Index (HPI) already shows even with billions in poverty we go into ecology debt early each year, meaning we consume and produce more than the planet can sustainably provide and regenerate.⁸ We live in a world in which the most vulnerable, based on the actions/choices of others, are harmed, insecure and vulnerable. Thus this report notes the inter-linkage of ecological boundaries/limitations – happiness/well-being and poverty/vulnerability. In this section the report illustrates the 21st century ecological crisis and the boundaries/limitations it imposes. In the next section, this report analyzes happiness/well-being theory in relation to ecological boundaries/limitations.

This report illustrates the variables involved in ecological boundaries/limitations. Based on Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren's theory, this report illustrates that human impact on the environment can be deconstructed into two components, (1) population impacts (typically increasing), (2)

⁴ This report utilizes the concept of ecological limits/boundaries found in Bhaskar Vira's, "Taking Natural Limits Seriously: Implications for Development Studies and the Environment," *Development and Change* 46, no. 4 (2015): 762. And; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Development Theory* (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010), 28. And; New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: Report 2.0* (London, 2009), 27.

⁵ Sam Thompson, Nic Marks and Tim Jackson, "Well-Being and Sustainable Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 499-500.

⁶ NDP Steering Committee and Secretariat, *Happiness*, 16-17.

⁷ We note the disproportionate effect ecological damage holds for vulnerable people in Vira, "Taking Natural Limits Seriously": 773-774. He states "There is growing evidence that the poor feel the impact of natural resource loss disproportionately, whether this is due to the long-term degradation of natural resources (driven by external factors which are not under their control), or the catastrophic consequences of extreme weather events. In studies that examine environmental income (Angelsen et al., 2014), there are clear patterns, which suggest that the lowest quartiles are those, which depend most on nature for their livelihoods. When natural disasters strike, those who are hit first, and hardest, are the poor and the already vulnerable (Royal Society, 2014). This has important implications for development studies. Taking this seriously means that protecting and restoring the environment can be a powerful targeted measure which disproportionately serves the interests of the least well-off, if the poorest groups can be provided secure access to the benefits from such efforts'.

⁸ Based on the same evidence as footnote 166.

consumption impacts (also increasing).⁹ Regarding (1) population growth, the evidence suggests that the global population is likely to reach 8 billion by 2020 and between 9 and 10 billion by 2100.¹⁰ This of course adds substantial pressures to a world that is already consuming beyond ecological boundaries.

In order to systematically analyze consumptions effect on the environment, this report splits consumption (2) impacts into three variables, (2.1) raw material consumption, (2.2) lifestyle consumption and (2.3) emission consumption. Regarding raw material consumption (2.1), the United Nation's Environment Program (UNEP) projects that because of growing consumption/production by 2050, human beings will likely consume 3 times more than 2012 in minerals, ore, fossil fuels and biomass per year.¹¹ Regarding (2.2) lifestyle consumption, if everyone in the world were to 'achieve' consumption similar to the United States, the world would consume the same amount of resources that 5 planets (Earth's) could sustainably provide. Regarding (2.3) emission consumption, the Happy Planet Index illustrates that in 2008 concentrations of Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere stood at 387 parts per million (ppm). This figure is the highest it has been for 650,000 years.¹²

This research report provides a brief contextual study of raw material (2.1), lifestyle (2.2) and emissions consumption (2.3) in relation to the two largest GDP economies, The United States and China. Regarding raw material (2.1) and emission consumption (2.2), we note that China's increasing economic development requires vast natural resources. China currently consumes over 30% of the world's steel, 40% of the world's cement and is the second largest consumer of oil after the US.¹³ China also contributes 31% of the world's SO₂ emissions.¹⁴ Regarding (2.1) lifestyle consumption, since the 1990s the Wuppertal Institute estimates that 53 per cent of global consumers live in industrial countries, while 47 per cent are new consumers from emerging economies. China has almost as many consumers as the United States whilst in China they only number around 10 per cent of the population."¹⁵

⁹ Vira's, "Taking Natural Limits Seriously": 767-768.

¹⁰ Vira's, "Taking Natural Limits Seriously": 767.

¹¹ Mogens Buch-Hansen, "Goodbye to Universal Development and Call for Diversified, Democratic Sufficiency and Frugality. The Need to Re-conceptualising Development and Revitalising Development Studies," *Forum for Development Studies* 39, no. 3 (2012): 302.

¹² New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: Report 2.0*, 9.

¹³ Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 132.

¹⁴ Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 132.

¹⁵ Buch-Hansen, "Goodbye to Universal Development": 305-306.

3 - The Philosophy of Happiness

3.1 - Introduction

This report considers five theories of happiness/well-being (hedonism, life satisfaction theory, emotional state theory, desire/preference satisfaction theory and self-fulfillment theory, which has linkages to the emotional state theory of happiness). This report notes a normative distinction in the literature between happiness (conceptualized as an emotion or an emotional state) and well-being (concerning a life that goes well for the individual and is simply 'good').¹⁶ The normative distinction between happiness and well-being is critically examined throughout this report, particularly in the sections on moralized happiness and the distinction between happiness as a philosophical (normative) or psychological (empirical) phenomena. Prior to proceeding it should be noted that this report argues that happiness and well-being are inter-related concepts, both are needed for a life to go well.¹⁷ Furthermore this report explores each concept's usefulness in resolving 21st century economic/developmental problems, notably the climate crisis. Finally this report analyzes the dominant

¹⁶ Valerie Tiberius, "Philosophical Methods in Happiness Research," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 316. And; Daniel M. Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5-6 and 31. In Haybron, we note a thought experiment that delineates happiness from well-being. He states 'George is generally very cheerful, highly satisfied with his life, and feels deeply fulfilled. He enjoys his life greatly and has a very pleasant experience on the whole. But he does not realize that his wife, children and friends can't stand him, ridiculing him behind his back. They pretend to love him only because he is wealthy. If he knew these things, he would be devastated. But he remains ignorant of the facts even into old age, and feels completely satisfied through the end of his life. He never learns the truth...Was George happy? By many people's lights, yes...Yet many find it implausible to think that George was doing very *well*, and indeed his predicament is likely to seem deeply unfortunate, even pathetic. Most philosophers also find it unintuitive to ascribe well-being to someone like George'. In Haybron's quote we note a distinction between happiness (a mental state) and well-being (non-mental and mental state). This report disagrees with a 'hard' distinction, in which happiness and well-being are conceptualized as entirely divergent concepts. The report argues as Haybron does later in his book that happiness and well-being are inter-related. The danger in solely fixating on well-being is that the concept may relate to normative but not empirical human beings. For example one may paternalistically conclude that someone is doing well based on an objective analysis of their living circumstances, utilizing concepts such as income, achievement, health and/or education. This fixation of objective data may ignore the fact that the same person may be psychologically struggling or depressed. This example is sadly not hypothetical, as rates of depression have skyrocketed in countries in which 'well-being' metrics assert people hold all the objective goods they need to flourish. When this happens, happiness (mental flourishing) no longer becomes an appendage to well-being (objective flourishing/achievement), it becomes a key aspect of well-being.

¹⁷ See footnote 16 for the conceptual distinction between happiness and well-being. Also in the footnote the report argued against a 'firm distinction' in favor of the interrelationship of both concepts.

concepts/theories of happiness and one quickly notes their limitation for the 21st century, particularly in relation to the ecological crisis. This report argues against happiness/well-being conceptualized as hedonism, life satisfaction and desire/preference satisfaction. This report argues for the potential of the emotional state theory of happiness and the self-fulfillment theory of well-being.

3.2 - Philosophical Hedonism

The theoretical linkage between happiness and hedonism (pleasure) goes as far back as ancient Greece (most notably the Cyrenaics).¹⁸ Hedonism in both its happiness and well-being senses argues that greater pleasure over pain is how one achieves happiness/well-being.¹⁹ A key problem for hedonism is that within its inherent framework there is no capacity to resolve the ecologic crisis. Many argue that hedonism is a strong cause of it. The individual chase of pleasure after pleasure without any consideration of one's impact on the global environment is the cause. Theoretically hedonism has a nearly impossible task in reforming, as the theory's ideal person is one experiencing maximum pleasure, without limits, often empirically chasing pleasure through individual consumption.²⁰ Foundationally as individuals attain momentary pleasure through continuous consumption and production, hedonism cannot accommodate a refutation of individuals' consumptive choice sets, as such behavior is pleasure producing and hence a good according to hedonism.

This report pondered briefly whether one could create a 21st century brand of hedonism for an ecologically bound world, possibly limiting pleasure per individual to ensure the theory does not allow pleasure being produced primarily through overconsumption and overproduction. The key problem this theory encounters is measurement ability of pleasure per individual. This report concluded that for such a hedonometer to be fairly objectively accurate would involve too many liberty restrictions and invasions of privacy. The key reason one needs a fairly accurate objective assessment over a self-report is because self-reports may be misreported to accrue greater resources. For example, if an economic system was created utilizing hedonism as the distributional criterion, for the system to work, one requires a method to analyze how much pleasure/happiness each individual experiences. If the method is self-reports, in which individuals state how much pleasure they experience, they may/probably

¹⁸ Christopher P. Niemiec and Richard M. Ryan, "What Makes for a Life Well Lived? Autonomy and its Relation to Full Functioning and Organismic Wellness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 216. And; Veronica Huta, "Eudaimonia," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 202.

¹⁹ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 61-62.

²⁰ In David Graeber, "'Consumption,'" *Current Anthropology* 8, no. 4 (2011): 495, he analyzes Colin Campbell's distinction between 'Traditional Hedonism' (the direct experience of pleasure such as wine, women, sex, drugs etc. in which there are natural limitations) and 'Modern Self-illusory Hedonism' (in which a social/economic order is created for the fashioning of daydreams attached to a consumerist chase after pleasure).

would misreport how much pleasure they experience to accrue greater resources. Thus to link hedonism to the economic system one needs to create a fairly objective methodology to analyze pleasure. To accurately gauge pleasure requires objectively studying the individual's mind and biological/physiological responses to stimuli. The dominant methods are all conducted in medical facilities utilizing medical machinery (see footnote 103). This report argues that these methods cannot be utilized as they would involve/require severe liberty restrictions, such as coercing/forcing individuals to be objectively tested to analyze how much pleasure they experience. Furthermore test conditions may not be relatable to life conditions as individuals under these conditions may be fearful or tense based on the testing environment whilst in life they are relaxed or tranquil. Therefore the concept/theory of hedonism's suffers from fundamental flaws/limitations for a potential linkage of the concept/theory to the economic system.²¹

This however still brings up the pertinent question of whether happiness equals pleasure? If so, how strong is the foundation of happiness when it is linked to pleasure? This report argues that happiness/pleasure is not a strong relationship and cannot withstand critique. Utilizing Haybron's critique of hedonism as too shallow an emotion to be linked to happiness, this research report links happiness to time and concludes that hedonism struggles theoretically as a theory of happiness.²² As happiness can be conceived in either a short or long term framework, this report argues the danger in constructing a short-term framework for happiness is empirical-psychological adaptation. Once the emotion arises, it arises rapidly and then vanishes rapidly.²³ In order to regain the feeling/emotion, one needs repeated exposure to newer and newer and more and more stimuli, often achieved/attained through the purchase of consumer goods. Theoretically and empirically, in relation to the 21st century ecological crisis, short-term rapid emotions damage the global eco-system that sustains our very existence.

A key theoretical flaw in linking happiness to pleasure is the superficial nature of pleasure in time. The emotion is intense yet momentary (short), as a result often not impacting human beings' emotional condition (long term emotions-mood dispositions and central affective state) at all.²⁴ One can experience the most intense of pleasures whilst feeling that the pleasures don't seep deeply into our core self.²⁵ Phenomenologically pleasure often feels fleeting, it arrives quickly leaves quickly and often our emotional condition remains unchanged.²⁶ Robert Nozick provides a strong theoretical critique of happiness/pleasure with his experience machine thought experiment. The experiment asks one to imagine

²¹ This report utilizes the concept of 'the economic system' found in Paul Krugman, Robin Wells, Margaret Ray and David Anderson, *Macroeconomics* (New York: Worth Publishers, 2).

²² Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 63.

²³ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 63.

²⁴ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 63.

²⁵ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 63.

²⁶ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 63.

being plugged into a machine in which one is able to select any experience one desires.²⁷ The experiment illustrates the intuition that human beings do not just want passive pleasure, rather they want authentic lives in which they are in active control.²⁸

Furthermore regarding pleasure-happiness-time, the short-term nature of pleasure contributes to a micro-environment structured on zero-sum competition. In GDP societies, pleasure is linked to consumption. Individuals attempt to attain pleasure utilizing their achieved consumption bundles as evidence of their relative status and social prestige. When human beings link pleasure to happiness they are often left in emotional withdrawal, not feeling the state they desire and addiction, a desire to achieve the state again. Tibor Scitovsky argues, when pleasures from achieved consumer goods emotionally fades, pleasures turns into comforts and human beings cannot accept comforts, as they want pleasures and novelty.²⁹ Therefore in order to feel the emotion again, new consumption bundles are desired in the hope that 'this time pleasure doesn't leave us so soon'.

3.3 - Philosophical Life Satisfaction

Many articles and books written on happiness simply utilize life satisfaction, as one can easily ask 'how satisfied are you with your life?' or utilize the 'cantril ladder' and ask 'on a scale of one to ten, ten being the best possible life you can imagine and one being the worst possible life you can imagine where do you rate you life?' A key danger in these studies is affective ignorance and arbitrary norms.³⁰ When one asks a person 'how satisfied are you with your life?' one is not providing them with a definitive framework to analyze their life.³¹ In essence the individual needs to arbitrarily decide which parts of their life get the most attention. Furthermore we do not look at our lives from an objective standpoint. Most people have ethical norms when deciding how to answer the question.³² For example, one could have a norm of gratitude and look at the good in one's life by being grateful one is not poor or dead. Whilst another person could have a norm of non-complacency, and regardless of how good their life is they rate themselves as unhappy as they use that to achieve greater things. A key problem for life satisfaction theory is that many of these norms are arbitrary and we often switch norms in the moment in order to feel a certain way. The problem arises in relation to inter-personal comparison of happiness/well-being.³³ Under this framework it would be nearly impossible to grasp whether two people are talking about the same phenomena because we cannot know which norms they

²⁷ Daniel Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness* (New York: Random House, 2005), 38.

²⁸ Daniel Nettle, *Happiness: The Science behind your smile* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 172.

²⁹ Barry Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004), 172.

³⁰ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 82.

³¹ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 95.

³² Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 94.

³³ For the complexities of inter-personal comparisons, see footnotes 104, 105 and 106.

are utilizing to make their happiness/well-being assessment. If life satisfaction is potentially linked to the economic system, arbitrary norms become a severe problem. If multiple individuals report their happiness and we do not know which ethical norms they are utilizing resources could be distributed to individuals unfairly. One individual may report that they are unhappy based on a norm of non-complacency, whilst another individual may report they are happy based on a norm of gratitude. If happiness/well-being (conceptualized as life satisfaction) is to be linked to the economic system as a distributional criterion, then solely by utilizing divergent norms individuals may accrue greater or lesser resources. Again the danger arises with self reports that an individual may misreport their happiness or even accurately report their happiness but the framework doesn't allow us to grasp which ethical norm they are utilizing to analyze their lives.

Whilst this report argues that life satisfaction theory is weak in terms of interpersonal comparison, arbitrary ethical norms and strategic answers, the theory is intrinsically strong with regards to democratic and non-paternalistic values.³⁴ These values are stronger in subjective accounts of happiness and not taken as seriously in objective accounts of happiness. This report hypothesizes that the theoretical foundation of life satisfaction theory is an Enlightenment idea of the rational human being, who is capable of apprehending their emotions and capable of placing concepts onto experience to accurately describe what they are feeling.³⁵ Haybron argues that life satisfaction is founded on a theory of individual sovereignty. The individual is provided with the responsibility of analyzing and gauging whether they are experiencing happiness or not.³⁶ Furthermore Daniel Gilbert argues that there is only one person at the critical point of observation and one has to ask him/her the only person who experiences that life.³⁷ The key danger with life satisfaction theory emerges in its relation to empirical psychology research, notably dual process theory, which illustrate individuals cannot grasp or analyze many phenomena that affect their lives as these phenomena occurs under the cognitive/conscious level. In relation to dual process psychology life satisfaction and cognitive-rational self-reports, whilst being democratic and non-paternalist, suffer from what is termed affective ignorance. As dual process psychology illustrates much of our capacity for happiness/well-being exists under cognition/thought.³⁸ Thus whilst we may rationally-cognitively assert we are happy deeper down in our automatic system we may not be happy. A key problem is that self-reports may not tell us anything about the individual's experienced happiness/well-being, which even they cannot directly comprehend as it exists under their cognitive/conscious mind. A key problem dual process psychology poses for life satisfaction is empirical studies illustrating many individuals in one test state that they suffer from

³⁴ New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: 2012 Report* (London, 2012), 6.

³⁵ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 11-12.

³⁶ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 12.

³⁷ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 72-73.

³⁸ Based on the same evidence as footnotes 94 and 95.

depression or anxiety whilst in another test they cognitively self-report that they are happy. This is deeply troubling for a theory of happiness.³⁹

Life satisfaction theory is equally as bad if not worse than hedonism in a key respect. Life satisfaction theory argues that individuals are happy if they rate their lives as satisfying to the question 'how satisfied are you with your life?' Fundamentally the cantril ladder is the worst possible indicator of happiness in the literature. People are asked to compare their lives to the best and worst possible lives they can imagine.⁴⁰ If this indicator ever gains policy relevance it would be disastrous. The indicator has no capacity to limit ecological consumption and production. If individuals are asked to conceive of the best possible life, whilst living in a GDP society, they imagine a highly consumptive life as the happiest, with a big house, cars and many clothes. Fundamentally they imagine a highly consumptive life that the planet cannot provide for anyone. In order to sustain a global world of GDP societies taken together with increasing population growth, either technological efficiency for producing goods needs to rapidly increase or societies/nations globally will need to limit consumption and production. The ecological crisis cannot continue. Fundamentally through globalization, GDP models are spread globally through television and telecommunications. As these models penetrate societies many human beings start to believe the lifestyles portrayed in the West are the most desirable and choice worthy. Rarely has any Western TV show included modest living, rather consumptive living is portrayed as the route to positive emotions.⁴¹ From a policy perspective one cannot have an indicator that asks about a best possible and worst possible life. In a globalized world the best possible life is conceptualized in a highly consumptive manner. For an indicator to illustrate that individuals are unhappy solely because they are not living their 'best possible life' is highly problematic under 21st century conditions. As the section on ecological boundaries/limitations illustrated, we are already over-exceeding planetary boundaries. A 21st century world cannot sustain more 'best lives' we need alternatives to happiness/well-being that are less ecologically destructive.

Furthermore how satisfied an individual is with their life is highly arbitrary determined on the norms they utilize on that day or even hour. Particularly damaging for life satisfaction is a dominant global economic indicator and model, which asserts to human beings your life, will only be happy (satisfying) if all your consumptive desires are satisfied. As most desire theorists note, desires are rarely fulfilled, after one is satisfied another arises in its place.⁴² What is particularly frightening is a college questionnaire that The University Of California Los Angeles (UCLA) gives to incoming students each year. Noted under

³⁹ Based on the same evidence as footnote 190.

⁴⁰ Carol Graham, *Happiness around the World: the paradox of happy peasants and miserable millionaires* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 29.

⁴¹ Bruno S. Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 158.

⁴² Raymond Angelo Belliotti, "The Seductions of Happiness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 292.

their goal for life over 75% self-report that they would like to become extremely wealthy.⁴³ To put this in perspective, in the United States the most consumptive society on earth, students want to consume even more than they are now. Easterlin also illustrates the lack of satisfaction in the highest consumptive country on earth. He conducted a long-term survey with 16-year interval re-surveys. When the survey begins individuals list the consumption items they desire (such as a house, car, travelling abroad, a second home etc.), then they list the items they already possess. 16 years later he illustrates that from having few of the items they desire to having many of the items they desire, they still came two items short of where they ideally would like to be.⁴⁴ Easterlin's questionnaire illustrates that even in the objectively wealthiest nation (conceptualized under the GDP model), in which human beings already hold many objectively 'valuable' goods, human beings still desire more. Hence this is not a model that can be globally implemented under 21st century conditions. Even the most advanced GDP country encompasses many objectively wealthy yet unsatisfied people. Creating a global developmental economy similar to the United States is too ecologically dangerous, and it would not even bring the satisfaction or happiness/well-being it asserts it will.

The life satisfaction theory could be amended to place limitations on happiness conceptualized as satisfaction, once one ranks one's 'happiness' above a certain level. However this report notes the dual structural limitations of this theory. Firstly it fails as a theory of happiness as it is overly rationalistic (cognitive), encompassing inter-personal comparison problems, strategic answers, affective ignorance and arbitrary ethical norms. Secondly it fails as a theory of happiness for the 21st century as ecologically the theory places all the responsibility on the individual to define happiness and the good life. In a GDP economy few people will rate themselves as happy without consuming vast amounts of resources. Thus this theory is unhelpful in resolving and exploring the relationship between choice/freedom and happiness/wellbeing in a period of ecological crisis.

3.4 - The Emotional State Theory

Constructing a long-term happiness concept/theory, Haybron introduces the emotional state theory. He argues that happiness is deeper than momentary emotions, which arise and fade rapidly.⁴⁵ He argues that happiness is a long-term

⁴³ Nettle, Happiness, 180-181.

⁴⁴ Nettle, Happiness, 76-77.

⁴⁵ This report notes the variety of emotions the emotional state theory considers in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 49. He states 'Consider some paradigmatic cases of happiness and unhappiness: *Happiness*: being in high spirits, exuberant, buoyant, joyful, exhilarated, elated, carefree, contented, at peace, at ease, feeling confident and self-assured, feeling "in the zone," being in an expansive mood, delighted with one's life, or blessed with a sense of fulfillment or well-being. *Unhappiness*: being depressed, melancholy, despondent, anxious, "stressed out," seething with rage, overwhelmed by fear, worried sick, heartbroken, grief-stricken, lonely, empty, low, burdened with shame, bored, feeling insecure or worthless, feeling spiritually reduced, pressed-upon or "compressed," or deeply dissatisfied with life. These are, I take it, more or less familiar

psychological state, structuring ones emotions (felt feelings that last from seconds to minutes), moods (enduring state of mind that last for hours to months) and most importantly located in mood propensities (disposing one to experience certain moods over others) and central affective states (disposing one to experience certain emotional affects over others).⁴⁶ These dispositions and states dispose us to react to the world in a certain way, as they concern our emotional condition (an enduring condition that can last from weeks to years).⁴⁷ Haybron argues that happy people's emotional condition (a condition made up of emotions/affects/central affective state and moods/mood propensities), dispositionally causes their experience to be by in large happy. Thus their emotional conditions dispositionally respond to reality in a fundamentally divergent way than unhappy people, whose emotional condition is filled with negative emotions/affects and negative moods/mood propensities.⁴⁸ As noted above when one links happiness to human beings' emotional condition, one is grasping more than momentary emotions and affects. One is grasping their moods/dispositions and traits, lasting from weeks to years. The emotional state theory's focus on the entire emotional condition radically distinguishes the theory from hedonism.⁴⁹ Since the theory focuses on human beings emotional condition encompassing emotions (affects/central affective states that dispose one to experience certain emotions over others) and moods/mood propensities (mood propensities also disposing one to be in divergent moods for a fairly enduring period of time, from hours to months) hedonism by contrast appears superficial. Emotional state happiness is deeper and more comprehensive, whilst

ways of being happy or unhappy. Or, if some of them are not sufficient in themselves, they are plausibly constitutive of happiness or unhappiness: one's happiness or unhappiness is augmented or diminished by virtue of being in these states'. Through this quote we note how drastically divergent the emotional state theory is from hedonism, which solely fixates on pleasure/pain. The emotional state theory is significantly more comprehensive as it analyzes the complexity behind one's entire psychological functioning and experience.

⁴⁶ For Haybron's analysis of emotions and moods see Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 84, 108-109. For his analysis of central affective states see *Ibid*, 127-133. For his analysis of mood propensities see *Ibid*, 133-138.

⁴⁷ We note the dispositionality of emotional state happiness in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 111, 178. Haybron states 'A natural proposal is to think of being happy as an individual's responding favorably, in emotional terms, to her life responding emotionally to her life as if things are generally going well for her'. Thus we note that happiness acts as a disposition (a favorable one) to one one's life. Furthermore this quote argues that happiness is an indicator for one's well-being. Being happy alerts us that emotionally our lives are going well for us. Furthermore this quote directly links up to Haybron's self-fulfillment theory of well-being. He states 'This is because happiness bears a special relation to the self: the facts about what makes us (authentically) happy partially define who we are, our selves'. Both quotes illustrate that happiness as emotional state and well-being as self-fulfillment drastically alter one's disposition and experience of reality. Furthermore through the experience of happiness-unhappiness we are able to grasp which aspects/activities of reality innately fulfill us versus those aspects we do not benefit from and should be left behind.

⁴⁸ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 130.

⁴⁹ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 30.

hedonism solely focuses on happiness in relation to two emotions, pleasure/pain. These two emotions are the only emotions considered in determining a persons' happiness. As noted in footnotes 42 and 16 of this research report, Haybron's emotional state theory considers many more emotions. Any emotion/affect and mood that affects the emotional condition is analyzed in relation to happiness. Pain and pleasure are included as they do affect a person's emotional condition, whilst Haybron's theory does not treat them as the sole foundation for happiness.

To illustrate the depth and complexity in the emotional state theory and its central conception of human beings' emotional conditions, this report constructs a thought experiment. This is an attempt to isolate the depth and comprehensiveness of the emotional state theory and the emotional condition. This experiment encompasses ten people or more (x....number). The same event happens, which for the sake of the experiment is something sudden, such as a scare prank, intended to elicit an immediate emotional reaction (y) whilst all (x's) are at the same location (z). Each visualizes the same event (y). As one would expect from having watched any candid camera type of show, each person responds differently, some emotional/affective responses directly visible are that some (x's) laugh as they find it silly. Some see it as a joke whilst others anger or scream and shout, and for the rest any version between these two extremes. Clearly as the reaction is not cognitive (thought) but rather automatic (immediate) we see something deeper in that individual than the event. We see their mood/mood propensity that structures their emotional/affective response to the world. This propensity/disposition is a fairly enduring trait, which can last and structure ones emotions/affective responses to stimuli from months to years. After realizing it's just a prank we also note the emotional condition of the (x's) involved. Some (x's) dispositions structure them to respond with laughter and taking the (y) as a joke, whilst other (x's) dispositions structure them to respond with anger. Utilizing mood induction, we grasp that the same event externally in the world, is internally translated in divergent ways leading to divergent responses. Thus (x's) whose emotional condition is positive are disposed to see/experience the lightness in life, the humor, negative events may affect them but they are quick to positively respond. On the other hand (x's) whose emotional condition is negative are disposed regardless of the (y) or (z) to respond negatively and unhappily to the world.

Happiness is deeper than momentary emotions. It structures our reality through our emotions/affects/central affective states and moods/mood dispositions.⁵⁰ Fundamentally a happy person experiences long-term stability in state of mind and happiness. Whilst being happy they experience many of the positive emotions and moods that affect their emotional condition. Based on the emotional state theory's exceptionally strong empirical and normative foundations this report proposes that this theory provides the strongest foundation for a linkage between happiness and the economic system. As this variant of happiness is longer than momentary emotions, consumption plays a

⁵⁰ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 147.

limited role. Pleasure is removed as the theory's foundation and other emotional states are considered. Emotions considered such as tranquility provide a divergent conception and choice set for action than a theory solely fixated on pleasure or human beings fulfilling their desires/preferences. Since the emotional state theory is a long-term happiness theory, adaptation is greatly reduced and hence human beings are not chasing a quick emotion through consumption choices.⁵¹ Theoretically founded on the long-term nature of emotional state happiness this report further notes its potentially strong foundational linkage to the resolution of 21st century development/economic problems. If happiness is not achieved through short-term consumption but rather through long-term emotional self-fulfillment, we start to note a theory that structurally allows for the creation of a happier world whilst addressing many 21st century developmental/economic problems. Prior to proceeding this report notes Haybron's emotional state theory of happiness is a core aspect of his self-fulfillment theory of well-being. The self-fulfillment theory is discussed in detailed depth in footnotes 44 and 213 and is utilized later in the Bhutan-Denmark section. Self-fulfillment theory is analyzed in relation to ecological considerations in footnote 125. Self-fulfillment is analyzed in depth in relation to Bhutan in footnote 204.

3.5 - Desire/Preference Satisfaction Theory

The third theory of happiness/well-being; desire/preference satisfaction is ecologically the worst concept/theory, as its foundation directly links it up to the GDP developmental and economic model.⁵² The desire/preference satisfaction theory asserts that happiness/well-being is achieved by having one's desires/preferences fulfilled.⁵³ This theory is the backbone of our capitalist economic consumptive systems. Linking this up to economic theory, we note that GDP models and conventional economists analyze how many preferences are satisfied in determining a person's well-being.⁵⁴ The danger of this approach is the same as the danger in the life satisfaction theory, as an individual can have an unlimited number of preferences and desires and if they are not fulfilled, the theory asserts that the individual is not happy. Living in a GDP model society with continuous advertisements telling one to consume, it is no surprise that individuals hold materialist extrinsic values, which directly influence their assessment of their happiness/well-being.⁵⁵ If one asks or analyzes how many

⁵¹ This report notes the non-existent linkage between adaptation, in relation to, emotional state happiness in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 124-125.

⁵² Donatella Alessandrini, Suhraiya Jivraj and Asta Zokaityte, "Exploring Well-being and Gross National Happiness in Sustainable Development Policy Making," *The Indian Journal of International Economic Law*, Vol VII (2015): 59.

⁵³ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 34.

⁵⁴ Alessandrini, Jivraj and Zokaityte, "Exploring Well-being and Gross National Happiness in Sustainable Development Policy Making," 59.

⁵⁵ This report finds the linking of GDP-advertising-materialism-extrinsic values in Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics*, 133. And; Tim Kasser, "The Good Life or the Goods Life? Positive Psychology and Personal Well-Being in the Culture of

preferences are satisfied, few will be. Living in these GDP model societies requires people hold more and more desires (cultivated through advertising-marketing) for more and more consumption. This report also argues that another variable concerning the growth of individual desires is psychological adaptation. As adaptation turns pleasures/desires/satisfactions into malaise, the individual is driven to keep on consuming to attain the desired state of mind.

3.6 The Enlightenment and Moralized Conceptions of Happiness

Jeffrey Sachs argues that the pleasure/happiness linkage is not natural but is rather historical and transpired around the Enlightenment. Prior to the Enlightenment happiness was linked to chance and virtue, conceptualized in many divergent ways. At the time of the Enlightenment chance/happiness/virtue was repudiated in favor of happiness/pleasure.⁵⁶ Instead of being an otherworldly good, happiness came to be understood as an innate right for human beings existing in this universe.⁵⁷ McMahon shows that the concept of happiness historically changes in time. In ancient Greece happiness was conceptualized as chance/fortune, one could not do anything to achieve the state, it either arose or it did not.⁵⁸ This changed with the arrival of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Happiness became linked to virtue, in which individuals could bring about happiness through virtuous activity.⁵⁹ During the Christian era happiness became linked to another world, in which, the happiness one experiences in this world, is minute in comparison to the ultimate happiness one will experience in the next world.⁶⁰ Finally McMahon illustrates that the Enlightenment refuted the historical concepts of happiness as chance/luck or happiness in another world. Instead happiness became an innate right of anyone living in this world.⁶¹ McMahon and Sachs note that Enlightenment happiness was/is conceptualized as hedonism/pleasure.

The innate danger in the Enlightenment linkage of happiness/pleasure is that happiness far from being something of value merely becomes a momentary emotion arising quickly and vanishing quickly.⁶² The natural empirical link behind happiness-pleasure is still argued from Bentham arguing that pleasure and pain were our natural masters to Nettle who links 'happiness level 1' to pleasure and Gilbert who argues that happiness is a feeling not a normative

Consumption," in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, ed. P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004), 62-63.

⁵⁶ Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Restoring Virtue Ethics in the Quest for Happiness," in *World Happiness Report 2013*, ed. John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs: 82.

⁵⁷ Darrin M. McMahon, "The Pursuit of Happiness in History," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 256-7.

⁵⁸ McMahon, "The Pursuit of Happiness in History", 252-253.

⁵⁹ McMahon, "The Pursuit of Happiness in History", 254.

⁶⁰ McMahon, "The Pursuit of Happiness in History", 254-256.

⁶¹ McMahon, "The Pursuit of Happiness in History", 256-259.

⁶² Sachs, "Restoring Virtue Ethics in the Quest for Happiness": 84.

theory, 'I prick you, you feel pain, it needn't be moralized'.⁶³ As a result of the Enlightenment's conception of happiness/pleasure as a right, Western 'Enlightened' human beings increasingly created states and environments with vast freedom/choice sets. The conception became the wider one's freedom/choice set the greater likelihood one finds happiness/pleasure. Whether that involved mass consumption was not frequently pondered. Under 21st century conditions, particularly the ecological crisis, this linkage of happiness/pleasure is problematic.

This report notes two strands of happiness from the Enlightenment, the first is subjective cognitive-rational happiness and the second is moralized happiness. The first, subjective cognitive-rational happiness was analyzed in the life satisfaction section. Individuals were tasked with analyzing their happiness and being capable of rationally placing concepts onto their emotions to accurately state what they are feeling. The second, moralized happiness arose as thinkers such as Mill frowned upon the state being achieved in 'the wrong way', 'a pig like' way.⁶⁴ Who was to define 'the wrong way' and utilizing what specific methodology was left unanswered. Gilbert illustrates the danger of moralizing happiness is its theoretically strength and empirical weakness. Fundamentally, he argued that these theories do not relate to anyone's actual experience of the emotion-happiness. Gilbert also critically exposes the flaws of moralized happiness through his refutation of thought experiments, such as a key one arguing that happiness is not valuable since German war criminals on a beach may experience happiness, whilst they do not deserve to be happy and experience the emotion.⁶⁵ He argues that the danger with this experiment is its normative desire to change an empirical phenomenon. Happiness felt is happiness felt, one cannot theoretically change emotions on a biological species.

Raymond Belliotti follows a moralized conception of happiness. He argues that a robustly meaning life is superior to a happy life.⁶⁶ Essentially Belliotti argues that happiness must be achieved in the 'proper way' if it is to be meaningful. A key danger in moralized conceptions is who is the authority on what 'authentic happiness' is? Who gets to determine what is real happiness versus in-authentic happiness?⁶⁷ Certainly metaphysically this is not easy to prove. Unfortunately moralized conceptions often reek of paternalism, asserting that certain conception of happiness and certain ways of living have intrinsic innate value and others do not. In relation to the 21st century ecological crisis, this writer briefly pondered whether a moralized conception may be useful in cutting back

⁶³ This reports find's Bentham's natural pleasure-happiness linkage in, Paul Kelly's, "J. S. Mill on Liberty," in *Political Thinkers: From Socrates to Present*, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 327. Happiness level one in Nettle, *Happiness*, 17. And; the prick-pain metaphor (arguing that happiness can be elicited the same way pain can) in, Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 39.

⁶⁴ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 38-39.

⁶⁵ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 39.

⁶⁶ Belliotti, "The Seductions of Happiness", 301.

⁶⁷ Jukka Varelius, "Objective Explanations of Individual Well-Being," *Journal of Happiness Studies* 5, no. 1 (2004): 74.

consumption and production. This conception/theory would allow one to judge certain choice sets and lifestyles such as highly consumptive lifestyles, as 'pig-like' and others such as voluntary simplicity as 'valuable'. This idea was quickly dropped as theoretically this may be sound but in order to address the 21st century ecological crisis and the relationship between choice/freedom and happiness/well-being one needs a conception that is closer to empirical reality and empirical people.

A fundamental danger in eudaimonic and moralized conceptions of happiness/well-being is their high demandingness.⁶⁸ These conceptions require learning happiness as a skill that continually requires practice, which entails individuals lose their rights to control their time. The Bhutanese conception of happiness is similarly moralized as it includes the practice of mindfulness and other ways of retraining the mind.⁶⁹ This is particularly dangerous if implemented through the state and required for all citizens, dramatically reducing their choice/freedom in favor of happiness/wellbeing. From a freedom/choice perspective this is highly dangerous as the citizen is then forced into a monist (singular) conception of existence and value, dramatically reducing their choice set and their ability to exist differently in a non-conformist manner.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Jonathan Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science* (London: Arrow Books, 2006), 78. In Haidt, this report notes that moralized/religious conceptions of happiness require individuals to devote time/practice in order to achieve the emotion/state of being. Furthermore this report finds the definition of 'Eudaimonic' in The Happiness Research Institute, *The Happy Danes: Exploring the reasons behind the high levels of happiness in Denmark*, (2014): 7. The report states '...Eudaimonic happiness...is concerned with achieving meaning in one's life, finding one's place in the world and being part of something greater than oneself.'

⁶⁹ This report notes the Bhutanese linkage between Gross National Happiness (GNH)-Moralized Happiness/Effortful happiness in NDP Steering Committee and Secretariat, Happiness, 34-35.

⁷⁰ This report utilizes the concept of monism found in Norman P. Barry, *An Introduction to Modern Political Theory* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), 219. And; in Adam Swift, *Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 88-89. Swift paraphrasing Berlin defines monism as 'the view that there is one harmonious and correct system of values that tells us how we should live'.

4 - The Psychology of Happiness

4.1 - Psychological Hedonism

Fundamentally Bentham noted the metaphysical relation of pleasure and pain to human beings; we seek pleasure and avoid pain.⁷¹ The key problem in Bentham's model is that human beings do not have an option not to seek pleasure, as his theory artificially creates a boundary of pleasure as the sole positive emotional state behind happiness. This report argues that the continuous drive for pleasure (overconsumption and overproduction) leads to the ecological crisis. As human beings seek pleasure, an emotion that arises quickly and dissipates quickly (through adaptation), greater consumption is required in order to feel the emotion again.⁷² As Nettle and Haidt note, pleasure is meant to give one a rush of dopamine to tag an activity as valuable, its vanishment occurs in order to keep one chasing those activities again and again, never to reach full pleasure-happiness.⁷³ Ecologically the chase after pleasure is a dangerous zero-sum game, in which many raw materials are extracted and goods are created in order for individuals to continually consume more and more in order to achieve the desired state of relative social success.

4.2 - Evolutionary Psychology

For Haidt and Nettle happiness is linked to evolution. For Nettle happiness is a handmaiden for evolutionary purposes. It is a program that runs for a purpose.⁷⁴ The implicit theory in our consumer societies is to consume. Nettle argues such consumption is natural as it allows one to illustrate and gain reproductive and social success.⁷⁵ Hence he argues, human beings automatically seek certain goods and an innate theory of happiness keeps telling them, 'consume more, if you do then you will reach happiness'. Once again we note a dual-processing theory about the nature of happiness and how the human mind exists, chooses and imagines. Utilizing evolutionary theory and Paul Ekman's anthropological work on emotions (in which six emotions were cross culturally identified from photographs in which actors dramatically expressed the emotion), Daniel Nettle

⁷¹ Kelly, "J. S. Mill on Liberty", 327.

⁷² The transitory relation between consumption-pleasure is noted in Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics*, 32. Frey also argues that this transitory link creates greater consumption aspirations. Further support of this reports argument, can be found in Barry Schwartz and Andrew Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse: The Paradox of Choice," in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, ed. P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004), 95-102. Schwartz and Ward illustrate that whilst consumption initially provides pleasure, based on adaptation the pleasure dissipates and human beings become disappointed. This disappointment leads to the pursuit of new commodities in the belief that these will provide a longer feeling of pleasure.

⁷³ Nettle, *Happiness*, 168. And; Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 83.

⁷⁴ Nettle, *Happiness*, 167-168.

⁷⁵ Nettle, *Happiness*, 62-63 and 158.

argues that human beings have at least 6 evolutionary programs.⁷⁶ These six programs include a 'happiness program', structure our motivations and felt emotions towards the pursuit of relative status, reproductive success and survival.⁷⁷ Taking into consideration the six programs as well as evolution's goals, Nettle argues that pleasures' turning into comforts is part of the evolutionary systems design.⁷⁸ He argues that 'pre-urbanized' and 'pre-historic' human beings needed the other systems (surprise, disgust, fear, anger, sadness) as much if not more than the happiness system. For example, in the wild, if a human being encounters a dangerous animal they need the fear program (one of the six programs) to take over consciousness completely in order to ensure all one's automatic reactions are geared towards running away. Through examples like these he points out the evolutionary necessity of the 'the happiness system'/pleasure not running all of the time.⁷⁹ The temporality-brevity of pleasure is a key part of 'the happiness systems' ability to reward-motivate action that supports evolutionary goals.

Nettle's theory provides a strong framework in understanding why individuals cannot attain enduring happiness-pleasure from consumption. The goal of the happiness-pleasure system is not to provide an enduring (pleasurable) emotional state. Rather the goal is to keep the individual pursuing evolutionary goals, pleasure is a brief reward for their achievement. The brief yet intense emotion tags an activity as valuable. However psychological adaptation (the repeated exposure to a phenomena/phenomenon diminishing the felt emotional experience) ensures the tag repeatedly needs updating. Thus in order to feel the emotion as intensely again, individuals are biologically/psychologically motivated to pursue new experiences/consumption purchases. In time adaptation occurs again and individuals are re-motivated in pursuit of this emotion. In GDP models this evolutionary consumptive behavior keeps production and consumption going and hence the indicator asserts that societies are 'progressing' and 'peoples lives are improving'.⁸⁰ Furthermore Nettle argues that his evolutionary theory metaphysically explains the income-happiness paradox.⁸¹ The income-happiness paradox refers to economic and subjective well-being evidence that illustrated incomes have dramatically increased in the 20-21st century whilst individuals reported happiness has stayed the same.⁸² Nettle's model explains why increasing income does not increase happiness ad infinitum. The happiness system is not designed for prolonged feelings of happiness/pleasure, but rather for goals of relative status, survival and

⁷⁶ Nettle, Happiness, 10-12. He lists Ekman's six emotions as joy, surprise, sadness, disgust, fear and anger.

⁷⁷ Nettle, Happiness, 14-15. In this section, Nettle directly links Ekman's work to evolutionary psychology. Ekman's emotion of joy is now linked to 'the happiness system'.

⁷⁸ Nettle, Happiness, 56-58.

⁷⁹ Nettle, Happiness, 32-33.

⁸⁰ Milena Nikolova, "Happiness and Development," IZA Discussion Paper no. 10088: 3-4.

⁸¹ Nettle, Happiness, 85-86.

⁸² A comprehensive overview of the income-happiness debate can be found in Graham, Happiness around the World, 29-30.

reproductive success. In an environment where all incomes rise, there is no status gain and one's prospects are the same as before in relation to other individuals. Unfortunately only in unequal income distributions does an increase in income provide one with greater relative status.

Jonathan Haidt also argues for the innate linkage between happiness and pleasure. Utilizing evolutionary biological/psychological theory, he illustrates the relationship between dopamine-pleasure and evolutionary goals.⁸³ Whenever human beings choose or engage in an activity, which enhances the attainment of these goals, a rush of dopamine experienced as pleasure occurs. This rush both rewards the action/choice (present) and through memory (past) and imagination (future), re-motivates the individual to further attain these goals at a later stage.⁸⁴

4.3 - Psychological Life Satisfaction

The life satisfaction theory is overly rational in the sense an individual cognitively ponders a question and then attempts to provide a rational answer.⁸⁵ Many psychologists are moving away from the highly rational concept of mind and are moving towards a dual-processing model, in which the mind is divided into two parts, a cognitive system and an automatic system.⁸⁶

Jonathan Haidt argues in the 21st century we have overemphasized the role of the cognitive system (Rational Choice Theory, Cognitive Behaviorism) in relation to the automatic system. As a result we have constructed a flawed understanding of ourselves, particularly concerning how we think, act and pursue happiness.⁸⁷ Utilizing a variant of a thought experiment, Haidt argues against a car-driver metaphor and for an elephant-rider metaphor. The car-driver metaphor, concerns how modern human beings conceptualize the action of driving a car. Emphasis is placed on cognitively deciding a course of action such as turning a car right and then left (cause) which leads to an action in the world (effect), the car moving right then left, following the driver's cognitive choices. Haidt illustrates that this metaphor and theory of the human mind is flawed. He argues a better metaphor of mind is the elephant-rider. In this example the elephant (automatic system) is strong-willed and stubborn and when one tugs on the elephant to go left and then right, the elephant disobeys the choice-command and rather goes straight, the way it desires.⁸⁸ Utilizing this model one develops a

⁸³ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 83. This section also starts his linkage of evolution to what may be termed 'the dual process theory of happiness'.

⁸⁴ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 83.

⁸⁵ Daniel M. Haybron, "The Nature and Significance of Happiness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 306. And; Nettle, *Happiness*, 34.

⁸⁶ We note the dual process model in Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast And Slow* (Great Britain, Penguin Books, 2011), 24-25. And; Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 13. And; Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 245-246.

⁸⁷ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 215.

⁸⁸ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 3.

different conception of human beings, their choices and the results of their choices. Instead of predictability of desired thought - desired action - result, we are often tugged in different ways and thus we are not cognitively in control as many theories assert we are. Haidt further argues, evolutionarily, the cognitive system arose significantly after the automatic system, the part of our brain we share with 'lizards'. Hence the cognitive system arose to serve the automatic system's demands, not the other way around.⁸⁹ Therefore as Haidt argues we have created theories, conceptions and axioms of human beings that are flawed and do not explain how we actually think and act in the world. This research report argues that this leaves us in a severely disadvantaged position to analyze and resolve 21st century problems, most notably how can we flourish whilst consuming significantly less resources.

⁸⁹ Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 14-16.

5 - Reflections on Happiness as a Philosophical or Psychological Phenomenon

A key issue for the field of happiness is whether happiness should be studied empirically or normatively. At a core this relates to an equally important question, whether happiness is a natural-physical phenomena or a normative-theoretical phenomenon. For example an automatic-dual process-evolutionary theory of happiness may be innate to nature and reality itself, thus regardless of any normative critiques it may simply be a natural-physical fact. This report argues that the empirical-naturalistic/physicalistic theories of happiness created by Nettle and Haidt contain normative implications. The authors themselves, particularly Nettle, utilize their 'empirical facts' about happiness to create and explain normative theories.⁹⁰ This report follows in this trend by noting the normative implications of their theories being true. This report utilizes 21st century conditions/problems as a methodology for their linked empirical-normative theories. In many ways this section of the report utilizes a variant of epistemological contingency in normatively analyzing 'empirical' models/theories.⁹¹ In essence this section of the report tentatively proceeds accepting that as time progresses empirical theories/phenomenon, can/do change based on further studies, testing, observation and even environmental changes (whether social, political or economic productive changes). Thus essentially this section of the report analyzes 'empirical' models contingently, exploring what if these models were true, what would be the implications of their truths.

If happiness is purely conceptualized as a natural-physical phenomenon, at present the most that can be achieved is to chart what exactly the phenomenon relates to. This would include physiological and biological studies empirically analyzing what neurons/pathways and parts of the brain experience the phenomena.⁹² Furthermore exploring how to activate the emotion in that part of the brain. From a social/political/economic standpoint the most that could be done under this framework is to analyze how human beings attain/attempt to attain the phenomenon in the environment. Thus how their behavior relates to the pursuit of the phenomena and how this behavior affects other in the

⁹⁰ This report notes Nettle building 'an ought (normative theory) from an is (empirical theory)' in Nettle, Happiness, 164. In his conclusion he states "The same rule applies even more strongly to material conditions. Having a safe, dry cave might be great when one's competitors are roaming the dark woods, but when they are living in brick houses with dishwashers, it is probably not such a clever strategy'. Note the key word 'probably'. From an empirical theory, evolution, he is deriving a normative theory explaining why human beings consumption strategies should change as societies advance. The explanatory leap from a cave to a brick houses is a normative assertion. Furthermore this assertion illustrates how economic, political and social factors affect the definition of happiness. It was a political and economic choice/decision to industrialize that led to environments of houses over caves.

⁹¹ This report found the social science contingency epistemology in Pieterse, Development Theory, 162.

⁹² The empirical-naturalist/physiclist research on the brain is based on footnote 106.

environment also pursuing the phenomena. This section of the report analyzes elements of these questions noting that happiness conceptualized in a natural-physical manner solely explains why 21st century problems exist/continue to exist, whilst at present, the theory cannot provide a framework for their resolution. If happiness is a normative-theoretical phenomenon a lot can be achieved as the framework implicitly contains a variant of social constructivism, in which one can choose divergent theories of happiness and attempt to implement them. This can be achieved as the environment and human beings conceptualized by the theory are malleable and amenable to change. Furthermore the field of normative-theoretical happiness has rapidly developed the past twenty years with many new theories being proposed and multiple methodologies created to choose between divergent happiness theories.

Empirical models and theories that biologically, psychologically (automatic system), physically link happiness to pleasure provide no assistance in resolving 21st century economic/developmental problems. As these theories solely attempt to illustrate, what the phenomena is not what the phenomena ought to be. However, these empirical/physical, models/theories of happiness do provide a fairly strong foundation to understand why 21st century problems exist/continue to exist. When defined naturally/physically there is a persuasive argument that innately links happiness to pleasure.⁹³ Foundationally, Nettle and Haidt are metaphysically bound to the claim that; when the happiness system runs, dopamine (pleasure-happiness) structures our being in the world: our memory-imagination and action/choices.⁹⁴ As a result, goals from the automatic (evolutionary; survival-reproduction-relative status) over the cognitive system structure the environment in which human beings desire/imagine and act/choose.⁹⁵ In relation to 21st century economic-development problems, evolutionary determinism innately linking happiness/pleasure, offers no constructive possibilities outside of structurally grasping why 21st century problem exist/continue to exist. Human beings are conceptualized a certain way, as a pleasure-dopamine structured species, which cannot theoretically (cognitively) structure the phenomena (happiness) differently. As the phenomena are of a natural cause-effect sort not a normative theories sort. A key problem in this account is that the theory places no limitations on pleasure accrual. This structures an environment in which empirical individuals are bound to end up in zero-sum conflicts. As the chase of pleasure after pleasure inevitably ends up in one-person accruing pleasure at another's expense. This creates a suboptimal micro and macro environment. Individuals in GDP societies pursue pleasure largely through consumption.⁹⁶ In order to consume human beings need to compete with others in the environment for positions (employment positions – stratified societies as some jobs hold greater status and

⁹³ Based on the same evidence as footnotes 63 and 94.

⁹⁴ The innate linkage between happiness-pleasure (dopamine) is found in Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 16-17 and 83. And; Nettle, *Happiness*, 121, 125, 127 and 161.

⁹⁵ The automatic goal of evolution is found in Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 15-16, 29, 83 and 143. And; 'Nettle, *Happiness*, 33, 97 and 164-168.

⁹⁶ Based on the same evidence as footnotes 20, 55 and 72.

greater resource bundles).⁹⁷ Hedonism-happiness and the continuous pursuit after pleasure is not ecologically sustainable and hence cannot provide a theoretical guide for the resolution of 21st century problems.

In contrast to biological psychological accounts of happiness in which happiness is structurally determined, reason-normative accounts make divergent assumptions and hypothesis about the phenomena. Fundamentally they argue; cognitively, happiness is a conception of mind. The mind creates (past-present) the phenomena through belief in certain conceptions/theories. Furthermore the mind can re-create (future) happiness through belief in divergent conceptions/theories.⁹⁸ In relation to 21st century economic/developmental problems, the cognitive account offers more possibilities than a purely biological/physiological account, which solely explains why these problems exists/continue to exist.

Following Haybron, Haidt, Kahneman, Nettle this report argues that happiness is a phenomena of 'affect' more than 'reason'.⁹⁹ Accounts of happiness solely based on reason include life satisfaction theory, desire/preference satisfaction theory and objective list theories whilst hedonism and the emotional state theory are affective. Since reason was conceptualized it has been linked to our 'humanness', a part of mind that allows us to surpass our 'lower' animal urges in favor of our 'higher' capacities.¹⁰⁰ A key dilemma for reason accounts is at this moment, their arguments diverge too far from the best empirical evidence and theories of the mind. Providing a persuasively strong argument against the rational theory of mind and hence rational happiness is dual process psychology, evolutionary psychology and situational psychology. This report starts with dual process psychology popularly known metaphors include 2 systems psychology (Nobel Prize Winner – Daniel Kahneman) and Elephant-Rider psychology (Jonathan Haidt). These theories based in the psychology of mind empirically and then theoretically illustrate that the human mind is deeply divided between an automatic system (Kahneman; system 1 – Haidt; The Elephant) and a cognitive system (Kahneman; System 2 – Haidt; The Rider).¹⁰¹ Evidence and testing indicates that system 2/the rider is not in control. The evidence at this point in time, persuasively refutes the central premise of reason-humanness and reason-

⁹⁷ Frey, Happiness: A Revolution in Economics, 169.

⁹⁸ In Anielski, The Economics of Happiness, 138, we find a nice quote that illustrates the 'mind creating happiness theory'. Paraphrasing the Dalai Lama, the quote states, 'I am thinking more of the enduring happiness that results from the thorough transformation and development of the mind that can be achieved through the cultivation of such qualities as compassion, patience and wisdom.' Later in this report's Bhutan section, elements of this variant of happiness will be analyzed.

⁹⁹ The evidence that happiness is a phenomena of affect over reason is found in footnote 83.

¹⁰⁰ Utilizing dual process psychology, the normative argument that reason should control emotions is strongly critiqued by Haidt in Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Kahneman, Thinking Fast And Slow, 24-25. And; Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis, 13.

happiness accounts.¹⁰² Haidt utilizes the example of split-brain patients to conclusively illustrate our cognitively assessment of our emotions can/does diverge from our automatic physiological emotional responses.¹⁰³ Therefore whilst some reason-happiness models/theories are theoretically compelling, the problem with these models/theories is their current limited relationship to empirical mind research and hence the best knowledge we have right now of empirical human beings.

Furthermore we have a theoretical distinction between happiness as an objective (empirical-universal) or subjective (normative-person specific) phenomenon.¹⁰⁴ This distinction particularly determines happiness's potential implementation and connection to economic/development policy. A key ideal of this report is an attempt to illustrate a potential linkage between happiness and the economic system. Hence fundamentally concerned with what should be produced, consumed and how resources should be distributed in society. The key danger for a subjective conception of happiness is inter-personal comparison and strategic answers.¹⁰⁵ Potentially if resources are distributed or redistributed based on a subjective theory of happiness, such as life satisfaction, people have an incentive to misreport their happiness level in order to accrue greater resources. Thus for a potential linkage between the concept/theory of happiness and the economic system one needs a more objective concept/theory of happiness, thus removing interpersonal comparison issues. This report notes the potential of the emotional state theory in regards to the economic system and policy environment. In relation to other naturalist/objective, concepts/theories of happiness, some of which take objectivity to be achieved solely by cortisol tests and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)'s, Haybron's happiness testing methodology is significantly less invasive.¹⁰⁶ He argues that a

¹⁰² Kahneman, *Thinking Fast And Slow*, 20-21. And; Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 18.

¹⁰³ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 6-9.

¹⁰⁴ This report notes two key objective-subjective happiness debates. The first is philosophical/normative and the most comprehensive coverage of the debate is found in Jon Elster and John E. Roemer, *Interpersonal Comparisons Of Well-Being* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 5-10. And; Varelius, "Objective Explanations of Individual Well-Being": 73. The second debate is economic-psychological and concerns how one measures happiness. The most comprehensive analysis of this debate is found in Nettle, *Happiness*, 42-43. He analyzes Kahneman's distinction between objective and subjective happiness. And; In Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 77 and 218.

¹⁰⁵ The dangers of inter-personal comparison are found in Carol, Graham, *The Pursuit of Happiness: An economy of Well-Being* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 45. And; UN, "Happiness: towards a holistic approach to development" Draft note (6 November 2012): 2. The dangers of strategic answers is found in Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, "Economics and the Study of Individual Happiness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 441-442.

¹⁰⁶ This report locates the objective happiness assessment techniques of facial musculature assessment, salivary cortisol, physiological arousal, brain imaging and mood inductions in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 149. And; the techniques of EGG, (fMRI) and the PET Scan in Richard Layard, "Happiness: Has Social Science A Clue:

variant of mood induction can be utilized to gauge human beings emotional conditions.¹⁰⁷ This report notes the implementation limitations of subjective measures of happiness, particularly in a potential linkage to the economic system. If happiness is utilized in a subjective sense, human beings would have strategic reasons to misreport their happiness and hence accrue greater resources. This further supports this reports argument that the potential of happiness research is greater utilizing other conceptions/theories of happiness. Not only is life satisfaction a deficient concept of happiness, it also significantly limits the possibilities for happiness in relation to the economic system. This drastically diminishes the potential resolution of 21st century economic and developmental problems.

Lecture 1 What is happiness? Are we getting happier?," Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures 2002/3 Delivered at the London School of Economics, (2003): 8-9. Layard argues 'positive feelings correspond to brain activity in the left side of the pre-frontal cortex...And negative feelings correspond to brain activity in the same place on the right side of the brain.', 'To detect the activity, you can use electrodes on the scalp to get an EEG which measures the electrical activity in that part of the brain. Or, more reliably, you can pick up the flow of oxygen to replace the energy used up in the electrical activity. This can be measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Or, slightly less instantaneous, you can use the so-called PET scan to measure the blood flow using radio-active isotopes put into the blood. All these methods give good correlations between reported feelings and brain measurements'. This report ponders, whilst Layard believes his objective methods have located 'happiness', isn't it more likely that his methods simply locate happiness when the concept is narrowly linked to pleasure. As a result his method-theory ignores other aspects/conceptions, which are equally as convincing.

¹⁰⁷ This report notes the mood induction technique in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 149. And a comprehensive list of the states encompassing happiness in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 49.

6 - The Philosophy/Psychology/Economics of Choice

6.1 - Control - Happiness – Choice

Martin Seligman's theory of learned helplessness argues that control is fundamental to happiness.¹⁰⁸ Seligman tested his theory out on rats and through observation of human beings he noted patterns of passivity and lacking control as strong foundations for depression. He conducted his experiment on two groups of rats; one group was taught how to escape from the experiment's setting, whilst the other was not. He illustrated that the group that was not taught how to escape, tried at first and as they adapted and felt hopeless they gave up. In this case they stayed passively receiving the shocks until the experiment ended. From this experiment and his analysis of depressed people, Seligman linked passivity, lethargy, and learned helplessness to depressed people.¹⁰⁹ Fundamentally, the repeated setbacks created neural pathways that gave the rats and human beings a feeling that life happened to them and they had to passively just live in it. Thus Seligman argued for healthy human functioning and happiness, we need to feel control, even illusory control. In Daniel Haybron's emotional state theory we also note the importance of control for dimensions of happiness. For Haybron, there are multiple axes happiness relates to, with regards to control, notably the engagement-withdrawn axis. The engagement axis argues that happy people engage with their lives as they see meaning and value in living.¹¹⁰ Importantly, in order to do this people need to feel in control and open to exploring what life has on offer.

Schwartz utilizes Seligman's research as a foundation for his argument that increased choice in multiple domains leads to variants of learned helplessness.¹¹¹ Whilst the capabilities approach and variants of positive freedom theoretically assert a larger choice set of achievable states is 'good', empirical psychological research has shown the opposite. Theoretically it seems rational that greater choice equals greater control and greater happiness, because, one has more available options to structure one's life around and therefore find and fulfill one's unique self. Whilst theoretically this may be plausible, empirical studies of actual human beings suggests the opposite. Instead of a linkage between more choice-more control-more happiness one finds a relationship between more choice-less control-less happiness (even depression). Daniel Haybron also notes that greater choice places greater demands on the cognitive system. The cognitive system becomes overburdened as pre-choice human beings need to analyze, imagine and predict which consumption choices will provide them with the desired emotional response.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 97-98.

¹⁰⁹ Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 204.

¹¹⁰ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 114-115.

¹¹¹ Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 97-99. And; Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 102-103.

¹¹² Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 246-247.

Schwartz argues that as individuals' choice sets become larger and one gains more choices in more areas than ever before, one's cognitive burden becomes greater as one actively has to think more and more and act less and less.¹¹³ He provides an interesting example of choice sets increasing as a result of modern technology and a global world. No longer is one bound by limited regional spaces, one can ponder choices to many questions that are very important which were not choices a century ago. For example look at dating and marriage. Previously the choice set was one's local community or region with a set number of people and a cultural method for marriage. However now one's options are nearly endless. One can fly to another country to meet someone, one can utilize the internet to find a partner or one can utilize Google to search groups of people with the specific interests one has at the moment one types this.¹¹⁴ The problem however occurs when one ponders which choice would be best. How will I know it's the best choice? Have I done enough research and thoroughness?¹¹⁵ Choices are often arbitrary yet we cloak them with rationality, as one can look at a specific choice in relation to another option or set from multiple perspectives, none of which is more authentically objective than another one.¹¹⁶ Furthermore the cost of making a wrong decision in this area can be tragic as Schwartz illustrates. Post decision regret can have severe negative impacts on one's psyche. The option costs are too high with such a wide option choice set, as one ponders, did I make the right decision, would I have made a better decision by analyzing a different choice influencing variable and this example entails only one field in which choice sets have magnified.¹¹⁷ Multiply this by employment type, educational field, employment location, employment field, employment type, conception of self, which values should I hold for this or that reason and consumption decisions, what to buy. Clearly one sees the paradox of choice, a world with scarce time and endless decisions, each of which drastically affect one's future prospects for happiness and fulfillment. Under these circumstances, increased choice quickly becomes a variable providing one with feelings of insufficient control. Evolutionarily these questions cognitively burden individuals, who flourish best whilst utilizing their automatic system.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 100-101.

¹¹⁴ This report locates the dramatic increases in choice in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 23-42. In this section Schwartz analyzes new choices in work, love, pray and who to be.

¹¹⁵ The concept of 'the best' is a maximizing choice strategy found in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 77-79 and Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 91-93.

¹¹⁶ The concept of cloaking choices in rationality is found in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 234-246. In this section he creates an economic choice style called 'lay rationalism'. Haybron argues our societies suffer from individuals' cloaking choices in hard attributes such as 'economic value' over soft values such as 'happiness', 'well-being' or 'fulfillment'.

¹¹⁷ The concept of post-decision regret is found in Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 94-95 and Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 147-165. The concept of option/opportunity costs is found in Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 95. And; Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 117-146.

¹¹⁸ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 246-247. And; Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 16-17.

The theory that economics and development are about expanding choice/freedom and the ability to achieve these desired choices/freedoms is founded in Isaiah Berlin's concept of positive liberty and provides Sen's capability approach with its theoretical foundation.¹¹⁹ The capabilities approach asserts that poverty is a restriction of choices and the wider the choice set for individuals the wider their capacity for achieving well-being.¹²⁰ A key problem with Sen's theory is its grounding in normative-theoretical rather than empirical psychological research. Unfortunately Sen's theory follows many economic models, foundationally based on the axiom of the rational human being. Empirical evidence provided by Schwartz and others illustrates (this research report focuses on Schwartz primarily as he is the leading researcher in psychological choice research) that Sen's theoretical linkage between greater choice and greater well-being is simply an axiom that relates to normative human beings not empirical human beings.¹²¹ In other words, Sen's theory, axiomatically assert what human beings are/should be like if they act rationally. This report links up these normative axioms to normative human beings, basically conceptualized and structured how the theory desires them to be/act and respond. Whilst empirical human beings concerns the psychological empirical research of what human beings are actually like, how human beings actually behave, not how one desires human beings to behave based on the model axioms, which are often rigidly defined/constrained.

Instead of simply arguing that greater choice does not lead to greater happiness/well-being, Schwartz's evidence illustrates that greater choice often hampers human beings attainment of happiness and well-being. The evidence indicates individuals dealing with a wider choice set spend significantly more time deciding between options.¹²² The individual has to consider option costs, the cost of choosing one option against others, which are often equally as attractive but with different attributes that appeal to the chooser.¹²³ Option costs are one example of the way wider choice sets require greater cognitive effort. Linked up to the cost of choosing are other problems such as pre-decision anxiety, experienced regret and post-decision regret. Pre-decision anxiety and post-decision regret are closely linked as individuals' fear making the wrong choice, particularly in choice sets of value and meaning to the individual, such as

¹¹⁹ This report finds a thorough analysis of positive freedom in Andrew Heywood, *Political Theory: An Introduction* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 263. And; Alan Patten, "Hegel," in *Political Thinkers: From Socrates to Present*, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 387. The report finds the direct linking between positive freedom and Sen's Capability Approach in Ian Gough and J. Allister McGregor, *Well-Being in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11.

¹²⁰ Graham, *Happiness around the World*, 9.

¹²¹ The arguments that greater choice does not lead to greater well-being is found in Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 89-90.

¹²² The linkage between choice and time is found in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 2-4.

¹²³ A description of option costs is found in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 120-124.

what to do in life, work, study, who to marry and where to live.¹²⁴ In such consequential decisions the individual must think, ponder and most importantly imagine what the results of each choice will be for that individual's life, in both an emotional-happiness and a life well lived sense.¹²⁵ In an ever-expanding choice set these decisions have so many divergent variables to imagine and ponder that the decision becomes fearful for the individual.

Added to this are developmental-economic-happiness/well-being models structured on the axiom of rationality, which assert to individuals that happiness is in your hands, if you think rationally and choose rationally.¹²⁶ These models also assert that errors in choice are never systematic as individuals 'are rational' therefore choice errors are arbitrary.¹²⁷ Furthermore these theories assert, in an expanded choice set you'll fulfill your 'self' as there will be more variables that personally appeal to your 'self'. Following Haybron, this report argues that this conception of well-being turns human beings into a highly individualized and needy species.¹²⁸ Finally this report argues that such a conception is highly consumptive as this definition of well-being cannot resolve the 21st century ecological crisis. It would in fact make matters much worse, as well-being conceptualized as capabilities or positive freedom to achieve desired states, requires an expanding choice set. In order to do this one needs to dramatically increase consumption and production to have enough resources in the choice environment, for individuals' to attain their desired choice's.

Fundamentally Schwartz's psychological research once again brings up the dilemma between theoretical axioms/theories in relation to empirically tested axioms/theories. Whilst a theory may hold logical axioms and deductions, such as Sen's capabilities approach and the linkage between economics and rationality, this does not imply that the theory relates to empirical people and how they think, choose and act. Basically we note a radical divergence between normatively created theoretical individuals and empirical existing individuals. The same problem exists in 'higher' theories of freedom such as Kant's and Hegel's, in which the individual holds two selves, a higher self - which freedom applies to and a lower self - which should not be considered in relation to

¹²⁴ Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 162-163.

¹²⁵ This report notes the complexity of expanding choice sets and their effect on individuals' choice strategies in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 48-49. And; Nettle, *Happiness*, 39.

¹²⁶ Frey and Stutzer, "Economics and the Study of Individual Happiness", 433-443. And; Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 15.

¹²⁷ Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics*, x, 8, 93 and 127.

¹²⁸ This report notes the 'needy species' metaphor in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 270-271. Whilst many assume 'the self' has a stronger likelihood of being fulfilled in a wider choice/freedom set, Haybron argues these arguments turn human beings into a needy species. He argues that a widening choice set for each individuals unique self-fulfillment, would be too ecologically consumptive and destructive. Fundamental, he argues, we can achieve self-fulfillment with less choice and a lower ecological footprint.

freedom.¹²⁹ Hegel, for example, considered choices that are not bound up in the self, as whims, in which case, a freedom account need not satisfy them.¹³⁰ Hegel makes a theoretical argument here distinguishing whims from choices bound up in the self. From a dual process perspective, he reaches the wrong conclusion. Based on empirical evidence and testing on actual human beings, dual process psychology illustrates two systems are at work in the mind. These researchers note the empirical strength of the automatic system for human action and emotion.¹³¹ Evolutionary psychology states and has evidence for choices being structured by a biological drive for relative status and reproductive success. Situational psychology including the person-environment congruency theory has evidence that physical and social environmental values structure choices.¹³² These researchers empirically refute Hegel's 'higher self' claim, by showing that the 'higher self' is not in control. Furthermore, in relation to human flourishing, they illustrate the importance of the automatic over the cognitive system. Choices/actions are physiologically more authentic when they arise from the automatic systems visceral reactions.

6.2 - Choice - Imagination - Prediction

A further key flaw regarding choice-imagination-prediction-happiness is noted by Harvard Professor Daniel Gilbert. He argues that human beings predictive abilities are systematically flawed.¹³³ We frequently rely on our cognitive capacity to imagine, predict and choose amongst a choice set, a specific choice we believe will lead us to a desired emotional state.¹³⁴ He illustrates that the cognitive system has systematic errors in anticipation, we 'fill in' and 'leave out'.¹³⁵ This concerns our overly strong rationalist assumption that we can both imagine future states and imagine what these states will feel like when we are in them. Gilbert argues our systematic cognitive flaw is that we cannot possibly imagine all of the variables that will affect our emotional condition in the future. Thus once we get to our desired state, we are often surprised that in our calculation and imagination we forgot to ponder this or that variable, that now seems crucial to our happiness/well-being.¹³⁶ Furthermore he utilizes many

¹²⁹ The dangers of the 'divided self' conception of freedom is noted in Swift, *Political Philosophy*, 68.

¹³⁰ Hegel's conception of choice as whims is noted in George Klosko, *History of Political Theory: An Introduction, Volume II: Modern* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 458, 460-461, 465.

¹³¹ Based on the same evidence as footnote 89.

¹³² The evidence for evolution is the same as footnotes 73, 94, 95. The evidence for situational psychology is found in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 247-248. The evidence for the person-environment congruency theory is found in Lilach Sagiv, Sonia Roccas, and Osnat Hazan, "Value Pathways to Well-Being: Healthy Values, Valued Goal Attainment, and Environmental Congruency," in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, ed. P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004), 75-77.

¹³³ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 247-251.

¹³⁴ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, xvii.

¹³⁵ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 245-247.

¹³⁶ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 247-251.

empirical surveys that show that human beings often assume their futures will be more successful than their past. The key variable involved here is an assumption that because we can predict-imagine our future, we can control it.¹³⁷ As Seligman and Schwartz argue, a feeling of control is important for flourishing. Gilbert illustrates the complexity in their argument, he argues, rarely do feelings of control lead to the successful attainment of the desired state.¹³⁸ This brings up a complexity in this report, whilst empirically human beings may not achieve the desired state, at least feelings of control keep them moving and not passively sitting around becoming disengaged and depressed. Rather human beings go out into the world and attempt to find their happiness/well-being. This report notes further evidence of human beings lacking control in dual process and evolutionary models. If thought-action-imagination and the ability to achieve desired states is hidden in our automatic system/biological functioning, empirically human beings are not in control except in illusion.

In illustrating the complexity of choice in the pursuit of happiness/well-being, Gilbert explores the imagination and the role of the frontal lobe, the part of our brain that allows us to conceptualize ourselves outside the present.¹³⁹ His research illustrates all the ways our cognitive imagination systematically fails us in the pursuit of happiness/well-being. The three key errors we make are 1) filling in and leaving out, 2) placing our current emotions in the future and 3) an inability to grasp how the future will feel.¹⁴⁰ Numbers 1-3 relates to an inability to accurately imagine a desired state outside of the present. This report argues, the cognitive inability to forecast emotional responses of actions/choices, drastically diminishes human beings potential for finding happiness/well-being.

Following a conception of time as linear, this report notes that human beings at one point in time (x) imagine alternative desired states and locations at (y) and make actions/choices (z's) in order to attain (y). As time advances either they make (z's) that lead them towards (y) or they re-evaluate (y) for any number of reasons. For example either the (z's) towards (y), felt unfulfilling, or they met someone with an alternative (y). The key problem arises at (x), where systematic errors, preclude human beings from accurately determining what the (y) will emotionally feel like. The problem is that there are a near infinite number of variables involved in accurately predicting (y). When human being commit to any (y) at (x), they are most likely doing so based on a few variables that they single out as important. Unfortunately for human beings there are a near infinite number of possible variables that could impact (y). Furthermore when human beings get to (y), if they ever do, a few variables 'left out' are often the most important variables. Based on Gilbert's research, this report's main finding is that the relationship between imagination-choices/actions-objective results is so

¹³⁷ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 18.

¹³⁸ The evidence of Seligman and Schwartz is the same as footnote 108. Gilbert's argument illustrating the complexity of control in relation to future happiness states is noted in Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 18.

¹³⁹ The complexity of the frontal lobes relationship between choice - imagination and happiness/well-being can be found in Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 11-17.

¹⁴⁰ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 247-251.

complex that cognitively setting one's path towards happiness/well-being holds little significance.

6.3 - Choice Architecture - Libertarian Paternalism

Based on all the evidence on choice/freedom and happiness/well-being, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler create a macro 'choice architecture' model, founded on their theory termed 'libertarian paternalism'. Choice architecture concerns the analysis and construction of the macro choice environment, the environment in which micro choice actors are provided with divergent choice/freedom sets to attain divergent desired materials/states.¹⁴¹ The psychological foundation of Thaler and Sunstein's choice theory is dual process psychology.¹⁴² Their theory starts from a foundational acceptance of all the systematic choice-utility errors human beings make in the pursuit of happiness/well-being.¹⁴³ They accommodate these errors and offer a 'libertarian paternalist' approach to choice/freedom. They argue that choices/choice options should not be blocked off or barred (full paternalism).¹⁴⁴ Rather, the role of choice architects is to structure the macro choice environment to facilitate certain micro choice/actions over other. This ultimately defaults certain options in a choice set and guides individuals towards them.¹⁴⁵

This report notes an innate freedom danger in Thaler and Sunstein's theory, concerning 'who elects/elected the choice architects?' and 'who guards the choice architects?' This reports critique is particularly strong based on their foundational acceptance of dual process psychology. A key question to ask is 'when choice architects structure choice environments how can we be sure that they are in no way affected by the same systematic choice errors as micro choice actors?' An even simpler question should be, if 'regular people' suffer from utility errors/mispredictions, why shouldn't the choice architects? Is it possible that, choice architects, by knowing the systematic errors and being alert in spotting them, are able to transcend them? The problem Thaler and Sunstein's theory faces is that not enough empirical psychological research has been done on the choice architects and whether they are also affected by systematic biases/errors.

6.4 - Virtue - Choice: Maximizing and Satisficing

This report now explores the relationship between virtue – choice – happiness under 21st century developmental/economic conditions. Aristotle argued that virtue is moderation between excesses.¹⁴⁶ The value of moderation is clearly diametrically opposed to the GDP model, which is based on hedonism and desire/preference satisfaction. The GDP model registers growth when

¹⁴¹ Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.

¹⁴² Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 19-22.

¹⁴³ Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 7.

¹⁴⁴ Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 5-6.

¹⁴⁵ Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 85.

¹⁴⁶ Sachs, "Restoring Virtue Ethics in the Quest for Happiness": 84.

individuals' consumption desires are fulfilled. Theoretically this report links the virtue theory of happiness/well-being to Herbert Simon's (Nobel Prize Winner) conception of satisficing.¹⁴⁷ Satisficing is a choice-behavior strategy in which an individual sets an acceptable threshold (aspirational level) for a choice to be made. This entails setting moderate boundaries for researching the choice, whilst accepting the impossibility of getting 'the best' out of any choice. Once the individual determines the threshold has been reached, the choice is made.¹⁴⁸ Thus the individual moderates their choice/action-decision making, within limits. This is the opposite of the maximizing strategy, which attempts to get the best objective result out of any choice/action. Getting the best is 'achieved' through an exhaustively analysis of every aspect of the choice.¹⁴⁹ The key problem with the maximizing strategy concerns the extreme complexity in both defining 'the best' and in defining what methodology or variable one utilizes to compare divergent 'best' choices. As Schwartz illustrates in different ways different options/choices have different 'best' aspects. Thus if maximizing, the individual has to ponder all these different 'best' options, within options. The results are quite striking. Satisficing, based on moderation, leads to less stress and greater satisfaction, post choice. Whilst maximizing leads to greater anxiety and regret, as choice actors cannot grasp why their choice, even after such an exhaustive analysis, does not provide them with the desired emotion/state.¹⁵⁰

6.5 – Prelude to Bhutan

Later in the Bhutan-Denmark section this report utilizes one of the central ideas behind positive psychology, that actions/choices proceeds from character. Our character shapes the choice/actions we make. Divergent individuals hold divergent characters and hence make divergent actions/choices. This report ponders whether character can be either re-shaped actively as the Bhutanese model attempts to do, or passively by changing macro economic aims and models/theories. At a core both methods aim to restructure the strategies of individual micro choice actors towards choices/desires that are more moderate and less ecologically consumptive/harmful.¹⁵¹ In relation to the Bhutanese choice architecture model and some variant of this report's exploratory proposals, Sunstein and Thaler's theory is freedom/choice preserving/enhancing. In relation to the 21st century ecological crisis, this report

¹⁴⁷ Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 91-93.

¹⁴⁸ Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 78-79.

¹⁴⁹ This report notes the relationship between maximizing and happiness in Schwartz, *The Paradox of Choice*, 82-96.

¹⁵⁰ Having created a maximization scale Schwartz compares maximization to variables including depression, anxiety, dispositional optimism, neuroticism, self-esteem and subjective wellbeing. In their article, Schwartz and Ward, "Doing Better but Feeling Worse", 91-93, they illustrates that being a maximizer lessens ones well-being whilst increasingly correlating quite highly with dispositions towards depression, anxiety and neuroticism.

¹⁵¹ Ingvild S. Jorgensen and Hilde Eileen Nafstad, "Positive Psychology: Historical, Philosophical, and Epistemological Perspectives," in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, ed. P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004), 17-18.

argues that Sunstein and Thaler's account is too theoretically choice/freedom enhancing. Since options are not barred this allows individuals to consume as they desire without limits. Theoretically, there is a possibility that consumptive choice/actions could be discouraged through divergent incentives and defaults. However the problem remains highly consumptive options/choices are still available and in social environments (GDP model environments) that support/require materialistic consumption, it is unlikely choice architects would be able to restructure choice sets significantly enough to make an ecological difference. This poses limitations for this theory in resolving 21st century development and economic challenges notably the climate crisis.

7 - The Economic Development of Happiness

7.1 - Irrational Economics

This section of the research report argues against the GDP based growth paradigm based on unlimited consumption and production. This research report utilizes the concept of happiness in order to illustrate the systematic flaws in our current global developmental and economic systems. The concept is also utilized to illustrate a positive yet complex and often paradoxical vision for what a 21st century society could be like. Furthermore this report refutes neo-classical economics axiom of 'rationality' and 'rational man'. An axiom that theoretically asserts that individuals decide rationally in both a choice set and an expanding choice set. This report argues that 21st century ecological limits/boundaries induces development to move beyond a focus on production, towards a focus on distribution. How should resources be distributed? From what theoretical framework should resources be distributed?

Utilizing John Stuart Mill's distinction between self and other regarding actions, this report argues that consumptive choices/actions and the enlargement of choice sets violate the harm principle.¹⁵² This report argues that these actions are other not self-regarding. The effects of these actions/choices affect the globe and as noted above particularly those who live closest to the land, whose existence is so bound to the land that even minute changes can affect their ability to exist.¹⁵³ One of the key concepts in ecology is interdependence (also a key to

¹⁵² This report notes John Stuart Mill's distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions in Jonathan Wolff, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 112-113. And; Heywood, *Political Theory*, 256-257. In Heywood's text we note that the harm principles applies in relation to other regarding action. He states, 'The only justification for constraining the individual, Mill argued, was in the event of 'harm' being done to others'. The report's main critique of choice/freedom expansion arises from the application of the harm principle. This report argues that economic, developmental and happiness theories requiring more consumption and production inherently ignore other regarding effects-harms.

¹⁵³ This report notes the strong evidence that consumptive choices have other regarding effects and therefore can be contextualized as harmful in Catherine O'Brien, "Sustainable Happiness: How Happiness Studies Can Contribute to a More Sustainable Future," *Canadian Psychology* 49, no. 4 (2008): 290. O'Brien utilizes a thought experiment about something as trivial as getting a cup of coffee from a store. Whilst the experience may provide one with pleasure, the pleasure may arise from conditions of harm. For example is the coffee free trade coffee, in which the workers are paid a living and fair wage and the plantation techniques are not harmful ecologically. Her key argument is that happiness must not arise at other peoples or the environments expense. Whilst I implicitly agree with her conclusion I don't find she targets the right culprit. This report believes the macro choice environment should attend to these concerns. If these concerns are hoisted onto the micro individual, the strain of decision-making will drastically over-burden the cognitive system. This report argues that Sunstein and Thaler's libertarian paternalist approach, whilst in various segments problematic at least targets the right culprit, the macro choice environment. Thus allowing individual at the micro level to exist unburdened.

Bhutan's Buddhist conception of Gross National Happiness) in which over-consumption and over-production in one area of the world affect (as the ecological crisis intensifies the interdependent costs of the crisis will as well) the world as a whole.¹⁵⁴ Thus over-consumptive/over-productive actions in one space in reality, do not just affect that individual/nation. Bhutan notes the limitation of a national ecological approach in a global world. They fundamentally argue that pollution does not abide by nation state borders, as their air quality is drastically affected by both China and India.¹⁵⁵ This leads them to argue for global reforms of economic systems to create happier lives with less consumption/production and destruction of the natural world. At a core these arguments bring us back to the theoretical/empirical questions of, what should individuals be allowed to choose and in essence how wide should their choice set be? Should certain choices be blocked or should one follow the libertarian paternalist theory of choice architecture in which human beings are guided to make certain choices pre-determined as superior over others?

Finally this report utilizes Mill's conception of harm. This report links harm to other regarding actions/choices, whilst further arguing that other regarding actions/choices-harms, form the core of the macro ecological crisis.¹⁵⁶ Whilst at the micro level individuals are systematically making flawed consumptive choices, these consumptive choice sets, are structured at the macro level based on divergent economic theories. These theories are tacitly founded on theories of happiness/well-being. Take the dominant global indicator of GDP, based tacitly on both hedonism and desire satisfaction theories of happiness/well-being.¹⁵⁷ Under this framework the indicator argues that unless the economy grows, individuals lives and societies are not progressing. This is based on a theoretical

¹⁵⁴ Tashi Wangmo and John Valk, "Under the Influence of Buddhism: The Psychological Well-being Indicators of GNH," *Journal of Bhutan Studies* 26 (2012): 58-59. And; NDP Steering Committee and Secretariat, *Happiness*, 9.

¹⁵⁵ Linda Pannozzo, "In with the Bad: Ambient Air Quality and Tranboundary Pollution in Bhutan," *Journal Of Bhutan Studies* 23 (2010): 121. In Pannozzo, through a satellite imagine we note the phenomena of the "brown cloud" over Bhutan. The cloud is particularly caused by coal-fueled power plants in India and China. Frankly whilst this report normative critiques aspects of the Bhutanese concept of happiness and its implementation, this report grasps and appreciates why the Bhutanese are so ecologically concerned. If they are right, as this report believes they are, human beings can exist on the planet with significantly less consumption. In future studies this report would like to go deeper into Bhutan's happiness theory and its ecological potentials whilst suggesting that non-consumptive choice sets in Bhutan should be expanded. Just to clarify, in relation to consumptive choice sets this report and Bhutan are in agreement they need to be drastically restructured. Where this report and Bhutan diverge is in relation to happiness being culturally defined. When defined culturally this report notes and argues that non-consumptive choices are overly restricted, drastically reducing human beings ability to achieve happiness/well-being.

¹⁵⁶ Based on the same evidence as footnote 152.

¹⁵⁷ This report notes the direct linkage between GDP and the desire/preference satisfaction theory in Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics*, 27. He states 'Persons with higher income have more opportunities to achieve whatever they desire: in particular, they can buy more material goods and services.'

argument that economic and consumption growth provides individuals with greater possibilities for achieving pleasure and having their desires fulfilled.¹⁵⁸ Clarifying this thought, this master's research report argues that the harm being generated arises from the macro structure of the economy, which is founded on certain principles/models/theories. These theories affect the actions/choices of micro choice actors, at the micro level, who are implicitly and tacitly required to perform certain actions in order for the macro theory to register progress. Therefore following the Bhutanese proposal and ecological theory this report argues that a global macro restructuring of the economic system is needed in order to address 21st century problems. This report argues that the hybrid empirical/normative emotional state theory provides the strongest foundation for a new economic system based on happiness.

In relation to GDP growth, it is useful to conceptualize China and India. Both countries are heralded as 'developing' and producing 'higher living standard for their people'. If one solely focuses on GDP models, they have had 'exceptional' economic growth and rises in individual per-capita incomes.¹⁵⁹ If one adds the Human Development Index (HDI) both countries have created economic growth, as well as rises in education (literacy) and higher life expectancy. The happiness-income paradox refutes the presumed positivity of economic growth and rising incomes. Many countries have economically tripled their economic growth rates whilst reported happiness stayed the same.¹⁶⁰ The problem with HDI's focus on life expectancy/longevity is human lives can last longer whilst we enjoy them less, as a result of, hard productive labor/work simply to keep the economy growing. Thus this report questions why is duration important, unless it is tied to another variable, such as experienced life happiness? Negatively both indicators do not take into effect the key variable of ecological destruction. A simple Google search of either Chinese or Indian cities illustrates thick smog, which has aesthetic and health concerns. This brings up the fundamental question of how and why is this development? How is this good? This report builds upon a main axiom of critical development, the world cannot consume like the west and newly industrializing countries are doing.¹⁶¹ One has to find an alternative model. This report does not 'transcend development' as the discipline is still linked to global economic models/income and power.¹⁶² Utilizing a superior theory holds possibilities for global happiness/well-being within a sustainable ecological framework.

Linking Haidt's thought to economics, one can further see the limitations in rational choice models. These models assert that choice actors choose perfectly.

¹⁵⁸ The linkage between GDP and desire/preference satisfaction is based on the same evidence as footnote 54 and 55. The linkage between hedonism and GDP is based on the same evidence as footnote 20.

¹⁵⁹ Pieterse, *Development Theory*, 211. And; Buch-Hansen, "Goodbye to Universal Development: 305-306.

¹⁶⁰ Based on the same evidence as footnote 82.

¹⁶¹ Aram Ziai, "Post-Development: Premature Burials and Haunting Ghosts," *Development and Change* 46, no. 4 (2015): 839.

¹⁶² Ziai, "Post-Development": 849.

Any errors in rational choice are arbitrary never systematic. Happiness economics however illustrates that utility errors are in fact frequent, predictable and systematic.¹⁶³ For example individuals frequently mispredict utility, they devote too much time and energy in pursuit of extrinsic over intrinsic rewards. Kahneman illustrates that individual choice actors systematically mispredict utility along 3 axes - 1) past (remembered), 2) present (experienced-utility) and 3) Future (predictive-expected utility).¹⁶⁴ In the present (2) we suffer from the 'peak-end' rule. An experience is stored in memory solely by its peak (the most intense moment) and the end (the emotion we felt when the experience ended). (2) affects both (1) and (3). Regarding (1), our experience of (2), provides a flawed summary of how the event/experience actually felt. Thus based on systematic errors in affective memory we choose activities, events and commodities that do not provide us with the utility we desire/remember. With regards to (3), we systematically mispredict our happiness in the future based on poor forecasting and non-acceptance of psychological adaptation. Regarding adaptation, we systematically assume a new experience will continue to provide us with the desired feeling. However repeated exposure to the phenomena decreases its emotional affect. Kahneman's research for which he won a Nobel Prize illustrates the extreme complexity in theoretically assuming greater choice/freedom entails greater happiness/well-being. The relationship between actions/choices and the attainment of felt emotions/emotional states is systematically deceptive. As Kahneman illustrates choice actors systematically create these errors when they make choices/decisions. Hence choice actors frequently achieve inferior utility outcomes. This report argues that GDP based models require greater and greater production and consumption in order to register 'growth' and 'progress'. This report tentatively argues that utility misprediction assists in this aim as choice actors are perpetually consuming new experiences/commodities in order to achieve a desired emotion/state.

Loewenstein argues to analyze consumption we need to move away from rational choice models. He provides evidence of a hot-cold consumption gap. In a hot state our cognitive system is not in control and we consume differently then in a cold state.¹⁶⁵ What Loewenstein's theory illustrates is that human beings make divergent choice/actions when they are automatically attracted to something (a hot state) versus simply reflectively pondering an attraction to something (a cold state). The divergence of a hot-cold gap/state further supports the dual process distinction between the cognitive and automatic system. A hot state encompasses the automatic system, whilst a cold state encompasses the cognitive system. As Haidt illustrated earlier on, the automatic system is in control, when our desires are strongest cognitive thought plays an insignificant role. Thus Loewenstein further refutes the rational model of individual choice actors.

¹⁶³ Frey, *Happiness: A Revolution in Economics*, 93 and 127.

¹⁶⁴ Mark Chekola, "Happiness, Rationality, Autonomy and The Good Life," *Journal of Happiness Studies* 8, no. 1 (2007): 56-58.

¹⁶⁵ Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 42.

7.1.1 - Modernization and Growth Models

Based on 21st century ecological limits/boundaries this report foundationally illustrated that development cannot be about bringing 'western' economic welfare to 'non-developed' countries. The report argues the goal should rather be a restructuring of the economic system to ensure all have the foundation for happy lives. The earth is already being utilized at an unhealthy rate. The Happy Planet Index illustrates every year we go into ecological debt and fail to achieve one planet living.¹⁶⁶ In determining a course of action for the future, we need to understand and utilize ecological limitations to ponder, how can we remove global poverty and vulnerability, whilst simultaneously consuming fewer resources. Furthermore we need to refute consumption models and empirically note their intrinsic inferiority as models for happiness/wellbeing.

This report furthermore critiques our contemporary economic/developmental model GDP. The report exploratively analyzes the models linkage to happiness/pleasure, a momentary emotion.¹⁶⁷ The pursuit of pleasure entails rapid emotions/affects (positive and negative). As pleasure innately contains adaptation greater and greater consumption is required in order to achieve the same affective level.¹⁶⁸ A key question is why is pleasure/happiness, a momentary emotion, a key part of the GDP model. This report argues that GDP as an indicator structurally requires continuous economic growth to register 'economic progress'.¹⁶⁹ Thus unless greater and greater production and consumption occur, the indicator asserts that 'economies are in recession' and 'require economic growth'. Whilst feigning 'objectivity', the indicator encompasses a loaded ideology to structure the macro choice environment and micro choice sets. GDP models require micro choice actors, to act/choose in certain ways, in order to illustrate the indicators worth. This report agrees with Mark Anielski who argues that GDP is structurally linked to an ancient Greek ethical theory known as 'chrematistics'.¹⁷⁰ Chrematistics as noted in footnote

¹⁶⁶ This report finds the concept of ecological debt in New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: Report* (London, 2006), 13. The Index illustrates that the world globally goes into ecological debt on the 23rd of October each year. Hence even with global poverty we consume a world's supply of resources too quickly. The concept of ecological debt provides a challenge for this report and economic/developmental models. How can one remove poverty whilst taking into account ecological boundaries? This report suggests that the emotional state theory provides us with the strongest likelihood of resolving these 21st century global problems.

¹⁶⁷ Based on the same evidence as footnote 20, 22, and 55.

¹⁶⁸ Based on the same evidence as footnote 72.

¹⁶⁹ Richard Eckersley, "The Mixed Blessings of Material Progress: Diminishing Returns in the Pursuit of Happiness," *Journal of Happiness Studies* 1, no. 3 (2000): 267. And; Kasser, "The Good Life or the Goods Life?," 64.

¹⁷⁰ The concept of chrematistics is found in Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 23-25. Anielski compares chrematistics to oikonomia. He illustrates chrematistics is an economic theory concerned with 'the manipulation of wealth to maximize the short term exchange value for the owner'. This theory is founded upon the ideal of unlimited accumulation, 'more is always better'. Finally Anielski links chrematistics to hedonism, he states, 'By contrast, chrematistics is really modern capitalism: the Hedonistic

167 is a short-term un-ethical theory. The theory is the antithesis of the Buddhist economic theory/concept of 'sufficiency'.¹⁷¹ Chrematistics is unethical, in the sense that, the micro choice actor solely fixates on the short-term accumulation of wealth. The only actor considered in the choice is the micro choice actor making that choice. Other considerations, such as harming others or ecological limits are not considered. Particularly distressing is that the theory places no consideration on the concept/theory of sufficiency. Under 21st century conditions one cannot have a theory that allows unlimited consumption, as the effects of unlimited consumption are other-regarding and harmful. The 21st century needs a theory that places sufficiency as a core value. Once one has enough, one should not desire more and more.

Furthering the argument that GDP developmental/economic models need continuous consumption and production in order to survive, this report utilizes John Maynard Keynes. Keynes thought with increases in technological efficiency, human beings would be working significantly less and less hours. He argued that the production of goods that support our existence would take less and less time. Thus instead of producing newer and newer models/commodities, he argued that more and more time would increasingly be devoted to areas of value outside of work. He was sadly mistaken. As technological efficiency increased, and jobs were completed in less and less time. In order to ensure unemployment stayed low, people needed to consume more and more, to keep the economy 'growing' and 'progressing'.¹⁷² As noted through the analysis of the 21st century ecological crisis, economic/developmental models that require/d the continuous consumption-production of raw materials destroy/ed many aspect of the natural world. Based on the foundation of the ecological crisis, this report argues that we have a fundamental flaw in our global consumer models. These models have arbitrarily placed economic success, consumption and production above the values of happiness, well-being and quality of living. Following Keynes argument, economic/developmental models should not continuously require more and more work to produce more and more commodities simply to register progress. With increasing technological efficiency we could/should fundamentally change

accumulation of riches or material wealth without any moral or ethical limiters on sufficiency or a sense of what constitutes a virtuous life...In a world dominated by chrematistics there is no moral or ethical limit to the acquisition and accumulation of more worldly riches and monetary wealth, even if others may be suffering for lack of basic life needs'.

¹⁷¹ The concept of sufficiency economics is found in Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 23-25. In this section Anielski contrasts chrematistics to oikonomia and sufficiency. In contrast to maximizing 'short term value for the owner', oikonomia and sufficiency is concerned with the long-term management of the community as a whole. Anielski states, 'For oikonomia, there is such a thing as enough'. The direct linkage between sufficiency and Buddhism/Buddhist economics is noted in Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 68-69.

¹⁷² New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: Report 2.0*, 49.

our economic systems. This requires a criterion determining what needs to be produced in order to cut 'waste' and increase sustainability.¹⁷³

Through an analysis of the variables impacting empirical data on happiness, one quickly notes that the GDP model detracts from the sources human beings list as their greatest sources of happiness. As *The Economist* notes, with increasing industrialization and modernization many social ills arise and deepen. These include increases in marital breakdowns, crime, drug use and suicide.¹⁷⁴ Empirically the literature illustrates we gain our happiness through family, social trust (strength of communities), political trust (low levels of corruption) and voluntary activities. None of these are calculated in the GDP, whilst majorities of respondents list these variables as meaningful and valuable goods.¹⁷⁵ Anielski argues, if one is not consuming or spending time working to produce, the GDP model sees one as an 'economic villain' or adversary.¹⁷⁶ Noting the bewilderment of the GDP model, this report illustrates, after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 in New York, President George W Bush asserted to Americans it was their patriotic duty to go out and spend in order to boost the economy.¹⁷⁷ This underlies how deeply economic models structure reality and how dangerous economic models become when human beings cannot conceptualizes their lives outside them.

¹⁷³ This report locates and follows the conception of waste found in New Economics Foundation, *The Happy Planet Index: Report 2.0*, 41. In this quote Colin Beavan argues that waste should be defined as '...the use of planetary resources that don't improve quality of life'. A key argument in this research report is that consumption is often a very ineffective way to achieve happiness/well-being. Beavan's definition of waste is useful for this report's critique of economic/developmental models that structurally require increasing producing and consumption to register progress. Based on Beavan's conceptual definition this report argues that these models are wasteful.

¹⁷⁴ Sam Thompson, Nic Marks and Tim Jackson, "Well-Being and Sustainable Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 509. This quote illustrates *The Economist's* Intelligence Unit's explanation why rising consumption does not lead to rising well-being. The report argued, concomitantly with rising consumption, are '...factors associated with modernization that, in part, offset its positive impact', these factors include 'a marked rise in various social pathologies (crime, and drug and alcohol addiction), and the erosion of institutions of family'.

¹⁷⁵ This report notes these factors in John F. Helliwell and Shun Wang, "World Happiness: Trends, Explanations and Distributions," in *World Happiness Report 2013*, ed. John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs: 10. Whilst this report tentatively agrees with the factors, Helliwell and Wang, tag as contributions to happiness. This research report argues that, Helliwell and Wang's methodology is foundationally weak. Their evidence of happiness is based on life satisfaction, a theory this report refutes in two parts. The first part theoretically refutes life satisfaction as a theory of happiness based on arbitrary ethical norms. The second part refutes life satisfaction in relation to 21st century problems notably the climate crisis. The report argued that life satisfaction and the best possible life question would be too ecologically consumptive in a world already dealing with an ecological crisis.

¹⁷⁶ Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness*, 32.

¹⁷⁷ Aaron Ahuvia and Elif Izberk-Bilgin, "Well-Being in Consumer Societies," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 482-492.

Even with regards to the 21st century ecological crisis. Politically it is deeply unpopular for policy and theory to suggest lowering consumption and production. Human beings by in large have unfortunately linked growing economies to self-fulfillment. 'The more income I have the happier and more fulfilled I'll be. I can purchase more and more goods I desire. Furthermore I can find my unique self through different hobbies/fashion styles/consumption bundles'. This report once again notes, when happiness is linked to pleasure, the key problem of psychological adaptation arises. Added to adaptation is the cognitive effect that economic reference group comparisons have on happiness. Both aspects ensure pleasure-happiness vanishes quickly and leaves human beings in the same state as before. Leaving them to imagine, 'oh if only I had this or that more then I'd then be happy'.

7.1.2 - The Capabilities Approach – Amartya Sen

The capabilities approach is based on the concepts of capabilities and functionings. The capability set refers to all the divergent functionings one is able to achieve.¹⁷⁸ If one takes the approach/theory to its 'positive' extreme, it would be a world with unlimited choice sets. A world in which human beings are negatively free from lack of interference whilst being positively free in possessing the ability/resources to carry out their desired choices. The problem arises ecologically. In order to create a world with this many choice sets it requires sizeable increases in production and consumption. Following Adam Smith, Sen (a Nobel Prize Winner) himself argues that divergent societies 'require' divergent bundles of commodities.¹⁷⁹ Thus existing in the United States

¹⁷⁸ For a good overview of the capability approach see Gough and McGregor, *Well-Being in Developing Countries*: 10-12. An analysis of the complexities involved in potentially implementing the capability approaches is noted in Sabina Alkire, "Measuring freedoms alongside well-being," in Gough and McGregor, *Well-Being in Developing Countries*, 93-108.

¹⁷⁹ Adam Smith argues that the 'necessary' bundle of goods to 'function' is dependent on the society. He states 'By necessities, I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the customs of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lower order, to be without. A creditable day labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt'. This report finds Smith's arguments in Dimitris Ballas and Danny Dorling, "The Geography of Happiness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 468-469. This report notes the linkage between Sen's arguments and Smith's in Tim Jackson, "Beyond the 'Wellbeing Paradox': wellbeing, consumption growth and sustainability," Center for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey, CES Working Paper 06/06: 11. In this working paper, Jackson states 'Echoing a sentiment expressed much earlier by Adam Smith, he (Sen) suggests that: "To lead a life without shame, to be able to visit and entertain one's friends, to keep track of what is going on and what others are talking about, and so on, requires a more expensive bundle of goods and services in a society that is generally richer and in which most people have, say, means of transport, affluent clothing, radios or television sets, and so on...The same absolute level of capabilities may thus have a greater relative need for incomes (and commodities)'. This report's first critique of the capability approach concerned the flawed linkage between greater

‘requires’ vastly more resources to function than in a country such as Bhutan, where the capability set/ability to achieve functionings is considerably narrower. A key question that this report poses but cannot answer due to a lack of scholarly literature on the topic is can the capability approach co-exist in a 21st century of ecological crisis. It appears it cannot, as any narrowing of the capability set is registered as a limitation on human beings ability to achieve desired functionings. This report argues that the capability approach places too strong an emphasis on freedom/choice, widening choice sets/functioning/achievements and not enough emphasis on happiness/well-being. This limits the approaches ability to analyze and critique excessive consumption and production. Thus limiting its potential for resolving 21st century economic/developmental problems.

In order to ‘refute’ the potential of happiness in relation to the economic system, Sen points to evidence of psychological adaptation.¹⁸⁰ He utilizes hypothetical

choice/choice sets and greater well-being. The second critique concerns the capability approaches relation to 21st century ecological and developmental problems, notably the climate crisis. If one takes Smith and Sen at their word, that divergent societies require divergent bundles of commodities to function, the question becomes ‘how can one achieve this in a world in which human beings are already exceeding planetary limits?’ Particularly concerning is the outdated term ‘society’. In a globalized cultural and telecommunications world, if individuals share cultural values in divergent locations does their bundle of good required to function relate to their neighborhood, their city, the nation or a global comparison? This report argues that linking the bundle of commodities to function to a contingent societal standard is ecologically dangerous. A trenchant example is the United States. The Happy Planet Index’s ecological footprint, illustrates Americans consume as many resources as 4 planets can sustainably provide. The country encompasses roughly 327 million people (2018 census) in which 39.7 million live in poverty (2017 census). This report argues that Sen’s theory structurally cannot resolve this example let alone the global ecological/developmental crisis. His theory would look at the commodity bundle and argue that 39.7 million need their living standard raised to the standard to live a reasonable life in that society. As noted, the US even with 39.7 million in poverty consumes more than 4 planets of resources. Thus the key problem lies in not raising the bundle of commodities up to the decent level to function in that society. In the case of the United States that bundle is drastically over-consumptive and over-productive. This report’s foundation linking happiness to ecology argues that globally we should try to redefine the bundle of commodities needed to flourish. The reason this report utilizes the words ‘should try to’ over more commanding words such as ‘must’ is a tension this report noted earlier between normative and empirical theories of happiness/well-being and their effects on consumption and the bundles of commodities needed to function. If one follows evolutionary theory it would be difficult to limit the consumptive choice/bundles, as they are needed automatically for relative status and reproductive success. However if one can normatively redefine well-being and happiness one can globally restructure what is needed and lower the consumption bundles amongst the largest consumers to remove those currently in poverty and vulnerability to a level of security, in which they can pursue happiness/well-being. Concluding this footnote, this report argues that our current economic/developmental models, including Sen’s, hold both an unreasonable ecological foundation and a misconception of what it takes to achieve wellbeing.

¹⁸⁰ Graham, *The Pursuit of Happiness*, 45.

thought experiments to prime the intuition that emotions such as happiness (subjective good) can and do diverge from actual life circumstances (objective goods).¹⁸¹ Thus he argues people in severe poverty, those in dominated/oppressed conditions, may adapt so much to their conditions that they are able to experience happiness.¹⁸² The first problem in Sen's approach is a common paternalist assumption found in economic thought. The assumption essentially states, 'based on my models axiom, if you assert how happy you are in your condition, it doesn't tell me much about your well-being'. This can be translated into even simpler language to isolate the argument, 'I have determined in relation to your objective quality of life, the emotion of happiness is inappropriate'. Providing complexity to Sen's thought experiments, Biswas-Diener went out into divergent contexts that traditional development/economic theory would assert and describe as 'poor' and 'vulnerable'.¹⁸³ He asked human beings living within these contexts, whether they themselves enjoyed their actual lives. In India, Biswas-Diener interviewed prostitutes, who by all indications appeared to be happy. His method did not axiomatically-paternalistically assume that their lives are bad. Through a relativist approach he was able to democratically and uncritically hear what these human beings had to say about their lives. From their self-reports and his objective analysis of their environment, Biswas-Diener grasped that they hold very strong networks of

¹⁸¹ This report notes the linkage between Sen's normative description of oppressed people and priming intuitions in Tiberius, "Philosophical Methods in Happiness Research", 321.

¹⁸² Furthermore in Tiberius, "Philosophical Methods in Happiness Research", 321, we find a quote by Sen, 'The hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the over-exhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the necessity of continuing survival, but it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because of this survival strategy.' This reports main criticism of Sen's intuitions is their paternalistic assessment and categorization of members in these groups' lives as missing something vital to flourishing. Sen's argument fundamentally primes the intuition, 'if these individuals experience happiness, the emotion is not appropriate for their lived situations'. Basically he argues that the linkage between their emotions and circumstances tells us nothing about their well-being. This report disagrees and notes two main flaws in Sen's critique of happiness. Firstly Sen conceptualizes happiness as hedonism and life satisfaction. He argues that the pleasure (hedonism) being experienced in this circumstance is not appropriate. Thus he argues an individual asserting they are happy (life satisfaction theory) does not tell us anything important about their objective circumstances. Secondly Sen superficially links and refutes happiness to these two theories, ignoring the emotional state theory.

¹⁸³ Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 103-104. Haidt provides an interesting assessment of Biswar-Diener's findings, 'the lives of these prostitutes are much better from the inside than they seem from the outside'. What Haidt is alluding to when he states 'from the outside' is our biased normative theories that assert that flourishing arises only as a result of holding certain objective goods, such as that wealth, material possessions, security. These thinkers do not consider the fact that many 'objectively superior lifestyles' end in inferior outcomes, their models axiomatically rule out this possibility.

social support. In this environment we note that individuals attain their happiness through close social interaction.

Just to clarify, this report grasps that its critique of human beings and societies achieving happiness/well-being through consumption turns paternalistic. Particularly in the proposed narrowing and blocking off of certain consumption choices/choice sets. This paternalism doesn't arise from the author of this report it arises from ecological boundaries/limitations and the complexities of individual's cognitively pursuing happiness/well-being in an enlarged choice set. 21st century ecological boundaries/limitations empirically illustrate that the planet cannot ecologically support highly consumptive choice sets. These boundaries/limitations particularly illustrate that economic/developmental models, asserting that happiness/well-being arises from greater consumption and production, cannot be achieved under 21st century conditions. Sen's theory is a example of an economic model/theory that cannot be attained under 21st century conditions, as widening choice sets requires societies to produce and consume more and more resources/bundles of commodities. This report argues that under modern conditions, when people achieve happiness/well-being with fewer resources, economic/developmental model/theories should be amenable to incorporate this data without paternalistically claiming these people only hold false happiness/well-being or that these people have adapted to universally harmful conditions which they should not be allowed to adapt to.

We need to grasp that GDP and capability (HDI) models are based on more choice sets, more preferences/functionings being fulfilled. This is based on the desire/preference satisfaction account of happiness. This report utilizes Barry Schwartz and 'the paradox of choice', to illustrate that more choice is not a universal good. His theory based on empirical data refutes Sen's capability theory and rational choice theories. With increased choice, pre-choice factors place a burden on the choice actors cognitive system. Two key factor are pre-decision analysis and comparison. Both factors encompass an individual comparing different variables of one choice to another choice. Since there are so many variables to consider often the choice actor feels over-burdened by the choice. The choice of one variable over another often feels arbitrary. As Schwartz illustrates, pre-decision choice in an expanding choice set, places burdens on the choice actor. This ratchets up anxiety and leads the choice actor to ponder the disappointment if the choice is incorrect. As this report noted earlier, when choice sets are maximized in multiple fields, the systematic problems of choice actors magnify.

The capabilities approach to human development theory axiomatically asserts if human beings choice set (the variety of choices/options that can be chosen and realized) increases, their lives are getting better. This report illustrates the foundational linkage of these ideas to positive freedom (ability to act) and Mill (cultivation of individuality). We note an implicit and explicit argument that human beings flourish when they have greater freedom/choice to live, as they desire. Whilst this seems plausible, Gilbert and Kahneman empirically test these hypothesis and find them wanting. As noted in section 7.1, human beings

systematically mispredict utility along 3 axis; remembered (past), experienced (present) and predictive (future).

7.1.3 - Loss Aversion – Redistributive Implications

Research conducted that illustrates, happiness does not increase with income (happiness-income paradox), seemingly provides a framework to redistribute income from the extremely wealth to those in poverty, insecurity and vulnerability. The key problem for this account is the phenomenon of loss aversion. As Kahneman illustrates human beings do not like to lose.¹⁸⁴ The implication of this empirical phenomenon is, whilst happiness does not increase with income, this does not automatically imply that resources can be redistributed. Removing money from others brings loss aversion/unhappiness into the equation. This brings up the implication that other concepts/theories may need to be utilized in order to redistribute income, whether capabilities, welfare, human development, distributive or global justice. This report argues that the emotional state theory can be this concept/theory.

7.1.4 - 21st Century Economic/Developmental Problems and Potential Solutions

Fundamentally this report accepts, analyzes and looks to theoretically propose possible solutions to 21st century problems, notably the ecological crisis. The report links the crisis to GDP macro choice architecture. The environment created allows micro choice actors to choose in a highly consumptive choice environment. The report notes that happiness can be achieved whilst consuming-producing significantly less resources, thus conserving and sustaining the environment. This research report follows the aim of the Happy Planet Index, which argues that human beings can create better, happier lives, with lower consumption and production. As they argue, 'Good lives that do not cost the earth'.¹⁸⁵ Where this report diverges from the Happy Planet Index is in not equating happiness with life satisfaction, which is the dominant theory and indicator they utilize.¹⁸⁶

7.2 - Concluding Analysis of Contemporary Societies and their Failings to Provide Happiness/Well-Being

This report explores the possibility of happiness (divergent normative conceptions/theories-empirical models) in re-structuring the global economic

¹⁸⁴ Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, 245-246.

¹⁸⁵ New Economics Foundation, The Happy Planet Index: 2012 Report, 5.

¹⁸⁶ New Economics Foundation, The Happy Planet Index: Report, 11. Even though the HPI links happiness to life satisfaction, the report writers do grasp it is not an ideal theoretical foundation. They state, 'Clearly this is not a perfect measure. Ideally, subjective well-being would be assessed by asking a series of questions, perhaps probing different aspects of life and framing the issue in different ways so as to gain a more complete picture.' This report argues with their assessment and argues for the emotional state theory being linked to the Happy Planet Index.

system in a more sustainable manner, whilst removing many of the harms that exist in the current economic system. This report argues for greater equality in economic systems. This report hypothesizes that discrimination and many other forms of exclusion and zero sum ruthless competition are perpetuated generation to generation, based on a concept this report creates and utilizes, the lowest point. The lowest point refers to the lowest level human beings exist at in any society. One of the reasons discrimination and zero sum competition exists is based on the realization that the lowest point is such a harsh place to be that all families ensure from a young age children are indoctrinated into a hard work extrinsic values perspective ensuring they do not end up at the lowest point. To ensure this, these children have extra lessons for everything possible, multiple extra-curricula activities in art, music, basically when children are born one plans their lives around admissions to this or that school. Fundamentally one ensures they are indoctrinated enough to be motivated to 'succeed'. The danger of letting "children be left behind" is that they do not compete and hence are subject to the possibility of belonging to the lowest point, a place with real insecurity and uncertainty. This report's argument for happiness, affect this realm, in the sense less competition would lead to less stressful happier existences. Children would be able to be children, and not from birth have to 'achieve' things. Placing them at a very young age in zero sum games. If societies lowest point is a high social minimum then the system can slow down and people can exist in time in a divergent manner. To achieve this, this report hypothetical-tentatively proposes much greater taxation on incomes above a certain amount is required (tentatively say 90% taxation over any amount of income over 1 million). This report follows the suggestions of voluntary simplicity theory, grasping that all the issues that affect the 21st century can be mediated through the recognition that good lives are not the most consumptive lives. Furthermore "happiness" is being pursued in an unsustainable manner, whilst paradoxically few ever experience happiness.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ This report finds voluntary simplicity theory in Ahuvia and Izberk-Bilgin, "Well-Being in Consumer Societies", 482. Paraphrasing they illustrate 'Voluntary Simplicity Theory espouses adopting practices to simplify one's lifestyle and reduce one's consumption'.

8 - Contexts - Cultures of Happiness; Bhutan and Denmark

8.1 - Comparing Bhutan and Denmark

In this section the report explores happiness secured within political/social/economic communities. Contextually this report analyzes Bhutan and Denmark in order to analyze the relationship between choice/freedom and happiness/wellbeing. Choice/freedom is an important variable as clearly both values when not taken to extremes lead to human flourishing and happiness. Furthermore both countries structure the relationship between these variables differently. For example in Bhutan one is coerced to dress, talk, act, think in a specific cultural way. Hence one's choice set is limited.

In both Bhutan and Denmark happiness/well-being is difficult to grasp based on our current indicator, which is founded on a specific conception and theory of happiness. This report argues that this indicator is a deficient way of truly grasping happiness. If for a moment one accepts the results, an interesting relationship occurs. Denmark scores significantly differently in regards to affective happiness versus cognitive happiness. Affective happiness refers to the felt emotion of happiness; it is measured by positive emotions/pleasure over negative emotions/pain. Cognitive happiness is founded on the life satisfaction theory and utilizes cantril's best possible life question.¹⁸⁸ Cognitively Denmark scores extremely highly, often topping all the world reports and statistical analysis. However with regards to affective happiness, Denmark ranks significantly lower.¹⁸⁹ This report argues that the key reason for this divergence is life satisfaction as a flawed indicator and theory of happiness. Once again, life satisfaction suffers from arbitrary ethical norms, human beings utilize when they are asked that question. When individuals are cognitively told to analyze their lives, the Danes for example, know how tough life is in many other countries, as a result, they most likely use an ethical norm of gratitude, along the lines of, 'I am so lucky to have enough food, shelter, healthcare, and I must be grateful for these

¹⁸⁸ William Tov and Evelyn W. M. AU, "Comparing Well-Being Across Nations: Conceptual and Empirical Issues," in *The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, ed. Susan David, Ilona Boniwell and Amanda Conley Ayers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 452-453.

¹⁸⁹ Tov and AU, "Comparing Well-Being Across Nations", 452-453. In this footnote, we note that in two affective happiness studies Denmark ranks 10 out of 70 and in another study just within the top 6. However in life satisfaction Denmark often tops indexed or comes in 2nd or 3rd place. What is also interesting for future happiness research is exploring the higher rankings of African countries in terms of affective over cognitive happiness. In the footnoted chapter, one notes that all 5 highest countries in terms of cognitive happiness are European, whilst in terms of affective happiness 3 out of the top 5 are African ((2) Djibouti, (3) Kenya and (5) Mali). As this report has consistently argued throughout, cognitive happiness and life satisfaction whilst admirably being more democratic a happiness measure and theory, holds multiple flaws, notable arbitrary ethical norms. These norms ensure any data collected is problematic. Affective happiness tells us more about the individual's emotional condition as these are felt over thought emotions.

things, therefore I must state I am happy, to not seem ungrateful'. A further danger in equating happiness to life satisfaction concerns the empirical fact that many people who are depressed, anxious and even those who experience suicidal thoughts have cognitively rated themselves as 'happy'.¹⁹⁰ Our intuition tells us, this doesn't make sense. Most likely, like the Danes, they are cognitively utilizing an ethical norm in place of a felt emotion. As these empirical studies illustrate, human beings self-reports are flawed. Self-endorsed ethical norms interfere and all we see are divergent norms not divergent happiness emotions/states. The fact that depressed and suicidal people have reported they are happy is a key problem for life satisfaction.

8.1.1 - Social Trust

Regarding the variable of social trust, this report notes its strengths as well as its weaknesses. Its strength includes communities that trust one another. For example, in Denmark, majorities of people leave their babies outside a shop while they go in. The lack of cognitive worry creates an environment that is hospitable and relaxed over hostile and fearful.¹⁹¹ The primary weakness is an insider (trust) outsider (not-trustworthy) societal relationship.¹⁹² The danger in

¹⁹⁰ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 84-85. Haybron illustrates that 'For example, one interesting pair of studies found that 42 to 49 percent of those rating themselves as "completely satisfied" also reported significant symptoms of anxiety and related forms of distress. And 6 to 7 percent of the completely satisfied reported that they were "usually unhappy or depressed". This report argues that these negative emotional conditions violate too many implicit beliefs about happiness to be considered a part of happiness. Most people's implicit theories of happiness would consider happiness as the antithesis of these conditions, which are more clearly linked to unhappiness.

¹⁹¹ This report notes the divergence between trust in Denmark and trust in the rest of the world in *The Happiness Research Institute, The Happy Danes*: 21. The report states 'Three out of four Danes believe that they can trust most people. That is a world record. In global terms, only one out of four people believes they can trust most other people. The Danes trust each other. Not just their families and friends, but also the man on the street – people they don't know – and that contributes to making life easier and happier.' Further, 'There is one thing in particular that foreign visitors tend to marvel at when they visit Denmark: that Danish parents are happy to leave their children sleeping outside in their prams, in public. While mum and dad enjoy a cup of coffee indoors, little Max is allowed to sleep outside the café in his pram. This is evidence of the trust that exists in Danish society'.

¹⁹² Pieterse, *Development Theory*, 139. Illustrating the insider-outsider argument he states 'Neighborhoods...are a source of trust and neighborhoods are a source of distrust. They promote trust of those you know and distrust of those you do not, those not in the neighborhood or outside the networks'...The other side of embeddedness is exclusion; the other side of trust is risk. Social capital then may be a strategy of risk management. (2) Social exclusion and closure facilitate trust and cooperation by ensuring the predictability of relations and preventing the leakage of resources.' In further studies deeper research should explore the linkage between trust-happiness and predictability. In fact in *The Happiness Research Institute, The Happy Danes*: 18, we find the following quote 'The Danish welfare state reduces uncertainty and concerns among the population. This has particular significance for those who are less well off, a segment of society which is happier in Denmark than in other wealthy countries'. A fascinating

many societies that achieve high social trust is that they are highly homogenous ethnically and culturally. If one is part of the group, either by sharing the dominant culture or ethnicity, one is accepted and trusted, whilst if one comes from a divergent culture/ethnicity one is treated with greater caution/suspicion. Briefly hypothesizing why this may be, this report again utilizes dual process psychology. Most likely what transpires in high trust societies is that trust is achieved through limited cognitive thought/effort, since one shares similar cultural beliefs and mannerisms as others in the society. When human beings exist in an environment in which their culture is the dominant one, they are able to essentially exist on autopilot, allowing their automatic system to simply guide their daily existence. However when one exists in a divergent culture, one's cognitive system needs to take over, actively having to ponder what to say, how to act, what can be said/done. Sadly high trust may be achieved, from existing in societies in which one's interactions and daily occurrences (whether work, shopping, eating out) require less cognition, as one actively does not have to think about divergent responses to divergent situations. One simply exists unrestrained by the cognitive system. In Bhutan we note the insider-outsider societal relationship through their treatment of the Lhotshampas, a minority ethnic group that was driven into refugee status. With regards to Denmark we note the relationship in their societies treatment of Muslims (anti-veil policies).¹⁹³ More importantly under 21st century conditions of increasing global migration and increasing ethnic/cultural diversity within nations, an overemphasis on social trust appears to link up domestically to cultural nationalism/ethnocentrism. We see this problem increasingly in Europe with assimilation policies, which at their core attempt to turn 'outsiders' into 'insiders', by restructuring the cultural beliefs and mannerisms of people. Based on these problematic foundation, a key question arises, can one de-link happiness/social trust from exclusion/cultural chauvinism?

8.2 - Exploring the Bhutanese Conception/Theory of Happiness

8.2.1 - Dual Process Psychology - Buddhism and the Bhutanese Concept of Happiness

Further exploring this report's argument that the foundation of Bhutan's conception/theory of happiness/well-being is dual process based, this report analyzes the Buddhist influence on the conception/theory.¹⁹⁴ One of the key theories in Buddhism is the noble path – encompassing right responses/actions

question from this could be the linkage between unhappiness and uncertainty. Evidence of uncertainties negative effect on happiness can be found in Graham, Happiness around the World, 43. Linking uncertainty to change she states 'The paradox of unhappy growth, for example, suggests that the rate of change matters as much to happiness as do per capita income levels, and that rapid growth with the accompanying dislocation may undermine the positive effects of higher income levels, at least in the short term'.

¹⁹³ For a comprehensive analysis of the Bhutanese treatment of the Lhotshampas see Norwegian Refugee Council, "Bhutan: Land of Happiness For The Selected," 1 (2008).

¹⁹⁴ This report locates the direct linkage between Buddhism and Gross National Happiness in Wangmo and Valk, "Under the Influence of Buddhism": 55-56.

and right thoughts. Fundamentally this concerns the retraining of human being's automatic and cognitive system.¹⁹⁵ Through right believing cultivated through effortful change and practice this theory holds right action intuitively follows. Foundationally, Bhutan follows a more plastic definition of the happiness subject, one that can be molded in different ways for different functions. This places the Bhutanese conception in conflict with evolutionary theory. The Bhutanese conception and theory basically assert, through retraining the cognitive mind/thought, one can gradually change one's automatic reactions to events/phenomena. Once perfected, one's mind (cognitive) and being (automatic-intuitive thoughts/action) will be in perfect harmony. The Bhutanese conception/theory also links up to MacIntyre's distinction of 'man as he is' (empirical man) and 'man as he could be if he realized his essential nature' (theoretical man).¹⁹⁶ Once again the danger is how and utilizing what methodology can one grasp 'what man can be' and 'what is his essential nature'.

¹⁹⁵ This report then locates the key axiom in Buddhist thought in Wangmo and Valk, "Under the Influence of Buddhism": 58. Wangmo and Valk state, "In his search for the meaning of life, the Buddha discovered the Four Noble Truths. They are the very foundation of all Buddhist beliefs, explaining the truth of suffering and the way to overcome it. The first noble truth recognises that suffering is the essence of human existence: suffering from birth, old age, sickness, and death as well as the pain from separation, grief, and despair. The second noble truth explains that desire or craving is the cause of all suffering: craving for pleasure, for individual existence, and for release from our present situation. The third noble truth states that suffering can cease by overcoming craving or desire. The fourth noble truth prescribes the way to overcome desire by following the Eightfold Noble Path (Easwaran 2007)." This report notes a key assertion that cannot go un-critiqued prior to proceeding. The first concerns the assertion 'suffering is the essence of human existence'. This is a metaphysical assertion without any proof. Suffering could easily be contingent on social forms and un-natural. Moving on, we note that desire satisfaction theory and its key variable desire is critiqued as a source of suffering and thus not an accurate conception/theory of happiness. Now that this report has built the background, let's look at the foreground, the fourth noble truth and the Eightfold Noble Path. In Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 160, we find the quote, the 'Eightfold Noble Path,' a set of activities that will, with practice, create an ethical person (by right speech, right action, right livelihood), and a mentally disciplined person (by right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration). This report argues from this foundation that the Bhutanese/Buddhist conception of happiness fits into the normative category of moralized happiness and into the psychological category of dual process happiness. The conception is moralized as it asserts a sort of life that is superior, one in which one actively has to work towards. The account is dual processed in that the ultimate goal is to restructure the individuals automatic system to act, think and feel in a divergent manner.

¹⁹⁶ A good quote illustrating this report's argument can be found in Jigmi Y. Thinley, "Values and Development: "Gross National Happiness"", Text of the Keynote Speech Delivered at the Millennium Meeting for Asia and the Pacific held on 30 October - 1 November 1998 in Seoul Republic of Korea, Thimphu: The Centre for Bhutan Studies: 17-18. Thinley states 'Within Bhutanese culture, inner spiritual development is as prominent a focus as external material development. This follows from an original meaning of development in Bhutanese context in which development meant enlightenment of the individual. I hasten to add that enlightenment is not solely an object of religious activity. Enlightenment is blossoming of happiness'. As the quote

8.2.2 - Positive Psychology and the Bhutanese Conception of Happiness

This report further notes a linkage between positive psychology and the Bhutanese concept/theory of happiness. One of the key axioms in positive psychology is that 'action proceeds from character' and the belief that character can be restructured for the individuals' attainment of happiness/well-being.¹⁹⁷ This axiom stands in contrast with evolutionary theory and biological-bio-psychological conceptions of human beings. There is no final scholarly consensus on which theory is 'true/r', this allows this research report writer to illustrate both positions and tease out their implications. In relation to choice/choice sets, the Bhutanese positive psychological theory, theoretically allows a restructuring of individual character and thus how they act and choose. This directly creates the possibility of restructuring the relationship between consumption/production and the climate crisis. This theory also has strong foundational links to dual process theory. Based on the argument that action (cognitive and automatic) proceeds from character (automatic system), one can change the character and thus the actions/choices made based on that character. This report notes that character is something deeper than momentary traits; character is similar to personality, a fairly enduring trait. This is the reason the Bhutanese note, regular training is required, to change character and thus the automatic reactions/responses of the individual. If character was cognitive, change would be easy, one would simply assert to an individual that a choice/action is wrong, rather choose another one. However as noted in dual process psychology and the Bhutanese account for sustainable change, this method does not work. Changing character, a fairly enduring trait, requires tedious effort as one is changing essentially the individuals structural responses to divergent phenomena.

notes and linking this to McMahon the Bhutanese attempt to take 'man as he is' and restructure him to 'man as he could be if he realized his essential nature'. To be fair, Haybron and this report's endorsement of self-fulfillment share similar elements to McMahon and the Bhutanese/Buddhist's. The key divergence is that the Bhutanese variant conceptualizes human flourishing in a nomothetic (species-macro-individuals') way whilst Haybron and this report conceptualize human flourishing in ideographic (specific individual-micro-individual) way. This report notes the Bhutanese nomothetic approach in Karma Ura, "The Experience of Gross National Happiness As Development Framework," Working Paper Series, Asian Development Bank, no. 42 (2015): 2. Ura states 'A person's psychological attributes begin with freeing her basic good nature, of kindness, generosity, forgiveness, contentment, and compassion, from repression by blinding negative emotions like anger, jealousy, and selfishness. This inner view of persons is the subject of psychological domain of GNH'. This quote illustrates human beings are nomothetically conceptualised as a species with collective attributes that require fulfillment. Self-fulfillment notes individuals unique attributes not their attributes as a part of a species.

¹⁹⁷ Jorgensen and Nafstad, "Positive Psychology", 17-18. This report utilizes the quote found in this reference, 'action proceeds from character', to further link Bhutan to a dual process and moralized conception of happiness. The evidence for dual process and moralized happiness that links to this reference is found in footnote 195 and 196.

8.2.3 - Reflection on the Possible Influence of Dual Process Psychology and Positive Psychology in Bhutan

In explaining Bhutan's low ecological footprint this report ponders, but cannot prove, two plausible theories. The first theory is simply that the Bhutanese haven't reached 'modernization' yet. However through time and location, being on the border of two modernized superpowers in China and India, the question arises, will Bhutan increasingly follow the regional trends towards 'modernization', in which case their ecological footprint will dramatically rise. The second theory, which in future studies this report would like to analyze further, is whether through the enforcement of culture and tradition, Bhutan successfully re-structured their citizens automatic systems, fundamentally redefining internal values/desires and thus choices/actions. This concerns state/cultural enforcement attempts to define actions allowed versus actions sanctioned.

In relation to the economic system and 21st century economic and developmental problems this theory holds very strong potentials and very strong dangers. A key strength of this theory is its ability to construct an environment in which individuals act instinctively (based on retraining) in beneficial micro and macro ways. This involves the restructuring of the individual's relationship with others as well as the collective macro effect of individual choices and action on the planetary system. A key danger of this theory is its delicate balance between multiple variables. Too much liberty/free action leads to ecological overconsumption and harm. Too little liberty leads to conformity and no self-discovery, one exists in the universe based on an external desire others have for you. Particularly concerning is precisely why should citizens trust their leaders to structure their lives under this theory? As politicians empirically more often than not act under self-promotion and self-enrichment.¹⁹⁸ Frankly this is the empirical danger of any theoretical solution including this report's exploration of happiness to political/economic problems. More often than not whilst politicians assert their unwavering belief in a theory and its implementation, unless it links up to their self-enrichment/promotion the theory basically becomes a slogan, close enough to be strived for, yet far enough as to never arise.

¹⁹⁸ Frankly, this report forgot, until re-reading, Frey, Happiness: A Revolution in Economics, 166-167, that happiness like so many other well-meaning strong normative ideas has to be implemented in the empirical or 'real political' world. Frey states, 'Once the happiness function has become politically relevant, the government, the public bureaucracy, and interest groups have incentives to manipulate it...Governments are not composed of purely benevolent politicians who want to make the population as happy as possible; the interests of politicians also matter'. This is the core danger for happiness as well as any other well-meaning ideal/theory. How can one successfully implement these ideals, in a world, in which many actors particularly in position of power have a structural incentive to keep these ideals out of popular reach and desire?

Bhutan refutes the GDP model of economics and development in favor of a Gross National Happiness (GNH) model/theory.¹⁹⁹ This report argues Bhutan's conception/theory of happiness is foundationally linked to both 1) a virtue/moralized theoretical account and 2) a dual process psychologically account. Essentially their theory encompasses a retraining of the automatic system to make choices in a certain way ("correct choices-choices that are not whims" – This is influenced by Hegel's account of freedom, noted earlier, in which case choices that are linked up to the core self of an individual are 'correct' whilst choices that are not linked up to the core self of an individual are 'whims', and need not be considered as a basis for legitimate choices/freedoms) by utilizing a distinctive concept of happiness/well-being. This report interrogates whether a state can achieve this. This theory requires drastic redefinitions of an individual's freedom to exist in the world under their own conception of value and meaning.

8.2.4 - Is Happiness in Bhutan Foundationally Weak?

A key context specific danger in linking global happiness to the Bhutanese variant is the historical creation of happiness in Bhutan. Happiness was placed on the agenda through the King who unilaterally determined what goals (happiness in this instant) should be pursued.²⁰⁰ Whilst this report argues for a greater role for happiness in economic/developmental policy, the report does note the danger in a monarchical concept of happiness/well-being, being paternalistically enforced with citizens/subjects as passive acceptors of the policy. A key aspect of monarchies is unilateral power to frame and enforce rules onto society at whim.²⁰¹ The theoretical danger for monarchical happiness is its

¹⁹⁹ This report locates Bhutan's refutation of GDP in Karma Ura, Sabina Alkire and Tshoki Zangmo, "Case study: Bhutan," in World Happiness Report 2012, ed. John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs: 110. This footnote also argues that 'In 1972, the Fourth King declared Gross National Happiness to be more important than Gross National Product (GNP), and from this time onward, the country oriented its national policy and development plans towards Gross National Happiness (or GNH).'

²⁰⁰ This report notes the Bhutanese monarchical influence in placing happiness on the agenda in Ura, "The Experience of Gross National Happiness": 1. The footnote states 'During the mid-1970s, Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, still a teenage monarch, first introduced gross national happiness (GNH)...' Two things jump out in this quote the first is clearly the term 'teenage monarch'. The second is the fact that he 'first introduced gross national happiness'. The problem from a democratic standpoint is who gave the teenage king the authority to place this happiness model on the agenda and if the people are unsatisfied with this teenage monarch-implemented policy are they allowed to voice their frustrations and potentially have the policy changed? Bhutan has to their credit increasingly moved away from a full monarchy, in fact the king has stated 'I do not believe that monarchy is the best system of government because the person who holds the high office of King does not reach that position because of merit'. This is another topic that should be engaged in the future, determining the Bhutanese populations ability to change monarchical led goals. Exploring the avenues available to them and the likelihood of facilitating change along diverge routes.

²⁰¹ The dangers of monarchical rule can be noted in John Morrow, History of Western Political Thought: A Thematic Introduction (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 82.

weak foundation, as the ruler can with a whim or unreflective desire change the policy/goal whenever they feel like doing so, based on whatever reason they choose. From a republican conception of freedom (Pettit), citizens/subjects of Bhutan are/were in a position of domination and a danger of being used as pawns without participation in the decisions that affect their lives.²⁰² Bhutan has been moving closer and closer towards democratic rule but unfortunately with regards to theoretical happiness it is a monarchy inspired goal done 'for the people', 'on their behalf'. Empirically Bhutan's GNH index does go out and gain self-reports from Bhutanese citizens; however the problem remains the index is based on a tacit theory of happiness that the people are not consulted on.

The danger in a moralized/virtue-demanding theory of happiness is that it requires a lot of training/effort to achieve the desired state.²⁰³ Foundationally this variant of happiness/well-being mirrors the flaws of the objective list theory, a bunch of arbitrary contingent goods are asserted to be good for you regardless of your subjective opinion.²⁰⁴ Metaphysically, objective list and

Morrow states 'Legitimate government was closely aligned with the interests and needs of the community and drew upon its collective intelligence to ensure that it was as effective as possible. It was also created by, or, kept in being by, the consent of its citizens. The principles and practices of hereditary monarchy were directly contrary to these requirements. Monarchies treated the state as the property of the king and were not based on natural rights. They pursued interests that diverged from those of other members of the community, and placed them at the mercy of rulers who had no attachment to the interests of society and were selected on the basis of the random and irrelevant principle of birth rather than ability'. This quote directly illustrates the dangers of monarchical rule. The key part of the quote is the argument that monarchies often hold divergent interest from the people they rule. As this master research report writer has not been able to visit Bhutan and question people's interest in happiness, for now the report does note that the Bhutanese monarchy placed happiness on the policy agenda and no data was found that illustrated that the Bhutanese citizens themselves desired the policy.

²⁰² This report noted the republican conception/theory of freedom in Morrow, *History of Western Political Thought*, 106. Morrow states 'As Pettit puts it, 'freedom as non-interference makes the absence of interference sufficient for freedom; in contrast, freedom as non-domination requires the absence of a capacity on the part of anyone else – any individual or corporate agent – to interfere arbitrarily in their life or affairs' (Pettit, 1997, p. 114). This view of freedom was applied in the past to the arbitrary implications of monarchical forms of government. In both its historical and modern forms, republicanism raises important questions about who rules, and the ways in which power is exercised'. Through this quote the report notes the arbitrary aspect of happiness in Bhutan. A policy placed on the agenda by the King who holds the power to arbitrarily interfere in the daily lives of his citizens, the Bhutanese people.

²⁰³ This report notes the demanding nature of Bhutanese happiness in NDP Steering Committee and Secretariat, *Happiness*, 34-35. The report states 'Other happiness skills include loving-kindness, compassion-meditation and the conscious practice of gratitude, empathy, and patience. These skills can all be cultivated through well-tested practices...' Clearly these practices are moralized towards a conception of the individual as virtuous, and virtue clearly requires retraining the automatic system through effortful practice.

²⁰⁴ This report notes the objective list theory in Varelius, "Objective Explanations of Individual Well-Being": 74-75. Varelius states 'Often objective theories provide a list of

moralized/virtue theories suffer from arbitrary assertions. They assert what's good for you, in the universal sense of what is good for human beings. Whilst foundationally they are incapable of illustrating why and from what evidence they are making their metaphysical claims. This report argues that happiness requires enough freedom/choice to locate the self (Haybron's self-fulfillment theory of well-being). Citizens should have a right to pursue variants of happiness that diverge from virtue, particularly when moralized happiness/virtue requires such effort and time, whilst being foundationally and metaphysically weak. A contradiction/paradox in this report is the unresolved (based on a lack of specific scholarship) complexity in either allowing human beings to act freely on their own values/conceptions of reality, whilst noting the macro ecological dangers of unlimited choice sets. Versus a more restricted choice environment in which certain choices that are too consumptive and acted on for the wrong reasons such as relative status concerns, are barred. Based on this reports contextual studies the report prefers the Danish conception/theory of happiness in relation to the Bhutanese conception/theory. Later this report will elaborate the reasons for the choice of Denmark over Bhutan. A key aspect, in which the Danish account is superior, is self-fulfillment and a less restrained choice/freedom set. Foundationally this reporter argues that Bhutan restrains choice set too far, particular in relation to un-consumptive freedoms/desires/choices.

8.2.5 - Choice/Freedom and Happiness/Well-Being in Bhutan

Anielski compares the Danish and Bhutanese models of happiness based on two variables, 1) life satisfaction and 2) ecological footprint.²⁰⁵ He illustrates that Denmark consumes significantly more resources than Bhutan whilst both countries achieving similar levels of happiness.²⁰⁶ Therefore in solely utilizing

things and activities that they consider to be good for a person and, accordingly, these theories are called objective list theories of well-being. Usually the lists of objective prudential goods include such entries as moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one's abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty (see, e.g., Parfit, 1984, p. 493 ff.), and these objective theories maintain that a life is good for the person who is living it only when it contains these particular elements. Importantly, an objective theory of well-being denies that there is a necessary connection between what an agent desires or has a pro-attitude towards and what is good for her, and maintains that something can be directly and immediately good for a person although that person does not regard it favourably'. As Varelus illustrates objective lists entail an arbitrary list of goods that are supposedly good for you. Furthermore once they are placed into a list your opinion on whether you need them is irrelevant as the theory normatively creates a subject that must hold these goods to flourish.

²⁰⁵ Whilst this report normatively refuted life satisfaction as a deficient concept of happiness, Anielski's attempt still needs to be considered as it is the sole source that compares Denmark to Bhutan ecologically.

²⁰⁶ A critical ecological comparison between Denmark and Bhutan's attainment of happiness is found in Mark Anielski, *The Economics of Happiness* (Canada: New Society Publishers, 2007), 222. He states '...Denmark and Switzerland rank one and two...in terms of life satisfaction as well as enjoying high GDP per capita and long lives. But these

two variables 1) life satisfaction 2) ecological footprint, it appears the Danish model is inferior to the Bhutanese in relation to 21st century conditions of ecological crisis. However when we consider a third variable that is also important in individuals achieving happiness, 3) choice/freedom, the Danish model definitively places less restraint on choice/freedom.

Bhutan limits choice/freedom through both cultural as well as macro economic policies. Bhutan's macroeconomic policy of GNH does not actively require consumption and production to register growth. Firstly this report utilizes the person-environment congruency theory in relation to the Gross National Happiness Index. The report argues that Bhutan creates macro environmental values, which structures the micro choice environment.²⁰⁷ Two of the key GNH indicators for this reports analysis are 'ecological diversity and resilience - responsibility towards environment' and 'cultural diversity and resilience - conduct'. 'Responsibility towards the environment' is measured through a subjective question meant to gauge 'feelings of personal responsibility towards the environment'.²⁰⁸ Karma Ura argues that the indicator of 'personal responsibility' encourages people to adopt ecologically friendly behaviors.²⁰⁹ Utilizing the person-environment congruency theory, we note a prevalent value in the macro Bhutanese environment is 'ecological concern'. As a result of this value being utilized at the macro level, micro choice/freedom sets are redefined. Individuals in this macro environment are provided with macro restraints to

nations have a relatively higher ecological footprint (i.e. they consume more of earth's resources) than Bhutan with a much lower GDP per capita, relatively high life satisfaction though slightly lower life expectancy. If one considers the "return on life satisfaction" for every dollar of GDP we might choose to live as the Bhutanese do: Bhutanese with a mere US\$1,696 (GDP) per capita have a life satisfaction index of 7.6 out of 10.0, an average life expectancy of 62.9 years and a very small ecological footprint of only 3.2 acres per person...Perhaps this is why Bhutan has proposed using a Gross National Happiness index to measure its progress...Affluent nations have much to learn from nations which consume less yet achieve similar rates of happiness and life expectancy.' Whilst this report by in large agrees with Anielski, the report diverges by placing other key variables in the equation that affect happiness/well-being within limits. The report argues that Bhutan overly restricts choice/freedom in relation to their cultural concept of happiness/well-being.

²⁰⁷ The person-environment congruency theory is found in Sagiv, Roccas, and Hazan, "Value Pathways to Well-Being", 75. Sagiv, Roccas and Hazan define the theory as '...the congruency perspective—suggests that it is the congruency between personal values and the values prevailing in the environment that lead to a positive sense of well-being'. Furthermore, 'the person-environment congruency perspective, which suggests that the more people emphasize the values that prevail in their environment, the more positive their well-being is likely to be'. One of this reports key contributions to research is being the first to attempt to utilize the person-environment congruency theory in relation to Bhutan.

²⁰⁸ For 'Ecological Diversity and Resilience - Responsibility Towards The Environment' see Ura, Alkire and Zangmo, "Bhutan": 123-124. For 'Cultural Diversity and Resilience-Conduct' see Ura, Alkire and Zangmo, "Bhutan": 119. For a critical analysis of culture in Bhutan see Norwegian Refugee Council, "Bhutan" 1: 6.

²⁰⁹ Ura, Alkire and Zangmo, "Bhutan": 123-124.

their choices/actions. As the person-environment congruency theory illustrates, choice actors who deviate too far from the dominant macro choice values will be socially disapproved of/sanctioned. These macro values essentially sanction micro consumptive choice behavior. Whilst this report wholeheartedly agrees with the Bhutanese ecological concern, this report disagrees with the spotlight being placed on 'personal responsibility'. This report agrees with the GNH report, that micro choice actors/individuals consume and do play a part in the ecological crisis. However this report argues that they are pawns and subjects in a global macro economic/developmental system that encourages economic growth and ecologically harmful behavior. Utilizing loaded terms like 'recession' or 'market collapse', people are led to believe an economy not growing is 'bad' and 'harmful'. Thus when people hear consumption strengthens an economy/country whilst keeping them employed, they engage in consumption behavior. Whilst theoretical economic development has moved past growth, growth models are empirically still very much in vogue and are the dominant indicators utilized in political discussions.

Through the second indicator, 'cultural diversity and resilience – conduct' or Driglam Namzha 'the way of harmony', this report argues that Bhutan over-restricts non-consumptive freedom/choice/choice sets in favor of a cultural conception of happiness/well-being. This report argues that Bhutan's conception of happiness/well-being is founded on very specific cultural, historical, nationalist and religious foundations. Regarding Driglam Namzha, the Norwegian Refugee Council illustrates, it is 'expected behavior' in relation to 'moving, clothing, consuming and talking'.²¹⁰ Since 1989 after a royal decree it became national policy for all citizens of Bhutan to wear the national dress/costume in public at all times during working hours.²¹¹ This policy based on a cultural conception of happiness/well-being, drastically reduces the choice/freedom set of Bhutanese citizens. This report argues that this is an over-emphasis of happiness/well-being in relation to choice/freedom. When choice/freedom is not taken to its extreme both values provide a strong foundation for individuals attaining happiness/well-being. The key danger in the Bhutanese linkage of culture-happiness is conformity, the lack of individuality and no experiments in new forms of living. This diminishes individual's ability to find self-fulfillment. Following Isaiah Berlin distinction between value pluralism and value monism, Bhutan's conception of happiness is overly monistic.²¹²

A key danger with authorized accounts of behaving/acting/appearing is that they are often utilized to strengthen the insider-outsider relationship. In Bhutan they are utilized by the ethnically majority Ngalong (insiders, the King's ethnic group) to re-structure the lives and culture of the minority Lhotshampas (outsiders, ethnically Nepalese).²¹³ The Norwegian Refugee Council argues the enforcement of 'One Nation, One People' requiring all Bhutanese follow

²¹⁰ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Bhutan" 1: 6.

²¹¹ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Bhutan" 1: 4.

²¹² Based on the same evidence as footnote 70.

²¹³ Norwegian Refugee Council, "Bhutan": 6.

‘traditional Bhutanese etiquette’ was particularly enforced on the Lhotshampas in the south of Bhutan. This created a cultural in which they were increasingly seen as ‘inauthentic Bhutanese’.²¹⁴ This is a clear case illustrating the danger of a culturally enforced conception of happiness/well-being. Cultural happiness creates an environment of over-restriction and intolerance of difference. In this environment, if choice actors’ follow ‘authorized-authentic ways of being’, the environment provides environmental support. If choice/actors do not follow the culturally defined ‘authorized-authentic ways of being’, they lose all environmental support and are frequently considered ‘inauthentic citizens’. Illustrating the dangers of a cultural-ideological conception of happiness this report utilizes Alberio Rognoni’s theoretical justification of the Lhotshampas oppression. He argues since the Lhotshampas did not wear the ‘national costume’ and share the ‘national identity’, it makes sense the Bhutanese saw them as a security threat to ‘the cultural integrity of Bhutan’.²¹⁵ In this section of this report, the report illustrated the dangers of a linkage between happiness and culture. This report increasingly realizes that for happiness/well-being to structure economic/developmental systems, a more universal theory of happiness/well-being is required. A cultural/context specific definition has too many dangers for vulnerable groups within these contexts.

8.2.6 - Self-Nonfulfillment and Nomothetic Happiness in Bhutan

In this section, this report utilizes Haybron’s self-fulfillment theory of well-being and Gordon Allport’s distinctive conceptions of the nomothetic and the ideographic, to theoretically deepen the understanding/dangers in overemphasizing culture-happiness/well-being in contrast to choice/freedom-happiness/well-being.²¹⁶ This report argues that Bhutan’s over-reliance on the

²¹⁴ Norwegian Refugee Council, “Bhutan”: 6.

²¹⁵ This report notes Rognoni’s assertions in Alberto Rognoni, “Gross National Happiness or Gross National Product? A Social Analysis of Bhutan’s approach to development” Masters diss., The University of Birmingham, School of Public Policy: International Development Department, 33-34. He states ‘...the numerous Nepalese community in opposing the imposition of the Drupkas’ national dress, the code of conduct, and the Citizenship Act, to the extent of being described as anti-national (Basu 2003, 111). While there have been allegations concerning the violation of human rights and the forced eviction of a number of Nepalese (Gupta 1999, 113), such tensions may be due to the conscious efforts of a politicised community to challenge the social, ethical, territorial and cultural integrity of Bhutan, rather than to the repression of an ethnic community (Ibid., 197). Being the national identity a very critical issue for Bhutan, it is not surprising that local authorities are so concerned and active in protecting it from any possible challenge.’ In this quote we note the dangerous rationalization of a cultural concept of happiness that was monarchically placed onto Bhutanese citizens by a teenage king.

²¹⁶ Haybron’s argument of well-being as self-fulfillment is found in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 21-23. He defines self-fulfillment as “The view of well-being is developed by noting that the emotional state theory of happiness reveals a close relationship between happiness and the self: our propensities for being happy or unhappy in various ways of living are important to who we are. This matters, I argue, because it seems important to live in accordance with who we are: well-being consists,

nomothetic (the study of universal aspects of human nature) over the ideographic (the study of the uniquely subjective experience) drastically reduces the chance Bhutanese individuals have for finding self-fulfillment. This report argues the nomothetic Bhutanese cultural-happiness approach, axiomatically analyzes human beings as a species. Based on this foundation, the model determines how human being should act as a species, what they ought to do as a species, how they should behave, talk and appear. Most importantly they utilize this same model to determine what is required for the species happiness/well-being.²¹⁷ The Bhutanese link culture to an enclosed conception of species, which allows them to define certain actions/choices as more authentic than others. The nomothetic approach is not only uniquely linkable to Bhutan's cultural conception of happiness/well-being. The nomothetic is also linkable and evident in evolutionary, dual process psychology, hedonism, desire/preference satisfaction and objective lists.

In direct contrast to the nomothetic is the ideographic. The ideographic is uniquely linkable and evident in happiness/well-being's life satisfaction theory and Haybron emotional state and self-fulfillment theories. The self-fulfillment theory appears as it sounds, it is a theory about the individuated self-fulfilling itself. Haybron utilizes examples of people emotionally unhappy in their daily lives. He argues/illustrates that their daily working lives are at odds with their self. This research report creates a thought experiment to isolate and illustrate these intuitions. Take a person (individual person - x) whose personality is bubbly and creative (personality - y) but based on familial pressure she became an accountant. In this example, employment is utilized as the variable. However to fully illustrate the theories foundations and strengths employment can be substituted for any activity the self engages with on a daily basis. This would include hobbies and lifestyle (employment, hobbies, lifestyle - z). Self-fulfillment fundamentally argues that each (x) has a unique (y) and in order to fulfill that unique (y) one needs the freedom/choice to find appropriate (z's). In relation to Bhutan (x) is defined universally as a species not individuated. This drastically downplays happiness/well-beings relation to the self. Based on Allport and Haybron, this report argues that Bhutan overly emphasizes a culturally defined, restrictive conception of human beings in universal (nomothetic) terms. This drastically reduces Bhutanese individuals (ideographic) ability to find/choose a life path in which they can find self-fulfilling. This report briefly ponders, whether the strong linkage between self-fulfillment and happiness/well-being, arises from the automatic system being in near-perfect synchronization with the cognitive system. In essence a close linkage between (1 – automatic system) what an individual is innately like and the activities the individual innately flourishes in and (2 – cognitive system) the individuals self-conception of who they believe they are and the activities they believe they flourishes in. In stark

at least partly, in self-fulfillment. And self-fulfillment in turn consists partly in fulfilling our emotional natures...' Gordon Allport's distinction is found in Jorgensen and Nafstad, "Positive Psychology", 26-29.

²¹⁷ Based on the same evidence as footnote 195 and 196.

contrast a key aspect of an un-fulfilled self, appears to be an internal fight and wide gap between (1) and (2).

8.3 - Danish Happiness

The Danish relationship to happiness is not so much active-direct but rather passive-indirect. The Danes do not have a normative theory of happiness, nor do they have governmental agencies and policies that pursue happiness.²¹⁸ Thus there is no such thing as 'Danish happiness'.²¹⁹ However global happiness indexes have termed the Danes 'the happiest people in the world'.²²⁰ Perhaps Mill was right, only in pursuing other values/activities does happiness arrive, never in its actual pursuit! There is however an interesting empirical contradiction in Danish happiness, between happiness indexes (both based on self reports) that measure affective (feelings - positive and negative emotions) happiness versus cognitive-evaluative (how good they feel their lives are going based on their standard of comparison) happiness.²²¹ The Danes score extremely highly on cognitive-evaluative indexes and significantly less so on affective indexes. Thus the Danish variant of happiness is less felt (affective) and more an evaluative-cognitive reflected assessment of their life as a whole.

This report argues the likely reason Denmark scores so highly on cognitive happiness is arbitrary norms most likely the norm of gratitude. When Danes are asked 'how happy are you?' this primes the cognitive thought 'I'm taken care of by the welfare state, I have job security/unemployment benefits, my time is largely controlled by myself as our workplaces are less vertical and more horizontal, I better state my life is going well because I don't want to be ungrateful'. Furthermore when the question is framed globally – this primes the thought – 'well I live in a country/nation in which I don't feel unsafe, there are no wars going on around me, there is limited violence and a lot of security – I better report that my life is going well. I should feel very lucky and very grateful and very happy'. Whilst these examples may seem exaggerated the core principle is still the same. Simply changing norms changes life satisfaction indexes. Furthermore there is no norm more authentic than another one in analyzing one's happiness and life as a whole.

8.3.1 - Choice/Freedom and Happiness/Well-Being in Denmark

²¹⁸ The Happiness Research Institute, The Happy Danes: 59. As one notes in 'The Happy Danes Report' the Danes create happiness through the pursuit of other variables such as trust, security and freedom. They pursue other variables and find happiness along the way.

²¹⁹ Unofficially there is a Danish concept of happiness known as *hygge*. The problem for this report is that the best sources about *hygge* are written in academic Danish.

²²⁰ The Happiness Research Institute, The Happy Danes: 5.

²²¹ For Mill's ultimate conclusion on happiness being achieved in the pursuit of other values see Nettle, Happiness, 154-155. The divergence between the Danes cognitive versus affective happiness is based on the same evidence as footnotes 188 and 189.

This section of the report explores the relationship between choice/freedom-happiness-wellbeing and ecological concerns/sustainability in Denmark. This report utilizes the same theories from the Bhutan section above (ideographic approach - self fulfillment theory – person-environment congruency theory). This report argues whilst Danes do not achieve high levels of affective felt happiness they are able to achieve self-fulfillment happiness/well-being. Utilizing capabilities approach/positive freedom terms, the Danish structure of society/environment, provide their citizens with wide enough capabilities/freedom sets and wide enough resources for citizens to achieve their desired choices/functionings.

As a thought experiment imagine a (1) Danish and (2) American teenager deciding on their life plan. (1) The Danish teenager lives in a welfare state, in which a variant of a social minimum exists (health care, housing, education, food allowances etc.).²²² (2) The American teenager does not live in a strong welfare state the social minimum is very low.²²³ Based on these foundations what are (1) and (2) likely to choose/do? The likelihood is that (1) based on a foundation of security looks internally (intrinsic values – self-fulfillment, growth, meaning) and chooses a path that will fulfill their self.²²⁴ Utilizing the concept of employment in relation to intrinsic life choices, empirical evidence illustrates that 7 out of 10 Danes even if they became financially independent (not needing to work) would

²²² The Happiness Research Institute, *The Happy Danes*: 18.

²²³ For a critique of the dominant American environmental value of materialism-extrinsic values see Sagiv, Roccas, and Hazan, “Value Pathways to Well-Being”, 68-69. And; David G. Myers, “Human Connections and the Good Life: Balancing Individuality and Community in Public Policy,” in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, ed. P. Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2004), 641-645. And; Haidt, *The Happiness Hypothesis*, 99. Haidt’s quote directly illustrates the American materialistic-extrinsic environment, he states ‘For example, people would be happier and healthier if they took more time off and “spent” it with their family and friends, yet America has long been heading in the opposite direction. People would be happier if they reduced their commuting time, even if it meant living in smaller houses, yet American trends are toward ever larger houses and ever longer commutes. People would be happier and healthier if they took longer vacations, even if that meant earning less, yet vacation times are shrinking in the United States, and in Europe as well. People would be happier, and in the long run wealthier, if they bought basic, functional appliances, automobiles, and wristwatches, and invested the money they saved for future consumption; yet, Americans in particular spend almost everything they have— and sometimes more— on goods for present consumption, often paying a large premium for designer names and superfluous features’.

²²⁴ This report notes the importance of security for happiness in the emotional state theory’s dimension of happiness called ‘attunement’ in Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 155. He states ‘The prominence of attunement reflects what we may think of as the stages of flourishing for a creature: the first priority is to establish conditions of safety and security, where the basic needs for functioning are firmly established so that it can make itself at home and blossom—like placing a sapling in fertile soil. The organism is in its element; it assumes a stance of attunement. This established, a stance of engagement will tend naturally to follow, as the creature exploits the situation in the energetic pursuit of its goals’.

continue to work.²²⁵ This refutes any imagined conception that the Danes engage in work for the pursuit of financial security/wealth accrual. Clearly work self-fulfills them over the accrual of a paycheck. Whilst (2) exists in a society with limited foundations of security, as a result (2) places financial wealth (extrinsic values) as a main criterion for life choices. Utilizing the person-environment congruency theory, we can track the inter-relationship between (1) and (2) from a value standpoint. (1) Exists in an environment that places less value in wealth accrual as in (1) the societal goals are geared towards security and self-discovery (the healthy values perspective) whilst (2)'s values are geared towards competition and having to earn scarce resources through effortful activity regardless of whether (2) fulfill themselves along the way. A key problem emerges for (1) and (2) if they changed environments. For example if (1) lives in (2) whilst (1)'s values are intrinsic (2)'s macro environment is extrinsic. Since the macro environment influences micro actors, (1) will not receive much social support, as (1)'s values diverge too far from the dominant macro values that structure the environment. This hypothetical experiment once again illustrates the complexities of contextual/cultural happiness. If an individual has a divergent concept of the good, these environments offer limited choice/sets and social support for their self-fulfillment.

Robert Inglehart provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between economic growth and ecologically friendly values. He argues that once a society reaches a certain level of economic wealth and economic development conceptualized in GDP terms, a social shift in values occurs from values of survival and wealth accrual (growth values) to values of self-exploration/expression, conservation and material simplicity (well-being values).²²⁶ Inglehart's theory explains (1) but does not explain (2) In America the country with the highest GDP, individuals still place very little emphasis on self-expression (intrinsic) and ecological values.²²⁷

This report argues that the 'Danish model' effectively structures the relationship between choice/freedom-happiness well-being and ecological considerations.²²⁸ It allows for choice/freedom and fairly wide choice/freedom sets whilst person-environment values determine the width of pursued choice options into the categories of supported versus not-supported choices. Furthermore this report links the Danish welfare state to Daniel Haybron's self-fulfillment theory. This report argues that the welfare state creates a macro environment defaulting intrinsic over extrinsic choices/actions/lives. Finally Denmark is globally recognized for its ecologically sustainable policies, such as renewable source of

²²⁵ The Happiness Research Institute, The Happy Danes: 38. This data was based on the European Social Survey 2010.

²²⁶ Ronald Inglehart, "Faith and Freedom: Traditional and Modern Ways to Happiness," in *International Differences in Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener, John F. Helliwell and Daniel Kahneman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 353-354.

²²⁷ Based on the same evidence as footnote 223.

²²⁸ This report notes the Danish local and global Ecological concern in The Happiness Research Institute and Danish Ministry of the Environment, *Sustainable Happiness*, (2015): 41.

energy, biking over automobile transport and global proposed positions regarding the climate crisis. Whilst the Danes currently consume more resources and have a larger ecological footprint than the Bhutanese, this report argues that in time based on Danes fundamental ecological values the country's footprint will go down.

In order to explain the 'Danish Model' this report argues that Denmark achieves 'macro institutional happiness'. This approach to happiness is founded on structuring quality macro institutions that positively provide micro choice actors with quality choice/freedom sets to attain happiness/well-being. This list includes institutions such as workplaces, housing, transport, hospital and school-university. Fundamentally national/macro government departments structure these institutions functioning and thus the real opportunities micro choice actors have for achieving happiness/well-being. This report concludes this section arguing that one's happiness is altered based on these institutions abilities to optimally function.

9 - Measurement of Happiness - Implementation Problems/Possibilities

Life satisfaction theory defines happiness/well-being subjectively. People are asked through self-reports (questionnaires) 'how happy are you?' Whilst Haybron critiques life satisfaction theory, both he and Gilbert argue methodologically when self-reports are conducted in large groups, important patterns emerge and theoretical flaws are largely 'washed out'.²²⁹ When people critique self-reports for being imperfect Gilbert rightly points out that every instrument in the world is imperfect until it continually is refined, even thermometers and clocks.²³⁰ In relation to the economic system, the key limitation for self-reports and the life satisfaction theory is strategic answers and longitudinal analysis of happiness. If people realize that their self-reports directly affect the distribution of resources, they can/may/probably will misreport their happiness in order to accrue greater resources. Based on Haybron's critique of life satisfaction notably arbitrary norms, self-reports in time suffer from inter-comparison problems. Individuals may self-report that they are happier/unhappier whilst in reality all that may have changed is the comparison/norm they are utilizing. When problems in inter-comparison are so severe it is not a good idea to link a theory up to the economic system (distribution, production, consumption). Economic policy requires a more objective measure for fairness. This report argues that life satisfaction reports analyze and measure a conception/theory of happiness not happiness itself.

This report notes complications and potential possibilities in the emotional state theory's relation to the economic systems. The complications include, how can economists periodically check the populations' happiness? Furthermore since the emotional state theory argues that happiness is deeper than cognition, how exactly can the automatic system be measured? Haybron proposes a variant of mood induction (creating an activity that induces a mood from the respondent – happy people's moods-emotions are fundamentally different than unhappy

²²⁹ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 77. And; Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 155. He states 'But *relative* levels of life satisfaction across large populations may usually be quite informative, since different groups of individuals may not differ systematically in the ways they generate life satisfaction reports; variations in the norms each individual employs, for instance, may wash out over large samples. Nothing said in this chapter undercuts the supposition that, more often than not, if one group (e.g., the employed) reports higher levels of life satisfaction than another (the unemployed), those individuals' lives are going better for them relative to their priorities. Similarly, you may not be able to tell the temperature from a cheap thermometer that errs by 40 percent; but if you distribute many such thermometers randomly across the United States, they will probably tell you that Florida is a lot warmer than Minnesota'. Haybron's argument is valid if one takes life satisfaction and happiness research as an appendix to other policies and values. However if one explores linking happiness up to the economic system as the core value for distribution, production and consumption one still faces the problem of strategic answers.

²³⁰ Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness*, 71.

people's moods-emotions).²³¹ With increasing technological sophistication and surveillance cameras (already in place, every city already utilizes them for multiple reasons), this report ponders, whether one can create a non-invasive algorithm/program to measure emotional state happiness. Since the subject is not aware of the camera, possibly the algorithm could study facial expression, such as Duchenne smiles or with further research alternative objective variables such as moods. How one studies them in public is still not known outside of controlled testing environment.²³² Since the variable/method is objective this potentially allows for the longitudinal assessment/study of happiness. This report argues that the value of happiness is greater when founded upon the emotional state theory and mood induction. Here one is studying a person's happiness at the automatic level, which structures their moods and emotions and fundamentally how they perceive and relate to the world. The research report writer will explore happiness measurements more in future studies.

²³¹ Haybron, *The Pursuit of Unhappiness*, 133-134. Explaining this method he states 'This effectively amounts to using what psychologists call "mood inductions" to assess how happy people are: life continuously presents us with circumstances that can elicit various moods or emotions — mood inductions, in effect—and we look for clues to a person's condition in how she responds to these situations'.

²³² This report found Duchenne smiles in Sarah D. Gunnery and Mollie A. Ruben, "Perception of Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles: A meta-analysis," *Cognition and Emotion* 30, no. 3 (2016): 501. Explaining a Duchenne smile the article states 'It is believed by many that when a person is expressing true and genuine happiness, the smile can be seen in his or her eyes...This specific type of expression, known as the Duchenne smile, is a smile that includes activation of the orbicularis oculi (cheek raiser) muscle that lifts the cheeks creating crow's feet around the eyes, slight pouching under the eyes, a slight droop in the eyelid and slight lowering of the outer eyebrow'.

10 – Conclusion

10.1 - Summary

The key relationship this report interrogated was between (1) freedom/choice-action, (2) happiness/well-being and (3) the climate crisis. Fundamentally this report illustrated that continually wider choice/positive freedom sets, negatively affect both the micro (for the individual) and macro (the planet; ecology-sustainability) level. At the micro level, Schwartz empirically illustrated continually wider choice/freedom sets cognitively burden individuals (Schwartz), drastically diminishing their attainment of happiness/well-being. Furthermore Daniel Kahneman illustrates that the mind makes systematic errors in predicting utility (choice/action - desired emotion/state). Finally Daniel Gilbert illustrated the mind's systematic inaccuracies in perceiving and imagining the future. Either (4) people do not reach the state they wished for or (5) they achieve the state but realize how different the actual state is from their anticipation and imagination. Importantly this master's research report illustrated key 21st century flaws in happiness concepts/theories, distinctively their lack of environmental awareness/concern. Most happiness/well-being concepts/theories allow human beings the freedom/choice set to continuously consume in order to achieve 'happiness/well-being'. This report foundationally critiqued the dominant concepts/theories of happiness from the basis of ecological limits/boundaries. Fundamentally this report utilized a methodology of ecological limits/boundaries to determine a happiness concept/theory for the 21st century. Theoretically this report explored and suggested, happiness should be redefined on the basis of the emotional state theory. The emotional state theory offers the strongest possibility for happiness/well-being's realization under 21st century conditions, notably in relation to the 21st century ecological crisis. From the contextual studies of Bhutan and Denmark, this report noted in Bhutan the over-emphasis on happiness/well-being in relation to choice/freedom. Utilizing Haybron's self-fulfillment theory this report argued that Bhutan's variant of happiness/well-being leads to conformity and a drastic limitation of choice/freedom sets for achieving self-fulfillment-happiness/well-being. Utilizing the person-environment congruency theory, the report noted that Denmark structures the relationship between choice/freedom and happiness/well-being in a near perfect manner. Choice/freedom sets are significantly wider than Bhutan, whilst in Denmark the environment structures sets towards individual self-fulfillment and the pursuit of intrinsic values.

10.2 - Future Areas of Research - Happiness/Well-Being

A key issue for further research is how; the concept/theory of happiness/wellbeing could potentially impact the global economic system? Whilst theoretically models have moved beyond the state, empirically a large part of world politics is still dominated by states acting on state/national interests. Does the potential implementation of happiness/well-being require a global state, such as a larger more powerful United Nations? Or can individual nation states individually do this, without the free rider problem emerging wherein some states cut back and others as a direct result expand? These

questions need to be pondered and hopefully in the future this research report writer will explore their implications further.

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