THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SERVICE DELIVERY.

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"The Goodness of the polis is directly related to the total self-actualization of the individuals who comprise it…the state then exists for the good of the individual"

(Aristotle)

ABSTRACT

This line of study was prompted by the intelligence services' role in the aftermath of the wave of incidents of protest and rioting ostensibly over service delivery, which by this account, began in Diepsloot in the northwest of Johannesburg, on the 5th of July 2004. The study seeks to explore the extent to which the charged dissonant involvement of the intelligence services in the wake of the protests indicated an existing problem with the South African conception of national security. Underlying this notion is the idea that the theory on security as applied in the South African context does not do justice to the reality of the needs on the ground.

This research contends that in retrospect the protests in Diepsloot and other areas did not pose a national security threat in the conventional sense of there being an existential threat posed to the state. It appears that at the very least, the potential threat of political instability that warranted the involvement of the intelligence services, required governance-based interventions. With this borne in mind, this study also seeks to investigate whether there exists a role for the intelligence services in facilitating governance and contributing to alleviating underdevelopment challenges in South Africa. This study is therefore about the institutional arrangements that inform how the intelligence services interact with governance in the service delivery process. Service delivery in this context is understood both minimally and more elaborately as both the provision of basic services as well as the larger goal of societal and human development.

Using the case study of Diepsloot, this study will consider whether there is indeed a case to be made for service delivery failures as the source of these protests with a view to arguing that the establishment of such a causal link would warrant synonymous governance efficiency-enhancing interventions from all stakeholders, including the intelligence community. Such an approach would call for the reassessment of the philosophical tenets informing the South African understanding of national security, wherein, along with focusing on traditional threats, the intelligence services seek to be orientated towards facilitating and responding to human development challenges in the medium to long term.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research report is my own unaided work except where due reference is made. It is being submitted for the degree of Masters of Management in the Field of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

SIGNED:
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10 February, 2006

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CASE (Report)	Community Agency for Social Enquiry
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CNL	Colonel
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EWS	Early Warning System
EXCO	Executive Committee
GJMC	Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IRI	Intelligence Research Institute
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NSF	National Security Framework
NSS	National Security Strategy
PAC	Pan African Congress
PCAS	Policy Coordination Advisory Service
PHP	People's Housing Process
PSC	Public Service Commission
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SANDF	South African National Defence Force

SASS	South African Secret Service
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights

CHAPTER 1: Main introduction

1.1 Introduction

Writing about service delivery, Ramaite observes that; *"In 1994 government was concerned about the hegemony of the development agenda in government as a whole. (…) It was a key priority that the language of government had to change and had to be primarily concerned with the construction of a development agenda"* (Ramaite, 2002, p.73). This *hegemony of the development agenda* extended to the area of security in terms of the country's civilian intelligence structures, safety and security structures and defence force structures.

The RDP as the point of departure and the framework for this development agenda for the developmental state in South Africa established the case for the link between security and development within the context of the new dispensation (RDP, 1994, p.124). According to this logic development engenders and promotes security and vice versa (Ibid). The common denominator in this relationship of dependence is that both the goals of national security policy (as the aggregated expression of the state's conceptualisation of security) and those of human development are fulfilled by the symbiotic relationship between these two concepts (Ambert, 1996, p.1). This dialectic relationship is also reinforced by the fact that individually, both security and development efforts in the developing world are constantly at risk from the existence of persistent underdevelopment and human insecurity challenges.

This relationship has also found expression in the various regional and sub-regional groupings in Africa such as SADC (Southern African Development Community), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), which started off as development-related groupings but increasingly assumed security functions (Solomon, 1998, p.3). The idea of a link between security and development is not novel, its gestation has been informed by some debates and perspectives in the field of development studies and some latter day views within the field of security studies, notably, those of authors such as Rocklyn Williams (2000; 2004), Mohammed Ayoob (1991), and Azar and Moon (1988), among others.

This link is also acknowledged in the legislation giving effect to intelligence. The WhitePaper on intelligence for instance observes that; *"the objectives of security policy (must) go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social justice"* (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994, p.3). The drafting of the National Security Framework (NSF), which should ultimately culminate in the construction of a comprehensive national security policy, is an attempt to deal with some of these issues in detail. However, navigating the treacherous course that is the theoretical debates around security seems to have thus far, created more problems than solutions.

National security as the centrepiece of this paper's analysis gives effect to the role and functions of the intelligence services. However, since a comprehensive and viable national security policy in South Africa is still under construction, this enquiry will focus on the implications of the notion of security qua its link with development. This link will be explored in relation to what its effects would or will be on the substance and form of the intelligence services' role and functions in the South African developmental state. In other words, this paper seeks to understand what and how, perspectives on security and development might inform what will come to be South Africa's national security policy, bearing in mind, the existing legislation on security and the said hegemony of development in the governance process in South Africa. What this assertion is coming short of saying is that service delivery, (understood as the aspect and process of governance which deals with the provision of basic services to communities), forms part of the larger development project in the South African state. The role of the intelligence services in service delivery is therefore going to be informed by how the adopted national security policy will articulate the role of the intelligence services in the hegemony of development in South Africa.

The recent reaction to protests and rioting over perceived or real service delivery failures in various communities has pointed to a polarisation of views around the practice element of the paradigm nexus between security and development. Various sectors of the population have expressed their concerns with the involvement of the security establishment in the form of the intelligence services, investigating a "*third-force"* (Sunday Times, 2005. May 29). For the most part the argument has been that this probe into a so-called third-force was a ruse to divert

attention from the failures of local government and provincial authorities, and that such involvement of the security establishment limited people's right to engage with the state.
The Minister for the Intelligence services for example, was quoted as saying that the intelligence services were looking into these incidents with a view to establish whether these protests were indeed prompted by community frustrations (Sunday Times, 2005, May 29). This seems to point to a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the praxis element of the security-development link. This contention is buttressed by the view that there exists a general uncertainty about the current configuration of the security establishment relative to the country's development imperatives, despite the fact that existing legislation clearly makes the case for a more developmentally-orientated security establishment generally, and the civilian intelligence structure specifically.

There is therefore a growing impetus for a process of widening and deepening[1] security theory and practice in South Africa. The inability of security establishments to adequately respond to the socio-economic challenges of their contexts seems to be a widespread phenomenon among developing countries. Among the many reasons for this is the fact that the theoretical background (in terms of the literature and discourse on security) has not historically catered for developing-world related social realities and challenges.

Although focusing on the armed forces, Rocklyn Williams' observation may be useful in understanding the nature of the current configuration of African security establishments, when he argues that: *"Virtually all African security institutions, in general, and armed forces, in particular, are near mirror reflections of their former colonial security institutions (…) their institutional culture aping that of either the British, the French or the American value system and the ideological themes that pervade their discourse are manifestly European in origin"* (Williams, 2000, p.4).

Citing Cox, Schoeman distinguishes between problem solving theory and critical theory in international relations. Where, problem-solving theory, like neo-liberalism accepts social reality as a given (as opposed to it being a man-made construct therefore alterable), where, despite the tensions and distortions between state-systems and the capitalist world economy for instance,

[1] Widening broadly refers to broadening the scope of national security such that environmental concerns, social concerns, economic concerns are securitized and safeguarded by the state security organs. Deepening broadly refers transcending the state-centric paradigm of security vis-à-vis the traditional "referent object" being safeguarded; where people become the centrepiece of national security for example.

neo-liberalism advocates a coexistence rather than a transformation of the status quo (Schoeman, 1998, p.1).

On the other hand critical theory espouses an approach that says, how did the existing order come to being and how can inequalities within this order be changed? (Schoeman, 1998, p.2-3). In other words, how can we as a society arrive at a point of questioning inherently biased (or loaded) assumptions that form the basis for certain outlooks, worldviews or *ideological themes*? Various authors acknowledge the normative basis of critical theory and its resonance with developing-world academics and audiences. Most notable in this regard are Booth (1991) and Schoeman (1998), who both introduce deepening arguments with respect to the referent object of security shifting from being the state to being the individuals within the state (Booth, 1991, p.318; Schoeman, 1998, p.2).

The length and breadth of this enquiry does not allow for a thorough expression of the different perspectives within security studies, and so the above expression of the inherent resonance of critical theory perspectives of security with this paper's own analysis is an attempt to acknowledge and affirm these perspectives rather than to claim the use of critical theory methodology in this paper. For example, when Wyn-Jones (1999) generally argues that traditional security studies despite their nuances and variations; all share similar ontological and epistemological assumptions[2]. Where, in terms of ontology, traditional security studies view the world from a "*statist*" or state-referent viewpoint, while in terms of epistemology their arguments are premised on "scientific-objectivist" understanding of knowledge (Wyn-Jones, 1999, p.95). In terms of what Wyn-Jones calls *statism*, this broadly entails that states within the international system are considered the primary units of analysis within traditional security studies. This contention echoes this paper's own premise and assertion that mainstream security discourses have not catered for developing country contexts and will continue in this pattern until national security doctrines in developing countries begin to speak to their own contexts.

With this in mind, this paper seeks to deal with some of the issues that attempt to answer the question; to what extent can the South African intelligence establishment be configured in order that it is best placed to operationally respond to, and facilitate South Africa's development imperatives. Development in this sense is best captured by Denis Goulet's idea of it comprising the three core values of **sustenance** in terms of meeting basic needs, **self esteem** as it refers to

[2] Ontology-broadly refers to a given understanding of the world or 'social reality'.
Epistemology-refers to a given understanding of what constitutes knowledge about a given social reality.

self worth and self respect and **freedom from servitude** as it refers to the freedom to choose (Goulet, 1971, p.89-90).

1.2 Rationale

Among documents presented during the NSF drafting process, an Intelligence Research Institute (IRI) paper, citing Tarry (1999), observed that there was a need to research and explore the validity of the claim that widening alone is adequate to capture the South African government's values, goals and objectives (IRI, 2004, p.1). This paper goes further and questions the extent to which the policy framework as expressed in the various acts and WhitePapers giving effect to the activities of the intelligence services is being practiced at operational level. This opens up a Pandora's box of loci of analyses where; on the one hand, the philosophical precepts allowing for the current conceptualisation of security and giving effect to the current operations of intelligence come into question, and on the other, the role of intelligence in facilitating the country's national interests (particularly the development agenda) also gets thrown into focus. This paper is an attempt to deal with some of these concerns in order that this research may modestly contribute to the debate on a more context-responsive intelligence establishment.

It is the view of this paper that the Diepsloot protests and other related cases of protest, ostensibly over poor service delivery, present an opportunity to study the role of intelligence (as both a state entity and a state function) within the context of the South African development project. This is because such protests point to problems with the current form and capacity of this development project; and to the extent that intelligence has a mandate to ensure the country's stability and development, intelligence should be involved in ensuring the effectiveness and efficacy of this development project. While this paper generally agrees that protracted incidents of protests may indeed point to a looming political instability threat, thereby justifying the involvement of intelligence investigating the validity of protest claims (vis-à-vis the existence of a third force), it is the "how" of such involvement that is of concern and in question.

The collective apprehension expressed in the media[3] at the involvement of the intelligence services in investigating a *"third-force"*, stems from the idea that the intelligence services' approach in investigating the protests was not perceived as being geared towards safeguarding individuals within the state. Instead, state intelligence was seen to be concerned with maintaining and safeguarding the status quo. If the status quo is such that local government is not rising to the challenge of meeting basic needs, then the impression created is that intelligence is in fact masking the weaknesses of local government by focusing on the personalities or individuals behind the protests rather than how service delivery can be made more efficient.

The justification for this paper then is that intelligence would better serve its mandate by investigating the causes of such protest action in the context of contributing to enhancing the state functions that relate to service delivery rather than focusing on the organisers of the protest action itself. This observation is supported by the view that focusing on the latter erroneously allows the problem to be formulated in terms of individuals who pose a threat to state security. The problem with this general approach to state security is that it has historically tended to introduce the possibility of descent into a regime-security style of governance. Azar and Moon's linkage of political legitimacy and security management in third world states is useful in order to illustrate the point being made here. They argue that legitimacy *"shapes the contents of institutional arrangements"*, such that, citizen commitment and loyalty to the state and its policies, generates national consensus about such state policies and ensures the continued survival of the regime in power (Azar and Moon, 1988, p.81).

[3] See:
1. Terreblanche, C. (2005, May. 29) "Sedition charges against protesters unnecessary in democracy, seen as harsh judgement", Sunday Independent.
2. Thomson, A. (2005, May. 30) "NIA probes housing riots", IOL.
3. De Lange, L., Bonthuys, J. (2005, May. 30) "NIA investigates country-wide demonstrations", Beeld.
4. Mtyala, Q., Ndenza, B., Monare, M. (2005, May. 31) "Ocean View erupts", Cape Times.
5. Monare, M. (2005, June. 01) "Five years on, the people speak their minds", The Star.
6. Barron, C. (2005 June. 05) "Q&A between Chris Barron and Ronnie Kasrils", Sunday Times.
7. De Lange, D. (2005, June. 08) "If Mbeki wants to know why we demonstrate, he must come and see for himself", Beeld.
8. Hlahla, P. (2005, June. 09) "City councillor-services are not spying, are needed to appease voters", Pretoria News.
9. Daniels, L. (2005, June. 17) "Friendly spooks", Business Day.
10. Merten, M. (2005, July. 08-14) "NIA security bungle", Mail and Guardian.

Continuing with this line of thinking, they argue that when there is a failure to meet basic needs, and such a failure elicits dissent, a crisis of legitimacy may follow; and often in third world states, this results in the state security apparatus becoming more antagonistic and hostile, perceiving such dissent as a threat to its own survival (Azar and Moon, 1988, p.82).

General discussions with various intelligence practitioners and policy makers about this line of research often prompted the response that an approach to intelligence practice that calls for state intelligence to be involved with the day to day running of governance structures providing services to communities would require a re-conceptualisation of security theory and practice. It was further argued that the broader roles and functions of most state organs would have to also be reorganised. At this point, it is important to state that this research makes the supposition that the trajectory of the South African development project is such that most security issues cannot be separated from development issues and vice versa. Further that failure to recognise this may for instance have implications for attempting to establish whether or not a causal relationship exists between service delivery failures and protest action.

It is therefore the view of this research that the proverbial stakes are high enough to warrant a re-think about security and governance in South Africa. Mason (2002) observes that in answering the question, "*what is my research for?"*, most research often overlooks what she calls "*the socio-political context of the research practice"* (Mason, 2002, p.21). The implication of *the socio-political context* for this research relates to its attempt to go beyond merely compiling for and against arguments in debates about security and development; to endeavouring to give practical (operational) expression, in the form of the proposed early warning system, in answer to the question *what is my research for?*

The research seeks to propose the creation of an intelligence-managed early warning system that may be focused on ensuring local and provincial government compliance with the Acts of law, regulations and plans governing and culminating in service delivery through the policy process. In the first place such a system would sidestep "the reinvention of the wheel argument", in that; the early warning system is a practical tool that may be applied without reducing the effectiveness of the current institutional arrangements. However, the adoption of such a system should not be to the exclusion of a process of re-conceptualising security theory and practice because there is also a need for intelligence practice to speak to the South African "social reality" or context.

Secondly, the role of the Chapter 9 institutions as public service "auditing bodies" would not be encroached on, were such a system to be instituted because a compliance-based early warning system would measure against already established guidelines and standards. The point of the proposed early warning system is in order to use intelligence-related knowledge and information to enhance governance broadly and service delivery particularly.

Since such an early warning system would produce intelligence about the service delivery process' compliance or deviation from stipulated regulations and plans, this mandate would preclude intelligence from acting on information unless directed to do so. This means that intelligence would still be functioning within the ambit of its mandate vis-à-vis providing the policy maker with the most viable policy options.

1.3 Purpose of study and research questions

The purpose of this research is to broadly assess the role of the intelligence services in facilitating South Africa's development imperatives in terms of the provision of basic needs through service delivery, with specific reference to Diepsloot as the first site of protests over perceived service delivery failures. According to Creswell, qualitative research must pose a central question followed by associated sub-questions (Creswell, 2003, p.105). The central question according to Creswell is the declaration of the issue to be examined in its broadest form (Ibid). In this regard the main question to be explored is; **what is the link between security and development and how can this link be realised in the functions and operations of intelligence facilitating service delivery?** This study will be guided by the following sub-questions:

1. **Is the current understanding of security theory and intelligence practise relevant to the South African social reality?**
2. **What are the alternative approaches to conceptualising security?**
3. **Should the intelligence services be actively involved in facilitating development broadly and service delivery specifically?**
4. **What are the advantages and disadvantages of intelligence being involved in service delivery?**
5. **Were the incidents of protest related to service delivery failures?**
6. **Can a service delivery early warning system enhance service delivery?**

CHAPTER 2: Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology

2.1 Ontological perspective

The ontological perspective refers broadly to what Mouton (1998) calls the 'social reality' in which the study exists or is located (Mouton, 1998, p.46). In other words how do the subject/s and object/s of this study fit into the social world?

It is the contention of this paper that the ontology or social reality in which this study takes place is that of a society undergoing socio-political and economic transformation. This socio-political and economic transformation is what informs the collective values and norms of the South African state, her government, and her people. In other words, South Africa is a state undergoing developmental transformation and this transformation affects every single facet of governance in South Africa. Therefore, development in this sense can be said to be the main driver (or catalyst) of transformation in the South African social reality.

In this regard this paper seeks to broadly explore the complex relationship between security and development and how this relationship manifests in practice. This is in order that the research better understand how it is that certain perspectives in security theory inform the way intelligence is configured and operates. Linked to this, is the need to understand the utility of such a form or configuration given the challenges faced within the South African society.

The reason for including security sector concerns into the broader development orbit is predicated on the notion that some security sector problems in developing-world contexts tend to emanate from underdevelopment challenges and so we cannot speak of enhancing development without thinking of the security sector's role in this process (Williams, 2000, p.2). The raison d'être for this thinking is that current understandings of security do not seem to adequately cater for developing world challenges as they relate to underdevelopment and human insecurity. Therefore thinking about the role of security in facilitating development will allow us to tease out some of the limitations that exist in the theory about security in terms of its applicability to developing country contexts. To this extent, altering the developing world social reality requires initially challenging and eventually transforming the philosophical foundations of security perceptions that formally emanate from, and are located in, the field of international relations.

2.2 Epistemological perspective

Epistemology can broadly be said to refer to the legitimacy of knowledge claims. It is directly related to the ontological position assumed. Mouton argues that the aim of all research is to arrive at the closest possible position to the truth (if we take the view that there is no absolute truth) (Mouton, 1996, p.28). In other words, the knowledge claims that are made in the process of, or at the end of an enquiry or research must be substantiated to the extent that they are as "truthful" as possible to the phenomena being studied or the social reality within which the study is located. The importance of the link between theory and practice is aptly captured by Schoeman when she states that: *"Theory is rooted in reality and conditioned by era and context, impacting on the construction of reality through the way in which it orients the minds of people as actors/builders in/of this reality"* (Schoeman, 1998, p.2). Put differently, this entails that those who are entrusted to make decisions on our behalf, about our well being within society are informed by discourses, theories and literature that are a result of particular trajectories of/in history and power relations which determine how these outlooks were shaped and ultimately how decisions are made about the allocation of resources within societies.

As a society then, in order to enhance our ability to choose, and the range of choices available within society; we need to query the underpinning logic and assumptions that inform the decisions that make available the choices we have within society. Following on this logic, it is this research's contention that there is no universal reality and that consequently, social reality is a human construct informed by the dominant perspectives, discourse/s and experience/s in the history of society and civilisation. These dominant perspectives which inform the formal agenda-setting process in the global socio-economic reality are largely the making of and under the control of the North (Schoeman, 1998, p.3). The reason for highlighting this idea is that it is important to note that what Mouton calls the "epistemic imperative" (Mouton, 1996, p.28); in the sub/field of security studies, has often been neglected or overlooked for subjective political reasons. This western hegemonic dominance of ideas around security has, and continues to influence the knowledge claims made on behalf of security studies. The consequence of this is that the applicability of some of these concepts, when applied to developing country contexts, is limited, even when such developing countries are the subject of enquiry. A suitable illustration of this limitation is the application and use of "securitization" (Buzan *et al*, 1998, p.4) methodology, which will be discussed in further detail below.

Since this research is concerned with the role of the intelligence services in service delivery the objects (data sources) of this study would be those laws, doctrines, regulations and individuals that would inform the manner in which intelligence operates so that it may facilitate service delivery specifically and development broadly. In terms of individuals, this would include both the security sector and the broader government (as development actors) decision-makers and agenda-setters that are involved in the discourse/s around development engendering security conceptions and practices.

A formal expression of the agenda to transform security understandings and practices would also be found in documentation released during the National Security Framework Conference proceedings, the ensuing National Security Strategy drafting process and eventually in the National Security Policy and the various legislations and WhitePapers on security, as well as other collected articles and publications.

2.3 Methodology

This research is qualitative in that it seeks to understand the extent to which security sector policy and practice influence the level of people's access to resources in development. In this sense the research is broadly about how poor people access resources, it is about how these people interact with government as the main service-provider in this regard. It is also about how the security sector defines its role in this struggle for resources and how the security sector locates itself in relation to facilitating this struggle for resources. The case study of Diepsloot is used in this paper to provide a practical account of the link between security and development in the context of the above depiction.

The interviews conducted constituted the primary sources of data. The interviewees numbered ten in total. These were; the five members of the Diepsloot-South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) executive committee, a region 1 district manager, a ward councillor from Diepsloot, a colonel from the South African National Defence Force, a National Intelligence Agency manager and a National Intelligence Agency analyst. These interviewees were purposefully selected on the basis that they would provide unique insights into the research questions posed. Because the locus of this paper's analysis falls in the middle-ground between security theory and practice and development and governance practice; qua the case of protest over perceived service delivery failures, the researcher opted to purposefully select a cross-section of interviewees who may speak to both security issues relating to intelligence theory and praxis, and governance and development issues vis-à-vis the provision of such services. This entailed that there be interviews that spoke mainly to the security sector in terms of its link with governance and development and also that there be interviews that spoke to the Diepsloot case in terms of the circumstances surrounding the protest and how these protests related to and interfaced with, security practice and policy. Creswell observes that one of the ways used to ensure the validity of data is to employ triangulation techniques (Creswell, 2003, p.196). Underlying this assertion is the idea that consulting different data sources that speak to different aspects of given environments (such as the security/development nexus) may help this research get closer to the "truth" as far as having the wherewithal to make knowledge claims about this link (Ibid). The assumption made here is that the limitations or shortcomings of the individual data sources (or interviewees, in this instance) when combined with other data, will balance each other out and bring this research closer to such truth (Mouton, 1996, p.156); in order that valid conclusions about the security/development link are arrived at.

Each of the individuals or groups interviewed spoke to different aspects of the research questions. For example, wittingly or not, the Diepsloot-SANCO members were an integral part of the protest action in Diepsloot. According to local officials in that area, they were responsible for inciting people, and a few of their members were subsequently arrested for stirring community members to commit violence and destroy private and municipal property. SANCO executive committee members claim to be the victims of heavy-handedness from both the municipality and the security establishment in the form of the police and intelligence officials. The broad themes covered during this particular interview related firstly to the circumstances surrounding the protest action in terms of the causes for the tensions between the municipality and community organisations. Another theme was that of being victimised as an organisation, linking this theme with their views on security agencies' responses in the wake of the protest action. They were also asked what their recommended posture for security agencies reacting to such incidents would be, particularly the recommended position for the intelligence services.

A ward councillor was interviewed in order to balance out the views provided by the SANCO executive committee. The ward councillor also happened to be individually linked to the protest action. Sarafina Mlauzi had her house vandalised and she was personally involved in trying to diffuse the situation before the protests. The broad themes covered in the interview with Mrs Mlauzi were; the causes of the protests, the legitimacy of such protest action and how government as a whole should in future, respond to such incidents. A further theme covered was whether intelligence should be involved and how it could be involved without limiting people's rights.

Cornell Nell, a region 1 manager, represented the municipal management point of view. This manager travels between her offices at the district level, located in Midrand, and her other office located at the community centre in Diepsloot. She was therefore able to offer insights from both a local Diepsloot perspective because she interacts with people in that community as well as from a district management point of view. These two standpoints were valuable for comparing the disjuncture (if any) between how community-level issues are dealt with versus the macro issues and viewpoints that managers typically have the benefit of. The broad themes covered in this interview were similar to those raised in the interviews with the local ward councillor.

Since national security policy is an integral part of the governance form and process, and gives effect to the activities of government in general and security agencies specifically; security sector interviews had to be conducted with a view to explaining the approach and thinking that informed the intelligence services' response/s in the wake of the protests. The research had to take into account the fact that the process of drafting a South African national security policy was still underway under the auspices of the NSF process. This means that on the one hand, the research had to assess the NSF process in terms of where the thinking around security was going, as well as what informed the current thinking on security.

In order to achieve this, the researcher had to select security sector interviewees, spanning the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), who were either at the forefront of transforming SANDF or the NIA, or part of the drive to draft the said NSF. Colonel J.J Huysamen was recommended to the researcher by one of the members of the NSF secretariat. He is an academic who has been an integral part of the transformation agenda in the South African National Defence Force. As such he was in a unique position to provide insights about the changing face of security in South Africa from a defence perspective. The broad themes covered in the interview with the colonel included, the link between security and development, how underdevelopment limited security functions, whether, and (if so), how the military was participating in engendering development, the relationship between policy and practice in so far as the security and development link. Also discussed was the use of early warning systems.

In terms of the NIA manager and NIA analyst; the manager is someone who has contributed extensively to the debate on transforming intelligence since the amalgamation of the former regime's intelligence divisions, the ANC's intelligence arm, the PAC's intelligence arm and the former homelands intelligence divisions. The analyst is a resident expert on Diepsloot. The broad themes covered in the interviews with these members include *inter-alia*, whether the current *modus operandi* of intelligence helped to engender or retard development and whether the bias in favour of development in the policy giving effect to intelligence is practically actionable.

Another key theme covered was the debate relating to the relevance of "securitization" methodology since this paper argues that the social reality is already given that South Africa is a developmental state. A further theme discussed was that of early warning systems and their possible use in governance processes, particularly in service delivery.

In terms of extracting the most value out of the research questions posed, the methodology of this analysis is such that questions were first posed to Diepsloot interviewees with the view that some of the emergent themes could be used to "refine" the questions posed to the security sector interviewees. According to Creswell, it is useful to "spread out" or split the interview phase in order that preliminary interviews may inform later ones (Creswell, 2003, p.182). This is important for establishing the methodological approach used because the researcher interviewed subjects in Diepsloot in order that the researcher gain insight about what the right questions would be to pose in the security sector. In other words, in terms of answering the methodology questions; how do we attain knowledge? And how do we ensure we reach our research goal? (Mouton, 1996, p.35), the researcher sought to pose questions to Diepsloot participants in order that "the enquirer learns what to ask and (to) whom it should be asked" (Creswell, 2003, p.182).

The Diepsloot interviews were conducted first and these were closely followed by the security sector interviews. An example of how the Diepsloot interviewees influenced the questions posed to security sector practitioners is the regime-security theme that emerged in response to the issues raised by Diepsloot-SANCO executive committee (exco) members. Also, the emergence of the early warning system as a viable alternative to proactively intervening in facilitating development gained more credence after the interviews in Diepsloot.

2.4 Limitations of study

A considerable limitation to this study is the fact that the research was constantly being overtaken by events on the ground and in the media such that the merit of the knowledge claims made by the study were constantly under threat. Because of this, it became necessary to broaden the scope of the research to cover both substance and form issues vis-à-vis the role of intelligence in service delivery. While this breadth of content is necessary for capturing all the macro and micro issues involved, this may take away from the specificity of the study and therefore render the findings contestable.

In terms of interviews; the Diepsloot SANCO exco members were apprehensive about having the conversation recorded and so the interview could not be recorded. However the interview has been used in the Diepsloot case study findings' section because it is important to this paper's analysis of the subject matter. A further limitation is that at least one of the interviews conducted (Cnl, J.J Huysamen, Defence headquarters), was completely inaudible. However supplementary notes were made during this interview. Therefore, even though Cnl. Huysamen's interview was not audible it was included in the findings on security.

A similar problem presented itself where the NIA manager was concerned, however, using better equipment and supplementary notes taken, solved this problem. A further limitation presented itself where the NIA manager and analyst were concerned; where these individuals requested that this research not mention them by name for security purposes.

The study also makes certain critical assumptions that are useful to mention:

- The study assumes that it has been established that these incidents of protest are widespread throughout the country and share the similar characteristics of potentially being a result of service delivery failures.
- The study assumes that it is desirable from a government efficiency and effectiveness point of view, to have an intelligence establishment that performs a policy analysis function and actively monitors service delivery.
- The study assumes that achieving an enhanced role for intelligence in the country's development project requires the exploration of the security/development link.

2.5 Research design

2.5.1 Data sources

Mason distinguishes between data sources and methods of gathering and generating data from sources (Mason, 2002, p.52). Linked to this is the idea that data is generated or created from sources and not simply collected (Ibid). In this regard the qualitative researcher undertakes to collect and analyse gathered data thereby creating new knowledge about situations and in the process dispelling misplaced and context irrelevant assumptions that underlie such data.

In terms of this research, the gathered information spans a wide range of data sources because the research area transcends any single body of legislation, organisation or group of individuals. This however should not limit the ability of this paper to be relevant in terms its "explanatory power", because as mentioned at the outset, the lack of a comprehensive national security policy is an issue which currently plagues the security sector.

The data source site, events, documents and individuals, as Creswell insists; need not be understood as a sample (in statistical terms of random sampling), but instead, as specialised data sources that speak to the different areas of this qualitative enquiry (Creswell, 2003, p.185). They are what Creswell terms, "purposefully selected data sources" (Creswell, 2003, p.186-7). In the case of this paper they include both primary and secondary sources. The selection of the various data sources including; government departments, organisations, individuals, documents, books and journals was carried out on the basis that each of these data sources spoke to the research questions posed.

The primary data sources include; the site in Diepsloot, SANCO, individuals such as a NIA manager, a NIA analyst, a colonel in the defence force, a region 1 municipal manager and a Diepsloot ward councillor; and the laws and regulations governing the security sector in South Africa. These laws, WhitePapers and regulations include; the RDP, the interim Constitution, the final Constitution, the WhitePaper on intelligence, the WhitePaper on defence, the WhitePaper on transforming the public service, the WhitePaper on safety and security, the National Strategic Intelligence Act and the Intelligences Services Act.

The secondary data sources include government departments such as NIA, SASS, NICOC, PSC, DPLG, and DPSA, as well as other articles and publications on security theory and development theory respectively. There are also events or processes that served as secondary data sources such as the NSF conference proceedings and documentation on the process of integrating government. In this regard, various conference papers presented at the NSF proceedings were used. In terms of the integrated governance system, The (Layman, DPLG) Presidential report on intergovernmental relations and service delivery was utilised.

2.5.2 Data collection techniques

According to Creswell there are 4 basic types of data collection techniques employed by qualitative researchers, they are; **Observation**, **interviews**, **documents** and **audiovisual materials** (Creswell, 2003, p.187).

Since this research is qualitative to the extent that it seeks to unravel the disjuncture between theory and context; it is an account of how the nuances of the context (Diepsloot) do not conform to the assumptions made by the theory (security theory and by inference, intelligence theory). For this purpose what can best be described as an aggregation of data collection techniques have been used. For example, observation was used to establish that the members of the Diepsloot-SANCO lived in fear following the incidents of protests in which they were (rightly or not), accused of inciting the violence that occurred. Face to face interviews as well as a group interview were also conducted. Statistical data on socio-economic indicators and the vital statistics of Diepsloot were also collected from Statistics South Africa.

2.5.3 Interviews

It is useful to elaborate further on the interviews as a major source of gleaning information about people's individual experiences and perceptions about intelligence's role broadly and its envisaged role in development specifically. This also speaks to Mason's idea that the assumed ontological position in a qualitative research paper may recognise individuals' views as being fundamental to expressing the difference between what people think should be happening versus what is indeed happening (Mason, 2002, p.63). This is also the case in this paper. The interviews have been divided between those that speak to the Diepsloot case directly, and those that apply more to the security environment and the intelligence establishment's role in this environment.

Mason further observes that qualitative interviews must be loosely structured which implies that a much regimented approach would limit the interviewer and interviewee's interaction and thus deny the research other information that might have been otherwise gained (Mason, 2002: pg 62). This research from the outset assumed an approach that says that knowledge is contextual and therefore did not seek to influence the interviews. For this reason, the interviews conducted were semi-structured and relatively informal in order that they allow people to express their ideas, perceptions, understandings and beliefs. The interviews followed broad themes emanating from the main research question and accompanying sub-questions; this is how the continued relevance of interviews was assured.

2.5.4 Credibility and validity

The issue highlighted in the limitations of research section, regarding the NIA members who chose not to be named, need not affect the credibility and validity of this paper's findings. In order to allay any misgivings in this regard as well as ensure continued rigour, professional transcribing services, in the form of Conference Communications (PTY) Ltd, located in Blairgowrie, Johannesburg, were contracted to conduct the transcriptions.

2.5.5 Ethical issues

Creswell observes that an enduring ethical consideration is that individuals who are subjects or objects of study have the right to access a copy of the research and must be allowed to reserve the right to withdraw at anytime and that these individuals must also understand the purpose of such a study (Creswell, 2003, p.64). In terms of these ethical considerations, the wishes of NIA members who requested not to be named were respected and alternative solutions of ensuring the validity and credibility of the data were sought by way of contracting transcribing services. The most challenging aspect in terms of constraints presented to this research was the interview of the SANCO executive committee who despite their insistence to the contrary, seemed apprehensive about being recorded for reasons that are mentioned in the Diepsloot findings and analysis sections in this paper. The main problem was that SANCO was central to the incidents of protest in Diepsloot, whether the charge that they incited the protests is true or not.

2.5.6 Research structure

The third chapter is the literature survey, which will *inter alia*, critically explore the dominant perspectives within security studies, examining the historical development of some of these perspectives against some latter day perspectives on third world security studies. This is in order to present the contention that the limited explanatory power of these dominant perspectives reduces their wholesale applicability and relevance relative to the challenges faced by third world contexts. The literature survey will also present some literature on the policy analysis function that can and should characterise a development-friendly intelligence establishment such as is proposed by the use of the recommended early warning system. In order to effectively capture this policy analysis role, the similarities between intelligence estimation and policy analysis will be assessed in the context of introducing the said early warning system for service delivery.

The fourth chapter looks at the existing legislation on security giving effect to intelligence operations and attempts to shed light on this legislation's view on the role of intelligence in facilitating development. This section is important for supporting the assertion that the legislation already gives effect to an intelligence service that engenders development. This line of argument will be further supported by the inclusion of a chart in the appendix section that will attempt to juxtapose the said legislation against its utility in the Diepsloot case.

The Diepsloot case is introduced in the fifth chapter as the first site of protest over service delivery. This section includes interviews conducted with stakeholders in the service delivery process of this site as well as some of the role players involved with the protest action. This section includes a findings and analysis section on the interviews conducted.

A central tenet to understanding the role of the intelligence services in service delivery requires a look at the body of legislation giving effect to current security sector practices vis-à-vis development; paying particular attention to how this role is articulated in the legislation on security. This chapter covers interviews of a select group of security sector role players. This section also includes a findings and analysis segment which relates to the interviews conducted with these selected professionals in the security sector. Both this section's findings and analysis section and the previous section's findings and analysis sections will attempt to answer some of the research questions posed above.

The final chapter, which incorporates the recommendations and conclusion, presents the proposed early warning system as the possible framework for a more context responsive intelligence establishment. The conclusion will surmise the research's findings. As formerly stated, the appendix section will present a tabular account of the objectives and utilities of the broad security legislation juxtaposed against the Diepsloot case.

CHAPTER 3: Literature review

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of a literature review includes *inter alia*, the presentation and examination of forerunning studies that have been conducted on the subject. In this way it orientates the reader on the ongoing debates within the field of enquiry. It may also provide a framework for the analysis contained in such a study. (Creswell, 2003, p.30).

This literature review will attempt to accomplish the following; it will provide a broad idea of the dominant schools of thought within security studies to show the lack of correspondence among these perspectives. This is in order that the paper introduces the idea of security as an "essentially contested concept". The introduction of the discussion on security as a contested concept gives a background to some of the gaps found between the different schools of thought. Since the nature of security being a contested concept is itself challenged, this paper will present some arguments to this effect in this section.

An accurate depiction of the concept of security requires that these dominant perspectives in security thinking also be located in the history of the development of the concept of security in international relations. This may serve to further explain why certain perspectives have enjoyed more prominence than others. The critical theory perspective (critical security studies) will be dealt with only in so far as its relationship to debates on human security, since the people-centred theme of emancipation runs through both of them. The subsequent section will deal with the link between security and development as a starting point to introducing the core argument around the operability of this association in South Africa. The operability of this security and development link requires an analysis and appreciation of intelligence in a policy analysis role and function. This role will be analysed in the context of its similarities to intelligence estimation.

3.2 The dominant Schools of thought

The main problem leading to the classification of security as a contested concept is the fact that there is fundamental disagreement on *what is* and *what should be* included within security and whether what is eventually included is an *accurate depiction of reality* (Tarry, 1999, p.1).

Widening refers broadly to those who argue that the traditional, militaristic and state-centric understandings of security (read national security) may be insufficient for the purposes of both theoretical analyses and real-life application. These individuals tend to argue that other threats such as ecological, social and economic concerns are equally vital and that therefore they must be included in defining the national security agenda.

Tarry identifies three groups of **wideners**, namely:
1. Non-traditional, but state-centric wideners who emphasise endogenous or intra-state threats as the main source of threats in states. These wideners have often argued from the point of view of developing countries. This category is best represented by the likes of Mohammed Ayoob and Azar and Moon.

2. Non-traditional (dualistic) wideners who, although agree that the scope of national security concerns should be widened, subscribe to the securitization methodology of widening (Buzan, 1998, p.5). This entails that an issue to be securitized must reach certain prescribed levels of saliency before it is incorporated as a security concern or a national security issue. These wideners are dualistic to the extent that they believe that both society and the state should be secured.

3. Other wideners such as Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas are more amorphous in that they perceive the security dilemma as a global problem, not between states, but among states-where persistent problems of economic crises, ecological insecurity etc, affect all societies equally. According to this perspective then, there needs to be a global security agenda (Tarry, 1999, p.1-7).

The deepeners however, are concerned with shifting the "*referent point"* of security from being the state (as in the traditional conception) to being some other identified entity or structure such as society or individuals (Sheehan, 2000, p.23). In other words while the wideners are only concerned with expanding the scope of issues being securitized, the deepeners are concerned with changing the primary recipient or locus of security, thereby altering the demand-side of security. The problem with the inconsistency between these perspectives manifests in terms of the limitations to the methodology and analysis of security. Tarry best articulates this shortcoming when she observes, citing Salmon: *"The word security itself has no meaning. (It is the) assignment of content which enables us to distinguish it from other concepts"* (Tarry, 1999, p.1).

Tarry labels the six main perspectives in the field of security studies as; traditional realism (such as Stephen Walt), non-traditional wideners (such as Mohammed Ayoob), and realist wideners (such as Ole Waever), and post-modern wideners (such as Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas), the deepeners: utopian realists (such as Ken Booth) and the feminist deepeners (such as Spike Peterson). Human security as a paradigm can be classified within this broad category of deepeners (Tarry, 1999, p.2-10).

3.3 Security: a contested concept

Within security studies, the concepts of security and national security are contested concepts that have been used over the years to justify and/or impede the growth and expansion of states and state-power. In Arnold Wolfers' authoritative essay on national security he argues that national security is an ambiguous concept that has been used at the whims and convenience of those seeking to advance certain arguments. He points out that policy makers are faced with the problem of deciding which values must be safeguarded on the one hand, what level of security this safeguarding must occupy, and the sacrifices or compromises to be made for this policy option (Wolfers, 1952, p.500). What is noteworthy here is that even at this early stage in the epistemological history of security, the problem, identified by Buzan as; "*the underdevelopment of the concept of security"*, was evident (Buzan, 1991, p.3).

Baldwin (1997) makes an attempt to dispute the contested nature of the concept of security by arguing that at least two requirements for a concept to be labelled a contested concept are not met by the concept of security[4]. Citing W.B. Gallie's (1956) work on contested concepts, Baldwin argues that the understandings of security must be bound by the same criteria, even if such understandings vary, for instance, the neo-realist conception of security is that security is the most fundamental value the state can hold (Baldwin, 1997, p.10-11). While for others such as Wolfers, states do not necessarily have the same values (for example socio-economic development may be a higher priority in a developing country than say, terrorism, which would be a higher priority for some developed countries), therefore these states cannot be said to be playing the same "international security game", as it were, as a result the neo-realist is concerned with a wholly different animal than say the critical theorist.

The second requisite condition for classifying something as a contested concept is that it must not have to do with normal policy disputes vis-à-vis varying "interests, tastes, or attitudes" (Gallie, 1956, p.172). According to Baldwin, citing Gallie, these do not represent a fundamental philosophical disjuncture, but issues that are solvable through the normal political bargaining processes. As such, "environmental concerns, budget deficits, drug syndicates and organised crime" etc, cannot qualify as national security concerns in a conceptual debate (Baldwin, 1997, p.11).

[4] NB: This is contrary to the position advanced by Buzan citing the same study by W. B. Gallie (Buzan, 1991, p.7), this conflict in analysis further underscores the extent of the contention around the concept of security.

3.3.1 Analysis

The thinking behind these conditions advanced by Baldwin citing Gallie is flawed, beginning with the first condition; the adherence to a single conceptual framework is certainly ideal for the purposes of comparing apples against apples, as it were, but is by no means a rigid requirement. Theories in international relations for example, are contested to the extent that they have markedly different philosophical precepts but still belong to the same field of study, implying some level of coherence despite fundamental theoretical divergence. Realists for instance, understand the state as the referent point to any conception of security, while critical theorists hold that individuals within societies must be the point of reference. Notwithstanding this difference, most critical theorists accept the basis for protecting the state against traditional militaristic threats despite their call for including other non-traditional threats; hence the call for "deepening the agenda" rather than doing away with it (Booth, 1991, p.319). To some extent then, contested understandings can not only exist in the same body of knowledge, but also, as in the above sense, in the same person.

As regards the second condition for a contested concept, the current configuration of developing countries' security establishments is in some instances, according to Ayoob (1991) and others, the result of colonial legacies which informed the hegemonic dominance of the bipolar world order in the security discourse (Ayoob, 1991, p.271). The result was that the values that informed the security sectors in developing countries during the cold war and after were not derived from indigenous (or locally defined) value systems and sources, particularly in those developing countries that were proxies for *de facto* theatres of war between the nations of the communist east and capitalist west (Ayoob, 1991, p.260-75). This means that the values which resonate and speak more to these developing country contexts, such as social and human development, and as in the case proposed by this paper, service delivery, etc; have been historically neglected in security discourse. This entails that the notion of security may still be a contested concept in developing country contexts because to a large extent these countries are still trying to overcome the external definition of their national security concerns, and therefore what Baldwin and others view as issues solvable within normal political processes may be pressing security concerns in the political life of such states.

3.4 The evolution of security: historical perspectives

The debate between the narrow (traditional) versus the wide (new security) conception of security, arguments emanated out of growing dissatisfaction with the traditional realist notion of security which confined the understanding of security to its militaristic context (Buzan, 1998, p.2). Ayoob states that the term security as it has been traditionally applied by realists in international relations literature is based on two major assumptions: the first is that threats to a state's security mainly arise from outside the state's borders (exogenously). The second assumption is that such threats are typically militaristic in nature (Ayoob, 1991, p.261).

Sheehan observes that formative strategic studies stemming out of international relations, focused on security as the maintenance of the requirements for sustaining the balance of power between the cold war blocks in the nuclear age (Sheehan, 2000, p.12). Borrowing from traditional realist perspectives, strategic studies identified its area of interests as having to do with the required conditions for strategic nuclear capabilities, and strategic studies' central doctrine; conventional deterrence (Ibid).

The western political establishments' fixation with maintaining nuclear capabilities as the basis for deterrence was advocated by the writings of, *inter alia*; Henry Kissinger's, *"Nuclear weapons and foreign policy"* (1957), Bernard Brodie's, "*Strategy in the missile age"* (1959), among others (Sheehan, 2000, p.14).

The so called "security dilemma" which created the impetus for the realist positions in their various manifestations, supported by the likes of Hertz (1950) argued that the international state system was anarchic and involved states (or groups of states), which in fear of being attacked, armed themselves; this in turn made other groups insecure, and they got armed, thereby creating a vicious circle of armaments and insecurity (Hertz, 1950, p.157-180).

Originating from the above nuclear-age lineage of thinking, the so-called idealists (also known as the peace researchers) sought to move away from the state-centric conception of security towards invoking the "security dilemma", in arguing that individual states' security in the international political system was dependent on other states' security (Ayoob, 1991, p.261).

In doing this, the idealists advanced arguments against hostile state positions in the international system, opting instead for system-centric thinking around the concepts of deterrence theory, arms control, limited war and strategic stability (Sheehan, 2000, p.14). According to Ayoob, the idealist debate fell into the same trap the realist debate set for itself; that of conceptualising security in "outward-directed terms" vis-à-vis power dynamics between states in the international system. Ayoob argues that this is as a result of the European trajectory of history tracing back to The Peace of Westphalia[5] (Ayoob, 1991, p.262). Says Ayoob; *"(…) These two trends- of interaction among sovereign states and of greater identification of individuals with their respective states-strengthened each other and in doing so firmly laid the foundations of the intellectual tradition in which, at least in terms of the literature on diplomatic history and international relations, security became synonymous with the protection of a state's vital interests and core values from external threats."* (Ayoob, 1991, p.262)

Intrastate Conflicts

"The overwhelming frequency of military force since 1945 has been in intrastate and not interstate conflicts" (Ayoob, 1997, p.262)

"This trend (of intrastate wars) has continued in the post-cold war environment where the number of civil conflicts, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, to name a few, far surpass the number of interstate conflicts (…)" (Tarry, 1999, p.4)

"(…) Of the approximately 127 'significant wars' which have occurred since 1945, all but two of them were within the so-called Less Developed Countries (LDCs)" (Tickner, 1995, p.179)

[5] Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the advent of religious wars in Europe, and is used by many historians as a symbolic point of reference for the beginning of the advent of the modern nation-state (Global Politics, 1995, p.168).

Sheehan contends that the so called "golden age"[6] of strategic studies saw the western political establishment's adoption of many of the concepts developed by idealists at the time, such as Robert Osgood's *"limited war"*, Snyder's *"deterrence and defence"* (Sheehan, 2000, p.14). Sheehan proceeds to observe that the canonisation of these concepts, because of their policy-relevant status, served to effectively narrow the debate on security to the extent that the ensuing political agenda was shaped by these concepts (Ibid).

The logic of interdependence in the international system created a basis for the idealists to also have to accept the anarchic (read competitive, individualistic and power-related) nature of the global system of organisation as it referred to political administration, economic establishments and trade flows etc. This led to a gradual synthesis of ideas between the logic of anarchy *a la* realism and the requirements of interdependence espoused by idealists, under the combined banner of *"common security"* (Buzan, 1991, p.13).

Buzan (1983), citing the lack of coherence and adequate material between the theoretical literature and the empirical work on the one hand, and the different schools of thought on the other; argues that security (and national security by implication) as a concept in international relations, is underdeveloped. This broad lack of coherence as well as the desire by many western political establishments to maintain the status quo are some of the reasons identified by Buzan, for the general lull in the development of the literature around of the concept of security between the late 1960s and early 1980s (Buzan, 1991, p.4).

The end of the bipolar world order created a new impetus for the "wideners" who generally argued that with the usefulness of strategic studies waning, there was a need to reanimate the concept of security to include other affected sectors within the state. This call for a reanimation, brought with it a surge of writings from traditionalists (in the form of classical realists, neo-realists and latter-day idealists), led by the likes of Stephen Walt, Robert Dorff and Colin Gray. As against critical theorists, third world security academics and amorphous wideners led by Ken Booth, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob (Buzan *et al*, 1998, p.3).

[6] So called because of the novelty of some of these concepts used to analyse superpower bipolarity (Sheehan, 2000, p.14).

In the ensuing uncertainty suffered by strategic studies in the advent of the fall of the bipolar world-order, the widened and the narrow conceptions of security came to a head between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, characterised best by the resurgence of traditionalist perspectives in the form of Stephen Walt's argument against the widening position (Sheehan, 2000, p.19). Walt argued that the wideners ran the risk of expanding the concept of security excessively to a point where every conceivable social ill was securitized, thus destroying the intellectual coherence of the study of security (Walt, 1991, p.212).

Buzan (1998), himself a widener, expounded on this logic arguing that the danger faced by widening security too excessively, is that because of the political applicability of security, this excessive widening stood the chance of mobilising the state to a condition of alert on every single social issue (Buzan *et al*, 1998, p.4).

3.5 Securitization

At this point it is useful to delve into the securitization methodology as presented by the likes of Buzan *et al* (1998). To solve the inherent dilemma of securitizing everything, Buzan *et al* proposed that criteria be used for the identification, and securitization of threats. They proposed that such securitization be undertaken by securitizing actors who would generate the necessary legitimacy for the proposed "*alert-status"* of the state and subsequent emergency measures leading to the circumvention of normal rules (Buzan *et al*, 1998, p.4-12).

According to this logic, an issue that is presented as a threat to be securitized must represent an existential threat, requiring treatment outside the conventional bounds of political procedure. This necessitates that the criteria for securitization as defined here consist of three requirements; that it pose such an existential threat (such that if it is not acted on it may affect the survival of the status quo), that it must be prominent enough to have potentially lasting political effects, if not treated, and that it be proposed to an audience of relevant political elites and be accepted by such an audience, thus legitimising the state's prioritisation of resources towards its alleviation as a threat (Buzan *et al*, 1998, p.25). In other words, a public issue is located on a continuum between being politically trivial (non-securitized) to it being a salient issue as it moves towards being politicised and eventually being securitized (Ibid). Accordingly, as the issue moves towards saliency it must pose an increasingly existential threat to a "referent object" (in traditional conceptions of security this referent object is the state) in the minds of decision/policy makers (the elite) and security actors for it to be securitized.

3.5.1 Analysis

This argument around securitization is problematic for several reasons, firstly; Buzan *et al* (1998) do not adequately explain what the parameters for "emergency action" may be. For example, if as developing countries we rank development (in terms of providing basic needs, alleviating poverty, dispelling human security threats etc) on par with state security (in terms of traditional threats of war from other states, espionage etc), we know, for instance, that we employ force to counteract threats of force, we employ counterespionage to dispel threats of espionage; but what emergency measures (within the current operational configuration) do we employ to counter poverty and what measures do we employ to counter human insecurity? In other words, how are the institutions that provide security as per the dictates of national security policy, configured to deal with non-traditional threats if national security policy securitizes such threats?

Secondly, securitization implies that something is given the status of a national security threat and that it doesn't already exist as a fundamental challenge to that state. In the case of South Africa for example; should the state not already be concerned with people-centric threats as part of its development project? In this regard, what Ramaite calls *the hegemony of development* in South Africa should already be extended to the security environment. The legislation giving effect to the intelligence services, for example, already mandates an intelligence service that exists as part of the development hegemony paradigm.

It is therefore this paper's contention that widening cannot happen without deepening because it is when we adequately answer the question; whose security is being threatened?, that we will have to answer the subsequent questions which deal with how the security establishments are best positioned and configured to action development within a security framework. This speaks to Williams' contention where he crucially observes that security needs to be "*indigenised"* instead of it being an "*orthopaedic aid"* derived from western and Eurocentric contexts (Williams, 2000, p.2-4). It is this paper's further contention then, that it is only when we achieve the goal of (context-specific) self-definition that we will be able to ask and answer the questions that inform the practices of intelligence in this regard. This methodology would nullify the need to securitize because a context-specific definition of national security would mean that all the possible salient security issues that pose an existential threat to the state would have already been identified. In other words, if our national security policy already speaks to the challenges faced by our developing country contexts then there is no need to securitize further and the operations of intelligence and other security establishments would already be geared towards operationalising the aversion of such threats and therefore no risk of over-securitizing would be run.

3.6 Critical theory and human security

This section will deal with critical theory as the basis for the conception of human security that is increasingly becoming a dominant perspective in security thinking in the South African context. Human security has increasingly gained credence in the post cold war period as the basis for more people-centred approaches to security.

Central to the hypothesis proposed by this paper, is the idea that understanding the nexus between security and development is crucial for the continued relevance of developing world security establishments. Schoeman (1998) invoking Cox's maxim on the contextual-use of theories, observes that critical theory, rather than problem-solving theory (like neo-realism and neo-liberalism) is more amenable to developing world attempts to construct new realities because of critical theory's inherent need to be more equitable and just (Schoeman, 1998, p.2).

The raison d'etre for this argument is that, while problem-solving theories accept the status quo as a given, critical theory seeks to understand the underpinning assumptions informing how the status quo came to be. Critical theory also explores the possibilities of changing such an order (Cox, 1995, p.32). This assertion is supported by the fact that critical theorists' perspectives within security discourses by the likes of Booth and others have attempted to dispel realist notions of only acknowledging threats from outside the state, arguing that in most instances in the developing world, states themselves tended to be the source of insecurity for their polities (Booth, 1991, p.316). Booth points out that the problem with realism and its latter-day manifestations is that it prioritises power and order as units of analysis in security studies, rather than prioritising the emancipation of groups and individuals. The problem with giving preference to power and order as the primary considerations, as he rightly observes, is that they are often attained at someone else's expense (Booth, 1991, p.319). In other words, if the primary motivation for studying security is to arrive at a condition of no threats then it stands to reason that denying people access to "power and order" in their own contexts (due to such power being subsumed by others) will necessarily lead to insecurity or instability, or both.

Booth takes this logic further by arguing that if the purpose of security is to achieve the absence of threats, then it is fundamentally the same as emancipation, which also seeks to alleviate threats to individuals and groups within society. Citing a study undertaken by Rummel, Booth states that the study concluded that there existed an inverse relationship between political rights and civil liberties on the one hand, and internal violence and war on the other, leading him to conclude that emancipation, from an empirical viewpoint, seeks to achieve the same ends as security (Booth, 1991, p.319-323). Flowing from this thinking then, the goals of both security and emancipation are the same (notwithstanding the distinction between the state as a referent object as against the individual as the referent object).

This idea of emancipation borrows from critical theorist debates in critical international theory championed by writers from the Frankfurt school critical theorists, particularly works such as those of Jurgen Habermas and Richard Wyn-jones which seek to dispel unjust assumptions inherent in social science knowledge constructs broadly and security discourse particularly. Favouring instead, the pursuit of "inclusive discursive encounters" wherein, those within a given society affected by the status quo, play a role in defining and eventually agreeing to the chosen direction of such a society (Habermas, 1996, p.408-458). At the centre of critical theory is the idea that socially constructed theory needs to be just and egalitarian in orientation, in that it must not be morally ambiguous and must seek to break down misleading assumptions that only serve to cloud issues and perpetuate inequality.

A related debate to that of constructing new interpretations and expressions of security is that of human security. Human security concerns speak to the link between security and development and as such, prove valuable in this paper's attempts to tease out links between security and development in the South African context. Human security is concerned with the welfare of individuals and is linked to the state's ability to provide "basic needs" (Cilliers, 2004, p.8). The shift in thinking from state-centric security conceptions to human security concerns among latter day African states is a further indication of the attempts to redefine security to fit with the need for people-centred emancipation, particularly in African contexts (Ginwala, 2002, p.3).

As far as is discernable, the concept of human security stems out of contemporary international relations literature espoused and popularised by the United Nations (Commission for Human Security, 2003, p.2). Within this body of literature there exist two dominant schools of thought on human security; on the one hand, the neo-realist perspective, based on traditional realist perspectives, which views states as the primary referent object. On the other hand; the critical theory perspective views the individuals within a state as the referent object/s of national security policy (Naidoo, 2001, p.2).

3.6.1 Analysis

The downside of these two perspectives on human security is that they do not provide a middle-ground approach encompassing both the security of the state and that of individuals and groups, supported by what Cilliers (2004) terms; "*the organisational terms of national security"*, referring to traditional security establishments (the military, the intelligence services, the police and so on) and the nature of governance (government institutions, popular values and norms etc) (Cilliers, 2004, p.11). This entails that the development of a South African national security policy must be consistent with the human security concerns of basic-needs obligations to people, without eroding protection against traditional threats. Since this research is concerned with firstly, the practical expression of adopting a people-centred national security policy and secondly, at national, provincial and local governance level, how service delivery can be enhanced by applying some of these assumption-critical methodologies to the operations of the intelligence sector, this paper will argue below that the justification for a national security bias towards people and the emancipation of such people in socio-economic terms, already exists in the policy governing the security sector.

3.7 Security and development

This section will begin to introduce some of the debates at the centre of this analysis, focusing on some third world perspectives on security with a view to introducing South African context-specific problems and theory.

The Détente period was characterised by the hegemonic dominance of western perceptions of security, the advent of liberation from colonial rule that characterised the era between the late 1960s up until the early 1990s in Africa, led to the inclusion of third world paradigms in the literature on security (Sheehan, 2000, p.16). Even with this inclusion of third world security paradigms, the worldviews that dominated this discourse remained western. In other words the third world became a consideration in the debates on security, but even then, these were still writings about the third world rather than writings by third world writers (Sheehan, 2000, p.16-17).

Ayoob discussing the role of third world states in the development of the concept of security observes that during the cold war the nations of the developing world were swaying to the currents of the superpowers. The implication of this was that in the cold-war battle for ideas around security, individual developing states were "up for grabs" by the superpower in the best position to provide the desired help (Ayoob, 1991, p.258). This in turn resulted in developing states being proxies for western superpowers advancing their own perspectives and interests, as far as the literature and thinking on security, and casting aside the perspectives of the developing world (Ibid).

It followed then, that the security of developing states and regions was analysed from the point of view of American and/or (then) Soviet interests and concerns. To Ayoob, these "historically preconditioned" understandings of security, limit the explanatory power of the concept of security when applied to the developing world context (Ibid). Accordingly, the usefulness of western security literature in the analysis of developing world security environments is limited; particularly those debates stemming from the realist perspective of international relations. This does not imply a wholesale rejection of the utility of realism, but instead, serves as a cautionary disclaimer to the reader, to the effect that the even contemporary security perspectives should not be adapted to neatly fit into the South African case.

The point of departure for the analysis to be undertaken by this paper links directly with the fifth question posed by Ayoob, in terms of what he considers to be the questions that must be posed and answered to raise the standard of third world security studies' debates. The fifth question posed reads: "*What is the relationship between the security and developmental concerns of third world states, and how does the interaction between these two preoccupations of third world state elites affect the levels of legitimacy enjoyed by third world states and regimes?"* (Ayoob, 1991, p.261).

This question raises a number of necessary considerations for any analysis of the current configuration of developing world security establishments. This question is premised on a logic or inference that western political elites do not themselves face legitimacy challenges on the basis of choices made or not regarding the link between security and development. Following on this logic, it would stand to reason that developing country contexts are not adequately served by western security theory because the elites in these developed states do not face such challenges. This is not to suggest that developing states' political realities are themselves the same, but rather, that they all share an irreconcilable interface with the outwardly focused, traditional security theory and national security thinking.

This line of argumentation is also captured in Azar and Moon's (1988) dated, but still relevant contribution; *"National security in the third world"*. They argue that a lot of emphasis had been previously placed on the security environment, referring to external threat and alliance patterns and the "hardware side" of security management which involves the physical capacity of a state's force projection capabilities (Azar and Moon, 1988, p.77). To offset this trend, Azar and Moon propose that developing countries be preoccupied with what they call the "software side" of national security (Ibid). This relates to the ability of the various sectors of the population to coexist under the existing status quo (integration), in terms of the national values that are defined within the state and its policies (political legitimacy), and in terms of policy choices made and implemented (policy capacity) (Azar and Moon, 1988, p.78). While it could be argued that this contribution is empirically questionable (in so far as it being an aggregated condition, required and applicable to all developing country contexts), and still falls into the international relations trap of assigning different normative standards for developing countries than those assigned to western countries, it remains a relevant analysis to use in the evaluation of the South African state's security posture in dealing with endogenous or domestic threats.

The domestically inclined software concerns of integration, and political legitimacy and policy capacity particularly, are relevant to this analysis for two reasons; the first is that development concerns as they relate to the emancipation of people from underdevelopment challenges cannot be separated from the national security policy and therefore from the security establishment's actions in as far as dealing with objective domestic threats[7]. The second reason has to do with the historical tendency of most post-independence, African state security establishments to degenerate into regime-security apparatuses because of the loss of legitimacy by political elites who begin to see the state-security apparatus as the only means to control the population.

3.7.1 Analysis

"Software issues" such as integration, political legitimacy and policy capacity are a good measure of the extent to which a state is managing the inherent contradictions within such a state. According to Azar and Moon, regime-security often results in the embattled leadership of a state that has lost its legitimacy; *"(…) creating real or imaginary enemies and threats, which legitimate the use of repression and coercion"* (Azar and Moon, 1988, p.83). While it would be an exaggeration to compare (without qualification) this scenario with the Diepsloot protests, the allegation by some local councillors of the existence of a third force and the subsequent probe by the intelligence services seem to exhibit similarities to the scenario depicted by Azar and Moon. The point being made here is that the intelligence services need to begin to examine means and methods by which they can be proactive in facilitating the state's development objectives without falling into the trap of regime-security. These incidents of protest can also be related to Azar and Moon's contention that meeting basic needs in developing countries is a determinant for political legitimacy and by implication, political stability (Ibid).

[7] Objective Domestic Threats: are those domestic threats to society that are not of the making of the regime in government.

3.8 Policy analysis and intelligence estimation

In order to adequately understand the function that the creation of an early warning system would perform, the link between the policy process and intelligence functions (particularly the role of analysis) must be clarified. This entails identifying the role of intelligence in the policy cycle qua the policy analysis function and elaborating on the roles and functions of warning intelligence in the above context.

According to the Intelligence Research Institute, intelligence should inform clients about what they need to hear rather than what they want to hear; in this sense intelligence can identify government failures and propose solutions. In this context, intelligence is similar in purpose and form to policy analysis (IRI, 2004, p.4). Lowenthal argues that intelligence exists for the sole purpose of supporting the policy maker and that in this regard it is about the constant need for tailored, timely information and knowledge that provides background and context and warning of possible negative outcomes (Lowenthal, 2003, p.3).

To the extent that intelligence is about providing information about the best possible policy alternatives using normative standards and factual information about "problem situations", it seems to overlap with the activities of people involved in policy analysis, enhancing the case for the creation of the said early warning system.

According to Dunn, policy analysis; "seeks to create, critically assess and communicate policy-relevant knowledge within one or more of the phases in policy making" (Dunn, 1994, p.15). According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984), policy analysis is understood as the prescriptive exercise of analysing and understanding the policy making process in order to make recommendations of the best alternative choices (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, p.28). In this form it falls generally within the field of study that is termed policy sciences (Dunn, 1994, p.12-14).

While the ideal phases of the policy making process may vary between authors and students of policy alike, the broad framework must involve an attempt to resolve some existing societal problem, by firstly identifying such a problem, identifying possible solutions to such a problem, choosing between alternatives of resolving such a problem, implementing the chosen alternative and evaluating and monitoring the outcomes of the implementation process (Dunn, 1994, p.14-15).

The policy-analytic procedures (problem structuring or definition, forecasting or prediction, recommendation or prescription, monitoring or description and evaluation) serve as methods of organising different methodologies and techniques of policy analysis (Dunn, 1994, p.14). A closer look at these procedures and accompanying standards reveals similarities with the main tenets of warning intelligence and early warning (Hough, 2004, p.5).

For example, forecasting or prediction of possible policy futures is similar to the exercise of estimative intelligence within the field of warning intelligence. Policy forecasting for instance, provides policy-relevant knowledge about the possible outcomes of the adoption of certain policies (Ibid); and while estimative intelligence techniques vary in approach and content, they also generally seek to provide forecasts of policy choices (Holman Jr, 1986, p.137).

Laur observes that warning intelligence is a field comprising the academic disciplines of history, political science, international relations, geography and environmental science (Laur, 1986, p.149). Warning intelligence as outlined by Laur emerges out of the American (realist) military tradition and has historically been used in the context of anticipating a "hot war" threat from Russia (Laur, 1986, p.160). Within this field, early warning is defined as the collection of information about, and analysis of, an impending threat such as that of a conflict or that of a humanitarian nature (Hough, 2004, p.3). Laur further distinguishes between strategic warning systems that are more long-term and allow time to formulate responses, as against, tactical warning systems, which require instant reaction as the threat/s has become active and now requires intervention; therefore decision making within this framework is ad hoc (Laur, 1986, p.152-154).

The key difference identified between warning intelligence and early warning is that in the latter case the intelligence practitioner or policy maker is far removed from the context of the analysis such that there is no direct threat posed to this individual. While in the case of warning intelligence, the stakes are higher because decisions taken on the basis of intelligence provided may affect the intelligence practitioner and the policy maker alike (Hough, 2004, p.4-5). This distinction is not applicable to the early warning system proposed by this paper because this paper is making the argument for the application of such a system in the early detection and elimination of problems in the process of service delivery using elements of both warning intelligence and early warning. This proposed system will be presented in the recommendations section of this paper.

CHAPTER 4: Security policy

4.1 Introduction

In view of the fact that the central thesis of this research maintains that there should and does exist a *means-end* relationship between the state security establishments (in this case the intelligence services) and the ideal condition of human development. The constitutional and legislative framework on security that brought about existing thinking around national security also has to be understood in this context. This requires that the broad legislative framework on security be understood in terms of the broader state objective of achieving human development vis-à-vis socio-economic upliftment and social justice. When viewed in this fashion, the broad security framework and legislation adopted already makes the case for a development oriented security regime and intelligence service specifically.

It is for this reason that this paper has placed much emphasis on the "operability factor" of this model within intelligence operations, predicated on the idea that a mandate to this effect already exists. The point being made here is that, the legislation on security and the intelligence services' roles and functions, is best captured in the argument that says, the development of a comprehensive South African national security policy must inform the intelligence service's operational mandate as far as giving effect to this development role.

The legislation outlining the role of intelligence in the republic and giving effect to the mandate and activities of intelligence facilitating development includes: The Interim Constitution (1993), The Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), The WhitePaper on Intelligence (1994), The Intelligence Services Act 38 (1994), The National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 (1994), The final Constitution (1996), The WhitePaper on Defence (1996) and The WhitePaper on Safety and Security (1998). National security policy is also informed by international best practices.

These areas of legislation and regulation will be outlined and analysed in terms of their mention of intelligence's role in socio-economic redress; in order to determine the extent of their invocation of development priorities in defining the parameters and roles of intelligence particularly and the security sector at large. The methodology followed is one of identifying an area within the policy or guidelines that speaks most to the idea of having a *scope for development* or engendering development.

4.2 The interim constitution (1993)

4.2.1 Background

The interim constitution represents the first and most significant policy departure from regime security policies of the apartheid government. This doctrine called for the creation of new institutions of governance and the transformation of apartheid institutions to be in line with the then envisaged dispensation. While the interim constitution did not specifically deal with the civilian intelligence services, it dealt with the role of the defence force in the new dispensation. The creation of this new defence organ can be understood to be the first shift towards a new security paradigm in the post apartheid South African context.

4.2.2 Development scope

Within the many roles and functions of defence, the interim constitution identifies some services where defence may be employed, such as;

- *"The protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country"*
- *"Service in the provision or maintenance of essential services"*
- *"Service in support of any state department for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment"*

(Interim Constitution, (1993), p.227 (1), a, d, f.)

4.3 Reconstruction and development programme (1994)

4.3.1 Background

The RDP is a socio-economic policy framework loosely deriving from the Freedom charter and other development best practises. As with the Interim Constitution, it was a basis from which the African National Congress-led government would formulate policy stances on various legislative imperatives for governance. It could be argued that the RDP was the first aggregate expression of South Africa's national interests in the state project of social transformation and nation building. The foundational principles of the RDP, for example are;

- An integrated and sustainable programme
- A people driven process
- Peace and security for all
- Nation building
- Linking reconstruction and development
- Democratising South Africa

(RDP, 1994, p.5)

4.3.2 Development scope

Some of these broad themes listed above remain prevalent in policy today and can still be found in current public service value systems such as Batho Pele, nation building and peace and security etc, underscoring the RDP's continued relevance as a policy framework. The RDP also acknowledges that without meeting basic needs (identified in the RDP as comprising; land reform, housing and services, water and sanitation, energy and electrification, telecommunications, environmental issues, transport, nutrition, health care, social security and social welfare), no *political democracy* can survive (RDP, 1994, p.26, 27). The RDP also proposes that the intelligence services (as well as the SANDF and the SAPS), be under civilian control through a ministry, and that such a department be answerable to parliament. It also espouses that: "(…) *the size, character and doctrines of the new defence force must be appropriate to a country engaged in a major programme of socio-economic reconstruction and development"* (RDP, 1994, p.124).

4.4 Constitution (1996)

4.4.1 Background

Chronologically the final Constitution was preceded by The WhitePaper on Intelligence (1994) and The Intelligence Services Act (1994). While these policies informed the formation of the intelligence services in 1994, the Constitution (in its reference to security and intelligence formation) is better explained in the context of it flowing from the Interim Constitution and the RDP. The Constitution as the supreme law of the state sets up the roles (and to some extent, the responsibilities) for institutions within the security sector generally and the intelligence services in particular. The Constitution provides for the recognition of people's socio-economic rights within the framework of state security. The Constitution defines socio-economic rights as those rights that have to do with the provision of "*basic needs"* such as housing, health care, water and social security (Constitution, 1996, p.11, 12, 13). They incorporate what Franklin D Roosevelt identified as the *four freedoms*[8] and some of what the UDHR proclaims particularly article 25, dealing with people's standards of living (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945).

[8] The four freedoms are; 1. Freedom of speech and expression, 2. Freedom to worship god in one's own way, 3. Freedom from want, 4. Freedom from fear. See US Information Service, n.d., "Living documents of American history", pg 71.

4.4.2 Development scope

In defining the principles that govern national security the constitution provides that: *"National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life"* (Constitution, 1996, Chapter 11, 198 (a)). The Constitution also requires that the formation of the intelligence services be in accordance with national legislation (Constitution, 1996, p.117, Chapter 11, 209 (1)). Chapter 3 of the Constitution provides guidelines for cooperative governance. This principle is important to this analysis' attempt to link security and development from an operations viewpoint. Under Chapter 10, the Constitution also provides the basic values that must be adhered to by all government spheres and entities. What is particularly noteworthy here is that the basis for a *development hegemony* is strengthened and rendered applicable to all state entities by the Constitution.

4.5 The WhitePaper on Intelligence (1994)

4.5.1 Background

The WhitePaper on Intelligence provided the most comprehensive framework for the role of intelligence in the new dispensation. Broadly, this imperative meant that the focus of the role of intelligence shifted from exclusively securing the state, to protecting individual rights (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994, p.1). To undertake this, the WhitePaper needed to redefine the philosophical foundation of intelligence qua the South African state building imperative. Crucially, the WhitePaper acknowledges the broad goal of intelligence (that of creating a secure environment for all South Africans), as being synonymous with the national government's goals of development and reconstruction (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994, p.1-2).

4.5.2 Development scope

The WhitePaper on Intelligence makes the case for the adoption of a widened conception of national security beyond the traditional narrow focus of protection against military threats of force and securing territorial boundaries and protecting national sovereignty. The widened conception of intelligence incorporates the traditional military conception, as well as political, economic, social, religious, technological, ethnic and ethical factors that shape the character of the developing nation state (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994, p.3).

Elaborating on this proposed approach to intelligence practice the WhitePaper on Intelligence observes that: *"(…) The objectives of security policy go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social justice"* (WhitePaper on Intelligence, p.2). In trying to fittingly articulate this suggested role of intelligence within the South African developmental state, the WhitePaper on Intelligence further observes that: *"(…) modern intelligence can thus be described as organised policy related information, including secret information"* (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994, p.2).

4.6 The Intelligence Services Act (1994)

4.6.1 Background

This act outlines the specific mandates and roles, and responsibilities and functions of stakeholders within the intelligence sector. Specifically, this act establishes the functions and roles of the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service (The Intelligence Services Act, 1994, p.4).

4.6.2 Development scope

This act gives effect to the intelligence sector members' roles and responsibilities and as such it invokes the intelligence services to perform duties aimed at facilitating development through security. In other words this act aims to provide the operational actions and jurisdictions that collectively inform the security environment's roles in facilitating development.

4.7 The National Strategic Intelligence Act (1994)

4.7.1 Background

The National Strategic Intelligence Act provides for the roles and responsibilities of the NIA, the SASS, the NICOC; which exist under the collective banner of civilian intelligence. The act defines the parameters, powers and jurisdictions of these institutions relative to the state and its agenda.

4.7.2 Development scope

This act makes provision for the participation of the intelligence services in "*departmental intelligence"*. The act defines departmental intelligence as: *"intelligence about any threat or potential threat to the national security and stability of the republic which falls within the functions of a department of state"* (National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, p. 2). In this regard, intelligence's role in the cooperative governance aspect of governance is highlighted.

In the context of this research, this idea of the dovetailing roles of departments of state is key to operability of the security/development link by intelligence. The case of the incidents of protest and rioting may be used to juxtapose the roles of the Department of Provincial and Local Government, the Department of Public Service and administration and the Public Service Commission, with the National Intelligence Agency in the creation of the said early warning system for example. The use of intelligence knowledge and information as well as knowledge resources resident in the above mentioned institutions may be used to provide constructive service delivery interventions.

4.8 The WhitePaper on Defence (1996)

4.8.1 Background

While defence policy is not directly related to the formation or the roles and functions of civilian intelligence, its importance is in the harmonious relationship that must exist between national security policy and other government policy. In this regard the WhitePaper on Defence acknowledges a shift in security thinking towards defining security as an *all-encompassing condition.* Further that; *"national security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and the needs of South Africa's people (…)" (*WhitePaper on Defence, 1996, p.5).

4.8.2 Development scope

Crucially, the WhitePaper on Defence locates its own goals of transformation and development parallel to government's own imperatives and programmes on development. The WhitePaper cites the RDP as a foundational document in the construction of defence policy. It also cites socio-economic deficiencies and the absence of essential services as threats to the people and indirectly to the state (WhitePaper on Defence, 1996, p.3).

4.9 The WhitePaper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997)

4.9.1 Background

The WhitePaper on Transforming Public Service Delivery gives effect to a more efficient and effective service delivery system in particular and public sector in general. While not immediately concerned with security, the ideals espoused and promoted here are applicable to the whole of the public sector including the security sector. The goal of the programme is therefore to improve service delivery and in this regard, it is concerned with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of services through the adherence to The 8 Batho Pele principles (WhitePaper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997, p.5). This document crucially acknowledges its roots in the RDP in terms of its bias towards people vis-à-vis the basic needs identified by the RDP. The WhitePaper also acknowledges the applicability of the Batho Pele principles to the security sector, including the intelligence services (Ibid).

4.9.2 Development scope

The Batho Pele principles are an attempt to organise the public sector towards the single goal of putting people first; the WhitePaper on transforming public service delivery insists; *"The Batho-Pele message is that the customer comes first, last and all the time. Batho-Pele does not promise the impossible. It asks public servants to commit themselves to the limits of what is possible; and then to push on to the next goal. If the initiative is to achieve its aims, public servants at every level, from the very top to the most junior, must understand it and support it. Batho Pele must become the watchword of the new South African public service."* (WhitePaper on Transforming Service Delivery, 1997, p.23). In this regard, the Batho Pele principles are speaking the same language as that of *a development hegemony* and by extension, that of this study in terms of adopting a people centred model of conceptualising national security, which necessarily involves a development engendering intelligence regime.

4.10 The WhitePaper on Safety and Security (1998)

4.10.1 Background

The WhitePaper on Safety and Security recognised the need to shift from authoritarian policing methods to methods synonymous with a state in transformation. In this regard the NCPS released in 1996, plays a key role in the paradigm shift that has occurred in the safety and security sector. The NCPS advocated a shift from an exclusive focus on crime control to include crime prevention. Crime prevention is a policing strategy that seeks to undercut the "social causes of crime", advocating for an approach that recognises that there are social causes for crime and that these causes generally take the form of underdevelopment challenges such as poverty, unemployment and human insecurity (WhitePaper on Safety and Security, 1998, p.12). Crime prevention is therefore a strategy that seeks to go beyond the superficial cause and effect methodology of crime control strategies in order that future strategies emanating from this sector deal with both root causes and effects.

4.10.2 Development scope

The WhitePaper observes for instance that; **"**(…) social crime prevention is aimed at reducing the social, economic and environmental factors conducive to particular types of crime. Targeted crime prevention strategies must focus on the individual offender or victim and the environment in which they live. For example, research conducted in the Northern Cape which is supported by police docket analysis suggests that high alcohol consumption (a result of historic distribution policies in wine growing areas) plays a key contributing role in some types of crime, particularly, assault, domestic violence**,** rape and murder. A multi-faceted strategy is therefore required to effectively undercut these crimes. This may require new alcohol control and distribution policies, programmes that will consider environmental factors (the position of shebeens in relation to schools), victim support as well as policing (regular patrols of high crime areas and enforcing of alcohol related laws)"(WhitePaper on Safety and Security, 1998, p.16). What is noteworthy here is that the WhitePaper recognises the need to create "a new way of thinking about old problems" in much the same way as service delivery at local government should be of concern to an intelligence establishment that is anxious to find solutions to enhance development by focusing on the root causes of protest rather than its superficial effects.

CHAPTER 5: A Diepsloot case study

5.1 Introduction

According to Yin, case studies afford research enquiries the ability to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events (Yin, 1994, p.3). In this regard, the Diepsloot case allows this research to be able to say for instance that, because the "third force" investigations by the intelligence services seem to have not contributed to alleviating further protest action in other areas over similar issues or furthering Diepsloot's own development agenda by better understanding and resolving the governance challenges; how then does intelligence reposition itself to firstly, be better placed to respond in case of the same eventuality in future? Secondly, is there a role for the Diepsloot case (and others like it) in this introspection that must be undergone by intelligence? This line of thinking is predicated on the protest incidents having led the intelligence community to posing questions regarding their role in the sometimes competing goals of alleviating insecurity and engendering development.

Yin further observes that; the *why* and *how* questions in qualitative research often require the use of case studies because they are explanatory, in that they require the use of *competing explanations of the same events* or phenomena (Yin, 1994, p.7). In the case of this research for instance, the research topic, "the role of the intelligence services in service delivery"; when decomposed, leads to the follow-up question, why must intelligence be involved in service delivery? Which in turn elicits the follow-up question, how can intelligence be involved in service delivery?

The answers to the above questions seemingly lie in understanding security in the context of the South African development challenge as it exists in Diepsloot (and other areas), which may help the intelligence community to glean information about how to, not only manage protest incidents in future, but also to be a role player in engendering development. Since it is the contention of this research that the case of protest in Diepsloot presented the intelligence services with a dilemma vis-à-vis intelligence's role in investigating such a phenomenon; Diepsloot has been selected as a case study to speak to this argument.

5.2 Background

On July 5 2004, incidents of protest and rioting began in Diepsloot over what was (or presumed to be) service delivery failures over housing provision. According to initial reports, 3000 residents of that area had taken to the streets demanding that councillors be sacked over poor service delivery and the lack of communication (Sunday Times, 2005, May 29). In the aftermath of these protests it emerged that the major issue fuelling the protests were rumours that residents were to be moved to Brits, in the North West Province, 45 Kilometres away (www.joburg.org.za, 25/08/2005). As events unfolded it became clear that there were other matters at play both from the side of the local government officials and from the side of the community and community organisations. According to municipal officials for instance, Diepsloot-SANCO members in collusion with some community members were fuelling the protests. On the SANCO side, the problem apparently lay with the ward officials' incapacity and lack of communication.

In the midst of the ensuing finger pointing between local and regional municipal staff, and provincial officials on the one hand and the local SANCO branch executive committee, the local ANC branch and other community members on the other; the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) was called in to investigate "third force" activity. It is not clear exactly who requested the involvement of the NIA in the Diepsloot case, or if it was a proactive exercise on the NIA's part. What is apparent is that the NIA's involvement in investigating the protest phenomenon increased as the incidents of protest spread across the country's provinces to the Free State, Mpumalanga, Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape, etc (Mail and Guardian, 2005, May 27-June 2).

5.3 Vital statistics

As can be seen on the map below, the City of Johannesburg is divided into 11 regions, where each region is endowed with the responsibility for the region's; housing, basic needs provision and social-development, health, local community-based services as well as recreational facilities (www.joburg.org.za, 25/08/2005). Diepsloot is a township located in the north of Johannesburg between the affluent suburbs of Dainfern and Chartwell. It has a growing population of roughly 150 000 people living in an area; 5.18 square kilometres in size (Ibid). In the year 2000, local councils were amalgamated in order that councils may be closer to communities.

Figure 1



(Source: www.joburg.org.za, retrieved 25/08/2005)

Diepsloot has an increasing influx of people from rural areas as well as people who have been relocated to the area since 1994. According to the CASE Report (2004), commissioned by the City of Johannesburg, Diepsloot is informally divided into ten sections and Section 1 which covers Reception area, is characterised by informal housing in the form of shacks as well as RDP housing (Case Report, 2004, p.44). In 1994 Zevenfontein residents were relocated to Diepsloot West and in 2001, 4 522 households were relocated to Reception Area (in Section 1) from Alexandra Township. At the time of the protests in 2004, most of the people occupying Reception Area did not qualify for subsidised housing (www.joburg.org.za).

Section 2 comprises People's Housing Process (PHP) stands earmarked for development; Tanganani (adjacent to Reception Area) comprises bond homes acquired through banks, Sections six, seven, eight and nine are characterised by RDP houses (CASE Report, 2004, p.44). Mayibuye, adjacent to Section 5, comprises service stands and bordering Mayibuye is an informal area consisting of around 2000 shacks (Ibid). There are currently de-densification projects underway, which require that people be moved from areas which have been earmarked for housing development. When juxtaposed against the increasing influx into Diepsloot, the enormity of the problem can be better understood.

Figure 2



(Statistics SA, 2004)

The graph above depicts the types of dwelling structures found in Diepsloot. The informal dwelling structures referred to here represent shacks. The highest number of dwelling types are stand-alone shacks which are 9 737 in number. Diepsloot also has a significant number of people who have informal shack dwellings in the backyards of houses with recognised stands. This number stood at 6 105 households at the time of this survey being conducted.

FIGURE 3



(Statistics SA, 2004)

According to the Joburg City metro's website, the unemployment rate in Diepsloot is estimated at 46% of the total population. 73% of the residents live below the poverty line (www.joburg.org.za). In the graph above the large majority of households have no source of income and this graph depicts the number of households without income to be at 7 999.

In a report on the state of poverty commissioned by The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC Report, 2000); the report noted that there was a correlation between lower levels of income and the higher use of natural resources like land, energy and especially water (GJMC report, 2000, p.1). In simple terms, poor communities are doubly condemned because their poverty status makes them more likely to deplete the natural resources of their area because they are more reliant on such basic natural resources. The GJMC study observes that poorer communities with limited or ineffective urban management resources and guidance tend to be more prone to depleting their ecosystem (GJMC report, 2000, p.1). In the case of the 7 999 cited households in the graph for example, their access to land energy and water is disturbingly low. This means that any redress efforts must take into consideration the ecological damage sustained because of acute poverty.

This assertion is made bleaker by the idea that even those residents in poor communities who are upwardly mobile or have access to better income levels have to emigrate from poor communities to access better services because certain infrastructure requirements are not in place in those poor communities. An example cited by Bond is that of pit latrines, where, whole infrastructures of water-borne sanitation are required, meaning that whole communities must be able to afford the infrastructure for it to be developed (Bond, 2003, p.45).

Figure 4



(Statistics SA, 2004)

Since the GJMC report also observes that natural population growth mixed with the migration of people into the city has resulted in a housing problem (Ibid). It is prudent to add that the housing problem is compounded by the historical legacy of the policies of apartheid; this trend manifests in the high cases of backlogs. In Diepsloot this has meant that the tenure status of residents in this area is unstable because the large majority of people do not own the land they occupy and thus, for the most part, do not qualify for subsidised housing.

A problem with discrepancies over land rights such as those observable in the graph below, insists Bond, is that they are a huge potential source of conflict (Bond, 2003, p.187). This conflict may manifest in the lack of basic services such as water, sanitation and electrification because individualised services are not accorded to those who the municipality does not recognise within demarcated zones (Bond, 2003, p.188).

A related problem is that those that hold tenure rights will tend to access benefits that the untenured community members do not have access to, and thus, if gone unchecked, this could lead to unequal development (Ibid). As is evident in the graph, the large majority of people in Diepsloot occupy dwellings rent-free. When compared against figure 1 above, this implies that the large majority of people in Diepsloot are occupying land illegally and such occupation tends to be in the form of informal housing.

5.4 Diepsloot interviews

The research interviews and findings are divided into the findings on the Diepsloot case in this chapter and the interviews and findings on the security environment in the next chapter. Within this section the people interviewed were, Sarafina Mlauzi (a ward councillor), Corneall Nell (a district manager, region 1, Diepsloot), as well as the SANCO executive committee in Diepsloot.

5.4.1 Sarafina Mlauzi (ward councillor) (dated: 11/08/2005)

The interview began with the interviewer asking the interviewee what she thought the causes of the protests in Diepsloot were. The councillor answered that the protests were caused by a rumour that people were going to be relocated to Brits. She also added that the reaction to this rumour was based on the idea that people come to Diepsloot with expectations of receiving houses and that this created the perception that people would lose out on such services if moved. She made the example of Cosmo city where people are flocking expecting development.

Asked whether she thought people were well within their rights or whether they went beyond such rights in protesting, she answered that she thought there was some underhandedness in terms of people with agendas deliberately misinforming people for their own ends. She claimed that she had called a meeting on the 30 June 2004, where she argues that she asked people where they had heard the rumour that they would be relocated. In terms of seeking this clarification from people, she alleges that even though she kept insisting that people would not be relocated, some people (allegedly the instigators of the protest) were persistent in their argumentation that they were going to be relocated. Following this meeting, she took leave of absence from work and went on holiday to Limpopo, during which time she received a call alerting her that there were people galvanising community members around Reception area, persisting with the rumour that people were being moved to Brits. Asked if SANCO had a part to play in all of this, she answered that SANCO rallied around personalities and that SANCO would not exist if certain individuals were not members. According to her, these individuals organise beyond SANCO structures in that they are also entrenched in the community, in this way they loom large in the politics of Reception area. According to the ward councillor; Diepsloot residents are more likely to be misinformed because “of the way we used to live”, implying a general lack of knowledge about governance systems.

Asked whether the NIA or police should be involved at community level, the ward councillor answered that these agencies should be involved; particularly when such protests get out of control. She questioned the logic of people burning title deeds and housing application forms if they claim that their complaints are related to receiving housing. In answer to a question relating to whether people had a fear of NIA she replied that people who feared NIA and other such structures, feared such structures because they had something to hide.

Asked if she thought the early warning system would be a viable solution to the problem of intelligence descending on communities, she answered that people would be better placed to provide information to intelligence structures about communities, effectively spying on their communities. She argued that this approach of using these types of people could solve the current problem between the councillors and community members particularly those community members agitating against local government officials.

5.4.2 SANCO executive committee (dated: 11/08/2005)

As explained above, the interview with the SANCO exco was problematic because although they insisted they had nothing to hide; they were reluctant to be recorded and wanted to know in detail, the reason for the research. In fact, SANCO-Diepsloot had to get permission for the interview meeting from the Gauteng structure of SANCO. During this conversation the gentleman from the SANCO Gauteng structure told the researcher that they needed to ensure that my intentions were not malicious, as SANCO-Diepsloot members had been victimised by security agencies at the behest of local and provincial government officials.

After assuring both the SANCO-Diepsloot exco as well as the Gauteng SANCO office that the research was strictly for academic purposes, the meeting was allowed to proceed. The exco members began by showing the researcher a copy of the alleged pamphlet, which announced that people would be moved to Brits. The pamphlet was an invitation to a council meeting where this issue of relocation to Brits was listed as an agenda item. Two things should be noted here; firstly, there was no way the researcher could determine the authenticity of this pamphlet, and secondly, even if this pamphlet was real, the issue was listed as an agenda item and was not necessarily the position of council officials and the municipality.

Beyond this, the researcher explained that the research was not immediately concerned with who was right or wrong but how this adversarial relationship between municipal officials and community members could be avoided in future. It is important to mention that even though the researcher avoided taking sides in the finger pointing between these two camps, the SANCO members felt that they were being victimised for speaking out against service delivery failures; and so to this extent, it was important to get their side of the story without taking sides and/or further heightening tensions.

According to the SANCO exco members, they were blamed for inciting the riots in Diepsloot and this began a wave of victimisation, which began with the branch chairperson of SANCO being arrested without a charge being laid against her. She was apparently accused of inciting people in the Reception area, area of Diepsloot. The exco members claim that they were not involved in inciting the protesters and that they were themselves called by an executive branch member of the ANC of that area who was leading a march before the rioting and vandalism began. They claim that they were surprised when the police arrived to arrest the SANCO branch chairperson. They claim that marching residents got upset when they heard that the chairperson had been arrested. This according to them is what sparked the incidents of violence, when some of the younger protesters decided to take it upon themselves to get violent.

The exco members claim that they have continuously complained to council members that the IDP process was selective and did not accommodate their inputs as a community organisation. One of the members claims that when she tried to attend an IDP meeting she was expelled from that meeting and told that SANCO had no jurisdiction and mandate for such matters. The members of the exco also alleged that they had complained about the pit-latrine system where; human waste had not been collected as scheduled and had started to overflow into the streets. They stated that it was the children who were most at risk because they were exposed to all types of ailments because they played in close proximity to where such waste was spilling. They also charge that there are cases of nepotism and corruption among council officials and that development is only taking place in extension 2. According to the exco, it was these complaints among others that caused friction between them and council officials such that they got blamed for inciting the protests.

5.4.3 Corneal Nell (District Housing Manager) (dated: 14/11/2004)

Corneal Nell is a District Manager in Region 1, where Diepsloot is located. The researcher began by asking her what the causes for the protests were. She remarked that the protests were not caused by service delivery failures, but that it was mostly a case of misinformation. She further observed that because of the land shortage in Diepsloot a system was introduced where, Reception area was supposed to be a transitory area where people waited while their RDP houses were being built. The problem according to her is that people do not vacate the transitory land in Reception area but usually opt to rent it out, and so this area has become progressively overpopulated. She claims that the problem is further aggravated by the fact that some people in Reception area are not South African citizens and thus do not qualify for RDP housing.

According to this manager, the misinformation was spread by community organisations such as SANCO and the local PAC. The media then exacerbated the issue by giving otherwise frustrated community members a forum to speak when there had been no consensus at community level. She acknowledges however that the frustrations are well founded and that people feel neglected while the municipality feels overwhelmed.

Asked about the proposed early warning system, she commented that she thought it would be useful for the purpose of "filling the gap" between the time of identifying problems and the time of intervening to remedy such problems. According to her, a persistent problem is that of the registration and management of RDP housing being administered by provincial government while local government is the point of contact at community level. She claims that this problem persists because provincial and local government do not perceive the housing problem the same.

While noting that it was well within the rights of people to protest, she also noted that the protestors' burning the municipal offices was self-defeating because the process of service delivery in that area was the casualty in these acts of sabotage. According to this manager, government is not doing badly in service delivery terms, given the fact that there is an influx problem from rural areas and neighbouring countries in areas such as Diepsloot.

5.5 Findings and analysis

From all of the interviews conducted, barring the SANCO interview, it appears that the interviewees blame miscommunication for causing the protests and they do not perceive communication as part and parcel of service delivery. It should be taken into account that in the SANCO interview, SANCO blamed service delivery failures for the protest. It is useful to also note that all the interviewees who cited miscommunication as causally linked to the protests to the exclusion of service delivery, were all in one way or another, municipal officials. In varying degrees however, all of the interviewees agree that there is a service delivery problem in Diepsloot.

In terms of the research question that seeks to find out if a causal relationship exists between the incidents of protest and service delivery failures, the finding listing miscommunication as the reason for the protests may be understood one of two ways. If communication of government plans and programmes of action is deemed as a separate process from service delivery, then the finding would seem to suggest that there is no link between the protests and service delivery failures. However, if a view that says, communication is an integral part of development planning and therefore part of the service delivery process, is taken (as is the case in this paper), then there does indeed exist a causal relationship between the protests and service delivery failures.

This view is supported by the idea that at municipal level the communication of plans and programmes of action is supposed to be performed by councillors and municipal officials after a thorough and exhaustive consultation process has occurred. Therefore failure to communicate information about whether or not people were going to be moved to Brits cannot be separated from the general process of policy adoption, implementation and service delivery. As previously mentioned, this paper is of the view that communication is part of the process of service delivery in that the community is only informed about government programmes and projects from municipal officials and it is because of this that municipal officials should not view communication as an aside to the service delivery process. This thinking is also highlighted in the Batho pele principles governing the management of the public service; where, communication is captured as one of the principles as well as an integral part of the effective delivery of efficient services. Specifically, the WhitePaper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (WTPSD) observes that as a minimum, information about services should be available at the point of delivery (WhitePaper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997, p.11).

Notwithstanding the reason for the protests however, this paper observed that there are service delivery bottlenecks in Diepsloot, some of which emanate independently from larger problems such as population influx, infrastructure underdevelopment, lack of education, HIV/AIDS and unemployment etc; while others emanate out of the lack of capacity of the municipality to adequately deal with providing services for such a large and deprived population.

In terms of the research question dealing with the meaning of service delivery failures from an intelligence viewpoint; protest action over (real or perceived) service delivery failures has now become widespread in many communities across South Africa and the implication and challenge for security agencies is to alleviate the threat of political instability without victimising those involved in such protests. The fact that members of the SANCO exco seemed apprehensive about being interviewed and felt victimised by the police and the NIA speaks directly to this issue. The researcher observed that these SANCO members had a fear that they were being targeted for victimisation, justified or not, this fear is undesirable from the point of view of constitutionality and affirming people within a democratic dispensation.

It may be argued that the insecurity felt by SANCO (because of being the target of state security agencies) is less a function of service delivery failures per se, and more a result of the consequences of their lawlessness or alleged involvement in inciting people to protest and to damage council property. Notwithstanding the legal implications, if the intelligence agency was to move from the above premise in trying to deal with such incidents, this would most certainly overwhelm the intelligence agencies (considering that the protests are now as widespread as they are) and possibly result in a legitimacy crisis for government.

Because of this paper's recognition and acknowledgement of the relationship of deep mistrust that exists on the ground in Diepsloot, this paper emphasises that arriving at a state of cordial relations between the different factions in that area will be a trying task. Recognising this, and keeping with the theme of enhancing service delivery from an intelligence point of view; this paper further endorses the usefulness of the early warning system in "closing the service delivery gap" in this area while preventing further threats. This entails that in answer to the research question interrogating whether the said early warning system would enhance service delivery, in the Diepsloot case, this research is of the view that the said early warning system would have identified the signs of imminent social unrest based on the breakdown in communication between the councillors and the community.

CHAPTER 6: Security sector interviews

6.1 Background

For the section below, the research relied on the three interviews conducted with a Colonel J.J. Huysamen in the SANDF, a NIA manager and a NIA analyst. These individuals in their different capacities are in one respect or another, involved with the discourse around transforming security broadly. Since the research covers different levels of the agenda to transform intelligence it was prudent that these different levels be represented in the data collected from interviews.

The colonel is an academic working in the defence sector, also at the forefront of operationalising the development approach advocated by the Defence in democracy policy. From a defence perspective it would be interesting to find out whether the militaristic approach still holds, given that the challenges presented to South Africa exist more in the sphere of development. While the colonel is not immediately involved in the intelligence environment; the security theory historically used to define intelligence emanates out of the military sphere; therefore, there exists a case for gaining insights from this field. The colonel's interview would speak to the broad research question that deals with the link between security and development and the question dealing with alternative methods of conceptualising security.

The NIA manager is involved from the point of view of being someone who has access to the discourse around the practice of ensuring a development supportive intelligence service. In this regard the NIA manager is someone that has and continues to contribute greatly to processes such as the NSF and eventually defining national security policy. This interview with the NIA manager would speak to the research questions that deal with alternative ways of conceptualising security and intelligence and finding out whether the current practices of intelligence are relevant to the South African context and reality. The NIA analyst has interacted with local government officials in Diepsloot and community organisations in that area. In his interactions, the NIA analyst is at the frontline of applying the *modus operandi* of intelligence at that level. In this regard, he is an interesting primary data source from which to establish whether or not the current approach, as far as interacting with individuals at this level, can be improved on and if so, how. This speaks to the research question that deals with the advantages and disadvantages of intelligence being involved at service delivery level.

6.2 Interviews

6.2.1 Colonel J.J. Huysamen (Air force Colonel, SANDF) (dated: 16/08/2005)

As mentioned in the limitations section above, the audiotape with Cnl. Huysamen was not audible and thus could not be transcribed, however, the researcher had notes from which a general outline of the discussion could be sketched. In response to a question regarding whether or not there exists a link between security and development and whether the national security policy should take these issues into account, the colonel responded that there needed to be a definition of development. In his view, there is a need to define development relative to economic growth and regional integration. The colonel was speaking to the idea that such a definition would need to take into account the difference between the perceptions around expectations, and actual production. In other words, when people understand what to expect they are less likely to have higher expectations than those that can be delivered. This would also serve to orientate security sector practitioners about where and how to locate themselves relative to socio-economic development.

Expanding on this, the colonel also observed that there were benefits present in south-to-south relations (among developing nations) that could serve as advantages to the debate about taking security forward. Particularly the solidarity among countries of the south that is not as widespread in the countries of the north. In this regard, he noted philosophies and principles such as that of Ubuntu and others found within Africa, that if harnessed, could serve as a basis from which to organise the link between security and development. The colonel is pointing out here that if we organise around the same values then in effect, the state that we would be developing or constructing would be the state of Africa, in that, the values that govern the different countries and their governments in Africa would be the same.

In answer to whether there was room for intelligence to be more responsive to developmental needs within its operations, Cnl. Huysamen observed that intelligence was involved with collecting and producing information and that such information had to be understood in a certain context or space, in a given time frame and so on, and only when it was understood in this way did the information become knowledge. The point being made here is that intelligence had to first ensure that there was a utility for information produced about the policy process involved.

In answer to whether there was scope for the creation of an intelligence-managed service delivery early warning system; the colonel crucially observed that early warning implies that something has already happened and so if one wanted to adopt a pre-emptive stance one would have to anticipate in advance, before the event. Pro-activeness according to the colonel requires the interpretation of signals or indicators that must have been determined beforehand.

6.2.2 NIA manager (dated: 20/08/2005)

The questions posed to the NIA manager were more or less the same theme as those posed to both the colonel and the NIA analyst. The researcher began by asking the manager what the current problems were with the *modus operandi* of the NIA relative to the challenges on the ground.

The manager observed that there was a need to focus on the intelligence functions of trend-spotting (extrapolation) and forecasting. Providing the examples of the recent strikes by labour movements; the manager noted that the intelligence function was located at the point of being able to predict the eventuality of the strike rather than retrospectively trying to determine the cause (or waiting for such a strike and identifying the "rabble rousers or culprits"). He further noted that the value of intelligence products was derived from their use and application in informing policy making and policy implementation. This manager further observed that a large part of accomplishing the ideal of useful intelligence was knowing what the "minister" (policy maker) wants and needs.

Carrying on with the analogy of the labour movements' strike action, the manager observed that the "usefulness" of intelligence, would come from the intelligence services predicting what issues the labour movements would rally around or seek redress on, prompting government to produce credible and viable responses to union demands in advance, and providing different scenarios of the consequences of not meeting union demands. The point being made here is that from a governance perspective, more intelligence value is derived from an intelligence product that focuses on predicting scenarios in advance and providing viable solutions to decision makers rather than focusing on reactive, investigative approaches which tend to retrospectively focus on individuals rather than the resolution of issues. According to the said manager, there still exists a culture within intelligence that borrows from the past where intelligence practitioners from former liberation movement intelligence structures as well as former apartheid structures who, because of their training relative to the challenges at the time, conceived of threats in terms of those contexts.

The philosophical tenets or ideology/ies that informed those methods of intelligence practice were those that can best be described as, "us against them". The "us and them" approach is meant to describe a method that focuses on singling out individuals who are challenging the status quo. Without casting aspersions, the manager stated that to a large extent this is still the thinking that informs intelligence practice.

In answer to whether widening (following the securitization methodology) is a relevant activity for intelligence, given that the imperatives already exist for a developmentally orientated state, the manager answered that there is more for intelligence to do in terms of facilitating development. Using the widespread incidents of protest the manager observed that the people involved in the protests were not organising against the state per se, but that they were in fact disappointed with the rate of delivery or lack thereof. This entails that intelligence should be able to observe and warn policy makers of impending problems stemming from not meeting people's needs. The manager further noted that intelligence should be involved in the discourse around, for example, assessing the bona fides of certain council officials vying for local government positions in order that intelligence can also be involved in ensuring that those who occupy public office are indeed fit to meet government-set deliverables in those communities. In this regard intelligence would be at the forefront of the development agenda, at least in as far as ensuring proper public representation.

6.2.3 NIA Analyst (dated: 08/09/2005)

The NIA analyst generally agreed that intelligence should play a role in service delivery, from the point of view of enhancing capacities. He argued that this was an existing mandate and was already happening. This analyst admitted however that there was a gap between what the intelligence community sometimes practices and what is identified as priority areas from a policy point of view. This analyst further observed for instance, that in the case of the protests in Diepsloot, residents were not informed about developments taking place in that area and those communication problems opened up a gap for people to be misled or misinformed. He therefore concluded that this vacuum allowed for other people, jockeying for political positions in the upcoming local elections, to use misinformation to mislead people in order to discredit local officials for their own ambitious ends.

Asked if there was room for intelligence to play a role in terms of identifying gaps in service delivery, the analyst answered in the affirmative. He further added that, local politicians "tell people what they want to hear" and that this made the case for the inclusion of covert collection of information in order for it to filter back towards enhancing the policy process.

The analyst also observed that the collection of overt information alone tended to limit the ability of intelligence agents to find out about certain phenomena like corruption for instance, further emphasising the need for covert collection along with open source information. Interestingly, the analyst argued for an early warning system before it was put to him that this would be the recommendation of this paper. He further remarked that there was already scope for a more development-oriented intelligence service in the current legislation and that it was the responsibility of the intelligence services to be proactive to this effect.

Asked about the creation of the said early warning system the analyst commented that indeed there was a need for such a system, but continued to add that such a system would need to encompass all spheres of government. In responding to the question around the early warning system and how it should encompass all problem areas such as taxi violence, water and sanitation issues and the RDP housing lists; the analyst stated that the protest itself must not be the focus for intelligence, observing instead that intelligence must concerned with why such protest is happening. According to the analyst, the MEC for safety and security has suggested that intelligence have offices within the provincial government structures so that they can be closely located to the processes they seek to enhance and safeguard.

6.3 Findings and analysis

In terms of the link between security and development, judging from the colonel's views, it appears that the South African military still conceptualises this link solely in outwardly focused terms. This however is not necessarily a negative prospect given that their activities are primarily based on external threats. In terms of the adoption of common values among states in Africa, this ideal is commendable and could potentially go a long way in terms of linking priorities and alleviating conflicts within the continent.

Although not the direct focus of this research, there is a case to be made for south-to-south cooperation enhancement, in turn, improving the domestic disposition of individual countries on the continent. A critical observation made by the colonel regards the conversion of intelligence information into knowledge. In this regard the idea of the service delivery early warning system would need to convert data and information about the policy process into knowledge, in order that policy makers use it in rectifying possible problem areas.

The colonel also observed that early warning happens after the chain of events possibly leading to a problem situation have begun. This means that the indicators that guide such a system must be such that they allow enough time to intervene with remedial measures. The creation of an intelligence-driven service delivery early warning system is predicated on the idea that it would be based on analysing the policy process in order to anticipate potentially problematic service delivery bottlenecks. In other words, whereas early warning systems have traditionally been used to pre-empt the spread of conflict or humanitarian disasters, their use in this context would be in the analysis of the policy processes to pre-empt policy failures and advise on viable alternatives.

The NIA manager stated that the functions of trend spotting and forecasting are important and should be paid more attention. In his use of the labour movements' strikes analogy; the manager underscored the idea that intelligence needed to speak to the real governance issues and not follow the "us and them" approach. For example, the logic of workplace striking is that it is a method of forcing that demands be heard and met by bringing pressure to bear on industry and industry managers and decision makers (rather than seeking to overthrow government). Since striking itself is well within the rights that people enjoy, it follows that intelligence need not focus on the individual instigators as a potential threat to the state, but rather, attempt to ensure that some kind of resolution is reached by forewarning policy makers in order that the economic loss sustained by the country is kept at a minimal. This view underscores the notion that from a democratic governance point of view, policy makers would be better placed to be forewarned about potential revenue loss from strike action rather than being informed about who instigated such action after the fact. Applying the same approach to the Diepsloot case; the intelligence value to be derived by policy makers would be in understanding the root causes of such protest so that such protest may be averted in future.

This is the context in which the NIA manager argues that to a large extent many intelligence practitioners are still stuck in the "us and them" approach of conducting intelligence. This may explain why, even though the policy on security and intelligence specifically makes the case for development-friendly approaches to security, the operations of intelligence (at least in the case of the protests) did not adopt such people-centred approaches. The NIA analyst crucially observed that the bias of intelligence towards development was already articulated in the policy giving effect to the functions of intelligence. This bias which was previously captured in chapter 4 in the section on the security policy environment is further captured in a tabular chart analysing security policy against the Diepsloot case in the appendix section of this paper.

As far as widening the scope of security using methodology of securitization, both the NIA manager and analyst argued that intelligence should already be seized with development-related concerns. The NIA analyst also observed that there was scope for the creation of the said early warning system. This paper agrees generally with the NIA analyst that such an early warning system would need to encompass all of government, even though it would be focused on service delivery. It is for this reason that the proposed system below is simply a conceptual model of how such a system would function, meaning that the nuts and bolts of such a system (such as what specific indicators would be used etc) would be subject of further research.

CHAPTER 7: Recommendations and Conclusion

7.1 Recommendations

7.1.1 The early warning system

Early warning systems originated in the American military sphere where they were used in the prediction and management of natural disasters. They have also been used in recent times in areas with the propensity for violent conflict or the potential for humanitarian disasters, as a mechanism for pre-empting and preventing conflict or humanitarian disasters within and between states (Hough, 2004, p.6).

This section attempts to introduce the early warning system within the context of monitoring and evaluating service delivery. The creation of an early warning system for service delivery is proposed on the following two bases; in the first place, that in the case of the protests against (perceived or real) service delivery failures (in Diepsloot and other areas) such a system may help government in distinguishing between service delivery failures and other limitations within the governance and policy processes. Secondly, such a system would allow the intelligence services to be proactive in the process of service delivery; in order to give effect to the earlier outlined security and development link. This assertion is reinforced by the idea that such a system could be introduced to "piggy-back" on already existing policy-making systems and intelligence-related functions.

Writing about monitoring and evaluation practice in South Africa, Levine observes that the Public Service Commission (PSC) in its role as the overseer of monitoring and evaluation in the public service, has often engaged other government departments about the creation of a transversal monitoring and evaluation system (Levine, 2004, p.3). These efforts have led to the identification of monitoring and evaluation practice as a priority area for governance in South Africa. Within Levine's suggested framework, different knowledge-specific areas would be designated to the departments where the requisite skills reside, for example, "value for money could be managed by National Treasury, human resource utility could be managed by The Department of Public Service and Administration etc (…)" (Ibid); (and as proposed by this paper) service delivery compliance issues could be managed by the intelligence sector.

Viewed in the above context the proposed early warning system would interact with the policy process seeking to ensure compliance (in terms of the relevant stipulated laws, regulations and development planning giving effect to that policy direction) and feeding back into the policy cycle as "intelligence information" to enhance the different stages of the policy cycle. The involvement of intelligence in the policy process in this regard would involve the use of policy-analytic methods and covert information to achieve the said support function. The IRI observes that the role of intelligence in supporting policy begins at the problem definition stage, in terms of enhancing the policy maker's understanding of the problem. The involvement then proceeds to the evaluation stage where intelligence may be involved in evaluating different alternatives (the intelligence role does not extend to decision making about which alternative is the best; intelligence may however present the likely scenarios of the chosen alternative/s).

The implementation stage places high demands on intelligence; this is because the executing arms of the state must constantly have their plans, actions, attitudes and approaches updated in order that the relevant actors stay on the policy-objective course. In effect, the involvement of intelligence in the policy support function exists to reduce any uncertainty about the policy environment.

Figure 5



Figure 5 is a rough sketch of how the proposed early warning system could work in terms of ensuring service delivery compliance at local government. The diagram outlines the basic policy process and the arrows between the stages denote the data sources for intelligence gathering about compliance levels. In other words, between the two outer arrows, the red one going back to the previous stage would be looking to gain information about how the current stage in the policy process was arrived at. Intelligence practitioners would be using various policy analysis tools and methods as well as covert and overt information and estimative tools to assess whether the requirements for compliance were met in the movement from one policy process stage to another. The blue arrow denotes intelligence that has been gained about a stage in the policy process in order that an assessment can be made about whether or not there is a problem foreseen.

These policy stages speak to annual planning cycles, budgetary cycles, and expenditure cycles etc, alike. This entails that at the problem identification/definition stage for example; an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) at local or provincial level takes into account the policy problem to be resolved. In this regard intelligence's role would be twofold; to ensure that the full extent of the problem is realised or defined (this would be part of the criteria determining the extent to which the chosen policy intervention is efficient and effective in dealing with the problem).

Furthermore intelligence may ensure, from a compliance viewpoint, that all necessary procedures and regulations are followed in implementing the chosen policy intervention. The same methodology could be applied at the implementation level to gauge whether the implementation is deviating from intended outcomes or on course to resolving the identified problem. This general methodology may be applied to other stages in the policy process.

Such an approach need not be in contradiction with any existing service delivery systems, but may serve as a/n support or (add-on) means to ensure the compliance of municipalities with service regulations to ensure efficient and effective implementation. Further, such a hybrid model would also generate projective and predictive information about the service delivery process. The dissemination of intelligence generated to a central locus in the presidency such as the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) (or a select Chapter 9 body), would prevent the problem anticipated by Hough of publicly disclosing covertly gathered information, leading to a compromise of sources and methods (Hough, 2004, p.7).

7.1.2 Analysis

In terms of specific service delivery failures, it is this paper's contention that the underdevelopment challenges faced by Diepsloot residents are common to other areas which are overpopulated and faced with poverty. Because of this, there is a need for a uniform solution applicable to all underdeveloped areas. Current monitoring and evaluation systems lack uniformity (Levine, 2004, p.3-4); therefore the introduction of such an early warning system may aid both service delivery in terms of an all-inclusive monitoring and evaluation system and intelligence vis-à-vis adopting a more development friendly modus operandi. This model is merely an illustration of how such a system could possibly work and so it may be researched and developed further, according to the particular specifications sought.

7.2 Conclusion

The central task of this paper was to conduct an enquiry into the research question; what is the link between security and development and how can this link be realised in the activities of intelligence facilitating development and service delivery. This enquiry was therefore an attempt to answer questions about the role of intelligence in service delivery in light of the incidents of protest, ostensibly over service delivery failures. To this end, the adopted methodology sought to establish the extent of the barriers and bottlenecks to service delivery in Diepsloot (if any), and the relationship between these barriers and the incidents of protest, as well as the intelligence services' positioning to deal with development broadly in light of insecurity challenges that may arise because of underdevelopment bottlenecks. The Diepsloot case shows the extent of deprivation that informs the need for concerted development efforts; however, the existence of such poverty and want seems lost on the current operations of intelligence, at least when judged by their response to the incidents of protest.

The hypothesis that informed this research took for granted that intelligence not only had a role to play in development broadly, but that this role was not one that hindered development and service delivery, but supported them. This hypothesis was based on the idea that the much publicised hue and cry by many (in the aftermath of the urban protests) about the "over-the-top" involvement of the intelligence services in investigating a third force, only identified half of the problem with this involvement. The furore about intelligence services' involvement mainly identified people's democratic rights being infringed as the main source of discontent. The hypothesis guiding this research attempted to go further; this research's central hypothesis identified a further problem as the limited conception, understanding and operationalisation of security within the South African context, relative to the challenges faced in the South African social reality. The objectives of national security policy, which inform the practice of the intelligence services, should be crafted such that they allow intelligence to maximise its utility in the facilitation of South Africa's development project.

Using the case study of the Diepsloot protests; the researcher interviewed the role players in that site and found that there were conflicting accounts of the reasons behind the protests. The councillors and municipal manager interviewed argued that the protests were not a result of service delivery failures but a result of faction fighting and jostling for political positions as well as a breakdown in communication. While the SANCO executive committee members interviewed argued that the protests were a result of service delivery failures.

The research observed and concluded that at the very least there was a breakdown in communication. While it is debateable, the research located communication as an integral part of the policy process, forming part of the planning process. This research therefore identified the need for governance structures in Diepsloot to be more accountable, and to ensure continuing consultation about the decisions taken on communities' behalf.

The findings on security were generally that the value of intelligence information was that it enhanced decision-making by political principals. Such that; the "us and them" modus operandi which *ex-post facto*, focused on individuals as instigators, was flawed, and that democratic political decision making stood to be enhanced more by an approach that dealt with the root causes of frustrations beforehand. In order for future social unrest to be pre-empted and allayed the research proposed the creation of an early warning system that requires the involvement of the intelligence services in a policy analysis role. There is a need for further research into the specific composition of such a framework.

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APPENDIX

ANALYSIS CHART

Legislative Framework	Objectives (values)	Objectives'-utility to Security	Diepsloot case (application)
INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1993)	**-**Socio-economic upliftment. -Provision of basic services. -Transformation of society towards "a better life for all" (Interim Constitution, 1993)	-Societal transformation, Socio-economic upliftment, basic services; are the bases for a more politically and socially secure environment.	**-**Security structures should be better placed to facilitate development and service delivery specifically.

RDP	-Six principles of RDP: • People-driven • Peace and security • Nation building • Linking reconstruction and development • Integrated & sustainable programme • Democratisation (RDP, 1994, p.4)	-A people-driven approach allows focus to be placed on development and minimises the chances of descent into regime-security model. -Nation building as an objective, fosters a more secure domestic environment (as far as political and social stability), because security cannot be separated from the goal of state building.	-The RDP as one of the main base-documents for the development project in South Africa informs intelligence theory and practise. The observation in the "security findings" section that indigenous knowledge systems such as Ubuntu which to some extent inform development within a public-sector context (as in the Batho-Pele principles) could also form the basis for informing national security theory and practice. -This also answers the research question posed, as to whether current security theory and practise is relevant to the South African social reality. In this regard, research and application of such philosophies could allow theory to speak to practise and visa-versa.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1996)	**-**Bill of rights (socio-economic rights). -Civilian oversight on security structure. -National security policy that facilitates development.	-The Clear distinction between police duties and intelligence duties is emphasised by the Constitution. This serves the dual purpose of limiting the power of the intelligence services while also demarcating for the use of executive powers.	-The Diepsloot case seems to point to the fact that miscommunication was a major factor leading to the protest action. However, communication should be viewed as an intrinsic part of the process of service delivery. -In terms of the research question that asks what service delivery failures' implications are for intelligence; socio-economic rights must also be guaranteed by national security policy. **-**Intelligence should be concerned with the councillors/municipalities' efficiency and effectiveness in executing their duties in order to enhance service delivery.

THE WHITEPAPER ON INTELLIGENCE (1994)	-Transformation of intelligence conception and practice. -Protection of fundamental rights (Bill of rights) contained in the constitution. -Promotion of "interrelated elements" of security, stability, cooperation and development. (WhitePaper on Intelligence, 1994)	-The transformation of the intelligence services is the basis for maximising its utility to the South African context and social reality. This transformation is also a manifestation of the broader regime paradigm shift. -The recognition of the "interrelated" nature of "security and development (…)" enhances our ability to indigenise the concept of security.	-The Intelligence WhitePaper details the basis for including socio-economic issues within the ambit of national security policy. As such Diepsloot is a case study on intelligence involvement in facilitating service delivery, albeit, the communication aspect of service delivery. -Instances of criminality are the responsibility of the police and intelligence should not be involved-the burning of municipal offices in Diepsloot is an issue of criminality.

THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACT (1994, 2000)	-Provides regulations that govern the administration and operations of intelligence. -Provides for the limitation of authority by demarcating the parameters of functions.	-Sets parameters for roles and functions within broad mandate. -This Act creates administrational guidelines by which Intelligence must be governed.	-While not immediately applicable to Diepsloot, the creation of administrational guidelines indirectly makes members within the Intelligence services accountable operationally and politically.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT (1994)	-Creation of NICOC and definition of roles and responsibilities. -Advocates gathering intelligence to aid government departments. -Identification of threats to republic or people.	-NICOC performs coordinating function in order that the "silo-effect" avoided. -Different departments have varying needs therefore departmental intelligence allows customised intelligence. -Although technically people are already incorporated in the state, the Act recognises that people may encounter threats that the state does not necessarily encounter.	-In terms of municipal failures (either to communicate service delivery or actually deliver services), intelligence intervention is warranted through the intergovernmental model of governance. -At this level the nature e of intelligence requirements must be re-conceptualised.

WHITEPAPER ON NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1996)	-National security conception broadened to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental matters. -Observes that the objectives of security policy are, inter alia; 1. "Ensuring individual citizens have access to resources and basic necessities of life." 2. "Ensuring the consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment (…), stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing" (WhitePaper on Defence, 1996, p.4)	**-**The broadened conception of National Security allows for wider threat matrices. -Provides for space to conceptualise South African Specific paradigms. -Enhances the bridges between development and Security.	-Acknowledgement of Security and Development link allows for people-centred paradigms therefore more empathetic methods of ensuring security and stability. - The Diepsloot protests may be recognised as a bi-product of underdevelopment and poverty rather than a security threat in themselves.

WHITEPAPER ON TRANSFORMING PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY (1997)	-Introduction of **8 Batho Pele** principles to enhance service delivery efficiency and effectiveness: • Consultation • Service standards • Access • Courtesy • Information • Openness and transparency • Redress • Value for money -These values form the guiding principles at all levels of government including the Intelligence Services	-The value of the Batho Pele principles is that they reemphasise the RDP notion that service delivery must be people-centred. -The Batho Pele principles derive broadly from the Constitutional principles (chapter 10) guiding the administration of the public service. As such, the intelligence services as the custodians of the constitution must as well seek to enshrine and even engender this people-centred approach in the public sector, particularly as it refers to service delivery.	-Crucially, the WPTSD observes that communication (read the information principle/value of the Batho Pele principles) is part of service delivery such that in the Diepsloot case the onus of informing the community that they would not be moved to Brits, still vested with the municipality. -These service standards also extend to the relevance of any intervention by intelligence in service delivery failures as in the case of Diepsloot. i.e. intelligence interventions/actions must move from a premise that enhances people's overall wellbeing rather than contribute to people's insecurity.

WHITEPAPER ON SAFETY AND SECURITY (1998)	-Advocates National Crime Prevention Strategy, which is a shift from crime management/ control to crime prevention. -NCPS brings together the state departments of Safety and Security, Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare, Defence, Intelligence, Health and Education (WhitePaper on safety and security, 1998, p.5)	-The NCPS recognises other social contributors to crime and advocates an all encompassing approach which seeks to alleviate the social causes of crime.	-The NCPS as a strategy applied to the Diepsloot case should recognise the difference between criminality and social protest. -In the case of the Diepsloot, SANCO chairperson who claims to have been arrested without formal charges being brought against her, if proven, may indicate a policing failure. -Related to this is the idea that councillors use police to clamp down on communities, if proven, this again may indicate safety and security failures.