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Vamusse, Yolanda Sarah. (2019). The discursive construction of African audiences :a comparative study of CGTN Africa, Al Jazeera English and eNews channel Africa 2013-2016. University of the Witwatersrand, https://hdl.handle.net/10539/29459

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THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF AFRICAN AUDIENCES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CGTN AFRICA, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH AND ENEWS CHANNEL AFRICA 2013–2016

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A thesis submitted to the Wits School of School of Literature, Language and Media, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Johannesburg
2019

ABSTRACT

The development of emerging economies, such as China, South Africa and Qatar has given rise to non-Western media networks, which mediate their increasing role in international affairs.

These news networks; Al Jazeera English, Chinese Global Television Network (CGTN) Africa and the former eNews Channel Africa (eNCA), are focusing on marginalised parts of the world, consequently constructing new African audience formations and creating imagined transnational communities beyond the nation state. The driving force behind these conceptions is Africa's economic growth and political stability, which started to shift the global narrative from a dark and hopeless continent to a rising Africa. Nevertheless, the implications of these new transnational players in Africa requires further investigation.

This study outlines the evolution of African audience constructions during specific periods in the 2010s, to provide insight into the implications of transnational media within the context of non-Western and emerging economies, particularly Africa. The significance of these developments is best explored through an analytical framework that considers the complex interaction of factors as opposed to traditional centre-periphery approaches. This study therefore draws from Appadurai's concept of global cultural flows, Foucault's notion of power/knowledge, as well as Benedict Anderson's 'imagined community'.

Keywords

public diplomacy; African audiences; eNCA; Al Jazeera; non-Western media
pan-African media; international communication; global media; CGTN Africa; Africa-China; media representations

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

Yolanda Sarah Vamusse

12th day of June in the year 2019

To my parents, Armando and Rozalia Uamusse

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the following:

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Cobus van Staden for his guidance, knowledge and continuous support throughout the years. Despite changes in his professional responsibilities and numerous commitments, he remained dedicated to seeing this project to completion.

Staff at the Humanities Graduate Centre and my peers who, during our short interactions provided insightful and critical comments which broadened my perspective. Their encouragement kept me inspired.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AFCON	Africa Cup of Nations
	Africa
AJE	Al Jazeera International
ANN7	Africa News Network 7
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China Central Television
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CNN	Cable News Network
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
eNCA	eNews Channel Africa
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association or
FNB	First National Bank
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G20	Group of Twenty
G8	Group of Eight

ICASA	Independent Communications Authority of South
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTs	Information Communication Technologies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
	International Federation of Association Football
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNET	Electronic Media Network
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
NWICO	New World Information and Communication Order
PwC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
RMB	Renminbi
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SCA	Socio-cognitive Approach
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference of African Development
TNC	Transnational Corporations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
US	United States
V-Day	Victory Day

WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWII	World War 2

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The rise of emerging powers from the global South, and their growing influence has contributed to the proliferation of new global media networks that mediate their profile and active role in regional and international affairs.

These media networks; Al Jazeera English, Chinese Global Television Network Africa (CGTN Africa) and the former eNews Channel Africa (eNCA), are expanding into non-traditional media markets, such as Africa, altering the global media landscape, and changing conventional notions of Africa. While their expansion goals are different, they are driven by a common desire to provide different perspectives on news, particularly from the global South[1] in an industry which has traditionally been dominated by Western media and viewpoints. Their international growth can also be understood within the context of public diplomacy, where they play a key role in projecting a favourable image on behalf of their respective countries of origin. From an audience perspective, their African presence is leading to increased engagement with the continent's audiences through programming that addresses them. However, they also engage with global audiences through mode of address, although to a limited extent. Their global character is therefore not only defined in terms of reach, but can also be understood from a discursive point of view, where they present a global outlook on African issues and address global audiences on relevant discourses.

These media entities share similarities and differences which both broaden our knowledge of pan-African broadcasting. Their unique features include different historical backgrounds, organisational success and varying levels of engagement with

[1] The term, global South is used in this document to refer to non-Western parts of the world which predominantly includes; Africa, Asia and Latin America. My usage captures the progressive and conceptual meaning of the notion to reflect the agency of non-Western institutions and their growing participation in the international media landscape which is shifting dynamics of power. A detailed discussion on the concept and how it is applied in this research is outlined in Chapter 2.

Africa. These reveals particularities of the different broadcasting models and insights into the discourses that inform the construction of audiences. The value of these perspectives is accentuated by the case of eNCA, whose sudden closure confronts the challenges experienced by non-Western media as they attempt to address African audiences. Consequently, the selection of eNCA as one of the case studies for this research serves an important function. It allows us to draw comparisons between CGTN Africa and AJE's state-sponsored broadcasting models. It also provides an African perspective on how African institutions imagine their own audiences, and finally, its dual identity as a South African and an African broadcaster allows us to analyse the interplay of these identities and their possible impact on audience construction.

Despite their differences, these channels have sufficient similarities from which valid and useful comparisons can be made within a pan-African context. These include their non-Western origin, transnational reach and global South perspectives arising from their shared concern about Western hegemony and lack of diversity in global news (Al Jazeera 2012b; CCTV 2012; eNCA 2013b).

The focus of this study is on the content accessed via the satellite service of these channels as opposed to other platforms. While recognising that audience behaviour is evolving, and media content is increasingly delivered and consumed through multi-media platforms, such as Video-On-Demand (VOD), satellite TV remains a preferred and popular platform of accessing global media for many African audiences due to barriers related to the digital divide such as high internet data costs. Programming from

these organisations is therefore accessible to African audiences primarily through subscription to satellite TV[2] in the form of a bouquet of television channels[3].

The impact of these organisations' engagements beyond their geo-cultural and geo-linguistic markets is a growing area of research, particularly where CGTN Africa and AJE are concerned. However, further investigation within the context of emerging economies, as well as comparatively with pan-African organisations is required.

This study argues that the focus of these non-Western transnational channels on Africa is leading to new ways of thinking about the continent, consequently creating new transnational African audiences beyond the nation state. The driving force behind these new audience constructs is Africa's economic growth which in recent years started to shift the global narrative from a dark and hopeless continent, to a rising Africa. The construction of these audiences is also set within the broader context of a pan-African project which attempts to unite African markets for economic and political objectives as is already evident through institutional continental frameworks such as the AU[4] and the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Hence, this study outlines the evolution of African audience constructions during specific periods in the 2010s, to provide a lense through which we can understand the role of the media in mediating these contemporary trends in Africa's history.

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[2] Usage of the terms *TV channel and satellite TV* and varies in different contexts depending on the technologies used to access media content. While cable is widely used in the US and other countries, satellite TV is still widely used in Africa, especially to access international TV programmes. I therefore use the terms to reflect how content from the case studies selected is distributed and experienced by African audiences, most of whom access them via satellite technology and describe their activity as 'watching a channel', as opposed to cable (Katisi 019; CGTN 2019). Satellite television is a television signal that uses "space satellites" to deliver signals to households or businesses often in areas where cable or terrestrial broadcasting is not available (Techopedia 2019). I use the term, *television channel* in its general definition as "a television station's programming" (Tecnicontrol 2019: para. 1; Halbrooks 2019; The Free Dictionary 2019).

[3] Ibid.

[4] The African Union's *Agenda 2063* is a strategic framework to shape the future of the continent by promoting Africa's renewal and solidarity. This framework has come to define Africa's image.

The significance of these trends and their implications on non-Western environments is best explored through analytical frameworks that take into account the complex interaction between the global, regional and the local, as opposed to traditional centre-periphery approaches. This study therefore applies Appadurai's concept of global cultural flows, Foucault's notion of power/knowledge, as well as Benedict Anderson's 'imagined community' to analyse these developments. Given the pan-African media industry is at its infancy and the focus of the study on non-Western actors, these approaches allow us to engage effectively with the unpredictable and at times contradictory research context as opposed to excluding these parts of the world based on their deficiencies.

1.2 Research Problem and Objective of the Study

The new transnational media players from the global South are creating new media markets and contributing to the multi-directional flow of cultural products. Their focus on marginalised parts of the world, is leading to new ways of engaging with Africa, and in the process, creating new African audience formations. Their broadcasting strategy also deviates from traditional global media where African audiences were not considered a viable media market, until recently. Yet, more knowledge is required about the expansion of these media groups beyond their geo-cultural and geo-linguistic markets. Although there is growing interest in Al Jazeera and CGTN, research on transnational African TV channels with continental reach and their implications is almost non-existent, except in radio and print media (Tomaselli 1997; Olorunnisola 2006; Batist 2010; Fleming 2009; Berger 1999; Bosch and Mullins 2012; Moyo 2013).

Our understanding of global media expansion and its cultural implications was originally influenced by relations of dependency between developed and less developed nations, and later through models that focus on contra-flows from South to North, as well as globalisation paradigms. Nevertheless, the circulation of global cultural products is further complicated by the evolving political, economic and social landscape where Western nations are no longer the only producers and exporters of information. Furthermore, the interaction of cultural products with regional, national and local forces

is leading to unpredictable and a wide range of outcomes depending on the context in which they are appropriated. Therefore, traditional perspectives on international communications no longer provide adequate empirical evidence to support claims of domination or explain latest developments in the global media industry. The significance of these contemporary trends contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of international communications, and are best explored through analytical frameworks that take into account the complex interaction of various factors.

The aim of this study is therefore to investigate the implications of transnational non-Western media in the African media market in relation to their construction of African audiences.

To achieve this aim, I will analyse reports from three transnational non-Western satellite[5] TV channels[6]; Al Jazeera English (AJE), CGTN (formerly CCTV Africa) and eNCA Africa, firstly to determine their patterns of coverage and to identify the discourses that shape their positioning of audiences.

1.3 Research Questions

The main research question for this study is:

How are African audiences constructed in non-Western transnational television channels?

This question will be addressed through the following sub-questions:

---

[5] Usage of the terms *satellite* and *channels* varies in different contexts depending on the technologies used to access media content. While cable is widely used in the US and other countries, satellite TV is still widely used in Africa, especially to access international TV programmes. I therefore use the terms to reflect how content from the case studies selected is distributed and experienced by African audiences, most of whom access them via satellite technology and describe their activity as 'watching a channel' (Katisi 2019; CGTN 2019).

[6] Ibid.

a) What is the extent of reporting of African issues on CGTN Africa, AJE and eNCA?
b) Which discourses inform the construction of African audiences in non-Western transnational television channels; CGTN Africa, AJE and eNCA?
c) To what extent are there disparities and/or similarities between the three channels?

This research is situated within media globalisation and international communications studies. It forms part of ongoing debates about transnational media expansion and its implications, particularly in Africa. While the research is also relevant to ongoing debates about the portrayal of Africa in the media, its focus is not on the representation of audiences or African issues. I use the term 'construction' to refer to how new audiences are imagined and made to exist through media discourse as detailed in Chapter 3 of this document.

1.4 Contribution of study

The study is an account of how new African audiences were created by non-Western transnational news channels during selected periods from 2014 and 2016. Its contribution to scholarly literature on the topic is threefold. Firstly, and more importantly, the research examines the implications of transnational media within the context of non-Western and emerging economies. The research is on African audiences at a regional level, and includes of an African regional TV channel, eNCA as a case study. As I will discuss, much of the existing literature on global and transnational media focuses on Western media and excludes perspectives from transnational African media. While some studies have analysed African media, their focus is predominantly at local and national levels. Other studies focus on global media, but Africa is talked about, and framed as a passive receiver of media messages and represented by outsiders, and not viewed as playing an active role in its own construction. The construction of Africans as audiences by non-Western global media is new, as emerging media players have specifically targeted the regional African market. The inclusion of eNCA, an African owned channel, fills this gap and provides valuable perspective on how Africans imagine their own audiences. Secondly, the comparative approach will provide

an analysis across three different media models – state-controlled, independent and hybrid media. Thirdly, while the focus of the study is not specifically on media representation, it contributes to broader conversations about the image of Africa as it may illuminate some of the root causes behind existing perceptions of the continent. For example, could it be that global media, Western and non-Western draw on the same discourses or media values, and does this imply that these discourses are universal?

1.5 Research Design

The key question addressed in this research is how audiences are constructed by non-Western media. This is accomplished by examining the coverage of African issues to determine the perspectives from which they are framed. As a social construct, the mechanisms for creating audiences cannot only be explained through causal patterns or media coverage trends, but through methods that take into account the social and cultural context in which the construction occurs. This requires a research paradigm that better explains the complexity, contradictions and transformational nature of social life, as well as its historical context. The appropriate research framework should therefore enable us to understand the relationship between discursive practices and the material, social and cultural formations from which forms of knowledge originate. Discourse analysis is therefore fundamental to addressing the research question as it helps us identify the discourses that shape the coverage of African issues, how they relate to other texts and socio-cultural contexts, consequently creating African audiences.

This study employs a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis to provide an in-depth understanding of the processes that inform the construction of African audiences. These methods are applied at different stages of the research process based on the research questions and objectives of the study (Hammersley 1996; Wimmer & Dominick 2006; Deacon et al 1999).

One of the functions of using different methods is to address different elements of the research problem (Bryman 2004). This is useful in the context of my research as I plan to first provide a snapshot of general coverage patterns about African issues which can provide a context for CDA.

1.6 Quantitative Content Analysis

Coverage patterns in all channels will be investigated through content analysis given its capability to yield quantitative data about the amount, frequency and themes of coverage (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998). However, this does not tell us about the discourses that emerge and how they are shaped as its capacity is limited to manifest content. The discourses will therefore be identified through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

1.7 Critical Discourse Analysis

Language provides a way through which the second research question pertaining to discourses can be addressed, as it is through language that discourses are articulated. To identify discourses requires an examination of latent content. CDA was therefore more suitable as it is concerned with language use and its relation to social and power structures (Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1991). CDA is also attentive to absences, which reveal perspectives that are excluded (Fairclough 1995).

CDA was therefore more suitable as it is concerned with language use and its relation to social and power structures (Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1991). CDA is also attentive to absences, which reveal discourses that are excluded (Fairclough 1995). Discourse however doesn't only operate in language, but also through forms of signification such as visual images and speech. Visual imagery may expose salient ideological meanings or frames that may not be immediately apparent in the spoken words of the news reader or text displayed on screen or at times even conveying contradictory messages (Boyd-Barrett 2009; Fiske 1987).

1.8 Thesis structure

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the study, outlining the background context for the research, its objectives and research questions. In Chapter two, I discuss key concepts and theoretical paradigms that are relevant to the study and explain their contribution to the research. These include Appadurai's concept of global cultural flows, Foucault's power-knowledge, Anderson's notion of imagined communities as well as various perspectives on power. This is followed by a review of

scholarship related to the topic in Chapter three, which situates my study within key debates about the construction of African audiences. I also highlight the gaps in scholarly literature and how this research seeks to contribute to knowledge on the issue. To provide a historical context of the three channels selected for the study, Chapter four discusses their origins and evolution into transnational media players. These broadcasters are linked to their countries of origin, but also have unique particularities that have shaped their development trajectories. Chapter five details the research methods applied to address the research questions. In Chapter six I present the findings and the discussion of the quantitative research. Qualitative analysis of discourses is presented in Chapter seven where I discuss the discourses that inform the construction of African audiences. For a more comprehensive discussion, I have grouped the findings according to the broadcaster, then into the type of constructions and discourses identified for the period. The study concludes with Chapter eight which reflects on the research, its findings, limitations and further areas of investigation.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The sections in this chapter outline key concepts and theories that have been influential in the analysis of global media.

As indicated in the title of this research, the concept of 'audience' and 'constructing audiences' form the basis of my enquiry. I therefore begin by outlining their background context and defining how they are applied in this research. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of media and cultural imperialism which has been an influential framework for understanding global media. In this chapter, I address their theoretical underpinnings and demonstrate their inadequacy in the analysis of transnational media. I then propose theoretical concepts that capture the multi-dimensional relationships that shape new trends in media globalization, such as multiple actors and power relations that inform constructions. These include Appadurai's concept of global cultural flows and Foucault's power-knowledge which illuminate the complexity that characterises African audience construction.

The significant role of the nation state in non-Western media institutions also requires an analytical framework that takes into account the relationship between the media and issues of national and cultural identities linked to nation states. For this reason, I also engage with Benedict Anderson's framework of the nation as an imagined community, as well as other concepts relating to nationalism.

2.2 Key Concepts

2.2.1 Defining the audience

In general terms, the audience can be thought of simply as the number of people who interact with a particular text or artefact, or viewers of a television programme. Burton (2005) outlines three ways of understanding audiences, and these include 'a disparate

collection of individuals' consuming one text at the same time, a group of people with similar characteristics outside their consumption and a mass group whose identity is linked to their consumption of a particular text (Burton 2005, p 16). However, these narrow definitions do not translate well across time and space, and inconsistent with current media developments and contexts in which messages are distributed and consumed.

The notion of audience is traditionally informed by audience research where audiences were originally conceptualized as tangible and passive receivers of information and directly influenced by media messages (Leiss et al 1990, cited in Ruddock 2001 8). These conceptions were shaped by early communication models which focused on the one-way transmission of messages from the communicator to the receiver, and were preoccupied by media effects, such as the hypodermic needle theory (Katz 1955, Blumer 1974).

Since then, debates on the relationship between the media and audience are centred on media effects, and the power relations between the media and recipients. Nevertheless, the assumption of passive audiences has since been challenged by numerous research. Uses and Gratifications theories conceive the audience as conscious of their needs and use the media to satisfy them (Blumer and Katz 1974). This concern about media influence also gave rise to Agenda-setting and Cultivation Analysis paradigms, which also assumed the media to have persuasive power over audiences (McCombs and Shaw 1972, Gerbner and Gross 1976). The emergence of reception studies from the cultural studies tradition and ethnographic research changed our thinking about audiences as passive to active participants in the creation of meaning (Hall 1980, Morley 1980, Ang 1996, Fiske 1987, Liebes and Katz 1986, 1990). Other scholars highlighted the role both media producers and audiences and interpreted the effects as varied across a continuum (Perse 2001, McQuail 1994). Nevertheless, a significant shift in the notion of audiences came with development of the internet which has significantly changed the manner in which content is distributed, and how people engaged with it. Audiences are no longer just active, but virtual, interactive and creating content. These trends continue to complicate the notion of audiences further as individuals and groups access different

content, at different times through different mediums, and in the process become part of different audience formations.

Thus, our understanding of the audience continues to shift as researchers highlight the role of audiences in different contexts as publics, citizens, consumers or commodities (Ross and Nightingale 2003, Ettema and Whitney 1994). More recent audience research is turning its focus not only on the media or audiences in isolation, but the broader social and cultural contexts in which they exist, leading to conceptions of audiences as socially constructed through discourse (Allor 1988, Alasuutari 1999, Ang 1996, Webster and Phalen 1994, Ettema and Whitney 1994, Burton 2005, Fiske 1987,). As Allor points out, "the audience exists nowhere; it inhabits no real space, only positions within analytic discourses" (Allor 1988:228). Alasuutari (1999) also refers to a discursive turn in the conception of audiences as a 'constructionist view' of audiences, which among other issues seeks to address the history and role of discourses produced by the media and how they reflect people's everyday discussion about the issues, as well as how they enhance or delegitimize public concerns (Alasuutari 1999:11). Fiske (1987) also defines the plural 'audiences' as different ways of constructing an audience, resulting in different types of audiences (Fiske 1987:16-17). Audience configurations can also differ based on the institutional arrangements and philosophy of the producers as demonstrated in Hellman's two paradigms of television audiences, where public service broadcasters discursively construct audiences as a public to legitimate programming policy, while commercial broadcasters construct them as a market or group of consumers (Hellman 1999). Ang (1991) also describes audiences as 'a public', where audiences are citizens to be informed, educated and entertained to enable them to exercise their 'democratic rights ad duties', while Ross and Nightingale (2003 refer to the 'citizen audience (Ang 1991: 28-29, cited in Ettema and Whitney 1994; Ross & Nightingale 2003).

For the purposes of this study, the notion of audiences as a discursive construct, which is constantly in flux and with multiple identities is a more appropriate description of African audiences given the transnational nature of the study. Consequently, the construction of audiences refers to ''how communicators make audiences" within the media and their

relationship with media institutions as I discuss in the next section (Ettema & Whitney 1994b:5).

2.2.2 Constructing audiences

The notion of audience construction is based on the concept of 'audience making', which is defined as ''how communicators make audiences" within the media and their relationship with media institutions (Ettema & Whitney 1994b:5). This conception of audiences adopts a constructivist approach to audience making where audiences are viewed as a social construct, with economic or social value, and hence referred to as 'institutionally effective audiences' (Ettema & Whitney 1994b:5; Ang 1996). Ettema and Whitney categorise these audiences into three types; *measured audiences* produced through quantitative research, *specialised or segmented audiences* "whose interests are presumed and created by media producers and *hypothesised audiences*, whose interests, convenience and necessity are presumably protected by regulators (Ettema and Whitney 1994b:5-6).

This formulation broadens the traditional notion of the audience which is concerned with the flow of messages, its effects and how they are interpreted by audiences (Morley 1980; Stuart Hall 1973, 1980). The original conception excludes communication institutions and their motives, as well as the transforming role of the audience due to developments in the media and technology (Williams 1990; Ettema & Whitney 1994; Turow 2005). Which further complicate the role of audiences which continues to evolve over time. Audiences are therefore socially constructed and embedded in the cultural and social context in which they emerge. Scholars have examined the various ways in which audiences are created by media producers, resulting in the emergence of different audience positions and identities where audiences are constructed as spectators, fans, consumers, citizens, learners, victims and so on (Webster & Phalen 1994; Mazdon 1999; Siapera 2004; Syvertsen 2004; Sumpter 2000).

However, despite access to market research and audience ratings, media institutions have no complete knowledge of the audience, and therefore create an image of the ideal

audience (Ettema & Whitney 1994). This image helps them to make sense of the audience and make 'basic assumptions' about their interests and best way to influence them (Bourdon and Meadel 2014:19). Knowing the audience is therefore fundamental to the existence and maintenance of media channels since it sustains them economically, and maintains their cultural and political legitimacy, particularly in the case of public service and state media, which to a certain extent are publicly-funded (Bruun 2014a). Turow (2005) refers to this process as the 'industrial construction of audiences' as their construction is aligned to the goals of the organisations, their relationships with stakeholders and rationality of their existence (Turow 2005). A similar conception of the audience in mediated communication is the 'imagined audience' which is defined as "the mental conceptualisation of the people with whom we are communicating, our audience" (Litt 2012: 331). This concept of audiences is based on Giddens' theory of structure and agency, where structures constitute and are constituted by human action and as such influence how audiences are imagined (Webster 1998; Litt 2012). The imagined audience is constructed through an interaction of both macro and micro factors. Macro level factors are structural and include social norms, technological infrastructure while micro factors are more individualistic and psychological such as persona attitudes, skills and motivations (Litt 2012).

I therefore use the term 'audience construction' or 'construction of audiences' to refer to the manner in which media institutions envision and attribute identities and values to a Pan African audience. This audience is different from the 'actual or real audience' that is measured through targeting and measurement, and akin to Benedict Anderson's imagined community where, "members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1983: 6). Anderson argues that communities are imagined because it is impossible to know or meet all the members of a community. In the same way, it is not possible to know all members of an audience, and even if they did get to know them, their conceptions might be different from those of the audience, particularly new African audiences that have not existed before. Strohn (1983) states that even 'audience centred' authors need to determine which of the various conceptions of the audience will be more practical, and the variability of imagined audiences (Strohn

(1983). One way to make sense of how audiences are constructed is by the media's approach to audiences which is evident in media texts and programmes (Hagen 1999).

Anderson also adds that these communities are "distinguished by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson 1983: 6). These styles are reflected in the media language through shared symbols and the way that issues are talked about. This creates a form of expressing which connects communities to each other, bringing audiences and their identities to life. The content can reveal the expectations of the creator and what attitudes and knowledge they expect from the reader or hearer (Strohn 1983). The imagined audience is therefore implied in the text and created as members interact with it (Strohn 1983). Hence, this study examines media content to identify the perspectives from which African issues are framed and how they relate to broader texts, ideologies and social structures.

Anderson's imagined communities was part of a nation-building project where the construction of the nation was limited within national boundaries. However, this research is extending the idea of imagined communities beyond the nation, to transnational audiences and how they are constructed by non-Western broadcasters. As opposed to a national project, the construction of African audiences is explicitly a Pan African one, with the aim of uniting Africa as a transnational market for free trade. This is in response to new ways of thinking about Africa beyond the national, as is already evident through institutional continental frameworks such as the AU and the Africa African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which seek to unite African markets for economic and political objectives. The media is in turn shaped by these developments, therefore, this study provides a lense through which we can understand the role of the media in constructing these new forms of African audiences.

It is worth noting that the audience making process is not only controlled by owners and distributors of cultural material, but a rather a complex and negotiated struggle among various parties involved, including audiences themselves whose tastes and behaviour changes, creating a demand to be met by media producers and the media system. Scholars also agree that conceptions of audiences that only focus on the production of content

negates the complexity of relationships within media institutions and its stakeholders (Ettema and Whitney 1994, Turow 2005). However, within the context of this study, the focus on discourses is more appropriate since the expansion of the news networks under study is driven by institutional objectives and broadcasting models than personal perceptions of media workers, particularly in CGTN Africa and Al Jazeera. Furthermore, as indicated in the literature review, personal motivations of media workers will have very little influence in organisations such as CGTN whose existence is to achieve public diplomacy goals unless they were aligned to the broadcaster and the state.

2.2.3 Television Channel

A television channel is generally defined as "a television station's programming" (Tecnicontrol 2019: para. 1; Halbrooks 2019; The Free Dictionary 2019). From a corporate perspective, the companies that operate TV channels are often referred to as media organisations, companies or corporations (CGTN 2018; eMedia Holdings 2019; Al Jazeera 2019). While these parent organisations may in some contexts also be referred to as 'channels', I use the term *channel* or *news channel* to reflect how the case studies selected in this study describe themselves (eNCA 2018; eMedia Holdings 2019; AJE 2019; Krane 2006; BBC 2006). The case studies are also described by their African provider DSTV as channels. For example, DSTV describes CGTN as channel 409, AJE as Channel 406, eNCA as Channel 403 on DSTV (DSTV no date). Although CGTN Africa refers to itself as a broadcast centre of CGTN, it directs its viewers to watch a channel (CGTN 2018; CGTN Africa 2019). Therefore, the word 'channel' is used in this context to mirror how the content is distributed and experienced by African audiences, who describe their activity as 'watching a channel', not a broadcast centre (Katisi 2019; CGTN 2019).

2.2.4 The global South

Given the limitations and negative connotations associated with descriptions of non-Western countries, one concept that has proved useful is *global South*. The concept is used to refer to parts of the world outside Europe or North America, mainly Asia, Africa

and Latin America, in replacement of previous terms such as *Third World, underdeveloped, less developed, developing*, etc. (Dados and Connell 2012, Commaroff and Comaroff 2012).

However, global South has more progressive nuances, which go beyond geographical boundaries and link to underdevelopment and passivity of developing countries. The concept emanates from the notion of *South,* which is rooted in initiatives of newly independent nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America to create a new world order that would also benefit their nations (Prashad 2012). These initiatives started out as the Third World Project which later became the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the South Commission which sought to increase South-South cooperation (ibid). Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) also links its origins to Antonio Gramsci's analysis of power inequalities between peasants in Southern Italy and workers in the North, which was later taken up by Argentinian Economist Raúl Prebisch, who was also part of the Third World Project (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Prashad 2012).

The notion of the global South is also defined as a "political consciousness" among nations from the South about their shared experience and marginalised position in the world, which motivated them to drive a shared agenda to articulate their aspirations (Mahler 2015: 95). global South is therefore an empowering concept and widely applied by some intellectuals and social groups, particularly from non-Western nations to express resistance to Western hegemony and agency of developing nations (Prashad 2012; Dados and Connell 2012; Iqani 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). Al Jazeera also uses the term to describe its non-Western philosophy to news production and has uses the term widely in its programme discussions (*The Stream 2012c; SouthtoNorth 2013b*).

The concept has been criticized for being defined by its opposition to the North and the North-South binaries it seeks to dismantle, but despite its links to core-periphery perspectives and colonial legacy, it also diverges to emphasise a departure from differences in geopolitical territories and development levels to capture the wider context of transnational and global processes that these countries participate in. Despite the shared experience of nations and peoples from the global South, the concept also

acknowledges the diversity and contradictions that characterise them. The concept also connotes the shifting global power after the Cold War and complexities of global relations. This agency and power of the global South make the concept suitable for application in this research as it resonates with the non-Western perspective of this study. It is also parallel to the concepts of global cultural flows and power/knowledge applied in this research to highlight the complexities of the interaction between the media and audiences from the global South. I therefore use the term global South to articulate the agency of non-Western institutions and their growing participation in the international media landscape which is shifting dynamics of power. The concept is also useful in shining the spotlight on the complex and often contradictory South-South interactions and global processes that shape them. Despite positive perceptions of the term, Potter et al (2008) observes that global inequalities and exploitation of countries in the global South by the Global North persist and continue to be reinforced (Potter et al 2008, cited in Chant and McIlwaine 2009:12).

2.2.5 The Concept of News

News has been a difficult concept for practitioners and scholars to define explicitly, and over the years, there have been various definitions from different perspectives. Creed C. Black, former Editor of *The Herald Leader* defined it as "anything that happens to, or near, a publisher." (Black 1981, cited by Friendly 1981). Former *New York Times* managing editor Turner Catledge referred to it as, "anything you can find out today that you didn't know before." (Catledge, cited in Padgett 1990: 67). These definitions highlight the event orientation of news, and the factors of time, newness and information in defining news. However, in the age of globalisation, the internet and 24-hour news, news is no longer an event bound by time and space.

Most definitions also focus on the features that characterise news. Among the most common are; currency, factual, significance, unusual and interesting to people (The News Manual 2008; Creed 1981, cited by Friendly 1981).

Early research on the sociology of news emphasised news selection, which produced findings on news features (Lippmann 1921; Galtung & Ruge 1965, cited in Fowler

1991). Although Lippmann (1921) and McQuail (1992) made important points about its social construction (Lippmann 1921: Chapter XXIII - no page; McQuail 1992, cited in Mutsvairo 2016, para. 1). Building on this research, contemporary studies have also attempted to define news within the context of news values, producing additional factors that determine newsworthiness (Schwarz 2005; Lee & Choi 2009; Shoemaker, Harcup & O'Neal 2001; Danielian & Brendlinger, 1991; Wu 2003, Wanta & Hu 1993; Atad 2017).

The definitions above demonstrate that news is socially constructed through news values. News values are important in the news gathering and selection process as they clarify the newsworthiness and prominence given to certain topics, and eventually determines "what becomes news". This has implications on the extent of news coverage, frequency and participants used to comment on issues. Considering the transnational focus of this study and public diplomacy role of some of the case studies selected, an understanding of factors that drive news coverage will be useful in understanding the news coverage trends. Some media scholars have therefore sought to define news within the context of news values which inform newsworthiness (Hall et al 1978, Fowler 1991; Gans 1979). Hall et al (1978) make reference to 'cultural maps' that form the basis for newsworthiness while Gans (1979) refers to news values as 'preference statements' which do not originate from individual journalists, but are derived from the society in which they belong (Hall et al 1978, p. 54, Gans 1979, p. 39).

News values are a set of judgments that news producers apply in their selection of news for publication which determines their newsworthiness (Elliott and Golding 2004, Fowler 1991).

One of the early studies that contributed to our understanding of news is Galtung and Ruge's 12 factors that determine newsworthiness (Galtung & Ruge 1965, cited in Fowler 1991:13). Despite being outdated and event-orientation, these values are dominantly used in media organisations in varying cultural contexts to the point of being universalised. Since then, contemporary research has taken into account the evolving character and contexts of news production and developments in technology. Over the years, scholars have highlighted other newsworthiness factors such as deviance

from norms, culture, social change, traits of nations and other political and economic factors (Schwarz 2005; Lee & Choi 2009; Shoemaker, Harcup & O'Neal 2001; Danielian & Brendlinger, 1991; Wu 2003; Wanta & Hu 1993; Atad 2017).

Literature on newsworthiness has also examined news values in relation to transnational media and global audiences to determine attributes that influence the coverage of international issues and their coverage (Golan 2006; Atad 2017; Wu 2004; Rosengren 1970; Wanta & Hu 1993; Schwarz 2005). While the selection of international news is complex, some of the determinants of international news coverage are deviance and relevance, particularly to the US (Shoemaker, Danielian & Brendlinger, 1991; Wanta & Hu 1993), cultural affinity (Schwarz 2005) and the hierarchy of nations (Galtung 1971; Kim & Barnett 1996), systematic factors (Wu 2003). Furthemore, Atad (2017) identifies two concepts of global newsworthiness; Domestication and Reversed Domestication. Reversed domestication is more relevant to this study and it highlights the relationship between country of origin of global media organisations, and the countries they report on. This can be manifested through the frequency in which the country of origin is reported and public opinions that reinforce the perspective and ties between the country of origin and country being reported (Atad 2016).

Golan (2006) also highlights the agenda-setting role of elite media organisations in shaping the international news agenda. His assessment of the *New York Times* and three TV networks in the US provided a high correlation between the morning edition of the *New York Times* and the evening news of the TV networks, providing evidence that a single publication, can successfully inform the news agenda of other media organisations.

Despite being outdated, given the new character and patterns of news production, some of the variables cited above have endured (Harcup & O'Neal 2001; Fowler 1991: 14). These values are dominantly used in media organisations in varying cultural contexts to the point of being universalised. On the other hand, universality is limited since news values are socially constructed and therefore influenced by the context in which they occur (Hall et al 1978; Fowler 1991; Gans 1979). Hall et al 1978 refers to 'cultural maps' that form the basis for newsworthiness, while Gans (1979) refers to news values

as ‘preference statements’ which do not originate from individual journalists, but are derived from the society in which they belong (Hall et al 1978: 54, Gans 1979: 39).

News values are consequently not universal but vary according to cultural environment in which the media operates. de-Westernising media approaches have criticised universal values, arguing that their Western origins do not translate well in non-Western contexts as they are sometimes at odds with non-Western social belief systems and news production environments (Tuchman 1978; Boyd Barrett 1994; Kasoma 1996; Mapfurutsa n.d). For instance, the role of the media in the West[7] and in Africa is different. Western media systems, especially in the United States tend to be privately owned and market-oriented whilst African media have a developmental orientation, with the state playing a prominent role in the broadcasting industry. Although private and independent media exist in Africa, these cater for a small section of the urban elite market and not the majority of the population. It is therefore argued that values underpinning these media models should be different given their goals.

News values are also not universal but vary according to context in which they are produced and consumed. de-Westernising media approaches have criticised universal values, arguing that their Western origins do not translate well in non-Western contexts as they are sometimes at odds with non-Western social belief systems and news production environments (Tuchman 1978, Boyd Barrett 1994, Kasoma 1996, Mapfurutsa n.d). For instance, the role of the media in the West and in Africa is different. Western media systems, especially in the United States tend to be privately owned and market-oriented whilst African media have a developmental orientation, with the state playing a prominent role in the broadcasting industry. Although private and independent media exist in Africa, these cater for a small section of the urban elite market and not the majority of the population. It is therefore argued that values underpinning these media models should be different given their goals.

[7] The West or Western is used in this context to refer to media systems in developed countries of Europe and North America

Despite different approaches to defining news, there are similarities on the important attributes of news, and these include: factuality; objectivity, accuracy, balance and currency. News is therefore real and different from entertainment. For this research, a news reports as defined as factual, non-fictional and non-advertising information in a news programme, including sport and visuals.

2.2.6 News Sources

As a social construct, news is shaped by relationships among actors in the social system.

As such, this research also examines the selection and usage of sources to establish the discourses represented. My conception of news sources rests on the hierarchy of influences model which highlights the hierarchical organization of the social structure in influencing news (Shoemaker & Reese 1996). News sources are people and documents which provide journalists with relevant information for media content (Sociology Group 2017; Shoemaker 1996, McQuail (1994), but in this study, my definition focuses only on the participants interviewed or cited in news reports as opposed to documents referenced since I am interested in the role of social actors in shaping discourses about African audiences. These are people who participate in news broadcasts as interviewees and commentators. They are 'relevant knowers' of issues and occurrences featured in the news (Fishman 1980: 51, cited in Allan: 68). I refer to these actors interchangeably as 'sources', 'participants or 'actors'. Through their participation, these news sources transmit ideas as they attempt to influence the news and compete for media attention. The visual appearance on TV creates a perception of authenticity in their views, which are reproduced in various media forms and programme genres such as news and current affairs and may also serve as further sources for other publications. The analysis of news sources yields insights about proportional representation of social actors from various countries, regions, organisations, professions across the three broadcasters. This information also contributes to the assessment of balance, objectivity and status of news sources, which is important in factual content. The selection of sources is not a neutral process but reflects the cultural knowledge and perspective of the media. It also gives us understanding of how power hierarchies are structured in discourses.

Studies examining news production processes have pointed to inequalities in accessing the media, as actors who are powerful politically, economically and culturally tend to have better access to news and discourse than ordinary people who often have to resort to defiant behaviour to obtain attention (Schudson 1995, Shoemaker & Cohen 2005, Gans 1979). The prominence of authoritative sources is a result of their role in the different spheres of social life and its regulation, making them 'primary definers of news' (Hall et al 1978, p. 57, Gans 1979). Their role as definers is important in the construction of discourse as it allows them to define the news agenda and shape our thinking about issues.

Nevertheless, institutional power does not guarantee a role as a primary definer. Accredited sources consist of a range of organisations, each seeking to influence the media agenda. The media therefore becomes a contested field where various bodies of experts compete for attention. Schlesinger & Tumber (1994) point out that sources resort to various strategies and tactics to gain media attention. In their discussion of source-media relations they also direct our attention to the institutional context in which this relationship takes place as other determinants of definitional power (Schlesinger & Tumber 1994). Examining the usage of sources helps us to identify which knowledge is adopted and legitimised.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Media and Cultural Imperialism

Although cultural and media imperialism approaches have been influential in the analysis of global media, they have been widely criticised in recent years. Some of these criticisms are an overemphasis on transnational corporations (TNCs) and cultural industries as transmitters of cultural change; the conception of information flow as unidirectional from North to South; and inadequate empirical evidence of domination (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997; Fiske 1987; Garcia Canclini 1995; Robertson 2010); Kraidy 2010; Tomlinson 1999; Hannerz 1997; Oyedele & Minor 2012; Straubhaar 1996).

Regarding the focus on TNCs, particularly American ones, Sreberny-Mohammadi (1997) draws attention to varied forms of 'carriers of culture' to Third World countries through their historical contact with the West to demonstrates that TNCs and cultural industries are not the first and only structures by which Western culture was transmitted. She points out other structures and institutions of imperialism such as missionaries and the export of religion as some of the pervasive forms in which Western culture was exported to the global South. Others include map-making and demarcation of country borders, which played a key role in nation-building and reconstruction of cultural identity, formal education and administration, among other things (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997).

The erosion of national culture is also criticised by scholars who highlight complex interactions between Western and local cultural products, as well as their media effects (Fiske 1987; Garcia Canclini 1995). While Western cultural products have found wider appeal in the global South, media reception research demonstrates that media texts can be 'polysemic' as active audiences appropriate and give them various meanings (Fiske 1987:5; Liebes & Katz 1986, 1990). While audiences can be exposed to consumerist and foreign cultures, these media messages do not necessarily erode national cultures but co-exist with them, and in other cases adapted cultures, leading to 'glocalisation' (Robertson 2010), cultural hybridity (Kraidy 2010; Tomlinson 2007; Hannerz 1997; Garcia Canclini 1995) and disjunctures (Appadurai 1996). In the African context, Oyedele and Minor 2012 identified tensions in the negotiation of advertising messages, and local and national political contexts determined the outcome of the interaction between the local and global. The authors found that in Nigeria, the global elements of advertising content were not localised and overwhelmed and suppressed the local, however, the media countered the Western lifestyles by legitimising traditional aesthetic attributes through occasional display of local fashion and other products (Oyedele & Minor 2012). In the case of South Africa, the authors found strong nationalistic sentiment partly because the country is still undergoing political transition where identity remains a highly contentious issue (Oyedele & Minor 2012).

Further criticism of cultural and media imperialism theories is its conception of a one-way flow of information. This conception of a North–South information flow reflects

the dominant discourse of the 1960s where geopolitical power was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds, with the first, particularly the US being the most powerful. As a result, less powerful nations such as the Third World were considered helpless and victims and recipients of knowledge from the North. However, the shift in global geopolitical power after the Cold War has seen the rise of emerging states such as the BRICS economies, which are redefining traditional notions of power. Despite revisions to the original concepts, these theories continue to inform humanitarian discourses of the Third World as a helpless continent, as Schiller states: 'Most of the Third World nations seem more helpless than ever to resist the demands of their creditors or overseers' (Schiller 1991, cited in Thussu 2010:248). Such a conception of developing countries also assumes that the countries are homogeneous, which ignores country-specific contexts, sophisticated patterns of transnational media exchange, and the outcome of local interaction with Western products. The emergence of television channels such as AJE, CGTN Africa and eNCA also demonstrates the active role played by non-Western countries and corporations in international broadcasting. These channels are creating new media markets and posing a formidable challenge to established Western channels.

Furthermore, current trends of contraflow, glocalisation, cultural hybridity (Kraidy 2010) and disjunctures (Appadurai 1996) demonstrate numerous outcomes of the intricate process of interaction between various forces and actors at local, national, regional and global levels (Cunningham, Jacka & Sinclair 1997; Appadurai 1996; Robertson 2010, cited in Ritzer and Atalay 2010; Thussu 1998; Thussu 2010; Kraidy 2010; Tunstall 2010, cited in Thussu 2010). Using Latin America and Brazil as a case study, Straubhaar (1996, 2010) argues that national media systems in Third World countries do not become completely dependent on foreign media companies; but the relationship to the world media market is characterised by asymmetrical interdependence, where the level of dependency ranges from a wide continuum of dependence to interdependence, based on technological change, audience preference and appropriation of media products. Technological advancement tends to ease production costs over time, stimulating local television production. Furthermore, the audience is not passive, but actively chooses what to view and often favours

programming that is culturally relevant, leading to an increase in local and national programming and balancing this with imported material (Straubhaar 1996).

2.3.2 Global Cultural Flows

The construction of audiences should be understood as a complex process that is shaped by multiple perspectives and interactions between the local, national and global, which are also constantly shifting. As noted earlier, traditional approaches to analysing the global media are narrowly focused and do not account for these global factors and connections. Appadurai's multifaceted approach to the cultural dimensions of globalisation allows us to explore different dimensions of how African audiences are imagined.

Appadurai proposes a framework of five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes. He points out that the interaction of these flows with local cultures is a complex process leading to disjunctures and various outcomes (Appadurai 1996).

a) Ethnoscapes – the large-scale migration of individuals and groups of people or their desire to move for various reasons

b) Mediascapes – the capacity to produce and disseminate information and images through media across the world in real time. These media flows are where news, commodification and politics collide to create a complex connection of media forms and messages that shape the imagined worlds of audiences, but they are consequently re-appropriated or re-imagined by different audiences.

c) Technoscapes – innovation in technology that enables high-speed connections and flow of information and finance across the world

d) Finanscapes – the rapid flow of capital that is the driving force behind currency markets, national stock exchanges and commodity speculations, which move capital at high speed across the world.

e) Ideoscapes – the flow of ideas and worldviews across the world. These are largely comprised of the political ideologies of states and opposing ideologies of movements. These ideas are manifested in images and terminology associated

> with certain contexts and resonate with specific audiences. We can also think of ideoscapes as discourses that spread across the world and are thought to be universal, but are given new meaning in various parts of the world, such as democracy and news values (Appadurai 1996:33–37).

Appadurai's analysis places more emphasis on the contradictions that characterise the flows. These *scapes* are fluid and the relationship between them is disjointed and unpredictable. Through this framework, we can begin to explore how these different global flows interact to inform the construction of audiences. Ideascapes are the discourses and ideologies that inform how African audiences are imagined, such as pan-Africanism. Various actors participate in the transmission of these ideas as news sources, interviewees and commentators. Through mediascapes, the ideas are reproduced in various media forms and programme genres such as news and current affairs, based on the imagined world of the producers. The production process is also affected by market and financial considerations, particularly in the case of independent media, as well as political, social and cultural aspects, bringing financescapes and technoscapes into the mix. What is also worth noting is the production and dissemination of the media messages transnationally where the dimension of ethnoscapes come into play. They are produced in one part of the world, say in Doha, Kenya or South Africa, where they are subject to different world views, interests and news values, and disseminated in Africa. This interaction of different contexts creates different ways of imagining audiences.

Borrowing from Anderson, he also refers to 'imagined worlds, which can contest and even subvert the imagined worlds of the official mind and the entrepreneurial mentality that surrounds them' (Appadurai 1996:33). Mediascapes produced by the state or private interests allow those who experience them to further break them up to create their own 'scripts' of their 'imagined lives' (Appadurai 1996:35). The interaction of the '*-scapes'* can therefore also lead to the creation of imagined audiences with various interests and formations. While original constructions of audiences may be vested in certain interests, these constructions are transformed and re-appropriated as they interact with audiences, leading to other ways of 'imagining'.

Appadurai's concept is useful in analysing the various outcomes of the interaction between global cultural flows and the context in which African audiences are constructed. It also provides understanding of the factors that account for the differences and similarities across the three channels, as well as the conflicts and negotiation process that characterises such interaction. The theory is also valuable in the analysis of interdiscursivity and coherence of discourses, not only across television programmes or channels, but also their relationship to other global discourses. Through such analysis, we can identify the types of audience that may be imagined from the interaction of various discourses or ideas about Africa, and the forces that shape them.

2.3.3 Power relations and the construction of audiences

Robert Dahl conceived power in terms of relationships between people. In his analogy of a policeman who controls traffic he demonstrates the ability of power to make others do things that they would otherwise not do (Dahl 1957: 202). The ability to control is central to the classical definition of power (Nye 1990b:153). By using certain resources, countries affect the behaviour of others to achieve the outcomes they want. Nye (1990b) identifies three ways in which countries can affect the behaviour of others. First, through hard power or coercion (sticks); second, inducement and payments (carrots); and third, through attraction (soft power) (Nye 2006, para. 1). This original conception of power emphasised state control and use of force to get what nation states wanted. As a result, coercive power and inducement such as military force have historically been used to affect other countries' behaviour. however many scholars now agree that the dynamics of power in the contemporary world have changed, and military power is no longer an effective method for countries to get what they want. Rather, co-optive or soft power is obtained through intangible resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions (Nye 1990b). The concept of soft power, coined by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, has been widely applied in international relations and other fields.

The expansion of non-Western channels in Africa, particularly CGTN Africa and AJE, is largely driven by soft power objectives to create a favourable image of their host countries abroad and the motive of playing a prominent role in international affairs. These objectives inform how they imagine African audiences from certain perspectives

or frames of reference. They also alert us to power relations among the actors involved in the construction of audiences, as it determines which discourse is legitimised, who takes part in it and the nature of their participation. Key approaches to issues of power and its practice therefore provide a relevant analytical framework to address the research questions about the discourses that inform the construction of audiences, which in turn enriches our understanding of the role of the media in the practice of soft power.

The concepts of soft power, public diplomacy and power/knowledge have had significant influence on scholarly thinking on contemporary power, and in the sections that follow I discuss their relevance to global communication. Of particular relevance to this research is Joseph Nye's concept of soft power and Michel Foucault's approach to the production and exercise of power/knowledge and its relation to discourse.

Soft power

Nye defines soft power as 'getting others to want the outcomes that you want' by co-option rather than coercing them (Nye 2010:333). Nye argues that soft power uses attraction to shape the preferences and behaviour of other countries rather than force, and identifies three resources countries have that make them attractive to others. These are culture (in places where it is attractive to others); political values (where the country lives up to them at home and abroad); and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye 2010:334). While Nye's original concept is generalised across countries, it is based on the US and France's experiences of diplomacy, which do not translate very well into non-Western contexts. He later revised his concept to include economic growth/success and international image (Nye 1990b).

Sources of soft power also vary across different eras, circumstances and national contexts depending on the country's interests and areas of priority. Therefore, Nye's concept has been broadened by other scholars to focus on non-Western countries such as China whose international importance and influence is growing, and to include additional sources of power where economic and development elements feature more prominently, as well as on the international image of a country and institutions (Li & Worm 2009; Huang & Ding 2006; Jura & Kaluzynska 2013; Piccone 2014).

Li and Worm 2009 propose an integrative model of soft power to highlight important elements that are more suited to the practice of soft power in non-Western contexts. The model is based on six pillars, comprising the traditional pillars and including others: a country's economic temptation, development model, international institutions and image. A country's economic temptation influences countries to align their policies in favour of the country they're attracted to because of the economic benefits. The scholars cite China as an example: it has successfully influenced the US to downplay China's human rights record in favour of the business and wealth generation potential offered by China. While the six pillars can also be applied across different countries, the authors acknowledge that countries can have unique, country-specific resources of soft power (Li & Worm 2009).

Focusing on Chinese soft power in Africa, Jura and Kaluzynska (2013) further highlight the image of a potential investor and economic model as fundamental sources of attraction in developing countries (Jura & Kaluzynska 2013). The authors' analysis of Zambian and Angolan newspapers and internet portals demonstrates that the African public is attracted to China because of its business and economic opportunities, while it is negative towards China's culture, labour laws and political values. A similar observation is made by Piccone (2014), who states that rising democracies such as the BRICS countries tend to favour economic interests, sovereignty and non-intervention at the expense of political values such as human rights (Piccone 2014).

Indeed, some African businesses and governments such as Sudan have ignored China's human rights record in favour of investment and development aid (Kotecki 2008). African countries have benefitted from China's demand for commodities and raw materials and the country's investment in the continent which has increased over the years. This has contributed to the Africa's economic rise, with China becoming one of Africa's largest trading partners (Tshabalala 2016; FOCAC 2015; Diop 2015; Juma 2011). China–Africa trade grew by 2000 per cent in the 15 years to 2014, and in 2018 China pledged an additional investment package of $60 billion (Tshabalala 2016; Xi 2018). Most of this investment has been in infrastructure development and construction as opportunities in China are very limited.

A significant source of attraction for developing countries is development aid. Aid provided by China and other BRICS member states is viewed by developing countries as an alternative to Western aid, which is conditional upon human rights and democracy. As Dr David Matsanga, an analyst at African Political Affairs, commented: **'**The problem is with funding … African countries should come up with a solution. Go to friends, go to *China*, go to Russia, Brazil, or some other country … leaders … must look for some other alternatives other than the EU which *ties aid to your human rights record*.' (CCTV 2013, my italics)

Economic success is of key importance to developing countries and crucial in improving the welfare of their citizens. Thus, a country's economic and business success holds significant appeal for these countries. Huang and Ding (2006) point out that economic clout can translate into soft power as it contributes to a country's reputation and attractiveness (Huang & Ding 2006). Similarly, Kurlantzick (2006) cites business activities abroad and the 'gravitational pull' of a nation's economic strength as a soft power resource for China in South-East Asia (Kurlantzick 2006). Countries in Africa and parts of the developing world are also attracted to China's economic success story, rising from a poor developing nation into a global economy. What makes this even more attractive is that it was achieved by China's own political economy driven by an authoritarian state, which some have called the 'Beijing Consensus' (Huang & Ding 2006:28; Nye 2005) and is not entirely based on the Western model of democracy and economic development. This has impressed developing countries, as they are dealing with similar challenges to those that China experienced more than four decades ago, and as a result they look to China as a role model to emulate in order to boost their economies. An often-cited reason to emulate China is the country's economic growth, which significantly lifted many from poverty and improved their economic prospects. China's economy grew by 10 per cent year-on-year for four decades, making it the country with the fastest transformation from poverty to prosperity in the history of mankind (Borg 2015; Kangai 2014). African leaders and experts also encourage countries in the continent to implement best practice from China, BRICS and other non-Western states, as indicated in the comment by an African academic, Professor Kodiaga of the African Centre for International Studies:

> *Best practice from Japan, China and Korea* – look at how these countries have managed to join the club and threatened the powers that be. When they were in a state of isolation, how they managed to take Western technology and acculturate it into their culture – they took Western technology but not way of life. *Look at China*, China took a time when they went back to their home and domestic industries and used it to move the country to the next level and then came to the world when they were prepared. (Kodiaga 2013, my italics)

Soft power models that play close attention to the interests of developing countries make for a more appropriate framework for analysing soft power in Africa. Given the soft power objectives of some of the media channels I examine, such as CGTN Africa, an understanding of soft power resources will contribute to our understanding of why audiences are constructed in a certain way. Research on China's soft power in Africa is increasingly examining the role of the media as a public diplomacy tool for influencing foreign publics and creating a positive image of China (Wu 2012). Public diplomacy is therefore critical to our understanding of how soft power is exercised in the media. In the section below, I discuss key conceptions of public diplomacy and how they relate to the construction of audiences.

Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a useful theoretical concept for analysing how audiences are constructed, as it helps identify the types of discourse and motivation that inform media constructions and the social structures to which they are linked. It is particularly relevant to this research given the role of CGTN Africa and AJE as soft power tools for their respective countries.

The public diplomacy field has largely been influenced by international relations paradigms such as early realist theories (Hans Morgenthau), where the nation state is conceived as the primary actor in world politics with a mandate to exercise power. Hence, original definitions of public diplomacy are state-centred, defining it as direct communication by nation states to foreign publics in order to influence their views, and ultimately those of their countries (Malone 1985; Potter 1990). Tuch (1990) defines it as

‘a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies’ (Tuch 1990, in Potter 2002/2003:44). These definitions also imply a one-way communication driven by governments.

However, with innovations in communication technologies and social media, other non-governmental actors and individuals can communicate directly with foreign publics, which prevents governments from controlling information. These trends also enable multidirectional flows of information, allowing citizens to respond to government messages, as opposed to a one-way communication controlled only by the state. Over the years, scholars have underscored the growing importance of non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, the media, political parties and individuals in shaping debates on international affairs (Keohane & Nye 1987; Signitzer & Coombs 1992; Tang & Li 2013; Gilboa 2001; Melissen 2005). Signitzer and Coombs (1992) define public diplomacy more inclusively as ‘the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions’ (Signitzer & Coombs 1992:138). Global news networks fall into this category of non-state actors, and their targeting of transnational audiences enables them to play an active role in conducting public diplomacy activities, either on behalf of their state or in pursuit of their own commercial interests like multinational companies.

Scholars from the liberal-pluralist school have also challenged the realist formulation of public diplomacy and further highlighted interdependence among various actors, state and non-state, arguing that non-state actors have altered the structure of the international system where nation states had the power, to one characterised by interdependence among actors (Keohane & Nye 1971:722–724). Scholars and practitioners have also signalled a ‘new public diplomacy’ (Potter 200–2003; Melissen 2005; Gilboa 2006) which pays attention to how public diplomacy has evolved; not just in the US but beyond, as well as the role of TNCs, civil society groups and individuals (Gilboa 2008). Tang and Li (2013) point out that ‘Chinese companies’ image is also China’s image’ and present a case study of how the Chinese corporation Huawei Technologies is using

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) discourse in consistency with China's development model (Tang & Li 2013: 96).

Despite the scholarly contributions, no practical theory of public diplomacy has been developed yet. Some scholars have however formulated models to increase understanding of how public diplomacy is conducted by various actors. Gilboa (2000, 2001) uses five variables from existing models to develop three public diplomacy models: the Basic Cold War model, the Non-State Transnational model, and the Domestic PR model.

The Basic Cold War model is based on classic public diplomacy where the state is the only primary actor, and therefore not sufficient to address the shift in power relations that characterise contemporary world politics. In the Domestic PR model, the state is still the main actor, but uses public-relations firms to conduct public diplomacy on its behalf in order to improve its image among foreign publics. The Non-State Transnational model, on the other hand, is more attentive to non-state actors and focuses on their role on the public diplomacy activities of individuals, groups and organisations beyond national boundaries. A key characteristic of non-state actors is their use of global news networks and media events to influence global public opinion. However, its application to the media is limited to its role as a channel through which other actors such as political groups and NGOs can conduct public diplomacy, while the media network itself is not considered a primary actor. But what if the media (independent media) is both a channel and an active participant in conducting public diplomacy activities of its own accord and not on behalf of the nation state? The Non-State model can easily address this question in the case of state media such as CGTN Africa or partly independent channels such as AJE, and numerous case studies have been conducted on the public diplomacy role of CGTN Africa (Wang 2013), and AJE (Seib 2013; Seib 2007, 2013; Powers & Gilboa 2007). However, it does not clearly account for the public diplomacy role of commercial independent news networks such as eNCA, particularly in non-Western contexts.

The concept of the CNN effect might seem like an appropriate framework for analysing similar cases as it is more sensitive to the role of global communications as an

independent actor outside the control of other actors or its use as a communication tool by governments (Gilboa 2002). The CNN Effect has been applied to evaluate the effects of the media on foreign policy. Nevertheless, its application is not suitable within the context of this research, as my study does not focus on the effects of the media on policy. Furthermore, while the model has been applied in numerous studies, its definition and validity are still contentious and subject to ongoing debate (Gilboa 2002).

The Non-State Transnational model therefore seems more appropriate for analysing discourses in the three channels. Although it does not focus on independent media, such as eNCA, it will provide an opportunity for new insights into how independent media use public diplomacy, and the role they play. The focus on non-state actors will also reflect the role of sources used in media reports, such as policy experts and organisations, in influencing public opinion. While the focus of this research is not on public diplomacy, an application of the concept will shed further light on the role of non-state transnational media in public diplomacy, particularly eNCA. Previous research has highlighted the public diplomacy role of transnational actors such as multinational companies in pursuit of both their interests and those of their governments. Interdependence among actors also implies that private actors can lobby support for their government policies independently without a formal arrangement with their countries. It would therefore be interesting to establish if eNCA engages in public diplomacy on behalf of the South African government.

Power/knowledge – Foucault

Michel Foucault's extensive work on power provides an important shift in the analysis of power dynamics, and how it is practised and rationalised in the modern world. Given the contemporary context of this research, my analysis draws on his concept of power/knowledge and discourse to enrich our understanding of power relations among actors involved in the construction of audiences and how they are manifested in media discourse. Despite his disregard for material structures of power such as the state, various institutions and media that underlie the exercise of power (as I discuss later in this section), Foucault's particular focus on context and the link between power,

knowledge and discursive practices renders the concept suitable for analysing media discourse and its role in exercising soft power. I also elaborate on the concept to draw attention to the influence of structural domains/sources of power in the construction and shaping of discourses, taking into account the sociopolitical context in which discourses are produced and circulated.

Foucault defines discourse as a set of 'domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualised group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements' (Foucault 1972:80, cited in McHoul & Grace 1995). Discourses are therefore more than a specific text and include the broader domain of a field of practice. Foucault refutes the notion that material objects have a fixed meaning and argues that meaning is derived through discourse. Discourse is seen as a social practice through which knowledge and meaning are constructed. The framing of issues involves adopting certain positions and draws on certain frameworks of thinking, thus constructing or defining the issue or object (Faubion 1994). Power relations come into play in the construction of knowledge and during discourse, as they determine what knowledge is adopted and legitimised, who has the power to define it and the nature of the interaction. His conception of power is pertinent to the analysis of contemporary power relations, as power is no longer exercised directly by states. It is also appropriate to the shifting global power dynamics, the influence of non-state actors and interdependence among them.

According to Foucault, power is not coercive, nor does it emanate directly from a specific source such as institutions or groups; but is instead exercised by strategic production of knowledge, circulation of discourses and mechanisms that govern conduct (Foucault 1975). The exercise of power is accompanied by the production of mechanisms for the formation and accumulation of knowledge that control and regulate behaviour (Smart 2002). This absence of confrontation therefore makes power productive as subjects are involved in its production and circulation. In his writing about Panopticism, Foucault observed that inmates in prison are caught up in a power situation in which they are themselves the bearers (Foucault 1975:4). Power therefore produces pleasure, as subjects are involved in its production and diffusion. It is also

seductive and induces others to follow through the efficient strategies that govern their actions, leading to rational and controlled conduct. This is in line with the appeal of soft power, and media discourse serves as an effective tool for exercising soft power by attracting and winning the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. However, power is contested between the one exerting power and those over whom power is exerted, allowing a range of reactions including resistance (Faubion 1994). It is 'recalcitrant', characterised as an interplay of resistance, struggle and negotiation between actors, as each tries to dominate the other through discourse (Faubion 1994:7). To identify and understand the discourses that inform the construction of audiences, we need to explore these relations of power and domination between actors involved in their construction.

Foucault's conception of power/knowledge is also relevant to understanding the roles of various actors involved in the construction of audiences within an African context. It is not based on a top-down approach to power, but on how contemporary power is exercised through the production of forms of knowledge that are justified and legitimated through discourse (Foucault 1975). Power is therefore linked to discourse as opposed to subjects or institutions. This Foucault refers to as the *micro physics of power,* which operates as a network and is circulatory, meaning it exists everywhere, including at micro level, not only among powerful actors in society (Foucault 1975). Therefore, knowledge does not only reside among dominant groups, but is productive, as subjects are also involved in its production and circulation (Foucault 1975). Thus, power relations cannot only be conceived as a North/South dichotomy but also exist among peripheral nations, and can also emanate from the South at different global levels. Foucault's approach is also attuned to the role of non-state actors and their relationship to each other, which is interconnected and characterised by reciprocity and cooperation as opposed to domination (Death 2011; Abrahamsen 2003). For Foucault, discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak', thus African audiences are socially constructed through discourse (Foucault 1972:24). This notion of power can reveal the discourses and forms of knowledge that various actors draw upon to construct African audiences. It also enriches our understanding of the interaction between various actors involved in the construction of media reports, such as

interviewees and the role of the nation state, by examining how their discourses are structured and positioned in media content.

Another key aspect of Foucault's discursive framework is its historical specificity. Discourses are not fixed but are specific to a particular time and context. This is of key importance to this research as it allows me to situate the construction of audiences within periods that are of historical significance to Africa – the colonial era that for decades has informed the construction of the continent, as well as the current economic landscape of an Africa Rising, which is redefining and challenging traditional constructions of Africa. These changes bring into play power relations between African and other non-Western actors who all have an interest in the continent. This power is indirect and highly negotiated.

Nevertheless, the non-structural aspect of the Foucauldian model presents limitations for this research as it ignores the structural links to power, such as the state media institutions that underlie these power tactics and mechanisms and how they influence the construction of audiences. It also renders insignificant the unequal participation of institutional actors in discourse, yet the construction of knowledge and participation in discourse is characterised by significant influence and dominance of certain institutions or groups. Although Foucault refers to 'non-discursive domains' such as social institutions, he does not clarify their relationship to discursive practices or identify the sources of power (Smart 2002:41). Power relations come into play in the construction of knowledge and during discourse, as they determine what knowledge is adopted and legitimised, who takes part in the discourse, and the nature of the debates. They are determined by 'the power to narrate, block certain narrations from emerging and in the representation of issues' (Said 1978: xiii). Discourse is connected to power as it produces selective knowledge of others through representations (Said 1978).

Discourse can therefore be linked to material power structures that dominate the production and circulation of discourse and knowledge, facilitating the effectiveness of power. Even Foucault states that those who act upon the actions of others can be regarded as a source of power, as they exercise dominance over others. He adds that the conditions for power relations include systems of differences 'in status or privilege,

differing processes of production, linguistic or cultural difference, know-how and competence' (Faubion 1994: 344). The unequal distribution of these resources enables actors with better access to resources to produce and participate effectively in discourse. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, this power is highly contested and negotiated and reciprocal.

In the context of this study, I argue that political, social and cultural structures such as state-owned media and African institutions are still relevant in exploring power relations in the construction of meaning as they are significant players (although to varying degrees) in transnational broadcasting. At this point I extend the scope of his approach to link power structures that dominate the production and circulation of discourse and knowledge, as they are necessary to explain why certain perspectives predominate.

Governmentality

Closely related to the productive nature of power is Foucault's analytical approach of governmentality, which further demonstrates how power is embedded in our everyday practices in liberal societies.

Despite criticism that the concept is not suitable for application in non-liberal societies such as Africa (Joseph 2010; Jackson & Rosberg 1982), it has inspired some scholars to identify flaws to broaden its analysis in ways that are relevant to Africa's unique place in the world (Death 2011).

Death refers to governmentality as an 'analytical perspective for relations of power in general', as opposed to a type of power (Death 2011:9; Dean 1994:188). The approach does not replace or compete with other forms of power theorised by Foucault, but can be combined with other concepts to explain the interactions and relationships between them. Death (2011) identifies four features that distinguish the governmentality approach: forms of knowledge, forms of subjectivity, techniques and technologies, and fields of visibility.

Forms of knowledge: The concept of power/knowledge is related to this approach as it emphasises how power is exercised in a logical manner through legitimation and justification of truth, rather than subjective reasoning. This truth-marking can be manifested through media discourse where sources of news and interviewees articulate their perspectives. These perspectives are drawn from various discourses, and during the discussion they are justified, legitimated or rejected by the media or other participants as truth. The interaction between agents involves reciprocity between agents of different levels. This weighing process renders the dominant discourse legitimate, as it has been transparently assessed and tested with other competing perspectives, and won.

Subjectivities: This form of power demonstrates the co-optive nature of power, and how free subjects willingly participate and reciprocate in its implementation. It also highlights how multiple agents such as international organisations, communities, and political groups interact and share similar discursive practices.

Techniques and technologies: These are the manifestation of power relations at implementation level. These techniques and technologies are the tools, or processes and procedures, that are used to exercise subjection. They include public demonstrations and audiences, international donors and development partners.

Fields of visibility: This form of power highlights inconsistencies and competition among different approaches, resulting in alternative lines of thought and resistance. Alongside visible and legitimate systems of governance, there are also invisible ones that challenge dominant thought.

The features outlined above help to identify the strategies and techniques that are applied by the media to justify certain discourses. These may include journalistic norms and practices that guide news production and how they shape the construction of audiences.

2.3.4 Nationalism and the construction of audiences

Given the continuing relevance of the nation state and its increasing dominance in a global world, the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nation state’ play a key role in identity construction

and continue to be a form of reference for members of a nation state. This section outlines theoretical concepts that inform the formation of the nation and other identities.

Defining the nation

While the nation has its roots in historical context and physical territories, the contemporary nation is defined as a social construct that does not necessarily have a state. Modern scholars reject the idea of pre-existing or naturally occurring nations and agree that they are based on commonality and a shared sense of belonging, and highlight the role of industrialisation as a catalyst in its formation (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1989; Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring 2010:11). Gellner (1983)'s definition links the nation to structure and centres on culture and belonging, where cultural homogeneity and solidarity among members are central to the development of nationalism (Gellner 1983). Nations therefore share the same culture or systems of communication such as language. Gellner also emphasises the role of the industrial age and state institutions such as the education system in creating the nation, which is akin to a new form of human association where solidarity was based on culture (Gellner 1983). While like other theorists he also cites the importance of industrialisation, Gellner's perspective focuses on its role in creating a sense of identity and solidarity among migrant workers who come to the city. Workers from various backgrounds were identified by a common language which allowed them to share common experiences and history, uniting them as part of a community. This also facilitated industrial demands for training and motivated workers to work hard for their country and nation (Leoussi 2013). Gellner's formulation of nationalism is however limited by its context of a physical space where workers are located and interact, which does not take into account new forms of interaction in the contemporary world where members of the same culture share ideas and interact across space and time and without even speaking the same language, using new communication technologies.

Hobsbawm (1989) points out that a nation is a form of 'social engineering' (Hobsbawm 1983:10). Like Anderson's industrial revolution that was crucial for the development of imagined communities, Hobsbawm also highlights the role of economic, political,

technical and administrative factors in the development of the nation, especially the education system. He also makes an important point about the role of the elite in the construction of a nation from 'above' (Hobsbawm 1983:10). Hobsbawm's emphasis on formal social structures places limitations on his theory. While institutions play a key role in perpetuating nationalist sentiments, a sense of belonging depends not only on structure, but can occur among members through direct interaction or be facilitated by new communication technologies.

Benedict Anderson's framework of the 'imagined nation' has found wide application among media scholars in an attempt to analyse the culture power of the media. The manner in which the nation is imagined is therefore crucial to our understanding of national identity. His concept of 'imagined' is a fundamental shift from how the nation was previously conceived, as it is independent of physical space or time, implying that the connection between members of a community does not require them to be in the same physical space or formal institutions. This makes it relevant to new media and communication technologies, which facilitate the formation of various communities.

Audiences as imagined communities

Benedict Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities' has been an influential model of thinking about the relationship between the media and audiences (Anderson 1983). While Anderson's original application focused on the construction of a nation, it is also relevant to our understanding of the construction of audiences, based on his attention to the role of the print media in the development of a nation.

Anderson defines a nation as:
an imagined political community … It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1983:6).
According to Anderson the print press and industrial capitalism were instrumental in creating national audiences through the use of vernacular languages (Anderson 1983). This visibility and use of 'national print-languages' suppressed other language markets,

consequently constructing readership communities based on shared language (Anderson 1983:67). The implication of the suppression of other languages is the exclusion and 'othering' of other nations.

Anderson adds that nations are invented and their existence is not only determined by their 'falsity or genuineness', but by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson 1983:6). Thus, imagining the members of the nation through languages serves as the best strategy to address them since they are unknown to each other. In the same way that audiences, unknown to each other come to exist by being imagined through discourses that resonate with certain experiences, or shape ideas about issues, thereby creating an audience based on shared identity or ideology. Hence, an analysis of discourse provides useful insights into the strategies used to construct African audiences.

Anderson's imagined communities are part of a nation-building project where the construction of the nation was limited within national boundaries. However, this research extends the idea of imagined communities beyond the nation, to transnational audiences and how they are constructed by non-Western broadcasters. As opposed to a national project, the construction of African audiences is explicitly a pan-African one, with the aim of uniting Africa as a transnational market for free trade. This is in response to new ways of thinking about Africa beyond the national, as is already evident in institutional continental frameworks such as the AU and AfCFTA, which seek to unite African markets for economic and political objectives. The media is in turn shaped by these developments. Hence this study provides a lens through which we can understand the role of contemporary political and economic trends in the continent in constructing these new forms of audience, as well as how these audiences have evolved.

Despite his acknowledgment of geographic biases, Anderson's conception of the nation is informed by Western history and as a result has been criticised for not adequately reflecting historical and cultural experiences in non-Western contexts, as well as factors that contribute to the formation of other forms of national imagination.

One of Anderson's main critics is post-colonial scholar Chatterjee (1993), who questions Anderson's notion that the development of nations was universal and homogenous and occurred during the modern period. Anderson's focus on modular nationalisms developed in Western Europe, the Americas and Russia, which means that 'nationalism was entirely a product of the political history of Europe' (Chatterjee 1993:215). This disregards other forms of nation such as anti-colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa. Western forms of nations were therefore considered legitimate and should be adopted in other parts of the world, leaving non-Western countries with nothing more to imagine. Chatterjee charts the development of Indian nationalism at different times in history and demonstrates how alternative forms of nationalism existed and continued to be resilient amidst contestation and imposition of colonial forms, such as the Bengali language and traditional drama. Chatterjee also points to the development of the Bengali language as a form of belonging to a cultural identity which excluded the coloniser (Chatterjee 1993:218).

Chatterjee further challenges Anderson's structuralist view for its emphasis on material domains of the state and institutions. While he agrees that print capitalism provides the institutional space for the development of the modern nation, he contends that spiritual forms of nationalism based on cultural identity continue to play a key role in the construction of nations in India (Chatterjee 1993:214–218).

Anthony W. Marx (2003) also challenges the inclusive nature of Anderson's definition of nations and highlights the exclusionary aspects of collective communities, stating that 'nationalism is justified by a sense of historical commonality which *demarcates those who belong and others who do not*' (Marx 2003:6, emphasis added).

Despite criticism, the originality of Anderson's work has extended its usefulness beyond nationalism as it provided new insights into the conditions and cultural institutions that facilitate the spread of nationalism, such as the media.

National identity and branding

Within media and communication research, scholars have sought to demonstrate how nationalism and national identity are manifested in the media and the implications thereof. Discourse analysts focus on the discursive strategies and techniques used in the media to construct national identity. Research conducted by Wodak et al (1999) examined how the nation was constructed in the Austrian media. What is unique about the study is its focus on 'national sameness' as opposed to 'difference', and the role of memory and past history in the construction of nations and national identity (De Cillia, Riesigl & Wodak 1999). It concludes that the construction of a nation depends on the context in which the discourses take place. These memories are brought to life in official, semi-official and private contexts, where constructs of the Austrian nation and national identity are drawn from definitions of citizenship and culture (De Cillia et al 1999).

The complexities brought about by globalisation also have an impact on how nations and national identity are constructed. The divergent and convergent processes of globalisation do not result in either homogenisation or heterogeneity, but tend to give rise to both the development of new collective identity based on shared interests and the preservation of existing ones to maintain a sense of community in an increasingly changing environment. De Cillia et al (1999) point out that globalisation brings about complexity and insecurities that sustain and encourage feelings of national identity. This inspires the rediscovery and revitalisation of the past, emotion and patriotism towards one's nation (De Cillia et al 1999). This further demonstrates the resilience of the nation with which communities may identify, as well as the resilience of its institutions, which refutes claims that globalisation erodes the nation state.

Shared history and memories are also woven into narratives and story-telling to construct nations; this has been highlighted by other scholars (Bhabha 1990; Knudsen 2010). Knudsen (2010) notes that popular understanding of historical events also plays a critical role in forging national identity through shared history. His research illustrates how performance evokes nationalistic nostalgia where nations are branded throbyugh story-telling, staging and re-enactment of historical periods.

Explaining the role of narratives, Ram states that nations are created discursively by a narrative process that gives them meaning and ideas about themselves and their identities. 'Nationality is a narration, a story which people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world. The fact that nationality is a story does not challenge its reality, because myths are not mystifications' (Ram 1994:153, cited in Theado 2013). These narratives can be modified by various actors, such as news sources and other media participants, to evoke emotion and create ideas about belonging to certain communities.

Billig's (1995) concept of banal nationalism has also been applied in media studies to highlight how national identity is constructed through everyday discourse and social life, manifested through routine reminders of national belonging. These reminders become part of everyday language and are eventually naturalised as part of the everyday (Billig 1995, in Bishop & Jarwoski 2003).

National events, particularly sports, are a popular site for displaying solidarity with one's nation, as demonstrated by Bishop and Jarwoski (2003) in their analysis of British press coverage of the football match between England and Germany. The authors conclude that the press constructed the nation as a homogeneous collective to which readers belonged through othering, stereotyping and use of military metaphors drawn from World War II, when the two countries fought on opposite sides. The war memories create a sense of belonging and patriotism for the British readers while constructing the German team as the enemy (Bishop & Jarwoski 2003). Similar strategies of constructing national identity were also employed by Chinese media in its coverage of the Beijing Olympics, and South Africa's hosting of the World Cup, which were characterised by discourses on national belonging and unity (Han 2011; Peltz-Steele 2014; Chuma 2012). The 2010 FIFA world cup hosted by South Africa particularly demonstrates the construction of African nationalism. Discourses about the event created feelings of pride, not just among South African citizens but throughout the continent, which was characterised by expressions of African achievement and 'a moment for Africa', thus creating an imagined community based on pan-African solidarity (Berger 2010; Ginsberg 2010; Chuma 2012). Such solidarity is also expressed by fans at other African football events where they support African teams and players from other countries on the continent, based on their African affiliation (Akindes 2011). Akindes (2011) points out that European football leagues have become more popular in Africa than local and national ones, as they feature players such

as Yaya Toure from various African countries who connect with the African audience. The decision by African audiences to watch foreign matches or support international teams is based on the identity of the African migrant players in those teams, and not their preference for the international broadcasters (Akindes 2011).

Nation branding

Although the existence of nations does not depend on a state, the concept of national belonging continues to organise communities and everyday life (Roosvall & Salovaan-Moring 2010). Nation branding is widely used by countries to construct the national identity of a country or place culturally and ideologically for commercial and political gain. Through nation branding the nation increasingly operates as a commercial entity, being constructed as a commodity to attract investors, as a source of soft power, and presenting countries and places as preferred destinations for tourism.

Marketing literature, particularly brand management, provides useful insights on how nations brand themselves. It highlights how the media commercialises the nation and constructs it as a commodity for domestic and international audiences such as investors. Brand expert Simon Anholt notes that nation branding involves the development of a 'competitive identity strategy' where governments partner with the private sector to define the core identity of a country and key messages about what it stands for. These messages communicate to the world what the country stands for (Anholt 2007:474).
The media is often used in partnership with the private sector to project messages that define the national brand of a country and ideas about what it stands for. This increases the country's domestic and global appeal, allowing it to successfully compete with others for investment and create a source of soft power. In this way, the nation becomes a commodity to be sold to domestic and foreign audiences.

The media in many emerging countries, such as China and South Africa, has been used to market the countries in a bid to attract investment or host international events. For example, the 'rainbow nation' played a key role in the national branding of South Africa in its bid for the World Cup, and in building national unity after apartheid. This message

conveyed a vision of sameness and equality. Similarly, South Africa's *Proudly South Africa* logo is an example of a branding concept used domestically to create patriotism and pride in being associated with quality South African products.

A study of national branding in Estonia and India also illustrates how similar branding practices were used to construct these countries as commercial enterprises to attract investors (Bolin & Stahlberg 2010). Bolin and Stahlberg (2010) argue that nation states act as commercial enterprises where they partner with corporates or the private sector to create nation branding. As a result, they address domestic audiences using solidarity and unifying rhetoric to create the nation as a commodity.

Nevertheless, the role of the media in national construction is not always formally organised, which demonstrates the role of non-state actors in soft power, as in the case of independent media such as eNCA.

African nationalism and identity

The concept of how nations are created as imagined communities can also be applied to the creation of regional nationalities and other forms of community beyond the nation state. These audiences can be based in various parts of Africa and beyond and will never meet, but identify with the continent and are united by common ideas about Africa. Anderson states that although members of the nations may not meet, 'in the minds of each lives the image of their communion', made possible through 'fraternity' or 'comradeship' (Anderson 1990:5–7). By specifically targeting African audiences, the non-Western channels have developed a 'communion' or bond that unites the audiences in terms of their African identity. This communion is central to definitions of national identity, and emphasises a sense of belonging to and solidarity with a community. Therefore, a common African identity is one way in which African audiences can be constructed.

Smith (1996) also notes that national identity is the main point of reference for 'social solidarity and individual affiliation' (Smith 1996:578). He also highlights factors that create national identity:

> ... 'national' identity involves some sort of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single

> code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong (Smith 1991:9).

The factors highlighted in the above definitions are characteristic of African audiences that are geographically linked to the continent and may be affiliated to similar political and institutional groupings, such as the AU and other regional organisations, as well as being limited by boundaries (Anderson 1993).

Shared history among members of a community also features prominently in studies of national identity (De Cillia et al 1999). The satellite television channels under study share a common history with Africa through their non-Western origins, which can be a source of solidarity and identity creation. As the 'other',[8] non-Western and emerging powers, their countries of origin – China, Qatar and South Africa – have similar historical experiences with Africa based on their place in the world and developmental challenges that they can harness to construct audiences. China and South Africa also share a colonial past.

While essentialist definitions of the term 'African' refer to people of African heritage, a new African identity that reflects its contemporary and complex nature has emerged. The conception of African identity is therefore very fluid, with different meanings that are not only linked to place, race and ethnicity, but can be based on factors that create affinity or a sense of belonging to the continent. Original conceptions of African identity are linked to a common culture and identity, which later shifted to reflect post-colonial opposition to Western constructs, shared history and place in the world, and currently to definitions shaped by multiple cultures, ethnicities and races. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki alluded to this diversity in his famous speech 'I am an African', in which he defines an African as a composite of different influences no longer linked to race, ethnicity or territory, but to global ideas and identities (Mbeki

[8] The 'other' as opposed to the West

1996). This modern identity of an African also informs the concept of an 'Afropolitan', a term used by Taiye Selase to define the cosmopolitan nature of Africans who are linked to Africa and many geographies but do not belong to any (Selase 2005, para. 3). Given the complexity of African identity, it is therefore fitting to conceive of African audiences as imagined.

A discussion of African identity is incomplete without considering concepts of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance, which have come to define what it means to be an African and central to constructions of African identity. Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance are ideologies that aim to counter negative Western definitions of Africa and assert Africa's right to dignity, freedom and self-determination. They are associated with terms such as 'regeneration, revival, re-awakening, self-reliance'. They form the foundation of the AU's *Agenda 2063,* which is a strategic framework to address inequalities and shape the future of the continent (AU 2013). These ideologies feature prominently in the AU's discourse to promote Africa's renewal and solidarity and define Africa's image.

The AU defines pan-Africanism as an ideology and movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide. It is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic, social and political progress and aims to "unify and uplift" people of African descent (African Union 2013:1). Based on the African Union definition of pan-Africanism, success of all Africa states lies in proper awareness and recognition of Africa's shared values, culture, beliefs, origin and common destiny. It also means that all African states should unite to approach and voice problems common to them (such as political instability, extreme poverty, unemployment, neocolonialism, etc.) (African Union 2013). The concept of pan-Africanism emerged as a form of resistance against European imperialism, colonialism and slavery (Thompson 1969; Geiss 1974; Tondi 2005). It has its roots in the late 18th century among freed African slaves in the diaspora to regain their dignity following years of slavery and to return to Africa (Thompson, 1969; Geiss 1974: 6). Tondi (2005) identifies four themes that characterise pan-Africanism, and these are: a) a universal expression of black pride and achievement; b) a return to Africa by the people of African descent living in the diaspora; c) a harbinger of liberation; and d) the

political unification of the continent (Tondi 2005: 309-310). The concept has evolved and takes various forms depending on the historical context, time and place in which it is used, but its main goals of securing equal rights for Africans in the continent and in the diaspora remain. Pan-Africanism was later established as a movement in the 1920s by Marcus Garvey and W.E.B Du Bois, who were to become prominent pan-Africanists. The concept was also manifested in various forms such as negritude, espoused by African scholars in France such as Aime Cesare and Leopold Senghor. Other prominent voices of the pan-African movement include the first Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, who was instrumental in founding the first African regional organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), based on pan-Africanist ideals (Team 2000). Pan-Africanism is therefore a form of African nationalism and characteristic of imagined communities.

The African Renaissance similarly articulates Africa's vision for the future, and refers to the 'rebirth and renewal of Africa'. Its objectives include the establishment of democracy, sustainable economic growth and development. It is not a new concept and can be traced to the writings of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois, who were central to the early pan-Africanist movements, but has been prominently championed by former Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa (Mbeki 2003, 2015; Iroulo 2017). The concept forms the cornerstone of the AU's strategic vision and South Africa's political philosophy, and continues to feature in the rhetoric of African scholars and leaders to express the revival of Africa through self-reliance and ownership of solutions to Africa's problems (AU 2013; Department of International Relations 2011).

As in the printed media of Anderson's time, today the media continues to facilitate the construction of various identities through discourse. Anderson's concept of imagined communities has therefore found resonance and application among media scholars.

Anderson's concept has also been applied beyond the nation to demonstrate how transformations in contemporary media systems can be a catalyst for the construction of audience. In South Africa, changes in media ownership after apartheid led to the emergence of 'black' radio stations that gave rise to the creation of urban black audiences linked by a common 'black' identity, such as youth radio station YFM (Berger 1999) and urban radio station Metro FM (Bosch & Mullins 2012). Nevertheless, these studies are limited to South African media, hence the focus of this study on transnational media to supplement current literature on African media that has so far concentrated on the political

economy of national media and audience reception (Tomaselli 1997; Berger 1999; Duncan 2006; Nyamnjoh 2005; Abubakar 2013; Bosch & Mullins 2012). Although some scholars refer to the role of South African media in the continent, they have not yet explored the issue empirically and in its regional context (Duncan 2006; Tomaselli et al 2007; Patterson 1998).

Discourse is key to the existence and sustainability of a nation, as it enables it to be expressed through everyday language to create a sense of shared identity. Billig (1995) notes that banal nationalism constructs the nation through everyday social life:

> The term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged', in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition (Billig 1995:6, cited in Zuelow 1999).

The nation is constructed by routine and familiar reminders such as 'us, them, here and there' which flag the nation, allowing members of that nation to feel a sense of belonging and potentially excluding others who cannot relate to these memories, places or shared meanings (Bishop & Jarwoski 2003).

The media plays a key role in perpetuating these reminders in its coverage of current affairs and social issues, by creating familiar connections from which identities for audiences can be constructed.

Based on the discussion above, I use the term 'audience construction' or 'construction of audiences' to refer to the manner in which media institutions envision and attribute identities and values to a pan-African audience. This is different from audience targeting and measurement; it refers to the creation of audiences by the industry to serve and justify its interests (Ang 2005:x). This study's analysis of media constructions therefore goes beyond the geographic segmentation of African audiences to examine the perspectives of

social actors who participate in media discourse, and their role in the construction of audiences, as well as African agency.

Within an African context, the concern with audience identities and how the media think about regional audiences is of significance to the study of global media because the notion of a pan-African TV audience is not fully defined and developed.[9] The African audience is therefore a new creation, which compels us to understand the relationship between transnational media and regional audiences within a unique African setting. An enquiry into the making of an African audience is essential to understand how notions of the audience influence the creation of knowledge about the continent, and how these audiences are served.

[9] However, there have been previous attempts to target regional viewers by broadcasters such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC Africa), eNCA and MNET, which focus on continental news.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is an evaluation of the existing body of literature and key debates that have shaped thinking on global media and the construction of African audiences.

3.1 Media and globalisation

The late 20th century saw a significant rise in international broadcasting as part of the globalisation process. While transnational connections and activities have always been a feature of human history, globalisation increased their magnitude and scale tremendously. The media and communications industry was also enmeshed in this process, resulting in the global expansion of media organisations, driven by a combination of economic, political and technological factors, deregulation and liberalisation in the industry, making it possible to reach and create new audiences to meet economic and political objectives. Some of these factors are improvements in satellite technology that increased the broadcasting spectrum, making it possible to increase the number of satellite and cable television channels; lower production and reproduction costs; economies of scale; and deregulation of the cultural industries in the US and many parts of the world. These trends created a demand for foreign media products, opening new markets for producers and allowing them to export these products at reasonable cost (Alexander et al 2013). The expansion later fragmented domestic media, in the creation of new audiences at local, national and regional levels (Alexander et al 2013). While some of the factors are relevant to the broadcasting industry internationally, they are primarily based on trends in the US media industry.

Although audience behaviour is changing as television content is now accessible through various technologies and platforms such as the internet, these technologies are still at their infancy and not affordable for many African users due to high data costs (Sukdeo, cited in Cornwell 2018). Subscription to satellite TV is therefore still a popular form of access to the channels under study and continues to grow (PwC 2015; Sukdeo, cited in Cornwell 2018). I therefore also refer to these channels as satellite TV as opposed to cable or other technologies to reflect the many in which they are accessed and experienced within an African context.

This global connectedness has facilitated the transnational expansion of global media entities. While global media is associated with international reach, the complex nature of news flows has deterritorialised media content, creating complex transnational flows (Berglez 2008). Global media is therefore not only defined by reach, but can also be understood from a discursive perspective where media from various levels (local, national, regional and transnational) can be global in their outlook based on the discourses they engage in (Olausson 2011). A global outlook aims to explain issues by connecting them with political, economic, social and cultural practices and processes in various parts of the world (Berglez 2008, p. 845). Reese (2007) points out that a global perspective is informed by the manner in which news is explained, framed and the selection of news sources (Reese 2007). News with a global outlook will therefore be transnational and intercontinental in nature (ibid.). In the news channels under study, this global outlook is reflected in the content and mode of address through discourse. For example, eNCA's global citizen audience was addressed through relevant news reports, and talk show discussions such as, *Africa's Global Competitiveness* which globalized the discourse on Africa's growth by linking it with local, national and regional issues that are relevant to global audiences such as investors. On the other hand, CGTN's address of global audiences was evident in business news, where audiences were as international investors as discussed in my analysis. The sharing of content and resources across broadcasting centres and bureaux allows these channels to engage in global processes and discourses which contribute to their global character, at varying levels.

The notion of 'global media' was previously challenged by Herman & McChesney (1997) who argued that global media was not global, but equivalent to Western or American media. This criticism is contradicted by the emergence of non-Western media organisations with a global presence as this study demonstrates. Other critics have highlighted the presence of nation-centred discourses in global media thereby reflecting the continued importance of the nation state as opposed to a global outlook or public sphere (Riegert 2010; Hafez 2007; Hollifield 2004). Hafez (2007) also highlights barriers that limit engagement with global audiences. Nevertheless, globalisation is characterised by convergence and interdependence of various factors as reflected in

contemporary perspectives on globalisation. It is important to note that while these channels address global audiences in some instances, their content and perspective is still primarily focused on Africa and the global South.

A key theme in the literature on international communication is media globalisation, which provides a holistic account of the dynamics of international broadcasting from the political, economic, social and cultural perspectives. Scholarship on globalisation is vast and multidisciplinary, and as a result is characterised by different theoretical and analytical approaches to understanding the phenomenon. Giddens (1997) defines globalisation as 'the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens 1997:20). Held and McGrew (2003) describe it as 'the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction' (Held & McGrew 2003:3). Appadurai (2001) emphasises that the disjunctive nature of globalisation, where the flow of people, objects and ideas are divergent and characterised by contradictions, 'produces problems that manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local' (Appadurai 2001:6). Despite the differences, what most descriptions of globalisation have in common is the intensity and accelerated rate of its changing trends. My discussion focuses on the link between globalisation and the media.

Key arguments on globalisation can be broadly divided into four approaches: pro-globalists, globalisation sceptics, approaches that highlight the complexity and contradictory nature of the process, and post-globalists who proclaim an end to globalisation (Holton 1998; Held 2000; Held & McGrew 2003; Thussu 1996, 2000). Held and McGrew (2003) provide a useful model for understanding major arguments about globalisation, and have categorised them into positive and pessimistic, internationalist and transformationist (Held 2000; Held & McGrew 2003). Similarly, Holton (1998) identifies three waves of globalisation scholarship, characterised by hyper-globalism, scepticism and post-scepticism (Holton 2005:5, cited in Held & McGrew 2003). The categories of the different schools of thought may differ, but most

reflect positions characterised by optimism, pessimism and a combination of the first two positions that highlight its complexity. The different positions reflect the evolving nature of the trends and thinking at particular times. Below I discuss these approaches, including contemporary thinking about the future of globalisation.

3.1.1 Proglobalist view

The pro-globalist approach to globalisation adopts a celebratory and highly optimistic view about the pervasiveness of globalisation, and its impact on all spheres of life – economic, political, social and cultural – as a result of the high level of integration in the global economy, communications patterns and interconnectedness (Fukuyama 1992; Ohmae 1995; McLuhan 1989; Castells 2007; Held 2000). Some of these views characterised early scholarship on globalisation, and were an attempt to analyse the dynamics of the globalisation processes and interpret the trends that were taking place, largely from an economic perspective. More extremist, hyper-globalist positions on globalisation conceptualise it as inevitable and a threat to national states due to the power of global market forces and borderless communications that cannot be controlled by the state. One of the proponents of this view is Francis Fukuyama, whose book *The End of History and the Last Man* has had a profound influence on globalisation debates, particularly in business (Fukuyama 1992).

Fukuyama's views are supported by Kenichie Ohmae (1995), who proclaims the end of the role of the nation state as mediator and facilitator of global solutions, 'in a world where economic borders are progressively disappearing' (Ohmae 1995:2). In his idea of the 'four Is' – investments, information technology, industry and individual consumers – which represent economic flows that are underpinned by a borderless economy, he demonstrates how these factors are contributing to the diminishing role of the nation state. Investment consists of cross-border transactions and movement of capital, which are no longer constrained by geographic borders. These investments are facilitated by the second 'I', information technology, which ensures the smooth transfer of funds and virtual operation for transnational organisations across the world. The third 'I' stands

for industries that expand their markets autonomously beyond national borders without concessions from the state. The last 'I' represents individual consumers whose purchasing behaviour is not motivated by national affiliation, but by personal preferences for goods and services from any part of the globe (Ohmae 1995:3–5).

The borderless character of this new global society is also best highlighted by Marshal McLuhan's concept of the 'global village', which suggests the shrinking of physical space as a result of increasing interconnectedness and communication among people in different parts of the world. Some of these connections are facilitated through the media, where events in one part of the world are experienced world-wide in real time, as if we were all living in a small village (McLuhan 1989.) This concept captures the key role of communication systems such as transnational media in social change and has been widely applied in media studies. Manuel Castells (1996) also points out that we are living in a 'network society', which comprises new social structures that are globally integrated and facilitated by electronic information networks such as the internet (Castells 2007).

Other scholars have emphasised the democratising impact of globalisation and its role in constituting a Habermasian global 'public sphere' that increases diversity and participation (Calhoun 1992; Kavoori 2007; Hannerz 1996; McLuhan 2010; Tomlinson 2003; Volkmer 1999; Held & McGrew 2003; Castells 2007, cited in Thussu 2010). The original notion of a public sphere was conceptualised by Jurgen Habermas as a free public space outside the control of government and other institutions, where diverse voices can engage in discussion (Calhoun 1992). The open nature of the internet has been likened to this public sphere. It is central to the so-called 'information revolution' that is said to have a transformative power in world politics by empowering non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations, activists and terrorists alike to organise and use communication technologies to participate in political, economic and social affairs and for advocacy (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Keohane & Nye 1972; Castells 2010). In recent years, information communication technologies (ICTs) and social media have been credited with amplifying ordinary voices and facilitating collective action in various protests, from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Kenyan post-election violence

and the Arab Spring, where it was used during citizen protests to draw attention to issues that are not covered in mainstream media (Shirky 2009; *Washington Times* 2009; Goldstein 2007; Lotan et al 2011; Janse van Rensburg 2012). Nevertheless, some authors conclude that digital tools can be a catalyst for both democracy and injustice (Goldstein 2008).

The exchange of ideas and interaction of cultures across the world is also said to lead to the formation of a global universal culture that resonates with people across the world, dominated by Western values (Hallin & Machini 2010; Schiller 1969; Ritzer 2004). Hallin and Machini (2010) argue that globalisation is developing a tendency to homogenise, where media systems converge to create a global culture of journalism driven by changes in technology, commercialism and secularism, as seen in Europe (Hallin & Machini 2010).

As discussed above, advocates of globalisation view the trends as beneficial with positive economic, social and cultural impacts for all. However, the impact of globalisation is uneven and complex, and not all societies have benefited positively. As a result, the nature and significance of globalisation have been widely contested, as the literature examined below demonstrates (Holton 1998; Bayart 2007; Stiglitz 2003; Hirst, Thompson & Bromley 2009).

3.1.2 Globalisation Sceptics

While globalisation trends are a reality and a significant aspect of social change, the nature and extent of global interconnectedness, its cultural implications and the role of the agents involved in the process have been questioned (Hirst et al 2009; Stiglitz 2005; Ferguson 1992; Robertson 1992; Bayart 2007; Holton 1998).

Economic and political globalisation

Hirst et al (2009) highlight the importance of international governance, the capacity of national economic and political strategies and the high degree of economic interdependence (Hirst et al (2009). The authors challenge extreme claims of globalisation on the grounds of their measurement and revolutionary claims. They

contend that the internationalisation of economies is not unique but has existed since the advent of modern industrial technology in the 1860s. Secondly, the growth of genuine transnational companies is slightly exaggerated, with most based nationally, regionally or multinationally, depending on their assets, production and market operations. Another important point they make is that the extent of capital transfers, trade and investment is not as international as it is believed to be, but largely occurs among developed countries and a few emerging economies that are beneficiaries of foreign direct investment (FDI). Instead, there is a growing trend towards 'supranational regionalisation' (Hirst et al 2009:3). A similar point is made by Ferguson (1992), who states that evidence of the so-called global transformation is only within 'one third of the world's population' and among the OECD and G7 countries (Ferguson 1992:74). These regionalisation trends are also evident in the media industry where markets linked by geography, culture and language have emerged, as I discuss in the next chapter (Straubhaar 1996).

The role of the nation state

Literature on the role of the nation state in a globalising world reminds us of its continuing importance and resilience. Claims that nation states are obsolete and that economic flows are beyond government control have also been contested, as powerful nations such as the G8, including China and India, play a crucial and necessary role in governing international trade and economic processes (Stiglitz 2003; Hirst et al 2009). Similarly, state formations such as BRICS, ASEAN and various regional bodies are actively involved in the formation and coordination of economic and political processes across regional blocs. The role of nation states in international governance has been underscored by Stiglitz (2003), who argues that while globalisation imposes constraints on governments, such as taxation and nation-building, the need is for global governance institutions to manage the global system and handle its consequences (Stiglitz 2003).

The important function of the state is also underscored by rising nationalist sentiment and protectionist policies in many parts of the world (Corrales 2017; WTO 2016). This was made evident recently in the growing influence of nationalist discourse and movements in Europe and the US, which demonstrates that affiliation to a nation state is

still a frame of reference for national identity. There is also a resurgence of trends towards divergence of cultures, ethnicities and religious groups, which questions assumptions about cultural homogenisation (Wang 2008; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997). While globalisation has limited and challenged the resources of the nation state to respond to international crisis, particularly the rise of international terrorism, it plays a crucial role in resolving terrorist threats and conflict through international governance institutions such as the UN Security Council. This was demonstrated in efforts to end the war in Syria, immigration and the Ebola crisis (United Nations 2017; UN News 2017). Holton (1998) makes a valid point about the importance of co-ordination among various actors, stating that other actors involved in globalisation have not overrun the state, but have actually used it to harness global processes and networks to meet their objectives (Holton 1998:6).

The notion of a threatened nation state is also problematised by some scholars who contend that it is still relevant as the primary actor in formulating policies that serve national interests and protect local industries (Waisbord 1998, cited in Chin Yik-Chan 2004:5; Holton 1998; Roosvali & Salovaara-Moring 2010; Ashun 2010). Through policy formulation, nation states can place barriers to entry and restrictions on investment in certain sectors or products to protect their economies. For instance, the South African broadcasting regulations stipulate that subscription television licensees should spend a minimum of 15% of their annual content acquisition budget on local content production (ICASA 2016). Moreover, after conducting case studies in China, Brazil and Australia, Flew and Waisbord (2015) point out that in the new information age the state has become more significant in the governance of the internet and media processes (Flew & Waisbord 2015).

Therefore, the impact of global media flows is not a linear process that can only be analysed as either a threat or a coercive power. The state is a facilitator of globalisation, while also being transformed by it (Thussu 2000; Zhang 2011), and is also a product of globalisation (Bayart 2007). In her study of Chinese television, Zhang (2011) concludes that while the Chinese party-state was transformed by globalisation, it also played a key role in the globalisation of the country's television industry (Zhang 2011). The CCP

adapted its policies to reorganise its media system in response to the presence of new global media after its entry into the WTO (Sukosd & Wang 2013). Nor do increased FDI investment and pervasive communication technologies translate into less state intervention. The interplay between the national, regional and global processes and diversity of audiences also means that the state is produced and reproduced in globalisation (Ashun 2010; Riegert 2010).

Furthermore, nation states react to global challenges by adapting the global to the local and balancing competing interests, resulting in new ways of exercising power and reconfiguring relationships. While certain ideologies and political interests may inform constructions of audiences in state-controlled media, these institutions also need to balance competing interests within a global and market-driven environment. The challenges and conflicts of this negotiated process are illustrated by the case of CCTV, whose role as 'persuader' may conflict with the expectations of its African and global audiences (Gagliardone 2013:35). The construction of audiences cannot therefore be understood only through traditional normative functions of the media, as it is a result of interplay between various factors, which may change over time as the interests and global positioning of the state change.

The extent of influence by global media on national audiences is also not inevitable, as audiences continue to prefer national and local content. Riegert (2010) observes that media globalisation has not changed the national news agenda; international news coverage is still aligned to national economic, political and cultural discourses that are relevant to audiences. Furthermore, media globalisation has also led to audience fragmentation, brought about by increased competition (Hollifield 2004). This loss of audience share has motivated media corporations to seek audiences elsewhere, leading to the construction of new audiences to attract advertisers (Hollifield 2004). Hafez (2007) argues that claims about the popularity of global media are based on the global reach of technology beyond national borders, but there is no empirical data on audience reach (Hafez 2007). Thus, globalisation processes that seem to weaken the state can also be used to strengthen it, making its impact contradictory and unpredictable.

While the nation state is under pressure and faces constraints, it remains an important agent in globalisation and will adjust its role to deal with the challenges. Both the state and other actors are interdependent.

Globalisation and culture

The impact of globalisation on culture has also been a key theme among critics, who have questioned claims of unidirectional cultural flows and homogenised global culture, drawing attention to the mixed outcomes and the complexity of the interaction between the global, the regional and the local (Robertson 1992; Tomlinson 1991, 1999; Hannerz 1997; Appadurai 1996).

The literature on cultural globalisation also highlights the negative consequences arising from the role of TNCs and Western corporate values as key drivers of the globalisation process. They argue that globalisation is akin to the transmission of Western culture and values, resulting in the erosion of local cultures following their exposure to American lifestyles, particularly consumerism (Schiller 1969) and the adoption of new cultural forms leading to a homogeneous global culture (Herman & McChesney 1997). Scholars such as Ritzer (2004) have even gone to the extent of using metaphors of the international fast-food chain McDonald's to describe the American principles and corporate values that have come to dominate the world economic system, which he labelled the 'McDonaldisation of society' (Ritzer 2004:1), or 'Americanisation' and 'Grobalisation' to highlight the global growth ambitions of TNCs (Ritzer 2004:73). Ikenberry (2007) also links globalisation with US hegemony as a result of its role in facilitating processes of the global world economy (Ikenberry 2007).

The relationship between globalisation and the US is also conceptualised as ideological. Brah and Coombes (2000) point out that the discourse on globalisation is a Western narrative that presents their view of the world. Similarly, Rosenberg (2005) states that globalisation theorists became 'ideological amplifiers' of globalisation (Rosenberg 2005:7), while Ferguson (1992) refers to globalisation as a myth. However, Ferguson's interpretation of 'myth' is not intended to question the existence of globalisation, but rather to describe a narrative that is socially constructed and evolves as globalisation

changes to align with certain interests. She identifies seven myths about globalisation and argues that they are embedded in the discourses about globalisation to serve and justify the objectives of the parties invested in the process, although she does not specifically link it to the US (Ferguson 1992). The conception of globalisation as a myth has particular significance for this research, as it is linked to discourses about globalisation and how they shape the expansion of non-Western media in Africa and inform the construction of African audiences. This is even more so since the proliferation of new media players in Africa is also underpinned by the discourse of a rising Africa, which is also enmeshed in globalisation processes, namely economic growth and FDI investment in the continent.

The most prominent cultural critique of globalisation is found in debates on media and cultural imperialism.

3.2 Media and cultural imperialism

Cultural theorists have highlighted unequal structural and power relations in the global media industry. They argue that global media expansion and infrastructure have created inequalities in media ownership, flow of information and cultural products, which are dominated by the West, particularly the US. These arguments are central to media and cultural imperialism theories that have characterised the analysis of international communications and its implications for non-Western markets.

Media and cultural imperialism theories are grounded in dependency theories, which were dominant in the 1960s and 1970s. Dependency theory stresses the unequal relationship between developed countries based in the North and developing countries on the periphery, as a result of international policies and processes that favoured countries that were more economically and politically developed. This maintained control over developing nations and put them at a disadvantage to the extent that they remained dependent upon industrialised nations (Frank 1969). A common theme among dependency theorists is the concept of developing countries as helpless and unable to defend themselves from the domination imposed on their societies and culture. A cultural perspective of this theory is espoused by Herbert Schiller, who concluded that

the global expansion of international broadcasting, primarily by US TNCs, was leading to cultural imperialism, which he defined as:

the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant centre of the system (Schiller 1976:9, cited in Thussu 2000:61).

In his analysis of the relationship between mass communication and the US empire, Schiller (1969) argues that the global business system and uncontrolled trade between nations with unequal bargaining power is not necessarily beneficial to all parties, especially poorer nations. Broadcasting systems in poor nations rely on foreign capital and programming to remain sustainable, which places them in a weaker position to negotiate better terms for the penetration of international communications in their countries. As a result, they rely on low-cost imported programming mainly from the US, which leads to exposure to a Western way of life characterised by consumerism at the expense of public-service broadcasting. He therefore concludes that

the cultural integrity of weak societies whose national, regional, local and tribal heritage [is] beginning to be menaced with extinction by the expansion of modern electronic communications, television in particular, emanating from a few power centres in the industrialised world (Schiller 1969:109).

Schiller's later work continues to highlight US dominance of international communication despite a rapidly transforming geopolitical arena (Schiller 2010).

The cultural imperialism thesis informed subsequent analysis of the political economy of international communications, leading to the identification of forms of imperialism in various cultural products such as Hollywood films, television programmes (Nazemroaya 2015) and Walt Disney comic books (Dorfman & Matterlart 1975). Cultural imperialism also informed NWICO debates that highlighted imbalances in the

flow of international information and criticised Western media's domination of international communications (UNESCO 1980; Nordenstreng & Varis 1974).

Within the same theme of imperialism is Gatlung's theory of structural imperialism, which extends the idea of inequality and dominance beyond the North over the South to dominance between and within nations (Gatlung 1971:81). Gatlung argues that the world consists of 'Centre' nations that are more developed, and 'Periphery' nations, which are less developed. Within the periphery there also exists a centre, which is more developed and tends to exercise dominance within the peripheral nation. The centres of both the centre and peripheral nations have harmonious interests, while the peripheries of both these nations tend to be in conflict (Gatlung 1971:83). This domination is seen to erode local cultures as new cultural forms and values are adopted, leading to a homogeneous global culture (Herman & McChesney 1997).

Closely linked to cultural imperialism is Boyd-Barrett's 1977 theory of media imperialism, which has significantly influenced international communications. Boyd-Barrett defines media imperialism as 'the domination of the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in one country by another' (Boyd-Barrett 1977:117, cited in Curran & Gurevitch 1991; Tunstall & Tunstall 1977). Media imperialism focused on global inequalities in the media systems, which were dominated mainly by US media and their affiliates.

The links between globalisation and Western media dominance were further highlighted by scholars interested in the political economy of the media, who also equated the global expansion of media corporations with Western dominance. Herman and McChesney (1997) argue that the global media market is dominated by a few conglomerates, mainly from the US, through commercialisation processes such as vertical integration and acquisition of smaller companies. This has resulted in inequalities in global information flows and concentration of media power among a few (Herman & McChesney 1997, 2004; Tunstall & Tunstall 1977), which suggests that capitalism and consumer culture are forced onto powerless societies that are unable to resist them. Bagdikian (2004) also investigates the footprint of global media ownership and affiliation and concludes that the global media industry is controlled by five media

companies (Bagdikian 2004:5). Deregulation and liberalisation of markets have opened up investment opportunities in other markets such as in Asia and former communist states in Eastern Europe, which has increased the global consumer demand for media products, leading some to argue that this exposure to foreign content will undermine local and national cultures (Hollifield 2004).

The growth of commercially-driven TNCs is also intertwined with a consumerist culture, as a result of a competitive global media industry (McChesney 1999; Thussu 2000; Tunstall & Tunstall 1977). The competition among media players has created a market-driven media system where commercial interests have become crucial to the sustainability of corporations, thereby increasing their role in facilitating a consumer culture. The free flow of goods and services across the world has led to the development of niche markets linked to consumption practices or 'imagined communities of consumption' (Sklair 2002, cited in Movius 2010). These practices form the basis of the construction of audiences with shared consumption experiences and tastes that the media needs to respond to. The creation of audiences as consumers and commodities is described to by Webster and Phalen (1994) as the 'market place model' where people are conceptualised in terms of their role as consumers who come to a marketplace to select products and services (Webster & Phalen 1994:27).

Commodifying audiences is one of the strategies used in commercial and other media models to increase audience size and therefore advertising revenue in order to remain sustainable. This concept of audiences choosing their preference is associated with rational choice economic theory and deregulation policies, where free choice and diversity are advocated to meet the needs of the audience. These audiences have preferred interests that the media needs to respond to (Webster & Phalen 1994). However, consumerism is not only manifested in advertising or commercial media. It is also evident in other programmes, as well as in public broadcasting and state-owned media, to help channels remain competitive, justify licence fees and meet public diplomacy and other objectives of the state. Another strategy used by the media to construct audiences as consumers is coverage that emphasises business success and reflects consumption lifestyles that audiences relate or are encouraged to aspire to. In

his study of consumer nationalism and media discourse in contemporary China, Wang (2006) concludes that consumption is one of the social processes used by Chinese media to express and communicate the national spirit among Chinese consumers in their encounter with Japanese Toshiba products (Wang 2006). Similarly, a study of city magazines in the US found that the publications created affluent, educated and engaged readership through content that reflected their perceptions and lifestyles, such as profiling successful residents and the economic potential of the city while ignoring its negative aspects (Jenkins 2016).

The growth of the commercial media industry operating across national borders is also evident in Africa, following recent economic growth in many countries and penetration of satellite television among African households. This has in turn created strong consumer economies that have made Africa a desirable investment destination and viable market for goods and services (Leke et al 2010). The growth of affluent viewers who can afford pay-tv subscriptions has led to new audience constructions based on a middle-class identity that reflects the new economic landscape. Identities linked to consumer culture therefore resonate with audiences, as is already evident on CGTN Africa and eNCA whose programming features business and cosmopolitan African lifestyles that are more related to the needs of the middle class. Research conducted by Oyedele and Minor (2012) into TV advertising on Nigerian and South African channels found that advertisements were dominated by middle-class and affluent lifestyles (Oyedele & Minor 2012). South African advertisements constructed a Westernised middle-class identity and consumption culture, whereas in Nigeria, consumerism was made evident by depicting Western ideals and affluent lifestyles (Oyedele & Minor 2012). In her research on South African general-interest magazines, Laden (2003) also finds a close connection between the magazines and the increase of a ‘South African consumer culture’, with evidence of aspirational content that promotes Western commodities and values (Laden 2003:191; Narunsky-Laden 2007).

Although the studies cited above focus on the consumer culture promoted in advertising and magazine content as opposed to television programming, the findings can be situated within broader discourses about the growth of the middle class in Africa and

how it has inspired the imagination of new African audiences for television programming and other cultural forms. While economic or political factors are likely to dominate audience constructions in the different channels, constructions will also be influenced by a combination of factors including commercial and contextual elements, which are critical to the image of emerging economies and the creation of an African identity as an investment destination. How the channels negotiate commercial and state interests is a key question that is addressed in this study.

Nevertheless, the expansion of global media and diffusion of its products globally does not erode national cultures or result in cultural homogenisation, but in unpredictable and often contradictory outcomes (Hannerz 1997; Tomlinson 2007; Robertson 1992; Sparks 2007; Dawei Wang 2008; Appadurai 1996; Abubakar 2013). As a result, cultural and media imperialist paradigms have been widely criticised for overemphasising the role of TNCs and cultural industries as transmitters of cultural change; the concept of information flow as unidirectional from North to South; and inadequate empirical evidence to support claims of domination (Hannerz 1997; Tomlinson 2007; Robertson 1992; Garcia Canclini 1995; Sparks 2007).

Tomlinson (1999) points to opposing tendencies and complex forms of cultural identification and fragmentation, stressing that national cultures are likely to remain important sites of cultural experience and identity well into the future (Tomlinson 1999). Robertson (1992) proposes the term ‘glocalisation’ to capture the interpenetration between the local and the global, where global culture has local cultural attributes and vice-versa (Robertson 1992). He also views globalisation forces as promoting both ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ (Robertson 1992:179).

Hannerz (1997) contends that the flow of cultural products is not unidirectional from the centre to the periphery, but is instead multidirectional, resulting in homogeneity on one hand and heterogeneous tendencies on the other (Hannerz 1997).

Literature from developing nations also challenges claims that foreign media undermines local cultures. Latin-American academic Garcia Canclini (1995) focuses on the flow of cultural material and interaction within countries in the periphery to

challenge claims of North–South information flows. He finds the notion of unidirectional imperialist domination an unrealistic model to explain the complexity of these interactions and adaptation of foreign forms of knowledge into local contexts. For example, in the case of Brazil, the flow of foreign cultural material did not result in dependency but strengthened local production, turning the country into a major exporter of cultural products to other countries in Latin America, and the 'seventh world producer of television and advertising' (Garcia Canclini 1995:230). Dawei Wang (2008) reaches similar conclusions in his case study of the Indian channel Zee TV, arguing that foreign media can at times be weak and become indigenised, leading to the preservation of cultural identity (Wang 2008). Canclini (1995) further contends that hybridity of cultures is also produced by the global experience through the mingling of cultures as a result of immigration not only from the West to the Third World, but from the Third World to the West, across countries in the periphery and between poor and urban centres (Garcia Canclini 1995).

Research conducted in Africa also demonstrates the resilience of local cultures (Oyedele & Minor 2012; Abubakar 2013). Although Western cultural products have found wider appeal in the continent, as indicated in the study by Oyedele and Minor (2012), media messages co-exist with local cultures and in some cases adapt to local contexts. The authors also identify tensions in the negotiation of advertising messages, where local and national political contexts determine the outcome of the interaction between the local and global. For example, in Nigeria the global elements of advertising content were neither localised nor overwhelmed and suppressed locally. Instead, media reaction was to counter the Western lifestyles by legitimising traditional aesthetic attributes through occasional displays of local fashion and other products (Oyedele & Minor 2012). In the case of South Africa, the political context played a part. The authors found a strong nationalistic sentiment, partly because the country was still undergoing political transition where identity and nation-building remained a highly contentious issue (Oyedele & Minor 2012).

Abubakar's (2013) study of audience reception of global media in northern Nigeria also showed the contradictions inherent in audience appropriation of foreign media products.

While northern Nigerians considered the BBC a reliable source of information, they also rejected some of its messages as they still considered the channel to be Western and biased against Islam and Africa (Abubakar 2013). These findings confirm similar conclusions by audience reception researchers about the limitations of audience influence (Morley 1980; Stevenson 2005:161; Fiske & Hartley 2003:58). While Western cultural products have found wider appeal in the global South, media reception research demonstrates that media texts can be 'polysemic' as active audiences appropriate and give them various meanings (Fiske 1987:5; Liebes & Katz 1986, 1990). While audiences can be exposed to consumerist and foreign cultures, these media messages co-exist with national cultures, and in other cases are adapted, leading to 'glocalisation' (Robertson 2010), cultural hybridity (Kraidy 2010; Tomlinson 1997, Hannerz 1997) and disjunctures (Appadurai 1996).

Furthermore, evidence of Western domination is based on the number of TNCs from the US and Europe, and media ownership that demonstrates Western presence and affiliation but not the cultural effects or adoption of Western culture (Herman & McChesney 1997; Rai & Cottle 2007; Bagdikian 2004:5).

Given the limitations of imperialist approaches to the analysis of global communications, scholarship has moved away from polarised positions of the negative and positive and core–periphery analysis to reflect the complexity of globalisation, its continuities and opposing trends (Daves 2000; Sassen 1992; Kavoori 2007; Appadurai 1996; Holton 1998), as well as the importance of understanding the economic, political and cultural context in which media consumption occurs. While acknowledging the limitations of the original cultural imperialism concept, Sparks (2012) argues for its relevance in analysing current and future media trends. However, he recommends a reframing of the concept from the idea of a single centre that dominates developing countries to one characterised by competition among different states (ibid.). He also calls on future studies to apply rigorous analysis of international cultural flows, as well as economic and state dimensions of contemporary trends (Sparks 2012).

3.3 Post Globalisation – Continuities and Discontinuity

Despite the wide-ranging perspectives over the years the debate on globalisation continues, as the process evolves in response to economic, social and political changes around the world. These changes are also shifting the nature of the discourse as new themes emerge and others become more prominent. Some writers have already declared an end to globalisation (Rosenberg 2005; Saul 2005; Ferguson 2005), while others propose alternative analyses that take into account the role of markets as well as the political, social and cultural forces that drive its trends (Stiglitz 2003).

Niall Ferguson (2005) draws parallels between globalisation and the world economy during the 1870 and 1930s periods. From around 1870, the world economy experienced a resurgence and dramatic economic and social change, which reached a climax, slowed down, and eventually ended with the Great Depression of the 1930s. He contends that globalisation has followed a similar trend, and is likely to come to an end eventually and 'sink' (Ferguson 2005). The trend towards a climax and decline of globalisation is also highlighted in Saul's (2005) argument that globalisation reached its peak with the establishment of the WTO in 1995, after which it started its descent, and the end is very close (Saul 2005).

Providing a theoretical critique of globalisation, Rosenberg (2005) contends that 'the age of globalisation is over' to the point of questioning its very existence (Rosenberg 2005:3). While acknowledging that it was characterised by significant changes, he argues that globalists misinterpreted the direction and impetus of the historical trends (Rosenberg 2005).

Given the constraints discussed above, and recognising the role of governments, perspectives on globalisation increasingly reflect the convergence and interdependence of various factors and focus on the future of globalisation. Stiglitz (2003) proposes a 'third way', characterised by public–private partnerships among stakeholders to balance the positive and negative implications of globalisation.

The discourse on globalisation has taken place not only in academia, but in all spheres of society. In recent years, the discontent about globalisation has inspired anti-globalisation movements around the world, such as the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, against the WTO in London, and Occupy Wall Street (Seattle Municipal Archives 1995–2016). There has also been an increase in protectionist and nationalistic discourse in the West, evident in the 2016 US elections, in Germany where the open immigration policy is fuelling nationalistic sentiment, in the Brexit vote where discourses of nationalism dominated the campaign debates, and in France where the nationalist party rose to become the main contender in the 2017 elections.

Despite proclamations of an end, there are optimistic views about the future of globalisation, as demonstrated in discussions at international fora such as the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017. While the merits of globalisation were strongly challenged, world leaders remained committed to it. However, the discussions reflected a shift in the debate to highlight inequalities and a more inclusive globalisation to protect those left behind (Parker 2017). Leading the pro-globalist debate was China, with the Chinese president championing free trade and an integrated world economy (Parker 2017). The discourse on inclusive globalisation was also reflected in the theme of the World Economic Forum for Africa – 'Achieving inclusive growth' – held in Durban in May 2017, where alternative voices from civil society were more prominent in the discussions (Byanyima 2017).

3.4 Media representations of Africa

Literature on the relationship between global media and Africa is dominated by narratives of how the continent and its people are represented in media imagery and content. Such writing addresses questions of how media coverage portrays Africa, and are largely based on Western media channels such as CNN or BBC to explain their role in shaping how global audiences understand Africa, as well as creating and reinforcing certain perceptions about the continent. One of the areas that has not been adequately addressed by this literature is a focus on African audiences as a target of transnational media and how they are constructed, as opposed to Africa as an object of representation.

The idea of constructing audiences is neither concerned with how audiences received messages, nor how communicators create messages, but rather on how communicators make audiences (Ettema & Whitney 1994). As Ettema and Whitney point out, institutions hypothesise or create audiences that have a social meaning or economic value by anticipating their interests and needs (Ettema & Whitney 1994).

This study contributes to these broader debates about the construction of Africa, by focusing our attention on the African audiences who are being targeted by global, non-Western media, addressing questions of how they are discursively constructed and created. This section therefore provides a discussion of historical conceptions of Africa and existing literature on the issue.

As many scholars and commentators have pointed out for years, coverage of Africa, particularly by Western media has been characterised by negative stereotypes of a dark and diseased continent (Kitzinger 1998; Michira 2002; Franks 2010; Shraeder & Endless 1998; DFID 2000; TransaAfrica Forum 2000; Domatob 1994; Hachten 2004; De Beer 2010).

These representation practices have their roots in colonial discourses about the continent and have become naturalised representation of Africa in fictional works such as Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* and Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, where Europeans coming to the continent account their experiences with Africans. These texts portrayed Africans as barbaric, irrational and unhygienic, and underscored the role of Europeans in bringing civilisation to the Africa. In his adventures across Africa, Crusoe is ship-wrecked in an island in Africa where he encounters cannibals, and teaches one of them, Friday, how to wear trousers (Watt 2000). Similarly, in his controversial novel, Conrad represents Africans in Belgian Congo as savages and cannibals (Achebe 1977). Although the above novels are non-academic, writings in fiction, they have been seen instrumental in shaping the construction of narratives about Africa and its people, prompting some writers, particularly from the global South to respond and problematise them to engage with issues of race, nationality, gender, class and sexuality, and situated them within the historical relationship between nations and countries (Césare 1977;

Achebe 1977; Ngugi 1995; Said 1978; Bhabha 1995; Spivak 1995; Kavoori 2010; McClintock 1995).

Postcolonial scholarship about Africa has contributed significantly to debates and understanding about representations of Africa, despite criticism for being theoretical and lack of practical application to the material world, as well as implying an end to the colonial period (Shome & Hegde 2002; Abrahamson 2003; Wisker 2007). Nevertheless, the writings provide insights about cultural and contemporary forms of power, the legacy and continuities of imperialism, as well as the complexities associated with the interconnectedness between the past and present. The literature provides a historical context into forms of power and their legacies – enabling us to situate discourses within a historical context. This is imperative to this study as it highlights the important role of cultural forms such as the media in circulating and naturalising discourses about the Africa and non-European cultures. Cultural texts are not a "passive" representation of the Orient, but the circulation of dominant ideas and a reflection of the cultural and political power of the Occident (Said 1978).

In his critique of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Chinua Achebe outlines how Africa and Africans is dehumanised and 'othered' as an 'anti-thesis of a civilised Europe and savagery, and actually questions the pronouncement of the novel as a 'great work of art' (Achebe 1977: 788). While also providing a feminist perspective, Mcclintock (1995) notes how Western imperialism created knowledge and circulated racial discourses which legitimised white male supremacy. Europeans in the Enlightenment and Victorian era depicted African culture and economic exchanges as irrational. She also illustrates how imperial iconography in early advertising played a crucial role in circulating racial discourses and created racial difference in what she calls 'commodity racism' (Mcclintock 1995: 209). Products such as soap and Eno were viewed as symbols of 'racial hygiene and imperial progress. For example, advertisements of '*pears*' soap were seen to bring hygiene to the dirty bodies of barbaric African hunters and gatherers. Images used in the advertisements depicted Africans with feathers on their heads, a spear and wearing nothing more than a loincloth to reinforce their lack of civilisation and their status as a lower class. Africans were thus constructed as carriers

and consumers of Western commodities which were more superior and civilising (Mcclintock 1995: 209)

Furthermore, Africa and its people have been constructed as a place of erotic excess and an anomaly from as far back as the second century (Mcclintock 1995). These representations of Africa continued to define media coverage of contemporary Africa, particularly in reporting about HIV/Aids. A study conducted between 1986 and 1990 by the Glasgow Media Group into British Television news coverage of AIDS in Africa revealed that reporting themes focused on the 'cultural deficit model' where causes were attributed to an African culture of that was primitive and promiscuous and under-developed (Miller & Beharrell 1998; Fredland 1989; Husband 1975). Coverage also drew on stereotypes about Africa as a dark and diseased continent (Kitzinger 1998). An audience study among British audiences showed that Westerners viewed Africa as 'a cradle and hotbed of AIDS' (Kitzinger 1998: 174).

This colonial legacy of imperialism evident in the reporting of conflict situations in Africa has also followed the same formula. For this reason, African issues that receive international media attention are related to conflict, poverty and disease (Huttman 1992; Franks 2010; De Beer 2010). Franks adds that interest in developing countries has decreased unless it is linked to natural resources or deadly crises (Franks 2010; Golan 2003). Coverage of conflict is discussed in relation to Western interests. Hawkins 2012's analysis of coverage of Africa pre and post 9/11 shows that while coverage of Africa has decreased, when it is covered, the majority of stories pre 9/11 focused on HIV/Aids in South Africa and various conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, DRC and Ethiopia (Hawkins 2012). However, not all conflicts are treated the same. Some scholars argue that coverage of conflict is selective and almost absent in some cases, depending on the needs of Western audiences or the interests of their governments such as natural resources and impact of conflict on Western nationals (Odine 2013; Franks 2010). Odine 2013 argues that conflicts in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo received more media attention compared to others such as Liberia (Odine 2013).

Media reports also attributed the causes of conflict to ethnicity and tribalism. The most publicised being the genocide in Rwanda and the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007. While ethnic violence played a significant role in both cases, coverage failed to examine the root causes and other social, political aspects of the conflict, such as the legacy of colonialism which was as divisive (Hawkins 2013). Pottier for instance points out that ethnicity is one of the variables that can be easily manipulated in conflict situations and points out that the Rwandan conflict was "not tribal," but rather a "distinctly modern tragedy" (Pottier 2002:9, cited in Carruthers 2004: 164). Such representations perpetuate stereotypes of Africans as savages who kill each other (Carruthers 2004) as indicated in America's coverage of the Kenyan post-election violence, "African tribes are savagely tearing each other apart." The critic observes that although the violence occurred along ethnic lines, many US journalists looked no further for their analyses. The Los Angeles Times (January 1, 2008) described the conflict as, "savage tribal killings." CBS Early Show (January 1, 2008) (Odine 2013: 215).

This coverage also sets the background for discourses on humanitarian intervention, which characterise coverage of conflict. Portrayal of African conflict, particularly human suffering, can also be linked partly to an agenda by the media in collaboration with various actors such as humanitarian organisations to put pressure on Western governments to intervene. One way in which policymakers can intervene is in the form of changing unpopular policies as in the case of Somalia and more recently Afghanistan where US troops were pulled out amidst loss of lives of US soldiers (Carruthers 2004; Franks 2010). Another form of intervention is through humanitarian aid where the West becomes a savior to helpless Africans.

Despite the valuable insights provided by the literature on postcolonialism and media representation of Africa, the writings have certain limitations which I seek to address through this research. While postcolonial writers have raised issues of agency and resistance of the colonized to imperial power (Ashcroft 2001; Fanon 2001; Said 1993), accounts of Africa's marginalization are largely dominated by rhetoric of negative representations of the continent and blame on external actors like the West, but not

sufficient analysis of the role of African agents in the creation and maintenance of these negative representations. Spivak (1995), for example argues that the colonised or subaltern are powerless and passive, and not active actors in the colonial discourse. This inability for the subaltern to speak for themselves is one of the reasons for the negative and stereotypical representations, for as Spivak points out, even the elite who have attained the literacy and power to speak on their behalf, cannot do so because they use the same discourses that construct them as the 'other', inferior ones (Spivak 1995). While Spivak makes a valid argument about the legacy of discourses about Africa, she disregards African agency and the power relations between the colonial rulers and the colonised, which may allow Africans to exercise forms of power indirectly. Yet, accounts of how African chiefs in West Africa benefited from slavery and strategies of extraversion are a case where Africans exercise agency (Bayart 2009). Ashcroft (2001) also disagrees with the concept of a 'speechless subaltern', pointing out that the very same dominant discourse that silences them can also be used in subvertive ways to resist and 're-inscribe' their cultural identities, and have been used successfully by resistance movements in Guatemala (Ashcroft 2001:8). This re-appropriation of discourse is demonstrated by the use of the term 'Negritude' by Fanon and African diasporic movements to subvert negative representations and reconstruct a positive version of the African identity to encourage African solidarity (Fanon 2001). I therefore argue that the subaltern is not voiceless - it can speak, however, their ability to do so involves the negotiation of power with other actors involved, and characterised by contradictions. Contemporary conceptions of power such as governmentality and extraversion are sometimes applied to provide power to seemingly powerless Africans. The non-Western media channels I use as case studies and their focus on parts of the world that have been previously ignored in global mainstream media such as Africa, can be viewed as a space for the powerless to self-represent and articulate their voices. These channels can use dominant news discourses by re-purposing and transforming them to construct African audiences in different ways. Hence, the importance of this study is to determine what discourses these channels draw on and how are they transforming dominant discourses to construct themselves (in the case of eNCA) and African audiences, therefore addressing some of the questions Spivak raises about the voice of the subaltern.

Moreover, the role of African actors in the creation of its dependency status and its relationship with the rest of the world is the focus of Jean-Francois Bayart's concept of extraversion. Drawn from Michel Foucault's framework of governmentality, Bayart defines extraversion as the subversion of Africa's dependency and unequal status, in order to theorise African power and agency, and it is in this context that I use it in this study to explain African agency and the role of African actors in the construction of African audiences (Bayart 2009). Official institutional sources of information such as government representatives are widely used by the media given their role in the different spheres of social life, making them 'primary definers of news' (Hall et al 1978:57). Although their participation is mediated, they also have motives and may use the media to convey their perspectives about Africa, which reinforce existing discourses. This is illustrated in a comment from a journalist who stated that some African governments intentionally projected an image of hardship in order to get foreign aid (Adewunmi 2012). Similarly, in a study of the Darfur conflict, Kothari shows that biases and motives of journalists and their sources influenced news frames (Kothari 2010). The role of external actors in influencing the news agenda is discussed extensively in agenda-setting literature, which I cannot discuss here given the focus of this study. However, it is important to note that the construction process is also shaped by a wide array of actors, who compete for media attention and try to influence the news. Our understanding of audiences constructions requires us to pay attention to the wide range of actors and an analysis of their interaction with each other.

Furthermore, debates on negative media representation of Africa are largely associated with Western media such as CNN, BBC, etc. The reason for this could be related to their global prominence, however the emergence of non-Western global media players raises interesting questions about their treatment of other non-Western locations. While the launch of Al Jazeera has prompted media scholars to investigate its coverage of Africa, no known studies have investigated representations of Africa by African regional media (Mellese & Muller 2012, Okon 2013). Furthermore, the majority of studies on coverage of Africa by non-Western media conclude that their treatment of the continent is not very different from Western patterns, and characterised by low and negative coverage (Okon 2013; De Beer 2010). Similarly, a recent study on CCTV

Africa's portrayal of Africa shows that the channel's promise of positive portrayals coverage of Africa is largely "neutral or negative" (Xiaoling Zhang 2013, cited in Gagliardone 2013). The studies discussed above have so far analysed coverage of Africa in terms of its tone, and drawing conclusions based on judgements of positive, negative or neutral frames, which doesn't explain instances where a certain tone occurs and the factors that contribute to such coverage. Nothias (2012) attributes the Afro-pessimism discourse to the absence of a definitive interpretation of the concept leading to oversimplified conclusions based on the presence of themes on war and undemocratic elections rather than in-depth empirical evidence. The Critical Discourse Analysis approach therefore allows for an in-depth analysis into various factors and contexts, by investigating the discursive frameworks that inform constructions of Africa and how they link to sources of power. Similarly, Scott (2015) argues that there is insufficient empirical evidence to make informative conclusions about the coverage of Africa.

Traditional discourses about Africa are however beginning to transform, despite continuities as demonstrated by the Africa Rising narrative. This is a result of the emergence of new, particularly non-Western perspectives on news, digital innovations such as social media which has increased the diversity of voices and empowered Africans to tell their own stories, as well the configuration of the humanitarian relations and geopolitical landscape following the emergence of economically developed African economies (Bunce, Franks & Paterson 2017; Nothias 2014). Franks & Ribet (2009) on the other hand credit that this transformation is due to China-Africa relations which have contributed to the continent's development. Nevertheless, this argument also reinforces the discourse that Africa is dependent on external assistance, in this case, China.

The focus of the above literature on Western media also limits it from incorporating transnational media trends which is no longer dominated by Western media, but characterised by increasing regionalisation and emergent non-Western players. An investigation into media representation of Africa should also be investigated in different contexts (Nothias 2012). This is addressed through the regional focus and comparative

nature of my study to provide perspectives from different non-Western contexts, including an African one.

Afro-pessimism is challenged by scholars who point out that Africa's coverage is not as negative and marginal as previously indicated. Scott (2009)'s study of UK press coverage concludes that Africa is not as "marginalized, negative or trivial". Instead, most African countries received more coverage compared to countries such as China, and negative frames were very marginal, particularly in broadsheet newspapers (Scott 2009).

3.5 Pan African media

Based on the Africa focus of this research, it is also important to consider African perspectives on media in the continent. The term, Pan African does not have a universal definition as it has taken various forms across different historical periods and contexts. However, a common element of all descriptions is the objective to unite people of African origin globally (Adi and Sherwood 2003, Oxfam International 2012). I use Pan African media to refer to broadcasting channels originating from Africa, and targeted at audiences in the African region, as opposed to national broadcasters. Scholarly literature focusing on African regional or transnational broadcasters, particularly content production and audiences is almost non-existent due to low presence of regional broadcasters in Africa, with the exception of the South African media company, MultiChoice Africa.[10] More recently, new channels such as the SABC News, ANN7 and eNCA have a continental reach which allows them to engage more with Africa issues, but their focus is predominantly South African. Some writers are beginning to document these new developments, highlighting the regional significance of South African media, even though these are merely descriptive accounts and at times very dated (Duncan 2006; Tomaselli 1997, Wasserman, & De Beer 2007; Paterson 1998,

[10] Keywords were used to search for scholarly articles pertaining to Pan African TV broadcasting on the Wits University research database, library catalogue and the internet. These included variations of the following terms: media in Africa, African media, Pan Africa, Pan African television, Pan Africa broadcasting, Broadcasting in Africa, SABC Africa, SABC AND Africa, South African Broadcasting Corporation.

Akindes 2011). Paterson's paper which examines the liberalisation of the media industry in sub-Saharan Africa provides useful insights on satellite television broadcasting in the continent and the role played by South African media groups such as MNET, his focus is more on technological developments not on audiences or media content. Teer-Tomaselli, Wasserman & De Beer (2007) highlight the expansion of South African media in the continent but they take a much broader focus and do not engage with the implications of the country's media presence in the rest of the continent (Teer-Tomaselli, Wasserman & De Beer 2007).

For this reason, African media literature has a stronger focus on local and national media systems rather a regional or transnational perspective. Scholarship on African media is characterised by themes on development communication, the role of the media in the advancement of democracy, media imperialism and more recently the impact of technology. Development communication featured in early studies on African media in alignment with the Western development agenda which sought to modernize African nations after colonialism (Lerner 1967, Schramm 1964, Rogers 1976). This literature emphasized the role of the media in development which saw the emergence of a development form of journalism (Ndlela 2009). This literature was challenged by neo-Marxist and leftist perspectives that interpreted the Western media models as a new form of imperialism - media and cultural imperialism to maintain dependency of African states on the West and transmit Western culture. With the advancement of new communication technologies, contemporary studies have also sought to assess the implications of technology on the media, linking technology to democracy (Lister et al 2003, Jenkins 2006; Jenkins & Deuze 2008, Coleman and Gotze 2001). A theme that continues to dominate African media scholarship is the democratic role of the media (Hachten 1971; Siebert 1956; Wilcox 1975). This literature is largely informed by the relationship between media, democracy and the state and the implications of these relations for the development of liberal democracy in these nations. Writings centre on challenges facing postcolonial and transitional societies such as media freedom and democracy and the role of state in democratic transformation (Nyamnjoh 2005; Olorunnisola 1997a; Hachten 1971; Ansah 1994). Similarly, while countries such as South Africa have a more developed media system, with some companies operating in

the continent, media research from South Africa also addresses national issues of media freedom and democracy, providing an analysis from the apartheid or post-apartheid orientation (Tomasselli 1997; Burger 1998). After the apartheid regime, the focus dwelled on media transformation with a comparison between the pre and post-apartheid periods and challenges facing transitional societies. This is hardly surprising given the fact that South African media system has been largely shaped by the country's political history.

3.7 Conclusion

Despite different perspectives on the nature and extent of the globalisation process, there is recognition that it has been a significant feature of social change in the twentieth century, however its implications are complex and unpredictable, and cannot only be interpreted by conceptual frameworks that focus only on one dimension of the process.

Core-periphery approaches are therefore inadequate in explaining the relationship between the global, national and the local as their passive conception of the global South does not take into account the roles played by countries such as China, South Africa and Qatar, which are considered developing countries yet active participants and beneficiaries of globalisation processes. Their transnational participation is also facilitated by the liberalization of the media industry, which enabled the expansion of media corporations from these countries to other parts of the world. The media landscape in South Africa is also illustrative of multi-directional flow of cultural products where the global, national and local intersect. South African audiences are exposed to foreign cultural products from both West and non-Western countries, while at the same time, South African media groups such as Naspers is the major content provider in the African continent through its DSTV platform, and its subsidiary, TenCent also has a stake in a Chinese media group.

Furthermore, the growth of the middle class and presence of foreign channels has not decreased interest in local content. Recently, there has also been an increase in local South African and African productions and channels such as Mzansi Magic which have become very popular among audiences for telling authentic African stories that ordinary

people can relate to, as well as the availability of affordable subscription packages for different types of audiences (Intelligent Life Magazine; Qukula 2017). Similarly, Al Jazeera is also a prominent player in the Arab world. An analysis of non-Western media channels therefore needs to take into account the different contexts in which African audiences experience the media channels and in which the channels operate.

A more appropriate approach to analyzing transnational media needs to consider the context in which globalisation is taking place and the various actors involved in the process. Appadurai (1996) points out that, "the new global cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing centre-periphery models (even those that might account for multiple centres and peripheries)" (Appadurai 1996:32). He therefore proposes a framework of five dimensions of global cultural flows; ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3 (Appadurai 1996).

CHAPTER 4: BACKGROUND OF CGTN AFRICA, AJE AND ENCA

4.1 China Central TV and China Global TV Network

Literature focusing on CGTN is broad, ranging from a historical narrative of its development as the official communist party mouthpiece, its domestic role within the context of the Chinese media industry, as well as global expansion and engagement in Africa. I begin my discussion with an overview of the Chinese media industry as this informs its global strategy which shapes its audience perspectives.

4.1.1 The Chinese media system

While my discussion on the Chinese media system is broader, pertaining to various types of media, as the largest television network, CCTV features as a case study in much of the writings. In this section, CCTV refers to China's national channel which operates in China, as well as the parent broadcaster of the international channel China Global Television Network (CGTN). CGTN or CGTN Africa refers to the international channel, formerly known as CCTV or CCTV Africa. CGTN operates outside China.

The media landscape in China is a reflection of the country's political, economic and cultural legacy. Although the country has experienced reforms in its history, the recent phase of reforms in the post-Mao era have had a profound transformation on various spheres of Chinese life, including the media industry, both national and international.

One of the significant changes in the Chinese media sector is the structural change from a two-tiered to a four-tiered structure comprising of Central, Provincial, City and County level media (Sukosd & Wang 2013). The top tier is dominated by state-owned organisations such as CCTV, Xinhua and People's Daily, while provincial or regional media consists of, among others, Oriental Satellite TV (OSTV) and Hunan Satellite TV (Zhu 2012:199; Zhong 2010a; Sun 2012). Through protectionist policies, state media groups have acquired the largest market share and more resources which gives them more competitive advantage. For instance, for a long time, CCTV was the country's only broadcaster mandated with national coverage, and has exclusive rights to national and international sporting events such as the Olympics, while audience reach for

provincial and local broadcasters beyond their respective geographical jurisdictions is limited by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) regulations and subject to negotiation with other provinces (Zhu 2012:197). Nevertheless, some provincial and local media such as Hunan TV are increasingly challenging the dominance of state media through quality programming and popular TV formats that appeal to the youth (Zhu 2012:199, Zhong 2010a).

Foreign media groups also became a feature of the Chinese media industry, after the country's accession to the WTO in 2001. China's strategy to open-up its media industry to foreign ownership was aimed at attracting foreign investment to reduce losses in the industry, as well as access knowledge and experience from well-established global players (Huang 2007:420). The move saw the introduction of foreign channels such as Hong Kong's Phoenix TV and the Star Group, and reflected China's increased confidence in a privatized media model and desire to become part of a global industry (Huang 2007: 420).

4.1.2 Media Transformation in China

The reforms in the 1980 and 1990s stimulated wide interest from media scholars who sought to engage with the nature of the transformation and its implications, as reflected in the vast literature on contemporary media in China. The literature addresses the political economy of the media with debates focusing on the relationship between the state, market and the media. These debates are predominantly framed from the neoliberal and new leftist perspectives, often with the objective to analyse the implications of media commercialization and highlighting their positive versus negative aspects on the media system (Zhong 2007; Zhong 2010a; Zhong 2010b; Stockmann 2013; Bai 2005; Sukosd & Wang 2013; Huang 2007; Qing 2007; Qing 2011, Vi 2008; Meng & Rantanen 2015; Yu 2011).

Scholars from the neoliberal school view economic reforms as a positive development since it has reduced dependency on state subsidies, and hence weakened state power over the media which has in turn increased media diversity and autonomy (Chu 1994; Sun

2010), created new powers of influence in the form of high profile television news anchors (Pugsley & Gao 2007) and local authorities (Tong 2010).

Commercialization is also said to have a favourable impact on media practice and journalistic styles. Tong and Sparks (2009) and Sun (2010) envision a more positive future for investigative journalism with greater autonomy for practitioners, where they can continue to thrive amidst challenges. Media discourse and reporting styles are also evolving from propagandist to more critical and professional. Dong and Chang (2006) observe the decline of the cold war discourse in CCTV's domestic foreign news reporting to reflect the shift in China's worldview on international affairs and in line with the domestic media's role to legitimate the Communist Party. Similarly, Yu (2007) notes a paradigm shift in journalistic practice from 'party mouthpiece' to a 'new mouthpiece style' which is more critical (while staying within the limit of the party line) and increasing professionalism (Yu 2007: pp. 1-21). There is also a rise in 'personal journalism' which focuses on human stories as journalists balance interests of the state, society and professionalism (Xu 2000). These scholars therefore consider increased privatization as a crucial step towards an open society and democracy in China (Xie 2014).

Nevertheless, some are less optimistic about the power of the privately-owned media over state control and argue that while private ownership has had some positive impact, it does not have the power to challenge state control of the media or lead to democratic outcomes (Yu 2014; Vi 2008).

The neoliberal perspective is therefore challenged by leftist approaches which focus on the democratic implications of commercialization, arguing that it has reinforced state control of the industry resulting in a less democratic media system (Zhao 1998; Svensson 2017; Brady 2006; Zhong 2004; Wang 2009; Chan 1994; Freedom House 2017; Reporters Without Borders 2017; International Communication Association 2012). Examining the impact of commercialisation on investigative journalism, Svensson (2017) adds that state control of the media has increased under Xi Jinping's leadership which is a setback for investigative journalism. The State

Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) continues to exercise control and editorial responsibility over state media through regulation (Sun 2012). Despite increased private media ownership and diversity, the privatization process is selective and the government applies various instruments and coercion to centralise, decentralise and recentralise control, which creates a repressive legal environment for private media and the internet, thereby limiting their opportunities (Vi 2008; Sukosd & Wang 2013). These assertions are supported by content research which reveals the strong presence of propaganda in media programming (Zhong 2004; Zhong 2001; Wang 2009).

Despite the prominence of the Chinese state and ruling communist party in the media industry, Chinese media has not escaped the influence of the capitalist market in its structure, content and practice. State broadcasters such as CCTV are incorporating Western production practices to compete internationally (Xie 2014). The government's strategy is to incorporate Western knowledge and media management practices, while retaining control of the media (Huang 2007). As a result, what emerges from the commercialization process is neither an exclusively state nor neoliberal model, but a media system where all parties co-exist, and is characterized by struggle and negotiation of interest, with none emerging as a clear winner (Stockman 2013; Zhao 2000; Huang 2007; Sun 2010).

Media practice in China is therefore characterised by a balancing act akin to Wanning Sun's analogy of 'dancing with chains' (Sun 2007). This involves a process of negotiation and compromise with media practitioners attempting to balance different interests and minimize negative consequences (Sun 2007; Yu 2007; Tong & Sparks 2009; Song & Chang 2001; Xu 2000). But ultimately, the outcome is different and contradictory depending on the issue in question, at times biased towards one party. Yu (2011) concludes that the interplay between different actors and introduction of neoliberal techniques into China's socialist legacy and traditional values is marked by tensions and pitfalls, creating a 'hybrid political-economic structure that is non-liberal, anti-liberal and neoliberal, all in one' (Yu 2011: 35).

While it is widely agreed that Chinese media is controlled by the state, scholars are increasingly emphasising the complex and mixed outcomes of the commercialization process, with the industry being a highly contested and negotiated environment where the state, market and the media co-exist and are interdependent (Yu 2011; Sukosd & Wang 2013; Sun 2007; Huang 2007; Stockmann 2013; Tang & Iyengar 2011). Others bring into attention the emergence of new sources of power with alternative perspectives that challenge dominant official discourses, such as prominent news anchors (Pugsley & Gao 2007), local government officials (Tong 2010), and media practitioners who are at times critical of the government. Social media is also increasing public participation, at times challenging the agenda-setting role of institutions such as CCTV (Bai 2010; Jiang 2014, IPI Report 1999, Tong & Sparks 2009; Sun 2010, 2012). It is however worth noting that the power of these alternative sources of influence is within the armbit of the party state, and their success depends on the issue and extent to which they impact on state interests.

The media system in China is therefore still evolving and is a contested space characterised by a power interplay between the state and market forces as the literature in the following sections indicates (Yu 2011, Sukosd & Wang 2013; Sun 2007; Huang 2007; Stockmann 2013; Tang & Iyengar, 2011).

Outside China, particularly in Africa, state media plays a key role in Chinese media engagement initiatives, but also encounters a diverse media landscape with various actors, including other private Chinese groups such as StarTimes.

4.1.3 The history of CCTV

Although CGTN broadcasting centres outside China have been rebranded to CGTN, it is important to provide the history of CGTN Africa's mother channel and national broadcaster, CCTV to better understand the domestic context that shapes its philosophy as this has important implications on its construction of audiences in Africa.

CCTV is China's largest national broadcaster, based on size, background and resources (Zhu 2012; Zhong 2010b). It was established in 1958 as Beijing TV, and like all media in China, the television industry was owned, controlled and managed by the Communist

party and under the Central Propaganda Department and Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (Zhu 2012; Zhong 2010b). As such, open self-censorship was practiced where the party policies could not be criticised, and major stories and sensitive issues had to be approved first. However, the modernization of the party-state in China from a strictly socialist to a more capitalist state have shaped the development of the broadcaster from a domestic ideological state apparatus into an international channel broadcasting in various languages to audiences around the world. The changes have seen state media, including CCTV relax its anti-foreign stance and open-up to Western journalistic practices and management philosophy, while also retaining a certain degree of state control. Nevertheless, under Xi Jinping, media censorship and restrictions against the media have increased with the President even demanding loyalty of the press (Svensson 2017; Freedom House 2011; *The Guardian* 2016). While freedom of expression as part of human rights is protected in the Constitution, State Secrets laws prohibit publishing information that is deemed a state secret (Human Rights in China 2014; Xu & Albert 2017). The definition of state secrets is unclear, allowing the state to exercise control over the press (Xu & Albert 2017). Balancing these different forces coupled with changes in technology results in contradictions and complexity in news development which is reflected in how audiences are constructed.

Domestically, CCTV currently has 21 public channels and 19 Pay TV channels in operation, covering almost every aspect of the Chinese social life. CCTV also runs six international channels in six different languages, which include Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic. Its business has also expanded into new media platforms such as Internet TV, Mobile TV, Bus Mobile TV and IP TV (Zhu 2012; Zhong 2010b; Nelson 2013). Today, China broadcasts in seven languages and has bureaus in 18 countries which includes production centres in Beijing, Washington and Nairobi, with plans to open one in London (Zhang 2011: 59; Nelson 2013:6; CGTN 2016). In 2016, CCTV rebranded its international channels to China Global Television Network (CGTN) to reflect its international outlook. CCTV's global expansion is covered in more detail in the upcoming section.

As China's largest national broadcaster, CCTV is an appropriate case study for understanding the media industry in China, and as a result, it has been extensively used by researchers to examine various issues from its structure, operations and programming, as well as its interaction with other players in the media industry. Given the high level of credibility that Chinese audiences accord the television medium, CCTV is also well-placed as an effective tool for transmitting ideological messages to audiences (Zhang, Zhou & Shen 2014).

One of the key writings on CCTV is Ying Zhu's book *Two Billion Eyes* provides a comprehensive history of the CCTV network and outlines its evolution from the economic reform period to recent years, and how these processes have shaped journalistic practice, programming and operations of the channel. Zhu also highlights the balancing act and at times contradictory interests from the state, the market and viewers, as well as the external context in which it operates (Zhu 2012).

In addition, Zhong (2010b)'s analysis of the structure of CCTV provides an understanding of the channel's ownership and forces that shape its operations. Unlike traditional media models which are either state, commercial or independently-owned, CCTV's model is a binary structure, which is a 'government business' controlled by the state and operated as a commercial entity. The organization is politically managed through the State Administration, and a commercial entity, China International Television Corporation (CITC). Zhong (2010b) points out that commercialisation of the media has not limited the role of the state, but has led to the establishment of government businesses which operate in parallel to government structures as agencies and controlled by the government. The role of these businesses is to provide a source of capital for state-owned media.

As CCTV expands globally, its primary role is to serve as a public diplomacy tool to create a positive image of China and influence foreign audiences. The next section provides a broader context for the concept of public diplomacy as it pertains to CCTV, beginning with its origins and how it has been conceptualised in China. This is followed by a discussion of CCTV's public diplomacy role in Africa. I have not included China's public diplomacy efforts in other parts of the world, as my study focuses on Africa.

4.1.4 CGTN's public diplomacy role

Public diplomacy is concerned with communicating and engaging with foreign audiences to achieve foreign policy goals. The Western definition of public diplomacy is 'the process by which an international actor conducts foreign policy by engaging a foreign public' (Cull 2009:1). Tuch (1990) defines it as 'a government's process of communicating with foreign publics to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies (Tuch 1990, in Potter 2002/2003:44), which highlights the state as the primary actor in practising public diplomacy. Public Diplomacy is different to propaganda, which involves manipulative communication, distortion of the truth and suppression of alternative views.

Discourses play an important role in public diplomacy, and their specificity to a particular time-period and context allows us to situate them at a certain time in history (Foucault 1994). The concept and practice of public diplomacy in China has therefore been shaped by its Confucian culture and values, as well as its economic and political history. These factors are reflected in China's relationship with its citizens and the outside world, hence its public diplomacy objectives.

A favourable image is an important aspect of Confucian philosophy, and originates from the concepts of *lian,* which refers to personal 'honour and moral worth', and *mianzi,* which refers to 'social prestige' (Cull 2009: n.p.). The main role of China's public diplomacy is to create a favourable image of China to counter negative perceptions arising from Western criticism and negative press coverage.

To understand the objectives of public diplomacy and its practice in China, it is important to explore the historical context and the discourses that inform it.

The concept of public diplomacy has always been a part of Chinese history, but it was not until the 1920s that the discourse around it developed in response to conflict with its neighbours – notably the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945) and resulting Chinese nationalism, as well as negative Western perceptions of China (Volz 2011; Cull 2009;

BBC 2014). At the time, China's practices were referred to as international propaganda targeted at foreign audiences to promote positive information about China and garner international support against the Japanese (Volz 2011). As a result, Chinese propaganda became institutionalised in the 1930s, first through private news agencies, then within the Kuomintang government with the formation of the International Department of the Ministry of Information in 1937.

The propaganda approach continued throughout Mao Zedong's rule between 1949 and 1978, as China adopted a closed policy and broke off relations with the US and Soviet Union to maintain its sovereignty and conceal its internal affairs. During this time, China practised Soviet-style propaganda characterised by ideological indoctrination to promote anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, as well as the revolution, particularly among liberation movements in the Third-World countries of Africa, East Asia and Latin America, some of whom were fighting for independence from the West (Van Ness 1970; Wang 2003). Zhang (2008) likens China's approach to the Western 'publicity model, whose purpose is propaganda, featured with exaggeration, distortion, lies and hoaxes' (Zhang 2008:307). These foreign audiences were reached through *Radio Beijing* (now China Radio International) and the *People's Daily* newspaper (Zhang 2008).

Although termed 'propaganda', China's approach in both the 1930s and during the Mao era was arguably a form of Western public diplomacy as it was targeted at foreign audiences to advance China's foreign policy goals. Among the key elements of public diplomacy are advocacy, which entails providing information to foreign publics, and international broadcasting; both were evident in Chinese propaganda practices (Cull 2009). In the 1930s and 1940s, China's news policy focused on 'positive news control/negative news control', while during the Mao era, international broadcasting institutions were established to influence foreign audiences (Volz 2011:162).

At the end of the Maoist era the new leader, Deng Xiaoping, initiated an open-door policy and started engaging with the international community. As the country has evolved, so has its discourse on public diplomacy in line with its economic and political reforms as China opened to the world and responded to events such as the Tiannamen

Square democracy protests in 1989 (D'Hooghe 2007; Cull 2009). These factors continue to shape contemporary public diplomacy as China develops into a world power.

Thus, the Chinese conception of public diplomacy is closely linked to propaganda, whose equivalent term *dui wai xuan chuan* or *wai xuan* refers to external propaganda aimed at promoting Chinese achievement and marketing the country's image internationally (Cull 2009:2; Wang 2008). Nevertheless, contrary to Western negative connotations of the term, the Chinese government's interpretation of propaganda, (*xuan chuan*) is viewed as legitimate and is justified as an essential response to Japanese aggression and Western negative perceptions of China. Through propaganda, information was censored so that audiences were only exposed to positive information and achievements (Cull 2009; Wu 2016).

Propaganda was therefore legitimised and institutionalised with the aim of informing the public about the country's policies, shaping public opinion and creating an organised and 'harmonious' society (Wang 2008; Volz 2011; D'Hooghe 2011:23). This concept of propaganda had implications for how journalism was originally understood and practised. Volz (2011) points out that when professional journalism was introduced in China in the 20th century, it was interpreted as a modern form of propaganda by the state and intellectuals, with the goal of serving public and national interest (Volz 2011:174). This creation of a harmonious society correlates with China's soft power objectives of building a 'harmonious world' and a 'peaceful rise', which characterise its international rhetoric and relations (FOCAC 2015).

The key role of CCTV is therefore to drive the government's agenda by reinforcing its ideological messages and discourse. These discourses evolve to reflect the country's guiding philosophy and in line with the Chinese and international context, but remain grounded on some aspects of China's history and values, and retain common elements of previous narratives. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Dream and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has become a dominant discourse that articulates his vision for the country's future. The Chinese Dream is not a new concept, but has a foundation in Communist Party ideology, in particular, Mao Zedong's *Thought* and Deng Xiaoping's

Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, with some adaptation to the present context (Wang 2014b, Xinhua 2017). However, it is part of a broader historical narrative on "national rejuvenation" which has been previously appropriated by Chinese leaders to political ends (Xi 2012; Wang 2014b, p. 2).

Xi describes the Chinese Dream as "the great renewal of the Chinese nation" (Xi 2012, para.1). This dream has political, economic, social and cultural dimensions which shape the domestic agenda and its international relations. Domestically, the Dream seeks to create national unity and identity among China's ethnically diverse population in response to internal instability and differences among various groups and territories, improve the economic life of the Chinese people, increase China's military strength and promote its image internationally (Xinhua 2013, Xi 2018).

Nevertheless, the Chinese Dream is not only domestic, but has geopolitical implications, with its realisation dependent on the international system (Hinck et al 2018; Callahan 2016). The Chinese Dream shapes China's foreign policy objectives through regional and international cooperation, peace and development initiatives. Furthermore, its social and economic aspirations for a better life for people has universal resonance with other countries much like the American Dream and desire by people across the world to improve their wellbeing, live safe and happy lives. These characteristics translate the Chinese Dream into an effective soft power resource, especially economically.

China's economic growth has transformed the lives of many Chinese nationals and lifted them out of poverty. This success increased China's demand for commodities to support its growth, which has boosted the economies of resource-rich parts of Africa. The dream of economic development is therefore a compelling one for developing nations who also aspire to become prosperous and are inspired by China's success and want to replicate it in their own countries (Kenyatta 2018, FOCAC 2018, Mokone 2018). China's success creates a positive image and admiration of China, and coupled with a common vision of future prosperity, the Chinese Dream becomes a source of economic soft power.

A core element of the Chinese Dream that is of interest internationally is military power and strength. While international peace and stability is key to realizing the Chinese Dream, China has strongly expressed the importance of defending its security and sovereignty (Xi 2018). This has raised concerns and criticism among many in the West who interpret the Chinese Dream as nationalistic and aggressive to revenge the years of China's humiliation by Japan and the West (Swaine 2010; The Economist 2013). China also draws on the Chinese Dream discourse by creating a sense of belonging with developing countries based on a shared colonial past and humiliation by the West, as well as similar development challenges.

The cultural aspect of the Chinese Dream is also a source of soft power exercised by showcasing China's rich cultural heritage and ancient civilisation (Xi 2013). This soft power is implemented through cultural programmes, Chinese medicine and sports, as well as media programming such as the Chinese Gala Shows and CGTN Africa's *60 Years of Chinese Friendship*. China has also formed partnerships with other cultures in the Middle East, Persia and France to celebrate its culture (Hinck et al 2018: 104).

Public diplomacy and propaganda are different concepts, and although China's practice of propaganda has evolved, the active role of the state in the media industry and restrictions on freedom of expression jeopardises CGTN's credibility as it is associated with propaganda practices (Svensson 2017, Vi 2008; Sukosd & Wang 2013). This is likely to create perceptions that are counterproductive to China's public diplomacy goals. Despite increased private media ownership and diversity, the privatization process is selective and the government applies various instruments and coercion to centralise, decentralise and recentralise control, which creates a repressive legal environment for private media and the internet, thereby limiting their opportunities (Vi 2008; Sukosd & Wang 2013). Some content research has also demonstrated evidence of China's continued use of propaganda in media programming (Zhong 2004; Zhong 2001; Wang 2009).

4.1.5 CGTN's International Expansion

As China's global influence and integration into the world system have increased, so has its quest to present a positive international image and influence foreign audiences. This has provided the impetus for CGTN's ambition to expand internationally. To understand the significance of its international activities, studies on CCTV are moving beyond the national to an international perspective, focusing on the nature of the strategies driving its international presence and assessing their impact (Zhang H. 2011; Zhang X. 2011; Mustafi 2012; Nelson 2013; Hu & Ji 2012; D'Hooghe 2007; Cull 2009). More studies are also focusing on Africa, where China's media engagement has intensified in recent years (Zhang 2013; Wu 2012, 2016; Wasserman 2016; Nassanga & Makara 2016; Zhang & Mwangi 2016; Marsh 2013; Wekesa 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016; Wekesa & Zhang 2014; Gagliardone 2013; Wasserman 2013b, 2016; Banda 2009; Gorfinkel et al 2014; Ramo 2007; D'Hooghe 2007; Cull 2009). Researchers are also beginning to consider audience responses to the Chinese presence in China (Li & Ronning 2013; Li & Sligo 2012), the United Kingdom (Zhang 2011) and Africa (Jura & Kaluzynska 2013; Gorfinkel et al 2014; Zhang & Mwangi 2016; Ojo 2016; Nassanga & Makara 2016).

CCTV's global expansion is set against the backdrop of China's political and economic aspirations as articulated in the Chinese Dream. The expansion of CCTV internationally falls within the country's broader going-out project, focusing on culture in pursuit of soft power objectives (Osborne 2016; McKenzie 2012; Branigan 2011; Foster 2012; Bandurski 2012, 2017; Gagliardone 2013; Nelson 2013).

Hence a central theme on discussions about CCTV's expansion is its role as a public diplomacy tool. Furthermore, while debates on China's public diplomacy role are dominated by state-led initiatives, there is a growing literature from scholars of international relations and diplomacy on the role of non-state actors such as Chinese corporates (D'Hooghe 2011).

International criticism of China's handling of the Tiananmen protest was partly a catalyst for its expansion overseas to counter Western negative reporting, and the media

plays a key role as a powerful public diplomacy tool to shape foreign public opinion about China and rebuild its international image as a peaceful and responsible superpower.

One of the early strategies used by CCTV to reach foreign publics was to partner with international broadcasters such as News Corp and Fox to carry its content, and to supply overseas broadcasters and transnational channels with Chinese programmes (Zhang 2011:59).

The launch of satellite television in China provided a further opportunity for international expansion, and in 1992 CCTV launched CCTV-4, its first international channel in Mandarin, broadcasting in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. This was followed by the launch of the first 24-hour English-language channel in 2000, subsequently channels in Spanish and French in 2004, then Arab and Russian channels in 2009. CCTV International has a wide range of current affairs programming and shows targeted at the international audience, expatriates living in China, and the Chinese diaspora (Zhang 2011:61). The channel's content focuses on Chinese issues, and as such its coverage is pro-China and overtly reflects the Chinese government's agenda. This lack of critical coverage, and state control, limit the channel's credibility as a reliable source of information, particularly among foreign audiences. Today, China broadcasts in seven languages and has bureaus in 18 countries including production centres in Beijing, Washington and Nairobi, with plans to open one in London (Zhang 2011:59; Nelson 2013:6; CGTN 2016).

CGTN America (formerly CCTV America) is a 24-hour English-language news channel launched in February 2012 to provide an alternative to Western news and a Chinese perspective on global affairs (CCTV 2012b). Its newsroom has been described as a sophisticated building with the latest technology and as professional and diverse a workforce as other global newsrooms (Nelson 2013). The channel is based in Washington D.C. and available to 'nearly 30 million households (encompassing 75 million viewers) in the United States' (CGTN 2016:n.p.). Its target audience is American viewers and the Chinese diaspora (CGTN 2012b). The channel focuses on the Americas, particularly regions such as Latin America that do not receive much attention

from Western media due to reduced budgets. Initially, the channel produced six hours of political, business and cultural programming, but its coverage is evolving (CGTN 2012b; Nelson 2013).

CCTV's international presence has exposed the broadcaster to competition with well-established global players, and literature on its expansion draws attention to the motivation behind China's media strategy and to its strengths and challenges within a global context, as demonstrated by Nelson (2013) and Hu and Ji (2012).

Hu and Ji's (2012) assessment of the opportunities and limitations of China's global media expansion focuses on its domestic social context. The authors highlight the tensions inherent in Chinese media's dual structure, and view the relations between state and market logic, national and global, as incompatible. The authors' focus on the domestic social context demonstrates how national issues are linked to China's global media strategy. Their conclusions echo findings of other researchers: that CGTN's ability to influence foreign audiences is limited by its perceived lack of credibility as a government-controlled entity (Zhang 2011; D'Hooghe 2007).

Nelson's (2013) report is one of the English documents available that discusses the role of the media in China's grand 'going-out' strategy as well as a detailed description of CCTV's activities in other regions such as Africa, Asia-Pacific and CCTV America. Like Hu and Ji (2012), she highlights opportunities and uncertainties in a challenging global media environment (Nelson 2013).

Reaction to CCTV's global presence reflects international response to China's growing global influence, which has attracted enormous attention. Views on its significance from both Western and non-Western observers have been mixed, and initially focused on evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of China's expansion from an economic and political perspective. As China's engagement in Africa grew, more attention was focused on implications for Africa (Koné 2011; Mbeki 2006; Foster 2012; Bandurski 2012; 2017 McKenzie 2012; Branigan 2011; Nelson 2013; Naidu & Davies 2006; Taylor 2014; Zweig & Jianhai 2005; Rotberg 2016; Condon 2012; Stman & Yan 2009).

Since debates on China's media presence are also linked to its broader economic and political activities globally, my discussion begins with an overview of debates on this topic. From a broader economic and political perspective, Western governments have expressed anxiety about China's growing economic and political influence, as it challenges the established Western hegemony and their global interests. Critics have questioned China's intentions and framed its expansion in terms of the so-called 'China threat' (Al-Rodhan 2007; Broomfield 2003).

Discussions have also highlighted the negative consequences of Chinese global activities, particularly in the developing world of South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa, arguing that Beijing's activities are largely motivated by its political and economic interests and that China is the primary beneficiary at the expense of other countries (Kurlantzick 2006; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007, 2018). China's uncritical support of rogue states with weak public institutions and civil society is said to be detrimental to democracy and good governance, and to US interests in these regions (Kurlantzick 2006; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007). Kurlantzick (2006) points out that China's labour and human rights practices are already imitated by countries such as Burma and Cambodia. Benner et al (2018) also argue that China's authoritarian ideal is set to threaten liberal democracy in Europe, with some leaders beginning to adopt Chinese rhetoric and even willing to adjust EU and national interests to align with those of China. Citing the trade agreement between China and Norway, they argue that China agreed to normalise its trade relations with Norway in return for Norway dropping its support for Chinese human rights activists (Benner et al 2018).

Furthermore, international businesses have also expressed nervousness at some of China's currency policies, arguing that they give China a fair-trade advantage while the opening up of its domestic markets has been very slow (D'Hooghe 2007; Kroeber 2011; Myers 2018; Morrison 2018). In April 2018, these concerns escalated into the so-called 'China–US trade war' where both countries imposed trade tariffs on one another's companies (Myers 2018; Holland 2018).

Similar discourses also characterised reaction to the launch of CGTN America and CGTN Africa. Western commentators, particularly the media industry, were among the

first to react. They framed the broadcaster's presence within neoliberal discourses on the role of the media in society and state–media relations, which questioned CCTV's credibility, and contrasted China's journalistic style with Western standards as practised by global players such as Al Jazeera, CNN and the BBC (Foster 2012; Bandurski 2012, 2017; McKenzie 2012; Branigan 2011; Gagliardone 2013; Nelson 2013). China's socialist legacy and media structure are considered incompatible with global media values and practices, and are therefore a liability among global audiences accustomed to the libertarian media system. Reacting to the launch of CCTV America, Foster (2012) expresses pessimism about the channel's potential success, likening it to the failure of Xinhua News in New York to produce compelling content. Furthermore, while Nelson (2013) acknowledges CCTV America's successes and expresses optimism about its ability to adapt to Western-style standards, she also observes that CGTN Africa's content is propagandist (Nelson 2013). The recent rebranding of CCTV's international channels to CGTN has also failed to change perceptions about the broadcaster. Bandurski (2017) is highly critical of the move, arguing that it is a misguided soft-power strategy that has not so far resulted in a new approach to news that understands foreign audiences and their interests.

Given the scope of my research, I now turn my attention to reaction to CCTV's expansion in Africa, where Chinese media engagement is growing and increasingly being documented.

CGTN Africa's presence is also contextualised within China's global 'going-out' strategy and Africa–China relations (McKenzie 2012; Branigan 2011; Foster 2012). As such, I begin my discussion with reaction to China's broader engagement in Africa, and then discuss responses from a media perspective. The role of Western nations has been central to these debates, which are underpinned by historical relations between the West and Africa, as well as the West and China, with comparisons between Chinese and Western policies in Africa. Analysis is dominated by themes of imperialism, governance, natural resources, human rights, environmental issues and African agency. Critics from Africa and beyond have questioned China's agenda in Africa, with some arguing that it seeks to exploit the continent's natural resources, particularly oil, to fuel

its own growing economy (Naidu & Davies 2006; Taylor 2014). Zweig & Jianhai (2005) note particularly what they call China's 'oil slick diplomacy', where the acquisition of exploration and supply contracts by Chinese state companies in the oil industry is a long-term strategy to position China as a major player in the global oil industry, with control and access to oil (Zweig & Jianhai 2005: n.p.).

From a governance perspective, some fear that China's controversial policies such as human rights, democracy and environmental affairs set a bad example for weak states (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007; Naidu & Davis 2006). China's no-strings-attached approach has particularly been blamed for encouraging poor governance in Africa (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007; Naidu & Davis 2006). Unlike Western institutions, whose aid packages are conditional upon democratic and other governance criteria, China's aid to African governments is non-conditional, which discourages these governments from improving democratic practices and reverses gains towards liberal democracy that some African countries such as Sudan and Angola have made with support from the West (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007; Naidu & Davis 2006).

At the same time, others argue in favour of Chinese activities in Africa and highlight the benefits (Rotberg 2016; Condon 2012; Stauman & Yan (2009). Stauman and Yan (2009) see criticism of China as ideologically motivated and lacking in context. They suggest a comparative approach between China and Western actors in the analysis of the impact of China's involvement in Africa. The authors question arguments that China's involvement is harmful to the continent and argue that the Chinese impact should be viewed within the context of the global world system, which also implicates the role of Western and African actors in shaping the outcomes of foreign engagement in the continent. They dismiss arguments that China is exploiting natural resources and the negative effect of cheap Chinese imports into the African market, arguing that Western involvement in the continent is also driven by competition from China, and it is a strategy to secure a supply of and control access to oil reserves. They also blame the problems in Africa's manufacturing sector on a decline in capital investment, poor management and lack of skills, as opposed to cheap Chinese imports of goods (Stauman & Yan 2009).

Arguments in favour of China also underscore the benefits of its contemporary relations with Africa, as an alternative to the West, and its importance for Africa's development (Rotberg 2016; Condon 2012). Africa's economic growth in recent years has been a result of China's demand for commodities, and while it has dropped in recent years, plunging some resource-producing countries into a recession, the revenues from previous years have improved these economies. Rotberg and Condon (2012) argue that while Chinese involvement is not without challenges, it can be effective where approaches by African and Western countries and the international community have failed, such as in South Sudan. However, Condon (2012) also highlights the role played by various actors such as Africans themselves, who decide on the terms of the relationship, and the West, which can assist and provide capacity to African governments to negotiate better terms with China (Condon 2012).

The focus of the Africa–China discourse on the positive versus negative analysis is however problematised by many who agree that China's expansion is characterised by both opportunities and challenges (Mbeki 2006; Koné 2011; Obiorah 2008; Piccone 2016; Alden & Hughes 2009; Brautigan 2007; Thomas & Tang 2010). In an interview with the *Financial Times*, former South African President Thabo Mbeki welcomed Chinese engagement in Africa, but acknowledged the challenges in the textile and clothing sector (Mbeki 2006). The involvement of other actors and different interests further complicates the relationship between Africa and China, making it difficult to measure the implications of the relationship in either positive or negative terms. Others have also highlighted the role of African actors in the Africa–China relationship and their engagements with foreign partners (Obiorah 2008; Condon 2012; Koné 2011). The outcomes of Africa's ties with China also differ depending on national contexts, and how individual African countries engage with China. Koné (2011) points out that Chinese expansion is beneficial as it provides more choices for African leaders to partner with, allowing them to secure better terms for trade and political solutions. However he adds that African governments need to use these opportunities to guarantee a better life for their people and ensure that they comply with good governance standards such as the Banjul Charter (Koné 2011).

Nevertheless, China's influence does not remain unchallenged. While China has ignored abuses of human rights and does not interfere with sovereign states, mounting criticism has become a hindrance to its global ambitions, forcing it to take action to balance its interests with global norms to demonstrate its responsibility as a global power. As a result, its activities in Africa now extend further than political and economic interests to peace and security, human rights and health. Although these are also motivated by the need to protect its investments, China has realised the importance of setting global norms as part of being a global power (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small 2007; Anthony, Esterhuyse & Burgess 2015; Parenti 2009; Du Plessis 2016). Many scholars are therefore drawing our attention to the multidimensional elements of the relationship between Africa and China, highlighting the opportunities and challenges (Obiorah 2008; SAIIA 2015; Benazeraf & Alves 2014).

Beyond the debates on China's political and economic activities, its cultural engagement, particularly its media presence in the African industry, has also sparked international interest, with debate also characterised by arguments on positive versus negative outcomes. The next section focuses on China's expansion from a media perspective and reaction to it.

4.1.6 CGTN Expansion into Africa

CGTN Africa (formerly CCTV Africa) was launched in Kenya in 2012, as CCTV's first production centre in Africa, with a primary focus on issues about the continent and international news relevant to the continent (CCTV 2012a). In Africa, the channel is accessible through subscription to the DSTV platform on Channel 409.

It is part of the Chinese government's global media organisation, CGTN (formerly, CCTV) (CGTN 2018).

The channel is targeted at audiences in Africa, but its content is also of interest to a global audience with an interest in the continent, as well as a Chinese audience, to help them better understand Africa and promote China–Africa relations. Nevertheless, as Gorfinkel et al (2016) point out, its audience is not yet clearly defined.

CGTN Africa produces current affairs programming covering a daily one-hour news programme, *Africa Live,* which includes business news. Programming also includes a weekly sports programme *Match Point* and talk shows, *Talk Africa* and *Faces of Africa,* and is evolving, with the recent introduction of a new business programme called *Global Business*.

Like other foreign news centres, CGTN Africa's workforce is diverse, with many staff members from Kenya (CCTV 2012a). The CCTV Africa News Production centre is considered a vital step in expanding CCTV's global news coverage capabilities and an important step towards CCTV's global news-gathering network to enhance its competitiveness (CCTV 2012a).

Since its launch, there has been growing interest in CGTN Africa in Africa and internationally, with comments and analysis from the media, individuals and institutions in various fields who have commented on what its presence means for the continent and broader international relations. Most of the literature on CGTN Africa was written before the channel's rebranding in 2016, therefore this discussion makes references to CCTV, CCTV Africa or CCTV America in alignment with the literature. Discussions on the issue have been dominated by the themes of natural resources, imperialism and China's poor human rights record, drawing comparisons between CCTV and global media such as Al Jazeera, and questioned China's intentions and credibility given its domestic censorship of the media (Global Voices 2012; Mustafi 2012; Jacobs 2012; Rhodes 2012; Abebe Gellaw, cited in Jacobs 2012; Plaut 2012, cited in Shek 2012; Bandurski 2007, 2017). On the other hand, reaction from Africa has been mixed, with some media professionals and government officials, particularly those working with CCTV, welcoming its presence, but being cautious about how they engage with Chinese media, particularly as a source of information (Soi 2012, cited in Rhodes 2012; Woka Nyagwoka, cited in Jacobs 2012; Wasserman 2016; *Daily Nation* 2012).

Nevertheless, relations between China and Africa are not new, and go back as far as the Ming Dynasty in the 14th century, through expeditions in East Africa (SAIIA 2017). The presence of Chinese media organisations in the continent, such as Xinhua in the 1950s, played a key role in assisting the Chinese government to form diplomatic

relations with newly independent African states (Wu 2012; China.org 2001; Ding 2008; Obiorah 2008). To counter national security threats from the Soviet Union and the US in the 1960s, China formed 'ideological solidarity' with some African countries, leading to its involvement in various projects in the continent (Ding 2008:199). What is significant about China's contemporary expansion strategy is the increased intensity of its engagement with Africa, which has received attention from scholars in various fields. Leading this media presence are state media groups CGTN and Xinhua News Agency.

As some media and communications scholars have pointed out, initial studies of China's engagement in Africa largely focused on the economic and political implications such as trade, downplaying the broader social and cultural impact (Banda 2009; Wasserman 2012). Nevertheless, studies from a media perspective are beginning to emerge, particularly from media and international relations; they attempt to understand and explain its significance as it interacts with local news practices and values, and to understand its social and cultural implications.

Academic response to China's media presence is reflected in scholarly work on CGTN, which addresses various issues from the nature of its activities to its content strategies. As this engagement evolves, the literature has also begun to evaluate its impact and responses from audiences and industry professionals. A discussion of the literature on CGTN's expansion in the continent follows.

Earlier studies from the media perspective followed a general content analysis of manifest content on the nature of news coverage (De Beer & Schreiner 2009; Wasserman 2012). De Beer and Schreiner's (2009) research is set within the context of debates on the flow of foreign news among different countries. Their focus on Africa addresses some of the gaps in traditional New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) research, where countries in the South were on the receiving end of information (as opposed to originators), as well as the scant research on African news flows. While such analysis provides a comprehensive description of patterns of coverage of China–Africa relations, the study does not account for the significance of the themes or explain the factors that account for these differences. There is therefore a

need for additional, in-depth knowledge that moves us towards a nuanced understanding of the discourses that inform such positive/negative sentiments; a perspective on audiences; and how the channel interacts with various actors such as other global media at a regional African level. For example, Wasserman (2012) builds on a previous study by De Beer and Schreiner (2009) to track media coverage of China by South African media. However, the content analysis produces descriptions of content divided into categories and sentimental results (negative, positive or neutral) (Wasserman 2012). As Wasserman himself points out, a more qualitative study that explores instances when coverage is negative or positive would add more value and allow us to make the right interventions (Wasserman 2012). As a result, more scholars, including Wasserman (2016), have started to address some of these deeper questions and various themes emerging from initial research, as discussed below.

The launch of CGTN Africa in Kenya in 2012 has increased research into China–Africa engagement to better understand how Chinese media is adapting to the African media sphere. China's entry into the African media market received a lot of interest from global media, which is already targeting African audiences, leading to questions about the implications for journalistic philosophy in Africa. Some scholars (Banda 2009:343) argue that it will lead to the adoption of the repressive media model and erode the continent's Western-style media values of objectivity and freedom of expression.

A more comprehensive approach to understanding the nature and implications of the Chinese media presence in Africa has been conducted on CCTV Africa. Initial research sought to determine and interpret the nature of recent Chinese engagement in Africa (Banda 2009). The media plays an important role in facilitating conversations about the relationship between Africa and China and how it is understood. Therefore, the approach taken by a number of scholars was to understand the implications and response to Chinese engagement in Africa through media coverage. The studies have so far assessed various aspects of this engagement, such as the impact on journalistic practices in African media outlets (Wekesa 2013b, 2014; Wekesa & Zhang 2014; Gargliadone 2013; Wasserman 2013b, 2016); African perceptions of China (Wekesa 2013a; Nassanga & Makara 2014; Ojo 2016; Olorunnisola & Ma 2013); the diffusion of

Chinese norms and policies through China's discourse in Africa (Zhang 2013; Marsh 2016); and African responses to China's media presence in the African media market (Gabriel & Botma 2013). A significant amount of the literature, particularly from international relations scholars, has paid more attention to the public diplomacy role of CGTN Africa (Banda 2009; Gargliadone et al 2010; Zhang 2011; Wu 2012, 2013, 2016; Wasserman 2016). This research has been valuable in providing insights into emerging patterns of China's presence in the continent; however, it needs to be taken further to explore an audience perspective, as well as the regional and global context in which Chinese media operates.

One of the early analysts of Chinese media engagement in Africa is Banda (2009). Adopting a critical cultural perspective, he argues that China's media presence will create African dependency on Chinese technology and skills and facilitate China's ideological and cultural influence in the continent. Nevertheless, as contemporary studies on media globalisation have shown, the presence of foreign cultural products does not erode local and national cultures, but is a negotiated process of complex interaction between various factors leading to unpredictable outcomes (Hannerz 1997; Robertson 1992; Wang 2008; Appadurai 1996; Abubakar 2013). While acknowledging that Africa is also an active agent in cultural production, Banda's conception of the implications of Chinese engagement in the African media industry assumes the relationship between Africa and China to be unequal, with China being more dominant due to its material resources. These conceptions are aligned with traditional media imperialism and core–periphery discourses that view African countries as powerless victims, unable to resist external influence. As I discuss later in this section, subsequent studies on the impact of China's media engagement on journalistic practice contradict Banda's analysis, demonstrating forms of resistance and varied outcomes.

Banda's analysis is tested in research conducted by Wekesa (2013b) and Wekesa and Zhang (2014) after the launch of CCTV Africa to examine the nature of Chinese media engagement in East Africa. In his study, Wekesa (2013b) identifies four emerging trends and patterns of Chinese media engagement, namely: support and engagement with media practitioners; partnership and support for East African media; use of East

African media as platforms; and competition with East African media. He points out that China–Africa media links are likely to increase partnerships between media organisations and lead to negotiations between Chinese officials and media executives.

Also interested on the impact of Chinese presence in the African media sphere is Gagliardone (2013), who focuses on journalistic values and practices to investigate the impact of Chinese journalistic values on African media. His analysis of China's media approach in Africa is based on an empirical framework developed in earlier research, where Chinese media engagement assumes the role of partner, persuader and prototype (Gagliardone, Stremlau & Nkrumah 2012). This approach is not based on Africa's previous media engagements with other nations, but grounded in the experiences of the actors involved in Chinese media activities. This provides much-needed empirically based evidence of China's media activities, although it cannot be generalised to all countries in the continent. Gagliardone's interviews with CCTV Africa personnel provide insights into the strategies that inform the broadcaster's construction of audiences and the production context that informs discourses about the continent. The author highlights positive reporting by CCTV Africa as a new way of reporting about the continent; but more importantly, he adds that the Chinese media presence in Africa will interact with different practices, presenting an opportunity to explore various and competing journalistic models, and not the transmission of a Chinese journalistic model (Gagliardone 2013).

Other scholars have also noted that a distinct Chinese journalistic style and discourse about Africa has not yet emerged (Zhang 2013; Marsh 2016). Zhang (2013) analyses the CCTV Africa programme *Africa Live* to establish how China aims to present an alternative discourse. His findings show that the broadcaster's reporting on Africa and on international issues is still experimental. Zhang's (2013) discourse analysis reveals the absence of a counter-hegemonic world order that challenges Western perspective. Similar research by Marsh (2016) focuses on comparing CCTV's *Africa Live* content with that of the BBC's *Focus on Africa.* Her findings also demonstrate China's different approach to covering Africa, which is dominated by the 'Africa Rising' narrative.

Nevertheless, the broadcaster's media practices and style are not a formidable alternative to traditional Western perspectives and journalistic style (Marsh 2016).

In addition, Wekesa and Zhang (2014) analysed CGTN Africa's reporting to establish whether the Chinese reporting model impacts coverage on CGTN Africa. They also compared it with popular perceptions about China's media presence in Africa. This study is useful in identifying the early effects of Chinese media engagement in Africa, and new trends emanating from the presence of non-Western media in the African media market. The findings are also significant as they disprove assertions by Banda (2009) that Chinese media will lead to 'ideological expurgation' and erosion of media objectivity in Africa (Banda 2009:349). Moreover, Chinese media's ability to erode national journalistic styles is unlikely, as Harber (2013) notes that China's authoritarian reporting style might find not find acceptance in countries such as South Africa, with its strong libertarian journalistic tradition and critical stance towards the ruling power (Harber 2013). Chinese media on the continent is more likely to introduce 'positive coverage', a new form of journalism and representation of Africa. This demonstrates the inefficiency of the traditional media and cultural imperialism framework for understanding global and transnational media, as it does not take into account the complex interaction of forces between the global, regional and local levels. My research therefore applies Appadurai's concept of '-scapes' or global cultural flows to understand the connections and contradictions that occur when various forces come into play.

One of the limitations of Wekesa and Zhang's study is that they attribute this positive reporting about Africa primarily to Chinese media presence in the continent. However, I argue that it is also largely a result of the growth of African economies in recent years, leading to a new narrative about the continent – its rise. Africa's growth has been the subject of much analysis and commentary in recent years from various stakeholders ranging from academia and media to social commentators (*The Economist* 2011, 2013; Taylor 2014; Tshabalala 2016). These positive developments attracted not only Chinese, but international, media interest, driven by business and economic news. The presence of media organisations such as CNBC Africa in Africa is to a large extent a

response to the new economic climate, which provided a different perspective on business and economic news about Africa before CGTN's presence in the continent. Africa's rise has experienced challenges following China's economic slow-down and has been questioned by critics (Taylor 2014; Bond 2017; Brookings 2013). Nevertheless, the 'Africa Rising' discourse remains positive, albeit cautiously so (Tshabalala 2016).

The research conducted by Wekesa & Zhang (2014) and Gargliardone (2013) also raises important questions about the nature of news coverage – negative or positive – which calls for further investigation into the sources of the media perceptions and types of discourse that inform such coverage, which I attempt to address in my research. My study widens the scope of these authors to take into account how China's strategic roles (partner, persuader and prototype) impact on the manner in which audiences are positioned and addressed. Furthermore, Wekesa and Zhang's (2014) methodological approach of 'loose framing analysis' focuses only on identifying positive–negative frames; the consequence is that the significance of these frames is not examined (Wekesa & Zhang 2014:5). The frame descriptions also suggest a homogenous interpretation of messages, which limits the multiple interpretations available and diminishes the role of the audience. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)'s rigorous analytical approach, on the other hand, advances a more nuanced way of thinking about the African audience as it reveals the relationship between the ideas in the text and sociocultural practice, implicating not just the Chinese media, but the disparate actors, their roles and the power relations between them (Fairclough 1995). However, China's credibility and its history of political repression is a challenge that the country should contend with when engaging with foreign audiences (Mustafi 2012).

Focusing on state-led public diplomacy practices and their impact, researchers have assessed how various stakeholders have responded. Many scholars have approached the issue primarily from the perspectives of international relations and international communications (Zhang 2011; Wu 2012; D'Hooghe 2011; Lu & Li 2011; Jura & Kaluzynska 2013; Wekesa 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016; Wekesa & Zhang 2014; Gagliardone 2013; Wasserman 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Banda 2009). Scholars from

various disciplines, particularly international communications, have further examined the implications of China's public diplomacy efforts from the viewpoint of a media institutions and practice perspective (Zhang 2011; Wu 2012; Wekesa 2013b, 2014, 2016; Wekesa & Zhang 2014; Gagliardone 2013; Wasserman 2013b, 2016; Banda 2009). They also address how China's presence impacts on professional practices and the media industry, while the audience perspective considers perceptions among audiences in China (Li & Rønning 2013; Li & Sligo 2012); the United Kingdom (Zhang 2011); and Africa (Wekesa 2013a; Jura & Kaluzynska 2013; Gorfinkel et al 2014). While debate on China's global expansion is dominated by the state-led initiatives, there is a growing literature on non-state actors such as Chinese corporates (D'Hooghe 2011; Lu & Li 2011) and Chinese diasporic communities (Li 2011).

Zhang's (2011) study of CCTV International's global expansion evaluates China's state-centric model of public diplomacy, its challenges and effectiveness, and UK audiences' perceptions of CCTV (Zhang 2011). Zhang's approach, incorporating perspectives from various actors such as media practitioners, scholars, guest speakers and audiences, provides a rich account and analysis of China's public diplomacy and challenges. The author concludes that winning the hearts and minds of foreign audiences is limited by China's state control, which makes it less credible and diminishes its global influence. China's credibility is also highlighted by Li and Sligo (2012) in relation to Western audiences who are sceptical about China's motives, given its history of suppressing dissent and media censorship (Li & Sligo 2012).

Nevertheless, Zhang's analysis is Chinese-centred, with interviewees being Chinese professionals. This does not provide an external perspective that reflects the experiences of the target audience. Further research could also contextualise this study by placing CCTV International in the global context in which it operates, produces and consumes content, as well as in comparison to other players, possibly using one of CCTV's overseas-based production centres such as CCTV America or Africa as a case study. While the author uses various methods that complement each other, this does not allow them to explore some of the issues in detail. For example, his sample is only the *Dialogue* programme, which narrows their perspective to current affairs content.

Zhang's research was conducted before CCTV launched in Africa, therefore the author's analysis needs to be expanded to provide a current perspective of China's expansion in Africa, given its on-the-ground media presence and strategic engagement in the economy and other social spheres in the continent. Furthermore, while the author also considers market forces and makes comparisons with well-established Western media channels, attention also needs to be given to non-Western transnational players who are competing with China for African audiences. China's global media expansion can also be understood within the shifting geopolitical power relations from the West to the periphery, increasing the importance of non-Western players in international affairs. Their growing international role has also resulted in their transnational media presence. Therefore, an analysis of global media needs to consider the influence of these new transnational media players.

Another public diplomacy strategy employed by China is its institutional approach, which entails expanding its media institutions worldwide and through media development initiatives in Africa (Banda 2009; Gargliadone et al 2010; Wu 2012). These include providing infrastructure support to African media, particularly state-owned broadcasters. Adopting a critical cultural perspective, Banda (2009) argues that this intervention will create African dependency on Chinese technology and skills and facilitate China's ideological and cultural influence on the continent. Nevertheless, as I point out in the media globalisation section, the presence of foreign cultural products does not erode local and national cultures, but is a negotiated process of complex interaction between various factors leading to unpredictable outcomes. While acknowledging that Africa is also an active agent in cultural production, Banda's conception of the implications of Chinese engagement in the African media industry presumes the relationship between Africa and China to be unequal, with China being more dominant due to its material resources. These conceptions are aligned to traditional media imperialism and core–periphery discourses, which view African countries as powerless victims, unable to resist external influence. As discussed later in this section, subsequent studies on the impact of China's media engagement on journalistic practice contradict Banda's analysis, demonstrating forms of resistance and varied outcomes.

Also, focusing on China's infrastructural support of African media is Wu (2012), who concludes that China's success in influencing African audiences is limited by competition from more established global media players, domestic circumstances that impact on African perceptions of China, and understanding the complex and often contrasting African media market. Being an organ of public diplomacy adds to the challenge, as Chinese media also needs to balance these factors with state objectives. Wu's (2012) analysis of Chinese influence is limited in scope. Her argument on the global reach of Chinese media does not necessarily translate into audience access to Chinese channels and influence. For instance, despite the presence of Chinese media channels in Africa, they are not accessible to the entire population and some members of the public are not aware of them (Gorfinkel et al 2014; Gagliardone, Repnikova & Streml 2010). These factors will need to be examined through audience research. Furthermore, although China's investment in media infrastructure counters Western hegemony and enhances the country's level of control and involvement in the media sector, Wu's focus on media development assistance limits her analysis to state actors who are beneficiaries of the assistance, and as such limits China's sphere of influence to these organisations as opposed to the wider audience. Further research that explores how these engagements translate into public influence, audience reception, and comparison with other media players in the continent would provide more insights. As the author acknowledges, it was too early to assess the effectiveness of China's media engagement on African audience perception, given that some of the media institutions such as CGTN Africa had just been established in Kenya.

The success of public diplomacy strategies is also to a large extent dependent on how they are received and the extent to which they influence public perceptions. Therefore, the role of African actors is a key factor in assessing the effectiveness of China's engagement. Nevertheless, measuring the effectiveness of China's public diplomacy is an issue that continues to evade many scholars, as some authors have highlighted (Wang 2011; Wu 2012).

A common element in the studies above, is their analysis from the perspective of centre–periphery discourses, which emphasise external imposition by external actors

and the passivity of Africa. The assumption is that Chinese media is acting on Africa, but the role of African actors and how they shape the news frames is not adequately considered. Scholarship on media globalisation has shown how local actors can participate by localising and re-adapting external content to the needs of local audiences. Furthermore, media content is a product of various factors and their complex interaction. As a result, China's model in Africa and its content output are varied, as it interacts with audience needs, media flows and counter-flows that African audiences are also exposed to and links with other discourses. It also varies depending on the issue, and is influenced by political and economic relations between countries.

Another factor in my research is that it situates CCTV Africa within the African regional and global context in which the channel operates, in comparison with other global players; this provides a global perspective and insight into how China's media is adjusting its model to suit foreign audiences, while also responding to the competition from other non-Western players including African media.

Within the context of negative Western perceptions of the Africa–China relationship, African scholars have sought to examine African perceptions of this relationship as reflected in media coverage (Wekesa 2013a; Wasserman 2016; Ojo 2016; Nassanga & Makara 2016).

Wekesa (2013a) examined how China is perceived in Africa, in a framing analysis of East Africa's media perceptions of China. His study concludes that China's image is more positive, and 'more inclined towards pragmatic, economic considerations' (Wekesa 2013a:36). Wekesa's findings on economic considerations are consistent with current discourse on the China–Africa relationship, which has been a primary focus area for many scholars (Brautigam 2007; Brautigam, Thomas & Tang 2010). They also confirm the argument by Jura and Kaluzynsa (2013) that the economy, business and development are new sources of soft power, which is used by China to increase its attractiveness to the receiving country, especially developing nations (Jura & Kaluzynska 2013). Indeed, as shown in the findings, China is seen as an investor in the economy and its development model is particularly of interest to developing countries that want to achieve the same results as China. This is particularly important because

China's rise as a global economic player is largely driven by the country's successful economic growth in the past decades.

The presence of Chinese media in Africa is also influenced by the relationship between countries. Therefore country-specific research is also key to understanding the role of local factors in shaping China's engagement in the continent. Focusing on Uganda, Nassanga and Makara (2016) also examine local perceptions of Africa–China relations in the reportage of Uganda's two influential newspapers. While they also apply framing analysis, the authors not only focus on the text, but also pay attention to the actors involved in coverage, as well as the journalists who cover the stories. Their analysis also addresses specific themes that characterise Chinese activity in Africa: Chinese aid, China as a global power, and the equality of the China–Africa partnership. The authors reach similar findings to previous studies where perceptions of China in Africa were neither positive nor negative, but largely neutral (Wekesa 2013a). Their analysis of actors and voices in the Africa–China discourse shows how government actors dominate the discourse about the Africa–China relationship, which can be linked to the fact that the relationship is driven by state actors.

Adopting an Afrocentric approach, Ojo (2016) analyses pan-African perceptions of Sino–African relations in diasporic news magazines to establish the extent and nature of coverage about Chinese presence. The author adopts a thematic analytical approach to identify dominant themes that characterise coverage. While the themes may reveal the ideological frames of the publications and journalists, the analysis is limited to meanings embedded only in the text, which does not link them to how they relate to broader discourses and fails to identify competing themes and meanings. Furthermore, the producer of content is assumed to have an active role in the construction of meaning, while the role of readers is obscured. As the author acknowledges, framing analysis highlights certain themes but also downplays others (Ojo 2016:50). While the two magazines adopted a pan-African perspective, the author's findings demonstrate that *African Business* magazine's reporting was more analytical and highlighted the multifaceted relationship between China and Africa, while *New African* coverage was episodic.

Olorunnisola and Ma (2013) also investigated dominant frames in the Africa–China relationship as reflected in newspapers in Nigeria, South Africa, the US and China. They found that African reportage focused on surveillance, with the dominance of frames on 'controversy, partner and new power', while the US framed China as 'competitor and watchfulness'.

Framing analysis is the dominant approach in the studies discussed above and in some cases, it is supplemented by other methods. Given the role of the media as a source of information and its ability to influence public perceptions, the researchers examine perceptions primarily through media coverage. While framing analysis identifies dominant themes, leading us to understand the narratives that characterise perceptions, its focus on manifest structures of text may obscure alternative and absent frames that would otherwise broaden our understanding. Neither does the emphasis on the text link the dominant frames to the broader social contexts in which they are constructed. Furthermore, a focus on textual analysis also suggests that the audience is passive, while content producers have an active role in constructing meaning about Africa–China relations. Discourse analysis, on the other hand, is attentive to absences and draws links between media discourse and its social, political and economic contexts (Fairclough 1995).

Continuing the perceptions theme are Li and Ronning (2013), who provide a domestic perspective on Chinese media coverage of Africa. Their study looks at media narratives of Africa in Chinese domestic media to ascertain how Africa is perceived in China. This helps to establish just how much China understands its trading partner, and demonstrates the link between the national, local and global in a connected world. Domestic media is part of China's broader soft power strategy in Africa as it is a space in which the state can educate audiences and justify its engagement with Africa, which increases the state's legitimacy and credibility. It also allows us to compare the relationship between its domestic and foreign public diplomacy efforts, and the discourses that inform national and international coverage.

While the studies above provide understanding of the character of perceptions about the Africa–China relationship, Wasserman (2016) further examines how these perceptions

translate into Chinese influence. His survey among South African journalists from various media platforms explores their views on the Chinese media presence in Africa to assess the effectiveness of China's influence on the African media industry. His study focuses on three aspects of the media: media content, journalistic practices and norms, and evidence of Chinese influence on editorial agendas. As opposed to focusing on a single element in isolation, he explores Chinese influence at various stages of the content production process – from the sources of information about China–Africa relations, to professional values that influence its creation, and finally the content produced. Previous content analysis of reportage on the Africa–China relationship found that it was positive or neutral (Gagliardone 2013; Wekesa 2013a; Wekesa & Zhang 2014). This study goes further to contextualise the nature of coverage and debate Chinese presence by shedding light on what shapes these factors, i.e. their source of information and perceptions of the content creators. The study also allows us to identify the level of Chinese influence at various points of the news-gathering process. Wasserman also situates the research within the BRICS context, allowing for comparative analysis of China's relationship with Africa within the broader context of other BRICS nations, and places it in the global sphere in which it operates. Wasserman concludes by highlighting the challenges facing China's public diplomacy efforts, and reiterates previous findings that Chinese media engagement has not impacted on local news values and journalistic practices (Wasserman 2016).

As media engagement between Africa and China matures, research themes are also developing to include perspectives of local audiences to evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of China's strategies (Gorfinkel et al 2014; Zhang & Mwangi 2016).

Gorfinkel et al (2014) conducted a pilot study to establish the types of audience targeted by CCTV Africa, and interviewed viewers to establish their perceptions of China. They conclude that CCTV Africa is targeted not only at African audiences but also at Chinese and international audiences. The study also highlights China's failure so far to influence foreign audiences, as indicated in previous research by Zhang (2011). This is the result of an undefined target audience; lack of awareness and lack of access to the channel for the majority of African audiences; and competition from well-established international

and local broadcasters (Gorfinkel et al 2014). The findings of the study will be supplemented by further research into how audiences are constructed, which will provide further insights into the audiences targeted by CCTV Africa.

A survey conducted by Zhang and Mwangi (2016) is one of a few comprehensive studies that focus on the reception of Chinese media by ordinary Africans, as opposed to media professionals and scholars. The objective of the study was to evaluate the influence of Chinese media in Kenya through public perceptions of Chinese media presence in the country and in Africa in general. The authors' findings are consistent with previous research, where awareness of Chinese media in Africa was found to be limited (Gorfinkel et al 2014; Zhang 2011; Gagliardone et al 2010). They also found mixed perceptions among audiences, where Chinese media was seen to provide better understanding about China and an alternative media source; however, there was also scepticism about China's intentions. Eighteen per cent of respondents were sceptical about China's motives and perceived CCTV Africa and China Daily as a strategy to expand Chinese culture in Kenya, and 11 per cent believed that Africa–China cooperation only benefitted China (Zhang & Mwangi 2016:76). As other scholars have pointed out, China's ability to influence foreign audiences is limited by its poor credibility and competition from more popular Western media and new global players such as Al Jazeera (Zhang 2011; Li & Sligo 201; Wu 2012). The success of Chinese media in influencing audiences in Africa depends on its ability to shake off its propagandist roots and prove itself a credible source of information that can compete effectively with global media outlets. Strategies for positioning audiences in Africa should take into account the African media environment in which CGTN operates. Traditionally, African audiences have been exposed to Anglo–American media, and national media systems that are largely based on a libertarian journalistic philosophy that is at times at odds with state interests and CGTN's role as a government mouthpiece. The involvement of the state in the media might therefore create scepticism, as the media is widely regarded as a watchdog that is free from state intervention.

4.1.7 Conclusion

The literature discussed above applied various perspectives to understanding China's media engagement in Africa, focusing mainly on African perceptions of the relationship between Africa and China. Nevertheless, the scope of previous research is limited to Chinese engagement at national level. To address this knowledge gap, my research situates CGTN Africa within the global media context in which it operates, in alignment with the broadcaster's global outlook and ambitions. I therefore adopt a pan-African perspective in my enquiry that includes pan-African media, thereby positioning Africans as active role-players in the construction of audiences as opposed to passive actors who are acted on by foreign media. My analysis also goes beyond a description of media coverage, to examining the relationship between discourses and their social, political and economic contexts.

4.2 The Origins and Evolution of Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera was launched in 1996, first in Arabic (AJA), and later in English (AJE) in 2006. It is part of the Al Jazeera Media Network – a global multimedia private corporation (Al Jazeera 2018). The case study for this research is Al Jazeera English (AJE). I begin my discussion with a brief overview of the Qatari media system, and the development of the Al Jazeera Media Network and brand to understand the philosophy and values that guide AJE.

4.2.1 The Media in Qatar

Qatar has various media forms ranging from print to digital, which publish in Arabic or English. Media ownership is dominated by the royal family with a few private businesses aligned to them (Pintak 2008; Freedom House 2018). The country has two television networks, Qatar TV which is domestically oriented, and Al Jazeera which focuses on regional and international news (Freedom House 2018; Miles 2005; BBC 2018). The country's information and communication technology infrastructure is among the most developed in the Arab region, and this has increased internet penetration which facilitated the development of digital media (ITU 2019).

According to the Qatari constitution, the media is not subject to state censorship following the termination of the Ministry of Information in 1998 (Freedom House 2018; Miles 2005: 29; Blanchard 2010). However, press freedom is conditional depending on "circumstances" (Freedom House 2017; Roth 2013. Roth (2013) explains that the Press Law, which governs the media is still in operation. As a result, domestic media remains conservative and avoid criticizing the Emir or Islam, with journalists practising self-censorship. The Qatar Radio and Television Corporation which licences and regulates national and international media also censors content that is deemed inappropriate or offensive to Islam (Blanchard 2010; Freedom House 2018). The government also filters offensive content (BBC 2018, 2019). Attempts to foster a culture of a free press were initiated through an agreement between Qatar and Reporters Without Borders, however, they were not effective, allegedly due to government interference which saw the resignation of the Director of the Doha Media Center (Blanchard 2010, p. 9). This domestic media context contradicts the principles of press freedom espoused by the Al Jazeera network, and demonstrates AJE's conflicting roles.

4.2.2 The Al Jazeera Media Network

The Al Jazeera Media Network was initially launched as the Al Jazeera Satellite Network. The network is funded by the Qatari government and its Board of Directors is chaired by a member of the Royal Family (Miles 2005, Zayani 2005). Unlike other state-owned networks such as CGTN, the network has editorial independence which is supported by the Qatari constitution (Miles 2005). The media in Qatar is also not subject to state censorship or control by state institutions following the termination of the Ministry of Information in 1998 (Miles 2005: 29). Nevertheless, its state funding and involvement of the Royal Family in its board has created conflict of interest and raised questions about its independence.

The network has a grassroots approach to news and positions itself as the "voice of the people", which allows it to bring up underreported issues and people to the attention of the global community (Al Jazeera Media Network 2019). The conception and evolution of the network is better summarised through (Zayani 2016)'s three phases, which

include its formation, expansion and uprising. These stages highlight the network's role that came to define its brand, and its controversies which are well documented. The formative years were characterised the revolutionary rise of the network, during which its Arabic channel AJA gained popularity for its in-depth and objective journalistic approach (Alterman 1998; El-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002, Miladi 2005; Powers & Gilboa 2007; Seib 2005; Miles 2005, Zayani 2008). Furthermore, Miles 2005 provides an insider's narrative of the channel's diasporic communities in the US. He outlines the key events that gave rise to the channel's popularity and its role in setting new standards of reporting in the region. This phase, can be characterised as "the al Jazeera era" due to its growing influence in the MENA region which in turn inspired the development of new Arab language channels in the region (Lynch 2007: 125; Kraidy & Khalil 2009, p.84; Zayani 2016). The channel is also credited for promoting democracy and a pluralist public sphere which transformed Arab political culture in the Middle East; the promotion of a Pan-Arabic identity; and public diplomacy (Sakr 2007; Seib 2013; Seib 2007; Powers & Gilboa 2007; Miladi 2003; Sakr 2007). However, the authors do not present empirical evidence of free speech or tangible political change that can be directly attributed to AJA. Instead they make assumptions that heated media debates about sensitive issues automatically lead to a democratic society and pluralist culture. Nevertheless, evidence of increased political diversity is presented by El-Nawawy & Powers (2009), whose research among audiences in six countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe shows that the more viewers watched AJE, the less dogmatic they became in their cognitive thinking – a finding that provides evidence of the channel's role in fostering cross-cultural dialogue and reconciliation (El-Wanawy & Powers 2009).

AJA's popularity increased the network's growth and influence, leading to its online and global expansion of its channels. In the expansion stage, the network started providing content online in both Arabic and English, and established specialised channels such as AJ Sport (rebranded BeLN Sports), AJ+, AJ Children, AJ Documentary and AJ Mushabir, among others. It was during this phase that the English channel, AJE and Al Jazeera America were established. The network is also expanding its style of journalism in the region through the establishment of the Al Jazeera Media

Institute. The Institute provides training in journalistic skills and international practices as well as media consulting. Other AJ institutes include: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies – a think-tank that focused on policy research in the MENA and the Al Jazeera Centre for Public Liberties and Human Rights (Al Jazeera 2018).

The Al Jazeera network broadcasts in over 310 million households in over 100 countries (Al Jazeera 2018). It also comprises of 10 channels and divisions which subscribe to the brand's values and its southern outlook to provide an alternative voice (ibid). It's attempt to expand to America were unsuccessful with the channel closing only after three years (Al Jazeera America 2016). The network now uses digital platforms to reach the North American audiences (Vivarelli 2016; Youmans 2012).

Much like the war in Afghanistan in 2011, the Arab Spring was another defining moment for the network. It provided its channels with an opportunity to be part of historical events in the Arab World and capture the imagination of audiences in the region and influence public opinion. AJ "planted a seed of change by liberating the Arab mind" (Edwards 2011, p.1). It's knowledge of the region and on-the-ground presence placed it at the centre of the revolutions, reporting events from Tunisia to Bahrain and challenging the official narrative. Through its reporting, AJ channels demonstrated their role as a champion of citizens, leading to accusations that it was encouraging rebellion (Zayani 2016). This resulted in the jamming of its signal in Tunisia and arrest of its journalists in Egypt (ibid; Al Jazeera 2013, 2014).

4.2.3 Al Jazeera English

Al Jazeera AJE was established to expand the brand's international reach and influence foreign audiences. It is modelled on the principles and values of the Al Jazeera Media Network, purporting to cover stories from marginalised parts of the world, which to a certain extent, sets it apart from the discourse of mainstream global news (Al Jazeera Media Network 2019). Since its launch, the channel has attracted international attention from a wide range of actors such as the media, scholars and professionals from various fields.

Like its sister channel, AJE has also been positioned as an agent of change in the global media industry by championing the rights of marginalised voices, as indicated in its coverage of the uprisings in the Arab World (Pintak 2008, Sarnelli 2013). Other scholars also view it as conciliatory in opposition to the stereotypical coverage of conflicts by other global media (El Nawawy & Powers 2008; Gerhard, 2010). Nevertheless, Gerhard (2010) also notes the degree to which AJE's discourses on sectarian violence in Nigeria differed from the BBC was very little, and some of its view mirrored mainstream global media (Gerhard 2010). The findings of this research also highlight instances of stereotypical construction of African audiences by AJE during the selected period as discussed in my analysis.

One of the prominent themes that has emerged from scholarship about AJE is its public diplomacy role, which is linked to its relationship with the Qatari government. Ayish (2002) classifies the network's broadcasting model as reformist and government-controlled, with the freedom to report on politically sensitive matters, but Qatar has the power to censor the channel's content on important matters of national interest or consensus among Arab viewers (Ayish 2002). As part of the network, AJE would, to some extent also be subject to government interference (Samuel-Ezran 2014). This literature helps us to understand how national affiliation can at times inform discourses that construct foreign audiences or national identity, which is sometimes achieved by 'flagging the homeland' or solidarity (Bilig 2005:248). AJE's relationship with the Qatari government has prompted an interest among scholars in examining the channel's role on both the Arabic and English channels. However, the channel's bias towards Qatari interests is difficult to prove beyond doubt, given its professional and objective reporting style. While research that examines Qatari influence on the channel's programming has failed to provide conclusive evidence, it demonstrates that the Qatari government does exert influence where critical national or regional interests are at stake. However, this is more the case on the Arabic language channel, AJA, than the English channel (Samuel-Ezran 2014). One such study was conducted by Samuel-Ezran (2014), whose analysis of reporting of the Qatari–Saudi conflict found that the Arabic channel was sometimes biased towards Qatari interests, but there was more balanced coverage on AJE (Samuel-Ezran 2014). These findings demonstrate that the level of

media influence also depends on the manner in which audiences are constructed and their perceived expectations. Therefore, to win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, particularly in Africa, global media's strategy for constructing audiences should be based on an understanding of the African media landscape as well as the context in which it operates. For example, post-independence media systems in Africa have to some extent followed a path of dependency, where they are shaped by the colonial past, resulting in various models ranging from authoritarian to libertarian (Ronning 2009). While some countries adopted authoritarian models, others were grounded in Western neoliberal media ethics and journalistic standards, even though press freedom in some parts of Africa has fluctuated over the years and Western media values are contested (Kasoma 1994; Nyamnjoh 2004, 1994; Tomaselli 2004; De Beer 2009; Wasserman 2006). Furthermore, with the deregulation and privatisation of the media industry, particularly in the 1990s, political transformation and technological advancement transformed many media systems in Africa. This led to the development of a diverse industry consisting of state, commercial and community players, which contributed to a pluralistic media and the creation of new audience formations (Ronning 2009; Kasoma 1994; Nyamnjoh 2004, 1994; Tomaselli 2004; De Beer 2009; Wasserman 2006). Exposure to global, national and local media has provided audiences with various perspectives, which have an impact on how media messages are mediated. De Beer (1998) notes that audiences have 'sharpened their criterion' on the credibility and value of media output (De Beer 1998:61). Hence, this research focuses on AJE's reporting outside the Middle East and North African (MENA) and Arab regions to explore the discursive strategies that the channel employs to construct African audiences.

AJE's role in public diplomacy is specifically framed within the new public diplomacy, which is no longer only practised by the state but also by other non-state actors such as media organisations (Seib 2007, 2005; Powers & Gilboa 2007; Abdel 2010; Zayani 2005). Seib points out that like other global satellite channels, AJE is also a public diplomacy tool for Qatar, allowing it to convey its viewpoint to foreign audiences, which is important in its role in international affairs. Most of these studies are interested in the effectiveness of public diplomacy initiatives. Samei (2010) focuses on US public

diplomacy and conducts a comparative study between AJA and Al Hurrah, the US-sponsored Arabic channel; Al-Najjar (2009) compares both the Arabic and English channels to establish differences and similarities. However it is not clear what the objective or goal of his research are and how they contribute to existing knowledge.

4.2.4 Contraflow from South to North

The establishment of Al Jazeera had implications for global information flows, leading scholars to view the channel as a key contributor to the emerging trend of contra-flow which is reversing traditional flows of media messages originating from the North or Western countries to the global South, to information flowing from the global South to the North, and various parts of the world (Sakr 2007; el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Miles 2005; Samuel-Azran, 2008; Seib 2005; Thussu 2007). The concept of contra-flow arises from ongoing concerns about disparities in international news flow as highlighted on global communication since the 1970s (Nordestreng & Varis 1974; UNESCO 1980). Figenschou (2010) argues that information is no longer just originating from the West to other parts of the world, but from East to West, with channels such as Al Jazeera becoming a key source of information about events in the Middle East (Figenschou 2010). Nevertheless, Figenschou (2010) concludes that despite its Southern agenda, Al Jazeera English continues to reinforce elitism and biased editorial policies of mainstream international news (Figenschou 2010).

Contra-flow demonstrates a resistance to dominant news flows, the re-configuration of patterns for the global flow of information and highlights the growth of non-Western media as a key player in the global media industry. Nevertheless, the label, 'contra-flow' is misleading, and the concept is insufficient in analysing the impact of these reverse flows since it presupposes an opposite and reversed flow, where there is a significant flow of cultural products from the South to the North. However, this is not necessarily the case, as Western institutions either directly or through affiliates are still a source of international news. Moreover, non-Western media products emanating from the South are not specifically targeted at the North or dominating the Western market, but largely targeted at geo-cultural and linguistic markets, resulting in the growth of South to South flows. While non-Western cultural products are accessible in the West,

their consumption needs to be contextualised within diasporic communities in developing countries. Framing contra-flows as unidirectional therefore disregards the complexity of global media production and distribution and multiple directions in which media products flow. Non-Western media players are also part of the contributors to the plurality of the global media industry and the multi-directional flows of information (Kavoori 2007).

Furthermore, the contra-flow concept is also informed by the same core-periphery paradigms it seeks to challenge. The emphasis on contra-flow from South to North is centred on spatial location and unidirectional flow of information (i.e. from North to South/West and non-Western), and links media products to their country of origin i.e. Brazilian Telenovelas, Indian Bollywood movies, etc. (Kavoori 2007). This ignores the complex processes and multiple directions in which information flows and how it is mediated in the host country. Drawing on Appadurai (1996), Kavoori (2007) argues that the notion of contra-flow is framed in nationalistic and cultural terms, which undermines the process through which contra-flows are constituted, stating that in a contemporary world, cultural products are 'deterritorialised' as they become contested locally, nationally and globally (Kavoori 2007:49).

Although Al Jazeera, like other non-Western channels represents this alternative information flow, there is no empirical research that compares it with other alternative non-Western channels. My comparative study of the three channels contributes to growing literature on global media contra-flow, to help identify new trends in global information flow and how these emerging players are contributing to the global media industry.

Furthermore, while literature on Al Jazeera is informative about its role in the Middle East and the world, it has so far focused more on its implications on the West and Arab worlds, and in comparison, with Western media in the Arab region (Miladi 2006; Mellese & Muller (2012). Although this is essential and understandable from the channel's primary audience perspective, Al Jazeera's objective and competitive advantage is to cover regions and stories that are ignored by Western media, such as Africa (Al Jazeera 2012b). What is missing then from current literature is a perspective

from Africa to help us establish how it is received and its implications. Such analysis is important as the channel also positions itself as an alternative voice for developing countries and focuses on parts of the world that are marginalised by the West. My study also provides a comparative analysis with other non-Western transnational players and not Western media, which has been the focus of most studies on Al Jazeera.

Figenschou (2010)'s content analysis above is one of the few studies that attempt to understand Al Jazeera's implications for Africa, and my research makes a contribution by addressing questions relating to African audiences and in comparison with other non-Western channels.

4.3 eNews Channel Africa

eNews Channel Africa **(**eNCA) was launched in 2008 as eNews Channel, becoming South Africa's first 24-hour news channel (eNCA 2016). The launch was at the back of the success of the news programme on its sister channel e.TV (eMedia Holdings 2017), the first privately owned, free-to-air television channel in South Africa. In 2005, e.TV was ranked the "second most viewed station, attracting 54 percent of the adult population and surpassing the other commercial services (BBC World Service 2006, quoted in Bradfield 2012: 536). In 2012, eNews Channel was rebranded to eNews Channel Africa with a new logo depicting the map of Africa reflecting its regional focus and to project an African identity to its transnational audience (eNCA 2013b; Screen Africa 2012; Da Silva 2008; Channel24 2012). Although ownership and management of the channel has changed over the years, the channel is owned by eMedia Holdings, whose majority shareholder remains Hosken Consolidated Holdings (eMedia Holdings 2017), and owner of e.TV. Although. Other shareholders of the channel include Remgro, which is partly owned by Rupert Murdoch (eMedia Holdings).

eNCA was established after the post-apartheid era where the media played a critical role of nation building and promoting diversity, through local content quotas and local languages. While neoliberal, this role needs to be balanced with the channel's commercial imperative as it requires it to address audiences at lower income brackets who do not generate advertising revenue, such as the use of vernacular languages in its

programming. How these contradictions impact continental audiences is an important aspect that is explored in my research.

According to eNCA, its news values are based on truthful coverage and fearless reporting, especially of the government (eNCA 2013a). eNCA has a daily African news programme, *Africa Edition* and a current affairs show, *Africa 360*, which both claim to bring compelling content about the continent (eNCA 2013b; eNCA 2013d; Youtube 2010). eNCA is available on DSTV channel 403 and on the Sky digital satellite platform in the UK on channel 518. It also has news services to affiliate networks across Africa, and to *The Africa Channel*, in the UK, where it reaches 10 million homes, and can access the South African diaspora, and 'global citizens with an interest in South Africa and Africa' (eNCA 2013c; Nevill 2012). The South African community eNCA also dominates the African market with bureaus in West and East Africa, as well as Beijing, and was said to be the most watched news service on the DSTV bouquet (eNCA 2013c, eNCA 2016).

A literature search on the Wits University library catalogue and electronic databases, as well as Google, did not yield results for media research on eNews Africa Channel except for very few studies on its sister South African channel, eTV.[11] These consisted of only three case studies of eTV programmes, which address issues relating to youth viewership of television news (Ndlovu 2014); race, class, and gender in postcolonial South Africa (Bradfield 2012) and reception analysis of SA television drama *7de Laan* (van der Merwe 2012). Different keyword variations also yielded results that were not relevant to scholarly research, but mention of e.TV or eNCA in news publications (van der Leek 2013; de Jager 2008; New York Times 2010).

The absence of research on eNews Africa Channel could be attributed to its short existence which only lasted until 2014, when it closed its Africa operations. This study therefore also contributes to our understanding of the challenges that face a Pan-African TV news channel broadcasting in the continent. The section below provides an

[11] The following keywords were searched: eNews, eNews Channel Africa, eTV, eTV South Africa

overview of the South African media and its role in the continent to help us understand the political and economic context in which eNCA constructs African audiences.

4.3.1 South African media in Africa

Advancement in technology and rapid liberalization and privatization in Africa in the 1990s presented opportunities for the growth of transnational media in the continent, leading to the expansion of South African media companies such as MultiChoice into the African market (Teer-Tomaselli; Wasserman & De Beer 2007; Paterson 1998). Africa's economic growth in recent years continues to fuel this expansion, presenting South African companies to widen their audience reach, while also providing them with a competitive advantage based on their geographical and cultural proximity, as well as the opportunity to transform and create narratives about their continent. An understanding of the role of these transnational media institutions in the continent would also provide further insights on discourses that shape their construction of African audiences.

Nevertheless, the role of transnational South African media and their interaction with foreign audiences is an understudied topic in media studies. The most proximate research is a study by Van der Westhuizen (2014) which examines the relationship between foreign policy, public diplomacy and the media, however, her focus is on domestic media as opposed to South African media targeted at foreign audiences (Van der Westhuizen (2014). eNCA and MultiChoice Africa align their role with their African identity stating that they aim to tell authentic African stories and contribute to the growth of the continent (eNCA 2013b; DSTV n.d.). While public broadcasters and state-owned media channels also seek to tell the African story, their role is also to support government's foreign policy (Mbeki 2007, Channel Africa 2017, AllAfrica 2013). These include SABC Pan-African radio and television channels; Channel Africa, SABC Africa (which was discontinued in 2008), as well as Ubuntu Radio, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's channel launched in 2013 (Channel Africa 2017, AllAfrica 2013). However, little is known about the significance and implications of their activities, or their relationship to South Africa's foreign policy. While some media scholars are beginning to highlight South Africa's regional

expansion, the literature is currently at its infancy, providing descriptive accounts of the new broadcasting trends, but not critically examining their significance (Duncan 2006; Tomaselli 1997, Teer-Tomaselli, Wasserman, & De Beer 2007, Paterson 1998). Although 24-hour satellite television channels are traditionally used by countries as part of their public diplomacy strategy, attempts to develop a similar South African channel targeted at foreign publics have not been successful. An attempt to launch a 24-hour transnational news channel, SABC News International in 2007 led to its closure in 2010 amidst financial constraints (News24 2015, Pampalone 2010). While the channel was relaunched as SABC News in 2013, its objective is not public diplomacy, but rather to increase the public broadcaster's revenues by targeting South African expatriates living in the continent as reflected by its South African programming (MultiChoice 2015, cited in News24 2015). South African foreign policy therefore tends to be dominated by official actors, and other non-state actors such as civil society and business (Masters 2007). Masters (2007) attributes this state of affairs to the media's less influential role as a foreign policy tool, since foreign news are accorded less prominence compared to domestic news, and as a result, South Africa's foreign policy does not include a public opinion element. He also observes that the use of soft power in South Africa is generally not well developed in African foreign policy (Masters 2007). Similarly, in her analysis of media framing of South Africa's refusal to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama, Van der Westhuizen (2014) concludes that the influence of the media as a public diplomacy instrument is limited by more influential state partners such as BRICS, especially China (Van der Westhuizen 2014). South Africa's approach to promoting its reputation internationally has focused on nation branding, implemented through media liaison and communications around government activities. This has seen various marketing and communication initiatives being rolled out by the International Marketing Council (IMC) and international sporting events to promote 'Brand South Africa' (BrandSA). The IMC is the custodian of BrandSA, however, its goal is also to create a positive image for Africa (Brand South Africa 2016).

4.3.2 The construction of Africa in South African media

Despite its African identity, domestic South African media understanding and knowledge of the continent has been criticized (Mbeki 2003; Wasserman 2016). Research on the representation of Africa by South African media is therefore informative, and highlights broader discourses and perceptions that might influence its construction of the continent. Research on South African media reporting of the continent domestically reveals the same Western stereotypical and unbalanced coverage (Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa 2017; Media Monitoring Project 2007; Media Tenor 2001). The Media Monitoring Project (MMP) study demonstrate the absence of key issues affecting nationals from other African countries in South Africa and point to the lack of editorial commitment in South African media (MMP 2007). Also significant in the findings was the framework of *otherness* and *difference* in the construction of issues from other parts of Africa where African nationals were referred to as 'aliens' and "illegal immigrants" even though some may be legal (McDonald 2001; MMP 2007). Popular themes that emerge from such coverage are also dominated by their involvement in crime, stealing jobs and business opportunities, and even women (MMP 2007). These findings are also confirmed in recent research by the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) which demonstrates the continuity of negative narratives against immigrants who are constructed as a threat to South African nationals (SIHMA 2017). The media was also accused of perpetrating xenophobia and for being 'largely anti-immigrant and lack of analysis (McDonald 2001). These results highlight the highly xenophobic attitude and hostility of South Africans against national from other countries, particularly black Africans.

A content analysis of South African media also concluded that media coverage of other African countries was scant – there was "still too much Europe, too little Africa" (Media Tenor 2001; Wasserman 2016). Countries that received more coverage were those with important links to South Africa such as Zimbabwe and Namibia. Mozambique did not receive much coverage despite the devastating floods and the significant number of Mozambicans living in South Africa. This demonstrates the lack

of depth and balance in the coverage on Africa with more consideration given to political and economic interests. (MMP 2007; Media Tenor 2001).

The studies outlined above provide insight about the South African discourse on Africa and a frame of reference for further analysis of the implications of South African broadcasting within a regional context. These naturalised representation practices by the South African media also raise questions about the extent to which South African media[12] draws on this knowledge, reproduce the national discourse in their continental coverage? Does the reporting framework change (from xenophobic) given the African audiences and multi-cultural context targeted? Although audiences create their own meanings, the role of the content producer and their culture also plays a significant role in supporting certain knowledge and discourse through representation. Outlining the role of cultural affiliation in the production of knowledge, Said (1978), points out that a Westerner studying the Orient, see themselves as European or American first, and as an individual second" (Said 1978:11). Cultural texts are therefore not a "passive" representation of the Orient, but the circulation of dominant ideas and a reflection of the cultural and political power of the Occident (Said 1978).

Although Said was referring to knowledge about the Orient, the same principles characterise South Africa's creation of knowledge about other cultures. As demonstrated in the findings above, media producers already distinguish themselves differently from other African nationals. This national identity precedes their African one and may form a primary frame of reference in how they imagine audiences from other parts of the continent. A perspective from African audiences from other parts of Africa on their experience of South African media content would be informative in this respect, however I have not found work on this literature. A relevant study was conducted by Ekwuazi (2014) on the perceptions and reception of Nigerian audiences of *Africa Magic* channels hosted on the DSTV platform. While the study highlights the role played by DSTV in promoting the Nollywood film industry, the content hosted on

[12] Although the findings are on South African media in general, the SABC is also implicated as SABC channels were also part of the study.

the channels in not South African or produced in South Africa, and DSTV only provides the platform for accessing them (Ekwuazi 2014). Similarly, Omoera (2010)'s comparison of South African media with media imperialism is also not based on empirical research or examined further (Omoera 2010).

4.4 Conclusion

The historical background and structure of South African media and how it has evolved after apartheid provides a comprehensive foundation for understanding the country's media landscape, however, its emphasis is largely on the South African context. As South African media develops and becomes a key player in the African region and internationally, there is a need to expand this knowledge to better understand its implications in other parts of Africa. An analysis of the discourses that inform the construction of African audiences would also explore the underlying reasons for South Africa's media treatment of other African countries.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODS

5.1. Introduction

The research questions will be examined using quantitative and qualitative methods.

My research approach is also informed by a pilot study I conducted in January 2014 to familiarise myself with the content and schedule of the channels. The pilot study also allowed me to test the coding scheme and identify the appropriate topics for analysis.

News coverage patterns were better addressed through quantitative content analysis, given its ability to yield quantitative data about general patterns of coverage (Riffe, Lacy & Fico 1998). However, it is limited to manifest content, which does not explain the patterns of coverage or expose the discourses that shape the construction of audiences. Identifying the discourses requires an examination of latent content, and this was better achieved through CDA, as it is concerned with language use and its relation to sources of knowledge and power structures, which is not always evident (Fowler 1991; Van Dijk 1991). CDA is also attentive to absences, which reveals excluded discourses (Fairclough 1995; Fiske 1987).

5.2 Quantitative Content Analysis

Within the context of this study, the goal of Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA) was to provide a snapshot of coverage patterns about Africa, at a specific time, as a context to CDA. The findings were not intended to make inferences and cannot be generalised to a larger population. QCA was therefore suitable given its capability to yield quantitative data about the extent and nature of coverage (Riffe, Lacy & Fico 1998).

5.2.1 Overview of Quantitative Content Analysis

QCA has a long history in media research where it has been applied to investigate a wide range of issues from agenda-setting, propaganda, media effects, representations of social groups, etc (McCombs and Shaw 1972, Lasswell 1927, cited in Krippendorff

1980; Gerbner 1969). It is defined as a systematic method for the quantitative description of media texts (Berelson 1952: 18). This allows us to measure and establish relationships between variables to make valid and reliable conclusions "from data to their context" (Krippendorf 1980:21; Kerlinger 1986). QCA is therefore objective, systematic, quantifiable and replicable. For the findings to be replicated by others, it is important for the researcher to explicitly describe the procedure followed throughout the process. The quantitative analysis approach is therefore appropriate for counting occurrences in manifest content to establish their frequency, hence it is useful for:

- Describing patterns and trends in media coverage
- Establishing media representations of issues and groups in society
- Testing or generating hypothesis
- Comparing media content with real-world indicators
- Drawing inferences about the role of the media or its effects

(Wimmer and Dominick 1994).

When correctly applied, QCA has several advantages. 1) It is an unobstrusive, nonreactive technique which reduces human error or subjectivity arising from human subjects and researchers (Krippendorf 1980; Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998). These qualities also make it suitable to investigate sensitive issues, and provides a more practical and feasible technique to collect and analyse data without access restrictions (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998; Insch et al. 1997). 2) QCA allows for complex and large amounts of data that would otherwise be difficult to analyse through qualitative techniques to be broken down into meaningful numbers, provided they are correctly operationalised and measured (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998). However, researchers should keep in mind that volumes may be too large to be analysed by a single person and would require additional resources such as computer software or coders which may be costly (Krippendorf 1980).

5.2.2 Limitations of QCA

One of the main limitations of QCA is that its capacity is limited to manifest content which obscures latent meaning of media texts and ability to fully interpret the significance of the findings (Jensen 2002; Wimmer and Dominick 1994). The quantified numbers do not adequately explain implications of the findings and absences. In the context of this study, the patterns identified through QCA are valuable for providing an overview of the locations, topics and actors involved in the coverage of Africa, but they are insufficient for revealing the forces that drive and shape such coverage. To mitigate these limitations, QCA can be supplemented by more informative qualitative approaches.

Although the primary focus of QCA on systematic procedures and quantification increases objectivity, bias may arise at any stage of the process due to judgements made by the researcher. For this reason, it is important for researchers to explicitly state the process followed to enable replicability and make it possible for others to judge the validity of the findings. Judgements and inferences should also be based on the objectives of the study and sound theoretical frameworks, to maintain reliability. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) advise that coding be limited to manifest content.

Despite limitations, QCA is a valuable technique that illuminates important issues, if it is based on the objectives of the research. Where interpretive meaning is required, then qualitative methods or a combination of both should be applied.

5.2.3 Sampling Procedures

Based on the purpose of the study, I have applied non-probability purposive sampling for the media sample, and a combination of purposive and convenience sampling for the content sample.

Selection of news organisations

My media sample consists of the three transnational non-Western television channels; CGTN Africa, AJE and eNCA as case studies for the research. The channels were

selected using purposive sampling, in line with the focus of the study on non-Western transnational media broadcasting in Africa, and African audiences. This required the selection of case studies that do not originate from the West, and with specific focus on Africa. However, the number of broadcasters meeting this criterion is very limited. This is partly because the African regional market and the global South have been historically ignored as viable media markets by global media, and most attempts by non-Western media to expand transnationally have been unsuccessful. At the time of writing, the only non-Western channels with strategic focus on Africa or the global South, were: CGTN Africa, AJE and eNCA. While AJE is targeted at a global audience, its global South perspective is aligned with the non-Western context of this study, making it suitable as a case study. Despite the increasing presence of global media in the continent in recent years, such as CNBC Africa, BBC, CNN, these broadcasters did not meet the criteria due to their Western origin and perspective. As a result of this limitation, there was no adequate sampling frame available from which to apply probability sampling, and it was therefore necessary to employ practical considerations and less formal techniques based on the data available.

The case study for an African channel is eNews Channel Africa (eNCA). While M-Net is a more established and popular African channel, its focus is primarily on entertainment and as such, does not have an English news programme. The SABC News 24-hour news channel would also have been a suitable case as its operational structure is similar to CGTN Africa and AJE in terms of state involvement. However, at the conception of this study, it was an extension of the South African channel and did not have substantive news and current affairs programmes with an African focus, but rather a strong South African perspective. Nevertheless, African content has since been introduced with programmes such as, *African Perspective* with was launched in 2018 (SABC 2018). Another potential broadcaster was South African channel, Africa Network News (ANN7), which was launched in 2013 but also ceased broadcasting in 2018. While SABC News has matured and other African channels have emerged during the course of this study, it was not practical to include them since the study was at an advanced stage. Despite being short-lived, the inclusion of eNCA adds valuable insights to the study, firstly because it provides an African perspective on how African

institutions imagine their own audiences, which is vital particularly in the context of debates about negative representations of Africa, where criticism is mostly levelled at Western media. Secondly, its dual identity as a South African and an African broadcaster allows us to analyse the interplay of these identities and their possible impact on audience construction. Thirdly, eNCA's role is also bound up in South Africa's role in the continent and the global expansion of South African companies such as Multichoice Africa, whose content carrier, DSTV provides the platform to access South African media products on the continent. This is a widely-debated issue, which has raised questions about South African influence in the continent and its so-called 'imperialistic tendencies' (Omoera 2010; Ndlovu 2003). Based on the operational trends and attempts by various pan-African broadcasters to enter the continental market, it can be argued that the consistent operation of African broadcasters is difficult to predict and will always be a challenge, especially for studies of a longitudinal nature. These inconsistencies highlight the challenges inherent in serving African audiences, but studying these cases even at their infancy and with their imperfections is important to our understanding of the pan-African media industry, which further studies can build upon as they mature to global standards.

The channels selected share common characteristics which form a suitable basis for comparison within a pan-African context. Key features include their non-Western origin, transnational reach and focus on Africa or global South, which arises from their shared concern about Western hegemony and lack of diversity in global news (Al Jazeera 2012b; CCTV 2012; eNCA 2013b). These factors meet the basic criteria for comparing objects on a basis of a common theoretical framework[13] and "similar enough" to be classified in the same category (CIRT n.d; Esser and Vliegenthart 2017).

[13]In this study, the terms West and non-Western should be viewed as descriptive terms to summarise certain common elements of media originating from Europe or North America on one hand and emerging transnational media outside Europe and North America on the other. The use of the term non-Western is not intended as a form of othering or deficiency that is at times associated with the prefix, '*non-*', rather, to emphasise the particularities of media from marginalized parts of the world and their role in the international media industry, which has been understudied. Nevertheless, the definition and use of these terms have been contested as the world is much more dynamic and evolving (Huntington 1996; Chant and McIlwaine 2009).

These channels are also characterised by a 24-hour news cycle, and became accessible to African audiences within the 2000s (Seib 2009; eNCA 2013a, 2013c; CCTV 2013).

The case studies also have unique features from which we can explain specificities that influence the construction of audiences, to address the research question pertaining to the similarities and differences among them. These differences include:

a) Broadcasting models and primary funding
    - CGTN Africa: State-owned and funded
    - AJE: Editorial independent, with primary funding from the Emir of Qatar, and some advertising revenue.
    - eNCA: Independently owned and funded
b) Country of origin
    - CGTN Africa: China
    - AJE: Qatar
    - eNCA: South Africa
c) Country of origin's relations with Africa
    - CGTN Africa: China has strong strategic relations with Africa
    - AJE: Qatar has stronger ties with Ethiopia, Eritrea and North Africa
    - eNCA: South Africa has very strong ties and influence in the continent as one of Africa's regional economic and political powers.
d) Geographic audience focus
    - CGTN Africa: African
    - AJE: Global with focus on North Africa and the global South
    - eNCA: Africa
e) Duration of operations
    - CGTN Africa: 2012 to current
    - AJE: 2006 to current
    - eNCA: 2008 to 2014

Despite the varying degrees of focus on Africa and state involvement, the selected channels have sufficient similarities from which valid and useful comparisons can be

made. These variations allow us to understand the impact of different broadcasting models on the construction of audiences and broaden our knowledge on the political economy of pan-African broadcasting. The hybrid nature of CGTN Africa and AJE as public diplomacy tools and actors in a competitive market enriches the analysis as it adds economic and political dynamics and how these are negotiated, which allows us to draw informative conclusions. On the other hand, eNCA's independent ownership model provides a different perspective on the political economy of pan-African broadcasting. Comparative analysis is more valuable when it goes beyond establishing identifying audience constructs to also highlight variances and similarities between non-Western models and understanding their limitations and value. This also moves the global media debate beyond the Western-non-Western dichotomy.

My decision to use satellite television as opposed to other mediums is due to the growth of satellite TV broadcasting and its significant role in the transformation of international broadcasting. This transformation was largely a result of technological advancement and the declining role of international radio as the primary medium to reach international audiences after the Cold War (Tedstrom 1994; Barnett 2008). These developments led to the establishment of satellite TV channels which have become prominent and popular, such as the case studies selected. The importance of satellite TV is also more than its function as a public diplomacy tool, but in the elevated position of 24-hour news channels as a status symbol, whose significance is worth exploring particularly in the context of emerging African audiences.

Furthermore, while radio is more accessible in Africa, national radio stations tend to be more popular among local audiences than regional or international ones, which diminishes their global character.

Sampling content

The content sample for this research consists of news bulletins and current affairs talk shows collected from 2013 to 2016 through convenience and purposive sampling. This sampling strategy was applied to the selection of the programme genres given the focus of the channels on current affairs programming and limited genres. Furthermore, based

on the pilot study I conducted, news and current affairs programming had a large volume of African content compared to other programmes. The talk shows also had a strong focus on engaging African audiences, and their objective was to showcase positive stories about Africa and its people and cover topical issues in more detail. The combination of programmes also provides a substantial corpus to illuminate the different elements of the research questions.

The talk show featured discussions on different topics, some of which were representative of dominant themes that attracted international attention during the period analysed. The sample was selected through purposive sampling from common themes that were covered in all the channels as this allowed for more direct comparison. These themes are: The African economy; Elections in Egypt; Africa's relationship with the ICC and Terrorism in Nigeria

The sample population for news consisted of all news items from the prime-time evening news bulletins as it provided diverse and detailed coverage. News programmes on CGTN Africa and eNCA were dedicated to African coverage, while AJE's coverage was more internationally diverse.

The talk show samples were selected from the following programmes: *Africa Live* on CGTN Africa, *SouthtoNorth* on AJE and *Africa 360* on eNCA. An overview of these programmes is provided in the next section.

The bulletins were recorded for a total period of six weeks – a two-week period for each year as follows:

a) 19–25 May and 1–7 June 2014
b) 1–14 September 2015
c) 1–14 September 2016

The two-week sample size per year was manageable and sufficient as the news bulletins were broadcast daily resulting in a large amount of content. Previous studies showed that a 12-day sample is representative of a year and any more content does not significantly influence the accuracy of the data and therefore not the best use of

resources (Stempel 1952, cited in Riffe, Aust and Lacy 1993: 135; Davis and Turner 1951).

The data recording method was equally accessible for all channels, and data collected over three years allowed me to track key changes and continuities. The 2015 sample is only for CGTN Africa and AJE due to the closure of eNCA's Africa channel.

Hansen et al (1998) advises that a sample should be selected from different time periods to reduce distortion that arises from the dominance of a particular topic and to obtain normal news trends. The authors recommend a combination of a continuous (i.e. Monday to Sunday) and a rolling week (i.e. Monday of one week, Tuesday of the following week) (ibid), while others suggest a constructed week sampling as it yields a more reliable estimate of stories for a period of a year or more (Jones and Carter 1959; Stempel III, 1952; Riffe, Aust and Lacy 1993). My original plan was to use constructed week sampling – a form of stratified random sampling where a week's content is not selected consecutively, rather from a population sample of one month to allow for cyclic variation of news due to the day of the week and festive period (Jones and Carter 1959; Stempel III 1952 in Riffe, Aust and Lacy 1993: 134). The sample would therefore include one Sunday from all four Sundays of the month, one Monday from all four Mondays, etc., until each day of the week is represented in the final sample (Riffe, Aust, & Lacy, 1993). This plan was based on observations during the pilot study, that the period between 1 December and 28 February falls within the festive period in most parts of Africa, which is characterised by low news volume and suspension of some programmes. Programming during this time is overwhelmingly dominated by festive news such as Christmas celebrations which would distort the news trends. Weekend news are also dominated by sports and recreation and in the case of CGTN Africa and eNCA, broadcast for less than the usual time.

Nevertheless, this strategy could not be applied due to loss of some of the data recorded which impacted on the availability of content for a full month from which random

sampling could be made. Interruptions in the DSTV signal[14] during the scheduled recording times resulted in incomplete recordings for much of the 2014 news bulletin, except during May and June. Furthermore, the unexpected closure of eNCA in 2014 also impacted on the availability of data for the 2015 and 2016 periods. I did explore alternative sources of news data such as website archives or Youtube, but only CGTN Africa had a news archive. I also tried to obtain news recordings directly from the media institutions but they were available at a cost which was very high and not affordable. I therefore applied convenience sampling.

A key limitation of non-probability purposive sampling is its subjectivity owing to judgements by the researcher (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998). While the judgements are guided by the objectives of the study and applied within its context, the findings cannot be generalised as typical coverage of these news channels or other populations. The quantitative findings used in this study therefore provide an overview of coverage patterns about Africa at a specific time and a contextual background for the CDA.

A secondary sample of news was selected for qualitative analysis as discussed in the CDA section.

5.2.4 Coding Procedures

The news items were coded to identify characteristics of the news reports from which patterns can emerge.

A coding sheet and manual were developed where attributes about the news items were coded into the categories and sub-categories below.

a) News articles

[14] The DSTV and StarSat signals fade or get lost during bad weather such as rain (Vermeulen 2017). While CGTN Africa news were available on the channel's website, eNCA and AJE were only available through DSTV's on-demand/Catch Up service from the end of 2014, which required access to broadband internet which I did not have access to at the time.

- Positioning in bulletin
- Geographic context of coverage
- Topic/theme of news article
- Duration of segment

b) Sources of news

- Name of interviewee or participant
- Occupation
- Organisational affiliation
- National or country of affiliation
- Role in story

News items were categorised by topic or theme, which refers to the overall subject matter of a news story (Poole 2006:92). In television news, the topic of a news report can be established from the opening statements of each news report, which provide a summary and the most important aspects of the report (Van Dijk 1985). In instances where the story covers different subjects or issues, resulting in lack of clarity, the most prominent topic was chosen. Prominence was also established by the frequency of a particular topic and the amount of time devoted to it (Hammersley 1996).

Categories and sub-categories for news themes were initially developed deductively, but updated in line with the emergence of new ones to minimise the limitations of both deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive approach may exclude other topics as all the variables are defined before the data is observed. Emergent themes are therefore forced to fit into the next best category, which may not provide an accurate description. Equally, preliminary reading of the text may increase subjectivity. These limitations can also be reduced through grounded theory. However, it does not adequately address my research questions, which have more emphasis on the ideological constructions of Africa, but not their causes. Furthermore, my research seeks to measure the frequency of coverage of countries, issues and sources that is evident from manifest content and therefore best addressed using quantitative data. I have

therefore elected to generate news categories that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive to guide the coding process and ensure consistency and replicability.

The geographic location or context of news events was categorised according to country. Non-country-specific items were categorised as general. Where more than one country was mentioned in the report, the geographic context was determined from the theme of the story and the context in which it was reported. The prominence of the country was also an indication of the theme, where prominence was measured by the references in the opening statement, emphasis and frequency.

The location of a story may also include descriptions derived from place names such as 'South African' as well as metonyms denoting a particular place such as 'Pretoria', which is at times used to refer to South Africa.

The general data is summarised and quantified using descriptive statistics and presented in frequency tables.

The next step of the content analysis was the analysis of news items about Africa, which involved further coding of themes emerging from the coverage. Thematic analysis was useful in establishing the types of African issue covered and instances when African issues were newsworthy. This helps to establish the types of discourse represented in the news, which can be further analysed using CDA.

It was also important to measure the participation of social actors in the news since the construction process is also shaped by various actors, who are not news producers but participate in the transmission of ideas as news sources, interviewees or commentators. I refer to these actors interchangeably as 'news sources 'or 'participants', and use these terms broadly not only to include people who provide information to journalists, but also to refer to interviewees who physically appeared and commented in the news bulletins. The analysis of news sources therefore yields insights about proportional representation of social actors from various countries, regions, organisations, professions across the three broadcasters. Some of these participants compete for media attention and therefore try to influence the news through their ideas, which are

reproduced in various media forms and programme genres such as news and current affairs. Information about news sources therefore contributes to the assessment of balance, objectivity and status of news sources, which is important in factual content.

Comments made by sources were further analysed through CDA.

5.2.5 Analysis

The objective of the analysis was to describe the news items to identify patterns of coverage about Africa across the three channels. Since the data was not selected through probability or random sampling, inferences made from the findings were limited to this research and not generalised to a broader population.

The unit of analysis was news items, which I have defined as factual, non-fictional and non-advertising information in a news programme, including sport, as well as visuals. The visuals were not coded as they formed part of discourse analysis.

An overview of the concepts of news and news sources and how they were operationalised for this research is provided in Chapter 2.

Data analysis procedure

Following the coding of news reports, the data was summarised and interpreted using basic statistical techniques based on the sampling procedure and objectives of the research. Since the variables coded were non-numerical values, a nominal level of measurement was used to label and categorise them. My intention was to count the number of times each value was observed to identify trends and make descriptive comparisons with other sets of data in the sample, as a result, frequencies and proportions were appropriate analysis techniques (Riffe, Lacy and Fico1998).

Frequencies are a basic description of data to highlight common characteristics (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998). However, they do not explain the significance of the issues counted, therefore a proportional measure using percentages was also used to provide context and understanding of how they compared with other news items. I did not apply

techniques such as sampling error and statistical inferences since the data was not collected through probability sampling, and the goal of the analysis was to describe the sample. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998) point out that if the intention is to make inferences and generalisations from a probability sample to the population from which the sample was collected, then tools such as sampling error and significance of difference can be used (Riffe, Lacy and Fico1998). The data was presented using frequency tables.

Selected news items were further examined through CDA to determine their significance.

5.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

The second aspect of my research focuses on qualitative analysis to establish how African audiences are constructed by identifying the discourses that inform such constructions and their relationship to the social and historical context. My discussion begins with an overview of CDA and its emergence as a theory and research methodology.

5.3.1 Overview of CDA

Theoretical origins of CDA emanate from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, which has had a great influence on the 'critical' aspect of CDA, as well as linguistics. The emphasis on 'critical' sets it apart from Discourse Analysis and other forms of descriptive analysis, as it entails rigorous examination of the production and use of discourse to expose ideological meanings that have become naturalised and accepted as normal. CDA therefore goes beyond understanding and describing content to contribute to social change (Wodak & Meyer 2009:6; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Tischer et al 2000).

CDA is also drawn from Western Marxist thought, particularly Gramsci, Habermas and Althusser (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009:6). However, practitioners reject Marxism in its orthodox form and some of its key concepts, as I discuss later in this section. The work of Michel Foucault has also had an influence on

how power is conceived by CDA practitioners. The CDA approach is multidisciplinary, encompassing various approaches and theoretical traditions.

Definitions of CDA are therefore manifold, but they share a common concern with the interaction between texts, discursive practices and the social context (Wodak & Meyer 2009; Fairclough 2010). In the 1990s, the 'CDA Group' (scholars who practise the approach) was founded, and it defines CDA as the study of language in social context (Wodak & Meyer 2009, 2015). CDA researchers are interested in the relationship between language and social structures, and their research agenda is to deconstruct underlying ideologies and structures of power in society, thereby highlighting inequalities and discrimination as reflected in language (Van Dijk 1993:249). Furthermore, CDA researchers view 'language as a social practice' and 'discourse as the use of language in speech and writing' (Wodak & Meyer 2009:5). Nevertheless, another feature of all CDA approaches is their attention to the workings of power and ideology in society, and how these are expressed in language (text and discourse), and it is this concept of CDA that I apply in my research (Wodak & Meyer 2009; Fairclough 1995, 2010).

The discourses through which audiences are constructed are circulated through the media, but they are not directly observable. Thus, CDA provides techniques for analysing latent media content to reveal the discursive strategies and ideologies that underlie the construction of audiences and how they are expressed in language to construct meaning. CDA's focus on power relations also helps us to examine relations of power and agency among actors involved in discourse.

While interviews with media workers from the various news networks provide further insights into micro factors that shape the construction of audiences, such as individual perceptions and motivations, they are more relevant in addressing the 'why' questions of audience construction, which is not the key focus of this research. This study seeks to address the 'what' and 'how' questions of audience construction through the coverage of African issues. Furthermore, within the context of this study, an analysis of media content and the social context of its construction is sufficient since the construction of imagined audiences is more driven by institutional goals, particularly broadcasting

models, than the personal perceptions of media workers as demonstrated in previous research. In his study of journalists in US television networks and news magazines, Gans (2004) observes that their personal perceptions had very little influence on the construction of audiences, because journalists produced for their superiors and themselves (Gans 2004, in Litt 2012). A similar argument is made by some scholars who highlight the negligible role of individual motivations in the construction of imagined audiences (Hagen 1999; Hartley 2002). Ettema and Whitney (1994) suggest that audience constructs are not found in individual routines of media workers, but in organisational strategies and institutional arrangements (Ettema & Whitney 1994b). One can also argue that the media content in the case of state-owned media, particularly CGTN, is more a reflection of the broadcaster's goals (which are aligned to China's public diplomacy) than the personal perceptions and motivations of the journalists. Researchers who managed to get access to CCTV have also highlighted self-censorship among personnel, which might influence their responses (Mustafi 2012; Zhu 2012).

Like most research methodologies, CDA has been criticised for its philosophical grounding, methodological criteria and practical application (Hammersely 1997; Martin 2004; Widdowson 1995; Haig 2004).

From a philosophical perspective, Hammersely (1997) problematises the Marxist foundations of CDA, and critical approaches in general. He argues that all forms of Marxism have failed to provide objective evidence to verify their narrative and claims, which poses serious questions for the validity of CDA and other critical approaches. Although original forms of Marxist thought were later rejected by Marxist theorists, they have failed to provide an alternative philosophical basis for critical research (Hammersley 1997). As a result, CDA is multidisciplinary in nature with multiple versions and theoretical approaches for analysis. This has given rise to various criticisms that include lack of objectivity, inconsistencies in methodological approach, disregard of the audience and failure to effect social change (Widdowson 1995; Haig 2004). Nevertheless, despite its Marxist origins, CDA scholars have rejected the orthodox form of Marxism, and its basis on the superstructure (Fairclough 2009). For example, the use of ideologies in CDA does not follow the Marxist interpretation, which

negates the truth, but rather a hidden type of ideology that is concealed in everyday actions and naturalised as common sense (Van Dijk 1993:258; Wodak & Meyer 2009). Similarly, the conception of power, particularly approaches based on Foucault, also rejects the Marxist notion of power that is based on 'false consciousness' and repressive power (Jäger & Maier 2009; Foucault 1972).

Given its research-centred approach, CDA research has been accused of lacking objectivity and even overinterpretation, as researchers interpret data according to their expectations and political agenda and not the validity of the data (Hammersley 1997:253; Haig 2004). Some CDA analysts suggest useful analytical procedures, even though their full application can be limited by the research questions (Fairclough 1992, 2009; Jager & Maier 2009; Reisigl & Wodak 2009). However, this should not lead to less disciplined and systematic analytical processes. Problems with inconsistency have less to do with the methodology than with poor application of CDA methodology (Breeze 2011; Stubbe et al 2003). Transparency of CDA work is ensured by explicitly stating the theoretical bases of the enquiry and political objectives, which is a basis for good-quality CDA (Breeze 2011; Wodak & Reisigl 2009). To enhance the objectivity of CDA, Breeze (2011) also advises analysts to compare their findings to other media studies to ensure that they are consistent with existing research on the relationship between media texts and social meaning. In addition, the process of collecting or analysing data depends on the research requirements and is a reflection of CDA's multidisciplinary nature (Wodak & Meyer 2009).

For a more comprehensive and clearly defined procedure, my analysis focuses firstly on the text, followed by the context and interdiscursivity across the different genres and channels. While my analysis still entails a non-linear back-and-forth process, which characterises most CDA approaches, this process ensures that the analysis is rigorous and all relevant elements of the content are examined.

Furthermore, although there are various CDA application techniques, there are similarities, with most being problem- and context-oriented, interdisciplinary and interdiscursive. Practitioners also apply analytical tools that focus on linguistic properties and argumentation strategies, among others (Wodak 2015; Fowler 1991;

Fairclough 2003, 2009; Van Dijk 2009). My analysis of the content (audio and video) is drawn primarily from the discourse–historical approach (DHA) used by Wodak and Riesigl and the sociocognitive approach (SCA) applied by Teun A. Van Dijk (2009). These approaches address issues of ideology that are relevant to my research questions. The DHA approach in particular is more attentive to argumentation strategies and how they legitimise certain ideologies. The role of socially powerful social actors is also central to this approach, making it useful for analysing the actors involved in discourses. However, I also incorporate analytical elements from other relevant approaches to illuminate certain aspects of my analysis. These include analytical frameworks applied in the work of other CDA analysts such as Fairclough (1985, 2003, 2009), Fowler (1985), and Hodge and Kress (1988).

One of the fundamental goals of CDA is emancipation, and by revealing ideologies and social inequalities the analysis yields knowledge that contributes to social change. CDA research therefore tends to focus on revealing social ills that are considered negative, such as domination of and prejudice against certain groups in society (Hammersley 1997). Nevertheless, some argue that CDA research has not led to practical action to resolve these inequalities (Haig 2004), and has failed to address the status of women as being different to other powerless groups (Grbich 2013). Hammersley argues the emancipatory goals of CDA lack evidence to support social change, particularly political action, which requires sound justification for political commitments (Hammersley 1997:243). Martin has called for a positive CDA that is more inspiring and encouraging (Martin 2000, 2004). While acknowledging negative facets of CDA, the approach provides knowledge that contributes to the mitigation and correction of social ills, and addresses various types of social issue, not just the negative (Fairclough 1995, 2010; Wodak & Meyer 2009; Breeze 2011). CDA practitioners are involved in activism and policy formulations, such as Fairclough's work on 'conversationisation of discourse' that has been applied in the UK for consultations between doctors and patients, media interviews and universities (Fairclough & Wodak 1997:265). In future, a more positive and practical CDA is likely to become a reality. Fairclough points out that an analysis focusing more on the Right (as opposed to Leftist) is possible (Fairclough

1996:52). Similarly, Martin (2004) shows that a Positive Discourse Analysis geared to constructive social change is possible.

Having noted the limitations of CDA, one of the methodological approaches I also considered for this research is framing analysis, which has been used by most scholars conducting similar research (Wekesa & Zhang 2014; Nassanga & Maraka 2016, Dong & Chang 2006). However, they were not suitable for identifying discourses. While framing analysis identifies dominant themes, leading us to understand the narratives that characterise perceptions, its focus on manifest structures of text may obscure alternative and absent frames that would otherwise broaden our understanding, and suggests that audiences are passive. The emphasis on the textual analysis also fails to link dominant frames to the broader social contexts in which they are constructed, as well as how they are contested and negotiated. CDA analysis on the other hand is attentive to absences and draws links between media discourse and social, political and economic contexts that are key to this research (Fairclough 1995; Wodak & Meyer 2009).

5.3.2 Selection of Texts

The sample for CDA includes news items and episodes from talk shows. The news articles featured in the headlines were first identified from the news programmes through purposive sampling. This procedure was appropriate given that news items featured in the headlines are more prominent and tend to receive detailed coverage, which provides substantive data for analysis. The second stage was to narrow the items down to one item per topic to avoid over-representation and ensure diversity of themes. This selection was done through random sampling in cases where a topic was represented in more than one news item. The final items analysed are outlined in Appendix A.

The sample for the talk show content was made up of episodes from each of the talk show programmes. The episodes were purposefully selected to feature different topics which increased the diversity of the content analysed. My initial plan was to select similar themes from across all channels to allow for analyses of the same value; however, this was not always possible, as the content differed remarkably on each

channel, and it was not particularly informed by the news agenda. This limited the availability of episodes on a similar topic, hence the opportunity to make direct comparisons. In the absence of similar topics, my selection of episodes was based on topics within a broader theme, but with a focus on Africa.

This sample size was sufficient for a qualitative analysis such as CDA as it allows more in-depth analysis. This also takes into account the feasibility of analysing a large amount of data, which is not practical given the limited resources for the project. Below are short descriptions of the programmes from which the samples were extracted.

a) CGTN Africa

Africa Live. Africa Live is 30-minute news programme broadcast daily at prime time on CGTN Africa. The programme features African news covering politics, business, sport and general issues.

Talk Africa. This is a 30-minute weekly talk show that discusses current affairs in Africa. The programme seeks to promote Africa as an investment destination and change negative perceptions about the continent. It is therefore targeted at leaders and decision-makers. Talk Africa claims to provide an 'open and frank discussion' about the challenges facing Africa, with a focus on the positive aspects and how the continent is tackling its challenges (CCTV 2012).

a) Al Jazeera English

Al Jazeera International News. AJE broadcasts an international rolling news programme every hour. Unlike the other channels, AJE does not have a dedicated African news programme.

SouthtoNorth. This is a one-hour weekly talk show focusing on a wide range of current affairs issues from politics to science. Produced in South Africa, the show focuses on Africa and presents an African perspective on international affairs. The show's guests include African personalities from across the world. The programme was discontinued in 2014. To maintain a representative sample, news items were analysed.

b) eNCA

Africa Edition. This is a daily one-hour news programme that provides in-depth coverage of general African issues as well as business and sport (eNCA 2012b; Africa Channel 2012).

Since the Africa channel was discontinued, the programme's content now focuses on South African issues. African news is secondary.

Africa 360. This is a weekly, 30-minute current affairs show that presents a 'contemporary and authentic view of Africa' (eNCA 2012d, n.p.). Its coverage is progressive to provide a balanced view of both the challenges and achievements of the African continent, as told by Africans. Some of the show's guests are African presidents and international politicians.

5.3.3 Analysis

CDA scholars also draw attention to how linguistic features such as lexical processes, syntax, naming and address, and location formulation are used in the social construction of power (Fowler 1985, 1991; Fairclough 2003; Schegloff 1972). An analysis of these features is evident in the work of Fairclough (1995, 2003) and Van Dijk (1985, 1991) highlighting ideological use of language. Van Dijk's analysis is textually oriented and concerned with structures of meaning in linguistic features such as lexical and semantic strategies as well as their reproduction of power and ideology (Van Dijk 1985, 1991). Fairclough on the other hand focuses on linguistic features of text to demonstrate how discourses are drawn from social domains, which can help reveal the workings of the ideological apparatuses (Fairclough 1995, 2003). Despite their focus on textual structures, these techniques reveal how audiences are addressed, and power relations among social actors.

Naming and forms of address focuses on the labels used to define Africa and African issues and the participants in the programmes. While choices used to label and address others are indicative of attitudes to and power relations between participants, they also

provide insight into how audiences are interpellated. Labels can be used to refer to experts to determine their relative status as authoritative sources.

The analysis process involves identifying patterns in the representations and descriptions of Africa or African issues, in order to identify discourses that inform the construction of audiences. Fairclough's analytical technique is useful in this regard as it examines semantic relations between words to distinguish discourses and determines how they constitute differing perspectives on the world (Fairclough 2003:124).

Location formulation, on the other hand, explores the use of geographic location to articulate the context in which Africa is constructed. Schegloff's notion of 'common sense geography' is useful in this regard as it demonstrates the role of context in shaping the character of discourse about Africa (Schegloff 1972:5). Location contexts are also markers of identity, and can be subtly incorporated in language where participation is limited to members of the specific identity (Billig 1995). This may reinforce difference or solidarity between groups or nations, which is significant in this study as it provides insight into the role of non-Western media, how they position themselves and how they identify with audiences in other non-Western geographic contexts. Such analysis is more relevant to the South African channel eNCA. As a South African channel operating in a pan-African context, it is also useful to understand how it negotiates its South African and African identities and how this impacts on its construction of the continent. It may also be argued that eNCA's construction of Africa can be considered as a yardstick to measure how Africans see themselves or want to be represented.

Fowler (1985) suggests that ideology can also be manifested in pronouns of power and solidarity, as these may indicate attitudes of superiority, inferiority or equality between actors (Fowler 1985). I therefore examined pronoun usage to determine if it articulates relations of superiority or African solidarity, more especially in the case of China, where its relations with Africa are characterised by 'mutual respect'.

Nevertheless, discourses may not be manifest but expressed implicitly (Van Dijk 1998). Therefore, analysis techniques also include identifying implications, presuppositions

and modality. This points to the types of discourse employed, thereby addressing issues pertaining to the ideological apparatuses that shape discourses on Africa.

Power relations and dominant discourses are also evident in the manner in which various perspectives are structured in media content (Fairclough 1995). Therefore, my analysis also illustrates how competing sources are positioned in news reports and talk show discussions. Drawing from Wodak and Riesigl's tools for analysing discursive strategies and argumentation, I also examine the linguistic features and argumentative strategies used by social actors to legitimise certain discourses (Wodak & Riesgl 2009).

CHAPTER 6: CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS

6.1 General patterns of coverage

Below is a presentation of findings on patterns of coverage of African issues by each channel. These findings provide an overall snapshot of the trends for the two-week periods selected. The results for each channel are categorised according to year as this was a more comprehensive structure, but this is not intended to compare the data across years as the sampled data is not representative of coverage for each year.

Table 1: Total News Content 2014 - 2016

Channel	News Items		
	2014	**2015**	**2016**
AJE	223 – 56 about Africa	206 – 20 about Africa	323 – 41 about Africa
CGTN	252	245	231
eNCA	323	n/a	n/a

6.2 CGTN News

This section is a description of CGTN Africa's coverage for the different two-week periods in 2014, 2015 and 2016.

6.2.1 Period – 19 to 25 May and 1 to 7 June 2014

Themes

A total of 252 news stories were covered during the period analysed. Most of them were about sports events and results which accounted for 14% of total news. Other popular

themes were economics, politics, and war and terrorism which accounted for 10% of coverage each.

The dominance of these themes corresponds with sections that make up the news bulletin. These comprised general news, which focused mainly on politics, and the business and sports sections.

The general political stories were related to elections and political processes mainly in Malawi and Egypt. These stories were also prominent, with 57% being featured in the headlines, which indicates their newsworthiness. The prevalence of sports news can be attributed partly to international sports tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup that took place in May and June. However, high-profile sports events on the continent such as the AFCON Africa Cup and Champions League were also prominently covered.

Table 2: CGTN Africa Themes 2014

Theme	Frequency (%)
Sports	14%
Politics & Governance	10%
Economy	10%
War & terrorism	10%
Business	9%
International Relations	6%
Arts & Culture	4%
Detention	4%
Labour	4%
Military & Defence	4%
Celebrities	4%
Migration	3%
Science & Technology	3%
Violent crime	3%
Poverty	2%
Travel & Tourism	2%
Epidemics	2%
Legal sytems - domestic	2%
Human rights	1%
Medicine	1%

Riots	1%
Environment	0.8%
Racial violence	0.4%
Religion	0.4%

Geographic context

The analysis also focused on the geographic context of the news stories, and found that it was set mainly on Africa's major political and economic powers such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. South Africa was the most frequently covered location, with 13% of stories about South Africa or with a South African context. The majority of these stories (44%) were about business and economic news, such as industrial action that was taking place at the time. This was followed by Egypt, Nigeria and issues affecting the continent as a whole. This was expected, as major political and economic events were happening during the time of the analysis and given the economic and political role that these countries play in the continent as political and economic powers.

Sixteen per cent of news items were non-African, and were about international events with a wider international interest such as the FIFA World Cup 2014. Only two items (1%) were set within Asia[15], and they were both about China; both reports were brief and focused on the country's diplomatic ties with countries in Africa.

[15] Regional rreferences, i.e. Asia, Africa, Europe, Oceania, Latin America, etc indicate that the items were set within a collective continental context or about the continent as a whole, and not about an individual country.

Table 3: CGTN Geographic Context - May/June 2014

Location	Frequency (%)
South Africa	13%
Egypt	11%
Nigeria	10%
Africa	7%
Somalia	5%
Kenya	5%
Malawi	4%
Libya	4%
Uganda	4%
Zimbabwe	3%
Tunisia	3%
Europe	3%
South Sudan	2%
North America	2%
Central African Republic	2%
Latin America	2%
Ghana	2%
Côte d'Ivoire	2%
Algeria	2%
International	2%
Multiple countries	2%
Ethiopia	2%
Cameroon	1%
Sierra Leone	1%
Rwanda	1%
Niger	1%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1%
Asia	1%
Zambia	0.4%
West Africa	0.4%
Togo	0.4%
Sudan	0.4%
Senegal	0.4%
Mozambique	0.4%
Morocco	0.4%
Middle East	0.4%
Mauritania	0.4%

Burundi	0.4%

News Sources

News sources or participants were analysed for their role, the type of organisation and nationality they were affiliated to as well as the amount of time they were allocated. A total of 365 sources were used in all news reports. Twenty-two percent were affiliated to government or the public sector, 19% were from the private sector, and 10% were from civil society organisations.

The public also played a role in providing additional information about news events. Fifty nine percent of the interviewees consulted had no organisational affiliation, and the majority of these (19%) were members of the public who were relating their personal experiences, while 14% provided their opinion of the events. Four percent were eyewitnesses to events that had taken place. More than half of the participants (51%) were spokespersons or representatives of various organisations.

Table 4: CGTN Africa - Organisation Types and Roles 2014

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	37%
Public sector	22%
Private sector	19%
Civil society	10%
Multilateral/Transnational	6%
Academic/Research	2%
Media	2%
Political parties	2%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	51%
Personal experience	19%
Public opinion	14%
Expert	10%
Eye witness	4%
Reporter/Narrator	0.8%
Secondary reporter	0.3%
Subject	0.3%

As Table 5 below shows, the majority of participants were from frequently covered locations – Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria. Participants from North America and Europe accounted for 4%, each.

Table 5: CGTN Africa - National Affiliation 2014

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Egypt	16%
South Africa	15%
Nigeria	8%
Malawi	6%
Kenya	5%
North America	4%
Zimbabwe	4%
Somalia	4%
International	4%
Uganda	4%
Europe	4%
Ethiopia	3%
Africa	3%
Tunisia	2%
Libya	2%
Côte d'Ivoire	2%
Unclear/Unstated	2%
Latin America	1%
Asia	1%
Central African Republic	1%
Algeria	1%
South Sudan	0.8%
Niger	0.8%
Morocco	0.8%
Mali	0.8%
Guinea	0.8%
Togo	0.5%
Sierra Leone	0.5%
Senegal	0.5%
Rwanda	0.5%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.5%
West Africa	0.3%

Sudan	0.3%
Middle East	0.3%
Ghana	0.3%
Cameroon	0.3%

6.2.2 Period – 1 to 14 September 2015

Themes

News coverage during the two-week period in 2015 were somewhat similar to the two-week period analysed previous year, with continued prominence of economic, political and sports themes. Nevertheless, there were changes in their frequency of their coverage. As indicated in Table 6, news about the economy were the most frequent accounting for 15% of total news output. The next most frequent themes were sports with 13% of coverage, business news with 10% and military and politics with 8% each. What was notable in 2015 was the high frequency of the military reporting, which is attributed to the World War II 70th anniversary celebrations, which accounted for six out of 19 news items pertaining to military and defence. As part of these celebrations, China held a military parade in Beijing – an important event that received repeated coverage on CTGN Africa – and as a result, four of the19 news items on military coverage were related to China.

Table 6: CGTN Africa Themes 2015

Theme	Frequency (%)
Economy	15%
Sports & Recreation	13%
Business	10%
Politics & Governance	8%
Military	8%
International Relations	6%
War & Terrorism	6%
Migration	4%
Social development	4%
Human rights	4%
International justice	4%
Accidents	3%
Labour	3%
Legal system	2%
Arts & culture	2%
Riots	2%
Non-violent crime	1%
Science & Technology	1%
Environment	1%
Epidemics	1%
Poverty	1%

Geographic context

The majority of news items were set within the African, South African and Asian contexts, with 7% for each location. The African and Asian news were set within a regional context and not about individual countries in these regions. Some of the South African news provided the country's perspective on WW II, which was a topical story on the channel during this period. During this period, the Africa Rising narrative became challenging, which increased media debate on continental issues such as integration. This contributed to an increase of reports with an African context. These issues accounted for 50% of a total of 16 reports on continental coverage.

Out of the reports with an Asian context, Chinese issues accounted for 4%. These reports were largely related to Victory Day celebrations in China and its relations with other nations.

Table 7: Table 6: CGTN Africa Geographic context 2015

Context	Frequency (%)
South Africa	7%
Asia	7%
Africa	7%
Europe	6%
International	6%
Somalia	5%
Nigeria	5%
Egypt	5%
Democratic Republic of Congo	4%
South Sudan	4%
Kenya	3%
Latin America	3%
Senegal	2%
Burundi	2%
Central African Republic	2%
Zambia	2%
Ghana	2%
Sierra Leone	2%
Chad	2%
North America	2%
Uganda	2%
Zimbabwe	2%
Ethiopi	2%
Mali	2%
Mauritania	2%
Rwanda	2%
Tunisia	2%
Cameroon	2%
Burkina Faso	1%
Libya	1%
Morocco	1%
Tanzania	1%

News Sources

A total of 208 individuals were used in all news reports, with the majority being institutional representatives. As Table 8 indicates 24% were from public-sector organisations and 19% from the private sector. There was a slight increase in the number of participants from civil society organisations, from 8% during the May/June 2014 period analysed to 12% for the period 1-15 September 2015. Twenty-nine percent of participants were not officially affiliated to organisations, and included eyewitnesses to events or street interviewees who gave opinions on the issues that were being reported.

More than half (52%) of participants were spokespersons for various organisations, followed by 18% experts, while 11% related their personal experiences. As previously indicated elsewhere in this study, official actors particularly linked to the state continued to play a key role in shaping the creation of African audiences. Forty-five percent of the spokespersons were affiliated to the government and only 5% to the private sector. These government actors were also from Africa countries, predominantly South Africa (8%), Egypt (6%), Nigeria and Kenya (5%) each, while the other African countries accounted for 2% or less, as Figure 9 shows. African audiences were therefore imagined through major African economies and major newsworthy events, reflecting the role of elite nations in the news agenda. Four percent of news sources were affiliated to China, and their comments pertained to the V-Day celebrations.

Table 8: CGTN Africa Organisation Affiliations and Roles 2015

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	29%
Public Sector	24%
Private Sector	19%
Civil Society	12%
Multilateral	5%
Academic	5%
Political Party	6%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	52%
Expert	18%
Personal Experience	11%
Public opinion	8%
Eye witness	7%
Subject of story	4%

Table 9: CGTN Africa National Affiliation 2015

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Unstated	16%
South Africa	8%
Egypt	6%
Nigeria	5%
Kenya	5%
Somalia	4%
International	4%
Zimbabwe	4%
Europe	4%
Democratic Republic of Congo	3%
Ethiopia	3%
Rwanda	2%
Uganda	2%
Mali	2%
Morocco	2%
Senegal	2%
Tunisia	2%
Burkina Faso	2%
Ghana	2%
Mauritius	2%
Tanzania	2%
Asia	2%
South Sudan	2%
Cote d'Ivoire	2%
Lesotho	2%

Sierra Leone	2%
Zambia	2%
Middle East	2%
Caribbean	2%

6.2.3 Period – 1 to 14 September 2016

Themes

During the period analysed, coverage was dominated by international relations, which accounted for 13% of total news coverage as shown in Table 10. This was an increase from 6% in the two-week period analysed in 2014 and 1-14 September 2015 to 13% in the current period. News on international relations featured China's relations with the African continent and individual countries, as well as its relationship with other parts of the world. The prevalence of the theme can be attributed to the new segments, *Fruits of Cooperation,* and *60 Years of Sino-Africa Relations*. Both sections were featured in the daily news bulletin and highlighted Chinese involvement in the development of Africa.

Another contributing factor was special coverage of the G20 Summit that was hosted by China, as well as China's space programme. Reporting on the summit focused on China's relationship with other countries and the Chinese president's meetings with various world leaders to strengthen its ties with them. While international relations was not a new theme, what was noticeable was the increase in its coverage over the period analysed, as well as the focus on China.

Sport coverage was high at 12% of total coverage, and consisted mostly of results from the Paralympics in Brazil which took place during the first two weeks of September, as well as the African football competition, AFCON.

The third and fourth most popular themes were economic and business issues, accounting for 11% and 8% of coverage respectively.

Table 10: CGTN Africa Themes 2016

Theme	Frequency (%)
International Relations	13%
Sports	12%
Economy	11%
Business	8%
War & Terrorism	6%
Travel & Tourism	6%
Arts & Culture	4%
Accidents & Disasters	4%
Religion	3%
Politics & Governance	3%
Migration	3%
Celebrities	3%
Science & Technology	3%
Poverty	3%
Environment	3%
Military & Defence	2%
Riots & Demonstrations	2%
Non-violent crime	2%
Human Rights	1%
Labour issues	1%
Epidemics	1%
Education	1%
Violent crime	1%
Medicine	0.9%
Development issues	0.9%
Detention	0.9%
Domestic legal system	0.4%

Table 11: CGTN Africa Geographic Context 2016

Context	Frequency (%)
South Africa	13%
Africa-China	13%
Nigeria	9%
Kenya	6%
Europe	5%
Middle East	5%
Global	4%
Egypt	4%
Ghana	4%
Asia	4%
Tanzania	3%
South Sudan	3%
Libya	3%
Ethiopia	3%
Chad	2%
Zimbabwe	2%
Uganda	2%
Gabon	2%
Cote d'Ivoire	2%
Somalia	1%
North America	1%
Latin America	1%
Zambia	0.9%
Angola	0.9%
SA-Mauritius	0.4%
Oceania	0.4%
Niger	0.4%
Mediterranean	0.4%
Mali	0.4%
Kenya-Somalia	0.4%
Guinea	0.4%
Egypt-Ghana	0.4%
East Africa	0.4%
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.4%
Comoros	0.4%
China-Zimbabwe	0.4%
China-Kenya	0.4%

Central African Republic	0.4%
Algeria	0.4%

A notable trend during this period was the focus of stories on both China and Africa, which were two of the dominant geographic contexts with 13% of coverage. South Africa and Nigeria were also the dominant context, with 13% of stories about South Africa and 9% about Nigeria. Non-African locations such as Europe and the Middle East received 5% of total coverage each, and stories with a global context accounted for 4% of total coverage.

Table 12: CGTN Africa Organisation Type and Role 2016

Organisation type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	31%
Private sector	30%
Public sector	24%
Multilateral/International	6%
Civil society	5%
Academic/Research	3%
Media	1%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	55%
Personal experience	23%
Expert	11%
Personal opinion	5%
Subject	4%
Eye witness	1%
Journalist	1%

News Sources

A total of 311 individuals were interviewed. Of the organisations that were mentioned, a third of the sources were affiliated to private organisations, while 24% were government representatives. Civil society representatives were among the lowest with 5%.

As in the previous two-week periods analysed in 2014 and 2015, most participants (55%) spoke on behalf of their organisations, accounting for over half of all participants. This was followed by people who related their personal experiences (23%) and experts (11%).

The prevalence of coverage of China–Africa was also reflected in the sources of news. Chinese sources accounted for 9%, the third-largest percentage of news sources compared to other countries, which was not the case in previous years. Participants from South Africa and Egypt were the most frequently used, with 12% and 9% respectively.

Table 13: CGTN Africa - National Affiliation 2016

National affiliation	Frequency (%)
South Africa	12%
Egypt	10%
China	9%
Kenya	8%
Nigeria	7%
Ghana	7%
Middle East	5%
International	4%
Tanzania	3%
Chad	3%
Europe	3%
Ethiopia	3%
Cote d'Ivoire	3%
Uganda	2%
Zimbabwe	2%
US	2%
South Sudan	2%
Libya	2%
Africa	2%
Zambia	1%
Tunisia	1%
Rwanda	1%
Sudan	1%
Not stated	1%
New Zealand	1%
Mali	1%
Gabon	1%
Somalia	1%
Senegal	1%
Malawi	1%
Liberia	1%

Comores	1%
Zanzibar	0.3%
Mauritius	0.3%
Japan	0.3%
Guinea	0.3%
DRC	0.3%
Burundi	0.3%
Algeria	0.3%

6.3 Al Jazeera English

Below is a description of AJE's news coverage patterns during the specified two-week periods in 2014, 2015 and 2016. To better understand AJE's treatment of African issues, I have further segmented the total findings into Africa-specific results.

6.3.1 Period – 19 to 5 May and 1 to 7 June 2014

Themes

A total of 223 news items were reported on AJE's main news bulletin. The news was dominated by topics relating to violence and terrorism, which made up 26% of total news stories. The next most frequent theme was politics with 16%, while 12% of coverage focused on human rights issues. The prevalence of human rights was attributed to the high number of news items about political detention, which were dominated by AJE's '#FreeAJStaff' campaign to release its journalists from jail in Egypt. Their coverage accounted for 16 of the 25 stories about the detention of political prisoners.

Table 14: AJE - All News Themes 2014

Theme	Frequency (%)
War & Terrorism	26%
Politics & Governance	16%
Detention	11%
International Relations	7%
Sports	7%
Natural disaster	4%
Health	4%
Military & Defence	4%
Riots	4%
Migration	3%
Violent crime	3%
Social development	2%
International justice	2%
Environment	1%
Business	1%

Arts & Culture	0.9%
Legal system	0.9%
Entertainment	0.4%
Economy	0.4%
Human rights	0.4%
Labour	0.4%
Non-violent crime	0.4%
Religion	0.4%
Tourism	0.4%

Of a total of 223 news items, 25% focused on Africa. Africa coverage was dominated by human rights issues (34%) arising from the detention of AJE journalists in Egypt. This was followed by the theme of war and terror, which accounted for 25% of African news, as a result of ongoing terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Kenya and the Sahel region. Politics and governance issues accounted for 19% of coverage. In comparison to CGTN and eNCA, AJE did not feature business and economic news in its coverage of Africa. While the economic and business theme was present in the channel's overall news coverage, this news only accounted for 1%. However, AJE's low coverage of economic issues was not particular to Africa, but characteristic of the channel's general coverage of economic issues across all locations. For example, only five items of the channel's total news coverage were about economic and business affairs.

Table 15: AJE - Africa News Themes 2014

Theme	Frequency (%)
Human Rights	34%
War & Terror	25%
Politics & Governance	20%
Protests	7%
War crimes	5%
Violent crime	2%
Sports	2%
Tourism	2%
Health	2%
Legal system	2%

Geographic context

The most frequently covered locations were Europe, with 26% of news items, the Middle East with 16% and Asia with 15%.

Table 16: AJE - All News Geographic Context 2014

Context	Frequency (%)
Europe	26%
Middle East	16%
Asia	15%
Egypt	13%
North America	9%
Libya	4%
International	4%
Latin America	3%
Nigeria	2%
DRC	1%
More than one country	1%
Kenya	1%
Mali	1%
Sudan	1%
South Sudan	1%
Central African Republic	0.4%
Malawi	0.4%
Tunisia	0.4%
Australia	0.4%
Unstated	0.4%

As indicated on Table 16, African issues were situated within 11 African countries where the events being reported took place, such as terrorism in Nigeria, Kenya and the Sahel region, the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, and elections in Malawi. Egypt was the most frequently covered location due to the #FreeAJStaff campaign, while other issues were related to Libya and Nigeria.

News Sources

News sources were analysed for their role, type of organisation and nationality they were affiliated to. A total of 259 sources were used in all news reports. The majority (40%) were spokespersons of the organisations or individuals involved, with 24% relating their own experiences, and 18% being experts.

The organisational affiliation of the majority of participants was not always stated. Of the ones identified, 24% were from public sector organisations. Civil society sources were also frequently used and accounted for 8% of total sources, followed by academic and private organisations comprising 5% of participants.

The participants were primarily from Europe (38%), while 15% were from North America and 14% from Asia. What is notable, however, is that while a significant number of stories were situated within the Middle East (16%) and Asia (15%), fewer participants were affiliated to these locations: 11% and 14% respectively. Instead, there was a high number of participants with North American affiliation (15%). The North American participants provided further analysis on news from other regions, with most being American experts from international institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment Centre for International Peace and the Centre for Strategic International Studies based in Washington D.C., who commented on the Thai coup and other conflict issues. The reasons underlying the selection of participants was beyond the scope of this study, and would be best explored in interviews with news editors from the channel.

Table 17: AJE - All News Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2014

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	48%
Public sector	24%
Private sector	4.6%
Civil society	8%
Multilateral/International	2%
Academic/Research	5%
Media	3%
Political parties	5%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	40%
Personal experience	24%
Expert	18%
Eye witness	8%
Public opinion	8%
Primary reporter	2%
Unstated	0.4%
Secondary reporter	0.4%
Subject	0.4%

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Europe	38%
North America	15%
Asia	14%
Middle East	11%
Egypt	5%
Unclear	5%
Libya	3%
Latin America	3%
Kenya	1%
Nigeria	1%
Australia	1%
Malawi	1%
Mali	1%
Sudan	0.4%
International	0.4%
South Sudan	0.4%

There were 23 participants who were interviewed on African issues. More than half of these (52%) were not affiliated to an organisation, such as individuals who were commenting in their personal capacity. The majority of participants were from the public sector (17%) and civil society organisations (9%). These trends contrast with the

two-week periods analysed in CGTN Africa and eNCA, where the numbers of civil society participants were low.

Thirty-nine participants were spokespersons for various institutions, 17% were experts, and 17% commented in their personal capacity. What was unique about AJE during this period was its use of participants from other media organisations where the stories were sourced, such as Egypt. In the case of Egypt, this was because AJE could not operate in the country; but other journalists were interviewed in their capacity as experts on the coverage of certain issues, such as the Africa editor of *L'Express* magazine who was interviewed on reports of violence in Mali, based on his experience of covering African issues.

There was a high incidence of international and North American participants who provided further analysis of news occurring in other regions. One of these regions was Africa, where 13% of interviewees were affiliated to Europe, 9% to North America and 9% were international. Four out of seven of these were experts from multilateral and think-tank institutions such as the US Institute of Peace and the ICC. In total, 40% of participants were non-African.

Table 18: AJE - Africa Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2014

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	52%
Public sector	17%
Civil society	9%
Multilateral/International	4%
Academic/Research	4%
Media	9%
Political parties	4%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	39%
Expert	17%
Personal experience	17%
Personal opinion	13%
Eye witness	9%
Secondary reporter	4%

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Egypt	26%
Europe	13%
Libya	9%
Nigeria	9%
International	9%

North America	9%
Oceania	9%
Kenya	4%
Malawi	4%
Mali	4%
South Sudan	4%

6.3.2 Period – 1 to 14 September 2015

Themes

Quantitative analysis on AJE was also conducted from 1–14 September 2015. There was a total of 206 news items, and 11% of these had an African focus. Unlike CGTN and eNCA, AJE news is international and not particularly focused on Africa. I have therefore further broken down the findings into Africa-specific themes, geographic contexts and sources to provide an African perspective on the news patterns.

Coverage in 2015 was also evenly spread across various themes as opposed to dominance of one issue, with a decrease in war and terrorism and human rights coverage. Sport coverage increased from 6.7% during the two-week period analysed in 2014 to become the second most frequently occurring topic 1-14 September, accounting for 10% of coverage. Although sport is generally a frequently covered topic, the Rugby World Cup preparations contributed to its popularity during the period analysed. Migration and social development were the next most popular themes with 9% of coverage, respectively. Although migration was not a new them, the two-week period in 2015 was the first phase of high-profile media attention leading to higher than normal coverage. The media interest in the issue can also be attributed to the newsworthiness of the event, as it involved a large mass of migrants and their death at sea, and impacted on elite European nations. Migration was also an important issue for AJE given its significance in the MENA region, with the majority of refugees fleeing the war in Syria and undertaking the dangerous crossing to Europe through North Africa.

Africa themes were different from the previous two-week period analysed, which focused on war and conflict, presumably due to the low incidence and magnitude of violent attacks. African stories comprised of 9% of total news. These items focused on human rights, international law, sports and women abuse. The majority (30%) of these were about the detention of AJE refugees in Egypt, and another 30% focused on the war crimes trial of former Congolese rebel commander Bosco Ntaganda.

Table 19: AJE All News Themes 2015

Theme	Frequency (%)
Sports	10%
Migration	9%
Social Development	9%
Environment	7%
Detention	7%
Violence & Conflict	7%
International justice	6%
Riots	6%
Human rights	5%
International relations	5%
Arts & Culture	5%
Politics & Governance	4%
Military	4%
Economy	4%
Business	4%
Labour	4%
Science & Technology	4%

Geographic context

Europe remained the geographic context for most of the stories covered in AJE during this period. These stories focused on continental issues as opposed to individual countries. Nevertheless, news reports were split across various locations, with Europe accounting for 9%, followed by Turkey with 6% and several locations (the US, International, Hungary, Syria and France) with 5% each. The dominance of Europe and other European countries is linked to the migration crisis that affected several countries,

such as Hungary where reaction to the influx was a source of controversy and with a high volume of coverage during this period. The event also sparked the interest of the international community. According to Chouliaraki, Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017), the initial phases of the crisis starting in summer 2015 were framed as a European crisis by the media, with a focus on the implications for Europe. Over the years, these frames have evolved – from descriptions of the event as a 'migrant' crisis to a 'refugee' crisis, with a focus on the humanitarian aspects and various countries the migrants were fleeing from and why. While Syria's role in the crisis is important, as the majority of the refugees were fleeing the Syrian war, Syria was not set as the context for the news reports during this period. This could be a reflection of the observation by the authors above, where media coverage during the early phases of the crisis focused on Europe. However, it is possible that Syria's role was further explored in other AJE programmes, such as *The War on Syria*, which provided in-depth coverage and analysis of the war. This programme as not part of the sample analysed and outside the scope of this study.

African locations (highlighted in red in Figure 17) covered during the current two-week period were Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, DRC and South Africa, and accounted for 8% of the total locations.

Table 20: AJE - All News Geographic Context 2015

Geographic context	Frequency (%)
Europe	9%
Turkey	6%
France	5%
Syria	5%
Hungary	5%
International	5%
US	5%
Greece	4%
Italy	4%
China	3%
Yemen	3%
UK	3%

Democratic Republic of Congo	3%
Egypt	3%
Gaza	3%
Germany	3%
Lebanon	3%
South Africa	3%
Thailand	2%
Ukraine	2%
Japan	1%
Australia	1%
Bangladesh	1%
Iraq	1%
Kenya	1%
Indonesia	1%
India	1%
Sri Lanka	1%
Bagdad	1%
Canada	1%
Ghana	1%
Guatemala	1%
Iceland	1%
Kazakhstan	1%
Korea-China	1%
Malaysia	1%
Mexico	1%
Nepal	1%
Pakistan	1%
Peru	1%

News Sources

Trends for participants in all news items were similar to the two-week period analysed in 2014 and comparable to CGTN Africa two-week periods analysed, with the dominance of official actors from the government and the private sector and low participation by non-organisational and civil society.

Table 21: AJE – Africa Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2015

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	33%
Public sector	19%
Private sector	14%
Multilateral/International	11%
Civil Society	7%
Academic/Research	7%
Religious	5%
Political Party	2%
Media	2%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	33%
Unstated/Unclear	17%
Personal experience	12%
Expert	11%
Public opinion	10%
Eyewitness	8%
Subject of story	4%
Reporter	4%

National Affiliation	Frequency
Europe	11%
Middle East	10%
US	9%
Asia	7%
Hungary	7%
Gaza	4%
Iraq	4%
Multilateral	4%
Unstated/Unclear	4%
Yemen	4%
Syria	3%
France	3%
India	3%
Germany	3%
International	3%
Japan	3%
Turkey	2%
China	2%
Canada	1%
Kenya	1%
South Africa	1%
Bangladesh	1%
Ghana	1%
Lebanon	1%
Mexico	1%
Nepal	1%

Peru	1%
Australia	1%
Iceland	1%
Italy	1%
UK	1%
Vienna	1%

The majority of participants were spokespersons (45%) representing private and government institutions. In addition to spokespersons, there was also a significant number of experts, accounting for 15% of participants. 10% of those interviewed were relating their personal experiences of similar incidents, while 5% such as street interviewees expressed personal or public opinions.

As Table 8 shows, half of the participants who were interviewed on African issues were from Africa, demonstrating Africa's role in shaping the creation of audiences. Nevertheless, the nature of their participation and the discourses that shaped their perspectives are further explored through CDA. These participants were from locations where the events occurred, such as Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, but also affiliated to multilateral organisations such as the ICC. International actors were not from the continent, and provided the perspective of the global community on African issues, such as war crimes and human rights issues involving the imprisonment of journalists.

The participants were also affiliated to academic or research institutions (10%) as well as international organisations (10%). Compared to 1-14 September 2014, participation from civil society decreased from 9% to 5%. There was also one instance where sources of information were affiliated to other media institutions – in the case of the detention of AJE journalists in Egypt – since AJE has been banned in that country and could not cover the story. A journalist from CNN covered the story on behalf of AJE, and was interviewed.

Table 22: AJE - Africa Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2015

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)	Role	Frequency (%)

Not applicalbe/Unstated	25%
Private	25%
Government	20%
Academic	10%
Multilateral/International	10%
Civil Society	5%
Media	5%

Spokesperson	45%
Unstated/Unclear	20%
Expert	15%
Personal experience	10%
Personal opinion	5%
Reporter	5%

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Unclear	25%
Kenya	15%
South Africa	15%
Multilateral	15%
Ghana	10%
International	10%
Egypt	10%

6.3.3 Period – 1 14 September 2016

Themes

During the period, 1-14 September 2016, the total number of news items in AJE was 323. Thirteen percent of these were about African issues, and 17% of them were in the headlines. Sport news continued to dominate coverage with an increase in frequency from 10% in the two-week period analysed in 2015 to 22% in the current period. This was a result of the Paralympics and the US Open. Attention to war and terrorism returned after a decline in the two-week period analysed in 2015, accounting for 12% of total coverage. General politics continued to make up a significant amount of coverage with the ongoing war in Syria and terrorist attacks in parts of the Middle East and Asia. Elections in the US and Gabon also contributed to the high frequency of political issues. Coverage was characterised by reporting on protest action, particularly the baseball protests in league games, as well as demonstrations in various parts of the world. Economic news remained low with 3% of total coverage. Human rights coverage

continued to decline, accounting for 3% compared to 15% of coverage in the two-week period analysed in 2014. This could be attributed to the end of the trial and campaign for the release of the AJE journalists in Egypt, which was the key driver behind human rights and justice coverage.

Table 23: AJE - All News Themes 2016

Theme	Frequency (%)
Sports	22%
War & Terrorism	12%
Politics & Governance	12%
Riots	7%
Disasters	5%
International Relations	4%
Military & Defence	3%
Economy	3%
Human rights	3%
Celebrities	3%
Religion	3%
Migrarion/Immigration	3%
Business	2%
Non-violent crime	2%
Environmental issues	2%
Art & Culture events	2%
Detention	2%
Science & Technology	2%
Social development	2%
Health	2%
Violent crime	1%
Labour issues	1%
Tourism	1%
Family relations	1%
Epidemics	1%
Education	0.3%
Agriculture	0.3%

Table 24: AJE - Africa Themes 2016

Theme	Frequency (%)
Politics & Governance	22%
Military/Defence	10%
War & Terrorism	10%
Peace keeping	7%
Science & Tech	7%
Disasters	7%
Ethnic conflict	5%
Human rights	5%
Non-violent crime	5%
Demonstrations	5%
Celebrity	5%
Sports	5%
Economy	2%
Health	2%
Social development	2%

Coverage of African issues was dominated by politics and governance (22%), arising from the elections in Gabon which accounted for 6 out of 9 items on this theme. The next most frequently occurring themes were war and terrorism and military, contributing 10% of coverage respectively. Others were natural disasters as a result of the earthquake in Tanzania, peacekeeping and science and technology, which focused on innovations in the continent.

Geographic context

Table 25: AJE - All News Geographic Context 2016

Location	Frequency (%)
Europe	19%
Asia	19%
North America	16%
Middle East	14%
Latin America	6%
International	5%
Gabon	2%

Oceania	2%
South Sudan	2%
Nigeria	1%
Russia-US	1%
South Africa	1%
Zimbabwe	1%
Ethiopia	0.9%
Libya	0.9%
Senegal	0.9%
Tanzania	0.9%
China-US	0.6%
East Africa	0.6%
Israel-US	0.6%
Africa	0.3%
Australia-SA	0.3%
Darfur	0.3%
Haiti	0.3%
Kenya	0.3%
Myanmar-US	0.3%
North Korea-US	0.3%

Trends in the geographic context of news items were similar to the two-week periods analysed in 2014 and 2015, with continued focus on Asia and Europe (19%) followed by the US with 16% and the Middle East with 14%. As indicated in Table 25, very few stories had an African context. News items on America were largely driven by the presidential election campaign, while coverage on Europe was around political issues such as Brexit, immigration and the English Football Premiership results. Despite its primary focus on the Middle East, the findings also demonstrate the international character of AJE's news.

News Sources

A total of 311 people participated in news reports. The national affiliation of participants reflected the geographic location of news stories, with the majority being from Europe, North America and Asia. In comparison to the periods analysed on CGTN

Africa, where the majority of participants were from the private sector, participants in AJE were mostly affiliated to the public sector or government (23%), followed by the private sector (13%). Civil society participation was also higher on AJE than on the Chinese channel.

The roles of participants in news showed similar trends to CGTN Africa and previous AJE coverage, with the majority being spokespersons (42%). Twenty-two per cent of participants related their personal experience of the events and 17% were experts.

Table 11 shows information about individuals and organisations featured in African coverage, which share similar patterns to AJE's total news coverage as well as other channels. The majority of participants (33%) were not affiliated to any organisation and were commenting in their individual capacity. Of the official participants, 25% represented public institutions, 17% political parties and 13% the private sector. As in the previous year, there was low representation of civil society.

Half the participants were spokespersons, while 21% shared personal experiences of the events. The rest gave personal or public opinions, or were experts or subjects of the news reports; each accounted for 8% of all participants. The number of experts interviewed declined from 15% in 2015.

While the majority of participants were from Africa, 13% were from the US and 8% from the UK. Most of the participants from the US were affiliated to the government and were commenting on the peace process in South Sudan, where the international community and the UN Security Council were the main actors. UK participants were commenting on the unrest in Libya.

Table 26: AJE - All News Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2016

National affiliation	Frequency (%)
Europe	18%
North America	18%
Asia	16%
Latin America	6%
International	5%

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	41%
Public sector	23%
Private sector	13%
Civil society	7%
Multilateral	6%

Not stated	5%
Syria	4%
Australia	3%
Iraq	3%
Senegal	3%
Nigeria	2%
South Africa	2%
Turkey	2%
Gabon	1%
Lebanon	1%
Afghanistan	1%
Ethiopia	1%
Haiti	1%
N/A	1%
Tanzania	1%
Zimbabwe	1%
Yemen	1%
Kurdish	1%
Libya	1%
Maldives	1%
Palestine	1%
Qatar	1%
South Sudan	1%
Jordan	0.3%

Political party	4%
Academic/Research	4%
Media	1%
Religious	1%
Rebel Groups	1%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	42%
Personal experience	22%
Expert	17%
Public opinion	13%
Eyewitness	3%
Subject	3%

Table 27: AJE - Africa Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2016

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	33%
Public sector	25%
Political party	17%
Private sector	13%
Civil society	8%
Academic/Research	4%

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
Gabon	13%

Role	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	50%
Personal experience	21%
Expert	8%
Personal/Public opinion	8%
Subject	8%
Eye witness	4%

Senegal	13%
US	13%
Ethiopia	8%
Nigeria	8%
South Africa	8%
South Sudan	8%
Tanzania	8%
UK	8%
Zimbabwe	8%
Libya	4%

6.4 eNCA

This section presents findings on eNCA's news coverage during the two-week period in May and June.

6.4.1 Period: 19–25 May and 1–7 June 2014

eNCA reported the highest number of news items during the May/June 2014 period analysed, 323 in total. As indicated in Table 28, sport was the most prominent theme accounting for 27% of total coverage, followed by politics and conflict issues with 16% of coverage, respectively. Economic issues accounted for 10%, while business accounted for 7%. The high frequency of sports news could be attributed to various high-profile sports tournaments that were held during the coverage period, such as the FIFA World Cup and regional competitions such as the AFCON 2015 qualifiers. Furthermore, sports items were very short, which allowed for more items to be covered, as opposed to general news items that are more detailed.

Themes

Table 28: eNCA News Themes 2014

Themes	Frequency (%)
Sports	27%

Politics	16%
Violence & Conflict	16%
Economy	10%
Business	7%
Social Issues	5%
Law	4%
Arts & Culture	4%
Human Rights	3%
Health	3%
Tourism	2%
Natural accident	2%
Science & Technology	1%
Environment	0.3%

Geographic context

Like the periods analysed in CGTN, eNCA reported a high incidence of news from Africa. The majority of news articles covered were from South Africa (11%), followed by Nigeria (9.6%) and Europe (9%). The prevalence of South African stories could be attributed to the proximity of the eNCA bureau located in South Africa. The news items from Africa were varied, covering a wide range of political, economic and sports issues, unlike on AJE where African coverage was in most cases linked to conflict. While coverage of the World Cup in Brazil was high, the channel continued its focus on events on the continent and other issues of global significance.

Table 29: eNCA Geographic Context 2014

Location	Frequency (%)
South Africa	11%
Nigeria	10%
Europe	9%
Africa	7%
Libya	6%
South America	5%
North America	5%
Egypt	5%
Kenya	5%

International	4%
Malawi	4%
Asia	3%
South Sudan	3%
Zimbabwe	2%
Central African Republic	2%
Mali	2%
Democratic Republic of Congo	2%
Sudan	2%
Somalia	2%
Côte d'Ivoire	2%
Algeria	1%
Sierra Leone	1%
Rwanda	1%
Morocco	1%
Liberia	1%
Guinea	1%
Ghana	1%
Cameroon	1%
Uganda	0.3%
Tunisia	0.3%
Tanzania	0.3%
Swaziland	0.3%
Namibia	0.3%
Multiple countries	0.3%
Mozambique	0.3%
Middle East	0.3%
Mauritius	0.3%
Mauritania	0.3%
East Africa	0.3%
Burkina Faso	0.3%

News Sources

A total of 232 individuals were featured in news reports. The majority, 48%, were not affiliated to any institution, while 19% were affiliated to private organisations, 16% to the public sector and 5% to multilateral organisations. eNCA was the only channel with a strong presence of participants from the private sector, which underscores its economic agenda.

Participants were largely from South Africa (17%), Nigeria (10%), North America (9%) and Latin America (9%). Only in the case of AJE, news events were also interpreted from a non-African and global perspective. The strong presence of Latin America was a result of the FIFA World Cup coverage in Brazil, where eNCA had deployed its reporter.

Table 30: eNCA Organisation Type, Role and National Affiliation 2014

National Affiliation	Frequency (%)
South Africa	17%
Kenya	10%
Nigeria	9%
Not stated	9%
North America	7%
Europe	6%
Latin America	6%
Libya	5%
Malawi	4%
Egypt	3%
CAR	3%
Côte d'Ivoire	2%
DRC	2%
Morocco	2%
Rwanda	2%
South Sudan	2%
Algeria	1%
Ghana	1%
Liberia	1%
Mali	1%
Sudan	1%

Organisation Type	Frequency (%)
Not applicable/Unstated	48%
Private sector	19%
Public sector	16%
Multilateral/International	5%
Media	4%
Civil society	3%
Academic	2%
Political parties	2%

Roles	Frequency (%)
Spokesperson	50%
Personal experience	17%
Expert	16%
Public opinion	13%
Reporter	2%
Eyewitness	1%
Secondary Reporter	0.4%

Zimbabwe	1%
Africa	1%
World wide	1%
Burundi	0.4%
Cameroon	0.4%
Mauritius	0.4%
Sierra Leone	0.4%
Somalia	0.4%
Uganda	0.4%
Asia	0.4%
Middle East	0.4%
Not stated	0.4%

6.5 Discussion

The aim of the quantitative analysis was to establish the extent of coverage about African issues by the various networks. The news items were analysed to identify their geographical context, themes, social actors and organisations who were featured, including their national affiliations and roles. News coverage patterns in the different networks during the two-week periods analysed were consistent with event-oriented and contextual approaches to newsworthiness, as well as broadcasting objectives of each channel, which in some instances can be linked to the interests of their country of origin. Despite the relevance of the newsworthiness model, there were some contradictions.

The findings demonstrate some similarities across all channels for the periods analysed, regarding global events with international significance such as sports which were frequently covered. In addition to the global significance of Sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup, the uniform treatment of sports by all the networks could be explained by Lee and Choi's observation that they are less likely to destabilise the social order (Lee and Choi 2009). Nevertheless, the use of NFL tournaments as a platform for racial protests in the US recently suggests their ability to influence society. Furthermore, similarities were stronger between eNCA and CGTN regarding the

locations and types of issue covered. The differences among the channels were more related to contextual factors such as proximity to Africa.

While non-Western channels are expanding into the Africa market, those with strategic interests and links with the continent were more committed to African programming. These include CGTN and eNCA which reported the highest volume of news during the two-week periods analysed in 2014 to 2016 compared to the same periods in AJE. During this time, CGTN and eNCA also demonstrated higher evidence of the contextual approach related to proximity to Africa (economic, political, cultural and geographical). While AJE's coverage of the continent was more driven by the newsworthiness factors that were event-oriented and traits of nations.

6.5.1 Period: 19–25 May and 1–7 June 2014

News coverage patterns during the period analysed in May/June 2014 comprised of hard and soft news topics such as economic and sports. Despite the continuing conflict in some parts of Africa, the Africa rising narrative was a dominant discourse as a result of economic and business news coverage in CGTN Africa and eNCA. On the other hand, AJE coverage was characterised more by human rights issues. These variations can partly be attributed to the political and economic proximity of the channels which influenced their broadcasting strategies and news selection processes. For example, the interest in African audiences is largely a result of the growth of the African economy, which made for a positive narrative for Africa-based channels such as CGTN Africa and eNCA. From a political perspective, it is also intertwined with China's public diplomacy strategy and China-Africa relations, reflecting the influence of political and economic proximity in influencing news selection. The same interests apply to eNCA, as a South African channel, its geographical, cultural, economic and political proximity to Africa informed news coverage. AJE's geographic and cultural proximity to the Arab world and Middle East also led to more focus on events in North Africa and its #FreeAJStaff campaign.

The prevalence of economic and business news in eNCA and CGTN Africa is part of the Africa Rising narrative which emanates from heightened interest in Africa as an

investment destination, but its significance will be more clearer through discourse analysis of the content to establish how audiences are imagined. The global focus on business opportunities in the continent has provided the media with the opportunity to adopt commercialism as a strategy to appeal to audiences in the continent. For China, an interest in economic news may reinforce criticisms about its business self-interests in Africa and the need to create a business-friendly environment. On the other hand, a focus on business issues de-politicises audiences as their focus moves away from sensitive political issues, which are often a source of conflict and stereotypical coverage about Africa and state activities, to more focus on positive stories about economic development in the continent which may contribute to positive perceptions about China. The commercial orientation also provides the new global media players with a competitive advantage against well-established global media (Yu-Shan Wu 2012).

During this period, CGTN Africa and eNCA therefore had similar patterns of coverage about African issues compared to AJE. Aside from sport, both channels were characterised by the high incidence of economic and business issues. On the other hand, AJE's coverage of Africa was dominated by law and human rights, as well as war and terror themes. These findings contrast with AJE's coverage where economic issues accounted for a mere 2%. However, this was characteristic of the channel's general coverage of economic issues across all locations, not just Africa. For example, only five items of the channel's total news coverage were about Economic and Business affairs. Africa coverage in AJE was also characterised by conflict in Egypt and Libya, and the arrest of AJE journalists in Egypt which accounted for 81% of items pertaining to conflict.

Other frequent themes in CGTN and eNCA were sports, politics and violence. Despite crises situations in most parts of Africa such as Nigeria, Central Africa Republic, violence and conflict themes were not very prominent but the fourth most popular theme.

In AJE, coverage patterns of Africa during this period also had more conflict related themes in line with traditional constructions of Africa which are set within a background of conflict and suffering. Therefore, after human rights, war and terror was

the next popular theme accounting for 25% of Africa news. Six out of 14 items on human rights focused on the unrest in North African countries of Egypt and Libya, but conflict themes were not only particular to African news. Viewed within the context of AJE's overall news on war and terror (71 items), much of these items (51) focused on conflict in non-African locations such as Ukraine and the Middle East. While coverage of war and terror has in many instances been associated with Africa, in the case of AJE, interest in this theme can be better explained through newsworthiness as well as geographical and cultural proximity rather than stereotypes about Africa. The significance of these patterns will be further explored through qualitative analysis. The findings also demonstrate that AJE's engagement with African audiences is still largely driven by cultural proximity hence the interest in Arab nations in Africa rather than Sub-Saharan Africa, and aligned to its primary positioning as a Pan Arabic channel. This demonstrates the competing interests at play in the construction of an African audience. Cultural proximity may increase audience preference for programming that is closest to their own culture as it provides them with the cultural capital or knowledge which influences their perceptions of media products (Straubhaar 1996), however, this is not the case for Egypt where the channel has been banned since 2013 (Al Jazeera 2018).

While CGTN Africa and eNCA did report on conflict issues, their coverage was broader to include topics such as business that provided a more optimistic view of Africa. The African location of eNCA and CGTN Africa's production centres could have contributed to cultural specificity in news selection and editorial decisions. Schwarz (2005)'s study also found a degree of cultural differences in the selections of news by German and Mexican newspapers (Schwarz 2005).

The context of news reports was to a large extent a reflection of the events covered and geographical focus of the news networks. The majority of reports on CGTN and eNCA were located within Africa, while in AJE it was in Europe, followed by the Middle East. The country of origin for the various networks was featured more on eNCA, with 11% of items set within South Africa, while CGTN had 1% of news pertaining to China. AJE did not feature any items about Qatar.

The actors who participated in news reports suggest that the construction of African audiences in all the news networks was largely informed by institutional sources of news, especially from the government and the private sector. While non-professional members of the public were frequently used as news sources, their role was not to interpret the information, but to describe the events and their personal experiences. The role of giving meaning to the events was held largely by official sources and independent professionals or experts, who were spokespeople for various institutions, and subject matter experts. In most instances, these sources took part in more formal interviews either on studio or on air for analysis. This is in line with previous research on news sources where institutions are the preferred source given their organizational credibility, easy access and resources to provide ready-made information in the relevant format required by the media (Allan 1999).

Furthermore, the extent to which African actors participated in the news also varied. Only eNCA and CGTN used a high number of sources from Africa, with CGTN having the top five sources from African countries comprising of Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya. The findings correspond with the geographical context of the majority of news items during the periods analysed. However, international sources some with affiliation to international organisations also commented on African issues. For example, interviewees for news reports about Nigerian news were not only affiliated to Nigeria, but other parts of the world as the news items had international interest, i.e. the attacks by Boko Haram where international leaders such as the British Prime Minister and US Secretary of State commented on the issue. In AJE, non-African, particularly Western sources were actively involved in the construction of African audiences, than African actors. While the majority of participants (26%) were from Egypt, a significant number of sources were from Europe (13%), North America, Oceania and other non-African countries (9%), contributing more participants than several African countries.

6.5.2 Period: 1-14 September 2015

The challenges experienced by independent broadcasters in the African market came into the fore in the two-week period analysed in 2015 with the closure of eNCA due to

financial difficulty. Satellite broadcasting is characterised by high operational costs which makes it difficult to sustain especially for small independent channels that rely mainly on advertising and other commercial ventures. On the other hand, CGTN Africa and AJE are funded by the state and have a public diplomacy objective which is critical to the foreign policy of their respective states, particularly China. Despite AJE's initial plan to become financially independent after 5 years, the channel failed to raise sufficient revenue and continues to rely on the Qatari government to keep it operational (Miles 2005).

Despite the lower volume of news on CGTN Africa and AJE during this period, in comparison to the two-week period anlaysed in 2014, CGTN Africa continued to have a high volume of news with 245 items, while African news in AJE decreased by 64%.

News trends during this period continued to be driven by newsworthiness and strategic interests of both channels. As a result, there was a high volume of event-oriented stories and themes with international interest, such as international sporting events and migration. Sports dominated coverage on both channels contributing 13% of the total news in CGTN Africa and 10% of AJE's international news. Sports issues were dominated by coverage of international sporting events such as the Rugby World Cup and annual competitions during this time of the year.

While AJE's Africa coverage during the two-week period analysed in 2014 focused on war and terrorism, focus on this theme decreassed in the current two-week period as the magnitude of attacks decreased during September 2015. However, related themes which focused on non-war violence and riots increased from 2% in the two-week period analysed in 2014 to 9% in the two-week period analysed in 2015. AJE's strategic focus on the Arab world was reflected in increased frequency of the migration of Syrian refugees from 2.7% in two-week period analysed in 2014 to 9% in two-week period analysed in 2015. This theme also gained international media attention in 2015. CGTN's interests were also reflected in its continued focus on the Africa Rising narrative, but the framing of Africa's success began to shift from a celebratory to a more cautious tone and other perspectives which interrogated its impact for the wider society and slow economic growth in Africa, particularly extractive industries and China's role

in it. This led to focus on other sectors and continental issues such as integration of Africa trade. There was also a high interest in global events such as the 100-year anniversary of World War II, which increased the frequency of the military theme. This event provided an opportunity for China to project its image as a global leader through coverage that showcased Beijing's military capability. The event also provided a Chinese perspective on the issue to establish a connection between global events and China. This is a form of reversed domestication, a strategy used by news channels provide the perspective of their country of origin when reporting foreign news.

6.5.3 Period: 1-14 September 2016

During this time, CGTN and AJE reported significant increases in their news volumes, CGTN by 70% and AJE by 56%. Coverage patterns also continued to reflect strategic interests while also accommodating breaking news of global and regional significance. However, there were significant changes in CGTN. The channel rebranded from CCTV to CGTN and CGTN Africa and coverage continuing to focus more on China.

CGTN's coverage reflected China's growing confidence as a global leader and more assertive projection of its image. While previous coverage on CGTN was more cautious about overt coverage of China, the 2016 period analysed was characterised by manifest themes about China's positive role in Africa and its relationship with Africa with the introduction of news segments - *Fruits of Co-operation* and *60 Years of Sino-Africa Friendship.* The decline in Africa rising continued on CGTN during this time, with increasing emphasis on the diversification of Africa's economy and reinforcement of Chinas commitment to Africa's development. Analysis of content in this period showed a decline in the economic and business theme, to be dominated by international relations. While this was not a new theme, frequency of its coverage increased steadily from 6% during the two-week period analysed in 2014 to 13% in the current period. Furthermore, the majority of reports on this theme focused on China, demonstrating its increasing confidence as a world power. Despite its rebranding, the volume of global news did not necessarily increase, but were domesticated to provide a Chinese and African perspectives.

Sports remained the dominant theme in AJE in 2016, followed by politics. War and terrorism was also popular contributing 11%, although not as high as in the May/June 2014 period (25%). While total news output AJE was higher than in this period compared to the periods analysed in 2014 and 2015, African news only comprised of 13%.

Participation of social actors in both networks reflected the themes of coverage and geographical location of news items. Given the high number of stories about China, participants affiliated to the country were also higher than previous periods analysed, at 9%. In turn, the majority of participants in AJE were also affiliated to Europe, North America and Asia. Given its focus on politics, the network also continued to have a higher number of public sector and civil society participants compared to CGTN.

It is worth noting that throughout the analysis periods, the treatment of the country of origin for the respective networks differed. AJE did not feature news on Qatar, which is consistent with previous research where the network reports more on other Arab nations that on Qatar (Atad 2017, Miles 2005). However, while news about China on CGTN Africa was low in the two-week period analysed in May/June 2014, it increased from 1% to 13% in the current period, and became more direct. On eNCA, the majority of news items were located in its country of origin, South Africa.

While the findings throughout the analysis periods show that coverage of Africa was driven by the nature of events and contextual factors, interviews with the news editors of the various networks would provide more insights into their selection of news. These relationships are clearly highlighted in Critical Discourse Analysis in the next section.

CHAPTER 7: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the main research question of how audiences were created through discourse. I employ CDA to identify the ideologies that underlie the construction of audiences and the strategies used to express them through language. My analysis also highlights the manifestation of relations of power and agency among actors involved. The news items analysed were sampled from specific time periods in 2014, 2015 and 2016, and not a representation of the channels' news coverage of Africa.

The findings show similarities and differences in how audiences were conceptualised by the different broadcasters, based on each their strategic objectives. AJE's approach differed from CGTN and eNCA and was largely driven by political discourses on democracy, human rights and social justice. CGTN Africa and eNCA's strategy was largely influenced by the political and economic climate in which the media operates. This environment is underpinned by the neoliberal ideology that has come to dominate international debate across other spheres of society. Neoliberalism gained popularity in the 1930s as:

> "a theory of political and economic practice that proposes human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey 2005:2).

There are a wide range of perspectives and schools of thought on neoliberalism, but today it is widely used as an ideology or term to describe an economic system characterised by a combination of a deregulated economy that facilitates the free movement of capital, labour and goods globally to enhance competitiveness and efficiency; and limited state intervention in the creation and maintenance of a policy framework that facilitates these practices (Harvey 2005; Birch 2015; Smyth 2017; Tucker 2017). From a political perspective, neoliberalism is linked to the ideas of

Walter Lippmann and Alexander Rustow who coined the term (Lippmann 1934; Tucker 2017). Lippmann pursued a new way of thinking about liberalism which, unlike laissez-faire policies, sought to pursue the active role of the state in establishing the free market and providing welfare to citizens, democracy, civil liberties, peace and environmental protection. This was the opposite of a passive state and a completely free market that exercised complete and inevitable control of the economic system (Tucker 2017; Birch 2015). While neoliberal ideals have inspired the spread of liberal democracy and economic and political reforms, their implementation has in some instances resulted in negative consequences. Some of these are capitalist power, social inequalities, authoritarianism and constraints on economic growth leading to rising criticism, particularly in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008 (Seattle Municipal Archives 1995–2016; Byanyima 2017; Parker 2017).

Neoliberal policies are widely believed to be key to addressing Africa's development challenges, and as such applied by development institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (Moyo 2009; World Bank 1994). However, their success has been widely contested in Africa and internationally (UNECA 1991; Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Nissanke 2001). China's successful model of capitalism, 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' - a fundamentally capitalist society with government oversight is increasingly viewed by many developing countries, including Africa, as an alternative (Kabemba 2012; Borg 2015; Kangai 2014).

In the sections that follow, I outline the findings for each channel, starting with CGTN. For each channel, the findings are structured according to the dominant audience identities that were constructed, with an analysis of the discourses that informed their construction which I demonstrate through various extracts[16] from the programmes.

7.2 CGTN Africa

[16] See Appendix 1 for all talk show and news items referenced.

The corpus for CGTN analysis consisted of the talk show episodes and news items below, which I refer to and quote as extracts in my discussion[17]. In some instances, I have highlighted and italicised relevant words and phrases to emphasise and demonstrate my argument.

Talk show episodes

a) Africa's Oil Boom
b) Kenyan cases expose ICC's underbelly
c) Tripartite Fee Trade Area (TFIA) from Cairo to Cape Town

News items

a) Elections in Egypt
b) Terror attacks in Nigeria
c) Labour unrest in South Africa
d) G20 Summit

While the focus of the study is on the channel's viewpoint as articulated by the programme presenters, reports and other personnel, I have also included viewpoints of participants such as studio guests and interviewees who were sources of information on the issues discussed. Their viewpoints were essential to the analysis, as they provided insight into other discourses that inform the construction of African audiences and understanding of the role of power relations in determining which discourses were legitimised. The selection of studio guests is not a value-free process but one that is also based on the interests of the media, and hence plays a role in informing perceptions about audiences. To ensure equal representation and objectivity, the media includes participants with various viewpoints in its programmes. However, power relations between the participants and the manner in which the discussion is mediated shapes how audiences are imagined. Appadurai (1996) points out that the construction of

[17] See Appendix A, for details about the talk shows and news analysed, as well as the broadcast times

audiences is an interaction of various '*imagined worlds'* and '-scapes', which when combined can be transformed or re-appropriated leading to other ways of imagining (Appadurai 1996: 33).

The findings illustrate that audiences on CGTN were conceptualised as:

a) investors and entrepreneurs
b) a homogenous pan-African community
c) self-reliant
d) upholders of democratic and human rights
e) friends and partners of China

7.1.1 Audiences as investors and entrepreneurs

The construction of audiences as investors and entrepreneurs was primarily shaped by neoliberal discourses, as demonstrated in the coverage of the mineworkers strike in South Africa and the news report about the establishment of the Free Trade agreement in the continent. These discourses were sympathetic to investors and negatively framed labour, and were centred on two themes: 1) unions are destroying the economy, and 2) investor sentiment is low because of the strikes.

Extract 1: Mineworkers' strike in South Africa

One of the prominent business stories in 2014 was the labour unrest in South Africa, which highlighted the impact of the strike on investment in the sectors affected and the wider economy.

The report was filed just before the so-called 'strike season' in South Africa, where trade unions negotiate wages with companies, particularly in the mining sector. Trade unions have a large number of representatives in the mining and manufacturing sectors since these are some of the largest in the economy, employing thousands of workers. Due their size and capital-intensive nature these sectors have traditionally attracted foreign investment, making the strike important to various stakeholders in South Africa and internationally. The story is also of interest to Chinese investors in the continent.

Furthermore, the sectors are especially characterised by power relations between unions, employers and the government, and wage negotiations are a platform on which these relations are articulated and exercised.

My analysis is based on the conception of power in liberal societies as productive, and linked to material power structures that dominate the production and circulation of discourse and knowledge. I therefore evaluate relations of power among social actors involved in the strike and the nature of their participation, while also examining the perspectives from which the event is reported to identify discourses and how they shape the construction of audiences.

Various actors were involved in the report, but the dominant ones were trade unions and the Chamber of Mines. One representative from these two groups was interviewed. The organisations were addressed collectively as the National Union of Textile Workers or Chamber of Mines, and the interviewees were addressed by their full names and designations. Striking employees were referred to as 'workers', a term traditionally used by trade union movements. However, its use is ideologically connected to the history of labour and class struggles between employers (owners of the means of production) and employees (providers of labour) which are fundamental to Marxist and Socialist thinking (D'Amato 2002; Jacobin Radio 2017). The term is also used to articulate the rights of the working class. The strike has always been a means for workers to express their exploitation by the capitalist class and generally used to imply the continuing struggle for workers' rights and equal pay. There were no comments solicited from striking workers, and interviews were only conducted with representatives of the trade union organisations.

One of the key players in the strike is the Labour Court, whose awaited ruling indicated a way forward for all parties involved. The role of the court as the decision-maker demonstrates the productive nature of power and structures of knowledge in society. In this case, the parties involved willingly participated in court proceedings and trusted in its processes and rulings to guide the negotiation process. Although the court's decision can be contested through an appeal, this is done through the same legal system as the only body with the power to make a decision that will be respected by all parties. The

Labour Court is consistent with the working of power in a democracy, where power is exercised through institutions such as the court of law.

To construct workers negatively, the report highlighted the magnitude of the strike and its impact on investment.

Magnitude of the strike

In his introduction, the presenter formulated the extent of the strike as significant as indicated in the text below.

- The textile union *joins* another strike by a *larger union.'*

Joining a strike that is already being carried out by even a larger organisation implies that the strike will increase in magnitude as more workers and companies are involved. The textile union is therefore making a bad situation worse.

- … which started on Monday, the *2nd of June* … around *164 companies* in total will be affected by the strikes

By giving the exact date, the presenter emphasises the number of days that the strike has lasted and the number of companies affected, implying that by joining the strike the textile union is prolonging the industrial action, which means that the strike will not end anytime soon.

- *The thing though is* … as if the coming strike in the footwear sector *isn't bad enough*, the National Union of Metal Workers also says a strike in their sector is *inevitable*

The presenter's argument depends on explaining why the actions by the textile union are a bad idea. The phrase 'the thing though is' could be read as meaning that 'the problem is', which problematises the strike action. The phrase '*isn't bad enough*' indicates that the textile union is making the situation worse. The term *inevitable* is a negative predication that constructs the union negatively as unwilling to negotiate and refusing to back down.

Impact of the strike

The presenter's two-way interview with correspondents in South Africa and London focuses on the impact of the strike on the companies affected, the economy, as well as reaction from investors. In explaining the impact of the strike, the journalists claim that it will have negative consequences on investor sentiment and company profits.

- **Presenter:** A walkout by NUMSA would weigh on key sectors like parts supply and steel output. It would also hold work on building projects that are vital to the country as a whole – that includes ESKOM's much-needed Kusile and Medupi power stations.
- **Presenter:** Sumitra, AngloGold Ashanti, Sibanye and Harmony Gold … what's their current financial health like?
- **Sumitra Naidoo** (Correspondent, Johannesburg): Well Ramah, the goldmine seems to be in better shape than that of their platinum counterparts.
- **Presenter:** Production though took some strain as a result of work stoppages earlier this year
- **Presenter:** How are investors reacting on your end?
- **Maryam Behmard** (Correspondent, London): … despite some optimism that operations will commence, investors are seeing this as yet another sign of uncertainty across the board of the mining sector. This wave of strikes is causing investors to tread water very lightly. At the end of the day companies are adopting collective bargaining and as the lead counsel said earlier, for the Chamber of Mines …

The presenter implies that there is low investor sentiment in a mining sector that is already experiencing difficulty, meaning that the strike by the textile union is making things worse.

The example below demonstrates how the strike is constructed negatively through strategies of 'othering' unions and workers, and negative labelling intended to exaggerate the magnitude of the events is used.

- **Presenter:** Sumitra, Anglogold Ashanti, Sibanye and Harmony Gold. These are the firms that have applied for the injunction in January ... what's the current *financial health* like?
- **Presenter:** How are *investors reacting* on your end?
- **Maryam**: The wave of strikes is *causing investors to tread waters very lightly*…
- **Presenter:** Investors are seeing this as yet another sign of uncertainty across the board of the mining sector

As the initiator of the strike, the implication of the statements above is that the union is responsible for the negative consequences and as such is destroying the economy. The presenter further describes the strike as 'ravaging the economy' and the events as 'doom and gloom', thereby presenting a bleak future for the economy.

The union is further framed negatively by formulating the pay rise as a demand, indicating that the union is unreasonable and not willing to negotiate. These claims are further supported by constructing the union's behaviour as a 'walkout' and speaking of 'unreasonable ultimatums' as indicated in the statements by the Presenter below:

- Now, the union *wants* a 10% rise and union is *demanding* a one-year 15% wage hike
- If their *demands* are not met…
- A *walkout* by NUMSA …

Although the dominant discourse places the blame on unions, analysis from Sumitra Naidoo also places the strike in the context of broader changes in the mining and manufacturing sectors. She highlights safety concerns as some of the reasons why workers are striking, thus giving the union and workers' perspective. Nevertheless, this information is provided at the end of her report and not followed up by the presenter, which implies that it is less important. This positioning of alternative discourses at the end of the report makes it clear that the concerns of workers are less legitimate and their representatives occupied a less powerful position in the discussion.

The focus of the report on investor perspective shaped how audiences were addressed as investors, which was apparent in the reports from the correspondents interviewed. The objective of the story can therefore be seen as an attempt to keep both foreign and local investors up to date about the mining industry in South Africa and the financial implications of the strike, which is imperative as the rise of Africa is based on FDI investment in natural resources. However, these constructions are not limited to audiences within physical borders or spaces, but are based on shared economic interests in South Africa and the continent. Therefore, while CGTN's focus is on African audiences, it is also addressing audiences in other parts of the world through its global presence. For example, Chinese investors would be particularly interested in the mining industry given their country's interests in African commodities and expanding their market. Despite China's slow economic growth, Africa remains a key partner due to its continued economic and population growth that provides a source of labour and market potential. China's continuing investment was demonstrated at the latest FOCAC meeting where President Xi announced a $60 billion financing and investment package to Africa (Xi 2018). China's strong economy is also a source of its global economic power.

In 2015, the construction of African audiences as investors and entrepreneurs continued, but there was a slight shift in 'who' these investors were. In traditional discourses about FDI investment in Africa, investors are constructed as foreign, usually multinational companies from the West, while the role of Africans is to attract them by creating a conducive environment for their investment, as demonstrated in the mining article above. These discourses were aligned to neoliberal perspectives of free trade, labour and individual rights. However, while foreign investors are still relevant, CGTN is increasingly moving the traditional role of African players from a policy-oriented one to that of investors and entrepreneurs in their own continent, with China as the external/foreign investor. This new construction is linked to the Africa Rising discourse, whose key message is that 'Africa is open for business' and has a growing middle class with capital to invest and start their own businesses, as well as a potential market. This message is supported by extensive business programming that features some of Africa's well-established multinationals such MTN and MNET, as well as entrepreneurs who are

taking advantage of good economic conditions to start small businesses in their communities. Business programming was expanded to include a new programme, *Global Business Africa,* which was launched in 2014 to update audiences on actions by 'African entrepreneurs' and multinationals (CCTV 2014). The programme situates Africa within the global economic and business context, which makes clear the economic motivations that underlie the creation of this imagined African audience, as discussed below.

Extract 2: Tripartite Free Area from Cairo to Cape Town

The emphasis on the African investor and entrepreneur was also evident in coverage of economic integration in the continent. Intra-Africa trade was promoted as a response to slow economic growth and negative perceptions of Africa as a risky location to do business. In a discussion about the creation of the Tripartite Free Area from Cairo to Cape Town (TFTA), the presenter highlights that the initiative will enable free movement of goods and people from Cairo to Cape Town, resulting in the ability of African businesses to invest in other African countries and regions instead of relying on foreign investment from other parts of the world (Talk Africa 2015). Intra-Africa trade also draws on pan-African discourses where Africa–Africa trade is framed as a 'move away from political to industrial and economic emancipation' (Juma 2015: n.p.).

7.1.2 Construction of a pan-African identity

Coverage on CGTN was also characterised by the conception of audiences as a homogenous collective with common challenges and experiences. Unlike Benedict Anderson's community, this audience is not national, but imagined as continental. This was achieved first by using labels and forms of address that associated audiences with the African continent, and secondly through broader discourses on pan-Africanism and post-colonialism, which appealed to feelings of solidarity and belonging, as well as shared history. At the centre of pan-Africanism is the idea of 'African solutions to African problems', which proclaims African solidarity and self-reliance as I illustrate below. This slogan was employed in numerous reports such as the coverage on conflict and terrorism and the oil boom in Africa.

African solutions to African problems

'African solutions to African problems' is a rhetorical statement commonly used by African leaders and elites to advocate self-reliance and ownership of solutions to Africa's problems[18]. The expression is rooted in pan-African and African Renaissance concepts championed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the AU (AU 2015). Mbeki revived the African Renaissance concept formerly promoted by former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. This ideology is also consistent with the China–Africa Cooperation Declaration intended to support African-led initiatives and non-interference in country politics (Focac.org 2015; China Daily Online 2013). As President Xi indicated, 'China strongly believes Africa belongs to the African people and African problems should be handled by the African people' (Focac.org 2015).

The notion of African solutions to African problems is embedded in much of CGTN's programming in line with China's support for the AU as stated in the China–Africa Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit which supports the AU's 2063 agenda, its *First Ten-Year Implementation Plan* and NEPAD (FOCAC 2015).

One of the manifest strategies used by CGTN to create the African identity was using the labels 'Africa' and 'African' to describe the issues and the context in which they were taking place. Although there were discussions about country-specific issues, the majority of issues were continental hence the use of 'Africa' to contextualise and describe them. While these labels are inevitable given the channel's focus on African issues, they are also a way to flag the continent as a place of identity. The common-sense nature of the labels legitimises the pan-African discourse by making it a normal way of talking about the continent. It is like 'a flag hanging unnoticed on the public building' (Billig 1995:8, quoted in Bishop & Jaworski 2003:248).

[18] African officials and professionals have advocated for African solutions to African problems such as Ramtane Lamamra - http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8334475.html and Economist, Dambisa Moyo - http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/rwjl/t1119868.htm

References to ‘Africa’ and ‘African’ also make a distinction between ‘African’ and ‘non-African’, or ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Such exclusivity reproduces African audiences in daily life, imagining them as part of the African collective, while excluding non-Africans, thereby creating a sense of belonging among audiences. In the same discussion, the presenter explicitly uses the terms ‘Western powers’ or ‘Westerners’ to refer to those who are not part of this African identity.

The rhetoric on Africa’s ability to solve its own problems continued in 2016, but to a lesser degree, as a contradictory discourse on China’s role in Africa’s development emerged, as I discuss later.

Audiences as self-reliant

Extract 3: Peace-keeping missions in Africa

African unity and the notion of African solutions to African problems were also reflected in expressions of Africa’s self-reliance, evident in the coverage of conflict and terrorism. The channel constructed audiences as actors who were taking the lead in peace initiatives in the continent to resolve their problems collectively.

In the current affairs show entitled *Peace-keeping Missions in Africa*, the continent’s effectiveness in resolving its problems was also reflected in the labels used by the presenter to describe the peace missions in the continent, such as *African-led intervention, Africa-led force; AU-led and African solutions…African problems*, which reinforced the active role of African leadership. The role of African countries as a unified entity was further articulated in the form of its institutions such as the AU or regional blocks such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The argument in support of the African solutions rhetoric is further reinforced by the presenter’s emphasis on African successes in resolving conflict and the failure of the international community throughout the programme, as shown in the excerpt below. One of the panellists, Mohamed Jibreal, even cites African intervention as a good model and calls for the urgent establishment of an AU stand-alone brigade.

- **Presenter** … African-led force in the DRC succeeded where MONUSCO had failed …
- **Presenter:** … *failure* of the UN peacekeeping force …
- **Mohamed Jibreal:** I think it's a *very good model that can be seen as African*

Nevertheless, member states have failed to contribute adequate funding to the AU despite the introduction of a new funding model (Ekott 2017). Instead, China has become one of the key funders for the initiative, providing $100 million towards the establishment of the AU's immediate response unit (Mwencha 2016; Perlez 2015).

Extract 4: Terror attacks in Nigeria

Africa's self-reliance is also highlighted in the news report on a terrorist attack in Nigeria. Between May and June 2014, Nigeria experienced numerous attacks by the militant group Boko Haram, and these were widely covered in most global media including CGTN. One of the prominent incidents covered by all the channels in this study was the Boko Haram attack in Jos, where over 17 people were killed.

The city of Jos is in Plateau State in central Nigeria, between the Christian South and the mostly Muslim North. This part of the country has been a flash point for Islamist insurgency in recent years, one of which is the town of Chibok, where more than 200 schoolgirls were kidnapped a month ago. The attacks were initially concentrated in Northern Nigeria, close to the border with Chad and Cameroon, but started spreading to the Southern part of the country. The Islamist group, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for taking the girls, and its widely been blamed for the latest violence.

The inception of the group Boko Haram can be traced to the 1960s, but it's prominence started in 2002 as a militant Islamic sect based in Northern Nigeria (Popoola 2012). The name 'Boko Haram' means western education is sinful, hence the attack and kidnapping of school girls (Ekwueme & Akpan 2011: 41). Boko Haram's beliefs are similar to other extremist Islamic groups such as the Taliban who are anti-Western, and as a result, the group has attacked Western interests as well as individuals and groups who have condemned its activities such as Christians and government institutions. The intensity

and frequency of these attacks has increased since 2011, making Boko Haram West Africa's extremist Islamist group and a wider threat, not just to Nigeria, but in the region.

The report on 21 May 2014, was a prominent story on CGTN and AJE, and while it was presented in a similar format, the time and resources allocated to its coverage, and framing of the incident illustrated the broadcasters' editorial practices and their influence on the construction of audiences. CGTN's coverage focused on the role of African actors to resolve the causes of the attacks as opposed to the violence and helplessness of the victims.

CGTN's presentation was in a simple studio set-up as opposed to AJE's highly visual and sophisticated presentation. There was no change in the delivery of the story, with the presenter sitting down in a close-up shot as usual, compared to AJE, where the news anchor was in a stand-up position, and full length shot as shown in Figure 24. Although CGTN anchors have used the stand-up position before especially when presenting prominent stories this was not the case. CGTN's presentation screen was also backgrounded by visuals of the scene of the attack, which was positioned on the left of the screen.



Figure 1: CGTN News Presenter

After the presenter's introduction, the report begins with a map of Africa, and the camera zooms in on Nigeria in a long-shot, and then Jos, where the attack occurred (Fig. 25). The long-shot of the map of Africa, then the entire region provided the geographical context and setting of the attacks (Fig. 26).



Figure 2: Map of Boko Haram attack - CGTN



Figure 3: Distance between Jos and Chad - CGTN

The presenter is also positioned on the right, which allows viewers to also see the background scene of the attack on the left and behind the presenter. These shots are immediately followed by shots from the scene of the blast, showing paramedics, police and members of the public sifting through the wreckage, but they're more static and not very clear and vivid as on AJE (Fig. 27). These scenes also appear to be pre-recorded and with a combination of full and long shots and provide a clear image of the extent of the damage and chaos of the streets, which demonstrates that it was a crowded market area. The field reporter who compiled the story does not appear on camera to provide more details. Comments are given by three survivors who calmly relate their experiences in close-up shots which makes them more personal and display their emotions. (Fig. 28 – 30)



Figure 4: Scene of Boko Haram attack in Jos - CGTN



Figure 5: Nelly Kure - Survivor



Figure 6: Gabriel Uchechukwu - Survivor



Figure 7: Survivor of attack

The camera returns to the original scene in studio with the presenter and a CGTN correspondent who filed the story from Lagos (Figure 31). The report from the correspondent is not live, and the correspondent is in a quiet area in contrast to the chaotic scenes of Jos. The presentation of the report shows that limited resources were allocated for field reporting from Jos and compelling visual elements. Given CGTN's access to state funding, this could be a deliberate editorial decision to shift away from narratives of a violent Africa to a more constructive one of how African leaders are solving problems[19]. As a result, a large part of CGTN's coverage emphasised the role of African actors in resolving the causes of the attacks, while the content and imagery on AJE focused on the violence, depicting Africans as victims of Boko Haram's insurgency. African audiences on CGTN were constructed as self-reliant and able to solve their problems by forming the West African regional force to fight the Boko Haram insurgents. While the report also mentioned the involvement of the international

[19] There were contradictions to CGTN's strategy of more constructive reporting about Africa as its coverage shifted to focus more on Chinese achievements. This is demonstrated in the channel's coverage of development issues in Africa in 2016.

community, such as France, Britain and the US, West African leaders are seen to be driving the initiative. For example, introductory comments about the establishment of the force frame Nigeria and its neighbours as taking the lead, while non-African countries are only mentioned afterwards.



Figure 8: CGTN Reporter in Lagos

Furthermore, the CGTN article gives an active voice to African leaders. The channel features comments from Paul Biya, President of Cameroon, who speaks directly to the camera and comments about the issue as both regional (West African) and African (Figure 32). The Nigerian president does not comment, but he is quoted directly by both the presenter and the field reporter. He is also shown in visuals welcoming the other Western heads of state.

- **Presenter:** in a related development, *troops from Nigeria and four of its neighbours are to join up* to hunt Islamist militant group BH.
- **Reporter:** President Goodluck Jonathan moved quickly to condemn the killings. He said, [I quote], 'the government remains fully committed to winning the war

against terror, and this administration will not be cowed by atrocities of enemies of human progress and civilization'[unquote].



Figure 9: Paul Biya - President of Cameroon

In contrast, the involvement of the international community in AJE's coverage of the same story was framed differently. The introduction to the issue positions the French president as taking the lead by hosting a meeting in Paris where the African presidents agreed to form a regional force, as I discuss in the AJE section. The visuals also show the French and British leaders arriving.

- **Presenter:** The French President *hosted a meeting in Paris* on Saturday where Nigeria and its neighbours agreed a coordinated strategy to fight the armed group**.**

The examples above highlight constructions centred on state actors. However, the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' also highlights the role of ordinary citizens as key to solving Africa's problems with their skills, thus constructing audiences as highly skilled and self-reliant. These identities were also manifested in the discussion on Africa's oil boom, as indicated below.

Constructing audiences as self-reliant promotes the idea that success does not have to be based on Western involvement or models; instead, like China with its particular style of neoliberalism or capitalism, Africa can also achieve it, as one of the guests, Professor Gutto, from the African Renaissance Institute states:

- **Professor Gutto:** … we do have the *capacity, intellectuals, political economists working for global institutions*. We can utilise them, we need our governments to use them instead of the 'advisors' who want to exploit

According to the guests in the programme, these intellectuals do not only have the knowledge and skills to evaluate the value of investment agreements signed by their governments; they are also ordinary citizens, with a global outlook. Guests referred to them as Africans who are working for international organisations such as the World Bank, and currently advising African governments, as the continent's human capital with the ability to check agreements signed by the state. The emphasis on the African workforce also demonstrates a people-centred approach based on principles of pan-Africanism and the liberal values of democracy as it highlights the active participation of ordinary citizens in the development of the continent through their skills and knowledge, not as political or economic power. These active citizens could be viewed as a new audience when considering that satellite channels tend to focus on elite African audiences and the state as key actors in the political and economic spheres. Ordinary citizens are predominantly constructed as victims of the problems that plague the continent.

Post-colonial experience

As in the construction of a nation, an African identity was further constructed by articulating a shared history, developmental successes and challenges, and future aspirations. This strategy is consistent with Billig's concept of 'temporality', which is used to imagine a nation through references to the past and the future (Billig 1995:8, quoted in Bishop & Jaworski 2003:248). As such, post-colonial discourses focusing on the legacy of colonialism in Africa were a recurring theme on CGTN's programming, as illustrated in the current affairs programme *Talk Africa* about Africa's oil boom.

Colonialism is an issue that resonates with many African audiences and used as a strategy to unite African audiences and create an identity that is bound by their colonial experience. In the discussion, the presenter and participants highlight the role of Western colonialism and its exploitative relationship with Africa as the main cause of the 'oil curse', but also acknowledge the role of African leadership and the continent's weak governance mechanisms.

Extract 5: Oil boom in Africa

- **Professor Gutto**: We went through *a period of plunder during the colonial era* ... after independence, Africa was not left alone. There was a new economic paradigm replacing *colonialism and plunder* continued with the collaboration of a few elites in Africa that left the majority of people in Africa in poverty.
- **Presenter:** But this seemingly rosy picture has a negative side, one that casts Africa as a continent endowed with immense resources but also one that is steeped in poverty. It is *a historic issue* that must be addressed now by Africa…

The presenter's reference to the 'historical issue that must be addressed by Africa' is an appeal to a common history that requires countries to unite to resolve their common issues. By discrediting colonialism as exploitation, this strategy supports the idea that a united continent will be more effective. Finding African solutions and independence from the West is therefore a common-sense and natural course of action, and justifies the call for Africa to solve its own problems.

While this common colonial history is shared by African countries, it also resonates with China, which is also a developing country. Point 3 of the China–Africa Declaration points out China's commonalities with Africa as a basis for their relationship:

Both African countries and China are developing countries facing common challenges of development and sharing broad common interests in a world that is undergoing and will continue to undergo profound and complex changes. Therefore, it is incumbent on us to continue to strengthen the current platform for collective dialogue, consolidate

Africa–China traditional friendship, deepen strategic collaboration and enhance the mechanism of practical cooperation between China and Africa (FOCAC 2015)

Furthermore, colonialism and negative perceptions from the West are not only African experiences, but have also been experience by China. China was also colonised by Japan and is not favourably perceived by the West because of its poor human rights record. The appeal to the legacy of colonialism and *othering* of the West is therefore a useful strategy for CGTN as it has the potential to win the hearts and minds of African audiences by highlighting common interests, which in turn increases China's credibility. Already, in some instances of CGTN's coverage, African actors refer to China as a good model for Africa, as I illustrate in this study.

Extract 6: Kenya and the ICC

Kenya's case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) is also one of the instances where CGTN reinforced an African identity through the legacy of colonialism. This was manifested in the *Talk Africa* episode *Kenyan cases expose ICC soft underbelly*, which discussed the relationship between Africa and the ICC (CCTV 2013). The guests in the programme were two analysts: Dr David Hoile, Director of the Africa Research Centre and author of the book *ICC: Europe's Guantanamo Bay?* and Dr David Matsanga, an analyst at African Political Affairs. The programme was set within the context of the summit attended by African heads of state to discuss the ICC's case against the Kenyan president and his deputy.

African solidarity was expressed by exposing the weaknesses of the ICC and discrediting the institution for deliberately targeting African leaders. This is achieved by strategies of scapegoating and victim–agent reversal, where the West is seen to be unfair, victimising and dominating Africans, as indicated in the excerpts.

- **David Hoile:** The court is *not independent* … It's not independent. It says it's an international court but in fact, *it's a European-funded, European-driven entity*. The ICC is in fact *an instrument of EU foreign policy*. It's been *prostituted to Western interests*, and on top of that, it's *not a functional court*.

The issue is that the ICC is not what it said it was. The *ICC is a selective European court for Africa, and Africa only*. It's not even a real court in that sense.

The guests in the programme sought to create solidarity and a sense of unity among African countries by framing the issue as a continental one that affected not only Kenya, but all African countries. This supported their argument that African countries should terminate their relationship with the ICC, as well as the case for African solutions to African problems.

- **David Matsanga:** *The continent of Africa* needs a decision.
- **David Hoile:** The ICC does not respect the recommendations *of the AU*.

The West and the ICC are also constructed as a common enemy of African countries, to support the argument that the ICC was unfair. Divisions are created between Africa on one hand, and the West and ICC on the other (Us/Them), where Western countries and the ICC are viewed negatively and acting against Africa. A recurring theme was that Africa was not respected, and was dominated by the ICC and its Western partners.

- **Presenter**: *The ICC hasn't listened before*. Africa has made a request before UN Security Council and has been ignored. Will the ICC listen this time round?
- **David Matsanga**: *The ICC does not respect the recommendations of the AU*.
- **Louise Mushikiwabo** (Foreign Minister, Rwanda): Most of us here are looking for *respect for Africa*.
- **David Matsanga**: …There is a *very arrogant condescending* on the part of the ICC. This has its root in that it is an EU entity.

These statements justify Africa's withdrawal from the ICC, support for African solutions such as the African Court and increased engagement with non-Western countries.

China and other BRICS member states are seen by guests as an alternative to Western aid, which is conditional upon human rights and democracy. The development and economic models in countries such as China are a source of attraction for Africa and therefore a source of soft power, as opposed to traditional sources such as political

values and culture. Thus, CGTN's strategy was to align Africa in relation to emerging global powers such as the BRICS countries, and away from the West, and to frame its relationship with Africa as a shift from dependency to partnership. This is also evident in the excerpt below, where a new funding model for the AU is advocated to replace foreign funding by donors and their allies that are largely from the West (Ekott 2017). By labelling the BRICS members as friends, it is implied that Western donors are enemies.

- **David Matsanga**: The problem is with funding. For funding, we have to look at the same EU countries, therefore they'll frustrate the funding. *African countries should come up with a solution*. Go to friends, go to *China*, go to Russia, Brazil, or some other country … leaders to listen and they must look for some other alternatives other that the EU which *ties aid to your human rights record.*

Nevertheless, these discourses do not necessarily support a self-reliant Africa; instead the comparisons between Chinese and Western approaches simply replaces the West as a source of aid with China and other rising powers.

South–South solutions to problems in Africa are a recurring theme in CGTN's coverage, as indicated in other chapters. This view is also consisted with China's unconditional aid policy for African leaders. It is this type of developmental discourse that will help China win the hearts and minds of African audiences, particularly if it is articulated by African actors.

Furthermore, the colonial legacy is manifested through metaphors of dominance and control to articulate the continued power of former European colonies such as France. In the comments below, David Matsanga refers to this control as the 'lock and key' that is used by the EU to 'tame' Africa.

- **David Matsanga**: … it's because that … they want to *tame Africa* under that *lock and key* of the ICC.

Furthermore, in response to the presenter's question about whether there is consensus among African states, Matsanga uses the metaphor 'calling the shots' to refer to the

control of the ICC by the French government, and suggests this as the reason for the lack of consensus by former French colonies such as Mauritius.

- **David Matsanga:** Let me be frank here, one of the countries that has got a programme with the ICC is the French, they pay from the porter who cleans the toilet up to the judge, *so they're calling the shots*. So that's why you see countries in Africa that are French-based like Mauritius, that are saying we must wait.

Although these arguments are made by the guests, the channel was also complicit and legitimised the discourses by its selection of studio guests and the manner in which the presenter mediated the discussion. Firstly, the title of the episode, *Kenyan cases expose ICC soft underbelly*, reflects the channel's viewpoint explicitly and suggests that the ICC has weaknesses that are being exposed by the Kenyan cases. This discredits the arguments in favour of the ICC before the discussion even starts. It is also noteworthy that CGTN's title is different from AJE's in a similar discussion. AJE's title was, *Is the ICC racist?*, which is framed as a question to be debated (South2North 2013). To sum up the key points of the discussion, the channel uses sub-headings such as *ICC on trial* on the screen that again illustrates CGTN's opinion that the ICC is on the wrong side of the law.

Secondly, the discussion of the issue did not accommodate alternative perspectives in its selection of studio guests or interviewees. Both analysts who participated in the discussion had the same views and used post-colonialism and pan-Africanism to construct Africa as a victim of Western exploitation. The reporter who filed the report at the summit also interviewed the foreign ministers of Kenya and Rwanda, who are supporters of Kenya.

Alternative perspectives could have been explored during the interview with the guests, but the manner in which the presenter mediated the discussion failed to adequately address them. Explaining the construction of identities and relations in media texts, Fairclough points out that media reporters are themselves constructed through media texts into different identities, which may range from being a facilitator to an expert, to

an entertainer. Through their role in managing the diversity of voices, they can contain, frame and order voices hierarchically (Fairclough 1995). This, Fairclough notes, is linked to the communicative style in broadcasting that arises from pressures of democratising, legitimising or marketising social relations (Fairclough 1995). These roles impact on media construction of identities as they are linked to relations of power within both the context of the programme and in broader society. During this discussion, the presenter did not raise discourses related to human rights, such as issues of impunity and justice for the victims, which form the foundation of the ICC's work. While she brought up Anglophone and Francophone divisions, the differences of opinion among member states was not clarified but remained ambiguous, even though these divisions are mentioned and alluded to in the background report and by one of the guests as indicated below.

- **Reporter:** … But as the executive burnt the midnight oil, it was clear that this was not to be, with *strong divisions between Anglophone and Francophone over the issue.*
- **David Matsanga:** So that's why you see countries in Africa that are *French-based like Mauritius, that are saying we must wait*

Furthermore, comments from the Rwandan foreign affairs minister that 'Most of us here are looking for respect for Africa' indicate that not everyone agreed, and others were looking for something else, but the views of those who are excluded by the 'us' are not explored. The views of the 'French-based countries…who say we must wait' are also not solicited.

This treatment of different discourses was hardly surprising given that the ICC cases being discussed relate to Kenya, and there is a sense that the channel does not want to be critical of the country that hosts it. The cautious tone of the channel as indicated below is an attempt by the presenter to explore issues of impunity, which is a key theme in discourses of human rights and justice, and the reason behind the establishment of the ICC. She refers to 'rogue leaders' but, to avoid its association with Kenya, she clarifies that this term is used by the West.

- **Presenter**: Is there no concern though as Africa is seeking full immunity for heads of states to be free from prosecution? Is there no opportunity for *'rogue leaders' – so to call them as they have been called by the West,* that they may take advantage?

CGTN is also selective in communicating the outcome of the summit, framing it in favour of the Kenyan position (not to prosecute sitting heads of states) and using exaggeration: 'unanimously agreeing' as opposed to the outcome on whether countries agreed to withdraw or not.

- **Reporter:** UN Sec Gen Ban Ki-Moon is said to have called each of the presidents at the meeting to persuade them against the withdrawal, promising to use his position at the state party's forum to address the concerns raised. Members were however *unanimous in agreeing* that the ICC should not prosecute sitting presidents.

This assertion is in contrast to eNCA's coverage after the summit, where the outcome was framed differently: *'African leaders voted to remain within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but not without demanding reforms of the world's court'* (Maroleng 2013).

CGTN also focused on state actors as opposed to individuals and their rights. In her statement below, the presenter refers to options for Africa's voice to be heard, as opposed to justice to be served. Based on the context of the discussion about African leaders who are ignored and not heard by the ICC, we can deduce that the Africans referred to in this statement are African leaders and not the public or individual victims.

- **Presenter:** In terms of options, does Africa have other options to ensure its voice is heard?

The choice of words by the guests also indicates a lack of a human-rights approach. The guests refer to 'redemption' as opposed to using human rights terms such as 'justice'.

- **David Matsanga:** Africa needs a *redemption strategy* on the ground, e.g. in Kenya we charge people on a local mechanism, so that there is no need of an outside interference.

Avoiding the human rights discourse is a reflection of CGTN's role as a state broadcaster, as it stays away from issues that are sensitive for the Chinese government.

The statements above, particularly the difference in opinion between Anglophone and Francophone countries, also indicate that the concept of a united Africa and the foundations of an African identity are contested. They also raise questions about what it means to be part of an African collective. While the colonial experience and common challenges are a strong foundation that creates a sense of belonging, they can also be divisive as they may not resonate with the other sub-identities or communities that African countries identify with.

Homogenous African audiences

Another strategy to create African belonging and identity is by reference to 'Africa' and a common history that also assumes that the countries are homogenous. As a result, the success or failure of one country is viewed as a success/failure for the entire continent. Framing African countries as a homogenous entity demonstrates that audience constructions are also influenced by universal media values, and may also be contradictory.[20] One of the criticisms of Western media, particularly media imperialism, is its conception of African countries as homogenous, ignoring the national context that is important in understanding how events occur, especially coverage of conflict and disease. This has given rise to negative stereotypes about the continent as diseased and war-ridden. While non-Western channels have unique constructions of African audiences, they also draw on traditional discourses about Africa not only to align to professional media values, but also as a strategy to legitimise dominant discourses and African initiatives such as the 'African solutions to African problems' rhetoric and

[20] Coverage of conflict demonstrated deviations from traditional constructions of Africa as helpless.

continental integration. Homogeneity is also applied more where issues are positive, particularly economic growth in Africa, which is a success story. For example, one might argue that in the recent media coverage of the Ebola virus, some channels made a concerted attempt to clarify that the virus does not affect the entire continent, but only certain countries in West Africa (Bajekal 2014; Dixon 2018).

Nevertheless, the pan-African identity was also challenged by alternative discourses that highlighted the challenges to pan-African integration initiatives such as the intra-Africa trade agreement that was signed in 2015 in Egypt. In the *Talk Africa* programme *Tripartite Free Trade Area from Cairo to Cape Town (TFTA),* CGTN debated the feasibility of a free trade area in Africa and highlighted challenges to implementing the agreement, as shown in the extract below.

Extract 7: Talk Africa –Tripartite free trade area from Cairo to Cape Town

- **Presenter:** … the agreement has not been immune to criticism. Greater regional integration has faced well-documented problems in the past including *infrastructural barriers and border post delays*.
- **Presenter:** Economic experts caution that there's still much to do before the dream becomes a reality.
- **Reporter:** Intra-Africa trade is only 12%. Can the bloc be expected to function with such *low levels,* and how can this be improved?
- **Marc Schoeman** (economic analyst): It's a significant achievement, but *we must be sceptical about celebrating the benefits* of the agreement too early.

Some economic analysts were sceptical about the agreement and highlighted differences among countries in Africa, such as language barriers and systems of government. This discussion demonstrates that Africa's colonial history is both a unifying and a divisive factor. Depending on their colonial experience, African countries have developed languages and systems that are different to each other. For example, some countries in North Africa use Arabic, and identify more with the Arab world than with sub-Saharan Africa. Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries also use the languages of their former colonies, and their tax regimes differ. Guests also argued that even within

regional trading blocs, countries are not completely united, and therefore unity across all 54 states will be a major challenge.

- **Bismarck Rewane** (economic analyst)**:** It is a very elegant concept that will take a long time to accomplish. Nigeria's GDP is 35% of Africa's GDP, *if Nigeria is out of the agreement; any African economic story without Nigeria is incomplete.*

Eventually, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) was signed by 44 members of the AU in 2018, and Nigeria was among countries that did not sign (AU 2018).

7.1.3 Audiences with liberal values

Democracy

Extract 8: Elections in Egypt

The elections in Egypt were one of the frequently covered topics on all three channels. CGTN coverage emphasised democratic principles of good governance, transparency, equality and citizen participation. This was evident in the description of how democratic elections were conducted, with former President, Mohammed Morsi described as a 'democratically-elected president'.

Liberal democracy was also framed as a process that was not only driven by the state, but also citizens and civil society, who were encouraged to actively participate. These discourses are not new but characteristic of political discussions about Africa in the media and other spheres of public life, which tend to feature some of the following themes:

- How democracy is or should be conducted

- Comparisons of democracy in Western and African societies, with some particularly arguing for a model of democracy centred on African values and culture

- The struggle for democracy

However, what is significant about CGTN's discourse on liberal democracy is that it is not characteristic of a Chinese state broadcaster (liberal values or democracy are uncharacteristic of China). China has been criticised in the West for its controversial human rights and democracy record, which is reflected domestically in its pro-government coverage and press censorship. However, to foreign audiences CGTN seems to maintain a pro-democratic stance (BBC 2016).[21] To remain globally competitive and win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, CGTN needs to balance its state and market interests. Below is a discussion of how CGTN programming constructs a liberal African audience.

Democracy is exercised through elections, which legitimise the elected government. Free and fair elections therefore tend to be a dominant discourse in electoral coverage, especially in countries where democracy levels are considered low. The extent to which elections are free and fair then becomes a benchmark for rating the democracy level of a country**.** Anyanwu (2012) notes:

The symbol of democracy is the ballot box. Discussions on 'democracy in Africa' in this tradition mainly concern the issue of implementation and result in a rich harvest of studies informing the reader about which countries have turned towards democracy, which are in the process of doing so and which lag behind. The frequently used metaphors depict democracy as something that has to 'grow', 'take root', 'come to full flowering' and 'bear fruit' (Anyanwu 2012: 99)

Throughout the report, the presenter highlights the possible low voter turnout, and interviewees urge citizens to vote. Liberal values are used to support the argument that the elections will bring democracy to Egypt, as seen in the address to the nation by the

[21] A Chinese columnist disappeared after being linked to a letter that was published on the online website, China Digital Times, calling for President Xi to resign. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35828918

Interim President Adly Mansour, who describes voting as ‘an expression of a free choice’ and states:

- **Adly Mansour**: … *in expressing our free choice*, to choose without any form of guidance or direction, the candidate who you trust and are convinced is capable of building and leading the country.

Mansour also discredits Mohammed Morsi’s presidency as ‘an oppressive and failed regime’ and uses fear to highlight the consequences of not voting:

- **Adly Mansour:** Those who refrain from participation in the political process will allow those who do not consider their interests to rule over them.

National identity is also employed to construct audiences as members of the Egyptian nation and religious. This is achieved through the forms of address where solidarity pronouns are used to unite people and create a sense of belonging as Egyptians. Mansour addresses the audience as *us*, *we* and expresses how they should be united as Egyptian to legitimise the ousting of Mohammed Morsi, as indicated in Mansour’s statements below. Identity usage creates unity and belonging by differentiating one group from another. In this case, the Egyptians are urged to unite against the whole world, of which they are not a part – in this context. The audience is therefore imagined as Egyptians with a belief in the liberal value of freedom of choice.

- **Adly Mansour:** Let *us all* participate tomorrow, and the day after too, in expressing *our* free choice, to choose *without any form of guidance or direction*, the candidate who *you trust* and are convinced is capable of building and leading the country.

Let *us* prove to ourselves and *to the whole world* that what Egypt has witnessed was not a temporary disturbance that aims to overthrown *an oppressive or failed regime*, but a truly popular and comprehensive and mature revolution that aims to succeed and build.

The vote is also seen as an individual choice that has not been influenced by others, a principle of democracy and its individualistic values. The interim president also uses the term 'God willing' to resonate with the religious beliefs of Egyptians.

To reinforce the interim president's statements and legitimise a democratic electoral process, the reporter also interviews an ordinary man in the street who states that the elections will bring peace and development to Egypt.

- **Street interviewee:** I will vote because that's the *only way we can move the country forward and develop ourselves*.

The participation of citizens in the electoral process is a key characteristic of democracy, as liberalism requires that they also agree on 'procedures of democracy' to legitimise the process and decisions made (Bühlmann, Merkel & Wessels 2007: 6). Given the violence and attacks that have taken place in Egypt since the revolution, the discourse on terrorism is also used to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood government and instil fear in the population. The current military government is then seen as peace-loving and committed to building a successful government by protecting society against militants.

Human rights

Two political stories that received prominent coverage on both CGTN Africa and AJE in 2016 were conflicts in South Sudan and Gabon. The report on the deployment of troops in South Sudan was featured prominently on 1 and 3 September when the UN Security Council Delegation visited South Sudan.

Extract 9: Conflict in South Sudan

The CGTN report was first aired on 1 September and was included in the headlines, indicating its prominence. CGTN coverage provided a more detailed analysis that lasted for six minutes, compared to AJE where it only lasted half that time.

Coverage of the story drew on previous discourses of African solutions to African problems and framed the intervention of Western actors, particularly the US, in South Sudan as motivated by Western interests.

The report initially focused on the visit by the UN Security Council delegation and disagreement between the UN and South Sudan, but while the presenter and reporters provided the viewpoints of both parties, there were no interviewees representing the UN or any viewpoint in favour of the deployment. The interviews were with the South Sudanese Information Minister Michael Mei, and a political analyst who was against the deployment. Further analysis of the story was provided by a CGTN correspondent in New York.

The channel applies various strategies to focus more on the disagreement between the UN and the South Sudan government, and in doing so, diverts attention from allegations that South Sudanese government soldiers are committing atrocities against civilians with impunity. This is evident in the introduction, where the presenter quotes what the UN says and what the government says. The use of the term 'convince' also indicates that each side has different views.

- **Presenter:** Delegates from the UN Security Council are due in South Sudan on Friday. They're going to discuss the deployment of an additional 4000 peacekeepers to the country. However, Sal Bakir's government is hoping to convince the UN to scrap the plan.
- **Presenter:** … The events of recent weeks have been well documented. Hundreds killed, here in the capital and elsewhere ... The UN regional body IGAD says more peacekeepers are needed to stabilise the country. The government says all is peaceful and it's weary of the peace-keeper resolution.

The statement above also demonstrates how the passive voice, 'killed', is used so that no specific group or individual is blamed for the killings.

The presenter's line of questioning also focuses on the divisions within the opposition party, which attributes guilt to power struggles within the opposition party and not the

government. These divisions are first highlighted by the political analyst Andrea Mabior, when he states in his interview that the UN should focus its attention on the legitimate leader of the opposition.

In her interview with the correspondent, the presenter asks about the role of the former vice-president Riek Marchar in the peace agreement, implying that the opposition party has a role to play in maintaining peace and in the fighting that is currently taking place in the country.

- **Presenter**: Do we know what the Security Council's position on the role of the former Vice President Riak Machar's implementation of that peace agreement, especially considering concerns raised in the past over the appointment of Dengai?

The commentary by the correspondent reflects how discursive domains shape discourses and the participation of actors. Montgomery (2007) points out that the broadcast news domain and practices are characterised by the differing roles of the news presenter and the correspondent or editor. The tight script of the presenter is highly structured to ensure it focuses on official opinion and is vetted to conform to legal requirements and accommodate time constraints, which leaves less room for unofficial commentary. The correspondent, on the other hand, has a loose script which allows them to improvise and include additional commentary of their own which, due to time constraints, is not fully checked; this leads to a less structured discourse (Montgomery 2007).

While CGTN and the government representatives interviewed articulated their disagreement about the deployment, they responded cautiously rather than with strong rhetoric and aggression, which might indicate that they are conscious of threats from the US to withdraw aid, and the role of government soldiers in the killings. While there are reports that the deployment is labelled by some government officials as a form of colonialism on both CGTN and AJE, this report does not provide direct quotes or use discourses on colonialism/post-colonialism, which has been the case on CGTN previously. This lack of confrontation can be linked to China's change in foreign policy

where, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its peace and security role in the continent, it can no longer ignore human rights and human suffering, and needs to increasingly support the UN security mandate.

Furthermore, the report states that there are divisions within South Sudan, but these are quoted indirectly rather than explicit. As indicated in the statements below by the presenter and CGTN's correspondent, the report refers broadly to South Sudanese, and officials in the leadership.

- **Presenter:** South Sudanese are divided on whether the United Nations security resolution deployment of additional 4000 troops in Juba …
- **New York correspondent:** We've heard that there are officials in the leadership who have rejected this and say it is like a new form of colonialism, but there is still a possibility that this could happen.

Another strategy to argue against the deployment of troops and avoid allegations of government's involvement in the killing of civilians is the focus on US interests. The correspondent argues that the deployment is motivated by US interests in South Sudan.

- **Presenter**: The other concern is that the visit comes in the wake of the brutal attack in July in which foreign aid workers were targeted, especially American foreign aid workers, and this is something that the US is of course concerned about. It wants to go to the ground and see, and get a sense of anti-foreign, especially anti-American, sentiment.
- **New York correspondent**: Of course, as we know the US is a major stakeholder in the future of South Sudan – it was the biggest endorser of South Sudan's independence, and it is also reportedly one of the biggest contributors of foreign aid to South Sudan, and has threatened to withdraw that financial assistance if South Sudan does not take concrete measures, concrete real steps towards peace.

One of the themes of the humanitarian discourse is conditional aid packages, where assistance is withdrawn if developing countries do not follow actions specified by the

donors. This is an area where China's no-strings-attached aid packages have a competitive advantage, and in the commentary above the correspondent draws on this discourse to reinforce her argument.

The CGTN correspondent further frames the issue as a fact-finding mission, which does not address the allegations that government troops are involved in killing civilians. This shifts focus away from government's role.

- **New York correspondent**: So, there are a lot of questions that the Security Council wants answered during this visit.

Other reports on the deployment of troops in South Sudan also drew on similar discourses, with the same interviewees commenting. However, a new theme was evident in the report on 3 September, reflecting China's importance as a new superpower. After the announcement that South Sudan had agreed to the deployment of additional troops, the presenter adds that the decision was welcomed by both the US and China, which underscores China's position in the same league as the US, and the importance of its reaction.

The analysis also mirror CGTN's economic news agenda. In its *Business News* section, the channel constructed a modern and progressive continent driven by business activity and social development. The audience for this content is therefore constructed as business-oriented investors and consumers with an interest in the performance of the markets, profits and key economic trends and their impact not just on Africa but globally.

China's discourse on neoliberalism continued in 2016 and is linked to broader discourses on globalisation beyond the media, as demonstrated in Chinese leaders' rhetoric and international engagement. During the World Economic Forum in February 2017, President Xi Jinping championed globalisation and liberal policies, at a time when protectionism and nationalistic discourse gained prominence in the West. According to Xi, 'It is true that economic globalisation has created new problems. But this is no justification to write off economic globalisation altogether. Rather we should

adapt to and guide globalisation, cushion its negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations' (Xi 2017: n.p.).

7.1.4 Evolving China–Africa relations

Between 2014 and 2015, discourse on CGTN Africa was dominated by the Africa Rising narrative and economic opportunities, particularly in extractive industries, with very little coverage or even mention of China. However, while the discourse on African solutions and progress in Africa continued through 2016, there was emphasis on the deepening of the China-Africa relationship. This was characterised by the key message that China was not exploiting Africa but was beneficial to the continent, which was evident in increased mentions of China and its role in the rise of Africa. Previous research also shows low positive self-reporting on China by CGTN Africa (Gagliardone 2013). However, this approach changed in 2016 from a low profile on China to assertive positive reporting by highlighting tangible results to demonstrate that its engagement in Africa was mutually beneficial. The construction of African audiences will therefore always be in flux, in response to evolving relations.

What was also remarkable in the 2016 discourse was the intensity of public and cultural diplomacy efforts by China, which extended beyond formal state and institutional interaction to public engagement with African people – individuals and people at community level. CGTN's strategy in 2016 therefore indicates China's increasing confidence in its place in the world, evidenced by the assertive projection of its international image.

This shift in discourse was most prominent on CGTN's two special segments that were introduced in daily prime news: *Fruits of Cooperation* and *60 years of Sino–Africa Friendship*. Both features highlighted the benefits of the relationship through key initiatives driven by China. These initiatives are key to the FOCAC action plan announced in 2015 and the 2018 Beijing Declaration, which include increased industrialisation of Africa, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, trade, people-to-people exchanges, peace and security, public health and skills development (FOCAC 2015, 2018).

I therefore use the two segments to illustrate the dominant discourses and how audiences were constructed as a result.

Fruits of Cooperation

Fruits of Cooperation demonstrated how Chinese engagement in Africa was beneficial to economic and social development. Coverage highlighted several initiatives that were driven by China in various sectors, such as FDI investment, humanitarian aid, health, agriculture and the media. My analysis focuses on the reports listed below, demonstrating the conception of audiences as beneficiaries of China's assistance and friends of China[22]. These conceptions were shaped by discourses on the mutually beneficial partnership between Africa and China, and humanitarianism as I demonstrate through the following reports:

- Providing humanitarian assistance to Africa by providing aid to areas affected
- China's boost to agricultural production in Zambia
- Eastern Industrial Development Zones and Egypt's Suez economy
- Mombasa–Nairobi railway

Extract 10: Industrial Development Zones – Eastern Industrial Zone and Egypt's Suez economy

The report focused on China's key role in the continent's industrialisation, one of the priority areas of FOCAC, by attracting investment from China into Africa and improving local economies. As indicated in the statements below, this was manifested by descriptions of the value of the investments and explicit figures of the returns.

In the statement below, the president of one of the companies that invested in the zone gives the number of jobs created, and points out that the company takes care of the workers (benefit to Africa) and in turn remains profitable (benefit to China).

[22] See Appendix 1 for full details of the episodes and reports cited

- **Zhang Huarong,** President, Huajian Group**:** The biggest achievement is 4 000 people working, they have stable incomes and three meals a day. They have no problem getting to work and back – we take care of that. The company is profitable.
- **Narrator:** Some *30 enterprises* with a combined investment of *US$460 million* and created *2000 jobs*.

Furthermore, the China–Africa cooperation is described as a 'two-way traffic' where African companies also invest in China. The report goes on to cite examples of African multinationals that have successfully partnered with Chinese companies such as Snowcape beer and Tencent, highlighting the value of the investments to illustrate the benefits to Africa. This justifies the argument that China does not just want to exploit Africa, but has equally opened its markets to African investment. Audiences are thus conceptualised as equal partners since they can also invest in China.

- **Narrator:** China–Africa economic cooperation is very much a two-way traffic. While China's enterprises have been entering Africa's market, so African countries have been investing in China, e.g. SAB Miller, the second largest brewery in the world *owns a 49% stake in China's Snowcape beer*. Naspers owns a *stake in Tencent Holding worth US$66 billion* which demonstrates successful investment by a foreign media company in China.

The rhetoric on mutual benefits is also reinforced by African leaders to lend credibility to the argument that all parties are benefitting from the China–Africa relationship. The Ethiopian Minister of Industry, Ahmed Abtew confirms the country's plan to seek Chinese investment, which demonstrates that Chinese investment is providing much-needed FDI investment and is not imposed on African countries.

- **Ahmed Abtew**: In our planning, we give a substantial focus to attract FDI, especially from China.

In a similar report about China's agricultural projects in Zambia and Malawi, Given Lubinda, the Zambian Minister of Agriculture, reiterates mutual benefits to both parties by describing Chinese assistance as a partnership:

First, I want to thank the Chinese government for *partnering* with the University of Zambia … *China is not taking anything through this centre to plough to China*. Instead, *they're bringing skills* which are being used in Zambia. I expect that this centre will play a very significant role in agricultural development of Zambia (Lubinda 2016).

These agricultural projects not only demonstrate China's role in Africa's development, but reinforce China's strategic approach on human issues such as human security and sustainable development as opposed to economic. China is also diversifying its interests beyond extractive industries to other sectors. Over the years, China's foreign policy has evolved, which has also impacted its engagement in Africa and media discourse. One of the shifts is its policy of non-interference in the politics of the host countries. However, as a growing world power, it has become imperative to balance its traditional approach with international norms such as human rights, peace and security, while also protecting its interests (Dittgen 2016; Parenti 2009). Secondly, as its involvement in Africa has deepened, its investment and personnel in the continent have increased over the years. In this regard, it can no longer ignore human rights and security problems in African states such as Sudan at the expense of economic gain. Dittgen et al (2016) point out that to become a responsible great power, China is playing a norm-setting role globally, which has seen it become actively involved in peace and security in Africa.

The positioning of CGTN as a global player has implications for its strategy to win the hearts and minds of African audiences, and it is imperative that this global outlook is reflected in the channel's discourses. As a result, African audiences are imagined as global in their orientation, subscribing to global norms. This aligns with the global orientation of the relaunched channel, which indicates that CGTN is also reaching out to audiences beyond Africa.

The discourses in the report were also evident in other programmes within CGTN, and external discourses within FOCAC, such as the coverage of the second Investing in

Africa Summit in China, where Chinese investment in Africa is framed as mutually beneficial for both Africa and China as demonstrated.

The rhetoric of mutual benefits is also used by African leaders who refer to the cooperative agreements between China and Africa as partnerships, which implies equality and benefits to both parties (Kenyatta 2015; FOCAC 2015). In his interview with the BBC, the Kenyan president also described China's partnership as 'mutually beneficial' and 'win-win' (Kenyatta 2018).

Furthermore, the *Fruits of cooperation* series focused on key priorities of the FOCAC action plan. These include investment, humanitarian aid, capacity building and human security. Reports on these initiatives were primarily informed by discourses on humanitarian aid, which are largely associated with the international development field, China's peaceful rise and concepts of a harmonious Chinese society and world. These discourses were used as predication and argumentation strategies to place China and its activities in Africa in a positive light and validate claims that China was not exploiting Africa but was committed to its development, even when there was no economic gain. The extracts below highlight how these discourses were used to construct African audiences as beneficiaries of China's assistance and friends of China.

Extract 11: How China has helped alleviate a humanitarian crisis in Africa by providing aid and capacity to the areas affected

This report focused on two initiatives in which China was providing humanitarian and development assistance to African countries. These included relief aid in disaster areas and the construction of a railway line in Kenya.

In the first initiative, relief aid, China and Africa are the dominant actors as subjects of the report and addressed as such, as well as collectively as 'Chinese, Chinese enterprises, Africa, African countries, a country and countries'. Proper names are used to refer to President Xi and the deputy prime minister, which emphasises their importance as political leaders. African actors as active participants in the humanitarian

crisis are absent from the report, and only imagined as beneficiaries of China's generous assistance.

As indicated elsewhere, the use of collective labels such as 'Africa' and 'African countries' indicates the conception of African countries as homogenous, with similar development challenges. Although the narrator also refers to 'affected countries' or 'a country in need', these countries are not specified. The humanitarian situations are therefore constructed as events that affect all countries in Africa, demanding uniformity in China's response irrespective of the country.

Nomination strategies are employed in the report to construct China's assistance to African countries as humanitarian aid. This is achieved by positioning the events and China's actions as 'a humanitarian crisis in Africa', 'a need', 'disaster' and 'emergency food aid'. China's actions are also described as 'providing aid and capacity to the areas affected', which emanate from discourses on international development.

CGTN therefore draws on traditional humanitarian paradigms from the international development domain where African countries are constructed as homogenous (one big country), non-distinctive and affected by disasters and in need of external assistance from the international community. Developed countries, and now China, are considered saviours.

Predication is a strategy that relies on stereotypes and evaluative attributes to portray actors, events and processes in a positive or negative light (Wodak & Meyer 2009). The description of China's actions as humanitarian also presents China's reaction and efforts positively and counters criticism of its exploitation of the continent. As indicated below, China is described as 'a dependable friend of Africa', and further arguments are employed to support these claims.

- **Narrator:** China has proved itself to be a *dependable friend of Africa*. Whenever a country is in need, China provides *timely and effective assistance.*

In 2011 when disaster struck the horn of Africa, China provided *400 000 grams of grain and cash* as emergency aid.

In 2015 when Africa suffered from El Nino … At the Johannesburg China–Africa Forum, the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would send emergency food aid *worth RMB 1 million* to affected countries. Jan 2016, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi provided details about the aid. *In the same month* the first consignment was dispatched.

Chinese enterprises in Africa are active in the community. They help protect the environment, donate money so children could go to schools, build roads and hospitals.

Furthermore, China's implementation of humanitarian aid is described as timeous and efficient, and is highlighted numerically with timelines of the implementation process in 2011 and 2015. The timeous action is also highlighted in the phrase 'in the same month', implying that China acted very quickly. China's quick reaction presupposes that China's approach to humanitarian aid is faster than traditional Western approaches, which take months to implement. These actions act as proof of China's role of providing 'concrete plans' to assist Africa to resolve its problems, as indicated in the follow-up actions of the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC (FOCAC 2012).

China is also constructed positively through the rhetorical device of extreme case formulation to produce facts that demonstrate the impact of China's aid package. Extreme case formulation draws attention to the significance of a claim to justify a position (Wodak & Meyer 2009). In this case, the numeric values of the aid package are cited in grams, i.e. '400 000' grams, which produces a large number to demonstrate the significance of the impact and assistance provided.

The report goes on to feature a second initiative, the Mombasa–Kenya railway, as another example of how a Chinese project is helping communities. This time, the focus is on the social and environmental benefits of the project. The same discursive strategies are used to support the positive benefits of China's relationship with Africa and construct audiences as friends of China and as a community facing similar economic challenges. In the same way as the humanitarian crisis, the report positions China as a responsible superpower that is mindful of the environmental impact of its initiatives in Africa, and reinforces its friendship with the communities in the area.

In this example, the primary actors are Chinese and Kenyan institutions involved in the project, such as the China Road and Bridge Cooperation and Kenya Wildlife Service. Others are described collectively, such as 'Chinese, Chinese builders, Chinese enterprises, Kenyan, local community, our people'. Compared to other reports, the presence of ordinary citizens is made manifest in descriptions of 'local community' by both the narrator and in an interview with the village chief, who is addressed by his first name, Jacob. These collective addresses are aligned to China's people-to-people approach to its relationship with Africa. By referring to the area affected by the railway construction as a 'local community', and as 'Kenyan', the narrator of the report imagines the audience as part of a local and national community. While they are members of a local village united by the environmental impact on their community, they also belong to the Kenyan nation. Nevertheless, the manner in which the report is ordered indicates that the participation of the local community is secondary to that of the officials who are named at the beginning of the report, such as the 'Chinese enterprises', 'Chinese builders' and the 'Kenya Wildlife Service'. Furthermore, members of the local community do not have the opportunity to share their perspective directly as the chief speaks on their behalf. They are backgrounded, constructed as beneficiaries who are able to improve their livelihoods through employment in Chinese businesses and the infrastructure projects that their countries invest in. Reference to Kenyan authorities and local communities further indicates the role of African actors in Chinese engagement in the continent, albeit in a secondary role.

As China's activities in the continent increase, many Chinese nationals and organisations now live in Africa, and the report highlights their participation in African communities by 'donating to schools, helping to protect the environment, and building roads and hospitals'. While the integration of Chinese nationals in some African communities is mired in controversy and tension as highlighted in some media reports of abuse and racism against Africans (*Daily Nation* 2018; *The Star* 2018; Yusuf 2018), this report formulates the Chinese in Africa positively as friends, thereby constructing audiences also as friends of China. The report is therefore also linked to African media discourses among the public about increasing Chinese presence in Africa.

The benefits of the railway construction to the community are also emphasised through specific reference to the high number of jobs created, which are supported by authoritative global institutions, and validated directly by the chief who represents the community.

- **Narrator:** The railway project has created more than *30 000 jobs. World Bank stats show that 70%* of the directly employed workforce is Kenyan, and that the figure is *95%* for those employed indirectly.
- **Jacob:** We have the Chinese rail project here. *Our people* go and work there. … *Chinese bring us water because before we had no water near here,* but now our people now get water, near here. So, we're *so very happy* for the railway to come this way.

As in previous reports, the construction of the railway also reflects discourses of mutual benefit, the peaceful rise of China and the harmonious society promoted by China, which are supported by evidence of the benefits of the railway to Kenyans and the relationship between the Chinese and African communities. The construction is accompanied by images of Kenyan workers demonstrating the job benefits and skills transfer. These arguments further counteract negative perceptions about lack of skills transfer to African workers by Chinese corporations involved in African projects, thereby benefiting China only, as well as concerns about China's intentions in Africa (Bloom 2017). The involvement and support provided by African actors in the project demonstrates the conception of audiences as beneficiaries of Chinese activities and active participants in the Chinese presence in the continent.

The report is also compiled within the context of environmental concerns highlighted by lobby groups in Kenya. In April 2016, Phase 2 of the project was suspended by Kenya's Environmental Tribunal (Oirere 2016). The report's emphasis on China's due diligence to ensure compliance and high construction standards to protect the environment aims to counteract these negative perceptions and allay fears by constructing China as a responsible power with sound business practices that pays attention to environmental and social implications of the project, as indicated in the phrases emphasised in the extract below.

- **Narrator:** The Mombasa railway in construction is currently under construction. It will cut across parks and *protect natural environment*. The railway's Chinese builders made a *solemn promise* – that they will complete a *high-quality* project *without harming the environment.*

  In March 2016, the China Road and Bridge Cooperation published a report on the *fulfilment of its obligations* to the local community. This was the first such report ever produced by a Chinese enterprise outside China.

  The railway crosses over several migration routes i*dentified by the Kenya Wildlife Service to allow the wild animals to pass unhindered.* The railway has *14 passageways*, as well as *600 culverts* and *61 overhead bridges*. *Protective fences* are installed in parks *to stop wildlife from encroaching or being killed by passing trains*.

Concerns about China's environmental record have also been highlighted in other parts of Africa (Louw-Vaudran 2014; Bosshard 2008). Bosshard (2008) outlines projects in Angola, Sudan, DRC and Zambia where international environmental standards have not been followed. This links China's failure to adopt environmental standards to its economic priorities at the expense of the environment, as well as its integrated investment strategy of investing in areas with weak ecosystems that are environmentally risky.

China has also been associated with poor-quality products, and the description of the project as 'high-quality' is also part of a wider effort to change misconceptions (Tadesse 2017; Capital Business 2016).

Similar reports were also featured to highlight China's humanitarian work in helping solve some of the continent's problems. Such coverage illustrates CGTN's role as a platform to bolster China's international image through its engagement in Africa, by using African crises. It can also be considered a response to China's critics, motivated by its competition with the West, and as such constructing not only African but also international audiences. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in parts of West Africa was an

international crisis that presented an ideal opportunity for China to demonstrate its leadership as a global power and the nature of its engagement in Africa (Africa Live 2016).

Humanitarian coverage was also characterised by a comparison of assistance offered by the international community and by China. The actions of the international community, predominantly through Western donors and humanitarian agencies, are framed as limited, while China's aid is unconditional aid. While CGTN's intention was to highlight China positively, the result is that Africa is constructed stereotypically as a helpless victim. By framing China's role as a rescuer in the Ebola crisis, the report draws on traditional humanitarian discourses of Africa as a hopeless continent, unable to deal with its own problems and always dependent on external assistance (Africa Live 2016). This contradicts the narrative of Africa's rise and a continent that is solving its problems.

Nevertheless, China positions its role as one that is limited to that of an assistant, implying that it merely helps solve 'some of the serious issues' (but not all), and as supplementary (providing wisdom and concrete plans), as indicated in the extract below. In this way, Africa is still driving the solutions and China is providing additional assistance and is committed to the principle of African solutions to African problems. As the narrator points out, China's involvement in the peace process is 'at the request of African countries'. Below is an extract from the report.

Extract 12: China's involvement in helping to solve some of Africa's problems

- **Narrator:** China is working constructively to solve *some of the serious issues facing Africa. China offers wisdom and concrete plans while holding to the principle that Africa should solve her problems in her own way. At the request of African countries*, China's foreign ministry launched a special consultation on the peace process in South Sudan.

60 Years of Sino–Africa Friendship

The series, *60 years of Sino–Africa Friendship* focused more on cultural exchange between Chinese and Africans, featuring experiences of Chinese individuals living in Africa, and Africans living in China. The message conveyed by the segment, particularly its name, is that the friendship between China and Africa is not new as reflected in the activities of the individuals featured. Like the *Fruits of Cooperation* series, this feature also seeks to highlight the benefits of China–Africa relations by focusing on people. My analysis is based on the topics below, which demonstrate how African audiences are constructed as friends of China.

- Liu Hongwu: Cultural and Education Exchange
- Africans in China

Extract 13: Liu Hongwu – African art and culture in China

- **Narrator:** Over the past 60 years, the relationship between China and the African continent has become closer with many students studying in China, especially after 2000, when the China–Africa Forum was held. We saw Sino–Africa cooperation in education *starting to bear fruit*, with more students being encouraged to study in China to *realise their dreams.*

China's cultural diplomacy in Africa is driven through Confucius Institutes, as well as African institutions in China. These institutions are a vital part of China's strategy, which is increasingly focusing on ordinary people and communities. As Liu Hongwu, a Chinese researcher featured in the programme, states: 'Understanding the African culture makes it possible to better understand the political and economic realities we have with them. …To understand Africa, it was necessary to begin with a thorough study of its culture and civilization. The museum plays a key role in this.' (Africa Live 2016).

In the report, the narrator points out that the exchange of ideas and culture between China and Africa strengthens their voices on the international stage, which demonstrates that the two parties are allies.

The friendship between Chinese and Africans is demonstrated by photos of the researcher with African people from the countries he has visited (Fig. 33).



Figure 10: Liu Hongwu in African community

Extract 14: Africans in China – Nashiri Ramazani

The series also featured Africans living in China, to highlight their friendship despite different cultural backgrounds. One of these was a Burundian medical student. The footage from the report portrays the positive experience of this African student, who is well integrated in the Chinese community and has made friends with Chinese fellow students.

The report demonstrates the friendship arising from the cultural experience, stating that it has made the student look like the locals as shown in Figure 34.

- **Narrator:** After ten years in China, he's now almost like a Changchun native. When he speaks, it is difficult to distinguish between him and the local people.



Figure 11: Nashiri Ramazani with Chinese friends

This report is also characterised by the discourse on China's contribution to Africa's development by offering scholarships to African students to study in China. This has helped them realise their future dreams, which in turn contributes to the upliftment of their communities. When the report begins, the African student is constructed as an individual from humble beginnings who wanted to become a doctor, but did not have the opportunity to do so.

The student states how the absence of a doctor resulted in the death of his grandmother from a curable disease, endometriosis, motivated his desire to be a doctor. This context provides a background to poor health services in Africa, setting the tone for the justification of China's involvement and the significance of its contribution.

China then comes to the rescue to offer him a scholarship that improves his prospects by enabling him to get a qualification, which he will put into practice by opening a clinic to provide medical services in his community.

- **Narrator:** *Thanks to a scholarship from the Chinese government*, he was able to make his dream come true like the other *1 861 African* students who received the same scholarship in the same year.

- **Nashiri:** I am the first specialist doctor from my village. My goal is to return to the country, open a clinic and help my people. Without China, I would never be what I am today. I'll never forget China.

The significance of China's assistance is also highlighted in the high number of other scholarship beneficiaries.

To create a positive image of China, the comments from the African student presuppose that China stepped in to help when Western countries, despite their relationship with their former colonies, were not helpful, thus positioning China as a reliable friend as indicated below.

- **Nashiri:** We're a French-speaking country. We were supposed to go to France, Belgium, or another French-speaking country, but we didn't have this opportunity. It's China that gave us this opportunity.

7.1.5 Relationship between discourses

Intertextuality and interdiscursivity demonstrate the relationship between discourses across different programme genres, and broadly in other domains (Wodak & Riesgl 2009). In the case of CGTN, the discourses in the news were largely consistent with other programmes such as *Business News* and talk shows, as well as wider perspectives about China–Africa relations and international debates on Africa and its place in the world. This is well illustrated on the news reports on two international events that were held in China in 2016:

- Second Investing in Africa Summit – Guangzhou, China
- The G20 Summit

In 2016, China hosted two key international conferences – the G20 and the second Investing in Africa summits. Coverage of these events was instrumental in positioning China as the new global economic powerhouse, underscoring its role in Africa.

Excerpt 15: The G20 Summit

The relationship between China and Africa, and other parts of the world was also well reflected in CGTN's coverage of the G20 summit which received special coverage in the daily news bulletin.

While coverage focused on China's relationship with world leaders, African themes were dominated by the discourse of friendship between China and African countries, as well as China's role in their development. These themes were highlighted when President Xi met various leaders, as illustrated below:

- **Presenter**: Looking for a *comprehensive and friendly relationship*, this is a message that Chinese president has said to his South African counterpart.

China and Chad have seen an *all-round increase of ties* in recent years. President Xi said China encourages its businesses to invest in Chad, *to help the country develop sustainable growth*.

Given the focus of the summit on inclusiveness, coverage also focused on the inclusion of developing countries in global economic growth. While the discourse on economic growth has previously characterised CGTN Africa's reportage, the emphasis on 'inclusivity' is a new perspective aligned not only to the theme of the summit, but to China's broader discourse that increasingly advocates responsible globalisation, liberalisation and interdependence that is beneficial to all (Xi 2017). These discourses have also dominated international discussions on inequality and inclusive globalisation as reiterated by global leaders, including President Xi (Xi 2017; Byanyima 2017). Terms such as 'sustainability' and 'inclusiveness' are used to describe international trade and economic growth.

- **Presenter**: It could also be the source of huge source of demand for *sustainable development.*
- **President Xi Jinping***: ...* keep *opening up our economy*

In our 13th five-year plan, we've advocated development that is innovative, coordinated and open, and based on *sharing*.

This discourse was also reinforced by Chinese business leaders who were interviewed for the report. These include; Jack Ma**,** Chair, B20 SME Development Taskforce and Jiang Zengwei**,** Head, Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

- **Jack Ma:** People hate globalisation, but *globalisation should enable every individua*l, every small business …
- **Jiang Zengwei**:'It (international trade) is not only concerned with growth, but also the *wellbeing* of people around the world.

This discourse on globalisation was also evident in the *Business News* report on the second Investing in Africa summit, which highlighted China's interest in expanding globally and diversifying its investments as indicated in the statements by the narrator and Ma Kai, the Chinese Vice-Premier.

- **Correspondent**: Chinese businesses are eager to *tap into Africa's growing markets.* Investment in various sectors from agriculture, manufacturing.
- **Ma Kai**: We'll continue to encourage Chinese enterprises to *expand their investment in Africa* following the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, as well as sustainable development.

Extract 15: Second Investing in Africa summit – Guangzhou, China

The main actors in the discussions in both summits were official government and business actors from China and various African countries, who were interviewed and addressed by their full names and designations. The actors were also described collectively as officials, businessmen and investors.

The report framed Chinese actors as investors in Africa, while African actors were the beneficiaries of Chinese investment. Evidence of China's investment is also made explicit by quoting the large amounts the country has invested in Africa since 2000, and the conclusion of the report reiterates the impact of the summit in the form of the amount invested after the event.

Correspondent:

- ... opportunities to welcome *Chinese investors*
- *Increase in Chinese investment in Africa* from … many African countries want to speed up industrialisation and agricultural modernisation and *Chinese businesses are eager to tap into Africa's growing markets. Investment in various sectors* from agriculture, manufacturing
- After the summit companies from Guangzhou signed investment contracts with companies and governments from Africa for more than US$2.5 billion

Chinese companies also confirmed their role as investors, as Wang Yi, President of Winhope International Group, added:

- **Wang Yi:** This time we plan to invest in an automobile manufacturing plant in the DRC for over US$200 million.

The report featured only part of Wang Yi's speech, selecting only the comment above.

The role of Chinese and African actors is well summed up by Mathew George Maputa, the Congolese international relations officer, who states:

- **Mathew George Maputa:** the DRC needs buses, and China is earning from investment

Description of the summit as 'one of the biggest and arguably, the most influential events of the year for China–Africa business' is also another strategy to reinforce China's positive image and influence by hosting such an important event.

Furthermore, Chinese businesses are described as 'eager to tap into Africa's growing markets', while 'Africa is open for business'. These descriptions create friendly African audiences who will welcome Chinese investment and partner with the investors. On the other hand, Africa is also constructed as depending on China's investment to 'speed up industrialisation and agricultural modernisation', and as stated by Ma Kai, the Chinese Vice-Premier: 'Chinese investment aims to help African countries increase their

opportunities for improving the environment and improving their peoples' livelihood'. Evidence of these benefits is reinforced by images of various Chinese factories with African workers.

Once again, CGTN draws on discourses from the Western international development domain which characterise the relationship between Africa and the West in terms of the dependency of Africans on external assistance, as backward underdeveloped (not modern) societies, as indicated in the descriptions above. Africa's dependent status is also justified by outlining the amounts already invested by China since 2000, and the deals made during and after the summit, reinforced by African actors who articulate their need of China. These discourses are also reinforced by African officials featured in the report such as former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma and Matthew George Maputa, the Congolese International Relations Officer who expressed their need for Chinese business and transportation.

- **Jacob Zuma:** Africa is open for business and partnership with China.
- **Matthew George Maputa**: I'm here to get buses. So we *need to put buses on the road*. Most of the *transportation* is what is lacking.
- **Ma Kai**: We'll continue to encourage Chinese enterprises to expand their investment in Africa *following the principles of mutual-beneficial cooperation*, as well as sustainable development. *Chinese investment aims to help African countries* increase their opportunities for improving the environment and improving their peoples' livelihood.
- **Correspondent**: … many African countries want to speed up industrialisation and agricultural modernisation and Chinese businesses are eager to tap into Africa's growing markets and invest in various sectors from agriculture, manufacturing.

The comments above also reinforce the China–Africa discourse of a mutually beneficial friendship, where China's need for expansion meets Africa's needs for business, transportation and modernisation. Chinese presence in Africa is also welcomed by Africans, as the Correspondent indicates:

- **Correspondent:** … many officials and reps from African countries say they will create more opportunities to welcome Chinese investors in Africa.

This statement is contrary to claims of the exploitative relationship between Africa and China that is driven mostly by Chinese needs.

7.1.6 Power relations and structuring of discourses

Participants in the various discussions highlight the role of various actors involved in the construction of African audiences and the complexity of the process. These actors represent the interaction of various 'imagined worlds' and '-scapes', which when combined can be transformed or re-appropriated, leading to other ways of imagining (Appadurai 1996: 33). At the same time, their level of participation is not always equal, as they might bring different perspectives that compete for dominance.

Although discussions are mediated by CGTN, participants also have an opportunity to convey perspectives that reinforce existing discourses about Africa. Furthermore, while they bring an African perspective to the discussion, this can be combined with other discourses and perspectives from other guests to create new African audiences with certain interests and formations. An example is the creation of African audiences as politically active citizens, global and intellectual, as discussed above.

For example, in the episode about Africa's oil boom, alternative discourses from the natural resources industry, government or the private sector, are not represented. While the guests acknowledge the corruption of African leaders, Western exploitation remains the dominant discourse. New forms of exploiting African resources are not critically examined. Instead, the pre-formulation tactic is used to raise these alternative discourses; a possible argument about the role of African leadership. However, this argument is discounted by blaming the West for corruption by helping corrupt leaders hide stolen wealth. The excerpts below illustrate how the studio guests; Professor Codiaga, Director for the African Centre for International Studies and Professor Gutto, from the African Renaissance Institute acknowledge corruption and poor governance in

Africa, but blame it on financial institutions in the North for hiding the proceeds of corruption.

Extract 16: Talk Africa – Oil boom in Africa

- **Professor Codiaga:** … We have to right some of the wrongs: corruption, weak governance, capital flight, agreements must be mutually beneficial.
- **Professor Gutto:** …We regard many of the leaders as having been corrupt, some are still corrupt but where do they hide those resources – *in banks, financial institutions, real estate in the North*. Why is the North keeping the stolen wealth of people*?*

Alternative discourses are further discounted by highlighting positive aspects such as how African countries have dealt with corruption.

- **Presenter**: You talk about the leadership in Africa being problematic, but *we've seen positive examples in countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Malawi.*
- **Professor Gutto:** What was symbolic was that when the new leader in Malawi took over, she cut her salary and benefits and indicated that she cannot be swimming in wealth, when her people are not. That is a leader who is setting an example

One of the interviewees, Professor Gutto, raises a point about the 'scramble for Africa', and the ensuing discussion demonstrates the concept of power/knowledge in the construction of African audiences. In response to the statement about the scramble for Africa, the presenter makes reference to Hillary Clinton's comments. The extract from the discussion below, which also includes Hillary Clinton's comments, illustrates this point:

- **Professor Gutto**: … well, there are books now being written about *a new scramble for Africa,* that is the new image in the public domain and discourse, but Africa should not allow itself to fail and be looted continuously …

- **Presenter:** … you talk about a *new scramble for Africa*, and various Western powers have talked about this. Hilary Clinton was in Africa recently. Here's what she had to say on that matter:

'The days of having outsiders come and extract the wealth of Africa for themselves, leaving nothing or leaving very little behind, should be over in the 21st century' – Hillary Clinton

- **Professor Kodiaga:** Whatever Hillary is saying on the telly is not for purposes of addressing the problem, and we do know that *America has a hand in most of these conflicts in Africa*, look at the DRC.
- **Professor Gutto:** I think it is very important for Africa not to listen to lectures from the West

Hillary Clinton's comments may immediately be interpreted as an attempt by the presenter to support the view that the West is responsible for exploiting African resources through acknowledgement from the West itself. However, Clinton's comments are dismissed by both guests, who view them as untrue and insincere. The guests' reaction to her comments illustrates how other discourses are delegitimised and excluded as lacking credibility, which determines who participates and how they do so, as well as the discourses that inform the construction of audiences.

As a mediator, the presenter does not challenge the professor's views (perhaps due to time constraints). Western voices are in this case silenced, giving African actors a more prominent voice in constructing audiences.

Further discussion of the 'newness' of the scramble for Africa highlights the negotiation process that CGTN has to engage in to balance competing interests by legitimising/delegitimising certain discourses. Professor Gutto specifically refers to the scramble for Africa as 'new', and to 'new agreements' being signed. While the presenter probes the 'new' nature of the scramble for Africa, guests continue to focus on the 'old' scramble for Africa and who was to blame – in this case African governments and Western countries.

Presenter: Western countries are talking about African resources being spirited out of the continent, what is the *new* context, is that really a concern?

The reluctance by the panel to critically explore this alternative viewpoint can be related to China's key role in the 'new scramble for Africa', where its engagement in Africa has been criticised as neo-imperialist. While Hillary Clinton's statement alludes to past exploitation of Africa's resources by outsiders, it can also be read in the present within the context of the 'newness' of the scramble, as she also points to continued exploitation in the 21st century, which implicates China. The presenter also fails to articulate China's role in Africa's natural resource industry, and her silence is a nomination/exnomination strategy to manage competing viewpoints. In this instance, we see CGTN playing its role as state broadcaster by balancing sensitive matters that are pertinent to the interests of the state at the expense of critical discussion.

7.2 eNCA

The corpus for eNCA analysis consisted of episodes featured in the talk show, *Africa360*, as well as news items on prominent themes as indicated below[23].

Talk show episodes

- Africa's competitiveness
- The International Criminal Court's role in Africa
- Egypt instability

News items

- SMME sector in Africa - Mobile Money
- Business, East Africa Region
- Business in Africa

[23] See Appendix for the detailed list of talk show episodes and news items sampled

- Boko Haram Terror attacks in Nigeria

Due to the closure of the channel in 2014, only 2013 data was available for analysis.

As with CGTN Africa, economic and business coverage was also prevalent in eNCA. This is linked to economic growth in Africa that has attracted media interest over the past few years. Given this economic background, the context of the reports were characterised by the Africa Rising narrative and a primary focus on continental issues, with Africa being described by presenters and reporters as one of the 'world's fastest-growing economies', 'a market to off-set losses in the US and Europe', and 'open for business' (Nta 2014; Khumalo 2014; Ramathibela-Smith 2014).

Moreover, despite eNCA's independence and lack of state intervention, its constructions of African audiences at times reflected the interests of its country of origin, South Africa, and its inherent business culture, albeit unintentionally. This demonstrates the role of non-traditional diplomatic actors in conducting public diplomacy. Since 1994, South Africa has embraced neoliberal principles including privatisation and free markets (Magubane 2004). Business news therefore kept African audiences (including South African companies that have investments in the continent) informed about the latest business issues and trends on the continent. South Africa's economic diplomacy is also central to its foreign policy and focuses on increasing the market for South African products to larger markets in Africa (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2011:27). As a result, the construction of African audiences on eNCA drew from discourses of neoliberalism, Africa Rising and pan-Africanism, leading to constructing of audiences as investors and entrepreneurs, consumers and liberal citizens. In the next sections, I demonstrate how these constructions are manifested in the talk show programme *Africa 360* and news items as referred to in my discussion. I have italicised some words for emphasis.

7.2.1 Audiences as entrepreneurs

Constructions of African audiences as entrepreneurs were also prevalent on eNCA where doing business in Africa was a key theme. Programming content featured African

businesses and the challenges they experienced. This was evident in business news stories on business in Africa; the mobile money story, which featured First National Bank, a South African bank operating in various countries in Africa; and a report on the implementation of the on-area network in the East Africa Community (EAC) region, which focused on how the new law would benefit small businesses.

Extract 17: Business in Africa

While the role of state and institutional actors was more pronounced on CGTN Africa's business coverage, eNCA highlighted the role of small business and entrepreneurs. In a business news report that discusses the challenges facing international companies in Africa, local businesses are seen as playing a key role in the economy because of their understanding of the market, as indicated in the news presenter's comments below. This gives them a better competitive advantage than foreign businesses, as indicated in the comments by the eNCA field reporter during the report on business in Africa:

- **Reporter:** Africa's mobile technology is especially attractive for international players. … Although this competition is good for economic growth, foreign companies don't always have it easy and often struggle to adapt to the ever-changing African markets.

Consultancy firm McKinsey says global organisations struggle to establish a shared vision for the African market; … struggle with innovation for the continent and execution of the brand, and have a hard time building relations with other business partners and governments. But they also have to have workable strategies for African markets that's always changing. This is where local companies step in.

Economists say *African companies have an advantage over foreign ones.*

The discussion focuses not only on how renewed investment interest is benefitting Africa, but also on the impact on local businesses, therefore constructing African audiences as producers of goods and services.

The construction by transnational media of African audiences as entrepreneurs is new. Previously, Africa's role was viewed as policy-oriented, with a focus on liberalising their economies and create an investor-friendly environment for foreign investors as opposed to Africans as investors or active participants in developing their own economies. This new construction is also aligned with South Africa's macro-economic policy since apartheid, where commercialism is viewed as a viable strategy for creating employment and reducing poverty. This strategy was initially outward-looking and geared to attracting foreign investment, but as the country and the continent continue to grow the focus is more inward, promoting the growth of local businesses and encouraging a culture of entrepreneurship.

In addition to constructing African audiences as creators of businesses that produce goods and services, eNCA further imagines audiences as consumers, as the news report below on the Mobile Money and Digital Payment Conference in Johannesburg illustrates.

7.2.2 Audiences as consumers

Economic growth in Africa has given rise to the growth of the middle class and consumers for goods and services, making consumerism a viable strategy to imagine audiences. This has led to a focus on economic and business programming, such as a business news section and a resident business analyst, Clive Ramathibela-Smith.

Extract 18: Mobile Money Conference

Coverage and analysis of the mobile money conference focused on successful strategies for driving mobile money consumers in the continent. African audiences are constructed as consumers of mobile banking products, as seen in the labels and forms of address used by the eNCA reporter, i.e. 'FNB customers' and 'consumers'. Another label used is 'Africans', indicating the continental profile of the audiences.

Interviews with guests further focused on mobile banking products, their benefits and consumer behaviour in different parts of the continent. Audiences were encouraged to use these products, as indicated in the excerpts below:

- **Reporter:** The benefits are quite obvious, I mean, its transferring money immediately and people can access and send it from person to person easier.
- **Yolande Van Wyk, CEO, eWallet Solutions, FNB:** … but the best way to learn about these services is from friends and family. So, if my friend, or my mother or my brother uses a service like this, I feel more comfortable using it. Cos generally, the services are very, very safe. If you keep your phone safe you're fine. Generally, they're security devices like PIN numbers and things on the mobile money services. So, it's actually a very, very safe service, people just have to experience it to do so. And then the biggest reason why people use it is convenience. It is convenient, it's immediate, it's instant, and it's really, really, easy to do, compared to any other way of getting money to somebody.

In another news report, Africa's consumerist culture in also highlighted by eNCA's economic analyst Clive Ramathibela-Smith, who points out that the African economy is still consumer-based as entrepreneurs are more concerned about enriching themselves than understanding their markets.

- **Clive Ramathibela-Smith**: We are still too much of an absorbing continent or a *consumer-based environment* where everything that comes in, we take … these big brands, when they come in here, they dictate to the African people what they must have, what to consume …

African consumers were also constructed as aspirant and driving demand for goods such as smartphones, which has led to the success of international companies in Africa such as Walmart and BlackBerry. This is indicated in the following statements made by the reporter:

- International companies are now seeing the continent as a market to off-set losses in the US and Europe
- But BlackBerry offered African consumers a product to meet their aspirations ... This resulted in 27% year-on year growth.
- More and more international businesses are moving into, or scaling up, their African operations

- Companies like Walmart have spent more than US $2.5 billion buying into the market as profits in developed markets dwindle.

By constructing audiences as consumers, eNCA is contributing to South Africa's economic diplomacy objectives of expanding the market for South African goods across the continent (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2011). This highlights that the interests of non-state media can converge with those of the state, allowing them to play an indirect and informal public diplomacy role.

7.2.3 Constructing a pan-African identity

Common history and future

The discourse on pan-Africanism was dominant in the construction of a pan-African identity based on African unity, collective political history, present challenges and future outlook. While instances of national identity are evident in the South African and Kenyan perspectives, eNCA's programming is largely set within the context of Africa as a whole, which evokes African identity and solidarity. African countries have a common history of Western colonisation, have similar developmental problems and most have natural resources. As a result of these commonalities, the continent is at times perceived and constructed as a homogenous whole – like one large country called 'Africa'. Collective identity is also imagined through a shared present and a collective future (Bishop & Jaworski 2003), hence the rise of Africa; and its future competitiveness is celebrated as a continental success that will benefit the continent, rather than the success of the resource-rich countries. While this homogeneity is at times problematic, it is employed in the discussion by African actors to create cohesion and a common identity in relation to other parts of the world, as the talk show discussion, *Africa's Competitiveness*[24] demonstrates.

Extract 19: Africa's Competitiveness

[24] See Appendix for full programme details

- **Essop Pahad,** former minister in the Presidency**:** We've had the longest period of colonialism in Africa.
- **Presenter:** One of the narratives that we hear about *Africa* is that it is beset by corruption, which is a challenge to *our development*, … people are increasingly beginning to change their *perception of Africa*

One of the narratives is that *Africa has* poor governance,

- **Member of the audience**: *Africa* belongs to *all Africans who live here*

Through African identity, economic growth is framed as continental, benefitting all countries and supporting the idea of economic integration and working together.

African identity is also manifested throughout the programme with reference to the collective term 'Africa', as well as the use of solidarity pronouns like 'our' and 'we' as indicated in the examples below:

- **Miller Matola,** Brand SA: '… trade among *ourselves*
- **Essop Pahad** … the resources *we* have
- **Ebrima Faal,** African Development Bank**:** in the sense that *as Africans, we've* been labelled as mostly corrupt

In the sentence 'Africa belongs to all Africans who live here', African identity is 'flagged' by reference to the continent's geographic location – '*here'.* Billig (1995) explains that the nation is created through 'banal nationalism' by using everyday language that is woven in to present the nation as normal and familiar (Billig 1995, cited in Bishop and Jaworski 2003:248). This discursive construction of the nation makes it natural and inevitable, thereby more acceptable, and corresponds to Schegloff's notion of common 'sense geography' (Schegloff 1972:5). 'Here' is a marker of identity, to subtly create solidarity that is limited to members of the specific identity: *Africans who live here* (Billig 1995, cited in Bishop and Jaworski 2003). This may reinforce difference or solidarity between groups or nations.

Intra-Africa trade

Pan-African ideals unite the continent, and this unity is also constructed through the promotion of intra-Africa trade, which is seen as instrumental in increasing the continent's global competitiveness. eNCA uses the discourse on pan-Africanism to demonstrate its role in enhancing Africa's global competitiveness, as indicated during the talk show *Africa's Competitiveness.*

Presenter:

- … Round table discussion on the next 50 years of *pan-Africanism and African economic integration*, both factors that could both enhance competitiveness
- Stanley, one of the issues that the ambassador has raised to enhance *Africa's competitiveness is through intra-Africa trade.*
- Dr Pahad, is there something that talks to the need to *reinvigorate pan-Africanism to enhance economic development*?
- **Producer:** While economic growth in the continent has increased, South Africa's growth has slowed, showing that the country cannot succeed unless it *improves continental trade*.

The statements above also indicate that the continued development of African countries such as South Africa is not sustainable without pan-Africanism. South Africa's prosperity is linked with that of the continent; thus pan-African ideals are also embedded in the country's foreign policy on Africa. South Africa seeks to achieve this by strengthening regional integration, increasing intra-African trade, and championing sustainable development and opportunities in Africa, Essop Pahad states.

- **Essop Pahad:** It was our own colonial racist experience that led to this situation. That's why we have to start here in the continent because we can only become better if we work together with the continent, so continental unity, cohesion integration is in our best interest as South Africans.

Pan-African solidarity underpins the vision of continental institutions such as the AU and NEPAD, and forms the foundation of Africa's socio-economic development and

political unity. The AU's vision for Africa for the next 50 years, Agenda 2063, clearly states: 'We rededicate ourselves to a pan-African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena' (AU 2015:1).[25]

Given their support of pan-African ideals, the selection of guests from NEPAD, the Southern African Development Bank and Brand SA legitimises the pan-African discourse. This discourse is also linked to the concept of African Renaissance and is instrumental in the formation of NEPAD. As South Africa's public diplomacy organ tasked with creating a positive image of South Africa, Brand South Africa's strategic vision also aims to enhance South Africa's global competitiveness (Brand South Africa 2016).

7.2.4 Audiences as self-reliant

The notion of African solutions to African problems is also key to the construction of a pan-African identity, which draws on broader discourses on pan-Africanism including the African Renaissance concept. African solutions for African problems advocates Africa's self-reliance and ownership of solutions to direct its own development agenda, and is often used to criticise foreign intervention in African affairs. To illustrate how these constructions are manifested, I also use the talk show discussion, *Africa's Competitiveness.*

During the programme, Africa's self-reliance is reiterated by eNCA's personnel and guests who give examples of good governance that saw the continent solve its own problems. The problems are also framed as continental to resonate with African audiences. Argumentative strategies are also employed to support the view that solutions to these problems require a united Africa to harness the continent's strengths.

[25] Agenda 2063 – The Africa we want. September 2015

One of the examples cited is Kenya, which resolved its post-election violence in 2008 by developing strong and independent institutions to sustain democracy without international intervention. Asking the Kenyan ambassador in South Africa, Patrick Wamoto for his view on Africa's governance, the presenter points out that Kenya has demonstrated a successful transition, which defies the narrative of poor governance in Africa.

- **Presenter:** One of the narratives is that Africa has poor governance, but what we've seen in your country has been *a successful transition*. What's your view about the state of governance in Africa?
- **Patrick Wamoto:** In my country we're no longer mourning about being colonised, we trying to transform our economy, institutions, empower youth, women. For example, Kenya has defined itself as an IT hub, silicon savannah – every kid from next year will have a laptop. We are structuring our education to make our country competitive ... We're having our own internal debate and not mourning about the British – first by ensuring we have our own institutions … we're very confident that in the year 2020 we'll be a middle-income industrialising country, focusing on infrastructure.

Although the example cited above refers to action taken by one country, it demonstrates that negative perceptions are a continental problem that can be resolved collectively by sharing lessons with other countries.

Africa's self-reliance and unity are also demonstrated by continental institutions, which are already driving Africa's self-reliance and representing Africa's voice. Essop Pahad, one of the panellists, emphasises the need for Africa to take more ownership, by citing UNECA and the African Development Bank as examples of institutions that are already taking ownership of the development agenda.

- **Essop Pahad:** Each of our countries should be ready to *surrender their sovereignty* to much more issues. Africa *must control its own agenda*. It's happening through *UNECA and AFDB* who raise *our own finances* to fund *our own development*.

7.2.5 Audiences with human rights values

As on AJE, the human rights theme is also characteristic of audience construction on eNCA. This is reflected in the discussion about the ICC's relationship with African states in the programme entitled *The International Criminal Court's role in Africa*[26], featured in the talk show programme *Africa 360*.

Although eNCA's discussion draws on a diversity of perspectives, the discourse on human rights is more dominant with two of the three representatives, Sipho Malunga and Tiseke Kasambala from Human Rights Watch, included in the panel discussion. The other guest is Koffi Kouakou, senior lecturer at the Wits Business School and Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative in South Africa.

The discussion focuses primarily on issues of justice and how to ensure that it is served, and not only on the work of the ICC.

Extract 20: The International Criminal Court's role in Africa

As reflected in the opening statements, the presenter Chris Maroleng, speaks about the role of the ICC in terms of 'international justice'. Similarly, in the background report, the conclusion drawn by eNCA programme producer Lynsey Shutel underscores the importance of human rights, which should also form part of an African solution.

- **Presenter:** The international Criminal Court and its role in Africa has dominated headlines for quite some time now, but when we speak of international justice, what exactly does that mean in practice?
- **Producer:** The only current solution is the African court on human and people's rights, but it's badly funded and located in Gambia – *a country with the worst human rights record* in the continent. The location of the court should not be an issue but African states should look at handling their own cases, but it's clear

[26] See Appendix 1 for details of the episode

that an African solution simply doesn't exist for this African problem, at least not yet.

The eNCA producer's view is reinforced later in the studio discussion by the presenter, who challenges the response by one of the guests, Koffi Kouakou, who argues that it is not possible for justice to come from the ICC because of its institutional bias and prejudice against Africa.

- **Koffi Kouakou:** It's a real savage indictment of Africans themselves for sending their cases out there in Europe. Why didn't you deal with them at home? Can Europeans send their own citizens to African court – never. There would be an enormous institutional bias and prejudice against those who are not even paying … the Africans are not even paying for the budget of the ICC.
- **Presenter:** The African human rights commission is based in The Gambia, but given its track record and the President Yahya Jammeh, you can actually say it is false to actually believe that any justice can emerge from a court that is based in a place like The Gambia.

Furthermore, eNCA's senior correspondent Kwangu Liwewe comments that the cases against African leaders were brought to the ICC by Africans themselves. This demonstrates that African audiences are seen to believe in justice and human rights, even if high-profile individuals are concerned.

- **Tiseke Kasambala:** I know African countries say they're being targeted, but as other people have said, *most of these cases have been brought to the ICC by Africans.*

It is clear from the discussion that eNCA's opinion is that Africa is not the best place for African people to get justice.

Alternative discourses from a diversity of voices, including public responses, characterise eNCA's discussion. The key themes emanating from participants in the programme (studio guests, presenter, interviewees and the public) are based on broader pan-African discourses on African solutions to African problems, post-colonialism and

race. The African solution in the form of an African court or justice system to handle similar cases, as well as African solidarity, were issues raised by the general public. eNCA also shared the view that the ICC is biased against African leaders; its links to the West were also raised.

Comments from the public:

- **Street interviewee (**Kenya**):** I think that the *court should be here*, not there.
- **Sindiso Moyo,** Facebook: *All African countries should stand together* and withdraw … because it is a tool by *Western countries to bully and continue colonising Africa in disguise*
- **Dudu Mthimunye,** Facebook**:** If we withdraw from the ICC, what mechanism do we have to replace it with? Ordinary courts will not be strong enough to try high-profile individuals like heads of state.
- **The Dictator,** Twitter**:** I am not convinced. We need an *African court* to deal with *African problems*.

While the channel challenged the feasibility of an African solution to injustices in the continent, the rhetoric of African solutions to African problems is introduced by the presenter, as indicated in the extracts below and Koffi Kouakou's comments on the previous page.

- **Presenter:** There must be something to be said about Africans finding 'African solutions'
- **Sipho Malunga:** The most ideal situation is strengthening our national judicial system anywhere. We need not go outside for our people to get justice.

7.2.6 Power relations and structuring discourses

The optimism about Africa's rise has been challenged by alternative discourses on the unevenness of the rise, characterised by an increase in unemployment and inequalities. John Page of Brookings argues that while the growth trends are impressive, the growth is uneven and fragile (Page 2013). Africa has de-industrialised over the past 20 years compared to some Asian economies, but this has not led to structural transformation and

increased productivity. This is because growth has been largely driven by investment in natural resources, but not in other key sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, leading to a fragile economy prone to commodity price fluctuations (Page 2013). These fluctuations are becoming more evident as growth in China begins to slow down and commodity prices begin to fluctuate. In this section, I use the discussion *Africa Competitiveness* and the news report on Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria to illustrate these power relations.

These inequalities arise during the discussion on Africa's competitiveness. The presenter raises alternative discourses to challenge the optimism of the Africa Rising narrative. These include corruption, poor governance of natural resources, and the uneven rise of Africa. However, he also uses the strategy of exnomination and inoculation to contain contradictory views to maintain the dominant discourse of a rising Africa. He states that despite this, perceptions about Africa are changing, which implies that it is not a serious issue.

- **Presenter:** One of the narratives that we hear about Africa is that it is beset by corruption, which is a challenge to our development, *but more importantly when you look at the commercial space, people are increasingly beginning to change their perception of Africa.*

Alternative discourses are also delegitimised by assertions about African solutions, where guests highlight achievements and future actions by African leaders to resolve challenges. This is indicated in the example of Kenya above. The panellists also support the channel's view of changing perceptions of Africa's rise. They point out that there has been a decrease in the levels of corruption, which is one of the reasons for the rise of Africa as it has reduced risk, leading to an increase in FDI investment.

- **Stanley Subramoney, NEPAD:** Africa is not only rising, its time has come. The reduction in the levels and quantum of corruption is being visible. You see the rise of FDI. Capital will go where it's perceived to be safe, the returns are high and the risks are low. That tells you that global capital is flowing and perceptions of corruption are not there.

Africa's problems were also described as 'challenges' that Africa is capable of dealing with, as opposed to 'problems'.

While Part 2 of the discussion is also dedicated to alternative views, focusing more on citizens, the channel manages this contradiction in the introduction, which is a positive story about ordinary citizens who are benefitting from Africa's growth. This sets the tone for the discussion and reinforces the optimistic view that Africa's rise and sustained economic growth will trickle down to citizens. Audiences are imagined as entrepreneurs who are taking advantage of economic growth to improve their livelihoods.

The rise in inequalities in gender and unemployment as a result of uneven growth is another contrast to the optimism of Africa's rise. In response, the guests focus on what is being done in various countries to deal with the issue. The Kenyan ambassador states that the debate about development in his country has shifted, and is no longer about the legacy of colonialism but about transforming the economy and institutions and empowering the youth and women. In South Africa, the Brand SA chairperson also notes:

- **Chichi Maponya,** Brand SA chairperson**:** A lot has been achieved and a lot more still needs to be done. There are plans in government, corporate sector … more in institutionalising the structures that recognise women as contributors to content, not only ticking the boxes, but also responsibility.
- **Ebrima Faal,** Regional Director of the African Development Bank**:** You need to have skills to be economically competitive. But the solution is there, there's a political vision – political championing from the top. There's an agreement on the minimum infrastructure development, but it'll take time.

These discussions do not refer to external assistance in dealing with challenges, but focus on what Africans can do themselves, once more reinforcing African solutions to African problems.

Extract 21: Boko Haram Terror attacks in Nigeria

Africa's self-reliance and the concept of African solutions are reflected in eNCA's news coverage of the attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria on 19 May 2014. As on the other two channels, the news report on the attacks was characterised by the discourse on war and terror. This was evident in the references associated with this discourse such as: w*ar against Boko Haram*, *fighting insurgents*, and *counterterrorism strategy* throughout the report

- **Presenter:** A declaration of *war against Boko Haram*
- **Paul Biya**, President of Cameroon**:** We are here to declare a *war against Boko Haram*
- **Reporter:** … action plan to *fight the insurgents*

Unlike the report on AJE which was aired on the same day, eNCA does not provide an extensive background and detailed analysis of the attacks, i.e. the geographic location or the destruction caused. The duration of the report is just over three minutes. The report was on the Africa Security Summit, convened by West African leaders to discuss Boko Haram attacks, and therefore begins with visuals of delegates at the summit (Fig. 35). There are also no visuals of the attack on Jos as the report is framed within the context of the broader attacks by Boko Haram, and part of the 'Bring Back Our Girls' campaign which seeks to put pressure on the Nigerian government to find the kidnapped schoolgirls.



Figure 12: Delegates at the Africa Security Summit

The lack of detail about the location is an indication that the audience is constructed as Africans who are familiar with the continent, therefore removing the necessity to provide them with an understanding of the region. This creates an African identity based on common sense geography. On the other hand, AJE and CGTN began the story with a detailed graphic presentation of Nigeria and the region where the attacks occurred, an indication that they are constructing not only African audiences, but a diverse audience that may not be familiar with West Africa or Nigeria.

Similar to CGTN, African solutions for African problems is also a key theme achieved by framing the event within the context of the summit as well as through nomination/exnominates. The summit focuses on how African leaders plan to handle the Boko Haram challenge as opposed to the violence acts, thereby emphasising African leadership. Furthermore, the channel nominates African sources: the President of Cameroon, Dr Iroanya, and interviewees who appear on camera, while the French president is quoted indirectly.

- **Reporter:** … *Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria approved a joint action plan* to fight the insurgents. French President *Francois Hollande says* this will all take place in just a matter of days.
- **Presenter:** A declaration of war against Boko Haram. This was the *sentiment of West African leaders* attending the security summit in France.
- In the long term, the *countries have also agreed to come up with a regional counter-terrorism strategy*.



Figure 13: Paul Biya - President of Cameroon, eNCA

The African countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria are viewed as the primary actors driving the counter-terrorism strategy, as opposed to Western countries, as noted on AJE. While France is mentioned, its role was only to host the summit.

7.3 Al Jazeera English

African audiences on AJE are in most cases constructed as liberal, with democratic values. The human rights, as well as war and terrorism themes were dominant, as manifested in news coverage during the two-week periods analysed in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The discourses were aligned to violence and conflict, law and human rights themes, and used as an argumentation strategy to defend punishment or corrective action against lawlessness and undemocratic actions.

To illustrate how these audience constructions are reflected in the channel's coverage, I refer to the talk show discussions listed below.[27]

Talk show episodes

[27] See Appendix 1 for the sample of talk show episodes and news items

- Egypt: A coup or a second revolution
- Is the International Criminal Court racist?
- Banking on Africa's economic boom

News items

- Terrorist attack in Nigeria
- Deployment of troops in South Sudan
- The G20 Summit

Unlike eNCA and CGTN, AJE had very scant focus on economic and business issues about Africa, except a few talk show discussions about Africa's economic boom, the energy sector and capitalism[28]. Its interest in Africa was in most cases on conflict issues which were given more detailed coverage.

As is the case with CGTN Africa, AJE's focus on human rights and democracy is contradictory to the host country (Qatar's) human rights record. Although Qatar is liberal and promotes Western values, it has been criticised internationally for its treatment of foreign workers (Human Rights Watch 2016; Global Database 2018). While the ruler has liberalised the country and opened it up to Western values, dissent is not tolerated and the country is not a democracy. However, unlike CGTN Africa, AJE does not avoid reporting on these issues, albeit in other countries but not Qatar. This contradiction of values nevertheless threatens AJE's liberal image and editorial independence.

7.3.1 Audiences with human rights values

The human rights discourse is manifest in both news reports sampled and current affairs talk shows. AJE's reporting on the arrest of its journalists and the #FreeAJStaff campaign are cases in point. However, within the context of African audiences, I

[28] The discussions include; *Africa's economic boom*, *Why capitalism needs poverty* and *The price of energy*

illustrate how African audiences are constructed as having respect for justice and human rights using the talk show topic on the ICC.

Extract 22: Is the ICC racist

In stark contrast to CGTN's coverage of a similar topic, AJE's discussion format is characterised by audience participation. The discussion takes place in a town hall meeting at the District Six Museum in Cape Town, and is based on questions from the public, which are answered by a panel of three guests. This can be viewed as a reflection of the show's objective and that of AJE, which gives prominence to voices from the South. This is more so given that the studio guests were Western, consisting of two Nobel Prize winners, former US President Jimmy Carter and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, and Mary Robinson, the first female president of Ireland and a former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Among the members of the public were other influential global leaders and members of The Elders, such as Kofi Annan and Richard Branson.

Human rights and justice was a predominant theme and focus of the discussion, rather than the ICC and the charges against African leaders. The following points were made:

- Human rights issues such as fairness and justice
- Human rights are universal.
- The longing for human rights is seen as a normal desire by people across the world.

As opposed to CGTN, AJE's guests argued for justice and fairness and framed the charges against African leaders as an indication of justice and a way to solve the problem of impunity (the issue of impunity was not raised on CGTN).

This is demonstrated by the labelling and descriptions of the charges as 'violations of human rights, crimes against humanity'.

- **Mary Robinson:** ... But the international court is a good way of *ending impunity* and ending the real problem – it is a very real problem, that those who get away

with *terrible violations of human rights*, terrible *sexual violence*, terrible *crimes against humanity*.

The human rights construction of African audiences is also evident in former president Carter's comments, where he indicates African citizens' need for justice.

- **Jimmy Carter:** Most of the people brought to justice so far *have been delivered by their own people.*

The values of justice and human rights is also seen to be shared by the public who were part of the studio audience. Their questions demonstrate that the African audiences are against corruption and want to see justice served, as indicated below:

- **Question 1, Nkosinathi George Matu:** We have seen in Africa that most of the leaders are corrupt. My question is, is it not high time now that we have African courts or tribunals to deal with these corrupt leaders?
- **Question 2, Alison Lazarus:** What might the elders think for the support of citizen arrests?
- **Question 3, Chad:** Can children's' rights be guaranteed?

While all the participants seem to agree that the ICC was not racist, they also want to challenge the panel, which is made up of former Western leaders. This is evident in their reaction when the presenter asks the panel if the ICC is racist.

- **Presenter:** Ironically, other members of the AU feel that the ICC is an African court that is there to try only African leaders. What do you say to that?

The audience reacts to this question with enthusiasm, clapping hands and urging the panel to respond. Speaking on behalf of the audience, the presenter further challenges the panel by asking the audience if they think some former US leaders should be tried for human rights abuses.

- **Presenter:** … there was a lot of enthusiasm from this side (pointing to the audience on her left). Do you think some former US presidents should be tried for the war in Iraq… [Again the audience says yes and claps in agreement]

The role of the presenter in this discussion is not only to manage the diverse views, but also to encourage interaction with the audience, and at times to entertain.

Although the presenter challenges the dominant discourse and the ICC's role as a symbol of human rights, the reasons and context for the AU's negative perceptions against the ICC are not discussed.

The construction of African audiences in the discussion is also contradictory. While African audiences are initially constructed as valuing human rights, these values are not viewed as inherently embedded in African societies. The discussion also draws on traditional constructions of Africa as lacking good governance and democratic institutions, compared to Western societies where these values are natural. Because of this, African leaders face challenges. Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari points out that it is harder for African leaders to excel, not just because of the additional issues they face but because they lack the kind of institutional support he had as President of Finland: 'It is much more complicated to be a president in Africa because in many countries the institutions that are absolutely vital to run a country are not there' (Ahtisaari 2013:n.p).

He also adds that policies in Finland protect equal rights for all, laying down a strong foundation for all children's rights. This implies that human rights are not normal in Africa.

- **Martti Ahtisaari**: I come from a part of the world where egalitarian policies are the norm. It doesn't matter if you're rich or poor; you get a decent education, decent healthcare, and possibilities in life. I think it's extremely important that these egalitarian policies are carried out throughout the world (South2North 2013).

While the discussion on Africa's relationship with the ICC is different between AJE and CGTN, the way both channels select studio guests legitimises dominant discourses over others. CGTN criticises and exposes the weaknesses of the ICC and selected guests and interviewees with similar views, while AJE takes the opposite view and selects guests with similar views.

Nevertheless, AJE's human rights argument in its coverage of the arrest of AJE journalists is also contradictory to its treatment of journalists. AJE has been criticised for dismissing an HIV-positive journalist, which is universally considered a violation of human rights (Lightspeed 2012). Qatar has strict regulations against people with HIV and Aids, which include pre-entry screening for foreigners moving to the country. Those with HIV and Aids are refused entry or deported (Global Database 2018; Chappelle 2012). AJE is therefore implicated in violating the human rights of the journalist and does not challenge Qatar's unfair labour practices. This conflict of interest between a liberal broadcaster and a conservative state further complicates the audience construction process. The broadcaster's handling of the topic of HIV and Aids echoes Samuel-Ezran's conclusion that AJE is at times biased towards Qatari interests, depending on the issue (Samuel-Ezran 2014).

7.3.2 Audiences with democratic values

Extract 23: Egypt, A coup or a second revolution?

The talk show discussion on the political crisis in Egypt, *Egypt, A coup or a second revolution*, employs the liberal democracy discourse to imagine audiences as liberal and pro-democratic. Countries that are democratic are characterised by civil liberties, freedom of speech and association, openness, and various other democratic principles. These principles or values are used as a benchmark to measure and judge the level of democracy and describe right vs wrong actions. Those who fail to meet these standards are considered illegitimate and condemned.

AJE views the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Morsi, as a legitimate leader because he was democratically elected, but also argues that he acted undemocratically

and therefore had to be removed from office in accordance with democratic principles. While the studio guests have different views on whether Morsi's removal from office was a coup or a revolution, they all draw on discourses of democracy.

Liberal democracy is evident in the labelling of individuals and organisations. The presenter uses the label 'liberals' and 'pro-democratic' to refer to the Egyptian people who took part in the protest to oust Morsi.

- **Presenter:** So what does the future hold for Egypt and other Arab Spring countries? Why did the very liberals who have been pro-democracy turn against the country's democratically elected leader?

The reaction of the Egyptian public to Morsi's undemocratic actions resonates with the perspectives of liberal African audiences, who share similar democratic principles and the belief that democracy should be protected by protest action and participating in elections.

- **Ayesha Kajee, Freedom of Expression Institute, South Africa:** There's been a rising opposition towards the elected government, specifically towards Mr Morsi, particularly after his attempt to arrogate fairly wide-ranging presidential powers to himself, and I think there was a lot of dismay at that given that he'd been democratically elected and had a mandate from the people as it were, to then turn around and to then take on himself the power of an authoritarian president, or what we would expect from an authoritarian president.
- **Presenter:** But he changed the constitution, he ignored their call for different reforms, the powers of the legislature were overruled, that's not democracy.

The above statements define what it means to be a democratic leader.

Extract 24: Terrorism in Nigeria

The pro-democratic values of audiences are further highlighted in the news report on the terrorist attack in Nigeria. This was a prominent story on AJE, where it began with detailed background information about the location of Nigeria and where the attacks

took place. Coverage of the attacks drew on discourses of war and terror, constructing African audiences as progressive, with modern values. Emotion was also used to construct audiences as resilient, yet gripped by fear for their safety.

AJE's report is a highly visual and detailed presentation. The report is introduced by the news presenter who is in a stand-up position with a 360-degree screen displaying visuals of the attack, making the presentation more engaging and compelling visual storytelling (Fig. 37). This application of digital elements is testament to the careful preparation and importance of the story.



Figure 14: News Presenter - AJE

The introduction is followed by visuals of a map, showing the location of the attack and wider geographical context. These visual cues provide useful understanding of AJE's audience. The location of the attack highlights the various audiences that are targeted by AJE. While the channel is global, covering stories from marginalised parts of the world, such as Africa, Africans are not the primary audience. The channel is also constructing a diverse global audience, with particular interest in the Middle East. The story was therefore presented visually, starting with the geographic context of Nigeria and the

location of the attacks, then linking up to interview a Nigerian-based correspondent. The map of Nigeria performed an important function, especially for viewers outside Africa and West Africa who may not have been familiar with Nigeria or Africa.



Figure 15: Map of Nigeria - AJE

The report also positions AJE as a credible and reliable source of information, which not only contributes to its global competitiveness, but also increases its influence among foreign audiences. This credibility is reflected in its detailed account and commentary provided by AJE journalists based in Nigeria, Mohammed Adow and Ahmed Idris. The use of professional local journalists to tell the Nigerian story as opposed to a foreign journalist lends credibility to the report, as they are considered insiders who are knowledgeable about the country and its politics. Seib (2013) points out that a "perceived lack of foreignness" is an asset in public diplomacy as it enhances the credibility of the message and is more effective in influencing foreign audiences (Seib 2013: 9). This is more important in conflict coverage of Africa, as foreign media is often accused of negative constructions of Africa.

According to Bhatia (2009), discourses on terror are characterised mainly by binary metaphors that highlight the Us/Them division. These include fear and anxiety, evil vs good, national identity and law vs lawlessness, civilisation vs barbarism and freedom vs

tyranny. I use the news article on Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria to illustrate this discourse.

The framing of terrorism as a barbaric act and against civilisation is prevalent in coverage of terror and rhetoric among various leaders when they condemn terrorist acts (Cameroon 2015, cited in Chorley 2015; Dlamini-Zuma 2015). In the case of Boko Haram, this frame stems from their core ideology of being against the education of women, which is the main motivation for kidnapping schoolgirls and violence. The name of the group, Boko Haram, means 'Western education is sinful' (Popoola 2012:47). The Nigerian president also refers to Boko Haram as 'enemies of human progress', which constructs the audience as a progressive society that is considered to value education, unlike the barbaric Boko Haram. Boko Haram's barbaric actions are reinforced by images of a building destroyed by the blast and descriptions of the attack by the channel's journalists and presenter, who construct Boko Haram as a lawless and evil group. This shown in the report filed by AJE's correspondent **Mohamed Adow**:

- The *target was a busy marketplace* ... the bomb was packed in a minivan *designed to cause as many deaths as possible*
- The most *audacious attack was the kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls* …
- *They steal, burn, loot and shoot people as they run for cover*

The images that accompany the story show the destruction caused by the attack and emergency personnel with the correspondent reporting in the foreground as show in Figures 40 and 41. As the images are shown, there are sounds of sirens and a lot of noise from people crying.



Figure 16: Mohammed Adow - AJE Field Reporter, Jos

The scenes of the attack are more vivid and detailed compared to CGTN's, with some recorded live as the attack happened as shown in Figure 40. A second blast is audible from the video footage and the camera then moves from a long shot of the market closer to the second blast, showing images of chaos as people run for cover.



Figure 17: Second bomb blast, Jos



Figure 18: Scene of attack - AJE

To further discredit Boko Haram, the report uses negative other-representation and labelling. Boko Haram is described as an armed group that has carried out evil and lawless acts such as deliberately killing people, destroying their livelihoods (market and

property) and kidnapping innocent girls. Vilification declares a moral judgement against Boko Haram and portrays it as an out-group.

Next the Boko Haram video of the kidnapped girls is shown on screen, with the group's logo and the girls sitting obediently under armed guard, demonstrating evidence of the group's tyranny and their responsibility for the killings.

One of the characteristics of the war and terrorism discourse is its intention to create fear and anxiety among citizens. Fear and anxiety promotes discipline and de-legitimise dissent, criticism and justify behaviour against opponents (Bhatia 2009).

This was evident in descriptions of the fear that gripped the Nigerian people, as one of the reporters, Ahmed Idris, explains:

- **Reporter:** Folly, there's a *general sense of fear, a general sense of insecurity*. Since the beginning of this year, the spate of attacks or the rate of attacks by BH all over the country is increasing … The *people are fearing* that probably, after Jos, this violence could move south of the country, where it's relatively peaceful now.
- **Presenter:** And there is concern that that frustration at the Nigerian government and the anger and fear that people are feeling and this rising security concerns in the country *could take on a sectarian character, Ahmed.*

Fear and anxiety helps justify action against Boko Haram to alleviate the fear and bring the violence under control, and also supports statements by the Nigerian government that they are 'fully committed to winning the war against terror' and 'will not be cowed by the atrocities of enemies of human progress' (Reporter quoting the Nigerian president's spokesperson).

The presenter in studio links up live with another AJE correspondent who provides additional context of the attack. The report lasted 8 minutes compared to 5 minutes on CGTN. While the resources deployed for live coverage, duration of the report and extensive preparation demonstrates the prominent treatment of African issues, its

framing of the story shows that Africa is prominently covered during times of conflict, in consistence with Western coverage.

7.3.3 Audiences with religious identities

Religious identity is also an important element in the construction of the attack, implying that it was linked to tensions between Muslims and Christians. This leads to the construction of victims and perpetrators based on collective religious identities. In the same report about the attack, the presenter presupposes that the attack is sectarian and will affect relations between Muslims and Christians.

- **Presenter:** … the anger and fear that people are feeling and these rising insecurity concerns in the country could take on a sectarian character, Ahmed. Are we seeing this happen already? Has this affected relations between the Muslim communities and the Christian communities in Nigeria? … but this attack is suspected to be carried out by Boko Haram, an armed group based in the North, which wants to enact Islamic law.
- **Reporter:** Folly, the attacks on churches and mosques over the last few years have rather entrenched some kind of feeling of suspicion between members of the Muslim and Christian communities in the North …

Although the reporter states that the attacks were on both religious groups, earlier statements that the attack was conducted by a Muslim group (Boko Haram) reinforce the association of the Muslim community with terrorism, a perception that has become common in discourses about terrorist attacks after 9/11 (Thussu 1997; Winkler 2006; Douai 2014; Sultan 2016). Binaries of 'us' versus 'them' are used to construct an identity based on religion, as well as groups against or in favour of perpetrators of violence.

- **Reporter:** There's been no claim of responsibility so far, but this attack is suspected to be carried out by *Boko Haram, an armed group* based in the North, which wants to enact *Islamic law***.**

Winkler (2006) states: ‘Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behaviour that is unacceptable … American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty’ (Winkler 2006: 12).

Referring to the American association of terrorism with Islam, Jackson (2007) explains that this is achieved by appropriating negative values to the other, such as ‘backwardness, illiberal, violent Islamic “other”’, while the ‘self’ (American) is associated with good, liberal, civilised values. This leads to the construction of collective identities based on values (Jackson 2007: 420).

7.3.5 Africa Rising on Al Jazeera

Compared to the other channels, AJE’s discussion of economic issues in Africa was not only scant, but was largely negative and did not reflect the continent’s progress. Instead, the channel focuses on an alternative discourse that explored challenges and questioned the sustainability of the continent’s growth such as rising inequalities, unemployment and poverty[29]. This is well illustrated on the discussion about Africa’s economic boom and news coverage of the G20 Summit in China.

Extract: 25: Banking on Africa’s economic boom

The discussion acknowledged Africa’s growth but the sub-heading, ‘Can the continent capitalise on its recent financial prosperity to achieve a repeat of Asia's economic miracle’, casts doubt on its sustainability. These doubts are further explored in the presenter’s interview with Dr Ibrahim Mayaki, the former prime minister of Niger and current head of NEPAD where she focuses on Africa’ challenges as highlighted in her statements below:

Presenter:

[29] This was evident in the topics *Why capitalism needs poverty, The price of oil* discussed on *South2North*

- …to have the warning signs is positive, but the fact that the climate in some countries is still ripe for coups is disturbing…
- What can Africa learn from Asia's economic boom
- What will it take for Africa to attract the investment needed

The statement above draws parallels with Asian economies which experienced a so-called miraculous growth, but only to collapse a few years later, implying that the same could happen to Africa. This discourse on the pitfalls of economic success was a consistent theme on *South2North*, which topics such as, *The dark side of diamonds,* and *The price of oil.* While China's growth is a more contemporary example of the growth from an Asian economy, the Chinese experience is not discussed, with AJE preferring to use an old example and the collective label, 'Asian' as opposed to specific countries. While the presenter does later raise China in her interview with the Japanese Ambassador, it was only in one instance, and within the context of debates about the China-threat.

- **Presenter:** We have a situation in SA, and many African countries where China's presence is growing and also seen as threatening, especially among local businesses and workers who argue that Africa is being re-colonised by China. Is Japan as concerned by China's dominance and flooding of markets with its own products.

The discourse of a China-threat and sustainability of Asian economies was also characteristic of AJE's coverage of the G20 summit held in China in 2016. The report focused on China's economy, constructing its future economic prospects as unsustainable. This negativism of China is demonstrated through implicit statements and metaphors by the presenter and journalist reporting from the summit.

- **Presenter:** Beijing is trying to convince world leaders of the world's major powers that its economy is doing well.

In the introduction above, the phrase ‘trying to convince’ implies a lack of conviction about China’s healthy economy, hence the need to persuade world leaders to make them believe otherwise.

Skepticism about the Chinese economy was further reinforced by the field reporter, who uses words such as ‘reassure’ and metaphors to describe China’s poor economic performance and imply that it’ll be difficult for China to convince world leaders.

- Reporter: The Chinese government *has another task* here. To *reassure* the G20 leaders that the China economy is not heading for *hard landing*.

The phrase, ‘hard landing’ is used in the economic domain to describe slow economic growth to such an unacceptable degree that it might result in a recession (Investopedia 2017). This metaphor is a rhetorical strategy of extreme case formulation by AJE to construct a negative image of China’s growth by questioning the impact of its rapid growth. Observers have previously argued that China’s double-digit growth was unsustainable and driven by the same model as East Asian economics which later collapsed in 1987 (Khan 2017; Yu 2012).

China’s rise has is a concern for many countries who fear losing jobs and industries to China, with its cheap goods leaving local manufacturers unable to compete, and increase in trade deficits. This sentiment is also echoed by the reporter in his reference to the consequences on Europe’s steel industry, and the President of the EU Commission.

- **Reporter:** The European commission president…had *harsh words* about *over production in China’s steel industry, which is hurting Europe’s steel producers*.
- **Jean-Claude Juncker:** We want to make sure they respect basic principles and the high standards that European citizens expect from us. Free trade must be fair trade

These sentiments about China’s growth have implications for Africa and discourses about the continent’s transformation which has been challenged. China’s growth has been a catalyst for Africa’s growing economy, and there are concerns that it’s

decelerating economy has reduced the demand for commodities, leading to a decline in economic growth, especially in resource-rich and less diversified economies.

Unlike CGTN, AJE's conception of Africa's success was still linked to its relationship with traditional powers as opposed to emerging economies as demonstrated in the interview with Yutaka Yoshizawa, Japan's Ambassador to South Africa. Despite Dr Mayaki's alternative discourse which highlighted Africa's changing dynamics and positive achievements, the presenter continued to challenge this success, and in her first question to the Ambassador, she asks if the era of aid in Africa is indeed 'dead' as Dr Mayaki had asserted.

- **Presenter:** Is the era of aid is dead?
- **Yutaka Yoshizawa:** Japan's aid to Africa has been doubled from $1.7 billion to more than $3.4billion

The Ambassador's response refutes Dr Mayaki's statement, demonstrating that AJE did not legitimise the discourse on African solutions to African problems but continued to draw on traditional discourses of Africa's dependence on external assistance, such as Japan where FDI is viewed as the continent's solution to development. The interview was set within the context of the Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) which is co-hosted by Japan and focused on Japan's role in Africa's development. The conference was also framed as an appropriate platform to highlight Africa's transformation and attract FDI to the continent, thereby highlighting the country's role in Africa's development. The statements below indicate that Africa should learn from the experiences of the West and Japan:

- Presenter: … has Africa taken into account the hardships that Europe and the US have faced in attracting FDI
- What were the building blocks of the Asian miracle…*how did Japan prepare itself*?
- Redi: What else can Africa learn from Asia, … what can we learn *from countries such as Japan*

In contrast to the earlier interview, the presenter's reference to Asian success is made specific to Japan, with explicit questions on the Japanese experience and what Africa can learn from it. The West and Japan are viewed as examples that Africa should emulate, in contrast to China and emerging economies as cited in the other news channels.

The discourse on rising inequality has been used by critics of the Africa Rising narrative to question who benefits from the rise (Taylor 2014; Bond 2017; Brookings 2013). Proponents argue that inequalities in Africa such as unemployment have increased despite growth. This discourse has also been raised in the discussions on Africa's competitiveness on eNCA.

In 2016, AJE did not change its conception of audiences, and continued to focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance, where African audiences were imagined to be subscribers to these ideals.

This was evident in the channel's coverage of the conflict in South Sudan. The deployment of additional troops in South Sudan received frequent coverage in AJE, as it was a topical issue. My analysis focused on the reports on 1 and 3 September as these were more detailed. All the reports drew on discourses of human rights and humanitarian assistance; however, they were not always balanced.

Extract 26: Deployment of troops in South Sudan

On 3 September, the report begins with a background image of the UN Security Council room and an image of the president of South Sudan. The CGTN reporter then talks about the plight of the people and the problems there; this is accompanied by images of soldiers and children.

The AJE report focuses on the human perspective of the deployment, which preserves its previous discourse on human rights and justice. The opening statement of the report is crucial in positioning AJE's argument in favour of the deployment of additional troops. As indicated below, the killing of civilians and violence are mentioned upfront,

followed by the UN plan to deploy troops and an explanation of why these troops are necessary (because civilians have been killed).

- **Presenter:** We're following a delegation from the UN Security Council that is visiting the South Sudanese capital *where hundreds were killed in violence* in the month of July.

The presenter continues to state the case for more troops by giving background information about the fragile peace deal, and states that the UN has called for an independent enquiry into the rape of women. Quoting the US ambassador to the UN lends further credibility to the fact that violence is taking place against civilians.

- **Presenter:** The US ambassador to the UN called for an independent enquiry into the alleged rape of civilians by South Sudanese soldiers.

In both reports, the argument for deploying troops is further justified by an argumentation strategy that uses explicit and implicit statements to accuse the South Sudanese government of failure to protect civilians. This is evident in the statement above. In the report on 1 September, the presenter explicitly states that there are allegations that civilians were attacked by government soldiers.

- **Presenter:** The ease with which civilians can move out of the protection sites *made the sites a target for soldiers* who regarded them as military camps rather than protection camps.
- **Presenter**: South Sudan's relationship with the UN is currently tense following allegations that it hasn't done enough in the country to protect the public.

The report on 1 September is also framed to respond to allegations that the UN mission is not doing enough to protect civilians in South Sudan. The UN describes the situation as a challenge, using figures to draw attention to the large number of civilians it needs to protect (200 000), compared to the troops currently deployed (13 000). It also outlines the challenges arising from the logistics of managing access to the camp and the complexities of using force.

- **Presenter:** The UN has a mission in South Sudan, but it is facing *numerous challenges* in carrying out its mandate. That includes protecting civilians, including nearly 200 000 sheltering in UN bases around the country. The *ease through which civilians can move out of the protection sites* made the sites a target for soldiers who regarded them as military camps rather than protection camps. The *parameters of the camp don't leave as much of a barrier*. It's *easy to go from inside to outside in a matter of seconds*.

The establishment of the enquiry by the UN, as opposed to the government of South Sudan, also implies that the government is not taking the matter seriously, hence the need for the UN to step in and protect people. This is reinforced by Samantha Power, the former US ambassador to the UN, who mentions that there is 'impunity' and lack of accountability, which implies a lack of action from the government:

- **Samantha Power:** For as long as armed actors rape and loot and kill people with impunity and are not held accountable, it'll be very, very hard for the course of the peace to take hold here. When we talk about sending 4 000 peacekeepers to South Sudan on top of the force that is here, it is with one concern in mind – it is for the people of South Sudan. It is with an eye on protecting them, it is with an eye to ensuring that they get the humanitarian assistance they need. Some are facing famine-like conditions.

In her comments, the UN representative draws on human rights discourses that focus on finding justice for human suffering, explaining that the aim of the additional troops is to protect civilians.

This news report is also informed by the discourse on humanitarian assistance, which reinforces the narrative of Africa as a continent of war and violence and in need of humanitarian assistance from external actors. As evident in the opening statement, the presenter does not identify the capital of South Sudan by its name, Juba, but labels it 'a place where the violence occurred'.

The discourses of humanitarian aid and human rights are also articulated in the images in the report. The background images of soldiers in uniform holding machine-guns casts Africa as a place riddled with war and violence. Images are also powerful in the construction of reality, as they provide evidence of what happened during an event, supporting the truth of the story. In this image, the soldiers are wearing government uniform, which legitimises the allegations that government soldiers are killing and raping women. In contrast, CGTN shows the same image of soldiers a bit later after the opening statement, preferring to lead with the image of the Security Council and a portrait of the South Sudanese president.

While only UN officials were interviewed in this report, a previous report on 1 September was more balanced, with interviews with the South Sudanese government spokesperson and a political analyst.

7.3.6 Conclusion

The rise of Africa has been a notable feature of media coverage of the continent for the past decade, as a result of economic growth in many countries and increased political stability in the continent. While this growth has been experienced mainly among resource-rich countries, it has been a celebration for the entire continent, hence its description as an 'African' rise.

The change in Africa's political and economic prospects saw the continent become a key investment destination for investors from across the world. In the media, this change in Africa's political and economic landscape was reflected in coverage that shifted the narrative about the continent from 'darkness' to a hopeful and bright future. The media is central to circulating this discourse, and as a result, the Africa growth story was a prevalent narrative in news and talk show programming on CGTN and eNCA, particularly in 2013 and 2014. The Africa Rising narrative was drawn mainly from broader discourses on pan-Africanism and neoliberalism. This led to the dominance of the neoliberal and pan-African discourses, resulting in the construction of audiences as investors and entrepreneurs; consumers; self-reliant people; and part of a collective pan-African community. Constructing audiences as investors, consumers and

entrepreneurs is a new way of imagining African audiences and not characteristic of traditional conceptions of the continent and its people as hopeless.

The prevalence of the Africa Rising discourse demonstrates the importance of the economy and development as sources of soft power in an African context (Li & Worm 2012). China's main appeal for Africa is its development model, which has led to its economic success, and its ability to provide FDI to the continent. This was expressed by African actors who admired China's economic success and considered it worthy of emulating. Chana's ability to invest in and fund African businesses without linking this aid to reform makes it an alternative to Western aid and a sought-after business partner for African investors, as indicated in the discussion on the funding of the African court. Furthermore, most of China's engagements in Africa are economic, such as its stake in one of Africa's largest banks, Standard Bank,[30] and the increase in its investment in Africa announced at FOCAC meetings.

Shared identity and history, as well as common areas of interest, are also strong sources of soft power among countries in SSA. This was reflected in the appeals to a pan-African identity based on a common colonial history, development challenges and future aspirations to create a sense of belonging and encourage countries to implement policies that will impact on desired relations with international institutions and enhance intra-continental trade.

Despite the slow economic growth in commodity-reliant countries from 2014, optimism about Africa's growth continued through 2015, but was characterised by a shift in the conversation, from a celebratory to a more cautious tone and a rethink of the investment strategy in Africa. Programming focused on reassuring audiences about continued growth and diversifying the economy through increased investment in other sectors such as manufacturing. The pan-African discourse also became stronger, with a focus on intra-continental integration, demonstrating how the continent was dealing with the current challenges with unity. On CGTN Africa, reinforcing the China–Africa

[30] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b4c8903c-aade-11e4-91d2-00144feab7de.html#axzz44iDBfAL4

relationship was also key to reassuring audiences about China's commitment to the continued growth of the continent. This relationship was framed as a partnership, and contrasted with one of dependency which has traditionally characterised Africa's relationship with the West. CGTN's strategy was to align Africa in relation to emerging global powers such as the BRICS countries, and away from the West, and to frame its relationship with Africa as a shift from dependency to partnership.

In contrast, economic coverage and the Africa Rising narrative were not dominant themes on AJE, which raised alternative discourses, through themes of human rights and liberalism. Where economic issues were discussed, they did not emphasise the continent's growth but highlighted the negative impact of this growth such as rising inequalities and poverty. This led to the construction of audiences as liberal and progressive, but socially conscious and with human rights values. This conception of audiences was also consistent in the news and talk show programmes. While CGTN and eNCA emphasised African solutions and new ways of imagining African audiences, AJE drew on traditional discourses about Africa, linking conflict in the continent to sectarian violence, and still considered the international community as a key actor in resolving African problems. The differences among the channels reflected their political and economic interests, which were also linked to their geographic areas of focus. Economic growth is more characteristic of SSA where the majority of resource-rich countries are based, and aligned to the interests of CGTN and eNCA in telling positive stories about the continent. Economic success is also a key source of soft power for China and South Africa, the countries of origin for both channels, although state influence was unintentional and indirect in the case of eNCA. On the other hand, AJE's focus on liberal values and pro-democracy is at the top of the agenda among the channel's primary audience in North Africa and the Arab world, who have been calling for change since the Arab Spring. AJE is in itself a source of soft power for Qatar, as its political values of human rights and democracy in a region characterised by authoritarianism have attracted global admiration and increased its credibility as a reliable source of information. This enhances the image of Qatar's cultural institutions and its international image, although this is threatened by Qatar's human rights controversies.

Also significant was the construction of a pan-African identity, which was again manifest on CGTN and eNCA. To create a sense of belonging and African solidarity, the channels appealed to a common colonial history, developmental challenges and future aspirations, which supported the argument of a united front in finding African solutions. These commonalities resonate with China, which is also a developing country with similar challenges, and serve as a useful public diplomacy strategy to influence African audiences. Nevertheless, this African identity was often contested, as demonstrated by the divisions in Africa's relationship with the ICC and intra-Africa trade initiatives. The factors that unite Africa, such as a colonial history, are also a source of divisions, as they have led to differences in language, governance and culture. As such not all issues will resonate with African audiences, resulting in the formation of sub-identities based on language, such as French- and English-speaking countries.

A common factor on all channels is the way they imagined African audiences as liberal and pro-democratic. This is evident in the coverage of political issues such as elections and terrorism. In constructing audiences, transnational channels have to balance competing political, economic and social interests irrespective of whether they are state-owned or independent. For instance, CGTN often plays the role of state media by playing down discourses that are sensitive to the state and its African partners such as human rights issues; yet it also emphasises democratic principles and citizen participation to maintain professional credibility among foreign audiences – which is key to remaining globally competitive and enhancing its global image. eNCA, on the other hand, did not completely escape influences associated with its country of origin, and demonstrated instances where its discourses were aligned to South Africa's foreign policy on Africa, even though this may not have been intentional. This demonstrates the informal role played by non-state actors in public diplomacy. While non-Western channels are a formidable challenge to well-established Western media institutions, the economic realities of the global broadcasting industry and audience consumption patterns will continue to impact on alternative ways of constructing African audiences. This was demonstrated by the eventual closure of eNCA's Africa division in October 2014 due to financial difficulties (Channel24 2015), and Al Jazeera America in April 2016 due to an 'unsustainable business model' (Al Jazeera America 2016).

Despite similarities, conflict coverage showed some differences among the channels. AJE's reporting drew on Western narratives of Africa's victimhood and dependence on the West, as coverage of terrorism in Nigeria demonstrates. While CGTN and eNCA's coverage of the incident focused on the response of African leadership to terrorism, AJE's report focused on the violence and linked it to sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians. The notion of African solutions was not manifested in AJE's coverage. Instead the attacks were framed as an international threat, hence the involvement of the international community. This involvement is aligned with discourses about the dominant West and dependent South, with the international community becoming a saviour that rushes to Africa's assistance. AJE's news trends during the periods analysed also show that African is considered important in times of conflict.

The audience constructions highlighted above were informed by media representatives and participants in media programmes through the structuring of discourses and power relations among the participants. This determined which discourses were dominant and eventually how audiences were imagined. In most cases, all channels had equal representation of views and time allocated to participants. However, strategies of nomination/exnomination and mediation by the programme presenter legitimised and/or delegitimised alternative discourses and how the various actors participated. Construction of audiences on CGTN Africa was largely informed by state and institutional actors such as representatives from the government and research experts, while participation from the general public was low. Although institutitional actors were widely used on eNCA and AJE, the broadcasters also had wider public participation through social media comments and public talk show discussions, as well as interviews with the public. This suggests that China's soft power in Africa is primarily targeted at political elites and middle-level interest groups rather than citizens, again a reflection of its political values that limit freedom of expression.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

Since the 2000s, economies in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant growth, with GDP increasing approximately 4.9% annually between 2000 to 2008 (Leke et al 2010, para. 1). Despite challenges, the continent's economic prospects remain strong given World Bank forecasting (World Bank 2018).

These developments have shifted perceptions of Africa as a 'dark continent' to a land of opportunities, which attracted the attention of international investors, keen to expand their markets. These investors are not only interested in commodities, which have traditionally driven much of FDI investment into the continent, but also other sectors such as telecommunications, giving rise to the proliferation of transnational media in the continent in the 2010s, particularly from the global South.

The broadcasting strategies of the new media players deviates from well-established global media which did not consider African audiences as a viable media market, until recently. They are focusing on marginalised parts of the world, leading to new ways of imagining Africa and in the process, creating new African audiences. These audiences are beyond the nation state and are part of a broader pan-African project to unite the continent for commercial purposes.

The objective of this research was to investigate how the new audiences were constructed by non-Western transnational news channels through discourse, during specific periods from 2013 to 2016. These channels include; CGTN Africa, eNCA and Al Jazeera English. To address this aim, it was important to first obtain an overview of the extent and nature of coverage about African issues through quantitative content analysis. This was followed by CDA to identify the discourses that informed audience conceptions.

The quantitative and qualitative findings revealed many similarities between CGTN Africa and eNCA compared to AJE. Both channels had a higher frequency of coverage

and similar discourses about Africa, which mirrored their geographical focus, their relationship with the continent and countries of origin (China and South Africa).

8.2 General patterns of coverage – 2014 – 2016

The analysis of the two-week periods from 2014 to 2016 revealed varied patterns across the three networks, however, there were more similarities between CGTN Africa and eNCA compared with AJE. These were evident in the volume of news, news themes, participants and geographical context of news. These trends can largely be attributed to the interests of the broadcasters, and the context in which they operate, which impacted on news gathering and selection, as well as news values.

News themes

During the 2014 period, CGTN Africa and eNCA reported the highest incidence of African news. News coverage on both channels was also largely driven by Africa's political and economic landscape, which saw the continent emerge as a key investment destination. This was reflected by the significant volume of economic and business themes in both channels. In contrast, AJE's coverage of Africa was dominated by law and human rights, as well as conflict themes, while the other channels had a wide range of issues, including conflict. This can partly be attributed to the political and economic interests of the channels which influenced their broadcasting strategies and news selection processes. For example, the interest in African audiences is largely a result of the growth of the African economy, which made for an interesting and positive narrative for Africa-based channels such as CGTN Africa and eNCA. From a political perspective, it is also connected with China's public diplomacy strategy and China-Africa relations. The same interests apply to eNCA, where cultural specificity as a South African channel may have contributed to news coverage. AJE's primary interest in the Arab world and Middle East also led to a more focus on events in North Africa and its #FreeAJStaff campaign.

It was not surprising then that AJE had the lowest volume of African news, throughout the periods selected. Coverage patterns on the channel in the 2014 period analysed were

also more aligned to traditional notions of Africa, with more focus on conflict-related themes of war and terror as well as human rights abuses. Despite conflict in parts of Africa, CGTN Africa and eNCA reportage was broader to include topics such as business which provided a more optimistic view. The African focus of eNCA and CGTN Africa also meant dedicated resources in the continent and editorial teams that are largely African which could have contributed to the use of 'cultural maps' in news selection and editorial decisions (Hall et al 1978, p. 54, Gans 1979, p. 39). Environmental, health and science issues received scant coverage in all channels.

Newsworthiness continued to drive news trends during the 1-14 September 2015 period, and this was evident in the high volume of event-oriented stories and issues of international interest, such as international sporting events and migration. As a result, the Rugby World Cup dominated coverage on both CGTN Africa and AJE.

Content analysis during this period included CGTN Africa and AJE due to the closure of eNCA in late 2014. The volume of war and terror reports that had characterised AJE's coverage in the 2014 period became low as the magnitude of attacks decreased during the 2015 period. AJE's strategic focus on the Arab world was reflected in increased frequency of the migration of Syrian refugees from 2.7% in the 2014 period analysed to 9% in the 2015 period analysed. This theme also gained international media attention in 2015.

During the two-week period analysed in 2015, CGTN continued to reaffirm the Africa rising narrative, however, the framing of Africa's success began to shift from a celebratory to a cautious tone and to include other perspectives which interrogated its impact for the wider society and slow economic growth in Africa, particularly in extractive industries and China's role in it. This led to focus on other sectors and continental issues such as integration of Africa trade. During this time, the frequency of economic and business was surpassed by sports, shifting from 23% to 12% of total coverage. There was also an emergence of new themes based on international events, resulting in prominent coverage of the 100-year anniversary of World War II, which increased the frequency of the military theme. World War II coverage presented China with the opportunity to project its power through coverage that showcased Beijing's

military capability in line with its goal to transform the country into a 'world class military power by 2050' (Estaban 2017). It also provided a Chinese perspective on World War II which established a connection between global events and China, supporting the notion of 'reversed domestication' (Atad 2017).

During 1-14 September 2016, coverage patterns were similar to the previous two-week periods analysed in 2014 and 2015, however, there were significant changes in CGTN, with the channel rebranding from CCTV to CGTN and CGTN Africa. Another notable trend was an increase in China's visibility in the news. This was characterised by manifest themes about China's positive role in Africa and its relationship with Africa with the introduction of news segments - *Fruits of Co-operation* and *60 Years of Sino-Africa Friendship*. This indicates China's growing confidence on the world stage in consistency with President Xi's adoption of a more assertive approach to foreign policy which aims to profile China as a wealthy, developed military power by 2050 (Swaine 2015; Esteban 2017).

A key trend in the period analysed in 2016 was the continued decline in the framing of Africa rising, with increasing emphasis on the diversification of Africa's economy and reinforcement of China's commitment to Africa's development, as well as international relations. This decline coincided with a decrease in China-Africa trade in 2016 from its peak in 2014 (China-Africa Research Initiative 2017). These trends were demonstrated through the decline in the frequency of the economic and business theme, and dominance of international relations, which had been increasing steadily over the periods analysed. Most reports on international relations focused on China, which demonstrated its increasing confidence as a world power. International relations is one of the key features of China's foreign policy, and has been re-affirmed under Xi's leadership, with the establishment of a new model of Major-Country Relations with great powers and emphasis on multilateralism, co-operation and peaceful relations with its neighbours (Dai 2016, Minseon 2015; Esteban 2015;). Despite CGTN's rebranding, the volume of global news did not necessarily increase, rather domesticated to provide Chinese and African perspectives.

In AJE, sports remained the dominant theme in the 2016 period analysed, followed by politics and war and terrorism. War and terrorism contributed 12% to total news coverage, which was lower than the 2014 period analysed (25%). The prevalence of war coverage suggests that the channel's interest in Africa was motivated by conflict, in line with traditional Western treatment of Africa in the news.

Geographical context

Trends on the geographical context of news throughout the years were in most cases aligned to the news themes and geographical interests of the broadcasters. Given the high incidence of African news and geographical focus, the majority of reports on CGTN and eNCA were set within African locations and contexts. In addition, eNCA's cultural and geographic proximity to Africa also contributed to high frequency of African news and participants. South Sudan, Central African Republic and Egypt also appeared more frequently across all channels, as a result of the prominence in conflict reportage in the two-week period analysed in 2014. In addition to North African countries, Syria, the United States and Europe were also the most frequent locations in AJE. The frequency of non-Middle-Eastern locations on AJE could be linked to newsworthiness following flooding which attracted international attention. These trends back up previous assertions in the literature that the geographical and cultural proximity of TV channels may increase audience preference for programming that is closest to their own culture and location (Straubhaar 1996).

Another significant observation on the geographical trends is the treatment of the country of origin of the various news networks which showed evidence of reversed domestication (Atad 2017). This relationship was true of eNCA and CGTN. eNCA had the highest frequency of its country of origin, South Africa, with 11% of items set within the country, while CGTN had 1% of news pertaining to China. Nevertheless, CGTN's coverage of China began to increase from the periods analysed in 2015 and 2016 given the high number of stories about China.

The geographical context of news was also linked to the political interests of the channels. eNCA had the highest coverage of South Africa while CGTN's coverage of

Chinese issues was initially low but became more frequent and specific over the years. This was an indication of China's increased engagement in the continent and public diplomacy role, which is likely to become more visible as relations between Africa and China deepen. Xi Jinping's consolidated power as CPC leader and China's President for life is also likely to strengthen his control of the media both internally and internationally, and this has implications on China's foreign policy and public diplomacy strategy in Africa (Sun 2016). China's control of the media has increased since Xi's appointment, and it can be expected that given his renewed power, CGTN Africa's role will increase China's ideological influence, and in turn, the conception of African audiences. While China's ideological influence on government policy in Africa is still contested, it can be argued that its deepening relations with Africa presents an opportunity to exercise influence. China's development model is admired by many African leaders as an alternative to Western models and therefore a source of its soft power (CCTV Africa 2013; Jura & Kaluzynska 2013; Kurlantzick 2006). Furthermore, professional exchange initiatives between China and Africa such as China's training of African journalists and other professionals provides an opportunity for ideological influence (Sun 2016).

In contrast, there was no coverage of Qatar on AJE – an effort by the channel to maintain objectivity and international credibility to an international audience. However, AJE's editorial independence is limited as Qatar does exert influence on issues of key importance such as its relations with Saudi Arabia and has the power to censor the channel's content on issues that are considered divisive to Arab viewers (Samuel-Azran 2014; Ayish 2002). Although evidence of this interference has so far been identified on the Arabic channel, Al Arabiya, the potential exists for similar influence on AJE, if Qatar's interests outside the Arab World become at stake.

News Sources

The analysis also looked at actors who participated in the news, their roles and the organisations and countries they were affiliated to. The findings showed similar trends throughout the two-week periods analysed, but also differences in the participants' country of affiliation. All broadcasters had a higher participation of institutional actors,

especially from the government and the private sector. CTGN Africa and eNCA's economic interests were reflected in the high participation of actors from the private sector, while AJE's focus on political issues was demonstrated in the low participation of private sector representatives. However, there were some differences in the national affiliation of participants. Only eNCA and CGTN used a high number of sources from African countries such as Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya. These findings correspond with the geographical context of the majority of news items in both networks. On the other hand, AJE had a high participation of Western actors compared to African ones. Some of the participants were affiliated to international organisations and involved in interpreting African issues. Despite AJE's vision to give a voice to the voiceless and marginalised parts of the world, African actors were still considered passive and given a voice by the international community, in alignment with Western conceptions of the continent.

The significance of social actors on the construction of audiences was further examined through discourse analysis, as it enabled a close analysis of the nature of their participation and discourses they legitimised.

8.3 Discourses that shaped the construction of audiences

The findings of the study also revealed a consistency between dominant news themes and discourses. The focus on economic coverage on CGTN and eNCA contributed to the dominance of neoliberal and pan-African discourses, with both channels tapping into the Africa growth narrative in their news analysis and talk show discussions. These discourses shaped the conception of audiences as investors and entrepreneurs; consumers; self-reliant, as well as being part of a collective pan-African community. The pan-African discourse advanced political and economic unity of the continent but was contextualised to drive Africa's economic agenda such as continental integration. This application of pan-Africanist thought shows its historical evolution from a strong political manifestation to a more economic one in response to current challenges facing the continent. In its inception, pan-Africanism was a response to European imperialism, colonialism and racial subjugation of African people which were major challenges at the

time (Geiss 1974:6). While nineteen century forms of slavery and colonialism have been officially abolished, developmental problems persist, and many African leaders believe the solution lies in building strong economies driven by African actors. AJE on the other hand discursively imagined audiences from the perspectives of social justice and human rights.

Dominant discourses

On CGTN, the optimism generated by Africa's growth continued despite the slow economic growth in commodity-reliant countries from the 2014 period analysed. However, from the period analysed in 2015, the discourse was more cautionary about Africa's sustained growth and reflected changes in China's investment strategy in Africa and it's evolving relations with the continent. These discourses served a crucial role in reinforcing China-Africa relations to reassure audiences and the world about China's commitment to Africa's growth. This was evident in content that highlighted continued growth and diversification of the economy through investment in other sectors such as manufacturing. In the period analysed in 2016, the benefits of the China-Africa relationship were driven through two special news segments, *Fruits of Cooperation* and *60 years of Sino-Africa Friendship*. These segments are evidence of escalated public and cultural diplomacy efforts by China, which extended beyond formal state and institutional interaction to engaging with African citizens at community level. These results confirm findings of the quantitative analysis during the two-week period in 2016, which was also characterised by rising coverage of Chinese issues. While CGTN's focus on Chinese initiatives in Africa is akin to 'positive reporting' given its focus on collective achievements, it is also reinforcing stereotypes of Africa's dependence on external actors (Gagliadone 2013:26). Furthermore, it contradicts the discourses of a rising Africa that is solving its own problems without external assistance. These findings indicate that conceptions of Africa and its audiences are not static, but evolving in line with maturing China-Africa relations and China's foreign policy agenda. The question of whether 'Africa Rising' will be replaced by 'China Rising' and overlaps between the two remains to be seen.

As with CGTN Africa, economic and business coverage was also prevalent in eNCA. As a result, news reports and discussions also tapped into the Africa rising narrative and a primary focus on continental issues, with presenters and reporters describing Africa as one of the "world's fastest growing economies"; "a market to off-set losses in the US and Europe", and "open for business".

Moreover, despite eNCA's independence, its constructions of African audiences at times reflected South Africa's business perspective, albeit unintentionally. This demonstrates the role of non-traditional diplomatic actors in conducting public diplomacy. The broadcaster constructed audiences as investors and entrepreneurs, consumers and progressive citizens who considered human rights important. These discourses are aligned to South Africa's neoliberal policies which began in 1994 but also broader pan-African discourses of an economically and politically united continent aimed at unlocking Africa's development potential (Magubane 2004).

In contrast, economic coverage and the Africa rising narrative were not dominant on AJE, which raised alternative discourses on human rights and values such as democracy and social justice. Where economic issues were discussed, they did not emphasise the continent's growth but highlighted the negative impact of Africa's growth such as rising inequalities and poverty. This led to the construction of audiences as liberal and progressive, but socially conscious and with human rights values. While CGTN and eNCA emphasised African solutions and advanced new ways of imagining African audiences, AJE drew on traditional discourses about Africa, linking conflict in the continent to sectarian violence. The high involvement of Western actors in AJE's discussions also indicated that the channel still considered the international community crucial to resolving African problems.

The differences among the channels reflected their political and economic interests which were also linked to their geographical areas of focus. Economic growth is more characteristic of sub Saharan Africa where the majority of resource-rich countries are based, and aligned to the interests of CGTN and eNCA to provide an alternative perspective and highlight the continent's achievements. Economic success is also a key source of soft power to China and South Africa, the countries of origin for both

channels, even though state influence was unintentional and indirect in the case of eNCA. On the other hand, AJE's focus on liberal values and democracy and human rights is of importance given its role in promoting political change and social transformation to the Arab world where many governments are still authoritative. AJE is itself a source of soft power for Qatar given that its political values of human rights and democracy in a region characterised by authoritarianism has attracted global admiration and increased its credibility as a reliable source of information. This enhances the image of Qatar's cultural institutions and its international image. However, Qatar's controversial human rights record creates a conflict of interest, giving rise to double-standards which compromises AJE's image and reputation.

Also significant was the construction of a pan-African identity, which was again manifest on CGTN and eNCA, particularly in the 2015 and 2016 periods analysed. To create a sense of belonging and African solidarity, the channels appealed to a common colonial history, developmental challenges and future aspirations, which were also used to support the argument of a united front to find African solutions. These commonalities also resonated with China, which is also a developing country with similar challenges, and serves as a useful public diplomacy strategy to influence African audiences. Nevertheless, this African identity was often contested as demonstrated by the divisions in Africa's relationship with the ICC and intra-Africa trade initiatives such as TFIA. Furthermore, the factors that unite Africa such as colonial history are also a source of division, having also led to differences in language, governance and culture. As such, not all issues will resonate with African audiences, resulting in the formation of sub-identities based on language, such as French speaking and English speaking countries. This creation of a collective African community also implied homogeneity of the various countries which is characteristic of mainstream global media's conceptions of Africa, suggesting that audience constructions were also influenced by traditional media values. Imagining audiences as part of an African community demonstrates the pan-African nature of the audience conception project and its commercial underpinnings.

These findings illustrate that the construction of African audiences is complex and often contradictory as it also demands that the media balance competing political, economic

and social interests irrespective of whether they are state-owned or independent. For instance, while CGTN's reporting during these periods reflected China's interests, it also emphasised democratic principles and citizen participation which is at times at odds with the authoritarian state and its human rights record. This also challenges criticism that China is supporting authoritarian states in Africa. eNCA on the other hand did not completely escape its South African association, with some of its discourses consistent with the country's foreign policy on Africa.

This study has shown that while non-Western channels are a formidable challenge to well-established Western media institutions, the economic realities of the global broadcasting industry and audience consumption patterns will continue to impact on alternative ways of constructing African audiences. This was evident in the closure of eNCA's Africa division in October 2014 due to financial difficulty, and AJE America in April 2016 due to an 'unsustainable business model' (Channel24 2015; AJE America 2016, para. 1).

Participants

The social actors who participated in programmes as interviewees or commentators, together with media practitioners played a key role in how audiences were conceptualised. These actors, most of whom were affiliated to African countries and institutions informed conceptions through the structuring of discourses and power relations between them. This determined which discourses became dominant and eventually how audiences were imagined. In most cases, all channels had equal representation of views and time allocated to participants. However, discursive strategies and mediation by programme presenters legitimised and delegitimised alternative discourses and how the various actors participated. As the content analysis has demonstrated, institutional actors were the most dominant participants, compared to the private sector, civil society or individuals. In the case of CGTN Africa, government representatives and research experts were the most frequent participants, whereas participation from the public was low.

CGTN's focus on macro-level issues (i.e. large-scale investments and high profile events) also led to content that was more accessible to policy makers and business leaders as opposed to the public or small businesses. These audiences are decision-makers who facilitate China's engagement with Africa, and therefore a key target for the network. The news section, *60 Years of Sino-Africa Friendship* was the only instance where ordinary citizens, both Chinese and African actively were visible. China's soft power in Africa is therefore primarily conducted through political elites and middle level interest groups rather than citizens - a reflection of its political values which limit freedom of expression. Nevertheless, there is a move towards people diplomacy. On the other hand, eNCA and AJE had wider public participation through social media comments and public talk show discussions as well as interviews with the public.

Based on these findings, broadcasters with strategic relations with the continent are more committed to African programming and creating alternative African audiences, despite their political and economic motivations. Even though there are differences, a common factor in all channels was the conception of African audiences as liberal and pro-democratic, as demonstrated by coverage of elections and terrorism.

The type of audience identities created also underscore the importance of economic growth as a catalyst for changing perceptions about Africa and creating new identities. This can be likened to the role of capitalism in the creation of new nations during Benedict Anderson's time.

8.4 Scope and limitations of study

The types of audiences constructed by the channels were limited by the objectives of the channels, which shaped the discourses and selection of participants. These objectives were largely informed by economic and political interests which limited the conception to elitist audiences at the exclusion of ordinary citizens whose voices continue to be suppressed. Human rights and democracy were also imagined as important to audiences, however this excluded different perspectives on democracy. This limitation suggests that while various types of audiences can be created, it is impossible for the media to

know and address all audiences, and even if they did, their conceptions might be different from those of the actual audience. Producers determine which of the various conceptions of the audience will be more practical and aligned to their objectives, however, they don't have complete control of this process, as it is also shaped by external factors, such as the political, economic, social and cultural context in which they operate, as well as changing audience needs. These contexts are not only at regional African level, but also local, global and in the domestic environment of the broadcasters' countries of origin. These limitations demonstrate the variable nature of audiences and the complexity of their creation, which is a negotiated struggle among various actors involved, including audiences themselves whose tastes and behaviour changes. Audience constructions will therefore continue to evolve.

Furthermore, imagining audiences as a homogenous pan-African community is further limited by the multi-faceted nature of audiences, given their multiple identities and interests. In addition to their African identity, audiences are also part of various communities and identities that may be linked with nation states, ethnic groups, ideologies, among others. This brings in various perspectives about what it means to be African.

The scope of this research was limited to 'how' audiences were constructed but not the reasons behind these conceptions. This allowed me to focus on the audience construction process and conduct in-depth analysis of the discourses that shaped their conception. The reasons behind these conceptions can be further explored through interviews with media practitioners to examine the role of news values and organisational practices in influencing media discourse.

This study involved data collection over a period of time, which was impacted by programming changes as expected in a study of this nature. Changes to the programming schedule at AJE and eNCA contributed to some differences in the data analysed for the period under study. The talkshow programme *SouthtoNorth* was discontinued in AJE from 2014 while the eNCA Africa channel was decommissioned in October 2014. Therefore, my analysis for the 2015 and 2016 periods was based on CGTN and AJE, and excludes the programme, *SouthtoNorth*. To maintain a

representative sample, the talk show data in AJE was supplemented by additional news items. The changes did however allow me to incorporate emerging elements, continuities and discontinuities that contributed to more robust analysis that reflected the strategies and complexities that characterise pan-African broadcasting.

The closure of eNCA also problematises its suitability as a comparative case study, however, its inclusion added an important perspective of an independent African player and a useful comparison of different broadcasting models. It also provides a historical account of pan-African media and construction of audiences.

Further limitations of the study relate to the sampling procedures used due to an inadequate sample and interruptions in the recording mechanism. This resulted in the application of non-probability sampling which limited the generalisability of news coverage patterns across the three channels. The dearth of transnational non-Western media entities with a focus on Africa or the global South meant that there was an inadequate sampling frame from which to apply probability sampling. I therefore employed less formal techniques in the selection of news channels for comparative analysis. Despite the imperfections and contradictions associated with these channels, their inclusion provides a vital foundation for understanding the latest developments in the pan-African media industry, from which further studies can build upon as the industry matures. These inconsistencies also highlight the economic realities and challenges of serving African audiences, as well as resistance by non-Western actors, which allows us to engage with the contradictions and complexities. Their exclusion would have further marginalized African research perspectives.

Sampling was also impacted by the loss of the satellite signal during the recording, resulting in incomplete data and decision to use convenience sampling. While attempts were made to obtain recorded material through alternative sources, these were not feasible given the cost and unavailability of online archives. The findings were therefore limited to the two-week periods sampled.

Despite the limitations, the types of audiences identified in this study has important implications for viewers and how they are conceptualised in future. They allow actual

audiences to forge new identities and become part of imagined communities beyond their nation states. This broadens their understanding of this vast and diverse continent which has the potential to facilitate economic and social change, particularly in trade and cultural exchange.

Furthermore, the emergence of regional broadcasters in a continent that has not previously had a pan-African or transnational news channel that deliberately targets African audiences is also providing viewers with a regional perspective of news and information in addition to local and national offerings. More importantly, they are providing viewers with a platform to share their perspectives on a regional and sometimes international stage[31] as opposed to relying on others to define their reality. Although institutional actors were actively involved in conceptualizing audiences, the possibility for diverse voices exists as more broadcasters enter the African market and new audiences are created.

The success of CGTN and AJE demonstrates the viability of the African media market and demand for African stories, which is a promising opportunity to attract the interest of other players with different and perhaps more sustainable broadcasting models.[32] This presents an opportunity for a competitive African media industry and the construction of more diverse styles of imagining audiences beyond economic and political orientations. Diversity in turn advances alternative discourses and gives more audiences a voice. It is expected that some of these new styles and discourses may positively contribute to changing perceptions and media representations of Africa and its people.

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[31] The regional channels are accessible outside Africa through arrangements with other international media companies. For example, eNCA was available on to UK viewers through the Sky digital satellite platform.

[32] SABC has made another attempt into continental broadcasting, and there are plans for the launch of *Newzroom Afrika*, a black-owned 24-hour news satellite channel to replace *Afro Worldview*. Given its black ownership structure, this new channel further opens-up the possibility for the construction of new African audience based on racial identity/black-oriented. Business Day TV is another channel accessible to Southern African viewers through DSTV, with specific focus on small business, entrepreneurship and personal finance, presenting an opportunity for other audience constructions. There are also opportunities for partnerships with established media groups such as the one between Sky News and BDTV, where Sky News crosses over to BDTV for a segment of its Africa news (Sky News (2018). BDTV's focus on micro businesses further opens possibilities for the creation of new African audiences.

Conceptions of audiences will continue to change as the African context and the continent's relationship with the rest of the world evolves. This presents opportunities for future studies to examine how notions of African audiences evolve at different historical moments.

8.5 Contribution of study and future research

The new conceptions of African audiences as illustrated in this research have implications for ongoing debates on international news flows, and the role of the global South. It is contributing to the disruption of traditional notions about the value of African audiences and discourses about the continent. On the other hand, these constructions are driven by foreign media such as CGTN, while pan-African-owned news networks have failed, as illustrated by the closure of eNCA and others before it. This continues to raise questions about Africa's capability to successfully construct its own audiences and news agenda, consequently reinforcing traditional stereotypes of Africa's reliance on external assistance. The involvement of non-Western media might create an impression that these developments are another form of media imperialism, however, as I have argued in this thesis, media imperialism is a simplistic model for explaining these trends, as it does not account for the complexity of African audience construction. As the findings demonstrate, African actors played an active role in the construction of audiences as sources of information and policy makers who support the existence of foreign media networks such as CGTN.

The prevalence of the Africa rising narrative and constructions based on neoliberal principles demonstrates the importance of the economy and development as sources of soft power in an African context. China's main appeal to Africa is its development model which has led to its economic success, as well as the ability to provide much-needed FDI to the continent. Furthermore, most of China's engagement in Africa is economic, such as its stake in one of Africa's largest banks, Standard Bank, and the increase in its investment in Africa as announced in the 2015 FOCAC meeting (England 2015).

The research findings add significant value for literature on international communications and global media as it locates these debates within the perspectives of pan-African and emerging powers. It highlights new trends and insights in international news flows as they impact African audiences, as well as the complexities that characterise the construction of audiences. The recent expansion of non-Western media players who are specifically targeting the regional African market is advancing new ways of thinking about African audiences. As such, this study provides a historical contribution to the different phases of audience construction and the role of non-Western media in the continent. The inclusion of eNCA, an African-owned channel also fills the knowledge gap that exists in global media studies as it provides a pan-African perspective on how Africans imagine their own audiences. Secondly, the comparative approach provides an analysis across three different approaches to transnational broadcasting – state-controlled, hybrid and independent media. Thirdly, while the focus of the study is not specifically on media representation, it contributes to the broader and ongoing debate about the image of Africa and coverage of African issues, as it may illuminate some of the root causes behind existing perceptions of the continent. This study therefore provides insights on the effectiveness of African and other non-Western solutions to alternative discourses about Africa.

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APPENDIX A: EXTRACTS

DATE	CHANNEL	PROGRAMME	THEME
CGTN Africa			
Talkshow topics - 16:30 - 17:00			
26 May 2013	Africa's oil boom	Talk Africa	Economy
20 October 2013	Kenyan cases explore ICC's soft underbelly	Talk Africa	Africa's relationship with the ICC
29 June 2015	Tripartite free trade area (TFIA) from Cairo to Cape Town	Talk Africa	Economy
News reports - 18:00 - 19:00 rolling news			
25 May 2014	Elections in Egypt	Africa Live	Elections in Egypt
21 May 2014	Terror attacks in Nigeria	Africa Live	Terrorism in Nigeria
6 June 2014	Labour unrest in South Africa	Africa Live	Economy
3 & 4 September 2016	G20 Summit	Africa Live	Economy
10 September 2016	2nd Investing in Africa Summit – Guangzhou, China	Africa Live	Economy
1 September 2016	Industrial Development Zones and Egypt's Suez economy	Africa Live: Fruits of Cooperation	China-Africa relations
3 September 2016	How China has helped alleviate humanitarian crisis in Africa by providing aid and capacity to the areas affected	Africa Live: Fruits of Cooperation	China-Africa relations
10 September 2016	Fruits of Cooperation - China's involvement in helping to solve some of Africa's problems	Africa Live: Fruits of Cooperation	China-Africa relations
2 September, 2016	Africans in China - Nashiri Ramazani	Africa Live: 60 years of Friendship	China-Africa relations
1 September 2016	Liu Hongwu: Cultural and Education Exchange	Africa Live: 60 years of Friendship	China-Africa relations
Al Jazeera English			
Talkshow topics - 14:30 - 15:30 GMT – Podcasts			
21 July 2013	Egypt: A coup or a second revolution	South 2 North	Elections in Egypt
10 November 2013	Is the International Crimial Court racist?	South 2 North	Africa's relationship with the ICC
1 June 2013	Banking on Africa's economic boom	South 2 North	Economy
News Hour - 20:30 - 21:30 rolling news			
21 May 2014	Terrorist attack in Nigeria	News Hour	Terrorism in Nigeria
23 May 2014	ICC trial of former DRC warlord, Germaine Katanga	News Hour	Africa's relationship with the ICC
1 & 3 Sept 2016	Deployment of troops in South Sudan	News Hour	Conflict
26 May 2014	Egypt elections	News Hour	Elections in Egypt
eNCA			
Talk show topics - 11:30 - 12:00			

19 May 2014	Boko Haram launches new offensive in the North of Nigeria	Africa 360	Terrorism
9 & 16 Nov 2013	Africa's competitiveness	Africa 360	Africa's economy
22 October 2013	The International Criminal Court's role in Africa	Africa 360	Africa's economy
06-Jul-13	Egypt instability	Africa 360	Elections in Egypt
News items - 00:00 - 01:00			
22 May 2014	SMME sector in Africa - Mobile Money	Africa Edition	Economy
23 May 2014	Business, East Africa Region	Africa Edition	Economy
3 June 2014	Business in Africa	Africa Edition	Economy
19 May 2014	Boko Haram Terror attacks in Nigeria	Africa Edition	Terrorism in Nigeria