

https://dspace.org/

Perspectives in Education: House Journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2(3)

Wally Morrow; Adriaan Viljoen; Shirley Pendlebury; Rosemarie Lindner; Christopher Orpen ...

1977-08
University of the Witwatersrand
https://hdl.handle.net/10539/28901
Morrow, W. (Ed.) (1977, August). Perspectives in Education: House Journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2(3).

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION

VOL 2 NO 3
August 1977

House journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

© Faculty of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
1 Jan Smuts Avenue
Johannesburg 2001
South Africa

Printed by Central Print Unit
University of the Witwatersrand
1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Johannesburg

See the back cover for Table of Contents

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

145 Letter from Professor T A Viljoen — Adriaan Viljoen

151 Margetson on Pedagogics — Wally Morrow

155 Talking of Dragons — Shirley Pendlebury

156 Black Students and Their Understanding of English Poetry — Rosemarie Lindner

159 A Modest Proposal? — Shirley Pendlesbury

ARTICLES

164 Course Evaluation Questionnaries: The Effect of Student Expectations — Christopher Orpen

168 Aspects of Human Nature in which Education is Rooted — G Van Wageningen

INTERCHANGE

180 The 'Educated Kaffir' and the Prejudices Surrounding Education for Blacks in Natal in the Late Nineteenth Century — Brigid Limerick

193 Brigid Limerick's Abstracted Empiricism — Eddie Webster

195 'Educated Kaffirs' in the Free State too! — Isaac Kriel

198 Further Perspectives on Late Nineteenth Century Attitudes — Henning van Aswegen

201 Every Country gets the Circus it deserves — Patricia Morris

NOTICES

203

Contributions for the next issue must be submitted to the Editor by 15 January 1978.

DISCUSSION

Editorial Note: the following letter has been received from Professor TA Viljoen, Department of Fundamental Pedagogics, University of South Africa:

4 July 1977

The Editor
Perspectives in Education
University of the Witwatersrand
1 Jan Smuts Avenue
Johannesburg
2001

Sir

Re: "Phenomenology and Education: a Comparison of the Findings of Researchers in Two Different Countries" Hannah Gluckman Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977 pgs 104-116

At last we have an English pedagogician in South Africa who reads Fundamental Pedagogics. This is an effort in pedagogical dialogue which must be welcomed. I hope this is the beginning of closer ties in the field of pedagogical thought. And therefore: May I please join this dialogue?

First of all I am going to ignore Mrs Gluckman's reference to English-speaking universities and colleges and Afrikaans (sic) universities and colleges and Afrikaans writers

because it does not affect the current topic of all and it may rouse emotions which are detrimental to clear scientific argument.

In the abovementioned article Mrs Gluckman has compared a number of South African authors' findings on pedagogic authority with those of Vandenberg. I want to compliment her on her keen argument and clear statement. But I am of opinion that she has been distracted from what Vandenberg really says about pedagogic authority by a too hasty hypothesis: "However, in one particular and vital area, their findings are considerably opposed: viz. in the area of 'authority'."

Therefore I want to suggest that we first try to establish what Vandenberg actually says about this topic before comparing his findings with those of the mentioned South African authors. With this aim in mind I wish to supply a number of citations from Vandenberg's book which Mrs Gluckman quotes, which I think are relevant. (I am following Mrs Gluckman's numbering.)

1 "To locate pedagogic authority within the child's world, i.e., from the child's point of view, is to disclose how pedagogic authority exists itself in the lived-world of the child and to ground education." (pg 60). This quotation must, in all fairness to Vandenberg, be read in the light of the following quotations:

"A precarious, unstable, threatening, and hostile world does not invite exploration, nor does it encourage him to go to it, nor do things beg to be played with ... beyond the child's control." (pg 63)

"... the child is mostly hepless but in need of less and less help as he grows." (pg 63)

"Within all the talk that is addressed to the infant by the mother, that which assists his wanting-to-be-someone-himself is ipso facto pedagogic." (pg 65)

"... pedagogy is only helping another person to become adult." (pg 65) Compare this quotation with Vandenberg's definition of adulthood just above it:

"... an individual, independent being ... accepts responsibility for his own being and his being with others." (pg 65)

"To the degree that the parent reveals authentic possibilities, he has authority in the eyes of the child that is grounded in their spatializing and temporalizing together." (pg 69)

"Then pedagogic authority resides in the teacher as a guardian of being." (pg 76)

It seems to me that Vandenberg is vesting his authority in the teacher as guardian. Whether a guardian is an adult who knows best is a following question.

2 The following quotation must be understood in the light of what has been said above:

"In any literal sense, the child and youth cannot prepare for adulthood because of their limited foresight. In the broad sense, they can best prepare for adulthood by living their present life-phase fully, by being themselves as children and youth. This follows from the nature of the life-phases of childhood and youth, but it also follows from the relativity of values to life-phases: to superimpose the values appropriate to adult existence on childhood is to contribute to the alienation of the child from the world, himself, and others, and to defeat the realization of the values imposed." (pg 56)

To understand what Vandenberg is getting at, it may be helpful to investigate the following quotes:

"He (the child) lives directly into the world, prior to the development of the subject/object split, prior to the alienation from the immediate world. The child's open communion with the world in his play, in fact, is not merely the place wherein the individual's relationship to being is formed, it is the primordial and originary relation to being." (pg 60)

"The 'anti-authoritarianism' of progressive education, on the other hand, proves unsatisfactory because it is an overstatement and partial truth to begin with." (pg 59)

"Play exists in childhood because childhood as a life-phase is becoming at home in the world." (pg 63)

"This does not mean that he knows what or who he wants to be or that he knows precisely what this entails in various situations, nor does it mean that the child or

youth knows what he wants in each situation." (pg 66)

"As the parent is legally and morally responsible for the child until he becomes of age, so the teacher is at least morally responsible for the well-being of the child during the time the child is within her care, and, more importantly, she is responsible for the development of the child's world." (pg 69)

"This responsibility necessarily entails the authority to develop the world of the child." (pg 69)

"Educating rests upon the authoritative relations between parents and children." (pg 69)

"On the one hand, the child's trust has to be obtained and maintained as part of the authoritative, co-disclosing, coexisting pedagogic relation for educating to have significance for his being." (pg 70)

3 Where does Vandenberg vest authority in the following quote?

"Scope for origin-ality, then, is of the greatest pedagogic significance. Letting the pupil be original, creative in what he does lets him unite the geography of schooling with the landscape of his own terrain and lets him develop his landscape with the values of the geography of schooling. That he does whatever he is supposed to do to accomplish schooling objectives develops his geography; that he does it in his own way allows him not merely to unite the geography with his landscape but to accomplish the prior step of acquiring subject matter not as a school subject but as geography, as a real, intellectual world rather than as a set of symbols, half understood, half memorized." (pg 104)

"In the authentic pedagogic co-disclosure, what occurs is something that far exceeds cultural transmission, instruction in subject matter, acquisition of knowledge, or skill formation. What occurs within genuinely pedagogic authority is authentic co-historicizing." (pg 76)

"Educating establishes being. It establishes the teacher's being, the pupil's being, and in the co-historicizing of their being-in-the-world it establishes the being of the world. The being of the world is its worlding, and in the worlding of the world being comes to be." (pg 76)

It seems to me as if Vandenberg is here definitely giving prevalence to the historic becoming of the individual - this colloquial language calls tradition. Compare the following:

> "When youth leaves school and enters society, confrontation with the factors of practical experience presents the young adult with the critical phenomenon of the singular inappropriateness of his ideals to what can actually be done in the societal-historical world." (pg 49)
>
> "He finds that societal-historical problems that he previously had all solved are in fact very complicated and controversial and that his simple norms are hardly applicable." (pg 49)

Although I can't find any passage in Vandenberg's works which points to his acceptance of Divine Authority, yet I find no authentic proof that he "is not prepared to grant authority to any divinity." He does not argue against "moral hypocrisy" appearing in the following three ways: in idle talk, in arrogancy and in shamefulness. But his explication of moral values and their grounding (cf pg 189 - 198, Ideology and educational policy, in: Theory of knowledge and education) does not place ultimate authority in any one individual and especially not in a child. He does not state very clearly where his universal (sic) norms are derived from.

4 When Vandenberg says that a child should not be dominated he attaches a very special meaning to this word. The fact that he expects all children to attend school - even against their own liking - shows that the child has got to subject himself to a master (dominus) within pedagogic accountable bounds. In this respect it is very necessary to distinguish between Vandenberg's usage: "to be independently" (a typical phenomenological expression) and the colloquial usage: "to be independent". These two expressions are completely different.

B The conclusion Mrs Gluckman comes to in the first paragraph is correct (cf Kilian & Viljoen, Fundamental Pedagogics and Fundamental Structures, chapter 4.) As regards her second paragraph I want to stress the word ideally in her quote of Vandenberg. The age at which a child is to be granted freedom, the degree of freedom to be granted and the question whether the granting of freedom also depends on individual differences between children are all highly debatable points and do not strictly speaking belong to the pedagogician's

field but rather to the field of the pedagogue (a distinction which Mrs Gluckman has unfortunately also missed (cf Viljoen's thesis: Die Pedagogiek as normatiewe wetenskap (a copy of which I will supply to her free of charge on request) and the last chapter of Landman, WA ao, Denkwyses in die Opvoedkunde, 1975.)

Finally, I might advise the reader to also refer to Vandenberg's description of "The pedagogic paradox" (pg 101 - 107). One must remember that he is considering domination in education from a pedagogical perspective, and that he attaches the same meaning to this concept as Landman attaches to the term "dwang", the pedagogic relevancy of which Landman denies emphatically.

Once again, Mr Editor, I thank you for this opportunity and I am pleased with the two copies of your journal I have received this far. I would love to continue the dialogue on the nature of the differences which Mrs Gluckman mentions in C and the reasons for differences once they have been authentically pinpointed.

Yours faithfully

T A VILJOEN

MARGETSON ON PEDAGOGICS

Wally Morrow

In a recent, long and thought-provoking paper (1) Don Margetson sets out to examine and raise some objections against a way of studying education called Pedagogics (2). In the light of the increasingly widespread influence of Pedagogics in South Africa, his paper should be welcomed both by those who espouse this mode of theorizing and by those who do not. By the former because the paper is a serious attempt to engage in that dialogue which exponents of Pedagogics so rightly emphasize will enrich thinking about education in South Africa; and by the latter because the paper goes some way to making Pedagogics more available to those outside of 'authentic Pedagogical thought'.

In a culturally heterogeneous society such as South Africa so glaringly is one central purpose of the enterprise of Pedagogics is highly commendable. Pedagogics aims at the establishment of universal (ie culturally neutral) truths about education on the basis of which culturally diverse educational systems can be erected. As Viljoen puts it '... Pedagogics provides the opportunity for people holding different philosophies of life to establish their educational systems on the truths revealed.' If such universal truths could be established (or revealed) this would be a notable advance in thinking about education and, particularly in the South African situation, would have immeasurable value.

Other aspects of the formal programme of Pedagogics are also commendable. There is, for instance, the opposition to what Viljoen calls '... the naturalistic view on reality, which is called scientism among the human sciences', and which Margetson characterizes as '... a reductionism which they believe leaves nothing human in the world: ...', and which I think can be characterized as the Positivistic blight which has so limited, distorted and impoverished the study of education. Then there is the opposition to studies in education which consist in <u>applying</u> '... psychology, sociology, philosophy, theology, or any other science ...' to education. The notion that theory is to be applied to practice is the natural corollary of the widespread but false notion that practice is itself independent of the way of understanding which makes that practice the practice that it is. Finally, as Margetson very rightly says, 'as regards

the language difficulties those of us who suffer from these are most grateful to authors who have made Pedagogical literature available in English.' Such authors have indeed provided 'a service and a contribution.'

However, Margetson argues that '... the claim about the status and methodology of Fundamental Pedagogics (3) ... are fundamentally unsound.' His argument proceeds through three phases - closely related to each other. The first (his Section III) is that the language (and here he is not talking about, for instance, Afrikaans) of Fundamental Pedagogics obscures rather than illuminates its subject matter (education). '... the language used by Viljoen persistently mystifies rather than clarifies the concept of education.' The second (Section IV) is that there is a kind of naivety in talking about the phenomenological method (cf Viljoen '... phenomenology is the only method which can reveal the essence of education.'), and that the method advocated by Viljoen suffers in any case from problems of its own. The third (Section V) is that the claim that Pedagogics is an 'autonomous science' is untenable in the light of the confusions its protagonists have about science, and particularly their failure to make a proper distinction between philosophical and scientific questions.

This last line of criticism applies not only to Pedagogics but to a great deal of what goes on, particularly in South Africa, under the general heading of 'The Study of Education.' The central trouble is that the 'shibboleth of science' haunts that study. Margetson quotes Winch with approval '... philosophy must be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of science', and concludes that '... philosophy of education must be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of studies in education to be scientific when they are not ...'

I think Margetson is right to '... support ... the motives for attempting to return to "the matter itself" ...' But the problem is, of course, how this is to be done. Separated in his paper from Section V about the distinction between philosophy and science, but in fact closely related, is Margetson's point about the priority of concepts in any investigation: 'If literally all theories, philosophies, etc. are "set aside" then in terms of what does the investigator study the phenomenon or even become aware of it? Surely he can do this only in terms of the conceptual scheme which he has.' And this, I think, is Margetson's most telling objection against Pedagogics. '... there is no way in which one can understand a phenomenon "as it is"

since it is only in terms of the concepts one has that one can begin to understand anything at all. That is, one does not first perceive something and then "conceptualise" about it; rather one sees the thing as something (as falling under some concept) in the first place - to see something is already to have seen it in terms of some concepts.' (4)

If Margetson is right then the immodest claims of Pedagogics, for instance '... to unique scientific respectibility in the field of education and exclusivity as a reliable method of procedure in this field', cannot be upheld, and it is highly misleading for such claims to continue to be made, and, in the light of the influence of Pedagogics, such claims might even hinder the study of education in South Africa. It is not possible in a short space to investigate thoroughly the question of whether or not Margetson is right; his arguments are subtle and detailed. And in any case possibly such a task can be properly undertaken only by someone who understands from the inside what the strengths and weaknesses of Pedagogics are. However, I think it might be appropriate to mention one lapse in Margetson's argument, a lapse which is particularly striking in the light of the general care in exposition, as it seems to me, and rigour of most of the argument he advances.

In the context of a discussion of Viljoen's distinction between two types of knowledge (a) that which has universal validity - and which is the result of the work of scientist (Pedagogician), and (b) that which is valid only in particular cases (such as within one culture and not another) - and which is the result of 'postscientific implanting', Margetson says the following:

> ... if we ask what the criteria are for distinguishing universal (type(a)) knowledge from particular (type (b)) knowledge, the only answer provided in the given account is that universal knowledge is what is found (if it is) by the scientist, and that particular knowledge is found in non-scientific practice. And if we ask what the criteria are for distinguishing the scientific from the non-scientific the only available answer is that the former is concerned with universal knowledge and the latter with particular knowledge.

I think that this is unfair to Viljoen who is not as visciously circular, on this issue, as this implies. He does, after all, give a careful account of the method which yields 'scientific' knowledge, and, whatever doubts one has about that method, it does provide <u>some</u> other criterion in

terms of which to make the distinction Margetson is rightly worried about.

Footnotes and Reference

(1) D B Margetson "Pedagogics in South Africa: The Mystification of Education?" in Philosophical Papers Vol VI No I (May 1977); edited by the Department of Philosophy, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

I do not provide references for the quotations in what I say; to have done so would have cluttered the text and, not very usefully, have increased the list of references. I think I make it quite clear where I am quoting Margetson and where I am quoting others.

(2) Neither Margetson nor the authors whom he quotes distinguish consistently between the common noun 'pedagogics' and the proper noun 'Pedagogics'. Throughout I am using the proper noun - and to show this I use an upper case initial letter - and I have changed all quotations according to this rule.

(3) Fundamental Pedagogics provides the theoretical underpinning for Pedagogics in general.

(4) It is to be noted that the point made here is closely connected with the point that no practice can be independent of the way of understanding which makes it the practice that it is.

TALKING OF DRAGONS

Shirley Pendlebury

Margaret Meyer (1) is wrong : dragons can and do fly. Perhaps not in the world inhabited by St George, but certainly in the Archipelago of Earthsea where their flight over the islands of Dragons' Run is regarded by those who have witnessed it as the most awe-inspiring sight of all. I quote briefly from The Farthest Shore, third and final book in Ursula Le Guin's Earthsea trilogy (2):

> As Lookfar approached the islands Arren saw the dragons soaring and circling on the morning wind, and his heart leapt up with them with a joy, a joy of fulfilment, that was like pain. All the glory of mortality was in that flight. Their beauty was made up of terrible strength, and utter wildness, and the grace of reason. For these were thinking creatures, with speech, and ancient wisdom: in the patterns of their flight there was a fierce, willed concord. (3)

The tale of Ged, Archmage of Earthsea, and his quest against the powers of evil is not a legend in the strict sense. It is a modern fantasy written for modern children. Yet there is much in and about the tale that falls within the tradition of legend; and insofar as it does fall within this tradition we cannot ignore the dragons of Earthsea. For, as Ms Meyer rightly points out, dragons are creatures of legend and the only way we can come to know them is through the tales in which they have their being. If, as Ms Meyer seems to suggest, we come to know dragons only through those tales associated with St George and damsels in distress, our knowledge of dragons will inevitably be impoverished.

References

(1) Meyer, Margaret. "English Poetry and the Second Language Student" Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977
(2) Le Guin, Ursula. The Farthest Shore Puffin Books 1975
(3) Ibid. 161

BLACK STUDENTS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF ENGLISH POETRY

Rosemarie Lindner

I read "English Poetry and the Second Language Student" (1) with great interest, particularly Ms Meyer's comments about the problem in the teaching of Black students. I should like, however, to question the assumption that Black students find 'much English poetry culturally alien and filled with attitudes very different from anything in their culture.' This is by no means the experience I had when I taught Black students in Swaziland.

Swazi students are taught through the medium of English from Standard five upward. The school leaving exam is the Cambridge or London 'O'-Level examination, written in English. The Junior Certificate examination is also written in English and set by the Swaziland Ministry of Education. Social communication, however, is in Siswati and most students will converse in their mother tongue outside the school situation. This is a major stumbling block in the teaching of the simple mechanics of the language. However, most students are able to cope fairly easily with their J C examination and a fair proportion pass their 'O'-Level examination. They are also, in my experience, able to cope adequately with their English Literature examinations.

Ms Meyer has quoted a Black student's description of a dragon wreaking destruction on the city of Johannesburg as an example of the cultural gap which exists, and which has to be closed, before the second language student, in this case, the Black student, can adequately understand a poem or a piece of prose. I feel that she is rather exaggerating the problem. I did not find this a major stumbling block. Is it so important that the reader should grasp every cultural allusion? The student who wrote so chillingly of the destruction wreaked by the dragon over the city of Johannesburg showed that he had related to the ferocity of the dragon, so closely, in fact, that he could visualise it in his own back yard. Is this not what poetry is all about?

Conscious of the great cultural gap bug-bear, I approached the teaching of Wordsworth's "Solitary Reaper", with much trepidation. To my surprise, my Junior Certificate class understood it with no great difficulty. On closer

examination, I think I understand why. Except for the second verse, which in any case would have to be explained to most first-language students at the same level (where, for instance are the Hebrides? how many students realise how bleak they are, an essential part of Wordsworth's imagery, not to mention the thrilling voice of the Cuckoo-bird, which most city-born children have probably never heard) the poem might have been written about a rural scene in Africa. Is one essentially changing the poem if, instead of visualising a Highland lass, one saw in the mind's eye a Swazi intombi.

Admittedly, a poem such as Pius Oleghe's "A Sudden Storm", included in the Junior Certificate syllabus, might be closer to the Southern African student's experience, but I submit that the essential descriptive images in both poems are understood, and were understood equally well by the Black students I taught, as they would have been by first language students.

Too much is made of the difficulty in explaining syntatical obscurities to second language students. The same difficulties arise in teaching first language students. Nancy Cato's poem "The Dead Swagman" should have presented difficulties to the Black students I taught. The last verse is certainly obscure:

'It might be called a lovely death. The tree
Led its own alien life beneath the sun,
Yet both belonged to the Bush, and now are one:
The roots and bones lie close among the soil
And he ascends in leaves towards the sky.'

I have taught the poem to both first and second language students and in both cases, those students who were sensitive to poetry were able, with ease, to follow the images of the two lone inhabitants of the bush becoming one.

A colleague of mine was struggling, she thought, to teach a class of Black students a passage from Wordsworth's "Prelude". Tortuously she explained the meaning of the words, how they related to each other, etc. One of the students timidly raised her hand, pointed to a picture of an oarsman on a moon-lit lake, overshadowed by a mountain, and asked if this wasn't a picture of the poem.

One of the poems included in the Swazi Junior Certificate syllabus is Ntshali's "The Birth of Shaka". I asked for a prose description of Shaka and many of the students wrote

that he was born as a lion cub. Zulu colleagues explained that, as the Siswati language was essentially a language of poetic condensation, this did not mean, as I, in my ignorance had believed, that Shaka was feline at birth, but that the students had grasped Ntshali's meaning exactly.

'His baby cry
was of a cub
tearing the neck ....'

Shaka was indeed born as strong and as brave as a lion.

In my experience I have found that most Black students usually understand the poem, but have difficulty when they try and express themselves in the second language. The student often has an imperfect knowledge of the vocabulary essential to expressing his thoughts, often, as in the case in Swaziland, where he speaks Siswati most of the time, his syntax and his flow of language is distorted. Is it not perhaps here that our misconception that the student does not understand the poem, arises. An experiment conducted at the school I taught in, has tended to show this is so. When a student expressed himself in strange prose, he was asked to translate his answer into Siswati. In nine cases out of ten the student shows that he has understood the poem but has expressed himself badly.

A comprehension test I once set my students described the honour Arabians confer on their guests when they allow the women to serve them at table. In answer to the question 'How do the Arabians honour their guests?', one student wrote: 'The Arabians honour their guests by allowing their women to service the guests on the table.' Commented a colleague, 'Probably some examiner in Cambridge will think that this is indeed some exotic African custom!'

Perhaps first language teachers of second language students are often as misguided as the mythical Cambridge examiner.

Reference

(1) Margaret Meyer "English Poetry and the Second Language Student" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977

A MODEST PROPOSAL?

Shirley Pendlebury

In his article "Teachers, schooling and the future of education in South Africa" (1) Wally Morrow makes what he calls a modest proposal for the creation of an institutional form, within the present school system, which he claims would help to alleviate the problem of teacher-shortage in this country. I want to suggest that Morrow's proposal is by no means as modest as he insists (and he is unusually insistent about this matter). A careful reading of his paper reveals his proposal to be a very bold one indeed. And I mean bold in the best sense of the word - showing vigour and daring.

My purpose is (A) to outline the main points in Morrow's proposal and (B) to spell-out some of the more important implications which he has not made explicit. It is in respect of these implications that I regard his proposal as a bold one.

A) The somewhat rambling nature of the article makes it difficult to give a brief, but coherent, outline of Morrow's argument. What follows is a very sketchy indication of some of its main features:

To date, analyses of the problem of teacher shortage in this country have been quantitative (ie they have been concerned to show that qualified teachers of certain subjects are not available in sufficient quantity). But that something is not available in sufficient quantity is only one of the necessary conditions for claiming that there is a shortage of that thing. The second condition requires that the availability of the thing in sufficient quantity is desirable. Morrow's purpose is to analyse the problem in terms of the second condition. This involves examining the framework of assumptions within which first condition analyses take place.

Model T (the school system and all that goes with it, from staff-meetings to examinations to extra-curricular activites) is a term coined by Morrow to stand for the framework of assumptions just referred to. Model T is so deeply embedded in people's thinking about education that any proposal for a radical departure from the model can only be seen as Utopian.

Nevertheless, it seems that the problem of teacher shortage is inevitable on Model T. Two points are crucial here: (a) On Model T a desirable teacher-pupil ratio is 1/25. Given Model T assumptions about who counts as a qualified teacher, we are at present short of about 300 000 qualified teachers. (b) On Model T a teacher is a multifunction operative who does his/her work within parameters set by others (most importantly an Education Department and a school principal). Two objections to this idea of a teacher are raised. First, is that on Model T a teacher's talents and qualifications are "disgracefully squandered" (for instance, most teachers are overburdened with routine tasks for which they are not particularly suited). Second, is that the idea of a teacher on Model T is in many respects in flat contradiction to the idea of a profession. I quote Morrow on this point:

"The central features of a profession require that the members of a profession need to work within institutional forms in which they have the autonomy and authority to exercise their rational professional judgement free of pressures and influences which might distort it." (2)

Model T does not allow teachers the autonomy and authority to exercise their professional judgement in this way.

Clearly then, the solution to the problem of teacher shortage depends, at least partly, on a modification of the Model T idea of a teacher.

The proposed modification is two-pronged: (a) The sole function of a teacher would be to contribute to the teaching of an aspect of the general curriculum. (It is assumed that an aspect of the general curriculum is one which requires expertise to teach and one which is felt to be important in some way). (b) Teachers of an aspect would become members of a professional association which would collectively bear the responsibility of teaching that aspect to all pupils. The fundamental loyalty of teachers would be to their colleagues in an association and not to an Education Department or a school principal. All judgements concerning the teaching and assessment of an aspect would be made by the appropriate association. The power granted to the envisaged association would provide members of the teaching profession with the appropriate authority to fulfil their professional responsibility in the light of their professional judgement.

Morrow maintains that the most important modifications of

Model T which follow from his proposal would be in respect of Model T ideas of "standards", "certification", and the permanent staff of schools. I want to suggest that there is a lot more to it than that.

(B) Few, I think, would argue with the statement that although Model T is pretty much a universal phenomenon, the model varies in detail from country to country and that the details which vary often have an important link with the ideology (or if you would prefer a more neutral term, the worldview) of the ruling class in any particular country. Soviet Model T is an obvious case in point. Something which Morrow has not made explicit in his article is the way in which his proposal affects those features of Model T which are peculiar to the South African version.

The assumption that education is a process which manufactures useful members of society is central to all Model T thinking. Judgements of the desirability of including certain subjects in the curriculum appear more often than not to be made on the basis of this assumption. Decisions about what is to be taught to whom and at what level depend very much on what counts as a useful member of society in the eyes of the decision-makers. What is unusual about Model T South Africa (although it is by no means unique in this respect) is that usefulness to society is defined differently for different sections of the population. So that, to put it crudely, members of Population Group A, who all happen to have certain not very important physical features in common, are thought to be most useful in professional and skilled work; while members of Population Group B, who have in common physical features different from those members of Group A, are thought to be most useful in manual and menial tasks. This difference in supposed usefulness to society is taken very seriously indeed. So seriously that there are different versions of Model T for the different population groups. But the delineation of usefulness to society does not stop here. There is a further delineation <u>within</u> each group, where people capable of bearing children are felt to be most useful in tasks related (however remotely) to child-bearing and child-rearing. At least part of the curriculum in each version of Model T South Africa is geared to the "special" qualities of child-bearers.

As I see it there is no way in which these features of Model T South Africa could remain unaffected by Morrow's proposal. For the envisaged associations to have the <u>de facto</u> autonomy and authority explicit in the proposal, members of the associations would have to be free to

exercise their rational professional judgement without pressures and influences which might distort it. A number of modifications to Model T South Africa seem to follow from this requirement.

Consider firstly membership of the different associations. The requirement that members be free to exercise their rational professional judgement implies that members, regardless of any external pressures, be personally capable of exercising their judgement in this way. Clearly then membership must depend on such qualities as expertise in the aspect of the curriculum concerned, professional integrity and so on. To limit membership to one population group or to part of a population group would be to submit to external pressures and influences in defiance of rational judgement. Physical attributes per se cannot be appropriate grounds for deciding who shall and who shall not be admitted as members of a professional body.

Concerning the status of members of professional teachers associations, Morrow points out that in our society status follows cash and suggests that professional teachers have their salaries increased considerably so that they may be accorded a fitting status. My contention is that once we grant the inappropriateness of physical attributes per se as grounds for restricting the membership of a professional association, we are bound to accept that they are equally inappropriate grounds for deciding who shall be paid what (and related to this, who shall be accorded a higher or a lower status). The appropriate grounds for according status to a professional person are in the same domain as those for admitting a person as a member to a professional body. The qualities to look for in a first-rate professional teacher are things like dedication, specialised knowledge, integrity, imagination and sympathy. This is not to suggest that physical attributes never play a part in our explanations for why some so-called professional people do not acquit themselves properly. For instance, it is a fairly well-established fact that some (perhaps most) child-bearers suffer from periodical fits of discomfort and/or depression related to their child-bearing function. But unless such discomfort or depression is so severe that it seriously hinders a person's professional performance then it is not a valid ground for discrimination in according professional status and its accompanying material benefits. If Morrow's proposed associations are to be truly professional then it is essential that each case be considered on its merits and not in terms of the rather vague generalisations which

prevail in Model T South Africa at present.

I have isolated for consideration just two of the implications which I think Morrow's not so modest proposal has for Model T South Africa. There are lots more. For instance, does it follow from his proposal that members from one population group may end up teaching children from another population group? I am thinking here particularly of language teaching (although other aspects of the curriculum may also be involved). It seems to me to be implicit in Morrow's proposal that as far as possible aspects of the curriculum be taught by people best qualified to teach them. It may be the case that a properly trained native speaker of a language is better able to teach that language than someone who is not a native speaker. Another question which occured to me has to do with the curriculum, the combination of subjects "done" by people in the different versions of Model T. Who would decide what to include in the curriculum? If professional teachers' associations had no say whatever in decisions concerning the curriculum, would this affect the exercise of their rational professional judgement in any important way? Alternately, if the associations played an influential role in curriculum decisions, would the present system of having different curricula for different population groups be bound to be modified significantly?

Whatever the answers to these and related questions, I think Morrow's proposal deserves the serious consideration of people concerned about the future of education in this country.

Footnotes

(1) MORROW, W. "Teachers, schooling and the future of education in South Africa" Symposium : A Journal of Education for Southern Africa 1976/77 p.34 - 46

(2) Ibid. p. 42

COURSE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRES: THE EFFECT OF STUDENT EXPECTATIONS

Christopher Orpen

The use of course evaluation questionnaires has increased tremendously over the past few years, starting at universities and spreading to some colleges and a few schools. However, it appears (to judge from recent surveys) that instructors are becoming increasingly sceptical about the value or worth of such questionnaires. One of the main reasons for this scepticism is the growing realization that evaluations 'conceal' a variety of attitudes which can affect the responses of students, but which are not directly, or only, related to their feelings about the course and/or instructor per se. In particular, it is felt that the evaluations of students partially reflect the extent to which their 'experiences' during the course agree with their 'expectations' on entering the course. And since the extent to which course experiences match or are consistent with initial expectations is largely (but not completely) beyond the influence of the individual instructor, this tends to reduce the value or work of the

course evaluation questionnaire as a diagnostic tool for improving instructor effectiveness.

In terms of cognitive consistency theory (1), individuals have a need for balance or harmony between their various cognitions and tend to change those cognitions that are easiest to alter, in order to maintain consonance with those cognitions that are most difficult to change. In the usual context of course evaluation questionnaires, the two main determinants of course evaluations in this respect are the students' perceptions of their actual performance in the course compared to their initial expectations on the one hand, and their perceptions of their experiences on the course on the other (2). Since it is usually easier to shift or alter perceptions of course experiences than perceptions of performance levels vis a vis expections, it can be predicted from consistency theory that if a student perceives his performance to be inconsistent with his initial expection, he will either (a) downgrade his evaluation of the course to compensate for his negative experience, if his performance is below expectation, or (b) upgrade his evaluation of the course to achieve consistency with his positive experience, if performance is above expectation.

An opportunity to test this prediction arose during the course of a recent longitudinal study on occupational choice among high school pupils (3). As part of a larger study, 40 matriculation students in a particular class (average 16.7 years) were administered two four-item five-point questionnaires; the first during the first week of the school year (before they had met the particular course instructor), and the second during the last week of the school year (just prior to the final matriculation examination). The first questionnaire required the subjects to indicate the extent to which they <u>expected</u> the course (a) to contribute to their later careers, (b) to be interesting, (c) to improve their general education, and (d) to be challenging. The subjects also indicated how well they thought they would do on the course (what grade they felt they were likely to obtain). The second questionnaire contained the same four itmes as the first one, except that the subjects were required to indicate the extent to which they <u>felt</u> the

course (a) contributed to their later careers (b) was interesting (c) improved their general education, and (d) was challenging. On this questionnaire the subjects indicated how they had actually done on the course (what grade they had obtained in the 'mock' matriculation examination). To permit matching of the two questionnaires, the students supplied their names. However, the questionnaires, were administered by a 'neutral' person (not a member of the school staff) and the students were told that their replies would be treated as confidential.

The subjects responses to the four items in each questionnaire were summed to give measures of their affective response to the course. To test the main predictions, the subjects were divided into two sub-groups, depending on whether their expected performance was higher or lower than their actual performance. The mean score of those subjects who performed better than expected (n=10) increased slightly from 11.9 (pre-course) to 12.2 (post-course). On the other hand, the mean score of the subjects whose performance was worse than expected (n=15) decreased markedly from 11.6 (pre-course) to 9.7 (post-course). It is important to note that while the students' course evaluations fell significantly ($p<.01$), as predicted, when they did worse than they thought they would, their evaluations did not rise significantly ($p>.05$) when they did better than they anticipated, contrary to what was predicted. A two-way analysis of variance applied to these scores yielded a significant interaction effect ($p<.01$), thereby confirming the importance of how well the students did on the course (relative to their expectations) in 'determining' their evaluations of the particular course.

The results indicate that students do tend to change their evaluations as a consequence of their experiences on a course, provided the level of their actual performance does not match or is inconsistent with how well they thought they would do. They also indicate that the tendency to change evaluations (downwards) if performance is worse than expected is far stronger than the tendency to change evaluations (upwards) if performance is better than expected. Since it is largely beyond the control of the individual instructor to alter the relationship between actual and expected performance significantly, these results suggest, in line with the view expressed initially, that course evaluations are not only a function of intrinsic factors concerned with the instructor/course per se.

In summary, the results suggest that students are not easily 'bought' by giving them good grades, but are fairly

easily 'lost' if they do worse than expected; which in turn highlights the potential danger of allowing a course to get the reputation of being an 'easy option'. Provided the results can be confirmed with larger (and different) samples, they therefore imply that the instructors' best bet if he wants good evaluations, is not only to create 'realistic' expectations but also to meet them. A typical finding of psychological research; easier said than done, and too vague to be useful. But we are still in our infancy as a science and this is therefore as it has to be!

References

(1) Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. New York, Harper & Row, 1957.

(2) Green, D.R. Educational psychology. Englewood-Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

(3) Orpen, C. "Student evaluation of teachers: the effect of attitude similarity" in Perspectives in Education, Vol.2 No.1, February, 1977.

ASPECTS OF HUMAN NATURE IN WHICH EDUCATION IS ROOTED

G van Wageningen

The phenomenon of education is rooted in human existence. Therefore, if we are to gain valid insight into the nature of education, we should pay some attention to the nature of man as a being who is dependent on education. The fact that man educates is a distinctive characteristic of human existence. However, we are not attempting to construct a comprehensive view of man in this writing, as we are concerned here with only one aspect of human being, namely, the aspect of man's concern with education. This should be helpful in making some sort of contribution to answering the question of what could constitute a valid view of the child in the classroom situation.

Human openness is stressed above all else by phenomenological thinkers as the basis of education. This means that man is not caught up in a relentless interplay of cause and effect. Man is ontical openness in the sense that his powers of dynamic participation in reality are given as a part of his humanity. It implies the ability to make things happen, the ability to act in the existing state of affairs and to bring about changes, the ability to bring projects to completion, the ability to be original, to use one's initiative to guide one's future and to plan ahead. Man can bring about progress or his own destruction, and can make a success or failure of his life. He does not move along a predetermined path nor is he at the mercy of blind natural forces. He has potential which can be actualised by his own effort.

In the course of becoming an adult the child exhibits the same characteristic, but his potential does not unfold spontaneously as the case history of feral children proves. In becoming an adult there is implicit the concept of being made an adult. Although the educator accompanies him on the way, he remains an open potentiality in the sense that, ultimately, it is he himself who achieves his adulthood. He resists being forced into a mould or being indoctrinated.

The point is well illustrated by the German Youth Movement referred to by Vandenberg (Being and Education, pp 78-84), in which the boys in a gymnasium in Steglitz fled the stifling atmosphere of an overstructured environment. Vandenberg refers to the principle involved as the pedagogic paradox (p 101). Schooling is bound to goals and objectives associated with the acquisition of systematic knowledge. These define its sphere, and the better schools become, and the better individual teachers become, the more efficient it becomes: objectives become behaviourally and observationally defined and materials of instruction become highly selected to achieve the objectives as speedily as possible (witness the detailed syllabuses and the subject inspectors of our contemporary school system). This is justifiable if the pupil is to become situated in the common world, but it is schooling, not educating. It achieves the teacher's objectives, not those of the pupil. The pedagogic paradox is that the better schooling is, the less likely it is to have room for the pupil's own project of being, ie, his being toward his own destination from his own origin, which means the less likely it is to be worthwhile. This may seem like playing with words (if schooling gets better, it gets worse)because of the different senses in which it is being evaluated, now in terms of the efficiency of the organization of the system, now in terms of individual development. But it does serve to illustrate what has been said about the pupil's openness, his resistance to being forced into a pattern. It is important to note that this is neither a psychological problem, a logical problem, nor a problem of theory of knowing. It is an educational problem and an existential problem for the youth himself. Pedagogically, schooling is structured according to the structure of the school subjects as a continuous process, but the youth has to do things his own way to make sense out of them from his own perspective to keep from becoming alienated from his own world. The possibility, as well as the entire nature of education, is predicated on the assumption that man and the child have the quality of openness in the realization of potential as a facet of human existence.

Human openness also points to the uniqueness of man. He differs from the animals not in degree but in kind. Whereas animals merely exist, man has a mode of existence; he experiences crises in his mode of living and is unlike the animals which have a pattern of life determined by instincts. The greater apes do not wrestle with temptation; the mouse does not blame the hawk, nor the trout reproach the otter; the tapeworm never feels ashamed, nor does the cobra seek to made amends. Man is a cultural being, not a product of nature like the animals. Although man's physical structure has much in common with that of the animals, man transcends the physical. He has higher mental equipment on the basis of which he lives and functions. Unlike the animals, he lives according to beliefs, values, principles, norms and convictions. He reasons logically and conceptually, and is a collaborator in building his own future and that of others.

Man's humanity is especially manifested in the education of his children. The care animals take of their young is of sub-human quality; it consists essentially of habitual actions which are the result of instinct. It follows that the child must also be unique. Whatever has been said previously about man applies to him also. But the child's existence among his fellow human beings is unique especially in that he is a complete person in a state of temporary dependence. He is not a miniature adult differing only quantitavely from grown-ups, because he exemplifies a peculiar form of human existence. He differs qualitatively from the adult. He is childlike, not childish, for only an adult behaving in an immature manner is childish. Initially the child is ignorant, temperamental, impulsive and ego-centric. Yet is is his very shortcomings that make him educable.

Another aspect in which man differs from the animals is that only he possesses self-consciousness of a high order. Modern man is becoming increasingly self-conscious because he has come to realise that he himself is at the focal point of world events and is not simply swept along by the stream of events. It is especially a longing for security and the failure of ideologies and grand designs, as well as the positivistic explanations of man

offered by the physical sciences that have thrown man back upon himself once more. Witness the rise of Existentialism as a philosophy of crisis, a theory of life and man particularly suited to our anxious times; a theory of individual meaning inviting every one of us to ponder the reason for our existence. In the C19 it seemed that the search for objective, scientific truth was the right pursuit. For science did produce knowledge; it did, indeed, rationalise experience. But by the C20 the great philosophical systems began to collapse; 'like cardboard boxes in the rain, they quietly folded into grotesque shapes of irrelevance' (Van Cleve Morris: Modern Movements in Educational Philosophy, p 284). Science, having promised so much, had not delivered. As a logic for explaining the world, it seemed helpless before the sweep of modern events. How, one might ask, can science and system rationalise a world in which men bring about two major wars in every lifetime and casually discuss, as just another problem in social affairs, the prospect of total human annihilation? As a consequence, modern man is thrown back on his own subjective humanity. It is up to subjective man to implement and use the knowledge afforded by science in accordance with the norms of humanity.

In contrast with animals which at most possess an instinctive self-awareness, man lives from the springboard of his self-consciousness. He is aware of his unique mode of existence, his openness to powers of creative activity. Furthermore, conscious self-understanding and subjectivity indicate that man is conscious of the fact that he is a unique and particular individual. Every person has his particular physical make-up with its biological, physiological and psychological basis. He chooses and decides as an individual, has definite potential and limitations, personal emotions, intellectual and temperamental abilities, talents, aptitudes and shortcomings. Each individual has his own conscience, his own way of living and conception of life. What all this means is that each person is an individual addressed by values, norms, culture, the world and others, and that he has to make a personal response. Although man is an individual-in-society, the subjective, individual person is primary. This does not, on the other hand, imply isolation, because by distancing himself man does not necessarily isolate himself.

offered by the physical sciences that have thrown man back upon himself once more. Witness the rise of Existentialism as a philosophy of crisis, a theory of life and man particularly suited to our anxious times; a theory of individual meaning inviting every one of us to ponder the reason for our existence. In the C19 it seemed that the search for objective, scientific truth was the right pursuit. For science did produce knowledge; it did, indeed, rationalise experience. But by the C20 the great philosophical systems began to collapse; 'like cardboard boxes in the rain, they quietly folded into grotesque shapes of irrelevance' (Van Cleve Morris: Modern Movements in Educational Philosophy, p 284). Science, having promised so much, had not delivered. As a logic for explaining the world, it seemed helpless before the sweep of modern events. How, one might ask, can science and system rationalise a world in which men bring about two major wars in every lifetime and casually discuss, as just another problem in social affairs, the prospect of total human annihilation? As a consequence, modern man is thrown back on his own subjective humanity. It is up to subjective man to implement and use the knowledge afforded by science in accordance with the norms of humanity.

In contrast with animals which at most possess an instinctive self-awareness, man lives from the springboard of his self-consciousness. He is aware of his unique mode of existence, his openness to powers of creative activity. Furthermore, conscious self-understanding and subjectivity indicate that man is conscious of the fact that he is a unique and particular individual. Every person has his particular physical make-up with its biological, physiological and psychological basis. He chooses and decides as an individual, has definite potential and limitations, personal emotions, intellectual and temperamental abilities, talents, aptitudes and shortcomings. Each individual has his own conscience, his own way of living and conception of life. What all this means is that each person is an individual addressed by values, norms, culture, the world and others, and that he has to make a personal response. Although man is an individual-in-society, the subjective, individual person is primary. This does not, on the other hand, imply isolation, because by distancing himself man does not necessarily isolate himself.

Actions originating in man's openness, uniqueness, and consciousness are not merely instinctive, reflex or automatic, but intentional and deliberate. Man is intentionally oriented towards the achievement of ideals. Animals and other organic life exist without intention or a conscious aim. Only human concern with them gives value and meaning to their existence. Aimlessness is alien to authentic human existence. Until openness and conscious thought are linked with ideals there is no worthwhile accomplishment. Without a purpose, openness and consciousness remain sterile.

The most important aspect of aim-achievement is in most cases not the achievement as such but the character acquired. When the aim is worthwhile and the intention of attaining it is strong, failure becomes a challenge to further attempts at success. Every success gives additional strength to the creative force of man's conscious openness, and continually elevates the individual's dialogue with reality to confident attempts in the significant fulfilment of his vocation as man.

Man is the focal point at which everything is concentrated. This qualifys him as a multi-dimentional whole of which no part can be meaningfully isolated. As such man is, however, not merely the sum-total of the different dimensions, because the real nature of man is not to be found in his 'make-up' but in his actions in world-situations. The term 'world' signifies the whole range of integrated phenomena by which man is surrounded and confronted, including himself. Man's consciousness, with all its sub-categories, is not something independent of the world, while the world is not independent of human existence. Man gives meaning to the world and visa versa.

Man is an individual-in-society-in-the-world. His consciousness of his individuality has already been mentioned. From this world-situatedness of man it is obvious that his individual presence presupposes his fellowship in community with others. Man is only man because there are other human beings. He is a unique individual among individuals. His consciousness as openness is consciousness and openness to the world of men. Communication with others is presupposed. Man is ontically and primordially incorporated in society, social institutions and mankind. As an individual man distances but never isolates himself.

No attempt is being made here to discuss fully all man's social relationships but merely to indicate man's openness to and in society. Man is the initiator of his social relationships in the family, the state, the Church, the school, etc. Modern man especially revolts against conventionality in which individual freedom conflicts with the increasing pressures of social conformity. He is against the 'type-mentality', the 'mob spirit' and all artificial behaviour dictated by the impersonal society-audience. The individual is value in and to the world and other persons. He is no mere means to an end. He is addressed in his personal capacity. Individuals create society and vice-versa. Human relations are not subject-object relations but always subject-subject or I-Thou relations. Genuine relations and dialogue between subjects require full mutual acceptance. This calls for authenticity and honesty and is destroyed by deception and pretence. Here courage is an important quality: the courage to live authentically with the reality of one's being rather than with the impression one makes on others. The best model of a free man is one who can come together with others in a community meeting in an I-Thou relation. Such a community is diversified and unique, its members existing not side by side but with one another. Collectivism values the community above the self, while individualism regards the self as sufficient. Both are inadequate. Only the I-Thou relation in which mutual acceptance is guaranteed can be regarded as a genuine relation of being an individual-in-society-with-openness.

The ability to revolt, initiate, enter into relationships, create, complete, change, experience crises etc. means that man has freedom. Although he has physical and biological needs and drives, he is not at their mercy. He plays the major part in building his own character which is never the result of purely hereditary factors shaped by the environment. Man is free from being compelled to do good just as nobody is predetermined to do evil. However, this freedom to participate, create, change, build and participate dynamically in world situations, does not mean licence in the sense that man is absolutely free to do as he pleases. His response-ability is turned by his very openness into responsibility, just as his answer-ability as freedom makes him answerable. This means that by using his freedom man incurs the obligation of duty.

Through his openness man is consciously aware of his temporality so that he realises that life and his freedom towards a responsible contribution in the world depend on time. Awareness of human existence is intensified by awareness of non-existence. Without the concept of non-existence, existence would be meaningless. The awareness of non-being produces a state of anxiety. The individual comes to realise that his existence may not be significant and that he could depart from the world without anybody missing him. In realising the imminence of death, man affirms life and the authenticity of existence. Consequently, he sees his freedom as an opportunity and life as the favourable occasion and only chance to live a meaningful life in order to deny nothingness and to justify his existence.

In order to give meaning to the world and human existence, man has to choose and decide. Such decisions are not made spontaneously. They are not merely habitual, instinctive or impulsive actions, nor are they the natural result of physical, biological, hereditary or environmental factors. A decision is taken after reflection and the weighing of possibilities, and responsibility is assumed for it. Every decision therefore always involves the possibility of having chosen otherwise. In such cases it is man's freedom which causes anguish and anxiety. Man's world-involvement and the decisions stemming from it are always in a state of tension between what is and what should be. These crises, this anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty and hesitancy, although the cause of tension, are nevertheless not symptoms of human weakness predisposing to failure. They are merely characteristic of being human. Just as man's temporality and the possibility of non-existence are motivating factors which enrich existence, so crises and tensions are means to keep alert and evoke an urge for meaningful self-affirmation.

Closely related to man's consciousness is his association with values and norms. These are hierarchically arranged according to their durability and this usually means according to the highest good which becomes the centralising value. Since people, groups or even nationsdiffer there is a plurality in the field of value systems, which are closely related to different philosophies of life. Viewed from the existential-phenomenological point of view, man's existence in his

association with norms precedes the essence of these norms. This means that norms are not ready-made to serve as formulae to guarantee good behaviour. On the other hand, it is also true that every generation enters a world in which norms are already established and have proved their validity as reliable criteria for authentic human existence, and these have to be accepted or rejected. Usually the new generation tends to be critical not so much of prevailing norms as their abuse.

What has so far been said about the openness of human existence as that in which education is rooted, all points towards the concept of human dignity. Nobody is a means to an end, an object or the property of society or the state, but has personal worth and dignity which should be recognised. But this dignity with which man is born may be enhanced or downgraded by his very openness. There is an obligation on the individual to live up to his dignity. He is not entitled to make demands on life because it is life that makes demands on him. His dignity is part of his being-in-the-world and this implies duties and responsibilities. If everyone had claims and rights, these would have to be claimed from others, who would also have their claims and rights, with resulting social chaos. Mutual acceptance of one another's dignity presupposes that everybody must fulfil his human destiny, that is, use his openness to enhance his dignity. The attitude that the world owes one a living degrades the individual and makes him a parasite. Privilege must be earned, otherwise a feeling of existential guilt may well arise and with it, the possibility that we live in a meaningless world.

In order to understand the nature of education we must also understand child existence as an integral part of adult existence. Throughout the long history of education two apparently opposite theories have been in evidence which may be illustrated in antinomies such as the child's individuality vs discipline; interest vs effort; immediate needs vs remoter ideals, etc. Theories emphasizing interest, immediate needs, personal experience, pupil initiative etc. and which in so doing tended to discredit and even condemn their opponents, naturally made a poweful appeal and exercised considerable

influence. We heard much of the newly achieved emancipation of the child, that 'felt needs' should guide his education and so on.

Critics of such theories argue that they arise from a false concept of the child. They also argue that these theories are rooted in a false concept of democracy, maintaining that democratic societies cannot survive either competition or conflict with totalitarian states unless there is a democratic discipline that will give strength and solidarity to the democratic purpose and ideal. If the theory of democracy finds no place for discipline, then the theory will have before long only historical significance. There are even educationists who maintain that the embarrassment of the Western world today is largely a result of this pedo-centrism, which actually implies the basic adjustment of the adult to the child.

All the attributes of adult human existence are also applicable to child existence, but child existence is distinguished from adult existence by the fact that the term 'child' always implies a 'not-yet', a can-be', an 'ought-to-be', and a 'must-be' which indicate that he is in a position of bocoming an-adult, which is different from mere growth'.

The essence of child existence can be revealed only in the context of his relation of partnership with the adult. Child life cannot be meaningfully understood without its integration into adult human existence and vice versa. A child isolated from this partership is not fully a child. Child existence gives meaning to adult existence. The child does not live in a 'kingdom' of his own, child and adult being co-existing partners in life situations in the same world. In child life the adult recognises the element of renewal in human existence. Whatever catastrophes befall the adult generation, in childhood another chance is given humanity, an opportunity of constant correction and renewal. In the awakening qualities of child life man always finds new promise, hopes and expectations of a better future. The continuity of human existence and the completion of unfinished human tasks are locked up in child existence.

The child in his partnership-situation in the adult world is not imprisoned in his original helplessness. He is intentionally directed at others and at his world. Given protective security, he ventures into the world in order to explore it. He grasps the opportunity of emancipation because basically every child wants to be somebody himself. The world the child enters is always an open world with possibilities awaiting realization. It is here that education comes in. The inescapable contact of the child as an existential being in a continuously world-related situatedness places the child in an educational situation. To understand the child's activity of discovery it should be seen from the point of view of the child as a being in the world. Here the child is intentionally directed at the world. All his discoveries in terms of thinking, playing, drawing, learning, listening, asking questions etc. are modes of going out into the world, exploring himself and the world, elevating his dialogue with others and the world, improving his understanding, and are therefore modes of actualising his potential, that is, becoming an adult, The concept of becoming therefore emphasises the child's openness and dynamic nature, but also emphasises the necessity for educational intervention, otherwise this potential would stagnate in its biological frame of reference. This continuous actualisation thus implies a series of successive discoveries by the exploring child in security. So we can say that the child's act of becoming is directed at adulthood by the adult.

The concept of adulthood does not, however, imply that a final stage has been reached. Man is never finally completed. A higher level of existence is always possible, Every actualised potential and discovery leading to a renewal of life is simply a single phase in continuous self-emergence in the sense that one can always become more mature, more dignified, experienced and better equipped for higher levels of responsibility and authentic human existence with its inviting new horizons. Without this, human existence becomes sterile. Man is thus not only what he is, but is also in a constant

movement towards self-renewal. Every accomplished stage, aim realised, problem solved, insight gained, renewal experienced or success achieved in self-and-world-exploration opens up new vistas, providing fresh motivation and stimulation.

This dynamic, continuous self-emergence does not, of course, always move smoothly and spontaneously. It is accompanied by conflicts arising from man's implicit urge and ability to become a better human being. Every success also creates an experience of incompleteness and restlessness. The more the individual knows and understands himself, the more he realises his ignorance. This innate dissatisfaction can lead to self-disparagement, bitterness, despair, boredom, rebelliousness or existential guilt. But it must always be remembered that such frustrations are not experienced in isolation. These crises in self-emergence occur in company with others in their world-involvement. When man experiences such conflicts within himself there is always a possibility of liberation in his coexistence. Crises, depression, feelings of alienation, meaninglesness and similar frustrations may be regarded as plateaus of temporary existential stagnation which serve as stepping-stones for existential renewal. Viewed in this way, crises and conflicts are necessary platforms for gathering energy, collecting strength, gaining perspective and becoming aware of new and meaningful possibilities which motivate towards a bold outward movement, progress towards new self-and-world-orientation; in other words, existential re-birth.

Yet during every stage of temporary existential stagnation man is always faced with a conflict between despair and hope, fear of the unknown makes him hesitant to cut himself loose from his past and present experience of relative safety, while at the same time there is the urge to venture and press on. He may experience unbearable tension from the fact that he cannot escape the ultimate decision, either to cling to the expired security of his established situation or to reach out to a potentially better platform of renewed stability. He must either refuse to face the

inconvenience of transformation or meet the demands of a future commitment. Especially in a highly technological and specialised society man may decide to live on the interest of his accumulated achievements in the past and his traditions, with the possibility of being gradually emptied of his essential human qualities and becoming dehumanised; or to sacrifice functional security and collective protection and to live daringly according to his beliefs, and thus accept the invitation of a new self-emergence. When man chooses despair, refuses to make sacrifices and clings to a functional existence, he actually negates the essence of existence. In such cases man's rejection of obedience to the laws of his own humanity exacts its price. This may be the annihilation of his noblest human qualities, paralysis of his spontaneity, renunciation of his freedom as opportunity, atrophy of his potential, concealment of his openness, loss of his dignity, a false sense of complacency, loss of the urge to explore - in brief, the atrophy of his existence. In the worst cases such a state of negativism, usually accompanied by a feeling of meaninglessness, may result in an attempt to escape existence by means such as drugs, alcohol, suicide or other forms of self-destruction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Joly, R.P. — The Human Person in the Philosophy of Education. The Hague, Moulton & Co., 1965

Kneller, G.F. — Educational Anthropology. An Introduction. New York, Wiley, 1965

Kneller, G.F. — Existentialism and Education. New York, Wiley, 1965

Marcel, G. — The Philosophy of Existentialism New York. Citadel, 1968

Morris, Van Cleve — Modern Philosophies of Education Boston. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1969

Vandenberg, D. — Being and Education: An Essay in Existential Phenomenology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1971.

THE 'EDUCATED KAFFIR' AND THE PREJUDICES SURROUNDING EDUCATION FOR BLACKS IN NATAL IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Brigid Limerick

1. Introduction

This paper attempts to highlight the confusion and conflicting attitudes towards the education of the blacks in Natal in the late 19th Century. At this time education for blacks had become a key electoral issue. Pamphlets were abundant, extraordinary statements were made based on pseudo-scientific claims, and the colonists generally became involved in heated discussion as to what type of education would be appropriate for the blacks.

Professor W B Hodgson (1) could have been referring to Natal when he described the dilemma of social opinion in England in the 19th Century -

> the inconvenience of total darkness were more and more recognised and the advantage of at least a sort of twilight state of mind was more and more perceived; but it may well be questioned whether the noonday blaze of knowledge was not more dreaded by the educational patrons of the lower classes than even the midnight blackness of total ignorance.

The Natal colonists were certainly interested in at least the 'twilight state of mind' but prejudice against giving the blacks too much education was very deepseated. As the title of this paper suggests the

prejudice was often focussed on educated blacks, or the 'educated kafir', as they were most commonly referred to in the 19th century.

The colonists seemed quite oblivious to the contradiction inherent in the use of the phrase 'educated kafir'. So perhaps it would be appropriate to start by looking at various explanations of the word 'education' and 'kafir' taken from late 19th century writings.

Russell (2) the Natal Superintendent of Education, wrote that 'kafir' was not an ethnic name but an Arabic word meaning unbeliever which was applied by Mohammedans and Portuguese to all the blacks living in the vast region between Mozambique and the Cape. After this explanation Russell proceeds to use the term interchangeably with 'native' throughout his geography and history textbooks. The missionary, Sibree, (3) commented that the common term 'kafir' derived from the Arabic word 'kâfir' meaning infidel, was a foreign word of reproach. Significantly it was neither recognised nor acceptable to the blacks themselves.

Stewart, (4) the famous Scottish educationist at Lovedale in the Cape, actually entitled one of his talks 'The Educated Kafir - An Apology 1884.' In the talk he heavily criticised the half-educated black and took the stand that for a truly educated black no apology was necessary. The title of his talk is surprising unless it is understood how frequently the word 'kafir' was used. Nowhere in his talk does Stewart use the word 'kafir' again although his views on education for blacks were very clearly expressed:

> You are to get education. I bid you acquire it with a clear conception of what education is. My idea of an educated man is not a man who has learned something, but a man who can do something. I should be sorry to see education reduced to a purely utilitarian standard, or value, and to see it rated solely by what it will fetch in the market. But it must be plain that if a man's education will bring nothing in the market it must be defective somewhere.

Another pamphlet published by the busy Lovedale Press

clarifies what Lovedale at least meant by 'education':

> the object of all education is to secure growth and efficiency, to make a man all that his natural gifts will allow him to become, and produce selfrespect a proper appreciation of our own power and the powers of other people to beget a fitness for one's sphere of life and action, and an ability to discharge the duties it imposes. (5)

Stewart and Moss both worked in the Cape but I think it is safe to assume that the missionaries who worked in Natal had similar ideas. Education was 'something' very worthwhile and a 'kafir' was a term with no emotive connotations merely identifying a black man who was an unbeliever (at least from the Arabic point of view). But this analysis of the phrase 'educated kafir' was not the way it was most commonly used in Natal, for it must be accepted that by the end of the 19th century it was widely used, inaccurately and usually in a derogatory fashion.

Earlier in the history of South Africa, 'kafir' had been used as a generic reference term, that is, 'it' meant 'African' and particularly the Bantu-speaking tribes of South Africa. But as the nineteenth century came to a close the word 'kafir' had become a term of abuse and, more than that, one of contempt. Perhaps this was partly due to the unacceptability of the word to the blacks themselves. The 'educated kafir' then is a contradiction in terms. Education portrays everything that is best and what one would aspire to, while 'kafir' conjures up visions of worthlessness. It is appropriate therefore that these two words should have come to together and been used so often in Natal at the turn of the century. The very phrase 'educated kafir' epitomised the muddled way in which the Natal colonists approached the thorny problem of black education.

2. Education breeds criminals

One of the most amazing claims against educating blacks (and this claim had also been current in Britain in connection with the working class) was that education breeds criminals. This statement was made so often

that missionaries and other interested people were forced to take it seriously and make positive attempts to refute these allegations.

Evans, (6) a well-known segregationist, tried to clarify the issues by looking at different classes of blacks, and pinpointing the mannerisms that worried or annoyed the colonists:

> Now I know that many of my fellow Colonists think that missions have done the native actual harm transforming an honest, simple man into an educated scoundrel. Others who do not go so far, have little or no sympathy with them. Much of this is due, I think, to misapprehension. They see an unpleasantly self-conscious, over-clothed dandy, who has lost the simple, natural, polite manners of his people, and whose self-assertion grates upon them. They think that an unduly large proportion of the native criminals belong to this class of native. But it does not necessarily follow that all of these or even many of them owe their unpleasantness or criminal habits to association with mission work.

In the same year Rev Le Roy (7) of Adams Seminary carried out extensive enquiries to enable him to use statistical evidence to prove the falsity of this allegation. He studied prison records and employers' reports to test the truth of the theory that education renders the blacks criminals and unfit for work. He listed the 1200 blacks who had been through the Amanzimtoti Seminary. Over eight hundred were traced and only eleven had been convicted of any crimes; although in two instances they had been convicted more than once. He also examined the records of Durban Gaol on December 31, 1905 and found that only five prisoners were sufficiently educated to be able to read a Fourth Reader. On questioning employers he found that the mission educated blacks had very good records although the bias against them was very evident. The comment of Brown and Co was typical, 'Good boys, but exceptions. Mission natives worthless.'

Even before Le Roy's investigation the Resident

Magistrates for various districts had felt it important that they should comment on the allegations that mission educated blacks were more prone to criminal activities than 'raw' or 'unspoilt' blacks. In 1897 Mr R H Anderson, JP., Magistrate for Nqutu, Zululand stated: 'An inspection of my Criminal Note Books for the last ten years would show that few Christian natives have been convicted.'

In the same year Mr J J Field, Magistrate of Mapumulo, thought it necessary to carry out a survey of criminal convictions relating to Christian and heathen blacks over a number of years. His conclusion after collecting all the available statistics was that

> the notion that the Christian native is worse in every respect than his heathen brother is clearly the result of ignorance, arising from the common, but of course fallacious, idea that all dressed natives are Christians. or have been educated or brought up on a mission station. All dressed natives are commonly called Amakolwa (i.e. believers) and hence the confusion between the Christians and the dressed natives.
> (Natal Blue Book. 1898 pp B7-B9)

Over and over again commentators stressed that just because a black is dressed in European clothes this does not automatically mean that he has been educated. But prejudice is an emotional response to a threatening situation and is not easily abated by facts. So despite all these proofs the 'educated kafir' continued to be regarded with a great deal of suspicion.

It is difficult to establish definitely why the Natal Colonists felt the situation to be so threatening. In the Cape during the same period real moves had been made to bring the Xhosa and the English and Dutch white settlers together, but this was not happening in Natal. Mr John X Merriman's biting accusation at the Inter-Colonial Commission of 1903 - 5 rings true:

> You have not elevated the natives in Natal you have not raised them, you have not educated them: they are barbarous, and you have designedly left them in a state of barbarism.

Perhaps the only convincing argument is Professor J S Marais' (8) thesis of fear .... the Natal Colonists were reacting to their awareness of the extent of the power of the Zulu nation who had <u>even</u> defeated the invinciable British Army.

They also knew that the Zulus were better organised than any other black tribe in South Africa. Finally Natal was still a very young colony and various incidents had brought home to the colonists their extreme vulnerability due to the proximity of the Zulus. Unless one enters the realm of pure race prejudice, this seems to be the limit to which one may go.

3. <u>Hereditary factors relating to education</u>

The whole nature/nurture problem was also brought into the arena of black education as ammunition for or against educating the black population. Tathan's article (9) on this subject makes fascinating reading. He was a member, albeit a young one of twenty nine, of the Natal Legislative Assembly. Presumably he was in a position where he was representing the opinions of at least a section of the population. His argument was that the facial angle of the Negro is 70°, that of the Caucasion is 52°, the specific gravity of the Negro's brain is 45 ounces, that of the Caucasion is 49 ounces, and these'facts' led him to conclude that:

> ..... education, although it may in time civilize and soften the more naturally intelligent of the coloured people, will, I am convinced, do very little for the pure blooded negro, the man with the facial angle of about 70%.

The obvious conclusion then to be drawn was that no more money need be wasted on attempting to educate the black population.

The theory of hereditary influence had been established and widely accepted by the late nineteenth century throughout the European world. For example Caldecott (10) in the Cape, while stressing the importance of the'daily monotonous toil of learning to read and write' quoted Huxley when he wrote that:

> Power that has been laboriously acquired and stored up as statical in one generation manifestly in such cases becomes the information faculty of the next.

Whereas Tathan's opinion was that the blacks would become extinct due to their overindulgence in European vices, Caldecott maintained on the basis of Huxley's theory that the blacks could only improve.

Plant, (11) the Native Inspector of Education was followed Fynney, in Natal, supported this view:

> ..... but just as we breed a particular strain into cattle, so here school teaching for three or four consecutive generations will accomplish much.

Plant goes on to state that all the teachers already know that some names on a school register are already guarantees for intelligence. Plant's approach to education was more pragmatic than Fynney's. Plant did not strive for high standards but rather accepted a slow plodding forward movement with an improvement in each generation.

4. Economic Competition

These then were two commonly stated viewpoints: education breeds criminals and due to hereditary factors the blacks were either not capable of education or would improve very slowly as their inherited potential improved. Underlying both these prejudices lay the economic factor. The white colonists in Natal feared the economic competition if the blacks were to become skilled workers and this fear was often voiced. Plant dealt with this fear in a scathing fashion commenting that any European artisan who was worth his salt would be unaffected by the practical education received by the blacks.

Plant's argument had very little effect on the European artisans and the fear of economic competition was generally accepted as realistic. Gilbert Gilkes (12) in a brochure pleading for money from the British people for a mission station in Natal wrote:

> There are some who are not certain that the best welfare of the colony will be attained by educating the native. I am inclined to believe that education and civilization must of necessity follow the preaching of the Gospel, and it seems to me that the prosperity of the colony will be increased more rapidly by creating needs amongst the natives than in any other way. Except in exceptional cases the native has not the qualifications which would enable him to compete seriously with skilled artisans.

Gilkes' point was that English people could send money for missionary work without feeling that they would be, depriving English colonists of their livelihood. Gilkes' idea of creating needs is an interesting one as this does have a beneficial effect on the whole population in terms of economic prosperity, but this is a long term result which is often difficult to understand and accept.

To return to remarks made in the introduction the majority of the colonists did accept the necessity for some education for the black population. However they were determined that this should not be in the field of industrial education as this was where competition was most feared. Many of the colonists were in favour of elementary education only as a sort of compromise measure. As Tucker pointed out this was not being entirely logical as if all the money was taken away from industrial education and channelled into education of a purely scholastic kind the colony would be flooded with blacks useless for any other type of work except teaching or work of a clerical nature. If one carries this to its logical conclusion the results would have horrified the Natal colonists!

5. Industrial, Academic or merely different education

Industrial education for the blacks could be looked at in many different ways. It could be a different education designed to prevent the political growth of blacks while increasing their value to the economy, or it could be viewed as Dube, the founder of the Ohlanga Industrial School, saw it. For him it would be education geared towards turning the black into a whole person, one responsible for himself and able to live and develop independently from the whites. There can be no doubt that black leaders in Natal - both educated and uneducated saw the necessity for education. However they themselves were not sure whether it should be industrial, academic or something different altogether.

This problem was recently analysed in the American context (13). Studying American black education King felt that from 1881 onwards three main themes were apparent. Firstly there was the demand by the dominant white group in America that black education should go off the white standard. Both black and white educators interested in black education agonised as to just how much differentiation was permissable. Murray (14) at one end of a continuum was adamant: Differentiation without equality means the permanent inferiority of the black man. ' Loram (15) at the other end felt that there was no political danger in differentiation, and temporary differences were necessary to place black education on a permanent footing.

The second theme concerned the extent to which black education should be a preparation for life. This could mean preparing black children for the life they would be living and hence introducing a self-perpetuating stratified society. Du Bois (16) particularly disliked the idea of education as a preparation for life. He stated quite explicitly what he saw to be the function of all schools:

> There are three disciplines which are the basis of intelligence, and which no school can fail to teach thoroughly and definitely, and call itself a school. Whenever a teachers'

> convention gets together and tries to find out how it can cure the ills of society, there's simply one answer, the school has but one way to cure the ills of society and that is by making men intelligent. To make men intelligent, the school has again but one way, and that is first and last to teach them to read, write and count. And if the school fails to do that, and tries beyond that to do something for which a school's not adapted, it not only fails in its own function, but it fails in all other attempted functions .... Because no school as such can organize industry, or settle the matter of wage and income, can found homes or furnish parents, can establish justice or make a civilised world. (p 257)

(Du Bois' ideas need to be viewed against a backdrop of Dewey - inspired pragmatic American Education.)

The third major theme was the belief that blacks through their educational system could be immunized against politics. They could and should be taught their place in society. This idea was also prevalent in Victorian England.

These three themes applied to Natal as well as they did to the United States. In Natal education for blacks was to be exclusively academic but it was also hoped that the blacks would be immunized against politics. There was certainly to be no place for blacks in the area of government, despite their academic education. As H D Winter, the Minister of Native Affairs in Natal in 1906 remarked: 'I have no objection to meeting the heathen chiefs but I have a strong objection to a Council which consists of Natives who understand, who read and write, the English language as well as I do myself.'

6. Conclusion

The issue of black education is still very much with us today. In the Star on the 5th July 1976 Bozzoli was quoted as saying

> some people express (the opinion) that a primitive society cannot take Western education and requires to be fed some watered down apology of education suitable for the less able intellectual digestive system.

Bozzoli goes on to say

> I believe that basic education can be assimilated by the children of our Black primitive societies just as well as those of sophisticated societies, provided only that the process starts early enough and perhaps even more important, that the child has appropriate conditions to learn under.

This statement raises many problems about the learning environment of black children. However for many years the ability of blacks to benefit from education has been recognised by educationists. Brooks (17) has an indisputable example in this regard:

> When Dr Langham Dale, Superintendent of Education in the Cape Colony, visited Lovedale in 1864 he 'examined the most advanced scholar in a portion of a chapter of the Greek Testament, an ode of Anacreon, and a portion of the first book of the Aeneid, and put general questions on the parsing and derivation of words. He also demonstrated the 47th proposition of Euclid Book I, and a geometrical exercise connected with it.' Depending on one's point of view this may have been an excellent or a fantastic education, but one cannot doubt the mental ability of the man who did so well at it. And he was only one of many.

In 1906 Mason (18) arguing for black education wrote:

> No doubt there are cases in which the acquirement (of education) is abused as it is amongst white people, but the fact is no argument against education itself, though it is frequently so regarded - where natives are concerned - as it once was by some of ourselves 'in the good old days'.

Whether some blacks become well-versed scoundrels or not has no bearing on the concept of and necessity for education. This is perhaps the final statement on the 'educated kaffir'. As the colonists suspected it is certainly not the final statement from him.

Footnote and references

For fuller datail of the background of the arguments in this paper see B Limerick Education and Prejudice: the Natal Native Commission of 1882 Unpublished dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand 1975

(1) HODGSON W B as quoted in Silver H The Concept of Popular Education MacGibbon & Kee, London, 1965, pg 24

(2) RUSSEL R Natal: The Land and its Story. Pmb 1904

(3) SIBREE J "South Africa. Country, People, European Christian Missions" pamphlet John Snow and Co 1881

(4) STEWART J "The Educated Kafir including an Apology and Industrial Education, A Sequel" pamphlet Lovedale Press 1880

(5) MOSS J S "Christianity, South African Christian Missions and the Native Races" pamphlet Lovedale Mission Press 1892

(6) EVANS M S "The Native Problem in Natal" pamphlet P Davis & Sons 1906

(7) LE ROY A E "The Educated Native: Fact against Theory" pamphlet Ebenezer Press 1906

(8) MARAIS J S "The Imposition and Nature of European Control" in Schapera I (ed) The Bantu Speaking Tribes of Southern Africa Maskew Miller Ltd 1937

(9) TATHAN F S "The Race Conflict in South Africa: An enquiry into the General Question of Native Education" pamphlet Munro Bros 1896.

(10) CALDECOTT A F "The Government and Civilization of the Native Races of South Africa" pamphlet Saul Solomon & Co 1884

(11) PLANT R Reports on Native Education. Natal Blue Books. 1888 and 1889

(12) GILKES G "Ikwezi Lamaci" pamphlet Beck and Inchbold Printers 1899

(13) KING K J Pan-Africanism and Education Calredon Press 1971

(14) MURRAY A V The School in the Bush: A Critical Study of the Theory and Practice of Native Education in Africa. Longmans Green and Co. 1938

(15) LORAM C T The Education of the South African Native Longmans, Green and Co 1917

(16) DU BOIS quoted in King K J Pan-Africanism and Education. Claredon Press. 1971 p 257

(17) BROOKES, E H White Rule in South Africa. University of Natal Press. 1974

(18) MASON F Native Policy in Natal - Past and Future Robinson & Co Ltd Printers, Durban 1906.

BRIGID LIMERICK'S ABSTRACTED EMPIRICISM

Eddie Webster

As I understand Brigid Limerick, she is arguing that white colonists in Natal in the late nineteenth century had ambiguous attitudes towards the 'educated kaffir'. There were two commonly stated viewpoints - education breeds criminals, and due to hereditary factors the Africans were either not capable of education or would improve very slowly as their inherited potential improved. Underlying both these prejudices lay fear of economic competition from African artisans.

A similar picture to that portrayed by the author emerged from my own archival work on white attitudes to Indians in nineteenth century Natal. Evidence at numerous commissions of inquiry into the 'coolie problem' stress white colonists' perception of the Indians as essentially a source of cheap labour for the sugar plantations. Colonists consistently articulate their fear of the 'educated coolie' whose acquisition of technical or entrepreneurial skill constitutes 'unfair competition'. Yet white colonists were not homogeneous in their attitudes or interests towards the 'coolie' - sugar planters were in favour of Indians staying in Natal as a source of cheap labour, while the white petty bourgeois feared them as competitors when they completed their indentures and therefore called for their repatriation. However Limerick seems to imply that white colonists had a homogeneous set of attitudes to the 'educated kaffir' - an examination of white attitudes may reveal differences in emphasis that reflect conflicting interests within the white community. For example, white workers would oppose the extension of industrial training to Africans for fear of job competition, while some employers may encourage African artisans to break the monopoly of skills held by white workers.

However my central concern in this comment is with the type of explanation Limerick offers. C Wright Mills has referred to what he calls 'abstracted empiricism', ie the collection of facts without any underlying theoretical framework to locate these 'facts'. Limerick, I feel, carries the methodological limitations of abstracted empiricism in that she fails to locate popular white attitudes to the 'educated kaffir' in a theoretical

framework that explains the ambiguous role of the African élite in a colonial political economy. She has simply abstracted race attitudes from the wider context of colonial Natal.

Colonial conquest in Natal divided the population into two categories - the conquerors, who controlled the country and had full social and political rights; and the conquered, who lost control over their country through this conquest. Of course it was never a simple dichotomy between white conquerors and black conquered. To impose an economic and social order after conquest that continues to reproduce itself, a new legal and educational system is needed. To operate this new order the colonists need to train some of the colonized as functionaries of the system - as clerks, teachers, interpreters and lawyers. In this way the colonized were divided into two groups: the majority of workers and peasants on one hand, and the functionaries, that is, the black élite on the other, who performed the function however intentional or unintentional, of social control. Thus in order to play their part in sustaining the system an élite drawn from the ranks of the colonized had to be educated into the culture of the colonizers. The source of the ambivalence to the 'educated kaffir' lay then in the contradictory nature of settler colonialism itself - in order to continue to reproduce itself the system required the education of an élite drawn from the colonized who were labelled as inherently racially inferior.

Debates about education cannot be divorced from the political economy in which they take place - attempts at explaining the history of education must therefore be located in the political economy of that time.

' EDUCATED KAFFIRS' IN THE FREE STATE TOO

Isaac Kriel

I was intrigued by Mrs Brigid Limerick's scholarly essay on the fears provoked by the 'Educated Kaffir' in Natal during the closing quarter of the last century. It occurred to me that the term 'Kaffir' in stark print looked both abhorrent and archaic. I remembered by contrast how freely we all used the word during my boyhood days. In fact Blacks themselves used it in referring to Blacks and without any connotation of irony.

Mrs Limerick's article took me back to the Free State village where I grew up. There were in that village - according to the consensus - two 'educated Kaffirs': Willie, the man with a car, and 'Mr' John Mhulu, the shoemaker. I was also to meet a third, but that was in Johannesburg and under special circumstances.

John Mhulu was not only educated but appeared also to enjoy an extraordinary level of emancipation. His shop was right on the edge of the railway line, but it was on the White side of the line. He and his three sons were skilled shoemakers. We used to watch them through the door, and were fascinated by the way they kept dozens of small nails between their teeth as they soled the shoes. We waited in hopeful expectation that one of them might swallow a nail or - given an unexpected fit of coughing - a whole lot of nails. But it never happened.

Mhulu became angry when we called him 'Mhulu'. We were to call him either 'John', he said or 'Mr Mhulu'. He was clearly eccentric. We called him 'John' mostly and '<u>Mr</u> Mhulu' when we were being funny.

On one occasion he chased a chattering lot of us out of his shop and we swore at him, not as boldly as young people swear nowadays, but we still delivered ourselves of a number of obscenities. He reported us to the school principal who told us we're never to swear at the shoemaker again 'even if he is a Kaffir' because swearing is a sin. We resented Mhulu for his treacherous ways, but the swearing stopped. We did not want to go to Hell.

Willie was the first Black I ever saw drive a car - I mean

a car as distinct from a truck. It was a two-seater with a dickey at the back and it actually belonged to Willie. What's more, he seemed to know something about motor mechanics and we often saw him tinkering handily with the machinery.

Apart from his car there were a lot of other things that were wrong about Willie. He wore European clothes including a slanted hat and shiny black shoes, and he had a pet dog. The well-kept mongrel sat next to him in the car or rode like bloody royalty in the dickey seat. We threw mud clods at it but invariably missed. The dog also accompanied his master wherever he went on foot. One day a car knocked the dog down, and I think for once we felt sorry for Willie when he tried to revive him under the water pump. We kept very quiet when Willie buried his dog next to the mill wall.

Our total population being a mere 150 (I refer naturally only to Europeans), we white boys associated with the black boys just about all the time outside of school. We swam in the same donga, fished and took clay from the same dam, played interminable soccer games. Because of the nature of soccer and the relative talents available, Blacks and Whites were represented on both sides. We might, in fact, still earn a footnote in History for having been among the pioneers of Mixed Sport.

But I must not forget that miraculous day when my father took me by train to the livestock market in old Kazerne, Johannesburg. He had brought some cattle for auction and he and other speculators were involved in discussion on the vagaries of the beef price. Interrupting them with a lecture on Marxism and its imminent application to South Africa was the most educated black man I had come across in my whole life. He carried that morning's neatly-folded edition of the Rand Daily Mail under his arm, and reached almost religious fervour as he harangued the speculators who replied to each of his pronouncements or predictions with raucous laughter.

One of the speculators crept up from behind him and set fire to his paper. The angry black man spat out some imprecations. He told them they were a lot of backward Whites who did not read newspapers because they did not know how to read. He saved what there was to save of his newspaper and walked off with incredible dignity.

A speculator was all for setting his paper alight again. But the others stopped him. It was all very well, they

said, teaching an educated Kaffir a lesson, but a mad Kaffir was another thing!

All that was about 1937. The ground on which the future Soweto would be built had not been loosened and the winds of change had not yet begun to blow.

FURTHER PERSPECTIVES ON LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY ATTITUDES

Henning van Aswegen

The article on "The 'Educated Kafir' and the prejudices surrounding education for Blacks in Natal in the late 19th century" by Mrs Brigid Limerick is of importance because it raises issues which are still topical today.

Black education, which has for most of our history been in the hands of the white ruling class, has for many years been a controversial matter amongst educationists, politicians, and the general public. Only in the course of the 20th century did the blacks start to participate in this debate and were their ideals and ideas formulated and put forward more clearly. As in the 19th century, black education still forms part of a larger set of racial attitudes which are deeply imbedded in the history, hearts and minds of white South Africans.

In dealing with white attitudes towards black education in the late 19th century Natal it could be of interest and an enlarging of perspective to compare the Natal situation to that of the neighbouring Orange Free State with its expressed 19th century Afrikaner republicanist government and ideals.

Education in the OFS developed slowly and it was only in the last quarter of the 19th century that it was placed on a solid footing. Unlike Natal there was hardly any confusion or conflicting attitudes towards the education of the blacks. Education in the OFS was clearly the prerogative of the whites. The government erected no public schools for the blacks. The few black schools were built and supported by church or missionary societies. Educational boards were appointed for white education only. All laws on education dealt only with white education and the government was very reluctant to assist black schools financially. This is borne out by the fact that the government expenditure in the 1890's for white education was as high as £6100 pa whilst black education received only £225 pa.

Although some OFS people were in favour of more education for the blacks the majority were either outrightly antagonistic towards the idea of black education or they

felt strongly negative about 'over-educating' the blacks. There was no intellectual debate on or controversy over why and how the blacks should be educated. It was generally believed that education, or too much of it, was not good for the blacks.

The reasons for this attitude are quite clear when one studies the documents of this period. The most important factors were economically based. The whites were not willing to spend 'white' money for black education. Far more important, however, was the idea that by educating the blacks they became unfit and/or unwilling to work and were thus educated out of the labour market. Black education therefore worstened the labour shortage. Testifying before the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1904 GH Turvey, an English speaking OFS farmer stated '... that directly a Native is educated, he makes a worse servant' (1). The more liberal JG Fraser testified as follows: 'I know that it was not a desirable thing to over-educate the Native, seeing he was not in a position to make the best use of that over-education, and that it only spoilt the Native to over-educate him. ... The Government considered the education ought to be to teach him the dignity of labour, and to teach him how to live' (2).

The whites' feelings towards black education were most clearly expressed by the influential editor of De Express, Carl Borekenhagen, when he criticised foreign missionaries for over-educating the blacks: not only did it make them unfit to work but education instilled in them ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity (3).

When these factors are analysed it becomes clear that the basic motive is to be found in the white's idea of differentiation and his belief in his own superiority. And when black education tends to eradicate the differentiation it becomes a danger to white society and therefore must be controlled.

The point that can be made after such a brief comparison is that there was more concern for black education in Natal than in the OFS for reasons which can fruitfully be explored. But, and Limerick's article bears this out clearly, this concern was limited to a specific group of people - educationists, magistrates ie higher class whites - and this group put forward certain limits to black education (see para 5 Industrial, Academic or merely different education).

For this limited approach Limerick, in her very stimulating article, gives three reasons: fear, hereditary factors and economic competition. As far as fear is concerned she links this to the military power of the Zulus. This may be true, or partially true, but I do not think black military power alone caused fear as far as black education was concerned. She is closer to a more acceptable explanation of fear where, at the end of para 2 she writes: 'Unless one enters the realm of pure race prejudice...'

It is a fact that the whites' attitude towards black education, as I have tried to indicate in the case of the OFS, is linked inseparably to the whites' race attitudes in general. The author touches on this, points the way, but I think for a better understanding of the '... prejudice against giving the blacks too much education.' (para 1 - introduction) black education must be projected on to the larger screen of race relations in Natal.

The article leads one on to many questions - questions which undoubtedly go beyond the scope of what the author set out to do. What was the attitude of the general public and the farmers in Natal towards black education? How much attention did the authorities give to black education, ie finance, schools, etc.? After the debate on "Industrial, Academic or merely different education" which line did the authorities take? Was the academic training of the blacks on the same level as the whites? Of importance is to know precisely what the Natal missionaries' ideas about black education were. Can we assume that they had similar ideas to Stewart and Moss? (para 1). What was the attitude of the blacks? Did they not at this stage express their ideas about education in general and black education in particular?

The strength and importance of Mrs Limerick's article lies in the fact that, while giving a well-balanced survey and pointing out the basic problems, it opens up a broad topic for discussion. It compels the reader to ask certain questions which relate not only to the fundamentals of education, but also to the fundamentals of race relations in Natal and the whole of South Africa.

References

(1) S.A.N.A.C. IV: GH Turvey, no. 38800, p.343.
(2) S.A.N.A.C. IV: JG Fraser, no. 37819, p.274 and no. 37864, p.279.
(3) De Express, 28.10.1880.

EVERY COUNTRY GETS THE CIRCUS IT DESERVES

A Tale for Toddlers

Patricia Morris

(In his human circus in the movie "Cabaret" Bob Fosse explored the phenomenon of the Jewish gorilla. Orwell preferred pigs. Swift went for Yahoos. This is a tale about apes.)

> 'Every country gets the circus it deserves. Spain gets bullfights. Italy gets the Catholic Church. America gets Hollywood.' (1)
>
> And South Africa gets its educational system.

The mercurial ringmaster cracks his whip. He lines up the chimps on one side of the ring. 'No dinner for you', he leers at them. The crowd applauds; perhaps the odd vrot tomato. He cracks his whip again and the orang-outangs line up. 'Sugar lumps for you my babies,' as he showers sparkling Hewlett blocks into the air. The orang-outangs swallow them in a gulp. The crowd applauds; perhaps the odd vrot tomato.

What next?

Should the chimps eat the ringmaster, the orang-outangs, the digested sugar lumps or the audience?

Or do you think they will just stay in line?

Brigid Limerick outlines the exploits and exploitations of the ringmaster and his favourites who have remained unevolved in the last 100 years. It is explicable. Without the perennial circus our elusive ringmaster, The Political Economy, would have no job (as explained by the law of the E Webster tongue-twister: 'The colonized continue the culture of the colonizers by concurring to the contradictory character of colonialism and capitulating to the colonizers.') And without the perennial ringmaster, how can the circus-lovers' show go on?

The problem that roared in the face of Limerick's ringmaster was how to discover a way of educating a dissatisfied chimp into performing tricks which would

perpetuate the master's wealth and supremacy, without simultaneously 'socializing' the chimp. A 'socialized' dissatisfied chimp might not only want a sugar lump, he might want a hand at cracking the whip. Oi!

Back, boy, back!

The myth that outsiders can be educated -- or tricked -- into a system where they will be 'taught their place in society' is fraught with the nineteenth century Victori-Afrikaner misconception that the future does not extend beond next Nagmaal. And bump my bustle if that wasn't precisely the trick our local ringmaster chose to perform for prime-time viewing! An unfortunate choice, given the money and effort put into attempting to perfect an anachronistic slight of hand, for as Limerick indicates, the popular panacea is purgatory for a chimp. Consider Lyall Watson's macaque monkeys (2) on two quite separate islands who suddenly all start washing their potatoes before they eat them. Chimps too can suddenly decide to step out of line without even being taught how: especially since that comes more naturally than toeing it.

Postcript: some apes and even audiences believe that circuses are unfunny, unentertaining, indeed unnecessary institutions which perpetuate inhumanity, ignorance, immortality and (a special persuasion for the Puritans) hair on your hands and blindness.

References

(1) Erica Jong, How To Save Your Own Life, Secker and Warburg, London, 1977, p.215.

(2) Lawrence Blair, Rhythms of Vision: the changing patterns of belief, Paladin, 1976, p.9.

NOTICES

PROFESSOR W D HAMMOND-TOOKE

Professor Hammond-Tooke has recently become the Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand. We would like, on behalf of the Faculty, to welcome him.

ASSESSMENT IN TERTIARY EDUCATION

The University Teachers' Association of South Africa (UTASA) is holding a conference on problems associated with assessment in tertiary education at Rhodes University from 31 January to 2 February 1978. Among those will be presenting papers will be Professor Ruth Beard (Postgraduate School of Studies in Research in Education, University of Bradford), Professor A N Boyce (Rector, Johannesburg College of Education), and Mr G Hall (Johannesburg College of Education.)

The objectives of the conference are largely to provide a meeting ground for academics from all institutions of higher learning in Southern Africa and to stimulate thought and exchange of views on problems associated with the assessment of the achievements of our students and on new ideas for their solution. It is hoped that people from all disciplines will make a contribution to the programme both formally and in informal discussions and workshop sessions.

For further information write to:

Dr B J Wilson
UTASA Chairperson
School of Pharmaceutical Sciences
Rhodes University
Grahamstown
6140
South Africa.

PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION 1978

We are in the process of updating our distribution list. If you would like to be included in our new list please make sure to complete and return the address label sent with this issue of the journal.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS: VOL 2 NO 3

ISAAC KRIEL - The Principal
Damelin College

BRIGID LIMERICK - Department of Educational Studies
Johannesburg College of Education

ROSEMARIE LINDNER - Graduate Student
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand

PATRICIA MORRIS - Department of English
University of the Witwatersrand

WALLY MORROW - Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand

CHRISTOPHER ORPEN - Department of Psychology
University of the Witwatersrand

SHIRLEY PENDLEBURY - Graduate Student
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand

HENNING VAN ASWEGEN - Department of History
Rand Afrikaans University

ADRIAAN VILJOEN - Department of Fundamental Pedagogics
University of South Africa

G VAN WAGENINGEN - Department of Education
University of Cape Town

EDDIE WEBSTER - Department of Sociology
University of the Witwatersrand

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Editor will welcome contributions in the form of comments on local events or issues, original articles, discussion of articles, reviews, items for the 'Notices' Section and so on.

It would be helpful if contributions were submitted according to the following specifications:

(i) the length should ordinarily be no longer than about 3 000 words;

(ii) the contribution should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double-spaced with good margins all round;

(iii) three copies should be provided, as well as an indication of length;

(iv) references and footnotes should be kept to a minimum but, if required, should appear at the end of the contribution.

Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is especially requested. Contributions for the Discussion section can be published anonymously provided that the contributor's name is submitted to the editorial committee. The Editor encourages the submission of short abstracts with articles longer than 2 000 words. The date by which contributions for the next issue must be with the Editor appears on the back cover.

All contributions should be sent in the first instance to the Editor:

Wally Morrow
Department of Education
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

If you want any further information please get in touch with a member of the editorial committee:

Paul Beard	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand
Huw Davies	Department of Educational Studies Johannesburg College of Education
Patricia Morris	Department of English University of the Witwatersrand
Wally Morrow	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand

DISTRIBUTION

If you know of anyone who has not received this journal, but would like to, please let the Editor know.

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

145 Letter from Professor T A Viljoen — Adriaan Viljoen

151 Margetson on Pedagogics — Wally Morrow

155 Talking of Dragons — Shirley Pendlebury

156 Black Students and Their Understanding of English Poetry — Rosemarie Lindner

159 A Modest Proposal? — Shirley Pendlesbury

ARTICLES

164 Course Evaluation Questionnaries: The Effect of Student Expectations — Christopher Orpen

168 Aspects of Human Nature in which Education is Rooted — G Van Wageningen

INTERCHANGE

180 The 'Educated Kaffir' and the Prejudices Surrounding Education for Blacks in Natal in the Late Nineteenth Century — Brigid Limerick

193 Brigid Limerick's Abstracted Empiricism — Eddie Webster

195 'Educated Kaffirs' in the Free State too! — Isaac Kriel

198 Further Perspectives on Late Nineteenth Century Attitudes — Henning van Aswegen

201 Every Country gets the Circus it deserves — Patricia Morris

NOTICES

203

Contributions for the next issue must be submitted to the Editor by 15 January 1978.