

NIGERIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN PARALYSIS

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Abstract

Al-Qaeda's 11th September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the US were a watershed moment in international politics. The events spurred the US to launch the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which redefined global safety and security. The catastrophic 9/11 events ushered in a new era in international relations that placed security at the centre of an evolving geo-political discourse in a millennial era where the GWOT continues to be a priority over other equally important and challenging global crises. In this regard, high-profile militant extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State have captured the world's attention and hogged media headlines, attention on smaller groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria have been lackadaisical.

In this research, the difference between terrorism and insurgency are made clear; counter-terrorism strategies are explained within the Nigerian context and in terms of regional and international interventions; Nigeria's political and socio-economic environment under both former President Jonathan and current President Buhari are examined, and recommendations are provided on how best to align country specific counter-terrorism strategies in order to achieve sustainable stability and human security in Nigeria.

Declaration

I declare that this report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Security) at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

Theodora Segomotso Lecholo

28 February 2018

Dedication

For my husband Aobakwe Cornelius Pone, you're the wind beneath my wings. My daughter Myra Obakeng Pone, you're my joy. (I know you will add just one more crack to the glass ceiling). Both of you have made my life complete!

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACSRT	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AFRICOM	US Africa Command
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMEC	Afro-Middle East Centre
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Channel News Network
CTSIP	Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
DIY	Do It Yourself
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFCC	Economic Crimes Commission
eNCA	eNews Channel Africa

EU	European Union
GCTF	Global Counter-Terrorism Forum
GDP	gross domestic product
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAT	Interdisciplinary Assistance Team
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Islamic State
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NACTEST	National Counter-Terrorism Strategy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC	National Economic Council
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NSS	National Security Strategy
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNTF	United Nations Trust Fund
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Although there is lack of consensus on the definition of “terrorism”, the UN defines it “as criminal acts perpetrated against civilians and others with the purpose of creating a permanent state of terror” (UNSC, 2014). There is global consensus that the escalating frequency of acts of violence, the destruction of infrastructure and the rising fatalities negatively impact the socio-economic development and GDP growth rate of a country – all within the context of rising threats to international peace and security. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, acts of violence and jihad militancy are referred to as terrorism.

Global safety and security trends over the last two decades reflect that no country is immune to terrorist attacks or the infiltration of violent extremist groups such as IS, Al-Qaeda, AQIM, AQAP, Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Dasuki, 2014; GTI, 2017). The most catastrophic terrorist events on the African continent include the attacks at the Westgate Shopping Mall (September 2013) and at Garissa University College (April 2015) in Kenya, the attack at the Bardo National Museum (March 2015) in Tunisia and the kidnapping of 276 Chibok schoolgirls (April 2014) in Nigeria (Sesay & Busari, 2016; Taylor, 2014; Aronson, 2013). The latest incident in Nigeria occurred on the 19 February 2018 when armed insurgents attacked a government college in Dapchi, Yobe state and abducted 110 schoolgirls (Barron, 2018).

The research indicates that the upsurge in the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks, as well as the destruction caused, globally reflect that there is no alignment between terrorism, its root causes and the counter-terrorism strategies implemented in an effort to stem rising insurgency (Bamidele, 2014).

An impediment to effective counter-terrorism strategies is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of “terrorism” (GTI, 2017). The contention stems from the ambiguity regarding “who” commits terrorism against “whom” and “to

what ends” (Savun & Phillips, 2009; Rostow, 2016; Edwards, 2011; Vermeulen, 2014; Aronson, 2013). Academics generally agree that terrorism embraces the use or threat of violence and fear in order to coerce or to achieve political, religious and ideological goals and public attention by both state and non-state actors (Vermeulen, 2014; Mogire & Agade, 2011; Aronson, 2013; Williams, 2013). This understanding brings some agreement on defining acts of terror rather than terrorism itself.

In the absence of a universally accepted definition of “terrorism”, overarching security terms such as “extremism” and “radicalism” are embraced in this research. While extremism does not necessary include the use of violence, it reflects one's social or political values. That said, extremism – as it relates to terrorism –denotes that extremists can be radicalised and become receptive to terrorism, while radicalism refers primarily to extremism (Aronson, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2016). For the purposes of this report, the researcher acknowledges that in the later part of the 21st century, radicalism, extremism and terrorism have increasingly been merged into one framework and therefore these terms are used interchangeably and in the context of the definitions outlined above in reference to acts of terror (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Both the 2017 and 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reports indicate that Nigeria is ranked third among the countries worst hit by terror attacks. Statistics indicate that terror attacks across Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger rose from 32 in 2014 to 151 in 2015 (Nzwili & Kenworthy, 2016). These findings put the spotlight on the instability in Nigeria and elevate the security threat and risk posed by the insurgency not only on Nigeria's domestic interests but also those of the region and the international community at large. On the African continent, and specifically in Nigeria, counter-terrorism strategies combined with international intervention have been overwhelmingly militaristic. They gloss over addressing political and socio-economic dynamics vital to Nigeria's security and developmental growth (Dasuki, 2014). Using the cause-and-effect analogy, research has over time indicated that the causes of terrorism are grounded in the social-economic inequalities that marginalise disadvantaged populations. The “effects” are an increasingly disenfranchised population, enticed, recruited and radicalised into militancy, where violence becomes a form of revolt and expression of discontentment with the status quo.

The purpose of this research is therefore to explore the Nigerian government's responses and international stakeholders' intervention against Boko Haram in the context of Nigeria's vulnerable socio-economic, political and ideological fabric, which has contributed, to the militant group's rise. Country-specific counter-terrorism measures that are best suited and aligned to these realities that have enabled Boko Haram to thrive and destabilise Nigeria are outlined.

1.2 BACKGROUND

The US's post-2001 GWOT set the blueprint for hard-approach military counter-terrorism strategies as the all-encompassing response to violent extremist attacks globally (Rutherford, 2007). Nigeria was no exception. Decades of military dictatorship, a contentious Christian and Muslim religious divide with perceptions of a political system providing social services to Christians in the south and the marginalisation of an underdeveloped Muslim north set the stage for an aggrieved Islamic sect to mobilise against the government. These undesirable political and socio-economic conditions served to further widen the inequality between the country's population in the north and south. These challenges provided fertile ground for extremist groups to effectively exploit Nigeria's vulnerable and marginalised northerners, and use them as conduits to carry out violent attacks as a means of redressing domestic and regional socio-economic grievances (International Crisis Group, 2016; Aronson, 2013; Leuprecht & Hall, 2013; Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2008; Mwangi, 2012; Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010; Matthaei, 2014).

In the early 2000s, a small Nigerian Sunni Islamic sect called Boko Haram advocated for the economic liberation of marginalised Nigerian northerners frustrated with the lack of socio-economic development provided by the political system. Boko Haram means, "Western education is forbidden", yet a deeper comprehension of the term implies that the Western way of life /ideology is taboo and should be despised (Agibi, 2016; Al Jazeera, 2016). It is during this period that the bombing of Christian churches and mosques became prevalent, followed by acts of retaliation (Minchakpu, 2001; Nda-Isaiah, 2017). Central to Boko Haram's ideology is the call for a caliphate to replace the Nigerian state and return to traditional Islamic rule whereby Sharia (Islamic law) will become the supreme law (Baker, 2015; Taylor, 2014; Odesanya, 2017; Dorrell, 2015; Weston, 2016).

In response to the growing Boko Haram threat in 2009, former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan deployed 20 000 troops to the country's northeast states (AMEC, 2014; Dorell, 2015). The deployment inevitably led to clashes between Nigeria's security forces and Boko Haram, culminating in the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's founder Muhammad Yusuf and the torture and killing of not only Boko Haram members but also other Muslim youth and civilians (Agibi, 2016; Bishop, Naga, 2017 & Baker, 2015). In addition, Boko Haram's infrastructure was destroyed and hundreds of militants were arrested without being charged (Taylor, 2014; Kurzan, 2014).

The Nigerian government's onslaught on Boko Haram had repercussions and further fuelled revenge tactics, helping it to galvanise and strengthen its membership to an estimated militia structure of 5000 members (Agibi, 2016; Baker, 2015). Although Boko Haram's leaders did not initially target foreign interests, a suicide bomber targeted a UN building in Abuja in August 2011. This signified a change in Boko Haram's tactics and Western interests became targets, suggesting that foreigners and foreign interests were no longer off limits (Taylor, 2014; Dorell, 2015; Ploch, 2014). The change in tactical warfare became even more evident in 2013, when Boko Haram became even more radical under the new leadership of hardline Abubakar Shekau. In 2015, Boko Haram pledged loyalty to IS and this allegiance was reflected in its anti-Western and anti-Christian rhetoric which not only called for revenge through jihad but also for a caliphate (Kurzan, 2014; Ewi, 2017).

With airstrikes killing the militia's senior leadership, Boko Haram's new strategy allowed for decentralised power through the formation of autonomous, progressively violent and clandestine militia cells heeding the call for jihad and killing indiscriminately (Agibi, 2016; Baker, 2015; Taylor, 2014). Boko Haram seized territory, amassing weapons and machinery abandoned by the Nigerian army (Agibi, 2016; Baker, 2015). In addition, they conducted more massacres and mass kidnappings and bombed churches, mosques, businesses, schools, markets, commercial and agricultural centres, students and teachers, and villages. Boko Haram received even more worldwide attention on 14 April 2014, after the kidnapping of 276 Chibok schoolgirls sparked an international outcry. Social media campaigns such as #BringBackOurGirls and global civil society protests drew global attention not only to the Chibok crisis but also to the overall security threats in

Nigeria and its immediate neighbours, which include Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Kurzan, 2015; Agibi, 2016; Otas, 2015).

Former president Jonathan's administration was criticised for his militaristic response to Nigeria's security challenges, including executing thousands of Boko Haram militants. That said, the growing frequency and escalation of violent attacks indicated that the execution of the militants did not diminish the growing threat posed by Boko Haram (Berman, 2014; Taylor, 2014). The high levels of loss of human life led to the international community alleging that human rights violations, including extra-judicial executions, had been perpetrated not only by Boko Haram insurgents but also by the Nigerian security forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations. Amnesty International specifically accused senior officers of former president Jonathan's administration of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, which culminated in the restriction of foreign aid and assistance to Nigeria (Taylor, 2014; Jones, 2014). In mid-2015, Amnesty International released a report indicating that the Nigerian army had detained more than 20 000 civilians in brutal conditions and killed an estimated 8000 civilians during its counter-terrorism strategy to eliminate Boko Haram insurgents (Rogo, 2015; Shetty, 2014).

Furthermore, the 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls and the most recent February 2018 abduction of 110 schoolgirls from Dapchi, Yobe state continues to cement sentiments of the ineffectiveness of Nigeria's security sector. Former president Jonathan's administration was marred by allegations of high-level corruption, incompetence and mismanagement of Nigeria's security agencies (Otas, 2015; Kurzan, 2015; Walker, 2017). With about US\$5,9 billion of its national budget allocated to the security apparatus, the Nigerian government was criticised for failing to respond timeously, effectively and sufficiently to prevent the kidnapping, due to what it claimed were lack of resources and military equipment and boots on the ground (Matthaei, 2014; Otas, 2015; Taylor, 2014; Berman 2014; Amnesty International, 2014). The kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls fuelled the Muslim-Christian divisions and ideology that continue to destabilise West Africa (Campbell, 2016). The Nigerian government's negotiations for the girls' release have not yielded a positive outcome as 100 girls remain in captivity (Odesanya, 2017; BBC, May 2017). Furthermore, Boko Haram's rhetoric to establish an Islamic caliphate has stoked international fears over the insurgents' growing ideological influence and

ability to expand their violent attacks beyond Africa to encompass Europe and the US (Ploch, 2014).

A point of contention between Nigeria and the international community is that Nigeria's harsh counter-terrorism policies have been ineffective and that its military conduct against Boko Haram borders on human rights violations. The international community has also raised concerns about the Nigerian government's ability to protect its civilians and military equipment when conducting military operations (Rogo, 2015). Based on this, Nigerian's military practices are often at odds with international humanitarian and human rights laws as outlined in the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Taylor, 2014). This led the US, the UK and France to impose restrictions on direct military assistance in the form of supplying weapons to the Nigerian army, military co-operation such as limiting the number of foreign troops and providing only experts and advisors to support Nigerian operations, and attaching conditions to financial assistance for the Nigerian military (Taylor, 2014).

However, the international community's counter-terrorism strategies on the African continent have exacerbated and rolled back any gains against extremists by fuelling radicalisation through mismatched African and Western security priorities. The perceived security threats have sparked Western countries' fear of the African continent evolving into a haven for international terrorism that threaten the desired stability for the extraction of oil and minerals from Africa's energy and mineral producing states. Western countries mainly focus on whether their counter-terrorism measures promote their national interests on the African continent instead of implementing strategies that comprehensively address the continent's wider security threats (Francis, 2010). The GWOT-oriented policies on the African continent have been heavily invested in the hard-approach premise that promotes military intervention, sanctions, execution of targeted individuals and specialised security training (Francis, 2010; Rutherford, 2007). This research questions monolithic counter-terrorism approaches that lack ideological and socio-economic characteristics specific to a country's security requirements (Francis, 2010; Rutherford, 2007). It argues that counter-terrorism policies have been based mainly on a security-driven solution drawing Africa closer to becoming the next frontier of war against terrorism. These policies have promoted the use of hard power interventions that have produced short-term military gains rather than a

comprehensive paradigm shift incorporating combinations of long-term ideological, judicial, religious, political and socio-economic strategies at a local, regional and global level (Rutherford, 2007).

Thus, this research questions the effectiveness of the current hard-approach counter-terrorism strategies as the main policy tool to curb the rise of radical extremists. As suggested by Bayo (2012), King and Murray (2001) the researcher explores the criticism levelled at counter-terrorism measures on the African continent that were drafted solely through a realism prism which assigns more weight to addressing security concerns by militaristic means instead of using a more comprehensive multipronged approach that also addresses socio-economic security.

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Boko Haram killed more than 12 000 people in terror attacks in Nigeria between 2013 and 2015 (GTI, 2017). The dire security climate required an urgent response, which came in the form of the introduction of the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). However, Nigerians viewed former president Jonathan's strategies as weak and insufficient; and in May 2015, they elected a new president who pledged to collaborate with several international stakeholders to eradicate Boko Haram. By 2016, trends showed that Boko Haram, IS, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had become the four most deadly militant groups responsible for 59% of deaths worldwide (GTI, 2017). Boko Haram has increased its capability and reach, and accelerated the frequency and intensity of suicide attacks and bombing of targeted locations (Al Jazeera, 2017). Therefore, the researcher argues that the use of military force to thwart the growth of the insurgency has not efficiently or effectively addressed the threat (Agibi, 2016; Dorell, 2015, Nzwili, 2014).

Furthermore, the centralised militarist approach of counter-terrorism strategies in Nigeria threatens to plunge the Sahel region into a prolonged crisis of instability posing a serious security and humanitarian threat. Concerns also exist over domestic terrorism evolving into transnational terrorism in West Africa involving terror groups and criminal syndicates (Zenn, 2014). Despite the implementation of various counter-terrorism strategies in Nigeria, the threat of transnational terrorism remains a high risk, with terrorist groups coordinating, collaborating and consolidating their

resources in terms of funding, military training, and the expansion of their networks and territorial reach (International Crisis Group, 2016; Zenn, 2014).

There is also concern that the continent's porous borders, illegal migration and the proliferation of small arms may not only create an enabling environments for terrorist activities but also that the continent may be used as a conduit and haven for terrorist activities or to plan terror attacks against countries further afield (Zenn, 2014). The frequency and escalation of violent attacks signifies the ineffectiveness of the current counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2016). This highlights what experts have repeatedly called unsuitable, inadequate and inappropriate damaging solutions to domestic and international terrorism (Bamidele, 2014; Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2008).

1.4 RESEARCH KNOWLEDGE GAP

The upsurge in militia attacks reveal that Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies have focused on addressing the symptoms of terrorism. Security strategies tend to be written for traditional threats with the primary aim of using the military as a counter-measure, which have proved insufficient for evolving threats (Francis, 2010). In other words, Nigeria has aggressively implemented short-term strategies involving military engagement that provide immediate quick results such as the elimination of Boko Haram's leadership. The government has neglected to implement long-term strategies to address the deep-rooted socio-economic grievances of Nigerians in the north of the country. The researcher seeks to challenge state-centric and traditional approaches to terrorism and explore solutions that address the 21st-century human security paradigm as a whole (Francis, 2010).

By outlining the context of the situation in Nigeria, the researcher aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on Nigeria's terrorism threats in the context of the political and socio-economic environment on the African continent in order to fully understand the root causes of Islamic extremism on the continent. The continent's strained and extreme socio-economic, cultural, religious and political climate act as a catalyst indirectly compromising its socio-economic security (Francis, 2010). Left unchecked, these social issues increasingly become interlinked and compounding challenges that defy traditional monolithic security responses (Francis, 2010).

Therefore, the focus on hard approaches has been at the expense of finding long-term sustainable anti-terrorism approaches invested in aligning Nigerian's counter-terrorism strategies to not only traditional state security threats but also human security challenges (Francis, 2010). This, in the long run, will cement a vortex of violence incapable of being halted without conscious and effective smart strategies and responses (Francis, 2010).

The state of development on the African continent has left government institutions in paralysis, with minimal capacity to handle issues of governance and socio-economic challenges (Francis, 2010). Therefore, identifying and putting mechanisms in place to address country-specific, underlying socio-economic challenges should be regarded as a fundamental prerequisite for addressing issues of radicalisation, extremism and violent attacks in an effort to restore peace and stability in Nigeria.

1.5 RESEARCH RATIONALE

Although there is extensive research literature on terrorism and specifically counter-terrorism, in the last decade terrorism has evolved and become more complex. It remains a global phenomenon and one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, economic development and social integration. In the case of Nigeria, terrorist attacks continue unabated as a clear indication that militarist and state-centric counter-terrorism strategies are ineffective and insufficient (Vermeulen, 2014; Aronson, 2013; Agibi, 2016). Anti-terrorism strategies have failed to act as early warning preventative mechanisms. Nigeria has struggled with minimal success to achieve sustainable peace, security, stability and development, which has directly affected the country's economic growth and the region's sustainable developmental goals (Taylor, 2014). The conflicting nature of the various counter-terrorism approaches has obscured the ability to gain a deeper understanding of the emerging and evolving security threats and adequate mechanisms to thwart the increasingly frequent violent attacks (Francis, 2010)

The counter-terrorism approaches have not been aligned to the nuanced and unique characteristics of different countries. Furthermore, the implementation of the overemphasised “pre-packaged”, “one size fits all” and “cookie cutter” militaristic approach has obscured and constrained comprehension of the enormous challenges

presented by terrorism as an evolving global threat and the opportunities to pursue comprehensive and effective counter-terrorism strategies. Therefore, research is needed to review strategies in pursuit of more effective, implementable solutions to attain sustainable peace and security in Nigeria.

The researcher explored additional and complementary nuanced and unique interventions and initiatives the Nigerian government, civil society and international players need to collectively adopt counter-terrorism measures that yield long-term effective results. Although terrorism and counter-terrorism have been extensively researched, terrorism as a specific area of research within the security sector is constantly evolving and therefore it is import to define how the African continent collectively defines terrorism by recognising the underlying causes (and not just the symptoms) threatening the continent's developmental and peace and security initiatives. In particular, this research will shed light on understanding the challenges and opportunities posed by terrorism in Nigeria, mainly due to the embedded unique and specific political and socio-economic characteristics of Nigeria's landscape and regional dynamics.

1.6 PURPOSE STATEMENT

The purpose of the research is to explore and explain the counter-terrorism interventions and responses Nigeria and international stakeholders have taken, and to explain the shortcomings in the adopted counter-terrorism approaches. The researcher will outline what ought to be done to align country-specific counter-terrorism strategies to Nigeria's political and socio-economic conditions.

The research aims to provide holistic short- and long-term interventions to strengthen Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies by addressing political, socio-economic and ideological challenges embedded in the country's social fabric.

Comprehensive, country-specific counter-terrorism strategies are needed, as standardised military responses prescribed in current counter-terrorism strategies have been ineffective. Multipronged or comprehensive strategies are needed to not only address the symptoms of terrorism but also the deep-rooted causes of terrorism.

The three key research questions are:

- (1) What were the factors that led the Nigerian authorities to adopt a militaristic counter-terrorism approach in response to Boko Haram?
- (2) To what extent has Nigeria's counter-terrorism approach addressed the threats posed by transnational terrorism?
- (3) What policy interventions are required to address and ultimately resolve the deep-seated roots of organised terror in Nigeria?

1.7 CONCLUSION

This first chapter introduced the research and the background outlining the rising instability in Nigeria and the world over as a result of frequent violent attacks caused by militant insurgents. The research problem was represented, as well as the research gap. The research rational was outlined, and the chapter ended with the research purpose statement. The next chapter will provide the review of the literature, which will be followed by the research design and methodology in chapter three that utilises both primary and secondary data collection tools. The fourth chapter will provide the presentation and analysis of the results. Chapter five which is the final chapter will present the data interpretation and summary of the research findings.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the literature review is to provide a general framework on the subject of terrorism and the various counter terrorism approaches that are implemented to curb the rising instability caused by the frequent violent attacks. This chapter will focus on the political environment that enables terrorism to flourish. The chapter also discusses the various counter terrorism efforts and challenges that both the former Nigerian President Jonathan and President Buhari have implemented and are currently seized with. The chapter will conclude with a conceptual framework that describes the main dimensions of security in order to comprehend the nuances regarding terrorism and what counter terrorism strategies are needed to achieve some form of stability.

2.2 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR TERRORISM

2.2.1 Governance Challenges

The African continent's colonial history has entrenched inherent governance challenges on the continent (Aronson, 2013). These social, political and economic challenges include lack of political stability, unstable neighbouring countries, rising poverty levels, Islamic fundamentalism, unequal allocation and distribution of land, endemic corruption, unaccountable governance systems, high unemployment, poor social delivery infrastructure and institutions, ungoverned spaces, porous borders, and weak judicial and law enforcement institutions (Hussein, 2013; Aronson, 2013; Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2008; Malečková & Stanišić, 2014).

These challenges inevitably mean that African countries are often ill-equipped and incapable of reacting swiftly to security threats and implementing counter-terrorism strategies (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Kenyan, 2005; Savun & Phillips, 2009; Bamidele, 2014). In addition, many African countries' judiciary systems have been ineffective in terms of terrorism laws and require a comprehensive overhaul of

counter-terrorism legislation (Aronson, 2013). It is often very difficult to pass and implement legislation, and most African governments operate without official and encompassing terrorism laws and proper prosecutorial systems and infrastructure (Aronson, 2013).

No aid and resources were advanced to assist the African continent in its post-colonial era. Imperialists have been criticised for not implementing a “Marshal Plan” to rebuild and reform government infrastructure and reinstitute social services while promoting nation building and social cohesion on the African continent (Hussein, 2013; Ogunrotifa, 2013).

2.2.2 Liberal Democracy, Globalisation and Ideology

While it can be argued that communist and socialist political systems place restrictions on civil freedoms and human rights and therefore limit freedoms for terrorists to thrive, liberal democracies are vulnerable to transnational terrorism (Savun & Phillips, 2009; Bapat, 2011). Liberal democracies have civil liberties that make it easy for terrorists to blend into societies. Furthermore, while terrorists are not confined by laws and rules, democracies function within confined regulations and institutions (Malečková & Stanišić, 2014).

Globalisation has made democracies even more vulnerable due to technological advances in telecommunications, weaponry and travel that enable radical and violent extremist groups to instantly export their influence activities, ideology and footprint to any part of the world (Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2016; Fakude, 2016).

Disenfranchised radical Muslims present extremism and radicalism as an alternative doctrine that enables refugees and marginalised Muslims to address political, social and religious grievances (Bayo, 2012; Bamidele 2014; Aronson, 2013). Furthermore, globalisation and modernisation are seen as direct threats to the Islamic religion, culture and political system. The Western lifestyle, political ideology and Catholicism are viewed as marginalising Muslims.

2.2.3 Terrorism as Asymmetrical Hybrid War versus Conventional War

Unlike conventional warfare where conventional state actors use conventional weaponry and are confined to a specific territory, terrorism is warfare defined by different rules. Terrorism is an asymmetrical or hybrid war with a series of multipronged threats and unconventional role players such as armed non-state actors (Kaldor, 2012). In essence, hybrid wars display military capacity and capability normally associated with state actors; however, the actors in hybrid wars are not governed by international law, rules of engagement/warfare, nor confined by territory (Layton, 2015; Bachmann, 2015). Boko Haram has committed mass massacres and kidnappings with impunity, indicating that non-state actors play according to different rules and are not confined by international law.

2.3 TRADITIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSES

Countries' first instinct is to gravitate towards state security and deploy state-centric strategies to strengthen their security and intelligence structures, and to revise and introduce counter-terrorism legislature and strategies (Bachmann, 2015). In an attempt to address security challenges due to terrorism, one of the African continent's main counter-terrorism strategies has been its partnership with foreign governments that have high-tech weaponry and airstrike capability to achieve the short-term objective of obliterating identified targets. While this option is ideal for Western countries that view locations like the Horn of Africa and the Maghreb as training and breeding ground for extremists, this option has had detrimental consequences, often destroying infrastructure, destabilising and causing ungovernable and failed states, and forcing migration (International Crisis Group, 2016; Leuprecht & Hall, 2013, Isike, Uzodike & Gilbert, 2008).

2.4 FORMER PRESIDENT JONATHAN'S ADMINISTRATION'S COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS AND CHALLENGES

Former president Jonathan faced a barrage of multifaceted domestic security and socio-economic challenges. As a result, his administration was unpopular and regarded as a failure even though he is credited with overhauling Nigeria's security sector policies in 2014 through the implementation of the NSS which was aimed at coordinating security operations across the various agencies such as the NPF,

Immigrations and Customs, and the military (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

With regard to counter-terrorism intervention efforts, former president Jonathan initially resisted regional and international pressure for foreign troops to assist in combatting Boko Haram on Nigerian territory (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). His administration instead prioritised a unilateral domestic approach that included launching an intense military operation against Boko Haram. However, inefficiencies and incapacity in Nigeria's security sector stifled defence capabilities (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). By 2014 Nigeria's instability increasingly threatened neighbouring countries. Nigerians fled from demolished towns and homes set on fire by Boko Haram and flocked to Niger while the militants increasingly launched attacks in Cameroon and Chad. Boko Haram's violent attacks in 2014 led to the internal displacement of two million people in the north-east region, which further exacerbated the country's security and socio-economic risks. Although the government contained the threat by creating IDP camps, inadequate plans to restore and maintain security in the recaptured territories remained a challenge together with inadequate education facilities for displaced children and the rehabilitation of displaced persons (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). The government was unable to rebuild institutions at the pace needed by communities, coordinate the reconstruction of burnt-down towns and provide sustainable social services in the areas where it regained territorial control (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). This included inability to create adequate economic opportunities in north-eastern Nigeria at the required pace, despite the multiple opportunities for infrastructure development (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

2.4.1 Regional Interventions

2.4.1.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The West Africa region, through its ECOWAS multilateral forum, in February 2013 adopted the CTSIP to combat the rising insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. The CTSIP acknowledges the need for a collective response to comprehensively deal with the multifaceted and transnational challenges posed by terrorism. The CTSIP

emphasises cooperation, coordination and the pooling of resources among West African states through the adoption and implementation of a multipronged strategy embracing prevention (through policies and good governance), pursuance (swift response to violent attacks and disrupting plans and networks) and reconstruction (rebuilding communities through reconstruction and infrastructure) (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2016; US State Department, 2016; ISS, 2013).

2.4.1.2 Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The MNJTF was established as a Nigerian force in 1994. However, with regional security a concern, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) expanded it in 1998 to include troops from Chad and Niger and its mandate was expanded to include terrorism. Although the MNJTF embarked on an exercise to increase its counter-terrorism efforts, facilitated through joint coordinated patrols and operations along the borders of the Lake Chad Basin countries, security challenges continued to destabilise Nigeria. As a loosely arranged military multilateral initiative, the MNJTF lacked effectiveness and did not have sufficient troops to undertake security operations/activities in the region (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

As a result of the deteriorating regional security, Nigeria gave in to accept assistance from the AUPSC. This led to the AU's deployment of the MNJTF, consisting of 8700 troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin in March 2015 (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). The formation of a force had been contemplated since 2009, but only after the US funded more than US\$195 million towards the force did it become a reality, with the objective of eliminating Boko Haram and containing their regional footprint. The MNJTF's operations included air and ground assaults against insurgents and deploying troops along Nigeria's borders (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). Although the MNJTF was established with the objective of coordinating actions, the greatest weakness of current multinational responses has been a lack of mutual collaboration and coordination between the participant nations and the West African security initiatives were characterised by discord (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). An example of this is that prior to the deployment of the MNJTF standby force in January 2015, Chad acted unilaterally and sent troops into Nigeria

(Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). Fortunately, the Nigerian government did not view this act as a breach of their sovereignty and Chad's troops continued to carry out air and ground assaults against the militants. Only in June 2015, during the Buhari administration, did the Nigerian government pledge US\$21 million to enable the MNJTF to prosecute captured Boko Haram militants and another US\$100 million for MNJTF operations (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

2.4.2 International Interventions

Boko Haram's activities continue to pose a threat to the Lake Chad Basin despite international efforts to strengthen West Africa's counter terrorism efforts through multilateral forums such as the GCTF launched in 2011 and the TSCTP established in 2005. Both initiatives were started to improve regional security sector governance and capacity. While the TSCTP and GCTF offered an opportunity for better regional coordination with international support to track and restrain insurgent networks across the region, the Lake Chad Basin's porous borders continue to compromise regional efforts (US State Department, 2016).

In 2013, Nigeria accepted international assistance through IDAT, the Joint Fusion Cell and the Joint Coordination Planning Committee that coordinated US and Nigerian military and intelligence operations. The assistance came in the form of counter-terrorism capacity-building programmes such as training the NPF on the use of explosives and prevention of attacks on soft targets such as diplomatic missions. The UK worked with the Nigerian Ministry of Justice to set up investigative and prosecuting processes for specific terrorism cases, while the EFCC and NPF received crime scene training relevant to counter-terrorism operations (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2016; US State Department, 2016; ISS, 2013).

2.5 PRESIDENT BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION'S COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS AND LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

The Africa Research Bulletin (2017) notes that although the Buhari administration has made significant progress against Boko Haram, Nigeria's northeast region

continuous to be unstable with daily attacks and kidnappings in the region bordering Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. Kidnapping for ransom and hijacking of oil tankers along the West African coast increased from 14 attacks in 2015 to 36 in 2016 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2017). The use of children as suicide bombers rose from nine attacks in the first quarter of 2016 to 27 in the first quarter of 2017. Amnesty International's 2015 report indicates that a minimum of 2000 women and girls had been abducted since 2014 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2017; BBC, 2017). One of the most glaring challenges was the 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls: 21 girls were freed in October 2016 and 82 girls in May 2017. With three more girls released or found to date, this leaves 100 girls still captive or unaccounted for (BBC, May 2017). The release of the 82 girls was the result of negotiations between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram as part of an alleged Boko Haram prisoners' exchange. It is important to note that the Buhari administration's willingness to negotiate with Boko Haram proved effective, with the negotiations brokered with the assistance of the ICRC and the Swiss government (Africa Research Bulletin, 2017). Confirming the severity of the situation another kidnapping occurred on 19 February 2018, when 110 schoolgirls were abducted from a college in Yobe state, even though kidnapping became a legislated crime in 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017; Barron, 2018). The Buhari administration has also made concessions to begin to ensure sustainable security and in 2016, amnesty payments to militants in the northeast resumed (Al Jazeera, 2017).

The Nigerian military in late 2015/early 2016 claimed that Boko Haram's defences had been weakened and the group was near defeat. However, although the Nigerian government regained territory it had lost to Boko Haram, the army conceded that their territorial gains led to Boko Haram striking back with more suicide bombings and kidnappings. While Buhari accepted that Nigeria could not claim victory while the Chibok girls and others remained hostage, the president none the less made claims of "technical defeat" (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2016). Furthermore, ECOWAS acknowledged that President Buhari's negotiations with Boko Haram validated and legitimised the militant group. This had the negative effect of leading to Boko Haram's resurgence during President Buhari's absence in 2017, with the militants receiving weapons and a financial boost from Al Qaeda.

Retired Nigerian army captain and security expert Sadeeq Garba Shehu noted on Al Jazeera (2017) that “holding ground also makes you weaker because...it means the opposing force has something to hit...But when you attack and run, you kind of dilute all the advantages in numbers, in equipment, in training”. Another setback for Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts was that Boko Haram pledged allegiance to IS in 2015 and this strengthened the group’s capability as IS enabled it to acquire financial assistance, modern ammunition and weapons and to extend their footprint through the use of various social media platforms (ISS, 2017).

A major achievement for President Buhari in 2018 was the confirmation that Nigeria’s NEC, comprising of Nigeria’s 36 states governors, and the minister of finance made concessions allowing the federal government to access US\$1 billion from the Nigerian Excess Crude Account to curb the growing threat of instability posed by Boko Haram (especially in the northeast) (Nda-Isaiah, 2017). In addition, as part of its military approach, the Nigerian government has launched Operation Harbin Kunama II to recover arms and ammunition as well as a campaign to halt ethnic violence and promote ethnic and religious integration between Muslims and Christians (Nda-Isaiah, 2017).

2.5.1 Regional Interventions

President Buhari attempted to step up Nigeria’s participation in regional security multilateral engagements and sought greater cooperation and coordination with the Lake Chad Basin countries (US State Department, 2016). In August 2016, Nigeria’s government devised yet another inclusive nationalist approach as a security model encompassing a platform premised on the provision of peace, security and development. For example, the NACTEST was conceived by the US and advised the Nigerian government on GWOT and how to create more effective partnerships between the government, civil society, trade unions and citizens (US State Department, 2016). In addition, President Buhari initiated and participated in a series of engagements aimed at improving security as a priority for development. This included the 26th Summit of African Heads of State and Government, the 2nd Regional Security Meeting held in Abuja (Nigeria) in May 2016 and the 3rd Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa held in Dakar (Senegal) in December 2017.

2.5.2 US Intervention

In April 2017, AFRICOM held a security and cooperation summit with 40 African defence ministers in Stuttgart (Germany) to discuss how best the African continent could be assisted in fostering security and stability on the continent.

AFRICOM's Commander General Thomas Waldhauser acknowledged the complexity of the socio-economic challenges (such as the youth bulge, poverty, lack of governance and ungoverned territory) as root causes that fuel militant groups such as IS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab (Levinson, 2017; Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017). The US also acknowledges that the humanitarian and high unemployment challenges have to be addressed simultaneously with military options to address issues of security and stability (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017).

Despite military cooperation agreements, the Obama administration was an unwilling player to sell weapons. They limited the US to assisting the African continent's fight against Boko Haram primarily through AFRICOM in securing the borders/coastal and outlying areas of countries, training African militaries, and providing intelligence and air/drone surveillance (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017). AFRICOM primarily operated through bilateral agreements and the US halted the procurement of US high-technical aircraft and weapons to Nigeria after the Nigerian government was accused of human rights abuses when a refugee camp was bombed in January 2014 (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017).

The US weapons sales ban to Nigeria stifled the Nigerian government's capability to effectively fight well-armed Boko Haram (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017). As a result, the government struggled to source arms due to its poor arms/human rights record, compelling it to buy arms on the black market and from Russia (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017). Without adequate military weapons, the Nigerian government was forced to use local vigilante groups consisting of farmers, hunters and carpenters to carry out basic security measures like staffing checkpoints (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017).

A change in US policy came during the Trump administration's prioritisation of security and fighting violent extremists in their foreign policy rather than human rights concerns (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017). With this, the US resumed its weapons sales to Nigeria, with US\$600 million allocated to acquire 12 M29 super crane aircraft (Al Jazeera, 19 April 2017).

President Donald Trump's new foreign policy doctrine of "America First" signifies a shift towards strengthening defence and security efforts in order to defend the US's strategic interests. This confirms that with security marked as a priority, the US military is accelerating its counter-terrorism strategy in Africa and will expand its military operations on the continent and using lethal force against jihad militants (Levinson, 2017). This reinforced military approach was affirmed by US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley in October 2017 who stated that the US fears that the African continent's rising security instabilities and humanitarian disasters could directly threaten the US's strategic interests (Levinson, 2017). Haley reaffirmed the US's strategic interests on the African continent as defence and economic interests (Levinson, 2017). Therefore, in order to stem growing conflict on the African continent, the Trump administration has expressed the following;

- The US will expand its military presence and counter-terrorism operations against militants in Africa.
- The US will form a stronger relationship with the AU and its African partners.
- It will support West Africa's G5 Sahel counter-terrorism task force.

2.5.3 UN Intervention

With a newly appointed UN secretary general in January 2017, the UN renewed its commitment to the AU. This was again illustrated on 29 January 2018, when UNSG António Guterres attended the AU Summit in Ethiopia and drew attention to the AU's role in matters pertaining to peace and security. He indicated that the AU is a very important partner of the UN and the UN, through his leadership, would cooperate and collaborate with the AU to address issues of peace, security, development, human rights and governance (AU Summit, 2018). Guterres specifically advocated for support of the G5 Sahel in the form of an enhanced

mandate and additional resources (AU Summit, 2018). In adhering to “African solutions”, Guterres supports African troops performing peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations with significant assistance from the international community and mandated by the UNSC.

With regard to development assistance, the UN supports the African continent’s concerns in line with sustainable development goals, military development goals, education and health goals, infrastructure, renewable energy and protection of the environment. In this regard, the Economic Development Group System was implemented to support African countries and the Economic Commission for Africa to support African states to take the leap towards development progress. Guterres (2018) acknowledged that Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 can only be successful if the African continent is successful; therefore, he called on the African continent to implement fiscal reforms and mechanisms such as good governance and anti-corruption measures.

2.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Guiding the research is the conceptual framework that describes the (main) dimensions of a broader concept of security in order to comprehend the nuances unique to terrorism and what counter-terrorism strategies are needed to achieve peace and stability as the pillars of sustainable development. Traditional counter-terrorism strategies rely heavily on implementing hard-approach military interventions to curb violent extremist activities and attacks. The researcher explores the criticism of counter-terrorism approaches on the African continent drafted mainly through a realism prism focusing on addressing security concerns through the use of military force (Bayo, 2012; King & Murray, 2001). The re-emergence of extremist groups indicates that hard approaches that are coercive and aggressive have short-term results directed at addressing only the symptoms of terrorism.

2.6.1 Realism

This theory is based on the premise that the international system is anarchic and is a reflection of contestation among state actors for power that instil fear in non-state

actors. These state actors feel threatened and therefore use military force to ensure and protect their strategic interests (Bayo, 2012; Williams, 2013). This theoretical framework explains traditional counter-terrorism strategies grounded in the realist narrative which dictates that governments as state actors have the monopoly and military muscle to suppress non-state actors, ethnic and religious militias, and rebel groups such as Boko Haram in order to wade off any security threat, conflict or war, and ultimately preserve the territorial integrity of sovereign states (Bayo, 2012; Walt, 2006; King & Murray, 2001; Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010; Malečková & Stanišić, 2014; Williams, 2013). Realism underlines that state strategies are underpinned by states' desire for power, which is ultimately rooted in the continuously struggle of states to increase their capabilities and therefore pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies (Williams, 2013).

2.6.2 Idealism

As a complement to realist theories, idealism has been recognised as an approach or strategy to counter terrorism. This understanding is premised on the idea that states are progressive and often finds ways to cooperate and interact in finding solutions based on mutual understanding and strategic interests on a whole range of issues, including security and trade (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999). This is evident in the use of multilateral forums such as the AU and UN to collectively engage stakeholders/role players in the security sector to find solutions to regional and global security threats in order to achieve peace and stability (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999 & Savun, & Phillips, 2009). Idealists note that it is not just the exercise of hard-approach hegemonic power that brings order to the international system but that states have shared values and international law; through interdependency, an environment that enables cooperation and partnership is created to restore and maintain peace, stability and security in the international system (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999 & Savun, & Phillips, 2009). Therefore, states are not only actors and the plurality of the international system reflected in the UN Conventions on Terrorism and the AU's ACSRT bear credence that an inclusive approach incorporating a host of state and non-actors yields more effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism solutions.

2.6.3 Critical/Transformative Theories

Critical theories allow for enhanced understanding of the world order in order to change it or transform it for the better. While realism accepts that the international system is anarchic, critical theorists agree that conflict in the global order is normal. However, for critical theorists, conflict is due to class struggle where the marginalised fight to have access to the means of production. For idealists, the international system is anarchic but conflict can be resolved through cooperation and finding mutual interests. Marxists view the battle for power or control of the means of production as only possible through radical transformation and class struggle. However, their class struggle entails investigating the position of warring parties within society and the economic interests of both the haves and the have-nots and not just the dominant interests. Marxists focus on the challenges and plight of the marginalised, unlike realists who accept that conflict represents the breakdown of the balance of power and security and that state power reigns supreme, cannot be altered and relations among states represent repetitive patterns (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999; Williams, 2013).

As the dominant transformative theory, Marxist theory advocates for radical change in the world order and not incremental change as advocated by conservative theories (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999). Transformative theorists criticise the current world order and explain relations of production as fundamental to understanding the world order, propose radical change spurred by the struggle for control over the means of production, and contention over belief systems or ideology. Marxism, therefore, emphasises the manner in which humankind uses capital and the means of production or labour forms the basis of the international order. The current unjust mode of production in its various forms fuels revolt, where acts of violence become push factors for change as witnessed in the dynamics of domestic and international relations (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999). The constant challenge posed by realism and idealism is that neither offers an adequate explanation for the unequal economic basis of the international system. Conservative theories do not go beyond explaining the political realm and do not explain the hostility, conflict and strife in

global politics that set the stage for radical change in the world order (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999)).

2.6.4 Historical Materialism

Marxists acknowledge that class struggle is a historic struggle with the dominant and the marginalised fighting for control over the means of production. For the marginalised, change of the status quo is not a natural progression but has to be fought for (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 1999). It is this view that encapsulates the state of affairs in Nigeria as transformative theories view the world from the vantage point of developing countries and go further to explain that the state is not an independent player but a captive of economic interests and forces.

While realism explains the anarchic international system as the result of contestation for power, Engels' historical materialism conceptualises Karl Marx's writings goes further in explaining not just the international system but also contemporary social and economic development as it relates to the class struggle (Blakeley & Bryson, 2005; Bayo, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013). Historical materialism is based on the premise that the exercise of power and control is mainly associated with the fight for the means of production (Ojione, 2014; Blakeley & Bryson, 2005). Therefore, the evolution of society's economic development and social change is explained through the changes in modes of production, class division and class struggle (Ojione, 2014; Blakeley & Bryson, 2005).

However, historical materialism is not consumed only by economics but extends to the non-economic class struggle that extends to social relations of production. Historical materialism's acknowledgment of the non-economic class struggle forms the basis for explaining political and other social phenomena of the 21st century, such as security threats like terrorism and ethnic and religious tensions (Partito, 2016; Blakeley & Bryson, 2005). Therefore, in terms of broader historical materialism theory, terrorism is a form of class struggle for socio-economic and political equality (Bayo, 2012). It is a reflection of class struggle within the modern capitalist political system, where violence is used as a means to protect interests, achieve objectives or

express grievances – and therefore to address political and socio-economic imbalances in the political system (Bayo, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013).

While realism gravitates towards counter-terrorism strategies that preserve state power through the use of militaristic defence mechanisms, historical materialism as adapted in the 21st century allows for the incorporation of soft strategies and ideological, social, religious and cultural tools that can be adopted in counter-terrorism strategies to strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms in order to address societal grievances, inequalities and injustices (Bayo, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013; Francis, 2010). Furthermore, the inclusivity of historical materialism allows for the implementation of “smart” counter-terrorism strategies combining hard and soft power in ways that are mutual reinforcing (Francis, 2010).

2.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined the social political and ideological root causes of terrorism that date back to the colonial and post colonial era. The chapter looked at the application of state centric military strategies in an era defined by an evolving unconventional war with non-state actors. The chapter in detailed outlined the governance and leadership changes that have plagued both the President Jonathan and President Buhari administrations and what domestic, international and multilateral interventions both administrations have instituted to curb the rise of Boko Haram. Under conceptual framework, the chapter looked conservative theories of realism and idealism vis a vis transformative theories in an attempt to explain the anarchy in the international system as it relates to conflict and security. The chapter emphasises that the research is premised on Karl Marx’s writings to explain contemporary security challenges as related to class struggle and the fight for means of production as outlined in Historical materialism.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This research is exploratory in nature and both primary and secondary sources of information are used to explore counter-terrorism measures in the context of rising instability in an attempt to outline effective and sustainable peace and security interventions in Nigeria. Although numerous studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism approaches have been conducted, this research is aimed at exploring and explaining weaknesses in Nigeria's counter-terrorism approaches in order to outline what comprehensive and complementary approaches are needed to effectively address not just the frequent and extensive violent attacks that have destabilised north-eastern Nigeria but also measures to address the long-term root causes of instability in the country, such as inequality, marginalisation, unemployment, lack of social services, weak governance, and ineffective law enforcement and judiciary institutions (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012; Baxter & Jack, 2008; McGowan, Cornelissen & Nel, 1999; Merriam, 2009; Zenn, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

The research is qualitative and embraces an interpretive, constructivist and naturalistic approach to studying social phenomena through the participants' frame of reference (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Merriam, 2009). It is for this reason that a qualitative research design was selected as it offers the advantage of enabling the researcher to probe respondents during in-depth interviews and to conduct documentary analysis by way of desk research (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The research was primarily inductive in nature; therefore, the findings will contribute to the body of knowledge on terrorism and counter-terrorism research focusing on the nuances of terrorism and counter-terrorism approaches on the African continent, specifically in Nigeria.

Using the qualitative design, the researcher was the main research tool for analysing the data obtained from the respondents and the desk research (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

Through the use of electronic communication, the researcher approached and secured seven respondents from academia and think tanks, and obtained authorisation to interview five members from the security cluster. The scope of the research did not include interviewing members of Boko Haram and instead focused on experts who had studied the insurgency and the various strategies implemented to counter it (Creswell, 2014; Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

The researcher used secondary data from research reports, journals, books, newspapers, speeches, policies, legislation and regulations, multilateral resolutions, and conference and seminar research papers to corroborate and complement the primary sources of information. Furthermore, the research used both the conservative and critical frameworks to demonstrate the evolving nature of the security sector, signalling the need for counter-terrorism strategies to be remodelled and standardised to embrace a multi-pronged approach advancing human security and not just state security.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

To adequately address the research purpose, a combination of primary and secondary data collection was used.

3.3.1 Primary Data Collection Instruments

Primary data was gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews. An interview guide was used during the semi-structured interviews to enable two-way discussion between the researcher and the participants with the aim of acquiring in-depth information on issues pertaining to terrorism and counter-terrorism (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

3.3.2 Secondary Data Collection Instruments

Secondary data was gathered through documentary analysis. This included extensive analysis of electronic and printed newspaper reports, journal articles and think tank articles/reports on Boko Haram and terrorism/counter-terrorism in general. Relevant speeches from political and security analysts, experts and politicians from the US, UN, AU, ECOWAS and Nigeria were downloaded and printed. The researcher took particular interest in material on Nigeria's security challenges with regard to terrorism as reported in written, electronic, audio and visual information sources from the BBC, CNN eNCA and Al Jazeera; analytical debates and question and answer sessions; and Nigerian printed and electronic media.

3.4 SAMPLING METHOD

Non-probability sampling was used because it allows for targeting units of analysis from specific professional sectors. With this in mind, units of analysis were purposefully and logically selected from academia, policy-making institutions, the diplomatic corps, think tanks and relevant government departments within the security cluster (Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The researcher noted the names of analysts and experts in the security sector and international relations interviewed in local and foreign documentaries and on political talk shows during the research. This was done deliberately so that the data could emanate from the knowledge base of experts and specialists in areas such as foreign affairs, terrorism and security in order to obtain rich and in-depth information over time. Although the researcher compiled a list of security sector and terrorism experts from scanning various electronic and media platforms, snowball sampling was allowed for and therefore referrals were used in an attempt to reach a wider range of experts in relevant fields.

3.5 UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Constructivism acknowledges that researchers and respondents express more than one reality. Therefore, the research included experts from a range of professions within the security sector in order to obtain different perceptions and understandings of terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies (Creswell, 2014; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The sample size of 12 respondents was composed of analysts,

lecturers, security specialists, researchers, policy makers and professionals across the domestic, regional and international spheres within the security sector. The respondents were clustered according to the professional sector they represented: X is the security cluster, Y is think tanks, Z is academia and, B is the multilateral and diplomatic corps. Each participant in each sector was coded as indicated below. The selection of respondents was designed to obtain information from a range of different experts within the relevant professions, while the interview structure was designed to tap into the institutional and expert knowledge of the various specialists in their respective fields.

Table 3.1: Units of Analysis

Targeted Professional Sectors	Reason for Selecting the Sector and Units of Analysis	Targeted Professionals	Targeted Institutions	Research Code for the Sector	Code for Each Respondent
Security Sector	These specialists understand the nature of the problem as their access to intelligence and the security sector gives them insight into terrorism as a security threat from an operations perspective. The security cluster has inside knowledge that the public does not always have.	Experts Specialists	Security Cluster	X	X1 Specialist on terrorism and counter-terrorism (Africa). X2 Specialist on terrorism and counter-terrorism. X3 Specialist on Nigeria. X4 Specialist on terrorism and militant groups. X5 Specialist on the West Africa region
Think Tanks	In-depth research and analysis enable these specialists to have a multipronged perspective from a policy, and operational level, access to other research from peers internationally and research nuances.	Researchers Analysts	Afro-Middle East Centre Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium Institute for Security Studies	Y	Y1 Specialist has intricate understanding of Muslim culture and religion that is reflected in his analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria and the Middle East Y2 Specialist on international terrorism, radicalisation and terrorism strategies Y3 West African researcher and security sector expert on domestic and foreign policies of Nigeria and the region
Academia	The academic sector was selected for its uniqueness in the theoretical examination of the issues; extensive and constant research to examine unfolding developments; and attendance of conferences and seminars globally for other perspectives.	PhD Student Lecturer	University of Johannesburg University of Pretoria	Z	Z1 Nigerian PhD student conducting intrusive field research on Boko Haram Z2 Humanities lecturer and political and security analyst specialising on Africa
Targeted Professional Sectors	Reason for Selecting the Sector and Units of Analysis	Targeted Professionals	Targeted Institutions	Research Code for the Sector	Code for Each Respondent

Diplomatic Corps	This sector was selected because of its diplomatic involvement in African affairs at a multilateral level. Both participants have extensive experience and institutional knowledge on the political and security arena at a multilateral and international relations level.	International relations specialists/government and multilateral experts	Department of International Relations and Cooperation/United Nations	B	B1 Former UNSC diplomat and political and security analyst B2 Former UNGA diplomatic experience, and political and security analyst
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3.6 DATA COLLECTION

3.6.1 Primary Data Collection

The primary data was collected during face-to-face, open-ended interviews, with the researcher using a semi-structured questionnaire as a guide to solicit information. Although the names of the research participants are concealed to protect the identity of the security cluster specialists, the names of most of the institutions where the respondents work are revealed to indicate the credibility of the sources of information. The researcher successfully defended her proposal in July 2017 and the interviews were conducted in August and September 2017. While the researcher did not have to obtain official permission to interview the specialists from the think tanks and academic institutions, the researcher obtained written authorisation to interview the security cluster officials on condition that the identity of the officials and their designations remain confidential.

3.6.2 Secondary Data Collection

The secondary data provide a wide and inclusive analysis of the measures Nigeria and international stakeholders have taken to curb Boko Haram's capacity and capability, to explore why these measures have not sufficed in resolving the crisis and to make recommendations on what ought to be done. Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing and evaluating printed and electronic material. Secondary information sources/documentation was analysed to fill in information gaps from the primary data and to explain what measures are needed to reinforce current counter-terrorism strategies in Nigeria.

3.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE DATA

The in-depth and qualitative nature of the research dictated that the researcher interact with participants from different professions within government, academia and multilateral forums. This process of collecting data from the various experts served as a form of triangulation to ensure the internal reliability, credibility and trustworthiness of the research. The use of both semi-structured interviews and documentary research also enhanced the internal validity of the collected and analysed data. Furthermore, the dependability, transferability and credibility of the research required adherence to the research code of ethics. In this regard, the researcher collected and stored all the data collected from the participants.

3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.8.1 Informed Consent

Informed consent requires that the participants are informed about the nature and objective of the study and that the researcher follows the code of ethics in obtaining informed consent from them (Creswell, 2014). The researcher obtained consent from the necessary government departments approach the officials in their employ for interviews. The researcher contacted each identified participants from the think tanks and academic institutions, explained the reason for the contacting them and the research, and solicited their consent and confirmed a date for the face-to-face interview.

This included full disclosure of the researcher's details, the purpose of the research and what would be expected of the participants. In addition, the details of how the research would be conducted, clear guidelines on the conditions for participation (e.g. that participation was voluntary, without coercion and remuneration; and that they could withdraw at any time during the research) and how the final research report would be used.

3.8.2 Anonymity and Confidentiality

Anonymity dictates that the identity of the respondents not be revealed outside the research process. Anonymity was upheld as purposive sampling was used and while the units of analysis were purposefully identified for their expertise in the relevant

field(s), their identities were not documented and were not required to process and analyse the data gathered during the face-to-face semi-structured interviews.

Confidentiality was guaranteed by ensuring that the research will only be used by the researcher to complete her studies and will not be disclosed to a third party without the consent of the participants. In addition, the researcher obtained authorisation from organisations in the security cluster to interview the identified experts. The data was being processed and analysed while concealing the identification and designations of these respondents.

3.8.3 Disclosure of the Research

The research code of ethics requires that the researcher discloses her personal interests, values and possible bias that could have a bearing on the research process. In this regard, the researcher is a public servant and has worked in the diplomatic arena serving in Madagascar and the US; she bound by her employment code of ethics not to use any classified information. The researcher also used various departmental and academic libraries and information from conferences, seminars and think tanks for the research. She obtained authorisation to collect and analyse information from the security cluster.

3.9 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

Due to time constraints and the extensive literature available, the researcher could not exhaust all the available relevant material on terrorism, counter-terrorism interventions, and Nigeria's political and socio-economic climate.

The scope of the research does not include Boko Haram militia as units of analysis; however, the researcher tapped experts and analysts' institutional knowledge and professional experience for information. Although the research covers regional and international multilateral institutions, the scope of the research did not extend to Francophone country interventions and developments in Chad, Niger and Cameroon even though these countries are part of the Lake Chad Basin. Relevant newspaper articles were used as secondary information in addition to journal articles and similar

publications solely because the newspaper articles covered the most recent and relevant developing events.

Since non-probability sampling was used, the research cannot be generalised to the whole population.

3.10 CONCLUSION

In this chapter the researcher described the methods used in the research study, with the qualitative approach as a method of data collection. The chapter outlined the units of analysis as representative of various sectors of academia, think tanks and the security cluster as captains of industry that provide specialised expertise in the security sector. The next chapter will presentation and analysis of the results from the primary and secondary and data collection.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the primary and secondary data that were gathered are presented and the steps taken to classify and present the data in logical, sequential and meaningful categories for interpretation and analysis are outlined (Patton, 2002). Qualitative analysis of data entails reducing volumes of raw data to bring about order, structure and meaning to the data. The analysis and interpretation of the data therefore involves organising the data into manageable sections, identifying themes and constructing patterns that enables the researcher to draw findings from the research (Maree, 2007).

In the first section of this chapter, the researcher presents the data gathered from the participants who were interviewed. Through qualitative data analysis, the researcher interprets and unpacks the meaning of the respondents' perceptions, knowledge base, experiences and attitudes in order to reveal their construction of phenomena like counter-terrorism (Maree, 2007). It should be noted that both the primary and secondary data reveal that there is still a contentious debate over terms such as "terrorism", "terrorist", "Islamic extremists", "insurgency" and "jihad militants". As a result, the data presented includes information on what is defined as terrorism and other similar terms.

In the second section of this chapter, the researcher presents the secondary data together with the latest and most relevant newspaper and journal articles, reports from seminars and conferences, and videos and documentaries on the subject matter. Secondary documentation was a relevant collection instrument for two main reasons: (1) so that the research could include most recent information released during the course of the research and (2) to explore secondary documentation to obtain additional information to fill possible gaps in the research.

4.2 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The researcher used a semi-structured interview guide as the main tool to collect the primary data. This part of the research entailed posing a series of questions to 12 respondents during face-to-face interviews. The raw data gathered from each respondent was summarised and presented as collective responses to each question of the interview guide. Therefore, each interview question is represented by a clustered series of responses from the academic, security cluster and think tank specialists collectively in an attempt to be sensitive to two main issues: (1) to protect the identities of the individuals employed within the security cluster and (2) to not intentionally reveal information that is either sensitive or compromises the political reputation and strategies or operational frameworks of institutions within the security cluster. That said, in the presentation of the responses, certain direct quotes are outlined to either cement the sentiments expressed or indicate a contrasting opinion of respondents. Furthermore, the researcher used the advantage of semi-structured interviews as a data collection instrument to follow up on or rephrase questions about the respondents' area of expertise in order to tap into their in-depth knowledge on the subject matter.

The collective responses were further categorised into three sections guided by the three key questions used to examine the measures that the Nigerian government and international stakeholders have taken to address the Boko Haram crisis and to assess why the measures have not resolved the crisis. Finally, short- and long-term recommendations are made to strengthen Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies by addressing political, socio-economic and ideological challenges embedded in the country's social fabric. As indicated, the data was organised into three broad categories by presenting the participants' responses according to the three key research questions:

- (1) What were the factors that led the Nigerian authorities to adopt a militaristic counter-terrorism approach in response to Boko Haram?
- (2) To what extent has Nigeria's counter-terrorism approach addressed the threats posed by transnational terrorism?
- (3) What policy interventions are required to address and ultimately resolve the

deep-seated roots of organised terror in Nigeria?

4.3 BACKGROUND

The 2017 GTI shows that the global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was US\$84 billion. Although this figure represents a 5% decline from 2015 and a 19% decline from the peak of US\$103 billion in 2014, 77 countries casualties from terrorism in 2016 – which reflects an increase from the 65 countries in 2015. With the spread of terrorism to two-thirds of all the countries, this means that counter-terrorism strategies worldwide are ineffective and counter-productive (Taylor, 2014; Rutherford, 2007). Specifically, the GWOT is not aligned to Africa's security challenges and threats (Taylor, 2014; Rutherford, 2007). In Africa, the GWOT has been based on flawed assumptions such as misdirected analysis of the continent's multi-religious, ethnic and cultural populations; its colonial history and its impact on issues of governance and socio-economic challenges; and the monolithic counter-insurgency measures imposed by the US, Europe and other developed countries (Rutherford, 2007; Francis, 2010).

The escalation of global violent attacks by extremists underscores the need for policy makers to rethink the exercise of hard and soft power by state and non-state actors in a world where security is central to development (Williams, 2013). The question of whether a state should implement a military or a non-military approach is particularly vital when taking into account the effect and impact of these initiatives at a micro and macro community level. This view recognises that terrorism it not only the physical attack but also the psychological impact on society for generations to come (GTI, 2017).




Figure 4.1: Countries with the Highest Number of Deaths from Terrorism in 2016

(Source: GTI, 2017)

4.4 THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

From the outset, the 2017 GTI report highlights ideological controversy about the religious and political meanings and the power sentiments, perceptions and perspectives regarding terrorism as a concept. All the respondents from the security sector, academia and think tanks highlighted the different views on what can be defined as terrorism. Respondents noted that one of the major factors that has led to the adoption of militaristic counter-terrorism approaches globally have been the misdiagnosis of terrorism vis-à-vis insurgency. Z2 noted that “there is inadequate understanding what is referred to as terrorism...as the term collapses all the permutations it’s associated with, such as radicalism, violence, extremism. Therefore, the definition is a limitation”. Y1 said that the “the term ‘terror’ should not be as simply labelled and boxed”. Respondent Z2 highlighted the importance of unpacking the term ‘terrorism’ in an effort to arrive at a common understanding of the various terms that form part of the lexicon. Z2 highlighted that “the whole issue of unpacking terror in its true sense is vital. Terror is unavoidable and is here for the foreseeable future”.

Therefore, the following should be made clear to move forward: Generally, terrorism means the threat or execution of concerted tactics and violent acts by insurgents, rebels, militants, extremist groups, resistant movements, piracy and migrant fighters (Akangbe, 2012). The intention is to intimidate the public, cause maximum casualties and damage, disrupt public services, and weaken or overthrow existing governments (ECOWAS, 2016a).

4.4.1 The UN and AU's Definitions of Terrorism

The UN defines terrorism as criminal acts perpetrated with the intention of creating a state of terror in communities (UNSC Resolution 2178, 2014). The AU defines terrorism as the intention to coerce government, private institutions or civil society to adopt or abstain from certain values, culture or ideology (AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism). Both the UN and AU recognise that the purpose of terrorism could include compelling certain changes such as the creation of new states, change of governments or regimes, religious reforms and policy change. Essentially, it is calculated acts to create an atmosphere of fear and helplessness and to cause public emergencies and insurrection in order to compel or coerce governments and certain groups or persons to act according to certain principles and to bring about some social or political change or particular actions (Jenkins, 2003).

However, it may be conceived that it involves violent criminality at atrocious levels, which most often are perpetuated against unarmed and vulnerable civilians. These crimes include gruesome and senseless mass murders; indiscriminate shootings; assassinations and targeted killings; bombings; kidnappings and hostage taking; hijackings; destruction of public facilities, social services and infrastructures; and attacks on and destruction of communities.

4.4.2 Terrorism vis-à-vis Insurgency

According to respondents Y3, Z1 and Z2 made the critical observations have to be made in that there is a distinction between insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. According to Kiras (2007), the difference is perhaps best understood by first understanding that insurgency is an asymmetrical hybrid or unconventional war. The crucial difference between the two concepts is that while terrorism rarely results in political change, insurgency is aimed at bringing about political change through the

use of arms (Kiras, 2007). This is in line with respondent Y3 who reiterated that “Boko Haram is not a terrorist group but more of insurgent group as its motive is to overthrow government in order to achieve a religious agenda to restore and preserve Islam through a caliphate”. Z1 emphasised that “an act of terror requires someone to act and an act to be committed, and therefore these definitions are designed for societies to respond to direct threats”. According to Z1, the definition of terror therefore justifies alienation and anarchy, which in turn justifies easy quick-fix solutions. Z1 justified this analysis by outlining that “the reoccurrence of terror is indicative of solutions applied being symptom based and not addressing historical root causes”.

All the respondents emphasised that terrorist acts are a direct response to the arrest, killing and executing of what are termed “enemies of the state”. Government attempts to eliminate the problem continue to manifest the strategy of eliminating the symptoms and not the root causes.

4.5 THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE

According to Al Jazeera (2017), in the past eight years, Boko Haram killed more than 20 000 people and displaced more than 2.7 million people. In 2017 alone, Boko Haram increased suicide bombings and abductions in the Lake Chad Basin. Approximately 50 people were killed on 21 November 2017 when a child suicide bomber blasted a mosque in north-eastern Nigeria (Al Jazeera, 2017) Amnesty International reported that from April to September 2017, Boko Haram killed an estimated 400 people (Al Jazeera, 2017). Furthermore, UNICEF reported that nearly 100 children have been used as “human bombs” since the beginning of 2017. Despite the fact that an estimated three million children in north-eastern Nigeria need education, instability has led to the closure of more than half of the schools in the state of Borno. Food security is also at stake, with the conflict negatively affecting farmers and resulting in chronic food shortages. This has left northerners on the brink of starvation and dependent on aid agencies for relief (Al Jazeera, 2017). With regard to the Lake Chad Basin as a region, Boko Haram’s wave of terror has resulted in more than 100 000 displaced people and 7000 refugees spilling into Chad (GTI, 2016; GTI, 2017).

4.6 COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES

Counter-terrorism involves a broad range of activities, techniques and strategies that governments design and use to prevent, combat, counter and deter terrorism; recover and rebuild terrorist territories; and rehabilitate victims (ECOWAS, 2016). The activities are both military and non-military in nature. The research shows that the range of actions depends on (1) understanding the nature of terrorism at work and whether it is part of a wider insurgency, and (2) the underlying political and socio-economic circumstances that have given rise to the insurgency.

All the respondents from the X, Y, Z and B sectors illustrated that generally counter-terrorism approaches globally are either hard approaches or a combination of both hard and soft approaches. Hard approaches are characterised by the use of the army, drones and bombs, while soft approaches are a combination of humanitarian and developmental programmes. Both the think tank and academia respondents indicated that hard approaches to counter terrorism are flawed for a number of reasons. Hard approaches have advantages and disadvantages that affect the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies. While military interventions have the advantage of producing swift results, the use of force to capture, detain without trial, and very often assassinate militants and their targeted leadership is often considered as coming close to violating human rights.

4.7 THE MILITARY APPROACH TO COUNTER TERRORISM

In the face of rising instability due to unconventional security threats, Kiras (2007) emphasises that the only means of defeating insurgent people who will not surrender is extermination. This agrees with what Taber (1972) notes is the only way to control a territory harbouring resistance – to turn it into a “desert”. With the state having exclusive autonomy over social, fiscal and military resources, the military approach is the inevitable response to mounting security threats. Kiras (2007) questions whether democratic states can apply state resources effectively to eliminate the insurgent threat without undermining the very same democratic principles they promote. Therefore, this emphasises the importance of what “mechanisms, solutions and initiatives” to implement in order to counter terrorism (Kiras, 2007).

4.8 CHRONOLOGICAL MORPHOSIS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES

From the beginning of the 20th century, Western democracies have had their security threatened by violent extremists in an unconventional manner. The challenge has been how democracies should respond to asymmetrical hybrid wars. There are numerous literature sources on how to quell insurgency or terrorism. Kiras (2007) gives a chronological summary (see below) of the various strategies that have been implemented. This sheds light on the metamorphosis template/structure evident in the pre-packaged counter-terrorism strategies imposed by the West.

Table 4.1: Principles, Prerequisites and Laws of Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism

	Material quoted from specific texts in chronological order
1934	Charles W. Gwynn: Principles from <i>Imperial Policing</i> (1934) • Policy remains vested in civil government • Minimum use of force • Firm and timely action • Cooperation between civil and military authorities.
1964	David Galula: Laws of counter-insurgency from <i>Counter-Insurgency Warfare</i> (1964) • Support of the population necessary • Support gained through an active minority • Support from population is conditional ▪ Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.
1966	Robert Thompson: Principles of counterinsurgency from <i>Defeating Communist Insurgency</i> (1966) • Clear political aim • The government must function in accordance with the law • The government must have an overall plan • The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas • The government must secure its base areas first (in the guerrilla phase).
1977	Frank Kitson: Framework for an effective counter-insurgency campaign from <i>Bunch of Five</i> (1977) • Good coordinating machinery (between civil and military agencies) • Establishing the sort of political atmosphere within which government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success • Intelligence (right information = sensible policy) • Law (upholding the rule of).
2006	US Government: The long-term approach, building democracy and representative institutions, as well as the four priorities of action, from the <i>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</i> (White House 2006) • Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states • Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and • Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success. This was one of the defining policy documents for the global war on terrorism. The strategy, which went through two editions, one in 2003 and one in 2006, owed its genesis to a student research project conducted at the National War College in Washington, DC. It is still available from a variety of sources but was removed from the White House website

	shortly after President Obama took office.
2007	US Army/Marine Corps: Principles of counterinsurgency from FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Department of the Army 2007) • Legitimacy is the main objective • Unity of effort is essential • Political factors are primary • Counter-insurgents must understand the environment • Intelligence drives operations • Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support • Security under the rule of law is essential • Counter-insurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.
2009	U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 2009: WWW.STATE.GOV/T/PM/PPA/PMPT ▪ Long-term political strategy -creating or enhancing <i>local</i> government legitimacy ▪ An integrated civilian-military effort ▪ Close and genuine partnership with the host nation government in the lead ▪ Population-centric security forces (military and/or police) ▪ Continuity and commitment of key personnel, with sufficient authority and resources ▪ Building effective and legitimate local security forces ▪ Region-wide approach that disrupts insurgent safe havens & controls borders ▪ Host Nation government willing to address root causes of the insurgency

(Source: Kiras, 2007 & US State Department, 2009)

Table 4.1 above clearly shows the militarisation of counter-terrorism strategies as the main policy tool implemented to stem the rise of radical extremists. The table illustrates that the traditional strategies for countering instability through hard-approach counter-terrorism strategies have increased insecurity by heightening the levels of direct and indirect military conflict globally. The 1994 UN Development Report emphasised that comprehensive security embraces human security characterised by prevention and a people-centred approach (King & Murray, 2001). It is argued that in order to achieve more effective counter-terrorism strategies, current policies have to embrace a wider definition of security with a shift from state threats to include the political and socio-economic threats addressed through both military and non-military strategies. Soft human security approaches should not replace hard national security counter-terrorism approaches. Instead, state and human security strategies and initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing (King & Murray, 2001).

From the outset, the respondents in the X, Y, Z, and B sectors all agreed that the militaristic approach in essence embraced hard-approach measures and the security sector apparatus, with the unintended consequences of loss of life and destruction of infrastructure and communities. As a result, actions such as bombing, torturing and assassination eliminate militant targets as casualties of war, leaving behind destruction for the families and communities residing in the targeted areas. Z2 was

critical of militaristic strategies and emphasised that “hard approaches are more often reactive and not offensive in nature”.

Respondent Z2 illustrated that Western countries have a direct interest in the stability of the African continent for the exploitation and extraction of these resources and have very little to do with achieving long-term and sustainable peace and security objectives. Z2, X1, X2 and Y2 highlighted that Western interventions have proved to fuel radicalism rather than invest in long-term solutions.

All the respondents from the X, Y, Z and B sectors had very strong views on the hard approaches advocated by Western states as largely beholden to a “defensive strategy”. Respondents from these sectors added that the counter-terrorism intervention strategies advocated by the US, EU and the rest of the developed world and the provision of resources for security efforts on the African continent are mainly because they collectively have multiple competing strategic interests on the continent (such as access to markets and multinationals, and mineral, agricultural, oil and gas investment opportunities). Y2 criticised current counter-terrorism strategies and reiterated that countries’ counter-terrorism approaches “are not based on measures to curb violent attacks but rather the measures adopted are to eradicate alternative views, ideologies and Muslim conservative groups”.

4.9 WEAKNESSES IN NIGERIA’S MILITARISTIC RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM

Terrorism in Nigeria is not entirely a new phenomenon and neither are strategies to curtail extremism. The heightened levels of instability in Nigeria suggest that the militarisation of counter-terrorism strategies have in fact not thwarted the rise of radical and violent extremists. All the respondents from the X, Y, Z and B sectors agreed that none of the counter-terrorism strategies implemented stopped Boko Haram’s growth and capability as attacks continue to escalate. In fact, these respondents had very strong convictions that despite the adoption of the militaristic approach, Boko Haram has remained a force to be reckoned with. The Nigerian government’s 2009 military response to Boko Haram may have crushed the group’s momentum and organisational footprint in north-eastern Nigeria, but the militants

have splintered into smaller groups in the Lake Chad Basin region. It is, therefore, harder to completely eradicate Boko Haram's organisational footprint as it is mingled into the social fabric of north-eastern Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Basin region.

The respondents in X, Y and Z sectors all acknowledged that Nigeria's security sector as a whole lacks coordination and integration. X3 and Z2 highlighted that "the Nigerian military specifically lacks an effective intelligence gathering mechanism". All of the respondents were of the view that the Nigerian army is ill equipped and often incapable to react swiftly to security threats. X3 explained that an army that is physically trained for combat but has out-dated weapons and lacks technical equipment is less than effective and therefore not combat ready for a hybrid war. To add to this point, Z1 noted that "the Nigerian army has low morale with no work benefits and medical insurance". In defence of the Nigerian government, respondent Y3 had a different opinion, and that the security situation in Nigeria is generally sensationalised and therefore "military responses make headlines". However, Z1 raised concerns that the Nigerian government had in the past "used the media to downplay military and civilian casualties while exaggerating the number of Boko Haram members killed by the military".

4.10 NIGERIA'S POLITICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, RELIGIOUS AND SECURITY COMPLEXITIES

4.10.1 Socio-Economic and Security Challenges

In order to align and implement effective counter-terrorism strategies that address Nigeria's political, socio-economic and security challenges and threats, it is essential to understand the country's socio-political DNA.

All the respondents were of the view that Nigeria's history of military rule set the stage for undercurrents that gave rise to its security instability. Y1 in particular noted that "Nigeria's series of 1990s coups are indicative of the influence of military rule on civil society and its psyche". In addition, all the respondents in the X sector and Y1, Y2, Z1 and Z2 agreed that Boko Haram emerged as a consequence of the

societal reality after 9/11, when the US's GWOT created a global Islamic awakening. In other words, extremists sought identity and called for the establishment of a caliphate as an answer and retaliation embarked on a global jihadist war. It is in this context that Yusuf arose from Nigeria's northern Muslim community seeking to reclaim supreme control over their culture, religion, ethnicity, territory and community.

According to respondent Y3, "Nigerian government had no way of predicting that the rise of Boko Haram in 2009 would be any different and particularly catastrophic as Nigeria had successfully dealt with and experienced insurgency before, such as the Maitatsine riots of the late 1970s and early 1980s".

All of the respondents from the security sector, academia, diplomatic corps and think tanks unanimously agreed that the years between 2002 and 2009 catapulted Boko Haram's ideological footprint with the creation of new partnerships and alliances such as the Boko Haram/Al-Qaeda alignment and the 2015 association with IS (ISS, 2017). This collaboration and association ushered in Osama Bin Laden's support for Boko Haram in 2002 in the form of seed money to the tune of US\$3 million. Al-Qaida provided both financial and technical support to Boko Haram (Aguwa, 1997).

Ethnic identity was another problematic area identified by all the respondents in the security sector, academia, diplomatic corps and think tanks. Similarly all the respondents emphasised that ethnic divisions polarised the country into north and south and that this dated back to the colonial era of British missionary occupation and the development of the north/south pre-industrial and industrial era. Compounded resentment from the British colonial era paved the way for the Nigerian socio-political system, with tensions reflecting the political system and governance. Hence, Nigeria's territory was carved in terms of a federal governance system with states created along each cultural and ethnic grouping. This bred dominions along identity and access to resources. Therefore, socio-economic marginalisation acted as a catalyst for the quest for identity where religion filled the vacuum/void of exclusion.

Participants from the X, Y and Z sectors explained that democracy, globalisation and Western culture spread through education are viewed as tools to further widen the

socio-economic inequality/disparities. In Nigeria, specifically extremists grabbed the opportunity to ensure that the north remained poor despite its rich Islamic history. This issue is illustrated by the oil-based development in the south, which has a predominantly Christian population and the undeveloped north that has a mostly Muslim population. All the respondents from the X, Y, Z sectors were of the view that these socio-economic disparities are fuelled by unemployed youth who feel disenfranchised and are therefore receptive to extremist ideas and radicalisation. All this leads to a psychological environment that fuel discontent and result in them heeding the call for jihad.

Because Nigeria does not exist in isolation and is part of the wider West Africa region, the respondents from all of the sectors agreed that it is just one of the countries in the Lake Chad Basin characterised by multiple socio-economic challenges that fuel instability. The Lake Chad Basin has vast unoccupied territory and porous borders separating cosmopolitan communities with direct and similar cultural, language, religious, ethnic and tribal ties across different countries (ECOWAS, 2016a). The borders effectively dismantled the coordination, cooperation and support of neighbouring communities. Furthermore, Nigeria's 1970s oil boom and military rule set the stage for governance challenges entrenched by weak and ineffective institutions reflecting the country's fragile security and poverty and inequality setting the scene for the recruitment of youth not integrated into the productive social fabric of the community (ECOWAS, 2016).

4.10.2 The Muslim and Christian Divide

Nigeria's demographic make-up is characterised along the lines of ethnicity, religion, language and region. With Nigeria having the largest Christian population in Africa (an estimated 86.5 million people), religion is a highly polarising phenomenon between the two most dominant faiths: 46.3% Christians and 46% Muslims (Hassan, 2017). Furthermore, as pointed out previously, Nigeria's political and socio-economic landscape is polarised along religious and ethnic divisions, with the south predominately Christian and the north predominately Islam. Religion plays an important role in the social fabric, not just as a set of spiritual values but also in the political system. Political trends show that religion in Nigeria is a mobilising tool, manipulated for political gain and personal power, influence and resources (Aguwa,

1997; AMEC, 2015). Islam and Christianity pit Nigerians against each other in a hotly contested terrain, resulting in prolonged conflict centred on the right to or ownership of socio-economic resources and inclusion in the country's political, economic and social spheres (Aguwa, 1997; AMEC, 2015).

Nigeria's most recent Muslim and Christian tensions surfaced in an estimated 20 religious riots, protests and conflicts between 1980 and 1996, particularly in the northern towns of Kano, Kafanchan, Kaduna and Zaria. An earlier series of religious riots (the Maitatsine uprisings) defined the 1980s and incited Muslim fanaticism. Churches, mosques and other meeting places were torched, and approximately 3000 people were killed from 1992 to 1997 (Aguwa, 1997). While non-Muslims fear Muslim domination, there is some tension between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims that has in recent times translated into an anti-Christian and anti-government Muslim sect advocating for an Islamic society as an alternative to the secular norms prescribed by the Nigerian constitution (Aguwa, 1997). All the respondents from the X, Y and Z sectors expressed similar views that fanatics use Islam and the Quran as justification to kill infidels and therefore these actions fuel Christian animosity and rivalry. According to respondent Y3, "targeting infidels only heightens religious tensions, yet religion is not the cause of Christians thriving in the south and the marginalisation of poor northerners". Y1 emphasised that "these were 'one' people before colonial borders divided the area known as the Lake Chad Basin".

The think tank and academia respondents also explained that religion and ethnicity influence military recruitment. Communities believe that military recruitment is not merit based, but is based on an ethnicity or religious quota system, which does not only affect the military's capability but also fuels sentiments that the army is loyal to ethnic and religious groupings and military leadership and not to the Nigerian constituency they are supposed to defend.




Figure 4.2: Religious Clashes and Deaths

(Source: GTI, 2017)

4.10.3 Religion as a Political Tool

Nigeria's constitution is enshrined in a secular system, which automatically puts it on a collision course with the Islamic theology practiced and preached by political leaders, scholars and clerics. As a result, Nigeria has a long history of inherent tension between Christians and Muslims, as reflected in Muslims advocating to replace the country's secular political system which is based on democratic principles with Sharia/religious law (Aguwa, 1997; AMEC, 2015). Northerners argue that there is a direct link between religious principles and the workings of the state as Islam advocates a direct and intertwined connection between the religion and the state. Therefore, northerners view separation of powers as espoused by democratic political systems, democratic principles and secular norms as the reason for their socio-economic ills associated with poverty and inequality, high levels of corruption, and sentiments that northerners are disenfranchised and marginalised (Aguwa, 1997; AMEC, 2015).

Respondents X1, X2, X4 and Y1 were of different opinions about the separation of religion and politics, and Y1 reiterated that "it's not religion but socio-economic inequality reasons that have fuelled the emergence of Islamic extremists". Y1 emphasised that hatred for Christian or Western values is not justification for Islamic

extremism but rather that historical reasons of Muslim isolation and exclusion have compounded the Muslim community's grievances.

Y2 reiterated that “while many believe that Islam as a religion is divisive, many argue that religion is not the problem but rather the problem is extremist views of fundamentalists that believe that there is only a narrow way of interpreting Islam or the Quran”. X1 from the security cluster conceded that “Government must take the lead and set the narrative for reconciliatory and unifying rhetoric, consistent with action government takes”. All the respondents from the X, Y and Z sectors were of the view that violent acts and militant groups have to be condemned and not the Islam religion these groups claim to represent.

4.10.4 Religious Fundamentalism and the Link to Instability in North and West Africa

All of the respondents were of the view that that the Muslim community has alleged that there is a concerted effort to align terrorism with Islam and this is seen as an attack on Muslims. According to respondent X1 “not all Muslim are terrorists and not all terrorists are Muslims”.

The security sector, academia and think tank respondents' views of the Muslim community were affirmed by Iran's 2011 envoy to the UN, Gholam Hosein Dehqani, who in January 2015 denounced all forms of terrorism and noted that terrorist militants do not represent Islam's values. Dehqani reported that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have no links to Islam as a religion (Awwal & Sani, 2015).

All of the respondents were of the view that Islam has been redefined based on popularised societal fears that play into the mind-set that Islam is evil and negative and should be loathed. While many commit violent acts in the name of Islam, it should not be seen as representative of Islam. The secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation states that terrorism has no gender, religion or ethnicity; therefore terrorism is not Islamic, nor is it a cause or effect of Islam. “It shouldn't be that terror is Muslim and Muslim is terror” (BBC Hard Talk, 31 March 2017). This affirms the Muslim community's opinion that the name of Islam has been hijacked by a minority in the Muslim faith who do not speak for the majority of

Muslims. The mistake is that media commentary/analysis links terror to a region, when terror concerns all regardless of ethnicity or religion. When communities are marginalised, extremist ideology spreads where acts of violence are used as a retaliation tool (BBC Hard Talk, 31 March 2017).

According to respondent Y2 “Islamic extremism is the existence of strong beliefs and ideology and [a] mind-set that are hard to change”. While all the respondents agreed with the narrative expressed by Y2, respondent Z1 noted that legislation like the Trump administration’s recent Muslim travel ban sets a religious and ethnic narrative that implies a global war against Islam, which does not bode well for social cohesion. Such action has a direct blowback in fuelling radicalisation efforts and justification for copycat/tit-for-tat/retaliation attacks. US intelligence, however, refutes this. CIA interrogator James Mitchell, who drew up and carried out the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques (including waterboarding) refute claims that terrorist attacks have nothing to do with Islam and steadfastly maintains that Islamists have tried to destroy the American way of life, calling attacks on Western interests “Islamist Jihad”. Mitchell notes that the US resorted to waterboarding to stop catastrophic attacks by forcing information out of captives (BBC Hard Talk, 31 March 2017).

While it is acknowledged that Nigeria is a deeply religious society, the clashes between Muslims and Christians have sowed deep divisions that directly impact security and stability in the country. The challenge with regard to religion in Nigeria is part of the tenets of extremism, which promote radical and violent ideologies central to the rise of terrorism (Aguwa, 1997; AMEC, 2015). Boko Haram’s primary identification is aligned to radical Islam, which has led to the breakdown of social cohesion and the relationship between the state and communities. Therefore, the rise of militant groups such as Boko Haram stem from failure to address structural political and socio-economic grievances that spiral from community marginalisation and disenfranchisement (Aguwa, 1997; AMEC, 2015). Unaddressed grievances, resentment and frustration fuel domestic terrorism, with militants using physical and structural violence as a tool and reflection of their discontentment with the political system.

Y2 emphasised that counter-terrorism has connotations of social and economic exclusion and ethnic cleansing, which have caused tensions and strained relations in communities. This escalates to revenge attacks and killings and the call for a “caliphate to transcend borders”. To this regard, ECOWAS has raised concern that the call for a caliphate refers to territory across West Africa, North Africa and the Horn of Africa as a collective Islamic fundamentalist state stretching beyond Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin (ECOWAS, 2016). Cultural diversity, particularly in terms of ethnicity, religion and varying radical levels of association, tends to create platforms of support and sympathy that fuel extremist militant groups. The risk of insurgency infiltration and activities in West Africa’s Muslim belt is high because of extremist and radical ideas amid the large population of poor and discontented youth in ungoverned territory (ECOWAS, 2016).

Y2 emphasised that the militaristic approach acts as a trigger or catalyst of “strong convictions of a people set in their beliefs and therefore a paralysis of the mind”. This has caused a religious divide and is breeding ground for fundamentalists and militants. According to respondent Y2, “extremists do not kill unless conditions are set that lead to violence”. Counter-terrorism approaches should not counter religion but rather fundamentalism and extremist belief systems. Y2 reaffirmed that religious sensitivities are “underplayed by the West in terms of the power religion has and the rhetoric to paint Islam as evil is a corrosive tool sowing fear of Islam as a culture”. According to respondents Y2 and X1, Muslims need to act in concert and put the spotlight on the values and culture that Islam and the Quran advocate as opposed to extremist ideology.

4.11 THE LINK BETWEEN THE LIBYAN CRISIS AND BOKO HARAM’S INCREASED CAPABILITY

Following the death of Boko Haram’s leader in 2009, the militant group became increasingly violent and at its peak in 2014, this coincided with the ramifications of Libya’s 2011 crisis (Abuja, 2018; Michaletos, 2013). A closer look at the unfolding and rising instability in North and Western Africa reveals a timeline aligned with security threat levels linked to the fall of late Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 and the spiralling weapons and arms smuggling networks in North

Africa. Late president Gaddafi was known to have a well-resourced military and when NATO with the assistance of the UN overthrew Gaddafi's regime, Libyan artillery found their way onto the black market arms trade (Aguwa, 1997). Boko Haram capitalised on the sudden availability of arms and replaced its out-dated weapons with modern AK 47 rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, explosive devices, grenades and light anti-aircraft artillery (Aguwa, 1997). The re-arming of Boko Haram outmatched the under-resourced Nigerian army, which had inadequate and out-dated weaponry.




Figure 4.3: Map of Smuggling Networks

Source: Michaletos, I (2013)

All the respondents were of the view that Boko Haram has effectively used its association, alliance and global networks with Al-Qaeda and IS to acquire sophisticated weapons and train militia to counter and overpower military battalions. The militant group has also been able to evolve and change its tactics to suicide bomb attacks in high-density areas like markets and kidnapping schoolgirls.

4.12 STRUCTURAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN NIGERIA

4.12.1 Leadership and Good Governance Challenges

All of the respondents were of the view that Nigerian's security challenges are to a large extent due to a leadership legitimacy crisis and therefore it is vital that the legitimacy and credibility of leaders not be overlooked and that particular attention be given to leaders legitimately representing the communities over which they preside. According to respondents X3, Y1, Y2, Z1 and Z2, traditional leaders in northern Nigeria should be included and consulted on security situations in their communities in order to give credibility to the leadership in the various states of the federation. X1 from the security cluster indicated that "locals must be put in charge of intelligence collection on insurgency activities in their communities".

All the respondents from Y and Z sectors raised concerns that the Nigerian political leaders have been complicit in elitism and corruption, with allegations that the military budget has been siphoned for personal gain. These respondents noted that Muslim fundamentalists have used these allegations as an indication of institutionalised corruption due to non-compliance with Islam's teachings, thereby raising mistrust of the government and political leaders' ability to provide basic social services.

Furthermore, respondents from the Y and Z sectors highlighted that communities have strong reservations that leaders are appointed based on their ethnicity or religious beliefs. There is especially strong suspicion that leaders' loyalty to religion and ethnic group supersedes the rule of law and loyalty to the constituency they serve. Many northerners question the way former president Jonathan (a southerner) assumed power after the death of the late northern President, before the northerners completed their term(s) of office. Late president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was a Muslim northerner and died in office. He was president from 2007 to 2010 and did not serve out his term of office, leaving his northern constituency disenchanted with the political system. According to respondent Z1 this is the main reason why northerners are still aggrieved that a Muslim did not serve a full presidential term and

they were unenthusiastic about former president Jonathan assuming power as he originates from the south.

With regard to governance, all the respondents in the X, Y and Z sectors were of the view that strengthening the credibility of government institutions and the oversight authority of watchdog institutions is important to strengthen institutional independence and enable authorities to enforce criminal and judicial regulations to stem corruption.

4.13 INEFFICIENCIES OF THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Although the various multilateral initiatives were provided with significant foreign assistance from the US, the UN and regional bodies, the initiatives did not function optimally to create working institutions to eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram. This was mainly because they lacked effective implementation, coordination and at times duplicated efforts and did not use resources optimally. Respondents X1, X2, Y1, Y2, Z1 and Z2 acknowledged that one of the challenges to sustainable security is that governments are satisfied with temporary victories and focus on short-term solutions. Governments must instead invest in long-term socio-economic solutions that require significant resources. According to respondent Z2, “the state is part of the problem and therefore unlikely to be the solution to the problem”. Respondents Y1, Y2, Y3 and Z1 agreed and emphasised that the government is not the only custodian of security, but that communities also need to take responsibility and ownership to finding effective solutions for themselves. All the respondents concluded that with regard to sustainable security, the following should be done:

- Implement early warning mechanisms need to intervene when potential crises (for example, attacks on places of worship or particular religious groups) are in an infancy phase and therefore the excessive use of force can be avoided;
- Introduce security legislation to regulate prosecution and penalties regarding issues of money laundering, cyber security and so on.

- Strengthen regional cooperation and coordination to act in unison as a region, for example synchronise operational efforts and facilitate effective working strategies to fight insurgency within the Lake Chad Basin.

4.14 MULTILATERAL RESPONSES

4.14.1 UN Intervention

The Nigerian government requested the UN to support the Nigeria's government's efforts to defeat Boko Haram and the UNSC added Boko Haram to its 1267 sanctions list in 2013 (Nichols, 2014). This list effectively subjects Boko Haram to arms embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes on the basis that Boko Haram is affiliated to Al Qaeda and AQIM (Nichols, 2014).

With regard to the laws and regulations that multilateral institutions like the UN are required to observe, According to respondent B1 and B2 regulations like the R2P (the right of member states to request intervention from the AU to restore peace and stability) and respect for international/diplomatic issues such as state sovereignty which are often overlooked. B1 and B2 pointed out that even though the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria posed a greater threat of instability spreading to the Lake Chad Basin countries, Nigerian's domestic security crisis was not referred to the UNSC. Instead, the UN had to delicately balance its relations with Nigeria as a regional power. As a result, the US imposed sanctions on Boko Haram as a militant group violating international law.

4.14.2 UN/AU Initiatives

Although the AU condemned the instability in the Lake Chad Basin and instituted military intervention through the AU's peacekeeping force, the UNSC is the only body mandated to maintain peace and security in the global context. However, the UN's powers are also curtailed by the UN Charter, which emphasises sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, and enhancing peace and security' (UNSC Resolution 2178, 2014). Based on this, the UNSC cannot unilaterally intervene in the domestic affairs of a country.

B1 and B2 highlighted that African countries have difficulty in implementing multilateral and regional resolutions of forums such as the AU and ECOWAS. This

is because African countries guard their sovereignty jealously and therefore their domestic strategic interests often override regional interests.

All of the respondents were of the view that the global counter-terrorism agenda is to a large extent viewed as driven by the West and ratified by the rest of the world, including many African countries. Although the AU has laid the foundation for and guides many African countries' counter-terrorism strategies, the implementation and operationalisation of these strategies are often dependent on Western funding and resources. Foreign funding unavoidably comes with terms and conditions that are very often favourable to the strategic interests of foreign players. For example: In July 2015, the AU provided military assistance to the Lake Chad Basin in an attempt to reign in Boko Haram. However, the operation was hampered by lack of funding and the necessary logistics, and only came into full effect with the assistance of the UN (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

Y3, a respondent critical of the African continent, noted that African governments do not have the capacity to enforce governance effectively and efficiently, and find that they have to outsource security to the West. Y3 emphasised that "looking to the West is a false expectation for Africans. The West does not owe Africans anything. Instead the destiny of Africans is in the hands of Africans".

Heavy criticism of African states also came from Y1, Y2, Y3 and Z1. These respondents indicated that African states tend to accept foreign funding under the banner of fighting terrorism but use the assistance and funding for personal and political gain, such as propping up their administrations. Furthermore, weapons procurement can be open to abuse as weapons can be used to stay in power.

4.15 US INTERVENTION TO COUNTER BOKO HARAM

The US pledged approximately US\$51 million in bilateral defence contributions to West Africa countries and in October 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced that the US would commit a further US\$60 million to the G5 task force (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania) on condition that a clear strategy is implemented (Levinson, 2017).

According to respondent Z2, from an academic institution, “Western intervention offer packaged solutions, that are not based on best practices as these Western interventions continue to yield disastrous results”. The respondent observed that preconditioned assistance packages are not backed up by solution-driven outcomes that address the underlying root cause but rather eliminate a perceived threat to Western strategic interests.

Furthermore, while the Trump administration has acknowledged that outlining, synchronising and implementing a coherent counter-terrorism strategy for the West African G5 would be a challenge, it also criticised the UN’s lack of counter-terrorism operations, noting that the UN mainly conducts peacekeeping operations (Levinson, 2017). To further emphasise this point, President Trump’s 2017 budget proposal indicated a 30% cut in the US State Department and USAID funding, which includes downsizing the US’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (Levinson, 2017).

Respondent Z2 was critical of African states constantly looking to the West for technical, military and economic assistance that comes with *carte blanche* conditions and requirements attached. According to Z2, African countries lose leverage to shape counter-terrorism strategies specific for African countries. Z2 further highlighted that dependency on Western funding comes at the high price of accepting pre-packaged counter-terrorism strategies that are inadequate in yielding effective results. Because African countries are beholden to the West for resources, Z2 noted that Western countries determine African counter-terrorism strategies by setting preconditions that African countries, as recipients have to accept. Z2 explained that in 2015, the US Congress made a commitment to lift the arms shipping ban against Nigeria and assist the Nigerian government to fight Boko Haram. However, because of allegations that the Nigerian government had committed human rights abuses during the 2009 Boko Haram conflict, the Buhari administration was unable to secure US weapons because of the restrictions in the US’s Leahy Laws¹ (Al Jazeera, 2017). A compromise was reached and in October 2015, the Obama administration pledged 800 military, intelligence and other security personnel to fight Boko Haram in Cameroon (Al

¹ The Leahy Laws (1997) prohibit US arms sales to foreign countries considered to have violated human rights.

Jazeera, 2017). Logistical assistance such as surveillance drones for intelligence and reconnaissance operations in the region and technical advisory assistance were at the crux of the partnership (Al Jazeera, 2017).

The laws/legislation of foreign countries play a direct role in Nigeria's international relations and, at times, have a contradictory and conflicting effect on Nigeria's security challenges. For example, the US's Terror Watch list and Muslim Travel Ban are both US regulations that have direct implications for non-US citizens. All the respondents conceded that laws such as the ones stated above infringe on the human rights of Americans and non-Americans and Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and even go as far as affecting universal freedoms of movement. The unintended consequences of these regulations fuel anti-Islam sentiment and therefore stigmatise the Muslim religion. All the respondents from X sector, Y1 and Z2, were of the opinion that such anti-Muslim regulations fuel sentiments of exclusion and are used to justify the call for jihad and forming a caliphate. These respondents similarly indicated that another good example is the incarceration of prisoners labelled "terrorists" without trial at Guantanamo Bay which cements the narrative that the GWOT and counter-terrorism measures adopted by various countries are a veneer for targeting Muslims globally.

4.16 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, both the primary and secondary data were discussed and the main findings of the research summarised into themes emanating from the data. Through this process, the researcher extensively explored the counter-terrorism measures Nigeria and international stakeholders have taken to counter Boko Haram in the context of the strained political and socio-economic environment of Nigeria. Chapter 5 focuses on why the measures undertaken have not resolved the crisis and stemmed the rise of instability that Boko Haram has brought to Nigeria and the region. Chapter 5 also contains an outline of measures to strengthen Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies by addressing political, socio-economic and ideological challenges embedded in the country's social fabric.

CHAPTER 5

DATA INTERPRETATION AND SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the findings from the primary and secondary data (as outlined in Chapter 4) are discussed. This chapter also contains a summary of the research findings emanating from the analysis and interpretation processes. The recommendations, conclusions and limitations of the study are also discussed.

5.2 INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA

The research entailed examining why counter-terrorism strategies have failed as early warning and preventative mechanisms, and why they have failed to curb the militant insurgency in Nigeria. Nigeria has struggled with minimal success to achieve sustainable peace, security, stability and development – which directly affects its economic growth and the region's sustainable developmental goals (Taylor, 2014).

The researcher sought to shed light on the challenges posed by terrorism in Nigeria, mainly due to the embedded and unique political, socio-economic and religious characteristics of the Nigerian landscape and regional dynamics. The research offers some insights into what addition and complementary nuances and unique interventions and initiatives the Nigerian government, international role players and civil society can collectively adopt as counter-terrorism measures to yield long-term effective results. The research findings highlight some of the challenges that hinder effective and efficient counter-terrorism strategies and provide an indication of what should be reviewed in pursuit of more effective, implementable solutions to attain sustainable peace and security in Nigeria and in the region.

What emerged constantly throughout the data collection process was the need to address the contention around the concept of terrorism (and counter-terrorism) and

who is defined as a “terrorist”. Therefore, this section opens with a discussion on this debate.

5.2.1 Concepts under Debate

(1) *Terrorism*

The researcher agrees with Madjd-Sadjadi and Vencill (2005) that there is indeed no single correct definition of “terrorism”. However, the literature review and data that were gathered confirm that there is general consensus on the definition of the term that is aligned to what Akangbe and Fidel (2012) and the GTI (2017) define as the threat or execution of violent acts or tactics by insurgents or extremist groups to instil fear or intimidate in order to achieve a particular political, economic and/or religious objective. However, there are a number of challenges regarding this generally accepted view of terrorism, which are discussed below.

History has defined insecurity as shaped by potential conflict between states, and actions to protect a country’s borders and the right to bear arms as solely in the hands of the military (Francis, 2010). Therefore states can be perpetrators of conflict. That said, the view that perpetrators of violence are only non-state actors is questionable. The slaughtering of civilians during the 2009 uprising in north-eastern Nigeria led to the killing of both Boko Haram members and civilians. Therefore, using brutality to achieve an objective cannot only be attributed to non-state actors. Iran’s UN Envoy Dehqani condemned the phenomenon of terrorism in all its forms, including “state terrorism”, and advocated for renewed efforts to cut the flow of financial aid from government or individuals in government to militant groups (Awwal & Sani, 2015).

The definition does not address the circumstances or “push and pull” factors at play that compel individuals to take part in or conduct acts of violence.

In the context of terrorism, ignoring factors that compel individuals to resort to acts of violence is a glaring oversight. In pre-1994 apartheid South Africa, the common saying emerged: “One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” In essence, freedom fighters (called “terrorists” by the apartheid regime) engaged in violent protests and acts to obtain equal rights and freedoms. Therefore, the push and full factors or underlying root causes that compel individuals to take up arms or engage

in violent acts as a sign of protest should not be understated. Addressing roots causes such as poverty; prolonged unresolved conflict; ethnic, political and religious discrimination; and socio-economic exclusion are in fact imperative to addressing grievances and are prerequisites for the successful combating of terrorism.

Therefore, understanding why militia groups such as Boko Haram embark on a violent path or path of terror is directly linked to understanding what counter-terrorism strategies are needed to address the group's political, religious and/or socio-economic exclusion. In an era where terrorism is an evolving and more diffused phenomenon within the security sector, understanding the underlying or root causes of terrorism is vital. Therefore, the researcher outlines that counter-terrorism approaches globally have been hampered by misdiagnoses of why militia conduct acts of violence in the first place.

By defining acts of terrorism as criminal acts, the use of force, arrests without trial, persecution and even executions are justified as solutions. The military approach therefore does not try to understand the problem but forces a quick-fix temporary solution that is in fact mere veneer.

The adoption of militaristic approaches from the early 20th century to the 21st century is a clear indication that counter-terrorism strategies are Eurocentric in nature and there have not been attempts to find long-term solutions to terrorism but the goal was rather to eradicate terrorists. Eurocentric counter terrorism strategies are a misfit for the African continent because the African continent suffers an apparent human security deficit in terms of fulfilling basic human needs as described in Maslow's hierarchy of needs; such as food, shelter, health and clean water (Francis, 2010). The UNDP defines basic human needs as similar to basic human security needs: 'safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and the desire for safety and economic opportunity. Therefore, the global counter-terrorism approach is to a large extent viewed as driven by the West with an agenda that is driven by the West's strategic economic interests on the continent and ignoring the exacerbation of human security on the African continent by military strategies.

The interchangeable use of the terms "insurgency" and "terrorism" is particularly problematic. With regard to Nigeria, the research reveals that Boko Haram is not a

terrorist group but rather an insurgent group. Boko Haram's motive is to overthrow the government and create a caliphate or Islamic state to restore and preserve Islamic culture and principles. This is very different from, for example, the ANC as a liberation movement that was prepared to negotiate with the apartheid regime for a political settlement.

(2) *Radicalisation*

The research indicates that typically the militaristic approach has acted as a trigger or catalyst for strong convictions in people set in their beliefs and therefore it brought about paralysis of the mind. This set of beliefs emanates from a religious divide that is fertile breeding ground for fundamentalists and the growth of militants who strongly believe that counter-terrorism has connotations of social and economic exclusion and ethnic cleansing. This gives rise to tensions and strained relations in communities, which in turn escalate to revenge attacks and killings – hence the call for a “caliphate to transcend borders” as respondent Y3 indicated. One of the central problems is the lack of communication or effective communication strategies, with miscommunication having a corrosive effect on counter-terrorism strategies.

The millennial challenge is that Islamic extremism has become the mainstream. IS and Al-Qaeda appeal to the youth, with the promise that extremism and the jihad is fulfilment of a religious obligation and therefore the achievement of a better world. In this regard, the use of conventional warfare to eliminate extremist militia does not necessarily translate into an ideological victory. Therefore, militaristic solutions only serve to fuel Islamic radicalisation and the call for jihad. Because extremism has become fashionable and impacts the psyche of the youth, one of the counter strategies should be education in order to counter the narrative. Therefore, there needs to be social cohesion initiatives to build trust, integration and respect for different religions among Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria.

5.2.2 Linking Islam with Jihad

The research indicates that despite the negative connotation that Islam and terrorism are aligned, Islamic extremism is rejected in the Middle East; the Muslim world (countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Algeria) acknowledging that the growth of extremism is a cancer within Islam. Furthermore, Rushdie (CNN, 20 November

2017) emphasised that the Muslim community are of the opinion that the name “Islam” has been hijacked by a minority within the Muslim faith who do not speak for the majority of Muslims. Therefore, efforts to align terrorism with Islam are viewed as an attack on Muslims. “Not all Muslim are terrorists and not all terrorists are Muslims” (Madani, 2017). The error adopted from the West due to the GWOT is that terror is linked to a region and an ethnic group and religion. As a result, the term “terror” is strongly associated with and used to justify alienation and elimination. It is no surprise, therefore, when Muslim communities are marginalised for their different values and ideology. Madani (2017) underlines that terrorism has no gender, religion or ethnicity; therefore, it is not Islamic, nor a cause or effect of Islam. Terror is not Muslim, neither is Muslim terror. These stereotypes continue to undermine equality, integration and tolerance of all religions.

5.2.3 Counter-Terrorism Strategies

In the UNGCTS (2006) counter-terrorism is defined as a comprehensive framework for a domestic and international response to terrorism. The implementation of counter-terrorism approaches therefore requires a broad range of strategies and initiatives by governments or multilateral forums to prevent, combat, counter and deter terrorism; rebuild and reconstruct terrorist-plagued territories; and rehabilitate the victims of terror.

The range of actions should depend on the understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and the country where the counter-terrorism package is to be implemented. The UN underlines that collective multilateral collaboration measures using each multilateral’s strengths and area of specialisation will effectively prevent terrorists from exploiting communications technology and resources (Thérout-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016).

5.2.4 Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies under the Buhari Administration

(1) The Socio-Economic and Political Climate

The research revealed that poor governance is pervasive in Nigeria, as is evident in corruption resulting from weak state governance and law enforcement institutions;

the economic crisis; social inequality; poverty; religious, ethnic and regional marginalisation; and poor development outcomes. Government institutions have been unable or lack capacity to provide economic opportunities; social services; employment opportunities; security (including border security); and law and order (ECOWAS, 2016). However, growing grievances compounded by socio-economic and religious marginalisation are fertile ground for violent protests, conflict, religious fundamentalism, ethnic political extremism, and the consolidation of terrorism and insurgencies.

This highlights the fact that strengthening governance and oversight are a vital element of a country's social fabric. Former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasango emphasised that African strategies have to include issues of culture, custom and religion in acknowledgement of the sensitivities and nuances of the African continent (BBC Hard Talk, 11 September 2017). The Lake Chad Basin countries must undertake extensive efforts to strengthen democratic/political stability, good governance, conflict resolution and peace building, and economic prosperity to consolidate a more sustainable platform as a counter-terrorism initiative. Furthermore, a more effective cooperation, coordination and strengthening capacity and synergy within and between the countries in the Lake Chad Basin are needed.

In the context of a rising youth and unemployed demography, the Nigerian government is challenged by its inability to provide its population in the northern part of the country with employment opportunities and adequate basic services such as education, healthcare services, housing, and safety, and security. This permutates in a vicious cycle of violent attacks, insurgencies and religious fundamentalism. Acknowledgement that socio-economic ills are push factors for extremism, radicalisation and militancy is necessary.

(2) *Leadership Challenges*

The responsibility for Nigeria's security solutions does not reside in the government alone but also in the federal states and various communities across the federation. Respondent Z² stated that "the state is part of the problem and therefore unlikely to be the solution to the problem".

Nigeria's population is very sensitive to ethnicity and religion, with leaders facing allegations of elitism and institutionalised corruption. Therefore, social cohesion and integration depend heavily on political and government leaders being sensitive to issues of ethnicity and religion and exercising their authority based on the rule of law and not along ethnic and religious differences. Boko Haram espouses anti-Christian and anti-Western, democratic values, norms, culture and principles. The danger is the perception that certain administrations are sympathetic or aligned to a particular religion and therefore aligned to a political constituency that directly benefits and has access to resources. This fuels systematic patronage that leads to resentment. The quality of people who become leaders can no longer be ignored or underrated. Prerequisites for leadership should include community buy-in, credibility and legitimacy.

The research revealed that one of the challenges to sustainable security is that leaders have been unable to focus on their communities' long-term socio-economic problems and focused instead on temporary solutions such as securing funding for refugee camps. Community leaders need to adopt long-term solutions to socio-economic problems alongside security reforms, and not just address defence and security issues.

(3) The Legacy of the Jonathan Administration

The researcher examined Nigeria's instability, which is associated with frequent violent attacks, kidnappings and rising insurgency. Using Nigeria as a case study, the researcher examined whether counterterrorism strategies are doomed to failure because of the socio-economic and political causes embedded in the country's history. Even though former president Jonathan was responsible for security sector reforms – with the overhaul of Nigeria's security sector in 2014 through the implementation of the NSS – his administration was viewed as weak on security, with Boko Haram gaining territory in the Sambisa Forest. His initial stance to resist regional and international pressure for foreign troops to assist in combating Boko Haram on Nigerian territory further weakened Nigeria's security strategy. The Nigerian government instead prioritised a domestic initiative of military action against Boko Haram in 2009. It is this military intervention that sparked an international outcry due to the high number of civilians and militants who were

killed. It had a snowball effect in that Boko Haram splintered into smaller militia groups and its strategy evolved into “low technical attacks” in the form of individual low-level attacks. The weak capability of the Nigerian army brings the issue of hybrid warfare into stronger focus, with Boko Haram being able to acquire sophisticated weapons despite the sanctions imposed on it.

These challenges reaffirm that addressing the threat posed by extremists requires a multipronged approach at various levels. While guarding porous borders and strengthening military capability are often recognised as government-level measures that curb militia groups’ mobility and financial support, soft approaches at community level are vital. Strategies involve countering incitement to commit terrorist acts or intolerance motivated through exposure to radical and extremist ideas and implementing mechanisms to stem recruitment. Such mechanisms include promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development, and social cohesion and inclusiveness. Facilitating the reintegration and rehabilitation of once-armed rebels are also important.

(4) *The Buhari Administration*

As a former member of Nigeria’s military, President Buhari followed a military approach with a strong anti-corruption response to Nigeria’s governance problems, which has always been the weakest link to effective strategies. President Buhari secured much-needed military weapons that assisted the government to regain large territory lost to Boko Haram. However, President’s security gains were short-lived, with his ill-health hampering security sector successes for the greater part of 2016/2017. Prior to his illness, his administration declared that Boko Haram had been defeated and the sporadic violent attacks were remnants of the dying insurgency. Later it became clear that this was simply not true as the military was unable to control territory beyond the cities and town it had recaptured from Boko Haram, leaving people in north-eastern Nigeria unprotected and millions displaced and unable to return to their villages and towns. Boko Haram’s resurgence during 2016/2017 once again resulted in the escalation of militant attacks on the Nigerian military and civilians in remote villages in the northeast (The New Age, 2017).

That said, Buhari's early successes are noted as him making concessions such as amnesty payments to Boko Haram captives and simultaneously prosecuting captured Boko Haram militants. Buhari directed significant financial resources toward security. In June 2015, he pledged US\$121 million for MNJTF operations and in 2017 US\$1 billion for the federal government's efforts against the Boko Haram insurgency.

(5) *Domestic and International Legislative Obligations*

Despite the fact that Nigeria is part of the regional Inter-Governmental Action Group against money laundering in West Africa, Nigeria's capacity to stem terrorism financing has been of great concern with questions arising about its ability to investigate and prosecute those involved adequately and effectively. Nigeria has attempted to pass legislation to address money laundering and terrorism financing. Although President Buhari recommended that the 2016 Nigerian Financial Intelligence Centre Bill be sent to the National Assembly for ratification, the bill is still outstanding and has not been ratified into law at the time of writing this report.

Although the Nigerian government prescribes to the UNSC list of terrorist groups and therefore adheres to the freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets identified by financial institutions and systems, domestic red tape and bureaucratic processes often prolong the process to freeze militant groups' assets. Lack of enforcement has compromised Nigeria's financial systems. The ISS (2017) indicates that there is a strong perception that Nigerian politicians are the main source of Boko Haram's funding. With research confirming that Al-Qaeda, IS and kidnapping for ransom are major sources of funding for Boko Haram, the lack of financial law enforcement confirms that the loopholes in Nigeria's financial regulations leave it vulnerable to exploitation.

5.2.5 Socio-Economic Empowerment Initiatives

Despite the renewed series of hard- and soft-approach initiatives outlined in Chapter 4, the research indicates that these initiatives have not yet yielded results. Insurgents' violent attacks and killings have continued despite repeated efforts by the Nigerian and Chadian governments, including various agencies in the security sector, to defeat the insurgency intent on creating an Islamic state in Nigeria's north-eastern region.

Therefore, the research findings advocate for renewed implementation efforts and introduction of additional empowerment initiatives for Nigeria as a whole, with specific focus on the north-eastern region. These initiatives need to be more comprehensive and specific to community needs. For example, they should include microcredit schemes and similar informal entrepreneurial organisations as a way of investing in self-reliance and self-ownership. Skills empowerment in carpentry, bricklaying and so on, as well as in education from pre-primary to secondary, are also important. For example the research participants emphasised that there is not enough awareness campaigns on social development and services offered at local level. At this level, empowerment initiatives such as education and skills training, strengthening local police stations and healthcare should be given the requisite financial and human resources backing. Social cohesion empowerment of local Muslim clerics is vital to detect early signs of radicalisation and use moderates to rehabilitate fundamentalists and build inclusive communities. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UK have instituted rehabilitation programmes for convicted militants and returnee youth hardliners through social and amnesty reintegration initiatives.

5.2.6 Regional Initiatives

The US provided very specific assistance to the MNJTF, including advisors, intelligence, training, logistical support and equipment (Global Security, 2016; Thérout-Bénoni, 2015). The MNJTF needs to be remodelled along African-centric, modern-security multilateral institutions. Examples of this include AMISOM (instituted in 2007 to combat Al-Shabaab militants) AFISMA (organised by ECOWAS to support the Malian government in combating Islamist rebels in northern Mali).

Comprehensive macro-developmental programmes emanating from the research are regional programmes similar to the Marshall Plan implemented after World War II for Nigeria's north-eastern region, where infrastructure development (building wells, hospitals, schools and roads) would allow for long-term human security development.

Iran's UN Envoy Dehqani noted in January 2015 that combating terrorism and violent extremism requires global cooperation. He therefore called on the UN to establish an anti-terrorism international convention (Awwal & Sani, 2015).

5.2.7 Pre-packaged Counter-Terrorism Strategies

With regard to pre-packed strategies, the US implemented AFRICOM in 2007 to harmonise and promote the US's security, defence and development and diplomatic objectives on the African continent (Francis, 2010). However the creation of AFRICOM occurred at a time the African continent through multilateral forums like AU and ECOWAS were trying to develop the continent's security capacity to resolve conflicts, maintain peace and security. Therefore the emergence of AFRICOM was seen as the securitisation of US foreign policy on the African continent and AFRICOM was viewed as counter to the African continent's security efforts, which directly undercut the AU's ability to develop its own security capacity and strategies (Francis, 2010).

Additionally, Nigeria's inability to acquire the required arms and adequate resources highlighted the plight of African countries subjected to the preconditions for Western assistance, cooperation agreements and trade initiatives. One such incidence which directly affected Nigeria is the US's Leahy Laws which prohibit the US from providing military assistance to foreign security forces that violate human rights. The allegations of human rights abuses hindered Nigeria from acquiring much-needed high-technical aircraft and weapons, and stifled the government's capability to effectively fight well-armed Boko Haram. Without access to adequate military resources, Nigeria had to be content with what the West offered in the form of advisors, logistical support, equipment, military training and humanitarian assistance for the growing demands of refugee camps. These Western pre-packaged basket of goods offered to African militaries are not specific to particular country or community needs analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats – SWOT).

5.2.8 Smart Counter-Terrorism Strategies that address Human Security

Terrorism today has emerged as one of the most potent threats to global peace and security. Easy access to sophisticated weapons and disruptive advances in

technology, especially the cyber world masks the identity of the terrorists, facilitates real time secure communications and the flow of funds and provides access to an infinite resource of DIY kits on issues ranging from making bombs to executing beheadings. These elements have collectively made terrorism the most preferred means of waging war (GTI, 2017). Therefore, while retaining a military strategy, Nigeria's security structures have to institute an effective soft-approach strategy that comprehensively deals with the threat of Boko Haram.

Wilson (2008) reflects on smart strategies emanating from a foundation of utilising 'aspects of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing'. Therefore, smart counter-insurgency strategies should be cemented in changing mind-sets/winning hearts and the emphasis should be on proactive measures such as intelligence collection. In other words, information – not weapons – should be used as a reactive measure. The chronological morphosis of counter terrorism strategies illustrated in Table 4.1 illustrated that military strategies prioritised and elevated State security over human security as far back as the 1960s. In the new millennial the UN's 1994 Human Development Report notes that the best way to address insecurity challenges is to focus on human security, thereby tackling both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (Bayo, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013; UNDP, 1994; King & Murray, 2001). Human security recognises and acknowledges that the broader concept of security is defined beyond just state security to include socio-economic security and self-actualisation. While traditional counter-terrorism strategies embrace the original concept of state security which canters on the role of traditional state actors to protect the integrity of the state from domestic and international threat, human security is an extension of state security and includes not just territorial and political security but also basic socio-economic needs (UNDP, 1994; Abad, 2000; King & Murray, 2001).

With human security in mind, the sensitivities over religion are "underplayed by the West in terms of the power religion has and the rhetoric used to paint Islam as not equal to other religions. In recent times, this perspective has proven to be a corrosive tool sowing fear of Muslim as a culture" (Madjd-Sadjadi, and Vencill, 2005). One of the main problems is lack of effective communication strategies, with miscommunication playing a corrosive role in community social cohesion and counter-terrorism strategies. The government, academia and other experts must take

the lead in the development of African ideas and solutions, and set the narrative for reconciliation through various platforms that condemn radicalism, extremist views and inequality. African solutions start with the understanding that debates, discussions, awareness campaigns collectively are important educational tools to enlighten communities on the detrimental impact that Jihad and violent activities have on the social fabric of a country and the economic development of a nation (Francis, 2010). Additionally, Muslim communities should act in concert in condemning violent acts and militant groups, including changing the mind-set of Islamic extremists by using Islamic clerics for social cohesion and nation building and to side-line hardliners through programmes like the UK's Prevent Programme which entails school teachers identifying and reporting radicalised students to authorities (BBC Hard Talk, 31 August 2017).

Rehabilitation programmes should be community-led initiatives and not government security apparatus tools. These initiatives should entail socio-economic assistance for families not promoting anti-Muslim sentiments as witnessed in recent legislation such as the France banning the hijab and the US's Muslim travel ban and Terror Watch-List. Counter-terrorism measures adopted by various countries must not infringe on the human rights of individuals labelled "terrorists". The research highlighted that to reverse the radicalisation of youth, counter-initiatives must be transparent in terms of their objectives and strategies in order to avoid being painted as anti-Muslim and used as a propaganda radicalisation tool; governance should be aligned with judicial and law-enforcement legislature; and finance regulations should be finalised; and socio-economic initiatives should target grassroots and marginalised communities and Muslim groups.

However, these programmes have to be synchronised with existing community projects and Muslim communities. Awareness should be raised to destigmatise the Muslim culture and use education as a tool, and not to stifle debate and discussion but rather to encourage debate, and use clerics to preach Islam's religious practices espousing compassion and the co-existence of diverse societies. The internet, with its various platforms that counter the extremist narrative with mainstream videos, should also be used.

Respondent X1 indicated that “South Africa has successfully used both Islam clerics to build social cohesion and swiftly identify hardliners in communities”. Residential areas are socially and religiously integrated, with temples, mosques and churches catering for all groups of people. Furthermore, Muslims are visible in many fields, from politics and the professional spectrum to the informal industry.

5.2.9 Nigeria’s Security Sector

It is evident that the Nigerian security sector has lacked capacity in terms of personnel and equipment to effectively fight Boko Haram, especially during the Jonathan administration. Although President Buhari has made strides in procuring weapons, Nigeria’s capability is challenged by the evolving nature of a hybrid war with low-level technical attacks in the form of individual low-level attacks.

Going forward, President Buhari’s successful trajectory requires expanding Nigeria’s army and specialised security units with the objective of increasing skilled combat soldiers trained in unconventional warfare that is more appropriate for hybrid wars. This is only possible by adequately equipping the army with appropriate arms and weapons, including modern technology and innovative social media platforms used as intelligence collection tools. With the consistent security vulnerabilities in the north-eastern region, analysts have advocated for sustainable security strategies such as training and deploying additional soldiers, strengthening police stations, and increasing checkpoints and roadblocks in the north-eastern region, specifically in Maiduguri. However, combat training should include unconventional warfare to effectively tackle hybrid conflict and intelligence training so that offensive tactics are filtered into combat. During heightened security threats, analysts have called for extreme measures such as introducing periodic/ad-hoc states of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Insurgency containment should be more pragmatic within an African context. Negotiations must therefore follow a flexible approach and additional amnesty concessions should be considered as a means for sustainable security.

As a matter of urgency, the Nigerian government should implement measures to restore and maintain security in the recaptured territories, as well as work with

regional institutions to secure ungoverned spaces in the Sahel region to prevent weapons smuggling and the infiltration of foreign terrorist fighters influenced through extremist ideology. The UN highlights that militants have used globalisation to further their cause through the increased use of communications technology for radicalisation, recruiting and inciting others to commit terrorist acts (Thérroux-Bénoni, 2015; Global Security, 2016). This includes the recent rise in foreign fighters carrying out transnational terrorism.

5.2.10 Nigeria's Military Approach

There is no doubt that military intervention, as a counter-insurgency approach has to remain an intervention strategy in Nigeria for the unforeseeable future/mid to long term. With sentiments that the army is overstretched in December 2017, the governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, rolled out a plan to congregate smaller villages into larger villages as a security measure. The governor has put forward plans to congregate towns into five larger urban settlements and provide them with social services such as education, healthcare, a livelihood and safety as a soft-approach pilot project for possible rollout to the rest of Borno State going forward (Reuters, 2017). As continuation of the military approach, measures are in place for the vigilante groups known as the Civilian Joint Task Force to become agriculture rangers and, together with the security forces, patrol each town and protect farms (Reuters, 01 December 2017). However, conditions need to be conducive – with both safety and opportunities made available — for refugees to voluntary return. The UN has pledged to return 30 000 IDPs to new shelters erected in towns such as Bama which were previously inhabited.

Military tools include effective intelligence-gathering mechanisms and operations in north-eastern Nigeria; effective border control and border intelligence in the Lake Chad Basin; and modern technology and innovative social media platforms as intelligence collection tools to counter insecurity. Included in the laundry list of military requirements are expanded army and security units, with the objective of increasing combat soldiers in Nigeria through deployment strategies to train military personnel on unconventional warfare such as hybrid wars. The respondents called for the deployment of additional soldiers in north-eastern Nigeria (and specifically placing a unit in Maiduguri) and increasing the checkpoints and roadblocks. They

advocated for the periodic/ad-hoc introduction of a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states as security developments deem necessary. Also needed is an adequately equipped army with appropriate arms and weapons.

5.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework followed in the research describes the broader concept of security that unpacks security sector nuances such as terrorism and what counter-terrorism strategies are needed to achieve peace and stability as pillars of sustainable development. The research affirms that safety and security threats that jeopardise Africa's stability paved the way for the implementation of counter-terrorism approaches aligned to conservative theories in the form of realist and idealist principles. Realism holds that the international system is a reflection of the contestation for power among state actors and the use of military muscle to retain the privileges of power. Idealism complements realism and maintains that states are progressive and often find ways to cooperate and seek mutual resolutions, as is evident in the formation of multilateral forums.

The researcher argues that critical/transformational theories allow for a better understanding of the world order, specifically terrorism and what counter-terrorism strategies are vital for sustainable peace and security. As a theoretical framework, the research aligns with historical materialism as reflected in the unequal power relations between the workers and the owners of production in Marx's class struggle. In the case of Nigeria, with socio-economic disparities between the north and the south, fuelling discontentment and the rise in insurgency, the African continent can no longer continue to implement strategies based on pre-packaged counter-terrorism approaches that do not address the underlying socio-economic challenges. This highlights the fact that strengthening governance and oversight are vital to a country's social fabric. Former Nigerian president Obasanjo emphasised that African strategies have to include issues of culture, custom and religion in acknowledgement of the sensitivities and nuances of the African continent (BBC Hard Talk, 11 September 2017). The Lake Chad Basin countries must undertake extensive efforts to strengthen democratic stability, good governance, conflict

resolution and peace building, political stability and economic prosperity in order to consolidate a more sustainable platform as a counter-terrorism initiative. Furthermore, more effective cooperation and coordination to strengthen capacity and synergy within and between the Lake Chad Basin countries are needed.

The African continent, specifically Nigeria, needs solution-driven assistance and intervention that can only come from the perspective of “African solutions to African problems”. That said, the class struggle highlights that it is pivotal to create social cohesion and equality at various ethnic, religious, class and socio-economic levels in communities and society at large in order to end the contestation for access to resources which are at the heart of or are the root causes of terrorism.

President Akufu Addo emphasised that Africans must charter a path that addresses sustainable development by taking advantage of its resilient and extensive youth population through job creation in various sectors such as mining, agriculture and renewable energy. This recommendation is in sync with historical materialism, which includes an economic and non-economic class struggle. The research confirms that terrorism is a form of class struggle for socio-economic and political equality (Bayo, 2012). Counter-terrorism approaches therefore have to include a comprehensive combination of both hard and soft approaches in order to achieve not only sustainable peace and security but also sustainable development.

5.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS

The research points to the conclusion that terrorism seems to have thrived at heightened levels of systemic social ills such as deep-seated poverty, poor human development, high levels of unemployment, the institutionalisation of corruption and poor productivity in the region. In fact, the socio-economic conditions of poverty, unemployment and large-scale social discontent are push factors for radicalisation and terrorism (ECOWAS, 2016).

Approaches to counter terrorism have been inadequate and flawed. Specific counter-terrorism strategies have been Eurocentrically tailored towards an African-centric approach with the flexibility to shape them for a particular country or community's

needs. This underpins the notion that pre-packaged counter-terrorism strategies are not guided by an analysis of a particular country's socio-economic, political and security environment and its constitution and societal needs (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats – SWOT analysis) which would best determine what hard and soft approaches are needed. This underlines that specific counter-terrorism interests need to be prioritised and used as a guide to what set of initiatives counter-terrorism packages are best suited to a particular country.

5.4.1 Good Governance and Provision of Social Services

The IMF noted that the African growth rate has slowed to its lowest in 20 years. Africa's economies are fragile with insecurity being a major role player. The African continent is in desperate need of better planning and preparation (Odesanga, 2017). Bearing in mind that lack of good governance and ethics hindered the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1990s, African countries like Nigeria should implement strong committee of enquiries to outline terms of reference that specifically focus on repurposing and strengthening the governance mechanisms of the government and corporate institutions. Good governance and anti-corruption principles need to be institutionalised with specific focus on the north-eastern region.

The research indicates that a high number of IDPs and bloating refugee camps in Niger clearly indicate that Nigeria has a logistical and capacity vacuum for dealing with Nigerian refugee camps in the Lake Chad Basin. Specifically, there are inadequate education facilities for displaced children and the rehabilitation of displaced persons. The Nigerian government was unable to rebuild institutions at the pace needed by communities, coordinate the reconstruction of burnt-down towns and provide sustainable social services in the areas where it had regained territorial control. Soft approach initiatives include empowering existing regional intervention programmes similar to the famous Marshall Plan implemented after World War II for Nigeria's north-east region. This includes microcredit schemes and similar informal entrepreneurial organisations as a way of investing in self-reliance and self-ownership and empowerment. With regard to social cohesion, the research findings encourage the empowerment of local Muslim clerics to detect early acts of radicalisation and use moderates to call out fundamentalists and build inclusive communities. At a community level, initiatives should include medical and

psychological assistance, education facilities for communities that have been the targets of militant attacks, and rehabilitation institutions for militants who have denounced extremism. The respondents from the security cluster noted the rehabilitation of convicted militants and returnee youth hardliners through social and amnesty programmes as vital reintegration tools.

5.4.2 Holistic Hard and Soft Counter-Terrorism Strategies

The UNSC acknowledges that terrorism will not be defeated through a military approach, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone but that a comprehensive strategy with mechanisms to embrace both hard and soft approaches to counter-terrorism plays a role in ensuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies.




Figure 5.1: Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Structure

(Source: ECOWAS, 2016)

That said, hard approaches are more often reactive and non-offensive in nature as militaristic approaches in essence use strategies that generally evoke the use of

security sector apparatus to eliminate security challenges through bombing, torturing and assassination. A hard approach can also be used in an offensive way and in fact have a soft approach through offensive and effective intelligence-gathering mechanisms. However, offensive strategies of this nature require an efficient, effective, integrated, and highly skilled and professional security sector loyal to a country.

Hard-approach counter-insurgency measures have to remain as an intervention strategy in Nigeria for the unforeseeable future, with smart use of effective intelligence-gathering mechanisms and operations. This includes the need for effective border controls and border intelligence in the Lake Chad Basin with the assistance of strengthened, effective, seamless, synchronised cooperation and collaboration security sector mechanisms from regional multilateral forums and players in the region, specifically the AU, ECOWAS and the MNJTF.

5.4.3 Foreign Intervention in Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Initiatives

Counter-insurgency approaches must be flexible and evolve, and be amendable to operational changes. Western countries provide very specific pre-packaged assistance for Africa to address security threats. The research illustrated how AFRICOM continues to advocate for training that ensures that African countries continue to develop US partnerships with a strategic objective to stop insurgencies from establishing sanctuaries in ungoverned territories (Francis, 2010). Therefore, African countries need to advocate for more collaboration between Western and African partners in supporting solutions outlined by the continent multilateral forums and initiatives, for example West Africa's G5 Sahel counter-terrorism task force. However, as long as the continent is dependent on the West, it will be subjected to conditions and requirements attached to assistance.

5.4.4 International and Multilateral Regulations

The UNSC acknowledges that terrorism will not be defeated through military force, law enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone; therefore, there is a need to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (UNSC Resolution 2178, 2014). However, the UN stipulates that any international cooperation and initiatives to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with the regulations of the

United Nations Charter, which call on member states to respect the “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” of individual states. Furthermore, any counter-terrorism strategies adopted by member states must comply with international law, international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law (UNSC Resolution 2178, 2014).

With regard to international regulations and guidelines governing international relations, the UN stipulates that international cooperation and counter-terrorism operations and measures must comply with the UN Charter. This entails adhering to the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Furthermore, member states must ensure that measures taken to counter terrorism comply with their obligations under international human rights law, international refugee law and humanitarian laws.

In a similar vein, matters threatening international security and stability are referred to the UNSC by the members of the UNSC and UNGA, or the host country experiencing the crisis. However, it should be noted that any UNGA member reported to the UNSC on any manner reserves the right to protest. An example of this issue played out in Nigeria. At the height of intense violent clashes between the Nigerian government and the Boko Haram insurgency, former president Jonathan resisted Western assistance and adopted a heavy-handed approach towards Boko Haram. This exposed the UN’s shortcomings as the UNSC generally avoids antagonising strategic countries like Nigeria. As a regional player on the African continent, Nigeria has economic and political leverage with access to markets and large exports of oil and gas. Therefore, in the case of Nigeria, the UNSC instituted sanctions against Boko Haram and not the Nigeria government. This despite multiple reports stating that the government failed to curb violent attacks in north-eastern Nigeria. To date, the UNSC has still not sanctioned Nigeria. One can deduce that Nigeria’s strategic influence and geopolitical standing compel the UN to be measured in its responses to Nigeria’s security instability. Despite the fact that the UNSC is the only body mandated to maintain peace and security in the global context, the UN’s powers are curtailed by the principle that the UNSC cannot unilaterally intervene in the domestic affairs of a country. Even though placing Boko Haram on the UN’s 1267 sanctions list subjected the group to arms embargoes, travel

bans and asset freezes, such actions have unintended consequences of providing militants with an effective radicalisation and recruitment tool.

5.4.5 No End in Sight of Boko Haram's Expansion on the African Continent

Increasingly ungoverned spaces in the Sahel region as well as increasing globalisation and the mobility of terrorist ideologies, networks, fighters, training, resources and influences drive the growth and spread of terrorism in West Africa (ECOWAS, 2016). Significantly, terrorism has become trans regional and transnational because of linkages, networks and outflows from Mauritania and Algeria into Mali and Niger and from Nigeria into Niger, Chad and Cameroon (ECOWAS, 2016). African regional and sub regional multilateral forums were originally formed to foster political, socio- economic development and integration; however in recent years these regional multilateral forums objectives are increasingly dominated by issues of peace and security. Unfortunately, coming from a colonial era the shift towards establishment of standby forces and military commands comes at a time when African populations have not obtained economic liberation and social development (Francis, 2010). This emphasise the notes that "human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa" (UNTF, 1999).

Boko Haram remains relevant as a force to be reckoned with, using the ethnic divisions that polarise the country into north and south to their advantage. The underdevelopment in Nigeria is spurred by high levels of corruption and inequality and is influenced by the south's development from oil reserves while the north remains mostly underdeveloped. As a response to being marginalised, extremists have called for the establishment of a caliphate as the answer to the rising inequality and retaliation in the form of a global jihadist war.

In addition, Boko Haram's strategy has evolved and the groups changed its tactics to individual suicide bomb attacks, targeting high-density areas like markets and churches to maximise killings and using kidnapping as a financing tool. Boko Haram has been able to acquire sophisticated weapons and is a formidable force against Nigeria's military. The group effectively uses its association, alliance and global networks with not only Al-Qaeda but also IS. With all this in mind, it is undeniable

that hard-approach counter-terrorism strategies have emboldened extremists in their ideology and fuelled militants to expand their footprint globally. What is clear is that current counter-terrorism strategies are short sighted and there is an urgent need for a global wake-up call that alerts role players to the importance of investing in long-term soft approaches by addressing the underlying or root causes of terrorism as a prerequisite for sustainable peace and security.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The core of the research was identifying and describing the challenge's relating to the rising instability due to frequent and increasingly violent attacks in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region and outlining what is needed to begin to contain the instability. What is clear is there has been a drastic shift in Nigeria's security landscape over 15 years starting from each Nigerian government administration from 2002 when Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf first started casually teaching the strict application of Islamic laws to his Muslims followers to the current extremist and violent Boko Haram insurgent militia. Nigeria has not been able to contain the capability, the territorial footprint and ideological influence of Boko Haram that has set on its mission to unseat the Nigerian government in the north-eastern region in an attempt to form a caliphate.

Boko Haram violent attacks peaked in 2014 compelling the Nigerian government to use its security sector arsenal in the form of military strategies adopted to prevent further loss of civilian lives and infrastructure destruction. Despite several interventions in the form of reform of security policies and laws, instituted US sanctions on Boko Haram and a series of regional, multilateral and international interventions Boko Haram continues its insurgency. Most recently a repeat high profile kidnapping case occurred when 110 schoolgirls were abducted in the state of Yoba in February 2018, nearly 4 years after the 2014 Chibok kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls. By unpacking the various counter terrorism responses and intervention measures during the Jonathan and Buhari administration the research explored why Nigeria's counter terrorism strategies have been ineffective while acknowledging that some soft approach measures have been implemented.

The challenges are multifaceted from deep-rooted historical changes such as governance, religious tensions between Muslims and Christians and ever increasing socio-economic inequalities between northerners and southerners. In addition there are leadership challenges at local community level and at federal level with systematic corruption and unaccountability featuring just as prominently as legitimacy to govern over communities where issues of ethnicity and religion are equally divisive among communities and their leaders. Other challenges are systematic challenges inherited from the colonial era. This includes an inadequate security sector requiring reform beyond policies reform and institution of financial systems that track militia funding. Challenges of an unequipped and ill-equipped security sector that is ill prepared to fight an unconventional asymmetrical war with non state actors in the form of well funded and equipped militia that is well resourced through pooling of logistical and financial support from other transnational insurgents such as IS in and Al Qaeda.

The research also found that regional and international interventions have fallen short and have simply not yielded the intended results. Regional platforms have been ineffective often with inadequate resources and lackadaisical political will to intervene in neighbouring countries sharing a common political history. Where African countries fail to contribute stipulated resources towards regional challenges and platforms like the AU standby force; this has forced African nations to accept conditional humanitarian assistance and aid from western countries. This alone has posed a challenge where issues of Francophone and Anglophone competition and rivalry going back to the colonial era resurface with political, diplomatic and strategic economic interests cementing the push and pull factors that enable terrorism to flourish in the Lake Chad Basin. A clear example of this is the 2011 Libyan crisis, where NATO led intervention without meaningful AU intervention and post conflict resolution strategies, toppled the Muammar Gaddafi regime but left rising instability in the region with IS and unsecured Libyan weaponry fuelling Boko Haram's capability and threat to Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. The research indicates that western counter terrorism assistance through extensive training and arms trade are not synchronised to meet the specific needs of the African continent. Training programs and equipment acquired is often too sophisticated and too expensive for African defence budgets characterised by a developing state challenges.

The research concludes that there is a general miss-match of applied counter terrorism strategies that aim to address peace and security challenges on the African continent when systemic political, governance, social-economic and at times ethnic and religious ideological challenges that plague the African continent are drivers of instability that fuel the rise of militant insurgent groups like Boko Haram.

The implemented pre-packaged counter terrorism strategies that are illustrated in Table 4.1 reflect Eurocentric contrived counter insurgency solutions that have evolved from the early 20th century to the 21st century. Kiras (2007) illustrated that post 1930s counter insurgency approaches embraced strategies cantered on a state security approach entangled in a conventional war scenario. The new dawn of the millennial era has had to embrace human security as vital to achieve not only peace and security but also sustainable socio-economic environment where non-state actors (in the form of rebels, militants, insurgents) are a force to reckon with and have the potential to threaten the social fabric of civil society. Globalisation has made social media platforms swift and effective radicalisation tools that spread extremist ideology to an African population that is already politically and socio economically marginalised.

Therefore, while the research strongly acknowledges that the fight against terrorism cannot be achieved without military action, the research notes that more needs to be done in raising the importance of soft approaches that are specifically structured to address country specific vulnerable needs of communities a local level. Military approaches tended to be strategised, planned and even implemented at a macro, 'national' level. History has shown that this is not effective. Soft approaches have to be applied systematically, persistently (long term) at a micro community level. Addressing socio-economic, political and governance challenges that persist in the daily lives of grass root communities that Generals and policy makers far removed from board rooms and high rise government buildings in western capitals can not phantom.

The research therefore concludes that hard and soft holistic approaches are a prerequisite to firstly understanding the nature of the instability through understanding the different definitions of terrorism and the various political and socio-economic environment that provides the breeding ground for terrorist activities vis à vis insurgency dynamics outlined in the research. Secondly, understanding what

are the underlying roots causes and grievances of communities and what is the ideological reach or influence of extremist groups within communities. Third, understanding the points indicated above would give an indication of what (w) holistic short, medium and long counter terrorism strategies and role players are needed to oversee the planning and implementation of reversing extremist and insurgency influence and capabilities respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

The research outlines that embracing a ‘smart’ counter terrorism approach equipped with the necessary soft and hard approaches that address both state security and human security at a macro and micro level is a step in the right direction in effective country specific counter terrorism strategies that will begin to reverse the gains of such militant groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Qualitative Research: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Appendix B: Researcher's Information Sheet

Appendix A: Qualitative Research: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Wits School of Governance Student Interview Guide

Title: Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Paralysis

31 July 2017

Table 4: Demographic Details

I	What area of employment are you in?	• Government • Multilateral • Think tank • Non-government organisation • Academia • Religious institution • Other
II	What is your occupation?	• Civil servant • Corporate service • Lecturer • Researcher • Analyst • Journalist/Media • Other
III	Years of experience in current occupation?	• 5 or less years • 6–10 years • 11–20 years • 21–30 years • More than 31 years

Status quo of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategies

01	What is your understanding of Islamic extremism and why does Islamic extremism flourish? What are the possible solutions to combat Islamic extremism?	
02	What are the possible solutions to combat Islamic extremism?	
03	What would you outline as the root causes of Nigeria's socio-economic and security challenges and threats?	

04	What has contributed to the growth of Boko Haram from 2009 to 2017, and what measures can be taken to stop the the recruitment of Nigerian youth to its ranks?	
05	How has the militaristic approach to counter-terrorism adversely affected curbing Islamic extremism and radicalisation in Nigerian communities?	
06	With the implementation of several counter-terrorism measures, why have these policies failed to curb extremist activities?	
07	How has the involvement and influence of foreign players affected the Nigerian government in the fight against Boko Haram?	
08	What international stakeholders' preconditions hindered Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies?	
09	What policy interventions are required to specifically address the radicalisation of Nigeria's youth?	
10	What policy interventions are required to address the underlying socio-economic causes of terrorism in Nigeria?	

Appendix B: Researcher's Information Sheet

Information Sheet

Wits School of Governance Student

31 July 2017

Dear Sir/ Madam

Interview: Nigeria's Counter Terrorism Strategies in Paralysis

My name is Theodora S Lecholo. I am currently registered at the Witwatersrand School of Governance (WSG), for a Masters in Management specialising in the field of Security. Under the guidance of my supervisor, Academic Director at the WSG, Professor Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, I am conducting a research report as the last module needed to complete the outlined programme. Whilst my research is titled 'Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Paralysis', the purpose of the research is first to exam the measures the Nigeria government and international stakeholders have taken to find a solution to the Boko Haram crisis. Secondly, to assess why the strategies were undertaken have not sufficed in resolving the crisis and lastly to recommend what ought to be done to curb the growth of radical extremists in North Eastern Nigeria.

With this in mind, I kindly request your time to participate in this study by answering questions using an interview format using the attached semi-structured questionnaire as an interview guide. Please note that participating in this study is voluntary and any information that you will provide in during this survey will be treated with confidentiality and your identity with be kept anonymous. The data generated from the interviews and document research will be combined, analysed and collated in the final research report. If you agree to take part in this study, please bare in mind that you are free to withdraw your consent at any time.

If you agree to take part in the study, the researcher kindly requests 50 minutes of your time to complete the interview at a place and time convenient to you as a research participant, no later than 30 August 2017.

If you have any queries or would like to be informed of the aggregated research findings, please contact the researcher at 1020856@students.wits.ac.za

Thanking you in advance for taking part in the interview.

T.S. Lecholo