

https://dspace.org/

Unscrambling the scramble: Africa's partition reconsidered

Phimister, Ian

1992-08-17
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/9599

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW 7003 (7th floor) at
4.00p.m. MONDAY 17TH AUGUST 1992

Title: Unscrambling the Scramble: Africa's Partition Reconsidered.

by: Ian Phimister

No. 321

UNSCRAMBLING THE SCRAMBLE:

AFRICA'S PARTITION RECONSIDERED *

Studies of the Scramble for Africa agree on very little beyond the fact that the topic is immensely broad and extremely complex. For all that the last decades of the 19th century have been the most closely examined period of Africa's past, there is agreement neither about what is meant by imperialism generally, nor about the causes of Africa's partition specifically. 'The growth of knowledge', Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins have commented, 'has brought less, and not more, coherence to historical understanding'.[1] Indeed, the apparently intractable nature of the process of Partition is underscored in numerous warnings to the unwary to stay clear. Some ten years ago, Bernard Porter darkly observed that the whole question was 'bedevilled with misunderstandings and confusions and crosspurposes'. 'An always somewhat treacherous field', he wrote, has been 'churned into a quagmire'.[2] Nor are more recent conclusions any more sangine. Although 'specific points of agreement will undoubtedly appear - such as the inapplicability of the Hobsonian model, or the economic bases for annexation in West Africa', it is unrealistic, according to James Sturgis, 'to expect that any overall consensus regarding the new imperialism will ever prove acceptable'.[3]

Yet however sensible and timely such warnings, they do little to assuage an equally widespread feeling that the retreat from generalisation has turned into a rout. To take only a few examples, Andrew Porter for one has remarked that the 'gathering of more knowledge from particular and local studies often does comparatively little to advance general understanding',[4] while Barrie Ratcliffe for another, has pointed to the growing danger that 'area and case studies will replace ... analysis of the Partition as a whole, and that concern with complexity will win out over the need to explain. It cannot

suffice to claim that the Partition was but the consequence of the convergence of many different chains of events'.[5] 'It is surely not unreasonable', Robin Law has argued, 'to expect that the enormous volume of scholarly work on the historical problem of European imperialism which has appeared during the last two decades, should have led to the refinement of theoretical models as well as to the accumulation of detailed facts, to greater understanding rather than to despair at the complexity and difficulty of it all'.[6]

While readily acknowledging the impossibility of reaching any consensus which would satisfy even the majority of scholars in such a bitterly contested field, this paper nonetheless attempts to meet the 'reasonable expectations' of at least some of them. It does so by immediately distinguishing between the territorial expansion of empire ('colonialism'), and imperialism (the monopoly stage of capitalism),[7] after which it proceeds, very briefly, to outline the main historiographical developments in the study of Africa's Partition over the last 30 years or so, before suggesting, at greater length, how an alternative explanation might be constructed. Two disclaimers are necessary at this stage, though. An attempted synthesis of this kind rests very largely on the labours of other scholars. Just how much this paper owes to a great many historians will become obvious as it progresses, but specific mention should be made of its indebtedness to seminal contributions by Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins, Shula Marks, Forbes Munro, Colin Newbury, and Stanley Trapido.[8] At the same time, it relies heavily on Geoffrey Kay's endlessly stimulating analysis of the various forms assumed by capital at different times and places in what became the Third World.[9] The second disclaimer follows from this. Although this paper quite explicitly employs one particular set of theoretical tools to uncover the historical process of Africa's Partition, their use does not imply that a conceptual straight-jacket is thereby wrapped around the past. There clearly is a danger, as one reviewer reminds us, that

> in the search to impose structure and order on the material, [scholars frequently lose sight] ... of what an incoherent and multi-faceted phenomenon European imperialism was; of how divided and confused, sometimes even powerless, metropolitan governments could be; ... [and] of how important the reaction of native societies was in explaining the course and nature of expansion,[10]

but even when allowance is made for all of this, the point surely still remains that theories are best treated 'less as oversimplifications to be exposed, ... than as devices for introducing order and intelligibility into data whose multiplicity and complexity make them otherwise incomprehensible'.[11]

I

Since 1961 the historiography of Africa's Partition has been dominated by Robinson and Gallagher's Africa and the Victorians, subsequently elaborated in a chapter on the Scramble in the New Cambridge Modern History.[12] The arguments of this watershed work hardly require extended rehearsal. Suffice it to say that Africa was partitioned not for reasons emanating from the centre, but for reasons arising in Africa itself. 'Scanning Europe for the causes, the theorists of imperialism have been looking for the answers in the wrong places. The crucial changes that set all working took place in Africa itself'.[13] More specifically, political crises in Egypt and South Africa obliged Britain to intervene to restore law and order, thereby ensuring the safety of the sea route to India. 'Both the British occupation of Egypt and the subsequent decision to annex territory on the east coast of Africa at the expense of claims on the west stemmed from the imperative of the strategic need to safeguard the route to India. In the main, British Africa was a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire'.[14] Whitehall's interventions, so Robinson and Gallagher assert, upset the existing diplomatic balance

of power between Britain and France, and caused France to seek compensation in other parts of Africa.

This strategic and diplomatic explanation of the Scramble was subsequently somewhat refined by D.K. Fieldhouse, most notably in his Economics and Empire.[15] While agreeing with Robinson and Gallagher that political causes were uppermost, Fieldhouse recognised that there were economic interests at stake in what he termed 'the imperialism of trade'. But like them, he argued that the causes of the Partition were located in Africa, in the periphery itself. Taken together, Fieldhouse, Gallagher, and Robinson succeeded in combining anti-Marxist prejudice with the appearance of Africanist agency. At pains to separate out political from economic causes, they defined imperialism politically, and explained it peripherally. 'Europe was pulled into imperialism', concluded Fieldhouse, 'by the magnetic force of the periphery'.[16]

For all its enduring popularity with conservative scholarship, however, important aspects of this 'excentric'[17] version of Africa's colonial subjugation have been substantially modified in the course of the last two decades. Undoubtedly the most telling criticisms which have been made of Africa and the Victorians, and of Economics and Empire, were Newbury and Kanya-Forstner's convincing demonstration that the 'crucial change in French African policy occurred not in 1882-3 [in Egypt] ..., but in 1879-80 [in Senegal];[18] Platt's vigorous re-statement of the specificity of the 'New Imperialism' in the context of the economic forces transforming Europe and North America in the latter third of the nineteenth century;[19] Hopkins' illuminating explanation of West Africa's partition 'in terms of a crisis of adaptation to the new economy made manifest in the long commercial depression which began in the 1870s, and in the conflicts which followed the intensified search for profits and revenue';[20] and the point forcefully made by Barraclough, and latterly by Law, that the distinction drawn by

Robinson and Gallagher, and especially by Fieldhouse, between political and economic factors was an unreal one.[21] 'The era of imperialism and the Scramble for Africa was precisely that in which relations between the state structure and capitalist business were becoming closer, as belief in laissez-faire gave way to acceptance of the legitimacy and necessity of state power to manage economic affairs', comments Law. 'This development ... can be seen in the revival of protectionism as well as in the increasing readiness to use political means to solve economic difficulties in Africa; its effect ... is to make the cherished distinction between "politics" and "economics" ... ultimately inapplicable'.[22]

The sum of these individual criticisms is formidable. Yet while their combined impact seemingly goes a considerable way towards meeting Law's contention that the basis for an alternative theory of imperial expansion 'showing the interconnexions among the multitude of detailed events and developments already exists,[23] neither his own explanation, briefly sketched in the pages of the Journal of African History, nor the more elaborate accounts recently advanced by Boahen[24] and by Sanderson,[25] are entirely satisfactory. While Law firmly locates the Scramble in a world context 'where the diffusion of industrialization outside Britain was creating severe competition in existing markets and fears that productive capacity was outgrowing available demand,[26] his emphasis on the role played by Britain's increasingly uncompetitive industrial sector may be misplaced. Similarly, Boahen's claim that the 'New Imperialism' can be seen 'primarily in terms of the intensification of competition between the principal industrial states for a share of the world's markets ... [and] as an almost hysterical reaction to the crisis in industrial capitalism',[27] is difficult to maintain in the face of an expanding body of literature which challenges much of the conventional wisdom concerning the nature of Britain's industrial revolution. These revisionist accounts,[28] which stress the pivotal position occupied by the

City of London, as well as the uneven and often highly regionalised growth of the 'first industrial nation', have already enabled Cain and Hopkins, for example, to cast a quite different light on the entire process of British expansion overseas.[29]

Although several summaries of existing explanations have been published in the last ten years or so,[30] the only other 'covering hypothesis'[31] for the Scramble as a whole is the one which Sanderson initially sketched in the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History and subsequently developed in volume six of the Cambridge History of Africa. His explanation turns on partition

> as the consequence of the collapse of an almost exclusive British hegemony, at a time when both Britain and other powers were beginning to see significant economic advantage in the extension and consolidation of their formal or informal control over African territory ... However, emphasis on the "background" of growing economic interest does not imply that all annexationist decisions were somehow, "in the last analysis", economically motivated. On the contrary. The collapse of British hegemony created a very complex and fluctuating pattern of conflicts and alignments in both Africa and Europe. Amid this complexity, policy-makers often simply could not afford to handle African questions by giving economic interests absolute priority over the demands of diplomacy and strategy, or even of prestige.[32]

But even this erudite interpretation has been criticsed for its 'apparent circularity'. 'Sanderson's case', argues Hopkins, 'amounts to the claim that partition was a result of the destabilised political situation arising out of

the decline of the military and political power which supported the Pax Britannica. The difficulty is not that this argument is untrue, but that it is a truism. It redefines the problem, but does not carry the discussion much further forward'.[33]

How, then, can discussion be taken beyond the range of obstacles identified by Hopkins and other scholars?[34] This paper will suggest that one possible way forward lies in paying close attention both to the pattern and consequences of capitalism's uneven development during the last third of the nineteenth century, particularly the City of London's crucial role in mediating the development of a world economic system; and to the various forms in which capital penetrated Africa, especially merchant capital in West Africa, and industrial capital in Southern Africa. It takes as its starting point Norman Etherington's salutory reminder that *theories of imperialism* are 'not theories of empire ... There are no general theories of colonial expansion. There is no special Marxist theory of colonialism ... [and] there are no "mono-causal" explanations'.[35]

II

'The major fact about the nineteenth century', Eric Hobsbawm has remarked, 'is the creation of a single global economy, progressively reaching into the most remote corners of the world, an increasingly dense web of economic transactions, communications, and movements of goods, money and people linking the developed countries with each other and with the undeveloped world'.[36] Of particular importance for the purposes of this paper was the further fact that the pace and nature of change accelerated in the last 30-40 years of the century. This period, according to Barraclough, transformed itself to such an extent that 'the age of coal and iron was succeeded after 1870 by the age of steel and electricity, of oil and chemicals'.[37] Industrial capital's accelerated development, sometimes called

the 'Second Industrial Revolution', more precisely identified as the transitionary phase between competitive and monopoly capitalism, was quintessentially an uneven process. It profoundly upset existing economic and social balances both between countries, and within them. Generally speaking, the new industries were most in evidence in Germany and the United States of America. By 1900, these two countries had carved out an increasing share of world trade for themselves, largely at Britain's expense.

Britain's relative industrial decline after c.1870 was influenced not only by increased competition from other countries, however, but also by the fact that her own process of industrialisation had been extremely uneven. Most research in the last decade or so stresses that the rise of industry in Britain was a more protracted process than had previously been believed; and that by the middle of the nineteenth century, but especially after 1870, the hegemony of commercial and financial interests centred on the City of London had been consolidated.[38] Leaving aside the vexed question of the extent to which Britain's loss of industrial dynamism 'derived from the historic *disjunction between City and industry*',[39] the fundamental point is that manufacturing and industrial interests played second fiddle to commercial and financial concerns. Consequently, from the 1870s onwards, 'while Britain's dominance of international finance increased, her industrial sector began to decline relative to her major competitors. Free trade and invisible exports, the twin supports of financial supremacy, played their part in emphasizing and underwriting the decline of industry'.[40]

This industrial decline was all the more serious because it occurred in the context of what contemporaries called the 'Great Depression' of 1873 to 1890. Once again, the effects of this Depression were not uniformly felt, but while there were periods of recovery, the general tendency of prices was downwards. In this deflationary situation, increased competition for markets sent a wave of protectionism sweeping across Europe and North

America between 1875 and 1892. Only Britain remained committed to Free Trade. It did so not because of any sentimental attachment to past practice when Britain had been the 'workshop of the world', but because the operations of the City depended on the unfettered movement of capital and commodities. As a result, British industry, already disadvantaged, according to some scholars, by a basic distortion in British capital markets, was denied protection on its home ground. British imports of manufactured goods increased from three per cent of total imports in 1860 to 25 per cent by 1900. Nor were British manufacturers able to compete in the markets of advanced industrial countries. Excluded by the often better quality of German and American products, as well as by tariff barriers, British exports to Europe and the United States fell by 19 per cent in value between 1875 and 1900. For all of these reasons, 'industrial interests in Britain shifted, around 1880, into decisive support for the acquisition of new markets in Asia and Africa'.[41]

But neither the shifting balance of economic and political power in the northern hemisphere nor intensified competition for markets during the Depression of themselves determined that Africa would be partitioned. Processes and events in Africa itself were equally crucial. Although the roots of Africa's involvement in the wider world economy stretched back to antiquity, the nature and impact of its most important commercial networks changed in the first half of the nineteenth century with the transition from the slave trade to trade in vegetable oils. Hopkins particularly has argued that whereas the trade in slaves had been very largely the prerogative of West Africa's indigenous ruling elites, so-called 'legitimate commerce' in vegetable oils gradually expanded to incorporate small farmers and traders. Elite power and wealth previously based on slaves and the slave trade found it increasingly difficult to accommodate these new forms of accumulation. In very general terms, so Hopkins concluded, West Africa's aristocracy experienced an economic and political crisis during this period.[42] It was

a crisis which essentially arose from the spread of commodity relations. Merchant capital, by providing a market and encouraging people to produce on a regular basis for it, had an unsettling effect, economically and socially, wherever it established itself. It tended to loosen existing social ties and relations, even though it did not transform them.[43] Ruling classes who earlier had concentrated wealth in their own hands, found their position weakening in relation to small producers who now dealt directly with coastal merchants or their middlemen. This was the case in Senegal and in several Oil River city states, for example, where established rulers were challenged by new producers and traders.[44]

West Africa's political and social instability, already manifest by mid-century, was greatly aggravated after 1870 by a dramatic fall in the price of vegetable oils. Prices fell not only because the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 provided Southern Asian producers with easier access to European markets, but also because of expanding world production of mineral oils.[45] The ensuing trade depression quickly made itself felt through intensified internal rivalries, as disputes raged over 'the allocation of shares in the export trade, over the prices to be asked and given, and over the distribution of reduced profits'.[46] These rivalries in turn were accentuated by European merchants, as they were drawn into local African politics, particularly in their role as creditors.[47] And increasingly, all of these tensions and struggles adversely affected the flow of trade. To take three examples only: in 1879 the number of trading caravans reaching Sierra Leone dropped by four-fifths as a result of inland warfare. In the 1880s commercial operations in the Gold Coast interior were hindered by the instability of the Ashante Confederacy; and during much the same period the supply of vegetable oils was occasionally deliberately held up by the Yoruba in attempts to force coastal merchants to pay higher prices.[48]

In these circumstances, some European traders began calling upon

their respective Governments to restore 'law and order'. The smooth operation of trade, they argued, depended on political stability. They were joined by others whose falling profit margins made them want to restructure the market, so as to eliminate African middlemen.[49] Wherever possible, competition was reduced through amalgamation and minimised by monopoly. 'Merchants do not make their profits by revolutionising production but by controlling markets', Kay has noted. 'Thus merchants capital ... never embraced the advantages of competition but strived to form monopolies wherever it could ... It eschewed the principles of laissez-faire and sought state support for monopolistic privileges'.[50] The introduction in the 1850s of regular steamship lines between Europe and West Africa had already added to the problems facing established merchants by lowering freight rates and making it easier for newcomers to enter the trade, and when competition further intensified during the Depression, the interruptions to the regular flow of trade caused by the dissolution of indigenous West African economy and society, were the last straw. European merchants began demanding 'political action up to and including colonial annexation, as a means of checking or suppressing commercial competition and, by reducing the political independence of African middlemen, forcing them to accept lower prices'.[51]

The 'character, intensity and influence of mercantile pressures' for metropolitan intervention not only varied from locality to locality in West Africa itself,[52] but also met with very different responses from the Governments of France, Britain and Germany. Of all the major powers trading in West Africa, France was least able to absorb the new competitive strains. Because the convergence of merchant demands with the broader impact of the Depression was particularly marked in France, her merchant lobby received a sympathetic hearing from successive administrations.[53] Indeed, when the slump deepened after 1875, Paris toyed with the idea of

large-scale state expenditure on railway development between Algeria and Senegal in order 'to pull the French economy out of depression'.[54] Named after the then Minister of Public Works and soon-to-be Prime Minister, this Freycinet Plan apparently envisaged using these regions 'as a springboard for the creation of an empire in North and West Africa which would perform the role for the French economy which India was assuming for the British economy - as a market for such capital goods as railway materials and, through the provision of cheaper transport, for such consumer goods as textiles'.[55]

Although the more grandiose elements of the scheme were hastily dropped when disaster overtook an Algerian expeditionary force, and the French economy made a recovery of sorts in 1880-1, thinking of this kind helped ensure that merchant requests for less dramatic forms of intervention were acted upon.[56] In any case, key sections of French civil society, including the Army still smarting from its humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War, were increasingly willing to countenance military campaigns.[57] And with Europe and North America's technological lead over the rest of the world widening almost daily, wars of colonial conquest promised to be cheap and easy. 'By 1870 the local [West African] deterrents to penetration were no longer serious ...', Flint has noted.

> Quinine, first used systematically by Baikie, the surgeon in command of the Niger expeditions of the late 1850s, proved its effectiveness as a prophylactic against malaria. The steamship was immune to tsetse fly, and the explorers had mapped the main navigable waterways by 1860. Railways with steam locomotives could be built where no navigable rivers would serve.[58]

What steamers and quinine prophylaxis made feasible, the 'gun revolution' rendered almost certain.[59] The rapid development of breech loading rifles,

soon with magazines and repeating mechanisms, and ultimately of machine guns, decisively tilted the military balance in favour of Europe. From the 1880s onwards, 'colonial battles in Africa became increasingly lopsided', reaching their apogee at Omdurman in 1898 where, in the words of its most famous participant, 'within the space of five hours the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern European Power had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any difficulty, comparatively small risk, and insignificant loss to the victors'.[60]

Starting from their existing Senegalese enclave in 1879, the French began to advance across the western Sudan. The details of this forward movement and of subsequent French expansion generally in the course of the 1880s and 1890s are not the concern of this paper, beyond noting that once French expeditions penetrated beyond the immediate hinterland of vegetable oil-producing regions, 'the impact of deflationary forces on external commerce cannot be held responsible for European annexations everywhere in West Africa'.[61] In its latter stages, the French scramble for African territory, even if accelerated by Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882,[62] and justified, like its British and German counterparts, in terms of Social Darwinism,[63] was primarily sustained by 'renewed industrial depression and heightened tariff barriers [which] generated a French will to claim any domain which could be brought within the tariff system of the French empire'.[64] 'At a time when France is trying to increase her volume of business with Senegal, to develop the resources of her colony and to create new outlets in the very centre of Africa, it does not seem to me possible that all this effort should be made for the profit of foreign industry', commented the colony's governor. '... In such a country the theory of free trade cannot be put into practice.'[65]

By contrast to French policy, Britain's initial response to the clamour of her own merchants for intervention in West Africa was cautious and

conservative. Although Britain's trading interests were by far the largest of any European state involved in West Africa, merchant cries for help were largely ignored. Once France began swallowing large chunks of West Africa, however, this raised the spectre of British trade being excluded by high tariff barriers from a widening zone of French territory.[66] As a result, British policy began to change direction. At first, merchant capital had to shift for itself in the form of George Goldie's monopolistic United African Company formed in 1879, but thereafter Whitehall gradually bestirred itself. Towards the end of 1883 'the policy of establishing protectorates for the Niger and Oil Rivers was endorsed by the Cabinet, "with a view to the maintenance of an unfettered trade, which unhappily is not favoured by the arrangements of the French in those latitudes"'.[67] Fifteen months later Britain secured international recognition of her interests on the Niger River, and soon afterwards the United African Company was transformed by charter into the Royal Niger Company. In 1887 Britain took action against local rulers who obstructed commercial operations in the Delta, but 'it was not until 1893 that the Niger Coast Protectorate was established with a formal administrative system to meet the growing needs for effective government in an area of expanding British trade'.[68]

This slow and reluctant change of policy precisely reflected the limited importance of both merchant and industrial capital in contemporary British political economy. Their interests were often important enough to cause London to react to external changes, but they were rarely sufficiently powerful to initiate policy. Government policy, crucially influenced by the financial and service interests of the City of London, remained committed to Free Trade.[69] In this context, and recognising that there was no realistic possibility of Free trade policies being jettisoned in favour of Protection, industrial interests in Britain added their voice to merchant demands for state intervention. Businessmen, according to Cain, 'began to take an interest

in anticipatory annexation of overseas markets. The main fear was that large areas of the world might otherwise be occupied by rival powers with protectionist inclinations'.[70] Seen in this light, 'far from being inconsistent with free trade, intervention in semi-civilized regions was regarded as an anti-cyclical measure for the restoration of commercial prosperity by a widening of the free trade area'.[71] Whereas France embarked on colonial expansion in order to erect tariff barriers around as large an empire as possible, Britain expanded her colonial possessions in order to keep as large an area as possible free of tariff barriers. 'Protectorates are unwelcome burdens', wrote one senior member of the Foreign Office, 'but in this case it is ... a question between British protectorates, which would be unwelcome, and French protectorates, which would be fatal. Protectorates, of one sort or another, are the inevitable outcome of the situation'.[72]

Britain's pronounced reluctance during the 1880s to do anything more than was strictly necessary to safeguard her existing commercial interests, was exemplified further south in West-Central and East Africa. In neither region were significant British interests involved. As in West Africa, markets in these two regions became much more competitive in the last third of the nineteenth century, but at the same time there were important differences between them and the West African littoral. In the first place, merchant capital in West-Central and East Africa was much less important than in West Africa; and secondly, their export trade was more diversified, including cloves from Zanzibar and ivory and wild rubber from the coastal hinterlands.[73] Here the significant point is that although the price of vegetable oils collapsed after 1870, the price of cloves remained stable, and the prices of rubber and ivory actually increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century. They ran counter to the general trend of the Depression.[74] Two very general conclusions can be drawn from all of this: the smaller volume of trade meant that although commodity relations were spreading, they were not doing

so at a pace and on a scale likely to generate the economic and political tensions manifest in West Africa; and the rising price of rubber and ivory more than offset the falling price of vegetable oils. Consequently, as Munro has observed,

> deflationary pressures on trade and profits were less acute in West-Central and Eastern Africa and European merchants at the coast had less reason to be dissatisfied with commercial conditions. The forces seeking to change the status quo came less from the ranks of established mercantile groups, and more from among interloping figures who saw in the relative commercial vitality of these regions a potential for the creation of commercial empires.[75]

Chief among the interlopers attracted to West Central Africa was Leopold II of Belgium. Obsessed with the idea of controlling what he hoped would be the riches of the Congo Basin, Leopold actively promoted European exploration of Central Africa during the second half of the 1870s.[76] In East Africa, Leopold's counterparts were Karl Peters, founder of the German Society for Colonization, and William MacKinnon, a British shipowner whose vessels plied between Aden and Zanzibar. MacKinnon had earlier wanted to lease the Sultan of Zanzibar's mainland territories in order to develop interior trade, but this particular scheme was blocked in 1877 when the British Government opted for the continued exercise of indirect influence through the local potentate.[77] The ensuing uneasy equilibrium was disturbed at the start of the 1880s when Leopold's efforts to make commercial treaties with local rulers along the Lower Congo ran up against the activities of the French explorer, Savorgnan de Brazza. When France ratified de Brazza's treaties in 1882, this set off alarm bells in Whitehall and the Wilhelmstrasse. Both Britain and Germany feared that the protectionist French intended

to carve out another huge colony for themselves in Central Africa, but because neither country had vital economic interests at stake, they were unwilling to make pre-emptive annexations to keep France out. For broadly similar reasons, they would have preferred the vast area which later became the Congo Free State left open to everyone's trade. '[The] ... main interest of Britain was that the Congo should be free to the peaceful enterprise of all the world', Hyam and Martin have written. 'Basically, Britain had enough to do and wished the Congo to lie fallow.'[78]

Until this point, Germany had remained aloof from the intensifying scramble for colonies. The very different structure of German industry and trade meant that Germany was subject to nothing like the same degree of competitive squeeze as were Britain and France during the Depression. For all that North German merchants were firmly rooted along the West African coast, their complaints about the threat posed by French annexations initially fell on deaf ears in Berlin. Bismarck at first ignored demands for an active colonial policy.[79] Then, quite abruptly, German policy changed. Between early 1884 and the first few months of 1885, Germany declared protectorates over Togoland, the Cameroons, South West Africa, and German East Africa. Most historians now agree that Bismarck joined the race for colonies because he found it expedient to defuse domestic political and class tensions by encouraging overseas expansion.[80] 'The policy of colonial annexation as a diversion in domestic policy', Stoecker has concluded, 'was for Bismarck only a tactical method tried for a time and not a permanent system.'[81]

That Germany did not join the Scramble primarily for economic reasons, was underlined soon afterwards by its attitude during the Berlin West Africa Conference. Alarmed by the mounting intensity of the scramble for pieces of Africa, and keen to take advantage of Anglo-French antagonism following the breakdown of negotiations over Egypt's future in August-September

1884,[82] Bismarck called a conference of all the concerned European powers, as well as the United States of America. Meeting between November 1884 and February 1885, the conference laid down ground rules for the future annexation of African territory. Among its achievements, the conference recognised British interests and rights along the River Niger, but most importantly of all it recognised the sovereign existence of Leopold's Congo Free State.[83] It did so not least because Leopold played his cards with consummate skill. He won French backing by promising them right of first refusal 'should the International Association of the Congo dispose of its territory', while France, well aware that Britain would block any forward move on its part, 'raised no objection, confident that Leopold's enterprise would soon collapse'.[84] And by committing the Association to Free Trade, Leopold also secured German and British support. In November 1884, with domestic politics now sufficiently under control for him to ignore once again calls for colonial expansion, Bismarck extended German recognition to the Association's flag. Britain reluctantly followed suit. Obliged by German hostility to abandon its support for Portuguese claims in the region, Whitehall acquiesced once the Congo Free Trade Area was guaranteed.[85] In East Africa, where no such guarantees obtained in the aftermath of Germany's unexpected seizure of Tanganyika, Britain belatedly unleashed MacKinnon. In 1888 his Imperial British East Africa Company was chartered. It rapidly established a presence of sorts in Kenya and Uganda, but in 1894 went bankrupt, forcing Britain to take over its responsibilities.[86]

Not long after MacKinnon had begun operations, a royal charter was also granted to another company. This was the much more formidable British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes, the activities of which are best understood in the context of the mineral discoveries which transformed Southern Africa in the generation after 1870. While Britain had been pulled into the interior 'on the coattails of expansionary forces inherent in Cape

colonial society' before that date, none of them came close to matching the expansive dynamic generated by the Mining Revolution.[87] The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley at the end of the 1860s, and especially of gold on the Rand in 1886, caused enormous and unprecedented demands for capital and labour. By contrast to West Africa where merchant capital took its profits in markets supplied mostly by peasants, the profitable mining of gold and diamonds depended crucially on the productive investment of industrial capital and the creation of a black working class. And the realisation of these imperatives led directly, and often violently, to a new and revolutionary economic social and political order throughout the sub-continent.

Britain's interests in the new mineral discoveries were substantial from the start, and grew considerably thereafter. Sufficiently attracted by the diamond fields of Griqualand West to contemplate South African confederation in the 1870s,[88] Britain was irresistably drawn to the huge gold deposits of the Transvaal. In the first place, as Marks and Trapido have pointed out, Britain's position as 'the centre of the world's money market depended ... on [her] unique financial institutions, and on an international trading currency - sterling - whose importance was assured by the preparedness of British banking institutions to defend it with gold'.[89] No less importantly, 'British investors supplied between 60 and 80 per cent of foreign investment in the Rand by 1899; and economic growth centred on the Transvaal provided a rich and rapidly growing market for British goods'.[90] British capital alone totalled c.£60 million, and Southern Africa's trade, worth some £52,200,000 in 1897, accounted for 'nearly three-quarters of the total external commerce of Africa south of the Sahara'.[91] Yet even as Southern Africa came to play an increasingly significant part in British overseas trade and investment, the very magnitude of the gold discoveries in the South African Republic seemingly posed a threat to British strategic

and economic concerns in the region. These latter interests, write Cain and Hopkins, 'were threatened by German and French investment, which raised the possibility that the Transvaal might be taken out of the British orbit, and by Kruger's modernization policy, which increased mining costs at a time when the leading firms needed to attract and invest substantial capital'.[92]

When the regional centre of gravity had first shown signs of shifting from Cape Town to Pretoria after the discovery of the main reef on the Rand, British policy had become progressively more solicitous of Cape colonial aspirations. Embodied in the cumbersome form of Rhodes, where they were further combined with the interests of De Beers, as well as those of his Consolidated Gold Fields which had been left on the fringes of the first Rand boom, these aspirations were never simply 'local', however.[93] In the specific context of the late 1880s they became increasingly intertwined with imperial policy, once Rhodes and successive British Governments discovered their mutual interest in finding another goldfield to counterbalance the Rand. As the gaze of fortune hunters and imperial adventurers alike fell on the reputed Land of Ophir north of the Limpopo, an area which had previously only been an object of fitful imperial and missionary concern, was suddenly transformed into one of compelling fascination.[94]

At the beginning of 1888, Lobengula of the Ndebele was persuaded to sign a treaty making his country a sphere of British influence. But by this stage of the Scramble, spheres of influence were not enough. The Berlin West Africa Conference had stressed 'effective occupation'. Nor were Rhodes and the British the only foreigners interested in the region. The Portuguese were as well. Although Portugal was virtually a British colony for much of the nineteenth century, from the late 1850s a small national bourgeoisie had attempted to loosen the ties of Portuguese dependency on Britain. One projected way of doing so was to establish closed or protected colonial markets

for Portuguese industry, but partly because of British pressure, and to some extent because Portugal's bourgeoisie itself was divided over the issue, the programme was never implemented.[95] According to Clarence-Smith, though, it was speedily resuscitated once the severity of the Depression became apparent. A further spur to action occurred in 1885 when Portugal's claims to the Congo were ignored, at least partly because effective occupation could not be proved. In the course of the next year or so, Portugal succeeded in winning international recognition of Angola's southern and northern boundaries, and began laying the foundations for a Central African empire which would stretch between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Expeditions were sent into the interior of Mozambique. When they began pushing onto the highveld of Mashonaland, however, disaster intervened. In 1886 a Portuguese force was defeated by the Shona of the Mtoko district.[97] It was a set-back which proved fatal to Portuguese aspirations. By the time they were ready to try again, British interest in the region had grown beyond recognition.

With Imperial backing, Rhodes and his well-connected associates had won a mineral concession from Lobengula. This concession was used as the basis for the granting of a Royal Charter in 1889, which empowered the British South Africa Company to 'make treaties and promulgate laws, as well as to maintain a policy force and undertake public works'.[98] In short, Rhodes was authorised to establish a company state. No northern limit was set on the sphere of the British South Africa Company's operations, and with one eye fixed on the need to secure labour supplies for the future, Rhodes agreed to subsidize the cost of extending British protection to Scottish missionary interests settled around Lake Nyasa (Malawi). In 1891 Portugal was warned not to encroach on these interests. Agents were also despatched beyond the Zambezi, and although Leopold beat them to copper-rich Katanga (Shaba), they nonetheless secured paper rights over much of what subsequently

became Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). But for all this, most of Rhodes' energy was actually spent on organising an invasion force to occupy Mashonaland, and it was this so-called 'pioneer column' which set out in June 1890 hoping to make its own and its backers' fortunes. When three years of frantic scouring failed to uncover rich gold deposits amongst the Shona, the Chartered Company wasted no time in provoking war with Lobengula. Once again, though, Rhodes was disappointed. Prospectors could find nothing remotely comparable to the Rand in the newly-conquered Matabeleland. And when mining engineers in much the same period began proving that the Transvaal's goldfields went far deeper than anyone had previously suspected, it became clear that the real 'second Rand' lay not across the Limpopo but in the deep levels of the Rand itself.[99]

At the end of 1895, every attempt at counter-balancing the wealth of the Transvaal by means of northern expansion having come to naught, Rhodes launched the Jameson Raid against Kruger's republic. To the great discomfort of the British Foreign Secretary who had been kept fairly well informed of Rhodes' intentions, the Raid was a dismal failure.[100] By January 1896 its surviving members were languishing in Pretoria Prison. The same year, close to the other end of Africa, another colonial invasion force also suffered defeat. At the Battle of Adowa in March 1896, an Italian army was defeated by Ethiopian forces.[101] But while the Ethiopians were left to enjoy the fruits of their victory for another 40 years, the British were much more impatient. The commercial and financial imperatives of the City of London, and those of mining capital, were immeasurably stronger than the forces propelling Italian colonialism. Although the Kruger Government's labour accord with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique, and its Industrial Commission in 1897, went a long way towards meeting the grievances of the goldmining industry, its continued policy of granting monopoly concessions in order to promote local industrial growth, greatly

aggravated the highly sensitive cost structure of the deep level mines.[102] The antipathy felt towards the Kruger state by the most important sections of the gold mining industry found regular expression in the local press, where capital's demands for reform merged with those of Whitehall.[103] Determined to uphold British and Cape interests against the Transvaal's renewed protectionism after 1895,[104] and anxious to maintain the weekly arrival of South African gold bars which provided the Bank of England with an important safety net,[105] London pressed hard for the extension of the franchise to the white 'uitlander' population and the installation of a friendly regime in Pretoria.[106] Yet none of this necessarily meant war, until push became shove under the combined impetus of British public opinion and military miscalculations on both sides.[107] In 1899 the South African War began. South of the Sahara, the partition of Africa was complete.

III

This paper's interpretation of the Scramble locates its dynamic squarely in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, but also attempts to pay due regard to changing conditions in the periphery contingent on the manner of capital's penetration of Africa itself. Africa was partitioned, then, because of capitalism's markedly uneven development after c.1870. This unevenness manifested itself both between countries and within social formations. Concretely expressed, the changing balance of economic power between the advanced industrial nations caused the weakest of them, France, and to a lesser extent, Britain, to embark on programmes of colonial expansion. British intervention, however, invariably reactive and reluctant, was crucially shaped by City interests encapsulated in the policy of Free Trade. Intervention occurred first in West Africa where a lengthy process of conservation-dissolution initiated by merchant capital slid into instability as export prices collapsed. Stabilisation of merchant capital accumulation

required the imposition of colonial rule. 'In uncivilised countries', remarked Sir George Goldie, 'there can be no permanence of commerce without political power'.[108] Once underway, this process rapidly expanded to cover West Central and East Africa where annexation more often than not turned on the question of tariff barriers. And above all, Britain's need to protect its global role in world commerce while retaining unencumbered access to the continent's biggest market, played a decisive role along with the revolutionary imperatives of mining capital in bringing the Scramble to a spectacularly bloody and extremely expensive finale. In this sense, it might be said that the partition of Africa was less a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire than it was to the City of London.

I R Phimister

University of Cape Town

FOOTNOTES

* Financial support from the University of Cape Town's Research Committee is gratefully acknowledged.

1. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, 'The political economy of British expansion overseas, 1750-1914', Economic History Review, 1980, 33, 4, 463.

2. B. Porter, 'Imperialism and the Scramble', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1980, 9, 1, 76.

3. J. Sturgis, 'Britain and the New Imperialism', in C.C. Eldridge (ed), British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1984), 105.

4. A.N. Porter, 'The Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-85 revisited: a report', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1985, 14, 1, 92.

5. B.M. Ratcliffe, 'The economics of the Partition of Africa: methods and recent research trends', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 1981, 15, 1, 30-1. See also S. Marks, 'Scrambling for South Africa', Journal of African History, 1982, 23, 1, 99: 'While for certain purposes it is indeed useful to study the regional manifestations of the "scramble", this is not going to settle the issue of the "relative potency of different expansive forces"'.

6. R. Law, 'Imperialism and Partition', Journal of African History, 1983, 24, 1, 103.

7. For extended discussion, see especially E. Stokes, 'Late nineteenth-century colonial expansion and the attack on the theory of economic imperialism: a case of mistaken identity?', Historical Journal, 1969, 12, 2; and N. Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital (London, 1984).

8. Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas'; Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: new imperialism, 1850-1945', Economic History Review, 1987, 40, 1; Cain, Economic Foundations of British Overseas Expansion 1815-1914 (London, 1980); Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London, 1973); Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa: a reconsideration of the occupation of Egypt, 1882', Journal of African History, 1986, 27, 3; Marks, 'Southern Africa, 1867-1886', 'Southern and Central Africa, 1886-1910', both in R. Oliver and G.N. Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 6 from c.1870 to c.1905 (Cambridge, 1985); Marks and S. Trapido, 'Lord Milner and the South African state', History Workshop, 1979, 8; J.F. Munro, Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960 (London, 1976); C. Newbury, 'The tariff factor in Anglo-French West African Partition', in P. Gifford and R. Louis (eds), France and Britain in Africa (New Haven, 1971); and Newbury and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, 'French policy and the origins of the Scramble for West Africa', Journal of African History, 1969, 10, 2.

9. G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment (London, 1975).

10. R.J. Overy, review of G. Schmidt, Der europäische Imperialismus, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1986, 14, 3, 225.

11. Law, 'Imperialism and Partition', 103.

12. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961, second ed. 1981), and Robinson and Gallagher, 'The partition of Africa', New Cambridge Modern History (London, 1962).

13. Robinson and Gallagher, 'Partition of Africa', 594.

14. Ibid, 616; Hyam and G. Martin (eds), Reappraisals in British Imperial History (London, 1975), 141.

15. D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire (London, 1973). See also

his The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism (London, 1967).

16. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 463. For further discussion, see W.R. Louis (ed), Imperialism (New York, 1976), 13-14, 236-7.

17. Robinson, 'Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a thory of collaboration', in R. Owen and R. Sutcliffe (eds), Studies in the theory of imperialism (London, 1972), 139.

18. Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, 'French policy and the origins of the Scramble for West Africa', 275-6.

19. D.C.M. Platt, 'Economic factors in British policy during the "New Imperialism"', Past and Present, 1968, 39; Platt, 'The imperialism of free trade: some reservations', Economic History Review, 1968, 21, 2; Platt, 'Further objections to an "Imperialism of Free Trade", 1830-60', Economic History Review, 1973, 26, 1; and Platt, 'The national economy and British imperial expansion before 1914', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1973, 2, 1.

20. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, espec. Ch.4; and Hopkins, 'European expansion into West Africa: a historiographical survey of English-language publications since 1945', in P. Emmer and H. Wesseling (ed), Reappraisals in Overseas History (Leiden, 1979), 65.

21. G. Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (London, 1967), 58.

22. Law, 'Imperialism and Partition', 104.

23. Ibid, 103.

24. A.A. Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism (Baltimore, 1987).

25. G.N. Sanderson, 'The European partition of Africa: coincidence or conjuncture', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1974, 3, 1; Sanderson, 'The European partition of Africa: origins

and dynamics', in Oliver and Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 6 from c.1870 to c.1905.

26. Law, 'Imperialism and Partition', 104.

27. Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism, 32.

28. Among others, see especially P. Anderson, 'The figures of descent', New Left Review, 1987, 161; G. Ingham, Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social Development (London, 1984); Ingham, 'Commercial capital and British development: a reply to Michael Barratt Brown', New Left Review, 1988, 172; and D. Nicholls, 'Fractions of capital: the aristocracy, the City, and industry in the development of British capitalism', Social History, 1988, 13, 1.

29. Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas'; Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: new imperialism, 1850-1945'.

30. See, for example, J.M. MacKenzie, The Partition of Africa 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1983); and G.N. Uzoigwe, 'European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview', in Boahen (ed), UNESCO General History of Africa VII, Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 (London, 1985).

31. Hopkins, 'European expansion into West Africa', 64.

32. Sanderson, 'European partition of Africa: origins and dynamics', 117.

33. Hopkins, 'European expansion into West Africa', 64.

34. For example, those mentioned by R. Bridges in his review of Volume 6 of The Cambridge History of Africa, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1987, 15, 3, 325.

35. Etherington, Theories of Imperialism, 267.

36. E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (London, 1987), 62.

37. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, 44.

38. For full references to this literature, see Anderson, 'Figures of Descent'; Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas'; and Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism ... II: new imperialism'.

39. Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism ... II: new imperialism', 4.

40. Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas', 482.

41. Ibid, 484, 485.

42. Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, 142-3.

43. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment, 94-5.

44. Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, 145-6.

45. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 71-2.

46. Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, 148.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid, 154-5; J Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', in Flint and G. Williams (eds), Perspectives of Empire (London, 1973), 101. See also Y Person, 'Western Africa, 1870-1886', in Oliver and Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 6 from c.1870 to c.1905.

49. Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, 156.

50. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment, 96.

51. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 72.

52. Ibid. For differing assessments of the significance of this pressure, see, variously, R. Austen, African Economic History (London, 1987), 116-7; Ratcliffe, 'Commerce and Empire: Manchester

merchants and West Africa, 1873-1895', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1979, 8, 2; and W.G. Hynes, The Economics of Empire (London, 1979).

53. Hopkins, Economic History of West Africa, 161-2.

54. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 70.

55. Ibid. See also, Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, 'French policy and the origins of the Scramble for West Africa', 261-4; and C.M. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 'Centre and periphery in the making of the Second French Colonial Empire, 1815-1920', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1988, 16, 3, 17.

56. Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, 'French policy and the origins of the Scramble for West Africa', 265; Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 70.

57. H. Brunschwig, 'French exploration and conquest in tropical Africa from 1865 to 1898', in L. Gann and P. Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Volume One. The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914 (London, 1969), 136-44; Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', 102-03.

58. Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', 101. See also R. Kubicek, 'The colonial steamer and the occupation of West Africa by the Victorian state, 1840-1900', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1990, 18, 1.

59. D.R. Headrick, 'The tools of imperialism: technology and the expansion of European colonial empires in the nineteenth century', Journal of Modern History, 1979, 51, 248.

60. Ibid, 258, 259-60. See also his Tools of Empire (Oxford, 1981).

61. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 73; Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', 104.

62. Recent scholarship downplays even this modest role for Egypt

in the Scramble; see especially Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa: a reconsideration of the occupation of Egypt, 1882', Journal of African History, 1986, 27, 3.

63. See, for example, C. Bolt, 'Race and the Victorians', in Eldridge (ed), British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century; V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind (Harmondsworth, 1972); and Sanderson, 'European partition of Africa: coincidence or conjuncture', 43-4.

64. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 73.

65. Cited in Newbury, 'Trade and authority in West Africa', in Gann and Duignan (eds), Colonialism in Africa, Volume One. History and Politics of Colonialism, 93.

66. Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', 102-06. See also, Newbury, 'The tariff factor in Anglo-French West African partition', in Gifford and Louis (eds), France and Britain in Africa.

67. Cited in Flint, 'Britain and the partition of West Africa', 109.

68. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 324.

69. Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism ...II: new imperialism', 6-7. For discussion of the relationship between City, government and administration, see variously, Y. Cassis, 'Bankers and English society in the late nineteenth century', Economic History Review, 1985, 38, 2; S. Checkland, 'The mind of the City, 1870-1914', Oxford Economic Papers, 1957, 9; and M. Daunton, '"Gentlemanly capitalism" and British industry 1820-1914', Past and Present, 1989, 70.

70. Cain, Economic Foundations of British Overseas Expansion 1815-1914, 52.

71. Hynes, 'British mercantile attitudes towards imperial expansion', Historical Journal, 1976, 29 4, 975. See also his Economics of Empire, 138; and B. Porter, The Lion's Share (London, 1975), 144-6.

72. Cited in Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century 1815-1914 (London, 1976), 280.

73. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 73-4.

74. Ibid, 74.

75. Ibid.

76. J Stengers, 'Leopold II and the Association Internationale du Congo', in S. Förster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa (Oxford, 1988), 237-8.

77. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 76. See also J.S. Galbraith, MacKinnon and East Africa 1878-1895, (Cambridge, 1972).

78. Hyam and Martin (eds), Reappraisals in British Imperial History, 150-1. See especially J.D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963), 284-315.

79. H. von Strandmann, 'Domestic origins of Germany's colonial expansion under Bismarck', Past and Present, 1969, 42, 148. But see also Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 329-36.

80. Despite their differences, see for example, H-U. Wehler, 'Bismarck's imperialism, 1862-1890', Past and Present, 1970, 48; and P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London, 1980), espec. Ch.10. See also W.J. Mommsen, 'Bismarck, the concert of Europe, and the future of West Africa, 1883-1885', in Förster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa.

81. H. Stoecker, 'The annexations of 1884-1885', in Stoecker (ed), German Imperialism in Africa (London, 1986).

82. Kanya-Forstner, 'French African priorities and the Berlin West Africa Conference', in Förster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa, 179-80. See also Porter, 'Berlin West Africann Conference', 86.

83. For detailed discussion, see Louis, 'The Berlin Congo Conference', in Gifford and Louis (eds), France and Britain in Africa; and especially Förster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa.

84. Sanderson, 'European partition of Africa: coincidence or conjuncture', 32-3.

85. Ibid.

86. Galbraith, MacKinnon and East Africa, Ch.9.

87. A. Atmore and S. Marks, 'The Imperial factor in South Africa in the nineteenth century: towards a reassessment', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1974, 3, 1, 110.

88. Etherington, 'Labour supply and the genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870s', Journal of African History, 1979, 20, 2.

89. Marks and Trapido, 'Lord Milner and the South African state', 56.

90. Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas', 487.

91. Munro, Africa and the International Economy, 83.

92. Cain and Hopkins, 'Political economy of British expansion overseas', 487.

93. Marks, 'Scrambling for South Africa', 100.

94. Marks, 'Southern and Central Africa', 439. See also Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948 (London, 1988), 4-6.

95. G. Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975 (Manchester, 1985). See also his 'The myth of uneconomic imperialism: the Portguese in Angola, 1836-1926', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1979, 5, 2.

96. Clarence-Smith, 'The Portuguese and Spanish roles in the Scramble

for Africa: an economic interpretation', in Förster et al (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa, 216.

97. M.D. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi (London, 1973), 323-8.

98. P. Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London, 1958), 128.

99. See, variously, Galbraith, Crown and Charter. The Early Years of the British South Africa Company (Berkeley, 1974), 41-153; Marks, 'Southern and Central Africa', 439-55; Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 6-12; and Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 221-43.

100. Porter, The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism 1895-1899, (Manchester, 1980), 80-5.

101. See, variously, S. Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London, 1976); and Sanderson, 'The Nile basin and the Eastern Horn, 1870-1908; in Oliver and Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge History of Africa. Volume 6 from c.1870-c.1905.

102. P. Harries, 'Capital, state and labour on the 19th century Witwatersrand: a reassessment', South African Historical Journal, 1986, 18, 42-4; and C. van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914. Volume 1. New Babylon (London, 1982), 12-14, 23.

103. A. Jeeves, 'The Rand capitalists and the coming of the South African War, 1896-9', Canadian Historical Papers, 1973 (Ottawa, 1974). See also D. Bransky, 'The causes of the Boer War: towards a synthesis', unpub. 1974.

104. Marks, 'Southern and Central Africa', 473-4.

105. J. van Helten, 'Empire and high finance: South Africa and the international gold standard 1890-1914', Journal of African History,

1982, 23, 4, 547.

106. I. Smith, 'The origins of the South African War (1899-1902) in the context of the recent historiography of South Africa', unpub. 1989, 15-19, 21-6.

107. Porter, Origins of the South African War, 234-76; and especially his 'The South African War (1899-1902): context and motive reconsidered', Journal of African History, 1990, 31, 1.

108. Cited in Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 273.