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African Studies Seminar

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The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case Study of the 1929 Bulawayo Location 'Faction Fight'

'Faction fights' and urban disturbances have been an almost permanent feature of southern and central African ghetto life since the late 19th century, yet with few exceptions they have never been subjected to detailed scrutiny. The fact that they have been dismissed by a historian as 'brutal inter-tribal riots' (1), or simply ignored by anthropologists and sociologists is clearly far from satisfactory. If 'faction fights' were and are so blatantly 'tribal', why have the anthropologists not looked at them? Alternatively, if the fights are better interpreted as particular manifestations of 'crowd behaviour' and class conflict, sociologists and historians working in southern African studies have been painfully slow to draw inspiration from the imaginative European studies of scholars like Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé.(2) Although East Africa can at least boast Frank Furedi's work on the crowd in Nairobi (3), the position elsewhere is rather more bleak. As far as South Africa is concerned, only contributions by Eddie Webster (4) and by Dudley Horner and Alide Kooy (5) relieve an otherwise barren historiographical landscape, while for Southern Rhodesia the silence is absolute. This is particularly unfortunate because what this silence masks is a form of disturbance which erupted with sufficient frequency and intensity in the urban locations, and especially the mine compounds of Southern Rhodesia, to warrant its inclusion alongside desertion and strike action as an important index of working class frustration and despair.

In Bulawayo itself, 'faction fights' had occurred at least since the turn of the century; Christmas Day 1900 witnessed an attack by 250 Ndebele on a 'Zambesi' (6) encampment near the town, apparently as revenge for the murder of a Xhosa and an Ndebele by the northerners. (7) After the Boer War, there was 'trouble' between the Xhosa and the Ndebele, again a few years later between Ndebele and 'Zambesi Natives', and by 1930 'native disturbances' had become a familiar part of Bulawayo's Christmas and New Year holidays for some years past. (8)

Such 'tribal' violence was even more common in the colony's scattered mining compounds, an early example of which concerned a clash in December 1901 between Shangaan and 'Zambesi' workers on the Tebekwe Mine. An estimated 4-500 men were involved, most of whom were armed with sticks, although some did have assegais and axes. The fight, for which no reason was reported, was stopped by police action before any serious injuries were inflicted. (9) A fight in the Nellie Mine compound on Christmas Day 1907 which resulted in two people killed and 15 injured, obliged the police to mount a special patrol the following year to prevent any recrudescence of the violence. (10) Fights of this nature were sometimes coupled with strike action to achieve the ends of dissidents; in July 1919 a fight at Gaths Mine

between local Kalanga workers and 'Nyasas' had as its sequel a strike of Kalanga labourers demanding the discharge of all Nyasas. Only when the manager dismissed eight Nyasas, against whom even the Compound Inspector thought the Kalanga had 'just grievances', did the strike end. (11) More typical was a 'serious disturbance' at the Fred Mine in May 1920, where white employees who 'fired shots over native heads', nonetheless succeeded in severely wounding one black worker. (12)

Normally, though, 'tribal fights' were deemed to merit only brief and laconic reports by state officials. 'On the day of my arrival', diffidently noted by a Compound Inspector of the Shabani Mine, a fight 'started through an Awemba woman insulting an Atonga, and several small arguments resulted in 8 natives being removed to the Shabani hospital'. (13) As early as 1915 a fight was thought be be small when only one worker lost his life, (14) and it was in this spirit that three months later the Chief Native Commissioner decided that faction fights were 'not of sufficient importance to warrant special legislation'. (15) Even the huge fight which shook Wankie Colliery compound on Boxing Day 1926 drew relatively little attention and received only a few paragraphs in official reports. On the one side were Ila ('Mashukulumbwe') and 'Zambesi boys' (in this instance, probably Tonga); on the other were Bemba and Ngoni. Approximately 1000 men were ranged on each side, armed with assegais, bows and arrows, sticks and stones. 'The trouble apparently arose', explained the local Native Commissioner, 'through a native of the Gokwe district, who was dancing with the Mashukulumbwes and Zambesis, entering the dancing square of the Angonis and Awembas and spearing their drum and stabbing a native in the fleshy part of the neck'. The fight, which started at 3.30 p.m., raged for three hours before it was eventually brought to an end by the Compound Manager, his compound police, and the British South Africa Police. During the uproar, two African workers were killed, 94 were wounded and 46 compound huts were set on fire and destroyed. (16) No other details were reported by either the Native Commissioner or the Compound Inspector, both of whom seemed satisfied that the immediate provocation was sufficient explanation for the fight, especially as 'all the natives were perfectly sober and it is understood that the fight was not premeditated'. (17) And in any case, as the Compound Inspector reminded his superiors, 'the feud between these two tribes is an oldstanding one'. (18)

So long as 'tribal conflict' did not jeopardise production and was confined to mine compounds, even when on a scale large enough actually to take or threaten a substantial number of lives and property, sustained state interest and action was conspicuously lacking. It was only when the violence which engulfed the Bulawayo Location and railway compounds - the working class ghettos of the colony's biggest town - promised to be uncontrollable, at the very least to seriously inconvenience the town's white residents, and if successful to disrupt the pattern of labour mobilization and control throughout Matabeleland, that the state was moved to mount a somewhat more thoroughgoing attack against, and investigation of, what the local newspaper headlined in inch-block capitals as 'Knobkerrie Warfare in Bulawayo'. (19)

I

As 1929 drew to a close, there was little to indicate that the pattern of end of year events in Bulawayo would differ greatly from previous years. Because 'minor native disturbances' had become a regular feature of the Christmas holiday period, the C.I.D. and Police took the 'usual precautions' of seizing a large number of weapons and of destroying a quantity of illegally brewed beer.

But such precautions notwithstanding, on the 24th, 25th and 26th December 'small native faction fights' took place in the Location and the streets of Bulawayo itself. In both places, combatants were either dispersed or arrested by the police. Up to this point, explained a subsequent official report, there was nothing to show that anything unusual 'was in the course of preparation or intended by the natives'. (20)

The next morning, Friday, 27th December, the Bulawayo Superintendent of Natives, Col. C.L. Carbutt, was visited by deputations of Ndebele who 'showed considerable apprehension'. They alleged that 'the Mashona natives were out of hand, and were going about in bands, assaulting any Matabele native who they found alone, and that a number of Matabele had already been the victims of serious assaults'. Later that day the same complainants returned to inform Carbutt that the Shona 'were organising a general attack on the Location about 5 p.m.'. As a result of this information, Carbutt contacted the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. and the Superintendents of the Town and District police and arranged to meet them, with whatever men they had available, at the Location by 4.30 p.m. After this point, the pattern of events during 27th December becomes confused. According to Carbutt, nothing happened on the afternoon of the 27th and it was only that night that the fighting really developed: 'on our meeting at the Location nothing occurred. The Police however agreed to keep a patrol in the Location during the night. The strength of this patrol was unfortunately inadequate to deal effectively with the numerous fights and disturbances which occurred during the night of 27th - 28th December.' (21)

This is in sharp contrast to newspaper reports which, although couched in sensational terms, seem too detailed to be pure invention. The Bulawayo Chronicle (22) claimed that the first indications of trouble came at about 3.15 on the afternoon of the 27th, when white residents in Lobengula Street near the Location complained to the police that 'a large and noisy crowd of natives had collected'. The crowd was promptly and easily dispersed by mounted police armed with 'long and heavy batons', but shortly afterwards

> 'the situation took a serious turn when a force of between 300 and 400 natives was seen marching across the veld from the railway location in the direction of the Bulawayo Location shouting and waving sticks, and generally behaving in an extremely bellicose manner'.

Just as this 'formidable force' was nearing Forestvale Road close to the Location, where ' a crowd of about 1,000 Bulawayo Location natives had gathered outside their huts to await the attack', so the mounted police force galloped down the road, and 'lined up between the attacking natives and the Bulawayo location'. The police then charged into the 'approaching mob' and succeeded in breaking up the crowd, while 'disarming many of the natives and arresting large numbers'. Many of the attackers, however, were not so easily discouraged and 'shouting and screaming threats, ran off and hid in surrounding bushes and dongas', from where they 'tried again and again to break through to the location'. For the rest of the afternoon, police patrols, comprising almost all of the town's strength, were obliged to repel persistent attempts to attack the Location. It was only with the approach of nightfall that the attempts gradually ceased 'and it seemed as though the trouble was all over'.

The quiet soon proved deceptive and was shattered at roughly 8 p.m. when police headquarters learned that a railway compound was being burned down. With the exception of a few troopers left on guard in the Location all available police were rushed to Raylton, even as 'a rosy glow of flame in the southern sky lent colour to the report'. 'As the railway compound was neared', reported

the Chronicle,

> 'a tremendous noise of shouting and screaming could be heard and flames were seen everywhere. On arriving at the location, it was found that all the clothing, bicycles and other belongings of some 300 or 400 Manicaland natives living in the location had been seized by Matabele, placed in nine or ten huge piles and set alight. In the light of the raging fires, natives could be seen dancing round, shouting warcries and threats and waving sticks, knobkerries and knives, inciting each other on to kill the Mashonas. The police surrounded the compound, but did not venture inside, the savage spectacle of the jumping, screaming, shouting natives continuing until the fires had burned down'.

While the police ineffectually contemplated the 'savage spectacle' in front of them, fighting once more flared up in the Bulawayo Location. The withdrawal of most of the police to Raylton had 'enabled the natives who had been dispersed earlier in the day to re-form', and just before 10 p.m. 'about 300 well-armed natives ... gained ingress to the Bulawayo Location and were careering through the compound demolishing huts and attacking the Mashona'. There was 'a tremendous din', as the attackers 'joined in the location by their tribesmen', rushed through the narrow streets ... fighting, screaming and demolishing huts', and it was at this stage that most of the casualties occurred, including one fatality. A scene of 'absolute confusion' greeted the police who had hastily returned from Raylton 'in motor cars, riding motor cycles, and on foot'. As before, numerous arrests were made, many people were disarmed and the attackers dispersed 'into the open veld'. Once again, though, repeated attempts were made to renew the attack: 'A party of police would hear an alarm from a distant part of the location and on immediately rushing to the spot would be just in time to see a body of men disappearing into the bush after having destroyed one or more huts'. These hit-and-run raids continued until midnight, with another major attack rumoured for 2 a.m. Only when the attack failed to materialise, did some of the police stand down, leaving strong patrols on guard for the remainder of the night.

The following day, Saturday, 28th December, Carbutt was again visited by 'further delegations of Matabele natives ... seeking protection'. (23) After listening to them and, later ascertaining what he thought to be the quite inadequate numbers the local police could spare for duty in the location 'and other disturbed areas', a thoroughly alarmed Carbutt telephoned Salisbury to request permission to have the white Citizen Defence Force mobilised. Convinced that there would be 'a very serious and widespread fracas during the night, unless we had adequate forces to control the natives', Carbutt decided not to wait while Salisbury pondered its decision. Because it was a Saturday morning, all mobilisation arrangements for the Defence Force had to be made before its members stopped work at mid-day 'and scattered for the weekend holiday', so when Salisbury still had not replied by 11.45 a.m., Carbutt contacted Major Newman, commander of the Defence Force. Newman once the position had been explained to him, immediately issued orders to members of the Defence Force employed in the railway workshops to attend a parade at 2 o'clock that afternoon. Authorization for this decision was received from Salisbury soon after 1 p.m. (24)

These arrangements made, Carbutt went to the railway compound where there had been a major disturbance the previous night, and warned 'large gatherings of natives' that further rioting would not be tolerated and that they should 'remain quietly in their compounds and not join in any fracas which might

occur elsewhere'. (25) At this point, Carbutt was particularly concerned to minimise and localise as far as possible the fights which occurred persistently throughout the day. Unlike the large scale clashes of Friday night, Saturday's pattern was mostly one of small, sporadic incidents. It was reported that during the day 'fights took place between small mobs of natives, and the charge office officials were continually answering the telephone to alarmed householders asking for police to come and disperse natives who had gathered in the streets and on pavements or who were fighting'. (26) Reports that 'Manicas in large numbers were fighting near the brickfields on the Khami Road' proved exaggerated, (27) and more typical was the attack on a single Shona worker near the railway compounds. The worker, one Mangesi, was surrounded by a group of ten Lozi labourers who seized his registration certificate, and putting it to an unintended use, shouted 'Yes, he is a Maswina. Hit him. Hit him'. Mangesi managed to break away from his captors but only got as far as the edge of No. 4 compound near the Loco workshops before he was knocked unconscious and 'assaulted in a very brutal manner'. (28)

As this example indicates, whatever the fights lacked in scale, they made up in their intensity. Africans who had been attacked 'were in many cases shockingly injured. One native, who could hardly stand ... (had) a tremendous gash on the side of his head, where he had apparently been bludgeoned with a knobkerrie. Blood was pouring from the wound and his shirt was simply soaking. His mouth was also badly damaged'. (29) Saturday also yielded an impressive array of confiscated weapons. A slightly incredulous reporter listed 'no less than 50 different weapons' collected in one police lorry. Among them were

> 'butchers knives, bicycle chains attached to wooden handles, pumps, pieces of lead, and knobkerries ... there were also a considerable number of most business-like looking assegais. Most of these were the real thing, although many had been improvised by tying a knife or razor at the end of a long stick. These weapons could be used like flails and were capable of causing shocking damage'. (30)

It was against this background that Carbutt addressed a major meeting in the Bulawayo Location at 3 p.m. The meeting, attended by over 1000 blacks, also enjoyed the presence of the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D., Major Brundel his second in command, and the commanders of the town and district police. Carbutt, speaking through an interpreter, asked the crowd to explain 'the cause of the disturbances', while stressing that 'all tribes of natives are equal in the eyes of the Government, and have a right to pursue peaceful avocations anywhere within the Colony'. His threat that 'a continuation of the disturbances would lead to the necessity of very strong measures being taken to suppress them', received graphic reinforcement from almost 100 uniformed and armed 'territorials' who marched past the meeting on their way along several location streets, but was nonetheless ignored. (31) Within minutes of the troops passing, as the meeting dispersed, a shout 'was raised on the outskirts of the meeting': "There are the Manyikas (a term used to describe all Shona) looking for us". The shout caused 'a general stampede, the Manyika natives being chased in every direction and mobbed by overwhelming numbers of Matabele'. When caught, they were clubbed to the ground and beaten, until their assailants were driven off by the police. (32)

Leaving the police to cope as best they could, Carbutt left the location to investigate a murder which had allegedly been committed in the nearby municipal quarries during the meeting. Although the rumour turned out to be false, he did discover 'large numbers of natives armed with assegais ... and other weapons advancing through the bush on to the Location, evidently bent on taking part in the fighting they thought was going on there'. Assisted by two Native Messengers, Carbutt disarmed as many as he 'could catch', and a little later also 'rescued another foreign native, who was being mobbed in the house of a Coloured man on the outskirts of the Location'. (33) On his return to the Location, Carbutt found it 'still in a state of turmoil, natives rushing about and shouting in every direction'. The situation was now 'rapidly becoming out of hand' as the number of police was far too small to deal with it. He concluded that 'unless order was restored a general fight on a large scale would probably develop', especially as 'a concerted attack on the Location might be expected during the night, from Mashonas who were assembling to the north of the Location'. (34)

After some discussion with the town magistrate and police and Defence Force officers, Carbutt's assessment of the situation was confirmed. Extra police for the location were made available by substituting special constables (white reservists) for regular policemen from the town station, the Defence Force was placed on picket duty inside the Location and at various points between it and the railway compounds, and instructions were issued to prevent movement between the two compounds. These measures succeeded in containing all but minor disturbances during the night, and with the arrival on Sunday morning of police and Askari reinforcements from Salisbury, it proved possible to withdraw the Defence Force, leaving the additional police to maintain order 'except for isolated fights which it is impossible for them to control over the wide area of the Township and Commonage'. (35)

An uneasy calm was thus restored to the Location and the railway compounds over the next few days. Exceptions such as occasional 'outbursts of fighting in backyards and in sanitary lanes' were speedily stopped either by ordinary police patrols or by the special 'raiding lorries' used by the police to break up any crowds they came across. (36) A Chronicle reporter who visited the Location on Sunday evening found 'everything was as quiet as could be expected. The Location was very thoroughly picketed and there was a reserve of mounted and foot police at the Location Superintendent's office ready to go to any part of the Location as soon as an alarm was received. Occasional arrests were made mostly of natives found carrying dangerous weapons'. (37) At the railway compounds, 'everything was also quiet', not least because of the precaution taken 'of installing extra electric light ... which ... did much to prevent a disturbance', and because 'large numbers of natives sat together outside their huts ... (as) a measure of self-protection (which) was not interfered with by the authorities'. (38)

The atmosphere, though, remained highly charged. Europeans and Africans in the nearby Sauerstownship were quick to believe rumours on Sunday night that a 'roaming band of some 50 Matabele were marauding in the district'. As the rumour spread, so did panic: 'Natives took refuge in their employers' houses and the employers armed themselves with rifles, revolvers and shotguns, telephoning the Police Station in town to let them have more ammunition'. When motorcycle police were despatched to

the township, they were unable to find any trace of the 'roaming band'. (39) At the Location itself, a large number of Shona who had previously fled from it, attempted to return at about 6 p.m. As the Shona approached, however, 'the Matabele turned out and made a hostile demonstration (before) being driven back by the Police'. Carbutt thereupon decided not to allow any Shona to enter the Location as he considered that the police could not protect them adequately. Nor were Shona workers able to return to No. 2 railway compound; as late as 2nd January they were still afraid to do so 'and the natives there had stated that they would not have them back'. (40)

One fresh development had been the spread of fighting to the neighbouring countryside during the night of 29th December. Rural disturbances were apparently confined to the Mzingwane district where a band of some 30 Ndebele attacked the huts of five Shona on Willsgrove Farm (41) as revenge for the actions of two of the Shona who 'had previously molested an Ndebele Native and damaged his bicycle'. Normally such an assault would have been a minor affair, but because 'most of the natives concerned were employed in Bulawayo, and knew of the disturbances there ... feelings ran high, and ... (they) considered they were justified in punishing these Mashona'. Following the attack, explained the local native commissioner, 'there was a tense feeling along the Umguza (river), the Mashona expected to be attacked and burnt out, and the Matabele thought Mashona re-inforcements would arrive and attack their kraals'. (42) A second, but seemingly unrelated incident occurred when a Shona visiting a nearby village accidently spilt beer over the feet of three Ndebele. The men had 'taken the action for a deliberate insult, and with one accord had set upon him and beaten him insensible'. (43)

After this point, the fighting more or less stopped. On Monday, 30th December, the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. issued a press statement which claimed that 'no disturbances of any importance were reported today from the railway or from the location. A few minor arrests have been made and the position generally is quiet ... While the trouble is not yet over and further minor clashes are anticipated for the next few days, the general outlook is peaceful'. (44) Carbutt concurred, and the next day decided that it was 'obviously necessary to test this situation' (45) of comparative calm. Ndebele and Shona leaders were assembled and harangued in separate groups. Carbutt spoke first to the Ndebele and then the Shona, warning both 'in much the same terms' (46) to

> 'Stop these disturbances now, while there is time, before the Government gets tired of merely separating the fights ... Many of your people, I know, think that white people never kill anyone, and that therefore no matter what they do, they will only be fined or go to Gaol for a few months. Do not be misled by that. There is a limit to all things, and if you carry your determination to drive out the Mashona too far, it can only lead to the Government having to resort to stronger measures than it has already taken, even to the shooting of some of the leaders of these disturbances ... I have warned you and the responsibility for warning your people and stopping the disturbances now rests with you'. (47)

The 'caution', claimed Carbutt, 'was well received, and as a result of it a better atmosphere appeared to prevail'. (48) Only one incident at roughly this time threatened the restored quiet: a 'roving band' of Shona on the Bulawayo Commonage were reported as assaulting 'stray Matabele', but their activities apparently were not sustained. (49)

At the close of their meeting with Carbutt, the African leaders had told him that if he 'would address a general meeting of the tribes in the same terms, they thought peace would be restored'. (50) This was accordingly arranged for 3 p.m. on Saturday, 4th January, in the Location. A strong indication that the meeting would prove successful came several hours in advance when at mid-day on Saturday, Carbutt went to No. 2 railway compound to reinstate the Shona labourers who had been forced out a week previously. When the compound inhabitants had been assembled, he bluntly warned them that the compound 'did not belong to them, and that it was not for them to say who could or could not occupy it'. Carbutt threatened the crowd that anyone who interfered with the Shona would be severely dealt with and 'invited anyone present who did not agree with me, to say so at once, and let us settle the matter'. As no one replied, Carbutt asked if he could take it that 'the trouble was over and that the Mashonas would not be molested. The crowd .... thereupon clapped their hands, signifying assent, and the meeting dispersed, a good tempered tone being shown as they broke away'. (51) This success was repeated at the mass meeting later the same afternoon where, despite some 'murmurings' from the back of the crowd, all of the black speakers also called for an end to the disturbances. (52) On the termination of the speeches', explained a satisfied Carbutt, 'I asked the assemblage to signify in the time honoured native manner their agreement to a termination of hostilities. This they did unanimously. Thereafter they sang the National Anthem and dispersed.' (53)

II

Bulawayo's 'knobkerrie warfare' had lasted about 12 days from beginning to end, with major clashes confined to the weekend of Friday, 27th to Sunday, 29th December. In that time two people had been killed, between 40 and 50 seriously hurt, and just under 350 had been arrested and brought before the magistrate's court, where the usual sentence was £5 or one month. (54) And only a relatively massive show of force, coupled with threats to identifiable 'native leaders', had brought the protracted unrest to an end.

The fighting had thoroughly alarmed the town and district's white population, some of whom abandoned houses near the location 'and came to friends in the town or stayed in hotels'; while in Sauerstownship 'the (white) women were in a "mortal funk" throughout the trouble, and the women in the outlying districts, whom I have known to have no fear of the native in the past, are being affected in the same way'. (55) White farmers themselves were extremely concerned at the 'sullen air' among their black labourers, and fantasized about what would happen if one of the police 'patrols came into touch with a gang of natives it could not control'. Because 'everything hung on a delicate thread', the 'result would be taken as a difference between black and white'. (56) Nor did alarm immediately subside once the fighting had been stopped; although anxious 'not to pitch an alarmist note', the Chronicle called for an investigation into African attitudes towards native commissioners: 'Not only are the Native Commissioners representative to the natives of the white race, but they are the representatives of government, law and order. If there is any reason to suppose that the prestige of these officials is being undermined no time should be lost .... to seek out the cause'. (57) The Native Department, too, had a decided, if different opinion about the significance of the fighting. Carbutt, himself a self-confessed possessor of 'very strong views' on the subject of 'native control, (58) had been quick to argue for 'very strong action', because anything less

> 'would be direct encouragement to assume a defiant attitude in any other situation which may arise, which does not happen to meet with their approval. Moreover if they are allowed to have their way with the Mashona in Bulawayo, I have no doubt that the movement will spread to the Mines and every industry in Matabeleland, resulting in the disorganisation of labour, and dictatorship by the Matabele, which cannot be tolerated'. (59)

But while the settler community, the Press and the Native Department might quibble over the significance of the unrest and debate the relative merits of teargas or low-flying aeroplanes for dealing with future disturbances, (60) there was singular unanimity as to the nature of the conflict. All agreed in seeing the fighting as ethnically inspired and ethnic in form. The press in particular held a pronouncedly one-dimensional view. The Rhodesia Herald, some 300 miles from the event, commented sourly that the 'the deplorable faction fight between native tribes in Bulawayo is an ugly reminder of the obstinate way in which feuds between tribes linger and break out into violence on occasion', (61) and managed in the space of a single editorial to refer to 'frenzied outbreaks', 'savage mobs engaged in tribal squabbles', and 'disturbing orgies'. (62) The Chronicle, on the spot and better informed, actually attempted to obtain ' a native point of view' (which was reproduced in the Herald) but even so, remained convinced that to label the disturbances as 'inter-tribal' (62) was also enough to explain them. Similarly, Carbutt and the Native Department persisted in viewing the 'tribal' dimension as the determining factor, despite the existence, discussed later in this paper, of contradictory albeit fragmentary evidence which their enquiries uncovered and which was incorporated in their reports.

Although obsessed with the 'tribal' aspect of the conflict, Carbutt did recognise that the origin of the trouble could not be attributed to any single cause, and concluded that the fighting 'was due to the cumulative effect of many small incidents, some real and some imaginary, plus the effect of false rumours, apparently deliberately circulated in order to inflame tribal passions'. (64) His official report listed nine reasons for the clashes, the last four of which were 'the false rumours' to the effect that the Shona had cut the breasts off an Ndebele woman; that a man had had his hands cut off ('attributed to both sides, and so equally inflaming the passions of both'); that a large number of Ndebele had been killed and that for every one so murdered, ten Shona must die; and, more specifically, the rumour which spread during the Location meeting of 28th December that the Shona had killed an Ndebele less than a mile away, and which Carbutt was convinced was 'the direct cause of the riot which took place immediately afterwards'. (65)

Inflammatory as the rumours undoubtedly were, Carbutt nonetheless rated them less important than five other reasons. Pride of place at the head of the list went to undiluted 'tribal' animosity; 'the raking up of past history, resulting in the engendering of animosity, by references to raiding of the Mashonas by the Matabele in the past, and taunting the latter with their inability to do so now'. The second reason for the fighting, said Carbutt, was that Shona 'court Matabele women and seduce them from their kraals, without paying lobola or consulting their parents', while thirdly was the fact that the Shona worker 'comes to Matabeleland and by his competition in the labour market lowers the rate of wages and gets the best jobs'. Then, if these causes were not enough, there were also 'quarrels arising at boxing contests and bioscope (cinema) entertainments (which) lead to tribal partisanship followed by recriminations, and finally by open

fighting'. And lastly, conflict was provoked by the 'allegation attributed to the Mashona, and apparently believed, that they had purchased from me or some other official the right to kill Matabele with impunity'. (66)

Of all these highly varied reasons, the only one Carbutt deemed worthy of comment concerned boxing and film shows, both of which were banned pending Government investigation. He acknowledged the necessity of denying the rumours but was otherwise silent about their origins. Nothing more was said about the nature of Shona competition in the labour market or about the allegations of bribery.

III

Carbutt's report clearly begged a great many questions and ignored even more. It persistently begged the fundamental question of just who was fighting whom and when, never mind why; nor did it make any effort to probe recent developments in the labour market or in the Location; nor even to understand why the customary tools of social control had broken down as far as they had. In suggesting answers to these questions, it will be argued that Bulawayo's 'knobkerrie warfare' is intelligible only in the general context of the town's economic and geographical situation within the regional political economy, and specifically only in the context of the conditions, controls and constraints existing in the Bulawayo Location and railway compounds.

Bulawayo in 1929 was the largest town in Southern Rhodesia. Its total estimated African population was close to 20 000 and there were well over 8000 whites. Over the preceeding two decades its black working population had grown steadily from approximately 5000 in 1911 to 10 500 in 1926, until by 1931 it numbered 16 000. (67) The origin of this pre-eminence and expansion is not difficult to explain; from its colonial inception the prosperity of Bulawayo had been closely tied to the development of Southern Rhodesia's mining industry. Because Matabeleland was initially the centre of gravity of the mining industry, Bulawayo became the colony's mining capital and the headquarters of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines from its foundation in 1895. Thereafter the town served the mining industry; it briefly boasted a stock-exchange in the 1890s, but more lasting development was based on the growth of light engineering for the repair of mine machinery and especially on the town's commercial function as an entrepot for mining materials. (68) For almost 40 years 'all significant industrial development ... was essentially in the interests of mining capital and it was not until 1932 that the newly formed Bulawayo Chamber of Industries was in a position to exhibit locally produced manufactures for the first time'. (69)

Above all else, though, by the 1920s Bulawayo had become a railway town. Although the railway too was a consequence of and intimately associated with the fortunes of the mining industry, it nonetheless imparted a distinctive character to the town. Between 1919 and 1921 the central mechanical workshops of Rhodesia Railways were built in Bulawayo, following the decision to move the headquarters of the system from Umtali. These relatively massive workshops (70) caused a substantial demand for labour; white artisans were recruited from the Rand, Natal and Britain (71), while the number of black workers in the two main railway compounds climbed from roughly 850 in 1924 to about 1700 in early 1929. (72) Numbers continued to rise throughout 1929, reaching an estimated 3000 in 1930, and frequently were significantly higher when workers were temporarily concentrated in

Bulawayo before being parcelled out along branch lines. By the latter date, the railways were the largest single employer of black labour in Bulawayo, although the biggest single group in employment were the 5500 domestic servants, (74) almost all of whom lived outside the Location in the ubiquitous 'kias' behind their employers' houses.

Bulawayo also acted as an extremely important labour catchment area, both for migrants seeking work on the relatively highly paid Matabeleland gold mines, and for those whose ultimate destination was the Rand. This was especially true of the so-called 'northern natives' or 'Zambesi boys' from Northern Rhodesia, for whom Bulawayo was the first large and comparatively lucrative employment centre on their way south. Bulawayo's particular situation thus made local workers, in this case the Ndebele, constantly vulnerable to being undercut by cheaper immigrant labour. Before the mid-1920s, though, this structural vulnerability remained more or less effectively hidden, as the Ndebele came to terms with the flow of northern labour, either by themselves migrating to the higher wage centres of South Africa or by remaining in those rural areas which were still viable. And in any case, employment opportunities in Bulawayo itself were expanding steadily.

Although still obscured, the growing weakness of the Ndebele position dated from the end of the First World War. Demand generated by the war and immediate post-war boom had temporarily arrested the underdevelopment of Southern Rhodesia's African peasantry, but when the boom ended in 1921, its effects were all the 'more sudden and drastic'. The 1921-3 slump in cattle and maize prices 'radically altered the position of the African peasants in the structure of the Rhodesian economy' and, together with the later impact of the Great Depression, brought about 'a sharp increase in African participation in the labour market'. (75) Related to this was the fact that 'several Reserves' were becoming 'overcrowded' by 1926, and by 1928 'general overstocking' was reported, particularly from Matabeleland. (76)

Ndebele and Shona workers appear to have responded to the deteriorating conditions in the rural areas and their accelerating dependence on wage employment in two main ways; by increased migration to South Africa (77) or by taking employment in the local agricultural industry. Statistics for the non-mining sector of Southern Rhodesia's economy are notoriously infrequent and inexact, but it seems safe to assume that the increase in indigenous labourers from c39 000 in 1923 to c70 688 in 1927 in non-mining employment was confined very largely to agriculture (78) which was then enjoying boom conditions. By contrast to the stagnant gold mining industry, white commercial agriculture expanded massively in the 1920s, having at last found a seemingly profitable and saleable crop in tobacco. Between the 1923/4 and 1927/8 seasons, virginia tobacco production leapt from 3,8 million lb. produced by 166 growers to 24,8 million lb. produced by 987 growers. And because tobacco production was highly labour intensive, requiring about 10 times as much labour as an equivalent area of maize, the number of Africans (including foreigners) employed in agriculture increased from 58 542 in 1921 to 83 985 in 1927/8. (79) But the boom was short-lived; the 1928 crop proved virtually unsaleable and 'brought ruin to all but a handful of growers'. By 1930 some 700 growers had abandoned the tobacco industry, production had fallen back to 5½ million lb. and as early as April 1928 a severe retrenchment of black labour had begun. (80) All in all, well over 10 000 Southern Rhodesian Africans lost their jobs in agriculture. (81)

This unemployment crisis was felt most heavily in Mashonaland where the tobacco farms were concentrated, and obliged work-seekers to look beyond the province's boundaries. To many Shona workers expelled from the tobacco industry, Matabeleland, and specifically Bulawayo, must have looked especially promising, with the prospects of work in farming, on the railways or in the myriad of occupations in the town itself.

Unlike Mashonaland, commercial agriculture in Matabeleland had neither boomed nor gone bust in the 1920s; its two staples continued as maize and ranching, and it had the further advantage from the prospective migrant's point of view that its average farm wages in 1927-8 were 21-23/- p.m., compared to 18/- in Mashonaland. (82) Neither feature unduly impressed Ndebele labourers, many of whom avoided farm work and went south, to the considerable exasperation of local farmers. 'To a great extent', complained one farmer near Bulawayo at the end of 1926, 'the kraals in this part of the country are peopled by natives who have been for some years working in Johannesburg'. (83)

Those Ndebele who did work on local farms drew on their knowledge of the South African market and asked for wages which Southern Rhodesian farmers were not prepared to pay. Demands for higher wages were translated by settlers as 'insolence' (84) and were often linked by farmers to the growing preference of the Ndebele for selling beer to meet their cash requirements. Consequently, 'farmers, if they could possibly get other than Matabele boys did so ... the Matabele natives were becoming so slack and careless that their positions were being taken by aliens'. (85) Of particular significance was the fact that at least some of the 'aliens' were Shona, as evidenced, for example, by the Ndebele attack on the Willsgrove farm workers during the December 1929 disturbances. Intense job competition was also manifest on the railways, where wages were higher (40/- p.m. without food) and in whose Bulawayo compounds were approximately 300 Shona by the end of 1929, and especially for the better-paying positions in town and as domestic servants. In both of the latter two categories the Shona enjoyed considerable and much resented success. (86)

The Shona were not the only outsiders seeking work in Bulawayo; throughout 1929 the flow of labour from north of the Zambezi continued as the 'usual steady influx', and the two combined meant that 'there is a surplus of labour and Labour Agents and Employers find the town a happy hunting ground for recruits'. (87) So huge was the surplus that when in the middle of 1930 it was necessary to recruit temporary labour for a new sewerage scheme for the town, the contractors were able to find about 1600 workers locally with 'little difficulty'. (88)

That more and more people were congregating in Bulawayo seeking work but usually without success, is indicated by the pattern of crime in the town. In Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the number of cases reported rose from 46 335 in 1928, to 50 221 in 1929 to 57 756 in 1930; while over the same period the number of cases dealt with in Bulawayo increased by 33,8%, the highest of anywhere in the country. (89) The great majority of the offences were 'minor'; contraventions of the pass laws, municipal bye-laws, the dog tax ordinance, the kaffir beer ordinance and so on. But this in itself is not without significance: as workers and peasants were squeezed, so the increasingly difficult and lengthy search for work raised the risk of running foul of the pass and municipal laws, as well as the temptation to seek a living in any way possible. Certainly the Commissioner of Police held the opinion that a contributory cause of the increase in crime was 'unemployment among the native population, leading to loafing'. (90)

For local workers, and especially the Ndebele, the whole situation was seriously complicated by the South African Government policy enforced in 1928 of gradually repatriating Africans from north of latitude 22° south to their countries of origin. This policy, which affected Africans from Southern Rhodesia as well as those from further north, was deeply resented, and towards the end of 1928 the Native Department in Bulawayo intercepted 'three anonymous letters, together with a newspaper cutting, from local natives employed in Johannesburg'. The letters objected 'to the notices served on them in the Union to return to their own country', argued that in turn 'all foreign natives should be ejected 'from Southern Rhodesia, and suggested 'agitating' for this end through 'their Chiefs'. (91)

Ndebele labourers were now in the intolerable and novel position of being squeezed from both domestic and foreign labour markets. For the first time, they were vulnerable to competition or even displacement in the labour market at precisely the same time the viability of their rural areas was being noticeably eroded. In addition to the established competition of 'northern' labour, the Ndebele also faced an influx of Shona migrants which must have seemed especially ominous when Ndebele migration to South Africa was threatened with curtailment. And on top of these wider forces and pressures were the very alienating stresses of living inside the Location and compounds, at the mercy of a corrupt Location Superintendent and venal Municipality.

IV

The Location, 'ill-defined and unfenced', was situated adjacent to and to the west of Bulawayo itself, and in 1930 covered 64½ acres, divided into an estimated 586 stands. (92) Initially, location dwellers simply rented stands, measuring 40' x 80', from the Municipal Council for 5/- per month. There were 'no restrictions on the type or number of dwellings' which could be built on each stand, but eventually the layout of the Location 'became so confused and the living conditions so unhygenic, that the Municipal Council in 1921 decided to build standard dwellings where the tenant refused or was unable to build a suitable house'. From 1924 onwards this policy was intensified, and, explained a later commission of enquiry, 'apparently stung to action by the threat underlying the policy many plot holders purchased bricks and built cottages of suitable materials and dimensions on their plots'. By 1929-30, then, the Location was characterized by two conditions of occupation - those who still had their own houses on plots leased from the Municipal Council, and a growing majority who rented cottages or rooms from the Council - and by four types of buildings. These comprised municipal barracks (single rooms) and cottages, and privately owned cottages, and huts or shanties. The only substantial buildings were a brewery and beerhall erected in 1913, and the house and office of the Location Superintendent built in 1919. It was the opinion of the Town Engineer that in 1921 these were 'the only decent buildings in the Location'.

In essence, what the Municipal programme represented for the great majority of Location dwellers was an attack on their already precarious standard of living. Although the new cottages may have been an immediate improvement over some of the huts and shanties described as 'small, old, unsightly and unsuitable', even this is debatable. Municipal cottages consisted of two living rooms and a kitchen, no verandah, no internal door, no ceiling and no floors. There were persistent complaints about leaking roofs and about

the lack of privacy, and even officials admitted in 1930 that 50 of the cottages constructed early in the scheme would have to be rebuilt. Much more important, though, were two other consequences of the programme. Perhaps the one which affected the greatest number of people was the fact that the official building programme aggravated rather than eased severe overcrowding. At no point before 1930 did the Municipality erect additional housing as opposed to pulling down existing private dwellings and replacing them with cottages or barracks which usually totalled a smaller number of rooms. The results, at a time when Bulawayo's African population was growing swiftly, were entirely predictable. In the comparatively small area of the Location were packed an estimated 5550 people, jostling for a quite inadequate number of rooms. The 1930 Commission found four men and two women in one room 10' x 12', and elsewhere discovered 'several rooms of equal dimensions occupied by numbers of Natives varying from six to eleven'. Further examples included the case of 40 people living in one three-roomed house, and the opinion of the Location Superintendent that he could let 150 cottages, if available, at a day's notice.

Together with shoddy accommodation and over-crowding went the extremely high rentals levied by the Municipality. Whereas before the mid-1920s, most people had been 'at liberty to build huts or other such cheap habitations as their means would allow', (93) they now had to contend with rentals described by the 1930 Commission as 'exorbitant'. Single rooms were let for 10/- and cottages for 15/- per month. Where cottages had an electric light bulb installed an extra 3/- per month was charged for a service which was switched off at 10.30 p.m. In relation to the average monthly wage then paid in Bulawayo - estimated variously at between 40/- with rations and 50/- without food - the rentals were clearly excessive. Women complained that 'our menfolk do not get paid sufficiently for them to be able to pay 15/- per month', while the Chief Native Commissioner, too, conceded that 'a rental of 15/- a month for a man whose wage is small - say, £2 a month - would be a heavy liability to meet'. (94) Just how heavily this liability weighed was forcibly explained by the ICU:

> 'I took a man earning £2 and eating his own food. Some men are earning 30/-, 1/- a day and eating his own food. How can he live? See, there are houses in the Location for married couples. They pay 15/- per month without light ... That 15/- taken from £2 leaves 25/-. And now mealie meal and wood 10/- per month leaves 15/-. 10/- for mealie meal; it leaves 5/-; and you have light, wife and children ... No wonder that our women are selling their bodies'. (95)

A further example taken from the budget of three workers, all of whom earned more than the average, is not appreciably different. Each month they paid 7/6 for sugar, 3/6 for '1 lb. of Mazawattee tea' and 4/- for tinned milk. In winter between 10/- and 15/- per month was spent on wood for heating, which did not leave much over for basic foodstuffs. For those earning the average wage or less, the only solution lay in a further aggravation of overcrowded rooms, by spreading the rental burden over as many people as possible.

While the impact of the municipal building programme affected the entire Location community, it posed a direct threat to one particular group. These

were the black landlords, seemingly fairly large in number, and including several women whose rented rooms were their sole means of livelihood. In the past, prospective landlords had been able to erect as many buildings as they wished on their leased stands, and 'the position of the householder was such that his outlay on buildings soon repaid him in rentals'. A fairly typical example of this 'well-known system' was the stand leased (for 5/- per month) by one Mahenga Manbe 'with seven dwellings thereon ... which premises she sublet as follows: 5 at 7/6 per month - £1.17.6 and 2 at 10/- per month - £1.0.0.' (96) At first it seemed as if the more affluent landlords might escape the full consequences of municipal policy by rebuilding their dwellings from suitable materials, but shortly after this was done, the Council abruptly changed its policy. Towards the end of 1929 it decided to acquire ownership of all the houses in the Location and withdraw 'without notice' the long-established 'privilege' of building houses on stands rented from the Council. (97) In the face of the ensuing protest, the Council smoothly disavowed any intention of 'exercising their powers arbitrarily', promised full compensation for demolished buildings, and left the Native Department to calm the 'not unnatural' anxiety of the Location dwellers. (98) Although Carbutt thought that his public explanation of Council intentions was considered 'satisfactory' by his audience, he was obviously mistaken. Some months later the visiting Commission of Enquiry was treated to bitter complaints on exactly that subject:

> 'In these days we enjoy no peace or happiness. The Council treats us as weeds and refuse to be thrown out. The Council has done many things to show that it does not now want us in the Location ... Until recently we were encouraged to build substantial brick houses in the Location ... We are now told that our houses must be demolished ... (nor does) the amount of compensation ... cover the cost of labour and material'.

Similar complaints were made by other witnesses.

From the evidence available, it would seem that the only rack-renting slum landlord in the Location was the Municipality; for an unknown but probably appreciable number of people the renting out of a room had brought in much-needed income, support which was now lost as the Municipality inexorably enforced its monopoly. Indeed, not only were these Location dwellers being deprived of one source of income, they were also being obliged to pay higher rents.

By comparison with the Location, disappointingly little is known about the material conditions of existence in the railway compounds. Although some railway workers were housed in the Location, most were in two separate compounds, No. 2 and No. 4, near the railway yards and the railway suburb of Raylton. The biggest compound was No. 2 which apart from its 'permanent' inhabitants, regularly had a large floating population of batches of 200 or more labourers destined for outlying regions of the system. Before 1924 this group was housed under nothing more than bucksails, which were eventually replaced by 'shelters of corrugated iron on poles'. Accommodation for the workers permanently based in Bulawayo consisted, in both compounds, of a mixture of brick barracks (with 'detachable iron bunks') for single men and pole and dagga huts and barrack rooms for the minority of married couples. (99) As the number of workers expanded, though, so over-

crowding became severe. Whereas in 1924 housing in No. 2 compound had been considered by the Compound Inspector to be 'ample' if 'a little conjested' in the married quarters (100), by 1927 it was euphemistically described as 'somewhat crowded'. In No. 4, between 15 and 17 men were crammed into 12-berth rooms, and "in some cases married men are also housed in these rooms, mixed with the other'. An overflow of 120 men were placed in the Location, where they had to pay for their accommodation. (101) Two years later, the shortage of railway housing was still acute, and the case of the workers was taken up by the ICU. These complaints were brushed aside by the Chief Native Commissioner, despite the Medical Director's observation that 'a circular hut, 12' in diameter, with no adjunct in the way of a kitchen or washing place, is hardly adequate for a married man and a family, even if they are native'. (102)

V

The 'sordid, overcrowded existence' (103) of Bulawayo's black working class was shaped not only by the poor and inadequate accommodation, low wages and high rentals recounted above, but was maintained and ordered by several forms of control exercised variously by the Municipality and the state. Most obvious of the mechanisms of control was the menace of the location police, after which came the less immediate social controls of prostitution, beer and recreation. Because of lack of material concerning the railway compounds, discussion will be confined almost exclusively to the Location where, in any case, matters were given a dramatic twist through the arrest and conviction in the latter part of 1929 of the Location Superintendent and several of his assistants on various charges of corruption.

Throughout the 1920s control of the Bulawayo Location was organised around a single white Superintendent and ten 'native police'. The Superintendent was ultimately responsible through the Town Clerk to the Finance Committee of the Municipal Council, but in practice little supervision was exercised over him and he was considered to have 'had unfettered control of the Location since its inception' (104) Below the Superintendent came the Location police whose duty, said the 1930 Commission was 'mainly that of sanitary inspectors. They assist in rent collecting and in general minor disciplinary measures'. The Commission made no further remarks about the location police beyond observing that 'when properly controlled there is no reason to doubt that they do their duty humanely and well'.

This was in sharp contrast to both the findings of the Commission in Salisbury and of 'expert' witness in Bulawayo. The situation in Salisbury in 1930 was one where

> 'Native witnesses allege that these police misrepresent them to the Superintendent, oppress them in petty ways, and show undue favouritism. Their ministrations are certainly not popular ... It was urged that Natives of different tribes should be engaged for this work and that care should be exercised in selecting responsible married men. Perhaps the worst charge brought against the Native Police is that they are in league with women of loose morals in whose interests they use their influence ... to secure tenancy of rooms and buildings'. (105)

In fact, such material as there is suggests that all of these charges, which were repeated in virtually every compound in the colony (106) also applied to the Bulawayo Location police. Although the evidence consulted is absolutely silent about the ethnic composition of the Location police, some compensatory glimpses of their social composition can be derived from Carbutt's cryptic observation that they enjoyed 'no prestige', and from the opinion of Major Brundell of the local C.I.D. that 'regarding the investigation of crime, the Municipal employees are unable to keep proper control. Manyena, late head messenger of the Location was discharged from the Police for misconduct and he had a criminal record. This goes to show that the boys selected as police boys by the Municipality are appointed irrespective of their antecedents'. Brundell had good reason to know exactly what he was talking about; in the last three months of 1929 he had uncovered a large number of cases in which 'Native Sergeant Manyena and other members of the Location Native Police' had indulged in forgery, the collection of rents without issuing receipts and generally had 'exercised improper authority and illegal power and committed many irregularities'. (107)

Behind the Location Superintendent and his 'native police' lay the much more formidable power of the British South Africa Police and the C.I.D. In the case of the Bulawayo Location, though, it was a matter of considerable concern and complaint to the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. that its ambiguous legal position prevented closer control and hampered 'proper supervision'. Under the vague regulations by which the Location was administered, reported Brundell, it was 'unnecessary for natives to comply with the pass laws while in the confines of the Municipal Location', and nor could people who were 'on the Location ground unlawfully ... be prosecuted because it has been held that, owing to the indefinite nature of the boundary, natives cannot know when they are within the confines of the Location'. He regretted that there were 'no regular patrols of police through the Location' and explained that a 'certain official of the Municipality raised an objection to a past practice of the Police of raiding the Location. The Police, as a body, feel hampered by the existing regulations, which prevent real contact with affairs in the Location.'

The Chief Superintendent's fears and objections were not shared by everyone. Indeed, roughly one year after Brundell faced the 1930 Commission, a member of the Legislative Assembly praised the system in operation in Bulawayo and remained convinced that 'nothing is more likely to stir up trouble in these locations than to allow the native police to enter those locations at any time they may so desire'. (108) Support for restricting the entry of black police to the Location was quickly forthcoming from another member representing a Bulawayo constituency, who rose to inform the Assembly that he personally had witnessed Africans being 'persecuted' by black policemen: 'the "Black Watch" in Bulawayo very often treat their own people in this way, and haul them to court for all sorts of petty offenses'. (109) In practice, though, as the Location Superintendent admitted, it was only uniformed police who were excluded, not the C.I.D., whose raids were frequently and vehemently denounced by the I.C.U. Speaking in July 1929, Masoja accused the Bulawayo Council of treating 'us like thieves in our own Location, they are always sending the C.I.D. to raid us'. (110) Nor was that all; by 1930 and undoubtedly from much earlier, the Location police also raided regularly in the process of searching 'each house for sick persons each day'. Either way for Bulawayo's black working class, the attentions of the Location police and the C.I.D. were an unavoidable reality of Location life.

Location dwellers had not only to deal with the police, they had also to come to terms with an all-powerful and corrupt Location Superintendent. (111) From June 1919 until his arrest in October 1929, this was T.E. Vawdrey. An apparently long trail of corruption only came to light in early September 1929 when Vawdrey went on holiday and 'a complaint was received from certain natives that money had been paid by them to Native Sergeant Manyena of the Location Police as rent ... and for which no receipts had been given'. (112) Investigation of this complaint led to the discovery of so 'many irregularities, corrupt practices and criminal acts', that subsequent enquiries 'as far as possible ... (were) confined to the months of January to August' of 1929 as they would otherwise have proved 'interminable'. (113) All in all, what these 'irregularities' and 'corrupt practices' amounted to in the estimation of the C.I.D. was that there had been 'an entire absence of organisation, system, supervision and control over the conduct and management of the Bulawayo Location affairs for some years, resulting in grave abuses and the commission of crimes by Municipal employees to the detriment of the natives resident in the Location; further, the authorities have apparently been defrauded for many years of monies, the amount of which may be estimated but cannot definitely be ascertained'. (114)

The C.I.D. first discovered that Vawdrey (as well as his African clerk, police sergeant and two constables) had 'permitted well known natives to occupy premises in the ... Location for years without payment of rent'; had collected rent without giving any or proper receipts; and had hired out the Beer Hall, again without issuing receipts. In one tantalising instance, they also uncovered a hint of Vawdrey's toleration of, if not actual involvement in Location vice; the C.I.D. noted that a further matter requiring investigation was the 'deceased estate of a notorious prostitute and seller of kaffir beer, one Ndebazana, which was valued at some hundreds of pounds and it appears at present has only partly been administered by T.E. Vawdrey'. (115)

As the investigation proceeded, some idea of the range of Vawdrey's criminal activities began to emerge. At various times he had lined his own pockets by using municipal transport to carry building sand, for which Africans were charged; since 1925 one individual had enjoyed a rent-free cottage in return for doing the Vawdrey household washing; and on a number of occasions Vawdrey had made demands for rents already paid. Perhaps the most telling example of Vawdrey's determination to extract all possible financial advantage from his position of 'unfettered control' was his habit of forcing newcomers to the Location, while temporarily accommodated in the 'casual ward', to collect bones which he sold on his own behalf to the African Explosives and Imperial Cold Storage companies. Africans had little choice but to comply with Vawdrey's instructions, because their registration certificates were confiscated until their tasks were completed. (116) When asked why they had not complained earlier, Location inhabitants replied that they thought that the rules of the Municipality 'authorised the management as conducted', and more cogently, that they 'were afraid to complain for fear of being expelled from the Location'. (117)

From these many offences the C.I.D. consolidated six charges of corruption and theft, (118) and in November, 1929, Vawdrey was brought to trial. In December he was found guilty and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with hard labour. Predictably enough, the white jury promptly entered a recommendation of leniency, 'pointing out Vawdrey's splendid record and the amount of good work he had done for the Council in the reconstruction of the Location', (119) and even the Mayor and Deputy Mayor were less than critical

when they subsequently praised Vawdrey's 'excellent work'. (120) What Vawdrey's peers and employers were prepared to forgive and forget, however, was less easily forgotten by his black victims. Although no record survives of their feelings beyond a single indirect complaint of a few months later - 'a new Location Superintendent is appointed each year and each Superintendent introduces new regulations ... we are troubled and tired of the constantly changed rules' (121) - it is clear that Vawdrey's corrupt regime left an explosive legacy.

The essence of the legacy was summed up in the remarkable admission by the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. in 1930 that the 'population of the Location is an unknown quantity'. (122) Such an admission was a direct contradiction of the basic function of urban locations in southern Africa, where, along with compounds and reserves, they were an essential institution of labour repression. John Rex has emphasized the central importance to the system of the 'harassment and close scrutiny and supervision of inhabitants which goes on in the locations'. The key figure was that of the location superintendent who, together with his location police, was responsible for 'implementing the dozens of laws which in his everyday life the migrant ... might break. In the location a continuous programme of pass raids, liquor raids and other forms of harassment creates a total insecurity which effectively prevents any but completely clandestine political organisation'. (123) But in the Bulawayo Location it was precisely this system of close scrutiny which was incomplete.

There was no plan of the Location and, as Major Brundell never tired of reminding the 1930 Commission, there was 'no proper supervision.' Corruption was not conducive to accurate records, and not surprisingly it was discovered that the 'old (Location) register was faked from beginning to end and the summary of receipts (for plots, cottages, lodgers, etc.) were always quite inaccurate'. (124) Vawdrey, of course, did not act in a vacuum and it would be an over-simplification to lay the blame for the absence of close control solely at his door. His activities remained undetected for so long at least partly because he was able to take full advantage of the distinctly cool relations between the Municipality and the police over the Location. This relationship, which saw the Location as 'a private reserve of the Municipality' (125) effectively precluded regular uniformed police patrols, and left Vawdrey and his accomplices virtually free to pursue their own special interests. Revolving as they did around corruption and favouritism, these interests lent themselves more readily to extortion and harassment rather than to close control over the Location population. Instead of systematic scrutiny, 'it appeared for some time that any native was given permission to be in the Location, simply by reason that he had asked for such permission', (126) until in the end no-one was certain either of the size or the composition of the Location population.

VI

For the various reasons described above, the system of direct control in the Bulawayo Location fell far short of what it should have been. Even at its 'ideal' form, though, urban location control was rarely as pervasively coercive as the compound system, not least because the highly diffuse production imperatives of urban employers were very different from the distinctive constraints operating in the mining industry. Nevertheless, municipal authorities still sought to emulate, albeit in a somewhat watered

down form and for their own reasons, the mining industry dream of total control over the lives of black workers. But because the social life of the locations and compounds did not produce a single, uniform and predictable consequence, it was an extraordinarily difficult element for the state or management to control.

Both in the locations and the compounds, control over beer and women was an exercise bristling with contradictions. (127) In common with the rest of southern Africa, beer brewing in the Bulawayo Location was a municipal monopoly. The reason for this was quite strightforward; it theoretically provided a source of revenue funded by the black location dwellers themselves for the provision of basic services. (128) Bulawayo's white ratepayers readily embraced this theory and in 1913 the brewery was launched with the express and much-publicised intention of funding the transformation of the Location 'into a model township by creating proper streets etc'. It was, announced the Mayor, to be 'for the sole benefit of the Natives'. (129) Instead practice proved quite the reverse. Brewery profits were diverted almost completely to other ends; until the disturbances of December 1929, Location streets were entirely unlit, sanitation was bad, and there were no medical facilities of any sort in the case of accidents or illness. (130) Subsequent investigators criticised the Municipality's accounting procedure as 'merely a method of appropriating to General Revenue the profit of the Brewery', and concluded that no opportunity 'to debit the Brewery with expenditure seems to have been lost'. By 1930, an estimated £40 000 of brewery profits were unaccounted for, presumably absorbed into the Municipality's General Revenue. (131)

The attitudes of Bulawayo's black working class towards the Municipal beerhall were mixed; in the first place, they were well aware of the broad outlines, if not the exact details, of municipal venality and complained frequently 'that the Europeans were profiteering from the Beer Hall business which they themselves were not permitted to carry on'. (132) The second attitude was less straightforward although no less clear; beer was generally welcomed as a cheap and necessary form of relaxation but the municipal monopoly and the irritating regulations of the beer hall were thoroughly disliked. Lastly, the beerhall was often regarded as an alien place where children and wives were lost to the control of parents and husbands. (133) In short, it acted as a catalyst on the social disintegration and demoralisation of Location dwellers.

Similarly contradictory and not easily predictable in its effects was the impact of prostitution. Municipal policy was simple; officially, prostitution was condemned, while in practice it was tolerated as a minimal concession to the sexual needs of male workers. The Location management attitude was neatly caught in the allegation by some outraged Location inhabitants that prostitutes were 'permitted to hire cottages from the Municipality simply because they are able to pay rent and they have cottages in preference to working men'. (134) And, as suggested earlier, Vawdrey himself may have been closely involved. (135)

In some respects, the Bulawayo Location was markedly different from the mining compounds; the presence of women was acknowledged and 'family' cottages were built. In every other respect, however, the Location pattern followed that of the compounds, particularly as urban earnings too were based on the assumption that the migrant worker's family were taken care of by, if not actually in, the rural areas. This 'economic denial of

the existence of women' had two important consequences. (136) One was a 'structural imbalance in the sex ratios' within the Location, although never quite as pronounced as in the compounds. Out of an estimated population of 5500 in 1930, no less than 4200 were men. Of the remainder, 600 were children and only 750 were adult women. (137) The other consequence was that it placed many of the women who did live there in a state of chronic financial deprivation and insecurity, (138) thus creating the conditions for prostitution in large numbers. Location prostitution was described by the C.I.D. in 1930 as 'habitual', (139) by which time it was customary for Indian traders to 'take car loads of women to the various mines round Bulawayo so that they may earn money from the natives employed there'. (140) Six years later, the Native Department thought that of the 1225 women then in the Location, 300 were prostitutes, 725 were 'concubines' and 200 were married. (141)

The structural denial of family life and the toleration of prostitution directly contributed to an appalling still-birth rate. There was no registration of births and the Location Superintendent himself had known of '8 or 10 still-births in a month'. Overall, it was estimated that 98 per cent of the children in the Location were still-born. (142) These and other multiplying signs of the disintegration of their society in the 1920s sufficiently alarmed some groups in the Location to cause them to approach the Government, and later beseige the 1930 Commission, with general complaints about Location conditions, prominent among which was concern about growing 'immorality'. (143) This was a sympton of the previously discussed gradual economic decline of the Ndebele peasantry in the late 1920s and more immediately of the intensified competition in the labour market from 1928 onwards, both of which ensured that it assumed a distinctly 'ethnic' character. Almost invariably, 'immorality' must have involved Ndebele women selling their favours to foreigners, including Shona migrants, who were successfully competing with the Ndebele for work (sometimes to the point of supplanting them) and who had money to compensate for their absence from home. This dimension was especially problematic in the particular conditions of the Location where 'no native can be sure of his wife' (144) and, where additionally, as in the mine compounds, 'perhaps inevitably, violence ... surrounded the adult women'. (145) Of particular importance was the consideration that women who often 'owed their only allegiance to the highest bidder acted as a catalyst of conflict among poorer workers. Thus much of the black workers' energy and wrath was directed against fellow workers while the fundamental cause of the conflict and competition lay outside the compound', (146) or, as in this case, the Location.

Essentially, Bulawayo seems to have anticipated by a few years a development which was heightened elsewhere in Southern Rhodesia by the Great Depression. This was the 'unrest' reported in early 1931 among black compound inhabitants, 'both indigenous and non-indigenous, owing to the ever increasing immorality amongst them'. The report emphasized that

> 'Indigenous natives appear to be the greatest sufferers. They are being ousted in the field of labour everywhere owing to their unreliability and the periods of labour they offer as compared with the non-indigenous native. This fact they are realising and feeling greatly. In addition to this their women folk are being attracted in

> large numbers by the lure of the compound life and the material gain they can procure in this life by means of promiscuous co-habitation and prostitution.
> .....A state of antagonism is growing between indigenous and non-indigenous natives which is not healthy and may have far-reaching consequences on non-indigenous natives seeking work in this colony.' (147)

Unlike the larger mining companies who had earlier sought to defuse these potentially violent contradiction arising from workers relying exclusively on beer and prostitutes for recreation, organised sport formed no part of the pattern of social control in the Bulawayo Location before the 1930s (148) The absence of organised sport was strongly regretted by Carbutt, but his advocacy of its introduction (149) went unheeded, and for much of the 1920s and '30s African recreation was neither controlled nor provided for. Instead, Africans were left to their own devices and in 1938, for example, on their Sunday afternoons off, congregated 'in their thousands' on an area of waste ground near the Location where they made their own entertainment: 'football matches attract, at most, a few hundred, but the majority make their own enjoyment by singing, dancing or boxing, or by watching others indulge in such activities'. (150) Of these activities, boxing was by far and away the most popular, and merits examination in some detail because of the light it casts on a whole area of working class expression which was allegedly a major cause of the December 1929 'faction fighting'. (151)

The unsurpassed popularity of boxing in the 1920s and 1930s was attributed by the Native Department, in the first instance, to 'the inherent communicability of the form of boxing. It involves no expense except the gloves and those used by the Native may be old cast-offs or merely a rag wrapped round the fist. It requires no organization, no special place. As such it holds advantages over all other European games'. (152) Equally important, thought the Native Department, was its compatibility 'with the preceeding culture. When asked what he associated boxing with back in the reserve an acknowledged leader recalled the wrestling matches (tsimba) that herdboys indulged in and the battles with sticks (zuvara) that took place when one group of herd boys drove a rival group away and took charge of their cattle - to the glee of the old people who looked on. "The difference is that now we use fists", he concluded'. And lastly, was boxing's cathartic function 'for those vital feelings which are denied an outlet in the town life of Natives. The strong emotional appeal it has attained, the emotional and social identity it provokes in tribe and boxing gatherings, the relief it affords from the isolated and monotonous daily round in an alien household or store - all these and probably many more factors must contribute to the powerful attraction of boxing'.

In Salisbury, boxing was organised around a number of 'tribal' clubs which had arisen 'quite spontaneously'. The clubs comprised the 'Wakorekore, the WaManyika, the Zesum, the WaBudjga and the MaBlantyre'. This latter club included most Malawi peoples and its members word black and red vests with a 'V 8' badge which symbolised association 'with the power of the Ford'. By contrast the 'WaKorekore' wore red and were known as the 'Dangers'. Nothing definite was known about the other three clubs, the only information coming from 'one informant (who) characterised the 'WaZezuru and WaBudjga "as being green"'. Each club had its own officials, sometimes in some kind of uniform, who kept the crowd out of the ring, with the help of sticks and sjamboks.

At matches, club members and the audience generally ranged themselves on opposite sides of the ring, 'the WaKorekore, the MaBlantyre, the WaManyika on the one side, the WaZezuru and WaBudjga on the other'. (153) Although junior members of the same club boxed among themselves, club leaders would only box 'representatives of other clubs and there is much banter, tribal self-praise and disparagement of others when a boxer struts into the ring to await a challenge'. The boxing itself was usually stylised to the point where the Native Department investigation was impressed by the readiness of the competitors 'to smile and enjoy a futile swing, often both parties pausing in the middle of a round to enjoy the joke', and concluded that the 'clustering of emotions in and round the ring is more reminiscent of solo dancing than of any raw fighting spirit'.

The moment of greatest potential trouble apparently arose when the bouts were over and the crowd was dispersing. With enthusiasm still at its height, 'but its controlling focus.... suddenly removed and with no line of attention to hold it, it is extremely liable to break out.... in very petty directions - a scornful word, a tribal boast, a bicycle accident, may easily start riotous trouble'. Rioting was a 'regular occurence' and before official control was imposed, 'spectators went armed - sticks, axes and knobkerries up their sleeves, down their trowsers (sic) and in their shirts, bicycle chains and pockets full of stones. The sale of beer worsened the proceedings, also the high-handed use of shambocks (sic) used by the "officials" to clear a ring and maintain order. Prostitutes also attended and their voluble bestowals of praise and taunts provoked the extremes of jealousy which attach to sex'.

In both Bulawayo and Salisbury, a further indication of boxing's popularity in the '20s and '30s, and the extent to which 'the sport was integrated into Native life', was the important and distinctive role played in it by magic. Mangoromera, 'a medicine introduced into the Colony sometime about 1924 by Portuguese Natives from Sena, and from other territories', was highly prized as conferring 'unusual strength and fearlessness'. (154) Its properties were derived

> 'from the skins of such animals as the lion, elephant, hippo, honeybear, crocodile, the head of a black mamba, two kinds of fish found in the Zambesi and various herbs. Pieces from each are burned together and pounded into powder. The compound is rubbed into incisions made in the wrists of those desiring increased strength. A person wishing to be a tower of strength will go as far as to have all his joints doctored as well as his chest. Some wear wrist guards (leather or python skin) which have been soaked in the preparation. The medicine is sometimes sewn into the wrist guards'. (155)

The attraction of mangoromera for boxers was immediate and obvious; customers were told that in exchange for anything from 5/- to 30/- they 'will possess great strength and bravery and will be feared by the uninitiated.... their strength will be such that their blows will cause fatal results or at any rate K.O. their victims'. (156) Not many were willing to disprove the efficacy of the treatment, and on one occasion the Native Commissioner for Salisbury saw 'in a private compound... a Native wearing such bands on both wrists and offering challenges to anyone to box but in spite of the urgings of the European manager.... not one would accept the challenge'. (157)

No less immediate and obvious were the attractions of mangoromera for groups other than boxers. As the Native Department report appreciated, the prime

function of magic was to mediate anxiety, and in the case of boxing, mangoromera was admirably suited to afford relief from, and control over 'the excitement, the stress and strain of anticipation, (and) the hazardous nature of the result'. (158) But if it could do that, it could also be used to combat that more pressing demands and alienation of location existence. For this reason, mangoromera was 'much sought after by the youths in the towns', who, at a time of intensifying competition for work, themselves constituted one of the more vulnerable segments of black urban society. (159)

Inside Southern Rhodesia, mangoromera was dominated by the Korekore who acted as the 'agents of the Northern Natives who bring down the medicine from time to time'. After delivery, it was fed into a distribution network organised around well-known 'mangoromera chiefs or champions' who lived in or near large towns and mines, and who were 'given a wide berth by the Native Police'. It was not, however, a medicine which was freely available to all; 'a person desirous of having Mangoromera can only be introduced to a practitioner through one who has already been treated otherwise suspicions are aroused'. With admission to the circle thus controlled and restricted, and with its distribution in the hands of the Korekore, mangoromera seems to have been almost exclusively a Shona monopoly. This latter feature, together with the effects of the treatment - 'bullying, assaults, bravado and insubordination and the Natives having exaggerated opinions of themselves' (160) was to have considerable bearing on the events in Bulawayo at the end of 1929.

VII

What emerges clearly from the details contained in the previous four sections of this paper is that Bulawayo's black urban population at the end of the 1920s was reeling under a series of blows, some old, some new, of unprecedented severity. Through exploration of linkages between these various factors and consideration of their interaction, it becomes possible to reconstruct the probable course of events between December 1929 and January 1930, and to establish who the fighting was between, when and why. In turn, this will reveal how the nature of the conflict changed significantly even while the fighting was in progress.

The first factors which need to be knitted together are the influx of foreign (largely Shona) work seekers to Bulawayo in the late 1920s and, in the same period the lack of 'close scrutiny' exercised over the Location's population. In all likelihood, these two factors combined to produce a distinctive concentration of foreign migrants in the Location. Because anyone could enter the Location, which in anycase was unfenced, and because unlike the only other major centres of black urban housing, the railway compounds, its accommodation was not tied to any particular type of employment, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Location was a haven for unemployed newcomers. A parallel and not totally unrelated development at a time of increasing unemployment, was the growth of a sizeable 'number of undesirable persons' in the Location. In short, the Location was becoming something of a refuge for thieves and, said the C.I.D, was characterised by 'habitual gambling and prostitution".(161)

Prostitution, as earlier discussed was itself merely one symptom of poverty and insecurity in the Location, where the Municipality systematically misused beerhall funds and enforced crippling rentals; where inhabitants were harassed by frequent police raids; and where for most of the 1920s the Location Superintendent and several of his 'police' were thoroughly corrupt. Nor did the arrest and subsequent conviction of Vawdrey shortly before the

fighting began, do much to improve the lot of Location dwellers. Carbutt was bluntly critical of the calibre of Vawdrey's successor, and many of the Location evils complained of by the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. referred to the period both before and after Vawdrey's successor took office'. (162)

The very fact that many of these developments had roots tracing back several years means that on their own none of them provide sufficient answer to the question why the fighting occurred in 1929, and why in December? The second part of the problem is easiest to explain. A glance at the opening pages of this paper show that almost without exception 'faction fights' took place at the end of the year. There were convincing reasons for this. The devices of control discussed in preceding sections worked well enough at 'normal' times, even during the corrupt Vawdrey regime, but were less effective over Christmas and New Year. Even in the tightly-controlled mining industry where these controls operated for most of the year, the situation was qualitatively different during the festive season in general and on Christmas Day in particular. At that time more black workers were simultaneously off duty than at any other time of the year; 'management and its agents, if not less vigilant, were likely to be slightly more tolerant, and in terms of the invading ideology of Christianity the workers did have a reason to celebrate. The brakes of control were thus more difficult to apply'. (163)

But although the various elements in the Bulawayo Location were thus rendered potentially more explosive over the festive season, there was nothing initially to differentiate Christmas 1929 from any other. Such violence as there was, was considered by the authorities to be unexceptional. The first indications of a new development came on the morning of 27 December when Ndebele delegations complained to Carbutt about Shona assaults, the particular significance of which necessitate detailed explanation.

Thus far we have written generally of Bulawayo's black working class and of its black urban population, sometimes employing the two terms almost interchangeably. While much of the evidence does not in fact permit any greater analytical rigour, it is clear that the two were not necessarily the same thing. Broadly speaking, three classes-in-formation were identifiable in the black urban population of this period. There was the tiny African petty-bourgeoisie (164) comprising small traders, businessmen and school-teachers; the working class, which was probably the largest group; and lastly a rapidly expanding 'under-class' where the unemployed merged, for shorter or longer periods, with the Location's lumpenproletariat. Indeed, this 'undesirable' group was sufficiently large and active to make life even more unpleasant than it already was for what the authorities called the 'respectable type of native'. 'Decent natives', explained the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D., 'are precluded from living comfortably in the Location by the number of undesirable persons there ... Pilfering ... is very rife (and) loafers steal from the town and Location and cannot be caught'. (165) And because the Shona were the most recent migrants, many of them would have occupied, at least temporarily, the lowest of Bulawayo's socio-economic rungs, including the ranks of the petty criminals and the unemployed. (166)

In the light of this, it is significant that the first outbreak of trouble followed the socio-economic cleavages outlined above, and not purely 'tribal' divisions. Carbutt's report of 27 December 1929 remarked simply that 'there is no doubt that the better class of native residing in the

Location is very apprehensive of trouble'. (167) Nor did the trouble emanate from all Shona. Carbutt was told that 'natives from Victoria circle (district) are at the bottom of it', and that they

> 'go about in gangs of five or six: that they do not allow any native to pass them and that they are particularly dangerous at night ... natives who have worked in Johannesburg are largely to blame for the state of apprehension ... particularly ... the type of native youth who ... "wear short coats and trousers wide enough for a man to get inside". (There was also) ... the insolent bearing of this type in the streets, who stand in front of shop-windows and block the foot ways'. (168)

The Victoria district, relatively heavily populated and with its best land speedily alienated to whites, had been one of the first rural areas to be underdeveloped. Consequently, the process of proletarianization had been set in motion earlier and more thoroughly than almost anywhere else in Southern Rhodesia. (169) Many of the region's inhabitants had experience of working on the Rand and in Johannesburg, (170) where they would have had first hand experience of the gangs specifically mentioned by Ndebele complainants at the Location meeting on the afternoon of 28 December: 'other speakers said they were merely defending themselves against the Mashona: that it was unsafe for any man to walk abroad at night, for fear of being set upon by bands of Mashonas who they said would develop into gangs similar to the "Zigebengu" and "Amalieta" gangs of Johannesburg, unless they were suppressed'. (171) Complainants had reason enough to be 'apprehensive'; the night before the meeting, one of the people killed in the Location had been executed in a manner which, although puzzling to the local police, displayed all the skill and economy of a typical Rand gang murder. As the body exhibited no signs of violence, it was only when a post mortem was conducted that it was discovered that the victim had been 'struck over the heart just when that organ was in such a position that the blow - a comparatively light one - sufficed to split the apex of the heart, internal bleeding setting in'. (172)

Moreover, not only did gang members wear fashionable and distinctive clothing (Oxford bags 'wide enough for a man to get inside'), (173) but their 'insolent' and 'aggressive' behaviour was strongly suggestive of the presence of mangoromera. The leader of these 'aggressive' Shona, according to Carbutt's informants, was a man named 'Rusere alias James Mabala, a native of Chibi District', near Fort Victoria. (174) This man, who was subsequently arrested and fined £10 or three months, (175) was identified a few years later as an important mangoromera chief or ishe who 'plies his sale of mangoromera medicines between Gwelo and Bulawayo'. (176) As a known seller of mangoromera, which the Native Department was later told had 'played quite an important role in the Mashona-Matabele clash at Bulawayo', (177) Mabala enjoyed a close relationship with his customers, who would have been predominantly young, fairly new to Bulawayo, perhaps unemployed, and Shona.

Very probably, then, the initial violence between Christmas Eve and 27 December, and in some instances afterwards, took the form of gang assaults and robbery. It was these assaults which caused the more 'respectable' Location residents to be apprehensive and to complain to the Native

Department. For many of Bulawayo's longer-established black residents - a division incorporating the 'respectable' element - this latest burden must have been the last straw against a background of declining living standards and intensifying job competition. With their wages depressed and their jobs threatened by the influx of foreign migrants, the welling resentment of the majority of Bulawayo's black population was given a convenient and not wholly inappropriate focus by the violent actions of 'Shona' gangs in the period up until 27 December.

At this point, any number of incidents, especially given the relaxation of such controls as there were over Christmas, could have sparked the fighting. A 'friendly' boxing match may have developed along the hypothetical lines suggested by Carbutt: it turns 'into a serious fight, and gradually tribal partisanship develops accompanied by insulting remarks and exaggeration. Old tribal differences are raked up, and the inevitable rivalry for the favours of women is brought in: feeling begins to run high and more lethal weapons than fists are used'. (178) Alternatively, trouble may have begun over foreigners abusing Ndebele women. For example, not long before the fighting erupted, an Ndebele prostitute was badly beaten up by an 'alien' man in provocative and public circumstances. (179) Or, lastly a peculiarly crass form of provocation was probably delivered during the popular pastime of gambling: 'mangoromera and gambling go hand in hand. A Mangoromera Native would think nothing of picking up and walking away with the stakes. He cannot be reported for theft and no-one cares to beat up the arrogant bully'. (180) The Ndebele reaction was natural enough; 'every now and then, when they are full of beer, the Matabele say, "Why are these people here? We do not go to their country and molest them and take their jobs and wives. Let us drive them out"'. (181)

From the afternoon of 27 December, the nature of the conflict changed radically. Whereas formerly it had essentially been a case of "Shona" gangs assaulting workers, it now became a case of workers attacking recent migrants, which explains why the Location, home of most new migrants, was the subject of persistent attacks. Once again, it was not an instance of mindless ethnic animosity; throughout the fighting the Ndebele were joined by the so-called 'northern natives', themselves migrants, but of far longer standing than the recent influx of Shona, by whom they felt equally as threatened as did the Ndebele. It was, for instance, people of 'mixed tribes' who burned Shona possessions in No. 2 railway compound, (182) and when Carbutt eventually managed to return the Shona labourers expelled almost a week before from the same compound, his warning was directed to a crowd who were 'all Northern natives'. (183)

That the conflict was now fundamentally one between 'established' workers and new immigrants, and not motivated by age-old 'tribal rivalries', was made absolutely clear by several references to the recent nature of the animosity felt towards the Shona. The Native Commissioner for Mzingwane discovered that the 'trouble between the Matabele and Mashona originated in Bulawayo about a year ago', (184) while a speaker at the final Location meeting on 4 January drew attention to new migrants: 'I have been here for many years and I have never known of trouble like this before. I do not know these new Manyikas. I could pick out from among you here, some Manyikas I know since 1908'. (185) This is not to deny, of course, that once the fighting was in progress all Shona became legitimate targets in an atmosphere replete with inflammatory rumours. The corruption and favouritism which for so long had characterised the Location management ensured that many Ndebele believed the rumour that in return for £8, the Native Department had granted the Shona permission to attack them. (186)

Although the great bulk of the fighting involved workers against workers, the breakdown of order also allowed other scores to be settled, and opened up, however fleetingly, more challenging vistas. One score was against the Municipality, whose sudden decision towards the end of 1929 to take over all Location housing, plus the fact that in the past its compensation had proved unsatisfactory, were two factors which help explain the otherwise apparently random damage to buildings in the Location on the night of 27 December. On that occasion 'a number of huts were completely destroyed and between 200 and 300 windows and doors were smashed in'. (187) Far more ominous from the State's point of view was the realisation by some workers where the real source of their exploitation and oppression lay; during the mounted police dispersal of the crowd on the Forestvale Road on the afternoon of the 27th, 'some of the more daring of the natives were heard shouting to their fellows: "Come on, attack them, they are not armed"'.(188) And later the same night, at the height of the fighting in the Location, the Acting Location Superintendent and another white Location official were stoned, 'but beyond minor bruises were not injured'. (189)

VIII

Of paramount importance was the fact that the Bulawayo violence occurred within, and at every stage was shaped by, the colonial nature of the Southern Rhodesian social formation. As such, the fighting in the most general sense can be interpreted in Fanonesque terms as internalised or displaced aggression. (190) A more precise instrument of analysis, though, is the not incompatible concept that violence of this sort was profoundly influenced by the process of class suppression. Class suppresssion, explains Webster, 'implies two things: firstly that consciousness of class - the common awareness of a shared interest - is inhibited by ethnicity and race prejudice... (themselves) the result of the deliberate manipulation of racial feelings by a group, usually the dominant group... (and/or) as the result of a belief system developing a force independent of material interests in the narrow sense'. The second implication of class suppression is 'the idea that the emergence of a class is "stunted" through restrictions on its ability to organise or promote its collective interests'. (191)

Appreciation of this latter aspect, the incomplete nature of class formation, is especially helpful in confronting those features of the fighting which are not easily reducible to class conflict. Indeed, as a society in transition towards capitalist industrialization, Bulawayo's black population exhibited many of the characteristics of what George Rudé has termed the 'pre-industrial crowd'. In 18th and early early 19th century Britain and France, the 'distinctive hall-marks' of the pre-industrial crowd were 'the prevalence of the rural food riot, the resort to "direct action" and violence to property; its "spontaneity"; its leadership from "without" the crowd; its mixed composition... and its concern for the restoration of "lost" rights'. (192)

Clearly, certain of these hall-marks were missing from the Bulawayo 'faction fight'. It was not a food riot, and with the exception of James Mabala, nothing is known about its leadership. What is compelling, though, is that wherever the leaders did come from, it was not apparently from existing organisations. This may be explained by the very conditions inside the Location and compounds which precluded the emergence of distinct divisions among the black population, but which were a source of considerable grievance to the aspirant petty-bourgeoisie who, as on other occasions found a champion of sorts in the ICU. (193) In 1928, Carbutt informed his superiors that the ICU leaders desired that the 'residential quarter of the.... Location should be divided, so that there should be an exclusive quarter for the educated

people, who should not be expected to live in proximity to the barbarians; in fact they recognise, and desire us to recognise, class distinctions amongst their own people'. (194) If this attitude persisted, it would explain why the rioters completely by-passed the established leadership of the ICU, the Matabele Home Society and other organisations, leaving Masoja, the General Secretary of the ICU, to admit publicly that 'we do not know the head or start of it' (the fighting). (195) All the established leaders could do was relay the stream of warning and threats from Carbutt to Location residents. These two features aside, however, all of the other pre-industrial characteristics mentioned by Rudé were strongly in evidence during the disturbances; direct action and violence to property were pronounced, as were spontaneity and the mixed composition of the crowd. And in one sense, too, the fighting was obviously concerned with the restoration of 'lost rights', particularly in the labour market and over women. (196)

But these strong pre-industrial overtones notwithstanding, the Bulawayo 'faction fight' of December 1929 was first and foremost a manifestation of intra-working class conflict. As this essay has demonstrated, the fighting, at least from 27 December onwards, was very largely an expression of competition within the working class about limited job opportunities. This does not deny the undoubted existence of tribal ideology and sentiment, both of which tended to obscure the real basis of the conflict. Although the fighting had nothing to do with mindless, irrational 'tribal' violence, its situation in the ghetto, where Bulawayo's black classes were squeezed together, did act as powerful insurance against the emergence of unsullied class consciousness. In this respect, Mafeje's preliminary identification of colonial administrators and the preoccupations of anthropologists as the twin creators of 'tribalism' remains incomplete; to their activities should be added the vital role of the urban ghetto in determining 'the material as well as the ideological base of what is now called "tribalism"'. (197)

These conclusions, although based on very detailed examination of only one 'fight', are directly relevant to 'faction fights' and tribalism in general. Only when the meaning of race or tribalism is related 'to the political economy in order to demonstrate its entanglement with the social structure through the process of class formation and class suppression mediated through the differential incorporation of groups' (198) will understanding of these concepts significantly advance beyond opinions such as that of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines who argued that 'faction fights' were 'riots which break out for no apparent reason amongst savage people', (199) and that of a Legislative Assembly member who considered that 'tribal fights are inevitable. In fact, I think the natives rather enjoy these incidents'. (200)

I.R. Phimister and C. van Onselen
June 1978.

Footnotes:

1. J.R. Hooker, 'The African Worker in Southern Rhodesia : black aspirations in a White economy 1927-36', Race, 1964, 6, 147.

2. E.J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels (Manchester, 1971); G. Rude, The Crowd in History (London, 1964) and Paris and London in the 18th Century (London, 1970).

3. F. Furedi, 'The African crowd in Nairobi : popular movements and elite politics', Journal of African History, 1973, 14.

4. E. Webster, 'The 1949 Durban "riots" - a case-study in race and class', in P.L. Bonner (ed.), Working Papers in Southern African Studies (Johannesburg, 1977).

5. D. Horner and A. Kooy, 'Conflict on South African Mines, 1972-1976', SALDRU Working Paper No. 5, 1976.
For the one study by an anthropologist of 'faction fights' see W.J. Argyle, 'Faction fights and the problem of explanation in social anthropology', unpub., 1975. This reaches the less than profound conclusion that 'faction fights' are feuds.

6. This was the term given to all Africans from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

7. Rhodesia, 7, no. 168, 26 January 1901.

8. S138/22, N(ative) C(ommissioner) Mzingwane to S(uperintendent of) N(atives) Bulawayo, 9 Jan. 1930. All file references are held in the National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury.

9. NB 6/4/16, Compound Inspector, Division I, Monthly Report for December 1901.

10. NB 6/4/8, NC Insiza, monthly report for December 1907;
NB 6/4/9, NC Insiza, monthly report for December 1908.

11. A 8/3/8, Compound Inspector, Victoria district, monthly report for July 1919.

12. N 3/22/8, telegram, S.N. Gwelo to C(hief) N(ative) C(ommissioner), 10 May 1920.

13. S 1175/7A, Compound Inspector, Matabeleland, monthly report for September 1928.

14. N 9/4/29, NC Gwanda, monthly report for December 1915.

15. N 3/22/8, CNC to S.N. Bulawayo, 3 March 1916.

16. S 235/504, NC Wankie, report for the year 1926.

17. Ibid.

18. S 1175/5, Compound Inspector, Bulawayo, monthly report for January 1927.

19. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

20. Ibid, 28 December 1929; S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

21. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

22. What follows comes from the issue dated 4 Jan. 1930.

23. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

27. Ibid.

28. S 404, no. 3407, Bulawayo Magistrate, 14 February 1930. The registration certificate would also, of course, have revealed the worker's job.

29. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid; S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

32. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930; ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury 30 Dec. 1929.

33. Ibid (both letters).

34. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 Dec. 1929.

35. Ibid; Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

36. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. S 138/22. S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 Dec. 1929; ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 11 Jan. 1930.

41. Ibid, NC Mzingwane to S.N. Bulawayo, 9 Jan. 1930. An earlier report identified the farm as Umgusa Springs Farm; see S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 Dec. 1929.

42. S 138/22, NC Mzingwane to S.N. Bulawayo, 9 Jan. 1930. Among the more pronounced of the 'tense feelings' was the native commissioner's first alarmed message to Bulawayo claiming that the 'natives in his district were "kicking up hell"', see Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

43. S 138/22, NC Mzingwane to S.N. Bulawayo, 9 Jan. 1930; Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

44. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

45. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

46. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 2 Jan. 1930.

47. Ibid, 'Address to Matabele on Disturbances by C.L. Carbutt on 31st December 1929'.

48. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

49. Ibid, NC Mzingwane to S.N. Bulawayo, 9 Jan. 1930.

50. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

51. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 11 Jan. 1930.

52. Ibid, 'Speeches of Natives at Meeting held at Location Bulawayo: 4th January 1930'.

53. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

54. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. 6 Jan. 1930.

58. Ibid, 4 Jan. 1930.

59. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 Dec. 1929.

60. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930; Rhodesia Herald, 31 Dec. 1929.

61. Rhodesia Herald, 30 Dec. 1929.

62. Ibid, 31 Dec. 1929.

63. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

64. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 9 Jan. 1930.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. T.O. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia (London, 1970), 139.

68. S. Thornton, 'Approaching a history of Bulawayo', unpub. 1977, 2.

69. Ibid.

70. For details, see A.H. Croxton, Railways of Rhodesia (Newton Abbot, 1973), 123.

71. Ibid.

72. S 246/430, Railway compound reports for the month of July 1924;
S 138/60, Compound Inspector, Bulawayo, to Medical Director, Salisbury, 25 Feb. 1929.

73. Thornton, 'The African experience of industrialisation and urban growth in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 1930-1963', unpub. 1977, I. This figure includes women and children but still seemingly represents a large increase in the number of labourers, as compound inspectors' reports for earlier years indicate that the former usually constituted only between 10 and 20% of the compound population.

74. Thornton, 'African experience', 5.

75. G. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', Jrnl. of Development Studies, 1970, 6.

76. Ibid.

77. See, for example, Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1929, 9.

78. M.C. Steele, 'The African agricultural labour supply crisis, 1924-1928', University of Rhodesia Labour Research Seminar No. 6, 1973, table I.

79. Ibid, table IX, 10; F. Clements and E. Harben, Leaf of Gold: The Story of Rhodesian Tobacco (London, 1962, 98-99).

80. Clements and Harben, Leaf of Gold, 99, 114; Steele, 'African agricultural labour supply crisis', 2.

81. Steele, 'African agricultural labour supply crisis', table I.

82. Report of the Native Labour Committee, 1928.

83. S 138/22, B. Prescott to Minister of Agriculture, 14 Dec. 1926.

84. Ibid.

85. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

86. S 1542/S12, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 12 Aug. 1935.

87. S 235/507, Annual report of Assistant Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, for the year ended 31 Dec. 1929.

88. S 235/508, Annual report of Assistant Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, for the year ended 31 Dec. 1930.

89. Report of the Commissioner, British South Africa Police, for the year 1930, 19.

90. Ibid, 20. At least one African was sufficiently down at heel in mid-1929 to risk imprisonment for the theft of a 'pair of bloomers, valued at 2/-'; see S569, Case no. 2024 of 1930, (c. July 1929). It may also have had a certain significance that a local Ndebele brought to trial in March 1929 had stolen clothing valued at the not inconsiderable sum of £17.2.6 from a 'Manyika native' employed in Bulawayo; see S404, Case no. 3309, 12 March 1929.

91. S 138/27, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 10 Dec. 1928, and attached letters.

92. What follows, unless otherwise stated, comes from S235/394, 'Commission concerning the Control and Welfare of the Native Population, 1930'; and S235/477, 'Notes of Evidence : Enquiry into Bulawayo Location', (1930).

93. S 138/41, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 21 June 1929.

94. Ibid, CNC to Secretary to the Premier, 8 June 1929.

95. S 138/22, Detective CID, to Chief Superintendent CID, 21 July 1929.

96. ZAN 2/1/1, Chief Superintendent, CID, Bulawayo to Staff Officer, B.S.A.P., Salisbury, 2 Oct. 1929.

97. S 235/418-28, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 10 Dec. 1929.

98. Ibid.

99. S 246/430, Reports on railway compounds for July and August 1924; ibid, reports on railway compounds for July 1925.

100. Ibid, reports on railway compounds for July 1924.

101. S 246/431, reports on railway compounds for Jan. 1927.

102. S 138/60, CNC to Secretary to the Premier, 1 March 1929; Medical Director to CNC, 27 Feb. 1929.

103. P. Gibbs, Avalanche in Central Africa (London, 1961), 21. Gibbs was describing the Location in 1960.

104. As before, unless otherwise stated, what follows comes from S235/394 and S235/477.

105. S86.

106. For full discussion of 'native police', see C. van Onselen, 'The role of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry 1900-1935', African Affairs, 1973, 72; and Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933 (London, 1976), chapter five.

107. ZAN 2/1/1, Chief Superintendent, CID, Bulawayo to Staff Officer, BSA Police, Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1929.

108. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 14 April 1931, col. 549. The speaker explained, 'the police only enter ... when they actually see a crime is committed, or are in pursuit of someone who has committed a crime, or are in possession of a search warrant, or have received the permission of the Bulawayo Municipality. In actual practice, whenever the police desire to enter the location for the purpose of investigating anything there, such permission is always granted; it is unhesitatingly granted, but still the natives realise they cannot be interfered with or molested - perhaps molested is the wrong word to use. They cannot be interfered with by the police without the police first having obtained the sanction of the Municipality to enter the location; and that, I contend, adds greatly to the peace and harmony with which the affairs of that location are conducted'.

109. Ibid, col. 554.

110. S 138/22, Detective, CID, to Chief Superintendent, CID, Bulawayo, 6 July 1929. Speech by Masoja.

111. Locations and compounds lend themselves to 'corruption' because of the near-absolute authority which is wielded over the powerless inhabitants.

112. ZAN 2/1/1, Chief Superintendent CID, Bulawayo, to Staff Officer, BSAP, Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1929.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid, Chief Superintendent CID, Bulawayo, to Staff Officer BSAP, Salisbury, 21 Sept. 1929.

116. Ibid, Chief Superintendent CID, Bulawayo, to Staff Officer BSAP, Salisbury, 17 Oct. 1929. African Explosives alone paid £84.10.0 to Vawdrey between 1925 and 1927, while between September 1928 and March 1929 he received £27.19.6d. from the I.C.S. Company.

117. Ibid, Chief Superintendent CID, Bulawayo, to Staff Officer BSAP, Salisbury,20 Oct. 1929.

118. For exact details, see S404, no. 3386, 15 Nov. 1929.

119. Bulawayo Chronicle, 29 Dec. 1929.

120. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. J. Rex, 'The compound, the reserve and the urban location: the essential institutions of Southern African labour exploitation', South African Labour Bulletin, 1974, 1, 13.

124. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. van Onselen, Chibaro, 159: 'Beer, for example, not only provided cheap recreation but it also helped reduce scurvy amongst the workers. Women who lived with and cooked for their husbands not only protected the health of workers, but assisted in labour stabilisation and reduction of labour turnover. On the other hand, ... not all of the workers' recreation was innocuous. Alcohol consumed in vast quantities over the weekend made its contribution to a reduced turnout on a Monday morning as well as to compound violence. Sexual competition was equally capable of producing violence, or a trail of venereal diseases that sapped productivity'.

128. For elaboration, see Rex, 'The compound, the reserve, and the urban location', 13.

129. S 235/394, 'Commission'.

130. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

131. Ibid. The Commission were even 'informed by the Treasurer that £1,00 a year was allocated for five years from Brewery Profits to start a Pension Fund which it may be remarked, is entirely for the benefit of Europeans'.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. A further dimension was the allegation that 'a frequent custom among white men (was) to send boys to the locations to get them prostitutes'; see J.J. Lerothodi Ntyweyi, Sec. of Union of S.A. Natives' Association in Rhodesia, to Sir Charles Coghlan, in The Star, 15 Sept. 1911.

136. van Onselen, Chibaro, 185.

137. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

138. van Onselen, Chibaro, 175.

139. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

140. Ibid.

141. S 1542/S12, Acting S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 15 Sept. 1936.

142. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. van Onselen, Chibaro, 176. For an example of this kind of violence, see S404, no. 3405, 21 Dec. 1929, and p. 42 of this paper, which details conflict between an Ndebele prostitute and an 'alien native'. The dispute which started over whether or not sufficient money had been paid ended with the woman hospitalised after being attacked with a bicycle chain.

146. van Onselen, Chibaro, 176.

147. S 1175/17, Compound Inspector, Bulawayo, to Medical Director, Salisbury, 16 Feb. 1931.

148. For wider discussion, see van Onselen, Chibaro. Nor will this section discuss film shows in the Location. Although Carbutt reported that both Ndebele and Shona mentioned the 'bioscope hall', as a source of trouble, this was 'not because there is anything inherently bad in the show itself ... but because it affords an uncontrolled meeting place, where people with grievances and emnities meet, and after the entertainment fall into discussion about their differences, which often leads to serious quarrels and fights'. Film shows were restarted on 17 January. See S 138/27, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 24 January 1930 and attached correspondence.

149. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

150. S 1542/S12, Chief Superintendent of Police, Bulawayo, to Staff Officer of Police, Salisbury, 13 June 1938.

151. The amount of evidence directly describing the situation in December 1929 is fairly limited, but from later Native Department and police reports, and especially from a thorough analysis of urban recreation in the Salisbury Location in 1939, it is possible to obtain a reasonable idea of what was involved.

152. Ibid, R. Howman, NC Salisbury, to Secretary for Native Affairs, Salisbury, 29 June 1939; attached report 'A Study of Recreation for Urban Natives - with special reference to Boxing among Natives in Salisbury'. Unless otherwise stated, what follows is drawn from this source.

153. Roger Howman, who compiled the report, noted that 'what this alignment implied or the reason for it my informant could not or would not explain. However, I later found out ... that there is a long historical and totemic affinity between the WaKorekore, the Nyasaland people and the WaManyika'.

154. S 998, 'Mangoromera', 28 June 1933.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

157. S 1542/S12, 'Study of Recreation for Urban Natives'.

158. Ibid.

159. S 998, 'Mangoromera'.

160. Ibid.

161. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

162. Ibid.

163. van Onselen, Chibaro, 189-90.

164. See, for example, S. Thornton, 'The struggle for profit and participation by an emerging African petty-bourgeoisie in Bulawayo, 1893-1933', 1978, unpub.

165. S 235/477, 'Evidence'.

166. It might be objected that this analysis savours too much of having cake and eating it; it is suggesting that at different times the Shona competed most successfully with the Ndebele in the labour market, but at other times constituted the unemployed, quasi-criminal under-class. While no direct evidence survives for December 1929, this was precisely the pattern which was followed nine months later in September 1930, when evidence does become available. Newcomers to Bulawayo, at first unemployed, were pulled into gangs, which they usually left once they had found work. See S 569, no. 5113, 29 September 1930.

167. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 27 December 1929.

168. Ibid.

169. Phimister, 'Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia, with special reference to the Victoria district', in R.H. Palmer and Q.N. Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty, (London, 1977).

170. As early as 1895 most of the Victoria district's tax was paid in gold earned on the Rand and at Kimberley; see D.N. Beach, 'The Shona economy: branches of production', in Palmer and Parsons (eds), Roots of Rural Poverty.

171. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 December 1929. For further discussion of the 'zigebengu' (Ninevites), see van Onselen, 'South Africa's lumpenproletariat army: "Umkasi Wa Ntaba" - "The Regiment of the Hills", 1890-1920', 1976, unpub. 'Amalieta' gangs are analysed in van Onselen, 'The witches of suburbia: domestic service on the Witwatersrand 1890-1914', 1978, unpub.

172. Rhodesia Herald, 31 December 1929.

173. See also the evidence of one hospitalized victim who reported that he had been attacked by 'natives dressed in black shirts'; S 138/22, 'Speeches'.

174. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 30 December 1929.

175. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 4 March 1930.

176. S 998, 'Mangoromera'. The latter report referred to 'a widely known itinerant Ishe, James Mambara'. However, because of the frequency with which official orthography used 'r' and 'l' interchangeably and because of the Native Department's general inexactitude in recording African names, it does not seem to be stretching credulity too far to suggest that Mabala and Mambara were one and the same.

177. Ibid.

178. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 2 January 1930.

179. S 404, no. 3405, 21 December 1929. Some objected to foreigners marrying Ndebele women, for whom they allegedly paid no lobolo. Even worse, it was claimed that 'the aliens have no home life and they do not respect their wives' people. When the wife's uncle or other relative comes to see her, they do not believe her story; they say "this man is not your uncle; he is your sweetheart", and then there are fights and killings and plenty of trouble'; see Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 January 1930.

180. S 998, 'Mangoromera'.

181. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1930.

182. S 138/22, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salsibury, 30 December 1929.

183. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 11 January 1930.

184. Ibid, NC Mzingwane to S.N. Bulawayo, 9 January 1930.

185. Ibid, 'Speeches'.

186. Ibid, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 27 December 1929.

187. Bulawayo Chronicle, 4 January 1930.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.

190. F. Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (London, 1967), 41-6.

191. Webster, 'The 1949 Durban "riots"',7-8.

192. Rude, Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century, 23.

193. For exploration of the ICU's diverse and confused ideological strands, see van Onselen, Chibaro, 213-14.

194. S 138/41, S.N. Bulawayo to CNC Salisbury, 31 October 1928.

195. S 138/22 'Speeches'.

196. In 1930 when a recrudescence of the trouble was rumoured it was reported that 'Lobengula's son has much to do with the stirring up of strife amongst the young men... and wishes to drive all Mashonas out of his father's Country'; see S 138/22, NC Charter to Acting CNC Salisbury, 25 November 1930.

197. A. Mafeje, 'The ideology of "tribalism"',Journal of Modern African Studies, 1971, 9, 254.

198. Webster, 'The 1949 Durban "riots"',47.

199. S 480/93, 'Memorandum on the position of Compound Managers on Mines in Southern Rhodesia', 11 July 1930.

200. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 14 April 1931, col 554.