

https://dspace.org/

The influence of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) on development: a case study of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana

Nkwanyana, Nomusa

2022
https://hdl.handle.net/10539/34183

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

University of the Witwatersrand: Department of International Relations



The Influence of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) on Development: A Case Study of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty of Humanities by:

Nomusa Nkwanyana

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Under the supervision of: Prof Gilbert Khadiagala

Declaration

I, Nomusa Nkwanyana, declare that this research report is my own unaided work except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise. This research report is submitted towards the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations by coursework and research report at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination at any other university.

…….

Nomusa Nkwanyana

Signed at …… On the..... Day of …… 20….

Acknowledgements

A love letter to all my well-wishers

I would like to pass my sincere gratitude to everyone who encouraged me and wished me well, without whose support this research would not have materialised. A major thank you goes to my mother and father for their insight, support, sacrifices, advice and help which were invaluable in this research. I would also like to thank my dear friend and massive well-wisher Savyasaci Das, thank you for being an inspirational person. Thank you for encouraging me to "just go for it". My heartfelt gratitude also goes to my mentor Mbuso, wow… without your constructive and valuable advice, counsel, consent care and sacrifices I don't think I would have finished this research. We have walked a long walk, and I am forever grateful. I would also like to thank my friend: Odwa for the constant care and encouragement and every time I was at my wits end. My deepest gratitude to: Eddy for the encouragement and lifting up my spirits: my sister Mbali for being my midnight oil burner buddy and waiting up with me almost every night until the end of this research: to my brother Sabelo for being considerate throughout this research. Thank you to all my friends Kgosi, Lenny, Bongani, Mpumi, Marcus, Malebo, Narrotam Das, Nokulunga, Rabelani, Paramahamsa Das, Sinesipho, Tumi, Tshepiso and many others.

Last but not least I would like to express my heartfelt thank you to my supervisor Prof Khadiagala a million thanks to you. Thank you for your advice, patience, investing time in me and believing in me. Thank you for guiding me, giving me constructive feedback being a walking library, a true intellectual and the personification of Ubuntu throughout this research, thank you so much.

I thank God and my ancestors for everything. I am humbled by what you can do for a rascal and a wretched child such as me. Thank you, namazwi anginawo okubonga ngoba uyazi ukuthi kwakunzima kangakanani ukuyenza le- research. Ngaphandle kothando lwako ngabe ngaphalala njengamanzi.

This research is dedicated to God and all His children particularly those who have taken birth in Africa. This research is dedicated to you.

Abstract

This study explores the influence of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) on development using the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana as case studies. Africa's development policies are decided on by the West because there has been a heavy dependence on Western epistemologies due to the legacy of colonialism. This research situated itself in the de-colonial theory and it defies the bombardment of Eurocentric development policies that have been imposed on African states without their input or participation. This follows centuries of colonisation and entrapment within the colonial matrix of power that has side-lined and even destroyed indigenous knowledge systems in African and the Global South. This study explores alternative ways of thinking about Africa's development and it foregrounds IKS and other downtrodden knowledge systems that have aided in the development of sub-states and states such as the Royal Bafokeng Nation and Botswana. This study provided a critique of the scholarly discipline of International Relations which has neglected Africa and its epistemologies from the discipline while, perpetuating the colonial perceptions of Africa and pathologising the continent as poor, war ridden and underdeveloped.

This study used secondary data to analyse and fully assess the influence of IKS on development. This study centred itself as a critical analysis of IKS and its influence on development. Through the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, this study found out that IKS has played a fundamental role in the development of these two case studies. The case studies revealed a shared reliance upon the pre-colonial political systems which resulted in the avoidance of the resource curse. Avoiding the resource curse resulted in substantial mineral revenue that was invested in the development of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. However, both these case studies have benefited from other variables such as foreign investment that have played a supporting role in the development of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana and in strengthening their economies. This study also found that although IKS has an influence on development, there are other variables at play leading to the actual formulation of a developmental program which is African-oriented.

Glossary

Difaqane: period (1800-1830) of turbulence, mass migration and social transformation accompanied by frequent destruction of life and property in Southern Africa.

Dikgoro: wards/ ward council

Dikgosana: clan heads

Kgosi: Tswana word for king (*Dikgosi* many kings)

Lekgotla: general assembly held to debate and decide important cases that come before the *kgosi* / public meeting or court

Mephato: age regiments

Ubuntu/ Botho: humanity towards others. A humanist philosophy, ethic and /or ideology.

Voortrekkers: pioneer Afrikaners who set out on the Great Trek from the Cape Colony from 1834 to the 1840s and founded the South African Republic and the Orange Free State

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
BIP	Botswana Independence Party
BBP	Bechuanaland People's Party
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
DDF	Domestic Development Fund
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IKS	Indigenous Knowledge Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
NARSSA	National Archive South Africa
NGO	Non- Government Organisations
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
SAHA	South African History Archive
SAP's	Structural Adjustment Policies
SWOP	Society, Work and Politics Institute
PQLI	Physical Quality of life
RBA	Royal Bafokeng Administration
RBF	Royal Bafokeng Finances

RBH	Royal Bafokeng Holdings
RBPlat	Royal Bafokeng Platinum
RBR	Royal Bafokeng Resources
UKZN	University of Kwa-Zulu Natal
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
ZAR	Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek

Table of Contents

Pages

Preface 1

Chapter I: Introduction 3

1.1 Historical Context 5
1.2 Rationale 11
1.3 Aims and objectives 13
1.4 Research questions 15
1.5 Case selection… 16
1.6 Chapter outline 18

Chapter II: Literature review 20

2.1 Introduction… 20
2.2 Colonialism and Decolonisation… 21
2.3 Development 26
2.4 Theoretical framework 32

Chapter III: Methodology 34

3.1 Introduction… 34
3.2 Methodology… 34
3.3 The Archive 38
3.4 Measuring Development 39
3.5 Conclusion… 40

Chapter IV: The Rupture: The Shattering of The Colonial Illusion, The Roadmap to IKS 42

4.1 Introduction: The Impact of Colonialism 42
4.2 Development 45
4.3 Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) 50
4.4 Culture 53
4.5 Critique of IR 55
4.6 Chapter Summary… 56

Chapter V: The case study of the Royal Bafokeng 58

5.1 Introduction 58
5.2 History… 61
5.3 History and genealogy of the Bafokeng of Phokeng… 62
5.4 Economic Integration and Political Rule 65
5.5 Land Acquisition and Missionary… 68
5.6 Missionaries 69

5.7 Missionaries and Education… 73
5.8 Platinum Mining… 75
5.9 Apartheid and Platinum mining… 76
5.10 The End of Apartheid and Platinum Revenue.....78
5.11 Analysis..... 84
5.12 Conclusion… 87

Chapter VI: The case study of Botswana 89

6.1 Introduction… 89
6.2 Historical background 91
6.3 Pre-colonial history and genealogy of Botswana..... 92
6.4 Bechuanaland Protector and Colonial Rule 96
6.5 The Road to Independence..... 101
6.6 Diamonds and Development..... 106
6.7 Political transition/ continuity and political legitimacy 107
6.8 Debswana..... 107
6.9 The "Indigenous" Developmental state 108
6.10 Analysis..... 112
6.11 Conclusion… 115

Chapter VII: Discussion and conclusion..... 117

7.1 Introduction… 117
7.2 Conclusion… 127

7.3 **Bibliography** 131

Preface

Africa today is in the midst of a development crisis and it is facing the bleak reality of severe underdevelopment, increasing poverty and the resource curse. The most distressing element of Africa's underdevelopment is that its development strategies have been outsourced from foreign development agencies, rendering African states onlookers to the decisions made about their futures. It is ironic that Africa finds itself in a development crisis and has been under-developing since the late 1970s, given that the continent has the largest natural resource wealth in the world. Moreover, these natural resources have led to significant revenue and economic growth for the global North since 2008. However, this economic growth and revenue has not been felt in Africa as, it has not brought about poverty alleviation for the vast portion of the population on the continent. Instead, African states with an abundance of natural resources often fall victim to the Dutch disease also known as the 'paradox of plenty', the irony that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to behave badly in terms of economic growth and prosperity than those with little or no natural resources. It is from this paradox that one enters into a critical enquiry about Africa's condition of underdevelopment as emanating from the historical conditions viz. global inequality and economic asymmetry resulting from colonialism.

Walter Rodney (1973) unflinchingly places African underdevelopment squarely on colonialism and mercantile capitalism expansion by the West. Therefore Africa's underdevelopment cannot be clearly articulated outside a full and clear understanding of the historical, discursive and structural context of modernity, imperialism, colonialism, decolonization, neo-colonialism, neo-liberalism and globalization (Appadurai, 1996; Paolini, 1999; Attwell, 2005; Geshiere et al. 2008). Conklin (1997) and Stoler (2002) posit that development emanating from the West is understood "from the empire as the locus of enunciation, imperialism and colonialism and grand civilising missions". This is to say that development was meant to bring about civilization to the uncivilised. Ndlovu Gastheni (2013, 96) stresses that Europeans were agents of development and Africans were objects of development. Thus, development in the context of imperial global designs meant opening up the African continent for economic exploitation.

This research carefully studied and took the aforementioned statements into consideration and critically explored the harsh reality of Africa's underdevelopment and it aimed to discover alternative solutions to Africa's development crisis through Indigenous Knowledge Systems

(IKS) which the Asian Tigers have claimed to be their secret to economic growth and development in the last four decades. This research illustrates how colonialism stunted Africa's growth and development through a process of devaluation and erasure of African cultures and indigenous ways of life, including the IKS. This state of affairs contributed to the thinking around the reconstruction of the African economy, culture, and politics; and the views expressed have been regarded as decolonial thinking, decolonial theory and discourses concerned with unpacking coloniality. IKS is one of the alternative theories that have emerged from the de-colonial school and IKS has been used in an attempt to promote development. International Relations (IR), as a discipline, has been described as sitting in the prison of colonial modernity because it has failed to expand its scope of knowledge outside the Eurocentric theory even when dealing with cases in the global South. As a result, IR has failed to provide nuanced discussions and solutions for an issue facing the global South such as development because of its colonial and Eurocentric lens. This research provides a critique of IR in relation to how it has contributed to the pathologising of Africa as underdeveloped. IR has also failed to expand its scope of knowledge to include theories and knowledges from the Global South because it is locked in the prison of Eurocentric 'othering' project which is a legacy of colonialism.

In the recent years, Africa and the global South in general, have been looking towards their indigenous knowledges as a way of alleviating their challenges with regards to underdevelopment, economic growth and poverty reduction. This was inspired by the success and economic development of East Asian tigers and the influence of their indigenous development policies such as Confucianism in China and Swaraj and Swadeshi in India. This research focuses on the African indigenous knowledges and the IKS influences on development. Recently, African countries and kingdoms such as the Royal Bafokeng Kingdom and Botswana have also claimed to use IKS to promote development. This research tries to survey the impact of IKS in the context of Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. The Royal Bafokeng and Botswana are the case studies of this research study. The research is interested in teasing out similarities and differences between the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana; and determine whether IKS in these contexts was eked out by other imported knowledge systems or no importation of any knowledge systems were implemented.

Chapter One: Introduction

"The crisis of development is a serious problem facing Africa. This is because the continent has remained largely underdeveloped despite the presence of huge mineral and human resources" (Ikenna, 2009: 354). It is unfortunate that despite the presence of vast natural and human resources in the African continent, economic growth has dwindled due to commodity prices in the global arena. Africa is considered the world's poorest and most underdeveloped continent according to the World Bank ranking of 2013. High levels of illiteracy, low levels of natural resource management, lack of basic infrastructure, malnutrition and poor health care besiege the vast portions of Africa's population. The continent also struggles with political instability, high mortality rates as well as poor social infrastructure and welfare (Ikenna, 2009: 354). This was most evident during the recent Ebola epidemic that hit Central West Africa when an estimated 11,300 people died and over 8% of the medical health care professionals in West Africa lost their lives between 2014 and 2016 because the disease could not be contained (World Health Organisation, 2017). In 2008 the World Bank estimated that more than 50% of Sub-Saharan Africa's populations were living below the then international poverty datum line of $1.25 per person per day. In the same study, the World Bank found that Sub-Saharan Africa was the least successful region in poverty reduction in the world.

Consequently, since the 1960s there has been an overabundance of scholarly studies, policy frameworks, conferences, summits and agenda deliberations that have been undertaken for the sole purpose of Africa's development. The initiatives that were intended for Africa's development were separated into two categories namely: those initiated by Africans, also known as African-owned initiatives, and those initiated and designed by the international financial institution for Africans (Baah, 2003: 2). African-owned initiatives were people centred and had relative success in terms of human development although they only lasted for a short period from the post-independence era to the 1970s before being overtaken by initiatives designed for Africa by international financial institutions. Initiatives designed and imposed on Africans by international financial institutions were blind, alien and somewhat "ruthless" and did not provide much economic success for the continent (Baah, 2003: 2). Despite the poor outcome of foreign designed development initiatives, these initiatives have persisted in Africa. All-the-while poverty, lack of adequate healthcare and quality education for all, as well as sparse, stagnant and worsening infrastructure continues to be a scourge in many parts of Africa. There has been several attempts to promote development in Africa by African states through state-centric models in the post-colonial era from Tanzania's Ujamaa, to policies such as

indigenisation in Zambia, the adoption of socialism in several African countries as well as experimentation with dirigisme across many African countries. These initiatives were often not given enough time to mature and their slow-paced growth was overridden by foreign-imposed policies that did not produce much success.

Nevertheless, the international community has remained fixated on aid and facilitating in Africa's developmental trajectory such as placing a heavy investment on the Millennium Development Goals regardless of the fact that Western models of development have failed numerous times in the continent. For more than half a century, development initiatives have been forcibly implemented on often non-consenting African nation-states through strategies such as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP's). Yet, Africa is still underdeveloped, poverty-stricken and finding it difficult to achieve its own version of modernity and infrastructure development. This is regrettable considering Africa's immense global contribution to the International Political Economy (IPE) over the centuries. The African continent and in particular Sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources have been the driving force behind the global growth IPE since the colonial era. Africa's natural resources laid the foundation for the IPE and the institutions that have developed around it such as the gold standard, networks of trade agreements and other powerful international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Natural resources have played a major role in driving the IPE as all-natural resources fall within its confines, including how they are traded and with whom they are traded. The major players that control or dominate the IPE are Europe, the US and in the recent years China which has emerged as an economic powerhouse. Africa has not benefited significantly from IPE or its natural resources. Instead, African states with an abundance of natural resources often fall victim to the Dutch disease also known as ‘the paradox of plenty’, the irony that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to behave badly in terms of economic growth and prosperity than those with little or no natural resources. It is from this paradox that one enters into a critical enquiry about Africa's condition of underdevelopment as emanating from the historical condition, global inequality and economic asymmetry as a result of colonialism.

Africa is reliant on natural resource commodities and it suffers when commodity prices collapse in the global economy. Africa is not immune to the shocks and changes in the World economy (Africa Economic Outlook, 2015). Although scholars such as Chironga and Van Wamelen (2011: 122) are optimistic about Africa's economic growth and its potential for a prosperous future to the extent of comparing it to that of China 20 years ago, the continent still

struggles with bread and butter issues as well as economic diversification and industrialisation. There is increased banter about Africa's economic growth, Africa rising and Afro-optimism. However, this is not the first time Sub-Saharan Africa finds itself at some intersection with regards to its development trajectory and its developmental future. Africa has been at this intersection before, during the early 1970s when African economies were rising prior to their drastic decline in the late 1970s. The difference this time around is that Africa needs long-lasting solutions so as to not ride the roller-coaster of Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism concerning economic growth and economic decline.

Historical Context

"All knowledge is rooted in life, a society and a language that have a history; and it is in that very history that knowledge finds the elements enabling it to communicate with other forms of life, other types of society, other significations" (Foucault, 1973:372). Our history is our map to our future. A people without a history cannot understand themselves, they cannot understand the importance of their heritage and culture (Cabral, 1979). When African leaders took back Africa from its colonisers they tried to restore Africa's indigenous institutions, knowledge systems, epistemologies and ontologies. African leaders such as Thomas Sankara, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Sir Seretse Khama attempted to restructure or indigenise the education systems as well as the political, legal and social welfare systems that existed before the coloniser's arrival. However, when the colonisers left, Africans inherited colonial epistemologies that established themselves as superior to those indigenous to Africa. In part, because colonialism was detrimental to indigenous knowledge as it deliberately eroded indigenous knowledges, asserting itself as the sole authority of scientific knowledge and logic thereby causing indigenous knowledges to be unlearnt (Santos, 2009). African leaders, especially in the immediate post-colonial era quickly became consumed by bread and butter issues as well as resisting the oppressive legacies of colonialism, and unintentionally overlooked the urgency of fully restoring indigenous knowledges partly because this knowledge had already been eroded and unlearnt for many generations.

Fortunately, the immediate post-colonial African leaders were armed with the philosophies of Pan- Africanism that reverberated across Africa and the diaspora although many lacked the sophisticated intellect of the indigenous knowledge systems (IKS). This harsh and unfortunate reality bestows validity to the statement by an unknown African philosopher who stated that "to colonise a people's mind, you must first demonise their culture, then their traditions". Colonial imperialists were cunningly brilliant at demonising and stigmatising non- Western

cultures and traditions through absolute submission by way of conflict, slavery and imprisonment as well as Christianisation and Western education (Eyong, 2007:131). For centuries, Western epistemologies have dominated and subjugated Africa's indigenous knowledge and replaced it with the so-called superior knowledge. Colonial authorities successfully suppressed the innate purpose of knowledge, which is the ability to think critically for the purpose of problem-solving within a given region. Eurocentric thought and Western epistemologies are often misfits and fall short of problem-solving when it comes to Africa's problems (Rodney, 1973; Baah, 2003 and Ndlovu Gastheni, 2013). Indigenous knowledges from the global South is often better at identifying and dealing with specific issues within the region (Ala, 2018).

IKS is comprised of the local knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society that is acquired through a long history of experimental and scientific practices (Nuffic, 2002 and Averweg, 2010). IKS is grounded in the belief that all things in the world are connected and interdependent, viewing the world as holistic rather than separate and divided. Western knowledge tends to be segmented and carefully compartmentalised into different disciplines and fields that rarely intersect (Cajete, 2000 and Cardinal, 2015). Hoppers (2005) defines IKS as "a total of knowledge and practices, whether explicit or implicit, used in the management of socio-economic, ecological and spiritual facets of life" (Hoppers, 2005: 2). Historically IKS has been marginalised by the west, its ways of exercising power, control and the belief that only Western knowledge is scientific, empirical and reliable because it had been baptised by the era of enlightenment and modernity. As a result, IKS was demonised and eclipsed by Western epistemologies.

Regrettably, hundreds of years of colonial oppression have resulted in a heavy dependence on Western epistemologies by African states and academics that misguidedly chose to look to the West for Africa's solutions. It is not entirely the fault of African leaders and academics when they choose to look to the West for solutions to Africa's problems, it is the colonial legacy of imperialism, cultural dominance and epistemic erasure that compels them to do so. The West has established itself and its institutions as superior and as gold standard by which the non-Western world should follow. The West has established ontological and epistemological homogeneity that limits the ability to investigate and understand the world outside the global North (Ala, 2018). This is due to the power politics that are at play within the international arena as well as international relations as a discipline. The politics of power are central in determining a weak state from a strong state and how these two kinds of states interact with each other in the international arena. The West is a hegemon within the international political -

economic arena. It established itself as such during the colonial epoch which granted it the power to dominate the rest of the world and their epistemologies

Credo Mutwa (1998) declared that:

> "The only thing that can save us (African States) is to tell the foreigners openly that we do not wish to have their alien creeds, dogmas, beliefs, and philosophies rammed down our throats. The sons of Africa must let the world know that we can well do without civilisation if this means that we have to throw our own cultures, beliefs and ways of life overboard".

Mutwa (1998) was responding to the bombardment of African states by Western institutions that stands at the fore of discussions and initiatives about development and poverty reduction on the African continent without Africa's input. What was deeply troubling for Mutwa was the proposition of development being pushed by the West as a universalised concept deeply steeped in Eurocentric epistemologies. These epistemologies promote Western modernity, a narrow construct of modernity saturated by Western supremacy and coloniality. Coloniality is a concept that is used to understand the relation between the former colonies; it tends to suggest that colonism does not end when the colonised get their independence, but instead colonialism continues in subtle forms such as loans, policy enforcement and many other forms. The basic premise of Western modernity implies that the more Westernised a state or society is the more developed it is. Consequently, the bombardment of such notions has alienated African states as well as their leaders from basic policy framing platforms about development and undermined their absolute sovereignty and management of their own State affairs because of the universalisation of Western modernity and Eurocentric development which has superseded the possibility of multiple modernities.

Post-development scholars such as Kothari (2005, 48) and Easterly (2007, 89) argue that the universalised notions of development (which can be used interchangeably with Western modernity) alienate Africans from themselves and their indigenous understanding of life, including their epistemologies and ontologies, without which a prosperous future for Africa is impossible. Nonetheless, colonial legacies continue to plague the African continent. However, Africa has arrived at a new epoch where Africa's bulging youth population can no longer submit to Western modernity but is working towards an Afrocentric modernity. The sentiments were prevalent in this epoch of the African youth revolution demand that African leaders take responsibility and appropriate action towards African centred development and poverty reduction without depending on the West. In the same breath, the West must also account for its

contribution to underdevelopment and poverty in Africa caused by colonial legacies and the unequal asymmetrical structuring of the international political economy and the international arena which is dominated by the West.

Merelli (2015) cites Zizek (2015) speech at the United Nations (UN) where he declared that "the people who make the world unequal are the very people who are going to fix it". The West's exercise of soft power and influence within the international arena has nations, states, regional organisations and Non- Government Organisations (NGO) such as the UN regard development as morally right. Thus, states and institutions that are committed to the development agenda are branded as being situated on high moral grounds and are treated favourably by the West and Western institutions. Those who do not adhere to Western development or fail to meet the stringent requirements are branded as immoral and irresponsible. However, the problem with development being considered as "morally right" and more favourable is that a staggering number of development initiatives, policies and plans are created, conceptualised, implemented and perfected in the West and later carelessly and "altruistically" dumped on the African continent in a bid to improve their poorly developed states. This perpetuates the belief held by the West, that Africans are incapable of imagining the future without accepting help from the West.

These beliefs stem from long-held ideas that African knowledge and other non-Western knowledge systems, as well as philosophical traditions, are considered primitive by the colonial matrix of power; a racial system of social classification and discrimination which was eventually codified as racial, ethnic, anthropological and national according to specific historical, social and a geographical context which is controlled by former colonisers (Quijano, 2000: 542). Non-Western knowledge and philosophical traditions are marginalised as they are largely regarded as prehistoric and unintellectual by the West. However, a great deal can be gained from these kinds of knowledge systems as they can facilitate cultural diversity, understanding, tolerance, respect and social cohesion and cooperation. Prime examples of knowledge gained from IKS can be found in the societies of Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. These two societies are used as case studies in this research. Furthermore, this research also provides insight and a discussion on how International Relations (IR) as a discipline that has been labelled as Eurocentric (see Ala ,2018; Buzan and Little ,2000;, Anand,2007; Lo Castro, 2011; Neumann,1998 and Cox, 1986) can diversify its theories and gain knowledge from IKS and the two case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana.

IR, as a scholarly discipline, presents itself as a multidisciplinary field dedicated to understanding global politics, intern state and non-state interactions as well as other global phenomena. IR claims to be influenced by historical experiences; however, IR as a discipline begins in the post-war era. This is problematic because it erases the histories and experiences of many people particularly people of the Global South. Moreover, it disregards the privilege that the Global North gained from slavery and colonialism. As a result, the global South has been marginalised and pushed to the periphery and this coupled with unequal representation of scholarly contribution and domination by the West in academia, has justified the accusation that IR is Eurocentric.

As aforementioned, the International Relations as a discipline was established at the end of World War I as a positivistic academic discipline that identifies itself as a branch of international politics and international studies. As a result, Western thought has dominated the discipline since its inception rendering IR undoubtedly Eurocentric by authors such as Neumann (1998,1-2) who wrote that, "dominant IR theories originated in a European context finding their feet in the academic institutions of the US and based virtually exclusively on what happens or happened in the West". However, even with vast criticism waged against IR for being too Eurocentric from scholars such as Neumann (1998), Brown (2006), DeMatosAla (2018), Smith (2006) and many other scholars; the gatekeepers of IR or Euro-American academics maintain that it is universally applicable and relevant.

The IR theory is often paraded, accepted and applied as a universalised theory with international applicability despite its lack of diverse contributions and omitting or erasing the vast majority of the worlds, particularly the Global South. Therefore, the IR theory cannot claim to be universal whilst it neglects the global South because it would imply that IR is unable to fully grasp the complexities and challenges faced by the majority of the world populations and states in the Global South. The lack of diversity within the discipline of IR renders IR empirically insufficient to institute general laws on states, groups and individuals because IR is dominated by hierarchical structures of knowledge production that favour the perspectives of the West. Although IR has to some extent broadened its Eurocentric borders and rigid thought to accommodate emancipatory theories such as Feminism, Neo-Marxism and post-modernism; however, Abrahamsen (2017: 3) argues that research about the international relations of Africa and Africa's place within the discipline of IR as well as bringing Africa into IR cannot simply be a question of "add Africa and stir" as the continent does not enter the discipline as a neutral object of study. It is not enough to pepper the discipline of IR with some African cases and claim to be diverse without attending to and changing the current status quo. Africans were not

consulted about the ordering of world politics even after colonisation. World politics and the discipline of IR did not reconfigure itself to accommodate African perspectives from African scholars and African epistemologies.

As Cox (1986:207) stated, "theory is always for someone and some purpose" when we consider this statement and the period in which IR was established, one comes to the hasty conclusion that IR was established to maintain the world order wherein the West is the dominant superpower or the core and the rest of the world sits at the periphery. This hasty conclusion can be supported by the fact that the IR as a discipline is a microcosm of the international arena or the international world order. Eurocentrism dominates the discipline of IR in the same way that the West dominates the international political arena and international knowledge production. This poses a threat to the majority of the world that resides in the global South or at the periphery of the international arena but must accept the discipline of IR as universalised while it privileges the West and simultaneously subjugates indigenous knowledge, rejecting it and claiming that it is unscientific and unverifiable by empirical evidence. The discipline of IR is biased as it favours Western thought; moreover it poses problems for the Global South because it rejects their epistemologies, undermines their intellectual autonomy as well as their cultures which have a direct impact on problem-solving from development to conflict, the economy and natural resource management.

Lo- Castro (2011:1) suggests that: "IR must become more comprehensive and unbiased; it needs to go beyond the Western boundaries towards the "South" or "East" of the world by re-introducing the roles of cultures and identities as essential in the analysis of world politics". There has been a growing number of voices such as Cox (1986), Chernoff (2005) and Anand (2007) who echo Lo-Castro's statement that for IR, as a discipline, to be unbiased and more comprehensive of the world we live in, it needs to broaden its borders to include epistemologies from the Global South as well as draw inspiration from the role that cultures and identities have on knowledge from outside the Western world. However, since the end of the Cold War, IR has remained rigid and has failed to broaden the borders of knowledge. For example, the majority of Southern African countries are governed by the philosophy of Ubuntu/ Botho; a philosophy of "turned towardsness", the understanding of extending one's humanity towards others and seeing the other as the self (Hoppers, 2009). Ubuntu means "I am because we are", the idea that one's wellbeing is reliant on the wellbeing of the next person thus, our wellbeing is impaired if some among us are suffering. Ubuntu/ Botho is the exercise of human virtues and a shared human bond among all people. As a result, any prescription made by any organisation or government with regards to Southern Africa must bear this philosophy in mind.

As Ayoob (1998:17) states, "IR theories are lenses used to view, understand and structure or construct reality. These theories in themselves are constructed from previous notions of reality and they further reproduce and perpetuate images of reality on which analysis and policymakers may base their prescriptions, decisions and policies". Consequently, if IR continues to harbour colonial epistemologies, the international system will continue to perceive Africans through colonial lenses hence undermining and prescribing ill-advised policies that perpetuate underdevelopment and poverty. Theories and epistemologies are like medication if one is misdiagnosed and prescribed the wrong medication due to limited knowledge one is bound to die. Similarly, if theories and epistemologies are ill-advised and wrongly prescribed, states and societies are likely to suffer. Santos (2012) states that the Global South is not merely a geographical space, but a metaphysical space characterised by inequality, exclusion and invisibility. For the sake of diversity, theoretical pluralism and growth, IR as a discipline must heed the call for the demand of a globally inclusive IR by expanding its epistemic borders to accommodate the epistemologies of the Global South.

Rationale

This research is motivated by the unequal asymmetrical structuring of the international political and economic arena: an oppressive system laden with the legacy of colonialism, responsible for the erosion and erasure of IKS in the Global South, particularly in Africa. My observations as an IR scholar is that Eurocentric epistemologies are still dominant in the discipline of IR and subsequently the international political system and IPE. There is a tendency to treat and theorise about Africa as a helpless continent that is dependent, poor and underdeveloped. This has forced African policymakers to pursue strongly misguided policies in an attempt to promote development and to curb poverty. In the late 1970's and the early 1980's Marxist scholars such as Ake (1982), Offiong (1981), Rodney (1972) and Nnoli (1981) suggested that strongly misguided policies were driven by Western capitalism and that capitalism was to blame for Africa's underdevelopment. Nevertheless, the results of misguided policies plunged Africa deeper into poverty and underdevelopment because of the dismal failure of policy recommendations that are implemented without local contribution or knowledge from the Global South. There is also the tendency to try and remedy Africa's problems with a one-size-fits-all approach, which also fails because the remedies do not take into consideration the complexities and challenges faced by African nation-states. The legacy of colonialism and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) still haunt Africa today (Ndlovu Gastheni, 2013).

Lamentably unequal asymmetrical trade agreements between the Global North and South, the presence of neo-colonialism in the Global South, Western hegemony over the international arena, foreign-imposed methods of governance and limited problem solving hinders Africa's development. In this globalization context, the African continent is playing a minor role in the landscape of world politics and its economic suggestions are yet to be incooperated into the IPE. Although globalization tries to use multicultarism, polyglossial consensions, to achieve a pluversalistic world, Africa is yet to be properly intergrated into any of the strategies that tries to have every continent benefiting from globalization, instead Africa remain in the periphery in relation to key issues which have signifant impact on the world politically and economically. In addition, African indigenous epistemologies are separated and relegated to prehistoric, oral traditions, without affinities with the empirically oriented western knowledges. Although it is evident that Africa has odds stacked against it, African governments are blamed for not taking responsibility for their domestic matters. Criticism was waged against Africa for not taking initiatives toward development following the East Asian development Miracle. However Osimbajo and Ajayi (1994) assert that "scholars point to the importance of domestic accountability and good governance as the way to deal with chronic underdevelopment in Africa, the comparison of heterogeneous histories and cultural experiences such as Africa, Asia and Latin America greatly oversimplify the complexities of different development trajectories". The oversimplification of Africa's condition and complexities portrays African governments as irresponsible compared to its fellow counterparts in the Global South such as Asia and Latin America. However, in the backdrop of all these challenges, there are still opportunities for African states to climb out of underdevelopment and poverty with the use of IKS like its Asian counterparts. IKS has been overlooked and undermined by the West as a viable avenue to foster development, end poverty and break free from the shackles of the colonial matrix of power.

There are several problems that have been identified and observed within IR as a discipline and the international political and economic arena as it currently stands. Several of the problems have been mentioned and they led me to embark on this research. The purpose and relevance of the problems that were identified in this research are to substantiate that Western knowledge is a misfit for Africa's development as well as to uncover the foul methods used to normativise Western knowledge in Africa. As aforementioned, the impact of colonialism continues to cast its long shadow in the postcolonial/ neo-colonial era, due to brutal policies and devious methods used by the colonisers to subjugate African people in order to acquire full control over their land and resources. Consistent inferiorisation of indigenous cultures and the concerted

effort to erase systems of knowledge and replacing them with Eurocentric beliefs and knowledge systems are some of the methods used by the west to subjugate Africans (Osman, 2017). Progler (1991:1) states that "pre-meditated policies were successfully culminated in one hand, the absolute submission of the communities and stigmatisation of their knowledge systems with the consequence that most of the communities were trapped in the design of perpetuating their own subjugations". The design of perpetuating self-inflicted subjugations is transmitted through Christianisation, Western education and the denigration of relativity and self-sufficient indigenous economies into dependent consumers (Eyong, 2007:131). The colonial design was successful in producing economic imbalances for the growth and domination of European capitalism and imperialism. Sadly, the colonial design of domination continues to prosper in the postcolonial era.

The current system of production and dissemination of academic knowledge in Africa reflects the Western hegemony (Zeleza, 2006: 196). Since colonialism, Western epistemologies remain deeply entrenched in Africa, rendering African's prisoners of Western epistemologies. "The provisions of intellectual exchange are distinctly unequal as the African Studies including IKS in Europe constitute a marginal part of the academy while the European epistemology remains central in Africa Studies" (Zeleza, 2006: 197). This is the reason why Abrahamsen (2017: 3) insists that we cannot have a situation of adding Africa and stirring into the pot of academia without a robust re-structuring of the academy because we will inevitably reproduce Western knowledge even in the African academy. The fundamental problem with the homogenisation of Western epistemologies and ontologies is that they limit the ability to investigate and understand the world, especially the Global South (Ala, 2018). In addition, the homogenisation of Western epistemologies limits creativity in providing effective solutions for urgent global problems such as climate change, sustainable development, medicine/ medical care for population threatening diseases, food security and global poverty as well as natural disaster relief. Western knowledge has generated extremely limited success in identifying and dealing with challenges faced by nation-states in the Global South. Santo (2009, 2012) suggests that facilitating epistemological diversity would allow more voices to give important global conversations. Although the intellectual conquest of colonialism has cast a long shadow over the Global South, Western epistemologies also fall short in dealing with Africa's problems.

Aims and objectives

The purpose of this research is to explore alternative ways of thinking about Africa's development as well as tracking and tracing states and sub-regions that have employed

alternative methods of thinking about development and states and sub-regions which have used IKS to aid in their development. The research aims to unearth and rediscover indigenous knowledge that is lacking in the academy and the IR discipline. Given that many African universities teach and do research in Africa, there is a knowledge deficit in teaching and researching the African content and context. The methods of teaching and researching still consume, reproduce and disseminate Western knowledge. Therefore, this research aims to explore the potential of IKS as a source of knowledge, diversity and multi-culturalism. Furthermore, this research explores how these knowledge systems are used as well as their possible utility in the contemporary. Moreover, this research aims to understand the importance of IKS in the postcolonial era, in the realm of development over other forms of knowledge that currently exist. This research also aims to neutralise the illusion of an anthropological archetypal Africa that is without history or civilisation before its encounter with European explorers.

The objectives of this research are to seek out alternative routes to development such as IKS in efforts to combat Africa's development crisis that has left the continent vulnerable, poor and disabled by imperial global forces. Furthermore, the research objective is to build on existing critiques of IR, interrogate IR as a discipline particularly its ways of knowing what it constitutes to be knowledge, its disregard of the non-western histories and cultures and its normative consensus towards Eurocentrism. Inspired by the African renaissance and the ideology of African solutions to African problems, this research aim to foreground Indigenous Knowledge Systems, its uses and its relevance as well as the teachings that can be gained from it. In addition, this research also explores the importance of IKS over imported knowledge.The relationship between modernity and coloniality continues to have an impact on global power relations, especially at the knowledge production level. Therefore, this study aim to understand broadly, how those who have studied IR can sharpen their understanding of the world, especially the colonised world, by going in-depth into a reading of their ways of being, how knowledge is transmitted from one generation to another, how they relate with others (the kinds of ethical relations formed), and how this fosters a different understanding of development. The aim of the study is not to jettison what we have been taught, but to argue that IKS is part and parcel of local histories, that have been silenced by the overemphasis on the monolithic Western project of reading the world.

Empirical evidence is used to support this research through two case studies, namely, the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. Both are mineral-rich societies that have not succumbed to the resource curse due to their implementation of their IKS as an instrument of development. The

significance of this research is to highlight that despite epistemic erasure by colonialism IKS has managed to survive and can provide solutions to an African development crisis. IKS has not only managed to survive but it also have given birth to a new breed of political consciousness that takes pride in Africa and is in line with epistemic disobedience which encompasses epistemologies from the Global South that emphasise delinking, de-colonialism and support for South-South co-operation (Mignolo, 2013). IKS is a part of an emerging collective of geopolitical thought that is driven by transnational actors determined to decolonise the Global South through indigenous epistemologies and cultural perspectives of indigenous people. It is important to note that while Western modernity is the outcome of the western knowledge systems, it is also important to be cognizant of the fact that knowledge systems intersect, and in their intersection it is whether they can compliment one another or they cannot compliment each other that must be suveryed. It is impossible for any particular knowledge system to be absolutely useless or to solve all the existing problems whether local or foreign. The case is usually around the area of representation; when there is a systematic measure of undermining some knowledge system as part of an empirical project usually what result from this faulty representation is that there are knowledge systems that will be seen as useless, and as a result it is justified that they must be replaced by knowledge systems which are useful. The research does not wish to uplight one form of knowledge system at the expense of another, but what it purports to perform is to defend the knowledge systems which has been prejudicially regarded as useless.

Research questions

During the1970s IKS made its mark on literature concerned with economic development because of the East Asian economic and developmental boom and other indigenous communities recorded by the Institute of Development at the University of Sussex (Maferetlhane, 2012: 6). The countries in the region have been able to move beyond the stagnation of the neoliberal policies by embracing their IKS, with Confucianism hailed as a major policy driver. The questions that arose following this roaring success were: do we need to only understand IKS in relation to economic development or do we need to understand in its totality? What are the key factors that can help us determine what IKS is? The continued success of the East Asian miracle answered many of these questions. IKS is not just about economic development but an epistemological tradition that needs to be understood in totality. The above questions led me to ask the following research questions:

- The main research question of this research is: Does IKS influence development?

- The auxiliary questions are: What are the key factors that can help us determine what IKS is?
- Can IKS exist alongside Western knowledge?
- Can IKS replicate the same success in Africa as it had in East Asia?
- Are the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana authentic IKS users or are there other factors at play?
- Why does IKS diminish in some areas and not in others?
- Is IKS effective in the development equation?
- What knowledge can be gained from IKS in enriching IR and communities in the Global South?
- What additional lessons can we learn from the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana?

Case selection

The case studies that are used to frame this study are the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. The reason why these cases were chosen is that these two have claimed, for decades, to have used IKS to spearhead development in their societies. They assert that employing IKS to promote development and end poverty is an act of defiance against colonialism and neo- colonialism, a proclamation of independence. These cases are coherent with the theoretical framework that is used in this research, namely, phenomenology because it highlights accurately the lived experiences of using IKS to influence development without having to use other theoretical perspectives to understand IKS which are often embedded in Eurocentric thought and could lead to misinterpretations as well as undermining the concept of IKS.

The Royal Bafokeng Nation is one of the wealthiest communities in Africa. It boasts of a host of achievements and development milestones such as sound state of the art infrastructure such as stadia, clinics, high performing schools, malls, farms, social/ recreational centres and mines. They are a fascinating community because they own mining rights to the mines on the land that they negotiated with Multinational mining companies using traditional modes of negotiations facilitated by the *lekgotla* (tribal council). They were able to negotiate a settlement that suited them with the colonial Boer government. Most impressively the Bafokeng owns the land which they occupy and have done so for close to 200 years due to pioneering recommendations and robust governance by their first king, *Kgosi* Mokgatle. *Kgosi* Mokgatle had the ingenious idea of conscripting young men to work in mines in Kimberly during the 1800s and then pooling their resources/ mining salaries to acquire land from the Boer. Since then the Bafokeng have been able to establish good public institutions such as schools, health care, safety and many more that will be spelt out in the case study analysis. This nation glorifies IKS for their success

and achievements (Mbenga and Manson, 2010).

Botswana is also a fascinating yet peculiar nation that honours IKS for its development and success. Botswana is confident and proud of its indigenous culture; Botswana has universities and university courses dedicated to teaching IKS. The country was never colonised but rather it was a protectorate of Britain. It was one of the world's poorest countries when it achieved independence in 1966 but today it is one of the world's fastest developing countries economically. A major reason behind Botswana's success is their political governance style in addition to their decentralised leadership. Similar to the Royal Bafokeng, Botswana's success and sturdy development can be traced back to the innovative leadership initiatives of their first leader after independence President Sir Seretse Khama. Khama was a well-educated man who commissioned local chiefs to lead alongside him. Khama decentralised the role of the state and relegated some power to the chiefs who ruled over their constituents while the state dedicated its attention to building important institutions for the development of Botswana. Khama understood that while under British protectorship, chiefs lost their role in society which was to maintain peace and order as well as guiding the people. Tswana morals, values and most worryingly their ontologies were eroded under British protectorship. The chief was seen as the rightful proprietor of these morals, values and ontologies. On the one hand, this move of reinstating the traditional authorities in the governance by Khama seemed a just thing to do for traditional authorities. On the other hand, Botswana was concerned with establishing its footing in the global arena and trying to get out of poverty. The solution for Botswana for its problems was the IKS.

The reason I chose to use these two case studies was because the IKS methodology applies in both these cases. I was drawn to the similarities in language, culture (which language is also imbedded in), pioneering leaders, decentralised leadership, natural resource management, missionary influence and in particular, the influence of Lutheran Christianity which imbibed a protestant ethic and a spirit of capitalism. There are many more things that can be mentioned about their similarities however I chose to focus on the above-mentioned similarities as they were the most congruent with the concept of IKS. Also, the aforementioned similarities were chosen because they are a catalyst for the development of Bafokeng and Botswana, however, they remain hindrances for development in other African nations. There are also a number of things that can be said about the differences of these two cases, namely: the types of natural resources found in each of these cases, the histories of these territories, as well as their physical geography. Their relationship with the colonisers and the time frame that they were colonised and granted independence is explored in the case study analysis. For the Bafokeng, I began

from the 1800s and for Botswana, I began from the 1900s.

The Tswana saying maropeng go a boelwa meaning 'we must return to our ancient civilisations' was critical in case selection. The concept of time for Africans and particularly for *Batswana* (Tswana people) is circular and not linear like that of Europeans. In the idiom maropeng go a boelwa one gets to understand that by turning back we are also moving or looking forward. Whereas in Europe, time is linear and linear time is restrictive because turning back is perceived as moving towards primitiveness, the dark ages and not towards modernity or scientific critical thought. African civilisations are characterised as having critical thought from time immemorial. Accordingly, looking back or referencing from the past is also looking forward towards a solution and steps that we might have missed in the present-day that can help us address certain problems. This idiom maropeng go a boelwa not only rejects Eurocentric conceptions of time but also entrenches us into the essence of IKS that resists linear time even after being violated and battered by colonialism. In language, we find antidotes that point us to how people live, how they theorised as well as their worldviews and epistemologies. It is such Setswana idioms that could very well have influenced the development trajectory of the royal Bafokeng and Botswana and revived IKS. Maropeng go a boelwa implies that we must return to our ancient civilisations therefore in turning back we are moving forward towards new developmental futures.

Chapter outline

Chapter one: Background. This chapter explored the background of this research, its significance, its purposes as well as foregrounding IKS which is the predominant research topic. In this chapter, the history and impact of colonisation are explored briefly in order to locate the rationale behind this research. This chapter states the research questions, rationale, aims and objectives as well as the case selection.

Chapter two: Literature review. This chapter provide the foundation that the research is built on. The literature review explores discussions and interpretations of the results that other studies from the de-colonial school, coloniality/ de-coloniality, IKS and development theory. Several areas of investigation, related to the research problem, are analysed in order to set the foundation for this research

Chapter three: Methodology. This chapter explored the research design and how the research was conducted. The chapter indicates the procedure that was followed in conducting this study such as secondary data collection, archival work and the measurements that were used to calculate development.

Chapter four: The Rupture: The Shattering of The Colonial Illusion, The Roadmap to IKS. This chapter provide an in-depth history of colonialism and its impact and legacy in Africa. It provides the significance of the research, particularly in the discipline of international relations whilst also providing a critic of international relations. This chapter serves as a bridge between the previous chapters and the case studies.

Chapter five: The case study of the Royal Bafokeng. This chapter explores the case study findings of the Royal Bafokeng. It goes into the history and genealogy of the Royal Bafokeng which are an important equation with regards to IKS. This chapter also brings out the mining endeavours of the Royal Bafokeng land ownership, land disputes, mining rights, natural resource revenue and the influence of IKS on the Royal Bafokeng.

Chapter six: The case study of Botswana. This chapter brings out the case study findings of Botswana. It provides the history and genealogy of Botswana which is significant to IKS research. The chapter also explores the political leadership of the country in relation to the economic growth of the country. The discovery of diamond and diamond mining in Botswana are presented as well as the absences of the resource curse. This chapter further lookes at the claims made by Botswana about using IKS in relation to Botswana's development.

Chapter seven: Discussion and conclusion. This chapter provides a critical and balanced discussion based on the findings and it concludes the research.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

This literature review examines and explores the work of decolonisation scholars such as Nyamnjoh (2012), Mignolo (1990- 2012), Kaya (2013), Escobar (2004, 2010), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013), Wa Thiong'o (2005) and Santos (2007) who have written extensively on decolonisation as well as the colonial matrix of power and how it continues to colonise non-western subjects through epistemic hegemony. According to Mignolo, since the colonial era there emerged a naturalised assumption that the knowing subjects or those who possess knowledge are from the West (Mignolo, 2009). These naturalised assumptions extend to the academic fields and scholarly domains. Mignolo (2009) states that the knowing subjects in the disciplines are seen as transparent. Thus, it is assumed that the knowing subject carries no biases that favour the West and exclude the global South. These naturalised assumptions consider knowledge from the West as universal. It is further assumed that knowledge comes from the West and the knowledge possessed by the knowing subject is transparent and even neutral. After all, it is cynically professed by Mapadimeng (2009) that Africa has culture while the West has knowledge. However, culture is part of knowledge, and at the same time knowledge tend to differ according to value, there is a knowledge that is common sense and there is also knowledge that is specialized.

Mignolo (2009) additionally explains that the "knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them". Here Mignolo (2009) states that the knowing subject/ the West/ Europeans categorises the world into geographical and racial classifications and determines what is good for them through global designs and arrangement such as developed and underdeveloped states. These categories and classifications were created by the West during colonialism where the West asserted its dominance intellectually over the rest of the world. Mignolo (2008) argues that the Western epistomogy is grounded in the rise of Christianity. Renaissance itself became a secularization of Christianity through offering alternative views to the views offered by orthodox Christianity – instead of creating a world that does not reflect on Christianity through commenting on Christianity. The main alternative was to create the concept of individuality in relation to religious power in order to suggest that Christianity was concerned with the individual as having cognitive capacities to under the material world. Consequently, the West became proprietors of knowledge and the fountain of knowledge across the world (Habermans, 1973). The West

established itself as the hegemony of knowledge and the knowing subject. As a result, non-western knowledge was seen as severely inferior and incompatible with Western Modernity.

As Fanon (1961) noted that colonialism was never simply content with imposing its grammar and logic upon the 'present and the future of a dominated country'. Colonialism was also not simply satisfied with merely holding the colonised people in its grip and emptying 'the native's brain of all forms and contents'. Rather, 'by a kind of perverse logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it' (Fanon 1961: 67). Subsequently at the dawn of independence, de-colonialism emerged as the leading school of thought not only as a means to break free from the clasp of physical colonial dominance but to break free from the assumption that knowledge is from the West and to reconfigure knowledge from the global South that had been disfigured by Western modernity. This literature review also explores the works of de-colonialism and de-coloniality, the development literature as well as literature about IKS. This approach seeks make an effort to map the resurgence of IKS in contemporary literature.

Colonialism and Decolonisation

Although the colonial experience was a brief moment in history, that moment changed the course of history for all colonised people and nations into what Mudimbe (1988) calls new historical forms of radical discourse such as de-westernisation, delinking from Euro-centricity using the de-colonial theory, de-coloniality, epistemic disobedience and other discourses emerging from the global South. Given the profound effect that colonialism had on the global South, which attempted to erase indigenous knowledge in its global conquest. Wilmer (1993: xii) asserted that "in the name of progress and modernization, through colonisation and global economic incorporation, the spread of Western influence over the past five centuries has resulted in the homogenisation of global culture and the ethnocide of countless non-Western tribal peoples" (Wilmer, 1993: xii). The process of decolonization should begin by the acknowldgement that the western knowledge systems are oppressive and erosive when it comes to non-western knowledge systems. Non-knowledge systems from Africa must be inward looking, they must become elevated in the IR context, so that they do not only describe Africa but they also describethe world from an African perspective. Heterogeniuty in a pluriversal knowledge system of globalization can only be achieved when the indigenous knowledge systems of Africa are not only useful in the understanding of Africa but are useful to understand the world as a whole – without being imperial or opposed to other knowledge systems which are non-African.

Decolonisation is the dismantling of the colonial apparatuses, breaking free from the colonial state towards independent self-rule. This breaking away does not mean the demolishing of the institutions of colonialism, but these institutions are redirected to do a different work of reintroducing the repressed indigenous power structures. Hence emphasis that these institutions must also be examined in relation to their meaning and how their colonial meanings could be replaced by native meanings. Decolonisation also encompasses breaking free from the colonial epistemology and ontologies to rid oneself of the colonial ways of being and colonial subjectivity (Ndlovu- Gastheni, 2013; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mudimbe, 1988). Maldonado-Torres (2008) explains that what is meant by de-colonialism is the "dismantling of relations of power and the conception of knowledge that formed the reproduction of racial, gender and geopolitical hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern /colonial world". Thus, decolonisation involves the vigorous undoing of the continuous colonial expression of power, knowledge and modernity that reproduce the undervaluation and inferior classification of colonised people or people in the global South.

Decolonisation is an act of defiance and disobedience to the colonial matrix of power. The theory of decolonisation has again become very popular over the last two decades in Africa and has captured the national consciousness of the citizenry in many African countries such as South Africa following the "fallist" movements such as Rhodes must fall and Fees must fall. The popularity of the decolonisation theory presents several problems for this important theory according to Tuck and Yang (2012). Decolonisation theory is a theory that asserts that for self-rule to be profitable for the former colonies these former colonies should completely break away from their history of colonialism in order for them to rebuild their new image, and this entails going back to IKS. For Tuck and Yang (2012) the project of decolonisation is a project of decentring the colonial perspectives and theories of social change. However, the popularity gained by decolonisation has turned into a metaphor. Yet decolonisation is more than just a metaphor, it is the primary epistemological process and programme that seeks to systematically understand the genealogy of colonialism, its ethical and ideological dimensions and assumptions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

Often decolonisation has been restricted to merely seeking the "political kingdom" (Chitonga, 2018: 23). However, a complete de-colonial project goes beyond the imperatives of political independence to include economic, cultural and epistemological sovereignty because colonialism is narrowly conceptualised as physical domination (Chitonga, 2018: 23). For scholars such as Grasfoguel (2007), Mignolo (2000), Rodeny (1968) and Ndlovu-Gastheni (2013) decolonisation is a critique of modernity and Eurocentrism from the subalterns and

silenced knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2007). For Fanon (1963) decolonisation is more than just a critique but a process of disordering and decentring from colonial structures, institutions, rationality, knowledge systems and world view. Chitonga (2018: 25) states that "in the Fanonian framework, decolonisation is the process of recovering oneself from the derangement which colonialism induced in the colonised, a recovery that unveils the myth that colonialism came to lighten the burden of the colonised". The unveiling of the myth of coloniality is what Maldonado- Torres (2008) defines as the "de-colonial turn", a concept embedded in a long history of centuries of resistance to colonisation and settler colonialism. The 'de-colonial turn' according to Mignolo "first of all challenges the mythology of the West as the only epistemic site from which the rest of the world is described, conceptualized, and ranked" (Mignolo, 1995: 35). Decolonisation does not simply focus its attention on the political independence and sovereign rule of previously colonised states. It extends itself to delink from the colonial matrix of power as well as coloniality. Ndlovu- Gastheni (2013) explains that while colonialism is easily identifiable by is characteristics namely; violence, repression and exploitation, what is far less apparently physical but more detrimental to the livelihood of colonised people is coloniality: the residue that is left behind by colonialism. Maldonado- Torres (2007: 243) defines and differentiates coloniality and colonialism as the following,

> Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism (Maldonad-Torres, 2007: 243).

Coloniality refers to the cultural, epistemic structure of the modern world. Amin (2009:165) analysed that, "Eurocentrism is the core component of the present world" as engineered coloniality. Mbembe (2015:182) declares that coloniality is a form of violence. "The coloniser turns the colony into a space of terror around the colonised, a world of prohibition and inhibitions far more terrifying than any world of the coloniser". The trap of coloniality is set by the colonisers through the coloniality of power, a concept that links the practices and legacies of colonialism in social orders and forms of knowledge, the living legacy of colonialism in contemporary society in the form of social discrimination that outlives former colonialism. Therefore, the colonial project is continued by coloniality, moreover coloniality outlives colonialism. Scholars such as Anibal Quijano and Sylvia Wynter write at length about the

coloniality of power propagated by the colonial matrix of power. Quijano states that "coloniality is based on the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power, and it operates on every level, in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale" (Quijano 2000b: 342). De-coloniality helps us to understand on a deeper level how the colonial empire continues to be sustained through the continuity of colonial forms of domination produced by colonial cultures and structures. Since coloniality affects all dimensions of life; Quijano argues that colonial structures of power resulted in a caste system where Spaniards (Europeans) were ranked at the top and those that they conquered at the bottom due to their different phenotypic traits and culture presumed to be inferior (Quijano, 2000). Quijano (2000) and Grosfegol (2011) state that the coloniality of power envelopes the Global South through control of the economy, control of authority and control of knowledge and subjectivity (Quijano, 2000 and Grosfegol, 2011 cited by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

Coloniality is maintained by the global matrices of power which have been confronted by the Global South in efforts to delink from Eurocentricity. In efforts to delink from the colonial matrix of power de-colonialism and de-coloniality emerged and presented themselves as challenges to the colonial logic. Delinking is the refusal to submit to the demands of the world-wide law of value or the supposed 'rationality' of the system of world prices that embody the demands of reproduction of world capital. It, therefore, presupposes the society's capacity to define alternative economic options, in short, a 'law of value of national application' (Amin 1990b: 70-71). Decolonisation is presented as direct opposition to the colonial matrix of power. The de-colonial approach explores and exposes the relationship between modernity and coloniality and how this continues to impact upon global power relations. The de-colonial approach represents an advanced way of thinking about the condition of coloniality and provides ways in which the global South may avoid some of its problems (Dirlik, 1994). This is because de-coloniality is a part of a family of theories and paradigms of liberation from the colonial matrix.

Mignolo (2008) described how coloniality of power cloaked the Global South through the control of the economy based on the appropriation of land and subsequently natural resources and control of labour and the financial control of countries indebted to Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) . De-coloniality serves as an aid that correctly identifies the matrices that are brought about by coloniality. Quijano (2007: 168) defines de-coloniality as a response to the relations of direct, political social and cultural domination established by Europe. De-colonial approaches are useful because they focus not

only on "theoretical deconstructions of the colonial structures which critics argue continue to shape relationships between states and peoples across the globe but also on the proposition of alternatives to them, sometimes through an appeal to the pre-colonial" (Lentin, 2017: 5). The de-colonial approach and rhetoric highlights the injustices of colonialism and provides alternative knowledge.

According to Mignolo (2006:314), "the rhetoric of modernity is that of salvation, whereas the logic of coloniality is the logic of imperial oppression". The two go hand in hand and you cannot have modernity without coloniality: "the unfinished project of modernity carries over its shoulders the unfinished project of coloniality" (Mignolo, 2006:314). This led scholars such as Rodney (1973) to affirm unequivocally that Africa was a victim of deliberate exploitation and underdevelopment by European colonial regimes. Rodney (1973:45) states that at the heart of human society and human socio-economic and political relations are power. Power allows people to bargain, manoeuvre and impose their beliefs. However, when one society finds itself forced to relinquish power to another society, that in itself is a form of underdevelopment because what is central to human social relations is relinquished too (Rodney 1973: 45). Therefore de-colonialism: unlike post-colonialism seeks to alter or deconstruct oppressive aspects of coloniality within modern epistemologies; it involves delinking from the rules of the game and decolonizing of the mind and taking back power (Lentin, 2017). Lentin (2017) explains that the process of delinking does not mean attempting to exist outside of modernity rather denying the "master's narrative" of coloniality that is carried over into modernity. If knowledge is decolonised it does not continue to privilege western modernity and epistemologies, instead, the privilege would be afforded to historical and contemporary thinkers from the Global South.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) asserts that decolonisation and de-coloniality are made difficult by the embedding of what he calls 'abyssal thinking'. He says that abyssal thinking forms the basis of modern western thinking. It divides western and non-Western thought into visible and invisible distinctions. The western thought is visible, functional and worthwhile whilst on the other hand; non-Western thought is invisible, irrelevant, incomprehensible and non-existent. De Sousa Santos (2007: 4) affirms that western modern thinking renders the colonised and thus the indigenous knowledge non-existent. Thus, de-colonial scholars emphasise that ontological classification of people in the Global South are location of oppression through the colonial matrix of power. Ontological categories such as blackness, femininity, religious identity, African and many others, affect transnational relationships between states within the global system and how states relate to one another. Ontological

classifications are often overlooked and neglected within International Relations even though the relationship between epistemology and ontology are interconnected (Blaney and Tickner, 2017). Blaney and Tickner (2017) discuss that ontological classifications are perceived as metaphysical and thus unscientific.

Mignolo (2014) refutes the lack of importance that ontological classifications carry in international politics and the epistemic economy but asserts that: race is not only an issue that affects individuals but states too. He insists that states are looked at with a coloured/ racial lens and that race is not only about colour but a geopolitical classification. The geopolitical classification of countries in the global South is saturated with the rhetoric of underdevelopment. Lentin, (2017) asserts that the rhetoric of underdevelopment is rooted in coloniality and modernity especially where the global South is concerned. Lentin (2017) further emphasises that "the de-colonial path has one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally" (Lentin, 2017: 7). Mignolo (2006: 318) suggests that racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by Humanitas (the West) in places inhabited by Anthropos (the colonised people in the Global South).

> "My humble claim is that geo- and body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of de-colonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and de-colonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take 'originality' as the ultimate criterion for the final judgment" (Mignolo, 2009:4).

It is within the self-interest of the West to categorise and devalue the subject in the global South as underdeveloped to gain easy access into the natural resources through a knowledge-based economy (Mignolo, 2009). Ontological classifications are deliberately neglected by the realist and self-interest needs of the West. The knowledge-based economy provides "helpful" policy frameworks to help underdeveloped countries to reach development and modernity. Development is a disguise for the continuation of coloniality. Thus, development discourse resides within the matrices of coloniality.

Development

As Lund (2010; 20) states, there is no shortage of definitions of development. Indeed, there are enumerable definitions of development suitable for different schools of thought, development

institutions as well as policymakers. From reading Donald Harris' World Bank report on development, Bernstein and several other development authors, development is understood as sets of policies, processes and mechanisms that are put in place to improve citizens' quality of life, reducing poverty and income inequality through the market economy. Israel (2018) defines development as the process that creates growth, progress, positive change or the addition of physical, economic, environmental, social and demographic components. Lund (2010: 20) best describes development processes "as the reproduction and transformation processes which somehow impinge on inequality, impoverishment and human insecurity". Thomas (2000: 777) defines development as "a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods". Fukuyama (2013) supports this notion by asserting that development is meant to benefit human beings and what they want through social change. Israel (2018) explains that the success of the development is linked to the availability of policies that take into consideration; everyone who might be affected by the decisions, therefore they must be informed about its relevance so as to have an opportunity to influence its outcomes. Yet, development has far too often been removed from the people that it is supposed to benefit.

There is a plethora of ways which can be used to define development and equally as many ways to measure development because the perception of development is constantly changing. For example, electrifying homes in the mid-20th century was considered as highly developed and in the early 21st century having access to internet connectivity as a part of the 4th industrial revolution is considered to be highly developed (Bhuiyan, 2019). Since development is a process of social change and improvement within a given society post-development scholars such as William Easterly, Uma Kothari, Babu Mathew, Chang and Goolam Mohamedbhai have questioned the emphasis that development initiatives and projects by Bretton Woods Institutions, the Private Sector and NGO have placed on Africa to adopt Western/ alien modes of development for the social change on the continent (Ndlovu-Gastheni, 2013). The inevitable failure that resulted from adopting alien modes of development has led to Africa's marginalisation in the international system (Ndlovu-Gastheni, 2013). Due to the failure that resulted from adopting alien modes of development, Africa is perceived as a place of philosophical unanimity allowing no room whatsoever for Socrates and Descartes. This means that no indigenous African person had the frame of mind to detach himself/ herself from the prevailing beliefs (and taboos) and offer a critical assessment or rational rejection of such beliefs.

The process of development has been described as "a drama: a too often tragic story of the

hopes, frustrations, efforts, failures, suffering and conflicts of thousands of people" (Harrison, 1981). A drama that is performed at a global level: curated and directed by the West and enforced on Africans specifically and the Global South in general. This great drama that is development has operated in ethnocentric ways to erase hundreds and thousands of years of histories for vast civilisations that had to be scrapped overnight because there was nothing of value within them (Osie-Hwedie, 1993). Osie-Hwedie (1993) explicates that development planners/ practitioners are yet to find practice paradigms that are consistent with the African context. Osie-Hwedie (1993: 1) expounds that, "socio-cultural, economic, political and environmental conditions, among others, are supposed to be the building blocks of development practices. However, models that are based on those conditions have not materialised". Development should serve to empower, indigenous localities and contextualise a helping system and process of the rule used to promote wellbeing in communities. De Hoyos and Anderson (1986) indicted that development must adopt a sociocultural approach that focuses on behaviours within a societal institutional setting. Therefore, developing appropriate knowledge of people's needs as well as of models for service provision is necessary for the development process (Osie-Hwedie, 1993).

The development has far too often been removed from the people that it is supposed to benefit; instead it has been entrusted to development planners from the West (Ndlovu, 2000). The development has also been accused of ethnocentric erasure and a grand civilisation project by Rodney (1973), Nkrumah (1965), Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2013) and other scholars who believe that development has done more harm than good in the Global South, in addition to being the completion of the colonial project. Nkrumah described development and neo- colonialism as the "last stage of imperialism" and correctly noted that: neo-colonialism is that foreign capital used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world (Nkrumah 1965: 8). Statesman such as Nkrumah give a post-structuralist critique of development by stating that: development is a radical socio-political project and a civilisational project by rich countries in relation to poor countries of world in Asia, Africa and Latin America discovered and invented as underdeveloped and then treated as such in these development projects and strategies systematically.

Post-development scholars suggest that development is about wiping clean the slate of culture, traditions and natural growth patterns and to begin modernising everything according to how things work in the West and sharing or imposing that on everyone. Development discourse has been accused of being ahistorical and obscuring the political realities by the development "experts". It has further been suggested that development is hegemonic in its construction and

regulation of the third world identity and limits the adoption of alternative ways of organising and achieving social progress (Kothari, 2005, 48). Easterly (2007, 89) claims that the project of development is committing ethnocide in Africa by not factoring in indigenous ways of life and accommodating organic changes.

Post-development scholars such as Kothari (2005) and Matthews (2004) argue that development discourse has exacerbated through the spread of globalisation; a wave that wipes away existing modes and operations and brings forth new ones. Thus, post-development scholars emphasise that development planning coupled with globalisation leads to ethnocide and cultural degradation. The alternative to globalisation and globalised theories of development, according to post-development scholar and indigenous knowledge expert Escobar (1995:90), is perusing indigenous knowledge systems. Globalisation is hegemonic and alienating. Gramsci (1977) implores us to be counter-hegemonic, and Escobar (1995) suggests that we use IKS to be counter-hegemonic and to de-westernise with regards to development.

The gap that I identified in the literature is that although scholars have presented valid perspectives of Africa's underdevelopment and can locate Africa's underdevelopment historically and academically through the sophisticated nexus of coloniality. As yet IKS is being talked about and finding resurgence in the journals but all this amounts to comparative studies that tries to survey the IKS in relation to western epistemologies. When IKS is being adopted within policy making structures investment is never sufficient, or the majority of the people are excluded from the initiative at hand. An obvious example is the African Development Bank Group which was tasked with implementing Ujamaa in Tanzania which focused on infusing IKS into a socio-economic de-colonial project. This initiative was facilated by the university staff members. Such initiatives have fallen short of ensuring development because of a lack of community participation and facilitation. It has often been stressed that African countries are beset with a "crisis of inadequacy" due to their development being influenced by colonial experience and Western theories of modernisation and economic growth. These influences, it has been suggested, have led to a lack of fit between traditional African social norms and Western concepts of social welfare, resulting in qualitative changes without social justice or social equality (Lalonde, 1991: 5).

Looking towards IKS can be an invaluable alternative to countries in the regions that are overly dependent on western modernity in their quest to raise the quality of life of citizens (Noyoo, 2007: 167). In addition, Maldonado – Torres (2016: 3) professed that coloniality suffers from what is termed benevolent neglect where de-coloniality is energetically embraced as needing

“urgent action” and then creatively and constructively abandoned as tried and failed, unrealistic and wishful in a bid to improve the quality of life of the citizenry. I hypothesised that IKS could be a useful element in the development equation because it is interlinked with the ways of life of the people who require social change and improvement to their quality of life. Therefore, IKS becomes relevant in so far as it is not imported or imposed from outside (Noyoo, 2007: 168). Although development scholars have valid perspectives of Africa’s underdevelopment, they also fail to come up with alternatives such as looking at indigenous knowledge systems as an alternative way of developing African states. This is where the gap in the literature was explored.

This knowledge is authentic, respected and valued by people of the community because it is a part of them and their identity. It has been shown by many sociologists that identity plays a big role in human life. As Kalb (2004; 88) puts it, "individuals do not construct their ideas about themselves in social isolation, they do so within groups and other larger social units". Thus, people value more the things that come from within their community and can identify with rather than the things that are imposed on them by superstructures (Mohamedbhai, 2013). This is why IKS is more effective in the development equation. The local people can identify with it. Western modernity and models of development tend to be alienating to numerous communities in Africa because it does not belong to them and has little African philosophy or way of life or even indigenous wisdom. Thus top-down approaches to development have been less than successful in the Global south.

IKS are bodies of knowledge, skills, teaching and beliefs produced locally by people in their specific cultural communities and environment to maintain and improve their livelihoods (University of KwaZulu Natal, 2008). IKS is also known as community knowledge, traditional knowledge and environmental knowledge. IKS is described as indigenous because it is an outcome of an intimate shared experience based on communal symbols, nativity of rites, and the native language. Although such knowledges are regarded as non-western, they are described in that manner to surface the fact that under the long history of western imperialism such knowldges were regarded as inferior to western knowledge. Western knowledge can be critiqued using principles of IKS but without using IKS explicity when doing this critique and the example of this is the theory or concepts used when coloniality is being discussed. Decolonial theories tend not only to defend IKS but they also tend to suggest that IKS do not need defending but IKS needs to be described accurately. Escobar (1995: 98) asserts that “the remaking of development must start by examining local constructions, to the extent that they are the life and history of the people, that is, the conditions for and of change”. There is an alternative to the Washington consensus kind of development and the globalised hegemonic

theories of development and it is found in IKS, the wisdom of knowledge of a specific people.

Nel (2005) states that IKS is "about the knowledge, practices, values and ways of knowing and sharing in terms of which communities have survived for centuries. IKS is not only knowledge and practices of a culture, custom, agriculture, medicine, biodiversity, ethnonumeracy, customary law… but also the rationality of these cultural practices and rites that effected social cohesion, creativity and artistry of dance and music, the technology of fashioning, clothing and beadwork". The research is interested in showing that IKS is important in political structures such as *lekgotla* (general assembly) because IKS achieves commonal understanding easily and quickly. A political structure of the setting of the *lekgotla* depend upon the native concordances the land ruled, and the persons ruled achieve through meaning and interrelationships. *Lekgotla* is governed in such a way that existing power structures from the society to the family are considered as central to the associativity that is created by the people. Change in the use of this knowledge is not haphazard, rather it is based on conscious efforts by people to define their problems and seek solutions through local experiments and innovation, including evaluating and learning from appropriate technologies elsewhere (Lalonde, 1991:4).

The wisdom and skills maintained by the "keepers of indigenous knowledge" (as applied in the traditional practices of farmers, hunters, gatherers, master fishermen, artisans etc.), are based on a dynamic and sophisticated understanding of their local surroundings. Change in the use of this knowledge is not random but rather predicated upon conscious efforts by people to define their problems and seek solutions through local experiments and innovation, including evaluating and learning from appropriate technologies elsewhere. Lalonde (1991) and Nel (2005) say that Indigenous knowledge systems are about the knowledge, practices, values and ways of knowing and sharing. Many scientific and social researchers associated with the formulation of development policies are now beginning to recognize the positive role that indigenous peoples' and their knowledge of the ecosystem, can play in the success of development projects and policies.

This implies that change needs to come from within communities, having confidence in and deploying indigenous knowledge, among other things, to bring about economic and social progress. It is important that the rural poor having a voice about the progress that affects them. It is equally important that outsiders listen seriously to what the rural poor have to say, learning from them and respecting their realities and priorities (Chambers, 1983, 2001). IKS is not new in academia but it has been marginalised and overwhelmed by globalisation. For instance, in 1979 IDS Bulletin published articles about the use of IKS as an alternative theory in the Global South. Extensive contributions were made by Barker, Bell, Belshaw, Chambers, Howes, and

Richards (1979) and landmark seminal work by Brokensha et al. (1980), by Richards (1985) and subsequently by Scoones and Thompson (1994). From much of this work, IKS has become central to later debates about sustainable development because of how such knowledge has allowed people to live in harmony with nature for generations. IKS has been praised for addressing the direct concerns of the poor. Indigenous knowledge has made, and can still make, a significant contribution to resolve local problems (Lalonde, 1991: 168). "Many scientific and social researchers associated with the formulation of development assistance policies are now beginning to recognize the positive role that indigenous peoples' and their knowledge of the ecosystem, can play in the success of development projects and policies" (Lalonde, 1991: 3).

Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework that is use in this research is epistemological disobedience (moving away from colonial modernity and episteme), decolonisation/ de- westernisation/ de-linking/ anti-colonialism, policy implementation, social participation and commitment as well as congruence of interests (Mignolo, 2009). IKS is understood and defined as the knowledge that an indigenous local community accumulates over time (Averweg and Greyling, 2010). It encompasses all forms of local knowledge acquired experimentally and scientifically through art, language, understanding practise, technologies and beliefs that enable a community to achieve stable livelihoods in its geographical residence (Nfila, 2011;3). IKS, unlike other mainstream Eurocentric systems, require participation, steadfast commitment from the communities and countries in which they are implemented.

The previledging of de-westernization of the post-colonies, particularly regarding knowledge systems, by the decolonial theoriests is in this research used to interrogate the capabilities of IKS. This will allow the research to reflect on the role IKS can play in the development. Additionally, the knowledge constructivism theory is used as a part of the theoretical framework because as a part of the enquiry I attempted to broaden the borders of IR by bringing IKS into the discipline as IKS is not prevalent due to the domination of Western knowledge (Wendt, 1992). A marginal engagement with the International relations theory of globalisation, particularly the empirics of globalisation theory: its extent and consequences, is done.

The theory that best informed and helped structure this research was the IKS theory as well as the decolonisation theory. Since Euro-centrism is a mode of knowledge and a paradigm for interpreting the present past and future (Capan, 2014), the alternative to this is decolonising knowledge and introducing IKS. Thus, the IKS theory and the decolonisation theory provided

the theoretical anchors for this research as counter opposition knowledge. The decolonisation theory calls into question the traditionally accepted colonial experiences as well as the consequences thereof (Deil, 2012). The theory recognises that the encounter between the coloniser and the colonised is characterised by various forms of violence and this includes epistemological violence (Nyamnjoh, 2012). The aim of the decolonisation theory or anti-colonial theory are to provide a critical analysis of the colonial and neo-colonial agenda as well as to reject "universalised" Western knowledge systems (Deil, 2012). The decolonisation theory allows us to be mindful of the historical devaluation of non-Western knowledge. Thus, it calls for a transformation in these universalised epistemologies to include IKS. Mkhize (2014: 13) emphasises that the call to engage IKS and the past does not amount to melancholy nor does it mean nostalgic engagement with tradition. Instead, IKS is the conceptual, epistemological transformation and re-valorisation of local knowledge in African universities, education systems and institutions. As the Kiganda proverb states "*amagesi si gomo"* meaning that no one has a monopoly on knowledge, therefore the strict borders of knowledge need to be expanded.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction

International Relations is a field of study with a wide range of methodological approaches that draws upon diverse traditions of research in the social sciences, law, economics, political science, history and sociology. One of IR's most common critiques concerning methodologies is that despite the vast pool of methodologies that it can draw from, IR relies heavily on more scientific approaches such as law, political sciences and economics (Lo Castro, 2011). This research, on one hand, critiques IR for being too Eurocentric and not inclusive of the Global South and on the other hand, it explores IKS research and its contribution to the development. The research dives deep into the history and legacy of colonialism and how it continues to impact the Global South in the post-colonial/ neo-colonial era. This research critiques existing theories and developed theories form IKS for a diverse IR as an academic discipline. As a result, this research moves away from the scientific methodologies towards a historical and anthropological methodology and means of data collection and analysis.

Methodology

The methodology that is used in this research is a case-based, qualitative approach. In addition, a descriptive and exploratory analytical approach is used to understand the role of IKS in the development equation as well as to explore how the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana escaped the resource curse, unlike other resource rich sub-Saharan African countries. The exploratory analytical approach is used to study topics that have not previously been studied or that have very little research available in an attempt to identify new insights, understanding and meanings (Banks and Wood, 1998). This research aims to identify new insights, understanding and meanings about IKS within the development equation. The exploratory analytical approach is appropriate in uncovering these new insights. The intention of this study is to go on an empirical quest to inquire about the influence of IKS on development as well as to use case studies for a more in-depth and exploratory inquiry. Thus, I chose to use descriptive analysis because it aids in understanding of IKS and development in the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana and how these phenomena interact with each other. Elliot, Fischer and Rennie (1999) explain that descriptive analysis also allows for the use of special strategies for enhancing the credibility of design and analysis. Since descriptive analysis allows for special strategies for enhancing the credibility of a study I chose to use phenomenology as a special strategy under the umbrella of descriptive analysis as a research method.

Phenomenology is considered an observational field of social science that aims to develop a complete, accurate, clear and articulate description and understanding of particular human experiences. Phenomenology seeks to make a relationship between individual meanings to shared meanings; it says that meaning is an outcome of objects and descriptive signs, and it also says that meaning becomes subjective because people's descriptive signs seek to make the objects sensible. It provides a rich complete description of human experiences and meaning. A phenomenological study's findings are allowed to emerge rather than being imposed by investigators. Consequently, phenomenology does not delete from or add to, change or distort original data but presents it as is. It is based on the view that there is a social contract between reality and individuals interacting with their socio-cultural world that need not be altered or disturbed. Since this project is oriented towards finding the influences of IKS as a field of study that has been neglected, undervalued and misunderstood it is important to present all findings in a clear undistorted manner. The same notion applies to the case studies. This particular tool of inquiry helps us to understand and explain the meanings of socio-cultural phenomena without disrupting the natural setting.

As a qualitative project - that is a case study – the study seeks to discover, investigate and reveal nuances and complexities that underlie each subject of study (IKS). Given that I chose to embark on a qualitative study, the research method was desktop orientated. I collected and used secondary data in the form of books journal articles, online sources, government documents, other forms of secondary data and also visited the archives extensively and on one occasion consulted with a specialist on IKS for an informal interview. The interview was open- ended as it was a discussion/ conversation about IKS and the history and development of the Sotho cluster ethnic group that is made up of the Sotho, the Tswana as well as the Pedi. The consultation was with Zulumathabo Zulu who is an author and historian of sacred knowledge systems from Southern Africa particularly the Sotho nation. The purpose of the conversation was to understand IKS, its history, the history of the Tswana people and the historical events and period that shaped Tswana culture. Considering that IKS is orally transmitted, I attended three public seminars and lectures about IKS and listened to speakers and researchers impart their knowledge and experiences on their IKS research and findings. I recorded the speakers, collected papers that were available at each lecture/ seminar and used them as a phenomenological tool to enrich the literature to gain a broader understanding of IKS as a subject, practice and discipline.

As aforementioned IKS is passed orally, however I did not visit Phokeng the home of the Bafokeng nor did I visit Botswana because I did not have the financial means to do so. It would

have taken a long time to visit both societies and conduct comprehensive interviews as well as produce a coherent study about the influence of IKS without fully understanding the complexities and nuances of IKS versus Western knowledge. Moreover, I foresaw limitations within myself as a subjective researcher trained in a Eurocentric discipline, conducting research in a Eurocentric way and how this could distort the outcome of the research. I did consider the fact that I did not come to university as a blank canvas but as an individual influenced by a socio-cultural background and upbringing as a black woman from two worlds, the modern and rural world. I did not come into university as an unknowing subject nor did I learn how to interact with people from the university space, as these are the interperstion skills I had learnt priror to enter university. However, I did have to learn new forms of interact with people from an academic perspective for research purposes. Which are some of the skills that I acquired from university that is vastly different to how I would usually interact with people.

Thus, I was still negotiating the proper method to research and document my research as a crucial first step in methodology since I was critiquing Western metaphysics and its method of "research". Postcolonial indigenous knowledge scholars such as Tuhiwai –Smith (1999) and Hoppers (2008) have suggested that the word research is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism. Tuhiwai- Smith (1999:1) posits that "the word itself, "research", is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world's vocabulary. When mentioned in many indigenous contexts, it stirs up silence, it conjures up bad memories and it raises a smile that is knowing and distrustful…how scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world's colonised peoples" (Tuhiwai-Smith, 1999:1). As a result, I opted to ground the study in secondary data and explore the uses of IKS through case studies before embarking on a large-scale case analysis.

I used secondary data because it offered a wide range of data dating many years back. It provides a great way of comparing data and it is compatible with discourse analysis. This aided in the research because I was determined to understand how IKS was perceived through literature over time. Since I aimed to theoretically ground the research in the decolonisation theory, I wanted to understand how existing social sciences literature perceives IKS. The question that I am interested in is whether the literature that speaks about the impact of IKS in development regards IKS to be capable of achieving its successes without it being eked out by foreign principles imported from other knowledge systems. The research uses a qualitative method because this method is able to allow for a coherent arrangement of the data that I collected from the archive, through informal discussions with knowledgeable individuals on the subject, through attending seminars dealing specifically with the role IKS can play in the

social-economic development of a post-colonial state.

I initially wanted this research to rely heavily on archival material and accordingly, I spent most of her time in the Wits University Historical Papers Research Archives as well as other online archival sites, for the first few months of the research, such as the National Archive South Africa (NARSSA) and South African History Archive (SAHA). Unfortunately, I did not rely as heavily on the archive as I had initially planned because of some historical discrepancies that were identified with the archival material or "official documents"/ "official histories". Official documents/ official histories usually have a political agenda and reflect positively on the political-administrative apparatuses than historical facts. Official documents "white-wash" history to portray a certain picture or perspective of those in power. In this research, I found out that the official histories or written histories are not coherent with the unofficial histories of the case studies particularly with the histories of the Bafokeng. The histories captured in the culture of orality told by clan elders, traditional healers (sangomas) and passed down for many generations are vastly different from those that are captured and portrayed by the archive.

My paternal grandmother was a Mokwena, a large clan of the Sotho cluster ethnic group that the Bafokeng belong to. The Bafokeng were once a part of Bakwena and even share the same totem of the crocodile "*Kwena*" which literally means crocodile (Mokwena refers to an individual which means: person of the crocodile, Bakwena refers to a group or society and it means people who conquered the crocodile). My grandmother often spoke about Bafokeng and how they became prosperous and she was well versed in their history, genealogy as well as their trials and tribulation. The critical historical facts from the archive and the stories relayed to I did not match; namely, the acquisition of land by the Bafokeng as well as their role as the regional hegemon, in some accounts they were a friend and in other cases they were a foe of other tribes.

I began to recall her discussion with Zulu who is a *sangoma* as well as a historian. He warned me to be careful when reading historical events especially those that involve colonised people because of the anthropological legacies of perceiving and writing about "the other" by Europeans. Through colonialism, the West was able to construct a new constitution of knowledge for the world and present it universally through political social and cultural dominance (Ndlovu, 2013: 39). Zulu's warning coupled with the discrepancies that I had already come across as well as the trajectory that the research was moving in (away from Eurocentrism), I decided to enquire further about archive research. In addition, I opted to

critique the archive and look at existing literature that problematises or critiques the archive in relation to indigenous knowledge.

The Archive

My observation of the archive is that the archive is a contemporary manifestation of the colonial state. The archive reproduces the colonial perspective and interpretations of the African subject by the West. The archive is imbued with a Hobbesian perception of Africa as a people without history, knowledge, philosophy or even a society, a people who came into being only after interacting with the Europeans. Moreover, the archives justify "civilising the uncivilised" by documenting the "barbaric ways" of indigenous people and portraying the European colonisers as a hero that saved the ignorant from their ignorance. Since the archive is a constructed system of knowledge production it is complicit in how history has been written, how historical representation has been constructed and the kinds of interpretations that we arrive at with respect to history (Auguist, 2018). These constructions are presented as linear and supposedly objective and fact-based. "With this paradigm is the assumption that archive provides us with a value-free epistemology, a value-free knowledge system pertaining to past events. Hence the archive tends classification and order of historical events as a source of objective knowledge, safeguarded by the notion that the archive is a "repository of objective knowledge" (Auguist, 2018).

On the contrary what is more accurate is that the archive and archival materials are linked to institutional objectives, colonial objectives or the objectives of the dominant class. This is to say that the archive is not value-free, rather it is value-full because it tries to push the objectives of the institutions that houses, protects and presents them as value-free. Foucault (1969:145) insists that "the archive is the first law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events". What Foucault means by this, is that the archive sets precedents for the kinds of perspectives we are 'allowed' to use to examine how certain subject matters are perceived. Consequently, the archive prescribes the lenses that are permitted to be used to view the world. Therefore, the archive does not have epistemic political neutrality and cannot be seen as a neutral, value-free source that can be relied on for historical facts. Wiredu (1980) and Gyeke (1997) accuse oral traditions of not being neutral or value-free either. Instead, Wiredu (1980:41) proclaims that oral traditions are "seriously handicapped" because they rely on spirituality, folklores and superstitions that lack rational enquiry. However oral traditions have been critiqued for decades on end whilst the archive is presented as superior and reliable. Archives are not ideologically neutral objects because they can be appropriated and

manipulated by speakers of history in ways that it was not intended to do (Auguist, 2018). This is what makes both the archive and oral traditions slippery objects of epistemic instabilities because of their subjectivity and distortion of history for institutional objectives.

The proposal of the archive being a neutral, value-free knowledge repository does not speak to the genuine ideological intentions of the archive which were to philosophically justify colonial expansion and governance. The archive tends to construct history as an objective fact as opposed to colonial collusion. Both the archive and oral traditions are heavily flawed, and both were necessary for the exploratory analysis of this study. Since this study sought to unpack factors behind indigenous/ traditional phenomena under investigation and revealing nuances and complexities that underlie each subject of study, the archive was used sparsely to avoid the over saturation of European epistemologies and institutional objectives of colonial collusion. The Society, Work and Politics Institute (SWOP) embarked on a long and tedious process of rewriting the archive or presenting more accurate archive about the Royal Bafokeng. SWOP's archive is still work in progress that has exposed many truths about the Bafokeng and dispelled myths and subjectivities that were presented in existing archives through rigorous research done by Sonwabile Mnwana and Gavin Capps since 2015. Data collection consisted of work done by SWOP as an archival historical repository which was critical in the discursive analysis of the Royal Bafokeng. This project required a lot of historical information and even though I wanted to limit my reliance on the archive I had to use it at certain points and supplement it with historical records that are not captured by the academy but lie in oral traditions. Given that oral traditions have been considered unscientific in the past, and citing them has been a point of controversy, whenever I cited oral tradition in this study I indicated by saying "according to oral traditions" and proceed with the citation.

Measuring Development

There are several instruments that economists, development experts and scholars use to measure development such as the Human Development Index (HDI) Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), economic growth, Physical Quality of life (PQLI) stable governance/peace, life expectancy, Gini Coefficient and many more. One of the most commonly used measurements of development is the GDP. GDP measures a country's economic productivity from the basis of goods and services in a given time. GDP is unreliable for comparing countries's developments because the growth of the economy of the country does not only depend on the goods and services which are created in a country but it also includes the salaries of the workers and the employment opportunities etcetera. There are

several problems with measuring development this way mainly because the economic situation of a country does not have a human element and it does not consider the living standard of individuals in that country. This method of measuring development fails to reflect the lived experiences and wellbeing of the populations. Thus, countries with a relatively good GDP growth score such as Zambia and Rwanda will be read as developing and growing at a steady yet robust pace. Whereas countries such as Ethiopia's GDP growth records will reflect a country struggling with economic growth development given the outcomes of their GDP score.

On the contrary, the physical quality of life, as well as the lived experiences of the citizens in the above-mentioned examples, reflects quite the opposite because economic growth does not indicate a better quality of life for citizens. There may be more economic development in Zambia and Rwanda but the wellbeing of the people in rural areas and areas outside the capital are dire according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) HDI. In Ethiopia, the wellbeing of the people is relatively good and there are little inequities between people in rural areas and those in the capital according to their UNDP's HDI score and the Gini Coefficient which measures development based on social inequality (the greater the gap between the rich and the poor in a country indicates that that country is less developed). The measurements of development mentioned above are prone to economic limitations as well as other limitations because when investigating and measuring development on a state and sub-state level it is difficult and impractical to apply universal measurements to different countries that are variant in historical, cultural and other contextual factors (Taodzera, 2015: 15). This research considered development as a broadly encompassing concept that is measured by social indicators such as literacy/ education, infrastructure, access to water, basic shelter, food security and medical facilities, overall wellbeing as well as specific needs of inhabitants in a particular territorial setting as a measure of development. Given that there is not sufficient data to measure development for a sub-state such as the Royal Bafokeng, this research grounded itself in humanistic indicators to measure development in both case studies for the sake of clarity, accuracy as well as foregrounding the influence of IKS on development.

Conclusion

The methodology used in this research was a qualitative case-based, discursive, descriptive and exploratory analytical approach. Secondary data collection was used to gather all the data necessary to analyse the influence of IKS on development as well as the historical account of the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. In collecting secondary data, the archive was consulted as well as the working archive done by SWOP. The archive posed some

challenges because it presented itself as objective, value-free and historically factual, when in fact it expresses the historical consciousness of those who were involved in its constructions and their institutional objectives. The archive is not objective and value-free thus it must be supplemented with counter-narratives and oral histories laden in oral tradition that is passed down generationally by spiritual mediums such as (sangomas). (Sangomas and the work of sangomas can be separated into several catagories viz., those that belong to the king acting as clairvoyant advisors and they also look after the king's health and his royal's family. There are also sangomas that are for the public serving as the local apothecaries, and physicians.)

This research measured development through humanistic social indicators such as literacy/education, infrastructure, access to water, basic shelter, food security and medical facilities, overall wellbeing as well as specific needs of residents in a particular territorial setting as a measure of development. Other measures of development such as GDP are limited in accurately measuring development because it is impractical and impossible to apply universal measures to different countries that have variance in historical, cultural and other contextual factors. Thus, humanistic social indicators are better in measuring development. The theoretical framework that was used in this research is the de-colonial, post-colonial epistemic disobedience as an attempt to move away from Eurocentric epistemologies and foreground IKS into academia. The aims of the decolonisation theory or anti-colonial theory are to provide a critical analysis of the colonial and neo-colonial agenda as well as to reject "universalised" Western knowledge systems that saturate IR and development discourse whilst excluding other forms of knowledge and ways of knowing, such as IKS. Therefore, the de-colonial school sanctions the critiques of Western knowledge systems whilst simultaneously giving relevance to indigenous knowledges.

Chapter Four: The Rupture: The Shattering of The Colonial Illusion, The Roadmap to IKS

Introduction: The Impact of Colonialism

It would be a considerable disservice to conceptualise about IKS without locating the profound effects of colonialism and how it sought to erase indigenous knowledge through global conquest. The notion held by Europeans from the late 1600s was that the world that exists outside the West was incapable of self-rule or progressive action. Wilmer (1993:1) asserted that "in the name of progress and modernisation, through colonisation and global economic incorporation, the spread of Western influence has resulted in the homogenisation of global culture and the ethnocide of countless non-Western tribal peoples". Overt and covert forms for violence were used by the West to suppress the rebellion by indigenous people when colonising and repressing them, forcing them to believe that they were inferior, ungodly and barbaric.

Colonial authorities held Hobbes's perspective of Africans, as people without history, knowledge and philosophy or even a society. Colonised people only came into being after interacting with European subjects. Historical narratives articulate the intention of the Western imperialism as a civilising mission spreading Christianity through missionaries, disseminating Western education as well as promoting ideas to arguably coerce other civilisations to become more like the West (Ntuli, 2009:54). The aforementioned instruments were used by the West to control natives by re-socialising and reconfiguring their cultural identity and assimilating them into Western culture until they reached a hegemonic stage where natives believed that what they were being taught was the truth and subsequently turning their backs on their indigenous knowledge. The West exercised its power over indigenous people through systematic dominance and superimposed its alien creeds to conquer the other and annihilate rebellion. Therefore, in the hands of the West, knowledge was a weapon used to control the native. It had a moderate guarantee of producing obedient natives that would fit into the international community and Western modernity.

Contact with colonial authorities did not only result in physical domination but cultural and epistemic erasure as well. The epistemic dominance by the West had the power to destroy the cultural, social, economic and political ways of life of the native. The consequences ofepistemic dominance resulted in ethnocide, epistemicide -the systematic destruction of

indigenous knowledge- and cultural degradation. The knowledge produced by Europeans during the colonial rule presented an image of indigenous people as being ahistorical, non-intellectuals and unimaginative hence categorising and labelling them as 'the other'. Said (1992) observed that Europeans' understanding of the 'other' arose in the context of an attempt by European imperialism to dislodge and disorient the Orients to control the production of knowledge about them and then exercise power over them. As Sir Francis Bacon (1668) argued: "Scientia potentia est" meaning "knowledge is power" or "ipsa scientia potestas est" meaning "knowledge itself is power" is undoubtedly true. Those who hold knowledge hold power. It was not surprising then that "the first discourse and discipline of knowledge by the colonisers about the "distant other" was Orientalism" (Padayachee, 2006: 33). Europeans wanted to gain knowledge about the 'other' to dislodge and disorient the orient to control the production of knowledge about them and then exercise power over them (Padayachee, 2006: 33). It was important for Europeans to have knowledge of the 'other' to dominate and exercise authority over the 'other'.

As a result, knowledge of the developing world particularly knowledge of Africa was externally produced and oriented, closely compared to a visitor looking through a window to understand the household problems without even asking members of the household. This is what Hountondji (2002: 26) defines as extraversion; the understanding of knowledge about Africa from an external perspective and the author places value on the outside perspective of Africa and many who study Africa have accepted this as the only valid perspective. Hountondji (2002: 26) goes on to elucidate that the Africa which Europeans theories explained was not an Africa which was familiar to indigenous Africans. The knowledge produced in and about Africa is extraverted which means it is externally oriented. Externally oriented research reproduces and reinforces the hegemony of the Global North over the Global South, keeping Africa in a perpetually colonised condition. Mignolo (2009) argues that European colonisation extends beyond the geographical conquest of the Global South to intellectual conquest as well. Mignolo (2009) asserts that the North-South divide represents an intellectual divide that dates back to the colonial era when colonial powers classified Western knowledge as scientific, intellectually rigorous and universally applicable and superior in contrast to their perspective of knowledge from the Global South which is unscientific, primitive and culturally based.

Africa and the Global South lost the independence to reproduce its own knowledge to serve its economies, but this process did not end with the colonial pact (Padayachee, 2006: 37). The impacts of colonialism by far surpasses the physical subjugation of Africans and descend deeper into the Africans' psyche which is captured by the term coloniality. Coloniality is used

to describe the physical and physiological impact of colonialism. Coloniality has been internalised and has impacted African academics. Therefore, research done in Africa applies alien theories from the West to understand phenomena from the Global South. Anthropology was another discipline that developed along the lines of observing and understanding the primitive and backward societies. Padayachee (2006: 34) asserts that development theories, as well as development studies, evolved from orientalism. Thus, development theories and development studies were born of a primitive understanding and the undermining of Africa.

African indigenous knowledge systems have been stigmatized as knowledges which are arbitrary, superstitious, non-empirical, and non-objective. Grosfoguel (2007) emphasises that,

> "The word "Africa" can never entirely escape its bondage to the idea of Africa in the European imagination.' Emerging within Western thought as available for colonization, the 'Other' assumed the identity of that subject that was incapable of mastering itself and was therefore described and represented by the 'master subject' as marked by deficits: lacking soul, lacking religion, lacking writing, lacking history, lacking rights, lacking development and lacking democracy" (Grosfoguel, 2007).

Since Africa is characterised by lack, according to development planners, the theories that they implement are intended to make Africa more Western by making Africa more modernised. However, following the spectacular failure of development theories and practices in Africa, these theories were declared dead by post-development scholars and economists, but their effects were yet to be buried. Instead, the effects of failed development theories reincarnated and were labelled as structural adjustment, globalisation, humanitarian assistance, aid, pre-emptive intervention, millennium development programs and many others that still haunt the African continent today in the form of neo-colonialism. Nkrumah (1965: 8) described neo¬ colonialism disguised as development as the last stage of imperialism, he noted that, "neo-colonialism is that foreign capital used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world" (Nkrumah, 1965: 8). European imperialism can be blamed for the mismatch between theory and practice/ implementation of development initiatives. Theories of development were derived from a large stock of information and development experiences from the West (Castro-Gomez, 2002: 277). The problem with this was that these development experiences were not altered to factor in local conditions and realities of the places they were meant to serve in the Global South.

Development

As mentioned above development has been conceptualised by the West, as a consequence African states have found themselves stuck in, a perpetual stagnation and non-development and failing to strategically position themselves in the international arena or launching themselves into their developmental future. Unfortunately, Africans cannot fully proclaim African solutions to African problems when they have been annexed by development agencies. Politicians, due to international pressure, adopt neoliberal agendas promoted by Western financial institutions and they abandon the philosophy of Africa for Africans. The philosophy of Africa for Africans symbolises imagining Africa's development, African towns, cities and villages that truly reflect the essence of Africa from its languages to its proverbs, beliefs, ontologies and most importantly African philosophies. Africa for Africans is imagining and actualising African modernity. It would be a great disservice and travesty to strategise and frame Africa's development without fully engaging African philosophical traditions which are rich and laced with wisdom about the land, its people, the infrastructure and the sustainable utility of Africa's resources.

African philosophical traditions are rich in wisdom, sciences and abundant knowledge about nature. Today Africa's indigenous knowledge is being exploited like Africa's natural resources. For example, African medicine and medical practise that was once considered inferior by European colonisers are today being labelled alternative medicine and used by Western practitioners for a variety of ailments and cleverly presented as "alternative medicines" by Western medical practitioners without giving recognition to their African origins. Thanks to colonial legacies and the archetypal representations of Sub-Saharan Africa as unimaginative and non-intellectual by colonial propaganda that continues to exist in the 21st century even though there is evidence that suggests otherwise. African philosophical traditions have sophisticated modes of governance and the rule of law. For example, restorative and retributive justice is administered sophisticatedly to rehabilitate all the concerned parties in a criminal case to rid the society of social ills. These are some of the attributes of the pre-colonial African legal system that continues today through customary law in Botswana. Communal consultations are dependent upon the *kgotla* before major decisions are taken. Sophisticated democratic systems have existed in Africa long before colonialism but systematic epistemic erasure by the West has led Africans to forget about their past civilisations and their rich knowledge systems. These knowledge systems are being poached while African states run on the hamster-wheel in a game of catch up for Eurocentric development.

While the subject of African development is important, it is also important for African states to not be entrapped in the hamster-wheel of Eurocentric development where they are constantly chasing a moving target by running around in circles. Development discourse has taken precedence in the international arena where nation-states facilitated by the UN and the World Economic Forum have agreed that the wellbeing of all humans should be the top priority of our (human race) endeavours (Links, 2018:15). The UN declared the 1960's as the decade of development and in January 1961 President Kennedy launched the decade of development with a captivating speech that made particular reference to the rapidly decolonising world. The right to development is enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Rights and publicised internationally, indicating that development is no longer considered a mere concept quantified by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) and economic growth, rather it has metamorphosed into a right; a fundamental element of human life and wellbeing. Links (2018:15) states that historically development existed as a term purely meant for economic progress and that was the goal of development. However, in the past decade, the term development has morphed into a broader concept that encompasses goals such as equality, fairness, equity as well as sustainability.

The characteristics of wellbeing are measured diversely by several social and economic indicators where social indicators take top priority. Social indicators include education, access to healthcare shelter, safe living conditions as well as household income. Distinguishing development as a right, indicated that the international community, particularly the Global North, recognises that development is integral to achieving an equitable, just and fair international order. However classifying development as a right, relegated development to the pool of universalised rights, which has forced African states to divert their attention to universalised rights over national responsibilities and repositioning themselves and their natural resources in the international arena. The universalisation of rights by the West which was popularised by a Western discourse of global human rights hampered efforts for African states to draw from their indigenous philosophies for development and growth. In addition to keeping Africa's development prospects stagnant, the universalisation of rights such as the right to development disregards the historical undervaluation of human rights in Africa due to colonialism and the impact that colonialism has had on development, human rights and geopolitical power dynamics. Moreover, nation-states should have a right to set their development trajectory without external interference as this seeks to undermine state sovereignty.

The universalisation of rights has hampered efforts for African states to draw from their

indigenous philosophies for the purposes of development and growth. Since Western institutions favour immediate human rights over long-term solutions and policies that have been pioneered by African leaders and scholars for the immediate alleviations of poverty and the gradual progression to development through indigenous philosophies, the third world is trapped in the catch-up hamster wheel (Links, 2018: 31). Within the international arena, Africa is a toddler at the gentlemen's table. The attitudes of the gentlemen/ West suggest that Africa is unable to deal with major issues of development. The West and Western institutions have appointed themselves the responsibility of Africa's development. As a result, the issue of Africa's development can be located in dependency theory, because Africa is dependent on the West to manage its development. Africa is at the periphery of the international system whilst the West is at the core and this is a relationship established as a direct result of colonialism, when Africa was exploited for its natural resources. The West adds value through industrial production to Africa's natural resources and sells them at a mark-up price. Natural resources are the primary contributors to Africa's economic income hence Africa is dependent on the sales of its natural resources to the West. Africa's development and dependency exist within a historical context.

According to Jerven (2014:2) development discourse, planning measurement and targets in Africa have not fully been historicised or contextualised. The development has traditionally been framed in the post- World War era as it is said to have originated in that epoch. The problem with seeing the world's problems as starting from this time is that it ignores a major part of the formation of the current world order such as colonialism and slavery and the propagation of Western modernity across the world. This perspective also fails to see how the West has inherited positions of privilege while others have inherited continued underdevelopment (Links, 2018:30). The story of Africa's development is a story of local realities with global design. Africa's development is designed globally and imposed on African states to fit local realities of regions with specific needs. The development theory has changed a lot through the passage of time. What is commonly accepted today as development has taken many turns, conceptualised and reconceptualised to incorporate a vast range of development concepts and criteria. However, what has remained is the one-size-fits-all approach to development which has simultaneously disempowered and disadvantaged the global South preventing the global South from determining their own trajectory of development in the post-colonial era.

As stated, prior, the bitter end to colonialism and the ushering in of independence across most African states in the 1960s ran concurrently with the formalisation of global developmental

rights, quotas, agendas and frameworks internationally instituted by the Bretton Woods system. Failure by states to meet development and growth quotas eventually led to the notoriously devastating Structural Adjustment Policies. SAP's programmes created and sustained unscrupulously through colonial power dynamics within the international arena. Consequently, colonialism covertly reproduced itself into what Pan-Africanists labelled neo-colonialism. Coupled with the covert rebirth of colonialism, SAP's were a dismal failure and reflected badly on the international community and the monetary institutions of the Bretton Woods system such as the IMF and World Bank.

The catastrophic failure of SAP's was replaced by the concept of "Aid as development" or official development assistance in order ractify the paralytic outcomes which were caused by SAP's (Links, 2018: 34). However, the "aid as development" initiative did not seek to redress the damages caused by SAP's, but it continued to help the west to determine the trajectory of development and modernisation of the African states. It had a prolonged impact on the economies of the global South and furthered the legacy of dependency from the Global North. This dependency preserved the unequal asymmetrical power dynamics between the Global North and Global South within the international arena. This rendered the Global South powerless and subservient to restrictions imposed through tied aid (Links, 2018: 34).

The 1990s ushered in another perspective to the discourse of development namely, the reduction of absolute poverty. This conceptual framework was largely driven by the UN and non-state / non-governmental agencies to eradicate extreme poverty. Within this framework, individuals and vulnerable groups become central in the developmental agenda. The socio-economic and cultural rights were neglected while political and civil rights were prioritised (Bell and Carens, 2004). Poverty alleviation as development within the international system contradicted its central tenets which were civil and political rights. The international power dynamics between the Global North and South did not change instead they were perpetrated by the neglect of the state for the individuals. Unequal asymmetrical trade still existed and the Global North became more prescriptive to the Global South with regards to development. The UN's Office of the High Commissioner (2013: 11) stated that "it is impossible to consider development without regard for the international context in which it takes place". Subsequently inappropriate policies, unfavourable terms of trade, low levels of savings and investment perpetuated Africa's underdevelopment and raging poverty.

Africa's development is heavily reliant on Africa repositioning itself in the IPE and rebranding its development to suit its local realties while matching its new place in the international arena.

Links (2018:29) questions whether all states and societies are equally able to achieve development in terms of opportunity and capabilities. The West has colonised most of the world which has granted them the opportunity and capabilities to achieve development. Moreover, the West has defined development and imposed it on the rest of the world. For instance, unequal trade agreements between the Global North and Global South serve as a hindrance and disadvantage to development in the Global south. Thus, at an international level, Africa encounters multiple blockages with regards to development.

The repeated failures of Eurocentric development initiatives implemented in Africa questions whether international financial and developmental institutions could fulfil new mandates of development, namely alleviating poverty and improving living conditions in previously colonised countries (Gregory, 2009:155-156). Reliance on the West or Western /international financial institutions for development in Africa and other previously colonised regions globally leaves countries vulnerable to the reproduction of colonial philosophies, prompting African states to remain stuck in a perpetual game of catch up within the international arena. Moreover, the current international system is changing due to the vast criticisms that have become prominent in spaces of international social dialogue such as the World Social Forum, the BRICS, civil society and University corridors. An array of counter conventional debates on how to achieve development have been interrogated, negotiated and brought to the fore by countries such as China, India and the Asian tigers. Links (2018:15) explains that the rise of China has challenged the status of international heavyweights in the West whilst simultaneously altering traditional modes of perceiving the international economic order.

From the edge of the 20th century leaping into the 21st century scholars such as Mignolo (2008), Bernstein (2008), Ndlovu (2013) and Escobar have been calling for a breaking of the borders of knowledge. Mignolo, (2012: v) explains that for the past five hundred years, universal history was told from the perspective of one local history, that of Western civilisation and paraded as the truth. “Western civilisation managed to have the epistemic privilege of narrating its local histories and projecting it onto universal history, which in most modern terms was the global history of pre-existing and, since the Renaissance, coexisting civilisations”. The imbalance between the Global North and South's contributions to knowledge production, epistemology and ways of knowing has led to greater South-South co-operation on major platforms. For example, the sharing of knowledge within and across the Global South at the World Social Forum that took place in Brazil 2001 which protested the Western hegemony of knowledge and the convenient forgetfulness of the Global South's colonial past. The main

subject of critique was capitalism and the rampant spread of neo-liberalism. These and numerous factors led to the widespread popularisation of de-colonial theories that directly challenged colonial theories and the negative narrative about the Global South. More societies began to enquire and moved towards understanding and identifying the role of indigenous cultures in the context of development in an increasingly globalised world.

In 2008, the UN proposed IKS as an alternative mode of development since Eurocentric development had offered no viable solutions. IKS has been used for thousands of years across the globe by most indigenous populations. IKS refers to the philosophical culture, knowledge, ontologies and ways of knowing about the world, the governance of populations as well as the overall wellbeing of populations. Just as Western philosophers such as Descartes philosophised about modernity and bringing to the fore empirical and epistemological knowledge in the West; philosophers in the rest of the world have also been philosophising in a similar way in their corners of the world whilst their societies lived according to these philosophies. Colonialism disrupted ancient philosophies and IKS. The preservation of these knowledge systems has been passed down orally through succession by shamans, Inyanga, traditional healers as well as "folklore". Alternatives to development are possible. China has proved that alternative ways of going about development are possible. These alternatives do not pose a threat to the international global order, but they will balance global financial systems.

Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS)

IKS is a unique, sophisticated web of knowledge and understanding, interpretation guides and experiences about the natural world. It is often found in traditional non-Western societies in the Global South. IKS provides explanations about how indigenous societies relate to the environment that they inhabit. This knowledge is passed down generationally usually orally and through cultural practices, rituals and folklores. This knowledge is not confined to or bound by science and Western epistemologies because this knowledge predates the enlightenment era. Some characteristics of IKS have led it to be labelled esoteric by scholars such as Gyeke (1997) and Horton (1967) because it uses more than just logic and reason for problem-solving and interacting with the environment. For example, the exploitation of natural resources for capital would not coincide with IKS practices. This is because indigenous people have a broad knowledge of how to live sustainably and in harmony with nature. However, lots of criticism has been waged against IKS for being incompatible with development and socio-economic progress (Gyeke, 1997).

Mapadimeng (2009) asserts that within the debates of IKS and development, there is a

perspective which holds the view that African traditional cultures and value systems are inhibitive to and incompatible with scientific, technological, economic and philosophical development and progress, unlike Western ones. Gyeke (1997:27) argues that the incompatibility of African cultural practices with development is as a result of Africa's intensely religious and spiritual nature of African life which discourages the expansion of technologies …which he further argues eventually stunts the growth of sciences. Gyeke (1997) argues that while African cultures appreciate the notion of causality which is crucial for scientific inquiry, the religiosity of African traditions accounts for causality in terms of spirits and mystical powers which resulted in empirical causal accounts to be neglected for religious causal accounts as causal factors.

Other criticisms waged against African indigenous knowledge in the realm of development by Gyeke are the manner in which knowledge is acquired. He asserts that knowledge was not acquired through experimentation but personalised through secrecy, which means that such knowledge was not made available for objective public scrutiny and analysis (Gyeke, 1997 and Mapadimeng, 2009). The veil of secrecy around knowledge causes it to disappear with its bearers at the time of death (Gyeke, 1997). Gyeke illustrates this point by stating that "in the past, all possible credible claims to knowledge of medicinal plants just evaporated at the death of the traditional healers or priest…and science, including the science of medicine, stagnated" (Gyeke, 1997: 29). Hopper (2013) disputes Gyeke's arguments and states that indigenous knowledge was passed down and disseminated orally and that is why we can account for such knowledge today. Moreover, Hoppers suggests that it was the formal education systems and the global spread of modernity by the West that disrupted the practical everyday life of indigenous people, their knowledge as well as ways of learning and replaced them with abstract knowledge and academic ways of learning (Hopper, 2005). While Gyeke is critical of the lack of scientific enquiry to pursue knowledge and development in African traditions the author acknowledges the existence and presence of technological and scientific capacity within African societies and their cultural and value systems (Mapadimeng, 2009) There is a great risk that these millennium-old knowledge systems can be lost along with its valuable knowledge about sustainable living. In principle, IKS is "informed by and relates to all domains of life and the environment" (Nel, 2008).

Other Scholars such as Amin are also very critical of IKS and accuse it of being reactive to Euro-centricity and coloniality. Amin's (2009) analysis of Eurocentrism was that is presented a challenge to non-Europeans as they were reacting to it in ways that Amin thought were regressive rather than progressive. "The first reaction is the common navel-gazing attempts at

returning to the ancient cultural roots that have informed some Islamic religious and African nationalist fundamentalisms" (Amin, 2009). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, this is a reactionary, blind and unprofitable rejection of the scientific view of the world and the progress made so far (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 25).

IKS has existed for thousands of years, their concepts and practices began to emerge in the sciences in the 1970s when de-colonial sentiments were popularised. The development of new political, economic and cultural realities and postmodern methodologies created grounds and new ways to approach and embrace the IKS (Osman, 2017: 1). Nel (2008) posits that the political recognition of indigenous people came at a time when development planning failed to achieve the desired results, the growing disillusionment of Africans with the promises of the modern "Western" science. At the same time, it increased the public awareness of the value of the cultural heritage and the fact that 'science' must find its locality in the social and cultural context are some of those new realities and developments. IKS emerged out of those new realities and developments foregrounded templates that shape values, behaviours and practices of development.

IKS operates on two entwined levels: namely the empirical level and the cognitive level. The empirical level can be understood and unpacked into four entities namely: the natural, technological, architectural and socio-cultural spheres. The natural sphere includes ecology, biodiversity, soil, agriculture, medicinal and pharmaceutical (Osman, 2009:5). The technological and architectural spheres consist of all the crafts such as metallurgy, textiles, basketry, food processing, building etc. The last sphere is that of socio-cultural aspects of life e.g. social welfare, governance, conflict resolutions, music, and art (Hoppers, 2005: 3). IKS covers broad spheres of human existence and systems which are both social and scientific. Such systems are innovated from within the given communities, whilst others are adopted externally from other knowledge systems to suit the local situation. Thus, new knowledge is continuously added and adapted.

"IKS is stored in peoples' memories and activities and is expressed in stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, community laws, local language and taxonomy, agricultural practices, equipment, materials, plant species, and animal breeds" (Grenier, 1998,12). Unlike the mechanistic conception of reality similar to those documented by Sir Francis Bacon, which advocates a vicious approach to nature (Capra, 1988: 226), IKS emphasises the importance of a harmonious "interrelationship and interdependence of all phenomena" be it biological, physical, social, cultural or spiritual (Hoppers, 2005: 4). Despite

the fact that IKS is contextually and culturally bound, all indigenous communities across the globe share a common respect for all forms of life, contrary to the modern separation of humans from their environment (Hoppers, 2005: 4). In conclusion, IKS refers to "a total of knowledge and practices, whether explicit or implicit, used in the management of socioeconomic, ecological and spiritual facets of life. It is stored in the collective memory and communicated orally among members of the community and to the future generations through, stories, rituals, songs and practices:"

Culture

IKS is located within the culture shared by communities. Within culture we find, modes of being, systems of meaning, knowledge, art, language, governance, norms, values and many other social aspects that influence day to day life. Hoppers (2005:1) insists that "culture is best understood as the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions and all other products of human work and thought". Kluckhohn (1949) describes culture as a spectrum that encompasses the total way of life of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from his group, a way of thinking, feeling and believing, a storehouse of pooled learning, a mechanism for the normative regulation of behaviour and a set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment and other people. It is a precipitate of history, a behavioural map, sieve or matrix. Simply put culture is learnt behaviour and a template of values. It can be said that culture influences ontologies and it is laden with elements of knowledge/ epistemologies, thought, systems of knowing as well as systems of meaning. Thus, we can strongly assert that knowledge is a cultural phenomenon. IKS can be understood better by understanding the cultural realm within which it exists.

Furthermore, culture can be defined as the total body of knowledge produced within a society (Ogungbure, 2013: 13). This means that all knowledge produced within a society is influenced by culture; even Western scientific knowledge is influenced by Eurocentric culture that arose from modernity. Thus, in so far as Africans have a cultural understanding of themselves and their environments, then, they are also capable of scientific thinking. All forms of knowledge are scientific knowledge in so far as they are produced within a culture; this is referred to as the cultural bases of knowledge. Just as culture influences knowledge and knowledge production, culture also influences development. "The purpose of culture in developing the social dimensions of culture, which have a positive effect on development is based on universally accepted ethical standards that have an important role in fostering the respect of other cultures and a system of beliefs and values which improved human capabilities" (UNESCO, 2004: 2). In

most southern African cultures, the ethical system of beliefs and values which improve human capabilities are encompassed in the principle of Ubuntu.

Culture also includes organising principles of African morality such as Ubuntu, a sense of turned toward-ness and responsibility towards others and it is directly translated into '"I am because you are"' or '" a person is a person through other people"'. Hoppers (2005: 4) suggests, "that a person is said to have Ubuntu if they are caring, generous, hospitable and compassionate. It means that my humanity is caught up with and inextricably bound with yours in other words, we belong in a bundle of life. A person is a person through other people". Unlike European modernity that declares 'I think therefore I am', Ubuntu rests on the principle of "a person is a person through other people". Which is 'I am human because I belong'. This philosophy does not believe that 'I am Human because I can think' but rather 'I am human because I belong'. Ubuntu is an organising principle of African morality, a unifying vision, a spiritual foundation and a social ethic. It defines the baseline for morality of compassion, communalism and concern for the interests of the collective (Pityana, 1999:137-48). These principles ensure harmony, friendliness and community. These characteristics are the greatest good in society. In recent years researchers have indicated that there is a relationship between trust to societal well-being in general and in particular to economic development (Fukuyama, 1995: 90). Thus, practising the principles of Ubuntu where members of the community trust each other and have a sense of responsibility towards one another means development can thrive.

Culture is communicated through language. IKS in Africa is often communicated through orality and oral traditions and other spoken form and not always written. Oral traditions and ideologies within African languages are wealthy in folk tales, verbs and witty sayings, which oftentimes communicate ideas, values and perspectives that guide people within African communities on how to go about their lives. When we speak of orality we speak of people's epistemologies. However, culture is not static, it is dynamic and ever-changing. Because culture is a social phenomenon, it can be adapted to suit society's needs and address social ills. The main goal of the program is to learn from the knowledge embedded in the practices of local communities. In other words, indigenous knowledge is based within a holistic, interdisciplinary frame of reference, with its own protocol of how knowledge can be learned. Its promotion is on restoration of dignity to communities, and part of a development strategy for enterprises and capacity building inside communities (Hoppers, 2005:8).

Critique of IR

Insofar as IR theories go, including realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism Africa did not exist until it was discovered by Europeans. Given that Africa's history is documented from the era of the slave trade and colonialism, before European discovery it is insinuated that Africa did not exist. Much like John Hobbes' concept of pre- European Africa where there was no account of time, no art, no letters, no society, one that contained fear and danger of violent death (Mudimbe, 1988, i). Long-held views of the African continent as the Dark Continent did not change post-colonialism; instead they have remained naturalised assumptions within the discipline.

The discipline of IR did not reconfigure itself to accommodate African perspectives from African scholars in Africa even after colonialism. Researchers argue that bringing Africa into IR involves epistemological and methodological challenges relating to our objective of the study and political challenges relating to the contemporary securitisation of Africa (Abrahamsen, 2017: 3). IR has been described as a profoundly Western discipline, unable to capture the historical specificity of the post-colonial African state to perceive of difference as anything but deviance from norms and therefore also unable to capture the continent globally (Hoffman's, 1977). Africa then becomes IR's 'permanent other' serving to reproduce and confirm the superiority and hegemony of knowledge epistemologies and methodologies. Hoffman's (1977) description of IR as an American social science remains a reasonably fair depiction. "Research suggests that an assemblage approach offers a productive way of negotiating this encounter between IR and African studies, making it possible to study Africa simultaneously as a place in the world and of the world, capturing the continent’s politics and societies as both unique and global" (Abrahamsen, 2017: 3).

Hountondji (2009) insists that there is a need for *“épistémologies du Sud*" or Southern epistemologies to be foregrounded by Africans so that our knowledge is not externally oriented but rather meets the practical needs of African societies. There is an urgent need for conceptual and epistemologies transformation that needs to happen to achieve sustainable development in Africa. Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (2005) suggests that Africans need to disentangle themselves from European memory. De Sousa Santos (2007), Escobar (1995) and Mignolo (2009) emphasise the need for the colonised to de-imperialise, de-link, de-colonise, de-Westernise to free themselves from the control of the colonial matrix of power that seeks to suppress every aspect of the life of the colonised even post-colonialism. Indigenous knowledge systems are often regarded as de-colonial. Scholars such as Escobar (1995) view IKS as an alternative to the

colonial matrix of power as well as colonial knowledge and epistemologies. IKS has had a prominent role in promoting development in Asia and Africa during the post-colonial era. However, these seemingly more progressive systems were later diminished at a policy platform and replaced with more neoliberal policies due to the swooping wave of globalisation and global economic pressure. On the other hand, some societies such as The Royal Bafokeng Nation and Botswana managed to resist the powerful wave of globalisation and preserve their IKS through anti-colonial policies.

IR is rarely told from the periphery and IR theorising remains steeped in theories made in the US (Brown, 2006). IR has been unable to capture theories of the global South. Yet, IR emerged as an interdisciplinary field that is made up of several disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the hard sciences such as law and economics. Over the past decade, African academics have been determined to remove Africa from the margins of the international arena and exhibit the lessons that IR can learn from Africa by including more voices from the global South into the discipline. To expand the empirical knowledge and horizons of IR, the discipline must include more cases that are African or illustrations of epistemological transformation. Since the borders of IR were determined by the West decades ago to accommodate a more comprehensive discipline that is equipped to understand and deal with new developments in the world. IR needs to incorporate the IKS corpus to its knowledge production structures in order for its purported support for a pluriversal knowledge to be tangible in research and in the course outlines. It is not sufficient to add a few African cases within IR because it does not change or challenge deep-seated assumptions about the continent. Instead, IR needs to be expanded because studying Africa goes beyond adding Africa and stirring. Studying Africa, questions what it means for the international arena to involve complex epistemological and mythological issues from the Global South.

Chapter Summary

There is a need for a new metanarrative in the study of Africa in IR. The integration of other knowledges into IR encourages a new metanarrative in the discipline. The rise of IKS has been flagged as one of those new metanarratives. Gyeke (1997:25) explains that the post-colonial era not only signified an end to "the period of diction, forcible imposition of a variety of alien values and institutions, (but also) a period of autonomous self-expression on the part of formally colonised people, as well as of self-assertion and sober reflection on values and goals and the gradual wearing way from the self-flagellating aspects of colonial mentality acquired through decades of coloniality". The negative portrayal of Africa as a jungle with savages and cannibals

with nothing civilised; has been an image fed to the world for centuries. This negative portrayal of African in the world has subjected Africa to subordination with regards to trade development and policymaking. This is because perceptions shape how we fundamentally see the world, at the same time perceptions are not reliable. The perception of the Global South in Western media and academia is that of an in-differentiable blended entity. A homogenous place encompassed by huts, dusty roads, hungry children and roaming animals (Mudimbe, 1988).

Chapter 5: Case Study of the Royal Bafokeng

Introduction

The Royal Bafokeng Nation is recognised as one of South Africa's wealthiest and most successful kingdoms situated on the platinum belt which stretches across the northern and north-western parts of South Africa endowed with rich deposits of the platinum group metals: responsible for 80% of the world's platinum output. The Royal Bafokeng Nation is a traditionally governed community that owns 1 400 square km of land (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 6). The Royal Bafokeng are referred to as a nation although they are technically a kingdom since their territory is within South Africa, thus the words nation and kingdom will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. This royal kingdom has not fallen victim to the resource curse and has rolled out a major development project known as Plan 35, which seeks to see the nation fully developed by 2035. The Bafokeng claim to have used natural resource revenue from platinum mining for socio-economic development within the region. Like other *Batswana* nations in the North West province, the Royal Bafokeng has made bold claims about relying on their centuries-old indigenous knowledge for their success.

For the Royal Bafokeng, not falling victim to the resource curse through natural resources management was influenced by their indigenous knowledge. For other Tswana's IKS has assisted in natural disaster management, medicine, food security, sustainable development, ecology, education, agriculture, economic enterprise and many other fields (Smit and Masoga, 2012: 5-6). These bold claims have drawn the attention of scholars, researchers and Non-Government Organization such as the UN and development practitioners, prompting large scale studies from Universities such as the University of the North West and UKZN. Whilst scholars such as Kaya, Smit and Masoga, (2012) have found these claims to be true and beneficial to advancing the alternative perspective of knowledge and development, others such as Capps, Malindi and Mnwana (2016) have found these claims to be overzealous and/ or even untrue.

This chapter explores the genesis and genealogy of the Royal Bafokeng Nation. An in-depth historical account of the Royal Bafokeng is established to trace and illustrate how collective memory and historical memory has shaped the platinum dynasty of the Bafokeng nation through historical institutions and IKS practises. Therefore, all the findings of the presence of IKS within the Royal Bafokeng Nation are rooted and discovered through their historical records because the history of the Bafokeng shapes its present-day success. In addition, this

chapter traces the influence that colonialism and apartheid had on South African indigenous groups particularly the influence they had on the Bafokeng. This comes because most indigenous groups were dispossessed of their indigenous land but the Bafokeng were able to purchase their land back from these oppressive regimes which were facilitated by the intricate relationship between the missionaries, colonisers and the Bafokeng.

The relationship of collusion between colonisers and missionaries with regards to the Royal Bafokeng is central to the question: Can IKS exist alongside western knowledge? In this case study, I argue that the Bafokeng have developed a buffering system to filter external knowledge and take only what they need from it without losing their cultural essence. Conventional accounts of the history of the Bafokeng stresses that indigenous institutions and community ownership of land and natural resources are fundamental to Bafokeng's development. However, this chapter challenges these conventional accounts and instead it posits that the relationship between the coloniser and missionary was central to the development equation of the Bafokeng. The tripartite alliance between missionaries, colonisers and the Bafokeng King is what led to the success of the Royal Bafokeng Nation and not IKS alone. Therefore the influence, interaction and collaborations that missionaries had with the Bafokeng were carefully examined with a particular focus on land acquisition and ownership, education as well as the role of diplomatic liaisons between the Royal Bafokeng and the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) government.

Historically, Christianity and indigenous African practise and philosophies have always been at loggerheads, their relationship can only be compared to the Shakespearean Montagues and Capulets: their interactions are known to be doomed. Colonial encounters with indigenous populations have often led to the disintegration of IKS especially through the spread of Christianity accompanied by colonial epistemic violence disseminated through subjugation and education. In this chapter, I argue that there was an interplay between Christianity and the preservation of traditional values and IKS of the Bafokeng to facilitate development. This is why IKS diminishes in some areas and not others. The analysis of the findings suggests that the relationship between the colonisers and Bafokeng was mutually beneficial in controlling other native populations within the region. This is explained in-depth in this chapter.

The theoretical framework of De-colonial theory, political continuity and the political culture/structure is used to explore the survival and self-preservation of the Royal Bafokeng's IKS and natural resource management mineral ownership. The de-colonial theory is also used to explore the education system adopted by the Bafokeng in post-apartheid South Africa and

their rejection of Bantu education during apartheid favouring missionary education. Using the theoretical framework of phenomenology, the chapter underlines the use of IKS through decentralised dikgoro (wards) and participatory democracy through *lekgotla* (general assembly). Through the findings related to education and governance, I argue that knowledge can be gained from the Royal Bafokeng to enrich the Global South in development and the utility of IKS.

This chapter scrutinises how IKS aided Bafokeng to amass their wealth and how they use it in line with the principles of IKS. Thus, I argue that the royal Bafokeng are authentic and IKS users. By means of the findings, I argue that IKS can replicate similar success in Africa that East Asian countries experienced in the late 1980 and early 1990s. It would almost be deplorable to write about the royal Bafokeng without mentioning platinum mining, platinum revenue and platinum wealth. As such this chapter delves deeper into the discovery of platinum in Rustenburg. Platinum mining, the negotiations of mining rights and ownership as well as the impact that this had on the Bafokeng are also discussed in this chapter. Platinum mining and mining companies have contributed immensely to the wealth of the Bafokeng. It has been argued that the development of this kingdom comes from the courtesy of mining companies and any other contributing factors such as IKS strolls in at a narrow second place. To conclude this chapter, I provide a balanced analysis of how Bafokeng adhere to IKS and how they have capitalised and imported aspects of western modernity in their development.

Conventional accounts of the success of the Royal Bafokeng suggest that the Bafokeng relied on indigenous institutions of collective participation through *lekgotla* to acquire land from the Boers and missionaries. Young men were conscripted to the diamond mines in Bloemfontein to raise capital to acquire land. Land is considered to be wealth in most African societies thus for the Bafokeng to amass land it would be equivalent to amassing wealth. Also, the land was owned communally thus the community was collectively wealthy. As the conventional narrative goes, community ownership of land and natural resources was fundamental to Bafokeng's development. This narrative is true for certain section of Bafokeng because some people within the kingdom are yet to benefit from the development. This is because a counter-narrative suggests that the property and land ownership in Phokeng was purchased by individuals facilitated by the King through the missionaries. Therefore, the land is privately owned but registered under the kings because under colonial apartheid rule individual Africans/ natives were not allowed to own land. Since the end of apartheid, some families have not owned the right to their land. Instead, they were removed and displaced from the land for mining activities by the royal administration. Fierce land battles between the royal family and members

of the community are on-going because of the land issue. This situation does not coincide with the philosophical practices of IKS.

History

As previously stated, the findings in this case study are deeply rooted in history and a historical analysis of the Royal Bafokeng. This is because history and IKS are integrally linked. IKS is a system of historical structures, epistemologies, philosophies and ontologies that were created in a historical context and later disrupted by colonialism. For IKS to be considered authentic, it needs to be rooted in history because its genesis is located in past experiences of indigenous people, their ways of life their philosophies and ontologies. A part of the definition of IKS indicates that IKS is acquired through a long history of experimental and scientific practices (Nuffic, 2002 and Averweg 2010). To fully capture the essence of IKS within the Royal Bafokeng Nation and how it helped them with regards to managing their resources, one must understand the linkages between the past and the present. The basis of comprehending history is also beneficial to the understandings of the condition of being human, the people of Phokeng and how history has shaped them.

“People are considered living histories” (Corfield, 2007). Therefore, the people of Phokeng form a part of the living histories of the Bafokeng. They live and contribute to a society with complex cultures, traditions and religions that have not been created in the spur of the moment, therefore, they too are repositories of knowledge. The knowledge and narratives held by the people of Phokeng are captured by Capps and Mnwana (2015) whose critique of the Royal Bafokeng's activities, social impact and illicit land acquisition has displaced many. In this regard, history proves not only useful but essential.

History is inescapable; it studies the past and the legacies of the past that influence the present. The objective of this case study was to examine the past legacies of Bafokeng and how they influence the present through IKS. "The study of the past is essential for rooting people in time", (Corfield, 2007). It is imperative to present the findings through a historical paradigm because colonial authorities conceive of Africa as a place and a people without history or civilisation before its encounter with European explorers. As aforesaid, colonial authorities held a Hobbesian perspective of Africans, as people without history, knowledge, and philosophy or even a society, therefore, colonised people (natives) only came into being after interacting with European subjects. The preconceived conception held by colonisers about indigenous people not having a history were refuted by re-counting Southern Africa's history and IKS. IR, as a discipline, also perceives Africa as having no history before colonialism. By

locating Africa's history within IR, one avoids the careless approach of "add Africa and stir" without fully understanding the historical background that created these phenomena.

History and genealogy of the Bafokeng of Phokeng

The Royal Bafokeng Nation is a community of *Batswana* living in the Phokeng -Rustenburg region situated in the North West province of South Africa. It is a community made up of 29 rural villages, spread across 1,200 square kilometres of land with a population of approximately 150 000 (Hall, Anderson, Boeyens and Coetzee 2008; Cook, 2010; Huffman 2007; Mbenga and Manson, 2010). Their name is derived from the word *'phoka'* which means dew in Setswana hence they are also affectionately known as "the people of the dew". Following a period of tribal conflict during the 18th century, Bafokeng migrated north and settled in Phokeng; a region that experiences heavy morning dew and accordingly named themselves after this place. Mbenge and Manson (2010:xiii) explain in their book "People of the Dew" that Bafokeng oral tradition relays that when "Bafokeng eventually reached their present location, they observed that in the mornings the valleys around the hills trapped heavy overnight dew, this natural phenomenon seemed to promise that the land would be fertile and they would prosper".

The 19th century was marred by fierce tribal wars that took place across the interior and south-eastern parts of South Africa. These wars were called '*Mfecane*' by Nguni speakers and '*Difaqane*' by Sotho –Tswana speakers. These were said to be epic violent wars that took place between most native groups. There was a brutal rivalry between tribes and intertribal conflict within the central and south-eastern parts of South Africa. Those involved in these grand factional battles were Sotho cluster tribes made up of the Sotho, Tswana and the Pedi, as well as the Nguni cluster tribes- those who spoke Nguni dialects known today as the isiZulu, isiXhosa, siSwati and isiNdebele. The Nguni clusters fought amongst themselves as did the Sotho clusters which resulted in major rifts within these groups. However, these two clusters heroically and most famously fought against each other as an exercise of power and dominance. This was a period that many colonial historians labelled as black on black destruction and near genocide of enormous groups of people which led to the mass migration of people across South Africa. The conventional narrative and accepted version of events blame Shaka and Zulu expansionism for the occurrence of these wars, which prompted several historians such as Cobbing (1988), Khumalo-Seegelken(2015) and Wright (1995) to reject the occurrence of such events ever happening. Largely due to the fact that too much emphasis was being placed on the role of Shaka.

Instead, contemporary historians label Difaqane/Mfecane as fictitious propaganda by the British and Boers to create mass hysteria amongst the native populations and justify their "intervention to civilise" the native populations of South Africa (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:10). The man who is credited for creating this propaganda was Walker, a white British settler who was a liberal and of whom very little was known about other than his involvement in orchestrating *Mfecane* propaganda (Cobbing, 1988: 486). Walker used the neologism to create a new term "*Mfecane"* which means "the crushing" and rooted in local African languages to create an unsavoury and almost savage narrative about the native populations of Southern Africa with a particular smear campaign against the "gruesome and evil" Shaka (Cobbing, 1988: 487). In Walker's accounts, Shaka was responsible for the destruction and diffusion of the Nguni which gave rise to Mzilikazi and Ndebele terrorism. The Ndebeles terrorised most of Southern Africa including massacring and enslaving Tswana groups such as Bafokeng. Given that the end of *difaqane* coincided with the end of the First South African War and the Voortrekkers moving into the interior of South Africa; disposing of natives of their land; war propaganda helped to disguise the land dispossession.

Although one cannot be fully convinced by the occurrence of *Difaqane/ Mfecane* both the official and non-official archive indicate that there was a period of turbulence during the early 19th century that resulted in the mass migration of many tribes. This turbulent period could have been caused by an array of factors such as high rainfall, coupled with the introduction of maize as a staple crop by colonial settlers, an increased population which led to increased competition for important resources such as land for grazing cattle (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:10). This, in turn, led to the mass migration of Tswana groups to the north-west of Ntsuanatsatsi (Eastern South Africa) in search of peace and greener pastures. The 1800s saw the rise of the *Batswana* wars where many Tswana communities fragmented into smaller subgroups which we can recognise today such as the Bakwena, Bakgatla- ba- Kgafela, Bahurutshe, Bapo, Batlokwa and of course Bafokeng. Tswana communities experienced further conflict and subjugation by amaNdebele led by Mzilikazi who defied Shaka, king of the Zulu's in Natal, fleeing northwards with several of Shaka's regiments (Mbenge and Manson,2010). Mzilikazi migrated northwest with his people and settled in present-day Magaliesberg, Rustenburg and Pilanesberg region.

The official archive, as well as Tswana digital archive, suggests that amaNdebele regarded themselves more superior than Tswana communities who were the original inhibitors of the region. It is documented and emphasised by the archive that amaNdebele often treated Tswana people maliciously, using Tswana's as slaves, beating them and even killing any Tswana who

challenged their authority. AmaNdebele had essentially colonised the Tswana and even forced them to assimilate to their cultural practises and even their style of dressing. The Tswana groups endured Ndebele persecution for 14 years, and finally defeated them with the help and collaborative effort of the Afrikaner/ Boer. Soon Ndebele cultural practices disappeared from the daily life of the *Batswana* and they quickly returned to their indigenous ways of life. The Ndebele were expelled by Boer *Voortrekkers* from the region and migrated north into Botswana and finally settled in Matabeleland in present-day Zimbabwe.

The Boer *Voortrekkers* who arrived in Phokeng 1836 were led by Hendrick Potgieter in what became the Transvaal province also referred to as the Transvaal Republic. Potgieter gifted *Kgosi* Mokgatle (Bafokeng king) a farm in Kookfontein as a reward for helping the Boers successfully defeat Mzilikazi and amaNdebele. He also thanked the Bafokeng for their hospitality following their long, draining trek in search for greener pastures free from British persecution. However, Potgieter later took away the farm he once gifted Mokgatle for reasons not well documented and this act would set a precedent for strained Boer -Tswana relations for the next four decades to come (Mbenge and Manson, 2010).

The arrival of the Boers in Phokeng brought several changes including changes in land ownership, authority, sovereignty and even political rule. The Boers established the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), a white settler state that colonised all the land in Phokeng and divided it up into farms and distributed it amongst themselves (Mnwana, Mtero and Hay, 2016: 7). They carved up the land into private property without any regard for the African groups still living on it. Some land was allocated to African groups for tenure which the Boers imagined that African land tenure involved a vague system of communal ownership with the chief as a custodian of the land but the land ownership belongs to the ZAR government (Mnwana, Mtero and Hay, 2016: 8). Before the arrival of the Boer "where I stand" was accepted as land right or land "ownership" model agreement (Kgoroeadira, 1993: 16). This meant that people owned property that they determined for themselves "I stand here and therefore this is my property". The arrival of the Boer brought with it the foreign concept of land purchase which in turn meant ownership (Kgoroeadira, 1993: 16).

The concept of land purchase also brought with it questions around how to get money which involved selling one's labour-power. This denoted that people could own, and purchase land and the means of the purchase was acquired through labour. The Boers were mostly agriculturalists who converted their land into farms and recruited Bafokeng to work on the land in return for food and accommodation (Kgoroeadira, 1993: 16). The Boers became landlords

while the original landowners, the Tswana, became tenants on their dispossessed land and were forced to work the land as slaves belonging to Boer farmers. As a result, Tswana groups lost their land and sovereignty, which affected smaller, less homogenous groups. The colonial policy did not recognise small groups or "sub-tribes", the only groups that were recognised as having any legitimacy was the tribe itself. Thus, many tribes including the Bafokeng grew in size due to the composites of many smaller diverse groups who integrated with the Bafokeng to gain legitimacy and recognition from colonial authorities.

The political rule took on a different form when the Boers settled in Phokeng. The *Kgosi* was no longer the sole authority, but the Transvaal government became the supreme authority. Paul Kruger was appointed the On-field Coronate in the Transvaal while Potgieter served as President (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). Kruger worked alongside the Department of Native Affairs, a feature of a colonial system that manages the matters of the natives within the Transvaal. The traditional authority of the *Kgosi* was maintained in Phokeng and survived colonial rule, although there was an additional feature which is the government. Colonialism interfered with the land ownership and indigenous uses of the land by dispossessing it and forcing the indigenous population to work the land. Indigenous cultural practices and performances disappeared from the daily lives of Bafokeng following their colonisation by the Boer. The King maintained his role as ruler, but his powers were somewhat undermined. Bafokeng had to adhere to foreign economic concepts imported by the Boers. Although the indigenous life and IKS of Bafokeng may have been altered by the arrival of the Boers in Phokeng, the Bafokeng were able to preserve their IKS through maintaining the leadership structures and complying with the *Kgosi* leadership.

Economic Integration and Political Rule

Kgosi Mokgatle strategically allied himself with the Boers upon their arrival in Phokeng. Both groups were in need of each other to recover from the aftermath of disruptive events such as the Ndebele occupation and the great trek. Mokgatle's biggest ally was Paul Kruger. They were said to be neighbours and were often seen sitting on the porch having long conversations (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:29). Kruger helped Mokgatle to buy land from the Boer farmers in Phokeng and had also integrated Bafokeng into the economic practices of the Boers. The Boers provided political and military backing for local leaders and allowed them privileges in the local hunting economy. The Bafokeng were revered and even feared by other Tswana groups because they were stronger, more populous and were co-opted by Kruger to conduct raids on weaker less organised Tswana groups and traded them as slaves for the Boers (Mbenge and

Manson, 2010:29). “Rustenberg was described as a slave trade centre with its resident dealers" (Maggs and Whitelaw, 1991:21). Guns were given as a reward for participating in the raids or so-called slave trade.

Between the 1840s and 1850s ivory trade was a lucrative business in the International Political Economy (IPE). African tribes and societies were already fully participating within the IPE. In southern Africa, the Boer were introduced to the Bafokeng through Kruger and the Bafokeng were incorporated into their economic systems (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:29). The guns that Bafokeng received from the raids/ slave trade were used to hunt elephants, granting them access to participate in the lucrative ivory trade. Mokgatle also directed young men southward to the Cape to purchase guns and other manufactured goods. Historian Fred Morton (College and Iowa, 2008: 65) states that Mokgatle and Kgamanyane of the Bokgatla “acquired wealth in cattle, plantations, tools, buildings and dependants” (Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa 2008: 65). Mokgatle would not have been afforded such opportunities if he was not friends with Kruger. When the smaller groups in Phokeng reported Mokgatle for his participation in the slave trade to President Pretorius, Mokgatle was exempt because of his previous friendship with Potgieter and Kruger and for providing the Boers with much-needed labour at a very bleak time. During 1840-60, Mokgatle grew in power and prestige. He was such an iconic figure that people, then and now, swear by his name when they testify to the truth (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:30).

The praise and adoration that Mokgatle received from Bafokeng did not make him invincible from envy and contestation within the royal family. *Kgosi* Mokgatle recognised that there was a new kind of competition from his half-brothers, *Dikgosana* (clan heads) and *dikgoro* (ward aristocrats), were probably given the many years of inter-Tswana wars. *Kgosi* Mokgatle devised a very intelligent initiative to co-opt them to join forces with him and dominate the Phokeng region through intermarriage with some of the other Tswana groups. In so doing he created new descendants of Bafokeng that populated Phokeng and inevitably created new wards /dikgoro which ensured that political competition was diluted from below and that his position as king would continue unchallenged. In this way, peace and a sense of stability were cemented within the kingdom which became the bass and structure of the Royal Bafokeng Kingdom. From that point, the king was able to mobilise labourers to work in Boer farms and diamond mines. This also led to the remodelling of Bafokeng society to the king’s family and put an end to the continual contestation of kingship from *dikgoro* which had become synonymous with pre-colonial African tribal politics (Capps, 2010: 149). Essentially Mokgatle reinstated ancient Tswana political structures that ensured that peace was maintained through political structures.

Regimental leadership was always a part of southern African political rule especially Tswana societies but Mokgatle solidified regimental leadership through wards/ *dikgoro* (Capps, 2010: 149). This meant that the king decentralised his leadership to protect himself from contestation because after all, he was disposable during this unsettling period. As a part of his structuring of Bafokeng society, *Kgosi* Mokgatle looked to the *mephato* (the cultural practice of initiating) and initiation school that groomed youths into adulthood to join a regiment at the graduation ceremonies. Regiments meant that tribal heads did not contest for kingship because they were leaders in their own right, but that young initiates who joined a regiment became associated with the royal family and Mokgatle himself. This was an act of social and further political structuring and continuity. The governing structures created by Mokgatle which exist within Bafokeng society today were derived from ancient pre-colonial regiments system which held the king accountable if he underperformed. Moreover, using the theory of phenomenology in this case study, paints a vivid picture of the vastness of IKS. Mokgatle used IKS to structure Bafokeng society but also to protect himself from political contestation. Mokgalte used historical Tswana institutions to shape the Royal Bafokeng Empire. Through the theory of historical institutionalism, one can observe the sequences of social political and economic behaviours that changed the trajectory of Bafokeng society. Historical institutionalism displays how the Bafokeng imported and indigenised the economic practices of the Boers to suit and inform their political practices.

On the contrary Bafokeng's adherence to the economic behaviours and economic institutional policies of the Boers has been interpreted as Bafokeng serving the colonial system and being in cohorts with the Boers. Given Mogkatle's close relationship with Paul Kruger coupled with Bafokeng's indebtedness to the Boers for helping them to fight off Ndebele occupation some authors like Capps (2010) and Cook (2005, 2010) believe that Mokgatle created a policy strategy that served the colonial system because stable tribal politics would allow for an endless stream of labour from the Bafokeng tribe (Capps. 2010: 173). Capps (2010:177) insists that colonial administration denied tribal heads, dikgosana and dikgoro from legally owning land and only the king could legally own land. Consequently, indigenous landowners were subordinate to the king. This was done to avoid the political fragmentation that would have resulted in multiple independent sub-groups (Taodzera, 2015: 106). Capps (2010: 177) explains that as a result, tribal chiefs were agents of the colonial state which "further cemented its position over indigenous communities". Furthermore, the long-held philosophy of botho/ ubuntu was promoted amongst Bafokeng, compelling them to unite instead of fragmenting into tiny little tribes that could easily be defeated which played on their historical psychology of

intra-Tswana wars and Ndebele occupation.

Nonetheless, a tribal trust system was carved leading "Bafokeng to become the single largest tribal trust area in the country, in effect a product of forced political centralisation and confederation" (Taodzera, 2015:106). This version of events told by historians fits comfortably in the meddling characteristics of colonial settlers characterised by divide, dispossession and rule. The bifurcation of nations and tribes into customary rule by the chief and official rule by colonisers gave rise to colonisation and the dispossession of land and resources of a people but showered the king with total authority. Taodzera (2015:106) describes this version of historical accounts best and asserts that "overall, this fell within the colonial policy of divide and rule, which sought to control indigenous people, limit their financial independence and property holding, confine them to the rural areas and assert the traditional authorities' control over their movements so that rural areas would act as pools for cheap labour". The historical unfolding of events does not coincide with the values of Bafokeng's ambitions of land acquisition. However, both accounts vividly indicate the ability of the Bafokeng to organise which has led to their success and development.

Land Acquisition and Missionary

From the late 1860s, Boer farmers began selling portions of their land. The price of the land was far too expensive for agrarian Tswana communities who were labouring for the Boers. In 1866 *Kgosi* Mokgatle called a *pitso*/council meeting where he and members of his *lekgotla* negotiated the buying of Boer farms in the Phokeng to gain Bafokeng land back (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). He knew that the wellbeing of his people relied in owning land and making good use of it. Accordingly, Mokgatle conscripted young men to work in diamond mines in Kimberly from 1867 and later in the gold mines in Johannesburg from 1886 (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). The money that these young men earned was given to the king and pooled together to buy land. This was an extraordinary display of communal pooling of resources. The more people a community had the greater their ability to generate economic resources and to buy additional land for the greater good of the tribe. The men who were conscripted to work in the mines did so for the good of the tribe and their individual gain.

Members of the community began to form syndicates to buy land for their families and many people bought land privately without a king or the Native Affairs Office. However, in 1880 the government passed a law that prohibited land purchase by individuals or small groups (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). Instead, those who wanted to buy land could only do so with the intermediation of a recognised chief. One would no longer have to go through missionaries or

white nominees to buy land anymore. Although there was restraint such as: natives could only buy land registered under a state official who would take trusteeship over that land and secondly the land must be registered in trust under a local group/tribe. Since the only group that was recognised as having any kind of authority was the tribe itself, it meant that natives who bought land would register it under the tribe (Mnwana and Capps, 2015). Communities in the area were forced to subscribe to one chief and this usually meant the chief with the one largest population, and at the time this happened to be *Kgosi* Mokgatle of the Bafokeng.

It is argued that the resilience of the Bafokeng nation was largely due to the pioneering vision of their founding father, Kgosi Mokgatle, who was a brilliant leader. He led his people to Phokeng, he gave them a new name; he avoided intra-Tswana wars and joined forces with the Boers to defeat the oppressive Ndebele led by Mzilikazi. He was a visionary in the sense that he had planned the Bafokeng success; he knew that land was wealth. He knew that the wellbeing of his people lay in owning land and making good use of it. He and members of his*lekgotla* negotiated the buying of land. He sent Bafokeng men to work in the mines in Kimberley. The money that these men made was used to buy land.

Missionaries

The Great Trek not only brought with its Boer settlers but missionaries from across the world. The Bafokeng, like numerous other *Batswana* in Rustenburg, were introduced to missionaries by David Livingstone of the London Missionary Society (LMS). They were the first to evangelise in Phokeng, although they were not welcomed by most of the local population especially the king (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). The presence of missionaries had a great significance, not only because they brought Christianity which posed direct challenges to the traditions and beliefs of the Bafokeng, but also because they introduced many new economic and cultural practices. LMS was the first missionary society to evangelise among the Tswana in the early 1860s (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). *Kgosi* Mokgatle was not ready and was unwilling to accept missionaries, consequently, he did not give them any recognition. Mokgatle supported indigenous practices such as traditional healers, rainmaking customs, as well as initiation schools (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). This was perceived as primitive and profane by missionaries. Additionally, LMS was considered to be an ally of the ZAR government particularly the British whom the Bafokeng had strained relations with. Inevitably, LMS could not be trusted, which justified the cold reception by the Bafokeng.

A group of north German missionaries known as the Hermannsburg Mission Society (HMS) had established themselves among African communities during the mid-1860s following an

invitation by Bakwena in Diteyane, present-day Botswana, as well as smaller scattered African communities in the Rustenburg –Phokeng region (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). HMS was tolerated and accepted because of their favourable anti-racial political stance as well as their agricultural orientation. This meant that they had much more to offer the locals than just Christianity and this they did. Unlike the LMS or Dutch missionaries, German missionaries such as the HMS had no attachments to the warring factions and political contestation of English and Boers following the first South African War. They would not have benefited substantially from the victory of either side therefore evangelising was their biggest assignment in addition to building schools.

The most prominent figure of the HMS was Christoph Penzhorn who was stationed in the north of Pretoria with *Kgosi* Makapane's people but a member of Bafokeng's *lekgotla* advised the king about the education system that was being taught by Penzhorn to *Kgosi* Makapane's people and how Bafokeng could benefit from the same education system. Mokgatle sent a request to Penzhorn to visit Phokeng and offered him a place to stay for his wife and young son so that he could do his missionary work amongst the Bafokeng (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). Upon Penzhorn's arrival in Phokeng, the Bafokeng bought him addition land from Kruger worth 900 pounds which Bafokeng paid for in cattle, sheep, pigs, maize, and skins (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). Penzhorn contributed 150 pounds towards the buying of the land. This was the first of many land transactions by Penzhorn and the Bafokeng due to the weakness of the early colonial state to control the racially exclusive land market and land acquisition (Mnwana and Capps 2015: 12).

The HMS was a Lutheran protestant Church following the acceptance of missionary teachings that the Bafokeng seemed to have also adopted a protestant ethic. The protestant ethic is a concept that is deeply rooted in the realist school of thought that promotes hard work and accumulation of wealth for investment while placing a heavy emphasis on the state and national interest. The Bafokeng began to aggressively buy land and farms from Boers in the Phokeng region with the help of Penzhorn. By 1880 the government in Pretoria had begun to introduce rigid rules for land ownership, especially for Africans. By 1913 the Native Land Act prohibited black people from owning land outside the native reserves or homeland, but the Bafokeng Empire continued to grow with the assistance of Penzhorn who bought land on behalf of the Bafokeng.

Missionaries would register the land in their names and hold it "in trust," to protect it against repossession by the Boer settlers. By the end of the 19th century, Africans had purchased an

estimated 545, 920 acres of land this way including the Bafokeng. At the time, the more people a community had, the greater its ability to generate economic resources with which to buy additional land. Thus, groups smaller than the Bafokeng were less able to buy land and this severely constrained their ability to expand their product base and extend their access to land. By 1905 Bafokeng had the largest population in Phokeng Rustenburg region with an estimated population of over 9000 whereas in the 1880's the population was a mere 6000 (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:74, 83).

As previously mentioned, Africans formed syndicates to buy back land from the Boer settlers through the intermediation of white nominees from the 1880s because there was a growing reluctance from the government to allow Africans to buy land (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 83, Mnwana and Capps, 2015: 12). The ZAR government debated about whether Africans could buy land. From the 1880s onwards the government decided to recognize the different tribes and to use this recognition to prevent the individuals to purchase land in their private capacities. There has long been an underestimation of Africans by the native affairs department. In a journal article written by Dubow (1986), the author officially labels the Native Affairs Department benevolent paternalism because of an invitation that depicted an administration (of the Native Affairs Department) as a white man who had both the qualities of a "Victorian patriarch and a traditional chief (a *kgosi*). This earned them legitimacy with the national ZAR government and trust amongst the native. The Native Affairs Department played a duplicitous role of “benevolent patrimonialism” allowing the African to buy land, however, the land they bought was not for any agricultural activities which resulted in a financial loss to the African (Dubow, 1986 and Mnwana, Mtero and Hay, 2016: 10-14).

African communities had begun buying land through white missionaries who evangelised in their communities. “Africans would give the purchase price usually in cattle, through the *kgosi* to the missionary, who would buy the land and register it for them in his name on their behalf’” (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:77). Legally the registration of the land would show that it belonged to the missionaries and not the Africans. Purchasing land was a long, intricate and expensive process. The *Kgosi* would lead his people through this lengthy and intricate process of buying land to grow his community and the grazing land for the cattle. Bafokeng through the help of the missionaries’ bought farms surrounding Bafokeng owned land to expand their territory. The archive indicates that some Bafokeng *dikgosi* owned land because certain farms in the Phokeng-Rustenberg region were registered under their name. The Native Affairs Department did not consider this land to be personally owned land but rather as land belonging to the Bafokeng as a whole.

The relationship between missionaries and African societies was a precarious and unstable one. On the one hand, missionaries forced African societies to turn their backs on their cultural practices and adopt Christianity. They evangelised about how African culture and spirituality was primitive, evil, and backward and would not lead them to the "promised land". In so doing, they were the first to devalue and erode IKS in African societies. The missionaries became a structure that successfully indoctrinated the natives with the Eurocentric values disguised under the systematized religion of Christianity. In this manner the colonial settler governments were able to use the missionaries to strengthen their annexation projects. It is without doubt that missionaries of all kinds; good or bad came to Africa and voyaged the world with a "saviour mentality" and the attitude that European modes of being were far more superior to African modes of being. Hence, they saw the world outside of Europe as barbaric and uncivilised. European missionaries believed that they were bringing civilisation to people who did not have it. This was false because we see a very well organised and 'civilised' Bafokeng society even before the missionaries. Missionaries often made the mistake of confusing biblical values with colonial values to the detriment of Africans. Such values and teachings included that hard work leads to salvation as espoused by the protestant ethic.

However, missionaries were also beneficial to African societies to a certain extent. They provided protection from the national government; bypassed policies that kept Africans in an inferior position such as, bypassing the inferior education system that the national government provided to Africans, which ensured that the education received by African would keep them as cheap labour for white settlers in the farms and the mines. Missionaries provided protection from native affairs administrators who often stripped black natives of their land, cattle and other wealth as well as humiliated black people including kings. Mbenge and Manson (2010) recall an incident where the administrator of the native affairs beat *Kgosi* Mokgatle with a whip and missionaries helped Kgosi to seek justice from the national government. It is well documented that many independent leaders in Africa were educated in missionary schools and their missionary education gave them an upper hand over those who were educated in government schools. Particularly in South Africa, missionaries defied the government and educated black students even though it was forbidden by the government. There are a few cases where missionaries-built clinics and brought in medicine and provided healthcare to reduce infant mortality and provided immunizations to many children saving their lives from curable diseases. Missionaries helped natives buy land under their names when buying and owning land was forbidden for black people.

In addition, missionaries in Phokeng brought with them Lutheranism which engulfed Bafokeng

with the protestant ethic to work hard with the belief that God rewards those who work hard. However, the spirit of hard work is not foreign to *Batswana* as it forms a part of Tswana indigenous knowledge. There is a Setswana insult that says *"o phuthile matsogo o lebelletse banna ba sebesta*", meaning you are sitting with your hand crossed watching other men/ women work. According to Tswana indigenous knowledge it is unfathomable and inexcusable for a Motswana to sit leisurely while others work because there is always work to be done or something to improve. This was supposed to encourage *Batswana* to work on constantly improving their living conditions and bettering their livelihoods. Thus, development or development rhetoric forms are part of Tswana's daily lexicon. Bafokeng worked very hard, hundreds of men went to work in the mines for their immediate families as well as for the growth of the kingdom/ society.

Many men lost their lives in the diamond mines according to Mbenge and Manson (2010:111) an estimated 500 Bafokeng men died each year in the mines. However, they died a "virtuous death". In the 20th century around the 1920s, the Bafokeng had acquired vast amounts of landholdings indicating that they preferred agriculture and commerce over employment in the mines (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:61). Legassick (1969:98) asserted that "no women ever thought of going to work for white men". A woman by the name Ernestina Mekgwe was boldly quoted as saying "we got rich through farming" (Legassick 1969:98). The sacrifices of the generations before secured the thriving for this golden age of Bafokeng. The generation led by Mokgatle ensured future Bafokeng did not have to work in the mines for income but that they could sell their produce to local Afrikaner farmers and white shop keepers (Mbenge and Manson, 2010:61).

Missionaries and Education

Mokgatle proved to be a great strategist as the monarch of Bafokeng. He organised the Bafokeng and prepared them for the future through education and land ownership. There is a heavy emphasis on education amongst the Bafokeng. *Kgosi* Mokgatle sent two of his sons (Bloemhof and Paul Mokgatle) to study in the Netherlands as teenagers. Bloemhof, also known as Keorapetse, was being groomed as the successor of the Bafokeng throne. It was alleged that Mokgatle paid for their education from his pocket and not through the Dutch South Africa Association that often paid for young white men to further their studies in the Netherlands.

It was reported that Kruger had stated that "Christianity and civilisation were not reserved for white[s] only" (Schutte, 2007: 60). Missionaries equipped Bafokeng with education at par with their white counterparts. However, missionary education eroded traditional practices as well as

traditional wisdom. Christianity and missionary education alienated people from their communities. School attendance was irregular and church services were poorly attended during the 19th century. Those who had converted to Christianity and received missionary education were labelled as outsiders; they were unpopular, stigmatised and estranged from their communities (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 47). Form 1890 the number of converts grew and by the beginning of the 20th century there was a decline in adherence to traditional customs and people were ashamed to be "heathens" (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 47).

Education, under colonialism and apartheid, was an interplay between the Church and the state, a balancing act between the government policies and missionary efforts. The education that was provided by missionaries was much better than that provided by the government however both educational systems erased traditional knowledge and replaced it with technical skills that equipped Africans for the "modern world".' "Christian missions destroyed traditional religion and morality, undermined African history and robbed the traditional culture of its charm and appeal among the younger generation. Instead, training in technical skills and professions necessary for a modern society were propagated by the education system" (Adjei, 1994: 189). This education was founded on the premise that Africans are backwards and uncivilised therefore education would save them from their savage ways.

The first and most detrimental place that IKS vanished was through the education system, the normative consensus of modernity is most prevalent in the education system. Shaping the way people think, their perceptions, norms and values is a powerful tool in anyone's hands. The apartheid government recognised this and subsequently introduced Bantu education to keep the black population as the subservient, cheap labour population. Colonial education excluded Africans from "social making" inhibiting them from caring for their path and self-determination. The ghost of colonialism and epistemic violence still haunts the education system. The first thing that independent governments strive to do, is to eradicate colonial education and introduce a de-colonial education or better yet IKS into formal education which is what Bafokeng have done by building Lebone High School.

Lebone was the name of the third king of the Bafokeng after Mokgatle. The name Lebone means light. Lebone High School follows a conventional curriculum along with another curriculum that priorities indigenous education and is known for using state of the art technology and educational material. Lebone High School prides itself in teaching the most eloquent Setswana in the region to eliminate language death and the social alienation that comes with using English as a primary medium of instruction. Cultural values, norms and

wisdom are embedded in language. If one loses their language or spends too much time outside of their language, they lose important cultural values and powerful tools of self- determination. As Mmatshilo Motsei (2004,77) articulated “by conceptualising in a foreign language at school children participate in a different world of experiences from that of their immediate family and community… leaving these seeds to grow may well result in a bitter harvest" (Motsei, 2005: 77). In essence, education is a vital tool in promoting IKS and self- determination that could lead to development.

Platinum Mining

The Royal Bafokeng Kingdom is well known for its platinum mining endeavours and riches. Platinum was first discovered in the early 1920s when a German geologist Huns Merensky traced a platinum belt that ran across the then Transvaal present-day North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). A platinum reef, of richer quality that housed 80% of the world’s platinum group metals, was discovered in Rustenburg, Phokeng area on Bafokeng land in the early 1930s (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). This led to a platinum rush in the area. Mining took off relatively soon after the discovery of platinum. The mining projects were slow and leisurely, mainly because colonial spatial planning and imagination did not anticipate the discovery of any precious minerals in this part of the Transvaal. Consequently, there was no railway line to effectively transport the metal after it was mined and other developmental futures that are synonymous with an industrial mining town such as Johannesburg or Kimberley. The government and mining companies such as Gold Fields, The Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company (JCI), Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum as well as the Chieftaincy began to construct a railway line, road and other industrial features that were necessary to develop Phokeng into a mining town (Mbenge and Manson, 2010).

Impala Platinum dominated platinum mining in the country at the time and by the late 1950s to early 1960's the company indicated that it was determined to fully invest its operation to platinum mining in Phokeng following its successful ventures (Mbenge and Manson, 2010). More substantive mining endeavours coincided with the beginning of the Apartheid era which earned the Bafokeng Tribal Authority substantial revenue from mining on their land. Apartheid spatial and racial segregation of the indigenous black population from the white settler population has its roots in the racial segregation of the British in South Africa. The British seized the Cape in 1806 which led to the mass exodus of the Boers northwards into the interior of South Africa which later led to the establishment of the Transvaal Republican, an “independent” Afrikaner republic within South Africa. In 1910 the British and Boers held

territories within South African amalgamated to form the Union of South Africa. However, the roots of racial segregation within South Africa date back to the British colonial strategy of indirect rule which entailed creating reserves which were typically rural areas that accommodated the indigenous population. These sorts of reserves were first created in the British Natal Colony between 1845-1875 (Kayser, 2002).

The rationale behind the establishment of reserves was to supply labour to bulging gold and diamond mining industries in South Africa. The reserves were governed by a tribal authority, using customary law, while the rest of South Africa was governed by civil or common law. Reserves and indirect rule became one of the most defining features of the colonial state in South Africa. Mining became the pillar of South Africa's economy and the foremost economic activity within the colonial state which gave rise to the power of mining companies who more frequently required cheap labour to reduce cost and produce profits. Inevitably, this required an exploitable labour force and unsurprisingly the reserves supplied this exploitable labour force. Several Land Acts, such as the infamous 1913 Land Act, prohibited Africans from owning land but rather pushed them into the reserve where subsistence farming became very difficult and forced young men to seek employment in the mines. More Land Acts followed such as the 1927 and 1929 Native Administration Act, which outlawed land purchase made by individuals or sub-tribal groups and not a recognised tribal Chief. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act gave the government the power to confiscate any land which they felt like taking. This led to many blacks having their land confiscated.

Apartheid and Platinum mining

Apartheid began in 1948, with the National Party's electoral victory and appointment of right-wing Afrikaner politician Hendrik Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs in 1950. Apartheid was a period of institutionalised racial segregation and discrimination. Such racial segregation and discrimination existed in South Africa although it was not as deeply entrenched institutionally as apartheid. Initially, apartheid was designed to control migrant labourers from accessing urban centres, which posed a threat to the job security of the Afrikaners. Its most significant laws included the Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and the Bantu Self Government Act (1959) that led to the creation of ten "Bantu Homelands," or Bantustans, that were self-governing and nominally, "independent" states (Drummond, 1991:339). This was essentially an upgraded version of the bifurcated state that was created by the English. The *Kgosi*/ chief had authority and more power than he had before it created a more centralised leadership within the tribe different from the traditional decentralised leadership that people were accustomed to.

In addition to this, the government established ten self- governing quasi-states namely KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, QwaQwa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, whilst the rest of the country belonged to white South Africans (Drummond, 1991:339).

Homelands were exclusively created for the occupation of the African population. Each homeland was divided and created according to tribal identities of the South African population and the chief functioned as the president (Drummond, 1991: 339). Thus, one belonged to a homeland of their tribal identity. The Bafokeng fell under the Bophuthatswana homeland. The role of the king was altered. Nonetheless, Bafokeng still had ownership of their land and mineral resources, but the Bafokeng suffered an internal refugee crisis when some land was dispossessed by the government in the creation of the homelands. In December 1977 Bophuthatswana received nominal statehood from the government led by Lucas Mangope who was connected to the Bahurutshe chiefdom, another Tswana group within the Rustenburg area. This again altered the role of the Bafokeng king because Mangope became the president of Bophuthatswana. This newly independent state relied on its natural resources from within its border and inevitably, this meant that Bophuthatswana relied on revenue from platinum mining, from mines that belong to the Bafokeng. The king had to adhere to the new president and still maintain good ties with his people and Impala platinum. Tensions between Mangope, the Bafokeng and Impala began to surface and quickly grew into hostilities.

The reason for these tensions was due to complex interdependencies coupled with contradictory interests between all three parties. For example, both the Bafokeng and Mangope's homeland government relied on revenue from platinum mining to provide basic services and for suitability (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 130). Impala relied on Mangope's homeland for cheap exploitable labour to keep operational cost low and profits high. On the other hand, the Bafokeng's rights to land ownership were undermined by the homeland system, the homeland government and having to adhere to Mangope's governance which seemed to favour Impala over the Bafokeng (Capps, 2010: 241). Mangope's homeland government failed to secure a stable operating environment for Impala Platinum and other mining companies, resulting in conflict between Impala and Mangope (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 130). Tensions escalated to conflict when Impala Platinum undermined the Bafokeng and went to the Homeland Minister of Bantu Administration to get the Bafokeng's land ownership overruled and grant impala a licence to mine on Bafokeng land from 1977 to 1983 (Capps, 2010: 260). This licence was extendable for a two successive ten-year period and the Bafokeng would be entitled to 13% mining royalties of Impala's taxable income (Capps, 2010: 260). The Supreme

Court justice E.A.T Smith ruled that the land in question belonged to the South African Development Trust (SADT) which made a section within Bafokeng owned and state-owned land (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 137).

The End of Apartheid and Platinum Revenue

Tensions between traditional chiefs, Homeland government as well as the apartheid state grew tense during the 1980s and this was a time of mass social action, civil unrest and political consciousness and contestation in prominently urban and peri-urban areas but rural South Africa remained politically weak. In 1987 a group of traditional leaders came together including Bafokeng King, *Kgosi* Lebone, to form the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) which was opposed to Apartheid and the false sense of independence through the creation of the homelands. The African National Congress (ANC) quickly took note of this political move by traditional chiefs and aligned themselves with CONTRALESA and provided them with political support. In the wake of growing political upheaval in the country and rural areas including homeland, a coup was staged with the intention to overthrow Mangope in 1988 (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 139-140). The coup was unsuccessful; instead, it intensified Mangope's rage and dislike for the Bafokeng. He blamed *Kgosi* Lebone for the coup and tried to arrest him, but *Kgosi* Lebone fled into exile in Botswana before he could be arrested by Mangope. Mangope's regime became more militant, oppressive and punitive toward the Bafokeng which dealt a double blow to the Bafokeng given that Impala was freely exploiting their land and minerals.

In 1990 the ANC and political prisoners were unbanned in South Africa. Political pressure mounted across the country including in the homeland which led the Mangope regime to fall, marking the end of Bophuthatswana (Mbenge and Manson, 2010: 148). In 1994, Apartheid ended, and a new democratic dispensation was rolled out in South Africa with the ANC forming a government of national unity. The constitution recognised the institution of traditional leaders and reconfigured their role to a decentralised leadership and the government began to reallocate land which turned out to be very contentious for traditional Kings and individuals. From 1997 the Bafokeng embarked on a lengthy legal action against Impala towards settling for the exploitation during the apartheid era. In 1999 the two parties reached a settlement which would entail the exchanging of royalties with the Bafokeng. Following the settlement with Impala, the royal Bafokeng became an organisation that established itself as a community-based corporate entity. In 2002 they established the Royal Bafokeng Resources (RBR) that was tasked to manage the community's mining interests.

> The Royal Bafokeng continued on their development trajectory well into the new millennium when they founded Royal Bafokeng Finances (RBF) in 2004 (Capps, 2013: 154). The RBF was mandated to develop the community's non-mining investment portfolio. In 2006 RBR and RBF merged and formed Royal Bafokeng Holdings (RBH) which had already amassed an asset base of 3 billion US dollars (Capps, 2013: 154). Finally, in 2007 RBH exchanged its royalties with Impala Platinum for 9.4 million shares which were worth 1.6 billion US dollars making the royal Bafokeng the largest shareholder in the world's second-largest platinum mine (Capps, 2013: 154).

The Royal Bafokeng also owns 50% shares in Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum mine, a joint venture with Anglo America Holdings (Capps, 2013: 155). The Royal Bafokeng has invested in over 20 non-mining companies ranging from telecommunications, infrastructure, gas, financial investment, oil and other diverse investments. From 1996 to 2008 there was a global spike in demand for platinum. The financial success of the Bafokeng is credited to the decade long platinum boom. However, as Capps (2012, 67) asserts, platinum mining is closely tied to the global economy thus it too is susceptible to the boom-bust cycles of the global commodities market. A healthy global economy results in a healthy and steady income stream in the platinum profits. However, a struggling global economy or a global economic crisis can cripple income streams and profits. Nonetheless platinum is still a very lucrative mineral to mine given the vast market that depends on it.

Communities under the control of the Royal Bafokeng are not dependent upon the government for service delivery, basic maintenance or funding, instead, it earns revenues from platinum mining and uses that revenue to provide basic services to its communities. These services include water, electricity, refuse collection, and infrastructure development. These services are overseen by the main administrative arm of the Royal Bafokeng known as Royal Bafokeng Administration (RBA) (Horner, 2015: 3). In return, the government taxes only the income that is banked and saved by the Bafokeng unlike other companies taxed on their annual income earnings. As a result, the Royal Bafokeng increased their net income since they are not taxed on their earnings.

The Bafokeng governed by a traditional governance structure with three tiers from bottom-up or ward village localities to the king. At the bottom of the rank is the *kgosana* who oversees the daily running of the ward, village or locality. The *kgosana* reports to *bannakgoro* which is higher up on the rank but also participates in *bannakgoro* to a lesser extent. These are the primary advisory council of the kingdom. Higher up on the rank is the *kgotla* supreme council

which meets six times a year and reports to the *kgosi*/ king who is also a part of the *lekgotla*. The *lekgotla* can remove a *Kgosi* if they deem him to be unfit.

Although the royal Bafokeng have experienced an economic boom, the effect of this economic boom has not been felt by the local population or the ordinary citizens on the ground. Youth unemployment in the region is very high, it is estimated that about 31% of youths living in the Bafokeng municipality are unemployed. Poverty still haunts a third of the people living in Bafokeng run municipalities (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 6). Although the RBN mining economy generates more employment than usual for a rural/ peri-urban area there is still large levels of youth unemployment in the region (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 9). Academic as well as private research predicted the likelihood of youth unemployment in the years to come, but very little was done to prevent this despite the recognition of the magnitude and negative consequences of youth unemployment (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 10). Studies also indicated that older people were more likely to find jobs than youth. People living furthest from the mining belt such as Leloreng, Mabitse, and Tsitsing had the higher levels of unemployment at 76%, 73% and 70% unemployment respectively (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 16). There was also a sharp contrast between the male and female rate for unemployment where 70% of females were unemployed and only 33% of males were unemployed (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 6). This is a reflection of the mining environment being more favourable to males than females. This indicates that there needs to be a more conscious approach from the RBA management in dealing with the gender unemployment rates.

The Royal Bafokeng kingdom suffers from numerous challenges facing the youth of the kingdom; however, the RBA is slow to respond or to take action to secure even more success for the future of this kingdom. Another major problem facing the royal Bafokeng youth is education. The Royal Bafokeng has one of the best schools in southern Africa, yet close to 46% of the youth are illiterate and/or have not completed their formal education (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 14 &19). This worsens the rate of unemployment for those who have not completed school and the illiterate. Moreover, the Royal Bafokeng have a higher rate of unemployment than other regions in South Africa including other regions in the North West province. The Royal Bafokeng youth have become very despondent because of the dire situation. Poverty, unemployment, boredom and lack of social support have led the youth to engage in crime, drugs and participate in corrupt activities (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 24). Given that the Royal Bafokengs are one of the richest tribes in Africa, it is unfortunate that almost half of their youth population has not felt the effect of this wealth. The youth has been overlooked and has not felt the effects of development in Phokeng. The social fabric that is necessary to transmute IKS had

been eroded by poverty, bread and butter issues as well as dissonance thus IKS is not being practised and when it is practised it is failing the youth of Phokeng.

The Royal Bafokeng often boast about their world-class health care facilities, however, these facilities are found in urban areas leaving the rural village population isolated from basic health care. HIV/ AIDS has run rampant in Bafokeng communities because of transactional relationships between young unemployed women who seek money in exchange for sex from older men due to the high youth unemployment (Moyo and Ngwato, 2015: 6). For a community and a people that pride themselves on taking care of each other and living by the principle of Botho it is difficult to fathom the existence of such rife social ills. Not to mention that the Royal Bafokeng nation has been embroiled in fierce land disputes since 2008 for land that they supposedly encroached on and stole from surrounding communities like the Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela (Capps, 2015)

Today the Royal Bafokeng are one of the wealthiest groups in Sub-Saharan Africa with Royal Bafokeng Holdings current estimated net worth at R30 billion or USD 4 billion (Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016). The tribe did not arrive at this point haphazardly, they used IKS and indigenisation policies that they imported or adapted from their contact with the Western epistemologies of the Boers and Christian missionaries. The Bafokeng have successfully been able to import other people's cultures without structurally affecting their own culture and historical modes of being but rather using imported cultural aspects and mechanisms to improve or modernise their culture and even globalise their economic practices and reach. Culture is not stagnated; it is ever-changing, what we understand today as "European/ Western culture" has metamorphosed much over time to be more palatable, economically competitive and globalised to suit modern times.

“European/ Western culture” has moved with the current modernity since the enlightenment era giving it the advantage of dictating what we consider to be modern, bringing forth with it political culture such as liberalism and democracy and setting the standard in the International Political Economy. In the colonised world and particularly in Africa the rise of colonialism and modernity impairs the natural ability to adapt to the externally changing political and economic environment. Consequently, political culture and IKS have slowed down or not developed at all because of the dominant colonial culture. Through the perceptive of IKS, I argue that colonialism and the phenomena of culture imposition which has led to the stagnation and erosion of IKS and political, social continuity has led to underdevelopment in many African states/ tribes. The success of the Bafokeng has come from overcoming culture imposition by

mporting external cultural practices and aligning as well as framing these imported and indigenised practises within their IKS.

Undeniably, the influence of political continuity and the political culture of the decentralised consultative style of leadership encompassed by the royal Bafokeng has greatly aided them in becoming one of the wealthiest tribes in Africa. The IKS of Tswana's especially Bafokeng necessitates multifaceted consultative rule, the *kgosi* can make decisions on his own, but he is kept accountable by the *lekgotla*. The philosophical tradition of *Botho/Ubuntu* also is another apparatus of IKS that keeps the *kgosi* accountable and informs his interactions, urging him to prioritise people over profits. The philosophy of *Ubuntu/Botho* says that collaboration is central to a positive social experience; it says that self-interests depend upon common interests. It says that when self-interests are divorced from common interests then selfishness and isolation forms and when these are formed a rich social experience cannot be had. These common interests point toward the pluriversalistic yet horizontal world of compassion because no self-interest can be realised outside of this horizontal world.

The natural resource curse has been averted by the Royal Bafokeng because of sound institutions political structure of accountability and transparency informed by IKS, decentralised leadership and Botho the philosophy of inter-relatedness. The philosophy of Botho governs how people act, thus if one steals from the tribe, they are essentially stealing from themselves because the person and the people in the tribe are interrelated. However, philosophies rarely prevent people from committing crimes thus the Royal Bafokeng under Royal Bafokeng Platinum (RBPlat) have supplemented the philosophy of Botho by being a signatory of the UN Global Compact (UNGC) (Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016). UNGC recognises that globally, corruption is a major hindrance to sustainable development and as such RBPlat committed the UNGC principle in their Boards decision-making process (Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016). RBPlat is a part of a global community that is committed to fighting corruption and having transparent natural resources governance.

Natural resource management is one of the Royal Bafokeng's strongest attribute and source for their wealth. It has often been argued that good institutions will lead to good natural resources management. However, in some resource-rich African countries such as Congo, that hold similar chieftaincies' structure to that of the Royal Bafokeng, they are still plagued with the natural resource curse even with the good institutions, there is poor natural resource management. Therefore, what is special about the Royal Bafokeng is not only their political culture and political continuity from the pre-colonial to post-colonial era but that cultural

beliefs and practices which plays a big role in natural resource management and economic development. Also, the Royal Bafokeng under RBPlat has a strict ethical code that requires all its representatives to act in good faith and in a manner that promotes good corporate citizenship (Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016). The RBPlat board "Audits and Risk and Social and Ethics Committees monitor compliance with their code of ethics through quarterly reports they receive from the Executive" (Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016). The code of ethics that is adopted by RBPlat is in line with international best practice. Moreover, the natural resource management and the code of ethics of RBPlat complies with South African legislation, to maintain good natural resource management for the good of the communities and the people of Phokeng.

The prioritisation of land informed by IKS principles gave the royal Bafokeng the foresight to purchase their land back from the Boers, maintaining it through apartheid and during the democracy. The Bafokeng land ownership did not become disturbed when there was a platinum boom in Bafokeng. There has been limited influence from outsiders influencing the Bafokeng mining activities (Mbenga and Manson, 2010). Over time the Bafokeng have maintained a high level of exclusivity in business and society. They have successfully managed to keep outsiders out thus preventing rent-seeking behaviour. Given that natural resources fall into the realm of IPE, the exclusivity demonstrated by Bafokeng has informed how the Bafokeng trade their platinum and with whom. For the most part, people who control or dominate IPE are Europe, China and the USA but Bafokeng have remained sovereign from the dominance of these parties. This is how they relate to outsiders.

It is through their political rule of *Kgosi* and the *lekgotla* that the Bafokeng have maintained their land ownership rights and land ownership distribution (the land belongs to the king and people must ask for land from the king). The success of Bafokeng can be related to the good leadership the Bafokeng community has. This is a leadership that is dynamic and in almost everything they decide upon they consult the IKS tenets. However, one must be careful not to fall into the trap of the Great Man Theory when we analyse the Royal Bafokeng which could lead one to ignore all the socio-political as well as the structural factors that have aided in the success of the Royal Bafokeng. The Great Man Theory is a theory that was developed in the 19th century in which history can be explained by the impact of a "great man" due to certain qualities like wisdom, intelligence, foresight or *charisma* in a way that had a historical impact on the society that they lived in or governed such as Kgosi Mokgatle (Carlyle, 1888: 2).

Herbert Spencer (1896, 31) claimed that great men are products of their societies and they are

shaped and influenced by the societies they come from. Spencer states that great men are influenced by social conditions and philosophies that are developed within the community before their lifetime. Therefore, the cornerstone of the Royal Bafokeng success lies in the ancient indigenous Tswana leadership that is decentralised and consensus-based which was developed before the rule of *Kgosi* Mokgatle. This kind of leadership is a complex manifestation of participatory democracy where people are free to express their dissatisfactions without fear of being censored or persecuted (Nthau, 2002: 13). *Lekgotla* is characterised by oral discussions. The king is not far removed from the people. The relationship shared between the king and the people is respectful, with a mutual communal obligation towards the society at large, these are principles and mechanisms that curb abuse of power.

Kingship in Tswana culture, both in South Africa and Botswana, is based on primogeniture, meaning that the eldest son of the senior principle wife inherits kingship from his father after his death or if his father falls too ill to continue his role as king (Nthau, 2002: 12). Therefore, a Tswana king is not elected to the position of the king instead one assumes the possession of the king through birth. According to Coertze (1988), the position of *kgosi* is passed down by right of birth to the rightful successor. The condition of an incumbent *Kgosi* is that he must be mature in age as well as physically and mentally fit for the role of kingship. The norms of Tswana kingship are patriarchal and ascriptive.

Analysis

The Royal Bafokeng Kingdom is hailed for its many achievements such as not succumbing to the resource curse, land ownership, having control of the natural resources and being the richest tribe in Africa. This nation has a rich history of overcoming adversities with resilience and pride. They have caught the attention of many onlookers academically and otherwise because of their claims and successes. However, has IKS influenced development in the Royal Bafokeng Kingdom? From the history of the Bafokeng, one can tell that this was a very self-sufficient kingdom that would do anything for survival and preservation. From *Difeqane,* the Bafokeng fought in solidarity alongside other Tswana kingdoms and against their fellow Tswanas' and ultimately fled for greener pastures. Peace is a central tenet of IKS and development thus from the beginning the royal Bafokeng was in alignment with IKS and development. In the beginning, their collaboration with the Boers was not seen as anything more than solidarity but their involvement in the slave trade and treating other natives with cruelty was establishing the foundation of a very self-interested kingdom that proved that it would do anything for wealth and security. This is not a principle of IKS but a realist principle

of protecting sovereignty and statehood. Also, in alignment with realism is the role played by the king in leading the kingdom.

The Royal Bafokeng's success was shaped by several historical factors namely the Tswana-Boer relation and later, and most critically, the Tswana–missionary relationship (Taodzera, 2015). The Royal Bafokeng were integrated into the economic practices of the Boer when they participated in the slave, arms and ivory trade. The economic capitalist practices of the Tswana-Boer trade set a precedence for how the Bafokeng prefer to control their economy in an aggressive and exploitative manner to gain profits. As James Boyce (2013: 8) argues "power is a zero- sum game: more for me means less for you". The Bafokeng economic progress has influenced a sense of confidence in the tribe, its culture, its knowledge, and this has been attractive to other tribes who are looking to use the Royal Bafokeng success story as a precedent. This resulted in the Royal Bafokeng being the symbol of progress, good leadership, and a model to be learned from by the other entities. The legitimacy of the Royal Bafokeng nation meant that the tribe was allowed to own land which was overseen by the king. The Bafokeng benefited a great deal from allying with the missionaries as this alliance led them to accrue their land back in missionary trusteeship. However, their alliance came at a cost.

The missionaries and Christianity eroded IKS amongst the Bafokeng. They undermined and undervalued IKS as being backwards, heathen and primitive. They replaced IKS with Western modes of being, Western knowledge systems and practices. Missionaries were part of the imperial project because they were used to make the colonized natives to regard their erosion of their cultures and their knowledges as something which is part of their destiny. The destination was the achievement of the western values which were grouped under the categories of enlightment and civilization. The missionaries were useful in the programme of indoctrinating the natives with values from the west because they acted in subtle ways, for instance, missionaries did not show themselves as concerning with performing epistemic violence on the natives but they depicted themselves as concerned with empowering the natives with values that would make their lives to become less difficult. IKS has been eroded and tainted through its encounter with the Boers and missionaries.

The adoption of the protestant ethic and is an example of the erasure of IKS within the Royal Bafokeng. This ethic not only harms the environment and its finite natural resources, but it also forces the members of the community to care more about money than their fellow community members. The conditions that allow development to flourish include peace and social cohesion. The inevitable greed that arises from imbibing the protestant ethic does not allow for peace and

social cohesion, which is why the present-day Royal Bafokeng kingdom is characterised by stark inequality. It would be a fair observation to assert that the success of the Royal Bafokeng was born out of the alliance that the Bafokeng foraged with the missionaries which subsequently led to the erosion of IKS amongst the Bafokeng. Education is another place where IKS is eroded. The willing adoption of missionary education posed a direct threat to IKS as initiation schools, the primary place where IKS was imparted on the youth, were destroyed or shunned.

The fierce and on-going land battles between the royal family and members of the community are troubling for any kingdom especially a kingdom that happens to be the richest tribe in Africa. The land is central to the livelihoods of Africans and *Batswana* is no exception. The land belongs to all the people because historically it was the people who pooled their resources together to buy the land back. It is an unthinkable form of exploitation to deprive people the land that their forefathers bought as an investment to their families' livelihood in the future. The land battles do not coincide with the philosophical practices of IKS nor are they compatible with the development equation as peace is central to the development equation. Under the legislation of traditional leadership in South Africa, it is unlikely that dispossessed people will get their land back from the Royal Bafokeng kingdom because of the law that grants the Royal family the power to be the "judge, jury and executioner" in a legal case under traditional governance (Capps, 2015). The Royal Bafokeng have abused their power with regard to the land issue and they have downtrodden IKS practices.

The Royal Bafokeng may have had some success with implementing IKS for development in some areas such as leadership and political control through decentralised governance. However, the use of IKS within the Royal Bafokeng Kingdom could also be perscived as a Trojan horse for the people within the community because IKS has led to the dispossession of their land, poverty, inequality as well as unemployment. In the end, IKS has come to harm ordinary people. Ironically, the people who went to work on the mines in late 1880s to secure the prosperity of their offspring are being ripped off from the grave as their children descend deeper underground into the mines in their backyard because they are poor and dispossessed of the land their forefathers worked so hard for. Thus this chapter argued that IKS has been successful in the development equation in some parts and it has the potential to influence development but it also has the potential to be a Trojan horse for the people of Phokeng who are being dispossessed of their land and livelihood under the guise of development.

Conclusion

The Royal Bafokeng have a rich history of coalitions and alliances such as aligning themselves with Boers to defeat Ndebele occupation as well as gaining power and prestige in Phokeng by being involved in the slave trade. The Bafokeng also formed an important alliance with missionaries to buy their land back and keeping it with the assistance of the missionaries. However, these alliances came at a great cost; the erosion of IKS principles which were replaced by Christian and Western principles of modernity and Eurocentricity began to seep into the Bafokeng kingdom. In some ways there are elements that point out clearly that there was also collusion between the Royal Bafokeng leadership and the white Europeans. This collusion started and perhaps reached its apotheosis when the Royal Bafokeng leadership made concessions with the Boer leadership and another important trade-off is that of the Royal Bafokeng leadership deciding to give the missionaries a leeway to influence the way of life of the Tswana people through their evangelism. While it is evident that the Bafokeng have developed a buffering system to filter out some elements of Western knowledge they have also been selective in the knowledge that they adopt. Nonetheless, the Boers and missionaries played a pivotal role in the development equation of the Bafokeng.

Indigenous tribal politics also played a major role in the development success of the Royal Bafokeng Nation. The decentralised political role in Phokeng has ensured peace and stability within the royal Bafokeng which is necessary for development. Decentralised leadership has ensured that the king deals with tribal commerce and resource management and revenue while the tribal heads deal with the governance of the Royal Bafokeng. The strong sense of nationalism and national pride has contributed to growth in Phokeng. Mining in Phokeng has been protected by laws and a strong administrative arm for the RBN which has prevented rent-seeking activities by mining companies as well as exploitation and corruption of resource revenue due to accountability mechanisms that have been adopted by the RBN. Had it not been for land purchases in the early days of this kingdom they would not have amassed the success that they have because they would not have had access to the platinum beneath the land. However, stripping people of their land is not in line with IKS and the Royal Bafokeng should be held accountable for land dispossession. The RBN also battles with a myriad of socio- economic issues that affect the youth such as youth unemployment, low literacy rates and poverty which is unacceptable for Africa's richest tribe. Overall, this case study found out that the RBN use a mixture of IKS and Western knowledge practices to amass their wealth, improve their development and avoid the resource curse. Since it is difficult to measure whether IKS led to the success of the Royal Bafokeng or if it was a combination of factors and not just IKS, this chapter

concludes with the findings that the Royal Bafokeng have adopted knowledge pluralism as their modus operandi, borrowing from both IKS and Western knowledge to gain economic success and development.

Chapter Six: The Case Study of Botswana

Introduction

Botswana, previously Bechuanaland, is a landlocked country in Southern Africa that is mostly covered by the Kalahari Desert. It shares its borders with Zambia to the north, South Africa to the south, Zimbabwe to the east and Namibia to the West. Botswana is a country with a very small population of just over two million people according to the World Bank (2014). Botswana rose to fame globally after riding the elevator to economic growth and development following the discovery of diamonds in the late 1960s. Botswana is a fast-growing developing nation in Africa and even making it to the top 10 fastest developing countries in the world. There are numerous anecdotes related to how Botswana became successful and a typical "rags to riches story". One claim is that Botswana adhered to pre-colonial modes of governance and traditional authorities as well as IKS. Other claims include foreign investments as well as an adherence to democracy and democratic practices. The country also boasts the best corruption ranking in Africa and ranks fourth in the world in the same corruption ranking. Upon gaining its independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana was amongst the poorest countries in the world. It had very little infrastructure, struggling public institutions and very low levels of development as compared to its southern African counterparts. There was very little public revenue and a dreadfully weak economy. However, soon after the discovery of diamonds, Botswana entered into a 50/50 partnership with DeBeers which was called Debswana and diamond mining began.

Unlike many resource-rich Sub-Saharan African countries like Congo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and many others, Botswana defied the odds and did not succumb to the resource curse. Instead, following the discovery of diamonds in the country, Botswana embarked on a state-led socio-economic transformation driven by diamond revenue. Government elites and royal families worked hand in hand to improve the socio-economic conditions in the country including the standard of living of all its citizens. The ancient Southern African philosophy of Botho/ Ubuntu coupled with the sophisticated pre-colonial systems of governance influenced by the IKS of *Batswana* have institutionalised accountability and minimised corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. Scholars such as Maipose and Matsheka (2007), Gaolathe (1997) and Good (2000) have come up with numerous theories such as democratisation, the developmental state and the democratic peace theory amongst many others in an attempt to explain how Botswana became an overnight success. However, many of these theories tend to overlook the

impact that tradition, local knowledge and traditional leadership have had on Botswana notwithstanding the history and genealogy that has shaped the trajectory of this country.

Botswana geographically is one of the relatively small countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the key moments of the country's history are bound up in the outside political climates viz., the United Nation ruling upon its sovereignty; the change in the political context in all the African countries during the Cold-War period and the changes which were brought about by the decolonial militancy around the continent after WWII. As a British protectorate, Botswana had all the features of a British colony and most noticeably the bifurcated state. A bifurcated state refers to a country/state that is separated into two detached entities made up of citizens and subjects (Mamdani, 1996). The subjects belong to the tribe, they are led by kings and ruled by customary law and the king is the supreme authority. Adjacent to customary law exists citizens who are governed by elected leaders directed by Roman-Dutch law (Mamdani, 1996). The British deliberately implemented this system to reduces the powers and sovereignty of the king and weaken traditional governance. This system worked in Botswana's favour to establish stability, social cohesion and political continuity from the pre-colonial era to the post-colonial era. In this chapter, I explore the history and genealogy of Botswana. I argue that Botswana's rise to success had more to do with Britain's attempt to weaken the state by bifurcating it which had an opposite effect and instead strengthened the state's power. I used the supposition made by developmental state literature which suggests that a bifurcated state is a defining feature of the developmental state, which I argue that it aided Botswana's development. Given that traditional rule and indigenous knowledge makes up a large percentage of the bifurcated state, I claimed that IKS may have played a role in Botswana's development, but Western knowledge bolstered this development.

In some ways, it is difficult to divorce Botswana's development and economic success from its indigenous knowledge systems because Botswana has been dubbed as an "indigenous developmental state" by scholars such as Maipose and Matsheka (2007); Wylie (1990); Edge (1998); and Maundeni (2001). The role that the state has played in Botswana's development has a unique traditional and historical significance. State-led development strategy was not unique to Botswana, this form of development has been shared by many other developing countries specifically in Far East Asia. Where Botswana is unique, is that its state-led development has been blended with pre-colonial Tswana political theory and social history influenced by the colonial era, outstanding leadership, intimacy between political and economic elite, as well as Batswana's consultative democracy *(lekgotla*) known for its public policymaking system to achieve state-led development (Maipose, 2007: 14). It is therefore

unsurprising that in 2011 Botswana made headlines when it declared that it was in the process of developing policies to protect, promote and preserve its indigenous knowledge into the country's Macro-economic framework. The national government set aside 1 million US dollars towards funding the project to protect and promote indigenous knowledge in the areas of health, agriculture, religious beliefs and culture. The project tried to identify, document and gather traditional or local knowledge systems and practices to feed them into the legislative framework of the country (Cassidy et al, 2011: 76). According to Oabona Monngakgotle (2011), Botswana realised the importance of IKS in the medical field, specifically related to the use of traditional herbs for the medicine to improve health care and generate income. Since 2011 Botswana has created awareness about IKS through education and research even though the country still has no laws on IKS but it does have specific laws on Natural Resource Conservation and Development as well as national policies and Culture (Makoni, 2015). Botswana is a forerunner in IKS research in Africa and scholars such as Maipose and Matsheka (2007; Wylie (1990); Edge (1998) and Maundeni (2001) have credited Botswana's success to its IKS.

Historical background

Botswana, unlike other countries in Southern African, was a British protectorate and not a colony of Britain like South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Nonetheless, it, unfortunately, had many features of colonialism such as colonial administrators, tax collection, Roman-Dutch law and Eurocentric epistemic dominance (Hjort, 2010). Unlike other African countries, Botswana did not have many known natural resources which rendered it unfavourable to colonial powers. It added very little value to the British colony, instead it burdened the British taxpayer (Hjort, 2010). The investment worth of the country was impractical hence it did not make economic sense for Britain to provide Botswana with protection. However, it did make political sense to keep Botswana as a protectorate because it demonstrated the might and power of the British colony in a region permeated with fierce competition from the Dutch/Boers, the German and the Portuguese. Geographically, Botswana is an arid country covered mostly by the desert land and a sparse population of subsistence farmers and hide traders. The country survived on exporting free-range quality beef to Europe and South Africa and continues to export beef to Europe and is currently one of the few African countries permitted to export beef to the European Union (EU) (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 7).

In 1885 the British agreed to protect Botswana from Boer and German invasion. At the time the Boers were moving further into the interior of South Africa and North West of Pretoria and

closer to the borders of Botswana (Parsons, 1999) The Germans were doing the same in Namibia and moving closer to Botswana's borders. Initially, given that Botswana was a protectorate and had very little to offer the British in terms of natural resources or monetary wealth meant that it also experienced little exposure to colonial rule. Following years of negotiations with the British government, Botswana gained its independents from Britain in September of 1966. Upon independence, Botswana was amongst the world's poorest and most underdeveloped countries with a recorded GDP that averaged about US$80 per capita at the time (Motlhabane, 2015: 4). It seemed like an irresponsible decision to seek independence given the country's desolate socio-economic state at the time. Motlhabane (2015: 4) paints a picture of Botswana after achieving independence as a country with scarce infrastructure, minimal or close to non-existent industrial sector, extremely low literacy rate and a population dependent on subsistence farming, government employment or employment in farms and mines in South Africa. The socio-economic situation was bleak and had no promise for a less bleak or successful future ahead.

Pre-colonial history and genealogy of Botswana

It is common from the academics and other scholars to write about Africa's history from colonialism recklessly neglecting the pre-colonial histories that shape the structural formation of countries or region. Often, pre-colonial histories haunt the independent post-colonial state but in the same token, they can serve as a blessing if they are thoroughly taken into consideration in the building and reconstruction of the post-colonial state. In Botswana's case, the pre- colonial histories and structural organisation of the country served as a tool for political continuity and legitimacy in the post-colonial era. I provide an explanation of political continuity and legitimacy in Botswana later on in this chapter. However, to track this political continuity one needs to fully grasp the complex history of the pre-colonial era. Moreover, tracking the pre-colonial histories is very important for this research because IKS is usually steeped in, created and informed by pre-colonial histories. In this way the past influences the future.

The history of Botswana begins with the mass exodus of Bantu people also known as Bantu expansion from Congo, known then as Katanga. The Bantu migrated south and crossed the Limpopo River and settled in the southeastern interior of Southern Africa and amalgamated with the Khoisan who had inhabited the region for thousands of years before the arrival of the Bantu. The Bantu were split into two groups the Nguni and the Sotho-Tswana. The Bantu established Chiefdoms across the interior of South Africa. The Sotho-Tswana groups were no

different from the other Bantu groups concerning establishing Chiefdoms settling there in the interior of Southern Africa and opting for a more democratic direction with regards to chiefly power. The history of the settlement of Sotho-Tswana groups is vast and longwinded thus for this research I focused only on the history of the Sotho-Tswana groups that settled in and around modern-day Botswana. The Sotho-Tswana groups that settled in Botswana are believed to have migrated from South Africa and settled in the country from the 13th century, according to Parsons (1999), to as late as the 18th century, according to Tlou (1985). These groups are split into two major categories namely those who settled in eastern and central Botswana and those who settled in north-western Botswana. To the east of Botswana at Moritsane hill rose the Moritsane culture closely associated with the Khalagari (Kgalagadi) chiefdom in present-day eastern Botswana who were synonymous with hunting and raising cattle rather than farming (Parsons, 1999).

In eastern central Botswana close to modern-day Serowe at Toutswe hill rose the Toutswe people (Basutswe) who were known for their thriving farming culture, cattle herding and trading with the state of Mapungubwe at the Limpopo-Shashe confluence (Parsons, 1999). Mapungubwe conquered Basutswe and began to develop rapidly and thrived in the gold trade era with sea merchants on the Indian Ocean. Mapungubwe dominated Basutswe forcing Basutswe to move further east closer to Mapungubwe leaving Toutswe hill abandoned (Parsons, 1999). The Khoisan population who inhabited most of southern Botswana occupied Toutswe hill and began trading hunted goods with the Mapungubwe (Parsons, 1999). Mapungubwe was a very successful kingdom with prominent gold traders and was Southern Africa's economic hub. The tales of its glory are still spoken about today. Before long Mapungubwe was surpassed by Great Zimbabwe in the gold trade, Mapungubwe lost its stature while Great Zimbabwe flourished in the gold trade from the 13th to the 15th centuries.

Great Zimbabwe controlled the area north of the Limpopo River, but it is not well documented how far west the kingdom spread. However, Great Zimbabwe successor the Batua state near modern-day Bulawayo western Zimbabwe who traded in salt and hunting dogs, exported its dominance over parts of eastern Botswana. Most noticeably from the eastern Makgalagadi pans that host distinct features such as built stone-walled command posts (Parsons, 1999). The Batua state which was under the control of Chibundule ruler was invaded by the Rozvi ruler. The people of Batua became known as Kalanga and they lived in western Zimbabwe and a region in eastern Botswana. When the Rozvi invaded Batua, Chibundule rulers fled to western Kalanga into present-day Botswana and formed Kalanga chiefdoms who make up a considerable part of Botswana's population today (Parsons, 1999).

North Western Botswana is historically made up of two groups from the upper Zambezi that arrived in Botswana in the 18th century (Parsons, 1999). They trace their ancestry to the Mbukushe people of Angola and the Yeyi people of Namibia. They migrated south-westwards to Tsodilo hill (Nqoma) and have settled there since. The Yeyi people, who were highly skilled farmers and fishermen, migrated south of the Zambezi into Ngamiland in a wave of migrations from the Lozi people in the north in search of peace (Sanzila, 2014). They settled among the Khoisan of the Okavanga delta region and incorporated the oral tradition of the Khoisan into their language which is represented by the distinct clicks (Parsons, 1999) (Sanzila, 2014). The Mbukushe people migrated south from the upper Chobe down the Okavango delta fleeing increasing raids in Angola from the Atlantic slave trade (Parsons, 1999). The southwest of the Okavango Delta is made up of people from the Herero and Mbanderu oral tradition of Namibia. They are situated along the Botswana-Namibia border as a result of Tswana cattle raids in the 17th century that split the children of the Mbandu from their parents (Parsons, 1999).

From the 1200s to 1400s emerged an era characterised by powerful Sotho- Tswana dynasties that spread from western Transvaal to the Southern Sotho led by the Fokeng (Bafokeng) dynasty and North Westwards of the Transvaal over the Kalahari led by the Rolong (Barolong) dynasty (Parsons, 1999). Barolong moved north-west of the Kalahari in search of better hunting exploits and larger cattle. There they amalgamated with the Khalagari people whom they formed an indomitable force known as Rolong –Khalagari in the 17th century. They were responsible for most of the cattle raids in southwestern Africa and they also wanted to control the copper trade which caused conflict with the Khoisan, Mbandu and Kore (Parsons, 1999). Stories of the raids and conflicts over copper trade became widespread even amongst Dutch settlers in the Cape (Parsons, 1999). Numerous Sotho-Tswana dynasties rose to power during the 1500 and 1600 such as the Hurutshe, Kwena, Ngwato, Kgatle, Thlaping and Rolong. These dynasties became great farmers and cattle herders. They moved around during times of droughts given the flexibility of their architecture which featured simple huts with a cattle kraal at the centre of their settlement.

In late 1700, following their encounters with the Batua state (the largest and most influential Sotho-Tswana migrant group from South Africa) their architecture changed and featured stone-walled villages with verandas and towns forming on hilltops. This dynasties/quasi states grew

rapidly and hostilities formed between them because of competition for cattle wealth as well as control over mineral and hunting trade. The Hurusthe and Kwena joined forces to form the Ngwaketse chiefdom in south-west Botswana among the Kalahari-Rolong dynasty. By late 1700, they became so powerful that they controlled the copper production, hunting and cattle raiding (Parsons, 1999). The Ngwato dynasty migrated north-west of the Ngami Lake in Ngamiland and settled among the Yeyi people and began controlling trade and hunting there. Sotho–Tswana groups conquered and assimilated indigenous population such as the Khoi/San into their own culture and over time they incorporated and assimilated more tribes that they crossed paths with (Hlavac, 2010: 16). The majority of the people who inhabited the territory of Botswana had stemmed from a similar linguistic, cultural and socio-political foundation. They also assimilated other tribes into their own, which resulted in a relatively high homogenous population that shared cultural and political institutions (Martin, 2008).

Consequently, their languages were similar or mutually intelligible and the socio-political structure bore similarities. They intermingled with many other nations which diversified their modes of being, yet they maintained the element of their Sotho-Tswana genealogy. Although they identified as different groups, they had the same mother tongue. It was a truly cosmopolitan society that had its fair share of realpolitik, exercises of power and dominance over weaker clans such as occasional raids. This also resulted in migration. Over the centuries Sotho-Tswana has developed mechanisms that buffer outsiders from their culture, yet they import outsiders' culture into their own without losing the essence of their own culture (Gapa, 2015). The pre-colonial history of Botswana is a signpost of how diverse its population is. This research focuses on the two case studies and their histories but is does not aim to locate itself in historiography. Instead, the history was used to indicate how the majority population, the Sotho-Tswana rose to dominate the country with numerous dynasties and have maintained their dominance over the centuries within Botswana.

By tracing this history, the intention was to show how collective memory or historical memory help us to understand the present. The argument is that, due to Sotho-Tswana maintaining their cultural exclusivity and the ability to buffer out other tribes/outsiders that they interacted with and extracted some influences from without losing their essence, this served as a vital mechanism for the coming years and the formation of their IKS. In the main IKS is not only about knowledge of the antiquity being celebrated for its sake, but it is about also how the present knowledge has benefited from the knowledge of the past. Hence the study began by locating IKS within the histories of the case studies. This is not to suggest that culture remains

static, but to argue that we cannot appreciate 'developmental successes' without locating the culture or knowledge that drives it.

Sotho-Tswana communities were thriving across southern Africa, however a climate of disruption across the interior of southern Africa occurred in 1800. Zulu expansionism, which is blamed for *difaqane* as explained in the previous chapter, was taking place in South Africa and spread across the interior of southern Africa. For the first time in history, Sotho-Tswana groups took on separate identities, namely Pedi, Sotho and Tswana. Cattle and ivory raids spread across the interior; mass migrations became a central feature and the slave trade grew from the coast of Angola to the interior. The Ndebeles, led by Mzilikazi, entered Botswana and raided Tswana chiefdoms after being expelled by the Boers in the Transvaal. This period of disruptions lasted until 1840. *Batswana* reconsolidated themselves and formed new political organisations. The Ngwato, Kwena and Ngwaketse chiefdoms organised themselves into states or wards that were run autonomously by their respective kings. *Difaqane* reconfigured Tswana identity and culture, empowering some and marginalising others (Gapa, 2015:24). Bakwena king Sechela who ruled from 1829-1892 allied himself with British missionaries from the LMS led by David Livingstone. He was a revered king who was greatly empowered when Tswana cultural identity was reconfigured but he marginalised bakgalakgadi/Khoi San people. In 1850 the Boers attempted to expand its government over Botswana, it failed to do so but it did capture women and children belonging to Bakwena, prompting *Kgosi* Sechela to take action given the ease in which the Boers attacked Bakwena (Parsons,1999) (Gapa, 2015).

Bechuanaland Protector and Colonial Rule

The disturbing events of the kidnapping of the most vulnerable members of the society: the women and children by the Boers were seen as an act of aggression and possible war. Yet, the ease in which the Boers were able to conduct these raids alerted the Tswana on their ill-preparedness in taking on the Boers, let alone protecting themselves from a further threat of invasion. The reality was that for decades, Tswana tribes had clashed with the Boers. The clashes had dispersed Tswana tribes over the territory of Botswana because the land was plentiful which was important for their most valuable position which is their herds of cattle and the mobility of their most valued assets (Hlavac, 2010: 17). As a result, Tswana Tribes migrated to new territories across Botswana as opposed to fighting over territory and avoiding conflict and clashes with the Boers. Nonetheless, the Boers had become stronger, more organised and well versed with the terrain of Botswana. They intensified their raids and clashes with *Batswana* to the extent that these clashes could be classified as war. Tswana tribes united a

ainst one common enemy resulting in unity amongst *Batswana* (Tlou and Campbell, 1997). Since then Botswana have often been referred to by many, such as Maipose and Matsheka (2007:22), as a culturally or ethnically homogenous nation, with little to no ethnic conflicts even though the history provided above indicated that Botswana is made up of diverse ethnic groups.

Constant raids coupled with the growing threat of German invasion and Boer state expansion as well as mounting pressure from British missionaries who had established relationships with the three most prominent Tswana kings namely Khama of the Bangwato, Sechela of Bakwena and Bathoen of the Bangwaketse led to the acceptance of help from the British in aform of protectionism (Gapa, 2016:24). Chiefs had aligned themselves with Christian missionaries for political and pragmatic reasons which served them in time of distress such as dealing with the treatment of foreign invasion. In striking a deal with the missionaries, which stated that the missionaries would be allowed to dissimate their values in the land of Batswana, the Botswana leadership was aware of the fact that they would be protected by the country from which the missionaries came when it comes to other potential foreign conquest armies. The Tswana kings came together to appeal and negotiate with the British for support in 1870 (Maundeni, 2001). This was characteristically in line with Tswana IKS and the consultative process that guaranteed the best possible outcome for the community.

Britain agreed to support *Batswana* and in March of 1885, Botswana known then as 'Bechuanaland' became a British protectorate with its headquarters in Vryburg and later moved to Mafikeng in South Africa's North West province (known then as western Transvaal). Uncharacteristic to the norm of a protectorate, an order in Council was passed in 1892 that allowed for British administration to be introduced in Bechuanaland with the acceptation that traditional native law and customary law would be respected (Gapa, 2016, 24). *Batswana* kings wanted to maintain their autonomy, cultural tradition and the rich political linage and indigenous techniques of governance. However, accepting British administration involved altering the status of Bechuanaland from a protectorate to a colony. Ultimately in November of 1895, the south of Bechuanaland became a part of the British colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the north of Bechuanaland remained a protectorate (Beulier, 2003).

According to the regulations of the British colonial system a protectorate was merely a territory under the British Crown and paraded in British dominance (Gapa, 2016: 25). However, a protectorate state, under the British colonial system, did not have to adhere to British regulations. Strangely, the British army began to occupy the southern region of Botswana in

the Warren Expedition and established their authority under the guise that the kings had granted them consent to physical domination of the territory (Gapa, 2016: 25). This was noticeably contrary to the concept of a protectorate. The British parliament argued that the Foreign Jurisdictional Act of 1890 allowed the British Crown to protect a state and its indigenous population diplomatically and military from European invaders (Morton et al, 2008). In truth, the British were motivated by geostrategic considerations when they agreed to protect Bechuanaland (Hlavac, 2010: 10). The only reason they agreed to protect Bechuanaland was to prevent interference with the route from the British Cape colony to territories under British control in southern and central Africa (Harvey and Lewis, 1990). Britain was not interested in Bechuanaland, its territory or its inhabitants, instead it was interested in Bechuanaland as a strategic "buffer zone" from other European colonisers (Hlavac, 2010: 10).

Cecil Rhodes once described Bechuanaland as 'the Suez Canal into Africa's interior'. The British High Commissioners added to this rhetoric in 1885 by stating "we have no interest in Bechuanaland, except as a road to the interior, we might, therefore, confine ourselves… to prevent that part of the Protectorate from being occupied either by filibusters or foreign powers doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as possible" (Dale, 1995; Beaulier, 2003.and Acemoglu et al, 2003). Therefore, colonial rule was characterised by neglect, light rule commonly referred to as benign neglect. A clear symbol of British neglect was the fact that the administrative capital of Botswana was in Vryburg, South Africa. The British government had no incentive to develop or protect Botswana except for its geostatic interests. This was a geopolitical win for both Botswana and the British because the British secured a buffer zone or a Suez Canal into the interior of Africa and on the other hand Botswana was safe from the threat of invasion and conquest whilst maintaining political continuity and the legitimacy of *dikgosi*.

Although British protectionism was characterised as benign neglect, the British takeover posed several challenges for *dikgosi* and traditional authorities of Batswana. *Dikgosi* retained their rights in the legislative, judicial and executive powers of operation however their powers were limited to the extent that they had to report to the colonial District Administrator who served as a liaison between the British administration and the local population (Gapa, 2016:25). Unfortunately, *dikgosi* were no longer sovereign because of the establishment of a colonial district administrator, which essentially meant that *dikgosi* had to report to the British government. Nonetheless, the status of *Batswana* kings was far better than that of kings in other African countries who lost all their power to colonial authorities in exchange for a rubber stamp of kingship. Although Batswana Kings had lost their sovereignty to the British administrators,

they were able to preserve their historical socio-political cultures and institutions as well as their indigenous way of life through their sophisticated structures of democratic tribal governance maintained by their *lekgotla* structure. This meant that even-though Tswana socio-political culture was dented by colonialism and that the *dikgosi* had to concede some of their power to British authority, Tswana socio-political culture was not severely eroded by the colonial matrix of power and continued to thrive even under protectionism thanks to the bifurcated state. In this way, IKS survived through political continuity of *dikgosi* and public adherence to tribal/traditional rule.

Whereas the socio-political culture of Sotho-Tswana groups across Southern Africa was unhinged and disturbed following the disruptive events that took place from the late 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century such as *difaqane*, which led to mass migration and inter-tribal conflict; the situation was different for *Batswana* in Botswana who began dividing themselves into eight self- governing groups from the 1820s. These groups were autonomous but shared some similarities with regards to their socio-political cultural practices that are synonymous with Tswana laws and customs that had been sophisticatedly developed over many centuries. These clans split themselves up into eight Kingdoms that occupied separate territories across Botswana. The kingdoms comprised of Bakwena, Bangwato, Barolong, Bangwakestse, Batswana, Bakgatla, Batlakwa and Bamalete. During British protectionism, the structure and makeup of these territories were preserved although they were reduced to occupy smaller tribal reserves similar to that of apartheid South Africa. Minority groups such as Bayeyi, Bakgalakgadi, Bakalanga and Basarwa and many others were often marginalised by Tswana groups who shared cultural homogeneity and superiority. Nonetheless, these minority groups coexisted alongside *Batswana* on the periphery of their kingdom in the Southwestern and Northwestern regions of the country which were less populated by Batswana. The kings cemented their power and respect during this era thus peace and political continuity formed the foundation of Tswana polity.

As mentioned above Tswana kingdoms shared similar socio-political structures of a paramount king and the tribal council/assembly (*lekgotla*). Just like the case study of the Royal Bafokeng, the *kgosi* was held accountable by the consultative mechanisms of the lekgotla. Khadiagala (2002) states that "the *kgosi* was the custodian of the culture, customs and welfare of his people but operated within a set of normative constraints on his power" (Khadiagala, 2002: 228). The role of *dikgosi* was not limited to serving one's indigenous population but it also extended to safeguarding IKS. The *kgosi* was also the central economic authority; this position was reinforced by his large herd of cattle which was an important indicator of wealth and a source

of agricultural productivity. Conversely, *dikgosi* also served the British administration to strengthen its military capabilities and administrative power to safeguard institutional continuity throughout the colonial period (Gapa, 2016). Britain had cemented itself in the country administratively and military since there was a lack of infrastructure and known natural resource for the colonial authority to exploit or occupy itself with. This changed the political structure and operation of Botswana for years to come establishing the bases of indirect rule or a bifurcated state. The British introduced hut tax in 1899 and native taxes in 1919 which compelled men and some women to leave their homesteads in search of a job that would provide sufficient money to pay tax to the king and inevitably the British government (Gapa, 2016: 26). The migration of a number of the adult population in search of work reconfigured the homesteads and subsequently the passing down of knowledge to the youth. Taxes also reconfigured the role of *dikgosi*.

The primary role of the *dikgosi* became collecting tax, providing labour to colonial administrators and promoting British economic interests (Gapa, 2016: 26). The *Kgosi* kept 10% of the taxes, which was an incentive to keep the peace and the system (colonial apparatus) running smoothly. The native Tswana population were not opposed to taxation because unlike other colonies such as South Africa or Sierra Leone that protested taxation, pre-colonial Tswana customs involved paying "tax" to the king in the form of harvest, livestock or profits from trade (Hjort, 2010). Paying tax to the king appeared to be a continuation of indigenous customs although taxation in the form of cash currency was a new addition to the Tswana political culture that came with its own set of challenges such as the migration of some of the adult population and the reconfiguration of the homestead. Taxation in the form of cash currency made it compulsory for at least one family member to get formal employment in the mines, farms or government administration. It became the norm for many Tswana families to send off at least one male member of the family to work so that they could afford to pay their taxes. Given that in Tswana culture men are responsible for socio-political continuity and maintenance, the absence of men eroded socio-political continuity of the homestead, but it also dealt a blow to the *lekgotla* institution which functioned on public participation.

Batswana worked as migrant labourers in South African mines and farms to make money to pay taxes. Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Schapera (1993) says that about half of Botswana's male population aged between 15 and 45 worked away from Bechuanaland in South Africa and provided cheap labour to the mines in the Transvaal. When Britain introduced tax this introduction of taxation changed the way Tswana people were living. Before this taxation system they were not exposed to any form of taxation. The result of this was a widespread of

migration of male youth moving from their rural areas and going to South African mines to work for a salary which in turn that salaries would be used to pay the tax legalized by the British administration. This inauguration of taxation by the British also changed the relationship between the king and his people. It meant that his was not a last word, but that the British administration had a greater power to make final decisions in Botswana. It is estimated by Colclough and McCarthy (1980) that in the late 1890s around a few hundred *Batswana* worked as migrant labours in South Africa but by the late 1900s to early1960's the numbers had risen to close to 50 000. Nevertheless, the effects of traditional continuity and indirect rule carried on into Botswana's independence. Some of the positive effects of indirect rule such as the political continuity of *Dikgosi* and *lekgotla* can be credited for Botswana's success post-independence given that *Dikgosi* maintained legislative, judicial and executive powers over his constituency and the national government focused on economic and state-building.

The Road to Independence

The economic standing of Botswana under British rule was in tatters. The country burdensomely relied on external forces such as Britain and South Africa for economic and political sustenance. This made little economic sense and was unsound for future development in Botswana. Moreover, the sovereignty of Botswana was not secure. During the 1950s questions of political and economic self-sufficiency by *dikgosi* became increasingly public especially following the Bangwato king, Seretse Khama who organised political movements from 1952 which sparked a nationalist spirit amongst older tribal leaders and elites (Du Toit, 1995; Griffiths 1983; Molutsi, 1984 and Ali Afzal 2014). The nationalist spirit had a domino effect, inspiring the population at large. Seretse Khama, the son of Khama III, was a well-educated charismatic leader who became *kgosi* at the tender age of four. His uncle Tshekedi Khama became his regent and guardian while he studied in South Africa and later on in Britain where he met his wife: a white British woman. Their union caused controversy among *Batswana* and was considered a total abomination in neighbouring apartheid South Africa. In 1951 the South African government submitted an inquiry to have Khama's chieftaincy revoked.

In 1956 Khama renounced his title as *Kgosi* and perused a life of cattle ranching followed by a budding and captivating career in politics. In 1960 the Bechuanaland Democratic Party was formed led by Seretse Khama and other political tribal elites. The party's name was changed in 1962 to the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Political activity and consciousness enthused people across the country even reaching the rural subsistence population as well as those who

worked as migrant labourers in South African mines. Much of the national discourse surrounding questions about independence was propagated by the influx of South African exiles into Botswana who fled the oppression of apartheid South Africa, who saw the impending possibility for an independent Southern African state (Middleton, 1997). The native population was making inroads with regards to political and economic changes but so were the British. After having administratively neglected Botswana for decades, coupled with the rise of political activity within the country, the British decided to move the administrative centre from Mafikeng to Gaborone in a final bid to keep Botswana as a protectorate.

This last-ditch effort from the British administration to retain Botswana as a protectorate was futile because more political parties began to surface across Botswana namely the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP) which fractured in 1962 and out of the fragments was born the Botswana Independence Party (BIP). BDP, BPP and BIP became the three main political parties in Botswana, playing a significant role in the formation of Botswana's democracy and constitution. BPP had mass appeal among growing demographics in the urban working class and migrant labourers and this demographic seemed to grow exponentially with each passing year. The party's inception and influence were provoked by the growing number of South African exiles in Botswana (Middleton, 1997). Unlike Khama, who appealed to the illiterate population of the country who held him in high esteem and credibility because of his royal bloodline, the BPP was different; the party was made up of mostly South African exiles and former mineworkers who campaigned for socialist transformation in Botswana (Middleton, 1997). The founding members of the party included Kgaleman Tumedisho Motsete, Phillip P. Goanwe Matante and Motsomai Mpho. Matante and Mpho had actively participated in the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC) (Gapa, 2016: 29). BPP was a radical leftist group that garnered its support from the disgruntled urban migrant population. Since the main source of income for numerous families was remittances from migrant labourers working in South African mines, the urban and exiled population could relate to the BPP. The party split in 1962 and Mpho left the party to start his party BIP. The BIP campaigned for similar socialist reform and independence from British colonialism.

Given that Khama was of royal blood he used his influence to mobilise support conservatively. He realised that rural households relied heavily on subsistence agriculture and remittances from migrant labourers working in South African mines for their wellbeing. Subsistence agriculture was labour intensive and many people relied on the oxen to do the hard labour (Gapa, 2016: 30). Numerous households did not have direct access to oxen and depended on relationships with families that did have oxen to help them in time of harvest. Khama co-opted those families

who owned oxen to join the BDP in the campaign for independence and traditional socio-political continuity which would guarantee them elite socio-political status within the community post-independence. This made Khama an attractive leader and given his status as a king, people's perception of the *dikgosi* was reformed with regards to the position of the *dikgosi* and their role in society. Moreover, the fact that Khama was a *kgosi* himself signified that the culture, customs, and welfare of *Batswana* would be safeguarded by the normative constrains of his power. Thus, IKS would be protected and continued by his rule if he were to become president.

In 1965 Britain accepted a proposal for democratic self-governance in Botswana which began the process of negotiations. Question on the significance and the role of the king going forward into independence were raised by political parties and kings alike. All delegations desperately wanted to avoid any form of post-colonial conflict which could arise from lack of political continuity and political reform without indigenisation or indigenous participation. Botswana's political elites used other African countries who had gained their independence prior and experienced post-colonial conflict as case studies of how traditional elites used their power and influence to disrupt the course of social, political, and economic modernisation. Thus, there was a deliberate effort to amalgamate traditional and modern institutions when constructing post-colonial institutional frameworks and a post- colonial government. There were several challenges that Botswana faced before engaging in negotiation such as the fact that "British colonial rule had made institutions of chieftaincy rigid and responsive to colonial administrations" (Khadiagala, 2002, 228). Only certain kings were given legitimacy and recognition within the protectorate by the British as they did across Africa. Thus, it was imperative to blend this bifurcated state comprised of traditional and colonial authorities into one state governed by an all-encompassing constitution.

In 1963 a constitutional committee was set up which was made up of equal representation from diverse groups of Botswana's political, ethnic, and administrative population. This roughly included three representatives from the chieftaincy, three representatives from the main political parties, three Europeans, two officials from outside the chieftaincy as well as one Asian representative (Khadiagala, 2002, 229). The primary concern of all the delegates/ representatives was the role of the chiefs in the post-colonial epoch. Several suggestions were put forward by the delegates with regards to the role of the chiefs since they had the respect and legitimacy from the native population. Yet, the majority of the delegates were in favour of modernisation. Four main suggestions were put forward viz.,: "1) the establishment of a council of chiefs, made up of the heads of the eight groups and two sub-chiefs from outside the tribal

territories that the government would consult on all matters pertaining to traditional authorities, 2) reserving seats for the chiefs in a unicameral legislature, 3) creating an upper chamber of a bicameral legislature composed of chiefs on the lines of British House of Lords, 4) a federal system in which the tribal authorities would function as regional governments and be represented equally in an upper house" (Khadiagala, 2002, 230).

The chiefs were not happy with any of these suggestions and they wanted to have more power and influence in a post-colonial democratic dispensation. However, compromises had to be made by all delegates to ensure a successful and peaceful transition that would last long into independence. The constitutional committee agreed on a unitary state with a parliamentary system made up of an elected National assembly and un-elected House of Chiefs/ Ntlo Ya *Dikgosi*. The House of Chiefs was an advisory body made up of 15 members consisting of the Chiefs from the eight kingdoms as well as four elected sub-chiefs. These 12 chiefs were then tasked with selecting three additional members to make up the 15-member body of the House of Chiefs. The Chiefs were not excluded from the national assembly as they participated in any legislative matter pertaining to traditional affairs.

Creating a House of Chiefs seemed like a successful, rational, and strategic play of game theory. This appeared as a perfect example of a zero-sum game with equal wins and equal loss. However, the government gained more from creating a House of Chiefs because it served a dual purpose for the government. It ensured that traditional authorities cooperated in policy formation since the chiefs had power and prestige within their kingdoms meaning that the policy implementation would be better articulated through them. Secondly, the House of chiefs provided constitutional channels for communicating traditional matters and grievances, allowing chiefs to exercise and moderate grievances because of their influence. To this effect, the government could create an independent judiciary that compromised of customary and Roman-Dutch legal structures. The judiciary in Botswana had its foundations in traditional/ customary law which was legislated and moderated by *lekgotla* as well as Roman-Dutch law which extended the reach of government institutions, eliminating a case of citizens and subject and replacing it with citizens (du Toit, 1995). This was an exercise of social cohesion, using traditional institutions as the foundation of Botswana's liberal democracy. The Chiefs/ *dikgosi* and the instructions of traditional leadership were the thread that carried over the pre-colonial era to the post-colonial era whist keeping IKS intact.

It was clear from the onset that post-colonial independence would be based on an electoral system and those leaders would be elected to power and would take precedence over royal

authority. As a former British protectorate, Botswana was ready to embrace a Westminster Parliamentary system. Elections were held in Botswana where the BDP won with an overwhelming majority. On 30 September 1966 Botswana was ushered into independence by BDP led by Seretse Khama who officially became Botswana's first president. Khama was not only the first president but he was simultaneously the legitimate Chief of Bangwato, this form of legitimacy facilitated a smooth transition from traditional institution to a modern institution that had the flair and influence of traditional institutions. That transition also facilitated a high level of socio-political continuity between pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial institutions which were indicative of Botswana's high levels of vertical legitimacy (Englebert, 2000: 158). In indigenous Tswana culture, the co-existence of wealth and power is traditionally and culturally legitimate under Tswana polity (Wylie, 1990:25-27; Parsons et al, 1995: 89). Political and economic powers were interdependent (Wylie, 1990; Good, 1994) and this is analytically evidenced "by the use of the term *kgosi* for both Chief and rich man" (Wylie 1990:23). Thus, Khama and the BDP winning the elections did not come as a shock, instead it was at par with IKS philosophies of Batswana.

For the first five years, Botswana relied heavily on Britain for financial support. The country's economy was driven by beef export to South African and the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as remittances from mine workers, working in South Africa (Motlhabane, 2015). Botswana was one of the poorest Sub-Saharan African countries after achieving independence. There was poor infrastructure, socio-economic development as well as low levels of education. Acemoglu et al. (2003) asserts that Botswana was amongst the ten least developed countries globally, with almost no infrastructure or human capital. "There was only 12 km of tarred road, few public services, and only 100 secondary school and 22 university graduates" (Acemoglu et al., 2003, p.80). The socio-economic conditions of the country forecasted a bleak picture of the future. However, in 1967 good fortune fell on Botswana when diamonds were discovered by a British archaeologist in Orapa which was a territory of Bangwato. President Khama declared that the diamonds did not belong to just Bangwato, but Botswana as a whole and that the revenue from diamonds would serve all the citizens of Botswana. President Khama was exercising Tswana indigenous knowledge under the principle of Botho /Ubuntu which purports equality and the equal distribution of all resources for the greater good of everyone in the society.

From 1967 to 1971 economic development planning took off and Botswana became fully independent including financially. The discovery of diamonds and other minerals significantly pivoted Botswana's abject socio-economic situation. Diamonds formed the backbone of

Botswana's economic growth and were instrumental in its economic growth. Shortly after the discovery of diamonds in Botswana the government and DeBeers entered intense negotiations which formed an equal share of 50/50 partnership called Debswana in 1969. This history and monumental partnership marked the beginning of the diamond production process in Botswana. Debswana has made Botswana the largest diamond producer by value (Motlhabane, 2015). Given that *Batswana* had a long history of negotiating their way into deals that served them well such as negotiating for protection from Britain and negotiating their way out of colonialism, it did not come as a surprise that they pursued an open policy for foreign investment with which they negotiated for equity shares to work in partnership and not nationalization (Lewis and Harvey, 1990). Negotiations formed the foundations of the pre-colonial Tswana society as illustrated earlier in this chapter and this continued to serve Botswana in the post-colonial era.

Diamonds and Development

Diamond revenue sparked high economic growth rates in Botswana of between 12 and 13 per cent annually (Wright, 1997:168). With high economic growth, the government embarked on a socio-economic and poverty alleviation project. The primary concern was the low education rate. The government began to invest in education following adequate health care, infrastructure development, building major roads from mining towns to economic hubs, joining cities and villages together. Within a short space of time, Botswana gained a prestigious title as Africa success story for having avoided the resource curse and rent-seeking behaviour by the government. Thirty years into independence and a functional democracy the country's socio-economic situation had completely transformed with the World Bank labelling Botswana, "Africa's first developmental state". Soon after the economic boom from diamond revenue, the government formed social services and the establishment of parastatals like Botswana Water Utilities (BWU), Botswana Power Corporation (BPC), Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) and the National Development Bank (NDB) (Tsie, 1996 cited by Motlhabane, 2015: 6).

"The government of Botswana, under the watchful eye of the Bank of Botswana, enforced macro-economic policies that stabilised economic growth, avoided external debts through the accumulation of foreign reserves and controlled fiscal expenditure guided by National Development Plans" (Motlhabane, 2015: 6). In 1970 the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) established advanced commercial and industrial development as well as financed citizens who had financially viable ideas. Citizens were given the opportunity to participate in the economic growth of the country, and thus inspired patriotism. Gapa (2016:16) praises

Botswana's citizens for having a "culture of diligence and steadfastness and are able to see developmental plans to their fruition, something their neighbouring counterparts marvel at" (Gapa, 2016: 16). The citizens of Botswana are to be acknowledged when mentioning the development of the country because of their patience and adherence to the government's plans.

In most cases in Africa the legacy left behind by colonialism is the division of multiple ethnic groups within one African state leading to ethnic fractions and heterogeneity, this was no different in Botswana. To avoid ethnic fractionating in Botswana especially in the northern regions of the country where the majority of the Kalanga population lived, integration and assimilation had to be propagated. Botswana was largely ethno-linguistically homogenous even before colonialism with *Batswana* making up 80% of the population and 20% of the population was made up of small populations of Kalanga, Herero, and Khoisan ethnicities. To avoid any chances for ethnic conflict the government of Botswana embarked on a project of nation-building, integration, and assimilation to create a Tswana mono-ethnic state. The government decolonised the British administration and legislation and passed a series of laws to reverse the divide and rule mechanics. The Government maintained the decentralised rule within the country with the chiefs at the helm of primary and mundane functions of society legitimised through the Chieftainship Act of 1965 and managing identity politics push-pull factors with the government.

Political transition/ continuity and political legitimacy

The road to independence and political legitimacy in Botswana was a difficult balancing act. Traditional authorities who had maintained their legitimacy from the pre-colonial era and throughout colonialism worked very hard to maintain their ways of life and the rules of governance. They were recognised by the general population as legitimate leaders. Yet, the country had an official bureaucracy which it had incorporated with traditional authorities when they sought protection from Britain. Therefore, Botswana was a mixture of traditional and modern governance and the task of political leaders at the time was finding a seamless way of incorporating the two (traditional and modern) at an institutional level.

Debswana

The discovery of diamonds and diamond revenue were not the reasons behind Botswana'ssuccess. Rather, it is how Botswana managed its diamonds as well as diamond revenue which singled them out from other resource-rich countries and helped them avoid the resource curse. DeBeers invested in Botswana through Corporate Social Investment (CSI)

projects that assisted the government in building schools, infrastructure development, establishing a functional health care system as well as other developmental projects that have helped to propel the state. Credits to Botswana's success and avoiding the resource curse are largely due to the style of governance and a transparent decentralised style of leadership which was first implemented by the British during their time as a protectorate of Bechuanaland. Botswana has been blessed with good quality leadership and a relatively small and fairly homogenous society coupled with a strong institutional capacity that had stood the test of time and even through colonialism. It was through sound policy frameworks implemented by Botswana's first, President Seretse Khama, and his constituency that lead to economic growth and a solid partnership between the government and the private sector.

The "Indigenous" Developmental state

The "indigenous" nature of Botswana's developmental state (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007) did not come as a result of diamond discovery alone but foreign investment, which played a major role in the development equation. "Growth has been strategically led/influenced and managed by the state and decreasingly complemented by foreign aid, within an overall institutional context of a liberal market economy and a multi-party democratic system of government" (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 2). Growth per capita averaged 6.3 per cent for four decades (1960 – 2000), while real GDP average growth was almost 10 per cent. Botswana is Africa's leading performer in cross-country perspective (Ndulu and O'Connell 2003). The country and its leadership went through three formidable stages beginning in 1960 through independence to 1975. This stage is described as a period of the initial base and creating a transitional phase starting with some degree of uncertainty about the nature of Botswana's state and ending with institutional transformation and development policy direction (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 2). The second stage, from 1975 to 1989, was a consolidation of both the market based state-led development strategy and continuity with a multi-party system of governance avoiding the wave of one-party or military regimes and forms of socialism/communism ideologies cutting across the African continent.

Stage two was one of the most crucial stages which prioritized and led to the creation of a competent state that provided visionary leadership and a management role without becoming excessively involved in the nuts and bolts of production (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 2). This stage mimicked the ruling of the tribal homesteads where the *kgosi* led the kingdom but the *lekgotla* was responsible for the running of the kingdom. The third stage from 1990, was characterised by a new policy environment, "the end of state-led development strategy and a

new reorientation towards private sector-led development and re-alignment of the main interests arising from rapid urbanisation and the spread of education as well as Botswana strives towards new production ventures" (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 2). The consultative process which underlines the Botswana policymaking process, including managing negotiations and contracts, is firmly established within the traditional institutions, such as the *lekgotla*, where there was an opportunity to express one's view and a need to achieve a degree of consensus.

Botswana was very dependent on foreign aid in the initial and intermediate stages of its development which led the country to make calculated compromises on several pressing issues such as indigenising development policies from the onset. High growth rates coupled with an extreme shortage of a skilled/educated population in Botswana posed a serious threat to economic growth. In a bid to avoid the Dutch disease that has wreaked havoc in the other African States, Botswana increased "inflow of foreign aid in the form of technical assistance with a policy of allowing foreign operational experts to occupy line positions, and partly because Botswana also avoided rushing into 'Africanisation' " (Stevens 1981; Maipose et al. 1996). Although Botswana did not rush into "Africanisation", democracy gelled relatively well with the consensus-seeking approach that is synonymous and deeply rooted in the Tswana culture. Through democracy and consensus-seeking approach "Botswana's leaders adopted an open policy towards foreign investment and pursued a non-aligned foreign policy to maximize volume and diversify sources of foreign aid" (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 7). These policies paid off relatively well as they led to the discovery and successful exploitation of copper, nickel and diamond mining. Botswana's economic development strategy has been and continues to exploit the country's mineral worth and invest the proceeds from mining in improving social and economic conditions and creating new economic opportunities, while at the same time encouraging the role of foreign aid and private foreign investment. This strategy of transforming the mineral endowment into an endowment of the physical and human endowment has the potential to achieve self-sustaining growth because physical and human capital is renewable, whereas the mineral endowment is not (Bank of Botswana 1995, p. 5).

Foreign aid provided Botswana the necessary economic stability it needed to find its feet, individually from South Africa economically and finally in 1976 Botswana deepened its independence and furthered its self-interest by creating its currency the Pula in pursuit of independent economic strategies. Therefore, increasing aid flows from a wide range of donors initially financed the whole development budget and about half of its recurrent expenditure deepened Botswana's economic independence furthered its self-interest. Foreign aid and

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) played a significant role in Botswana's development effort. Through "smart partnership" such as Debswana with investors and donors as well as the government as a share-holder, Botswana was able to develop the mining sector which provided the critical resources and revenue the country needed for the first phase of economic diversification from purely agriculture (cattle farming) to include mining.

"Another important policy choice was the approach to national development, underlined by development planning and pragmatism – not "ideological dogma" – for economic policies and the overall strategy of state-led development" (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 8). Botswana's development analysts and development planners recognised the significant role that strategic state intervention played in formulating and implementing a national development plan. As such the national development plan was drafted and adopted and became the forerunner in development planning and an instrument for resource mobilization and management in a market economy (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 8). According to Raphaeli et al (1984) and Stevens (1981) "National development planning and its integration with the annual budgetary process has been the foundation of Botswana's development management machinery, and the basis for managing its windfall gains… mineral rent and foreign aid" (Stevens, 1981; Raphaeli et al., 1984; Maipose et al., 1996). Therefore, the adoption of the national development plan has served as the engine that powers Botswana's development as well as effectively managing mineral profits and aid revenue. Moreover, since the adoption of the national development plan, Botswana's development plans have sought to promote Botswana's four national principles namely: democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity which subsequently led to the country's four national development objectives being: rapid economic growth, social justice, economic independence and sustainable development (Maipose and Matsheka ,2007: 8).

Democracy served the best interest of Botswana's leaders because it was seen as a "magic wand" which was used to deliver a better public good because it attracted foreign resources/foreign aid whilst also managing internal politics. Unlike the plethora of independent African countries that defaulted on democracy in the 1970s, Botswana managed to hold on to its democratic values that dates back to pre-colonial times to manage national affairs whilst attracting foreign aid. The geopolitical positioning of Botswana made the country very attractive to donors because it was surrounded by racist and minority-ruled southern African states at the time such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Being the only liberal democratic state with liberal economic policies, Botswana attracted the sympathy of Western donor agencies which led to large inflows of aid. Maipose and Matsheka (2007: 13) speculate that this might have motivated Botswana's political leadership to keep the liberal democracy

and economics in place because aid was not seen as a donation but an investment; hence it was included in the national development plan. Aid helped to finance the original public investment in infrastructure, mining as well as facilitating private capital inflows, especially for the mining sector (Maipose et al., 1996).

To ensure effective aid management and coordination on the part of the state, Botswana's development planners/ analysts requested donors to support in addition to having the flexibility to choose projects that the development planners/ analysts had already identified as national priorities in the national development plan. This was done to increase national project ownership and to avoid problems that had previously occurred in other African countries where donors had allegedly "imposed" or taken over the design of key policies/programmes such as SAP's (Van de Walle and Johnston, 1996). This not only safeguarded the national developmental interests of the country but also ensured that foreign aid was used effectively for infrastructure development so that more revenue could be generated for mining activities and that national plans were not hijacked to pursue the interests of the West. The common view among donors and development analysts was that the planning system has worked relatively well in Botswana as opposed to many instances of failure in many developing countries (World Bank, 1984; Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Maipose et al., 1996).

The main domestic source of funding for development projects in Botswana was the Domestic Development Fund (DDF). The Development Fund aimed to help the government to avoid costly delays in project implementation by allowing donor-funded projects to go ahead on a reimbursement basis, and it was also effective in integrating foreign aid into the annual budget (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 15). The DDF warranted that the money intended for capital expenditure together with finance from external funding agencies was first paid into the DDF and then paid out of it to meet approved capital project expenditures (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 15). The pre-colonial Tswana culture regarded state leadership as crucial to the process of accumulating wealth and centrality of the state was promoted to facilitate economic accumulation as a worthy state function and redistribution, thereby having an interdependent relationship between the state and economic owning class (Maundeni, 2001). The Tswana chieftaincy was, according to Wylie (1990:32), “the trunk from which new leaves sprouted and was the “wife,” milk-pail, and “breast of the nation”.

Botswana’s “long tradition of using friendly outsiders to help cope” with problems came as a calculated blessing during the elementary stages of national development (Lewis, 1993; Maundeni, 2001: 144). As aforementioned, given the inherited shortage of trained and

experienced manpower, the government avoided rushing into "Africanisation". Instead, Botswana's government leaders have held the views of industry experts in high esteem, such as liberal economists in line with their ideology and development analysts/planners. Since it was the norm to work and trust knowledgeable and qualified foreign experts, Botswana leaders pursued a slow but smooth localisation policy, enabling nationals to acquire the necessary skills and experience a wide staff development policy that exploited legitimate ambitions to give progressive responsibility to persons who had necessary skills (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 18). This is in line with Tswana IKS practices that steam from *Lekgotla* proceeding. State-led development strategies have blended well with pre-colonial Tswana political practices regarding the role of the state, leadership and the intimacy of political and economic elite because of the separation of power or bifurcation of the state. The *lekgotla* institution, through which traditional leaders' consultations were made and legitimised, provided the community with a forum to express their views and a need to achieve a degree of consensus (Maipose and Matsheka, 2007: 19). Openness and consultation were always essential, and this was a springboard for modern development planning and its legitimacy for support and implementation, though policymaking including planning is dominated by government officials (Somolekae 1993).

The overall standard of living for the majority of the population of Botswana has improved since the 1970s and continues to do so today. More and more citizens were receiving an education because more schools and universities were built for the population. There has been a drastic improvement in health care with the government providing health care even in the most remote and rural areas of Botswana. The economy of the country has been controlled nationally with the government at the helm of economic development. Debswana has contributed to the economic growth and development of the country but it has failed in helping Botswana diversify its economy. The indigenous nature of Botswana's developmental state is illustrated by illuminating how the state mobilised development resources – especially savings and investment, and human resource, widely known as the primary drivers of economic growth

– and prudently managed the economy without itself getting excessively involved into the nuts and bolts of production.

Analysis

From the data that has been collected and presented about Botswana, it is difficult to link its success purely to IKS. Instead, Botswana's development has come as a result of foreign aid and the help of friendly outsiders. Botswana has portrayed itself through its policies as a state that

relied on IKS on its path to development. While it has extracted some of its policies from IKS such as the rule and role of the kings and tribal heads, the country has also relied heavily on foreign aid for its development. The country relied on the help of what it calls friendly outsiders to assist them with their development. One may argue that even though they received outside help they indigenised these policies for the benefit of their people and the economy. The colonial bifurcated state helped Botswana to develop apparatus for a dual judicial state whilst maintaining a place in society for the *kgosi* and traditional rulers across the vast rural areas of Botswana. It could be argued that the *kgosi's* leadership and role in the state is a mere rubber stamp. Since the colonial era, the role of the *kgosi* has been reduced significantly to that of an administrator. The right and power to allocate land were assigned to the Land Board which served the rich in the urban areas and neglected the poor people in the rural areas where the majority of the population resided (Ntua, 2002: 74).

Despite the power of the *kgosi* being reduced, the role that the *kgosi* plays in the rural areas is anything but a rubber stamp instead it can be categorised as local governance since the *lekgotla* is the keystone of the political apparatus in the rural areas. In some cases, the role of the king far exceeds that of the government because the king and *lekgotla* are responsible for the governance of the judiciary as well as the allocation of resources. From the king and the administrative function of the traditional rule in Botswana, one can appreciate the influence that democratisation has had on the country. *Batswana* kings preserved their historical socio-political cultures and institutions as well as their indigenous way of life through their sophisticated structures of democratic tribal governance maintained by the *kgosi* and *lekgotla*. Yet, since the *kgosi* was the custodian of the culture, customs, and welfare of his people his absence in mainstream politics and economics is symbolic of an absence of IKS in Botswana's political and economic administration. However since *dikgosi* were the first to lose "their way" by serving the British/ colonial administration it is fair to say that major aspects of IKS were lost during the colonial era because *dikgosi*, the custodians of the culture, customs, and welfare, had sold out to the colonial powers.

As discussed in this chapter, missionaries played a significant role in the development of Batswana. Not only were they present to evangelise, but they were on a civilising mission to civilise the "barbarians" of Africa. This is why scholars such as Rondeny and Ndlovu-Gatsheni would describe the Christianisation of Botswana as the enforcement of the colonial matrix of power and a way to erase the cultural beliefs of a people and replacing them with more Eurocentric beliefs and modes of being. While missionaries are praised for having assisted Botswana to get protection from the British, this gesture of asking for help from outsiders set

the precedence for how Botswana would conduct its politics in the future. This chapter illustrated how Botswana has relied on friendly outsiders for help even in their development planning and strategies. Relying on friendly outsiders forced the country to delay on Africanisation, opting rather, to continue with colonial development strategies instead of their own. As a result, the country was besieged with development initiatives that failed because they were a mismatch with community-based knowledge and practices. For example, in the Okavango Delta, indigenous knowledge covers a range of resources and how to sustain them because the local knowledge has been used for centuries for natural resource management (Cassidy et al, 2011: 76).

Although outside influences and development initiatives were not successful in the Okavango Delta the community's adherence to local knowledge and sustainable use of natural resources aided them in their development. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Christianity is one of the first and most preservative ways in which epistemic erasure takes place. This is no different for Botswana because of cultural and epistemic erasure as well as overlooking the so-called Africanisation of initiatives which first took places when the dikgosi chose to rely on the missionaries. As explained in previous chapters, during colonialism the West asserted its dominance intellectually and otherwise over the rest of the world. Therefore, Botswana did not necessarily decide not to Africanise its development policies; instead the tidal wave that is colonialism has long established its intellectual dominance over Botswana coercing them to value western knowledge over indigenous knowledge. As Mignolo (2008) stated that the colonial subject classifies people and projects into what is good for them.

Since 2011 Botswana has created awareness about IKS through education and research; however, the country still has no laws on IKS but it does have specific laws on Natural Resource Conservation and Development as well as national policies and Culture (Makoni, 2011). This is a clear indication that Botswana has made a lot of noise internationally about IKS but domestically has done very little to protect or even enforce IKS through law. Maipose and Matsheka (2007:30) have noted that there is an absence of indigenous businesspeople outside the cattle industry in Botswana, this they say may be the reason why unemployment and poverty still besiege the country. The lack of economic diversification and inclusion of the local population is the reason why the poor are still struggling. Although cattle farming is very lucrative, coming at a close second to diamond mining, the country needs to diversify the economy because natural resources are susceptible to the boom-bust cycles of the global economy. The disappointing high levels of unemployment and noticeable poverty among the people can be attributed to the adoption of the colonial economic model, which only took

resources from the colony to serve the economy of the colonial master. Often the colonial master did not diversify the economy and did very little to industrialise the country. IKS works as a directive because it foregrounds African beliefs and values of collaborative systems which do not tolerate any form of degradation of nature. IKS is important for the development because it enforces a horizontal and collaborative spirit which encourages the sharing of ideas rather than the use of ideas which are decided by a minority. Botswana has attempted to diversify its economy and has forecasted that from 2021 its economy will grow by 4% driven by mining, construction, the service sector as well as intensified public investments (World Bank, 2019). However, by not protecting and promoting IKS through the legal system and policy reform Botswana can only partially be hailed as having used IKS to promote development.

What failed to be eroded by the colonial matrix of power because of the carefully maintained socio-political culture was subsequently eroded by the adoption of Eurocentric development strategies within Botswana. Accepting Eurocentric policies and strategies has proved to be problematic even in Botswana. For example, adopting the Eurocentric form of tax collection has reconfigured Batswana's way of life resulting in the internal and external migration of some of the adult population. Even the so-called buffering mechanisms that *Batswana* have so tactfully developed have not helped them buffer out destructive elements of the colonial matrix of power. Political continuity and pre-colonial democratic practices are the only ways that Botswana is upholding IKS. Botswana is still viewing its current challenges through the lenses of IKS because it is IKS that has made Botswana to not lose its identity or its pre-colonial *modus operandi* when it comes to governances.

Conclusion

Botswana is a country that is growing at an exceptional rate economically and socially. In this chapter, I discussed how the country's growth has been influenced by a number of factors namely: the adherence to traditional rule and the democratic practices of their culture and epistemic dogma; stable political environment, driven by a multi-party democratic system, smooth running election every five years; the rule of the *dikgosi* and *lekgotla* in the rural areas as well as a participatory and transparent political system, combined with the good and disciplined political leadership to moderate/limit corruption and most importantly, enhance public accountability. One cannot fault Botswana on its leadership and its sterling record. However, this chapter also indicated that the labelling of Botswana as an indigenous developmental state is farfetched because the country has fallen for foreign developing policies

to protect, promote and preserve its indigenous knowledge and it has also delayed the Africanisation of its development and is opting for Eurocentric policies. The country benefits heavily from grants and foreign investments across the developed world for adopting "Eurocentric" policies, adhering to democracy and being one of the few African countries to do so between the 1970s to the early 1990s.

This chapter has also indicated how Botswana was once described as the Suez Canal into Africa which is partly why Britain agreed to provide protection for Botswana. The country relies heavily on commodities, making it vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The country has had very little economic diversification which has been the biggest critique of its economic system since the late 1990s. The lack of economic diversification and the delay in adopting Africanisation policies have resulted in the continuation and the undermining of IKS policies. Missionaries played a major role in the history of Botswana as advisers and diplomatic liaison to the British government. However, missionaries broke the tribe from its traditions through the spread of Christianity and modernity.

Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusion

Introduction

Throughout this research, I attempted to explore alternative ways of thinking about Africa's development as well as tracking and tracing states and sub-regions that have employed alternative methods of thinking about development. The specific focus was to track and trace those states and sub-regions that have used or claimed to have used IKS to aid in their development endeavours. I endeavoured to demonstrate and reiterate the definition and utility of IKS both abstractly/ theoretically and practically in an attempt to deconstruct this unfamiliar "beast" known as IKS, for greater understanding and to answer the key questions posed in the introduction of this research. This research aimed to unearth knowledge systems that rerouted themselves from Western knowledge and to explore the probing potential of IKS as a source of knowledge. It appears that IKS is a broad subject matter that is multidisciplinary, one has to consider this when looking to unpack and discuss its impact on the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. IKS can present itself in a myriad of ways as it is multifaceted but at its core, it should remain community or local knowledge. To a large extent, IKS is about the knowledge that existed before colonialism or knowledge that was created to fight or resist the spread of colonialism. IKS is the knowledge that is untainted by outsiders, it is not imported but it is organic to a place and the people who inhabit it.

This research intended to find out whether IKS influences development. Auxiliary questions were posed to help unpack the main question, namely what are the key factors that can help us determine what IKS is? Can IKS exist alongside Western knowledge? Can IKS replicate the same success in Africa as it has in East Asia? Are the royal Bafokeng and Botswana authentic IKS users or are there other factors at play? Why does IKS diminish in some areas and not in others? Is IKS effective in the development equation? What knowledge can be gained from IKS in enriching IR and communities in the Global South? What additional lessons can we learn from the royal Bafokeng and Botswana? In this chapter, I discussed some considerations with regards to the research that came up during the data collection and the presentation of the findings. Perhaps it is worth considering that IKS has become somewhat fashionable, a global trend that has swept across the previously colonised world. This global trend comes at a crucial time when western economies are stagnating and facing a crisis. Moreover, this is not the first time that IKS is popularised across the world, this is merely a resurgence of a trend that came and went during the immediate post-colonial era. In this chapter, I critically discussed the

findings of this research in relation to the research questions and the literature.

At the beginning of the study, I did not have many expectations about the findings, however I did have an open-ended enquiry about the influence of IKS on development. The only expectation that I may have carried was for IKS to be presented unambiguously and in its purest form within the case studies. However, this was not the case. From the findings on the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana; IKS has been integrated with Western Knowledge. It seems rather contradictory to integrate Eurocentric knowledge into IKS only because IKS has been considered as primitive and barbaric by the West for a very long time. The incorporation of Western knowledge into IKS, in this case, is as good as annihilation or erasure of IKS. From the literature, one gathers that IKS is supposed to present a paradigm shift from the bombardment and erasure of Eurocentric knowledge systems that have left Africa in the dark ages and at the deficit of knowledge production and societal problem solving for African states. A part of looking towards alternatives such as IKS is to free Africa from the grip of colonial hegemony and coloniality towards a prosperous future through African centric solutions.

While several factors can help to determine what IKS is, through the findings, one can determine that IKS is the knowledge that is developed over epochs, shared by communities and stored in people's memories through stories, philosophy, dogma, proverbs, cultural values, rituals, community laws, agricultural practice, education and the socio-economic and political structures of that society. IKS can survive even the epistemic violence of the West as it is able to conceal itself within the memories and practices of the people and transform itself to accommodate the needs of the people. IKS forms the modes of being of a people and society. It transforms as the people transform, and it is not stagnant. It is for these reasons that IKS scholars such as Omanchi (2015) believe that IKS cannot be borrowed or integrated into other knowledge systems. These are some of the key factors that help us to determine what IKS is. Although IKS is also very specific to a region it can transcend regional constituency due to its intrinsic duality of possessing both fixed and malleable elements to its knowledge pool. This was evident in the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, where even though both case studies are influenced by Tswana culture. In each society/state IKS was very specific but the knowledge pool has the potential to transcend the society/state.

Tswana culture, philosophy and practices have influenced the IKS of these two case studies, unmistakably through political continuity and peaceful transition of power from one leader to another; are some of the strong suits of indigenous knowledge that are common and

synonymous with Tswana IKS which have been carefully documented by the case studies. Other Tswana IKS that have been illustrated by the cases studies are participatory democracy or community consultation through the process of *lekgotla,* diplomacy and peaceful negotiations as well as *botho/ Ubuntu*. A very interesting aspect of Tswana indigenous practices is the practice of knowledge indigenisation, learning from outsiders and adopting practices and knowledge that can aid in the wellbeing of society. This was demonstrated by the Royal Bafokeng when they participated in the ivory trade with the Boers and were able to acquire weapons which came with the benefits of power: both hard power and soft power similar to that of the Boers in the region. The Royal Bafokeng also invited Christian missionaries and adopted Christian philosophies and practices which aided in the education of their population and the acquisition of land.

The case study of Botswana also shows knowledge indigenisation from when migrating Tswana groups amalgamated with other tribes in Botswana, but *Batswana* kept the essence of their indigenous knowledge whilst indigenising the knowledge of other tribes. In addition, the case study on Botswana demonstrated how the country was able to maintain its socio-political culture under British protectorate and their encounters with missionaries. However, as mentioned in previous chapters, Eurocentrism is erosive to other cultures. Eurocentric epistemologies have failed to exist alongside other cultures without committing epistemic erasure whether intentionally or unintentionally. From the case study of Botswana, the government/state strongly believes that Eurocentric knowledge can exist alongside indigenous knowledge which is how the state rationalised the decisions to delay "Africanisation" projects. One can argue that with this decision Botswana was merely chasing foreign investment from European states that were sympathetic towards its plight as a peaceful democratic country surrounded by unrest and socialist elements. Moreover, these European states wanted to "reward" Botswana; a country in Sub-Saharan Africa that was not swept up by violence, political contestation and corruption which had become the norm across most independent African states. This was a way to control, undermine and condescendingly reward African states (in this case Botswana) in the way that they had during colonial times.

This is at par with the Christianisation of Africans, the spread of missionary education, segregation and colonialism where African's were made to believe that anything that emanated from "Africa" was inherently wrong. Accordingly, the missionaries and colonisers are presented as saviours that saved Africans from their backward ways and gave Africans civilisation. This, of course, was a political strategy to subdue Africans and to create submission amongst them. Whilst this is a generic statement with regards to this case study

Western knowledge is evasive, exclusive and exclusionary in that it seeks to ease the indigenous knowledge of Batswana; exclude all Tswana knowledge and exclusively celebrate and recognise Western knowledge and Western knowledge systems as the only kind of knowledge that can exist. In these case studies, IKS precedes Western knowledge and is able to accept Western knowledge and even indigenise it. IKS allows for other knowledge systems particularly Western knowledge systems to exist alongside it. It is accepting, amendable, flexible and pliable for whoever needs it and takes into consideration the place, time and circumstance of the users. Whereas Western knowledge is rigid and has set the expectation that must be met by the users and it does not allow for knowledge plurality. IKS allows for duality and plurality in knowledge and theory whereas Western knowledge does not.

Due to the flexibility of IKS presented in the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng, many have argued that the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana are not authentic IKS users. This research and the case study findings do indicate to some degree that the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana are not authentic IKS users because they have demonstrated how they betrayed IKS for Western knowledge at critical times. Moreover, they have to use the argument of knowledge indigenisation when it is favourable to them or when they are trying to meet a specific end, such as cashing in on foreign aid or looking good for foreign investors. The notion that the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana are not authentic IKS users emerges from the perception that for IKS to exist alongside Western knowledge, aspects of IKS must be compromised which nullifies certain practices of IKS. This emerges from the perception that there is a rich pool of indigenous knowledge that is embedded in Tswana culture and modes of being that has not been foregrounded even by IKS. For example, the Royal Bafokeng adopted the economic practices of the mining companies that they are in business with at the expense of the local population who are left landless and in fierce battles with the Royal family. Even during colonial times, the Royal Bafokeng adopted the trading practices of the Boers and acquired guns which they used to terrorise other tribes in Phokeng which is a serious offence against the principle of Ubuntu. These actions contradict the principles of Ubuntu/Botho because they are concerned with promoting degradation of other people, when what should be happening is that people must be empowered, justice, and equity, and sharing of resources without succumbing to prejudice is what should be advocated. In both these case studies, it is the state and the tribe that declare to have been using and continue to use IKS which has resulted in the steady development over the years.

From an economic standpoint, both case studies have achieved an impressive amount of development in addition to avoiding resource curses. One may even extend the merit of both

the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana success to the political realm. However, from a social perspective, these two cases have fallen short and even failed the people and development has not reached the broader society. The voices of the people are absent with regards to the use of IKS and these two case studies. This is a shortcoming of this research and other research that is being done around IKS and development. Often the voices of the people are marginalised from economic statistics and other material indicators of development such as infrastructure and world rankings. The voices of the people have not been heard however what is known is that development has not quite reached the people because of on-going land battles, life expectancy, health care, unemployment rates and the absence of their voices. Development is about people and the gradual improvement of people's lives, hence the lack of improvement of people's conditions indicated that there has been no development.

Another analysis is that IKS is a knowledge system that is vastly different from the Eurocentric knowledge systems but to try and understand IKS for this research I compressed and stunted the potential of IKS by measuring it using Eurocentric standards that are rigid and uncompromising. As aforementioned IKS is flexible and plural and thus its plurality may explain the adoption and indigenisation of Western knowledge systems by the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. The Royal Bafokeng and Botswana have demonstrated with some instances of being authentic IKS users, at the same time there are other factors at play namely: capital, big business, major investment from foreign states and multinational organisations. There are of course other factors at play such as population size and relative homogeneity. Given that there are other factors at play that have contributed to development in these case studies we see that IKS diminishes in some areas and not in others. IKS first diminishes when it comes into contact with Western knowledge where there is an overt attempt to erase and overthrow it to replace it with Western knowledge.

The findings indicate that IKS survives when it allows itself to adjust and indigenise and incorporate some Western knowledge into its knowledge field. This does not denote abandoning the core concepts/philosophies of that indigenous knowledge. As demonstrated by the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, Botho was the core philosophical strand of their IKS which they did not stray too far from however, there are instances in which the philosophy was questionable in both case studies. In both case studies, political continuity played a major role in preserving IKS and making sure that it does not diminish. Omanchi (2015; 2) explains that "like Western knowledge systems, Africa's IKS is devised for structuring community's experience and explaining how things come to be the way they are". IKS diminishes when it fails to be flexible and fails to find innovative ways to preserve itself as

well as when there is limited political continuity from the leadership. IKS further diminishes when it comes into contact with external forces such as colonisers who exercise physical and intellectual violence over people and nations for their civilising mission to subdue the natives for their economic and political benefits, as demonstrated by the two case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana.

Knowledge is knowledge for a purpose, the validity of knowledge depends largely on the purposes it serves in the Affairs of men/women (Njoku, 2002: 21). According to Okpeh (2007:13-22), no organised human society can thrive without indigenous knowledge of some sort. The purpose of IKS and knowledge, in general, is to assist the people in society to navigate life with ease or with a particular compass that provides directions on how to face certain situations in addition to improving the quality of life of the people in the society. Problems differ across societies as climates differ across states. People living in cooler climates have a particular way of engaging knowledge about the climate to keep warm and people in warmer climates will engage with knowledge on how to keep cool. While these two worlds may come together to share knowledge, the knowledge about climate and temperature control is specific to each state. In the same way that challenges facing African states are exclusive to Africa, Africans need a solution that is specific to its needs, its particular kind of development and modernity that fits Africa's needs. Since Western solution/interventions have failed in Africa and have provided very little relief for Africa's challenges and in the development equation the question that arises is is IKS effective in the development equation? IKS does possess some effectiveness in the development equation when it is applied strategically and with caution.

Unfortunately, there are pros and cons to living in a highly globalised world and one con is that there are standardised ways of doing things that have been established by Western modernity and are monitored by stronger states to ensure that all states, specifically weaker previously colonised ones, comply with these standards. Thus, as demonstrated by the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, states that wish to use IKS must be creative in how and in what instance's they apply IKS. Knowledge production is an inherently rebellious thing because it problematizes existing knowledge. It goes against the grain and pushes the realm of what we know into that which is yet to be known. Although IKS is not new and has been around for centuries in the realm of Western knowledge, IKS is new and poses a threat to Western knowledge. This may be the reason why Botswana delayed its Africanisation project. It had the insight to see that other African states were being "punished" for using indigenous knowledge as a way to purge themselves of colonialism.

IKS is effective in the development equation particularly with regards to economic development as demonstrated by the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. IKS can assist the state to avoid resource curses. IKS can help states negotiate for better trade and business deals with MNC's, especially in the mining sector. IKS can help states become more self-sufficient and self- reliant, such states do not accept aid from foreign states and recognise the potential within their states, and in instances were aid is accepted it is utilized wisely as demonstrated by the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. The use of IKS promotes peace and state stability. Development thrives where there is peace and it is for these reasons that IKS is effective in the development equation. However, from a societal perspective, IKS has failed to bring about social change and development to the poor masses that have patiently waited for the economic success of their nation to trickle down to assist them out of their poverty. Omanchi (2015; 2) explains that "like Western knowledge systems, African IKS is derived from community structures and experience which explains how things came to be the way they are". The shortcomings of IKS in the development equation have a lot to do with the lengthy process of indigenisation of Western knowledge into IKS.

Western knowledge that is integrated with IKS is not derived from a community's experience and explaining how things come to be the way they are, there are usually politically driven changes that come from the leaders to meet certain political goals. It is not much of a secret that IKS is a political tool to draw the attention of investors and a new political slogan that has been adopted and celebrated by Western countries as a term that signifies political correctness and acceptance of those people who were previously colonised. One should also be suspicious of the sudden popularity of IKS which is also been condoned by the World Bank and other Western institutions that are directly linked to the demise of Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The politicisation of IKS coupled with knowledge indigenisation and the lack of concrete and unambiguous data about IKS in the two case studies made it challenging to determine and declare with certainty that IKS is effective in the development equation. However, aspects of IKS are effective in the development equation and/or play a supporting role with regards to development.

As a consequence of the difficulty to declare with certainty that IKS is effective in the development equation is also difficult to assert that IKS can replicate the same success in Africa as it had in East Asia. This is because, in the African context, IKS has had to change so much and adopt aspects of Western knowledge, in addition, IKS in Africa has had to sacrifice a lot because of international pressure and scrutiny. African states who wish to use IKS are not robust enough as yet to replicate the same success it had in East Asia. For IKS in Africa to

replicate the same success it had in East Asia it would need to be bold and unapologetic and intentional about what and why it is choosing indigenous knowledge over western knowledge. African countries in general and the two case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, in particular, have been selective in how they implement IKS as they have chosen bits and pieces of IKS to implement as opposed to being confident and robust about their IKS.

This for one, illustrates a lack of commitment from African states to change or at least challenge the status quo. In most East Asian countries that experience the Asian miracle, there was a commitment to changing the status quo and to pull the citizenry out of poverty. Although the same sentiment of pulling citizens out of poverty is shared by African leaders as well, there is a lack of commitment to fully and unapologetically implement IKS within African states. However, on the other hand, the selectiveness exercised by African states in implementing IKS is a consequence of epistemic dominance that has resulted in ethnocide, epistemicide and the systematic destruction of indigenous knowledge and cultural degradation. This is because the historic relationship between modernity and coloniality continues to have an impact on global power relations, especially at the epistemic level in the African context. Thus, adopting IKS to promote the development and to end poverty is an act of defiance against colonialism and neo-colonialism; it is a proclamation of independence and a commitment to post-colonialism.

Nonetheless, there are still lessons that can be learnt from the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana by African countries and IR as a discipline. Starting with natural resource management, these two case studies have presented alternative ways to manage natural resources and to avoid the Dutch Disease. They did this by owning or jointly owning their natural resources and mining rights. In both case studies, the leaders took charge of natural resources and negotiated favourable deals with foreign investors and MNC's that would yield high returns. They were not afraid to ask for a better deal and walk away from deals that would not benefit them. This was important because by taking charge of their natural resources they could participate in the IPE as players and not pawns as was the case in the colonial era. They used soft power to negotiate deals and had leverage in IPE. In the global arena money equals power and thus having money affords states the voice to speak at the global arena. Moreover, by avoiding the Dutch Disease and owning their natural resource rights the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana were able to invert themselves within the development rhetoric globally and economic epistemic development globally. The Royal Bafokeng and Botswana are used as special or exceptional case studies around the world to understand natural resource management in Africa contributing to the global knowledge production and the locus of enunciation from the core to the periphery. The world is forced to look outside of the West for

knowledge and nuances about development. As the world looks to the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana they have reintroduced the role of culture and identity as essential in the analysis of world politics.

Both case studies displayed a great deal of transparency when negotiating mining/trade agreements with MNC's and in the management of the revenue. This was partly because of the *Lekgotla* or collective governance that consulted with leaders and held the leaders accountable for everything because they had a responsibility to report back to the citizenry as well as to take the matter of the citizens to the leaders. Public participation ensured transparency and good governance. The lessons that we can draw from these two case studies are that participatory democracy aids in good governance because leaders are held accountable and the citizens are also a part of forming and shaping policies, therefore, there is little alienation between the ruling class and the citizens.

In the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, the lessons that can be learnt are that African states can be agents of change and not objects of change waiting to be saved by the West. The two case studies demonstrated agency by maintaining and adhering to some of their indigenous practices in the post-colonial period. They charted their development and modernity agenda that was inspired by their communities. These two case studies exhibited how to be resilient; how to overcome oppression and exploitation and not allowing colonialism to erode IKS. Both case studies invested in education. From them we can learn that investing in education is an investment that yields high benefits in other sectors too. Education has played a pivotal role in changing the socio-economic conditions of the poor. Through education, the physical and intellectual infrastructure has improved and allowed for the reimagining of new modernities outside of Western modernities and new knowledge systems outside of Western knowledge systems. Both case studies have shifted from fully depending on Western epistemologies thus freeing themselves from the legacy of imperialism and epistemic erasure. From the two cases one can learn that there is a plurality of knowledge and multiple knowledge systems can coexist in the same space at the same time.

As mentioned in previous chapters the West tends to segment and carefully compartmentalise knowledge into different disciplines and fields that rarely intersect. International Relations is one such field that tends to segment knowledge and rarely intersects with other knowledge streams, particularly within the human social sciences. From the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana IR, as an academic discipline, can learn that Western epistemologies do not work in every setting and often fall short when enforced outside the west. Therefore the

discipline of IR cannot claim to be universal whilst it neglects the Global South because it would imply that IR is unable to fully grasp the complexities and challenges faced by the majority of the world's populations in the Global South. IR must be pluriversal through incooporating the Global South IKS to the discipline; at this moment the Global South is treated as though it does not have its own knowledge systems, but the truth is that the knowledge systems from the Global South are available but they are not integrated into IR. The knowledge that can be gained from IKS and these case studies are plurality, acceptance of other knowledge systems and allowing them to coexist within the academy.

IR needs to broaden its borders of knowledge to include the Global South in order to make well- informed prognosis on the global South. From the two case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, IR can learn to reconfigure itself to accommodate new knowledge. From the two case studies, it was demonstrated that new knowledge and incorporating other knowledge systems does not spoil the pot instead it makes the pot richer. As the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana indigenised the Western knowledge systems, IR can indigenise African perspectives from African scholars and African epistemologies including epistemologies of the Global South to truly reflect universality. This would ensure that IR is more comprehensive and unbiased when engaging with issues from the Global South and it reaffirm the essential role that culture and identity play in the analysing of world politics. Since "IR theories are lenses used to view, understand, and structure or construct reality" (Ayoob, 1998: 17), reconfiguring IR to be more inclusive would make the above quote more plausible, unbiased and universal.

In the spirit of providing recommendations, there are some serious recommendations that the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana should consider, namely that Africa and natural resources of all kinds are not immune to shocks and changes or boom-bust cycles of the world economy thus they need to diversify their economy to include other sources of generating revenue. In addition, both cases need to implement plans that they will follow through to industrialise their nations. This will create new sources of generating revenue and it will also create networks to assist the poor to be lifted out of poverty and to feel the impact of economic development in these nations. Finally, the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana need to be more steadfast in their IKS and how they implement it. They need to allow their IKS to mature so that they can yield the fruits of development, decolonisation and indigenous modernity.

The limitation that was experienced during the findings was that I did not go out into the field to collect primary data in the form of interviews. There was a general lack of data about IKS and a lack of data about IKS in relation to the two case studies. Therefore, this affected the

outcome because I had to rely on what was published by scholars only. What was evident from the secondary data was the monolithic voice that the authors had written in support of the IKS in both case studies and linking this usage to the development. The lack of critique meant that I had to read between the lines and contradictions for the findings to have a well-balanced enquiry. In the case of the Royal Bafokeng, there was some critique of the Kingdom from scholars who collected primary data such as Capps, Malindi and Mnwana. However, their critique was based on an on-going court case and the outcome of that court case could change some of their critiques. In the case of Botswana, most of the authors spoke with a monolithic voice that praised the government for using IKS to foster development. This is problematic because development has yet to reach the deep rural areas where IKS could be found intact and there has been very little economic and social mobility for those citizens living in the deep rural areas. Thus, the glories of IKS are falsified or manipulated in certain areas and instances. The lack of vast data and even primary data is a weakness inherent in these findings. The limitations and weakness of this research could impact the validity of findings, especially in the future if someone wishes to embark on a similar study using primary data, they may present vastly different and more accurate findings than this research.

The principal impacts of these findings are that IKS can be used to dismantle the colonial matrix of power. IKS can exist alongside Western knowledge while imagining new modernities and contributing to global epistemologies. The findings of this research and this study and their aforementioned conclusions are significant and make an impact on our understanding of the alternative ways of thinking about Africa's development. The finding tracking and tracing states and sub-regions that have employed alternative methods of thinking about developmentwhich have used IKS to aid in their development endeavours. In so doing, they have avoided the Dutch disease. These findings have unearthed and helped to rediscover indigenous knowledge, its significances and its absences in the academy and IR.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to explore alternative ways of thinking about Africa’s development by tracking and tracing states and sub-regions that have employed alternative methods of thinking about development. These states (the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana) claim to have used IKS to aid in their development endeavours and in so doing, they have avoided the Dutch disease. This research demonstrated that while the two case studies, of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, did indeed avoid the resource curse by adhering to IKS; IKS

was not the sole factor that helped these cases in their development. Several factors were at play, such as knowledge indigenisation and the influence of Western modernity and aspects of Western knowledge that helped them to reach high levels of economic development. The two case studies cannot be blamed for using Western knowledge as well as IKS because Western knowledge has a homogenising effect on epistemologies and ontologies in the Global South because of the impact of colonialism. Unfortunately, the unequal asymmetrical power dynamics between the Global North and the Global South within the international arena have forced the Global South to adhere to Western knowledge systems and practices that are preserved and presented as universal by the international community. Nonetheless, from the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana, other states in the Global South can learn to push back against the global matrix of power by adopting even minor forms of IKS to inform their development initiatives to help with poverty alleviation and general national development.

This research aimed to unearth and rediscover indigenous knowledge that is lacking in the academia and the IR discipline. This was done by exploring the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana that had an interacted web of IKS that was derived from pre-colonial Tswana culture and advocated for the philosophy of Botho. From these two case studies, there was an interplay between IKS and Western knowledge. This interplay created fertile ground for development through pioneering leaders, decentralised leadership, natural resource management, missionary influence, in particular, the influence of Lutheran style Christianity which imbibed a protestant ethic and a spirit of capitalism as well as the preoccupation with education as an instrument for development. A great deal can be gained from the knowledge systems presented in these case studies such as facilitating cultural diversity, understanding, tolerance, respect and social cohesion and cooperation. This research aimed to build on existing critiques of IR, through interrogating IR as a discipline particularly its ways of knowing and what it constitutes to be knowledge, its disregard for history and culture and its normative consensus towards Eurocentrism. The knowledge that IR can gain as an academic discipline from IKS, from this research and its findings, is knowledge plurality and the acceptance of other knowledge systems and allowing multiple knowledge systems to co-exist. This type of plural knowledge can grant IR the license to refer to its knowledge pool as universal knowledge since the role of culture and identity are essential in the analysis of world politics.

The case study findings indicated that IKS can exist alongside Western knowledge systems. This can facilitate an equal intellectual exchange since there is distinctly an unequal intellectual exchange that marginalises Africa and IKS, but the existing intellectual exchange celebrates Western knowledge systems and European epistemology. This intellectual exchange can

facilitate creativity in the international arena to provide effective solutions for urgent global problems such as climate change, sustainable development, medicine/ medical care for population threatening diseases, food security and global poverty as well as natural disaster relief. This research aimed to neutralise the illusion of an anthropological archetypal Africa that was without history or civilisation prior to its encounter with European explorers. The case studies traced the long history and knowledge systems that were derived from the pre-colonial era proving that Africa had an intellectual history that supported its epistemologies that have been maintained and carried over the violent colonial era into the post-colonial era which is saturated with coloniality. These histories depict an Africa that has a rich heritage of knowledge production that can be accessed in the post-colonial era for development initiatives and state sovereign development planning.

This research also sought to understand the importance of IKS in the postcolonial era and the realm of development. The case study findings indicated that IKS is important because it provides us with the specific and relevant knowledge of a particular region and in so doing it also provides us with the relevant knowledge for problem-solving in that region. IKS recognises the inheritance of regions as knowledge producers and not mere subjects that are ready to receive Western knowledge. This is also why IKS is important in the development equation because it considers local knowledge when initiating development projects; ensuring that the development is relevant and necessary for the people who need it. IKS ensures the restoration of dignity to communities who have been neglected or stripped of their dignity, its development strategies enterprises and capacity building inside communities are demonstrated by the case studies of the Royal Bafokeng and Botswana. When IKS is applied robustly and without reservations, the Global South's dependence on the West will become a possibility. The unequal asymmetrical power dynamics between the Global North and Global South within the international arena will be deposed. IKS fosters a different understanding of the development and foregrounds the possibility of multiple forms of development. But when IKS is implemented for the wrong reasons it is a trojan horse that comes to harm the people as illustrated by the Royal Bafokeng. This research presented how IKS is part and parcel of local histories that have been silenced by the overemphasis on the monolithic Western project of reading the world.

This research sought to enquire whether IKS has an influence on development. Through the research findings, IKS does, to some extent influence development particularly economic development. IKS does struggle to produce sufficient societal development that would improve the overall quality of life for ordinary citizens especially in the rural areas. IKS can exist

alongside Western knowledge and can replicate the same success in Africa as it has in East Asia if it is applied robustly, and with good intentions and not as a gimmick to impress Western donors of MNC's. Thus, at its core, IKS must consider the greater good of society and wellbeing of the state in all aspects for it to replicate the same success in Africa that it had in East Asia. The Royal Bafokeng and Botswana have both adopted and indigenised aspects of Western knowledge systems in their development endeavours. This research has indicated that IKS is effective in the development equation especially with regards to natural resource management and economic development.

It is worthwhile for the African states, specifically and states in the Global South generally, to consider adopting IKS in their development planning. This can assist in natural resource management, economic development and dismantling coloniality and the colonial matrix of power. The Global South must assert its position at the global arena and IKS can assist the Global South in garnering the confidence to divorce from coloniality and to reawaken the knowledge systems that were downtrodden by colonialism. The significance of this research is to highlight that despite epistemic erasure by colonialism, IKS has managed to survive and provide solutions to Africa’s development crisis.

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, Rita. “Africa and international relations: Assembling Africa, studying the world.” *African Affairs*, 2017: 125-139.

Adjei, Osei-Wusu. “Democratic decentralization and disempowerment of Traditional Authorities under Ghana's Local Governance and Development System: A Spatio- Temporal Review.” *Routledge*, 2017: 303-325.

Ajayi, Yemi Osinbajo and Olukonyisola. “Human Rights and Economic Development in Developing Countries.” *The International Lawyer*, 1994: 727-742.

Ake, Claude. *A Political Economy of Africa.* Ibadan: Longman, 1982.

Alomond, Gabriel and G. Brigham Powell. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Almond, Gabriel, and James Coleman. *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Amin, Samir. “Eurocentrism: Second Edition.” *Monthly Review Press*, 2009: 25-58.

Anand, Dibyesh. *Geopolitical Exotica. Tibet in Western Imagination.* London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.

Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at Large.* Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

Attwell, David. *Rewriting Modernity: Studies in Black South African Literary History.* Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZuluNatal Press, 2005.

Averweg, Udo Richard. “Some challenges for Information andCommunication Technologies in Indigenous Knowledge preservation.” *University of KwaZulu-Natal*, 2010: 1-5.

Baah, Anthony. “History of African Development Initiatives.” *Africa Labour Research Network Workshop.* Johannesburg: Ghana Trades Union Congress, 2003. 1-10.

Bacon, Sir Francis. “knowledge itself is power.” *Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge.* Journal of the History of Ideas, 495–518 1668.

Bank, The World. *Doing Business 2020 Indicators.* Working Paper, Gaborone: The World Bank, 2019.

Bernstein, Henry. “A Brief History of the American Economic Assi.” *African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework*, 2008: 421-443.

Bhuiyan, Muhammad Faress. “Micro-entrepreneurship and subjective well-being: Evidence from rural Bangladesh.” *Journal of Business Venturing*, 2018: 625-645.

Boyce, Jame. “Pursuing Profits—or Power?” *Dollars & Sense,* July/August 2013: 8.

Brown, William. “Africa and international relations: a comment on IR theory, anarchy and statehood.” *Review of International Studies: Cambridge University Press*, 2006: 119-143.

Cabral, Amilcar. *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral.* New York and London: Monthly Review Press , 1979.

Cajete, Gregory. *Native science: Natural laws of interdependence.* Santa Fe New Mexico: Clear Light, 2002.

Calderisi, Robert. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working.* New York: ST' Martin's Griffin, 2007.

Capan, Zaynep Gulsah. “Decolonising International Relations.” *Taylor and Francis*, 2014: 1-15.

Capps, Gavin. “A Bourgeois Reform with Social Justice? THe Contraditions of the Minierals Development Bill and Black Economic Empowernment in South Africa Platinum Mining industry.” *Review of African Political Economy*, 2012: 315-333.

Capps, Gavin. “Tribal - Landed Property: The economy of the Bafokeng chieftancy, South Africa, 1837-1994.” *London School of Economics and Political Science*, 2010.

Capps, Sonwabile Mnwana and Gavin. *No Chief Ever Bought A Piece of Land!* Working Paper, Johannesburg: Society, Work and Development Institute, 2015.

Capra, Fritjof. *Uncoomon Wisdom. Convesation with Remarkable People.* London: Flamingo, 1988.

Cardinal, Rob. *Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science.* Kansas City: University of Missouri, 2015.

Carens, Daniel A. Bell and Joseph H. “The Ethical Dilemmas of International Human Rights and Humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a Dialogue between Practitioners and Theorists.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, 2004: 300-329.

Carlyle, Thomas. *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History.* New York: Stokes & Brother, 1888.

Castro-Gómez, Santiago. “Traditional Theory and Critical Theory’.” *Cultural Critique*, 2002: 139 – 154.

Chernoff, Fred. *The power of international theory: reforging the link to foreign policy-making through scientific enquiry.* London: Routledge, 2005.

Cobbing, Julian. “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo.” *The Journal ofAfrican History*, 1988: 487-519.

Coertze, R.D. “Bafokeng family law and law of succession.” *South African Bureau of Racial Affairs*, 1988: 1-277.

Conklin, Alice L. *The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa.* California: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Cook, Susan. “Chiefs, Kings, Corporatization, and Democracy: A South African Case Study.” *Brown J. World Affairs*, 2005: 125.

Cook, Susan E. “The Business of Being Bafokeng: The Corporatization of a Tribal Authority in South Africa.” *Current Anthropology*, 2010: 151-159.

Corfield, Darian Leader and David. *Why Do People Get Ill?* London: Hamish Hamilton, 2007.

Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, by R. O. (eds.) Keohane, 204-255. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

David W. Brokensha, M Warren and Oswald Werner. *Indigenous knowledge systems and Development.* New York: University Press of America, 1980.

Dirlik, Arif. “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism.” *Pacific Affairs*, 1994: 328-356.

Drummond, James. *The Demise of Territorial apathied: Re-incorparating the Bantustans in the New South Africa.* Mmabathoand Johannesburg: Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie, 1991.

Dubow, Saul. “Segregration and native administration in South Africa, 1920-1936.” *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, 1986: 217-239.

Easterly, William. “Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2007: 755-776.

Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World.* New York: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Eyong, Charles Takoyoh. “Indigenous Knowledge and Sustainable Development in Africa: Case Study on Central Africa.” *Tribes and Tribals, Special Volume (1)*, 2007: 121-139.

Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth.* New York: Grove Press, 1961.

Foucault, Michel. *Order of Things.* London and New York: Routledge, 1973.

Fukuyama, Francis. “Social Capital and the Gloabal Economy.” *Foreign Affairs*, 1995: 89-103.

Fukuyama, Francis. “What is Governance?” *International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 2013: 347–368.

Gaolathe, B. “Development of Botswana's Mineral Sector,” In *Aspects of the Botswana Economy: Selected Papers*, by D. Mapabanga, D. Cowan, J. Selwe, and M. Wright J. Salkin. Oxford: James Curry, 1997.

Gapa, Angela. “Diamond in the Rough - Unearthing Botswana's Sources of Political Legitimacy.” *Florida International University*, 2015.

Gapa, Angela. *Escaping the Resource Curse: The Sources of Institutional Quality in Botswana.* Ph.D. dissertation, Florida: Florida International University, 2013.

Genevieve De Hoyos, Arturo De Hoyos and Christian B. Anderson. "Sociocultural Dislocation: Beyond The Dual Perspective,"." *Oxford University Press*, 1986: 61-67.

Good, Kenneth. *Elites Against Democracy.* London: Pailgrave Publishers, 2000.

Grenier, Louise. *Working With Indigenous Knowledge; A Guide for Researchers.*. Ottawa: Canada, 1998.

Grosfoguel, Ramón. "The Epistemic Decolonial Turn Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms." *Taylor & Francis*, 2007: 211-223.

Gyeke, Kwame. "Philosophy Cuture and Technology in the Postcolonial." In *Postcolonial African Philosophy- A Critical Reader*, by Chukwudi Eza. London: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

—. *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Habermas, Jurgen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973.

Hall, S., Anderson, M., BoeyensJ., and Coetzee, F. "Towards an outline of the oral geography, historical identity and political economy of the late precolonial Tswana in the Rustenburg region. Five Hundred Years." In *Rediscovered*, by N., Esterhuysen, A., and Bonner, P. Swanepoel, 55-85. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008.

Hjort, Jonas. "Pre-colonial Culture, Post-colonial Economic Success? The Tswana and the African Economic Miracle." *Economic History Review*, 2010: 688–709.

Hlavac, Marek. "Economic Development in Pre-Independence Botswana, 1820-1966: Historical Trends, Contributing and Countervailing Factors." *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*, 2010: 1-28.

Hoppers, Catherine A. Odora. *Culture, Indigenous Knowledge and Development: The role of the university.* Occasional paper, Pretoria: Centre for Education Policy Development, 2005.

—. "Engaging critically with tradition, culture, and patriarchy through." *The 6th Julius Nyerere.* Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, 2009. 1-29.

Horner, Bridget. "The Royal Bafokeng Nation: Cultural Identity and Spatial Expression." *Eighth International Space Syntax Symposium.* Santiago de Chile: University of Kwazulu Natal, 2012. 2-18.

Horton, Robin. *African Traditional Thought and Western Science.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967.

Hountondji, Paulin J. *Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies.* Annual Report, Godomey: National University of Benin African Centre for Advanced Studies, Benin, 2002.

Huffman, Thomas N. “Leokwe and K2: Ethnic stratification during the Middle Iron Age in southern Africa.” *Journal of African Archaeology* (University of the Witwatersrand.), 2007: 163-188.

Ikenna, Mike Alumona. “Understanding the crisis of development in Africa: Reflections on Bedford Umez's analysis.” *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 3* (Anambra State University), 2009: 354-359.

Israel, Sid. *What is Development?* 11 11 March 2018, 2018. https://www.sid-israel.org/en/Development-Issues/What-is-Development. (accessed September 20, 2018).

Jerven, Morten. “Statistical Tragedy in Africa? Evaluating the Data Base for African Economic Development.” *Taylor and Francis*, 2014: 111-115.

Kalb, Don. *Globalization and Developmen: Themes and Concepts in Current Research.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004.

Kgoroedira, Kenalemang Olga. *The Praise Poerty of thel Bafokeng of Phokeng.* Research Report, Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg, 1993.

Khadiagala, Gilbert Muruli. “Southern Africa.” In *A Strategic Vision For: The Kampala Movement,* by William Zartman and Francis Deng. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

Khumalo-Seegelken, Ben. *John Wright: iMfecane?* 23 July 2015. https://www.benkhumalo-seegelken.de/suedafrika-texte/1007-john-wright-imfecane/ (accessed March 14, 2018).

Kluckhohn, Clyde. *Mirror for Man.* New York: Whittlesey House, 1949.

Kothari, Uma. “Authority and Expertise: The Professionalisation of International Development and the Ordering of Dissent.” *Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester*, 2005: 426-446.

Lalonde, Andre. “African Indegenous knowledge and its Relevance to Environment and Development Activities.” *The Common Property Conference.* Quebec: Canadian International Development Agency, 1991. 1-12.

Legassick, Martin. “The Sotho-Tswana People Before 1880.” In *African Societies in Southern Africa,* by Leonard Thompson, 86-115. London: Hieneman, 1969.

Lentin, Alana. “Decolonizing Epistemologies: Part 2 Race Critical and Decolonial Sociology.” *Public Seminar*, 2017: 1-10.

Lin Cassidy, Donald L. Kgathi, D. L. Kgathi, H. Bendsen. “Indigenous knowledge, livelihoods and government policy in the Okavango Delta, Botswana.” In *Rural Livelihoods, Risk & Political Economy of Access to Natural Resources in the Okavango Delta, Botswana*, by B. N. Ngwenya and J. Wilk D. L. Kgathi, 75-97. London: Nova Science Publishers Inc, 2011.

Little, Barry Buzan and Richard. *International Systems in World History Remaking the Study of International Relations.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Lo-Castro, Francesca. “Does International Relations theory privilege Western ways of thinking and acting?” *E-International Relations,* 2011: 1-5.

Lund, Christian. *Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Maferetlhane, Oageng Ivan. “The role of indigenous knowledge in disaster risk reduction: a critical analysis.” *UKZN -IKS North West University*, 2012: 1-139.

Maipose, Gervase S. “Developmental State Capacity, Poverty Reduction and Institutional Reform.” In *Poverty Reduction and Changing Policy Regimes in Botswana: Developmental Pathways to Poverty Reduction Series,* by Happy Kufigwa Siphambe, Onalenna Selolwane, Keitseope Nthomang, Imogen Patience Bonolo Mogotsi Onalenna Selolwane, 210-239. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Maipose, Thapelo C. Matsheka and Gervase S. “Explaining African Growth Performance.” *University of Botswana*, 2007: 1-76.

Makoni, Patricia Lindelwa. “Exploring economic structure and drivers of economic growth in Botswana.” *Journal of Governance and Regulation,* 2015: 673-679.

Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. “On Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of Concepts.” *Cultural Studies,* 2007: 240-270.

Malindi, Gavin Capps and Stanly. *Dealing with the Tribe: The Politics of the Bapo/Lonmin Royalty-to-Equity Conversation.* Working Paper, Johannesburg: Society, Work and Development Institute, 2017.

Mamdani, Mahmood. “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late.” *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 1996: 273-275.

Manson, Bernard Mbenga and Andrew. *People of the Dew: A History of the Bafokeng of Phokeng-Rustenburg Region, South Africa, from Early Times to 2000.* Jacana Media: Johannesburg, 2010.

Mapadimeng, Mokong Simon. “Indigenous African Culture and Relevance to Socio-economic Development in the Contemporary Era.” *International Conference of Culture and Development.* Accra: National Arts Council of South Africa, 2009. 1-25.

Martin, Philippe. “A Closer Look at Botswana's Development: The Role of Institutions.” *Paterson Review*, 2008: 35-54.

Masoga, Johannes A. Smit and Mogomme A. *African Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Prospects.* Durban: People’s Publishers, 2012.

Mathew, Babu. “Relevance of Constitutional Economics in India's Post-Neoliberal Era.” *National Law School of India University*, 2019: 212-264.

Matos-Ala, Jacqueline de. “Making the invisible, visible: challenging the knowledge structures inherent in International Relations Theory in order to create knowledge plural curricula.” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 2018: 1-19.

Matthews, Sally. “Post-Development Theory and the Question of Alternatives: A View from Africa.” *Third World Quarterly,* 2004: 373-384.

Maundeni, Zibani. “State culture and development in Botswana and Zimbabwe.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 2001: 105 - 132.

Mbembe, Achille. “Decolonising Knowledge and the Question of the Archive.” *Wits Institute for Social Economic Reseach (WISER),* 2015: 1-29.

Merelli, Annalisa. “Slavoj Žižek thinks political correctness is exactly what perpetuates prejudice and racism.” *Quartz,* 8 May 2015.

Michael Howes, Robert Chambers, Deryke Belshaw, Paul Richards, David Barker, Martin Bell. “Rural Development: Whose Knowledge Counts.” *IDS Bulletin* (IDS Bulletin), 1979: 5-23.

Mignolo, Walter D. “Epistemic Disobedience: Independent thought and Decolonial Freedom.” *Theory, Culture & Society,* 2009: 159-181.

Mignolo, Walter D. “Geopolitics of sensing and knowing: On (de)coloniality, border thinking, and epistemic disobedience.” *Confero,* 2013: 129–150 | .

Mignolo, Walter. *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.

Mkhize, Nhlanhla. “Afrcan Languages, Indigenous Knowledge Sytems, and the Transformation of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Higher Education.” *University of KwaZulu Natal,* 2014: 10-37.

Mnwana, Gavin Capps and Sonwabile. “Claims from below: platinum and the politics of land in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional authority area.” *Review of African Political Economy,* 2015: 606-624 .

Mohamedbhai, Goolam. “What can be done to tackle corruption?” *University World News,* 5 June 2015.

Mohammed Ayoob. “Theorizing security, state formation and the 'Third World' in the post-Cold War world.” *Review of International Studies,* 1998: 125–136.

Monngakgotla, Oabona C. *Policy makers’ knowledge and practices of intellectual property rights on indigenous knowledge systems in Botswana.* DISSERTATION, Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2011.

Motsei, Mmastshilo. *Hearing Visions Seeing Voices.* Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2004.

Mudimbe, Valentin Yvse. *The Invention of Afric: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Mutsa Chironga, Acha Leke, Arend van Wamelen, Susan Lund. “The Globe: Cracking the Next Growth Market: Africa.” *Harvard Business Review,* 2011: 117-122.

Mutwa, Vusamazulu Credo. *Zulu Shaman: Zulu Shaman: Dreams Prophecies and Mysteries.* New York: Rochester, 1998.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity.* New York: Berghahn Books, 2013.

Nel, Philip J. "Indigenous Knowledge: Contestation, Rhetoric and Space." *Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Sytems,* 2008: 81-88.

Neuman, Stephanie G. *International Relations Theory and the Third World.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.

Nfila, Jain R. "Managing Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Bostwana Using Informationand Communication Technologies." *International Annual Conference of the Faculty of Communication and Information Science.* Islamabad: National University of Science and Technology, 2011. 1-24.

Ngwato, Mbuso Moyo and Tara Polzer. *Youth Unemployment in the Royal Bafokeng Nation – Quantifying Youth Unemployment and Documenting Youth Perceptions on Barriers to Labour Market Entry.* Research Report, Phokeng: Royal Bafokeng Administration, 2015.

Njoku., Francis O. C. "Philosophy in Politics, Law and Democracy: A Study in Moral, Political and Legal Theory." *Clacom Communications*, 2002.

Nkrumah, Kwame. *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.* Gold Coast: Panaf, 1965.

Nnoli, Okwudiba. *Path to Nigerian Development.* Senegal: Codesria, 1981.

Noyoo, Ndangwa. "Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Their Relevance for Sustainable Development: A Case of Southern Africa." *Tribes and Tribals, Special Volume*, 2007: 167-172.

Nthau, Nnagolo Lowell. *The possible role of traditional leadership in development planning in South Africa: A case study of the Bafokeng Community in North West Province.* Thesis, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2002.

Ntuli, Pitika. "The Missing Link between Culture and Education: Are We Still Chasing Gods That Are Not Our Own?" *African Renaissance*, 2009: 67-72.

Nuffic, Karin Boven. "Best Practices using Indigenous Knowledge." *UNESCO Digital Library*, 2002: 10-275.

Nyamnjoh, Fancis. "Potted Plants in the Greenhouse: A Critical Refection on the Resilience of Colonial Education in Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 2012: 129-154.

Offiong, Daniel. *Imperialism and Dependency.* Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1981.

Ogungbure, Adebayo Anthony. "African Indigenous Knowledge: Scientific or Unscientific." *Inkanyiso*, 2013: 12-20.

Okpeh, Okpeh Ochayi. "Patterns and Dynamics of Inter-group Relations in Nigeria 1800-1900." In *African indigenous science and knowledge systems: triumphs and tribulations*, by Okpeh Ochayi Okpeh, C B N Ogbogbo, Adoyi Onoja Olayemi Akinwumi, 123-137. Abuja: Roots Books & Journals Limited, 2007.

Organization, World Health. *Ebola outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo 2017.* Periodic Report, Brazzaville/Kinshasa: World Health Organization, 2017.

Osie-Hwedie, Kwaku. "Globalization and culturally relevant social work: African perspectives on indigenization." *International Social Work,* 1993: 137-147.

Osman, Anwar. "Indigenous Knowledge in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities." *Centre for Africa Studies,* 2017: 1-13.

Padayachee, Vishnu. *The Development Decade: Economic and social change in South Africa.* Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006.

Paolini, Albert J. *Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations,* 1999: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Albert Paolini.

Parsons, Neil. *Botswana History Pages: A Brief History of Botswana.* April 1999. http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/bhp1.htm (accessed September 27, 2018).

Peter Geschiere, Birgit Meyer, Peter Pels. *Readings in Modernity in Africa.* Amsterdam: International African Institute, 2008.

Pityana, Nyameko Barney. "The Renewal of African Moral Values." In *African Renaissance,* by W. Makgoba, 137-148. Cape Town: Mafube and Tafelberg Publishers, 1999.

Progler, Yusef. "Towards defining Western research on Indigenous Knowledge." *Muslimedia,* 1991: 1-17.

Pye, Lucian W. *Aspects of Political Development.* Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Quijano, Anibal. "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America." *Sage Journals,* 2000b: 533-580.

Richards, Paul. *Indigenous agricultural revolution: ecology and food production in West Africa.* London: Methuen Publishing Ltd, 1985.

Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for Human. *Action Oriented (Social Hunanitarian and Cultural).* Press Release, New York: United Nations, 2013.

Robert Elliott, Constance Fischer, David Rennie. "Evolving Guidlines for Publications of Qualitatuve Reseach Studies in Psychology and Related Fields." *British Journal of Clinical Psychology,* 1999: 215-229.

Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.* London and Dar-Es-Salaam: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1973.

Rostow, Walt Whitman. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* Cambridge: Cambridge University , 1966.

Royal Bafokeng Nation, Legal and Corporate Affairs Department. “Submission by The Royal Bafokeng Nation In Respect Of The Communal Land Rights Bil.” *Government Gazette,* 3 October 2003: http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/2003/appendices/031114bafokeng2.htm.

Royal-Bafokeng-Holdings. *About Royal Bafokeng Holdings.* 8 July 2008. https://www.bafokengholdings.com/about.html (accessed November 22, 2018).

Royal-Bafokeng-Holdings. *Vision 2020, Royal Bafokeng Nation Masterplan.* Annual Review, Johannesburg: Royal Bafokeng Holdings, 2007.

Royal-Bafokeng-Platinum. *A guide to our 2016 Integrated Reporting and Board approval.* Integrated Report, Johannesburg: Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 2016.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. “Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges.” *Fernand Braudel Center*, 2007: 45-89.

Santos, Carla Almeida. “Images of the Other: Selling Study Abroad in a Postcolonial World.” *Sage Publications (Journal of Travel Research),* 2009: 191-204.

Sanzila, George. “Mayeyi celebrate cultural heritage.” *New Era Repoter Archive (New Era Newspaper Namibia),* 5 August 2014.

Schutte, Gerhard. “Looking to the Future: Crossing Disciplinary Borders in South Africa.” *International Sociology*, 2007.

Siad, Edward. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient.* New York: Penguin, 1978.

Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. *Decolonising Methodologies.* New York: ST' Martin's Press, 1999.

Smith, Steve. “The discipline of International Relations: still an American Social Science.” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (British Journal of Politics and International Relations), 2000: 374-402.

Sonwabile Mnwana, Farai Mtero and Michelle Hay. “Dispossessing the Dispossessed-Mining and Rural Struggles in Mokopane Limpopo.” *Society, Work and Development Institute*, 2016: 1-44.

Spencer, Herbert. *The Study of Sociology.* New York: Appleton and Company, 1896.

Stoler, Ann Laura. *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, With a New Preface.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2002.

Taodzera, Shingiria Lenon. *Incoparating Indegenous Forms of Governance in the Management on Natural Resources: The Case of South Africas Royal Bafokeng.* Reseach Report, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2015.

The-World-Bank. *The World Bank Open Data- World Bank Group.* 1 January 2014. https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana (accessed January 23, 2019).

Thiong'o, Ngugi Wa. “African Identities: Pan-Africanism in the Era OF Globalization and Capitalist Fundamentalism .” *Macalester International*, 2004: 14.

—. *Decolonising The Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literture.* London: Jame Currey, 1986.

Thompson, Ian Scoones and John. *Beyond Farmer First: Rural People's Knowledge, Agricultural Research and Extension Practice.* London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1994.

Tickner, David L Blaney and Arlene B. "International Relations in the prison of colonial modernity." *Sage Journals*, 2017: 71-75.

Tlostanova, Walter Mignolo and Madina Vladimirovna. "Theorizing from the BordersShifting to Geo and Body-Politics of Knowledge." *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2006: 205-221.

Tlou, Thomas. *A History of Ngamiland, 1750 to 1906.* Gaborone: Macmillan Botswana, 1985.

Udo Richard Averweg, Elizabeth Greyling. "Some Challenges for Information and Communication Technologies in Indigenous knowledge Preservation." *Journal of the South African Institute of Mangement Services (SAIMAS)*, 2010: 15-17.

UKZN, Univesity of KwaZulu Natal. *Centre in Indigenous Knowledge Systems.* 12 April 2008. http://aiks.ukzn.ac.za/iks-faq (accessed January 9, 2018).

UNESCO. *Education for Al: The Quality Imperative.* Book, New York: UNESCO Digital Library, 2004.

W.A. Edge, M.H. Lekorwe. *Botswana: Politics and Society.* Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1998.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Constructs of Power Politics." *International Organistion*, 1992: 391-425.

Whitelaw, Tim Maggs and Gavin. "Areview of Recent Archaeological Reseach on Food-ProductionCommunities in South Africa." *The Journal of African History*, 1991: 3-24.

Wilmer, Franke. *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics: Since Time Immemorial.* Michigan: Sage, 1993.

Wiredu, Kwasi. *Philosophy and an African Culture.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Wright, John. *Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History.* Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995.

Wylie, Diana. *A Little God: The Twilight of Patriarchy in A Southern Africa Chiefdom.* London: Hanover, 1990.

Wynter, Sylvia. "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument." *Michigan State University Press*, 2017: 257-337.

Yang, Eve Tuck and Wayne. "Decolonisation is not a Metahpor." *Decolonisation: Indigeneity, Educationand Society*, 2012: 1-40.

Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. “The disciplinary, interdisciplinary and global dimensions of African Studies.” *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies,* 2006: 195 - 220.

Zulu, Zulumathabo. *The Sacred Knowledge of The Desert.* Johannesburg: Madisebo University Colledge Press, 2014.