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Title: Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948.

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Liberalism and ethnicity in South African politics, 1921-1948

One of the main problems confronting liberal ideology in the South African context is the nature and role of group identities. This has been no small question because liberal theorists have tended to be hide-bound by a reliance on the inherent rationality of a free market that specifically excludes the role of group interests from its sphere of operations. Thus, while twentieth century liberalism has made a number of important revisions in the classical laissez-faire model of the nineteenth century (I), it still places a considerable emphasis on the free market sector even though, as Professor John Kenneth Galbraith has observed, this now typifies only a minority sector in western capitalist economies (2). It is this dependency on the free-market model, however, that restricts the liberal view of rationality to one of economics. The most rational figure in this view remains the classic homo economicus, the child of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, who buys in the cheapest market and sells in the dearest.

The implications of this model are far-reaching in terms of social values. If the basis of society is seen to rest on free-floating individuals motivated by a high degree of psychological hedonism then the basis of society's values rests on individual ones to the neglect of the wider community. This is perhaps one reason why capitalist societies in the west have had such difficulty, for example, in regulating and controlling firms involved in spreading pollution: the traditional free-market model only assumes a relationship between buyer and seller and cannot account for a third party involved in the transaction in the form of the community (3). Moreover, in terms of its

system of morality, liberalism relies on a general public good accruing from the actions of individuals: by some mysterious hidden hand, "public good" is assumed to emerge from "private vices". As Robert Paul Wolff has argued, liberalism is unable to make the jump, short of radical revision, from the notion of a private value to one of community. Utilitarianism, he argues, in its concern for the greatest happiness for the greatest number, rests only on private values and a development of liberalism towards the direction of interpersonal values is the only way of resolving this problem and developing a liberal morality that recognises the existence of a wider community (4).

The most serious charge, then, against the liberal ideology in the twentieth century is that it has singularly failed to recognise the salience of group interests. This has had, in turn, serious implications for liberals in South Africa. Racial ideology, for example, has been explained away by liberals as autonomous to the rationality of the free-market and dysfunctional for the long-run maintenance of the economic system. In its most extreme form, this can be seen in Michael O'Dowd's "stages of growth" theory which assumes that South Africa, through the logic of the free market, will emerge as a liberal-democracy by around 1980 (5). But similar assumptions are to be seen in a number of other works written in the liberal tradition. In the Oxford History of South Africa, for example, there has been an implicit assumption in a number of chapters, especially those by Francis Wilson and David Welsh (6), that the inherent rationality of the urbanisation process in the twentieth century has been distorted by the irrational nature of racial ideology. What has been

overlooked is the possibility that the two may have been mutually re-inforcing and that urbanisation and industrialisation may have been actually promoted by an ideology of racial separatism.

What liberalism in South Africa has ignored, therefore, is that the overall functioning of the economic system can be seen as rational, despite the continued prevalence of a racial ideology. As Ruan Maud has argued, the economic-determinist model of the liberals ignores "the crucial intervening cultural variable which leads people from dissimilar backgrounds to interpret natural and social reality in a variety of different ways" (7) and that seemingly "traditional" values from the pre-industrial and colonial era not only survive under industrialism and urbanisation but become expanded and devloped to fit a new social order.

In this respect, liberals in South Africa need to pay much greater attention to the nature and role of ethnicity in South Africa's political development. The term has been used comparatively recently by social analysts with the most significant date being 1960-61 with the publication of Beyond the Melting Pot by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (8). This book argued, on the basis of a study done in New York, that ethnicity in American society was "not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form" (9). Thus, even while various distinctive traits like language, customs and culture that the immigrant groups brought with them to America may have declined in the "melting pot" of American mass culture, ethnic identities "are continually recreated by new experiences in America" (10). The implications of this thesis for South Africa are fairly evident. As urbanisation spread in the twentieth century, it was unreasonable to expect the disappearance of ethnic identities in a new polyglot culture; on the contrary, new identities were to be formed and a new pattern

of group identities emerged. The most significant for South Africa's political development was, of course, Afrikaner nationalism which emerged as a new and vibrant factor from the 1920s onward together with the trek of Afrikaans speakers from the platteland into the towns.

What is important in this process is that the rise of Afrikaner nationalism was not an atavistic and backward looking movement, relying solely on the myth of the two Boer Republics, but was very much concerned with the economic regeneration of the Afrikaner within the new urban context. This concern with modernisation in turn explains the rise of the apartheid ideology by the middle 1940s as the means by which Afrikaner nationalists could apply their ethnic model to the South African economic system. Thus, instead of seeing apartheid, after Pierre van den Berghe, as an "anachronistic white elephant" (II) or after Les Kuper, as " a transient doctrine, since it is invalid in the sense that it is not consistent with the social structure and does not allow for the accommodation of action to the new and changed situation of industrial integration" (12), we must rather look to it as the means by which ethnic identities could be preserved within a new industrial society and as a method of <u>actively fostering</u> this continued industrialisation.

At this point, we are faced with an analytical problem. Social scientists are still not quite sure how the ethnic model is to be used and, as a recent volume edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan suggests, we are still within the stage of the development of an overall theory. (13). Clearly, one crucial component to ethnicity as its economic base and it is necessary to see exactly <u>how</u> and in what <u>manner</u> ethnic group identities relate to the surrounding economic system. In their earlier

volume based on the New York study, Glazer and Moynihan suggest that the ethnic group behaves very much as an interest group within the urban setting, thus hinting that the model can be integrated into general interest group theory (14). But the growth of racial consciousness in America in the latter part of the 1960s and the polarisation of values that it has produced suggests that ethnic groups are more than mere interest groups operating within an overall framework of value consensus (15). Thus some social scientists have turned away from seeing ethnicity within the mould of structural functionalism and have seen it as operating within a model based on continued value conflict. Frank W. Young, for example, has looked towards "reactive subsystems" as a means of explaining contemporary group conflict and have seen them as examples of collective group behaviour which depend upon "the formal patterning of the symbolically represented meaning areas in the group" (16). This emphasis on group symbols as a means of defining ethnic identity has, in turn, been taken up by Michael Hechter in a study of voting patterns on the "Celtic Fringe" in Britain. Arguing that ethnicity has too often been seen by social scientists as a given and defining attribute of a particular social group and less as a phenomenon to be explained, Hechter sees the importance of ethnicity in terms of its ability to actively influence the system of social stratification within a society (17). The resulting implication is that the very functioning of the economic system must be seen to depend on patterning of ethnic identities which define what Hechter calls the "cultural division of labour" (18).

This ability of ethnic groups to influence the structure of social stratification suggests important implications for the use

of the ethnic model in future social analysis. It implies, for example, a revision of much analysis based on class divisions within contemporary industrial societies. (19)

The economic basis of ethnicity, is clearly a key factor in the promotion of ethnic identities and it may thus be apposite to look for some kind of a relationship between ethnicity and class as a means of explaining the group patterns within industrial societies. The prevalence of ethnic consciousness over class consciousness need not be put down to "false consciousness" as much as vulgar marxist analysis would tend to suggest. It would seem, in fact, that the saliency of ethnicity rests upon the manipulation of cultural symbols within the ethnic group and here class interests can be seen to come into play. Ethnic group consciousness may, indeed, be an ideological means by which certain class groupings attain the necessary economic basis to be bale to launch themselves into an industrial society. This is because many of the industrialising economies in the twentieth century are post-colonial ones where the previous colonial elite has abandoned power: thus political power does not directly accrue from class interests as the classic marxist model suggests. The promotion of class interests, in fact, depends on precisely the opposite means in the form of the capture of political power and <u>then</u> the fostering of class divisions. It is, in other words, a kind of marxist model stood on its head. Ethnicity, in this context, is precisely this means towards the attainment of political power and it is thus not surprising that ethnic conflict is so prevalent in much of the Third World.

Since 1910, the growth of ethnicity can be clearly perceived in the era of post-colonial politics in South Africa. At the time of Union, the dominant economic interests were those of the

gold and diamond mining industries which remained under expatriate control. But as industrialisation began to get under way after the First World War so new interests and economic structures began to be formed. Manufacturing, for example, grew from 40,4 million rands in 1920 to 99,3 millions in 1939, while between 1932/3 and 1938/9 the national income rose from £234,7 millions to £394,8 millions alone. The urban composition of the population also changed fairly rapidly as the rural areas became depopulated outside of the native reserves. H.A. Shannon estimated that between 1904 and 1936 percentage of "urbanized" Europeans rose 10,7 to 13,1 and Africans from 5,9 to 11,2. (20). In absolute terms the numbers of urban whites doubled between 1911 and 1936 from 658,300 to 1307,4000 while Africans rose from 508,1000 to 1141,600 over the same period. In this context, it was not surprising that there was going to be a struggle over scarce resources.

This conflict could have taken a class form, with Afrikaner uniting with English-speaking workers to form a common front against mining capital and its concomitant interests. This had seemed a possibility up to the time of the 1922 Rand Strike when the majority of striking miners on the Reef were Afrikaans-speaking. The unity, in fact, of all white workers had traditionally been the hope of the South African Labour Party which had sought to mobilize Afrikaans-speaking voters on a class basis as far back as 1915. A pamphlet printed that year by the SALP had argued against participation in the First World War and had sought to mobilize workers against imperialism:

> Dit is die belang van die kapitalist partije om die Arbeids Partij te beweeg om sij teenwerking te laat vaar. Hul wil he dat ons hul sienswijse anvaar. Hul streef onsininglik om ons te dwing ons bestaan te laat vaar in alle lande, deur

ons te wil lei om ons spesiale werk om die mensheid tot rede te bring op te gee. (21).

But, as David Ticktin has shown, the SALP was never successful in its appeal to Afrikaans-speaking workers, hampered as it was by its attitude to the war and the imperial connection. (22). After a poor showing in 1915 the party went on to win 18 seats in 1920, after which its showing in Parliament progressively deteriorated and it was by 1924 forced into coalition with the Nationalists if it was ever to gain any political power. The result, was that the Nationalists were able to appeal increasingly to Afrikaans-speaking workers in an ethnic basis. The Nationalists were able to hold their own in Parliament and after 1924 they began to implement a programme that stabilised the industrial colour bar and consolidated the white working class within the South African economy. This was electorally successful for in 1929 the Pact Government, now overwhelmingly dominated by Hertzog after the SALP had split in 1928 (23), was able to beat Smuts and the SAP in the "Black Manifesto" election. The gains, however, made by the Nationalists by the end of the 1920s were mainly confined to the industrial spehere (i.e. legislation protecting white worker interests against non-white competition) and cultural and language matters: in 1925, for example, Afrikaans was recognised as one of the two national languages while the national flag, after a long controversy, was extablished by 1928. The actual <u>economic</u> position of the Afrikaner within the economy remained to be settled.

Here it had long been recognised that Afrikaners as a group were seriously disadvantaged compared to English-speakers. When the "Second Great Trek" to the towns began after the Boer War,

many Afrikaners tended to move into relatively poor suburbs where there was low-cost housing. This tended to perpetuate the poverty syndrome of the platteland in the new urban context. In 1932, the Carnegie Commission concluded that the number of "poor whites" could be as many as 220,000 persons, a high percentage of whom were Afrikaans-speakers (24). But Afrikaans-speakers also tended to hold the lower rungs in terms of jobs within the white economy: by 1936, for example, some 59% of whites in public administration were of the Afrikaans language group (25). It was not surprising therefore that within this context Afrikaners were easily capable of being made to feel under-privileged.

One solution had been put forward as early as the first decade of the twentieth century. This was basically one of ethnic capital formation and the accumulation of sufficient savings as a meanings of collective economic upliftment. The scheme was principally associated with Dr J.D. Kestell who, as a Predikant at Kimberly, had proposed such a scheme in 1907 (26). The objectives of the Nationalist elite after 1914, however, remained essentially ones of achieving political, social and cultural equality with English-speakers and Hertzog's "two streams" policy did not include any scheme for ethnic economic mobilization. By 1929 however, there began a radical transformation within Afrikaner nationalism such that Kestell's ideas gained increasing acceptance. Professor T. Dunbar Moodie, for example, has shown that the formation in 1929 of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings marked an upturn in the "Afrikaner civil religion". The FAK was crucial, he argues, in the development of a "new ethnic conception of culture" (27). In particular, it

was instrumental in extending the conception of a "Christian National" sacred history. The FAK, however, was under the control of the Broederbond whose role, during the 1930s was to be crucial "both in organizing the rising Afrikaner elite, and in providing an interpretation of the civil theology which was tight enough to unite Afrikaners and yet loose enough to allow considerable difference of opinion on practical matters" (28). These developments were also to be aided by a crucial idelolgical transformation by the inportation of what Moodie calls "neo-Fichtean nationalism" from young Afrikaner intellectuals like Dr Verwoerd, Dr Geoff Cronje, Dr T.G. Hugo, Dr Piet Meyer and Dr Diederichs who had pursued studies in Europe. These nationalists were insturmental in establishing the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond in 1933 in opposition to NUSAS, while also being influential in Nasionale Pers publications and Die Volksblad. It was on the latter organ that Dr Kestell had had a regular column after 1929 (29).

By the latter part of the 1930s, therefore, this strongly ethnic conception of nationalism, which was epitomised by Diederichs's pamphlet in 1936, Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, became closely linked to ideas on economic self-regeneration (Helpmekaar). Indeed, it can be argued that the two were essentially mutually complentary and that the new ethnic consciousness that was being espoused by the elite depended upon the establishment of a sound economic base. To this extent, Moodie's conception of the problem as being one merely of "integrating the symbols of the civil faith into the problems of urban industrial life" (30) fails to grasp the relationship between the ethnic group consciousness that was being promoted and its

material pre-requisites. This is partly because he insists on looking at the historical development of Afrikaner nationalism through the Webeian ideal-type of "civil religion" which is defined in terms of its "reference to power within the state" (31), whilst ignoring the material pre-conditions for that power. For once a sufficient fund of ideological commitment had been built up amongst the Afrikaans-speaking population, and, the land-mark here was the 1938 Ossewa Trek, the new Afrikaner nationalist elite was able to extend this commitment into an economic one of capital mobilisation and the accumulation of sufficient savings to fund the rise of a new Afrikaner entrepreneurial elite. (32).

The key step in the development of this capital mobilization was the calling of an Economic Congress at Bloemfontein on the 3, 4 and 5 of October 1939. The arguments of the various speakers at the Congress illustrated the intention of using the Afrikaner ethnic group as a means of capital formation. Professor L.J. du Plessis, for example, declared:

> ...die volk het in sy selfbewuswording ook hiervan bewus geword en die nuwe ekonomiese volksbeweging stel hom ten doel om hierdie proses om te keer, om nie verder toe te laat dat die Afrikaanse volk verwoes word in 'n poging om hom aan te pas by 'n uitheemse kapitalistiese stelsel nie, maar om die volk te mobiliseer tot verowering van die uitheemse stelsel om dit om te skep en aan te pas aan ons volksaard (33).

In addition, in a forthright paper on the mobilization of capital and savings by the Afrikaner, Dr T.E. Donges argued that the reasons why Afrikaners had hitherto been so unsuccessful in making their capital bear fruit were twofold: psychological (sielkundig) and technical. The psychological reason lay in the tradition of Afrikaners to invest in concrete objects that could be seen like houses and land so that "Dit is maar selde dat hy

in Afrikaanse handels van nywerheidsondernemings bele, gedeeltelik omdat daar nie baie sulke ondernemings is nie en gedeeltelik omdat hy in baie gevalle afgeskrik is deur mislukkings van sulke besighede war met onvoldoende kapitaal of besigneidsleiding en dikwels sonder behoorlike ondersoek opgerig is" The technical reason lay in the fact that there were few investments available for the Afrikaner to make his capital bear fruit. There were, for example, no large secondary industry or business on any extensive scale that was managed by Afrikaner capital. The only solution to this problem argued Donges, was the creation of an investment organisation that was able to mobilize disposable Afrikaner capital which depended upon the "aanmoediging van spaarsin en die voorsiening van behoorlike spaarfasiliteite sodat spaargeld in kapitaal verander kan word" (34) (emphasis added).

From these arguments it is clear that, despite the professed anticapitalist sentiments expressed by many speakers, the main thrust of the Congress was to gain access by collective organisation into the existing capitalist system, dominated as it then was by English and Jewish capital. (35). The appeal to ethnic sentiment was a crucial means by which this mobilization of resources was to be achieved and represented, in fact, the expression of a kind of class consciousness by the rising Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. The organisations that were to emerge as a result of this Congress illustrated the masking of these class interests through ethnicity: they were the Handelsinstituut, or the Afrikaans chamber of commerce, the Ekonomiese Instituut, concerned with economically uplifting the Afrikaner, and, most importantly, the Reddingsdaad bond which was headed by Dr N Diederichs. This was a mass-based organisation that by

1943, so Diederichs claimed, had 400 branches and 4000 active helpers (36). The RDB seems to have been the most crucial organisation for the mobilization of funds essential for the growth of a specifically Afrikaner capitalism. In March 1941, for example, a five year plan was announced in order to collect £I½ millions which had as its target 5000 people subscribing £I a year, 6000 people 16sh. a year, 7,500 people 10,000 2sh. a year and 10,000 1sh. a year (37). Centainly, the long-term effects for Afrikaner capitalism were significant for between 1939 and 1949 the number of undertakings owned by Afrikaners increased from 5% to 10% of the national total, while the number of Afrikaner industrial undertakings rose from 2,428 to 9,585 over the same period. By 1949, it was estimated that Afrikaner capitalists were in control of 6% of the nation's industry and 25 to 30% of its commerce (38). Cellective mobilization of capital was clearly paying off.

In this context, centain questions on the liberal response to the ethnic mobilization of Afrikaner capital needs to be asked. The emphasis, in fact, on most studies of this period has been on the specific trends within <u>either</u> Afrikaner nationalism <u>or</u> within liberalism, as represented by the Hofmeyr wing of the United Party and the South African Institute of Race Relations. (39). There has been little or no light thrown on their <u>interaction</u> which is essential in order to understand the long-term thrust within South African politics.

This point needs emphasising for if by the end of the 1930s Afrikaner nationalism had become increasingly ethnic and exclusive in its nature then at the same time English-speaking capitalism was becoming increasingly subject to the criticisms of liberals

both within and without the political system. This critical opposition was to gain increasingly in its effectiveness during the course of the Second World War.

Crucial to the understanding of this liberalism is the socio-economic context in which it developed. As Martin Legassick has shown, South African liberalism has to be seen in terms of the extension of the liberal ideas from the missions and the Cape to a new urban and industrialising environment after the First World War (40). Out of this environment there grew in the 1920s the Joint Council movement, originally sparked off by the arrival of the Phelps-Stokes Commission under Aggrey and Jesse Jones in 1921, and in 1929, through the mediation of C.T. Loram and the Carnegie Commission, the South African Institute of Race Relations, which had as its "adviser", J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones. The weakness of these groups perhaps lay in the fact that they were never able to develop a sufficiently strong conception of the nature of the society that they wished to foster and sustain. This may well have been a product of the increasingly despondency and self-doubt experienced by liberals in the West generally between the wars and discussed, for example, in such books as Walter Lippmann's The Good Society and Herold Macmillan's The Middle Way. The best strategy on hand, indeed, lay in tinkering with the existing systme and "muddling through" in the best way possible: this certainly tended to be the case until the popularisation of Keynes's work in the latter part of the 1930s and the "pump-priming" of the economy through public expenditure in order to bring it out of recession. But even this only became successful when the Second World War brought with it massive state expenditure in such countries as Britain and America on armaments.

The model open to the liberals, then, was not a particularly finished and well-rounded one. In addition, the liberal plant was difficult to cultivate in the somewhat arid conditions of South Africa. The essential political consensus of such liberal democracies as America and Britain was lacking in South Africa where the salient political cleavages by the 1920s centred around national (more commonly known then as "racial") identities. The initial response of the liberals was to hope that nationalism and liberalism were capable of being reconciled. Edgar Brookes, for example, who had been a supporter of Hertzog's segregation policy in the early 1920s and had openly championed his cause in the 1924 election, wrote in his pamphlet The Political Future of South Africa in 1927 that a possible reconciliation of nationalism and liberalism could well come about with the next generation of university students. This hope, doubtless fostered by the Versailles Peace Conference and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points also looked forward to a united European opinion regarding native policy which would be based on the provision of adequate land for separate native development. Such a policy would help foster a common European nationality in South Africa and it would be the "task of the future liberal party of South Africa...to preserve this happy compromise" (41).

These early hopes, however, were to be dashed by the 1930s where, in South Africa as in Europe, nationalism grew increasingly intolerant of liberal aspirations and the edeals of the post-war Wilson reconstruction were smashed. In South Africa, the emergence of the increasingly ethic conception of Afrikaans culture prohibited the emergence of a common European nationalism: a development in

fact that did not really begin to take place until the middle 1960s on the basis of Afrikaner nationalist hegemony (42). The response of liberals to this situation was to retreat from any attempt at reconciliation between nationalism and liberalism and to expouse the classical liberal model of social relations based on the unit of the individual. In 1933, for example, Edgar Brookes in his Phelps-Stokes Lectures entitled The Colour Problems of South Africa argued that "The great work of nationalism in South Africa has been done" so that, while "a moderate and inclusive nationalism could still do good" it would be "to misread the signs of the times" to "carry on Exclusive and intolerant nationalism" (43). Above all the aim should be a "higher ideal of patriotism" which made "all South Africa the goal of our endeavours" and to realise that:

> South Africa can only be great if the individual members of the community, be they Black, White or Brown, are great. Let us treat individuals as individuals, as persons, entitled to respect, and to recognition on their merits, not merely as members of artificially defined and limited groups (44) (emphasis added).

The implication of this liberalism was a clear rejection of the group and ethnic basis of contemporary South African society and the championing of a society more closely resembling the liberal-democratic societies of America and Western Europe. The results, however, for South African liberalism were, in the long-term, to be disastrous.

The articulation of liberalism based upon the unit of the individual in South Africa had the effect of forcing liberals to work inside the existing political system without being able to suggest any radical alternative. The implicit assumption that liberal ideals could be best achieved by gradual reform within what was accepted as a perliamentary system (45) meant that

liberals were unable to suggest any significant alternative social model to the segregationist ideals of the majority of politicians in the House of Assembly and Senate in the 1920s and 1930s. As W.M. Macmillan recalled of this period in the Joint Councils nad the Institute of Race Relations before he left South Africa in 1932:

> Despite (a) lack of faith in leading politicians one had to work with them. Among the Africans themselves there may have been movements of which we knew very little; these are now being explored by research workers, but I can only say that at the time they appeared wholly inneffectual and to cut even less ice than the orthodox political approach (46).

Undoubtedly much of the work that was done by liberals in the Joint Councils and the Institute of Race Relations served a valuable social function in the presentation of facts: but the failure to evolve a strategy that transcended a merely pragmatic response to the existing trend of legislation left liberals, at the onset of war, with no coherent ideological alternative to Afrikaner nationalism. This was to prove crucial for, as shall be seen the wor-time Smuts government was sensitive, to some degree, to liberal pressure for reform of the economic system with the onset of industrialisation brought about by South Africa's isolation in the war. This was an opportunity that could have been of great advantage to a liberalism that was equipped with an understanding of nationalism.

But the one liberal, Alfred Hoernle, who did offer some sort of shift in the emphasis of liberalism away from the individual towards a wider recognition of groups, was repudiated by his colleagues. Hoernle's Phelps-Stokes Lectures of L939, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, argued that "the liberal spirit" was not confined to individuals but also included groups and that the

liberty of the former rested on the recognition and respect of the latter:

> The varied possible excellencies of human nature must be realised in individual human beings: concern for individuals, respect for personality, respect for human nature and its potentialities in every human being - these are one aspect of the liberal spirit. But, individuals live their lives as members of social groups, and the excellence of their lives is relative, therefore, to the culture (in the widest sense) of their group; the culture to the pattern of which individual lives are moulded, the culture from which they draw the materials, as it were, for a life worth living. The liberal spirit, in this aspect, shows itself as a respect for social groups other than one's own, for cultures other than one's own, for sentiments and traditions other than one's own, though always coupled with a willingness to share one's own (47).

This recognition of the power of groups in Hoernle's thought needs further research: indeed a biography of this crucially important thinker in South African history is very much needed. But one possible influence may well have been Hoernle's attendance at a conference of the Rasseverhoudingsbond van Afrikaners in Pretoria on the 19th and 20th June 1935. This conference, which had as its secretary M.D.C. de Wet Nel, led to the formation of the Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie and represented an earlier version of the Bureau of Racial Affairs that was formed in 1947. The Rasserverhoudingsbond was a crucial development in the ethnic conception of culture, that had been developed with the formation of the FAK in 1929, and its extension into the sphere of race relations. Hoernle's extensive notes of the addresses made at the conference suggest his interest in the ideas of the proceedings. The tone of the conference was an attack on the "civilising mission" of the white man through such instruments as the missions and the clergy. Various speakers suggested that the Africans should be educated in their own vernacular to encourage a separate identity that avoided turning blacks into whitemen (48).

Undoubtedly, the assumptions behind many of the arguments were racist (49), but, as Dunbar Moodie has pointed out, there is an important non-racist stream in apartheid represented by Dr W.W.M. Eiselen, who became Secretary of Native Affairs under Verwoerd (50). The ethnic conception of Afrikaner nationalism was believed applicable to various tribal groupings, which were identifiable by early 1950s through the language maps of Van Warmelo (51), and who were thought capable of their own autonomous development in their respective cultural spheres. As a statement of the Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie put it in 1936:

> Die Afrikaner erken die feit dat daar 'n eeue-oue Bantu-kultuur bestaan en derhalwe wil hy dat die naturel gelei word deur kennis en verheerliking van God tot herskepping van sy eie beskawing, waarin sy eie kultuur, sy eie tradisies en sy taal hoofrol speel, sodat die naturel uiteindelik oor sy eie eienskappe kan beskik en die tot volmaaktheid kan ontwikkel in die lig van Gods woord (52).

The power of such sentiments may well have been an important reason why Hoernle felt the need by the end of the 1930s to modify South African liberalism in order to make it account for this group and ethnic basis to the political conceptions of Afrikaner nationalists. In turn, they also explain his gloom for the future of South Africa which was at the stage of "heartbreak house" (53). Of three possible alternatives for the future pattern of race relations om South Africa, parallelism, assimilation and total separation, Hoernle could only see separation, whereby he meant the "sundering or dissociation so complete as to destroy the very possibility of effective domination" (54), as the means by which the liberal spirit could be realised. But

even then, Hoernle realised that separation was not practical and offered "no ultimate hope for the liberal spirit" (55).

Hoernle's main quest was to seek a strategy for liberals in the South African context. To fail to do so was, he argued, to accept the status quo. As he explained in a letter to G.J. Ponsonby:

> Nearly all our liberal efforts work, consciously or unconsciously, within the parallelism framework and to that extent accept segregation (56).

While in a memorandum he prepared for the Secretary of Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, in 1941, Hoernle charged his fellow liberals with failing to serve their principles by refusing to evolve a strategy that could develop a society without racial divisions:

> In the present-day South African world, there is not, in my opinion, any hope or prospect, of the realization, under the leadership of the White castes, of the obolition of the system of racial castes. But, I fail to see how those liberals who, for this reason, avoid, or refuse, or give up, the effort to think out the application of liberal principles in some kind of social structure without racial castes, are really serving the cause of their principles most effectively. It seems to me that, thereby, they allow the upholders of an illiberal theory and practice to win the contest by default. They confine their efforts - in fact, if not by intention - to ambulance work within the caste society and tending to strengthen the caste society; and they shut their eyes to, or else simply remain unaware of, this fact (57).

But the liberal response to Hoernle's argument remained a negative one. One reviewer of his Phelps-Stokes lectures suggested in The Forum, for example, that

> With his clear goal of obtaining greater liberty, an increasing measure of fair play, and wider opportunity for subject peoples, the liberal does not need to define his "long range" programme as rigidly as Professor Hoernle has attempted to do. Our programme must evolve with rapidly changing circumstances (58).

while Bishop Clayton, in an exchange of letters with Hoernle, charged him with abandoning "hope" and taking the line "that the structure of S.A. Society of fixed". "Like you", went on the Bishop, "I do not see how any change in the structure of society is to come. I see no signs of such a change, and yet it seems to me that the criticism and development of ambulance work within the present framework may in itself lead to gradual changes within the framework itself. If Native education can improve, if the economic position of natives improves, it seems to me possible that the Walls of Jericho may fall down of themselves" (59).

This response typified the reaction of most liberals of the period to Hoernle's arguments and indicated that there was not going to be an articulation of an alternative strategy to that of the prevailing "ambulance work" within the existing political system (60). This nagative reaction however, masked over an essential reluctance to perceive Hoernle's failure to perceive the economic structures of South African racial segregation. One particularly penetrating review by George Findlay of Hoernle's Phelps-Stokes Lectures argued that the pivot of the argument hinged on subjective attitudes (a product of Hoernle's idealistic philosophy) and ignored the economic context in which such attitudes existed:

> Ignoring the pyramid of production and its essential character, affecting all our social correlations, he (Hoernle) tends to attach primary importance to psychological attitudes and secondary importance to real external developments. He does not see that men's minds must and inevitably will come into correlation with the facts outside them, and that the mind cannot

> influence real developments unless it does so. Thus, while he speaks of the "spirit" of this and the "ideal" of that, he confuses the very basis of "domination" (61).

Such arguments at least began to get to grips with the essentially economic relationships involved in the group-based struggle for control over economic resources in South Africa. It afforded, too, the possibility of gaining an insight into the economic basis of Afrikaner nationalist mobilization. But Findlay's criticism seems to have been largely lost on liberal thinking of the time, which remained wedded to the classical free-market model. As such, therefore, Afrikaner Nationalism could only be perceived in liberal eyes as an essentially irrational phenomenon that worked against the laws of the economic system.

A further result of this position was that from the time of Hertzog's break with Smuts over the war issue in 1939 until the election of 1948, the tendency of liberalism, as indeed of the United Party as a whole, was to link this perceived irrationalism of Afrikaner nationalism with Nazism. The most classic statement of this view is probably to be found in Arthur Keppel-Jones's When Smus Goes, which was first published in 1947 (62). This dip into the future foresaw a Nationalist victory leading, in somewhat Orwellian terms, to the establishment of a Christian National Republic, a police-state and a mass exodus of English-speakers to Rhodesia. The whole emphasis, however, was nagative in tone, as the very title suggests. There was no hint of any positive alternative stance that could be taken to ward off the perceived threat. The whole book indeed, personifies the

inability of liberals to perceive the essentially economic nature of Afrikaner nationalism. By simply writing off Afrikaner nationalism as merely a brand of Nazism (which in many cases may well have been actually true), the liberals merely revealed their own antinationalism:

> We are faced with the urgent necessity of building a New Order. We have to choose between the violence, dogmatism, racialism and ignorance of the New Nazi order, and a revised conception of our social and economic condition, our ethical and religious system and the idea (already becoming obsolete) of the state as "sovereign" in its independence.
>
> The hard school of experience has shown...that no state is completely independent today; it cannot remain sovereign in the swift swirl of world movements; and a small state like ours, unless it is prepared to take its stand on the side of democrats in the struggle, is simply signing the death warrant of its freedom.
>
> The Malanite dream of retaining Afrikaner individuality by discussing terms at the conference table or becoming little Fuhrers under Adolf shows so little knowledge of the Nazi mind that one has doubts about its sincerity (63).

Undoubtedly some of these sentiments were based upon a new politico-economic conception of the Union brought on by the industrialisation facilitated by South Africa's economic isolation during the Second World War. Manufacturing, for example, increased by 116% between 1939 and 1945 and the industrial labour force rose by 53%, a large percentage of which were non-whites (106,000 out of 125,000) who were moving into skilled and semi-skilled jobs as many whites went off to fight (64). The effect of these economic changes was to boost the liberal position that had clustered around the Hofmeyr wing of the United Party. Hofmeyr, together with Lesley Blackwell, had decided not to break with the United Party in 1938 when they resigned from the U.P. caucus (65) and they represented a liberal pressure group within the U.P. during the course of the war. Their arguments were articulated by the weekly magazine, The Forum, which had been founded in 1938 with Hofmeyr on the

> Excluding the Rhodesians, and leaving the Belgian, French and Portuguese colonies aside, the Union's rightful sphere of influence in Africa embraces a market of 40 millions - an infinitely larger source of potential wealth than is vouchsafed to either Canada or Australis (70).

With the establishment of this wider market and economic contadts, there was also envisaged a transformation in political structures that would transform the status of South Africa within the British empire into a local centre in a wider federation. The Cape Town parliament, therefore, would be one of a "series of Commonwealth Parliaments, each of them independent entities, none subservient to each other, and with separate needs and requirements, yet each co-operating for purposes of defence and other common objects which none can fulfill standing alone" (71). This vision of the future South Africa, however, had little or no place for internal national groupings.

The most important feature of this liberal ideal for South Africa's internal political development was that it hit the economic basis of the rising Afrikaner ethnic consciousness. The strategy of seeking wider markets for secondary industry, which were wholly under English-speaking control in this period, and seeking the integration of urban Africans into the economic system drew capital away from the area of the ethnically-based primitive accumulation of the Afrikaner bourgeoisie. The liberal conception of industrial development in South Africa presupposed a market system where individual, as opposed to group interests predominated. There was, accordingly, no place for group mobilization of capital on the basis of the strategy outlined at the Economic Congress in 1939. This strategy, indeed, was viewed as "so fantastic a policy" that it could "lead to the ruin of the country" (72). For it challenged the basic market

board of directors. The Forum had an editorial council on which sat R.J. Kingston Russell as editor in chief and managing director, John Cope, T.J. Haarkoff and S.A. Frankel while among its advisers were I.D. MacCrone and W.H. Hutt. The emphasis, therefore, was strongly liberal in the classical tradition and the nature of its arguments revealed a bisic lack of understanding of nationalism and group identities within South African society. The basic objective of the magazine, indeed, was to reduce nationalist sentiments in the search for a wider community in Southern Africa that would facilitate the expansion of South Africa's internal market: an earlier version, in fact, of South Africa's "detente" policies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (66). These arguments for a Pan-African community in Africa to some extent took off from Smut's vesion of a white-controlled group of states stretching from South Africa up to Kenya which he had exponded in his lectures at Oxford in 1929 (67). But now they combined with a strong emphasis on the need for internal reforms of South African economic structures. This meant a change in the system of pass laws and influx control:

> The fact is that the African in our cities and towns is today an integral part of our industrial machinery upon whose stability and acquired skill our industry is coming more and more to depend. But our laws continue to treat him as a periodic peasant worker not wanted permanently in the town (68)

While at the same time a rise in African wages would aid secondary industrialisation:

> In our own interest it is essential to raise the standard of living among the Non-Europeans. Increased wages would do that. It would also stimulate consumption of our primary and secondary products (69).

With these changes, the future of South Africa lay in a wider sphere of influence that would facilitate greater industrialisation:

conceptions of liberal ideology:

> They overlook the fact that buying and selling are but two aspects of the same process of exchange. If I act as a buyer of shoes, it is only because I am a seller of something else - say, wigs. To say that I will refuse to buy shoes from X is the same as saying that I refuse to allow X to be a shoemaker. Moreover, if X is no longer a shoemaker, he will cease being a buyer of my wigs and, therefore, my alleged superiority over him must vanish into thin air... To be accurate, one should not use the terms "ours" and "theirs" at all in talking about the National Income is produced by the efforts of all the sections of the community and it is quite absurd to argue that Natives produce one function, Indians and Coloureds another, Europeans a third and so on....We might just as well calculate the further fractions contributed by women or by men, by the married or by the unmarried, or by widows and widowers. Such calculations are little less fantastic than the idea if all Afrikaners....were to bind themselves together they could improve their position because they could now buy on terms which they would dictate and only from those whom they approved of (73).

It is thus not surprising to find, in this ideological context, that the objectives of the Reddingsdaadbond were similarly condemned. The RDB was seen as "isolationist" and, with the precedent of Pearl Harbour, "History has shown that isolationist economics cannot pay; indeed, the great lesson of our time is that isolationism, whether in politics or education, religion or sociology, is doomed to bring sterility and strife" (74).

But the liberal strategy, of course, failed to see that the ethnically based Afrikaner capitalism <u>was</u> able to mobilize extensive appeal and to generate sufficient savings so as to become a signigicant economic and political force by the end of the 1940s. The basis of this mobilization needs further research, focusing on the extension of an ethnically based national consciousness among the mass of Afrikaners. It is quite possible that the <u>Ossewa Brandwag</u> was an important ideological instrument in this respect since it appealed to the Afrikaans-speaking white working class as a defense organisation so that, despite its

considerable political differences with the Nationalist Party under Malan, it may have been crucial in the long-run political mobilization of Afrikaners that put the Nationalists into power in 1948 (75). This mobilization was essential for the Nationalist success and has been largely ignored by Newell Stultz in his analysis of Afrikaner politics between 1934 and 1948. Indeed, to place the main cause for the Nationalists' success on the "war vote" of 1939 completely misses the long-run structural trends within the political system (76). Afrikaner Nationalism, has shown itself as not a fixed entity but a series of class alliances that have exploited the opportunities for access to political power and the control of the South African state. What is needed, therefore, as Dan O'Meara has pointed out, is an analysis of Afrikaner Nationalism that sees it as an ideology that "developed historically as a response to social change, and is no immutable weltanschuang" (77).

On the other hand, it is possible to place too much emphasis on the active role of the Nationalist Party in mobilizing political support for itself. While this was undoubtedly necessary in the Nationalists' victory in 1948 and, as Alf Stadler has pointed out, the Nationalist Party had many similarities to a populist party based on an exclusive sectional appeal (78), to rest the explanation at this point is to make the analysis teleological. The mobilization of support for the Nationalists rested on a variety of contingent factors which were substantially related to the performance of the United Party government. It was not, in other words, inevitable that the Nationalists were going to win in 1948 (most people expected them to lose) and the election was very closely fought. Clearly, one key factor was that the United

Party lost support as opposed to the Nationalists actively winning it. This losing of support undoubtedly came from the uncertain and ambiguous ideology of the United Party by 1948 as a result of the intrusion into its platform of the Hofmeyrian liberalism that had been fostered by the Second World War. The extent of the cleavage that this promoted within the UP before 1948 is still rather uncertain and extensive research is needed into the UP archives on this point (79). It seems clear, however, that by 1945 the position was one where gold-mining, while still exercising overall political hagemony in the party, fealt that its position was under considerable attack. As the 1945 "Programme of Action" argued, for example:

> The United Party cannot agree to the theory that gold is a wasting asset which must be concerved (sic) and its extraction be spread over a long period of time. On the contrary, it believes that every encouragement should be given for intensive gold-mining as this is the quickest and surest way of developing the Union in other directions industrially (80).

At the end of the war, therefore, the liberal wing in the United Party still did not exercise political control, but had probably succeeded in orientating the party increasingly in the direction of its position. The crucial years for the U.P.'s fortunes can thus been seen to rest from 1946 to 1948 following the 1946 African Mineworkers and the collapse of the Natives Representative Council (81). The initial response of the United Party government ot the strike was the establishment of the Native Laws Commission under Justice Henry Fagan on the 16th August 1946. But this only post-poned the question of eventual government policy towards non-whites and the immediate problem of what the government was going to do after the Natives Representative Council had passed a resolution on the 15th August deprecating the

government's "post-war continuation of a policy of Fascism", remained. The dilemmas of the position were recognised by Hofmeyr who foresaw a reaction from the European electorate:

> It means that the hitherto moderate intellectuals of the Professor (Z.K.) Matthews type are now committed to an extreme line against colour discrimination, and have carried the chiefs with them. We can't afford to allow them to be swept into the extremist camp, but I don't see what we can do to satisfy them, which would be tolerated by European public opinion (82).

But Hofmeyr was unable at this point to come out with a strong liberal position on reform of the structures of native administration established by the 1936 Hertzog legislation. This was partly because of his own personal deficiencies which might never have allowed him to break with Smuts and also partly because, as deputy prime minister, he was running the government in Smuts's absence. Some liberals had hoped that he would be able to seize the opportunity and lead a liberal party before the next election. On the 25th September, for instance, Leo Marquard wrote to him that "the only hope we have of defending liberal ideals in South Africa lies in a party led by you" for a party of this kind "based on the abolition of the colour bar in industry and on some form of universal franchise would attract to the fight for liberalism a very large number of left-liberals, it would have your own personal following, and it would attract a proportion of industrialists and men of the Van Eck and Van Biljoen type" (83). Hofmeyr, however, preferred to work inside the United Party despite the fact that, as Alan Paton records, opposition within U.P. ranks was rising to his liberal stance (84), while at the same time he was allienating himself from moderate black opinion who saw him as a champion of white supremacy. Indeed, Paton is probably right in saying that the crucial date in Hofmeyr's liberal fortunes was the 26th November when a

reconvened Natives Representative Council found itself unable to co-operate with the government, as represented by Hofmeyr (85). In this context, the crucial figure from the end of 1946 was not Hofmeyr, who remained over-burdened by work and government duties until January 1948, but Smuts, who returned from his visit overseas to the United Nations.

From the time that Smuts started to intervene in matters of native policy, at the start of 1947, until the election capaign of 1948 prohibited any further work on the matter, it is clear that the need for some kind of reform was recognised. Exactly what kind of reform, and the economic and political implications that it would have entailed, remains a matter of historical debate (86), and indeed cannot be dealt with fully in this paper. But it seems certain that, while Smuts was no liberal, he felt and recognised the need for gradual change. As he wrote to M.C. Gillett on the 1st February 1947:

> The fully publicized discussions at U.N.O. are having a great effect in all directions. We even hear about them from our domestic and farm natives who really have nothing to complain of (sic), but are deeply stirred by all this talk of equality and non-discrimination. I am so anxious to stay this rot and get a move on to better relations, but it is even more difficult now in view of these Native slaims, which have just the opposite effect on European mentality. Both extremes are gathering strength and it is all the more difficult to find a via media as a solution. The old Fabian slogan of gradualness would be the best solution under the circumstances but the extreme tempers on both sides almost rule this out. If only one could get people back into a reasonable mood, but that is the very thing that has disappeared on both sides. Still, I am anxious to try my hand at a solution (87).

During the following months, therefore, various proposals were discussed in the Department of Native Affairs, then under the ineffective Piet van der Byl, the Native Affairs Commission and with the Prime Minister himself. From an analysis of the Douglas Smit papers, it seems that Smuts placed great reliance on

the former Secretary of Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, who had left the Native Affairs Department in 1945 and was a member of the Native Affairs Commission. Indeed, at Smuts's express instruction, Smit's successor, G. Mears, sent departmental memoranda for Smit's comments (88). The result of this was that liberal pressures for changes of policy were extremely powerful during the months of February to September 1947 and could have led to a major change in governmental policy. Most signigicantly, the proposals related to a reform of the Natives Representative Council and a bill to recognise African trade unions, the Industrial Tribunals Bill.

Hints of changes in these spheres were given by Musts in a meeting with members of the Natives Representative Council on the 8th May, 1947. Here, Smuts promised greater devolution of powers to the NRC to make it "a real working institution, helpful to the good government of this country" (89), together with a proposal to link up the urban advisory boards for Africans with the NRC into a general congress of such boards. Regarding trade unions, Smuts proposed reforms to recognise African trade unions on similar lines to those of white unions in the Industrial Conciliation Act, though not going so far as Edgar Brookes's proposal in the Native Affairs Commission to bring the African unions within the scope of the latter act (90). The Bill that Smuts proposed was to follow the machinery of the Industrial Conciliation Act, though no strikes were to legally take place as a consequence (91).

But the problem of these proposals possibly clashing with the proposals of the Fagan Commission when it reported, together with the coming election, meant that by September they had to be

shelved. By this time, after discussions between Smit and the Native Affairs Department and the Native Affairs Commission a Progressive Programme for Native Administration was drafted which envisaged a reformed NRC with 50 elected members with powers to impose a personal tax on Africans, to allocate funds to councils for certain approved services and "to make laws for the Native areas in respect of such matters as may from time to time be approved by the Governor-General" (92). In addition, the programme envisaged a system of elected African councils at a "tribal", district and local and general level which were to function as they had done in the past while in urban areas a Union Advisory Boards Congress which was to be constituted "especially for the representation to the Government, through the Natives Representative Council, of the views of urbanised Natives only" (93). These were hardly radical proposals, but when they came up for discussion on the 1st September 1947, Smuts felt it necessary to post-pone their implementation until after the election (94).

One key factor in this decision, fatal as it was to prove for the United Party, was that Smuts had very few doubts on the U.P.'s ability to win the election. Despite the Nationalist attacks on Hofmeyr and Smuts's supposed links with "Hoggenheimer", Smuts believed that it would be able to win because of the Nationalists' discredited war record. Boubtless, the long years away from South Africa, toghther with Smuts's own isolation through old age and lack of understanding of contemporary trends increased his illusions. Indeed, his main problem by the 4th May 1948 was how to fit in the formation of his cabinet after the election before going off the Cambridge to be installed as

Chancellor (95). But this political ineptitude of Smuts is not the only reason by far for the United Party's defeat. The liberal element in the party was hampered by its unwillingness to suggest a clear ideological alternative to the existing party line of muddling through on the previous government's record (96). This was partly due to a lack of direction from the top. After the election, for example, Richard Currie wrote to Hofmeyr to say that the Rivonia-Morningside branch of the United Party in his constituency had had no information or direction or information since its inception which had led to a situation where:

> ...the political aspects of the political activities of the United Party affecting this branch, and all United Party supporters, have been completely ignored, and all that memebers have been asked to do is to organise the branch from the electoral viewpoint. While acknowledging this essential service, members have been pointed in their criticism and dissapointment in the way political direction and information have been lacking. This disappointment is having a serious adverse effect on the efficiency and enthusiasm of the branch (97).

One possible reason for this has the defensive nature of liberalism by 1948. The ideological developments previously out-lined, together with the tardy and inadequate reforms that were being suggested by 1947, left liberalism with no viable political base in the United Party by 1948. This weakness has to be seen in the context of the growing appeal of nationalism among whites, especially afrikaners, after the war. Combined with this appeal was a racist appeal that likened liberalism with black domination (see appendix for cartoons). This nationalist and racist appeal, epitomised in Malan's manifesto of March 1948 (98), left liberalism with little or no counter. The serious ideological deficiencies within liberalism had

failed to be able to meet the challenge of nationalism, though at the same time they had been able, for a brief period, to re-orientate the political stance of the United Party Government in the post-war period or native policy. The effect of this however was to bring a reaction that ended the possibilities of reform in the interests of non-whites in South Africa for at least a generation. On the liberals fell the blame for the U.P.'s loss in 1948 and their position continued to deteriorate within the white political system such that when the Liberal Party was eventually formed it was created outside the parliamentary context. As Smuts wrote to M.C. Gillett on the 28 June 1948 after the election:

> What is called Liberalism is at a discount here even more than in Britain, and Hof's liberal views have been exploited against the party in a most unfair way. My successor must be killed in advance of his advent (99).

Paul Rich,
University of the Witwatersrnad,
January 1976.

PAUL RICH'S PAPER - FOOTNOTES.

Notes.

1. See, for example, James F. Becker, "The Corporation spirit and its liberal analysis", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXX, Jan-Mar., No.I, 69-84.

2. J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 2d ed., rev. London, Andre Deutsch, 1972. See also, J.K. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, London, Andre Deutsch, 1974.

3. This has been cogently argued in E.J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth, Staples Press, 1967.

4. Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1968, chap. 5, "Community", 162-195.

5. M. O'Dowd, The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa, Unpublished Paper, 1970; see also, Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, London, 1967.

6. Francis Wilson "Farming", chap. III, pp. 104-153, and David Welsh, "The Growth of Towns", chap. IV, 172-242, in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1971. See also Anthony Atmore and Nancy Westlake, "A Liberal Dilemma: A Critique of the Oxford History of South Africa", Race, XIV, 2 (1972), 107-136.

7. Ruan Maud, "The Future of an Illusion: The Myth of White Meliorism in South Africa", in Adrian Leftwich (ed), South Africa, Economic Growth and Political Change, London, Allison and Busby, 1974, 290; for a somewhat illogical reply to this article, see Heribert Adam, "Decolonising South Africa", unpublished seminar paper, 1974.

8. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 2d ed., The M.I.T. Press, 1970.

9. Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., 16.

10. ibid. 17.

11. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Apartheid, Fascism and the Golden Age", Cahiers d'etudes Africaines, Vol. II, No. 4, 1962, 608.

12. Leo Kuper, "The Background to Passive Resistance", Race Relations Journal, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1953, 29; for a similar view see Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek, London, 1953.

13. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds), Ethnicity, Cambridge,

14. Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., 17.

15. To this extent, the argument relates to the wider discussion on the question of whether contemporary western industrial societies are characterised by an "end of ideology". The traditional interest group theory assumes a non-ideological consensus. See, in particular, Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1961 and for a penetrating criticism of this thesis Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of Advance Societies, London, Hutchinson and Co, 1973, esp. chap. 14.

16. Frank W. Young, "Reactive Subsystems", American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 1970, 297-307.

17. Michael Hechter, "The Political Economy of Ethnic Change", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79, No. 5, 1151-1178.

18. Hechter, op. cit., 1162.

19. N. Glazer, "The Universalization of Ethnicity", Encounter, February 1975, 8-17.

20. H.A. Shannon, "Urbanization 1904-1936", South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, 1937, 184; see also Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1967, esp. chap. 9, "The Political Economy of Land".

21. Archive of the South African Labour Party, Johannesburg Public Library, pamphlet entitled "Die Plig van die Arbeids Partij", n.d. (1915?).

22. David Ticktin, "The War Issue and the Collapse of the South African Labour Party 1914-1915", South African Historical Journal, No. I, November 1969, 59-73.

23. For a study of the fortunes of the S.A.P. during the first Pact Government see Richard Brouch, The South African Party in Opposition, 1924-1929, Honours Essay, University of the Witwatersrand, May 1972.

24. J.F.W. Grosskopf, Rural Impoverishment and Rural Exodus, Stellenbosch, 1932, vii-viii.

25. Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa", American Political Science Review, LVII, No. I., (March 1963), 80.

26. Dr. P.J. Nienaber, Dr. J.D. Kestell, vader van die Reddingsdaadbond, Nasionale Pers, 1946, 105-106.

27. T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom, Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, 107.

28. Moodie, op. cit., 115.

29. Nienaber, op. cit.

30. Moodie, op. cit., 198.

31. ibid. 298.

32. As Dan O'Meara has argued: "The only available mobilisational device which could unite their diverse interests was that of ethnicity, their common 'Afrikaans' culture. Political power too was essential to this aim, not only because government contracts could be awarded to the 'right' people, but because of the role of government in determining economic policy and its power of appointment to the critically important advisory boards, planning councils and control boards", see Dan O'Meara, "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner Nationalism", South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 1, No. 10, April 1975, 43-44.

33. E.P. du Plessis, 'n Volk Staan Op, Die Ekonomiese Volkskongres en Daarna, Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1964, 104; see also David Welsh, "The Political Economy of Afrikaner Nationalism" in Adrian Leftwich, South Africa, Economic Growth and Political Change, London, Allison and Busby, 1974, 249-285 and S. Trapido, op. cit.

34. Du Plessis, op. cit-, 112-113.

35. To this extent, the arguments of David Kaplan that the crucial turning point in the challenge to international capital in South Africa was the victory of the Pact in 1924 are rather unconvincing. While the period after 1924 may have allowed the national bourgeoisie some access to the political structures of the state, it does not seem true to say that mining capital lost overall political hegemony. Certainly by 1928 mining capital had been able to buy off a large section of the SALP which split as a result, while in 1933 mining capital was able to engineer coalition between the Nationalists and the S.A.P., leading to fusion the following year. By the mid 1930s, national capital and "agrarian capital", as Kaplan calls the Nationalists, were still excluded from hegemony over the economic system and this may well explain the long-run structural features behind the intense efforts towards group mobilisation of capital by Afrikaners after 1939. See D. Kaplan, "The State and Economic Development in South Africa", University of Sussex, Unpublished seminar paper, March 1975; see also Belinda Bozzoli, "Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing in South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume I, No. 2, April 1975, 194-214.

36. Dr. N. Diederichs, Die Volksverbondenheid van die RDB, RDB Voorligtingsreeks, 1943, I; see also Dr. N. Diederichs, Die Reddingsdaad-Strewe, Johannesburg, Voortrekkerpers, 1941.

37. The Forum, March 22, 1941, 5.

38. Trapido, op. cit., 80; see also, Larry Salomon, "The Economic Background to the revival of Afrikaner Nationalism", in Jeffrey Butler (ed), Boston University Papers in African History, Vol. I, Boston, Boston University Press, 1964, 217-242.

39. Moodie, op. cit., Trapido, op. cit., W.H. Vatcher, White Laager, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965; Welsh, op. cit.; Newell Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974 and Janet Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. One study which has departed from this unilinear mode of analysis concentrates on the post-1948 period. It illustrates the natures of the interaction between liberal and nationalist ideologies: the conclusion, however, that the two ideologies are very similar in their assumptions about the working of the economy in South Africa is somewhat controversial. See Martin Legassick, "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume I, Number I, October 1974, 5-35.

40. Martin Legassick, "The Rise of Modern South African Liberalism: Its Assumptions and Social Base", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Unpublished seminar paper, 1st March 1972; see also, Stanley Trapido, "Liberalism in the Cape in the 19th and 20th Centuries", in Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Volume 4, 1974, 53-66.

41. Edgar Brookes, The Political Future of South Africa, Cape Town, 1972, 57.

42. For a fine study of the way this white nationalism developed in the 1960s, see, Newell Stultz, "The Politics of Security: South Africa under Verwoerd, 1961-66", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. I, April 1969, 3-20.

43. Edgar Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, Lovedale, n.d., 50.

44. Brookes, op. cit., 50.

45. Consider, for example, the statement by R.F. Currey and T.H. Haarhof in their chapter "South African Nationality" in the important landmark in the development of liberal thought in South Africa, Coming of Age;

> The Party system seems to be an integral and valuable part of the national life, certainly in those countries which, like South Africa, have inherited their parliamentary institutions practically without change, from those of Great Britain, Coming of Age, Cape Town, 1930, 23, emphasis added.

By the end of the 1930s, however, doubts about the nature and role of parliament in South Africa began to set in. See J.H. Hofmeyr, "Is Parliament Effete?", The Forum, January 14, 1939, 12.

46. W.M. Macmillan, My South African Years, Cape Town, David Philip, 1974, 205.

47. R.F. Alfred Hoernle, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, Cape Town, 1939, 149-150. See also a collection of Hoernle's essays, Race and Reason, Johannesburg, 1945. For a Nationalist attack on liberalism in South Africa and a, somewhat mistaken attempt, to liken Hoernle's liveralism with that of Hofmeyr see G.D. Scholtz, Die Bedreiging van die Liberalisme, Voortrekkerpers, 1965.

48. Archive of the South African Institute of Race Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, (hereafter known as "Arch. Ins. R.R."), Box B 43, File E. This file also contains the conference agenda.

49. Arch. Ins. R.R., Box B43, File E, Conference notes in Hoernle's handwriting. There were comments like that of one Ste-n that "A Native may become a B.A. and even a barrister, but his brain remains the same" (p. 7). The discussion indeed, foresaw many of the developments in Bantu education in the early 1950s based on the ethnic model of Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen. Thus the underlying assumption that arbitrary ethnic "tribes" would be capable of their own endogenous development on the lines of the collective Afrikaner nationalist mobilisation of the 1930s. One speaker, for example, argued that "Die Naturelle kwessie is net die ou stryd oor Boer en Briton - elke kolonie was 'n exploitasie gebied; en assimilasie. Imperiale politiek was daarop gemik om die Afrikaner te ontstam. "You (sic) like that: just what I expected from you. Johnnie: remember you are a little Britisher. "Ons moet die Naturel nasionale trots inboesem. Ons moet die Naturel weer 'n Naturel maak." (II)

50. Moodie, op. cit., 271-276; it is, of course, possible to see this kind of anthropology as an example of research serving the needs of a local imperialism. See Jack Stauder, "The 'Relevance' of Anthropology to Colonialism and Imperialism", Race, Vol. XVI, No. I., July 1974, 29-51.

51. Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1950-51, U.G. 30/1953, see enclosed language map. Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen, as Secretary of Native Affairs, wrote in this report that the abolition of the Natives Representative Council by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, "should be of greater benefit to the Bantu Community. The most important causative factor which led to the failure of the Council is, in my opinion, the fact that the system did not take into account the racial characteristics of the Bantu people, but was based on the European conception of social organization." (5).

52. Arch. Ins. R.R., Box B43, File E, pamphlet entitled "Afrikanerbond Vir Rassestudie", n.d. 6.

53. Hoernle, South African Native Policy, op. cit., 178.

54. ibid, 168.

55. ibid, 178.

56. Arch. Ins. R.R., File 520, "Hoernle Correspondence", Hoernle to Ponsonby, 28th May, 1938.

57. Smit Papers, Albany Museum, Grahamstown, 25/41, Hoernle to Smit, 27th November, 1941, enclosing a memorandum entitled "Reflections on the Racial-Caste-Society of the Union", 4.

58. The Forum, April 20, 1940, review by Charles Frederick, 22.

59. Smit Papers, 25/41, Geoffrey Johannesburg to Hoernle, 25 October, 1941; Hoernle to Smit, 31 October 1941; Hoernle to the Rev. Bishop Clayton, 21 October 1941; Hoernle to the Right Rev. the Bishop of Johannesburg, 28 October 1941; Smit to Hoernle, 21 November 1941 and Hoernle to Smit, 27 November, 1941. See also, Alan Paton, Apartheid and the Archbishop, The Life and times of Geoffrey Clayton, Archbishop of Cape Town, Cape Town, David Philip, 1973, chap. 14, "The Nature of Hope", 106-122.

60. See, for example, the statement by Rheinnalt-Jones's successor as Director of the Institute of Race Relations, Quintin Whyte. In Apartheid and other policies, S.A.I.R.R., 1950, Whyte argued against Hoernle and stated that a single uniform pattern of policy could not be imposed on either European or non-European. But this pragmatism had the effect of leaving no guide at all for future liberal aims:

"Men of liberal spirit if they are to be realistic and practical and not merely to wander aimlessly in the desert of arid speculation, cannot align themselves today with any one of the three most clearly defined policies (ie parallelism, assimilation or separation). They must accept in the meantime (this) diversity is practical, holding fast to principle and denying the validity of any measure that infringes the sanctity of human personality and living" (20). This definition of liberalism seems essentially negative and left it denuded of any clear ideological response to the apartheid doctrine as it was to be developed under Verwoerd in the 1950s.

61. Race Relations, vol VII, No 2, 1940, 33.

62. Arthur Keppel-Jones, When Smuts Goes, Pietermaritzburg, 1947; Keppel-Jones's solution to this problem was a race federation on lines similar to those taken up by the United Party. See Arthur Keppel-Jones, Friends of Foes?, Pietermaritzburg, 1950.

63. The Forum, May 24, 1941, 6.

64. quoted in D. Hobart Houghton, "Economic Development, 1865-1965" in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa, Volume 2, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1971, 36.

65. Leslie Blackwell, Farewell to Parliament, Pietermaritzburg, 1946, 53; Alan Paton, Hofmeyr, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, 312.

66. See, in particular, Sean Gervassi, "The Nature and Consequences of South Africa's Economic Expansion", Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Volume 1972, pp. 140-154; Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa, Manchester University Press, 1975; Kenneth Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

67. J.C. Smuts, "African Settlement", in Africa and Some World Problems, Oxford, 1930; see also, E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1973.

68. The Forum, July 19, 1941.

69. The Forum, May 10, 1941, 6.

70. The Forum, November 4, 1939, 9 ("Lammergeier", "Capital Problem for our industries").

71. The Forum, June 13, 1942, 1.

72. The Forum, October 14, 1939, 1.

73. ibid, 1.

74. The Forum, July 18, 1942, 3.

75. See Hans van Rensburg, Their Paths Crossed Mine, Central News Agency, 1956 for an account of the Ossewa Brandwag by its former fascist commandant-general. What is interesting is the mass appeal of the organisation that transcended language differences. "Even in the wild and woolly years of the war", writes van Rensburg "the extreme Afrikaner Republican Organisation was led by a spirit which was not anti-English but rather pro-Afrikaans. Next time anyone wants to get gad-shy of the word 'racialism', let him remember that the emotion is ambivalent. It embraces not only race hatred ... but also race love" (172).

The O.B. as a result had a radicalising effect on the Nationalists who were continually forced to respond to the O.B. challenge during the course of the war. See Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, Longmans, Green and Company, 1947.

76. Newell Stultz, The Afrikaner in Opposition, op. cit., 65.

77. Dan O'Meara, op. cit., 48.

78. A.W. Stadler, "The Afrikaner in Opposition, 1910-1948", Journal of Commonwealth Studies, Vol. VII, No. 3 (1969), 204-215. Stadler sees the central thrust in the South African political system as emerging from "a dialectic between two kinds of political organisation" namely "coalition type parties" which were "formed to accommodate political resources and economic groups" and "populist movements based on exclusive sectional appeals" (212). Apart from the fact that detailed research of the Nationalist party records may reveal far more of a coalition between different groups than Stadler's analysis suggests, it is not clear exactly why the central thrust has to come mainly from the populist movement: there is a kind of inevitability to the process which is belied by historical analysis. Michael Paul Rogin, for example, has shown, from an analysis of the McCarthy era in American politics, that even Western liberal-democratic systems can be subject to period of stress where value consensus breaks down. This perhaps suggests that the focus of political analysis should be less on why systems break down but why they are ever stable. Michael Paul Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy, M.I.T. Press, 1967. In this process of breakdown of the previous hegemony of the United Party and the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism, a considerable degree of weight has to be placed on the inner workings of the U.P.

79. Research on the United Party may, however, be difficult due to the fragmentary nature of the material available and its dispersal over South Africa. One collection, which still remains to be sorted and inventoried, is at the University of South Africa, while a second collection is at the University of the Orange Free State.

80. United Party Archive, University of South Africa, draft programme entitled "Programme of Action: What the United Party will do", marked "ca. 1945", 2.

81. See Dan O'Meara, "The 1946 African Mineworkers Strike", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, January 1976.

82. Jean Van Der Poel (ed), Selections from the Smuts Papers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, Hofmeyr to Smuts, 8 September, 1946, 82.

83. Hofmeyr Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, Marquard to Hofmeyr, 22 September, 1946.

84. Paton, Hofmeyr, op. cit., 441.

85. Paton, op. cit., 440:
"26 November 1946 was a turning point in South African history. After that the demand of non-white people was for equality not alleviation or improvement. And Hofmeyr, in the eyes of many non-white people, ceased to be the spokesman of freedom and became the spokesman for white supremacy. He knew it, and found it painful."

86. For two view on whether the Smuts government could have introduced real changes if it had been re-elected in 1948 see T.R.H. Davenport, "Racial Policies of the Smuts Government", Unpublished paper presented at Oxford and London, 1974 and Martin Legassick, "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post 1948 South Africa", op. cit., Davenport suggests that government policy emerged from a variety of conflicting

pressures during the war-time period, with a general direction of one of liberalisation. No clear-cut policy emerged, however, until the report of the Fagan Commission which only appeared in February 1948 such that "it offered the electorate a liberal aspiration rather than a policy, and if the choice for the voters was between aspirations, the Sauer Report of the Nationalists seemed to offer more security on more traditional lines" (11). Legassick, however, suggests that, while there was significant dissatisfaction among the white working class on the allocation of racial work roles during the "liberalisation" of the 1940s and that this led to substantial support for the Nationalists in 1948, the actual practice of the Nationalists Government after 1948 was little different to the proposals of Commissions in the 1940s (12). It was only in 1956, in fact that new legislation was introduced. Clearly such questions need further research and are outside the main focus of this paper. But in terms of ideology, the orientation of the Nationalists was considerably different to that of the U.P. for the probable reason that Afrikaner capital was still passing through the stage of capital accumulation and was unable to accept any incorporation of a black middle class into the economy. In the 1940s, based on "ethnic" mobilisation, Afrikaner capital was still seeking entry into the economy and hence blacks were seen as competitors. It was the manipulation of ethnic symbols, however, that was crucial in putting the Afrikaner bourgeoisie into power in 1948: a factor which Legassick seems to play down.

87. Van der Poel, op. cit., 121.

88. Smit Papers, II/47, Smit to the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 25th March 1947:
" ... Mr Mears informs me that the Prime Minister desires me to discuss the matter with him" (re. memorandum by Secretary of Native Affairs on the development of native councils). See also Smit Papers, 19/47, "Memorandum by the Native Affairs Department setting out the framework for a progressive policy designed to grant the natives a greater voice in the administration of their own affairs" by G. Mears, Secretary of Native Affairs, dated 28th April 1947. This memorandum stated that "In the course of an interview, the Prime Minister stated that while the repeal of all discriminatory legislation could not be considered, he desired me to put forward proposals for the introduction of a progressive policy" (1).

89. Smit Papers, 23/47, Notes of an interview between the Right Honourable the Prime Minister and Members of the Natives Representatives Council at 11 a.m. on the 8th May, 1947, at Cape Town, 4.

90. Smit Papers, 21/47, Native Affairs Commission, Notes of discussion re. Natives Industrial Bill, 3 May 1947, 1.

91. Smit Papers, 23/47, op. cit., 10; Smuts also stated that the Bill would exclude the mines from its scope, 9.

92. Smit Papers, 55/47, memorandum from the Department of Native Affairs entitled "A Progressive Programme of Native Administration" with a note in Smit's handwriting "revised draft after corrp. between G. Mears and H.A. Fagan, 20-23 August, 1947"; see also Smit Papers, 45/47, G. Mears to the Honourable Justice H.A. Fagan, 20, August, 1947; H.A. Fagan to Mears, 23 August 1947.

93. Smit Papers, 55/47, op. cit., 4-5.

94. Smit Papers, 57/47, Notes of discussion with the Prime Minister, Field Marshall Smuts in his office at the Union Buildings on Monday, 1st September, 1947. Present at the meeting were the Minister of Native Affairs, Major Piet van der Byl, the Secretary of Native Affairs, Gordan Mears and the members of the Native Affairs Commission: Dr. D.L. Smit, Dr. A.G.M. Payn and Senator Edgar Brookes.

95. Van der Poel, op. cit., Smuts to C.E. Raven, 4 May 1948, 196.

96. This point is certainly born out by the absence of any liberal resolutions at United Party congresses after the War. At the Fifth Union Congress at Bloemfontein in November 1946, for example, there were only two resolutions on the native question, from the North Rand and from Losberg, and both concerned legislation to tighten up the pass laws. See United Party, Fifth Union Congress, November 26-28, City Hall Bloemfontein, 12.

97. Hofmeyr Papers, Richard Currie to Hofmeyr, 4 November, 1948.

98. For details of Malan's manifesto see D.W. Kruger, South African Parties and Policies, 1910-1960, Cape Town, Human and Rousseau, 1960, 402-407.

The Nationalists made a particularly vicious attack on Hofmeyr in the 1948 election. See their pamphlet "Meet Mr Hofmeyr: Future Leader of the United Party", n.d. United Party Archive, which stated that "The road he is following leads to equality, and the downfall of white South Africa". It accordingly urged "Vote against Hofmeyr and save South Africa from ruin", 4.

99. Van der Poel, op. cit., Smuts to M.C. Gillett, 28, June 1948, 212.