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Fatalism and closure

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Abstract

In “Fatalism, Incompatibilism and the Power to Do Otherwise” (2003), Penelope Mackie presents new objections to logical fatalism. One of her objections shows that the principle of *Closure* is invalid. The principle of *Closure* is the inference principle used by logical fatalism. In this paper, I give a response to Mackie’s objection by drawing a distinction between logical action-fatalism and logical event-fatalism. I argue that whereas logical-action fatalism presupposes *Closure* and is so susceptible to Mackie’s objection, logical event-fatalism does not presuppose an inference principle that fails by Mackie’s objection.