THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION HERITAGE IN POSTCOLONIAL SOUTHERN AFRICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

_____

(Signature of candidate)

_____day of June 2017, Johannesburg.

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the politics of liberation heritage in postcolonial southern Africa with special reference to Mozambique. The aim is to scrutinise the different ways in which liberation heritage discourse is used and mobilised to construct a range of socioeconomic and political values in the southern African region and to examine the processes of heritagization in Mozambique based on field observations at two national heritage sites: Chilembene and Matchedje. I adopt the conceptualisation of heritage as discourse and put the hegemonic Western heritage discourses into historical perspective in order to explore how this Western understanding of the past has influenced the official discourse and practice in southern Africa in both colonial and postcolonial periods. I argue that the process of re-appropriation and 'mimicry' which allow the perpetuation of Western paradigms in the conception of heritage result from a combination of geopolitical and socio-economic contexts and circumstances at play nationally, regionally and globally, combined with the strategies adopted by former national liberation movement's ruling elites to pursue their own nationalist agendas related to state-crafting and nation-building. I also argue that the recent traction that has led to the institutionalisation of liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, represents a specific way in which former national liberation movements, now in government, have tried to respond to changes in circumstances marked by an increasing contestation by the different social groups over the content of the official discourse of 'the past', based on selective memories of the liberation struggle, in an increasingly disputed multi-party democratic dispensation. To understand the politics of heritagization of the liberation struggle in postcolonial Mozambique, I look at FRELIMO's efforts to undertake selective celebrations and to silence particular 'pasts' for particular 'presents' during the struggle years as well as through the different socio-political and economic contexts of the successive presidencies: Samora Machel (1975-86), Joaquim Chissano (-2004) and Armando Guebuza (-2014). By (1) addressing the question of *why* and *how* the heritagization of this particular category of the past (i.e. liberation heritage) accomplishes the reproduction of state power held by ruling elites of former national liberation movements, and by (2) illustrating the networks of meanings and practices on which liberation heritage rests, and by (3) analysing the socio-economic, cultural and political work it does, this study contributes to the embryonic body of knowledge about heritage processes in southern Africa.

DEDICATION

In memory of my grandparents

Albino Jopela

1917 - 1998

Lina Tembe

1930 - 2006

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ACRONYMS

ACLLN	Association of Veterans of the National Liberation Struggle (*Associação dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional*)
ANC	African National Congress
ARPAC	Sociocultural Research Institute (*Instituto de Investigação Sociocultural*)
AU	African Union
AWHF	African World Heritage Fund
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CCM	*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*
CHDA	Centre for Heritage Development in Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	Congress of South Africa Trade Union
COREMO	Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (*Comitê Revolucionário de Moçambique*)
CPHLLN	Research Centre of the History of the Liberation Struggle (*Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de Libertação Nacional*)
DA	Democratic Alliance
DISA	Digital Innovation South Africa
DNPC	National Directorate for Cultural Heritage (*Direcção Nacional do Património Cultural*)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPA	Ecole du Patrimoine Africain
FADAM	National Defence Forces (*Forças Armadas de Moçambique*)
FLS	Frontline States
FMI	International Monetary Fund.
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola/*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*)
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
ICOMOS	International Council of Monuments and Sites
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDM	Democratic Movement of Mozambique (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*)
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*)
NAD	Namibian dollars

NESAM	Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (*Núcleo de Estudantes Secundários Africanos de Moçambique*)
NHC	National Heritage Council (South Africa)
NMMZ	National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLIHEP	Our Liberation Heritage Project
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAFMECA	Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
PAI	Open and Inclusive Presidency (*Presidência Aberta e Inclusiva*)
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde/*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*)
PCN	National Coalition Party (*Partido da Coligação Nacional*)
PIDE/DGS	Portuguese International and State Defence Police (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*)
PPMR	Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
TRC	Truth and Reconciliations Commission
UANC	United African National Council
UDENAMO	National Democratic Union of Mozambique (*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*)
UDP	uKhahlamba–Drakensberg National Park
UEM	Eduardo Mondlane University (*Universidade Eduardo Mondlane*)
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	National Union for Mozambican Independence (*União Nacional de Moçambique Independente*)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*)
WHL	World Heritage List
WHS	World Heritage Sites
ZANLA	African National Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNLWA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

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INTRODUCTION

Whilst collaborating with the National Directorate for Cultural Heritage (*Direcção Nacional do Património Cultural* - DNPC) of Mozambique between 2005 and 2009, I was involved in several projects related to the conservation of immovable cultural heritage. One of these projects was the production of a national inventory of 115 monuments and sites to be declared sites of 'national interest' under the designation of 'national heritage'. According to the justification put forward by the then Ministry of Education and Culture the purpose of this was to, 'provide special protection by the state to sites and monuments of exceptional value' (Macamo 2008: 2). Despite the soundness of the technical justification and the diversity of cultural heritage on the inventory, the Council of Ministers did not approve the document. The reason given was that there were not enough *bases* on the list - these are FRELIMO[1] military operational bases used during the national liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonial authority between 1964 and 1974 - they made up less than 8% of the total proposed sites.

At first it seemed a contradiction that the government would reject the opportunity to celebrate and protect the country's prime cultural heritage sites whilst at the same time it was actively promoting self-esteem (*autoestima*) as one of the pillars of mozambicaness (*moçambicanidade*) (e.g. pride among Mozambicans about their past and heritage)[2] (see e.g., Guebuza 2006, 2009). A couple of years later, however, I came to realise that my indignation with the government's apparent lack of interest in the protection of heritage sites in the country stemmed from my inability to grasp the politics that engulfs cultural heritage in Mozambique today. Political support was only available to those projects that focussed on the more recent past, and more specifically on the liberation struggle.

My preoccupation in understanding this new or renewed interest in the memorialization of the liberation struggle, seemingly at the cost of all other types of heritage, has directed this study since 2012.

[1] I use the term FRELIMO to refer to the national liberation movement that was founded in Tanzania on June 25, 1962. This movement was later transformed into political party - Frelimo (*Partido Frelimo*) - during the third Congress of FRELIMO in 1977. To avoid confusion, I use the term FRELIMO throughout the Thesis.

[2] In his speeches, former President Armando Guebuza often used expressions such as 'beloved motherland' (*Pátria Amada*), 'pearl of the Indian Ocean' (*Pérola do Índico*), 'land of heroes' (*Pátria de Heróis*) and 'our beautiful Mozambique' (*nosso belo Moçambique*), as a way of instilling pride in Mozambicans (Matusse 2009: 10).

This thesis attempts to understand the processes by which the history and narrative of the liberation struggle is institutionalized as 'heritage' and how ordinary people relate to this heritage. I look at the ways in which authoritative heritage discourses (Smith 2006) about liberation come into conflict with alternative views of the past and their role in the production of national and transnational cultural practices. I also interrogate the ways in which the idea of liberation heritage is used or 'mobilized' (Lafrenz Samuels 2010) to construct a range of socioeconomic and political values, as well as the consequences of the 'work' (Meskell 2003) that this category of heritage does. Thus, through the analysis of the politics of liberation heritage in postcolonial southern Africa with special reference to Mozambique, this study:

a) Discusses the concept of liberation as the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism in Africa and its relationships with notions of power, memory and history both in postcolonial Mozambique and in the southern African region more widely;
b) Conceptualised heritage as discourse in order to explore the way Western understanding of 'the past' has influenced the official discourse and practice concerning heritage in southern Africa in the colonial and postcolonial periods;
c) Examines the processes of heritagization (Harvey 2001) in which the past, in particular the liberation struggle, is being created by states and negotiated by different social groups in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (with especial reference to two national heritage sites: Chilembene and Matchedje);
d) Scrutinizes the different ways in which the liberation heritage discourse is used and mobilized to construct a range of socioeconomic and political values in southern African region, with consequences of this discourse for the broader heritage landscapes, especially in Mozambique.

These questions are explored in the following eight chapters, which are arranged as follows: Chapter One sets the scene for the project: firstly, by providing the political backdrop, in Mozambique and selected countries in southern Africa, within which liberation heritage is being mobilised, and, secondly by justifying why politics and the recent past are worthy of archaeological study. This chapter also presents the methodological approaches for this study.

Chapter Two presents the study areas where two sites of liberation are located: the historic sites of Matchedje (in Niassa province) and Chilembene (in Gaza province). These constitute the main case-study areas where I conducted fieldwork. This chapter also presents the products of the heritagization projects in these two localities as well as some of the issues

concerning these projects, which constitute the background for further discussions on recent heritagization of the liberation struggle in Mozambique, in chapters seven and eight.

Departing from the definition of liberation heritage as exclusively the historic material remains related to the struggle for independence, Chapter Three conceptualises heritage as discourse and puts the hegemonic Western heritage discourses into historical perspective in order to explore how this Western understanding of the past has influenced the official discourse and practice in southern Africa in the colonial period. Despite the existence of different heritage discourses this chapter focuses solely on the hegemonic authoritative heritage discourse as originated in the European context since it is this discourse which has set the parameters within which official discourses about heritage, particularly liberation heritage is constructed in postcolonial Africa. In fact, despite privileging the cultural symbols of a particular social group, this Western European discourse and its associated conservation ethics have become hegemonic and globalised in the form of international heritage conservation treaties and conventions (i.e. The Athens Charter of 1931, The Venice Charter of 1964 and The World Heritage Convention of 1972). Thus, I demonstrate how this hegemonic Western conception has been transferred to Africa by outlining two main types of colonialist discourses in archaeology and illustrate that notwithstanding the different forms of colonialism which shaped the make-up of the colonial state, with different historical impacts on African populations, heritage was mostly defined as relics from the past.

In Chapter Four I explore the dynamic processes through which hegemonic Western heritage discourses produced in the colonial period were carried over and re-appropriated by the postcolonial countries. I argue that this process of re-appropriation and 'mimicry' which allowed the perpetuation of Western paradigms in the conception of heritage result from a combination of geopolitical and socio-economic contexts and circumstances at play nationally, regionally and globally combined with the strategies adopted by former national liberation movements ruling elites to pursue their own nationalist agendas related to state crafting and nation-building. Thus, I first discuss the usefulness of the concept of glocalisation in understanding the ideological workings and dynamics of authoritative heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa. I use this 'glocal' approach to contextualize the authorized heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa focussing on three main discourses and their related practices, which are discussed in the following sections of the Chapter: (i) the decolonization of heritage policies and landscapes, (ii) local

community ‘participation’ in heritage and ‘community benefits’ through heritage management and (iii) the ‘domestication’ of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in southern Africa.

I analyse the first discourse by looking at how several post-independence African governments have selected designs that clearly foreground a foreign visual culture for architectural works to symbolize and celebrate their liberation struggle and independence. I argued that such examples clearly illustrate: the disjunction between the rhetoric of liberation and the constrains imposed by the need of ongoing nation-building and state crafting in the postcolonial period; the ‘glocalised’ nature of heritage and its associated discursive practices, where African states are able to rework aspects of global phenomena that originated from the West and appropriate such aspects for their own nationalistic projects informed by ideological legacy of the liberation struggle and, to some extent, non-Western modes of monumentalization; and the failure of African ruling elites to ‘indigenize’ the modes of memorialization of the liberation struggle in the public space. This chapter also highlights some of the issues regarding the notion of ‘participation’ often employed in the ‘community conservation discourse’ in the field of in environmental conservation which resonates highly with the challenges of participatory approaches to management of cultural heritage across the region. I argue that although some heritage sites have generated forms of economic development, mostly in the case of World Heritage sites, generally, the benefits mostly generated by global tourism rarely materialize and when they do they seem to be limited, apart from a few exceptions. Thus, local communities are yet to see significant improvements in their lives and livelihoods. Yet the discourse of ‘community’s benefit’ through cultural heritage continues to be promoted by heritage officials who often overstate the tourism potential of heritage in a bid to sway the often ‘impoverished local community’ to support projects such as the nomination of heritage sites to UNESCO’s World Heritage List.

With regards to the third discourse, that of ‘domestication’ of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in southern Africa, I illustrate that despite the effort of different actors to advance the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Africa, the ‘domestication’ of the Convention is still marked by tensions resulting from the divergences between local understanding of heritage as well as domestic agendas and nationalistic interests on the one hand, and the agenda of international organizations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS or IUCN which often advise States Parties on the type of sites that have a potential to demonstrate

outstanding universal value, based on the dominant Western notions of heritage, on the other. Based on a 'glocal' approach to the processes of implementation of the Convention in postcolonial context, I also argue that the hegemony of Western heritage discourse does not reside exclusively on the imposition from the West through conservation principles and guidelines associated to the World Heritage system. It also lies on the ambiguous position created by the postcolonial state adoption of the European model of nationalism to monumentalize itself, based on the narrative of liberation struggle (at the national level) and the use of World Heritage processes to pursue nationalistic agendas at the global stage.

In order to understand the complexities and contradictions of the current liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, Chapter Five discusses the notions of liberation which form the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism in much of the African continent and the way that this concept was translated and transformed (or lost) during the transition to the post-colonial dispensation. I focus on the (i) particular history of the transition to democracy, (ii) the 'liberation mentality' of former national liberation movements and (iii) the attitudes of former national liberation movements once transformed into 'party-machines' to illustrate the reasons why national liberation movements now in government have betrayed the cause of true liberation once made to the peoples they claim to represent across southern Africa. Acknowledging the specificities of individual cases, as well as the myriad of agendas and motivation for different interested groups that engage with liberation heritage, I argue that this recent traction that has led to the institutionalisation of liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, represent a specific way in which former national liberation movements, now in government, have tried to respond to changes in circumstances marked by an increasing contestation by the different social groups. These are typically over the content of official discourse of 'the past' (i.e. liberation struggle), based on selective memories of the liberation struggle, in an increasingly disputed multi-party democratic dispensation. This is also illustrated in detail in the case of Mozambique in Chapters Seven and Eight. In this chapter I also illustrate the way 'liberation parties' have responded to the current challenge to their hegemonic power by strengthening the solidarity of former liberation movements and, at times, 'inventing traditions' that did not exist in practice during the struggle.

In Chapter Six I illustrate how former liberation movements have responded to the current challenge to their hegemonic power by mobilising and canonizing the liberation struggle by

writing the official 'history of the liberation struggle in southern Africa' (i.e. the SADC[3] Hashim Mbita Research Project) and institutionalising liberation struggle as a specific Pan-African category of heritage under the 'Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme'. I argue that although the SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project makes a valuable contribution to the documentation of liberation struggles in the region, its main objective was to canonize the official history of the liberation struggle. Thus, although the nine volumes of *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994*, include substantial sections of 'personal stories' told by the veterans themselves, this SADC initiative perpetuates the exclusion of many 'other voices' that are not aligned with the official liberation discourse (i.e. those who do not belong to the group that 'won the struggle' or held leadership positions in the current ruling parties and post-independence governments).

With regards to the African Liberation Heritage Programme, I argue that this Programme can be criticized on at least five points. First, while the liberation heritage discourse was formalised through the adoption of the African Liberation Heritage Programme, numerous local, national and transnational processes of heritagization of the struggle were already underway at the grassroots as well as at the nation-state levels. Thus, the Programme is not an initiative but a response to events already happening on the ground. Second, the recent drive of liberation heritage discourse epitomised by the African Liberation Heritage Programme has broadened the recognition of the contribution of the heroic struggles of anonymous men and women for political independence including countries in the region (e.g. Swaziland and Botswana) seen as not having liberation credentials. However, unfortunately (my third point), this recent liberation heritage discourse has allowed almost all SADC countries led by both the 'liberation' and 'democratic' parties, with few exceptions (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles), to sanitize the often conflicting and messy histories of the 'struggles within the liberation struggles' across southern Africa and therefore has accelerated the 'invention of new traditions'. Fourth, despite the integration of grassroots memorialization practices as part of the Programme in some contexts, the emphasis on official celebrations and forms of remembrance frequently fails to help the victims of struggle to heal the traumatic experiences of the violence in the aftermath of the struggle. Fifth, the Programme has established official timeframes that define and therefore limit what is

[3] Southern African Development Community.

considered part of the liberation heritage across the region. By doing so it continues to marginalise other struggles for liberation and memories of violence often suppressed by postcolonial regimes in southern Africa. Lastly, liberation heritage discourse is constructed and shaped by other discourses (i.e. the discourse on 'community's benefit' through cultural heritage and the discourse on the 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention) and is deployed by former liberation movements now in government for nationalistic ends.

Chapters Seven and Eight focus on the politics of heritagisation of the liberation struggle in postcolonial Mozambique. To understand what draws FRELIMO back to the legacy of liberation struggle more than thirty years after independence, I look at FRELIMO's efforts to undertake selective celebration and silencing of particular 'pasts' for particular 'presents' during the struggle years as well as through the different socio-political and economic contexts of the successive presidencies. Accordingly, Samora Machel's call for Mozambicans 'not to forget the time that has passed' (*não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou*), meaning the evils of colonialism and the sacrifices made during the struggle for independence; Joaquim Chissano's 'conspiracy of forgetfulness' and silencing of certain memories of the liberation struggle (including its heroes) and the recent Socialist-Marxist past in the neoliberal era; and Guebuza's renaissance of the memorialization of the legacies of the liberation struggle, represent the different ways in which FRELIMO elites tried to respond to changes of circumstances and the contestation by the different social groups over the content of the officially sanctioned discourse about 'the past'. Following the outline of the formative years of the liberation discourse built during the struggle, in Chapter Seven I analyse the dynamics and tensions resulting from the operationalization of liberation discourse in building the postcolonial nation during the presidency of Machel (1975-1986). I also discuss the processes and contexts that demanded the 'suppression' of the liberation discourse as well as the multiple threats to this discourse by different social groups during the presidency of Chissano (1986-2004).

Finally, Chapter Eight looks at the heritagization of liberation struggle under the presidency of Guebuza (2005-2014). I argue that given his preoccupation with inculcating a notion of utopia capable of building a national identity to sustain the liberation discourse and therefore to legitimize FRELIMO's right to rule, Guebuza resorted to notions of 'national unity', 'mozambicaness' and to the already sacralised heroes of the liberation struggle to mobilize Mozambicans to adhere to the 'new struggle' (i.e. 'the fight against poverty'), thus

legitimizing the agenda of his governance. At the same time, through the exaltation of the national heroes and their monumentalization (with great infrastructures), Guebuza claims for himself a prominent place in the pantheon of the liberators of the nation, having as its political ancestors the 'Architect' (Eduardo Mondlane) and the 'Father' (Samora Machel) of the Mozambican nation. The implications of the current liberation heritage discourse for other types of heritage and the broader heritage management policy in the country are also discussed.

CHAPTER ONE - ANCESTORS AND HEROES: THE HERITAGIZATION OF LIBERATION IN POSTCOLONIAL MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

1.1. Setting the local scene: The heritagization of the recent past in Mozambique

Since gaining its independence from Portugal in 1975 only three sites in Mozambique have been declared National Cultural Heritage (*Património Cultural Nacional*). These are the historic sites of Matchedje, Chilembene and Nwadjahane (see location on the map in Figure 1) which were recognized in 2008. They are commonly designated as heritage of the national liberation struggle (*Património da Luta de Libertação Nacional*) (cf. Decreto n°. 33/2008 de 13 de Agosto; Decreto n°. 46/2008 de 30 de Outubro; Decreto n°. 65/2008 de 23 de Dezembro). According to the justification in these Decrees, the sites were declared on the basis both of their historic significance and of their symbolism for the patriotic education of Mozambicans. Matchedje hosted the second Congress of the liberation movement, Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* - FRELIMO), between the 20th - 25th of July 1968. It was the birthplace of the movement's strategy of armed struggle for independence. The second site, Nwadjahane, is the birthplace of Eduardo Mondlane, the first President of FRELIMO, whilst Chilembene is the birthplace of Samora Machel, the first President of Mozambique.

This noticeable revitalization of state-driven heritage projects began in 2005 when the former President Armando Guebuza came into power (see e.g., Inguane 2007; Souto 2013). This witnessed government institutions and the ruling FRELIMO party focussing on the memorialisation of the liberation struggle, especially the struggle heroes. Within Guebuza's nation-building project, several monuments and memorials, often incorporating a site-museum and a resource centre, were built throughout the country to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the death of sixteen struggle heroes whose remains are deposited in the Heroes Acre in the country's capital Maputo (Anonymous 2008a; Anonymous 2008b; Anonymous 2008d; Anonymous 2010). In addition, several biographical, historical, and individual memoirs were published. Some were written by state institutions such as the Sociocultural Research Institute (*Instituto de Investigação Sociocultural* – ARPAC) (see e.g., Matusse and Malique 2008; Dove *et al.* 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Mudender and Malimusse 2008; Dava *et al.* 2008; Malimusse and Mudender 2009; Mudender *et al.* 2010), some by the Research Centre of the History of the Liberation Struggle (*Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de*

Libertação Nacional – CPHLLN) (see e.g., Siliya 2011; Dick 2011; Pachinuapa 2011) and many by participants in the struggle (see e.g., Veloso 2006; Ferrão 2007; Mboa 2009; Moiane 2009; Vieira 2010; Chissano 2011; Langa 2011; Matsinha and Sampaio 2012; Pelembe 2012).

The state also paid homage to heroes of the struggle who were still alive. In 2008 FRELIMO made contact with the Tanzanian government so as to preserve those historical sites used by the liberation front during the armed struggle which fell within their borders. The Party intends to rehabilitate several sites: its former headquarters in Dar es Salaam, the residences of Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos (one of the founders of FRELIMO) and Joaquim Chissano (the second President of Mozambique), and the training centres of the guerrillas, among other properties located in Nachingwea, Dar es Salaam (Anonymous 2008c). Making use of the Law of 1991 (Lei n°. 5/91 de 9 de Janeiro) which establishes the framework for the sale of buildings in Mozambique previously owned by the state to national tenants, FRELIMO decided to buy the property which houses the Museum of the Revolution (*Museu da Revolução*), the only institution that details the history of the liberation struggle - the 'Mozambican revolution' (Souto 2013: 291). FRELIMO's appropriation of *Museu da Revolução* raised heated debates in the public sphere as many commentators could not understand how a museum that tells the story of the Mozambican revolution, led by a liberation front made of three national liberation movements, could now belong to a political party rather than the Mozambican state (Anonymous 2015a: 24). In March 2010 the *Museu da Revolução* was officially integrated into the 'historical heritage of the FRELIMO party' (Anonymous 2015b).

Within Guebuza's nation-building project, a new Law (Lei n°. 13/2009 de 25 de Fevereiro) was created to specifically 'protect, preserve and enhance the heritage of the national liberation struggle'. This law defines the heritage of the national liberation struggle as 'all assets of historical value related to the national liberation struggle' (Lei n°. 13/2009: 19). This includes:

> (i) the archives of the Mozambique Liberation Front and all documentation related to Mozambican nationalist movements; (ii) all items and materials owned or used by guerrillas of the Mozambique Liberation Popular Forces (*Forcas Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*) during the national liberation struggle; (iii) the operational bases and detachments of the Mozambique Liberation Front, including educational centres and other places intended to house guerrillas of the Mozambique Liberation Front during the national liberation struggle, having under their command

> detachments from where guerrillas left to fight the armed forces of the Portuguese colonial regime; (iv) the monuments of the Mozambique Liberation Front; (v) the headquarters and penitentiaries of the Portuguese Political Police (PIDE/DGS); and (vi) all items and materials of the Portuguese colonial army seized by the Mozambique Liberation Popular Forces (*Forcas Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*) in ambushes and attacks on barracks of the troops of the Portuguese colonial army or abandoned by them (Article 3 of Lei n°. 13/2009).

Although the national liberation struggle is conceived as a '*political* and *cultural process* that dictated the affirmation of the dignity of the Mozambican people, of belonging to a historically given space' (added emphasis in italic) (Lei n°. 13/2009: 19), liberation heritage is narrowly defined as *artefact*s and *physical spaces* related to the struggle for independence between 1964 and 1974. This legislation also ignored that liberation heritage was *already* protected within the existing legal framework for the protection of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage in the country under the Law (Lei n°. 10/88 de 22 de Dezembro) of 1988.

After declaring 2009 as the 'Year of Eduardo Mondlane' (*Ano Eduado Mondlane*) to celebrate the founding President of FRELIMO who is considered the 'architect of national unity' (cf. Decreto n°. 65/2008; Anonymous 2009), the height of liberation heritage celebrations was 2011, which was declared the 'Year of Samora Machel' (*Ano Samora Machel*). Samora (as the late President is commonly known) had already been designated the 'founder of the Mozambican nation' (cf. Decreto n°. 46/2008; Anonymous 2011b). As part of the 2011 celebrations, which marked the 25th anniversary of Samora's death, the government commissioned bronze statues of Samora for each of the ten provinces in the country (Anonymous 2011a; Anonymous 2011d; Anonymous 2011e).

Running parallel to, but separate from the state's promotion of liberation heritage and also pre-dating it, is public opinion in Mozambique, which proudly remembers Samora Machel for his ideals of social justice and equality, in clear contrast to the current neoliberal government (cf. Ngoenha 2009). The neoliberal[4] economic policy adopted by Mozambique since the late 1980s is believed to be at the core of many current social troubles, such as poor service delivery, rapidly growing corruption, and increased poverty (see e.g., Hanlon 1996, 2010). A Multidimensional Poverty Index estimation, made by United Nations Development Programme in 2011, revealed that 70.2 per cent of the population are 'multidimensionally

[4]Although *neoliberalism* is a site and terrain of struggle with different meanings for different people and political constituencies, here the term is used to mean the conservative macro-economic philosophy underpinning the capitalist development ethos (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 62).

poor' while an additional 14.8 per cent are 'near multidimensional poverty' (UNDP 2014: 5). The FRELIMO leadership is blamed for having quickly 'forgotten' its recent socialist past, and for failing to improve the livelihood of the ordinary Mozambican (see e.g., Sumich 2005; Pitcher 2006; Hanlon and Mosse 2010). Thus, after years of silence around his name suddenly, in recent years, Samora re-emerged as an important figurehead amongst an unhappy public (see e.g., Ngoenha 2009; Souto 2013). For example, Samora was used as a rallying figure in the public protests and riots that swept the country in February 2008 and September 2010 (cf. Cunguara and Hanlon 2010), as a response to the government's unwillingness to tackle the increasing cost of living, particularly high cost of public transport (*chapas*) and essential goods.

Although many Mozambicans openly criticize the current government whilst revering Samora's legacy, for instance, through popular songs (e.g. *O País da Marrabemta* [2003] by famous rappers G-Pro; *A Marcha* [2007] and *Combatentes da Fortuna* [2008] by celebrated rapper Azagaia) and literature (e.g. *O País do Deixa Andar* [2003] by famed writer Mia Couto), not everyone shares such positive memories of Samora. The time and events of the so-called first Mozambican Republic (1975-1986) are so interwoven with the image of its President that for many Mozambicans, Samora embodies the violent postcolonial regime. He is inseparable from the memory of mass arrests and detentions in 're-education camps' (*campos de reeducação*). These *campos de reeducação*, were initially created by FRELIMO in 1974 to re-educate 'prostitutes' (i.e. independent women living by themselves) who were moved from the cities to rural labour camps. Soon the centres expanded to accommodate all kinds of people from criminals and delinquents (*marginais*) to political suspects or FRELIMO dissidents (Anonymous 1974). At least 15 000 people were detained and sent to the camps without charge or trial (International Commission of Jurists 1981). *Campos de reeducação* were the sites of terrible injustices (e.g. prolonged detentions, torture, floggings and even execution by shooting) as Samora himself found out in 1981 in a tour to the camps (LeFanu 2012: 217). Forced displacement also took place under operation production (*operação produção*). According to FRELIMO *operação produção* was a political-administrative measure aiming at eradicating social evils (mostly crime and prostitution) in cities and to protect the gains of the revolution against the threat of infiltration of armed bandits to the urban center by sending the 'non-productive' people to the countryside (Quembo 2012: 65). However, the operation was used to label all undesirable groups in the eyes of Leninist-Marxist FRELIMO (e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses who accept no authority other

than their God, refused to join in with *Viva FRELIMO* [long live FRELIMO]) as 'non-productive' and flew them to the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado where they were supposed to settle permanently and never return to the cities (Quembo 2012: 70; LeFanu 2012: 216).

Corporal punishment and public executions by firing squad became frequent for the perceived 'enemies' of the revolution (Machava 2011: 595. See also Anonymous 1983c; Anonymous 1983d; Ncomo 2003; Zengazenga 2013). On March 1, 1979, the government approved the Law of Crimes Against the People's Security and the People's State (Lei n°. 2/79 de 1 de Março). Capital punishment was re-introduced and citizens found guilty of crimes such as sabotage were executed. In February 1983, Samora made a speech at a public meeting in Chibuto (Gaza province) in which he equated economic crimes such as black-marketeering (*candonga*) to banditry and demanded that offenders receive the same harsh treatment (Anonymous 1983a). Following Machel's recommendation, in March 1983 the government amended Law no. 2/79, extending the death penalty to additional political and non-political crimes, including smuggling, *candonga* and murder (Lei n°. 1/83 de 16 de Março; Anonymous 1983b). On March 31, 1983, the government passed the Law (Lei n°. 5/83 de 31 de Março), which introduced public flogging (in addition to prison sentences) for perpetrating, aiding or abetting specified serious crimes (Anonymous 1983a). In April 1983, several offenders were publicly flogged and others executed by firing squad in front of large crowds (Anonymous 1983e; Anonymous 1983a; Anonymous 1983g).

The alleged enemy within (*inimigo interno*) was the name given to traitors, internal agents, reactionaries (*reacionários*), anti-revolutionaries, traditional healers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and numerous others accused of past collaboration with Portuguese colonialism who were labelled the compromised (*comprometidos*). They were arrested and sent to northern Mozambique, especially Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces (Igreja 2010; Machava 2011; Gonçalves 2012). There they lived mostly in the former 'liberated zones' (*zonas libertadas*). From the start of the liberation struggle in 1964, and as soon as some control of the territory was established, FRELIMO would gather population in bases they controlled. Throughout the war these bases became bigger and gave rise to what were to be known as the *zonas libertadas* in which FRELIMO imposed an administrative structure and provided services to the population. At the same time, the people living in there provided FRELIMO with food, shelter and information (Santos 2010:12). Ironically, what had once been the liberated zones

during the struggle and a source of inspiration for the new nation, had become 'punishment zones' in the postcolonial period (LeFanu 2012: 220).

Countless events speak of the political and ideological brutality of the postcolonial regime. Notorious cases of political prisoners and people who were engaged in unlawful trade (*candongueiros*) executed by the FRELIMO government remain a vivid part of the memories of individuals who survived that period in many parts of Mozambique (see e.g., Anonymous 1983e; Anonymous 1983h; Igreja 2010) as I learnt while listening to some of local residents' life stories during my fieldwork in Lichinga (the capital of Niassa province) in 2013. For example, when I asked a war veteran (*Antigo Combatente*) if he had participated in any activity regarding the celebrations for the 'Year of Samora Machel' in 2011, he replied in an emotional and distressed tone: 'we have to ask: why is it that there is no year of Lázaro Nkavandame? Why is it that there is no year of Uria Simango or Joana Simeão?'.[5] These are some of the names of those who were considered dissidents (*reacionários*) and executed by FRELIMO during the liberation struggle or soon after independence (see e.g., Ncomo 2003). It thus appears that while some Mozambicans may share the current FRELIMO-led government's values of patriotism and national unity (values that were strongly promoted by Samora), not everyone agrees with the specific *politics*[6] of representation and memorialisation that underline these liberation heritage projects.

So what do all of these current processes of heritage formation, or heritagization, tell us about the ways in which the past is being created and negotiated by different groups in postcolonial Mozambique? How can we make sense of Guebuza's heritagization of the liberation struggle more than three decades after independence? What does it mean to memorialize and 'consecrate' a 'Socialist/Marxist and undemocratic President' such as Samora (so described by the Mozambican philosopher, Severino Ngoenha (2009: 10)), in the neoliberal era of present-day Mozambique?

[5] Interview with VL, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.
[6] Politics understood as strategic public claim-making and struggle over public meanings which results from the ability of some groups, individuals or communities to have their values and meanings taken up and legitimized, rather than others (Müller 2004: 25; Smith 2006: 81).

1.2. Setting the regional scene: The heritagization of the recent past in South Africa and Zimbabwe

Adding to this complex scenario is the fact that Mozambique is not alone in its liberation heritage drive. To recognize the contribution of people and institutions towards the liberation of the continent and to preserve the shared legacies of the struggles in southern Africa, in 2005 the SADC countries[7] submitted a Draft Resolution (33C/DR.29) for the creation of the 'Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme'. This multi-country programme spearheaded and hosted by Tanzania since 2003 in collaboration with United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organization (UNESCO), was adopted by UNESCO during the 33rd Session of the General Conference in October 2005 and subsequently endorsed by the African Union (AU) in 2011 (UNESCO 2005a, 2005b; African Union 2011). Besides preserving and conserving the 'vestiges of the past', the aim of the initiative is to 'contribute to the promotion of peace and integration on the African continent, to encourage dialogue and reconciliation, and to revitalise the history of African independence' (UNESCO-Dar es Salaam 2008: 4).

Shortly after UNESCO's endorsement in 2005, the National Heritage Council of South Africa created its national chapter of the African Liberation Heritage Programme called the Liberation Heritage Route, which consists of a series of sites that express the key aspects of the South African liberation experience (National Heritage Council 2011; Houston *et al.* 2013). In 2009 South Africa inscribed a series of thirteen sites[8] under the designation Liberation Heritage Route in the country's UNESCO Tentative List, signalling the intention to spearhead a transnational serial nomination of liberation heritage sites across the SADC region, and to inscribe the Liberation Heritage Route on the World Heritage List. According to the South African justification the Liberation Heritage Route represents a 'common heritage of shared global values such as human rights, freedom, democracy, promotes dialogue amongst nations and cultures and contributes to the memory of the world' (World Heritage Centre 2009). In April 2015, South Africa updated its Tentative List, adding the 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' as

[7] Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and supported by Côte d'Ivoire.

[8] The proposed sites were: Robben Island; University of Fort Hare; Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication (Kliptown· Soweto); Nelson Mandela Sites (e.g. Qunu); Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe House; Steve Buntu Biko House and Zanempilo Clinic; Constitution Hill; Chief Albert Luthuli Museum; Hector Peterson Memorial; Sharpeville; Sol Plaatjie House; Liliesleaf Farm; and Avalon Cemetery (World Heritage Centre 2009).

another liberation heritage property to be inscribed on the World Heritage List (cf. World Heritage Centre 2015).

Although the African Liberation Heritage Programme intends to 'foster the integration of Africa and help affirm Pan-African identity while celebrating cultural diversity' (UNESCO 2011: 85), this category of liberation heritage is currently implicated in a number of different local, national and international projects. It has been called upon to serve different political agendas of the former national liberation movements and current ruling parties[9] in many of the SADC countries (see e.g., Kriger 1995, 2006; Werbner 1998a; Ranger 2004; Thram 2006 [for Zimbabwe]; Marschall 2006b, 2010a, 2010c, 2012 [for South Africa]; Kössler 2007, 2010; Melber 2003a; Metsola 2010; Becker 2011; Becker and Lentz 2013 [for Namibia]; Inguane 2007; Coelho 2013; Souto 2013 [for Mozambique]). For instance, in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government has long imposed a 'patriotic history' that asserted a continuity between liberation struggle and the practices of the Mugabe government more than three decades after independence (see e.g., Ranger 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009; Pearce 2015). In South Africa, apart from fostering the political goals of nation building, reconciliation and unity, liberation heritage, like any other heritage category in the post-apartheid dispensation, is also implicated in the economic development agenda (see e.g., Marschall 2010a; Meskell 2012a). Since its conceptualisation, the Liberation Heritage Route has been regarded as a means to catalyse infrastructural investment and socio-economic development mostly through cultural tourism (Bialostocka 2013: 3). At the transnational level, liberation heritage has also been mobilized to foster Pan-African collaboration between different countries. A Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of Mozambique and South Africa was signed in 2010 (cf. Mate 2010) and the African National Congress (ANC) government has since invested in the construction of a monument and a high-level interpretation centre at the site of the Matola Raid, on the outskirts of Maputo, to memorialize the death of the thirteen ANC guerrillas killed by the apartheid regime during the bombings of 30 January 1981 (see Figure 2).

[9] The former national liberation movements which remain as the current ruling parties in SADC countries are: FRELIMO in Mozambique since independence in 1975; the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* - MPLA) in Angola since 1975; the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980; the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia since independence in 1990; and the National African Congress (ANC) in South Africa since independence in 1994.



Figure 2: View of Matola Raid site illustrating the memorial (left) and the interpretive centre (right).

However, the very idea of Pan-Africanism is fraught and often contested within the African continent (see e.g., Chacage 2010; Olaoluwa 2012). The gap between the democratic ideals of Pan-Africanism (e.g. 'the struggle for social and political equality and freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination' or 'solidarity amongst Africans' (Murithi 2007:2)) and the social reality on the ground has led critics to assert, in line with Franz Fanon's prophetic analysis of decolonization in Africa in his *The Wretched of the Earth* (see Fanon 1967: 134-36), that people's struggle for freedom has been betrayed (cf. Saul 2001, 2003; Saul and Leys 2003; Gibson 2012; Saul and Bond 2014). For many, the African nationalist liberation movements now in government, continue to prevent the realisation of freedom for their citizens due to the adoption of neoliberal policies and an economic order which ironically excludes the people that these liberation movements were meant to liberate (see e.g., Saul 2011; Magubane 2004; Southall 2013). As Olaoluwa reminds us in his analysis of the liberation struggle, memory and freedom in Mongane Serote's *Freedom Lament and Song*,[10] 'true freedom after all the centuries of struggle will be evident only if it translates into better standards of living for the people' (Olaoluwa 2012: 9).

Whilst the success of Pan-Africanism, in its institutionalized forms (i.e. the Organisation of African Unity - OAU), in liberating the continent from the grip of colonialism is undeniable, today it is debatable that the principles, norms and values of Pan-Africanism (e.g. solidarity amongst Africans), have been successfully translated into policies and practices that impact positively upon the lives of African citizens (see e.g., Momoh 2003; Murithi 2007). In fact, the aspiration of having 'an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideal Pan- Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance', as stated in the recently approved AU Agenda 2063 – 'The Africa We Want' (African Union 2015), is a challenging goal.

[10] Mongane Wally Serote's response to the mandate of reconciliation in his poem *Freedom Lament and Song* (Serote 1997).

For instance, in South Africa, the ANC leadership's shift from its socialist, basic-needs-oriented Reconstruction and Development Program in 1994 to its neoliberal Growth, Employment, and Redistribution framework in 1996 compromised the transformation towards equitable redistribution of existing resources among the majority of previously disadvantaged black South Africans in the post-apartheid era (see e.g., Peet 2002; Magubane 2004; Weiss 2014). Consequently, since the late 1990s grassroots movements such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign[11] and the *Abahlali baseMjondolo*[12] (shack dwellers) have challenged the post-apartheid government with claims of betrayal of the promises of the liberation struggle encapsulated in the Freedom Charter (Gibson 2012: 51). The Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People, in Kliptown, on June 26, 1955, declared among other things, that 'the people shall share in the country's wealth' and that 'restrictions of land ownership by race shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger' (African National Congress 2011). However, in 2007, just two years after an extravagant event was held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Charter, hundreds of Kliptown residents took to the streets, barricading roads, burning tyres, looting shops and pelting the police with stones to protest at the government's failure to deliver the services such as sanitation, electricity and housing they had been promising for years (Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008). It seems evident that the several high profile celebratory state-sanctioned projects, such the one in Kliptown in June 2005, are more about 'crafting a political pageantry than reflecting national heritage' (Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008: 158). It has proved much easier for the ANC to 'bolster state pageantry with heritage monuments' than to fulfil the document's (Freedom Charter) promises for the residents of Kliptown (Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008: 170).

More worryingly, the state's failure to fulfil the promises of the post-apartheid era as seen in

[11] The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign was launched in February 2001 to fight against evictions, water cutoffs, and poor health services. In 2007 the Campaign represented approximately 25 communities in Cape Town. It encompasses a wide range of activists, issues, immediate material needs, histories of struggle, and political perspectives, and is an important oppositional voice in local politics (Oldfield and Stokke 2007: 147).

[12] *Abahlali baseMjondolo*, an organization of people who live in shacks, arose from a road blockade in 2005 organized from a settlement on the Kennedy Road in Durban, which was protesting the sale of land that had been promised by the local municipal councilor to shack dwellers for housing. In October 2009, Abahlali famously won the repeal of the slum clearance act of KZN in the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2009). In 2010 the movement had become the largest autonomous grassroots organization of the poor in South Africa, claiming to have 10,000 paid-up members and to represent up to 35000 people. Today Abahlali consists of 25 informal settlements in the KwaZulu Natal, and 35 across South Africa (Gibson 2012: 52; Weiss 2014: 19).

the high rates of unemployment, the lack of housing or electricity is frequently portrayed as an immigration problem (see e.g., Neocosmos 2008, 2010; Dodson 2010). The widespread frustration of many communities with the slow pace or lack of socioeconomic transformation as well as with the failed government policies and perceived corruption and favouritism has at times being taken out on foreigners in the form of xenophobic[13] attacks such as those of 2008 (when sixty-two people were killed mostly in Alexandra township, north-east Johannesburg) and 2015 (when seven people were killed in Durban and Johannesburg) (Neocosmos 2010; Oketch 2015). These xenophobic attacks are often with tacit support of some state officials and traditional leaders through silence, denial, or affirmation (cf. Dodson 2010). Neocosmos observed that while many in the ANC have spoken against xenophobic utterances, the political leadership has been largely equivocal: 'We do not like xenophobia, but on the other hand, how are our social services to cope under massive pressure from immigrants?' (Neocosmos 2008: 592). In April 2015, a wave of xenophobic rioting that swept over South Africa started in Durban after a speech on March 21 by the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, in which he invited 'foreign nationals to pack their belongings and to go back to their countries' (Smith 2015). The king claimed to have been misquoted and refused to apologise (Anonymous 2015b). Although the South African President Zuma, condemned the attacks, he and other leaders of the ANC with an eye to pending local elections, stopped short of criticising the Zulu king (Anonymous 2015c).

The attacks led the award-winning Mozambican writer and poet, Mia Couto, to write an open letter to Zuma to ask whether the attacks on Mozambicans were a sign of his amnesia regarding the great support which had been offered by Mozambique to himself and other ANC freedom fighters while in exile, and at great cost to Mozambique (Couto 2015). In fact, many commentators in South Africa and abroad were quick to point out that ordinary South Africans seemed to have no idea of the support and solidarity that many African countries offered during the anti-apartheid struggle (Mubangizi 2015). The legacy and ideals of South African leaders like Chief Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Robert Sobukwe, Desmond Tutu and the others also appeared to have been forgotten (Muzengeza 2015). In his response to Mia Couto Zuma acknowledged the hospitality and generosity accorded to him by Mozambicans during his years of exile and reiterate the deep bonds of Mozambicans and

[13] Some ANC officials and commentators prefer to call it Afrophobia on the grounds that while the term xenophobia means 'fear or dislike of strangers or foreigners', in the spirit of Ubuntu and Pan Africanism, there is no African who can be a 'foreigner in Africa'. Africans who live here are not considered foreigners. It is a contradiction in terms, to be an African and a 'foreigner' at the same time (cf. Pheko 2015).

South Africans, and of FRELIMO and the ANC. Yet, he also maintained the ANC discourse, conveniently blaming xenophobia on the frustration of South African citizens caused by the increasing number of illegal and undocumented immigrants in the country; the displacement of many local small traders by foreign nationals. He accused some of the migrants of operating illegally; of drug peddling and human trafficking; of taking the jobs of locals by being prepared to take lower wages; and of securing free government housing (Zuma 2015).

It is within this prevailing environment that I echo the concerns of commentators such as Marschall (2004, 2006a, 2010a) and Meskell and Scheermeyer (2008) by asking whose interests are really served by the current mobilization of liberation heritage sites at the national and transnational level? Does liberation heritage represent anything more than the 'appropriation' by southern African governments of former liberation movements, and the 'political pageantry' that is used to legitimise their power?

1.3. Why study liberation heritage (of what concern is it to an archaeologist)?

When I decided to look into the politics of heritage in postcolonial Mozambique I soon realised that the scrutiny of this heritagization process would be a delicate undertaking. It was a topic that some considered to be 'too political' for an archaeologist in Mozambique. As a fellow archaeologist once asked: 'This study is about ancestors and heroes (…) [dealing with] intangible issues related to historical places. What is our role here, as archaeologists?'

Although there are multiple definitions and understandings of archaeology, I believe that such concerns about archaeologists' engagement with politics and heritage are symptomatic of a narrow approach to archaeology and its practice. As Meskell (2002: 293) puts it, 'part of our problem as archaeologists rests with the illusion that the subjects of our research are dead and buried, literally, and that our "scientific" research goals are paramount'. In fact, it is important to note that since the post-processual reaction to the 'hard-science' approach of processual archaeology in the 1980s and 1990s, which brought the politics of archaeology to the fore (see e.g., Hodder 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992; Shanks and Tilley 1987, 1992; Tilley 1989), the discipline can no longer be simply regarded as the pure scientific study of past societies through their material remains. The idea that archaeologists deal solely with the past has since been challenged on the grounds that 'the interpretation of meaning and significance of material culture [of the past] is a contemporary activity. The meaning of the past does not

reside in the past, but belongs in the present' (Tilley 1989: 192).

Consequently, archaeologies, both official and alternative, deal with a multi-temporal present, one that is not sharply separated from the past since they deal not only with the material traces of dead people, but also with the living people who engage with these traces (Hamilakis 2007: 30). Research in southern Africa has illustrated that the use of archaeological sites such as rock art sites by contemporary communities is a clear indication that communities in these landscapes draw on past material cultures to negotiate and reconstruct present identities and ritualized world-views (see e.g., Pwiti and Mvenge 1996; Macamo and Sætersdal 2004; Sætersdal 2004, 2010; Thebe 2006; Pwiti *et al*. 2007; Bwasiri 2011; Jopela 2011). In the same way, many communities around the world do their version of archaeology by reconstructing the past via their ancestors (see e.g., Lane 2011). In many parts of Africa, consultation with deceased community members is an inextricable part of everyday life (see e.g., Pwiti 1996; Sætersdal 2004; Fontein 2006; Fredriksen 2011, 2012). Importantly, ancestors are not abstract beings but real, active and omnipresent partakers in constant heritage-in-the-making (Jopela and Fredriksen 2015). Thus, this study is founded in this broad understanding of archaeology as a discipline concerned with both the living and the dead (Harrison 2011: 160).

I am interested in understanding the processes and products of this specific category of heritage by tracing the connections between local, national and regional events as well as contextualizing past events within present concerns (cf. González-Ruibal *et al*. 2011). Thus, in line with the above conceptualization of archaeology, the study of the politics of liberation heritage in Mozambique and southern Africa should be understood as the archaeology of the recent and contemporary past—that is, the archaeology of places and events that relate to the period of recent or living memory (Harrison and Schofield 2009: 186). The contemporary past is, as Harrison and Schofield (2010) define it,

> That period with which we are most closely familiar: the present, the age that we live in and have lived through, whose fabric and landscapes we shape and that influences our everyday lives and actions (…) the past of our generation, and the generations immediately before and after, of which memories and stories are first- or second-hand, as the period of time we can most closely and clearly envisage and recall. It is called contemporary not simply because it is 'now' and recent but because it is not 'closed' in interpretation nor emotional influence (…) the contemporary past is about lived experience; about human life. In this sense, the archaeology of the contemporary past overlaps closely with heritage, which for us is more a social phenomenon than something physical (Harrison and Schofield 2010: 5).

Within this conception of archaeology, with blurred boundaries between past and present and in which the material remains of the past are mobilized and called upon to create the present (Harrison and Schofield 2010: 8), a site is conceived not exclusively as 'archaeological record' (Hamilakis 2007) but also as heritage (Winter 2013); a space of contemporary cultural production, a locale where partial and fragmented traces of various pasts are often reconstituted, a contact zone that enables various encounters: between archaeologists and diverse publics; between communities and past material culture; and between diverse and coexisting times which are given duration through materiality (Hamilakis and Theou 2013: 181-2). Accordingly, the creation of heritage is a culturally generative act that is intrinsically political (Meskell 2005: 127). Places of heritage are intensely political spaces or 'contested geographies where specific histories and cultural memories may be either enshrined or erased, depending on state sanctioning, collective amnesia, and, quite simply, the willingness to remember or forget' (Meskell and Preucel 2004: 316). Therefore, heritage is always dissonant, contested and constituted in multiple ways (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996; Graham *et al.* 2000; Graham 2002). In contemporary societies, like those in the past, the power to control heritage is the power to remake the past in a way that facilitates certain actions or viewpoints in the present (Harrison 2010: 154).

Archaeology, through its connection with the processes of creating heritage, is also intimately caught up in politics such as the ideological work of creating a sense of nationhood (see e.g. Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Appadurai 2001), making archaeologists' engagement with the past a political act (Harrison and Schofield 2010: 29). Hence, archaeologists and their archaeological practices have always been entangled with politics, whether in negotiations with governments and state institutions, international organizations such as UNESCO, local communities as well as many other segments of the interested publics (see e.g., Meskell 1998, 2001, 2002, 2005; Smith 2001, 2004; Kane 2003; Hamilakis and Duke 2007). So the question, 'is archaeology political?' has only one answer: it is (McGuire 2008: 224). Therefore, a politicized social archaeology represents archaeologists' contemporary engagement with other fields and audiences (see e.g., Meskell and Preucel 2004), and fulfils part of our ethical responsibility not only to 'steward the care for and protection of the past' (Hamilakis 2007: 26), but also to understand our work as part of a broader, critical practice that engages with larger political issues (Harrison and Schofield 2010: 13) such as rhetoric, materiality, politics and memory (cf. González-Ruibal 2008). Given that politics is fundamentally about how groups advance their interests within society (McGuire 2008: 17)

and that both archaeology and heritage are involved in a process of retrieval and memorialization of the past, the study of the processes through which heritage sites are produced, the issues of identity, as well as different perceptions and uses of the past in the present, all form a critical arena of analysis for archaeologists today (see e.g., Meskell and Preucel 2004; Hall 2006; Hamilakis 2007).

Despite constituting a critical arena for analysis, the new heritagization process of the more recent past in Mozambique, has not yet received much scholarly attention (exceptions are Iguane 2007; Souto 2013). In fact, although the preoccupation with heritage, commemoration and public memory has firmly established itself in academia in America, Europe and Australia in the past three decades (see e.g., Lowenthal 1985; Connerton 1989; Nora 1989; Gillis 1992, 1994; Urry 1996; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, Harvey 2001, Smith 2004) and more recently in southern Africa (see e.g., Ranger 1999; Coombes 2004; Marschall 2004, 2010a, 2012; Meskell 2005b, 2006b, 2012; Fontein 2006; McGregor and Schumaker 2006; Stolten 2007), the theorization of heritage as a social act and its use in the scrutiny of the processes by which the past is constituted and utilized by different groups in postcolonial Mozambique is still an understudied topic. The significance of studying the recent heritagization of liberation struggle in Mozambique and in southern Africa at large, become even more critical if we consider the fact that several cultural landscapes in the sub-region, and indeed other regions of the continent, are entrenched with memories of people that have 'fought long and hard, with great heroism and often at great cost, in order to achieve the liberation of their territories from oppressive regimes' (Clapham 2012: 4). In addition to that, the politics of re-inscribing and recognising the suffering of people on the struggle landscape, have gained renewed political traction in recent years across southern Africa. For instance, Zimbabwe has engaged in the promotion of 'patriotic history' including massive exhumation and re-burial and memorialization projects of Zimbabweans who died during the liberation in camps in Mozambique (Chimoio), Zambia (Chikumbi Camp) and within Zimbabwe (Chibondo) (see e.g., Fontein 2009, 2010, 2014; Fontein *et al.* 2015; Bvocho 2015). The National Heritage Council of South Africa undertook several 'legacy projects' which included the creation of sites of national mourning (for example, Freedom Park in Pretoria), the monumentalization of sites where Mozambicans and South Africans lost their lives in the struggles against apartheid (for example, Mbuzini in South Africa and Matola in Mozambique) and the creation of a national and transnational Liberation Heritage Route.

All these heritage projects attest to the different ways in which different actors in the postcolonial dispensation have engaged with the past. Although intended to honour unsung heroes and heroines of the struggle and promote national unity, such projects have often provoked controversy and resistance, and liberation heritage has thus become a site of a myriad of new struggles between former national liberation movements in power today and different segments of the population in their countries (see e.g., Kriger 1995; Werbner 1998a; Melber 2003b; McGregor and Schumaker 2006; Kössler 2007, 2010; Inguane 2007; Marschall 2010a). Notwithstanding the contestation by the different social groups over the content of official discourse about the past, liberation heritage has played a central role in post-independence politics and life in the region and is still highly significant to current socio-political relations and for granting entitlement across southern and eastern African regions (see e.g., Werbner 1998a; Kriger 2006; Metsola 2010; Coombes 2011; Larsen 2011; Coelho 2013). And yet, despite the increasing importance of liberation heritage in many countries, the networks of meanings and practices within which this category of heritage sits, as well as the socio-economic, cultural and political work it does, this is an area that has not been dealt with in Mozambique. This study is a contribution to the embryonic body of knowledge about heritage processes in Mozambique in particular, as well as in the southern Africa region.

1.4. Methodological approaches to studying the politics of liberation heritage

1.4.1. Archaeological ethnography

In order to analyse the politics of the past in the present-day Mozambique and in selected places across southern Africa, this study has modelled itself on previous approaches which have combined ethnographic and archaeological methods as a form of archaeological ethnography (see e.g., Meskell 2005a, 2006a, 2007; Breglia 2006; Fontein 2006; Lafrenz Samuels 2009; Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009; Karlström 2009; Hamilakis 2011). Framed within a broader definition of archaeology as 'the discourses and practices involving things of another time' (Hamilakis 2009: 72), archaeological ethnography can be understood as

> a trans-disciplinary or even a post-disciplinary and transcultural space for engagement, dialogue and critique, centred upon the material traces of various times and involving researchers as well as various other participants. It is a space that brings into sharp focus the poetics and politics of the

> present, being at the same time multi-temporal, rather than presentist. (…) it builds on the experience of not only social archaeology and social anthropology, but also social history, contemporary art, media and cultural studies, human geography or other disciplinary areas (…) it is an arena that enables a scholarly-cum-political engagement, and allows various social actors that are normally kept apart to coexist, share information and ideas, engage in common practices, but also disagree and clash (Hamilakis 2009: 73).

Archaeological ethnography maintains a strong contemporary emphasis and is concerned with unpacking the micro-politics of archaeological practice, the impacts of heritage on an international scale, and the entwined global networks of tourism, development, and heritage agencies, nongovernmental organisations, and so on (Meskell 2010: 434). At the level of methodology and practice, archaeological ethnography involves multi-sited ethnographic and ethnohistorical research (e.g. formal and informal interviews), participant observation, archival research, ethnographic site tours amongst local and trans-local communities as well as ethnographic research on the media (exhibitions, blogs, photo-essays, other performances) (Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 67). Within this research paradigm, I have combined an array of methods (i.e. textual analysis, multi-sited research approaches, semi-participant observation, and in-depth interviewing) to investigate a range of social processes and experiences related to liberation heritage and to gather evidence across southern Africa and on the specific practices at the sites of Chilembene and Matchedje in Mozambique.

1.4.2. Textual approach methods

I conducted a desktop survey in the archives and databases of three universities: the University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, South Africa), Eduardo Mondlane University (Maputo, Mozambique) and Oslo University (Oslo, Norway). Research visits were made to the archives of the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (Harare, Zimbabwe), the National Historic Archive of Mozambique (*Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique*), the Institute of Socio-cultural Research in Mozambique (*Instituto de Investigação Sócio-cultural* -ARPAC), the National Directorate for Cultural Heritage in Mozambique (*Direcção Nacional do Património Cultural* - DNPC), the former Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture (current Provincial Directorate of Culture and Tourism) in Gaza and Niassa provinces, the Administrative Posts (*Postos Administrativos*) of Matchedje (Niassa province) and Chilemene (Gaza province), the Centre of Documentation and Information of Mozambique (*Cento de Informação e Documentação de Moçambique* - CEDIMO), the Research Centre of the History of the National Liberation Struggle (*Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de*

Libertação Nacional - CPHLLN), and the physical archives of the daily newspaper *Jornal Notícias*, and the weekly magazine *Savana*, both in Maputo. Apart from the academic journals accessible online I also gathered information from electronic archives offered by daily and weekly newspapers in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia.

In keeping with the aims of this study, this body of information was used to contextualize the discussions about liberation heritage within the broader debates on heritage processes in postcolonial southern Africa, and to generate an understanding of the relationship between power, memory, history and heritage in the region, with special reference to Mozambique. This formed the basis from which I developed interview schedules that I used during ethnographic fieldwork missions in Gaza (at the sites of Nwadjahane and Chilembene and institutions in Mandhakazi and Chokwe districts), Niassa (at the site of Matchedje and institutions in Sanga district) and Maputo provinces (at institutions in Maputo city). I have also conducted guided and unguided visits to sites associated with the liberation struggle in South Africa (Freedom Park in Pretoria and Samora Machel Memorial site in Mbuzini), and Zimbabwe (National Heroes Acre in Harare) to familiarize myself with the exhibits (i.e. photographs, descriptive and didactic panels) and employed a textual approach to analyse the narratives presented in the interpretative materials at these sites. The textual approach method 'involves reading the object of analysis like a text for its narrative structures and strategies. In museums, the textual approach can involve analysis of the special narratives set up by the relationship of one gallery or object to another, or it might consider the narrative strategies and voices implicit in labelling, lighting, or sound' (Mason 2006: 26). Reading exhibits (including objects, texts, images, audio, visuals and space) as texts enables the analysis of the intended and unintended messages presented (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 21).

The documentary study has also included content analysis centred on heritage practices and state-organized public events related to commemorations and memorialisation of liberation heroes and sites. In my attempt to understand the way in which hegemony and power are operationalized within heritage practices (cf. Smith 2006; Lafrenz Samuels 2010), and to investigate how the official liberation discourse has been institutionalised in recent times, I examined the discourse of state officials in print and television broadcasting. I paid special attention to the widely circulated Presidential speeches of Armando Guebuza (2005-2014) published in seven volumes by the Centre for Documentation and Information of Mozambique (Centro de Documentação e Informação de Moçambique - CEDIMO) (cf.

CEDIMO 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The analysis included other speeches by Guebuza that have been recently compiled in Matusse et al. 2015. I have also analysed speeches of local state officials in Niassa and Gaza provinces for insight into how the official discourse is translated or reproduced at the local level.

1.4.3. Multi-sited research approach

In order to understand the complex network in which liberation heritage is situated, I have gone beyond the traditional conceptions of research sites (as defined geographically) and adopted a multi-sited research approach based on the fact that the liberation sites in Mozambique and others across the region are produced, reproduced and consumed at the intersection of local, national and global processes and networks of knowledge and power (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Lafrenz Samuels 2009; Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009). In fact, a significant part of recorded local history is not stored locally, for instance at Chilembene or Matchedje, but in places outside these historic sites and the process of heritagization in which these sites are implicated also takes place across spaces that transcend the locale (cf. Hamilakis 2009; Meskell 2011). This approach allowed me to explore ethnographies related to liberation heritage in southern Africa across time and space and to examine the social processes at the locality (i.e. the specific case studies in Mozambique), taking into consideration the globalizing dynamics at play on the local stage (cf. Lafrenz Samuels 2010; Silva and Santos 2012). The majority of liberation sites and key locations discussed in the thesis are illustrated on the map of southern Africa (see Figure 3). The legend indicating the site names and their specific location is presented together with the map in Table 1.



Figure 3: Map of southern Africa illustrating most of liberation heritage sites and key locations mentioned in the discussions.

Table 1: List of site names and locations corresponding to numbers on map in Figure 3

Site No.	Site description	Location	Country
1	Ponta do Ouro Partical Marine Reserve	Maputo Province	Southern Mozambique
2	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park	Kruger National Park, Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces (South Africa) and Limpopo National Park, Manica Province (Mozambique)	Mozambique and South Africa
3	Palace of Justice	Pretoria, Gauteng Province	South Africa
4	Union Buildings	Pretoria, Gauteng Province	South Africa
5	Freedom Park National Memorial Site	Pretoria, Gauteng Province	South Africa
6	Lieliesliefarm Liberation Memorial Site	Rivonia, Gauteng Province	South Africa
7	Rivonia Treason Trial (1963)	Rivonia, Gauteng Province	South Africa
8	Sophiatown Forced Removal Memorial Site	Sophiatown, Gauteng Province	South Africa
9	Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory	Johannesburg, Gauteng Province	South Africa
10	Constitutional Hill and Truth & Reconciliation Commission	Johannesburg, Gauteng Province	South Africa
11	Vilakazi Street and Hector Peterson Memorial Museum	Soweto, Gauteng Province	South Africa
12	Kliptown, Walter Sisulu Square	Kliptown, Gauteng Province	South Africa
13	Sharpeville and Langa 1960 Massacre Memorial Sites	Sharpeville, Gauteng Province	South Africa
14	Mbuzini	Lebombo Plateau mountain range bordering South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland	South Africa
15	iSimangaliso Wetland Park World Heritage Site	KwaZulu-Natal Province	South Africa
16	Official Luthuli Museum	Groutville, KwaZulu-Natal Province	South Africa
17	Ohlange Institution and J.L. Dube Memorial	Inanda, KwaZulu-Natal Province	South Africa
18	Nelson Mandela Capture Site	Howick, KwaZulu-Natal Province	South Africa
19	Manaye Hall and Reconciliation Sites	Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal Province	South Africa
20	Kamberg Rock Art Centre	uKhahlamba-Drakensberg World Heritage Site	South Africa
21	Waaihoek Wesleyan Church	Bloemfontein, Free State Province	South Africa
22	Wildebeest Kuil Rock Art Tourism Centre	Kimberly, Northern Cape Province	South Africa
23	Qunu, Nelson Mandela Site	Umtata, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa
24	Mvezo, Nelson Mandela Site	Umtata, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa

25	Mqekezweni, Nelson Mandela Site	Umtata, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa
26	Mqhezweni Great Palace	Umtata, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa
27	Zanempilo Clinic	Zanempilo, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa
28	University of Fort Hare	Alice and Bhisho, Eastern Cape Province	South Africa
29	District Six Forced Removal Site	District Six, Cape Town, Western Cape Province	South Africa
30	The National Heroes' Acre	Windhoek, Khomas Region	Namibia
31	Independence Memorial Museum	Windhoek, Khomas Region	Namibia
32	State House	Windhoek, Khomas Region	Namibia
33	The Heroes'Acre Memorial	Windhoek, Khomas Region	Namibia
34	The Military Museum	70km north of Windhoek, Khomas Region	Namibia
35	The Ntwaesele Thatayone Keitseng House/Nelson Mandela Museum	Lobatse, South-East District	Botswana
36	Samora Machel Museum	Lobatse, South-East District	Botswana
37	The Three Dikgosi (chiefs) Monument	Gaborone, South-East District	Botswana
38	Francistown Bombings (1985)	Francistown, North-East District	Botswana
39	'White House'/Sam Nujoma House	Blue Town near Francistown, North-East District	Botswana
40	Dukwi Refugee Camp	Dukwi, Central District	Botswana
41	Kazungula Liberation Heritage Site	Kasane, North-West District	Botswana
42	Lesoma Massacre	Lesoma, 13km east of Kasane, North-West District	Botswana
43	Great Zimbabwe	Masvingo Province	Zimbabwe
44	Statue of Joshua Nkomo	Bulawayo, Bulawayo Province	Zimbabwe
45	National Heroes' Acre	Harare, Harare Province	Zimbabwe
46	Mass grave of William Monkey Mine	Mount Darwin District, Mashonaland Central Province	Zimbabwe
47	Gonarezhou National Park	Masvingo Province	Zimbabwe
48	Battle of Cuito Cuanavale	Cuando Cubango Province	Angola
49	Massacres of Mkushi, Freedom Camp	Central Province	Zambia
50	FRELIMO Training Camps	Nachingweia, Dar es Salaam,	Zambia
51	Statue of former president Joseph Kasavubu	Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of Congo
52	The Victory (Dialachin) Monument and the Kwame Nkrumah's Independent Arch	Addis Ababa	Ethiopia
53	Bronze Statue of Kwame Nkrumah and Kwame Nkrumah's Independent Arch	Accra, Accra Region	Ghana
54	The African Renaissance	Dakar, Dakar Region	Senegal

1.4.4. In-depth semi-structured interviewing

1.4.4.1. Data generation and analysis

Human participants used in this study produced a wide range of qualitative data including people's conversations (quotations), interview transcripts and memos, observational field notes and images (pictures and videos). All these documents constitute the primary field data of this study (cf. Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2008: 340). Following the broad review of the literature the identification of key research areas and semi-participant observations, I conducted in-depth interviews targeted at people who had participated in the liberation armed struggle, and those who were involved in projects relating to the celebration of liberation heroes and sites, and people who attended events related to the celebration of liberation heritage, mostly in relation to the historic sites of Matchedje and Chilembene. In order to obtain the subtle nuances of peoples' relationships to heritage and the embedded politics I used open-ended subject-oriented interviews as part of the 'journey of discovery' (Sørensen 2009: 169) into the significance and work that liberation heritage does today. Although I developed a general interview schedule based on my key research questions, which was then personalised for each interviewee, to build in personal, professional, and cultural sensitivity, I soon became aware of the limitations of this tool. Thus, participants were encouraged to talk in depth about their personal experiences and freely elaborate on issues directly or indirectly related to the topic under investigation. Although there was a clear theme of questioning, I tried to allow the participants the flexibility to 'travel' (cf. Kvale 1996: 5) on their narrative and explore new areas of discussion as they occurred. After each interview, I reflected on how the questions were understood and any new topic areas that arose and used this information to improve consequential interviews. Each interview was digitally recorded, with the permission of the interviewee, to enable transcription and detailed analysis of the interviews. During interviews, I engaged in memoing (cf. van den Hoonaard and van den Hoonaard 2008: 187), and took notes of different aspects and elements (e.g. peoples' names, place names, conceptual and theoretical ideas, themes for further inquiry, silences and omissions) that came to mind during the conversations.

In order to derive meaning from the ethnographic interview data, I adopted the grounded-theory approach (cf. Bernard 2006). I first produced transcripts of interviews (i.e. a textual representation of audios and short video recording) and read through small samples of text to

identify potential themes and concepts that emerged from the text that would constitute analytic categories. I followed 'inductive coding' in order to become grounded in the data and to allow understanding to emerge from a close study of the texts (Bernard 2006: 493). As the categories emerged, I pulled the data from those categories together to analyse how these categories were linked together and how these categories and concepts were related to substantive and formal theories including my theoretical framework. I finally presented the results of the analysis using exemplars: quotes from interviews and public speeches that illuminate the theory (Bernard 2006: 493). Although I present the data analysis as a distinct phase including sub-stages, in practice, however, the data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously through the practice of writing memos during and after data collection, the use of some sort of coding about potential hypotheses and new directions for the research, and the use of writing as a tool for analysis (cf. Julien 2008: 120). Despite acknowledging that there are several software packages (e.g. NVivo), which may be very helpful tools for handling larger quantities of data (cf. Julien 2008), no software was used for my data analysis due to the reduced number of interviews and my limited knowledge of these methods. Instead, I manually coded the data, identifying key themes and topics, and grouping transcript quotes accordingly using coloured pens and paper (often A3 sheets stuck against the wall) and coloured sticky notes. This exercise resulted in the creation of a general coding tree based on five nodes, namely: armed struggle (*luta armada*), patriotism, material compensation, national unity (*unidade nacional*) and heritage management. Those were developed into sub-nodes which guided the selection of the most illustrative quotations and placed them in the text of this thesis. All interview quotations were translated from Portuguese into English and they are the result of my own translation as Portuguese is my mother tongue. The key issues I drew out of the interviews and analysis of the different data sources are addressed in detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

1.4.4.2. Research participants

Given the need to choose the participants for this research rather than randomly sampling (cf. Bernard 2006: 186), I combined the use of 'convenience sampling' (finding relevant people who are available) and 'snowball sampling' (asking people who participate to recommend others who might participate) as a model for my sampling (cf. Devlin 2006: 54). Employing the snowball technique, I use the exploratory ethnographic and background information to identify participants and then asked those people to list other participants who

I could interview. In this way, I was handed from participant to participant. Some were available and interested in taking part in the research while many others declined frequently stating that they 'didn't have anything to say', while others argued that 'talking about politics with a stranger was a bit risky'.

In order to document and analyse the perceptions of the different groups in relation to heritage in general and liberation heritage in particular, I interviewed people living near heritage sites (including ordinary people, local traditional authorities, state officials), people who have interacted with these sites (e.g. attended State-ceremony celebrations at the sites), people who actively participated in projects concerning state-led celebrations of liberation heroes and sites (including State officials, researchers and academics, heritage practitioners (e.g. architect, museum curators)). I have also targeted people who purposely did not participate in the celebration related to the liberation heritage (e.g. members of opposition parties). I provide the number and brief description of participants divided into fluid categories in Table 2.

Table 2: List of participants according to categories

Type of participant	Number. of interviewees	Description
State officials at central and local levels	10	This group includes government officials from the Ministries of Culture and veterans at central level (based in Maputo) who were directly involved in the planning and implementation of various activities related to the celebrations of the heroes and heritage sites of the liberation struggle. This group also comprises local state officials at different levels (Province, District, Administrative Post) directly involved in the implementation of various activities mostly planned by the central government.
Scholars	6	This group includes university professors and researchers (historians, architects, heritage scholars) who were directly involved in Ministerial and FRELIMO party's working committees for the preparation and implementations of projects related to the celebration of liberation heritage. This group also includes members of the Technical Brigade that conceived and coordinated the implementation of the revitalization of the historical site of Matchedje.
Heritage professionals	6	This group comprises heritage 'experts' with a history of involvement in heritagization processes in Mozambique, including construction of monuments.

		It also includes international heritage professionals who have been directly involved in projects concerning the current promotion of liberation heritage in their respective countries (state officials) or involved in regional initiatives within the framework of 'Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme' as heritage consultants.
Veterans	7	This group include the ex-guerrillas of the national liberation struggle, mostly members of the Association of Veterans of the National Liberation Struggle (*Associação dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional* - ACLLN). Some veterans were directly involved in celebratory projects related to liberation heritage such as the 40th anniversary of Matchedje.
Political parties (Niassa)	2	This group is made of official representatives of two political parties: the ruling party FRELIMO which is the main promoter of the heritagization of the liberation struggle and its heroes, and the representative of the opposition party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), who actively attended the state-organized public events related to the celebration of liberation heritage. The ordinary members of political parties appear distributed in other categories.
Local communities (Niassa and Gaza)	16	This group includes ordinary citizens who in some way (i) interacted regularly with heritage sites in the study; (ii) participated in the celebrations related to the liberation heritage sites and heroes; or (iii) actively did not participate as a form of contestation.
Total of interviews	**47**	

Conversations with state officials at the central level were very useful to understand the genesis of state-led heritagization of the liberation struggle. Most of the interviews took place at the interviewees' workplace. Contacts with officials of the Ministry of Culture, particularly from the National Directorate of Cultural Heritage (*Direcção Nacional do Património Cultural* - DNPC) and the Institute for Sociocultural Research (*Instituto de Investigação Sociocultural* - ARPAC) were much easier to organize than those of the Ministry of Veterans, since I was known to some of the participants for having collaborated with the DNPC between 2008 and 2011. The interviews with the officials from Ministry of Veterans at the central level, especially from the Research Centre of the History of the Liberation Struggle (*Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de Libertação Nacional* - CPHLLN) were more

difficult to arrange partially because of the busy schedule of the staff and also because many of my requests for interviews and access to documentation were not acknowledged (I will return to this point later under research limitations). Although some participants expressed some concern about the possible impact of my research project (i.e. what would I be 'allowed' to say about present-day politics), they were generally very open and addressed several issues not only related to liberation heritage projects but also to heritage management in Mozambique in general, and the challenges concerning the institutional relationship between the Ministry of Culture (in charge of cultural heritage in general) and Ministry of Veterans (in charge of liberation heritage). Some officials from the Ministry of Culture were critical of the model within which the heritagization projects were carried out, complaining of the enormous pressure resulting from the 'double subordination' (from the state and the ruling Party) and the difficult conditions under which each project had to be implemented: 'always rushed'. However, all considered that the initiative of the Party and of the State in celebrating the national heroes was a noble one.

Contacts with state officials at the Provincial (Niassa and Gaza), District (Sanga and Chokwe) and Administrative Post (Chilembene and Matchedje) levels were extremely useful to understand the local dynamics created by heritagization projects and to address some of the issues raised by officials at the central government related to the conservation and management of liberation heritage at the grass-roots level. At the provincial level, it was possible to interact with participants from other state institutions, besides the Directorates responsible for veterans and cultural heritage affairs, such as the Provincial Directorate of Tourism and the Provincial Directorate of Public Works of Niassa, which played important roles in the implementation of the Matchedje project. Some local staff members were very open about discussing aspects of the projects in which they were involved and narrating interesting episodes about the conditions under which some of these projects were implemented. Most of the local state officials were very cautious in their answers and kept a strategic silence regarding some issues (e.g. the cost involved in the projects even from the contribution from their own institutions) and framed their responses around the significance of liberation heritage around the official liberation discourse, even reproducing political clichés.

The interviews and several informal conversations with the group of scholars was greatly facilitated by the fact of being a lecturer myself at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM)

where most of the participants were based and some of the participants I knew from the time they taught me during my Bachelor with Honours degree in History, between 2001 and 2006. Most participants had a long history of collaboration with the Ministry of Culture, having been part of several working committees within the scope of the various projects, including: (i) celebration of the 87th birthday anniversary of Eduardo Mondlane as part of the celebration of the 45th anniversary of FRELIMO in 2007; (ii) celebration of 75th birthday anniversary of Samora Machel and the declaration of Chilembene as national heritage site in 2008; (iii) celebration of the 40th anniversary of II Congress of FRELIMO in Matchedje and the declaration of Matchedje as national heritage site in 2008; (iv) 2009 consecration of the year to Eduardo Mondlane, the 'Architect' of the National Unity; (v) several celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the death of 18 heroes of the liberation struggle; and (vi) 2011 consecration of the year to Samora Machel, the 'Father' of Mozambican Nation. The conversations were very useful to understand the contours of the various projects and the nature of the involvement of each participant in these projects. Since the interviews took place between 2012 and 2014, when several projects had already been implemented, some participants analysed many aspects in retrospect and were able to explain the conditions that led to some of the recurring problems related to conservation and management. They pointed out the 'rushed' conditions under which most projects were implemented and the disputes between different state officials and institutions (some people wanted to be seen as the protagonists of such projects mostly for political gains) who were supposed to collaborate, as key factors. Although some participants were critical of some aspects of the heritagization projects (e.g. the extreme influence of some Party cadres who often took problematic decisions about technical aspects regarding memorialisation projects despite their lack of technical expertise on the matter), all were satisfied and proud with the results of their involvement in these projects.

The interviews with heritage professionals, mostly international experts, took place in Maputo (Mozambique), Harare (Zimbabwe)[14], Midrand[15],Johannesburg (South Africa) and Istanbul (Turkey)[16], sometimes in the course of my attending professional meetings in these

[14] During the *Review Workshop of the Second Periodic Report Programme* held between 5 and 7 November 2014. The meeting was organized by *UNESCO Regional Office in Harare.*

[15] During the *Seminar on Harmonising Heritage with the African Union Agenda 2063* held between 6 and 8 May 2015. The seminar was organized by the African World Heritage Fund.

[16] During the *40th Session of UNESCO World Heritage Committee* held between 09 – 20 June 2016. Here I was able to interact with a number of heritage professionals from the region who were part of their respective country delegations to this UNESCO meeting.

countries. The conversations with this group of participants allowed me to familiarise myself with the liberation heritage projects that were underway in countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia, as well as the outcome of some early regional initiatives promoted by the African World Heritage Fund (AWHF) such as the *Regional Workshop on the African Liberation Heritage of Africa* held in Pretoria between 16 and 18 August 2011. Most participants presented some of the challenges faced at national level and also the difficulties in the coordination of activities amongst countries within the framework of *Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme* for the materialization of common aspirations (e.g. the production of a serial transboundary nomination of liberation heritage sites to be inscribed in the UNESCO World Heritage List).

The process of identifying and contacting veterans of the liberation struggle, residing in Lichinga and the Administrative Post of Matchedje, to participate in this study was one of the most complicated tasks during my field work (I will return to this point when I discuss some of the limitations of this research). In total, only seven veterans were interviewed, all men and members of the FRELIMO party, although this group cannot be considered at all homogeneous. Following protocols, I contacted the Veterans Association (ACLLN) and the association guided me to potential participants. With the assistance of ACLLN, I have interviewed four veterans. This group is considered to be the primary source of information regarding II Congress of FRELIMO held in Matchedje in 1968 by virtue of having participated in the event. They are individuals who are based in Lichinga (the provincial capital of Niassa), at some point held positions in the Party structures, some took office in the provincial government and they currently hold positions of leadership in ACLLN and others are members of the Municipal Assembly. Their personal narratives about their involvement in the liberation struggle emulate awareness of the official liberation discourse with constant reference to the important elements of FRELIMO's official narrative. They often mention the names of the heroes and political figures of FRELIMO and reproduce faithfully the official version of events before, during and after the II Congress. Three other veterans were interviewed, one living on the outskirts of Lichinga and two from *Aldeia II Congresso* in Matchedje. Although Party members, they fall into the group, like the majority of veterans, who had no access to education and therefore no choice but to demobilise after independence and spend their civilian lifetime engaging in subsistence farming. In their personal narratives, these veterans were wary of questioning government decisions and Party policies, and they have repeatedly stressed the desire for 'better material recognition' because the state

pensions for veterans that they have received since 1988 are way below the needs of their households. Although they never challenge the official liberation discourse, during the interviews this smaller group was more interested in showing their contributions and sacrifices made by the armed struggle and the fact this has not yet been recognised by FRELIMO and the state. As one veteran said 'I heard that veterans were telling their stories before the big party in Matchedje, but no one came to interview me. But I was there in Matchedje'. For these three veterans, the post-independence period was full of disappointments and unfulfilled expectations, as one reads from their silence and refusal to speak on certain topics. Nevertheless, these veterans also share the view, with the first group of four, that the greatest gain from the armed struggle was independence, for even if they had not benefited much at the personal level, their children and grandchildren would reap the benefit of this.

The representatives of the political parties were contacted in Lichinga. Not surprisingly, the FRELIMO party official, although not a veteran of the liberation struggle himself, reproduced the liberation discourse in its entirety, emphasising the 'glorious history' of the liberation movement. He was very cautious in his choice of words and intentionally avoided advancing any detailed information about the process of reconstitution of the list of the participants to the II Congress (I will return to this point in Chapter Two). Further he would not talk about the costs involved in these heritagization projects. For its part, the narrative of the MDM representative emphasised the value of historical sites in Niassa province and lamented the state of abandonment and decay of many significant liberation heritage sites. He also justified the participation of members of the MDM in the commemorative events related to liberation heritage on the ground that those are state-organized public events and therefore the MDM, like any other political party has the right to attend. He also lamented the 'lack of democratic culture' often shown by FRELIMO party members and structures who want to 'privatize' state-organized events such as national heroes' celebrations, often threatening MDM members to dissuade them from attending.

The provincial delegation of the Renamo party was also contacted for interview, but the representatives declined to participate in the study on the grounds that 'Renamo does not participate in partisan events', and therefore had nothing to say about it. Nevertheless, the party structure facilitated contacts with its members who fit the profile and were available

and willing to participate in the study (these are listed under the category of members of the local community).

The term 'local community' is used to designate the group of participants living in the city of Lichinga (near the monument named after Samora Machel which was opened in 2012), the Village II Congress in Matchedje (near the historical site of Matchedje) and of the Administrative Post of Chilembene (close to the historical site of Chilembene). Here I acknowledge that 'communities' are complex and heterogeneous, with fluid boundaries and membership, often consisting of groups within groups, with competing and overlapping factions, and with members who have diverse perspectives, needs and expectations (cf. Jopela and Fredriksen 2015: 276). Thus, this group of participants includes people in permanent contact with historical sites such as site managers, tourist guides, people normally mobilized by governmental structures for events and activities at these sites such as FRELIMO party structures (e.g. at the village, Administrative Post, district or city; mass organizations such as FRELIMO's Women League) community leaders (including traditional leaders), primary school teachers, as well as other residents who make a point of not participating in such celebrations (e.g. Renamo party members). The conversations with the site manager at Matchedje and tourist guides at both historic sites of Matchedje and Chilembene allowed me to familiarize myself not only with the recent history of heritagization of these historic sites but also to understand issues related to their day-to-day management and conservation, including the institutional relationship between the local structures and the state at the provincial and national levels.

A common denominator in the conversations was the precarious working conditions (including lack of employment contracts for the position they occupy) and the inability of the various government structures (mainly the Ministry of Culture) to solve the problems. The conversations with local residents in the Administrative Post and Matchedje were important to understand the local history including recent dynamics resulting from the armed struggle and the post-independence civil war. Although all participated in the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Second Congress, some participants lamented (e.g. the village head and community leader) the fact that their authority is often undermined and not recognised by the party and government structures at the district, provincial and central levels. For example, the community leader complained about not having a uniform and subsidy and on the day of the celebrations, rather the government called other leaders from *Matchedje Aldeia* to perform

the traditional ceremonies at the historic site of Matchedje. The participants that are Renamo members, for their part, emphasised in their personal narratives the journeys as members (one participant) and guerrillas (two participants) of FRELIMO in the early days of post-independence and the circumstances that led them to join Renamo. They recalled the memories of the post-colonial violence carried out by the FRELIMO government and the permanent exclusion and discrimination they have endured since the Peace Accord in 1992 when interacting with state institutions. One example put forward is the fact that some Renamo members are yet to receive the pensions to which they are entitled as veterans while others refer to the discrimination between the amount of the pension earned by veterans of the liberation struggle compared to the veterans 'for the defence of sovereignty and democracy'. This is the official designation of ex-combatants that engaged in the civil war (1976-1992). Another example of discrimination relates to the 'patriotic speeches' of FRELIMO members who take advantage of the commemorative events (popular rallies) to accuse the opposition parties, especially Renamo, of not contributing to the country's development, being only a source of insecurity (referring to the military-political instability caused by confrontations between Renamo and government forces that resumed in 2013).

1.4.4.3. Research ethics

Approval for this study was granted by the University of the Witwatersrand and the National Directorate of Cultural Heritage in Mozambique and its local representations at provincial, district and Administrative Post levels. I designed a participant information sheet which was an invitation to the potential participants to take part in my research. The participant information sheet contained a brief introduction to me and an explanation of my role as a researcher; a brief description of the research and its aims; a brief explanation of how and why the potential participant was selected and an invitation to the participant to become involved in the study. The information sheet also explained what the involvement in the study would require potential participants to do and that participation was voluntary, and refusal to participate would involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the participant is otherwise entitled. All participants were promised anonymity and confidentiality. However, one of the issues that arose was the difficulty of maintaining the anonymity of certain interviewees, as they could be easily recognised by associated factors. Interviewees were informed of this and given a choice to be identified or to remain anonymous. The majority of the participants consented to be identified in the final report. I have also designed a consent form which was a

declaration form for my informants that they understood what my project was about and whether they agreed to be recorded. However, the approach was not without problems, as a number of interviewees felt uncomfortable with signing paperwork, as they feared they may sign away their rights to knowledge. Others, who were not Portuguese first language speakers, felt uncomfortable with the vocabulary presented to them. Thus, the process of securing the consent of participants was often continuously negotiated. For those who were unwilling to sign the consent form, their consent was audio-recorded after I have read the text of the consent form (sometimes this text had to be translated from Portuguese to Yao by my field assistant). Each of the participants was fully debriefed after their participation. They were also informed that the raw data would be kept safe in a password locked computer owned by the researcher for about 5 years and that it will be accessible to the researcher and the supervisors. The summary of the results will be available on request (mostly in an electronic PDF format and bounded copy in some institutions).

1.5. Research limitations

The present study had several limitations, including limited access to information (consultation of institutional documents), limited access to potential participants and their disinterest in participating in the study, and also language barriers.

In general, state official and bureaucrats have a difficult relationship with official documents and this translates into their reluctance to grant access even to documents that have been conceived to be shared with the public. This is partly because of the natural tendency of state officials to keep official secrets. This excess of zeal in withholding information derives from the fact that providing information to the 'wrong person' may result in one being seen as in opposition to the ruling government and ultimately might damage one's career (cf. Gonçalves 2012: 30). The culture of a closed state, embroiled in secrecy derives from the 'liberation mentality' of the ruling elites developed during the years of the armed struggle which was then further entrenched by the civil war of 16 years, which followed national independence. Consequently, the access to information was regulated along the lines of state security. Thus, Law 12/79 of 12 December 1979 defines the legal regime for the protection of the secrecy of state. This law was introduced in a revolutionary environment, designed to protect a single party state and in a situation where the state had to deal with a multiplicity of 'internal enemies'. Consequently, the definition of 'state secret' established by this law is somewhat

laconic, ambiguous and susceptible to subjective interpretations by state officials. Under its Article 1, the law states that it is intended to protect the confidentiality of the state in relation to all documents containing classified facts and information. Article 4 of the aforementioned law defines 'classified documents' as 'those which contain military, political, economic, commercial, scientific, technical or other data or information whose disclosure would prejudice, conflict with, or disrupt State and People's Security or the national economy' (Lei no. 12/79: 5). Consequently, for many years this law imposed strong restrictions on freedom of information by blocking access to official documents and data containing information of public interest. The disclosure of any unauthorized information subject to legal protection is punishable by imprisonment ranging from three months to two years (if the information disclosed is classified as 'confidential'), from two to eight years (if the information revealed is classified as 'secret') and from eight to twelve years (if the disclosed information is classified as 'State Secret').

In addition, the decree 36/89 of 27 of November of 1989 which approves the norms of functioning of State Services states in point 2 of Article 4 that 'all information that due to its complexity needs further consideration, should be submitted to a decision maker higher up in the hierarchy from the person from whom the information was originally requested' (Decreto no. 36/89). Furthermore, Point 9 of Article of the Law 14/2009 which approves the General Constitution of State Agents and Functionaries states that agents and functionaries 'should keep secret on matters related to the service even after the end of term'. The same document states in point b) of number 2 of Article 87 that should a state functionary or agent 'disclose or allow the disclosure of information which he or she knows as a function of his/her service', he or she shall be dismissed (Lei no. 14/2009). The result of this legal framework is that state bureaucrats both at central and local government were uncomfortable in granting me access to documents. At the local levels, each state official would refer me to another person who was 'responsible for that area'. Whenever I found the person 'responsible for that area', I had to make further appointments with senior bureaucrats to be granted authorization. Often I did not have enough time in the field to go through the whole process of moving upwards and downwards through the state hierarchy so I was unable to access most of the official documentation related to these heritagization processes.

Another considerable limitation of this study was the sample of participants. While government officials were willing to talk to some themes, it was often difficult to find

participants with the necessary profile for my study who were available and willing to participate in this study. For example, interviews with veterans and local community members were at times very difficult to arrange. Due to protocols, I had to contact all state institutions before engaging in fieldwork and some of them would direct me to other institutions such as the veterans association. Despite being helpful, there was a tendency to guide me to a pre-selected group of participants that have been involved as 'informants' in other projects conducted mostly by ARPAC. Any attempt to look for participants outside of this group was strongly discouraged and blocked. In some cases, the fact that I was introduced to some veterans by ACLLN structures (seen as FRELIMO members) was in itself enough for the veterans to say that they had nothing to say because of the 'structures' (*estruturas*), referring to Party cadres, are the ones authorized to tell the story. This apprehension and silence, the fear or unwillingness to contradict the hegemonic canon, as well as FRELIMO's 'ownership' of that narrative, suggested that veterans were inculcated in military discipline and party loyalty through the experiences of war to a greater degree than others.

The research was also limited by my cultural and linguistic knowledge. In Gaza province, I could conduct interviews in both Portuguese and local language Xichangana, both my mother tongues. However, this was not the case in Niassa where I had to work with a field assistant and translator in the Matchedje area. The consequences of this were that some of the meaning and nuances of interviews were lost in translation (e.g. from Yao or Kiswahili to Portuguese). Additionally, I had no choice but to work with community members that were in some way or another involved in local politics, the nuances of which were often difficult to grasp.

CHAPTER TWO – TWO LIBERATION HERITAGE SITES IN MOZAMBIQUE

This chapter presents the setting of two main case-study areas where I conducted fieldwork: the historic sites of Matchedje in Niassa province and Chilembene in Gaza province. It also presents the products of the recent heritagization projects undertaken at these two sites and briefly discusses some of the issues concerning these projects. These heritagization projects are further analysed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

2.1. Historic Site of Matchedje

2.1.1. Location and setting

The historical site of Matchedje is located in Niassa Province, Sanga district, Matchedje Administrative Post (*Posto Administrativo de* Matchedje), about 600 meters from the Rovuma River, the northern border of Mozambique with Tanzania (see Figure 4), and about 250 km from the capital city of Lichinga (see Figure 5).



Figure 4: View of the Rovuma River, on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania (2013).




Figure 5: Map of Niassa province illustrating the location of the historic site of Matchedje (Source: National Center of Cartography and Remote Sensing of Mozambique [CENACARTA] 2017).

The area where the historic site of Matchedje is located consists of steep ground covered by copious vegetation (grass, bamboo, shrubs, and large trees), crossed by several streams (Mowola, M'singe, Myangachi) and the Rovuma River. These elements were important for the selection of the place by FRELIMO for the realisation of the Congress because these constituted natural barriers that would hinder an eventual incursion by the Portuguese army. In fact, the name Matchedje is a distortion of the word *machenje* that means 'precipices' in local Yao language (Manso 2008: 5). The dominant vegetation in the area is the miombo forest, which is interspersed with floodplains, mountain forest on Mount Sanga and riverine

forest along some permanent rivers. Forest resources are used for various purposes. Trees are used for extraction of wood (some with a high commercial value such as Chamfuta (*Afzelia quanzensis*) locally known as *Nkongomua* and Blackwood (*Dalbergia melanoxylon*), locally called *Mpingo*), construction of hives and canoes, firewood, the production of utensils and handicraft objects. Shrubs and grass are used for building houses, manufacturing barns, producing mattresses, obtaining traditional medicines, among others (Lipilichi Wilderness 2013: 12). The forest also hosts considerable wildlife including lions, elephants, leopards, hyenas, warthog, wild pig, common duiker, various types of monkeys, birds and reptiles. Due to its rich biodiversity, a joint private and community-based natural resources programme called Chipanje Chetu was set up in 1998 (Manso 2008: 8).

The *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje is composed of seven villages: Matchedje, II Congresso (where the historic site is located), Mowola, Chimbanda, N'gogoma, N'Sanga and Nova Madeira. This *Posto Administrativo* has a population of 1513 inhabitants (of which the Aldeia II Congresso hosts only 268 people, around 75 families) representing three ethnic-linguistic groups: the Yao (majority group), the Nyanja and the Ngoni. Although other languages are spoken in the region such as Kiswahili, because of the influence from Tanzania, and Portuguese (only 27% of the population), Yao is the dominant language. The levels of literacy (about 71% of the population is illiterate) in this *Posto Administrativo* are very low, a common feature across Sanga district (Ministry of State Administration 2005). The economic activities of this population are aimed at meeting the basic and immediate needs. Subsistence farming is the main activity (e.g. corn, cassava, rice, peanuts, beans and sweet potatoes), followed by fishing (e.g. tilapia [*Oreochromis niloticus*]), livestock-keeping (e.g. goats, sheep and poultry) and hunting (e.g. impala and bush goat). There is also incipient retail trade, and transportation is made through bicycles, canoes and sporadically public transport (mini-buses) (Manso 2008: 6; Lipilichi Wilderness 2013: 14).

The recent history of the population settlements in the region is marked by the frequent movement of the populations due to wars and also by the weak administrative presence of both the colonial and postcolonial state (cf. Newitt 2009). During the liberation struggle, a large part of the population took refuge in southern Tanzania and only returned in the late 1970s. During the struggle, the population from the *Matchedje Aldeia*, considered one of FRELIMO's liberated zones, played an important role in supporting the movement's military activities. Affected by the post-colonial period war, the populations of northern Sanga district

sought refuge in other areas in southern Tanzania and neighbouring districts in Niassa province. With regards to the presence of state administration, this has been weak from the time when the rights to administrate the territories in northern Mozambique was granted to the Niassa Company (1890-1929) until the later years of colonisation (the 1960s) when some development infrastructure were built. Likewise, contacts with the FRELIMO government in post-independence took place in the late 1970s and then almost completely interrupted until the end of the postcolonial civil war in 1992 (cf. Lipilichi Wilderness 2013; Anstey 2009).

In terms of electoral demography, although the Renamo party had the majority of the votes across Sanga district in the general elections in 1994[17] (48,1% against FRELIMO's 37.3%) and 1999[18] (49.9% against FRELIMO's 39,3%), FRELIMO became the dominant party in the election of 2004[19] (52,4% against Renamo's 39,4%) and 2009[20] (78,4% against Renamo's 16,9%). Yet there has been a rejuvenation of Renamo support in Niassa province in general where it recovered from 13,1% of the votes during the 2009 elections to 40% in the 2014[21] elections while FRELIMO dropped from 81,4% in 2009 to 49,3% in 2014.[22]

2.1.2. The II Congress of FRELIMO

The site where the II Congress of FRELIMO took place between July 20-25, 1968 was divided into three main areas: (i) the camp, where the thatched huts, latrines, kitchen and the security posts were located; (ii) the Congress room, a place reserved for meetings where the monument to the II Congress is currently located; and (iii) the magazine, the warehouse for food products, kitchen supplies and washing facilities. The delegates to the Congress came from all provinces of Mozambique with exception of Cabo Delgado province where the head of the delegation, Lázaro Nkavandame, boycotted the meeting. There were about 170 national and foreign delegates (see the reconstituted list with the names of 103 delegates in Appendix A) including delegates from Angola representing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* - MPLA), the African

[17] The level of absenteeism in the whole country was 12,1%.
[18] The level of absenteeism in the whole country was 33%.
[19] The level of absenteeism in the whole country was 66,8%.
[20] The level of absenteeism in the whole country was 55,6%.
[21] The level of absenteeism in the whole country was 51,3%.
[22] Electoral Cartography of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE). Available online at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/cartografia-eleitoral/#/. Accessed on February 13, 2017.

National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of South Rhodesia and the British journalist Basil Davidson (Manso 2008: 18-19).

The key issues that were discussed, fought over and deliberated upon during the five-day Congress included: (i) organization of economic life in the liberated areas; (ii) the definition of the enemy; (iii) the divergences regarding military strategy and tactics; (vi) the influence of tribal social structures (council of elders or *baraza ia wazee* in Kiswahili) which overshadowed the powers of FRELIMO's Central Committee; (v) women's emancipation and their integration into the armed struggle; (vi) the nature of armed struggle; and (vii) criteria for access to education and the place of the 'educated' in the process of the struggle (Manso 2008: 20). Thus, the Congress adopted several decisions, in the form of resolutions, in the various areas. In terms of military strategy, it was decided that the armed struggle would be a protracted war (based on the full participation of the 'popular masses') and the combat fronts would be extended to other provinces. With regards to women's emancipation and participation in the armed struggle, a Women's Detachment was created whose main functions were: (i) mobilization and organization of the popular masses; (ii) recruitment of youth to engage them in armed struggle; (iii) production (farming) and transportation of military and logistic equipment; and (iv) military protection of populations and promotion of women's participation in all activities and especially in the battlefields. The enemy was defined in terms of attitude towards the people and not in race. A policy of clemency was adopted in relation to the enemy soldiers captured by FRELIMO. In the education sector, it was decided to continue the program of primary school development, extension of literacy campaigns, and the integration of Mozambican students from Dar es Salaam and abroad into various activities in the liberated zones. It was also decided to promote, whenever possible, the regrouping of the populations; to encourage Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries to return to Mozambique to participate in national reconstruction work; and to intensify the formation of the necessary cadres to carry out the various tasks imposed by the Revolution (Manso 2008: 21-24). According to the liberation discourse, the decisions adopted at this Congress strengthened FRELIMO by allowing it to 'close ranks against the internal enemy (the reactionary) and the external enemy (Portuguese colonialism)' which led to the ultimate victory of the armed struggle. For this reason, this Congress is considered the 'Congress of Victory' (Manso 2008: 25).

2.1.3. Heritagization of Matchedje

The first measure towards the preservation of the historic site of Matchedje, immediately after independence, consisted of the relocation of part of the population from *Matchedje Aldeia* and their resettlement, together with groups of Mozambican refugees coming from Tanzania, in a new village around the historical site, now called *Aldeia II Congreso*. The *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje was created for the administration of the territory. In 1976 a monument was erected to commemorate the II Congress. Conceived by the late architect José Freire, the monument consisted of three pillars symbolizing the three nationalist movements UDENAMO (National Democratic Union of Mozambique - *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*), MANU (Mozambique African National Union) and UNAMI (National Union for Mozambican Independence - *União Nacional de Moçambique Independente*), that united on June 25, 1962, in Tanzania to give rise to the Liberation Front of Mozambique. In front of each pillar, there was a metal plaque engraved with a text recalling the great event that took place in July 1968 (Manso 2008: 26) (see Figure 6).



Figure 6: View of the monument of the II Congress built in Matchedje in 1976.
(Image courtesy: Emanuel Dionisio).

In 2006, a technical brigade set up by Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) carried out a feasibility study for the revitalization of the historic site through a rural development programme and identified the following priority areas of intervention:

- Rehabilitation of infrastructure including the monument to the II Congress, the road connecting Matchedje to Lichinga (including bridges, road signs), the water supply system and the office building of *Posto Administrativo*;
- The construction of a tourist centre to provide accommodation for visitors;
- Development of territorial/urban plan for the *Posto Administrativo*;
- The electrification of the *Posto Administrativo* through an electric generator and solar panels;
- The installation of telecommunication infrastructure to allow mobile, television and radio connections;
- The construction of an aerodrome (Manso 2008: 27).

The FRELIMO party and the government created multi-sectoral working groups at central and provincial level, who worked between December 2006 to July 2008 to implement several projects in the above-mentioned areas of interventions. All infrastructures were inaugurated on July 25, 2008, during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the II Congress of FRELIMO. A month after the celebrations, on August 13, the government gazetted the historic site as National Heritage Site (Decreto nº. 33/2008 de 13 de Agosto). Officially, the historic site of Matchedje comprises the following heritage components: the monument to the II Congress; the room of sessions of the II Congress; the camp of delegates to the II Congress; the sacred tree *N'solo*; the interpretation centre of historic site of Matchedje; the tourist centre; the communications centre; and the landing runway (Diploma Ministerial nº. 184/2013: 779).




Figure 7: Map of the historic site of Matchedje illustrating the main features and heritage components.

At the entrance of the monument, a didactic plate welcomes the visitors to the historic site of Matchedje in Portuguese, Kiswahili, Yao and English. The plaque also presents a map with the location of the main elements at the site accompanied by a text (very difficult to read given the small size of the letters) in the four languages about the meaning of Matchedje (see Figure 8).



Figure 8: View of the main entrance to the historic site of Matchedje (2013).

The monument and the interpretation centre are immediately visible from the entrance, but before reaching those, one finds the sacred tree *N'solo* (see Figure 9) and an element devoid of heritage values but important for the state-led performance associated with the celebrations of liberation heritage in this site: the platform for popular rallies (see Figure 10).



Figure 9: The sacred tree *N'solo* (2013).



Figure 10: The platform for dignitaries used during popular rallies (2013).

One of the main elements of the site is the monument to II Congress which was upgraded in 2008. The upgrading consisted of the construction of a new structure made of reinforced

concrete, on top of the old monument thus following the same design of three converging pillars. A mast for the national flag was added at the point of convergence of the three pillars. Individual marble plates were added onto the pillars, each plate bearing the name of an individual delegate of the 170 delegates who attended the Congress (see Figure 11).



Figure 11: Monument to the II Congress of FRELIMO in Matchedje (2013).

Two points merit observation in the new monument: the order in which the plates are displayed and the process of reconstitution of the names engraved on the monument (see Table 3). Asked about the order of placement of the plaques in the monument, the architect described the dilemma he faced in the following terms:

> That [placement of the names] was the most complicated thing I found [laughs] (…) it was the hardest thing. I ordered the names according to the hierarchy of the delegates at that Congress. That was an easy criterion. What I say it was difficult was to define if this hierarchy was to be placed horizontally or vertically, because the order placed horizontally gave one result and on the vertical, gave another result completely different. So, this was the most difficult moment for me, because as I said this material had to come from Maputo, and in this case, there were no conditions for consultation with a wider group. I received the plates the day before the inauguration and we only finish fixing them around 22:00 hours the night before the inauguration. (...) At the end the hierarchy was horizontal, because it gave us an indication that fit well in historical terms, first having President Mondlane, then came Uria Simango, because at the time he was part of the Party's leadership, and then came, I believe, Samora Machel and finally Joaquim Chissano to close a certain historical moment. President Armando Guebuza appears at the beginning of another moment and so on.[23].

[23] Interview with Vicente Joaquim, Maputo, December 14, 2012.

Table 3: Order of the names of the delegates displayed in panel one of the monument to II Congress in Matchedje

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane	Urias Timótio Simango	Marcelino dos Santos	Samora Moiséis Machel	Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Armando Emílio Guebuza	Jorge Rebelo	Silvério Rafael Nungo	Mariano de Araújo Matsinha	Jonas Geraldo Namashulua
Manuel dos Santos	Raul Casal Ribeiro	William Boodya Kadawele	Samuel Robrigues Dhlakhama	Olímpio Vaz
Francisco Manyanga	Alexandre Magno,	Marcos Sebastião Mabote	Joaquim Manuel Munhepe	Pedro Gaivão Odelah

Although there was an attempt to follow the hierarchy of the delegates at the time of the Congress, it seems that with regards to the position of Guebuza there is a conflation between his position in FRELIMO in 1968 and 40 years later. Whilst it is undisputable that Guebuza was the fourth President of FRELIMO (2005-2015) and indeed his governance marked a distinctive phase in the political history of Mozambique, it is not clear how the Secretary of the Education Department, the position occupied by Guebuza at the time of the II Congress, could be seen as the fifth highest position in the political-military hierarchy of the movement in 1968. According to the document of the official speech of FRELIMO's Central Committee, at the time of the II Congress the leadership structure of FRELIMO still included, apart from President Mondlane and Vice-President Simango, three further members of the Central Committee who were elected during the First Congress of FRELIMO in 1962, namely: Silvério Nungu (Secretary of Administration), Mariano Matsinha (Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs) and Marcelino dos Santos (Secretary of the Department of Political Affairs). In addition to those 'first line combatants', a term used by some veterans to highlight the fact that they had been with FRELIMO since its inception, the FRELIMO leadership structure also included: Francisco Sumbane (Secretary of Department of Health); Jorge Rebelo (Secretary of the Information Department); Samora Machel (Secretary of the Department of Defence); Joaquim Chissano (Secretary of the Department of Security); Manuel dos Santos (Secretary of the Department of Finance and Treasury) (FRELIMO 1968: 6). Thus, in the order of seniority which has always be an important guiding principle of FRELIMO, one would expect that, similarly to the position occupied by Marcelino dos Santos (placed 3rd in the hierarchy), both Silvério Nungu and Mariano Matsinha (placed 8th and 9th respectively) would be hierarchically above Guebuza (placed 5th in the hierarchy). It can also be speculated that by ordering the plates with the names of the delegates in a vertical hierarchy, Guebuza would not appear in a prominent position (at the beginning or at the top)

which could have been seen as problematic by the Party leadership in charge of overseeing the project. This element must have weight on the shoulders of the architect, who is a Party member himself.

The other important element concerning this monument is the fact that it only bears the names of 110 of the 170 delegates . According to the historian António Manso who worked directly on the documentation of the history of the II Congress and the reconstitution of the list of names of the delegates, this process was very complex mainly because there was no official list of Congress delegates even at the Party (at least in the archives made available). Thus, the current list of delegates was reconstituted from individual and group interviews with veterans who were appointed or claimed to have participated in the Congress. The process of identifying reliable informants and confronting different sources of information was also constrained by the political context within which this exercise of reconstituting the list of delegates was conducted. As Manso puts it:

> We went to work as professionals in the field, but we had to face politics and other local dynamics on the ground (...) the Party wanted to control and guide all aspects of the project so everything was conducted within the beacons of what they wanted to happen. So, the narrative presented, the people interviewed, the documents made available, all were within those parameters that were considered acceptable by them. We worked with obvious people [laughs], so we did not have much time and access to follow other stories and names that we heard here and there during our interviews. We often came to a point where we saw that one [informant] says that so-and-so was there in X position, and the other says no, it is not that one, it was so-and-so that occupied that position and the worst in all of this is that officially nobody was saying anything (…) we even thought that some list existed somewhere, strangely the Party was asking us to produce this list. But if we were not there at the Congress, how can we produce a list right? So, the risk we faced was having people taking opportunity to take advantage and say that I was there as in fact happened in the interviews, some said that I participated in the congress, participated as who [in which capacity]? This was the question we always asked, did you attend as a Congressman? 'Oh, no, I was there, but I was security', some would say [laughs]. See, he was not directly at the Congress, but he wanted to appear as an individual who was in the Congress, so things like these happened several times (…) I really wonder the extent to which some voices would not appear tomorrow to complain that so-and-so was a Congressman but it was excluded from the monument or even worse, that so-and-so was not a delegate but the name has now been engraved in the monument.[24]

In fact, from the list of delegates to the II Congress published in Manso's booklet (2008: 39-40), and reproduced here in Appendix D, there are only 103 names. However, the monument has 110 names engraved on it. I could not ascertain the procedure which led to the addition of these seven names to the 'official list' produced, but a report from the ARPAC assessing the general situation of the *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje and state of conservation of the

[24] Interview with António Manso Maputo, December 13, 2013.

historic site in 2010 states that ‘the brigade has learned that names of people who were not delegates to Congress were inscribed in the monument’ (ARPAC 2010: 4).

From the monument, the guided tour often proceeds to the interpretation centre (see Figure 12) which is a masonry building built from scratch in 2008. It hosts a permanent exhibition consisting of giant panels, some fixed to the walls and others in metal cube structures (with the panels covering all four sides), aligned in the centre of the room (see Figure 13). The exhibition can be divided into two parts: the first one presents the official liberation discourse, focusing first on ‘Portuguese colonisation’, followed by notes on ‘Mozambican nationalism’, the ‘creation of FRELIMO and the First Congress’ and ending with the ‘national armed liberation struggle’. The second part focuses on the II Congress with several panels presenting the various topics that constituted discussion points and the decisions adopted at the Congress. In all the panels, the text is accompanied by images of congressional delegates and some other images depicting the armed struggle. Despite being simple but informative, the captions to the panels rarely mention the names or positions of the delegates photographed . The exception is the panel depicting the image of Eduardo Mondlane and Uria Simango where the caption reads ‘President and Vice-President of FRELIMO in 1968'. This might also be symptomatic of the difficulty of recovering the complete list of names of the delegates, as highlighted by Manso.



Figure 12: Interpretation centre of the historic site of Matchedje (2013).



Figure 13: Permanent exhibition at the interpretation centre of Matchedje (2013).

The camp of the delegates begins after the Naandembu river (in fact a small stream) and comprises the houses constructed with local material (thatched roofs) where the delegates were housed during the Congress (see Figure 14). The houses were identified with the names

of the delegations based on the province of origin of each delegation. At the northern end of the camp one finds the house of the Zambézia delegation while the houses of the delegations of Manica and Sofala (see Figure 15), Lourenço Marques and Inhambane are grouped together on the western side of the camp. These houses were protected by the various checkpoints (control posts - *postos de segurança*) positioned on the edges and access points of the camp (see Figure 16). Also dispersed across the camp were the latrines (see Figure 17). In the central zone of the camp are the houses of the President (see Figure 18), Vice President (see Figure 19) near the house of the Department of Defence. At the extreme south-west section of the camp is the trunk of the fallen tree. This is believed to be the place where an iconic photo of Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel was taken. I will return to this point in Chapter Five.



Figure 14: Entrance to the camp of the delegates to the II Congress (2013).



Figure 15: House of the delegation of Manica and Sofala (2013).



Figure 16: One of the several control posts around the camp of the delegates (2013).



Figure 17: One of the latrines built around the camp of the delegates (2013).



Figure 18: House of the President of FRELIMO (2011) (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).



Figure 19: House of the Vice-President of FRELIMO (2013).

There are other elements that are classified as integral parts of the historical site but are not located within the main area of the site, such as the tourist camp (see Figure 20) and the communications centre comprising the transmission equipment of the state-owned radio station (Rádio Moçambique), mobile cellular network provider (Moçambique Celular) and television broadcaster (Televisão de Moçambique) (see Figure 21).



Figure 20: Partial view of the tourist centre in Matchedje (2013).



Figure 21: Communications centre in Matchedje (2013).

The cultural significance of Matchedje is presented in the regulatory document for the historic site (*Regulamento do Local Historico de Matchedje*) approved by a Ministerial Diploma, as being associated with historical, socio-cultural, political-patriotic, didactic-scientific and economic values:

a) The historical value lies in the fact that the II Congress of FRELIMO in the District of Sanga, in the Niassa Province, in a liberated zone, redefined the general armed insurrection as a strategy for the struggle hence the name 'Congress of Victory';
b) The socio-cultural value is evidenced by the existence of the sacred tree *N'solo*, where the local community continues to perform various ceremonies of evocation of their ancestors and others incorporated by the Mozambican people throughout its history;
c) The politico-patriotic value is demonstrated by the community of *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje that maintains a daily practice of hoisting the National Flag in the monument to the II Congress, holding of official ceremonies on festive occasions in the history of Mozambique, maintaining the linkage between national history and the historic site;
d) The didactic-scientific value is boosted by the existence of a school at *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje, which benefits from the historic site as a testimony of the national liberation struggle, honouring its heroes;
e) The economic value of the historic site comes from the opportunities that the place offers for social and economic development, through the practice of cultural tourism, involving the ecological reserve (Diploma Ministerial no. 184/2013: 780).

Some community authorities of the area also confirm the cultural significance of this historic site. During an interview with the community leader (*Régulo*) of *Aldeia II Congresso* he indicated that in addition to the 'monument' (as the historical site of Matchedje is locally known), there are two other sacred areas in the region. The first is the Sanga mountain, a long-standing refuge place used during wartime (during the liberation struggle and then the civil war). The other sacred sites are located in the floodplain of the Rovuma River, an area where the traditional authorities forcefully forbid any fishing.[25]

[25] Interview with AS, Aldeia II Congresso, August 27, 2013.

2.1.4. After the celebrations

In the aftermath of the celebrations, Matchedje became one of the points of concern of the FRELIMO party and the government due to the difficulties in managing and maintaining the site. Three months after the celebrations the weekly newspaper *SAVANA* (October 31, 2008) published a report indicating that the Congress room where the 170 delegates met was burnt down, the benches in the meeting area had been removed and solar panels and lamps had been stolen. At the time, the Sanga district Administrator, Mr. Ferreira Mahumane, pointed to the Tanzanians as main suspects of stealing the solar panels while the local community at *Aldeia II Congresso* was blamed for 'uncontrolled burning' (*queimadas descontroladas*) around the site (Senda 2008: 5). Since then, several joint evaluation missions were carried out by government department and Party structures in order to define strategies for the upkeep of the site. For example, a joint mission was carried out in June 2010, integrating researchers from the ARPAC at central and provincial (Niassa) levels, officials from the Provincial Directorate of Tourism, Provincial Directorate of Veterans, and officials from the Provincial Committee of FRELIMO in Niassa. The report produced by ARPAC indicates that despite being rehabilitated in 2008, 45 kilometres (the route from Nova Madeira to Mwoco River) of the road connecting Lichinga to Matchedje was in very bad state. This report also indicates that residents of *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje were drinking water from the rivers and alternative wells because the water pump installed during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of Matchedje was no longer functioning. This scenario remained unchanged until 2013 as confirmed by the Chief (*Chefe do Posto*) of *Posto Administrativo* during my visit to the site (see Figures 22 and 23).



Figure 22: One of the non-operational water fountains built in 2008 (2013).



Figure 23: A group of residents collecting water from a well in front of the seat of *Posto Administrativo* (2013).

The 2010 report also notes that although the *Posto Administrativo* benefited from electricity produced by an electric generator and a system of solar panels, the lack of fuel to supply the electric generator causes the area to be without electricity for several weeks. Most of the solar panels installed at the time of the celebrations were already damaged in 2010. This scenario remained in 2013 when the only solar panels that were working were those of the FRELIMO party headquarters and the tourist centre. The lack of electricity also affected the interpretation centre of the historical site (the office of the site manager) which despite being equipped with two computers, were hardly ever used. The generator allocated to the interpretation centre stopped working in 2010 and had not been replaced until September 2013. The 2010 report also notes that the historical site had at that time 11 workers, except for the site manager, all were seasonal workers, with a monthly salary of 900 Meticais (approximately US$ 20) which they had not received for six months (from January to June 2010) (ARPAC 2010: 2-3). I will discuss issues concerning conservation and management of this site in Chapter Eight.

2.2. Historic Site of Chilembene

2.2.1. Location and setting

The historical site of Chilembene is located at the *Posto Administrativo* with the same name, in the southern province of Gaza, district of Chókwè, about 150 km from the capital Maputo.




Figure 24: Map of Gaza province illustrating the location of the historic site of Chilembene. (Source: National Center of Cartography and Remote Sensing of Mozambique [CENACARTA] 2017).

The district of Chókwè has great hydrographic potential, due to the presence of Limpopo River which serves the country's largest irrigation system, which runs through the district of Chókwè (Ministério da Administração Estatal 2005a: 3). According to oral tradition, one of the versions about the origin of the name Chilembene (or Xilembene) derives from the fact that the area is surrounded by the Limpopo River in the form of a hat (*Xilembe* in local Tsonga language) (Dava *et al.* 2011: 12; Funzamo 2011: 11). Being part of the Limpopo basin, the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene is situated on a vast plain dominated by clay soils, providing good conditions for fishing, agriculture, and pastoralism as the main sources

of subsistence. In fact, agriculture is the largest economic activity in the region and the main crops produced include corn, rice, beans, butter beans, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Several vegetables are also grown and despite cyclical animal diseases, the district of Chókwè is an important cattle breeder in southern Mozambique (see Figure 25) (Funzamo 2011: 9-10). The predominant climate in Chilembene is semi-arid (savanna dry), with average annual temperatures varying between 22° C and 26° C. The low rainfall combined with high temperatures results in considerable water deficiency. Irregular rainfall causes drought and frequent droughts even during the rainy season (Ministério da Administração Estatal 2005a: 2).



Figure 25: A herd of cattle at the entrance to Chilembene (2012).

The recent history of the region is marked by migration and settlement of the Tsonga speaking people since the 17th century, Nguni migrations and the integration of the region into the Gaza state, labour migration to South Africa and major social changes caused by the settlement of white farmers and the post-colonial war in the Limpopo valley. Regarding the origins of settlement and structuring of political power in and around Chilembene, there is the presence of the ancient lineages of Tsonga speaking groups such as Nkuna, Macamo, and later Khosa around the 18th century (Liesegang 1997: 7; Feliciano 1998: 36). With the advent

of *M'fecane*[26], some Nguni groups moved northwards from Zululand and settled in the Limpopo valley around 1821-1822, creating the Gaza empire under the leadership of Sochangane (Manukuse) Nqumayo (Liesegang 1975: 8). Although territorial control remained to a certain extent in the hands of local leaders such as the Khosa, the political centralization of the Gaza empire meant control over the population and appointment of Nguni chiefs. The control of Chilembene was designated to Mpisse Nqumayo and, up to this day, the traditional political power continues in the lineage of Nqumayo (Dava *et al.* 2011: 14). As part of the implementation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference (1884-85), Portugal carried out occupation campaigns led by Mouzinho de Albuquerque with the aim of dethroning the King of Gaza, Ngungunyane Nqumayo. After several confrontations and resistance, Ngungunyane was arrested on December 28, 1895, in Chayimite, transferred to Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo) on January 6, 1896, and deported to a prison in Açores Islands (Portugal) where he died in 1906. The arrest of the Ngungunyane sparked a resistance campaign called *Mbuyiseni* ('bring back the King') led by Maguigwane Khosa. Samora's grandfather, Malengani (Maghivelani) Machel (c.1830/35-1922), an official of the Gaza empire army, participated in the *Mbuyiseni* campaign (Liesegang 2001: 19). According to the oral tradition, Maguigwane had the tradition of gathering his army under a *mafurreira* tree (*Trichilia emetica*) in Muxuvane or Inchovane (Dava *et al.* 2011: 21). Although the original tree was cut down by the colonial administration and in its place a local shop was built, the area has since been considered sacred by local communities and a nearby *mafurreira* tree (see Figure 26) it is now classified as part of the cultural heritage of the historical site of Chilembene.

[26] The term has been used in reference to the era of Zulu expansion by Southern Africa in the 1820-1830s, when Nguni groups moved in flocks to occupy the northern regions of the Limpopo due to the wave of conflicts in Zululand (Rasmussen and Robert 1990: 201).



Figure 26: The sacred *mafurreira* tree in Muxuvane/Inchovane (2008).

With the development of plantations in the Cape and Natal regions, and the mining industry (with the discovery of the Witwatersrand gold deposits in 1886 and Kimberley diamond mines in 1867) in South Africa, and the increasing demand for labour, the Nguni chiefs began to encourage labour migration of young people in order to levy the tax in pounds (Neves 1998: 61-63; Liesegang 1996: 9). After the disintegration of the Gaza empire, labour migration was then institutionalised by the Portuguese colonial authorities for the first time in 1897 (First 1998: 19). In 1909 (with revisions in 1928 and 1930), Portugal and South Africa signed the so-called Mozambique Convention, which allowed South Africa to recruit up to 100,000 Mozambicans a year to work in the mines of the Transvaal. The Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WENELA) enjoyed a monopoly over workers' recruitment until 1966 particularly from the southern provinces of Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo. Between 1940 and 1975 WENELA recruited between 13% and 21% of the male working population in Gaza province (Centro de Estudos Africanos 1979: 4). In June 1974, Mozambican workers numbered 91 000, about 24% of the total workforce in the South Africa gold mines. According to the terms of the Convention, after six months of full salaries paid to the miners, 60% of the Mozambican miners' wages in South Africa would be remitted to Portugal (to Mozambique following independence) in gold bars at the low price of US$35 an ounce. The remaining 40% was paid the workers in *escudos* at the end of their contracts. Portugal (and Mozambique until 1978), with South African assistance, would sell the gold bars at the free market price, which provided a lucrative income in foreign currency to the colonial administration (Azvedo *et al.* 2003: 91-92).

Along with a new religion (Protestant christianity), diseases (e.g. silicosis and tuberculosis), and a new dress code, most labour migrants returned from South Africa with money used to supplement the local subsistence economy based on cultivation, with this income agriculultural tools and cattle were bought. They also returned with knowledge of new technologies such as the plough (introduced in Chilembene from 1919) which allowed the cultivation of new lands, not previously cultivable with the traditional hoe. These elements allowed some African families to become prosperous farmers (Centro de Estudos Africanos 1979: 4). For instance, Samora's father, Mandhande Machel (ca. 1892-1984), was one of the migrant labours from Chilembene (between 1912 and 1926) who brought ploughs and capital from South Africa and invested in cattle, animal traction joints and the expansion of his farms. Thus, by September 29, 1933, when Samora was born his family was already relatively prosperous (Liesegang 2001: 21; Dava *et al.* 2011: 27; LeFanu 2012: 14).

Other significant changes to communities of Chilembene were brought about by the installation of the *Colonato do Limpopo* (settlement or colony) in 1954, located on the right bank of the Limpopo river. As a result, between 1950 and 1952 part of the local population was forcefully removed from the prime areas and settled in the peripheral areas (Dava *et al.* 2011: 27). With this *Colonato*, the colonial regime intended to intensify colonisation of the Limpopo valley with a large contingent of white settlers in order to enhance its colonial power in this 'overseas territory'. At the same time, Portugal aimed at relocating the excess of population in the metropolis, especially the Portuguese peasantry who lived in extreme poverty, while giving them the opportunity to produce wealth. Officially, Portuguese settlers sent to the Limpopo valley should not only develop the country but also expand 'European and Christian civilisation - civilize the native within the parameters of Portuguese culture' (Covane 2001: 226). On the other hand, with the involvement of the African peasantry in the *Colonato*, the colonial state sought to appease and prevent the dissemination of ideas of self-determination and independence through the creation of a new rural bourgeoisie that, in defence of its own interests, would side with the Portuguese regime. By establishing the *Colanato* the colonial regime also wanted to demonstrate to the world its economic capacity in ensuring effective and direct colonisation of its territories and that Mozambique was part of the 'Greater Portugal' (*Portugal Maior*) (Valá 2003b: 131). Although the colonial regime established the goal of 75,000 families for the settlement, the European population in the *Colonato* reached its peak in 1968 with only 1146 settlers. Since 1964, the number of

Africans who claimed the title of 'settler' was prevented from increasing, which did not go beyond 476 black settlers (Hermele 1986: 61; Valá 2003a: 83).

The reinforcement of the colonial presence through the *Colonato* led to the tranfer of the *Posto Administrativo* initially created in 1897 in Inchovane, some 5 km away from the land ocupied by the Machel family, to the seating of *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene (Liesegang 2001: 20). This was acompanied with the creation of other state institutions of law and order such as the police force and a prison (built between 1952/54) where individuals accused of avoinding paying tax, disobedience to the *régulos* (traditional authority), theft, attempts or obstruction of the irrigation channel through due to uncontrolled grazing by goats or cattle were detained. The repressive police force integrated into the lowest category of its hierarchy local agents designated *sipaios*[27], who, in addition to being used in the application of corporal punishment, were also involved in the process of collecting taxes and patrols in the neighbourhoods (Dava *et al.* 2011: 33). After the departure of Samora Machel and his brother Josefate to join FRELIMO in Dar-es-Salaam, the colonial authorities transferred the headquarters of *Posto Adminstrativo* from the present day centre of Chilembene to a place near the prison and forced the Machel family to relocate to the right bank of the main access road to Chilemebne, where the main residential complex of Samora Machel family is currently located.[28] The prision, the former house of the chief of *Posto Adminstrativo*, the three houses of the *sipaios* and the ruins of the former headquaters of *Posto Adminstrativo* of Chilembene, have all been declared part of the heriatge of the historic site of Chilembene.

With the independence and nationalisation of the land, the Africans and the Portuguese 'settlers' who remained in the country were expropriated from the land and the irrigated lands of Chilembene were exploited by the Limpopo State Agro-Industrial Complex Company (CAIL) constituted in 1978. Under CAIL, rice cultivation became almost a monoculture in the Limpopo valley. The resettlement of population affected by massive floods of 1977 in communal villages (*aldeias comunais*) contributed to the decline in productivity. Thus, in 1983-84 CAIL was restructured and the land redistributed. Two state-owned enterprises, LOMACO and Empresa de Chilembene received 600 and 1300 hectares of land respectively.

[27] The term *sipaio* refers to an African policeman usually assigned to a lower level administrator or to the (African) régulo (chief) in colonial Mozambique. When attached to the régulo, the cipaio's function was to help recruit workers, arrest and beat individuals suspected of crimes or disobedience, and carry messages. Often, the ire of the Africans was directed toward the cipaio, although in most cases he simply followed to the letter the orders of his superiors (Azvedo *et al.* 2003: 64).

[28] Interview with Inácio Ossivane, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.

Further, 800 hectares were distributed to the peasants in areas of 0.5 to 4 hectares and to the old settlers, between 4 and 16 hectares (Mosca 1996: 64). The social instability created by the civil war context, the inability of the state to run state-owned enterprises, the recurrent calamities of droughts that affected the area between 1983-85 and the Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank between 1987-90, all had severe impacts on Chilemebene's agrarian economy. The result was the deterioration of technical conditions of the irrigation system, decline in numbers of cattle (due to theft, illness, and starvation) with repercussions on the ability to cultivate the land and steep decline in the productivity of all major crops. This resulted in the 'impoverishment of the majority of the population given the high loss of local employment as well as the reduction of food self-sufficiency' (Mosca 1996: 85), which continues to characterise the area considered as the 'basket of southern Mozambique' in official political discourse.

In 1996, the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene had a population of about 10,900 inhabitants, of which 4,600 (42%) were displaced/affected by war and came from neighbouring districts of Guija, Chibuto and Macia-Bilene (Mosca 1996: 64). The intensity and violence of the postcolonial civil war between FRELIMO and Renamo in many districts of Gaza (cf. Roesch 1996) remain vivid in the memory of residents of Chilembene and has been significant in the structuring of the present day political affiliation at the local level.[29] The memories of war coupled with the perception of Gaza being the cradle of the leadership of FRELIMO (the first three Presidents of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano are all from Gaza) results in the overwhelming electoral support of FRELIMO and general aversion of the local population towards Renamo (Brito 2015: 5), as illustrated by the results of the general elections in the district of Chókwè over the years. In 1994 FRELIMO obtained 83% of the votes (against the 2.6% of Renamo), 86.5% (against 4% of Renamo) in 1999, 94.5% (against 1.5% of Renamo) in 2004 and 97.3% (against 1% of Renamo) in 2009.[30]

[29] Interviews with CM, and BC, Chilembene, December 15, 2014.
[30] Electoral Cartography of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE). Available online at: http://www.iese.ac.mz/cartografia-eleitoral/#/. Accessed on February 13, 2017.

2.2.2. Heritagization of Chilembene

Although the heritagization around the figure of Samora began immediately after his death in 1986, there are no records of major projects in Chilembene during the Joaquim Chissano Presidency (1986-2004). One of the first actions was the musealization of a prefabricated house used by Samora Machel as the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. The house was built by the then Minister of Public Works, Júlio Carrilho, shortly after independence, on the occasion of Samora's marriage with Graça Simbine (later Machel) on September 7, 1975 (see Figure 27 and number 13 [*casa/pais*] on the map of Figure 30).



Figure 27: View of the house-museum of Samora Machel (2012).

It appears that the first memorial to Samora Machel built in public space in Chilembene was the monument with a bust located in the roundabout next to the current headquarters of *Posto Administrativo* (see Figure 28 and number 1 [*Monumento*] on the map of Figure 30).



Figure 28: Monument with a bust of Samora Machel in Chilembene (2008).

In 1996, numerous events were held as part of the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of Samora's death. At UEM, intellectuals and historical leaders of FRELIMO, such as Sérgio Vieira and Marcelino dos Santos, gathered to evoke the 'father of the nation'. In those days, Mocambique Television (TVM) presented a documentary under the title 'Samora and the People', which began with an effusive speech by Samora during the period of the so-called 'Political and Organisational Offensive' in 1980. The then South African President Nelson Mandela was invited by President Chissano to attend a state-led ceremony to 'honour who, along with him, had been a fighter against the apartheid regime and an unconditional friend of the South African people' (Macagno 2009: 18). As part of the celebrations, on October 19, 1996, Chissano visited Chilembene and planted a baobab tree at the place where Samora was born and his umbilical cord was supposedly buried (see Figure 29) (LeFanu 2012: 20).



Figure 29: Baobab sapling, marking the site of Samora's birth, planted by President Chissano in 1996. (source: http://www.sarahlefanu.co.uk/photos-from-mozambique.html).

In 2008, the historic site of Chiemebene was classified as National Cultural Heritage as part of the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the birth of Samora Machel. The historic site of Chilembene comprises an area of 5,250 hectares and the location of key heritage elements are presented in the map that accompanied the Decree (Decreto no. 46/2008 de 30 de Outubro) which is reproduced here in Figure 30. In what follows I present the other heritage components classified in 2008 referring to the numerical key used in the map (Figure 30).




Figure 30: Map illustrating the location of heritage components and the limits of historic site of Chilembene gazetted in 2008. (source: Decreto n°. 46/2008 de 30 de Outubro).

The *Escola/Samora* (number 2 on the map of Figure 30) refers to the Primary School of Marrambadjane built in 1925 or 1927 and officially designated Rudimentary School No. 21 of Uamuchinga (*Escola Rudimentar nº 21 de Uamuchinga*) (see Figure 31). The building follows the standard of primary schools for Africans built by the colonial state at the time. These consisted of one room with a raised floor, low walls and a ceiling resting on pillars. The room has no divisions between the classes, only two small cabinets for the teacher (Liesegang 2001: 24). This was the first educational establishment frequented by Samora Machel, having entered in 1941 at the age of 8. The school was also used as a hiding place of pamphlets about FRELIMO and the national liberation struggle to be distributed in Lourenço Marques (Dava *et al* 2011: 23). The *Igreja* (number 3 on the map of Figure 30) refers to the chapel of the Catholic church located right next to the Primary School of Marrambadjane (see Figure 32). It was founded in the early 1940s after the signing of the agreements between the Catholic Church and the Portuguese government, the Concordat and Missionary Agreement (*Concordata e Acordo Missionário*) on May 7, 1940. With this agreement, the Catholic church gained the exclusivity of the education of non-assimilated Africans in Portuguese colonies, which allowed the expansion of Catholicism and the repression of Protestants (Dava *et al.* 2011: 38). In 1943 Samora was expelled from the Primary School of Marrambadjane, already controlled by the Catholic church, most likely because his parents were Protestant (Liesegang 2001: 24).



Figure 31: Primary school of Marrambadjane (2008).



Figure 32: Chapel of the Catholic church near the primary school of Marrambandjane (2008).

A number of landmarks represented on the map are points that indicate the geographical boundaries of the gazetted area of the historical site. This is the case of Nwamutchinga (number 4 on the map of Figure 30), also designated Uamexinga, is the homestead of the

former Queen of Chilembene belonging to the Nqumayo dynasty (see Figure 33); *Ponteca* (number 5 on the map of Figure 30), a small bridge on the main road (EN 205) to Chilembene (see Figure 34); *Contornos do Limpopo* (numbers 7-11 on the map of Figure 30), landmarks that follow the outlines of the Limpopo River (see Figure 35); and the *Estação de Bombagem* (number 15 on the map of Figure 30), a pumping station. The boundaries of the gazetted area also tried to include other places of cultural significance in the region such as the *Nascente* (number 14 on the map of Figure 30), a spring considered sacred by the local communities (see Figure 36).



Figure 33: Partial view of the Nwamutchinga homestead (2008).



Figure 34: *Ponteca* (small bridge) on a main road to Chilembene (2008).



Figure 35: One of the bends (*contornos*) of the Limpopo River (2008).



Figure 36: Sacred *nascente* (spring) in Chilembene (2008).

The *Berço/Samora* (number 12 on the map of Figure 30) or the 'Cradle' of Samora Machel, refers to the place where Samora was born at the original house of the Machel family near the edge of the high area (known as *nthlaveni*) before the family was removed to the present-day

space where the Samora Machel house-museum is located, together with other family houses. The exact point of the 'Cradle' is marked by a tree planted by President Armando Gubuza on September 29, 2008, during the celebrations of the 75th birth anniversary of Samora Machel. In front of the tree there is a marble interpretation plate that reads:

> Samora Moisés Machel, founder of the Mozambican State and first President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, was born here. This tree was planted on September 29, 2008 by His Excellency Armando Emílio Guebuza, President of the Republic of Mozambique, in honor of President Samora Moisés Machel, on the occasion of the celebrations of the 75th Anniversary of his birth[31] (see Figure 37).

Interestingly, the baobab tree planted in 1996 by President Chissano is not mentioned in the 2008 Decree that gazetted the site, it is unidentifiable on the site and none of the participants I interviewed (excluding members of the Machel family) seems to know about this tree.



Figure 37: The tree representing the 'Cradle' of Samora Machel and the didactic plate (2012).

The list of heritage components at Chilemebene was then enlarged as a result of memorialization projects undertaken as part of the celebration of the 'Year of Samora Machel' in 2011, aimed at celebrating the 25th anniversary of the death of the 'founder of the Mozambican nation' (Diploma Ministerial nº. 183/2013 de 18 de Outubro). The celebrations

[31] Translation from the original Portuguese text *Nasceu neste local Samora Moisés Machel fundador do Estado Moçambicano e primeiro Presidente da República Popular de Moçambique. Esta arvore foi plantada a 29 de Setembro de 2008, por sua Excelência Armando Emílio Guebuza, Presidente da República de Moçambique, em homenagem ao Presidente Samora Moisés Machel, por ocasião das celebrações do 75º Aniversario do seu nascimento*.

included two major programs: the construction in all provincial capitals and later in Chilembene of monuments with statues of Samora Machel and the creation of the Samora Machel Center for Knowledge and Development (*Centro de Conhecimento e Desenvolvimento Samora Machel* - CCDSM) (República de Moçambique 2011: 2). Apart from the construction of a monument with a statue, Chilemebene benefited from a construction of a monument to Josina Machel and the rehabilitation of places considered to be of heritage value. Thus, the main area of the historic site now comprises two main complexes: the 'cradle' of Samora Machel complex and Samora Machel residential complex, as illustrated on the map of the site in Figure 38.




Figure 38: Map of the historic site of Chilembene illustrating main features and heritage components.

The 'Cradle' of Samora Machel complex (number 6 on the map of Figure 38) comprises, apart from the birth place (*Berço*) of Samora Machel (see Figure 37):

- The former residence of the chief of *Posto Administrativo* (*Chefe do Posto*) of Chilembene which has been converted into a digital resources center (*Centro de Inclusão Digital*) (see Figure 39);
- The prison building of the International Police of Defense of the State (PIDE) and Directorate General of Security (DGS) (see Figure 40);
- The three residences of the *sipaios* (see caption 'G' in the map of Figure 38);
- The ruins of the former secretariat of the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene (see Figure 41).



Figure 39: The former residence of *Chefe do Posto* and current *Centro de Inclusão Digital* (on the left) which houses a model of the historic site (on the right) (2012).



Figure 40: Old prison building of PIDE-DGS (2012).



Figure 41: Ruins of the former secretariat of the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene (2012).

The monument to Samora Machel built in 2011 is located on the eastern side of the 'Cradle' of the Samora Machel complex. Between the monument and the 'Cradle' there is a platform for public rallies (*comícios populares*) (see Figure 42).



Figure 42: View of the platform for *comícios populares* and the monument to Samora Machel (2015).

The monument to Samora Machel has a 50 meter-diameter base, slightly elevated off the flood plain. In the centre is the monument with a bronze statue of Samora, who appears in one of his emblematic postures, with one hand on his waist and the other hand up in the air with his index finger raised. To the right of the statue are eleven columns, 4 metres high, lined-up in a crescent shape. The eleven columns are symbolic of the 11 provinces of the country as well as with the years of governance of Samora (1975-1986). At the lower part of each column is a portrait forming a gallery with images of the different episodes of the life of Samora as a guerrilla and statesman. Away from and opposite the eleven columns, there is an aquarium with the contours of the coastline of Mozambique, representing the 'pear of the Indian Ocean', as the country is often referred to in the political discourse (see Figure 43).



Figure 43: Front view of the monument to Samora Machel (2012).

On the opposite side of the main road, one finds the Samora Machel residence complex which includes, apart from the house-museum of Samora Machel, the houses of members of Machel family (Machel's brothers, mother, grandmother, children), the residence of the Ministers and the family cemetery (see Figure 44). Next to this residential complex is located

the monument to Josina Machel, inaugurated on April 7, 2011 as part of the celebration of the 40th anniversary of her death (see Figure 45).



Figure 44: House of Samora Machel's mother, Gugiye Dzimba (2012).



Figure 45: Monument to Josina Machel built in 2011 (2012).

The second major component of the celebrations of 'Year Samora Machel' consisted in the development of the Samora Machel Knowledge and Development Center (CCDSM), a programme which aggregated 10 main areas of intervention under different government departments aiming to maximize social, economic and cultural potentialities of Chilembene. One of the CCDSM components consists of a fish farming project (*Piscicultura*) (see Figure 46). According to the National Director of the Institute of Aquaculture, Mrs. Isabel Omar, interviewed during the inauguration on September 29, 2011, this project comprises four tanks with a productive capacity of 10 tons where tilapia fish (*Oreochromis niloticus*) were being cultivated. The project aimed not only at building capacity amongst residents but also at repopulating the lagoons of Chilembene and further afield in Gaza province.



Figure 46: Tanks of the fish farming project (*Piscicultura*) in Chilembene (2012).

Several CCDSM projects were developed outside the historic site of Chilembene but still within the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene such as the construction of new petrol station (see Figure 47) and a hotel (see Figure 48) located some 8 km from the historic site.



Figure 47: Petrol station (*bombas de abastecimento*) of Chilembene (2012).



Figure 48: Hotel Kapulana in Chilembene (2012).

The cultural significance of Chilembene is presented in the *Regulamento do Local Histórico de Chilembene*, approved by a Ministerial Diploma, as being associated with historical, socio-cultural, political-patriotic, didactic-scientific and economic values:

a) The historical value of Chilemebene stems from the fact that this is the place where the liberator of the Mozambican fatherland, the founder of the Mozambican state and first President of the People's Republic of Mozambique was born;
b) Socio-cultural value is evidenced by the existence of the M'chovane *mafurreira*, a sacred tree venerated by the local population, at a few kilometres from Chilembene, as it was where the resistance warrior against the colonial occupation, Maguiguane Cossa, convened his army during the frequent route between Tchaimite, Magul and Mapulanguene;
c) The politico-patriotic value is signalled by the role played by President Samora Moisés Machel and his family, as well as by the existence of the community of the Administrative Post of Chilembene that maintains a daily practice of hoisting the National Flag, performing official ceremonies on dates of the history of Mozambique;
d) The didactic-scientific value is justified by the existence of two schools in the Village of Chilembene, which use the cultural heritage of this place as a testimony of the National Liberation Armed Forces, honouring its heroes, with emphasis on President Samora Moisés Machel. The Government has organised, in a systematic way, youth days, creating opportunities for patriotic education, through the testimony of the Historical Site of Chilembene on the effort undertaken by President Samora Moises Machel with a view to national liberation (Article 4 of Diploma Ministerial n°. 183/2013).

2.2.3. After the celebrations

On September 29, 2011, Chilembene hosted the state ceremony as part of the celebrations of the 'Year of Samora Machel'. In the company of the FRELIMO party leadership and distinguished guests such as the President Seretse Khama Ian Khama of Botswana and President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, President Guebuza led the

celebrations which included the visit and inauguration of the various enterprises that are part of the CCDSM. In an official tour, Guebuza inaugurated several projects including the digital unit, the agro-processing centre, a corral, an agricultural fair, fish farming project, petrol station, community forest project and at the end a monument to Samora Machel. This was followed by a *comício popular* (popular rally). It was not possible to evaluate the current state of all these projects inaugurated in 2011. However, contrary to the Matchedje scenario, the immovable cultural heritage components of Chilembene are still in a good state of conservation. Both Matchedje and Chilembene only had their respective regulatory framework approved five years after they were declared a National Cultural Heritage sites. This delay was the cause of major management problems due to lack of allocated funding and permanent site managers from the government. Both historic sites had their management framework[32] officially approved by the government in 2013, although they are not yet fully functional due to the difficulty of the state in funding the up-keep of these heritage sites. Despite this, Chilembene appears best preserved when compared to Matchedje because it is located in a peri-urban environment close to central government agencies (approximately 150km from Maputo). Also, the heritage components are built in more solid materials (masonry buildings) which benefited from a more recent intervention (2011), and most importantly, the custodian of Chilembene is a private entity, the Samora Moses Machel Foundation, and not the State, as is the case of Matchedje, which is the under the responsibility of the District Administration of Sanga through the *Posto Administrativo* of Matchedje (cf. Diploma Ministerial no. 183/2013 de 18 de Outubro; Diploma Ministerial no. 184/2013 de 18 de Outubro). Nevertheless, Chilembene still presents similar problems to Matchedje due to lack of state funding and full operationalization of its management framework. For instance, although nine tour guides were trained in 2011 none of them were formally employed and today only one person is still working on a voluntary basis as the official guide at the site. As Mr. Ossivane puts it, 'I'm still working as a guide just because of patriotism'.[33]

[32] According to the Regulation, these historical sites are managed by a Director appointed by the sector that oversees the area of culture (on proposal of the provincial government and recommendation of the sector that oversees the area of the veterans); a Management Committee composed of the Director, representatives of the project implementation units; and a Council of the Historical Site which includes representatives of all the administrative institutions of the historical site, two representatives of the central government (departments of culture and veterans), a representative of the Provincial Government, District Government, Administrative Post, the Association of Veterans of the National Liberation Struggle (ACLLN), representatives of the veterans of the National Liberation Struggle, representatives of civil society, one of them from the local community (see Diploma Ministerial nº. 183/2013 de 18 de Outubro; Diploma Ministerial nº. 184/2013 de 18 de Outubro).
[33] Interview with Inácio Ossivane, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.

CHAPTER THREE - HERITAGE DISCOURSES AND COLONIALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the advent of colonialism in Africa the official discourse about what constitutes heritage has been defined and institutionalized through legal instruments (Ndoro and Pwiti 1999). Such heritage legislation and policy has always been controlled by the political and intellectual elites (Díaz-Andreu 2007). Most importantly, at national and international levels, heritage legislation has come to determine the 'regulation of powers, what is to be protected and how' (Ndoro *et al.* 2008: 34). In Mozambique, since 1988, cultural heritage has been defined as 'a set of tangible and intangible assets created or incorporated by the Mozambican people throughout history, relevant to the definition of the Mozambican cultural identity' (Article 3 of Lei n°. 10/88). Yet, the heritage of the national liberation struggle is officially defined exclusively as 'all *assets of historical value* related to the national liberation struggle' (Article 3 of Lei n°. 13/2009). No other southern African country has a specific legal document that defines liberation heritage, which is usually treated as a category within the existing heritage legislation. For instance, in Zambia liberation heritage is officially termed 'liberation war sites' and like any other tangible cultural heritage in the country it is under the management of the National Heritage Conservation Commission, a statutory body established according to the National Heritage Conservation Commission Act, Chapter 173 of the Laws of Zambia. By virtue of this Act, liberation war sites, many of which are burial sites and buildings, are classified as 'ancient heritage' (Chipote 2011).

These definitions of what constitutes the heritage of the struggle appears not to account for all constitutive elements of the national liberation struggles, which were commonly conceived by the national liberation movements as '*political* and *cultural process[es]* that dictated the affirmation of the dignity of the [African] people of belonging to a historically given space' (added emphasis in italic) (Lei n°. 13/2009: 19). Thus, the obvious question that comes to mind is: if heritage and the liberation struggle were broadly defined as political and cultural processes, as illustrated in the case of Mozambique, why is it that in the recent heritagization process across southern Africa, particularly in Mozambique, liberation heritage is overwhelmingly defined exclusively as the 'historic material remains' related to the struggle for independence? The narrow conception of heritage and particularly that of liberation

heritage held by some elite groups[34] in southern Africa in general, and Mozambique in particular, derives partially from the heavy influence of hegemonic Western notions of heritage which, coupled with nationalistic state craft and nation building agendas of those African elites, has been inherited, reproduced and re-appropriated in the post-independence period across the continent. This argument will be illustrated throughout the thesis.

This chapter is divided into three interrelated sections. In the first section I demonstrate how the conventional definition of heritage, including that of liberation heritage, with focus on material culture, is incapable to account for the various and contradictory ways different social actors produce, use and mobilize heritage. Such conceptions also obscure the power relations that give rise to what is canonized as heritage, as well as the socioeconomic and political work that heritage does in a given society. Therefore, in the second section I adopt instead the notion of heritage as discourse. The discursive approach to heritage helps to investigate different forms of heritage representations as well as the ways in which different group interests and ideologies deploy narratives, knowledge and technologies to create and re-create heritage in ways that maintain and perpetuate particular relations of power, drawing also on postcolonial critique, and its application in archaeology and heritage, to examine power relations behind the hegemonic official images and narratives of the past as currently produced across the southern African region.

Despite the multitude of ways of constructing heritage and therefore the existence of different heritage discourses I focus solely on the hegemonic heritage discourse as originated in the European context since it is this discourse which has set the parameters within which official discourses about heritage, particularly liberation heritage, are constructed in postcolonial Africa. This Western European discourse on heritage privileges the cultural symbols of a particular social group. Its conservation ethics have become hegemonic and globalised. I describe the socio-political context in which a series of material and discursive interventions in the form of international heritage conservation treaties and conventions (i.e. The Athens

[34] The term *elite* refers to a powerful, minority social group affecting public and political outcomes in a systematic and significant way in a given society. It often refers to persons considered power holders whose influence reflects control over 'power resources' and who are often involved in making key decisions at the national and transnational levels (Pakulski 2006: 162). In the case of Mozambique, I employ the term *elite groups* to refer to a range of key actors who include political elites (leaders), military elites (veterans), state bureaucrats, intellectuals and 'experts' in government and non-government organizations who despite having multiple voices, different values and expectations, all play a key role in defining, promoting and implementing state sanctioned agendas and policies concerning both cultural and natural heritage.

Charter of 1931, The Venice Charter of 1964 and The World Heritage Convention of 1972) have actively shaped the world in particular ways through the globalization of specific ideas about heritage and the appropriate procedures for its management.

In the third section I demonstrate how this hegemonic Western conception has been transferred to Africa by outlining two main types of colonialist discourses in archaeology: the discourse of origins and the discourse of civilization. I illustrate that notwithstanding the different forms of colonialism (e.g. the British 'indirect rule', Portuguese and French 'direct rule') which shaped the make-up of the colonial state with different historical impacts on African populations, the definitions of heritage in these legal instruments generally limit heritage to relics from the past. This hegemonic Western heritage discourse with its emphasis on buildings and objects (i.e. antiquities, ancient monuments) also led the colonial authorities to ignore the spiritual significance of specific places or entire landscapes (heritage places) for people who have acted as custodians of the spiritual, biological and other values of such places, ensuring their appropriate use and survival.

3.1. Heritage as discourse

The definition of the liberation heritage in Mozambique, shared by many countries in southern Africa, follows the widespread conception of heritage presented by UNESCO as 'our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations' (http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/). Yet conventional definitions of heritage which focus on material culture, the 'heritage-as-artifact approach' to use Breglia's (2006: 11) terminology, simply cannot explain the variety and contradiction evident in how different social actors (i.e. local residents, state officials, archaeologists, and others) 'use and abuse heritage on the ground'. The common conception of liberation heritage simply as military camps (*bases*), monuments, memorials or even songs of the liberation is inadequate to understand the heritagization projects related to liberation struggle: they 'obscure power relations that determine what is canonized as heritage and make opaque the cultural and social work that heritage does' (Smith 2006: 17). In fact, it has long been established that heritage is not simply the legacy of the past, as is so often implied (see e.g., Ashworth 1994); it is also something created and constantly changing according to present-day needs and strategies of the powerful (see e.g., Lowenthal 1998b; Graham and Howard 2008). Accordingly, heritage is the process wherein 'the present selects an inheritance from an

imagined past for current use and decides what should be passed on to an imagined future' (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996: 6).

Heritage is less about tangible material artefacts or other intangible forms of the past than about the meanings presently placed upon them, and the representations which are created from them (see e.g., Graham *et al.* 2000; Graham 2002). This rejection of materiality as the paramount criterion to define heritage led increasing number of scholars to propose that heritage is better understood as social action, cultural process, mode of cultural production, discourse or something that is done rather than a concrete entity (see e.g., Urry 1996; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998; Harvey 2001; Graham 2002; Breglia 2006; Smith 2006; Byrne 2008; Waterton 2010). As Smith (2006: 44) suggests, 'heritage is a cultural process that engages with acts of remembering, [working] to create ways to understand and engage with the present, and the sites themselves are cultural tools that can facilitate, but are not necessarily vital for, this process'. Therefore, there is no one defining action or moment of heritage, but rather a 'range of activities that include remembering, commemoration, communicating and passing on knowledge and memories, asserting and expressing identity and social and cultural values and meanings' (Smith 2006: 83).

This definition of heritage as a cultural process stresses a sense of action, power and agency and broadens the conceptual understanding of heritage, and draws attention to the cultural and political work that heritage does in any society (Smith 2006: 19). There is rich ethnographic evidence that power is a central matter within the realm of heritage and that power is indeed generative to heritage (see e.g., Graham *et al.* 2000; Smith 2004; Breglia 2006; Lafrenz Samuels 2010; Meskell 2012a). This created-nature of heritage is demonstrated by the fact that the official process of heritage formation almost always requires some form of legal enunciation, be it at a local, regional, national or global level (Silva and Santos 2012: 324). The understanding of heritage as a cultural practice leads us to the need to take the social agents and dynamics that constitute the heritage process as central in any reflection on it (see e.g., Smith 2006, 2011; Lafrenz Samuels 2010, 2015). In the same vein, heritage has been increasingly recognized as being discursively constructed, encompassing discursive practices (see e.g., Byrne 1991; Ashworth and Larkham 1994; Smith 2006; Waterton et al. 2006; Waterton 2007, 2010; Waterton and Watson 2010; Wu and Hou 2015). A discursive approach to heritage studies is particularly helpful in the study of the politics of heritage in Mozambique and in southern Africa. It leads us to investigate

different forms of heritage representations as well as the 'ways in which different group interests and ideologies deploy narratives, tropes, knowledge and technologies to make and remake heritage in ways that forge, maintain and perpetuate the relations of power' (Wu and Hou 2015: 39).

Over the last few decades the notion of discourse has been widely used across contemporary humanities and social sciences in a variety of ways, reflecting the different theoretical starting-points of the various theorists and fields of knowledge involved. Discourse is often conceived as an element of social life (e.g. language-in-use) (see e.g., Fairclough 1992; Jones 2013), 'ways of being in the world' (Gee 2013: 1762) or, 'particular ways of representing aspects of the world' (e.g. different political discourses) (Fairclough 2003: 215, 2006: 11). For the purpose of my argument here, I use the notion of discourse developed by Michel Foucault and his followers which highlighted the complex and often contested relationship between notions of discourse, power and policy (see e.g., Howarth 2010). In a Foucauldian understanding, discourse is a 'system of representation' that results from the process of 'meaning-making' and 'knowledge-power' interaction that produce socially agreed understandings in a particular context (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 7; Wu and Hou 2015: 39). Thus, discourse is the way meaning is produced and organized in a particular social field: 'discourse encompasses the language, meanings, and beliefs through which the world is constructed and becomes understandable' (Anker 2007: 231).

Discourses are relational configurations of elements that comprise agents (or subjects), words, actions, and things. These elements are individuated and rendered intelligible within the context of a particular practice (Howarth 2010: 311). In this sense, a discourse about a particular object produces and comprises a 'set of statements' which qualify as candidates for truth and falsity because they conform to a historically specific system of rules. These are held to be true or false because they are accepted as such by the relevant community of experts.[35] In such discursive practices, experts are empowered to make serious truth claims about objects that are constituted within particular discursive formations: they can do so

[35] According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) an expert is a person who has acquired extensive skill or knowledge through study and practice over the years, in a particular field or subject (e.g. biology, history, architecture, archaeology, ecology and others). Thus social and nature scientists (e.g. archaeologists or conservation biologists) are often considered 'experts' and are therefore recognized as a reliable source of information whose faculty for judging or deciding wisely on issues of cultural and natural heritage conservation is accorded authority and status by peers and the general public (see Morris 2012:91). I explore the contentious role of experts further below.

because of their training, institutional location, and mode of discourse (Howarth 2010: 315). Accordingly, such 'sets of statements' (for instance, about the past) acquire authority and act as institutionalized rules that govern the way a certain topic (in this case, heritage) should be thematized, that is, 'meaningfully talked about' (Molder 2009: 313). As Zongjie Wu and Song Hou (2015: 39) clearly put it:

> Discourse, from the perspective of CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis], is viewed as a form of social practice that shapes our knowledge, ideology and identity, and manipulates the way we act in the world as well as interact with people. Discourse, at the same time, refers to systematic ways of talking about and understanding the world, and, through certain apparatus and institutions, regulates what can (and cannot) be said, thus influencing the ways in which meanings are circulated and consumed. These two senses of discourse are finally realized and concretized in texts, specific written or oral (or, more inclusively, visual) forms of communication, which is the third dimension of a discourse.

Social practice discursive formations cannot exist alone. They rely on a society's technological and material practices for their operation because 'discourse is embedded in and arises out of the practices and events that define society' (Anker 2007: 232). In this sense, institutions like states, international non-governmental organizations, markets or governance networks can be conceptualized as more or less 'sedimented systems of discourse, that is, partially fixed systems of rules, norms, resources, practices and subjectivities that are linked together in particular ways' (Howarth 2010: 312) and operate partly through the meanings, languages, and traditions that are at play within them (Anker 2007: 233). Thus, power is at the core of discourse and discursive practices because every discursive formation involves the exercise of power, as well certain forms of exclusion. This means that every discursive structure is uneven and hierarchical (Howarth 2010: 313). Power determines which knowledge can be applied and defines 'fields of knowledge' (Pochet 2014: 3). For Foucault, power is a relational concept that presupposes a certain play in any structure of domination, and thus the interaction of relatively free social agents who are engaged in a struggle to impose their wills and objectives on each other (Foucault 1982: 220–221). In this sense, the production and circulation of discourses are simultaneously mechanisms of social power, since those who wish to exercise social power must use discourse in order to do so. Similarly, the regulation of discourse determines who is allowed to speak on a given topic, as well as what types of knowledge are subjugated in the production of truth (Stoddart 2007: 205).

Given their ability to naturalize a particular representation, for instance, the material-centred conception of heritage as 'common sense', certain discourses become dominant or hegemonic[36], when a certain worldview stamps out any other ways of seeing and explaining reality (Molder 2009: 315). Hegemony is a form of social power that relies on voluntarism and participation, rather than the threat of punishment for disobedience (cf. Gramsci 1971). In this sense, it appears as the common sense that guides our everyday, mundane understanding of the world. It is a view of the world that is 'inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed' and which tends to reproduce a sort of 'moral and political passivity' (Gramsci 1971: 333). Howarth (2010) contends that hegemony can also be seen as a form of rule or governance that can elucidate the way in which subjects accept and conform to a particular regime, practice, or policy, even though they may have previously resisted or opposed them. This is so because any hegemonic discourse offers points of attachment and identification (e.g. through a creation of 'fantasy' or 'myth') that can grip subjects in particular ways, thus providing benefits and enjoyments that affectively bond them to a certain set of actors (Howarth 2010: 320). Put simply:

> A exercises power over B to the extent that A creates or propagates a *fantasy* with which B identifies, and the grip of this fantasy precludes other possible *identifications*, and thus other possible constructions of *interest*. But if and when B identifies with a certain fantasy – when B is gripped by a picture that holds it captive – and it becomes sedimented and naturalized in practices, institutions and images, then it ceases to be a relation of power in the strict sense and becomes instead a *relation of domination* (added emphasis in italic) (Howarth 2010: 323).

Stoddart (2007) warns that hegemonic networks of power are the result of contestation between 'ruling elites' and 'subaltern' groups. Because contestation is basic to the process of constituting hegemony, there is never a unified, totalizing system of ideological domination. Hegemony and counter hegemony exist in a state of tension; each gives shape to the other (Stoddart 2007: 203). In this sense, discursive forms of dominance are considered 'jointly constructed' rather than simply imposed (Molder 2009: 315). This understanding of power and hegemony, both entangled with discourse, thus posits a certain degree of freedom for social agents both to maintain systems of domination and to propose counter strategies of resistance (Howarth 2010: 316). Therefore, discourse operates in a more open, fluid and negotiated manner (Stoddart 2007: 205). Multiple discourses can interact in any given

[36] In general terms *hegemony* refers to a particular way of conceptualizing power and the struggle for power in capitalist societies, which emphasizes how power depends on consent or acquiescence rather than just force, and the importance of ideology. Ideologies are largely acquired, expressed, and reproduced by discourse (Fairclough 2003: 218; Van Dijk 2013: 439).

society. Furthermore, it is important to note: 'discourses are always in a process of change' (Anker 2007: 232).

The understanding of heritage as discourse and discursive practices has been defended by Smith, who notes particularly how power-knowledge generates governmentality[37] (Smith 2001, 2004). As she contends, dominant archaeological discourse privileges disciplinary and expert subject-positions, bolstered by the logical positivism of processualism, this has ensured the prominence of certain versions of the past, particularly those that are 'often important to a range of groups for defining their identity, a sense of community and belonging, and a sense of place' (Smith 2004: 9-10). Thus, archaeology, by presenting itself as possessing scientific and technical expertise in managing heritage, renders heritage issues as a series of technical problems about preservation and conservation, and allows 'the use of archaeological knowledge as a technology of government' (Smith 2001: 99, 2004: 3). Yet at the same time, expertise is de-politicized as it is seen to rest on technical rationalist calculation, which must operate above competing interests of different social groups, including the experts themselves (Smith 2004: 70).

The role of experts, for example, heritage practitioners such as archaeologists has proven to be contentious. It has been argued that archaeologists' engagement with the past, which is always dissonant and contested, is a political act (see e.g., Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996; Graham *et al*. 2000): archaeologists and their practices have always been entangled with politics (see e.g., Meskell 1998). Hence, despite presenting themselves as apolitical and neutral, experts possess significant power: they frame the problem for government and non-governmental institutions (at national and international levels) and provide 'unbiased' information and opinion to guide policymakers to make informed decisions (see e.g., Hamilakis and Duke 2007). Therefore, heritage experts are often comfortable acting as mediators (heritage brokers) between communities at the local and national/international spheres of activity, often without considering any of the ethical or political implications of

[37] Foucault's *governmentality* thesis argues that government is an activity of governing issues and subjectivities, which concerns the 'how' and 'what' of public interventions (Howarth 2010: 321). *Governmentality* represents the modern government of territories and populations that the state exerts through 'technologies' of power; that is, through practices inspired and justified by one or more scientific rationales. Accordingly, intellectual knowledge is incorporated into the act of governing populations and social problems by subjecting them to analysis (Rose and Miller 1992:182; Dean 1999: 2). Thus, the claims of intellectuals to meta-professional authority, superior knowledge, and their search for the attainment of 'truth', underwrites the often privileged position of the intellectual in Western societies and thus the role of intellectual knowledge in governing social problems (Smith 2004:9).

the heritage mediation process (see e.g., Wynne-Jones and Fleisher 2015). However, Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (2009: 30) have argued, with regards to the role of experts working for Non-Government Organizations in Africa, that:

> behind the seemingly neutral modes of translating knowledge and information, combining a 'scientific approach' and 'participative discourses', it is often possible to glimpse techniques of power which aim to reinforce the legitimacy or even 'indispensability' of the intermediary *vis-a-vis* the 'local community' or governments.

In effect, archaeologists and other heritage practitioners serve as mediators in the process of identification and conservation of heritage at the local, national and international levels, with the power to 'transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning or elements [of the heritage] they are supposed to convey' (Latour 2005: 39). Working within hegemonic authoritative heritage discourse, experts either in governmental agencies or in academia are often empowered to assert their superiority in identifying and defining innate values of heritage. The messages produced and conveyed by such 'heritage authorities' help them govern and manage the social behaviours of the wider public (Yan 2015: 67).

The re-theorization of heritage as discourse and discursive practice is further developed by Smith who asserts that 'there is no such thing as heritage': for heritage is a discursive construction, something that we come to know in and through language use. How we refer to, and talk about, heritage not only reflects but actually constitutes what heritage is and what it is not (Smith 2006: 13). Heritage discourse generates not only conceptual but also material consequences: it shapes the way heritage is constructed, identified, interpreted, valued, conserved, managed and used. There might be a multitude of ways of talking about, seeing and thereby constructing heritage, or, in other words, we may have different heritage discourses (Wu and Hou 2015: 41). This work focuses on the impact of hegemonic heritage discourses on prevailing official notions of heritage in postcolonial Africa.

The focus on Western hegemonic heritage discourse does not mean to imply the absence of other cultural and historical discourses about heritage, especially in non-Western societies (see e.g., Langford 1983). However, I focus solely on the hegemonic heritage discourse as originated in the European context since it is this discourse which has set the parameters within which official discourses about heritage in general and liberation heritage in particular are constructed across southern Africa. Furthermore, this conceptualization of heritage as

discourse allows me to see heritage as a political act and to explore the socio-economic, cultural and political work that the category of liberation heritage does at the different levels in Mozambique and in the southern African region. However, this framework is not without its limitations.

The Foucauldian notion of discourse has been criticized for its attempts to 'absorb too much' into the idea of discourse (i.e. to reduce all social action to discourse), and in particular to neglect the material, economic and structural factors in the way power and knowledge are deployed (Fairclough 2000: 145; Hall 2001: 78). It has been pointed out that 'discourse does not *cause* actions and actions do not *cause* discourse in any direct way' (Jones 2013: 1704). In addition, Foucault's ideas about discourse have been criticized for not offering a clear methodological approach, particularly in relation to the links between knowledge and practice and social change (Smith 2006: 14). To remedy this situation, critical discourse analysis has been increasingly adopted as 'an important methodology for identifying, problematizing and unpacking the constitutive discursive field of heritage' (Waterton *et al.* 2006: 351). Critical discourse analysis is a social movement of scholars in the field of Discourse Studies interested in the study of the ways social power is (re) produced—and resisted—by text and talk. Thus, critical discourse analysis uses a wide variety of methods of discourse analysis such as syntax, speech acts, rhetoric, argumentation, narrative structures, or other conventional organization of discourse as well as quantitative corpus analysis, ethnography and participant observation (van Dijk 2013: 437). The use of critical discourse analysis in heritage studies scrutinizes the social and political context of that discourse and analyses the social effects that a discourse has, with particular attention to the way discourses becomes intertwined with the legitimation and maintenance of power (Smith 2006: 15-16). For instance, Waterton employed the critical discourse analysis framework in her analysis of heritage policy texts (including international authoritative texts) and visual representations of heritage in Britain to illustrate how the authorized heritage discourse works in naturalizing and legitimizing Western conceptualizations (e.g. universal, innate values of heritage) through which globalized heritage practices are shaped (Waterton 2007, 2009, 2010).

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that despite the usefulness of the conception of heritage within the framework of governmentality (after Foucault 1991; Smith and Campbell 1998; Dean 1999, 2002) to understand how heritage is interwoven with relations of power, governmentality has been criticized for its tendency to 'over-privilege the authority of

knowledge' and for failing to make room for resistance and contestation of local and indigenous people to the heritage 'expert knowledge and discourse' mobilized by the state (Smith 2004: 10 see also Silva 2011; Silva and Santos 2012). Several studies in many parts of the world have illustrated that while hegemonic heritage discourses are largely manifested through state sanctioned practices of commemoration, remembering and forgetting, these often co-exist with alternative and often localized heritage practices from marginalized groups and communities. Such 'unofficial' heritage discourses and practices are often articulated as counter claims and contestation in the course of struggles around issues of rights to resources and representation (see e.g., Young 1997, 1993; Rassool 2000, 2011; Ndoro 2001; Coombes 2004; Meskell, 2002, 2012a, 2013; Fontein 2006, 2009; Weiss 2007; Shepherd 2007, 2013; Shepherd and Ernsten 2007; Peterson 2011). As Mataga has argued in the case of Zimbabwe, 'through counter-heritage practices, local communities define themselves in opposition to official history and state-imposed practices of commemoration, yet they seek to be recognized as part of official heritage' (Mataga 2014: 26).

For these reasons, this study also draws on postcolonial thinking in the form of postcolonial critique (see e.g., Fanon 1967; Said 1978, 1993; Chatterjee 1986, 1993, 1996; Appiah 1992; Bhabha 1994, 2004; Mbembe 2001) and its application in archaeology and heritage studies (see e.g., Breglia 2006; Fontein 2006; Liebmann and Rizvi 2008; Karlström 2009; Meskell 2012a) to scrutinize power relations that are behind the hegemonic official images and narratives of the past as currently produced across southern Africa. The adoption of postcolonial critical approaches to heritage is useful to understand the relationship between nationalism and heritage in post-independent Africa (Chatterjee 1986; Sivaramakrishnan 2007) and, as Giblin (2015: 313) puts it, to facilitate the analysis of 'the history and legacy of the relationship between political power, colonialism and heritage, and related lingering heritage colonialities in post-colonial contexts'. In the same vein, the study follows Fontein's (2006) adoption of Chatterjee's (1986, 1993, 1996) critique of postcolonial nation-building, alongside the addition of Bhabha's (1994) concept of neo-colonial cultural 'mimicry', to explain dynamics of heritage-making in postcolonial Africa. For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe, Fontein (2006) employs Chatterjee's (1986) concept of post-colonial nationalist 'derivative discourses' and Bhabha's (1994) 'mimicry' to argue that the cycles of heritage-making at Great Zimbabwe can be understood as a deliberate attempt to create cultural renewal by re-appropriating discourses and recycling meanings to construct modern African

national identities (Fontein 2006: 133–4). In his analysis of Fontein's (2006) work, John Giblin (2015: 322) concludes that:

> This is an attempt that preserves the *derived/material/developmental spheres* of Western nationalism but that also remains *autonomous/spiritual/sovereign*, *authentic* and *original*, based as it is on African *spiritual* and *traditional* pre-colonial domains in contrast to Western colonial ideologies of modernity (emphasis in the original).

On the basis of the above theoretical underpinnings, I will briefly outline the 'ideological workings of a discourse that is both hegemonic and regulating, sustaining a notion of heritage that privileges the cultural symbols of a particular social group [in Western Europe] to which other groups [non-European societies] are strongly encouraged to gravitate' (Waterton 2010: 2).

3.2. The Western heritage discourse and its globalization

The idea of heritage is associated with Western European cultural history, having emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and developed under the assumption that 'all values attributed to places rested on the material evidence of the place' (Araoz 2011: 56, see also Choay 1999; Harvey 2001). This Eurocentric conception of heritage which emphasizes the materiality and innate cultural value of heritage tied to time depth, monumentality, expert knowledge and aesthetics is what Smith (2006: 4) terms the authorized heritage discourse.

Over the last two centuries heritage has traditionally been conceived as discrete and often aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, building or other structures, with historic values, inherited from the past (Smith 2006: 31). The origins of this discourse has been succinctly analysed by Díaz-Andreu (2007) and can be traced to the entangled relationship between the emergence of the modern state in Europe and the appropriation of antiquities (mainly monumental antiquities, especially those from the Roman, Greek, and Egyptian civilizations) from the Renaissance to the Reformation, first by the elites and then, by the end of the eighteenth century, by the nation-state. By the end of the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth century the learned strata in society, to which those interested in the past belonged, already shared a strong perception of the past as a source of prestige, as a 'symbolic capital'. The antiquity of Ancient Greece and Rome was still regarded as the basis of the European nation by most intellectuals and politicians in the early years of the birth of

nationalism as a political ideology. For instance, Napoleonic France was portrayed as a modern Rome, while Ancient Greek and Roman architecture and arts continued to inspire architects all over the Western world (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 11-13).

According to Díaz-Andreu (2007: 20) 'nationalism is based on the nation, but for nations to be believable a past for them is needed. A past provides legitimacy to the very existence of the nation'. Hence, heritage conceived as the material legacy of 'glorious pasts', mostly embodied in the historic monument (e.g. the cathedrals, the palaces, the gardens, and the statuary), has traditionally played a key role in substantiating 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) based on which the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) of nations have been constructed and celebrated (see e.g., Bandarim and Oers 2012). Hence, the desire to protect and restore national monuments as 'concrete evidence of a nation's history' became widespread. Particular attention was given to classical buildings. Restoration and conservation, although often taking different philosophical paths, aimed at the safeguarding and recreating of the 'authentic object', with emphasis on the preservation of aesthetic values of the monument according to the specific historic period(s) represented. Thus, national monuments tended to become 'frozen illustrations' of particular moments in the history of the nation (Jokilehto 2005: 7). In fact, the common idea that monuments are witnesses to human history (see e.g., Choay 2001; Waterton 2010) led European nation-states to use the inherited monuments as source of national pride and legitimacy of the nation and its progress and this contributed significantly to the sedimentation of authorized heritage discourses as an important element in the construction of the machinery of the State across Europe (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 20-22).

As a result, the concept of heritage as inheritance in the form of monument was shared across Europe. The French idea of *patrimoine* as 'assets descended from parents to their children according to the laws of the country' (Choay 2009:15); and the Portuguese notion of *património* meaning 'inheritance', 'inherited property' or just 'property' (Costa and Sampaio e Melo 1998: 1069), has promoted the idea that the present has a particular duty to the past and its monuments (Choay 2009: 51; Rossa and Ribeiro 2015: 12). The duty of the present is to receive and revere what has been passed on, and in turn to pass it on, untouched, to future generations for their education and to forge a sense of common identity based on the past (Smith 2006: 29; Smith 2011: 13). This discourse was consolidated during the French Revolution (1789) which became the 'moment of synthesis to the various developments in

the appreciation and conservation of cultural heritage' (Jokilehto 2005: 231). The massive vandalism and destruction of historic monuments contributed towards a new understanding of the values contained in the heritage (monuments and objects). Consequently, the revolutionary authorities decided that:

> The lessons of the past had to be learnt from these objects in order to keep France in the leading position even in the world of economy and sciences. It was also conceived that this heritage had to be preserved *in situ* in all parts of the country; it had to be inventorised, classified, and conserved to pass it with eventual 'new pages' to the memory of future generations (Jokilehto 2005: 231).

Since the Enlightenment of the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries in Europe, this idea of what constitutes heritage has been institutionalized through policy documents and legal instruments. Protective legislation in earlier periods did however occur. For instance, early in the sixteenth century king Carlos I of Spain, adopted strict legislation aimed at protecting the underground and pre-Columbian monuments of the West Indies. The primary interest of the Spanish monarch was not to protect the archaeological and built heritage but rather to ensure the ownership and control of the treasures that were discovered in its overseas territories (Ramos 1994: 13). Early traces of the formalization of authoritative heritage discourses are found in the Sweden and Portugal. In 1630, King Gustav II of Sweden created the *Riksantikuariu*, a body responsible for preserving the 'vestiges of the past' in 1666 the Swedish crown declared as his property, all the antiquities that were to be discovered in the kingdom (Rodrigues 1998: 13). The example of Sweden was followed in the next century by Portugal wherein King Dom João V promulgated the Decree of 20 August 1721, following a report presented by the Director of the Royal Academy of Portuguese History (*Academia Real da História Portuguesa*) which stressed the importance of historic pre-Roman, Roman, German and Arabs remains in the Portuguese territory (Marcelo 2013: 136). Although often not mentioned in the Anglo-Saxonic literature (see e.g., Waterton 2010), this Decree appears to be an important Portuguese contribution to the history of heritage protection in Europe. It represents a significant example of key elements that were to be included in the heritage legislation and be adopted by most countries in years to come. As the Portuguese historian Ramos (1994) contends:

> The Decree stands out for recognizing the importance of material remains from pre-Roman, Roman, German and Arab presence in the Portuguese territory; presenting a comprehensive understanding of the concept of heritage; for defining an historical period of the 'ancient monuments' (until the reign of King Dom Sebastião, 1557-1578); for assigning responsibilities to municipalities and towns in the safeguarding the monuments; for

> adopting a consignment to be used by the Portuguese Royal Academy of History for conservation action; for setting legal measures against possible infringements of inherited assets and the assignment of the said Academy as the coordinator of matters related to the protection of historical remains listed in the Decree (Ramos 1994: 14).

Despite these early versions of heritage protection, the formal documentation of authorized heritage discourses appeared mostly in the late nineteenth century in a suite of national legislation, policies and guidelines (cf. Waterton 2010). The fact that legislation and institutions inevitably operated at the level of the nation-state further reinforced the sense of the nation and the importance of 'cultural material remains' in nation-building in Europe (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 22). Examples of national heritage legislation include the Ancient Monuments Protection Act of 1882 in England, the Decree of 30 December 1901 which approved the basis for the classification of properties considered to be national monuments in Portugal, the *Regolamento* of 1909 in Italy, the Oldenburg Monuments Protection Law of 1911 in Germany, the *Loi du 31 Decembre 1913 sur les Monuments Historiques* in France, and the first Nature Conservation Act of 1937 in Denmark (Waterton 2010: 38; Bandarim and Oers 2012: 2). These legal instruments designed to protect what were often defined as 'monuments', 'historic monuments', 'relics' and 'antiquities' were ushered in with a particular set of conservation principles to safeguard these objects (Smith 2006: 18; Ndoro *et al.* 2008: 25; Choay 2009: 25). These principles have become embedded in some of the canonical texts of later modern heritage practices, such as the Athens Charter of 1931, the Venice Charter of 1964 and the World Heritage Convention of 1972 (see e.g., Smith 2006; Ahmad 2006; Jukilehto 2005, 2011). However, it is important to acknowledge that the above trajectory represents only one history which does not take into consideration the production of other hegemonic heritage discourses and the long-standing debates concerning heritage and its conservation ethics in other parts of th world such as Asia (see e.g. Fong *et al.* 2012; Winter 2014; Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015).

In what follows, I briefly describe the socio-political context in which a series of material and discursive interventions (i.e. international heritage conservation treaties and conventions) actively shaped the world in particular ways through the globalization of specific ideas about heritage and the appropriate procedures for its management.

3.2.1. International conservation organizations and treaties

The hegemonic Western heritage discourse was further institutionalized and later globalized following the Great Wars in Europe (cf. Bandarim and Oers 2012). I use the term 'globalization' to refer to the increased interconnectedness of people and environments around the world through the transfer and exchange of capital, ideas, money, labor and commodities. One of the major events precipitating economic globalization was the formation of Bretton Woods institutions since 1944, mainly the World Trade Organization, the IMF and the World Bank which have changed the face of global trade and governance through neoliberal economic policy reforms (i.e. free-trade policies, increased privatization of social services, and reduced government regulation). Moreover, because of the global governance, localized issues and concerns regarding cultural heritage and the environment have become issues of global concern though the diffusion of various environmental and heritage ethics, principles, and management strategies that uphold various discourses including sustainability, ecological modernization and conservation (Simon 2007: 784-5).

The destruction of built heritage across Europe during the First World War (1914-1918) brought about the establishment of an international system aimed at joining forces for the common good and for the promotion of peace through the League of Nations established in 1919 (UNESCO 2014: 5). In 1922 the League founded the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, which became operational in 1926. This Committee created the International Museums Office which operated between 1922-1946, and organized the first International Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Monuments, held in Athens in 1931, to prepare the first international heritage charter (Jokilehto 2011: 3). This first Congress adopted the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Buildings, one of the early instruments that globalized Western authorized heritage discourse. As Waterton (2010: 39) puts it:

> The charter privileged the 'fabric' and materiality of historic buildings, espoused a 'conserve as found' ethos, and rested on a belief in aesthetic and historical verities. It was also underpinned by a very strong sense of patrimony, in which ideas about carrying heritage forward and for future generations were seen as paramount.

Most importantly, these ideas embedded in the Athens Charter defined the international doctrine concerning heritage preservation and influenced a number of other texts, including

the 1964 Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Waterton 2010: 39).

Like the First Great War, the Second World War (1939-1945) damaged important historic towns and monuments, museums and archives across Europe. London and Coventry (England), Louvain (Belgium), Warsaw (Poland), Hamburg, Cologne and Dresden (Germany), Genoa, Florence and Rome (Italy) all suffered serious damage. Large areas were completely destroyed (Jokilehto 2011: 5). In response, UNESCO was established as a specialised agency on November 16, 1945, to 'contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture' (UNESCO 2014: 6). Its constitution came into force on November 6, 1946 after ratification by 20 countries. In the decades that followed UNESCO was instrumental in developing a framework for international collaboration in safeguarding the cultural heritage of 'humanity' as well as to globalize its views on heritage and its conservation doctrine. Initially, this involved the deployment of experts to advise nations on heritage policy, but then developed into a series of international campaigns, such as that for the preservation of the Abu Simbel Temples in Nubia in 1959 and the Italian city of Venice in 1966 (Jokilehto 2011: 32-34; Labadi 2013: 26). Most importantly, UNESCO has been a key player in the globalization of heritage discourse by providing international recommendations and conventions as a framework of reference for legislators and heritage managers.

In 1964 the Second Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Buildings held in Venice, produced a number of long lasting resolutions. The first created the International Charter on the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (the Venice Charter). This Charter was the culmination a long debate in Europe concerning conservation of historic monuments and the need to preserve physical authenticity (Bandarin and Oers 2012: 38). It formulated a 'framework of sixteen Articles for the protection, conservation and restoration of architecture, monuments and sites, within which the scientific nature of preservation is taken as axiomatic, as is the notion of authenticity' (Waterton 2010: 39). Preferences for tangibility of inheritance and authenticity proposed by the Athens Charter of 1931, are clearly present in the Venice Charter. It took the form of a Treaty setting out standards for the preservation and restoration of historic monuments and buildings (Harrison 2015: 301).

The Venice congress also adopted a UNESCO resolution to create the International Council

of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)[38] to oversee the implementation of the Venice Charter (Harrison 2015: 301). Most importantly, in spite of the Venice Charter's position that only two types of values, historic and aesthetic, could be designated as heritage (Jukilehto 1998: 232), it stressed one of the key principles of heritage management today: 'that the cultural significance of a site, building, artefact or place must determine its use and management' (Araoz 2011: 56). This is the first of a range of ICOMOS Charters. It continues to be seen as a canonical text within national and international settings to frame the debates about conservation and heritage management practices across the world today (see e.g., Waterton *et al.* 2006; Bandarim and Oers 2012). Hence, ICOMOS (through the adoption of Charters[39]), UNESCO (through the adoption of Conventions[40] and Recommendations[41]) and other international conservation organisations such the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)[42] are all responsible for standard setting and the adoption of policies and guidelines concerning heritage conservation and management (see e.g., Meskell 2012a; Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015). This family of organizations (i.e. ICOMOS, UNESCO and IUCN) and their discursive texts are part of the international system of cooperation and governance that is best encapsulated by the World Heritage system.

[38] ICOMOS is an international non-governmental organisation aimed at promoting the application of theory, methodology and scientific techniques to the conservation of the architectural and archaeological heritage. Currently (as of March 2016), this association of professionals comprises 9500 individual members in 151 countries, 300 institutional members, 106 National Committees and 28 International Scientific Committees (http://www.icomos.org/en/about-icomos).

[39] Some of the guidelines adopted since the Venice Charter include: Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas in 1987; Nara Document on Authenticity in 1994 (http://www.icomos.org/en/).

[40] Conventions define the rules that member states undertake to comply with and are subject to ratification, acceptance, or accession by these states. Some of the UNESCO Conventions regarding heritage include: Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003; Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar), 1971; (http://portal.unesco.org/en).

[41] Recommendations are instruments and norms that are not subject to ratification but that member states are invited to apply. Recommendations are intended to influence the development of national laws and practices. Some of the UNESCO Recommendations include: Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, 2011; Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas, 1976 (http://portal.unesco.org/en).

[42] IUCN was founded in 1948 to bring together national governments, NGOs, and scientists in a worldwide partnership to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable (UNESCO 2015: 10). Since its creation, IUCN have issued over 1000 resolutions. These have been the Union's most effective means of influencing conservation policy, at species, site, national and global levels. With more than 1200 member organizations (including 200+ government and 900+ non-government organizations) in some 160 countries, as well as almost 11000 voluntary scientists and experts generating scientific and legal knowledge and developing standards for the conservation community, IUCN is the world's leading association of conservation agencies and has long been instrumental in setting the global conservation agenda (http://www.iucn.org/about/).

3.2.2. The World Heritage Convention

The globalization of Western authorised heritage discourse was further entrenched in 1972 when UNESCO adopted the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (commonly known as the World Heritage Convention). This shaped the way that heritage is viewed. Firstly, the Convention set a universal definition of heritage, of relevance and interest to the international community as a whole, confirming heritage as an international issue. Secondly, it brought together principles that were previously separated into different categories, nature vs culture. Thirdly, the Convention solidified an international agenda for both cultural and natural sites by canonizing the principles of conservation under an international legal system. Lastly, it established a system of international responsibility to conserve and monitor the evolution of sites deemed to be of 'outstanding universal value' (Labadi 2013: 26-28. See also Waterton 2010; Meskell 2013). Like previous regulatory texts, the World Heritage Convention defined cultural heritage exclusively as 'monuments', 'group of building' and 'sites'[43] (cf. UNESCO 1972).

More significantly, the World Heritage Convention has created a '*world heritage system*, through which the idea of *world heritage* is reified and naturalised, and can be *imagined* to exist' (emphasis in the original) (Fontein 2006: 185). The world heritage system comprises of the World Heritage Committee, the World Heritage Centre (the secretariat), the World Heritage List, the List of World Heritage in Danger, the World Heritage Fund as well as statutory documents and directives such as the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention (Fontein 2006: 185; Labadi 2013: 29-30). UNESCO is an inter-governmental organisation and the power of decision-making rests with nation states, specifically those States Parties that serve on the World Heritage Committee. The World Heritage Committee is the body responsible for the implementation of the World Heritage Convention and has the final say on whether a property is inscribed on the World Heritage

[43] *Monuments*: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; *Groups of buildings*: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; *Sites*: works of man or the combined works of nature and of man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view (my emphasis added) (UNESCO 1972: 2).

List[44] (Meskell 2012a: 149; Meskell 2012b: 2). It is made up of 21 States Parties.[45] The Committee members are elected during the World Heritage General Assembly and serve a four-year term. To be included on the World Heritage List, sites have to meet at least one of the defined ten universal criteria laid down in the Operational Guidelines, to be considered of outstanding universal value, and to meet the condition of authenticity (for cultural sites) and integrity (for both cultural and natural sites). As of December 2016, there are officially 1052 world heritage properties, comprising 814 cultural sites, 203 natural sites, and 35 mixed properties in 165 States Parties.[46] The World Heritage List is historically dominated by properties in Europe (see e.g., Labadi 2007), and dispite the efforts from within the World Heritage Convention to create a more 'representative, balanced and credible' World Heritage List through the adoption of Global Strategy in 1994, this strategy has failed and the imbalances on the List have worsened (see e.g., Meskell 2012b). The discussion on 'domestication' of World Heriatge Convention in Africa (section 4.4.) will illustrate this point further.

The World Heritage Committee is advised on the implementation of the World Heritage Convention by three external Advisory Bodies: ICOMOS, IUCN and International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) (Long and Labadi 2010: 8; Meskell 2012a: 149). The specific role of ICOMOS and IUCN in relation to the World Heritage Convention include the evaluation of properties nominated for inscription on the World Heritage List, monitoring the state of conservation of World Heritage cultural and natural properties, reviewing requests for International Assistance submitted by States Parties, and providing input and support for capacity-building activities (UNESCO 2015: 10).

Despite its 'noble' global mission (i.e. 'to create the conditions for genuine dialogue based upon respect for shared values and the dignity of each civilization and culture' (Rupar 2007: 1800) this World Heritage system has attracted criticism for failing to incorporate indigenous

[44] As of February 2016, there are officially 1031 World Heritage Properties, comprising 802 cultural sites, 197 natural sites, and 32 mixed properties in 163 States Parties. There are now 48 sites on the List of World Heritage in Danger (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/). The World Heritage List is also historically dominated by properties in Europe (Labadi 2007), but there have been vigorous efforts from within the WHC to create a more representative list (Meskell 2012b).

[45] In 2016, the World Heritage Committee is comprised of Angola, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Croatia, Cuba, Finland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, VietNam, Zimbabwe (http://whc.unesco.org/en/committee/).

[46] See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/.

and local communities heritage perspectives and for being overly focused on the kinds of tangible and monumental heritages that epitomize Western elite notions (see e.g., Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006; Jenkins 2008; Labadi 2013; Meskell, 2012a, 2013). For instance, it has been suggested that the distinction between cultural and natural values in world heritage sites is problematic because often the 'natural' values are deemed to be of 'outstanding universal value', whereas the indigenous cultural values are not. Because of the separation between cultural and natural values, local communities and indigenous peoples are frequently excluded from decision-making.[47] Moreover, the ways in which the concept of outstanding universal value is applied by 'heritage experts' often result in a discrepancy between the local values attributed to place by the local community and the recognized outstanding universal value that serve as the basis for world heritage listing. This has caused some scholars to argue that the world heritage system indeed fails to place heritage in its local context (see e.g., Lennon 2002; Bouchenaki 2003; Sullivan 2003). The World Heritage system has also been criticised for seeking to set global standards of heritage conservation behaviour and attempting to impose Western notions of heritage across the world (see e.g., Byrne 1991; Fontein 2006; Logan 2012).

The World Heritage Convention has been very successful in spreading heritage consciousness and in particular Western heritage practices around the world (see e.g., Logan 2012; Isar 2011). Indeed, with 163 United Nations (UN) Member States having ratified the Convention since its adoption by UNESCO in 1972, this Convention is one of the most popular of the UN's instruments (Long and Labadi 2010). Yet, while many reasons might be found for this popularity of the Convention, it has been argued that a prime reason is that 'nations use the alleged universalism of the World Heritage Convention for their own nationalistic ends' (Long and Labadi 2010: 6). In reality, there is no genuinely bottom-up heritage identification process allowed for in the World Heritage listing process. Heritage and the attribution of its meaning need authorisation by nation-state (Askew 2010: 39). Thus, sites that are nominated for world heritage listing are chosen by national governments, often for nationalistic reasons. Political intentions are easily disguised behind the façade of UNESCO's universalised and de-politicised objectivity (Long and Labadi 2010: 9). Numerous studies illustrate that nationalism has not disappeared as a result of recent wave of globalisation, but continues to shape the way countries interact with global processes such as

[47] International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) (2015: 7-9).

the United Nations (see e.g., Holton 1998; Evans 1999; Turtinen 2000; Porter 2001; Askew 2010; Long and Labadi 2010). Case studies from Africa (see e.g., the World Heritage Sites of Matobo Hills (Ranger 1999) and Great Zimbabwe (Fontein 2006) in Zimbabwe; Mapungubwe in South Africa (Meskell 2012a)) and elsewhere in the world (see e.g., Dietler 1994; Meskell 1998; Hamilakis 2007a; Silverman 2011; Luke 2013; Akagawa 2014) have succinctly demonstrated how heritage is used as a tool in legitimizing governments or dominant groups and reinforcing perceptions of local and/or national identities (cf. Kersel and Luke 2015). Some commentators have suggested that the signing and ratifying of the World Heritage Convention by many African countries was in part a way of entrenching their sovereignty as newly independent countries and building their political identity that had been seriously eroded by years of colonialism (Makuvaza and Chiwaura 2014: 50).

Despite the statutory rule that the World Heritage Committee decisions be based on 'objective and scientific considerations', following carefully prepared documentation, thorough and consistent procedures, evaluation by qualified experts and the use of expert referees whenever deemed necessary (UNESCO 2015: 6), recent ethnographic work has exposed the politics involved in the World Heritage Committee's deliberations (Askew 2010; Meskell 2011, 2012b; Luke and Kersel 2012). Recommendations presented by UNESCO's Advisory Bodies are increasingly at odds with the final decisions adopted by the World Heritage Committee (see e.g., Meskell 2011; Meskell *et al.* 2014). The decision-making process over World Heritage designation is increasingly becoming a platform for new political and socioeconomic alliances and gift exchange amongst States Parties while the 'technical requirements' for world heritage listing, as well as issues of conservation and preservation of heritage sites, are relegated to a secondary stage (cf. Meskell 2012b, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).

It follows that the often-widespread perception that the globalization of Western authorized heritage discourse through the practices of UNESCO and associated key global agents like IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM having imposed a hegemonic view through technical and policy processes, does not reflect reality. Askew (2010: 20) has argued that the globalized World Heritage system has not overcome nation-state-based power structures and nationalist agendas, but has rather enhanced them, severely compromising the universalistic ideal evoked by the term world heritage. 'UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage is as much a creature of its member states and their agendas as it is an instrument of UNESCO's

specialists and affiliated professional bodies of conservation specialists' (Askew 2010: 22). Similarly, Fontein (2006: 189) has illustrated through a case study of Great Zimbabwe, how under the guise of seemingly de-politicised claim to 'universal value' and the need to 'preserve heritage for humanity', the World Heritage system, has reinforced and entrenched the authority of state bureaucracies, such as the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ). Rather than being imposed by international organizations, the hegemonic Western heritage discourses are maintained and reproduced by States Parties signatory to the World Heritage Convention, as part of their strategy to achieve their own nationalistic agendas.

When considering how States Parties across the globe have understood the notion of outstanding universal value, Labadi (2013: 60) has illustrated, based on the analysis of 114 world heritage nomination dossiers (including European and non-European religious sites and industrial heritage properties) that all the dossiers refer primarily to the monumentality (i.e. the impressive architecture of these monuments), beauty and opulence of sites, through which the 'nation' is being exemplified. It seems, therefore, that the concept of outstanding universal value continues essentially to be defined based on the 1964 Venice Charter. More worryingly, Labadi (2013) suggests that the European interpretation and use of outstanding universal value as one long continuous and unilateral narrative aiming at highlighting the 'centrality of architectural, aesthetic and historic values' of the site, has been taken up by the non-European States Parties, through a strategy of imitation in order to have their sites recognized as worthy of global status. By employing the same strategies and vocabulary as the ones used by the Europeans, 'non-European States Parties reposition themselves from the periphery to an egalitarian position at the very heart of European discourse' (Labadi 2013: 61). I explore this point further below through the notion of 'mimicry' (Bhaba 1994) when debating the postcolonial heritage discourse in Africa.

In the following, I demonstrate how this heritage discourse, like colonialist archaeology, has been transferred to Africa within the broader context of colonialism (cf. Trigger 1984: 360-63; Byrne 1991: 230-32).

3.3. Heritage discourses and colonialism in southern Africa

Colonial discourses define the way Europeans thought about, advocated and understood colonialism (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 7). The term colonialism is most often used to describe the process by which one nation extends its sovereignty over another nation's territory and establishes either settler colonies or administrative dependencies between the host nation and the colonial metropole (a term used to describe the geographic and symbolic seat of an empire's power). The displacement and administrative subjugation of indigenous populations often occurred as a direct result of this process (Harrison and Hughes 2010: 235). As Liebmann (2008: 6) notes:

> Colonial discourses typically represent colonized peoples through a series of essentialist binary oppositions that favour colonial (Western) cultures, presenting colonized 'Others' as variously inferior, passive, feminine, savage, lazy, marginal, simple, static, and primitive in contrast to the superior, active, masculine, civilized, industrious, central, complex, dynamic, and modern colonial Self. These "truths" about colonized peoples were formulated and shaped through Western literatures and histories, and are not, of course, based in ethnographic realities but, rather, created the "facts" that justified Western colonialism. In so doing, Western cultures defined themselves through the representation of colonized 'Others' in negative terms. These colonial discourses rely upon essentialist representations, wherein social groups are presumed to possess universal features exclusive to all members.

It is now well attested that the disciplines of anthropology and archaeology have a modern origin and are associated with the centres of political and economic power of Western Europe. These disciplines became institutionalized as a knowledge-producing enterprise at the service of the colonial/imperial agenda (Curtoni 2014: 394). From the early days, archaeology played an important role in the construction of colonial discourses by creating and controlling the representation of the past in colonized societies and therefore justifying colonial conquest as well as constructing the identity of the European bourgeois classes (Trigger 1984: 360-1; Liebmann 2008: 6; González-Ruibal 2010: 39). Colonial archaeology created by archaeologists coming from the imperial powers produced a narrative that excluded other accounts of the past and such narratives became hegemonic because they were broadly accepted by colonizers and colonized, and produced the only authorized discourses about the past. Such discourse legitimized the authority of the West as colonizers and consigned the 'Other' (colonized non-European) to a secondary status, as inferior, subordinate and dependent (Díaz-Andreu 2007: 8).

González-Ruibal (2010: 39) identifies two main types of colonialist discourses in archaeology: the discourse of origins and the discourse of civilization. The discourse of origins created a divide between history and prehistory, which was deployed to deny indigenous peoples their roots and their historical rights to the land (González-Ruibal 2010: 43). Accordingly,

> Whenever monuments were discovered in places where no monuments were expected due to evolutionist prejudices, they were automatically linked to superior, white populations which had supposedly occupied the land before the arrival of their current inhabitants. The strategy itself was inherent to the diffusionist paradigm, which conceived a very restricted number of creative core areas from where cultural products spread all over the world (González-Ruibal 2010: 44).

The huge influence of Hegelian philosophy of history, particularly the division of world-history (Western history vs. Prehistory of the 'people without history'), combined with evolutionist and diffusionist paradigms, when archaeology began to establish itself as a discipline in the 1880s and 1890s, all came together to produce a powerful discourse that would support colonialism for over a century (Curtoni 2014: 395). Zimbabwe provides a telling example of British colonists' control of the representation of the past in Africa. Despite being perceived as a sacred site, used by local communities in pre-colonial era, during the colonial period (1885–1965), colonial and archaeological discourses attached new meanings to the archaeological site of Great Zimbabwe. Based on the racial premise that nothing of cultural significance could have happened within sub-Saharan Africa without non-African involvement, Great Zimbabwe was presented as an example of earlier, ancient and 'exotic' non-African colonization in the region (i.e. the historical home of the Queen of Sheba or of King Solomon, or an outpost of the Phoenicians) (Trigger 1984: 362; Pikirayi 2001: 12; Fontein 2006: 3-5; Seymour 2014: 2226; Giblin 2015: 320). This false projection of Great Zimbabwe as the remnants of a long-lost Phoenician or Semitic civilization not only denied agency to indigenous Africans but also provided the 'moral' justification for the British to colonise the land (Liebmann 2008: 7; Katsamudanga and Manyanga 2013: 1).

The second colonialist discourses in archaeology, that of civilization, can be traced back to process of appropriation of antiquity from the Renaissance (Classic Greece and Rome) as part of the formation of nation-states in Europe (see e.g., Díaz-Andreu 2007). Thus, European powers, namely Britain, Germany and France, appropriated the past of other formerly 'progressive' civilizations of Greece and Rome. Whereas the appropriation of Greece was

mostly cultural, that of Rome was mainly political. Rome provided theoretical and practical models of colonization and offered justifications for European colonialism. For instance, the presence of Roman monuments in certain lands allowed colonial powers to lay claim over those territories as illustrated by the French in Algeria and Tunisia and the Italians in Libya (González-Ruibal 2010: 42-43). Portugal also aimed to emphasise the greatness of the nation by promoting the idea of an empire under the 'mission of civilizing the "natives" (*indígenas*) in overseas territories' (Santos 2008: 49). To 'civilize' in practice meant teaching the Portuguese language and the rudiments of the Catholic religion to the 'natives', enabling them to 'read, write and count' not to create African educated elites but so they could contribute towards the development of the metropolis (Santos 2008: 50). Thus, the concept of 'civilization' combined a number of assumptions that justified the superiority of Portuguese culture and the possibility of 'other' cultures (of those inferior and incapable of self-government) to improve their qualities as a result of the colonial encounter. It also implied that Portugal, like other European countries, had the historical right to advance the progress of the 'primitive' cultures. These beliefs and prejudices were captured in a series of legal frameworks[48] that, trying to justify the colonial policy of Portugal, created subaltern legal categories, such as *indígenas* in African territories such as Mozambique (Meneses 2010: 69).

It was within this context of the European colonization of the African continent that the use and safekeeping of heritage places became based on legal instruments (heritage legislation) that converted places of cultural significance (i.e. sites) and objects into the property of the colonial authority (see e.g., Deacon 1993; Ndoro and Pwiti 1999; Ranger 1999; Ndoro and Pwiti 2005; Ndoro *at al.* 2008). Notwithstanding the different forms of colonialism (e.g. the British 'indirect rule', Portuguese and French 'direct rule') which shaped the make-up of the colonial state with different historical impacts on African populations (see. e.g., Mandani 1996; Njoh 2000; Harrison and Hughes 2010), heritage in these legal instruments was generally defined as buildings and objects (i.e. antiquities, ancient monuments and relics) from the past (Ndoro *et al.* 2008: 25). For instance, in the colonial Bechuanaland Protectorate

[48] Examples of such legal instruments include the Political, Social and Criminal Statute of Indigenous of Angola and Mozambique (*Estatuto Político, Social e Criminal dos Indígenas de Angola e Moçambique*) in 1926, the Colonial Act (*Acto Colonial*) of 1930, the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and Overseas Administrative Reform (*Carta Orgânica do Império Colonial Português e Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina*) of 1933 and finally the Statute of Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique (*Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique*) approved by Decree-Law of 20 May 1954. This law aimed at the "assimilation" of indigenous into the colonial (Western) culture (Departamento de História 2000; Newitt 2009).

(present day Botswana) the Bushman Relics and Ancient Ruins Protection Proclamation of 1911 was passed to protect 'Bushman relics [rock art] and ancient ruins' (Mmutle 2005: 49). Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the Ancient Monuments Protection Ordinance was passed in 1902. This law defined ancient monuments and relics as any material predating 1800, and the colonial administrator was charged with implementing the ordinance. In 1912, the Bushmen Relics Ordinance was passed in order to include the protection of rock paintings. The 1902 and 1912 ordinances laid the foundations for the present heritage management system in Zimbabwe (Ndoro 2005: 11). A common feature of this pioneering protective legislation across Africa is that it did not necessarily preserve the diverse African cultural heritage, but rather protected a few sites that served the interests of the colonial agenda (see e.g., Ndoro and Pwiti 2005; Macamo 2006; Ndoro *et al.* 2008).

As several commentators have noticed, since the colonial times, the discourse about cultural heritage protection has been framed by the parallel discourse about environmental protection, preservation that was philosophically informed by Western romanticist and utilitarian ideas (i.e. imagining of Africans as 'noble savages' who make no human impact on the landscape or wilderness) which emphasized the separateness of humans from nature (see e.g., Carruthers 1995; Campbell 2007; Adams and Hutton 2007; Meskell 2012a; Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015). For instance, looking at the Kruger National Park in South Africa, Meskell traced the processes through which the 'enclosure movement'[49] that began in England during the fifteenth century was later exported to the British colonies in Africa or North America and found full expression in 'fortress conservation'[50] discourse. This idea was also appropriated for the protection of cultural heritage, archaeological sites in particular (Meskell 2012a: 24-25). In effect, the Fencing Acts of 1883 and 1910 in South Africa were key in strengthening white settler control of the environment and of its commercial productivity and

[49] The *enclosure movement* refers to the vast changes in land tenure in the English landscape between the fifteenth and nineteenth century, when over 6.8 million acres (21% of the English land area) were 'enclosed' - commonly held public lands was converted into private ownership. This resulted in the transformation of the landscape and the traditional models of agriculture based on open fields and communal grazing areas without fixed boundaries into small, private holdings separated by physical barriers including ditches, fences, and hedges. These units of production and residence were separated from areas dedicated for 'nature' (Wittman 2007: 559).

[50] *Fortress conservation* is a model based on the belief that biodiversity protection is best achieved by creating protected areas where ecosystems can function in isolation from human disturbance. 'Fortress', also knows as 'protectionist', conservation assumes that local people use natural resources in irrational and destructive ways and as a result cause biodiversity loss and environmental degradation. This approach has since been challenged by those who argue that many of the areas now designated as protected areas or wilderness were only recently cleared of people who had occupied and transformed the environment over generations, sometimes millennia. Further problem with the concept of protected areas lies in the question of who gets to decide what resources are protected and in what manner (Doolittle 2007: 704; Neumann 2007: 1959).

resulted in the creation of fortress reserves like Kruger, Kalahari Gemsbok and Mountain Zebra national parks which fenced out previous occupants and stakeholders (Meskell 2012a: 27-28; see also Carruthers 1995; Massuku van Damme and Meskell 2009). Thus across the African continent, protected areas (the embodiment of the fortress conservation discourse) had four main characteristics: the exclusion of local communities dependent on the natural resources such communities were typically labelled as criminals, poachers, and squatters on lands they have occupied for decades or centuries; the enforcement was implemented by park rangers patrolling the boundaries, using fines to ensure compliance; concessions granted uses only to tourism, safari hunting and scientific research within protected areas (Doolittle 2007: 704); and the central place given to the state to 'make rules about who can use nature and where, when and how they can do so' (Adams and Hutton 2007: 152).

The justification given for this approach was that the 'natives' did not understand their own heritage (i.e. the value of aesthetic landscapes and pristine wilderness or archaeological and historical monuments) such heritage would be either contaminated or destroyed if left to them (Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015: 137). Thus, Singh and van Houtum (2002: 255) have succinctly argued with regards to the southern African context that:

> Conservation, in effect, was produced as a disciplinary tool for the expansion of state control through the domain of public lands and enhanced rule making and was supported by actors and agents responsible for the production and dissemination of conservation knowledge (…) conservation as a science established 'truths' such as the need for parks and protected areas in order to sustainably manage natural resources. Knowledge creators, such as biologists, ecologists and social scientists, have validated these truths for states, international institutions and non-governmental organizations.

By situating heritage conservation in the domains of international and national academic and technical institutions and state bureaucracies, the practice of conservation has marginalized non-Western knowledge systems (Singh and van Houtum 2002: 255). The hegemonic Western heritage discourse also led the colonial authorities to ignore in southern Africa the spiritual significance of specific places or entire landscapes and that people during generations, have acted as custodians of the spiritual, biological and other values of such places, ensuring their appropriate use and survival (Ndoro 2003; Wild and McLeod 2008; Massuku van Damme and Meskell 2009; Jopela 2011).

Having presented a critique of the materialist conception of liberation heritage by adopting the notion of heritage as discourse and put the hegemonic Western heritage discourses into

historical perspective to explore how the Western understanding of the past influenced the official discourse and practice of heritage in southern Africa in the colonial period, in the next Chapter, I analyse the processes through which colonial heritage discourses were carried over and re-appropriated by the postcolonial countries in southern Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR - 'GLOCAL' HERITAGE DISCOURSES AND PRAXIS IN POSTCOLONIAL SOUTHERN AFRICA

In this Chapter I explore the dynamic processes through which hegemonic Western heritage discourses produced in the colonial period were carried over and re-appropriated by the postcolonial countries. Why and how this was allowed to happen requires analyses. The authoritative heritage discourses need to be understood within the geopolitical and socio-economic contexts of southern Africa. Following independence of southern African countries, mostly through 'the barrel of a gun' (Werbner 1980a), heritage, especially that of the 'heroic liberation struggle', has been mobilized to serve the nationalistic projects of nation-building and socio-economic development. I argue that this process of re-appropriation and 'mimicry' which allowed the perpetuation of Western paradigms in the conception of heritage result from a combination of geopolitical and socio-economic contexts and circumstances at play nationally, regionally and globally combined with the strategies adopted by former national liberation movements ruling elites to pursue their own nationalist agendas related to state-building and nation-building.

The global geopolitical context within which these projects were formulated and deployed was of intense ideological warfare, the Cold War (1945-1989), between the socialist East and the capitalist West. By 1990s a neo-colonial[51] order had emerged as a result of the triumph of neoliberalism over state socialism. An important feature of the hegemonic Western heritage discourse in the postcolonial context is that it became entangled with other earlier globalized and dominant discourses such as 'community participation' and 'sustainable development'. These interpenetrating processes entailed a complex network of relations at multiple scales which 'both affects discourse and depends upon changes in discourse' (Fairclough 2003: 217). They are best expressed and framed through the Japanese term 'glocalisation', a blend of the terms global and local, popularized by the sociologist Roland Robertson (1995) who used it to emphasize that global and local, or universal and particular, are not mutually exclusive but rather intimately intertwined (Knowles and Elliott 1999: 318).

[51] *Neocolonialism* can be understood as the contemporary continuation of Western colonialism in new ways that differ from historically traditional forms of colonialism that expanded an empire's frontiers and its control of lands and people. Neocolonialism instead operates by controlling political, economic, and cultural elements of a society, people, or institutions. The colonial system is seen to endure and thrive even while assuming that nations and peoples are legitimately independent (De La Garza 2009: 680).

I have divided this Chapter in four parts. In the first part I discuss and outline the usefulness of the concept of glocalisation in understanding the ideological workings and dynamics of authoritative heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa. I use this 'glocal' approach to contextualize the authorized heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa focussing on three main discourses and their related practices, which are discussed in the following sections of the Chapter: (i) the decolonization of heritage policies and landscapes, (ii) local community 'participation' in heritage and 'community's benefit' through heritage management and (iii) the 'domestication' of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in southern Africa.

In the second part I analyse the discourse on decolonization of heritage policies and landscapes promoted by the postcolonial state by looking at how a number of post-independence African governments have selected designs that clearly foreground a foreign visual culture for architectural works to symbolize and celebrate their liberation struggle and independence. I argued that such examples clearly illustrate, on the one hand, the disjunction between the rhetoric of liberation and the constrains imposed by the need of ongoing nation-building and state crafting in the postcolonial period. In fact, given the urgent need of former national liberation movements to 'capture' the state and consolidate power, the ruling elites prioritised state-building projects that simply upended becoming a celebration of liberation but bearing many of the deemed 'old colonial' tropes employed by the colonial state to monumentalize itself such as the heroic language, central locations, nationalist focus, imposing imagery, and the grandeur of the constructions. On the other hand, the monumentalization of postcolonial landscape in southern Africa is a clear illustration of the 'glocalised' nature of heritage and its associated discursive practices, where African states are able to rework aspects of global phenomena (i.e. nationalism) that originated from the West and appropriate such aspects (e.g. monumentalization of the state) for their own nationalistic projects informed by ideological legacy of the liberation struggle (Communist/Socialist ideology) and, to some extent, non-Western modes of monumentalization.

Nevertheless, it is my contention that the monumentalization of postcolonial landscape in southern Africa clearly exemplifies the failure of African ruling elites to 'indigenize' the modes of memorialization of the liberation struggle in the public space. As a matter of fact, the problematic perpetuation of hegemonic Western notions of heritage (e.g. emphasis on its materiality and monumentality) is also noticeable in the postcolonial heritage policy where

despite a handful of progressive legislations adopted many years after independence, the general trend in postcolonial southern African, and in fact much of Africa, is that state-based heritage organizations inherited and adopted rigid colonial policies regarding heritage (e.g. equated heritage to monuments, ancient/historic monuments, relics or antiquities) and the hegemonic western heritage discourse is thus continued and perpetuated. As a result, heritage practitioners and state institutions have failed to safeguard aspects of heritage that are deemed important for local communities despite the discourse of local communities 'participation' in heritage management.

In the third part I analyse the discourse on local community 'participation' in heritage and 'community's benefit' through heritage management where I highlight some of the issues regarding the notion of 'participation' often employed in the 'community conservation discourse' in the field of in environmental conservation which resonates highly with the challenges of participatory approaches to management of cultural heritage across the region. I use the case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park to illustrate that while Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) are discursively constructed as important entities to promote economic growth and development for local communities living adjacent to these conservation areas, based on the sustainable use of natural resources, the promoters of 'community conservation discourse' have actively marginalized local communities and cause them to lose social capital and relinquish their access to natural resources. I also demonstrate that the interpretation of what constitutes 'participation' differs from one context to the another, and the degree of participation including the rights of the often poor rural local communities to use natural resources depend on the political will of government departments officials, donors and experts. All these constitute important insights to understand some of the problems with the discourse and practices regarding 'community's benefit' through cultural heritage management that came to shape the relationship between archaeologists and heritage practitioners and various segments of the public, especially local communities. The analysis of this discourse reveals that although some heritage sites have generated forms of economic development, mostly in the case of World Heritage sites, generally, the benefits mostly generated by global tourism rarely materialize and when they do they seem to be limited, apart from a few exceptions. Thus, local communities are yet to see significant improvements in their lives and livelihoods. Yet the discourse of 'community's benefit' through cultural heritage continues to be promoted by heritage officials who often overstate

the tourism potential of heritage in a bid to sway the often 'impoverished local community' to support projects such as the nomination of heritage sites to UNESCO's World Heritage List. The last part of this Chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the discourse of 'domestication' of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in southern Africa. Here I illustrate that despite the effort of different actors to advance the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Africa, the 'domestication' of the Convention is still marked by tensions resulting from the divergences between local understanding of heritage as well as domestic agendas and nationalistic interests on the one hand, and the agenda of international organizations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS or IUCN which often advise States Parties on the type of sites that have a potential to demonstrate outstanding universal value, based on the dominant western notions of heritage, on the other. Based on a 'glocal' approach to the processes of implementation of the Convention in postcolonial context, I also argue that the hegemony of Western heritage discourse does not reside exclusively on the imposition from the western through conservation principles and guidelines associated to the World Heritage system. It also lies on the ambiguous position created by the postcolonial state adoption of the European model of nationalism to monumentalize itself, based on the narrative of liberation struggle (at the national level) and the use of World Heritage processes to pursue nationalistic agendas at the global stage.

4.1. On Glocalisation

The world today is in the grip of globalisation. A dominant theme in the globalisation debate has been the discussion of how these processes and networks of economy, technology, politics, and ecology that have encircled and compressed the world as a whole, affect the historical claims of nation-states, especially their sovereignty, as well as the cultural identity of localized groups and communities around the globe (see e.g., Michie 2003; Martello and Jasanoff 2004; Mensah 2008; House-Soremekun and Falola 2011). There has been a tendency to see globalisation as a colonising process or homogenising force (e.g. the discourse of cultural imperialism) against which the local is often seen as passive actor (Appadurai 1990: 295; Kickbusch 1999: 451). This ignores the fact that Western cultural messages are received and interpreted differently by local groups across the globe (Robertson 1995: 38). Consequently, in numerous contemporary accounts, globalizing trends are regarded as being in tension with local assertions of identity and culture. Thus, ideas such as the global versus the local and the international versus the national are widely promoted

(Robertson 1995: 33). Robertson has argued that 'there is no good reason (…) to define globalization largely in terms of homogenization', nor 'to define the global as if the global excludes the local' (Robertson 1995: 34). Instead, he argues for two intertwining processes: the universalization of particularism (as in the nation-state) and the particularization of universalism (the appropriation of the universal in local contexts), suggesting a 'glocal' interplay between the two, rather than the triumph of one over the other (Robertson 1995: 40 see also Friedman 1995: 72; Tolzmann 2014: 594). Certainly, if on the one hand globalization has meant that countries keep their legal sovereignty but that on the other, they lose some of the ability to independently conduct public policy, it is also true that 'the era of globalization of the economy is also the era of localization of polity' (Kickbusch 1999: 451). The debate surrounding cultural and political dynamics of the global-local is paralleled in other discussions of globalisation in many different ways (see e.g., Appadurai 1990, 1996, 2001, 2006).

For the purpose of my argument here, I will use the term 'glocal' and the general idea of 'glocalisation' to better grasp the processes and contexts within which authoritative discourses about heritage are produced, appropriated and reproduced in postcolonial Africa at national and local levels. Such discourses can be significantly strengthened because of national and local circumstances and interests. The African nation-building projects resulted, in the words of Appiah (1992: x), from a 'negotiable middle way' between endogenous 'tradition' and 'Western' ideas. Following this, I use the idea of glocalisation to illustrate that while there is a constant shaping of the local notions and agendas from the 'outside', there are also constant and diverse reinterpretations of these influences which gives the local a voice on the global stage (Knowles and Elliott 1999: 318; Kickbusch 1999: 451). For instance, although the hegemonic Western idea of heritage have been widely reproduced in postcolonial Africa, the World Heritage system has in turn been modified to embrace criticisms and concerns from the 'peripheral' non-Western States Parties especially with regard to the implementation of the World Heritage Convention. The idea of 'glocalisation' also helps to illustrate how African countries have 'mimicked' the Western discourse to pursue their nationalistic ends. This general idea is useful to emphasise how localized phenomena such as nationalisms can be understood as global products (Robertson 1995: 30-31; Friedman 1995: 72). In fact, 'nation-states have, particularly since the late nineteenth century been engaged in selective learning from other societies, each nation-state thus incorporating a different mixture of 'alien ideas' (Robertson 1995: 41).

The idea of 'glocalisation' is helpful in tracing globalism in political discourses on themes such as heritage, environment, local communities and sustainable development. Science and technology have long occupied centre stage in Western notions of progress and civilization, not only linking every corner of the globe through extensive systems of communication and transportation, but also serving as the basis of authority for a wide range of emergent institutions of global governance (Miller 2004: 98). Experts and expert knowledge figure prominently in the emergence of globalism via their construction and dissemination of issues previously perceived as local or national, now cast by international institutions in conceptual global terms (Miller 2004: 83). Therefore, a 'glocal' approach seems suitable to analyse the complex interconnectedness of the global and local in the activities of international institutions for, in the 'process of constructing global representations and categories of thought, and working out technical relationships between the "developed" and "developing" worlds, institutions like IMF [UNESCO and ICOMOS] also construct and reconstruct, local categories and representations' (Miller 2004: 85).

4.2. The decolonization of heritage policies and landscapes

4.2.1. Postcolonial monumentality

In most African countries, the immediate post-independence era was marked by an ideologically driven quest for self-representation. There was blanket rejection of the dominant colonial discourses, often accompanied by the destruction, removal or defacement of the colonial heritage landscape (Marschall 2008a: 350). As Amilcar Cabral said in 1973:

> We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country in order to make everything possible for our people. The masses realize that this is true, in order to convince everyone we are really finished with colonial domination in our country (Cabral 1973: 83).

The liberation struggle became the main 'foundation myth' of the new nations. The new political leaderships promoted the physical removal of the most obvious markers of colonial presence. Monuments were dismantled and abandoned on site or in storage facilities and others were sent back to the former metropolis. Additionally, neighbourhoods, roads, and squares, were renamed in order to build a new symbolic landscape (see e.g., De Jorio 2003;

Marschall 2008a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009; Marschall 2010a). For instance, in Algeria, the eight years of a painful liberation struggle (1954-1962) left a deep-seated resentment towards the former colonial presence, leading to the swift elimination of monuments commemorating French heroes. The French rescued much of the old colonial statuary in 1962, transporting dozens of memorials back to France. Those that remained were stripped down and re-allocated to other purposes. One such monument, dedicated to the glory of French colonialism, that was not removed (the neo-classical statuary ensemble - *Le Pavois* - built in Algiers in 1928 to pay homage to the victims of the Great War), was simply covered in concrete after independence and radically reshaped into a 'Soviet-style' monument to the victims of the Algerian Revolution (Aldrich 2012: 3; Sèbe 2014: 943). This symbolically charged destruction and re-shaping of colonial memorial sites signified the deep desire of young African countries to free up space, and transform the landscape for new commemorations in line with new postcolonial nationalist narratives of anti-colonialism, the struggles against imperialists and the heroism and martyrdom of freedom fighters and founders of newly independent countries (see e.g., Marschall 2010a; Aldrich 2012; Sèbe 2014).

Yet, in former colonies (e.g. British non-settler colonies) where independence was achieved through the political settlement without armed struggle (i.e. through constitutional revisions that granted increasing authority to local African elites), often a more tenuous and at times ambivalent approach was taken towards the decolonization of public spaces. For instance, in Ghana, the first sub-Saharan country to attain independence in 1957, a monumental bronze statue of Kwame Nkrumah (the first Prime Minister between 1957-1960 and first President until 1966), was erected in the capital city of Accra in front of the Parliament (Hess 2000). Commissioned from Nicola Cataudella, an Italian sculptor, Nkrumah's first freestanding monumental statue was dressed in African robes ('independence dress'), a symbolic icon to preach Ghana's independence to the nationals as well as promoting the use of locally made clothing (Essel 2014: 52). Towering to an approximate height of six metres, the figure assumes a solemn salutatory posture ('so evocative of the heroicized posture of architectural monuments in Greece' [Aldrich 2012: 3]) with one hand raised above the head while the other firmly grips a walking stick as the right foot gently steps forward. On the base of the monument, were inscribed three phrases attributed to Nkrumah, among them: 'Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto it' and 'To me the liberation of Ghana will be meaningless unless it is linked up with the liberation of Africa' (Hess 2000:

35; Fuller 2014: 106) (see Figure 49).



Figure 49: Two components of the statue of Kwame Nkrumah mounted at Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park in Accra, Ghana (2016). (Image courtesy: Elizabeth Mantebeah).

The history of each of the components of the statue is presented on the respective pedestals. The information plate of Nkrumah's body statue (on the left) reads:

> Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972). The original statue of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah which stood in front of Parliament House, opposite old polo grounds, Accra, attacked by a mob, vandalized as it stands now in the wake of military with Police Coup d'Etat on 24th February 1966, recovered for the National Museum in 1975. This is on loan to KNMP from Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, mounted on 11th June 2007.

The information plate of Nkrumah's head statue (on the right) reads:

> Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972). The bronze head of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's original statue which stood in front of the old Parliament House, Accra, vandalized during the February 24, 1966 Military and Police Coup d'Etat. This was recovered and presented by a patriotic citizen to the Information Services Department which in turn released it to the Park on May 28, 2009. Mounted on the Park on September 1, 2009.

A further post-independence marker, Kwame Nkrumah's independence arch, is seen by some commentators as one of the most self-contradictory monuments in postcolonial Africa (see Figure 50). The arch, together with the Black Star Gate located not far from it (see Figure 51), finished in beautiful stonework with inscriptions of 'Freedom and Justice' could both be

standing in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, or any other Western capital. It is clearly an adaptation of the Roman triumphal arch (Elleh 2002: 163).



Figure 50: The Independence Arch Monument, located in the Independence Square in Accra, Ghana. (source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).



Figure 51: The Black Star Gate, located in the Independence Square in Accra, Ghana. (Image courtesy: Elizabeth Mantebeah).

Another example of a somewhat paradoxical approach to the decolonization of public spaces was taken in Zimbabwe where, despite the bitter liberation struggle, colonial memorials of the Second World War were preserved because they were seen as symbol of anti-fascism and thus in line with the official liberation discourse (Werbner 1998b: 82). However, two new important national symbols were created soon after Independence. The first was the proclamation of public holidays on 11 and 12 August, which would be called Heroes' Days[52] to commemorate those who gave their lives in the struggle. The second was the creation of a

[52] Later, Heroes' Days were reduced to only one day, August 11. August 12, became Defence Forces Day.

national monument to Zimbabwe's heroes - Heroes' Acre located seven kilometres west of the capital Harare (see Figures 52). It comprises:

> i) a statue comprising three heroic figures, one woman and two men, portraying the guerrillas; ii) a flag pole flying the Zimbabwe national flag; iii) a tomb for the unknown soldier; iv) a 40 metre-high tower carrying the Eternal Flame which was lit at the 1980 Independence Celebrations which depicts the spirit of independence; v) on either side of the tomb of the unknown soldier are two high walls on which are engraved or painted scenes of the armed struggle; and vi) a revolutionary museum displaying war materials (Kriger 1995:144-5).



Figure 52: Overview of Zimbabwe's National Heroes' Acre, Harare, Zimbabwe (2014).

At the centre of the monument, there is a statue comprising three heroic figures, one woman and two men, portraying the guerrillas. The plaque on the bottom of the statue reads: 'Our eyes are on you, our brothers and sisters, the fallen heroes of Zimbabwe. We bleed for you yet we must not grieve, for in you is our rebirth and you are all that we shall ever be' (see Figure 53).



Figure 53: The statue comprising three heroic figures at the Zimbabwe's National Heroes' Acre (2014).

Werbner (1998b: 82-86) observes that the monument's aesthetics closely mimics the patterns developed in the modernist construction of nineteenth and early twentieth-century European war monuments but here combined with North Korean Stalinist realism. For instance, one of the two high walls at the Zimbabwe's National Heroes' Acre on which are engraved scenes of the armed struggle, with the prominent image of a leader that resembles Robert Mugabe (see Figure 54).



Figure 54: One of the high walls at the Zimbabwe's National Heroes' Acre (2014).

These examples illustrate the grip of foreign ideologies despite political independence. In contradiction to Fanon's appeal to his African 'comrades' of the struggle 'not [to] pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies which draw their inspiration from her [Europe]' (Fanon 1967: 314), the efforts to transform the colonial monumental landscape with symbols of independence in the postcolony, were marked by the adoption of an at least partly Western mode of commemoration and an architectural vocabulary inspired by both capitalist and communist ideologies (Larsen 2011: 264; Sèbe 2014: 938).

4.2.1.1. Memorializing African liberation through North Korean realism

The National Heroes Acre in Zimbabwe was built in 1981 by a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or North Korea) Mansudae Overseas Project Group. The Mansudae Overseas Project Group was established in 1970s as a foreign commercial division of the Mansudae Art Studio founded in 1959 in Pyongyang. Mansudae Overseas Project Group has created monuments, museums, stadiums and monumental palaces for African, Asian and

European countries (as of 2014) including Algeria, Botswana, Cambodia, Chad, the DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Malaysia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Senegal, Syria, Togo and Zimbabwe (Passarielo 2010). Today, a considerable number of monuments built to commemorate the triumph of the liberation struggle and its heroes are preeminent examples of projects completed by the North Korean firm for postcolonial African nations. Such projects represent, in Kirkwood's words (2011: 3), a 'mixture of influences from Western monuments, transferred through Socialist and Communist Realist Soviet and Chinese works to a hybrid North Korean monumentalism in Africa'. They include the Victory [Dialachin] monument built in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in the 1970s (Baecker 2011), the statue of former President Joseph Kasavubu built in Kinshasa, DRC, in 2010 (Baecker 2011), the National Heroes Acre built in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2002 (Becker 2011), the three Dikgosi [chiefs] monument built in Gaborone, Botswana, in 2005 (Parsons 2006), the African Renaissance monument built in Dakar, Senegal, in 2010 (Ritter 2011), the statue of Joshua Nkomo installed in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, in 2010 (Anonymous 2010c) and the statue of former President Samora Machel built in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2011 (Anonymous 2011e).

Although economic motives are often advanced as the main reasons for this African adoption of North Korean monumentalism - these monuments are amongst the cheapest worldwide (see e.g., Leighton 2009; Anonymous 2010b) I would argue that such monuments attest, above all, to the lasting legacy of the recent African socialist past which marked the liberation struggle and immediate post-independence periods in most countries. Between the 1950s and 1980s, thirty-five African countries declared themselves socialist (Peterson 2015: 10). Although the first wave of post-independence leaders such as Nkwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, all embraced what came to be known as 'African Socialism', its meaning varied widely. In response to the challenges of national reconstruction in the 1960s and 1970s many leaders produced political philosophies that reflected their understanding of their own cultural heritage in combination sometimes with their appreciation of certain elements of the political thought of the West (from the thought of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin). Thus, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* philosophy of socialism, which inspired Mozambique's socialism, was based on a communal villages approach to development through collectivization of agriculture in rural areas while Jomo Kenyatta's 'African Socialism', on the other hand, actively pursued capitalist economic policies. The so-called 'African Socialism' was in fact an aggregation of different political philosophies

inspired by socialist ideals (e.g. Nkrumah *Consciencism*, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* philosophy or Kaunda's *Humanism*) that informed the statecraft and ultimately resulted in a variety of socialist experiments across Africa (see e.g., Wiredu 2004; Táíwó 2004; Peterson 2015).

During this socialist era many African liberation movements received ideological and material support from North Korea. In the context of the Cold War, the leadership of Pyongyang viewed diplomacy with newly independent African nations as a space to gain an upper hand over South Korea in the competition for diplomatic recognition as the legitimate Korean government. Thus, North Korea offered military training and guidance to many African states while also disseminating propagandist materials throughout the continent and giving African students the opportunity to study in North Korea (Young 2015: 98). In 1969, Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic (which he renamed the Central African Empire) established official diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung endorsed the 'domestic politics' of Bokassa's rule in a joint *communiqué* in 1978 after signing a 'treaty of peace and friendship' where it was agreed that North Korea would provide agricultural equipment to the Central African Empire in exchange for coffee, timber and diamonds. The North Korean government had also agreed to build Bokassa a palace in the same style as Kim Il Sung's Kumsusan Palace. Similarly, and despite Mobutu Sese Seko's anti-Communist stance, Zaire (now the DRC) and North Korea established official diplomatic relations in 1972 and a Zairean embassy soon opened in Pyongyang. In 1973, Mobutu swapped Israeli military advisors for North Korean and travelled to Pyongyang in 1974 to meet with President Kim Il Sung with whom he signed a major arms deal. North Korea also assisted the Tanzanian military in overthrowing the regime of Idi Amin Dada (the third President of Uganda, 1971-1979). In 1979, 45 000 Tanzanian armed forces and 500 North Korean military advisors invaded Kampala and Amin had to flee to Libya. Milton Obote, the Uganda leader who was overthrown by Amin in 1971, regained his Presidential position in 1980 and subsequently signed a defence treaty with Pyongyang. As part of this deal, Kim Il Sung supplied Obote with 600 to 700 North Korean military advisors to train the anti-guerrilla forces of the Ugandan military (Young 2015: 101-103).

In a bid to win the 'hearts and minds' of African leaders North Korea also deployed 'heritage diplomacy' (see e.g., Kersel and Luke 2015; Winter 2015a) as part of their African foreign policy. For example, in Ethiopia, Pyongyang constructed a 50 meter-tall triangular column memorial, in Addis Ababa, free of charge (see Figure 55). The Tiglachin monument

(meaning ‘our struggle’ in Amharic) was offered to the Ethiopian socialist regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam (1974-1991) and was designed to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the overthrow of Emperor Haile-Selassie on September 12, 1974 (Elleh 2002: 164).



Figure 55: Tiglachin monument, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).

Conversely, African leaders pursued relations with Pyongyang for their own specific goals and interests, beyond aid and military assistance. Often African leaders viewed North Korea as a less-threatening alternative to the two dominant communist powers active in Africa: China and the Soviet Union. The North Korean brand of development appealed to most African leaders, who admired the guerrilla warfare tactics of the North Korean military and the personality cult of the Kim Il Sung family (Young 2015: 101). Kirkwood (2013) describes Pyongyang as:

> an orchestrated system supported by a unified, omnipresent visual culture, in which monuments and visual references to the Great Leader serve to remind citizens of their leader’s legitimacy and achievements towards North Korean self-definition after a period of Japanese colonial rule (…) North Korean socialist realist works are noteworthy for their emphasis on commemorating the revolutionary past, specifically the achievements of the supreme leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, who fought to end Japanese colonial rule (Kirkwood 2013: 552).

It seems that North Korea was an important source of inspiration to many African leaders in pursuit of their own nationalistic goals. North Korea encapsulated a powerful example of the use of the nationalist narrative of the struggle for liberation as a pillar of nation-building and

statecraft, these were also the key priorities of ruling elites in emerging African states. Importantly, Pyongyang used 'architecture to immortalize the official narrative [liberation discourse] - one of the most powerful commemoration methods by virtue of its visibility, stability, multiple functions, history, and of course, visual representations' (Elleh 2002: 162). In this sense, North Korean monumentalism in postcolonial Africa represented a viable non-colonial/non-Western mode of monumentalization in consonance with the discourse on decolonialization. At the same time it provided important elements for the self-assertion of the new African leaders, as illustrated by some examples from Zimbabwe and Namibia discussed below.

After visiting Pyongyang in 1980, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe wanted to create his own personality cult based on what he had seen in North Korea (Young 2015: 102). The Zimbabwean Heroes' Acre was inspired by the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery in Pyongyang (see Figure 56), constructed by the Mansudae Art Studio in 1975 and expanded in 1985 (Kirkwood 2013: 553).




Figure 56: The Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery in Pyongyang, North Korea.
(source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).

Mugabe also sought military assistance from the North Koreans in order to eliminate his rival political party, ZAPU. In 1981, Kim Il Sung obliged and sent US$ 18 million worth of small arms and ammunition as well as 106 North Korean military instructors to train 3500 members of Mugabe's elite military division, the Fifth Brigade, who between 1983 and 1987 went on to kill approximately 20 000 internal 'dissidents' in the region of Matabeleland, home to the followers of Mugabe's main political rival, Joshua Nkomo, and the Ndebele, an ethnic minority (Young 2015: 103). These massacres, locally known as *Gukurahundi* have left deep scars in the social and political tissue of contemporary Zimbabwe (see e.g., Ranger 1999; Alexander *et al*. 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012; Fontein *et al.* 2015). The term *Gukurahundi* is

derived from a colloquial expression in Shona language that means 'the storm of the summer that sweeps away the chaff'. It refers to the weather event that clears away the dry, scaly protective casting from cereal grain that remains on the land after the harvest, although at times this early storm also destroys crops and weeds, huts and forests, people and animals, opening the way for a new ecological order. While the strategy of *Gukurahundi* was in use in ZANU-PF as early as mid 1970s to discipline those considering to be wavering, it was officially adopted as a strategy of dealing with opponents in 1979, a year that was declared *Gore re Gukurahundi* (the year of the storm). The deployment of the *Gukurahundi* strategy in the 1980s against the Ndebele-speaking people, who were accused of harbouring 'dissidents' was only an early manifestation of the culture of violence that have affected the country up to the 2000s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012: 4).

In 2010, outrage spread in Zimbabwe when the ZANU-PF-led government contracted Mansudae Overseas Project Group to build two public statues of the nationalist leader and vice-President of Zimbabwe, the late Joshua Nkomo (Anonymous 2010c, 2010d, 2011f). Their installation in Harare and Bulawayo was halted. Many Zimbabweans saw the move as an affront to the memory of the victims of *Gukurahundi* (Winter 2014). The Nkomo family and members of ZAPU (the party Nkomo led until its merger with ZANU in 1987, forming ZANU-PF) felt that putting the statue at the proposed site in Harare, outside the Karigamombe Centre, was an insult. The word *Karigamombe* means 'the one who fells bulls' in Shona and *Nkomo* in siNdebele (Nkomo's home language) means 'bull'. It was presumed that placing the statue in front of this building was to honour President Mugabe's triumph over Nkomo in the 1980s and this opened many old wounds among former ZAPU members (Anonymous 2010c). Although the pedestal was already in place, the erection of the statue was stopped by High Court ruling, in favour of the Mining Industry Pension Fund, the owner of Karigamombe Centre, who had already secured an agreement with a local retail outlet Innscor to construct a food court on the site (Anonymous 2010e). In May 2015, the City Council of Harare approved the erection of the statue at the new location: the African Unity Square (Anonymous 2015d).

On September 15, 2010, the *News Zimbabwe* newspaper reported that a three metre-tall bronze statue of Joshua Nkomo was unveiled in Bulawayo, at the intersection of Main Street and 8th Avenue. However, the Home Affairs Minister Kembo Mohadi stated that the monument would be immediately pulled down following objections by Nkomo's family and

the Bulawayo community (Anonymous 2010d). A letter dated of August 31, 2010, from Nkomo's family representative, Thandiwe Nkomo, to the Minister of Home Affairs had outlined eleven points of objection to the monument. The family claimed that there was no consultation on the final prototype, characteristics, or proposed locations of the statue. The statue itself was described as 'very small and pitiful, hardly a street statue at all nor the landmark and monument that it should be'. The design of the statue, the family continued, 'said nothing about Nkomo and his historical legacy (…) and the size and colour of the 1,2-metre pedestal it was installed on does not match the lofty stature of the late Father of Zimbabwe' (Anonymous 2011f). Mohadi, whose ministry commissioned the two statues, expressed his own and the government's frustration at the failure to get the statue to stand in Bulawayo. He reportedly said to the media:

> It is unfair to myself and the ministry because we thought this was a government project that we initiated in honour of Dr Nkomo, but because the family objects to it we find it proper to concede to their plea and have no option but to abandon the project (…) With me, it is the end of the project indefinitely and I do not think we will do anything about it. The budget on it has been wasted (Anonymous 2010d).

However, it seems that the government did not want to be seen as failing by conceding to pressure from the Nkomo's family and the people of Matabeleland. On May 12, 2011, the *North Korean Economy Watch* reported that ZANU-PF had decided to re-erect the controversial Nkomo statue. President Mugabe appointed Environment Minister and Nkomo's son-in-law, Francis Nhema, to oversee the raising of the statue in Main Street, Bulawayo. Nhema, who chairs the Joshua Nkomo Foundation, had reportedly met with the vice President of ZANU-PF, John Nkomo and several members of politburo and made frequent visits to Bulawayo where he also met senior politicians to lobby for the re-erection of the statue (Anonymous 2010d). As a result, the statue was unveiled by Mugabe on December 22, 2013 (see Figure 57), a date which marks the annual celebration of the Unity Accord signed between Mugabe's ZANU and Nkomo's PF-ZAPU in 1987 (Winter 2013).



Figure 57: Statue of Joshua Nkomo, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe (2016). (Image courtesy: Henry Chiwaura).

Mugabe's regime is not alone in the promotion of liberation heritage heroes through North Korean modes of monumentalism. As in Zimbabwe, other African postcolonial monumentalization projects are often highly contested by different segments of societies. I illustrate this with examples from Botswana, Namibia and Senegal. In 2004, Botswanan local artists protested that they were priced out of the bidding process when the Mansudae Overseas Project Group won a US$ 1.1 million contract to design and build statues of three Batswana chiefs: Khama III of the Bangwato, Sebele II of the Bakwena, and Bathoen I of the Bangwaketse to be placed in Gaborone (see Figure 58). The local artists further complained that North Korea's socialist realist style had no connection with indigenous African culture (Baecker 2011). Nevertheless, the project went ahead with the undertaking by the Botswana government that local community members would be used in the project and trained by Mansudae Overseas Project Group so that they could lead future projects. The government has kept its promise and has since allocated all monumental projects (e.g. the construction of the monument at the Khama International Airport) to local artists (Thebe *pers. comm.* 2016).



Figure 58: The statues of three Batswana chiefs: Khama III of the Bangwato, Sebele II of the Bakwena, and Bathoen I of the Bangwaketse, Gaborone, Botswana (2016). (Image courtesy: Phenyo Thebe).

Namibia presents a different experience. Sam Nujoma, the first President of the country is among a cadre of African leaders with first-hand knowledge of how the Mansudae group's artworks function within the visual culture of Pyongyang. During his travels to North Korea in November of 2000 on a state invitation, Nujoma familiarized himself with the particularly potent brand of socialist art and architecture common to North Korea and 'observed first-hand how monuments and buildings could be combined on a grand scale to glorify the legacy of the nation's founders and their resistance to colonial forces, and how they enable the performance of a shared national history' (Kirkwood 2013: 554). As a result, since 2000, Namibia has hired the North Korean company to design and build four large-scale projects: the Heroes' Acre Memorial, a memorial cemetery located 10 km south of Windhoek built in 2002 (see Figure 60); the comradery Military Museum situated 70 km north of Windhoek in the city of Okahandja, built in 2004; the new Namibian State House in Windhoek, built in 2008 (see Figure 61); and the Independence Memorial Museum in central Windhoek, built in 2009 (see Figure 59); (Kirkwood 2013: 548).



Figure 59: Independence Memorial Museum, Windhoek, Namibia.
(source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).

The official liberation discourse of Namibia has found its most potent symbol in the national

Heroes' Acre. Completed over a period of 13 months, at a cost of approximately 60 million Namibian dollars (NAD) (up from an original estimate of 34 million NAD), the Heroes' Acre was inaugurated on Heroes' Day, August 26, 2002. The monument features a 35 meter high obelisk, an 8 meter high bronze statue of an unknown soldier, a continuous semi-circular bronze relief depicting Namibia's struggle for independence, an eternal flame and 170 gravesites. This 732 acre memorial complex, which also includes a restaurant and an amphitheatre, emerges at the foot of the Auas Mountains, 10 km south of Windhoek's downtown area (Becker 2011: 523; Kirkwood 2013: 554). Despite being 'directly inspired by and modelled on the Zimbabwean archetype' (Becker 2011: 525) with an aesthetic and ritual that is distinctly North Korean, Nujoma described the Heroes' Acre as being 'built in the true African tradition of bestowing honour to our forefathers and mothers' (Kirkwood 2013: 555).



Figure 60: Heroes' Acre Memorial, Windhoek, Namibia. (source: http://www.war-memorial.net).

Similar remarks were made by the Minister of Presidential Affairs Albert Kwana in relation to the new Namibian State House (commissioned in 2002 and completed in March of 2008) when he reportedly told the National Assembly: 'The new State House is (…) a symbol of Namibia's sovereignty, of our history and our struggle (…) People will appreciate our freedom when they see the new State House' (Kirkwood 2013: 559). However, the Namibian State House interior recalls elements found in the Grand People's Study House, the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, and the Pyongyang Maternity Hospital all in North Korea. Critics also pointed out that North Korean workers made up the majority of the labour force for the building project: when the project began in 2003, only 44 of the 176 workers on site were Namibian citizens (Kirkwood 2013: 559). As a prominent local architect, Jaco

Wasserfall, observed in relation to the State House: 'we have missed out on a crucial opportunity to have created appropriate public buildings in our country (…) [that] reflected the soul of the new Namibian nation, its beliefs, cultures and values' (Kirkwood 2013: 562).



Figure 61: New Namibian State House, Windhoek. (source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).

Furthermore, Mansudae artists were commissioned to travel throughout Namibia and paint large-scale canvases representative of Namibia's landscape such as Ruacana Falls, Fish River Canyon, Epupa Falls and the Spitzkoppe rock formation: their works figure prominently within the State House interior (Kirkwood 2013: 561). This choice of North Korean rather than Namibian artists to paint scenes of the Namibian landscape for State House decoration is very intriguing, to say the least. The project was realized at a cost of over 500 million NAD, up from original estimates of 242 million NAD, fuelling anger amongst some segments of public opinion in Namibia, who argued that the government was acting irresponsibly when nearly a third of the population lived in poverty (Kirkwood 2013: 558).

Further north, in Senegal the hallmark of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of independence from France in 2010 was the unveiling of another Mansudae Overseas Project Group, the African Renaissance Monument, a colossal 49 metre tall bronze statue, highly reminiscent of the socialist realism (Ritter 2011). The monument depicts a father holding a baby in his left arm. The man's right arm is around the waist of the baby's mother. The three are reaching out to the sky and out to the ocean (see Figure 62).



Figure 62: The African Renaissance Monument, Dakar, Senegal. (source: https://commons.wikimedia.org).

According to former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012), who commissioned the monument, the statue represents 'Africa emerging from darkness, from five centuries of slavery and two centuries of colonialism' (Passariello 2010). However, the monument was widely criticized by different segments of Senegalese society and abroad for its cost (estimated to have cost US$ 27 million payable in kind, including 30 to 40 hectares of prime land in Dakar. Some sources put the cost at US$ 70 million (Anonymous 2010). The monument endured further criticism for the false claims of its Senegalese origin - it was designed by a Romanian architect - and for being stark representation of the 'macho sexism' of African authoritarian rulers (Look 2010; O'Toole 2012). It was also criticised as idolatrous and inappropriate in a majority Muslim country depicting semi-nude male and female figures (Leighton 2009). In his response, former President Wade reportedly stated that 'only the North Koreans could build my statue (…) they offer monuments at a good rate (…) I had no money' (Passariello 2010). It seems that Africa's renewed rash of nationalistic monuments, statues and shrines has made the North Korean Mansudae Overseas Project Group's signature aesthetic of socialist realism fashionable (Flood 2013). It can be argued that while the African Renaissance Monument is a monumental statement of African liberation, it also represents a failure of confidence in fellow Africans from the leadership, despite their empty Pan-Africanist rhetoric: Abdoulaye Wade is deemed by some as the 'last great Pan-African

theorist' (Passariello 2010: 2). As one commentator questioned: 'where are the African designers and African sculptors who'd be better representing African consciousness?' (Pollard 2016: 1).

The above examples raise a critical question: why would post independence governments, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Senegal select designs that so clearly foreground a foreign visual culture for architectural works that symbolize and celebrate their own independence? (cf. Kirkwood 2013: 549). The above examples clearly illustrate the disjunction between the rhetoric of liberation (e.g. the rejection of ideologies and legacy of the colonial state) on the one hand and the practicality of ongoing nation-building and state crafting in the postcolonial period on the other. For the former national liberation movements, now in power, *nation*-building was conceived as a long-term goal. Much more immediate was the desire to build the *state* and consolidate the authority of the central government inherited from the colonial regime. Most post-independent regimes considered the state and/or the party as the main tool for creating a national consciousness and promoting development (Elaigwu and Mazrui 2010: 535). Thus state-led national projects were often designed to function as tools for 'reforming the collective memories of the citizens in order to suit the exigencies of the new leaders, just as the colonialists were invested in transforming the memories of the people whom they colonized from free citizens into colonial subjects' (Elleh 2002: 162).

One of the most important strategies of state crafting in Africa has been cultural performance and commemoration, through state ceremonialism. This has been an essential part of postcolonial state's attempt to popularise a form of nationalist politics that spoke to the heart of emotions and drama, also known as the 'politics of affect or performance' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 947). As Gonçalves puts it, 'whereas the colonial state asked only obedience, the postcolonial polity demanded affection' (Gonçalves 2012: 16). In the same line of thought, Mbembe use the notion of 'aesthetics of power' to describe the centrality of public ceremonies and festivities such as imagery-lavish Presidential send-offs and homecomings, proliferating national holidays, and elaborate state-sponsored titles and honours, which constitute 'the vehicles, par excellence' for giving expression to 'displays of magnificence and prodigality' of the postcolonial state (Mbembe 1992: 7). The result of these state crafting projects has been the prevailing tendency of the state to monumentalize itself (see e.g., Coombes 2004; Rowlands and De Jong 2007; Marschall 2010a; Gonçalves 2012). Consequently, the strong irony of state-building processes in postcolonial Africa is that it

simply ended up becoming a celebration of liberation but bearing many of the deemed 'old colonial' tropes such as heroic language, central locations, nationalist focus, imposing imagery, and the grandeur of the constructions (Aldrich 2012: 4). It ended up 'recreating the evils of colonialism that they [liberation movements] set out to erase' (Elleh 2002: 165).

It has been argued that the increase of North Korean monumentalism in Africa also attests to a lack of commitment to eliminate the colonial past as shown in 'a persistence of the *colonisation of consciousness* or lack of re-appropriation of public spaces by a grassroots or state- sanctioned form of reconstructed or nationalist *African-ness*' (emphasis in the original) (Sèbe 2014: 947). The fact that twenty-one years after South Africa became a multiracial democracy, the statue of Cecil John Rhodes was still standing at the centre of the Jameson Hall steps on the University of Cape Town campus (see Figure 17), only to be taken down on April 9, 2015, after weeks of protest by mostly Black students under the banner 'Rhodes Must Fall' (Mbele 2015) is an indication of the unfinished decolonization and transformation of the 'liberated' South Africa.



Figure 63: Statue of Cecil John Rhodes at University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. (source: Mail and Guardian [South Africa], April 11, 2015)

On the other hand, most post-independence governments saw the bold and monumental works characteristic of the Mansudae Group as a decisive, modern, opulent and authoritative means of asserting their nationalistic selves and establish their political legitimacy. For instance,

> By opting for a design representative of a North Korean aesthetic, the post-independence Namibian government challenges assumptions that Europe and the West constitute the sole source of modernity. Indeed, it may be useful to understand the hiring of the Mansudae Overseas Project as an expression of what Comaroff terms 'alternative African modernities', which consists of signs, practices and dispositions that originate in African encounters with 'elsewheres'. Because these modernities are negotiable and constantly in the making, they are as much a product of local agency as they are a reaction to external forces. Comaroff's approach helps us to see that, distasteful or as inappropriate as Mansudae-designed works may seem, they do represent strategic expressions of local agency (Kirkwood 2013: 558).

Seen from this perspective, the 'mimicry'[53] of Western monumental modes in postcolonial African nationalisms can also be understood as a form of cultural resistance. According to Mazrui this is a 'resistance substantially rooted in the values and techniques of the colonizer. In Africa this meant resistance by Westernized Africans using Western ideologies, rhetoric, techniques, and sometimes methods of warfare' (Mazrui 2004: 477).

The monumentalization of postcolonial landscape in southern Africa is a clear illustration of the 'glocalised' nature of heritage, where African states are able to rework aspects of global phenomena (i.e. nationalism) that originated from the West and appropriate such aspects (e.g. monumentalization of the state) for their own nationalistic projects that speak to a variety of localized conditions and circumstances. For instance, Fontein (2006) has illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe that despite following the modernist patterns of European war monuments combined with North Korean Stalinist realism, the Zimbabwe's Hero's Acre also 'embodied many stylistic features that derived directly from Great Zimbabwe' (Fontein 2006: 137). As Werbner describes it: 'the high walls are surmounted on each side by an emblematic figure from Great Zimbabwe known as the Zimbabwe Bird. Chevrons on the walls, in the style of those at the Great Enclosure of Great Zimbabwe, heighten the resonance with the country's most famous and ancient African civilisation' (Werbner 1998b: 85).

There is a disjunction between decolonisation discourse and the complexities of materializing such discourse on the ground. In the postcolonial context, the new authorized heritage discourses have been shaped by local, national and global contexts as well as nationalistic agendas of the African ruling elites. At the same time they are also marked by continuities such as the persistence of Western notions of heritage emphasising materiality and

[53] '(…) a difference that is almost the same, but not quite (Bhabha 1994: 122).

monumentality. The following analysis of the postcolonial heritage policy illustrates further some of these problematic continuities.

4.2.2. Postcolonial heritage policies

Newly independent African states faced a dilemma, whether to correct the deficiencies in the former colonial system with regards to protection of cultural heritage, or to reject this legacy and to build a new system for the protection of cultural heritage based on a new cultural identity (Négri 2005: 6. See also Ndoro and Pwiti 2005). Many countries adopted new heritage legislation immediately or not long after independence, mostly borrowing from colonial or European nations. For example, Chad attained its independence from France on August 11, 1960, and within three months adopted the Act No. 14-60 of November 2, 1960, for Protection of Monuments and Natural Sites including archaeological sites and ethnographic objects.[54] Chad seems to have been a front runner. Other countries took at least a year to update their heritage legislation. For instance, Malawi attained its independence from Britain in 1964 and adopted the Monuments Act in 1965 for Preservation of Protected Monuments and Relics. Lesotho attained its independence from Britain in 1966 and a year later adopted the Historical Monuments, Relics, Fauna and Flora Act of 1967. Similar timeframe was followed by Angola which became independent from Portugal in 1975, and after a year approved the Decree No. 80/76 of September 3, 1976, determining the Form of Conservation and Protection of the Angolan People's Historical and Cultural Heritage.[55] Other countries took at least three years to repeal the colonial legislation. For instance, Cameroon gained its independence from France in 1960 and three years later adopted the Federal Law No. 63-22 of June 19, 1963, establishing the Protection of Monuments, Objects and Sites of historic or artistic character.[56] Similarly, Tanzania gained its independence from Britain in 1961 and in 1964 passed the Antiquities Act No. 10 providing for Preservation and Protection of Sites and Articles of Paleontological, Archaeological, Historical and Natural interest. Algeria attained its independence from France in 1962 and five years later adopter Ordinance No. 67-281 of 20 December 1967 on Excavation and Protection of Historic

[54] *Loi no 14-60 du 2 novembre 1960 ayant pour objet la protection des monuments et sites naturels, des sites et monuments de caractère préhistorique, archéologique, scientifique, artistique ou pittoresque, le classement des objets historiques ou ethnographiques et la réglementation des fouilles.*
[55] *Decreto nº 80/76 do 03 de setembro de 1976 que determina a Forma de Conservação e Proteção do Patrimônio Histórico e Cultural do Povo Angolano.*
[56] *Loi fédérale no 63-22 du 19 juin 1963 organisant la protection des monuments, objets et sites, de caractère historique ou artistique.*

Monuments and Natural Sites.[57] Seychelles attained its independence in 1976 and four years later adopted the National Monuments Act of 1980.

In most cases, independence did not result in the repeal of the colonial heritage protection system. Instead, colonial laws persisted or were updated and enforced for many years (see e.g., Négri 2005; Ndoro *et al.* 2008; Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015). For example, despite Kenya's rhetoric of liberation and initial efforts to decolonise Nairobi's urban landscape through the removal of some colonial monuments - Lord Delamere statue, King George V statue, King George VI memorial plaque - and the erection of two monuments (designed and sculpted in England) between 1963 and 1978 (Larsen 2011: 265; Larsen 2012: 45), it took the country a further 20 years, after independence in 1963, to adopt the Antiquities and Monuments Act of 1983, which repealed the Preservation of Objects of Archaeological and Paleontological Interest Act of 1934 and revised in 1962 (Négri 2005: 6-7). Another enigmatic case is Zimbabwe which in spite of its long and painful liberation struggle, one year after attaining independence in 1980, adopted legislation (the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe Act chapter 313 and later chapter 25.11) which is a verbatim copy of the colonial National Museums and Monuments of Rhodesia Act chapter 313 17 of 1972, changing only name 'Rhodesia' to 'Zimbabwe'. The 1972 Act was not repealed (Chiwaura 2005: 19).

It is also interesting to note that although most postcolonial governments sought to get rid of the heavy legacy of the *modus operandi* of the colonial bureaucracy, including its heritage sector, many ideas and practices of the colonial period were in fact carried over into the years that followed independence (see e.g., Mandani 1996; Werbner 1998a, 1998b; Marschall 2010a; Gonçalves 2012). Thus, in many countries, even those that adopted new heritage legislation immediately after independence (e.g. Lesotho, Malawi, Seychelles), the colonial mind-set persisted with regards to notions of heritage and its conservation principles (see e.g., Négri 2005; Mumma 2005). As Ndoro (2008: 34) noted, in many legal instruments in Africa the definitions of heritage are still Western in orientation, often very prescriptive (e.g. 'categorizing immovable heritage under three main areas: antiquities, ancient monuments and relics'). Frequently they fail to accommodate important aspects such as intangibles or cultural landscapes. Even such recent legislation such as Botswana's Monuments and Relics Act of

[57] *Ordonnance n° 67-281 du 20 décembre 1967 relative aux fouilles et à la protection des Sites et Monuments Historiques et Naturels.*

2001 does not cover the intangible aspects of the cultural heritage, ignoring spiritual values and practices that play a vital role in the use and safeguarding of the cultural heritage (see e.g., Mmutle 2005).

Despite a handful of progressive laws adopted many years after independence which recognized the place of intangible heritage, such as the Mozambican Law of Cultural Protection (Lei n°. 10/88 de 22 de Dezembro) of 1988 and Zambia's National Heritage Conservation Commission Act of 1989, the general trend in postcolonial southern African, and much of the rest of Africa, is for state-based heritage organizations to inherit and adopt rigid colonial policies regarding heritage (see e.g., Maradze 2003; Ndoro and Pwiti 2005). The hegemonic Western heritage discourse is thus continued and perpetuated. Consequently, contemporary state-based heritage organizations fail to recognize the importance of local and traditional ways of protecting heritage sites that were already in place. Traditional custodianship systems of cultural sites have not been integrated into the postcolonial legal heritage framework (cf. Jopela 2011). As a result, there has been much criticism of heritage practitioners across southern Africa, accused of protecting only those aspects of sites specialists consider important and of presenting heritage resources in a lingo that is only familiar and understandable to those within the profession. They are accused of dwelling on issues of little interest to the wider public, and of involving local communities in very limited ways, if at all (Jopela *et al.* 2012: 176).

4.3. Heritage and local communities

4.3.1. Community 'participation' in environmental conservation

In southern Africa, the preoccupation with the involvement and participation of local communities in heritage management, which is here referred to as 'community conservation discourse'[58], was broadly developed within the framework of so called Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programmes which arose in response to critiques

[58] I have briefly illustrated in Chapter Three that the discourse about cultural heritage protection has, since colonial period, been framed also by parallel discourses about environmental protection and preservation. Due to space limitation I will not discuss in length local communities participation in environmental conservation (e.g. through Community-Based Natural Resource Management programmes and Transfrontier Conservation Areas initiatives), even though this would have provided valuable insights about the issues concerning the 'community conservation discourse' and its associated practices, which are mostly shared with the parallel discourse on community participation in cultural heritage management across the region.

of the traditional 'fortress conservation' approach to conservation in parks and protected areas (cf. Ndoro 2003; Chirikuri *et al.* 2010). It is commonly seen as having two central objectives: to enhance conservation of wildlife, biodiversity, and/or the environment; and to provide economic, social, cultural, and political benefits to local people (Campbell 2007: 329).

Although the so-called participation of communities in conservation initiatives has become a centrepiece of CBNRM programmes, the interpretation of 'participation' on the ground varies widely (Fabricius 2004: 29). Some projects do not go beyond 'passive participation' when there is unilateral announcement by external professionals, from the government or Non-Governmental Organizations, without listening to communities' opinions and concerns. Local people are told what is going to happen or, worse, has already happened, as illustrated by the case of the creation of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2000. On November 10, 2000, the governments of the three countries signed an agreement to development a Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA). The three adjoining areas, Limpopo National Park in Mozambique, Kruger National Park in South Africa and Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, together form a 35 000km^2 block. When this idea was first put forward in 1995, it was presented as a TFCA with multiple land uses, which would especially help impoverished communities living in communal lands in Mozambique. However, soon after the signing of the agreement, *Coutada* 16 (in Mozambique), a Wildlife Utilization Area located directly opposite Kruger National Park, was declared a national park.

The TFCA was launched in November 2001 and renamed Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. This was done without any consideration about what this would mean for the approximately 27000 people living within its boundaries (Spierenburg and Wels 2006: 303). The conceptualization and agreement of the creation of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park had taken place without any consultation with local communities. By 2003 only two workshops had been held with local representatives of affected communities. At the time, an estimated 40% of the households in the Mozambican portion of the Park never heard of this change in their territory or their involvement in this donor driven top-down process (Magome and Murombedzi 2003: 126-127).

Likewise, in the Kruger National Park, the South African portion of the new Transfrontier Park, there had been no consideration of the effects of the Park's creation for the Makuleke, an indigenous group that had been forcibly moved from the far north in 1969 and had legally reclaimed some 250 square kilometres in the Park in 1995. Yet, the precondition of land restitution to the Makuleke Communal Property Association had been the assurance that biodiversity and conservation would remain paramount. Hence the reclaimed land is now managed as 'contract park': a protected area developed on land belonging to the government, private individuals, or a community which is co-managed by the Park authority in conjunction with the private individuals or communities through a joint management board (Dikgang and Muchapondwa 2013: 5). This constitutes a massive compromise (Masuku van Damme and Meskell 2009: 87). While a few community leaders have been able to develop their capacities and careers and have received modest salaries for the dedicated work that they have done over the years, and while donor funding has supported the Makuleke's planning and capacity-building for their role in co-management of the Park, the ordinary citizens have yet to see material benefits flowing from this agreement with South Africa National Parks. They have not moved back onto the reclaimed land to farm it. Collection of wild plant resources there remains a problematic issue, and hunting is prohibited (Reid and Turner 2004: 233).

In addition, and despite the announcement that South Africa would in August 2001 start moving 300 of 1100 elephants earmarked for Mozambique's protected area through the Makuleke reclaimed land, the preparations and signing of the memorandum of understanding between governments affected by the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park went ahead without attention being paid to the aspirations and concerns of the Makuleke (Magome and Murombedzi 2003: 123-124). To the contrary, South Africa's Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Mohammed Valli Moosa refused to allow Makuleke community representatives access to a top meeting of the three Ministers for Environmental Affairs concerned (van Amerom and Büscher 2005). The Park constitutes one of the several examples of ways in which the promoters of TFCAs marginalize local communities, causing them to lose social capital and to relinquish their access to natural resources under the guise of 'community conservation discourse'.

In many countries in the region, participation of local communities within CBNRM programmes is framed in terms of 'devolution' but what the multiple actors actually do on the

ground varies from one country to another and from one project to the other. For example, while Botswana and Namibia allow communities to hold secure tenure over communally managed natural resources, Malawi's policy retains rights over resources firmly in the state's hands (see e.g., Jones 1999; Shackleton and Campbell 2001). When considering the level to which the state is willing to devolve power, it interesting to note that while Botswana, Namibia and Malawi devolve control to the village level, Zimbabwe and Zambia do so only to the district level (see e.g., Shackleton and Campbell 2001; Sibanda 2004). Thus, the interpretation of what constitutes 'participation' or 'devolution' differs from one context to the another, and the degree of participation including the rights of 'poor rural local communities' to use natural resources depend on the political will of government departments and officials (Koch 2004: 72; Jopela 2010b: 128).

A closer look into the implementation of CBNRM programmes suggests that many officials feel it right that the state should control access to and decision-making over natural resources, communities being passive participants. For these officials, often poorly equipped to deal with a people-centred approach, the purpose of involving local communities is simply to inform them of their role in nature conservation policy (Fabricius 2004: 20; Draper *et al.* 2004: 349). Consequently, in many national policy documents, 'participation' consists mainly in the creation of village councils in order to give local communities a sense of 'responsibility' towards the management of natural resources. Participation is often framed in terms of profit-sharing with local communities, that is to say, only downstream in the decision-making process. The structure, composition and operation of the local consultative and management structures are rather imposed than negotiated (cf. Adams and Hulme 1998). The implementers of CBNRM programmes have often 'failed to operationalize community participation in project identification, design, and management. '"Participation" is, rather, often seen as a means to get people to support predetermined conservation programs' (Campbell 2007: 329).

4.3.2. Public archaeology: community 'participation' in cultural heritage management

Much of the debate concerning public archaeology in southern Africa and elsewhere has centred the power imbalances between archaeologists/heritage practitioners and local communities (see e.g., Chirikure and Pwiti 2008). Key concerns include: public or community involvement in archaeology, including engagement with archaeological sites (see

e.g., Pwiti and Mvenge 1996; Pwiti *et al.* 2007; Jopela and Fredriksen 2015); legacies of colonialism in conservation and heritage management (see e.g., Pwiti and Ndoro 1999); challenges related to the decolonizing of archaeological practice (Lane 2011); heritage sociopolitics and ethics (see e.g., Hall 2005; Shepherd 2007; Meskell 2005b; Meskell and Masuku Van Damme 2007); archaeology education (see e.g., Esterhuysen 2000); archaeology and museum display (see e.g., Mazel and Ritchie 1994; Lane 1996); and the more general role of archaeology in society (see e.g., Segobye 2005b; Pikirayi 2009).

The involvement of non-academics in the practice of uncovering, interpreting, presenting and preserving the past has been variously titled as 'applied', 'community' or 'public' archaeology (see e.g., Marshall 2006). From its earlier concern with specific practices, including that of cultural resource management and public outreach in the USA in the 1970s, public archaeology has evolved to include several forms. Today it is widely understood as a 'subject that examines the relationship between archaeology and the public, and then seeks to improve it through modes of practice' (Matsuda and Okamura 2011: 4). Such modes of practice include: cultural heritage management (Smith 2004); outreach and education, involving presentation and interpretation of archaeological heritage (see e.g., Morais 1984; Esterhuysen 2000) and community archaeology (see e.g., Lane 2006). Despite the growth of a range of strategies designed to facilitate and to ensure a meaningful involvement of the public, public archaeology still faces a number of theoretical and methodological challenges. A conceptual problem is the identification of who the 'public' in public archaeology actually are (see e.g., Pyburn 2011) or what is meant by 'public' or 'community' in relation to archaeology (Skeates *et al.* 2012: 4). Here I use local communities to refer to interested local groups, which are subsets of a larger, but similarly, interested public. They are complex and heterogeneous, with fluid boundaries and membership, often consisting of groups within groups, with competing and overlapping factions, and with members who have diverse and conflicting perspectives, needs and expectations (Pyburn 2011: 30).

Part of the blame lies with archaeologists and heritage managers being unwilling to share power. They continue to see the different segments of the public as passive agents (Chirikure and Pwiti 2008: 474) that simply need to be informed and enlightened about the values of heritage (Holtorf 2006: 132). In this light, public archaeology is often seen as comprising a series of activities (e.g. consultation, public outreach, training) *additional* to the task of undertaking a conventional archaeological project and not as a *different approach* to the

production of knowledge and heritage conservation through meaningful public engagement (Green et al. 2003: 369). Involving the public is often seen as politically correct rather than an epistemological move to accept the public as full partner in exploring the past and making it relevant to the present (Nicholas 2000). As a result, when the scientific mode of inquiry intercepts indigenous and local knowledge systems the latter are often ignored or not fully recognized due to the prevailing dominant archaeological paradigm (Jopela and Fredriksen 2015: 266). It is within this last set of concerns that I situate the discourse and practices regarding 'community's benefit' through cultural heritage management.

4.2.3. 'Community's benefit' through heritage management

Recent efforts to preserve cultural heritage in the region has been shaped by the notion that 'heritage must pay' (cf. Meskell's 2012a). Heritage has been relentlessly promoted as a potential socio-economic driver mostly for impoverished communities, particularly in the face of declining government services and failed delivery (Meskell 2012a: 55). Yet, a closer look into 'community's benefit' through heritage reveals that negative results are far more common than positive ones (see. e.g., Chirikure *et al.* 2010; Marschall 2010a; Galla 2012; Meskell 2012a; Taruvinga 2014).

The southern African governments' shift towards liberal market policies in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by a strong promotion of tourism based on the assumption that poverty eradication and economic development and would thus result from economic growth (Marschall 2010a: 306). The niche area of cultural heritage-based tourism has been increasingly regarded as one of the most significant and fastest-growing parts of the tourism sector, often seen as able to provide opportunities for job creation, infrastructure development, public awareness and educational opportunities in both rural and urban areas (Ndoro 2016: 393). In particular, World Heritage sites are seen as a potential catalyst for improving livelihoods of local communities and generating considerable income to the state (see e.g., Galla 2012; Ndoro 2016). For instance, before world heritage listing in 2001, less than 3000 people visited the Tsodilo Hills in Botswana annually. After listing, the visitor numbers increased to 10,000 per year between 2001 and 2005, representing approximately a 40% growth per annum. Between 2005 and 2014, visitor numbers fluctuated between 10,000 and 12,000 visitors per year (more than half foreigners). Apart from infrastructural

development, the life of local community members, who sell crafts and other tourist-related products like tour guiding to visitors has changed, as seen in the building of more substantiated houses (Ndoro 2016: 400). Similar successful examples of community beneficiation through cultural heritage-based tourism around World Heritage sites can be seen in other countries in the region such as Great Zimbabwe, inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1986. Between 1989 and 2000, visitor numbers increased from around 30,000 to over 100,000 per year, with a peak of 121,000 in 1997 (Ndoro 2016: 401).

The potential for heritage to produce local benefits is also demonstrated by Twyfelfontein, (also known as */Ui-//aes*), located in a sparsely populated rural area of northwest Namibia. Famous for its rock engravings and inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2007, the site attracts approximately 60,000 tourists per year. Although there has been minimal infrastructural development at Twyfelfontein, the small size of the population of the area has meant that the benefits are shared by the whole community (Duval and Smith 2014: 14; Ndoro 2016:404). In South Africa, a public-private partnership between the Guateng Provincial Government, the University of the Witwatersrand and Maropeng a'Afrika Leisure (Pty) invested some R347 million (US$34.7 million) primarily on development of Maropeng visitor center and Sterkfontein sites at the Cradle of Humankind World Heritage Site as well as construction and upgrading of roads around the area (Meskell 2012a: 71). The construction of the Sterkfontein and Maropeng tourism attractions has created 600 permanent and 1200 temporary jobs, while the construction of roads in the area created a further temporary 600 posts. The listing of the Cradle of Humankind as a World Heritage site has had the desired effect on growth in the tourism sector. Site tourism products such as accommodation, tours, guiding, and so on have more than quadrupled – from 68 in 1999 to 405 in 2010. A study conducted in 2008 reported that tourist spending from visits to the Cradle of Humankind generated a total of about R695 million (US$69.5 million), about 0.1% of Gauteng's GDP (Ndoro 2016: 402).

Despite these successful cases the designation of World Heritage status does not necessarily bring increased socio- economic benefits or development, as demonstrated by the site of Kilwa Kisiwani in Tanzania (Ndoro 2016). The site is an island that, together with the neighbouring island of Songo Mnara, was designated a world heritage site in 1981. Kilwa Kisiwani has received considerable funds for the conservation of the fabric of the site from

World Monuments Watch, the Aga Khan Foundation, and the French, Japanese, and Norwegian governments. Yet, none of these funds have been targeted at community development or projects that could be beneficial to circa 15 000 people living in the island. There is no private-sector investment on the island of Kilwa Kisiwani hence the limited jobs opportunities and infrastructure. The visitor fee is very low, and not currently apportioned to the islanders (Ndoro 2016: 404). But even when considerable sums of money are invested in development of cultural heritage sites for tourism-based income-generation activities, the benefits deriving from such initiatives for the most impoverish rural local communities might also be insignificant, as illustrated by two rock art tourism development initiatives in South Africa.

At the beginning of the new dispensation and with the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Program, tourism was targeted as a priority for South Africa's economic development (Meskell 2012a: 69). As part of the government-led tourism development initiatives aiming to correct the imbalances of the past and to promote the emancipation of previously disadvantaged groups, rock art sites, often located in rural regions marked by high unemployment (sometimes above 40%), were identified as cultural products 'able to act as drivers of rural tourism and thereby to transfer capital and skills to previously disadvantaged segments of the population (…) therefore help to rebalance South Africa's skewed socio-economic dynamics' (Duval and Smith 2012: 2). It was hoped that South African rock art sites, once re-packaged would be able to draw the numbers of tourists that such sites in Europe, Australia and America do, which in turn would create self-sustaining jobs for the local communities. Through this venture there was also the opportunity to,

> benefit all South Africans by informing, educating and inspiring locals and visitors about this proud South African contribution to world heritage (…) [and] help to guarantee the long-term protection of rock art by sensitizing people to its value, *allowing many people to derive tangible benefits* from it and putting in place world-class site-management and conservation practices (added emphasis) (Laue *et al.* 2001: 6).

The government used the Poverty Relief Fund to develop tourism infrastructure at the rock art sites of Game Pass Shelter in the uKhahlamba–Drakensberg National Park (UDP) and Wildebeest Kuil close to Kimberley in the Northern Cape as well as the Living Landscape Project in Clanwilliam, Western Cape (Duval and Smith 2014: 37).

The Kamberg Rock Art Center, open to the public in 2002, is situated in UDP which overlaps

the border between Lesotho and South Africa. Given the outstanding natural beauty of its mountain flora and fauna and its exceptional richness in rock art, the UDP was granted World Heritage Site status by UNESCO in 2000 as a mixed cultural and natural heritage property (Duval and Smith 2012: 1). Other rock art tourism developments in the UDP just before and after the development of Kamberg Rock Art Center had already been launched. In 1998, the Main Caves tourist site was completely refurbished by Amafa (the provincial heritage agency for KwaZulu-Natal province) in conjunction with KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service and the Rock Art Research Institute of the University of Witwatersrand. Guides were employed and trained to explain the rock art to visitors. In 2003, KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service opened a new Rock Art Interpretation Centre at Didima, near Cathedral Peak, with museum-style displays and an auditorium for audio-visual presentations (Mazel, 2008). In spite of these important developments, the new rock art developments did not attract significant numbers of tourists: rock art has never developed into a major attraction and source of social empowerment (Duval and Smith 2012:12). In 2009, out of the estimated 740,000 tourists who visited the UDP region, only about 27,300 (less than 4%) tourists paid to enter any of the 23 rock art site opened to the public, including the Didima centre. Income of between R1,218,823 and R1,425,213 was generated excluding income from sale of food and accommodation (Duval and Smith 2012: 4-5; 2014: 36).

This failure of rock art to act as driver for tourism in the region has been attributed, amongst others, to poor communication between main actors responsible for promotion of tourism and the preservation of rock art in the region, the persistence of tourism marketing of the UDP which continues to focus almost exclusively on the area's natural beauty, the lack of expertise by KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service's personnel about issues facing UDP rock art sites, as well as a precarious custodianship system of rock art sites. Take for instance the custodianship system introduced in 2004. The custodians, whose primarily role is to accompany visitors to rock art sites and to ensure appropriate behaviour at the sites, are accredited by Amafa but they are neither Amafa nor KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service employees. The fees paid by tourists are the only income custodians receive yet they are not permitted to have another job because they must be available at all times to accompany tourists. The system can only survive if there are enough tourists to provide the custodians with a living wage. This is far from being the case. One custodian might sometimes receive as few as three tourists per month and thereby earn around 100 rand (approximately 10 Euros in 2014). Unsurprisingly, turnover of custodians is high and it is

becoming increasingly difficult to find people willing to take on this role. A shortage of custodians will rapidly undermine the system and adversely affect the preservation of the rock art sites (Duval and Smith 2012: 12-13; Duval and Smith 2014: 36). Although tours were still taking place to the Game Pass rock art site in 2016, the Kamberg Rock Art Center is no longer functioning.

A similar undertaking to Kamberg was the Wildebeest Kuil Rock Art Tourism Center located some 13 km west of the diamond town of Kimberley and opened in 2001. Following the public announcement of the project, the local 'Coloured' community protested their exclusion when the !Xun and Khwe San were identified as the beneficiary community. The !Xun and Khwe San were refugees with an awkward history of involvement in the Namibian war, having come originally from different areas of Angola. Since 1996 they had become the owners of the land where Wildebeest Kuil was located (Morris 2014: 190). Like Kamberg, Wildebeest Kuil was intended to be a 'self-sustaining poverty-alleviation project, generating jobs for guides and promoting community crafts' (Morris 2014: 189). The Wildebeest Kuil Rock Art Centre achieved a measure of critical acclaim with positive remarks in the visitors' book. It was also flagged in the major tourist guidebooks, had a digital media presence and has been featured in magazines, books, and television documentaries. Yet, as a commercial endeavour, it drew relatively few visitors, far short of the initial estimates on which sustainability was based — often much less than a hundred monthly compared with a budgeted 1000 adult visitors per month (Morris 2014: 192). In fact, the local people from the nearby city were unwilling to pay R25.00 (US$4.00) per person for a guided tour. With some times fewer than 100 foreign visitors a month, the enterprise began to lose financial viability it recovered temporarily only after a considerable reduction in entrance fees and agreement from provincial government to pay the salaries of the staff (Deacon 2006: 390).

Despite the naïve belief that these 'centers have played their part' (Hampson 2015: 387), it is undeniable that both centres have failed their objective of improving the livelihoods of local communities, which was one of the primary reasons why the government decided to finance these two initiatives through the Poverty Relief Fund. Tourists did not come in the imagined numbers, and consequently income was not generated. The damage done to a community, whose hopes were raised and then dashed is hard to quantify. The local guides who saw this as an opportunity to improve their lives have been disappointed. What effect has this had on local perceptions of rock art and its value, has not yet been established. In the same line of

thought, Morris (2014) has asked: 'what might be the consequences for relations between project and community, when !Xun and Khwe leaders were led to anticipate material spin-offs from vastly inflated tourist numbers?' (Morris 2014: 192) and 'to what extent niche market heritage sites could or should be considered as sustainable job creation opportunities in the first instance?' (Morris 2014: 194). These two examples are symptomatic of some of the core issues with community beneficiation through cultural heritage across South Africa and beyond. What is worse, in Meskell's words, is that 'the desire to make heritage pay post-apartheid South Africa has unwittingly embraced, if not reinvigorated, much of the same racial and ethnic categorizing that was instrumental in the very logics of minority rule and majority subjugation' (Meskell 2012a: 59). Thus,

> despite the promises made by governments, NGOs and corporations alike that heritage promotion has obvious socio-economic benefits, the depressing images of failure and futility are the ones that persist. !Kun and Kwe women sitting on cold floors in tin sheds at Platfontein painting versions of ancient rock art in an assembly line of development (…) women beading jewelry in a deserted movie set that is now Shakaland, men in their eighties from impoverished villages bordering Kruger National Park who want to lead community tours showing how 'the blacks live today' and telling stories about their ancestral sites (Meskell 2012a: 80).

Even in situations where 'community's benefit' is framed not in economic terms but as 'symbolic reparation' to victims of apartheid and their descendants (see e.g., Marschall 2004), as recommended by the Truth and Reconciliations Commission[59] in 1998, community 'consultation' are often a 'token gesture' by government authorities who often initiate (or jump on the bandwagon) of communities initiatives and sponsor memorials and monuments and other heritage projects. Thus, such heritage projects do not necessarily reflect 'what the people value about the past and how they would like to see their heroes memorialised, but a highly institutionalised form of commemoration sponsored and directed by the national government in pursuit of specific aims and intentions' (Marschall 2010a: 170).

In fact, the ANC-led government agenda is 'to be seen, and eternally remembered for, paying tribute to those who made sacrifices to attain liberation' (Marschall 2012: 194) but without delivering on the very same promises of liberation made to those communities (cf. Marschall 2004; Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008). This has led to fierce contestation from different groups over the politics of memorialisation as illustrated in the cases of the Sharpeville

[59] In October 1998 the Truth and Reconciliations Commission recommended that 21,000 victims of apartheid repression should receive reparations of between R17,000 and R23,000 annually for six years. In addition, there should be symbolic reparations like memorial gardens and reburials (Marschall 2004: 84).

Massacre memorial (see e.g., Ngidi *et al.* 2002; Marschall 2010a; Marschall 2013b); the Hector Pieterson memorial in Soweto (see. e.g., Simbao 2007; Marschall 2010a); the Trojan Horse Massacre memorial in Athlone, Cape Town; the Guguletu Seven memorial in Guguletu, Cape Town; the Langa Massacre memorial near Uitenhage, Eastern Cape; the Thembisa Heroes Acre on the East Rand near Johannesburg (for all see Marschall 2010a); the Emlotheni Heroes Acre in New Brighton, outside Port Elizabeth (see e.g., Hansen 2003), the monuments to the warrior kings (see. e.g., Sekhukhune I of the Bapedi at Tjate, Makhado of the vhaVenda in Louis Trichardt, Ngungunhane of the Shangaan in Giyani, and Malebogo of the Bahananwa in Blouberg) in Limpopo Province (Thotse 2015) and the Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication in Kliptown (Kuljian 2009). It is no coincidence that many of the recent service-delivery protests in townships have occurred precisely in places where expensive commemorative markers and memory sites had been built (Marschall 2012: 200). For example, similarly to Kliptown in 2005 and again in 2010 (cf. Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008), in February 2010 angry residents took to the streets of Sharpeville to complain about the annual cosmetic sprucing-up of the township in preparation for Human Rights Day celebrations staged around the Sharpeville Massacre memorial and museum precinct, while the community is still forced to live without many basic services for the rest of the year (cf. Tau 2010; Marschall 2012). These examples are illustrative of a pattern seen across the region: whenever governments impose memorialisation initiatives that do not consider the socioeconomic needs and are not grounded in the aspirations of the communities to whom these projects are meant to serve, such initiatives are built to fail.

In conclusion, a brief scrutiny into the discourse on 'community benefit' through heritage reveals that although some sites have generated some form of economic development, mostly World Heritage sites, generally, 'the knock-on effects generated by global tourism seem to be limited, and local communities are yet to see significant improvements in their lives and livelihoods' (Ndoro 2016: 407). In fact, despite the discourse of heritage projects creating jobs and resulting in a range of material benefits for the impoverished local community, in reality such benefits rarely materialize. As Marschall (2012) describes it, in the case of South Africa but resonating with most of the African context,

> Heritage officials report that funding applications tend to vastly overstate the tourism potential of heritage sites and completely outrageous figures about anticipated arrivals are sometimes publicized in the media. Understandably, desperate communities who know little about the requirements for successful tourist attractions are easily swayed to support

> memorials and heritage projects that raise the specter of opportunities and an escape from poverty (Marschall 2012: 199).

Similarly, meaningful community reparation, recognition and restitution though heritage cannot be achieved due to insufficient or total lack of meaningful consultation, political party appropriation and distortion of community memories of the past (see e.g., Marschall 2012: 198). Despite much rhetoric to the contrary,

> 'consultation' is often short-circuited or reduced to patronizing, tokenistic processes, especially when the approaching date of an important anniversary adds time constraints. Public officials want to be seen to engage in consultation, but—legitimated through the democratic mandate—sometimes make decisions to suit their own political ends, disguised as broader societal goals (Marschall 2012: 198).

Despite all the challenges and limitations discussed above, the discourse on community's beneficiation through heritage has continued to thrive, also entangled with discourses associated to World Heritage.

4.4. World Heritage in Africa: 'domesticating' the UNESCO's 1972 Convention

UNESCO and its World Heritage system have attracted considerable criticism for their support of nation-state domination, their failure to incorporate indigenous and local communities' heritage perspectives and for being overly focused on materiality and monumentality that epitomize Western elite notions of heritage (see e.g., Jenkins 2008; Meskell 2012a, 2013). In particular, the World Heritage List has long been criticized for being heavily balanced in favour of European countries (see e.g., Byrne 1991; Smith 2006, 2009; Waterton 2010; Labadi 2010, 2013). Nonetheless, many commentators (see e.g., Logan 2001, 2012; Askew 2010; Colwell and Joy 2015) have also acknowledged that UNESCO itself has taken such critiques to heart and this has led to significant changes such as concerted efforts to nominate World Heritage sites outside Europe, through the adoption of the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World Heritage List in 1994, to ensure that the list reflects the full spectrum of the world's cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value (UNESCO 2005).

The Global Strategy has been criticised for its several problems and limitations (cf. Labadi 2013: 45-46). Nevertheless, the Global Strategy, aligned with UNESCO's mid-term strategy which prioritise Africa and Gender (cf. UNESCO 2008a: 8), led to many positive

achievements in Africa, like the identification and inclusion of heritage more specific to the African continent (e.g. cultural landscapes and archaeological and paleontological sites); the development of capacity-building programmes in the heritage sector such as Africa 2009[60] which made possible the establishment of two regional training and capacity-building centers (the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain* – EPA, based in Benin and the Centre for Heritage Development in Africa – CHDA, based in Kenya); the founding of the African World Heritage Fund (AWHF) in South Africa in 2006 which through its World Heritage Nomination Training Programme[61] assisted African countries in preparing more robust nomination dossiers (between 2011 and 2016 fifteen African sites were successfully nominated through the AWHF support) and also contributed to improvement of the technical capacity and network of heritage professionals; the introduction of the fifth 'C' (for Communities)[62] in the strategic objectives of the World Heritage Convention in 2007, leading to the recognition of the role of 'local communities' in World Heritage matters including the recognition of traditional systems as legitimate mechanisms for management of World Heritage sites (see e.g., Abungu 2009, 2016; Rakotomamonjy 2010; Deacon 2014; Kiriama 2014).

Although it is undeniable that Africa 2009 programme contributed significantly in strengthening institutions to better manage heritage across the continent, it can also be argued

[60] Implemented between 1998 and 2009, the *Africa 2009* programme carried out: eleven three-month courses on conservation and management of cultural heritage which trained approximately 220 African professionals from 42 countries; seventeen regional and national seminars covering issues such as documentation, legal frameworks, conservation of sacred sites, and sustainable tourism; thirty-seven *Projets Situés* (site projects) in 23 countries in the region; six books were published with the participation of 57 authors from the region (topics included Traditional Conservation Practices in Africa; Legal Frameworks for the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage in Africa; Cultural Heritage and the Law); and *Projets Cadre* which served to develop ideas, disseminate results from programme activities and bring people together to develop common frameworks and shared strategies (e.g. 148 people attended the 6 national seminars; 200 people attended the 9 thematic seminars; 53 people attended the special seminars; 604 people attended the 11 Directors' seminars) (Rakotomamonjy 2010: 9-11;18-19).

[61] The World Nomination Training Programme was spearheaded by the AWHF who worked closely with IUCN, ICCROM and Woirld Heritage Centre in developing the curriculum while the implementation of the programmes was tasked to EPA in the French speaking countries and CHDA in English speaking countries. The main goal of this programe was to assist African countries in preparing nomination dossiers through regional training courses using the selected nominations as case studies. Heritage professionals from these countries were brought together in a three steps programme: i) a three week initial course to introduce the World Heriatge nomination process and establish targeted goals for each country; ii) an eight month period where the professionals return to their countries and continue working on the nomination dossier (fieldwork); and iii) a three week workshop which brings the professionals involved to finalize the draft nomination dossiers and plans (AWHF 2008; Kiriama 2014). AWHF implemented 17 nomination-training courses that benefited a total of 315 participants from Francophone (14), Anglophone (17) and Lusophone (1) countries. Twelve sites were successfully nominates with direct support of AWHF (AWHF 2016: 20).

[62] The other four 'Cs' of the strategic objectives of the World Heritage Convention are: Credibility, Conservation, Capacity-building, Communication Communities (http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/).

that this programme was similar to others designed by ICCROM, that served as the training ground for many heritage professionals since early 1960s, which 'trained experts to focus on the Western model of conservation, who on their return to their home countries subsequently strengthened systems that had been propagated under colonial rule' (Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015: 140). Both the Africa 2009 Regional Courses[63] (with a duration of three months) and Technical Courses[64] (with a duration of one month) aimed at improving the skills and knowledge of professionals in both conservation and management (Rakotomamonjy 2010: 10), by providing 'guide to practice' (i.e. procedures and tools of practical heritage management (Carman 2002: 2)) and not necessarily engaging in critical reflections about theoretical underpinnings of heritage management in postcolonial Africa.[65] Even the research activities which resulted in six noteworthy publications on several facets of conservation and management of immovable cultural heritage (Rakotomamonjy 2010: 14), did not provide a solid theoretical framework to challenge the hegemony of the Western paradigm with regards to heritage management praxis in the continent. The emphasis on community involvement in heritage conservation promoted by the Africa 2009 programme, although informed by some empirical cases from Africa (e.g. incident in Domboshava rock art site in Zimbabwe in the 1990s), was more in line with the global shift that advocated community participation and the mobilization of indigenous knowledge led by the environmental conservationist (see e.g., Martello and Jasanoff 2004: 8-9) always within the framework of the dominant Western dominant notions of heritage and its conservation ethics.

The Global Strategy has also fallen short in ensuring a more representative and balanced World Heritage List (see Meskell *et al.* 2015 for discussion on number of sites inscribed to the World Heritage List by regional group). New categories such as cultural landscapes were not sufficient to overcome the disparities of representation on the World Heritage List since 'Europe was quick to embrace them, and prepare faster and better nominations' (Abungu

[63] 224 African professionals from forty two countries gained knowledge through their participation in the eleven Regional Training Courses on conservation and management of immovable cultural heritage (Rakotomamonjy 2010: 10).

[64] One hundred and twenty eight African professionals from forty countries acquired skills through their participation in the seven Technical Courses which focused on inventory and documentation (1st and 2nd Technical Courses), strategies and techniques for conservation of immovable heritage (3rd Technical Course), conservation and management of rock art places (4th Technical Course), the World Heritage Nomination process (5th Technical Course) and impact assessment (6th and 7th Technical Courses) (Rakotomamonjy 2010: 11).

[65] With the exception of one publication produced within *Africa 2009* programme which addressed issues related to traditional conservation practices in Africa (cf. Jeffroy 2005).

2016: 377). When the 'Global Strategy' was adopted in 1994 the Africa Region[66] had only 42 properties (9.5%) out of the 439 inscribed on the World Heritage List. More than two decades after the adoption of the 'Global Strategy' this region still accounts for only 89 properties (8.6%) out of the 1031 inscribed on the World Heritage List (as of May 2016) (http://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/stat#s7). Even when Africa is taken as a whole[67] it still accounts for only 13% of the total World Heritage properties, with 137 inscribed properties distributed in 37 countries across the continent (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/).

Since 1994 the disparity has grown: there are now 131 World Heritage properties across only 9 countries in Western Europe and 140 World Heritage properties distributed in only 15 countries in Southern Europe. Table 2 illustrates the complete distribution of World Heritage Sites by regions as of May 2016.

Table 4: Distribution of World Heritage Sites by regions

Region	Cultural	Natural	Mixed	Total	Percentage (%)	States Parties with inscribed properties	States Parties with no inscribed properties
Africa	48	37	2	89	9%	33	21
Arab States	73	4	2	79	8%	18	4
Asia and Pacific	168	59	11	238	23%	35	15
Europe and North America	420	61	10	491	48%	50	3
Latin America and Caribbean	93	36	5	134	13%	27	13
Total	**802**	**197**	**32**	**1031**	**100%**	**163**	**56**

Source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat) (as of May 2016).

The reason for this Global Strategy's failure to make the World Heritage List more balanced is astutely summarized by an UNESCO official interviewed by Waterton (2010: 61), who stated:

> It is starting to change [the World Heritage List] but it will never fundamentally change, because you have a problem in the definition [...] The other part is that those countries that signed early won't give up on World Heritage and that is a political issue; it is not a heritage issue. It is a political issue that Italy, France, Germany and the UK don't want to

[66] Meaning sub-Saharan Africa: the Africa Region recognised by UNESCO for the purposes of the World Heritage Convention comprises only 54 countries on the continent south of the Sahara as well as islands in the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

[67] The Africa Region plus the 6 countries north of the Sahara that UNESCO includes in the Arab States Region (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).

> give up their one seat or one nomination per year you see, so that is an issue (…) So, the focus on Western Europe is not in principle to do with the Committee itself – it has to do with those States Parties which have beyond 30 [world heritage] sites, and that is Spain, Italy, the UK, Germany and France, and they don't stop nominating (…) they don't stop nominating (…) because it is a prestige issue.

It is also interesting to note that although the AWHF has supported all the 12 successful world heritage nominations from Africa inscribed since 2011[68], this does not mean an increase in the number of African nomination dossiers being successfully inscribed. In fact, only 18 African sites were inscribed on the World Heritage List between 2005-2010 compared to 22 sites inscribed between 1999 and 2004. The reasons for the difficulty faced by Africa to increase the number of sites on the World Heritage List are manifold. It has been suggested that nomination and management of heritage sites by African states has low priority when compared with other government development projects (see e.g., Kusimba 1996; Mahachi and Kamuhangire 2008; Chirikure 2013; Kusimba and Klehm 2013). There is a lack of funding to support the nomination of new sites and subsequent management of sites with world heritage status (Makuvaza and Chiwaura 2014: 46-7).

Nevertheless, I have argued elsewhere that while factors such as widespread poverty, lack of financial resources, adequate infrastructure and weak institutional capacity for conservation and management doubtless contribute to the current situation in Africa, the often neglected aspect of governance of heritage conservation, specifically the power relations and dynamic processes involving key stakeholders (e.g. UNESCO World Heritage Centre, ICOMOS, States Parties, central and local governments, and various groups at local level) who often influence and shaped decision-making in these World Heritage Sites, is indeed a key factor (Jopela 2016: 52-53). Thus, many governments opportunistically adopt a conservation strategy based more on advocacy for international donor funding and less on domestic measures that would empower local actors in the conservation of the already inscribed world heritage properties.

In addition, African States Parties have often wasted resources by investing in the

[68] Five sites had been inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2011 (i.e. the Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe (Sudan), Fort Jesus (Kenya), Kenya Lake System in the Great Rift Valley (Kenya), Konso Cultural Landscape (Ethiopia) and Saloum Delta (Senegal)). Another five sites were inscribed in 2012 (i.e. Lakes of Ounjanga (Chad), Rabat, Modern capital and Historic City, Shaded Heritage (Morocco), Bassari country: Bassari, Fula and Bedik Cultural Landscapes (Senegal), Sangha Trinational (Cameroon, Central Africa Republic and Congo) and two sites were inscribed in 2013 (i.e. Namib Sand Sea (Namibia), Historic Centre of Agadez (Niger)) (AWHF 2016: 25-27).

development of world heritage nomination dossiers of sites that, according to the Advisory Bodies (ICOMOS and IUCN), cannot be considered to be of outstanding universal value. However, for multiple reasons, States Parties invest years and resources working on such sites rather than nominating other more 'promising ones' in the eyes of Advisory Bodies. Despite the pivotal drive of AWHF to assist States Parties in nominating their sites there are still tensions and disagreements resulting from the divergences between domestic agendas and nationalistic interests on the one hand, and the agenda of international organizations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS or IUCN on the other, which often advise States Parties on the type of sites that have a potential to demonstrate outstanding universal value, based on the dominant Western notions of heritage.

The disjuncture between global heritage organizations and nation-states is briefly explored by Ndoro and Wijesuriya (2015) using case studies of Matobo Hills in Zimbabwe and genocide sites in Rwanda. In the first case the authors point to the refusal of ICOMOS to include Njelele (a sacred site) as part of the nomination of the Matobo Cultural Landscape in Zimbabwe during the nomination process in 2003. Njelele is a rock outcrop situated on a hill southwest of Rhodes Matopos National Park in the Khumalo communal area, often referred to as *Dombo letshipoteleka*: the shifting or turning rock. It is believed that the voice of *Mwari/Mlimo* is heard from the stone at Njelele and must not be tampered with in any way (Ranger 1999:21; National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe 2004). There are regular visits by priests and messengers from various chiefs throughout the country to appease *Mwari/Mlimo* by sacrificing and presenting him with cattle and beer. The cult could also be consulted and *Mwari/Mlimo* invoked in times of illness and death, domesticated animal diseases, during agricultural seasons of sowing and reaping, succession disputes, natural phenomena such as rainfall failure, and even in times of politics and war (Makhuvaza 2008: 166).

For ICOMOS, the rock art found within the Matobo were of far greater value to the world than the rituals and religious values of Njelele, which was considered by some experts as a 'pagan practice'. This was despite the fact that for Zimbabweans what gives Matobo its continuing relevance today is the strong persistence of indigenous beliefs and practices associated with the landscape of Matobo as a sacred place or the seat of God, (*Mwari/Mlimo*), the home of ancestral spirits, and the focus for rituals. Thus, for Zimbabweans Matobo *is* Njelele. It is regarded as the most important heritage place in the country, which still attracts

people from as far as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Lesotho. For ICOMOS the condition of inclusion of Njelele as part of the nominated property was that the religious leaders and communities had to abide by the rules and regulations of a protected area. No indigenous rituals were to be permitted, and permission for any use had to be authorized by the protected areas management authority and should not threaten the fauna and flora of the area. Thus for the local community, nomination meant a change of ownership of the sacred site from the community at large to National Parks and National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, restrictions and denial of access, and desecration of sacred places through tourism (Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015: 143. For detailed discussion see Nyathi and Ndiwini 2005; Makuvaza and Makuvaza 2012).

The second case involves the rejection of Rwanda's Tentative List by UNESCO and ICOMOS experts following the Rwandan government criticism of the French government's role in the 1994 genocide[69] in their country. Since 2012 Rwanda's Tentative List contains only one property of a series of sites associated with the genocide (the Genocide memorial sites: Nyamata, Murambi and Bisesero Gisozi). UNESCO and ICOMOS experts were sent to assist Rwanda in identifying possible heritage sites to nominate. They suggested, among others, a list of cathedrals, churches, and archaeological sites as part of a compromise for tentative listing. For Rwandans, no site can have greater significance than the sites of genocide that were witness to the wiping out of so many of their compatriots. Despite Rwanda seeking assistance from UNESCO for their own expert findings, the Advisory Bodies have ignored the interest and values of the Rwandans themselves. Thus, Ndoro and Wijesuriya concluded that these two cases clearly demonstrate that,

> International standards set by UNESCO and ICOMOS are often geared towards privileging certain cultural symbols and particular 'experts' who are deemed capable of discerning the value, meaning, and significance of any heritage place in the world. The concept of listing and the heritage being defined is clearly Eurocentric or at least based on pro-Western cultural norms (Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015: 143).

The low representation of African sites on World Heritage List has been compounded by new demanding standards and requirements for inscription. For instance, now it is required that sites must have an operational management system in place before inscription. Although

[69] The 2008 report from the National Independent Commission Charged with Gathering Evidence to show the Implication of the French Government in the Genocide Perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994, claimed to detail that France was not only complicit, but had engaged in actions on the level of conspiracy to genocide.

there is a positive tendency that the nomination dossiers are increasingly developed by African professionals, the outcome in terms of the number of inscriptions is still comparatively low. For instance, while twelve sites from Africa were inscribed between 2011 and 2015, the World Heritage Committee, in agreement with ICOMOS evaluations, has deferred[70] another seven nomination dossiers to 'allow States Parties, with the *advice* of ICOMOS and the World Heritage Centre, if requested', to refocus and strengthen the nomination dossiers (ICOMOS 2013, 2014, 2015).[71] The paragraph 160 of the Operational Guidelines 'encourages' States Parties that fail to get their sites inscribed to '*seek advice* from the relevant Advisory Body and/ or the World Heritage Centre to discuss how the recommendations of the [World Heritage] Committee might be addressed. Where required, the States Parties may wish to consider inviting an *Advisory mission*' (added emphasis in italic) (UNESCO 2015: 44).

Such statements illustrate one of the key current trends of the hegemonic heritage discourse: the idea that international cooperation is the only way to ensure effective long-term conservation of heritage and development of respective communities. Such discourse and its associated practices have placed international organizations as 'key players in a world of global conservation' (Pochet 2014: 7) mainly as advisors, mediators and funders. Yet, 'who counts as expert, whose knowledge is deemed relevant, and who participates in advisory and negotiating bodies' (Jasanoff and Martello 2004: 345) are all critically important questions to understand the intellectual workings of authoritative heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa, including that of 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention.

The above discussion of the three heritage discourses and their associated practices seem to suggest that 'glocalised' processes have allowed the prevalence of the hegemonic Western heritage discourse decades after independence, despite rhetoric of liberation. This conclusion has important implications for the understanding of some of the complexities and

[70] According to paragraph 160 of the Operational Guidelines, the Committee may decide to *defer* a nomination for more in depth assessment or study, or a substantial revision by the State Party. Should the State Party decide to resubmit the *deferred* nomination in any subsequent year, these nominations are reevaluated again by the relevant Advisory Bodies like any other new nomination (UNESCO 2015: 44) .

[71] The *deffered* sites are: Bijagós Archipelago – Motom Moranghajogo of Guinea-Bissau (inscribed on Tentative List in 2006); Isandra Zoma of Madagascar (inscribed on Tentative List in 1997) (ICOMOS 2013). Tongo-Tengzuk Tallensi Cultural Landscape of Ghana (inscribed on Tentative List in 2000); Mount Mulanje Cultural Landscape of Malawi (inscribed on Tentative List in 2000 as nature site); Barotse Cultural Landscape of Zambia (inscribed on Tentative List in 2009) (ICOMOS 2014). Thimlich Ohinga Cultural Landscape of Kenya (inscribed on Tentative List in 2010) and Nyero and other hunter-gatherer geometric rock art sites in Eastern Uganda (inscribed on Tentative List in 1997) (ICOMOS 2015).

contradictions inherent in the current heritagization and the official liberation discourse across southern Africa. For, although the notions of liberation which form the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism in much of the African continent is related to Pan-Africanism, the current heritagization of the liberation struggle is entangled and shaped by discourses related to decolonialization of African landscapes, community 'participation' and 'community's benefit' through heritage as well as the promotion of liberation heritage in the global stage through World Heritage Listing, as I will illustrate in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE - LIBERATION HERITAGE DISCOURSE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

During my visit to the historical site of Matchedje in 2013, Mr Fernando, a war veteran now volunteering as a part-time guide at the site, took me on a tour through a dense low scrub and thorn forest while pointing to significant places in the landscape and narrating events of 1968 FRELIMO's Congress. 'It was here in this place where this photo was taken', he said, while unfolding an A4 leaflet with the image of Samora Machel and Eduardo Mondlane sitting side-by-side on a fallen tree trunk and holding a Heckler & Koch G3 machine-gun supposedly captured from the Portuguese army (see Figure 64 and Figure 65).




Figure 64: Samora Machel (on the left) and Eduardo Mondlane (on the right) in one of the 'liberated zones' in Cabo Delgado province (Pachinuapa 2011: 55).



Figure 65: Fallen tree trunk in the historical site of Matchedje, Niassa Province.

I instantly recognised the iconic photograph (Figure 64) from the cover of my grade four history textbook. As I stood there in front of that fallen trunk, and looked at some of the fallen *palhotas* (thatched houses) that were put up in 2008 to recreate the shelter used by the Congress delegates, I could not help feeling deeply moved by some of Mr. Fernando's narrative which resonated immensely with the history of the liberation struggle (*história da luta armada*) that I learnt from the days when I used to sing *viva viva a FRELIMO* (long live FRELIMO), the first sentence of the old national anthem at my primary school. At the time, I was unaware that Mr Fernando might have been misremembering or indeed appropriating by association, the historical photo of Mondlane and Machel that was actually taken in another province, Cabo Delgado (see Pachinuapa 2011: 55). As we moved through the camp, Mr Fernando continued to re-enact the past by activating his memories not of the deliberation of the Congress itself, since he wasn't one of the FRELIMO delegates but support personnel. He

recalled the attack he survived when the camp was bombed by the Portuguese military on the last day of the Congress, by which time the delegates had already left the camp.

Like Matchedje, many landscapes across southern Africa, a region defined and structured by a history of conflicts, are associated with rich and specific stories of the struggle for freedom, conveying the suffering, the sacrifices and the deaths of many unnamed heroes and heroines. Although each process of the struggles for liberation of individual countries in southern Africa, from 1960 to 1990, is to a certain degree unique, based on historically particular features of the society and combination of circumstances and events, since independence, the appreciation of the sacrifices of the 'liberators' and founders of the 'liberated' states has always been a common concern amongst the elites of former national liberation movements, now political parties in government. From the beginning, liberation struggle has played a central role in post-independence politics and life across the region, as a rallying point for state crafting and nation-building as well as defining the politics of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. granting entitlements) in the Postcolony. Yet, in 2005, thirty years after Angola's and Mozambique's independence, twenty-five years after that of Zimbabwe, fifteen years after Namibian independence and the end of apartheid in South Africa, there appeared a renewed interest by all countries in the region to recognize the contribution of people and institutions liberation and to preserve the shared legacies of the struggle in southern Africa. Why now (i.e. 2005)?

Aiming at understanding this current heritagization of the liberation struggle in southern Africa, this chapter explored the notions and processes of liberation and the current discourse on liberation heritage based on examples from selected countries in the region. The goal is to tease out some of the complexities and contradictions inherent in the recent traction of liberation heritage discourse. I have divided this Chapter in two main parts. In the first part, I discuss the notions of liberation which form the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism in much of the African continent and the way that this concept was translated (and transformed) during the transition to the post-colonial dispensation. I focus on the (i) particular history of the transition to democracy, (ii) the 'liberation mentality' of former national liberation movements and (iii) the attitudes of former national liberation movements once transformed into 'party-machines' to illustrate the reasons why national liberation movements now in government have betrayed the cause of true liberation once made to the peoples they claim to represent across southern Africa.

In the second part, I discuss the reasons for the renewed interest by all countries in the region in recognizing the contribution of people and institutions towards the liberation of the subcontinent. Acknowledging the specificities of individual cases, as well as the myriad of agendas and motivation for different interested groups that engage with liberation heritage, I argue that this recent traction that has led to the institutionalisation of liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, represent a specific way in which former national liberation movements, now in government, have tried to respond to changes in circumstances marked by an increasing contestation by the different social groups over the content of official discourse of the past (the *liberation script*), based on selective memories of the liberation struggle, in an increasingly disputed multi-party democratic dispensation. This is also illustrated in detail in the case of Mozambique in Chapters Seven and Eight. In this Chapter I illustrate the way 'liberation parties' have responded to the current challenge to their hegemonic power by strengthening the solidarity of former liberation movements and, at times, 'inventing traditions' that did not exist in practice during the struggle.

5.1. Pan-Africanism and liberation of southern Africa

The concept of liberation entered African political discourse in the post-Second World War period to denote a process of the political struggle of colonised peoples against the specific ideology and practice of colonialism (Southall 2003b: 30; Ashcroft *et al.* 2013: 15). Despite taking numerous different forms, liberation was articulated in terms of a discourse of African anti-colonial nationalisms, broadly encapsulated under Pan-Africanism: 'the ideology and movement that guided the nationalist movements and national liberation movements to independence' (Osaghae 2005: 4). Born as a Protestant and reformer ideology in favour of people of African descent in America in 1900, Pan-Africanism rapidly changed from a 'petit bourgeois' forum advocating the improvement in conditions for colonial subjects, to a radical anti-colonial social movement demanding self-determination for Africans and other colonised peoples (Ratcliff 2009: 11). For the first time throughout the history of the Pan-African movement, the Manchester Congress in October 1945 had numerous African representatives and the discussions revolved essentially around the decolonization of Africa (Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 898-900). In fact, it was in Manchester that a 'firm blueprint for the decolonization of Africa was laid for the first generation liberation fighters in Africa' (Mensah 2014: 114). Thus, Pan-Africanism may be redefined as 'a political, cultural, and

economic movement initiated by people of African descent in the Americas, and later taken over by continental Africans, that aims to liberate all Africans and people of African descent from the shackles of political, economic, cultural, and intellectual domination' (Uzoigwe 2014: 222).

Because a major aim of the Pan-African movement was the liberation of Africa from colonial rule, Ghana's independence in 1957 is an important milestone in the movement's history, Ghana provided the movement with a territorial base and, for the first time, Africans assumed control of Pan-African movement (Uzoigwe 2014: 225). In fact, in the history of Pan-Africanism as a liberation movement, the fifteen-year period 1950-1965 was dominated by the figure of Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of independent Ghana (1957-1966), who on the March 6, 1957, the day of Ghana's independence, made a call which was at the heart of his Pan-African agenda. He stated: 'We have done the battle and we again re-dedicate ourselves not only in the struggle to emancipate other territories in Africa. Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent' (Mensah 2014: 96). Nkrumah's idea of Pan-African responsibility in the national liberation struggles provided a direct source of encouragement and hope to other African nationalist movements (Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 898-900; Mensah 2014: 97). This Pan-African discourse on liberation was emulated years later by Julius Nyerere, the first President of independent Tanzania (1964-1985), and Samora Machel, the first President of independent Mozambique (1975-1986), the principle that the independence of those countries 'would be meaningless until all of Africa was liberated from colonial rule and white minority domination such as apartheid' (Campbell 2010: 48).

To advance the liberation agenda Nkrumah summoned the All-African People's Conference which was held in Accra on 8th December 1958. In the opening speech of the conference he stated:

> My first advice to you who are struggling to be free is to aim for the attainment of the *Political Kingdom* – that is to say, the complete independence and self-determination of your territories. When you have achieved the *Political Kingdom* all else will follow. Only with the acquisition of the Political power-real power through the attainment of sovereign independence will you be in a position to reshape the vexations problems which harass our Continent (Mensah 2014: 123).

This speech was critical for disseminating the idea that the first step towards liberation from colonialism was the attainment of 'political freedom'. Nkrumah believed that the socio-

economic development and progress of Africa would come only within the 'political kingdom' not the other way around (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 40). This notion of liberation was widely shared by a number of leaders of liberation movements and asylum seekers from South Africa (ANC and Pan-African Congress [PAC]), Southern and Northern Rhodesia (ZANU and ZAPU), Tanganyika (Tanganyika African National Union [TANU]), Algeria (National Liberation Front/*Front de Libération Nationale*), Angola (MPLA), and Mozambique (UDENAMO) who had converged upon Accra since early 1960s. Most nationalist movements went to Ghana mostly because Accra 'internationalized their struggles in a way that few other extra-metropolitan locales could' at the time (Ahlman 2011: 40).

But the Ghanaian 'miracle' was short-lived. A widespread discontent amongst segments of society due to regime's failure to deliver on promises of liberation (e.g. despite the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the leadership most of the development projects were dependent on funding from either United States of America or Great Britain) coupled with the dictatorial tendencies of Nkrumah (e.g. the cult of personality that had developed around him or *Nkrumahnism*), led to military coup in 1966. Subsequently the 'freedom fighters' mostly from southern Africa were arrested and expelled from Accra. Nevertheless, the Ghanaian experiment provided the 'anti-colonial rebels and visionaries' with the unique platform not only to share the ideological bases and strategies to advance African decolonization, but also to identify the main issues that Pan-Africanism should develop in the era of independence (Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 8; Ahlman 2011: 39). Following the Accra conference, a series of meetings[72] which took place between 1959 and 1963, amidst ideological differences, eventually culminated in the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in Ethiopian capital Addis-Ababa in 1963. The OAU established principles such as the primacy of political independence, support for liberation movements, and the formation of a united front within the UN and the non-alignment countries (Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 898-900).

In broad terms, national liberation struggles in southern Africa took place in two waves. First, nationalist movements fighting against colonialism gained relatively easy successes in those parts of the sub-continent which, following the post-Second World War decision to abandon the 'burden of empire', were especially given away by Britain (Southall 2003b: 31). This is

[72] For instance, the Second Conference of Independent African States that took place in Monrovia in 1959 which adopted the resolution on 'the right of the colonial territories to self-determination' and the 1961 meeting in Casablanca where the African Charter was signed.

how Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika and Zanzibar) became independent on December 9, 1961, under the leadership of TANU party of Julius Nyerere, Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) became independent on October 24, 1964, under the leaderships of United National Independent Party (UNIP) of Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991) and Malawi (formerly Nyasaland) became independent on July 6, 1964, under the leaderships of Malawi Congress Party (MCP) of Hastings Banda (1966-1994). Yet in settler's territory where nationalistic movements met concerted resistance to their call for self-determination, they had to resort to armed struggle. The armed struggle required the formation of the armed wing of the nationalist movement and the articulation of military and political struggles (implying the need for military hierarchy, discipline and security) as well as higher levels of popular participation and accompanying class consciousness of diverse social strata (i.e. peasants, workers, and progressive bourgeoisie). These circumstances transformed nationalist movements into national liberation movements (Southall 2003b: 31; 2013: 2-3).

Informed by Leninist doctrine that advocated that nationalism could be a progressive force to create 'free but revolutionary societies' in the postcolonial world (Ashcroft *et al.* 2013: 173), national liberation movements may be defined as:

> revolutionary political organizations that mobilize oppressed peoples for purposes of overthrowing imperialist domination. They are organizations of workers, peasants, and other exploited classes and strata (the proletariat, the lower strata of the petite bourgeoisie) under the leadership of revolutionary intellectuals, committed to radical social change (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1984: 49).

In the region, the national liberation movements' decision to take up armed struggle was initiated by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola/*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA) and MPLA in Angola in 1962 and 1963, followed by South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia in 1962, by FRELIMO in Mozambique in 1964 and ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe in 1964 (Legassick 2003: 157). Consequently, amongst national liberation movements the official discourse about liberation came to be defined by struggle, especially the 'long and hard armed struggle' fought with 'great heroism' (Clapham 2012: 4).

Nevertheless, given the numerous forms of resistance and diverse nature of struggles against colonialism across the region, for the purpose of my argument here I consider the liberation struggle as a 'glocal' multi-dimensional social movement. According to Thörn (2010: 14),

social movement can be defined as

> a form of collective action that articulates a social conflict and ultimately aims at transforming a social order; it is a process of action and interaction involving as a fundamental element the construction of a collective identity, or a sense of community, of 'us', sharing a set of values and norms, and 'others', i.e. antagonistic actors. However, the dynamic of a social movement also involves conflicts and tensions not just in relation to the movement's adversaries, but also within its own space.

Thus, in the broader context of decolonization movement, liberation struggle was to a large extent a 'movement of movements', comprising religious institutions, the trade unions and labour movements and many other anti-colonial movements, which, together, provided a wide range of different networks and forms of the struggle for liberation (Thörn 2010: 15). While these movements shared their repulsion for the colonial regime, internal relations were also constantly defined by conflict. A common feature of national liberation struggles was the contest over the hegemony within the movement, in the course of which often vicious fighting took place between rival movements to determine which of them would be the ultimate beneficiary of the eventual triumph, to become the ruler of the new nation (Clapham 2012: 6). So each national liberation struggle was above all a 'struggle within the struggle' to use Masipula Sithole's (1979) words. For instance, in Zimbabwe, despite sharing a common enemy and goal, the nationalist movements remained fragmented into ZAPU with its armed wing Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), ZANU and its armed wing Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), United African National Council (UANC), among many other smaller factions. While new and smaller political formations emphasised the need for unity amongst nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU fought over 'authenticity' and which party was more committed to the liberation of the country which resulted in terrible violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 39).

Hence, an important aspect of national liberation struggles was the national liberation movements permanent struggle for legitimacy. In 1958 a solidarity movement emerged called the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) initiated by the first Presidents of Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah), Tanzania (Julius Nyerere), Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda) and Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta). In 1962, after independence of all Eastern African countries, southern African countries joined the PAFMECA and the movement was transformed into the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa

(Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 910). This alignment of liberation movements, resulted in a creation of the so-called 'authentic liberation movements', those regarded as the 'original and revolutionary movements': the ANC of South Africa; FRELIMO of Mozambique; SWAPO of South West Africa (now Namibia); MPLA of Angola; PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde/*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*) of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde; and ZAPU of South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The 'unauthentic' movements were those that resulted from splits in original movements such as SWANU (South West Africa National Union) of former South West Africa; PAC of South Africa; ZANU of South Rhodesia; FNLA and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) of Angola (Saíde 2014: 737).

Such categorization, the result of alliances based on personal relationships, aimed at marginalising rivals, was taken up by the OAU which formally recognised as legitimate national liberation movements only those organisations which engaged in armed struggle (Southall 2013: 3). Thus, ZANU initially considered 'unauthentic', was later accepted as an authentic liberation movement due to the perceived seriousness with which it fought for the liberation of South Rhodesia (Saíde 2014: 738). The implicit assumption amongst nationalist leaders seemed to be that independence through the armed liberation struggle, being highly political and aimed at the total emancipation from the stranglehold of colonialism and neocolonialism, would be more meaningful than independence negotiated and attained on terms imposed by the erstwhile colonisers (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987: 38). Yet, the current neo-colonial condition of 'liberated' countries in southern Africa is a clear illustration that this assumption has been proven to be false. Most importantly, the recognition of some national liberation movements as 'authentic' allowed movements such as the ANC, FRELIMO and SWAPO to participate in OAU meetings, receptions at embassies, international solidarity conferences and retreats in Dar es Salaam, where they could share issues relating to the struggle. This recognition also allowed these victorious national liberation movements, now political parties in government, to construct and promote a liberation struggle discourse that marginalised the role of other movements (i.e. the losers in this historical process) and promote themselves as 'sole liberators' in their countries.

Although I will not chart the long and fascinating history of liberation struggles and the role of different actors in the process the above discussion on the struggle for legitimacy sheds

some light on the 'glocal' multi-dimensional nature of the liberation struggles which simultaneously operated on national, international and transnational levels. At the national level the armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the colonial regime. It was part of the broader movement of popular or mass resistance including the urban community struggles such as the militancy of the trade unions (e.g. through workers' strikes), the oppositional work of cultural activists and religious institutions, student organizations (e.g. the 1970s Soweto uprisings in South Africa) as well as peasants insurgent actions (e.g. peasant opposition to forced cotton cultivation in Mozambique) (Isaacman *et al.* 2005: 62-63; Melber 2010: 42). Independence was also the achievement of the solidarity movements across southern Africa and around the world (e.g. Britain, Australia or the Nordic countries) (see e.g., Jennett 1989; Eriksen 1999; Sellström 1999, 2002; Soiri and Peltola 1999; Fieldhouse 2005; Thörn 2006). For instance, in 1968, in response to an appeal by the President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, political activists who supported the liberation of Mozambique created the Committee for the Freedom of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau in London. The solidarity committee's main task was to carry out awareness campaigns, disseminate information on the liberation struggle in Portuguese colonies, to uncover the support that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation states were providing to Portugal, as well as to gather more sympathisers and mobilise material resources to send to freedom fighters (Saíde 2014: 739).

As a 'glocal' social movement, the international and transnational facet of the liberation struggle was characterised by the involvement of international organisations, such as the UN, the former OUA (since 2002 AU) and Frontline States (Thörn 2010: 15). For instance, the UN played a crucial role in bringing about Namibian independence culminating in the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group, with supervisory powers for the transition of Namibia to an internationally accepted sovereign state under UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 (Melber 2014: 9). With regards to South Africa, between 1960 and 1963, the UN General Assembly adopted many resolutions on apartheid, including Resolutions 1598/1961, 1633/1961 and 1761/1963, expressing its conviction that the racial segregation in South Africa was 'inconsistent with the principles contained in the United Nations Charter'. Later, in terms of its Resolution 2202 of 16 December 1966, the General Assembly condemned apartheid as a 'crime against humanity' (Mangu 2011: 11).

At the continental level, the OAU was able to mobilise worldwide condemnation of colonialism and apartheid, as well as moral and practical support for the liberation

movements. The OAU secured UN recognition for the legitimacy of liberation struggles and under Resolution 2555. The General Assembly requested all its specialised agencies to give material aid and assistance to liberation movements. Most importantly, in 1963 the OAU adopted a strong resolution on decolonization, in which they unanimously acknowledged 'the duty of all African independent states to support dependent peoples in Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence' (Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 906). The OAU also created the African Liberation Committee consisting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, with its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. This Liberation Committee had the following aims: (i) to co-ordinate the material and financial support sent to liberation movements from independent African states and from abroad; (ii) to give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary movements; (iii) to reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups and nationalist movements so that they may present a united front; (iv) to facilitate the formation of revolutionary alliances across national boundaries; and (v) to publicize the struggle through diplomacy in international relations (Garaba 2010: 20-21).

All these developments were important in creating transnational solidarity networks, connecting numerous organisations and action groups, which had important nodes in southern African, in places such as Dar es Salaam (where almost all national liberation movements had their military camps and exile offices) and Lusaka. For the ANC, London was also an important 'postcolonial capital' in the northern hemisphere since this is where the ANC had its main exile office (Isaacman *et al.* 2005: 64; Thörn 2010: 15; Campbell 2010: 49). These different levels (national, international and transnational) of the liberation struggle were often intertwined resulting in complex and sometimes conflicting relations due to the broader structural contexts, such as the Cold War and the numerous challenges imposed by the condition of postcoloniality in the newly independent countries (Thörn 2010: 16). For instance, despite FRELIMO's foreign policy based on 'solidarity and co-operation with all anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist peoples, governments and organisations' (Saíde 2014: 737), the intensification of military aggression against Mozambique forced the government of Maputo to reach an agreement for peaceful co-existence with the apartheid regime, by signing the Nkomati Accord in 1984. This was seen by many as a sign of capitulation and ultimate betrayal of FRELIMO to the ANC liberation struggle (Fauvet and Mosse 2003: 210-213).

Despite their tortuous roads, national liberation struggles in southern Africa also came to epitomise solidarity amongst African peoples through the creation of co-operation mechanisms and networks for conflict resolution and the advancement of the liberation cause (Omari and Macaringue 2007: 48). In 1976, the leaders of five independent southern African countries, namely Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Antonio Agostinho Neto of Angola (1975–1979) and Seretse Khama of Botswana (1966–1980) created the Frontline States (FLS) specifically as a security alliance against apartheid South Africa's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). The strategy was to support the region's national liberation movements and overthrow white minority rule (Nyakudya and Jakarasi, 2015: 95). The FLS became one of the most important institutions in Southern Africa receiving a mandate to work for the liberation of Southern Africa on the behalf of OAU and the UN (Omari and Macaringue 2007:52). The Interstate Defence and Security Committee, the security leg of the FLS, played a key role in the region's security architecture, especially in the battle over the Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale during 1987 and 1988, between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and its United States of America (USA) supported ally UNITA against the Angolan army, the People's Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola, supported by Cuban forces. This was one of the final and most significant battles of the Cold War in the region whose outcome permanently changed the political and strategic landscape of the southern African region (Nagar 2010: 17; Velthuizen 2009: 120).

In April 1980 the FLS evolved into Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) through the adoption of Lusaka Declaration on 'Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation' ratified by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (which became independent on April 18, 1980) aimed at strengthening economic development in the region, and minimising dependence on apartheid South Africa (Nagar 2010: 8; Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015: 95). The release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation movements led to a protracted series of negotiations that marked the end of apartheid. On March 21, 1990, Namibia was granted its independence. Thus, despite the ambiguous geopolitical context of the Cold War (e.g. the USA was supporting the apartheid regime and backing the invasion of southern Angola while simultaneously providing considerable funds to SADCC [see Nagar 2010: 12-13]), it is undeniable that the Pan-Africanist movement, in its various organised forms (i.e. OUA and its African Liberation Committee, FLS and later

SADCC) achieved the main goal of the struggle: political independence (Kodjo and Chanaiwa 2010: 906-907; Melber 2014: 11). Most importantly, the experience of the liberation struggle has produced what I consider to be the most powerful and legacy after the attainment of political independence: a 'liberation mentality' developed during the armed struggle and lifetime individual and institutional alliances that continue to shape the life and politics of the region to this day.

5.2. The idea of liberation

To understand the nature and contradictions of the current liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa one needs to look at the idea of liberation of the elites of the liberation movements *vis-à-vis* broader societal groups in these 'liberated' countries. The anti-colonial struggle was often articulated in terms of a radical discourse of liberation that sought to reconcile the internationalist and anti-elitist demands of Marxism with the nationalist sentiments of nationalist movements and national liberation movements as exemplified in the work and theory of national liberationist thinkers such as Fanon and Cabral (Ashcroft et al. 2013: 16). Fanon's (1925–61) work in Algeria led him to become actively involved in the Algerian liberation movement and to publish a number of foundational works on colonialism, including *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), a broader study of how anti-colonial sentiment might address the task of decolonization. After his death, Fanon remained a vital ideological reference not only during the struggles but also to various protest movements in postcolonial dispensation calling for true decolonization. A clear example is the 'Rhodes Must Fall' movement that began in South Africa in March 2015. Originally directed for the removal of the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town, the campaign rapidly led to a wider movement advocating the 'decolonisation' of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa (see e.g., Hall 2015; Kamanzi 2015; Wamai 2016).

Although Fanon shared with the national liberation movements the need for the removal of colonial regimes and the establishment of sovereign states, he was opposed to the idea of liberation as merely political and therefore formal. Based on his experiences from the 'liberated' countries in West Africa, Fanon believed that although in 'theory liberation movements espouse the aspirations of the masses for freedom, predicated on the eradication of hunger, ignorance, poverty and unawareness' (Fanon 1964: 164), in practice, however, once in government, the leaders become seduced by power and bureaucracy to the point that

liberation becomes a mere formality for the majority of the people (Ndlovu 2010: 3-4). Therefore, for Fanon, decolonization is incomplete if it is not waged on all levels: political, socioeconomic, geographical, and psychological (Fanon 1967: 13). This enables Fanon to distinguish between false liberation, that is, liberation based on the acquisition of state power in which there is no fundamental change in the old colonial relations and institutions, and genuine liberation which he conceives as the product of consciousness, determined by the masses themselves (Ndlovu 2010: 6).

Amílcar Cabral, whose political-philosophical thinking regarding African liberation struggle has received less recognition than that of Fanon, is considered one of Fanon's most important interlocutors. The originality of his approach in adapting elements of Marxism to the African context made him particularly influential to liberation movements particularly in the former Portuguese colonies (Hallen 2002: 75; Gibson 2010: 211; Ashcroft *et al.* 2013: 17). According to Cabral, the two principal forms of imperialist domination in the contemporary world are colonialism (direct imperialist domination through foreign rulers, administrators, and settlers) and neo-colonialism[73] (indirect domination through national rulers) (Cabral 1972: 100). Thus, in both the colonial and neo-colonial contexts,

> the principal target of the national liberation struggle is imperialism. [Accordingly], national liberation is a very rich concept indeed as it represents a reality that goes beyond political independence. This is to say that in its fullest sense, national liberation is a revolutionary process, and one that involves the complete overthrow of imperialist domination in its colonial as well as neocolonial forms. It implies both a national revolution (or a people's struggle against foreign rule) and a social revolution, one which seeks to destroy the capitalist structure on which the exploitation of workers and peasants is built in order to replace it with socialism (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1984: 45-46).

Following from his definition of national liberation, Cabral postulated that the struggle consists of two phases: the national phase and the social phase. Whereas the national phase involves principally the struggle for national sovereignty or independence, the social phase is one in which the very question of genuine liberation is clearly posed. 'Has independence benefited the gross majority of the population economically and socially? Is the new nation truly free to determine its own destiny?' (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1984: 46).

[73] The term neo-colonialism was coined by Kwame Nkrumah in his *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965) to denote the new force of global control operating through a local élite or c*omprador* class. Nkrumah argued that neo-colonialism was more insidious and more difficult to detect and resist than the direct control exercised by classic colonialism (Ashcroft *et al.* 2013:178).

It is often suggested that by adopting a Fanonian framework the national liberation movements' conception of liberation was narrow in that it conceived liberation merely as political independence (i.e. the 'political kingdom' of Nkrumah) leaving unchanged the colonial structures that benefit imperialism, therefore creating a 'false sense of liberation' (Ndlovu 2010: 30-31; see also Saul 2003, 2011b; Gibson 2012). While the actuality of the postcolonial condition in many African countries seems to justify this interpretation, I would argue that the discourse of the leadership of liberation movements in southern Africa seem to align with Cabral's idea of two-phase liberation. For instance, according to Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, the aim of FRELIMO was not to safeguard the essence of the colonial state under a new flag, anthem and a Black President: 'to "Africanise" colonialist and capitalist power would be to negate the meaning of our struggle (…) our objective is to liberate ourselves, to build a new society' (Parry 1998: 46). Similarly, Nelson Mandela had consistently warned his fellow ANC cadres about the 'complacency of simply assuming that freedom would follow directly from political liberation' (Hamilton 2014: 7). In his autobiography *Long Walk to Freedom* he says:

> When I walked out of prison, that was my mission, to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say that has now been achieved. But I know that that is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning (Mandela 1994: 1617).

In the same vein, in 1993 Chris Hani, the leader of the South Africa Communist Party, a partner in the Tripartite Alliance together with the ANC and Congress of South Africa Trade Union (COSATU), stated shortly before his assassination that,

> The ANC will have to fight a new enemy. That enemy would be another struggle to make freedom and democracy worthwhile to ordinary South Africans. Our biggest enemy would be what we do in the field of socio-economic restructuring: the creation of jobs, building of houses, schools, medical facilities, overhauling our education, eliminating illiteracy, building a society which cares, and fighting corruption and those moving into the gravy train of using power, government positions to enrich individuals. We must build a different culture in this country, different from Africa, different from the Nationalist Party. And that culture should be one of service to people (cited in Saul and Bond 2014: 135).

Despite this holistic understanding of the notion 'liberation' by the leadership of the national liberation movements, more than two decades since the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa, the great promise of liberation encapsulated in the ANC Freedom Charter has given

way to very little real political and economic change in the lives of most south Africans. The official unemployment rate is 25%. Yet this is unevenly distributed according to race, generation, and geography. There are communities, mostly in rural areas, where the figure is well above 50% (Powell 2013:1). The breakdown in service delivery has often resulted in violent street protests by poor and marginalised communities. One protest, in particular, led to bloody events of the August 16, 2012, when police massacred 34 striking miners at Marikana mine, owned by the London-based Lonmin company. The ANC has found itself in a crisis of legitimacy brought about by the corruption scandals at the highest level of public offices, such as the 'Nkandlagate', the exorbitant use of public funds (R246 million, approximately US$19 million) on the 'security upgrade' of President Zuma private residence, in a country where inequality has grown since apartheid and the gap between rich and poor is now amongst the world's largest (Saul and Bond 2014: 249, 268-269; Hamilton 2014: 2, 18).

But South Africa is not a unique case. The history of post-independence Zimbabwe has been marked by state-sanctioned genocide, the erosion of individual rights accompanied by the systematic militarization of the state, all led by ZANU-PF, the former national liberation movement. Mozambique, after ten years of liberation struggle (1964-1974) followed by sixteen years of civil war (1976-1992) and more than two decades of relative peace, since 2013 is facing a military expression of a domestic political problem that emerged as a result of FRELIMO's political inflexibility. Despite adopting a multi-party democratic system, FRELIMO prohibits any form of opposition. By December 2016, the ongoing conflict had resulted in 10,000 refugees fleeing Tete Province into neighbouring Malawi, while many others are said to have entered the Zimbabwean territory (Guilengue 2016). An understanding of the current state of affairs in the region is crucial to making sense of the current discourse on liberation heritage promoted by the very former liberation movements that once embodied the aspiration for true liberation by the peoples of southern Africa. So what has gone wrong?

There are a plethora of theories and explanations that can be put forward as to why national liberation movements now in government betrayed the cause of true liberation once made to the people they claim to represent (see e.g., Southall 2013). The answer, I believe, lies in a combination of circumstances. For the purpose of my argument here I focus on the (i) particular history of the transition to democracy, (ii) the 'liberation mentality' of former national liberation movements and (iii) the attitudes of former national liberation movements once transformed into 'party-machines'.

5.3. *A Luta Continua* [the struggle continues]: The unfinished liberation

5.3.1. Liberation 'lost in transition'

While the outcome of the liberation struggle in the region represents a remarkable triumph for the national liberation movements and peoples of southern Africa, political independence was not achieved through the 'barrel of a gun' but rather through negotiations between the major contending forces. Due to the regional politico-military stalemate both national liberation movements and colonialist regimes were subject to enormous pressures to reach an agreement which often resulted in the compromises of constitutional settlements (Southall 2014a: 81-82). For instance, in South Africa, by the late 1980s some leaders of both the National Party and the ANC recognized that an *impasse* of military and political power had been reached. The ANC leadership recognized that they had no hope of bringing down the apartheid regime military, while some leaders within the National Party realized that its military might was insufficient to maintain the order and oppression necessary to sustain and restore apartheid regime and its economy to its prime levels of the 1970s (Hamilton 2014: 31). Thus, the *impasse* between the two main parties, the geopolitical context of post-Cold War, the internationalization of anti-apartheid struggles and coherence around the globally accepted and powerful human rights discourse, coincidently allowed both parties to agree on a framework for the transition that satisfied the interests and reduced the fears on both sides. The result of this 'elite compromise' was the institutionalization of forms of political power that safeguarded existing interests of the elites. Thus, it was agreed that the private property and supposedly distinct Afrikaner 'cultural group' would be safeguarded by a formal, equal and constitutional framework; the election of political representatives would occur by some mean of majority rule or popular democracy; the political power would remain centralized around the party in power (Hamilton 2014: 32-35).

As a result, the ANC, like SWAPO in Namibia and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, gained political power and 'captured' the state but the economic power remained in the hands of white minority (Southall 2014a: 81-82). Thus, the 'elite compromise' that brought apartheid to an end prevented any revolutionary shift of power or institutional reconfigurations much needed to bring about meaningful liberation to the majority of south Africans and address properly the injustices of the past (Hamilton 2014: 94-99). In fact, all means to eradicate poverty,

which was Mandela's and the ANC's sworn promise to the 'poorest of the poor', were lost in the process of transition from apartheid to democracy. As Saul and Bond (2014: 126) put it:

> Nationalization of the mines and heights of the economy as envisaged by the Freedom Charter was abandoned. The ANC accepted responsibility for a vast apartheid-era debt, which should have been cancelled. A wealth tax on the super-rich to fund developmental projects was set aside, and domestic and international corporations, enriched by apartheid, were excused from any financial reparations. Extremely tight budgetary obligations were instituted that would tie the hands of any future governments; obligations to implement a free-trade policy and abolish all forms of tariff protection in keeping with neo-liberal free trade fundamentals were accepted. Big corporations were allowed to shift their main listings abroad.

Consequently, each of the country's first four democratic governments – led by Mandela (1994–1999), Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), Kgalema Motlanthe (2008–2009) and Jacob Zuma (2009–present) – 'failed to redistribute the country's wealth and establish conditions for thoroughgoing participatory democracy, thus leaving the door open for widespread social protest, populist demagoguery and apathy' (Saul and Bond 2014: 146). In fact, the combination of extreme nationalist rhetoric (e.g. the ANC promoting itself as 'the party of liberation' and blaming the failure in transformation on apartheid) with failed neo-liberal practices, has resulted in a South Africa that is characterised by systemic corruption, extreme inequality, unemployment and low pay in varied communities which often leads to rising tide of angry protest to which the ANC government responds at times with the brutality only comparable to that of the apartheid regime (Saul and Bond 2014: 176). During the centennial year of the ANC, the government presided over the first post-democracy state massacre by allowing its police force to serve white-dominated multinational capital represented by the London-based Lonmin (through the collaboration of black capitalism epitomised in the figure of ANC vice-President Cyril Ramaphosa) by killing dozens of black workers in Marikana so as to end a brief strike (Saul and Bond 2014: 215). Race replaced by wealth, but poor still remain poor in both equations.

The reason for such betrayal of the utopian pledges of the liberation struggle, are indeed complex and multifold. While it is partially true that the political settlements led the national liberation movements to abandon their substantive commitments to the highly equalizing social programmes which had characterized their liberation struggles (Southall 2014a: 81-82), there were often other interests at play as it can be clearly illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe. Here the transfer of political power from the white settler political elite to the black nationalist elite was formalized through the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 under

the supervision of Britain and United States of America. However, the agreement failed to deal with the issue of land dispossession that had lain at the heart of the 'settler-native' conflicts since the 1890s. In addition, the West never fulfilled its promises of aid to compensate white citizens for any land sold (the 'willing buyer, willing seller' principle) so as to aid reconciliation between 1980 and 1990 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 82). Thus, despite some considerable advances mainly in the social and educational spheres, some (e.g. Southall 2014a: 84) are of the opinion that the government 'was soon thrown into debt and into the arms of the IMF and its structural adjustment, leading to the collapse of the currency, skyrocketing inflation, mass unemployment, and the decimation of the health and education sectors'. Yet it is important to note that the economic crisis was also brought about by ZANU-PF successive concessions to former guerrillas who fought in Zimbabwe's liberation in order to maintain its grip on power by maintaining a loyal constituency and advancing its own nationalistic interests.

Former guerrillas of the liberation struggle have been politically constructed as veterans and have played a prominent role in the country's politics since independence in 1980. Through three major legislature instruments (i.e. the War Victims Compensation Act of 1980; the incorporation of guerrilla's war service years for the purpose of calculating retirements pension in 1989-90; and the War Veterans Act of 1992) the veterans were given privilege access to state resources over civilians including those who had participated actively in the liberation struggle (Kriger 2007: 225). Nevertheless, top politicians, senior government officials and other influential people in Zimbabwe's liberation war have allegedly corruptly drained the national fiscus of millions of dollars from the War Victims Compensation Fund established in 1980. Thus Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA) created in 1990, accused ZANU-PF of victimising the veterans and demanded a belated recognition for their sacrifices in the liberation of the country (Mhanda 2011: 5-6). In December 1995, with elections pending the following year and responding to the ZNLWA's claim that many rural ex-combatants had not even heard of the compensation scheme, the government set aside over Z$200 million to cover another round of medical assessments of war-disabled ex-combatants. There was a dramatic rise in new disability claims, almost all from ex-combatants: 1000 in 1994, 6000 in 1995, 9000 in 1996, and 9500 for the first nine months of 1997. State expenditures on the compensation scheme also jumped from Z$353 million in 1995 to Z$606 million in 1996 (Kriger 2005: 257). In 1997 ZNLWA engaged in high profile and often violent street protests including an unprecedented demonstration at

State House, President Mugabe's residence, demanding cash payments. With the tacit support from their colleagues who commanded the police and the army, ex-guerrillas threatened to remove President Mugabe unless he met their demands for state recognition of their liberation war services. Mugabe conceded to an estimated total of 50 000 ex-combatants a gratuity of Z$50,000 (about US$12000 at the time), a monthly pension of Z$2,000 for free education and health service for ex-combatants and their dependants, funds for business projects, funeral expenses and 20 percent of future land resettlement plots. Seventy percent of the urban population at the time earned less than Z$2,000 per month: some skilled workers earned Z$50,000 a year (US$12000). Since veterans had demanded Z$500,000 gratuity, they accepted the Z$50,000 only after the President promised to review it later. The gratuities (around Z$ 2.5 billions) cost more than twice total government funding on land reform, a major government policy objective since 1980 (Kriger 2005: 261).

These large unbudgeted payments to veterans were a turning point from which the economy did not recover. Soon after the pay-outs, the Zimbabwe dollar crashed on November 13, 1997, losing its value to the American Dollar by 73 per cent thereby eroding the value of the payments and nullifying the intended benefit (Article 19 - The Global Campaign for Free Expression 2000: 28). The pay-outs to the veterans also marked the start of a close alliance between the veterans and the ruling party, mostly against urban workers who had joined the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Kriger 2007: 221). Veterans were at the forefront of state sponsored land invasion of primarily white-owned farms in 2000 and of state orchestrated violence against all known or suspected supporters of the opposition party. The economic meltdown of Zimbabwe was also caused by the rampant corruption within the state parastatals that ran into billions of Zimbabwe dollars and by the country's military intervention in the DRC. In August 1998, Mugabe abusing his position as sitting chairman of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security of the SADC decided to sanction a military intervention in the DRC and sent Zimbabwean troops to fight on behalf of his fellow comrade of the struggle, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whose friendship dates back to the 1960s in Dar es Salaam (Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015: 100).

The leadership of former national liberation movements and its supporters have often argued that during the transition into government the 'liberation parties' were 'pushed by foreign international capitalist-imperialist interests to abandon their socialist projects and adopt market-oriented policies' (Southall 2014a: 85). Outsiders have argued that within the ANC

‘an active choice for capitalism was being made quite consciously by those moving towards power – a decision to embrace and to celebrate capitalism, its present and its ostensibly promising future’ (Saul and Bond 2014: 128). In Mozambique, factions within FRELIMO’s revolutionary elite that had been silenced after independence re-emerged in the beginning of the 1980s eager to abandon the Socialist revolution and accumulate wealth, much to disillusion of Samora Machel.

> But there were some things he [Samora] felt powerless to change: the heart and minds of Party members themselves. A Central Committee meeting a few months before Samora’s death [in 1986] passed new regulations that allowed Party members for the first time to own private property and to hire peasant labour to work on their land. Samora looked around him and saw that for the first time in twenty-five years, ambition for wealth and for the accumulation of wealth was driving the decisions of some of the comrades (LeFanu 2012: 256).

In fact, the role of the revolutionary elite as a strictly politically based elite began to change after the fall of socialism in the West. When large-scale privatisations were implemented in mid and late 1980s, current and former state officials were often among the chief beneficiaries. They were some of the few who had the skills, experience, resources and political connections necessary to operate these industries. The expansion of the revolutionary elite into the market economy has been accompanied by a great deal of corruption, extensive asset stripping of former state industries, the use of political connections to facilitate money laundering and drug smuggling and land appropriation. All this is strictly at odds with the revolutionary elite’s puritan roots (Sumich 2005: 17-18).

The case of Mozambique is also interesting because unlike Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe where the terms of the transition resulted in the acceptance of constitutional democracy by ZANU/ZAPU, ANC and SWAPO, in Mozambique the new Portuguese government, following the *coup d'état* on April 25, 1974, officially recognized FRELIMO as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Mozambique. There was no talk of elections. The agreement signed in the Zambian city of Lusaka on September 7, 1974, established a transitional government that would prepare the conditions for the declaration of full independence on June 25, 1975. As Samora Machel stated at the time: ‘Independence is non-negotiable. It is an inalienable right of the people of Mozambique. However, we are ready to discuss the arrangements for transfer of sovereignty for the Mozambican people which FRELIMO is the sole legitimate representative’ (Bragança 1986: 14). Thus, the agreement ignored the more than two dozen political parties and nationalist movements who

claimed to have participated in the struggle and therefore deserved a place in negotiations on the independence and the future of the country (Machava 2015: 53). This ambiguity towards democracy, Southall (2013) argues, derives from the fact that

> The liberation struggle was conceived by the national liberation movements as revolving principally around self-determination more than it was about achieving democracy. However, the problem was that for the national liberation movements self-determination and democracy became conflated whereas there were never identical, nor necessarily congruent (Southall 2013: 5).

This conflicting relationship between liberation and democracy is rooted in one of the lasting legacies of the struggle: the liberation struggle mentality of national liberation movements that has come to characterise political culture of 'liberated' states.

5.3.2. Liberation struggle mentalities

Within national liberation movements liberation is defined by armed struggle. Participation in the struggle is for most of those who go through it a life-defining experience. As they emerged triumphant, the 'freedom fighters' have a deep sense of conviction in the rightness of their cause and of their entitlement to run the new government in the 'liberated' state. Such powerful sense of legitimacy comes from the sacrifices they have made for the cause of freedom and the obligation to remember the fallen comrades and martyrs who have died in order to enable them to achieve independence (Clapham 2012: 4; Southall 2013: 6).

> NLMs [national liberation movements] share what can only be termed a common theology. National liberation is both the just and historically necessary conclusion of the struggle between the people and the forces of racism and colonialism. This has two implications. First, the national liberation movements - whatever venial sins they may commit - are the righteous. They not merely represent the masses but in a sense they are the masses, and as such they cannot really be wrong. Secondly, according to the theology, their coming to power represents the end of a process. No further group can succeed them for that would mean that the masses, the forces of righteousness, had been overthrown. That, in turn, could only mean that the forces of racism and colonialism, after skulking in defeat and biding their time, had regrouped and launched a counter-attack (Johnson 2002: 2).

One of the consequences of this totalitarian mentality has been the discursive construction of officially sanctioned grand-narrative of liberation or, to borrow from the Mozambican historian João Paulo Borges Coelho, the *liberation script* - defined as a 'coherent and fixed narrative corpus, which holds the monopoly of explanations of the past and places and FRELIMO, appears as the single source of authority in the post-independence period' (Coelho 2013: 21). The *liberation script* has also been famously termed 'patriotic history' in

Zimbabwe (Ranger 2004; Kriger 2006). There is now an extensive literature on the uses and construction of 'patriotic history' in both Zimbabwe and Namibia illustrating the diverse associated tendencies to discursively construct the liberation as the armed struggle and therefore focusing on the victorious and now ruling party and its claim to perpetuity (Kössler 2010; Southall 2014b; Melber 2014). Reflecting on the case of Zimbabwe, Sanders (2007) has argued that

> 'patriotic history' is really not history at all, but myth and propaganda. It does not tell the truth about the past, but emphasises selected aspects of the past to present a picture of a glorious, continuous revolutionary tradition. It rejects academic history writing as an attempt to complicate the story of the past, and, instead, attempts to impose a hegemonic view of the liberation struggle. This writing about the Zimbabwean past is not concerned with the liberation struggle versus the colonial oppressors as one of right against wrong, for the rightfulness of the independence struggle against white minority rule is taken for granted. It stresses, instead, another divide, between those who led the fight and won and those who compromised and should therefore be denounced as unpatriotic and as sell-outs. This categorisation of people into those who were with us and those who were not, relates, of course, to present political battles in Zimbabwe, with those in power trying to legitimise their position by identifying themselves as the true liberators of the country (Sanders 2007:14).

Across the region, the *liberation script* has played a central role in post-independence politics and life, not only by reverberating the past in the present and guiding nationalist projects (e.g. the production of struggle heroes) (Coelho 2013), but also by 'reinventing tradition' through a narrative 'seeking to claim exclusivity for the liberation of the country and its people and the subsequent successful consolidation of political power and control guided by this exclusivist perspective' (Melber 2014: 25). Consequently, the *liberation script* it still highly significant to current socio-political relations, defining terms for inclusion or exclusion from the nation and for granting entitlements as witnessed in the cases of Mozambique (cf. Coelho 2013; Souto 2013), Namibia (cf. Metsola 2010; Melber 2014), South Africa (cf. Marcshall 2010a) and Zimbabwe (cf. Ranger 2004). In the case of Namibia, for instance, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of SWAPO, is largely portrayed in the official discourse as the champion of liberation against South Africa, ignoring the thousands of Namibians who participated in the struggle without resorting to violence (cf. Saunders 2007). SWAPO's 'exclusive nationalist' liberation discourse also serves to impose an official silence regarding its leadership's alleged abuses of power during exile when hundreds, if not thousands, of exiled Namibians, labelled 'spies', were tortured and killed in the movement's detention centre at Lubango, Angola, in the 1980s (Metsola 2010: 605; Saul and Leys 2003a: 333).

Although the analysis of the differing strategies and forms of social engineering that 'liberation parties' have adopted to remain in power is not part of this study, it is important to note that the national liberation movements have managed to accommodate their key frames of reference from the Marxist-Leninist liberation ideology that guided their struggle, to the current dominant liberal-democratic framework (Johnson 2003: 221). As Johnson (2003) notices in the case of the ANC, the Marxist-Leninist liberation ideology shares considerable similarities with liberal democracy. While liberal democrats advocate gradual, rational, managed change implemented by political leaders and an elite intelligentsia, the Leninist vanguard push for faster, revolutionary change, but in both cases it is the role of an elite, revolutionary vanguard that is central to that change. Both doctrines profess a stated belief in the rule of the people, i.e. democracy. Democracy is defined as a situation in which experts and elites represent the people, and are allowed to make essential political decisions, promoting the rule of the few, at least supposedly, in the interest of the many (Johnson 2003: 202). Furthermore, the defining principle of Leninism such as vanguardism[74] and democratic centralism[75] which has shaped profoundly the way liberation elites conceived the transition from national liberation movements to political parties share a key similarity with liberal democrats: the party system is a form of political organization whose primary function is representation, not participation (Johnson 2003: 203-207).

Thus, the ANC leadership and other former national liberation movements, have found the reorganization of state/society relations along conventional liberal lines quite compatible with their own understanding of the hierarchical relationship between rulers and ruled and the primacy of the leadership over mass action in process of revolutionary change (Johnson 2003: 202). So although not Marxist-Leninist, the leadership of political parties born out liberation movements still holds ideological convictions that have their roots in the national liberation struggle as witnessed sometimes in the phraseology in their discourses. For instance, any critique of the liberation movement in power is seen as an act of blasphemy by Western 'puppets' and swiftly dismissed as 'imperialist conspiracy'. In the same vein, the former national liberation movements (now formal liberal democratic political parties) are still structured along Leninist key principles such as democratic centralism (e.g. tight internal discipline and strong central co-ordination) (Johnson 2003: 214-5). During the course of my

[74] A strategy for political action that gives primacy to leadership and hierarchical organization over the decentralized and more spontaneous actions of the masses.
[75] Premised on the belief that a united, hierarchical organizational structure whereby advice flowed from the bottom up and decisions from the top down, is the most efficacious.

fieldwork in Mozambique between 2012 and 2013, I was particular astonished by the consistent and distinctive Marxist-Leninist way of thinking of many FRELIMO party cadres inside and outside government institutions at both central and local levels.

Given their 'liberation struggle mentality' national liberation movements have failed to make the transition into credible liberal democratic governance institutions framed by the pursuit of the ideals of social justice that inspired the very struggles for freedom they committed to (Melber 2014: 59). Instead, the 'liberation struggle mentality' has allowed national liberation movements to transform into *de facto* 'Party machines' and use the 'liberation credentials' to claim legitimacy and right to rule in an ever contested multi-party democratic dispensation.

5.3.3. National liberation movements as 'Party machines'

The agreed constitutional framework that paved the way to liberation in most of southern Africa countries emphasised liberal democratic systems (e.g. free elections). However, when combined with the 'liberation struggle mentalities' of the current 'liberation parties', this has resulted in political liberation without meaningful democracy (cf. Melber 2003c). While national liberation movements viewed democracy (via transitional elections) as a legitimising route to gaining power, their principal concern then became to consolidate their control over the state apparatus. They have placed their 'party machinery' into the centre of governance leading to a situation of *de facto* party-state, government and state have been merged with the former liberation movements becoming dominant political parties (Southall 2013: 65). This 'polygamous matrimony' of national liberation movement, 'liberation party', government and state, has meant that the Party has become omnipresent, featuring everywhere in the national polity and conflating all aspects of the government, state and society to party activity. This is so because, as in their formative years during the struggle, the current 'liberation parties' continue to see themselves 'as a prototype of a state within the state—one that sees itself as the only legitimate source of power, which includes intolerance towards any form of political opposition' (Melber 2014: 24).

This situation is clearly illustrated by the existence of competing paradigms of legitimacy in the SADC region between a core group of countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique) whose current ruling parties are deemed to have been integrally involved in the struggle for liberation, and other countries where the originally 'progressive'

movements have been defeated at the polls (Zambia) or the present rulers played a more ambiguous role during 'the struggle' (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland). As Southall (2003a) puts it:

> On the one hand, the paradigm of 'national liberation' celebrates past leadership of, and involvement in, the nationalist armed struggle against colonialism and apartheid. It stresses the ruling party as the embodiment of the national will, its historic right to rule for and on behalf of the people, and critically, it effectively prioritises the past over the present. On the other hand, the paradigm of 'democracy' states the right of rulers to hold state power by reference to their enjoying the active support of the people, as demonstrated most notably by their having secured victories in cleanly fought and run popular elections. It therefore prioritises the present over the past. However, these competing paradigms overlap massively allowing enormous ambiguity and nuance. For instance, 'liberated' states typically assume democratic forms and rules even though the underlying reality is that of authoritarianism exercised by the national liberation movements which have transformed themselves into dominant political parties which (like the ANC and SWAPO) genuinely win successive popular elections (Southall 2003a: 115-116).

The cases of Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique clearly illustrate how former national liberation movements in government have used their liberation appeal in combination with other repertoires of engagement to regenerate their hegemonic power (see e.g., Melber 2003c; Southall 2013). Take for instance the famous ANC struggle slogan '*Amandla Awethu'* (or power to the people), which is still an important party political slogan. This isiZulu and isiXhosa phrase was adopted by the ANC and its allies as a rallying cry in the resistance against the apartheid. The phrase is still associated with the struggle, both by the ANC leaders linking the liberation struggle to current challenges such as the eradication of poverty and at the same time by popular poor people's movements to protest against the ANC government policies and the poor delivery of basic services such as water, sanitation, housing and so on. As stated by Hamilton (2014: 4),

> What is sadly ironic about the continued use of this slogan by the ANC is that not only power has not been 'given to the people' in that many remain with little or no real power (and thus freedom[76]), but the continued use of the liberation slogan of this kind more than two decades after political liberation, under conditions of consolidated representative democracy, is the clear sign of the desire of the ANC to claim exclusive representation of 'the people'.

Thus, the liberation struggle remains a vivid source of legitimacy in the minds of former 'freedom fighters'; the ANC still regarded as 'the party of liberation' by most black South Africans, continues to ride on struggle credentials which legitimate its continued hold upon electoral power securing 62% of the vote in general election of 2014 (Saul and Bond 2014:

[76] Freedom is power under modern conditions within complex polities and economies in the sense that freedom is identified with and as power, in that it is a combination of my ability to determine what I will do and my power to do it, that is bring it about (Hamilton 2014: 2).

246). The recent reaction of the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to the main opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA) use of Mandela's voice in its election campaign propaganda, has clearly uncovered how the inspiring narrative of liberation and values embodied in its heroes have been emptied of their meaning and mobilized by 'party machines' to serve the interests of partisan politics (see Figure 66).




Figure 66: The struggle over Madiba's legacy before local elections in August 2016
(Source: Dr Jack & Curtis *In*: Eyewitness News, 2 August 2016)

Yet, as some commentators have already suggested (e.g. Clapham 2012) and the renowned south African cartoonist Zapiro has cleverly illustrated in his portrait of the 2014 General election in South Africa, the 'liberation credit' is a finite one (see Figure 67).




Figure 67: ANC struggle legacy - credit extended only to 2019.
(Source: ZAPIRO *In*: *Mail & Guardian* [South Africa], 2 May 2014).

The historic victory of the DA during the arguably most fiercely contested local government elections on August 3, 2016, where the ANC lost control of both the political and economic hubs of the country (i.e. the cities of Tswane and Johannesburg) clearly suggests that the 'liberation credit' of the ANC, unless accompanied by tangible deliverables to truly 'move South Africa forward' and provide a 'better life for all' (both ANC slogans), may soon not be enough to secure election victory as attested by the last general election results in the major urban centres: the city of Cape Town, the seat of Parliament, has been under control of the DA since 2006. At a public gathering on August 16, 2016, the date that marked the fourth anniversary of the Marikana massacre, Julius Malema leader of the EFF, whose party won ward 26 of the Madibeng local municipality, saluted Marikana residents for removing the ANC in this ward, which includes the Nkaneng informal settlement and the koppie, where 34 miners were gunned down by police in 2012. In a clear reference to President Zuma's pronouncement regarding ANC's divine right to rule by stating that 'the ANC will rule till Jesus comes back' (cf. Mkhwanazi 2008), Malema remarked:

> I hear people saying Jesus has arrived in Port Elizabeth [main economic hub in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality also won by the DA]. Jesus has also arrived in Rustenburg [the Local Municipality where the EFF won five seats preventing ANC's outright majority]. This municipality, no matter what happens, will not fall in the hands of the ANC. We are eating this elephant called the ANC piece by piece (Tau 2016).

At the same event, DA leader Mmusi Maimane said there would never be freedom in South Africa until President Zuma came to apologize to the people of Marikana. 'The ANC will forget this day, but we will not forget. Until Jacob Zuma comes here to apologize to the people, and pay back the money, there can be no freedom in South Africa. We are saying compensation [for Marikana murders] must come from the government' (Maromo 2016).

Two decades into the democratic era the ANC is watching the 'liberation credit' losing its grip on part of the electorate that no longer equates the end of apartheid with meaningful liberation. This is even more worrisome if one considers that similar pattern also unfolded in Zimbabwe when approximately two decades after independence the hegemony of ZANU-PF was seriously challenged by the emergence of MDC in 1999, under the leadership of trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 73). Ideologically, the original MDC espoused its narrative as being based on the concept of social democracy and transformation, as shown by its slogan, *Chinja Maitiro!* (Change in the way things are done!). This discourse about 'change' resonated with a wide array of Zimbabweans who were disenchanted by patronage politics and poor governance by the ZANU-PF and their attendant effects such as declining living standards and rising unemployment rates (Mutisi 2015: 167). While the ruling party managed to retain control of central government and national institutions, the opposition MDC began in 2000 to oust ZANU-PF from urban councils in successive general and local elections. Before the end of 2003 the city councils of Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare and Masvingo had become opposition-controlled councils. In municipalities that, in Zimbabwe's urban hierarchy, are a tier below city councils, the ruling party lost Chitungwiza, Gwanda, Kariba and Victoria Falls. Even Chegutu, deep in a traditional ZANU-PF strong-hold, elected an opposition executive mayor (Kamete 2007: 42).

During the electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe the MDC sought to convince the electorate that the vision of ZANU-PF, which often reduced the national project to the liberation struggle and the land question at election times, was 'exhausted and moribund for failing to accommodate the fundamental post-Cold War normative variables of democracy, human rights, social peace, human security, good governance and orderly management of the economy' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 73). According to the MDC the 'liberation struggle was made possible by the people of Zimbabwe, not by a few nationalist elites who continued to claim that they "died" for all the people, that they liberated all the people' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni

2011b: 76). Thus, the MDC claimed that it was fighting against the highjacking of the 'nationalist revolution' by power hungry nationalist elites in ZANU-PF who claimed to be the sole liberators of the Zimbabwean people. In a 2003 document on core values, goals and policy principles, the MDC recognized 'the struggle of the Zimbabwean people throughout our history for economic, social and political justice' and acknowledged 'the continuing liberation struggle for social, economic and political rights and freedoms' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 72). Its 2008 policy documents projected the MDC as pursuing 'social liberation policies aimed at completing the unfinished business of the national liberation struggle and [it] shall strive for the democratic structural economic liberation, rehabilitation and transformation of Zimbabwe' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 73).

In response, ZANU-PF has since early 2000 mobilised the state apparatus to deploy heavy and violent measures against the opposition and civil society while investing enormous energy in the revival of nationalist and Pan-Africanist endeavours. Mugabe and ZANU-PF resorted to their tactics nursed during the liberation struggle, of using violence to achieve political ends (cf. Kringer 1995), by retching the process of militarization of state institutions and gradually building a 'securocratic'[77] state. In a bid to win the vote of the peasants who had been hungry for land since 1980, ZANU-PF embarked on violent fast-track land reform programme dubbed the *Third Chimurenga* (liberation struggle) at a time of elections in 2000 and 2002 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 82). Following the contested elections in March 2005, ZANU-PF led government launched the *Operation Murambatsvina* (clean out the rubbish), aiming at 'restoring order' by forcibly clearing slum areas across the country. The campaign started on May 19, 2005, and lasted for three weeks resulting in the demolition of various settlements including housing and informal structures affecting directly 700,000 people, through loss of their homes or livelihood, and possibly indirectly affecting around 2.4 million people. While ZANU-PF government officials characterise the operation as a crackdown against illegal housing and commercial activities, and as an effort to reduce the risk of the spread of infectious disease in these areas, the opposition and independent organizations described the campaign as an effort to drive out and make homeless large sections of the urban and rural poor, who make up much of the internal opposition to the Mugabe administration (Mutisi 2015: 170).

[77] *Securocrats* is a term that has been adopted to describe the leaders of Zimbabwe's security sector institutions such as the Zimbabwe National Army, the air force of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Zimbabwe Prison Services.

In 2008, the Zimbabwean government undertook the *Operation Mavhoterapapi* (who did you vote for?), a large scale campaign to punish those who supposedly voted for the MDC in the 2008 Presidential election (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 3). The deployment of violence as political strategy was often accompanied by the 'exclusive nationalist' discourse which promoted Mugabe as a defender of the hard-won independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 17). The ZANU-PF leadership has repeatedly dismissed the MDC as lacking liberation war history. For instance, during the election campaign rally held in Silobela, Central Midlands, prior to the June 2008 run-off election, President Mugabe reiterated this message by declaring: 'We fought for this country and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give up our country because of a mere 'X'. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?' (Mutisi 2015: 164).

Zimbabwe clearly illustrates the most extreme example of how the former national liberation movement, those who supposedly liberated the people from the colonial yoke, have responded to increasing contestation by the people who feel unliberated, by themselves degenerating into the 'oppressor' in the postcolonial polity. Events in Zimbabwe help to unveil how a former liberation movement responds to internal contestation, through the revival of 'exclusive nationalism' and 'Pan-Africanism'. ZANU-PF and its leader President Mugabe are portrayed as 'dedicated to the continuation of the historic mission of taking decolonization to its logical end of economic decolonization' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011b: 75). Solidarity networks amongst former liberation movements have been reactivated. It is within this complex political context that 'liberation parties' have resorted to their shared past and re-mobilized the idiom of 'liberation struggle' to maintain their historical claim to power as I discuss below.

5.4. Responding to contestation of the liberation discourse: Zimbabwe and beyond

5.4.1. Reinventing traditions: solidarity among national liberation movements

Responding to the increasing challenge to its hegemony by the MDC, ZANU-PF also resorted to the Pan-Africanist ideals that guided the liberation struggle. It actively sought to ally itself to those former liberation movements with which it had weak links prior to 1980, promoting a discourse that highlights the solidarity among 'brothers in arms'. The strategy is

to isolate the opposition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a). For instance, ZANU-PF National Chairperson Simon Khaya Moyo declared at a meeting of the party's National Conference in December 2010 that

> no liberation movement will ever be replaced by people coming from nowhere. This applies to ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, MPLA in Angola and Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania. We are not just neighbours with South Africa. We share a common liberation history, culture and values. Any of us who are not part of this revolutionary journey should think again (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a: 5).

Thus, President Mugabe's visit to Namibia between February 27 and 28, 2007, was declared to be a symbol of the enduring friendship between the two countries, notwithstanding public protest against him by some local human rights activists (Melber 2014: 172). This strengthening of solidarity extends to other ruling parties that draw legitimacy from their liberation credentials. For example, Jacob Zuma visited Namibia as the ANC President on December 8, 2008, a couple of months before assuming office as South African head of state. He met with President Hifikepunye Pohamba and the former President Sam Nujoma. A joint communiqué released after the visit, stated:

> The longstanding and strong relationship between the SWAPO Party and the ANC, which was forged in the struggle for liberation of our two countries against a common enemy, was emphasized. (…) It was noted that there is a recurring reactionary debate around the need to reduce the dominance of former liberation movements on the African continent. In this regard the emergence of counter revolutionary forces to reverse the social, political and economic gains that have been made under the leadership of our liberation movements was discussed. (…) It was agreed that the two parties should cooperate closely to strengthen the already existing strong fraternal relations (African National Congress 2008).

During another state visit to Namibia in November 2013, President Zuma addressed the Namibian Parliament and praised the close ties since the struggle days: 'In SWAPO, we had brothers and sisters who were prepared to die with us. Ours is a unique and special solidarity' (Melber 2014: 175).

Yet this common narrative that portrays the solidarity amongst 'brother in arms' in the region as one of the lasting legacies of the struggle, often brushes over much that is inconvenient in the past and invents unities in struggle which were often totally absent in practice (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a; Southall 2014a). The interrelations between different national liberation movements were infused with rivalries, mutual suspicions and ideological disputes, even apart from the Sino-Soviet split which aligned them with different international patrons.

For instance, ZANU was closer to the South African PAC than it was to the ANC, and was deeply resentful of movements like the MPLA and ANC both of which had close ties with the Zimbabwe's ZAPU (Southall 2014a: 90). Nevertheless, since 2000 ZANU–PF has actively sought to strengthen its relation with the MPLA by successfully reinventing a common history for ZANU–PF and the MPLA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a: 7). Similarly, the links between ZANU-PF and SWAPO during the latter's years in exile were virtually non-existent and Mugabe was notably the only SADC head of state not attending Namibia's Independence ceremonies in 1990 (Melber 2014: 170).

The close relationship between Robert Mugabe and Sam Nujoma only developed during the mid-1990s as a result of a perceived threat to struggle hierarchies represented by the global celebration of the leadership of Mandela and the admission of South Africa into the SADC (Southall 2014a: 90; Melber 2014: 170). In the view of Mugabe and Nujoma, Mandela did not deserve such admiration, since strictly speaking they not he were the ones who had organized in exile the resistance against white minority rule in their countries, while Mandela was 'only' spending time in prison protected from the harsh outside realities, involving a great deal of internal power struggles. The elevation of Mandela into an international figurehead of southern African leaders braving settler colonial rule as first-generation freedom fighters. Mugabe and Nujoma expected similar admiration (Melber 2015: 108). Consequently, SADC became a theatre of contestation between Mugabe and Mandela. Even though South Africa was transforming its apartheid government, Mugabe remained wary of South Africa's new political transformation. Mandela had strong concerns over human rights and democracy issues in Zimbabwe. This tension only changed once Thabo Mbeki took over the South African presidency from Mandela in 1999, advocating and adopting an approach of 'quiet diplomacy' (Nagar 2010: 19).

It is important to note that Mugabe has since the 1980s dominated regional politics. Mugabe's decision to bring Zimbabwe into the FLS and SADCC tilted regional power decisively against apartheid South Africa. His seniority contributed significantly to his substantial authority as by November 1985, when Nyerere stepped down, Mugabe was left to rule the roost in SADCC as the eldest statesman (Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015: 105). While South Africa's freedom in 1994 marked a dilution of Zimbabwe's (and hence Mugabe's) unchallenged dominance of the region, some events clearly suggest that Mugabe has shrewdly maintained control of the direction of regional politics. For instance, while a

chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Mugabe manipulated SADC into intervening in the DRC to further his interests in the region despite the strong opposition by Mandela. In fact, Mandela, in his capacity as the sitting SADC chairperson, publicly reprimanded Mugabe for his inflammatory move, declaring that the decision for armed intervention was not an SADC decision: 'We would not worsen the situation by sending in a military force. We are committed to peace'. Yet, a few weeks after the summit, Mandela backtracked from his original position when he called a press conference in Durban and announced that SADC had unanimously supported military intervention by its member states in the DRC (Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015: 100-1). A decade later, after signing the Global Political Agreement mediated by Thabo Mbeki on the September 15, 2008, and establishing the Government of National Unity, Mugabe persistently and wilfully acted against the SADC agreed-on principles and practices, particularly those governing elections. SADC leaders watched helplessly as Mugabe failed to announce the 2008 Presidential election results for an unprecedented five weeks while undertaking a large violent campaign, *Operation Mavhoterapapi* (who did you vote for?) to punish those who supposedly voted for the opposition. Mugabe's regional sway was further demonstrated when he openly threatened to pull out of SADC if the body persisted in pushing him to demonstrate democratic tolerance by accommodating the interests of his opponents (Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015: 105).

As a matter of fact, various stakeholders have, in line with the MDC, doubted the sincerity and impartiality of those countries led by former liberation movements towards finding a lasting resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis that is not favourable to ZANU–PF. Only the leaders of Botswana and Zambia (Ian Khama and the late Levy Mwanawasa) have differed openly with Mugabe and condemned ZANU–PF's political conduct. In the case of Zambia, neither the UNIP nor the veteran nationalist, Kenneth Kaunda, had close ties with ZANU–PF. This was despite ZANU–PF once being based in Lusaka before moving to Mozambique. The assassination of ZANU–PF national chairman, Herbert Chitepo, in 1975 on Zambian soil led Kaunda to detain the entire ZANU–PF executive. He suspected them of having killed one of their own because of ethnic and regional bickering for power within the party. Moreover, Kaunda had supported ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo instead of ZANU throughout the Zimbabwean liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a: 6). Similarly, Khama publicly criticised Zimbabwe's 2008 elections and delays in forming the government of national unity between Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the MDC. In 2013 the Khama administration challenged

the outcome of Zimbabwe's 2013 election, despite its endorsement by SADC (Motsamai 2015: 11).

SADC's ambivalent and disappointing response to the crisis in Zimbabwe is a clear reflection of the dominance of 'liberation struggle mentality' in the region. It imposes a moral obligation to support fellow former liberation cadres whose relations of comradery are portrayed as having been 'sealed in blood' shed during the struggle. In addition, it is important to consider the fact that within the ZANU-PF Mugabe is a 'demi-god': he is feared and rarely challenged. This is why despite or possibly because of his advanced age, ZANU-PF, at its December 2014 Sixth People's Congress, elected Mugabe unopposed as its Presidential candidate for the 2018 elections. By 2018, Mugabe will be 94 years old (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 2). Similarly, within SADC, 'comrade' Robert Mugabe is widely respected not only as a senior or veteran nationalist,[78] but he is also considered as Pan-Africanist champion who seeks to put an end to the unjust legacy of colonial order. He is also appreciated for his role in helping SADC during its nascence particularly for coordinating the peace and security issues (Mutisi 2015:175; Nyakudya and Jakarasi 2015:105-6). At 91 years of age, Mugabe was elected to chair the AU and the SADC. While these positions are rotational and largely ceremonial, they also indicate that Mugabe is trusted as a Pan-Africanist (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 2). In fact, SADC's position towards Zimbabwe is summarized by Thabo Mbeki in 2007 when he stated:

> The fight against Zimbabwe is a fight against us all. Today it is Zimbabwe, tomorrow it will be South Africa, it will be Mozambique, it will be Angola; it will be any other African country. Any government that is perceived to be strong, and to be resistant to imperialists, would be made a target and be undermined. So let us not allow any point of weakness in the solidarity of the SADC, because that weakness will also be transferred to the rest of Africa (Mutisi 2015: 175).

Hence, by mobilizing regional power and alliances to make SADC support Mugabe, the veterans of former national liberation movements are also being pragmatic in preventing winds of dissent from spreading into their own countries. As a self-preservation strategy of collectively ensuring political survival and regime security, these African leaders would rather not support the MDC: this would set a dangerous precedent that might be repeated in their own countries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011a: 14; Mutisi 2015:175). Moreover, in order to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise the functional cooperation of SADC member

[78] As a Zimbabwean friend once told, 'that old man [Mugabe] used to deal with the current SADC leaders' fathers such as Govan Mbeki and Seretse Khama when Thabo Mbeki and Ian Khama were just boyz'.

states, given the absence of common values between 'democratic' and 'liberation' ruling parties amongst member states (Chingono and Nakana 2009: 402), the 'liberation parties' have increasingly invested in the politics of solidarity and resorting to narratives and legacy of the liberation struggle to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism while claiming legitimacy and power within individual countries.

This is the reason why the 52nd Conference of the ANC in 2008 decided it was necessary to revitalize and reconvene the meetings of the former liberation movements. The first meeting took place on November 25, 2008, at the ANC Headquarters (Luthuli House) in Johannesburg, South Africa. In early August 2011 the heads of political parties of former liberation movements met in Windhoek, Namibia. According to the summit official *communiqué* the 'liberation parties' reiterated 'the importance of identification, restoration and preservation of historical sites which are relevant to the liberation struggles' need for promoting the spirit of solidarity and cooperation amongst Africans in the context of the former liberation movements'. At the meeting it was also agree 'to working together in realising the objective of building the political school in Tanzania' (African National Congress 2011). This political school will be built with the financial support of the Chinese government. It is considered an important initiative in retaining the legacy and heritage of their national liberation movements (Kikwete 2011). Also significant was the fact that the Windhoek summit was preceded by consultative meetings between the youth wing leaders and the party secretaries-general. Agreement was reached that such meetings should take place as side events at every SADC summit to strengthen relationships (Melber 2015: 112).

Subsequently, a meeting of the secretaries general of political parties of former liberation movements of southern Africa held in Harare, Zimbabwe on June 8, 2012, adopted the Harare Declaration. The meeting reiterated what the secretaries general saw as an 'onslaught on governments of former liberation movements by the West', who are said to be working tirelessly to effect regime change and replace liberation movements with their puppets. In a rhetorical discourse typical of the 'struggle days', calls were made for political parties of former liberation movements to 'remain vigilant and defend the hard won independence' (Matukio-Michuzi 2012). The siege mentality that characterized the liberation struggle is once again mobilized in order to strengthen unity amongst the 'liberation parties' as attested by the pronouncements of the leadership during the ever more frequent summits of heads and secretaries general of political parties of former liberation movements of southern Africa. For

instance, during the seventh summit of heads of political parties of former liberation movements held in Maputo on November 20 and 21, 2015, President Zuma stated:

> We all agreed that with time, you begin to feel that elections as we move, they become quite challenging because the views of the people are being poisoned in one form or the other. They generally have the media on their side and everyday the media is saying there is no leadership in the former liberation movements etc., etc. (…) Now they have a strategy to try and get the population to have a different view about the former liberation movements, begin to feel that these are not good people, the fact that they have liberated the people, they have been trying to make that disappear. (…) We said now that we understand that the enemy is common and is active, we now need to identify specific activities they are undertaking and work out strategies, how to counter those (Twala 2015: 1).

In the same vein, during the meeting for secretaries general of former liberation movements from the southern African region held on May 8, 2016, in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, the General Secretary of ZANU-PF, Ian Chombo said:

> At the height of the liberation struggle, when things went wrong and when there was need to explore different ways to attack the enemy, a strategic retreat was necessary to regroup, re-strategize, reorganise and re-launch a vigorous counter attack. We are gathered here today precisely for that same reason to have a fresh look at the enemy's intentions and strategies to enable us to identify and adopt appropriate counter measures on a collaborative level in defence of our people and our revolution. (…) The Western-orchestrated regime change agenda is not sparing any of us. Therefore, there is an urgent need to give special attention to our challenges (…) For as long as we stay in unity and face our challenges as family, like we did during the struggle for our political independence, victory is certain. Never shall we allow complacency to threaten our political power (Ncube 2016: 2).

The above discussion sought to outline the way former liberation movements have individually (specially in the case of Zimbabwe) and collectively responded to the increasing contestation of different social groups in the current multi-party democratic dispensation. 'Liberation parties' have responded to the current challenge to their hegemonic power by strengthening their cross-national solidarity and at times reinventing traditions that did not exist in practice during the struggle. Most importantly, apart from strengthening solidarity, former liberation movements have mobilized the past, resorting once again to the liberation struggle, by writing the official 'history of the liberation struggle in southern Africa' and canonizing liberation struggle as a specific Pan-African category of heritage, as I demonstrate in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER SIX – 'ROADS TO INDEPENDENCE': POLITICS OF CANONIZING THE LIBERATION HERITAGE DISCOURSE

This Chapter illustrates how the former national liberation movements have responded to the increasing contestation to their hegemony by canonizing the history of liberation struggle and the liberation heritage discourse through two major projects: the 'SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project' and the 'Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme'. I have divided this Chapter in two parts. In the first part I analyse the SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project and argue that although this project makes a valuable contribution to the documentation of the liberation struggles in the region, its primary aim was to canonise the official history of the liberation struggle. In fact, even though the nine volumes of the *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994* include substantial sections of 'personal testimonies', 'other' voices not aligned to the official discourse are rare mainly because most the 'witnesses' whose stories have been recorded and published are part of the group that emerged victorious at the end of the liberation struggle.

The second part focuses on the African Liberation Heritage Programme that can be criticized on at least five points. First, while the liberation heritage discourse was formalised through the adoption of the African Liberation Heritage Programme, numerous local, national and transnational processes of heritagization of the struggle were already underway at the grassroots as well as at the nation-state levels. Thus, the Programme is not an initiative but a response to events already happening on the ground. Second, the recent drive of liberation heritage discourse epitomised by the African Liberation Heritage Programme has broadened the recognition of the contribution of the heroic struggles of anonymous men and women for political independence including countries in the region (e.g. Swaziland and Botswana) seen as not having liberation credentials. However, unfortunately (my third point), this recent liberation heritage discourse has allowed almost all SADC countries led by both the 'liberation' and 'democratic' parties, with few exceptions (i.e. DRC, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles), to sanitize the often conflicting and messy histories of the 'struggles within the liberation struggles' across southern Africa and therefore has accelerated the 'invention of new traditions'. Fourth, despite the integration of grassroots memorialization practices as part of the Programme in some contexts, the emphasis on official celebrations and forms of remembrance frequently fails to help the victims of struggle to heal the traumatic experiences of the violence in the aftermath of the struggle. Fifth, the Programme has established official

timeframes that define and therefore limit what is considered part of the liberation heritage across the region. By doing so it continues to marginalise other struggles for liberation and memories of violence often suppressed by postcolonial regimes in southern Africa. Lastly, liberation heritage discourse is constructed and shaped by other discourses (i.e. the discourse on community's beneficiation through cultural heritage and the discourse on the 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention) and is deployed by former liberation movements now in government for nationalistic ends.

6.1. The SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project

In an inspirational address to researchers in 2005, the former (1974-1992) Executive-Secretary of the Liberation Committee of the OAU, Brigadier-General Hashim Mbita, stressed the need to 'record the inspiration, commitment, determination, sacrifices, means, strategies and experiences gained at different stages of the liberation struggle', hence, the need to create a project on the 'History of the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa' (Garaba 2010: 65). The 2004 SADC summit held in Port Louis, Mauritius, approved a research project to document the history of the liberation struggle in southern Africa, and to publish the documents of the research in a series of books (Mbita 2014: ix). During this summit, Mozambique and Namibia immediately pledged US$ 100,000 each to support the project, which was launched in 2005 during the SADC summit in Botswana, to mark its silver jubilee and was designated the Hashim Mbita Project in honour of its patron (SADC 2005: 1; Garaba 2010: 65). It was based in Dar es Salaam and directed by Tanzanian and Mozambican historians, Professors Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe, as project manager and deputy project manager, respectively. The primary objective of the project was to document the history of the liberation struggle of the Southern African region through collection, cataloguing and compiling of oral texts and data in the SADC member states and beyond the region. The project entailed research in the core countries involved in liberation struggle (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and the Frontline States (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland) (Garaba and Ngulube 2010: 169).

This project was part of the recent 'glocal' wave of concerns of archivists, researchers and public intellectuals who had begun a vigorous effort to preserve, digitize, and disseminate on the web, collections of documents on liberation struggles (cf. Isaacman 2005). This renewed interest, both in society and in academia, can be traced back to the 1990s when 'authoritarian

decompression' led to more open and pluralist political systems, allowing the emergence into the public realm of new voices and new testimonies about the struggles for independence, postcolonial conflicts and the history of nationalisms in general (Morier-Genoud 2012: xiv). This democratization of the discourse about the past forced states and their elites to develop new forms of 'patriotism' and nationalism. There was a flurry of publications by former participants in the liberation/colonial wars about 'decolonisation' and a spell of new public history projects on the liberation struggles (Morier-Genoud 2012: xiv-xvi). Among many, five of the most important projects that focused on documentation and digitalization of liberation struggle were:

a) The Digital Innovation South Africa (DISA), initiated in 1998 and based at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa). This is a national collaborative initiative to build an easily and universally accessible online information resource containing historical material of importance and interest to scholars and students. It was funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and developed in two phases. The first, entitled 'South Africa's Struggle for Democracy: Anti-Apartheid Periodicals, 1960-1994', covered the three key decades in the growth of opposition to apartheid rule. The second phase, entitled 'Southern African Freedom Struggles, c.1950-1994', began in 2003. It includes documents, interviews, articles, posters, commissions, trials, and legislation under the umbrella theme of freedom struggles, with selected content in areas such as human rights, leadership, political parties, urban struggles, land issues, trade unions and student unions.[79]

b) The University of Connecticut (USA) and the ANC Partnership. Initiated in 1999, it aimed to (i) share with scholars materials from the ANC's struggle for human rights in South Africa; (ii) chronicle the struggle through oral histories; and (iii) link University of Connecticut with the University of Fort Hare (South Africa) to focus on comparative human rights. Through this partnership, the University of Connecticut has become one of the major repositories for ANC materials in USA.[80]

c) The South African Research and Archival Project, initiated in 2000 and located on the campus of Howard University in Washington DC, is a documentation project that

[79] See http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/. Accessed on September 13, 2016.
[80] See http://web.uconn.edu/ancpartnership/statemnt.htm. Accessed on September 13, 2016.

identifies, lists and facilitates access to archival collections that demonstrate linkages between Americans (principally African Americans) and South Africans.[81]

d) The Nordic Documentation on the Liberation Struggle in Southern African. This project, undertaken by the Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden) between 2003 and 2009, aimed at identifying archives in the Nordic countries, that covered anti-apartheid resistance and the liberation struggle, mainly in South Africa and Namibia, during 1960-1990.[82] A documentation project titled 'The National Liberation of Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries' between 1994 to 2001, coordinated by Tor Sellström, resulted in the publication of five volumes focusing on the contributions of Sweden (Sellström 1999, 2002), Norway (Eriksen 1999), Finland (Soiri and Peltola 1999) and Denmark (Morgenstierne 2003).

e) The Aluka Project (Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa) is an online archive of international scholarly resources initiated in 2002 and building on DISA. The 'Struggles for Freedom: Southern Africa' component of Aluka Project brings together materials from various archives and libraries throughout the world and makes them available online. The first phase of this project focused on Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Botswana. The subsequent phase included Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and other countries in the region that figure prominently in the larger freedom struggle (Isaacman *at al.* 2005; Garaba 2010).

Although differing in geographic scope, scale, and internal structure, all these projects share a common objective: 'to ensure that the record of this moment in world history is not lost to posterity' (Isaacman 2005: 56). Many politicians and intellectuals (often senior members of the 'liberation parties' in the region) were involved in, or at least aware of, some of these projects that resulted from this global wave of documentation and digitalisation stet after the end of Apartheid. Many of the current and former leaders were interviewed as part of the Nordic Africa Institute projects.

The results of the SADC Hashim Mbita Project titled the *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994* was launched on the August

[81] See http://husarap.tumblr.com/. Accessed on September 13, 2016.
[82] See http://www.liberationafrica.se/about_us/. Accessed on September 13, 2016.

17, 2014, as a side event of the 34th ordinary summit of SADC head of states and government held in Victorian Falls, Zimbabwe. It comprises nine volumes. Following the introduction in volume 1, volumes 2-5 focus on the liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Volumes 6-7 document experiences in the FLS (Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia) and in the 'extension countries' Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Each historical-analytic chapter is followed by an extensive section with personal stories, not only in English but also in Portuguese (Mozambique), Swahili (Tanzania) and Shona (Zimbabwe). The last two volumes focus on 'countries and regions outside of SADC) and 'international organisations' that were sympathetic to, and supported, the liberation movements in various ways (Temu and Tembe 2014). Officially the Hashim Mbita Research Project stemmed from the preoccupation of the region's statesmen, mostly veterans of the liberation struggles, that many veterans were getting too old or dying and their memories were at risk of being lost forever (SADC 2005). Tanzania, which hosted the OAU's Liberation Committee had a special interest in seeing its role in the liberation properly documented and recognised internationally.

One of the preoccupations of the promoters of the Hashim Mbita Research Project was the growing number of competing narratives in the form of memoirs and autobiographies that were being continuously released into the public sphere. Thus, 'one of the goals of the [Hashim Mbita] project then was to confront, undermine and possibly silence alternative narratives of the past that challenge state power that legitimates itself through a particular version of the collective memory of the liberation struggle' (Bonate 2013: 231-32). Despite a disclaimer in the Foreword of *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994* that, 'while the SADC states sponsored the research, the resulting documentation should not reflect the views of the political leadership, individuals and parties currently in power to the exclusion of all others' (Mbita 2014: ix), it is doubtful that the project would fairly balance the official *liberation script* with 'other' voices. For instance, in the case of Namibia, among the thirty-five personal stories of Namibians (including SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma and others who obtained high office after independence), a rare dissident voice is SWAPO member Andreas Shipanga's, who, believed to be a spy for the West Germans, was arrested by the Zambians in 1976. Shipanga's story in the official SADC documentation of the liberation struggle is introduced as that of a man who was 'among the group that betrayed the SWAPO people in what came to be known as the "Shipanga Rebellion"' (Temu and Tembe 2014a: 491). Yet, Shipanga, like other 'traitors' in

SWAPO eyes, has reiterated having done nothing against SWAPO and its constitution or its people or the nation of Zambia. As Shipanga explains:

> When the SWAPO youth leagues came [in 1974] they said they wanted to fight and the situation could not be the way it was. There was no rebellion, it was only that people were critical and they were demanding for the first Congress so that the leadership could be changed or reorganized, but [Sam] Nujoma said no (…) The Guerrillas did however rejected Nujoma and [Peter] Nanyemba when they went to see them; they were tired of fighting with sticks while Nanyemba buried the guns (Temu and Tembe 2014a: 496).

The difficulty in balancing the official liberation discourse with 'other' voices, derives from the overwhelming institutional authority and control exercised by ruling elites of former national liberation movements, now in government, over the production of knowledge, specifically by controlling the access to the liberation archive. In fact, despite the adoption of enabling legislation to protect freedom of information in the postcolonial period, in practice, public access to certain archives of the liberation has remained restricted. Legislation regulating the access to information is routinely used by state institutions to keep part of the liberation record classified. For instance, in Mozambique, the Decree (Decreto n°. 33 de 26 de Outubro) of 1992, concerning the System of National Archives, establishes a period of thirty years for declassification of historic documents, before, making them public. Yet, forty-two years since the end of the liberation struggle, the archives of all nationalist movements remain locked up under the custodianship of the current ruling political party - FRELIMO (Coelho 2015: 162). Thus, despite wide efforts for digitalization and unveiling the liberation record in online platforms, the official documentation of the history of the liberation struggle still falls largely within the parameters defined by the former national liberation movements. An example from Mozambique provides interesting insights into the entangled relationship between politics and the researchers who engage in the production of the history of the liberation struggle.

Joel das Neves Tembe is a history professor at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo and considered part of the intellectual elite of FRELIMO party. Since 1999 he has served as the director of the National Historic Archive of Mozambique (*Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique*) which houses all the material on liberation struggle in Mozambique. In addition to serving as the Deputy Director of SADC-Hashim Mbita Research Project and co-editor of the nine volumes of *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994*, he is the curator of Mozambique Liberation

Struggle Museum Requalification Project, the Project Director of Mozambique Liberation Struggle Project and the editor of the volume on 'History of Liberation Struggle in Mozambique' (*História da Luta de Libertação Nacional*) commissioned by the Ministry of Veterans (cf. Tembe 2014). A researcher who participated in this project has described how Tembe and other academics who were part of the working groups in charge of documenting this history of liberation had to present their work to the Political Bureau (*Comissão Política*) of FRELIMO who had to approve it before it could be published.[83,84] Thus the Volume One of *História da Luta de Libertação Nacional* represents faithfully only the official discourse about the liberation in Mozambique. Similar dynamics resulting from power relations in the production of knowledge across the southern Africa have undoubtedly resulted in an unbalanced official narrative of the liberation presented by the Hashim Mbita Research Project: the chapter about Mozambique was coordinated by Joel Tembe. However, more critical and nuanced work produced by some of the scholars involved in the Hashim Mbita Research Project, including the work of Tembe and Bonate, was published in the special issue on *The Liberation Script in Mozambican History* of the journal *Kronos: Southern African Histories 39* in 2013. These publications were not part of the proceedings of the Hashim Mbita Research Project (cf. Bonate 2013; Tembe 2013).

During the launch of *Southern African National Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994* volumes in August 2014, President Mugabe honoured Brigadier-General Mbita, who at one point had served as Tanzania's Ambassador to Zimbabwe, with a Royal Order of Munhumutapa. Only liberation heroes such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Agostino Neto (Angola), Samora Machel (Mozambique), Seretse Khama (Botswana) and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), had been awarded such recognition before. Most importantly, and despite the financial crises that have knocked the country, President Mugabe also gave Brigadier-General Mbita US$100 000 in recognition of his central role in the liberation struggles of Africa in general and Zimbabwe and made remarks about the need to do more to recognize icons of Africa's liberation, such as Julius Nyerere. As Mugabe accepted ascension to the post of SADC Chair, he stated:

> We have not done much by way of paying tribute to our founding fathers. Yes, something has been done for [Kwame] Nkrumah at the AU [African Union], and recently a hall was named after

[83] Similarly, the selection of the historic documents to be made available for digitalization within the Aluka Project on Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa had to have prior approval of the Political Bureau.
[84] Interview with AC, Maputo, September 12, 2014.

> [Nelson] Mandela. But we forget, perhaps as a new generation of leaders, that the greatest burden of freeing Africa was borne by one country — Tanzania. That one. Not that he was the greatest, but Mwalimu — no mention has been made, no symbol to remember his part. We cannot be that ungrateful, no. I would want to say, help us, help me, respect Mwalimu at the AU [African Union] somehow (Anonymous 2014).

The above discourse clearly epitomises the position of the 'liberation parties' and especially that of President Mugabe to adopt a Pan-Africanist stance while tapping into the major source of a legitimacy to claim the right to rule (i.e. liberation credentials) in the present multi-party democratic dispensation. This repackaging and institutionalisation of liberation struggle as specific heritage must be understood within the nexus of concerns of former liberation movements to counter the growing contestation of different segments of society in this democratic context.

6.2. Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme

According to the official documentation, the *Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme* was initiated by Tanzania in 2003 in recognition of the fact that:

> The heritage created during the Africa's Liberation Struggles was being left to fade with time; cultural heritage was an important element and instrument of the expression of human identity; the protection and promotion of African liberation heritage was an important strategy for fostering multi-cultural identities and enhancing dialogue within and between civilizations (Ndagala 2011: 2).

In early 2004, several consultations were held between the Government of Tanzania and UNESCO Dar es Salaam Cluster Office. This Office was established in 1974 and played a key role in providing material and moral support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.[85] It decided to fund the *Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme* as part of the Dialogue among Civilizations Programme. This was part of UNESCO's Medium-term Strategy (2002-2007) and in line with other UNESCO's projects concerning regional histories as well interregional and intercultural projects, notably the Silk Road and the Slave Route projects (UNESCO 2001: 16). In July and August 2004, a UNESCO-sponsored delegation visited Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The objectives of that mission were: (i) to explain the background and importance of the cultural programme on Africa's Liberation Heritage; (ii) to secure clear and specific focal points for the programme in each country; and (iii) to collect and synthesize

[85] See http://en.unesco.org/countries/field-offices/dar-es-salaam. Accessed on September 18, 2016.

views and ideas from individual institutions that could lead the success of the programme (UNESCO 2008: 2; Ndagala 2011: 2).

The Tanzania initiative clearly interested a number of African leaders. With the support of Tanzania ambassadors in Paris and ambassadors and high commissioners stationed in Dar es Salaam from eleven other African countries (Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), Tanzania presented a Draft Resolution 29 to the 33rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO in October 2005 (Ndagala 2011: 3). That Draft Resolution was approved by the General Conference giving rise to the *Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme*. The Programme is aimed at protecting and safeguarding the liberation cultural heritage (that exhibit universal significance) worldwide through the strengthening of cultural policies and cultural industries, promoting intercultural dialogue among different civilisations, protecting and rehabilitating cultural heritage in its diversity (National Heritage Council 2011: 3). Through this Programme UNESCO desires to:

> (i) promote understanding and protect the common heritage and shared values of African liberation; (ii) promote dialogue among cultures and civilizations in partnership with regional institutions (SADC, NEPAD, AU); (iii) promote the educational component of memory of the world; and (iv) develop a culture of peace (National Heritage Council 2011: 4).

After UNESCO endorsement of the Programme in 2005, consultations between stakeholders at the sub-region and regional levels were considered necessary. As a start-up to this consultative process, a two-day meeting was held in Dar es Salaam October 19-20, 2006, followed by another one in Windhoek, Namibia two years later on February 20-21, 2008. At the regional/continental level there have been two major briefings. In November 2008, during the 2nd Meeting of the Africa Union Ministers of Culture held in Algiers, in Algeria, the Minister of Culture of Tanzania briefed his counterparts on the Programme. In November 2009 UNESCO briefed the 2nd Pan-African Cultural Congress of the African Union on the Programme (Ndagala 2011: 5).

On May 5, 2010, the heads of political parties of former liberation movements of southern Africa met in Dar es Salaam, under the Chairmanship of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the Chairman of the Tanzanian ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), specifically to discuss the importance of *Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme*

which ‘seeks to celebrate Africa’s recent past in which Africans were main actors of their liberation and achieved their freedom through struggle and sacrifice’ (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2010). The heads of political parties resolved that the ‘sister parties’ (i.e. ZANU-PF, FRELIMO; ANC; SWAPO and MPLA) should take an active role in documenting the proper historical perspective of their liberation struggles. The ruling parties should also invest in the identification, restoration and preservation of historical sites that are relevant to the liberation struggles and collaborate with the AU and UNESCO on the establishment of the African Liberation Heritage and get the project approved by the summit of the AU (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2010). In January 2011, the African Liberation Heritage Programme was presented at the 16th Ordinary session of the Assembly of the AU (Assembly/AU/Dec.357 [XVI]). The Assembly expressed its commitment to preserving the history of the African independence struggles for the benefit of future generations and called upon the Commission and all Members States to extend maximum support to the Programme (Ndagala 2011: 6).

The implementation of the Programme was conceived at two levels: the national and regional levels. At the national level, each participating country would identify the Government Ministry or other institutions that would act as the focal point and rely upon all key stakeholders to constitute its National Chapter of the African Liberation Heritage Programme. The National Chapter that would serve as the main implementation organ of the African Liberation Heritage Programme. Therefore, within the framework of this Programme, each country should:

- Establish national chapters where they have not been put in place;
- Identify, demarcate and protect sites and building relating to the African liberation struggles;
- Collect oral testimonies of the liberation struggles by interviewing people know to have participated in or witnessed the struggles;
- Devise a systematic approach to collecting, documenting, curating and making accessible African liberation archives in their different formats (written texts, photographs, films, audio recordings etc.) including digitalization of existing archives;
- Make visible the critical role played by women in the struggles for independence in Africa;

- Collect artefacts of the liberation struggles (arms, uniforms, etc.) for permanent exhibition at national and regional levels;
- Initiate the presentation of Africa liberation heritage through exhibition during Africa Day, SADC Day, Museum Day and through organised visit/tours to African liberation sites and monuments.
- Prepare legal guidelines for the protection of African Liberation Heritage;
- Device structures and processes for the management of the liberation heritage information;
- Establish database(s) of sites and monuments relating to African liberation struggles in the participating countries;
- Organize training workshops for heritage professionals in the management and presentation of Africa's liberation heritage;
- Undertake curriculum audit and textbook reviews to determine the content on the African liberation struggles with the view to imparting appropriate education on African liberation unity;
- Conduct research and publish the findings on the African liberation struggles with the view of making available teaching materials for the different levels of education;
- Undertake research on the role of indigenous science and knowledge in liberation struggles (Ndagala 2011: 4).

At the regional level, the Programme entails the development of a one-stop liberation heritage resource centre comprising of, but not limited to, a museum, library, archive, multimedia hall and research centre. This centre to be built in Dar es Salaam would showcase the roads to the independence of all participating countries with the full participation of the respective national chapters (Ndagala 2011: 5).

The African Liberation Heritage Programme can be criticized on at least five points indicated in the introduction of this chapter. In what follows, I use examples from Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa to expand and illustrate the points made above.

6.2.1. Grassroots memorialization and official heritagization of liberation struggle in Zimbabwe

Whilst visiting the Heroes Acre in Harare in November 2014, I was allowed access to the unofficially open exhibition titled 'Torturing a Nation'. This exhibition is centred on the mass grave discovered at William Monkey Mine situated on Chibondo Farm in Mount Darwin District in Mashonaland Central Province in 2008 but only publicised when exhumations were initiated in March 2011. The exhibition aims at taking the visitors 'Inside the Chibondo Genocide' as indicated in the first display, where the grotesque displays of the aftermaths of violence of the liberation struggle on human bodies undoubtedly causes a heavy emotional response from the viewer, as I witness myself. It was to be launched before the August Heroes Day celebration of 2015. The official discourse, as conveyed by the state broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, was that the mine shafts contained the remains of 10,000 people, mostly liberation struggle fighters killed by the colonial Rhodesian Security Forces between 1972 and 1979 (Benyera 2014: 48). It is said that the Rhodesians would round up entire villages and homesteads and shoot them at point blank range. Some did not die in the shootings but all were dumped in the mine shafts where grenades, tear gas and chemical arms were tossed in after them (cf. Siamonga 2015).

As one moves through the room the 'Chibondo Genocide' is presented as part of the broader context of counter-insurgency of the Rhodesian regime during the liberation struggle. An image of a child with swollen eyes and other people with mutilated lips and ears seems to attest to the use of biological warfare where anthrax and cholera, both banned biological warfare weapons, were deployed by the Rhodesian authorities during the liberation struggle in areas like Masvingo, Chilimanzi, Gutu and Mberengwa. The exhibition also presents examples of 'mass deception as counter-insurgency' strategy adopted by the Rhodesian regime through the creation of Selous Scouts, a pseudo-guerrilla force that posed as liberation fighters and perpetrated hideous acts against the black civilian population to discredit the freedom fighters. The bottom of this display shows an image of four locals who died when Selous Scouts attacked a school complex near Shabani on July 12, 1977. A shocking image of three young men is depicted in a 1973 Rhodesian leaflet. They were shot and refused burial (a horrific desecration in the Shona culture). This image is displayed to attest to mass

torture as counter-insurgency by Rhodesian forces which consisted of electrical shocks, beatings, sawing off body limbs and other vicious interrogation methods.

The exhibition also presents the violent scenes of the aftermath of cross-border raids of the Rhodesian army which resulted in massacres of Chimoio, Nyadzonia, Tembwe in Mozambique and Mkushi, Freedom Camp and Nampundwe in Zambia. In November 1977, around 200 Rhodesian troops crossed the Mozambique border in the biggest 'pre-emptive' cross-border raid yet. With air bombardment provided by the Rhodesian Air Force, the troops attacked the 4,000-strong ZANLA base at Chimoio in Mozambique (Mills and Wilson 2007: 23). Although there is no consensus about the exact figures, the raid is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of at least 1200 mostly unarmed young men, children, women and the elderly (Chiwaura 2005a: 6; Mtisi *et al.* 2009). The Chimoio main camp is situated some 24 km north of the town of Chimoio and housed ZANLA high command for the liberation struggle. This was the biggest camp that was given to ZANLA forces by the then President of the independent Mozambique, Samora Machel in 1974. Chimoio became the backbone of ZANLA in terms of food reserves, clothing, training, armoury, logistics, vehicle maintenance and transportation of human and other resources. Of great importantance was military training. It was the commanding post (commonly known as commando) where the defence officers, army commanders, medical officers, doctors, untrained soldiers, tailors and dressmakers gathered for briefing (Chiwaura 2005a). Thus, Chimoio played a significant role in the operation of the liberation movement to sail in Mozambique as it housed basic infrastructure necessary for the liberation movement to prevail in Zimbabwe.

Another prominent feature of this exhibition is a display of the exhumation stratigraphy in the middle of the room representing three strata of the human remains in the 90m shaft. This stratigraphic column is accompanied with a description of the finding. A number of pathological inferences are deduced from the status of the bodies analysed, highlighting the violent nature of how the victims met their death.

The display of horrors suffered by the victims in 'Torturing a Nation' has been used by the ZANU–PF government as a rhetorical weapon and evidence of Rhodesia government brutality and as a sign of sacrifice by Zimbabwean people who decided to engage and support the liberation which cost the lives of an estimated 25,000 civilians, 7 954 Rhodesian security force personnel, and over 8,000 guerrillas (Mills and Wilson 2007: 22).

But at the same time, the exhibition aims at discrediting the opposition MDC which is portrayed in ZANU–PF discourse as being bankrolled by white commercial farmers (Chitukutuku 2013: 26). The politics and contestations that surround the official heritagization of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle dates back to the early 1980s. It is encapsulated, amongst others, in the controversial National Heroes Acre built in Harare and the accompanying, hierarchical structure of provincial and district heroes acres across the country that later followed it (cf. Kriger 1995; Fontein 2009; Fontein *et al.* 2015). Thus, the postcolonial context of Zimbabwe has been marked by efforts to 'heal the wounds', reflected in the 'disturbing accounts of the massacres and their aftermath, of grief and loss, and of long painful and incomplete recoveries' of the liberation struggle including the 'settling of the dead and the landscape disturbed and interrupted by the violence of the killings' (Fontein 2009: 6; Fontein *et al.* 2015: 44). This notion of the liberation war dead becoming the bones and spirits that haunt postcolonial Zimbabwe has led to various grassroots memorialization marked by controversial war veteran-led exhumations of mass graves aiming at returning the war dead from mass graves in former camps abroad (such as Chimoio and Nyadzonia in Mozambique, or Freedom Camp in Zambia), or in other hastily dug shallow graves or excavated old mine shafts. These efforts and other vernacular manifestations represent local efforts to remake communities and landscapes marked by violence and death, to gain recognition and recompense for losses and sacrifices made during the struggle while highlighting the inadequacies of state commemoration and heritagization of the liberation struggle for failing to respond to the demands and complex politics of the dead (Fontein 2010: 426; Fontein *et al.* 2015: 44-45. For detailed discussion see also Fontein 2009, 2014).

So, it is the preoccupation with the unsettled spirits of the unreturned dead that have often left rural communities, deeply disturbed, that led initially war veterans along with relatives, spirit mediums, prophets and other religious or 'traditional' leaders to undertake efforts to locate, identify, exhume and rebury individual human remains from mass graves. In some reported cases, the spirits of the dead themselves were involved as they possessed spirit mediums or war veteran comrades, and were then able to identify their own specific bones from the remains of the several graves and abandoned mines across the country (Fontein 2009: 17; Fontein 2010: 427). For instance, the Chibondo exhumations initiated in March 2011 were also carried out in the context of giving former freedom fighters decent reburial. The work was spearheaded by the Fallen Heroes Trust of Zimbabwe comprised of veterans of the

liberation war formed in 1981. According to the information displayed in the Heroes Acre exhibition the Fallen Heroes Trust of Zimbabwe has identified 200 mass graves through the country, has identified 1000 individual shallow graves, and exhumed and repatriated over 2000 deceased individuals mostly from the Mashonaland Central region. Although not initially involved, significant state actors such as members of the Central Intelligence Organization local administrators and archaeologists from NMMZ have subsequently become involved in the process of settling the spirits of the dead (Fontein 2010: 428). This the official heritagization of liberation struggle encapsulated in what has become the Zimbabwe Liberation Heritage Programme results in part from the need to incorporate this vernacular memorialization (i.e. reburials) initiated by non-state actors and groups.

The Zimbabwe Liberation Heritage Programme which has been since 2005 formalized as part of the African Liberation Heritage Programme can be traced back to 1994 when the government gave the NMMZ the responsibility to look after the various Heroes Acres in order to 'give the shrines an inspiring and distinctive character' (Mupira 2010: 3). From early 1997, the government started to make specific arrangements to address the issues of the liberation war burials in neighbouring countries (National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe 1999d). According to a report produced by the NMMZ, the Zimbabwe Liberation Heritage Programme comprises the identification, documentation, rehabilitation, protection and presentation of Zimbabwe liberation war sites and aspects related thereto within Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries. The different elements of the Liberation Heritage Programme include the rehabilitation and development of liberation war burials in Mozambique and Zambia, the presentation of this heritage through the development of interpretation facilities, the development and management of National Heroes Acre and all Provincial Heroes Acres, the collection of liberation war experiences and testimonies through the Oral History Project, the development of National Liberation Museum, the production of statues of leading figures of the liberation struggle as well as the inscription on the National Monuments Register of those places and sites that are intimately associated with the peoples' resistance against the colonial establishment (Mahachi 2005).

6.2.1.1. War memorials: Chimoio liberation war shrine

In order to answer the 'deafening call' for 'decent burials of Zimbabwean heroes' (NMMZ 1999d), a task force was set up on April 24, 1998, aimed at identifying the graves of fallen freedom fighters in Mozambique. This task force comprised of Zimbabwe National Army, the NMMZ and Mozambique officials. Early in 1998, the government of Zimbabwe decided that two memorials, one each in Mozambique and Zambia, be constructed in honour of Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Zambians who died for Zimbabwe's liberation. The government then initiated memorandums of understanding between NMMZ and the National Heritage Conservation Commission of Zambia and the DNPC in Mozambique (NMMZ 1999d). During July 1998 President Mugabe visited the Freedom Camp outside Lusaka (Zambia) and Chimoio (Mozambique) and in both places unveiled foundation stones for the two monuments. A month later, President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and President Mugabe commissioned the 'Fallen Heroes Graves and Shrines Rehabilitation Programme' which comprised the identification and surveying of grave sites. A task force of war veterans was set up. Its initial task was to identify and quantify the war graves at various camps in Mozambique and Zambia.

In Mozambique, the task force covered Gaza, Sofala and Manica provinces covering liberation war camps such as Kombomune, Mapai, Chicualacuala, Barrageu, Chibawawa, Samakweza, Nyadzonya, Doroi, Chimoio, Mavhonde, Tembue among others. The programme was also supposed to rehabilitate about 140 graves of Zimbabweans buried at ten former liberation war camps: Tembwe in Tete Province, Nyadzonya, Chimoio and Doroi in Manica Province, Nyangao and Chibawawa in Sofala Province as well as Chicualacuala, Madulu, Mapai and Barragem in Gaza Province. In Zambian, burials at Freedom Camp and Nampundwe Camp near Lusaka, Mkushi Girls camp and Mulungushi camp, both near Kabwe, Solwezi camp close to Angola/DRC border, Sinde Farm and Kabanga Ission near Livingstone, Kavalamanja on the Zambezi River near the Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe border as well as Boroma in the north-eastern province were also included in the rehabilitation programme (NMMZ 1999d). The 'Fallen Heroes Graves and Shrines Rehabilitation Programme' signified the extension of state commemorative efforts to become what is now known as 'liberation heritage' (Fontein 2009: 14).

With US$ 10 million budget funded by the Public Sector Investment Programme in 1999, the NMMZ went ahead and built two monuments, one in Freedom Camp in Zambia and other in Chimoio in Mozambique, in tribute to all the Zimbabweans as well as local people whose lives were lost in these countries for the liberation of Zimbabwe (NMMZ 1999b). Like the Heroes Acre in Harare, the iconography of the state that was utilised in these monuments embodied many stylistic features that derived from Great Zimbabwe, namely the conical tower and stone walling, as illustrated in the drawings of the preliminary proposals of monuments to the fallen heroes in Zambia and Mozambique (see Figure 68). The conical tower, designated 'Tower of Freedom', is located in the centre of the monument. In front of it, a black granite slab paced on the ground with an inscription:

> This monument is dedicated in memory and glory of the gallant sons and daughters of Zimbabwe who fell in Mozambique/Zambia. To unshackle the chains of bondage, these heroes selfishly made the supreme sacrifice which culminated in the attainment of Zimbabwe's independence on 18 April 1980 (see the plan of the monuments in Figure 68).

On the inner side of the stone walling on a black granite frieze the inscription 'Our eyes are on you, our brothers and sisters; the fallen heroes of Zimbabwe; we bleed for you; yet we must not grieve; for in you is our rebirth, and you are all that we shall ever be' (see section AA illustrating the elevation of the monument in Figure 68). All inscriptions are in English, Shona and Ndebele in Zambia and English and Portuguese in Mozambique. Another important feature of these memorials is the 'wall of contemplation' placed at the central area of the inner stone walling, on which is inscribed the names of the people who died for Zimbabwe's liberation in these neighbouring countries (see section BB illustrating the elevation of the monument in Figure 68).




Figure 68: Drawings of the preliminary proposals of Monuments to the Fallen Heroes in Zambia and Mozambique produced by Architects Partnerships in June 1998. (Source: National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, 2016).




Figure 69: Descriptive plate at Chimoio liberation war shrine (2016). (Image courtesy: Rumbi Bvira).



Figure 70: Chimoio liberation war shrine in 2005. (Image courtesy: Henry Chiwaura).

Apart from the construction of monuments to fallen heroes, rehabilitation and upgrading of the graves, the rehabilitation programme also involved the development of museums at both Freedom Camp and Chimoio. This entailed the reconstruction of the operational headquarters of ZIPRA, the armed wing of ZAPU at Freedom Camp, and reconstruction of headquarters (also known as White House) of ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU in Chimoio (Mahachi 2005). At the end of 2005 the NMMZ started the project of building a site museum at

Adriano in Chimoio. The six-week construction period ran from December 22, 2005 to February 4, 2006. The building was constructed up to the wall plate level (Chipunza and Chiwaura 2006). It seems that financial constraints had prevented the NMMZ from finalising the project by 2006. An exhibition has been currently put in place which is intended to be open to the public in December 2016 (see Figure 71).



Figure 71: Partial view of the exhibition displayed at the museum of the Chimoio liberation war shrine (2016). (Image courtesy: Rumbi Bvira).

6.2.1.2. Legal framework for protection of liberation heritage

One important aspect of the Zimbabwe Liberation Heritage Programme was the creation of regional cooperation mechanisms for protection of liberation heritage. Memoranda of understanding that give legal force to NMMZ activities were entered with Zambia's National Heritage Conservation Commission and Mozambique's National Directorate for Cultural Heritage (DNPC) (Mahachi 2005). The need for reburial of the liberation war dead and a joint effort in the heritagization of the liberation struggle is well captured in the preamble of the Memorandum of Understanding between NMMZ and DNPC, dated of July 22, 1999, when it states:

> The liberation of Zimbabwe was a result of the combined effort and commitment of the people of Zimbabwe on the one hand and the Government of the people of Mozambique on the other. The

> supreme price paid by these people is evidenced by human remains that lie in some areas of Mozambique. In the adverse circumstances of war, these remains were at best interred in shallow or unprotected graves and at worst, they still litter the surface. At all events, the present situation does little justice to the noble vision and selfless sacrifice of these cadres. Furthermore, the need to indelibly enrich the story of the liberation struggle through systematic research is long overdue. This Memorandum of Understanding represents the express wishes of the Governments and peoples of Zimbabwe and Mozambique to rectify the anomalies enunciated above (NMMZ 1999c: 1).

Thus, in the Memorandum of Understanding the two parties agreed to:

a) Identify, document and manage all human remains, graves and battle sites and experiences relating to the liberation war in Mozambique and Zimbabwe;
b) Determine the construction and reconstruction of graves, including the construction of memorial monuments and centres of interpretation and site museums which will be carried out by the competent organs of the State, in accordance with the rules in force;
c) Administer through competent organs of the State and Municipal councils, the graves, memorials monuments and museums with the joint technical assistance of NMMZ and DNPC;
d) Collect, research, preserve and promote an understanding amongst general public so as to enable them to learn and understand the history, values and goals of the fight for freedom: this for educational, cultural and recreational purposes and above all, for posterity (NMMZ 1999c: 3).

In 2007 a Policy Framework for the Management of Provincial Heroes Acres was developed in consultation with various stakeholders who included the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence and Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development. The policy sought to guide NMMZ other Government Departments on how to deal with issues such as conferment of hero status, construction of graves, upgrading of graves, maintenance of Heroes Acres and presentation of shrines. The role of NMMZ was defined as ‘managing the shrine through preserving and upgrading the graves, maintaining the sites, providing the Zimbabwean public and others with information on the struggle and the significance of fallen heroes’ (Mupira 2010: 4).

6.2.1.3. Documenting the intangible heritage of liberation: Capturing a Fading National Memory

The Oral History Project is a collaborative project between the University of Zimbabwe's Department of History, the National Archives of Zimbabwe and the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe. The project seeks to collect testimonies on Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation, from the *First Chimurenga* to the present. For the NMMZ, the project will provide the additional data required for the mounting of informative exhibitions both at the National and Provincial Heroes Acres (Mahachi 2005). 'Capturing a Fading National Memory' was launched nation-wide on May 15, 2004, at a time when the country was deeply politically polarised, just two years after the contentious 2002 elections that ZANU–PF had only narrowly won. This was blamed on MDC supporting urban voters, mockingly referred to as 'born frees', who were seen as the ones who were causing the memories of the war to 'fade' because they did not value the liberation war. Geared towards collecting and preserving oral accounts of the struggle as a form of intangible liberation heritage it tied in closely with both the priorities of government's historiographical agenda and the alignment of NMMZ's with the new African Liberation Heritage Programme (Fontein *et al.* 2015: 21). Fontein *et al.* (2015: 22-24) have noticed that in some areas the historical accounts collected by the project's researchers were narrow, focusing most attention on the brutality of the Rhodesian Forces without much nuance in terms of the deprivations, coercion and violence that were also sometimes caused by guerrilla fighters during the war, which have been well reported elsewhere (cf. Kriger 1992). In other areas, like in the Matabeleland provinces, the project never took off because informants preferred to talk about the more recent events of the *Gukurahundi* massacres of the 1980s.

6.2.1.4. 'Glocal' heritagization of liberation struggle in Zimbabwe

Although the UNESCO supported African Liberation Heritage Programme was officially launched only in March 2007 in Zimbabwe (UNESCO 2007, 2007a), it can be traced back to a SADC initiative which was discussed at the UNESCO Windhoek office in August 2004 (Fontein 2009: 4). The Zimbabwe Liberation Heritage Programme was a response to multitude of events already happening on the ground. It encompassed elements such as regional cooperation for documentation and preservation of liberation heritage, as advocated by the African Liberation Heritage Programme formalised in 2005.

The new traction of liberation heritage discourse encapsulated in the African Liberation Heritage Programme can also be seen as a response to a variety of different interests in Zimbabwe and in other countries in the region. As Fontein (2009:15) puts it:

> For many people, the new focus on oral histories of the struggle can offer the opportunity to recount their own experiences, wrestling control of the representation of the past away from both the elite accounts of nationalist leaders, but also those of academic historians who have dominated the study of the war since independence. These oral histories can sometimes offer profound challenges to the dominant narratives of ZANU PF, as for example when rural people describe atrocities and violence they suffered at the hands of both Rhodesian forces and 'freedom fighters' during the struggle.

Against the long-running failures of hierarchical, state-driven efforts to commemorate the liberation struggle (Fontein *et al.* 2015: 37), this renewed liberation heritage discourse engages with the continuing demands of spirit mediums, war veterans and relatives, for the repatriation and return of the war dead, and the settling of their spirits. The high-profile presence of spirit mediums, chiefs and other 'traditional' leaders at reburial events illustrates the extent to which this discourse has come to respond to ritual demands previously marginalised or excluded (Fontein 2009: 16). For instance, since the early 2010s, some war veteran and community members have undertaken efforts to commemorate and monumentalise two massacre sites in Gutu district: the Kamungoma massacre that happened on May 14, 1978, where 104 civilians and one guerrilla commander died and the Hurodzavasikana massacre that happened on June 27, 1979, where 21 people were killed. They have put pressure to have them declared National Monuments in order to achieve national recognition for Gutu district's contribution to the liberation struggle (Fontein *et al.* 2015: 8). Accordingly, the 'languages of suffering' deployed by these communities to seek state recognition for their losses, go beyond demands for official commemoration and monumentalisation of the massacres, to include 'demands for local development projects as well as for individual compensation for lost livelihoods and insecure futures' in order to 'remake possible futures interrupted materially as well as symbolically by violence and death' (Fontein *et al.* 2015: 11).

On the other hand, for NMMZ, this new liberation heritage discourse, framed in the African Liberation Heritage Programme, also coincides with the 'glocal' shift in heritage discourse (caused in part by the changes to the world heritage system in response to pressures and demands of practitioners from non-European context and UNESCO's willingness to overturn

the monumentalist and Eurocentric biases of its world heritage concept). A more comprehensive understanding of heritage conservation and more diverse forms of preserving memory are in alignment with an international trend bolstered by the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (Fontein 2009: 16; Marschall 2010a: 184). As Fontein (2009) argues,

> What is clear is that the broader, international climate of changing definitions of world heritage, an increased recognition of 'intangible', 'ritual' and 'living' forms of heritage, and a mounting desire for notions and practices of world heritage to be responsive to both African contexts, and particular 'local' forms of management, provides the context within which Zimbabwe's liberation heritage project gains traction across the southern African region (Fontein 2009:16).

Yet, despite this 'glocal' shift towards intangible heritage which has strongly influenced the NMMZ approach, much of the conceptualisation concerning heritagization of liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and across the region has remained firmly structured around monuments and museums due to the persistence of the hegemonic Western notions of heritage (e.g. emphasis on its materiality and monumentality) in postcolonial Africa. Nevertheless, another 'work' performed by the recent liberation heritage discourse, epitomised by the African Liberation Heritage Programme, has been to broaden the recognition of the contribution of heroic struggle of anonymous men and women for political independence, including countries seen as having no liberation credentials such as Swaziland and Botswana.

6.2.2. Botswana: African Liberation Heritage Programme in a 'non-liberation' country

Since the country's independence in 1966, and especially after 1969, Botswana consistently denounced apartheid and colonial rule in the region and opened its borders to political refugees but prohibited the use of its territory as a springboard for violent attacks on its neighbours. Botswana was 'the pipeline' from Rhodesia and South Africa north to Zambia and Tanzania both for guerrilla training and as bases for liberation movements. ZAPU had offices in Francistown while the ANC and PAC operated in various safe houses around Gaborone and Lobatse (Ramsay *et al.* 1996: 196). The 'aerial pipeline' supplemented road, rail, and safe-house networks established by a prominent Motswana trade union activist and leader of the opposition in Botswana, Ntwaesele Thatayone 'Fish' Keitseng. Operated by several liberation movements, the 'pipeline' was also known as the 'road to freedom'. The 'pipeline' ran from Lobatse, via refuelling at Kasane, over-flew Northern Rhodesia to Mbeya, then to Dar es Salaam. It operated as a mini-airline called Bechuanaland Air Safari's, later Bechuanaland Air Services that was acquired by Botswana National Airways in 1966 (Benneyworth 2011: 82). Together with Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia, Botswana was one of the founding countries of the FLS in 1974 to assist the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Botswana prevented Rhodesia from receiving military supplies by rail through its territory and played a leading role in developing an economic strategy amongst independent states to supplement the political goals for the FLS. In 1979 the SADCC brought the FLS together with Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland in order to reduce dependency on South Africa. In 1982 the headquarters of SADCC were in Gaborone (Ramsay *et al.* 1996: 73). Although Botswana did not provide military bases for liberation movements it became a 'safe-haven' for large numbers of refugees. Between 1976 and 1979 Botswana took care of over 30 000 refugees fleeing from Namibia, Rhodesia, Angola and South Africa. For instance, before 1980 Botswana accommodated as many as 17,000 Zimbabwean refugees. When South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994, those eligible to vote in Botswana numbered approximately 35,000 (Motsamai 2015: 6). Due to its 'open door' policy for political refugees Botswana was also a victim of the hostile white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa which launched several raids into the country, including two separate strikes into suburbs of the capital Gaborone in the mid-1980s (Ramsay *et al.* 1996: 74).

Yet, Botswana's liberation struggle credentials have at times been regarded with suspicion by its neighbours. In fact, Botswana faced the difficulty of accommodating asylum seekers and 'freedom fighters' whilst, at the same time, trying not to offend its powerful neighbours (Oitsile 2010: ii). In August 1967, 33 guerrillas from the ANC and ZAPU, both based in Zambia, entered Botswana for retreat and recuperation, after engaging Rhodesian troops in the Wankie Game Reserve. South Africa and Rhodesia threatened Botswana with hot pursuit. Fearing reprisals, Botswana arrested, sentenced and later deported the fighters to Zambia. After this incident, Botswana stopped supporting the armed struggle, limiting itself to expressions of strong moral support until the mid-1970s when it started providing limited logistical support (Morapedi 2012: 76). Thus, while in other cases the Botswana government turned a blind eye on the use of its territory as a base for liberation movements attacks to South Africa and Rhodesia, it was in most cases forced to capture guerrillas to avoid economic and security disruption (Oitsile 2010: 134). Furthermore, whilst Botswana publically supported the liberation struggle, its relations with the FLS were often tricky to manage due to friction over the extent to which Botswana and its ruling party (Botswana Democratic Party) supported the member states' liberation movements. For instance, together with Zambia, Botswana leaned more towards ZAPU led by the relatively moderate Joshua Nkomo while the rest of the FLS had stronger ties with ZAPU's information and publicity secretary, Robert Mugabe, who led the more radical wing of the party (Motsamai 2015: 6). Botswana also found itself at loggerheads with both ZAPU and ZANU over the nature and activities of the movements' representatives in the country, regarding many of them as unacceptable to Botswana on security grounds (Morapedi 2012: 89). Another area of friction was divergences in the policy approaches of the Front Line States during the Angolan civil war. For instance, countries like Tanzania and Mozambique had clear alliances with the MPLA while Zambia gave tacit support to UNITA and advocated a government of national unity. Botswana's position was often ambiguous in such scenarios. Its approach was to adopt a principled position supporting all parties that were engaged in the liberation struggle, without necessarily defining its ideological leanings (Motsamai 2015: 7). All these tensions contributed to the somehow low recognition of Botswana's role in the liberation struggle in the region when compared to the recognition given to Tanzania and Zambia by former national liberation movements.

The new liberation heritage discourse encapsulated in the ten volume publication of the SADC Hashim Mbita Project and promoted by the African Liberation Heritage Programme

has been crucial in recognizing Botswana's role in the regional struggles and illustrating that 'South Africa and Zimbabwe did not travel the journey to freedom and independence alone', as I heard from the head of Botswana National Museums, Gaogakwe Phorano in 2015. In 2005, Botswana's Office of the President released documents pertaining to the period of 'cross-border raids'. The release of these papers has launched a series of new research projects and initiatives, including the Botswana documentation Aluka Digital Library 'Struggles for Freedom'; the Botswana Chapter for the Hashim Mbita: History of Liberation; the Botswana Chapter for the South African Democratic Education Trust; and in 2012, the Botswana Chapter of African Liberation Heritage Programme titled 'Our Liberation Heritage Project' (OLIHEP), with special reference to the roles played by ex-combatants, the Botswana government and ordinary citizens (Bolaane 2013: 559). Within the framework of African Liberation Heritage Programme, Botswana organised a side event during the 'Living with World Heritage in Africa International Conference' held in South Africa 26-29 September 2012, as part of the celebration of 40 Years of the UNESCO 1972 Convention. This regional meeting was important for the various countries to share information about individual initiatives and to discuss the need to have joint initiatives, apart from the projects and activities outlined by Tanzania.[86] In addition, some of the critical sites related to liberation have been declared national monuments as part of Botswana's OLIHEP. Some of the examples are:

a) Dukwi refugee camp

The camp was opened in 1978 during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle when refugees were flooding west from what was then known as Rhodesia. Since then, the camp has grown and contracted as crises have intensified or diminished. Relatively uncrowded during the mid-1990s, Dukwi filled again when Congo collapsed into violence, Angola's civil war intensified and Namibia fought a secessionist movement (National Heritage Council 2011: 15).

b) Three transit-houses of former Presidents

These are three transit and 'safe houses' which were part of the 'pipeline', where some 'freedom fighters' passed through before flying out to join the liberation movements in other parts of Africa located. Two houses are located in South-Eastern

[86] Interview with GP, Midrand, May 7, 2015.

Botswana, 70 kilometres south of the capital Gaborone, in the town of Lobatse. The first house is known as Ntwaesele Thatayone 'Fish' Keitseng house where the late President of South Africa Nelson Mandela stayed between 11 and January 19, 1962, before being airlifted into the 'pipeline' towards Dar es Salaam. Keitseng's Lobatse safe-house also hosted the ANC clandestine meeting that formally endorsed the new line of the armed struggle against the Apartheid regime in 1962 (Benneyworth 2011). The second house belongs to the Kgaboesele family who hosted the late President of Mozambique Samora Machel in 1963 while on his route to Tanzania (National Heritage Council 2011: 15). Preparations are well underway for the construction of two Museums in Lobatse: one for Samora Machel and other for Nelson Mandela.[87] The third house is located in Blue Town in Francistown, about 400 kilometres north-northeast from the capital Gaborone. The house is popularly called the 'white house' and hosted the former President of Namibia Sam Nujoma in March 1960 while in transit into exile but has since been demolished (National Heritage Council 2011: 16).

c) Lesoma massacre

On 27 February 1978, Rhodesian security forces crossed into Botswana and ambushed 35 soldiers and two civilians, killing 15 soldiers and a civilian at Lesoma, a small Basarwa-dominated village, 13 kilometres east of Kasane. This incident is described as the 'most traumatic moments so far in the history of Botswana' (Gumbo 2014: 580). In response to the massacre, the Botswana government took a harder line against the Rhodesians. In 2006 a monument was built at the site (Ramsay *et al.* 1996; Thebe and Keaketswe 2005).

d) Francistown bombings

In 1985, the apartheid regime launched attacks in Molepolole, Mogoditshane, Tlokweng and Francistown. Five people were killed as the result of the attacks, including military and civilians. Currently there are some remains of the house foundation on which the five people died. A monument has since been erected in honour of those who lost their lives in the house (National Heritage Council 2011: 15).

[87] Interview with GP, Midrand, May 7, 2015.

The Botswana Charter of the African Liberation Heritage Programme (OLIHEP) comprises several projects including production of a trail map, a documentary film and a booklet on the role of Botswana in the regional liberation struggle. Some of the projects are undertaken in close cooperation with South Africa. For instance, on November 25 and 26, 2015, South Africa High Commission in Botswana participated in the launch of the Kazungula Liberation Heritage Monument at Kazungula site, located in Kasane. Most of the political exiles wishing to go further north for military training crossed the Zambezi River from Botswana into Zambia using a pontoon, the Kazungula Ferry also known as the 'Kasane Freedom Ferry', at Kasane (Gumbo 2014: 573). The ferry was also used by ZANU-PF fighters to smuggle arms into then Southern Rhodesia which led the Rhodesian air forces to sink it mid-stream in 1965. The two days' event included the unveiling of signage (donated by the South Africa High Commission) at the proposed Regional African Liberation heritage monument site (*News from Botswana* 2015). Speaking at the launch of the monument on December 7, 2015, former Minister of Education, Dr Gaositwe Chiepe reportedly stated:

> Botswana contributed to the liberation struggles of all neighbouring states, ordinary Batswana from the villages (…) It is, therefore, relevant for a regional monument of this nature to be erected here to mark Kazungula's importance in the history of liberation in the region, and is a testament to the hard-fought struggles the region had to bear to gain independence (Chube 2015).

The remains of the pontoon are conveniently placed next to the monument and were visited by President Jacob Zuma back in August 2012 where he confirmed having used the route during the South African struggle. At the time President Zuma expressed his gratitude to Botswana stating that 'Whatever we used for the struggle passed through Botswana so we will never forget the role the country played. Our struggle was your struggle and our victory is your victory as well' (Republic of Botswana 2012). According to a Botswanan official, the monument in Kazangula will be connected to another regional monument to be built in the south where the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in took place between 1987 and 1988. This battle symbolizes the defeat of apartheid which opened the way for the independence of Namibia followed by that of South Africa. Kazangula, together with places such as Lobatse are intimately associated with the beginning of the liberation struggle in the region where liberation movements used the 'pipeline' to wage war against the colonial regimes, by crossing the Zambezi.[88]

[88] Interview with GP, Midrand, May 7, 2015.

In addition, the recent liberation heritage discourse has also allowed Botswana and its liberation heritage to be mobilised to contribute towards the listing of the liberation heritage on the World Heritage List, a project very much spearheaded by South Africa. The provincial government of the North West in South Africa is funding a multi-million Pula research project in Botswana called the National Liberation Heritage Route (NLHR) in collaboration with North West Department of Arts and Culture, Botswana Tourism and the Department of Museums and Art Gallery of Botswana to trace, track, assess, identify, document, protect and propose for listing to the South African Heritage Resources Agency, sites which represent indigenous Africans Wars of Resistance and the struggle against apartheid. The project is portrayed as an initiative of the AU and SADC as the document indicates:

> This project complies with the vision of UNESCO and the AU [African Union], that the NLHR [National Liberation Heritage Route] should first cover South Africa and ultimately encompass the rest of the SADC member's states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with a potential of identifying other African states outside the SADC region (Dithato 2015).

According to a local newspaper *Weekend Post* of October 26, 2015, this project is viewed in the context of transnational serial nomination and is part of the SADC serial nomination to the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Clearly, the liberation heritage discourse promoted by the African Liberation Heritage Programme has broadened the recognition of the contribution of the heroic struggle of anonymous Batswana men and women for political independence in the region, including the significant role played by Botswana as a country. As Osei-Hwedie (1998) has argued,

> A country's role in the liberation struggle can take many forms, the most important being to offer operational facilities for freedom fighters, including transit camps, operational bases and rights of sanctuary; administrative and financial aid; propaganda facilities and moral support in the form of recognition and diplomatic assistance; granting political asylum to refugees; and promoting unity among liberation movements (Osei-Hwedie 1998: 427).

Botswana provided most of these forms of assistance, except for the provision of operational bases. Because of its cautious approach, and its determination not to give its neighbours an excuse for intervention, it confined itself largely to moral and verbal support, the latter mainly expressed in international forums, although it also included permission for liberation movements to set up administrative offices and residences in the capital and other main centres (Oitsile 2010: ii; Morapedi 2012: 76). As a Botswana official puts it: 'Batswana were

not doing a favour to South Africa by supporting the struggle; It was also their liberation from underdevelopment imposed by the industrial policy of Apartheid'.[89]

Another interesting aspect of the 'work' of this recent liberation heritage discourse in the region is the fact that many of the projects concerning the heritagization of the liberation across the region were also part of specific dynamics of bilateral relations amongst countries in pursuit of interests: strengthening solidarity amongst ruling parties and advancing economic agendas. For instance, since 2005 when President Armando Guebuza came to power in Mozambique there was a noticeable strengthening of relations with Botswana's President Ian Khama, seen in several reciprocal state visits. In July 2010 President Khama accompanied President Guebuza to Lobatse, where the latter officially opened the newly built Sbrana Psychiatric Hospital. While in Lobatse, President Guebuza also visited the site where a museum honouring Samora Machel was being established. Guebuza recalled that many others nationalists, including himself in 1965, had also passed through Botswana on their way to join the freedom struggle in Tanzania, adding that 'the people of Botswana could thus be proud of their contribution to Mozambican independence' (Republic of Botswana 2010). In August of 2011, Khama went to another state visit to Mozambique which culminated in the signing of a total of ten Memoranda of Understanding with Mozambique for cooperation in areas of transport, minerals and energy, control of cattle diseases, health, education and human resource development, taxation and the abolition of visa requirements. With respect to transport, both countries agreed to invest in projects that will enhance Botswana's access to the Indian Ocean. For its part, Mozambique announced plans to invest approximately P 2.5 billion (US$ 230 million) to double the capacity of the Port of Maputo. Both countries further confirmed their intention to construct of a new deep water port in Mozambique's Techobanine region, which will be linked to Botswana, via Zimbabwe, by a railway and oil pipeline (Republic of Botswana 2011).

The 'Integrated Project of Techobanine Port' was approved by the Council of Ministers of Mozambique through a Decree (Decreto n°. 57/2010 de 1 de Dezembro) in December 2010 and includes the construction, maintenance and operation of a deep waters sea port, maritime structures, railway network and the development of satellite projects. Yet the project sits at the heart of Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve (PPMR), a Marine Protected Area created

[89] Interview with GP, Midrand, May 7, 2015.

in 2009 (Decreto n°. 42/2009), adjacent and connected to the iSimangaliso Wetland Park World Heritage Site in South Africa. Together they form one of the few Africa's cross-border marine reserve and they are part of one of Southern Africa Peace Parks, the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area. If this project proceeds the port will destroy the major coral reef complex (Ponta Doble – Ponta Techobanine) and one of the most significant nesting areas for sea turtles inside the PPMR. It will have a huge negative impact on the conservation of the unique marine and terrestrial ecosystems in both Mozambique and South Africa (Jopela 2012: 14). Hoping to use UNESCO World Heritage listing as a shield to protect the interests of conservation the Mozambican authorities in charge of conservation have placed PPMR on the UNESCO Tentative List in 2008. Since 2011 Peace Parks Foundation has been spearheading the process of developing a nomination dossier for listing the site as an extension of iSimangaliso.

The example of Botswana clearly illustrates the work of African Liberation Heritage Programme in promoting the recognition of the efforts and sacrifices of communities previously marginalized in the narrative of the liberation in the region. Yet, I would also argue that the liberation heritage discourse has also allowed almost all SADC countries to 'invent traditions' as exemplified by the case of Malawi.

6.2.3. Malawi: African Liberation Heritage Programme and sanitization of the 'struggles within the struggle'

Like most postcolonial states, post independent Malawi has its officially sanctioned grand-narrative of resistance and ultimate triumph over colonialism as its foundation myth. This grand narrative has been revived and reworked along the lines of the recent liberation heritage discourse as one can grasp by reading the summary of liberation heritage in Malawi in the report of the proceeding of Regional Workshop on the African Liberation Heritage of Africa held on August 16-18, 2011, in Pretoria, South Africa. The general outline of the narrative can be summarized as follows: The fight for freedom began as soon as Nyasaland was declared a British protectorate in 1891. The imposition of the land, labour and taxation laws caused a great deal of suffering to the African people, thereby triggering resistance. Several chiefs fought the system in their own ways. An early example of nationalist activists against colonial rule was John Chilembwe who led a revolt in 1915 against colonial white farmers who mistreated Africans on their farms. From 1912 many educated Africans had

formed Native Associations to speak for African interests to the colonial government. In 1944 the various native associations merged to form the Nyasaland African Congress.

Although initially peaceful, in the 1950s the Nyasaland African Congress turned to violent protests against the new constitutional order, in which Nyasaland was to be part of a federation with Southern and Northern Rhodesia. As the focus of the nationalists changed towards fighting for independence and self-rule for Africans, there was a need for the Nyasaland African Congress to be led by someone with the 'poise and political experience'. Hence from July 1958 Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, a British-educated medical doctor (who was then working in Ghana) was made the leader of the party, and has since regarded as the 'saviour of Malawi independence, who would destroy federation and set the people free' (National Heritage Council 2011: 15). Some of the liberation sites included the March House, where Banda together with a hundred party officials was arrested following a State of Emergency declared by the Governor of Nyasaland on March 3, 1959. The protest resulted in over 2000 people being detained without trial and over fifty being killed. Another landmark is the Nkungu tree which was the venue for the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) Convention in July 1960 where political detainees from the State of Emergency in Nyasaland in 1959 were reunited. Full independence was achieved on July 6, 1964 with Banda as Prime Minister. The country became the Republic of Malawi, and Banda became President on July 6, 1966. The Independence Arch is the monument associated with this event (National Heritage Council 2011: 16).

The construction of the post-independence national discourse has been mostly based on the heroism of Banda. Other social groups, including many of prominent Malawian politicians who were involved in the struggle for independence, and who played pivotal roles in the anti-colonial mass movements, have been left out of the official narrative of the liberation through the history of the MCP's one-party regime (1964-1992). The approximation of Banda's government to fascist regimes of Portugal and South Africa since 1965 brought rapid and hostile consequences for the liberation of southern Africa. Malawi refused to support FRELIMO's struggle. After Mozambique attained independence, Banda increased his collaboration with the only remaining racist regime of the region, South Africa, but simultaneously participated in the SADCC (Hedges 1989: 635). Thus, in 1986, Malawi could not avoid being the object of the indirect conflict between the SADCC countries, particularly Mozambique, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other.

Faced with proof of Malawi's complicity, the FLS at the summit August 21-22, 1986, in Luanda demanded that Malawi adopted a new position. On September 11, Machel, Kaunda and Mugabe went to Blantyre (Malawi's capital) to explain to Banda that the fundamental interests of the Malawian people were no different from those of other SADCC member states, and threatened that possible retaliation of the FLS would seriously affect Malawi's land and air communications. In response to this pressure, foreseeing a change of attitude on the part of President Banda, South Africa at the end of September began to infiltrate thousands of armed bandits into Zambézia province of Mozambique. A new wave of massacres, mutilations, destruction of infrastructures and massive displacement of people was thus set in motion. Information surfacing in South Africa suggests that a total of about 12,000 bandits entered Zambezia, Tete and Niassa provinces from Malawi from the end of September 1986 (Hedges 1989: 640-1). On his return to Maputo from the Blantyre meeting, Machel called for what would be his last press conference where he expressed his visceral contempt for Banda, whom he often described as a fascist (Mosse 2001: 140). In a combative mood, Machel stated:

> Malawi likes to depend on whites (...) When the ports of Mozambique were in the hands of the Portuguese, Malawi did everything for the world to send goods through them. When we proclaimed the independence of the People's Republic of Mozambique, the ports of Nacala, Beira and Maputo were entirely at the service of Malawi. They did not like it because the ports were now under a black regime. Malawi has issues (…) We went to Malawi to tell them that' (Fauvet and Mosse 2004: 260).

So 'what will Mozambique do?', asked a journalist to whom Machel replied without hesitation: 'First, we'll put missiles along the border with Malawi. We have too many missiles, they just didn't have a target. Second, we'll close the transit of Malawi through Mozambican territory. Malawi should find another way to reach Zimbabwe and South Africa' (Fauvet and Mosse 2004: 260). These public threats against Malawi, South Africa's only ally in the region, caused the apartheid regime to make harsh and belligerent threats against Machel in the middle of which Machel met his death when his plane diverted and crashed in South African territory in Mbuzini (Hedges 1989: 617; Saíde 2014: 787). By focussing solely on its own 'road to independence' Malawi uses the recent liberation heritage discourse promoted by the African Liberation Heritage Programme to omit and sanitise controversial aspects the country's role in the regional liberation struggle and aligns its narrative with that of other SADC member states.

6.2.4. Mbuzini: Memorialising without healing

Mbuzini is the site of the plane crash on October 19, 1986, that killed President Machel and thirty-four others when their aircraft, the Tupolev 1343, left Mbala in Zambia for Maputo but never made it home. Mbuzini lies on the plateau of the Lebombo mountains that form the eastern corner border between Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland (van Vuuren 2003: 222; Saíde 2014: 788). There were 33 passengers on board, among them: Luís Maria Alcantara Santos (Mozambican Minister of Transport and Communications); José Carlos Lobo (Mozambican Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs); Aquino de Bragança (Mozambican Director of the Center for African Studies); Fernando Honwana (personal aide to the Mozambican President); Cox Sikumba (Ambassador of Zambia); and Tokwalu Batale Okulakama (Ambassador of Zaire). Nine people sitting at the back of the plane survived the impact of the crash (Saíde 2014: 789).

In 2016 the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), declared the Samora Machel Memorial and Crash Site, Mbuzini, as a National Heritage Site in terms of section 27 (5) of the National Heritage Resources Act (No. 25 of 1999). The statement of significance reads:

> The site commemorates the tragic plane crash in which the then President of Mozambique and loyal supporter of South African Struggle, Samora Machel was killed. The site pays homage to Samora Machel and his inestimable contribution to the establishment of peace and democracy in southern Africa. He has become a revered martyr of the struggle against the forces of Apartheid and Colonialism on the African Continent. The memorial is a symbol of the crucial moral and material support given by the Frontier States to the South African liberation struggle, often at great costs, and honours the people of Mozambique and their solidarity towards the liberation of South Africa (DAC-SAHRA 7 October 2016).

This was not the first recognition of Mbuzini as an important heritage site. The heritagization of the liberation struggle in South Africa was well underway before the recent traction of the liberation heritage discourse. Since 1994, the ANC government has been trying to redress imbalances in the heritage landscape and to acknowledge the suffering and heroism of those who contributed to South Africa's liberation as a nation (Jordan 2006), thus promoting a more egalitarian culture, as part of the general process of transformation (Saunders 2007a: 185). On October 17, 1996, during the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the death of President Machel in Mbuzini, President Mandela announced: 'A memorial will be erected at this site by our two Governments, to mourn our loss and to celebrate the life and vision of

Samora Machel. This heralds a new era in which the pioneers of our new society are honoured as they should be' (Mandela 1996). In 1997 the South African Cabinet adopted the National Legacy Project, developed by the Department of Arts and Culture, Science and Technology in consultation with South African social historian Luli Callinicos. The Legacy Project comprises a selection of nine high-priority heritage developments spread throughout the country, namely: (i) the commemoration of the Zulu warriors at the battlefield of Blood River/Ncome near Dundee in KwaZulu-Natal; (ii) the Monument for the Women of South Africa at the Union Buildings in Pretoria; (iii) the inclusive commemoration of the Centenary of the South African Anglo-Boer War; (iv) Constitution Hill (the site of the Old Fort and the new Constitutional Court in Johannesburg); (v) the commemoration of Nelson Mandela's home and sites associated with his youth through the Qunu Museum in the Eastern Cape; (vi) the Albert Luthuli project focused on the restoration of his home in Groutville in KwaZulu-Natal; (vii) a Khoe/San heritage route situated mostly in the Western Cape; (viii) the ambitious Freedom Park monument outside Pretoria; and finally (ix) a memorial to former Mozambican President Samora Machel on the rural site where his plane crashed near the border town of Mbuzini (Marschall 2010a: 169). On January 19, 1999, President Mandela fulfilled his pledge and unveiled a memorial in a moving ceremony witnessed by thousands of South Africans, Mozambicans and members of the local and international communities.

The Samora Machel Memorial consisted at that time of a concrete platform where a set of 35 rusty steel pipes representing the deceased are fixed (see Figure 72). When it rains, the rust is washed down the pipes and stains the concrete platform resembling the blood of the deceased.[90] Lying flat on the concrete platform is a marble plaque with the names of the victims (see Figure 73). Beyond, there is a deep pit, narrowing to a point buried in the hillside, containing twisted lumps of metal wreckage (see Figure 74). The platform on which the poles stand forms a kind of trapezoid, pointing into and away from the furrow ploughed up by the plane; it represents the flight path as the plane came down and crashed into the hillside (LeFanu 2012: 151).

[90] Interview with SS, Mbuzini, October 16, 2015.



Figure 72: Samora Machel Memorial in Mbuzini illustrating the 35 steel pipes and a deep pit with part of the aircraft wreckage (2014).



Figure 73: The marble plaque with the names of the victims of the aeroplane crash (2014).



Figure 74: Parts of the aircraft wreckage inside the deep pit on the edge of the concrete platform (2014).

The memorial was designed by Mozambican architect José Forjaz who described the symbolism of the monument in the following terms:

> The memorial sought to represent the memory of the disaster by displaying part of the aeroplane that is stuck in a dramatic site (...) It was also necessary not to dishonour the memory of those who died by magnifying the memory of a person (Samora Machel). This was a correct interpretation of what Machel's philosophy of life. This is why the monument uses the steel pipes of the same height to represent the number of people who died (35), and convey the notion that all who died were important (equal human beings) (…) We tried to make a monument that would not disturb

> nature: a monument with a dramatic presence, but not a brutalization of nature (...)We also added the dimension of sound, a monument that echoes variable sounds of lament, cry, drama according to the intensity and direction of the wind (…) But above all the monument was meant to impose to the visitors the idea of a pilgrimage (…) the plane fell on a mountain and that in itself is a symbolic fact. It was important to convey the message that a visit to the monument would impose certain effort to the people wanting to reach this secluded site.[91]

In his speech at the opening of Mbuzini Community Library on October 6, 2006, the Minister of Arts and Culture Pallo Jordan stated:

> From the outset in 1996, the view was that the project [the Samora Machel Memorial] should be broader than simply a monument or memorial and should include a facility that contributed directly to the upliftment of the Mbuzini community. Therefore, the Legacy Project was conceived of in two phases. The first was the construction of the memorial which has become a place of homage and pilgrimage for South Africans and Mozambicans alike, and the government also improved the road infrastructure to make Mbuzini more accessible to the rest of the province. The second phase is this library: It was strongly felt that a library would be an appropriate community amenity that exemplifies the visions and ideals of the late President Machel and also former President Mandela (Jordan 2006).

Yet, it seems that for certain groups of the ANC leadership there was a need to fully develop the Samora Machel Memorial so that site would occupy 'its rightful place on the South African tourist circuit' (van Vuuren 2003: 229). During the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Mbuzini tragedy, President Thabo Mbeki mentioned the place where the bodies of the deceased were put to rest by the South African authorities. In Mbeki's words:

> That is the exact spot at which the bodies of the deceased were finally recovered, the piece of earth into which blood would have flowed from the dead and injured on the night of 19 October 1986. At this moment, it is marked by three headstones with the names of the deceased and an explanation of why this particular area of the soil of Mbuzini, Mpumalanga and South Africa occupies a special and sacred place on the face of our territory. Together, *we will do more*, consistent with African tradition, to protect this place, sacred to the dead, as a fitting shrine to the Martyrs of Mbuzini (added emphasis) (Mbeki 2006).

It is difficult to ascertain for sure but it seems that the drive to do more, for multiple reasons, led the then Premier of the Mpumalanga province, Thabang Makwetla to spearheaded a R 11 million project to upgrade the memorial site in 2006 whereby a museum, parking lot, auditorium, helicopter pad, and ablutions were added and integrated into the original memorial (see Figures 75, 76 and 77). According to José Forjaz when the Mozambican government was notified about the plans to upgrade the memorial it objected vigorously. A Mozambican delegation led by the then Minister of Education and Culture Aires Ali went to Cape Town to meet the South African Minister of Arts and Culture Pallo Jordan, but the

[91] Interview with José Forjaz, Maputo, May 15, 2015.

Mozambican delegation was informed that it was too late to change the project headed by Premier of the Mpumalanga province. For Forjaz, the 2006 upgrade emptied the memorial of its meaning. As he stated:

> What they [South African authorities] did in Mbuzini is a crime from an architectural and monumental point of view. Personally, I cannot go anymore because one of the things that cost me the most emotionally is to see that everything that was done (…) like to build an auditorium that 99% of the year remains empty (…) all this was against the spirit of everything that the memorial stood for and shows an utmost lack of sensitivity for the values of that heritage.[92]



Figure 75: View of the Samora Machel memorial illustrating the museum building on left of the original memorial (pipes) (2014).



Figure 76: View of the Samora Machel memorial from the eastern side showing the original memorial (left) the museum building (middle) and access to the auditorium (right) (2014).



Figure 77: View of the Samora Machel memorial from the western side showing the toilets (left), a frontal view of the auditorium (middle) and section of the museum building (right) (2014).

[92] Interview with José Forjaz, Maputo, May 15, 2015.

During my first visit to the site in October 2014, one of the tour guides, Raimond Magagula took me on a tour. The visit started in front of a standing cement slab with the heading 'we will remember' that shows an extract of the letter of condolences from Nelson Mandela (while still imprisoned) to Graça Machel. Here Mr Magagula presents the historical context of the accident and the significance of the monument. A commemorative plate indicates that the Samora Machel Museum was officially opened by the Premier of Mpumalanga David D. Mabuza on October 19, 2009. Mr Magagula then clarifies that although the upgrading work at the site finished in 2007, the South African authorities needed to work with the Mozambican counterpart and liaise with the families to produce all the exhibition material required in the museum. At the Museum, I first sign the visitor's spreadsheet. According to the records in this register's book, the Museum received just in May 2015, 327 visitors, the majority from Mbuzini and other nearby areas (e.g. Tonga, Malelani, Komatipoort) but also people from distant places such as Maputo, Nelspruit, Polakwane, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town. In the section of the book reserved for remarks, one can read apart from 'good' and 'amazing experience', some visitors suggesting further developments at the site: 'We need drinking place or vendors to sell beverages and food so that when we are here we can enjoy the place'. Mr Magagula takes me through the whole exhibition which starts with the genealogical tree of Machel's family and a description of his life in his homeland, Chilembene. As we move along a corridor in a "V" shape, we pass through the section where there are pictures of all who died. For each, there is a small book where people are invited to leave messages. Next to it a pile of luggage, not the ones from the crash, but donated by the victims' relatives for the exhibition. Overall, the narrative displayed on several big boards and photographic images focus on the regional liberation struggles and Samora's life. The last section of the museum is a gallery with file boxes that represent the work produced by the various investigative commissions of the Mbuzini tragedy.

Shortly after the Mbuzini plane crash, a tripartite commission of inquiry was created to carry out the investigation into the accident, in compliance with international aviation regulations. Mozambique (the country that operated the plane); South Africa (the country where the accident occurred); and the Soviet Union (the country that manufactured the plane) made up the commission. The inquiry examined various black boxes; studied the credentials of the pilots; inspected the factory where the plane was manufactured; had the electronics checked

in Switzerland; and finally listened to the cockpit voice recordings in South Africa (Saíde 2014: 793). According to the report of the Margo Commission,

> (…) the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements for an instrument let-down approach, but continued to descend under visual flight rules in darkness and some cloud, i.e. without having visual contact with the ground, below minimum safe altitude and minimum assigned altitude, and in addition ignored the [Ground Proximity Warning System] alarm (Robinson 2006: 45).

While the finding of the inquiry was technically true, that the failure of the crew to heed their instrument's warnings led to the crash, it deals only fleetingly with the more important and politically contentious question of why the plane initially veered off-course. Some unresolved issues surrounding the crash include several questions:

> Why, considering that South Africa's own reports of their radar capabilities divulged that they could track the position and altitude of planes in southern Mozambique, did they not warn Machel's plane of the impending accident? Why were Mozambican authorities not notified of the accident for ten hours, even though South African police had arrived at the scene six hours earlier? What is the explanation for a heightened military alert in Transvaal province on the day of the crash? What is the explanation of mystery incisions in the necks of the two Soviet pilots that suggest they may have been killed at the scene? Why was Renamo's Lisbon office alerted on that evening that they should be prepared to release a press statement about an important event? (...) In addition there were the reports that a military tent was seen in the area of the crash and removed after the incident, including an anonymous call to the Johannesburg office of United Press International from a man who demonstrated substantial technical knowledge and claimed to be a South African Air Force officer. Deepening suspicion about the timing of the crash were the additional facts that only two weeks before Machel's death he revealed that there had been a recent attempt on his life and that before Machel left Lusaka he accused South Africa of planning to kill him and left instructions for what to do if he died (Robinson 2006: 46).

Both the Mozambican authorities and the Russians rejected the findings that were announced on July 9, 1987. Armando Guebuza, a member of the Politburo and head of the Mozambican team in the inquiry, reaffirmed that the work of the commission of inquiry was by no means over (Saíde 2014: 794). Yet, despite Guebuza's promise which was echoed by successive Mozambican presidencies (Joaquim Chissano [1986-2004], Armando Guebuza [2004-2014] and Filipe Nyussi [since 2015]) and post-apartheid South African governments (during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela [1994-1999], Thabo Mbeki [1999-2007] and Jacob Zuma [since 2008]), the mystery surrounding President Machel's death remains and theories and suspicions have mushroomed regarding not only the apartheid involvement but also a collaboration on the Mozambican side (cf. Robinson 2006; Saíde 2014).

The year of 2011 was declared 'Year of Samora Machel' in Mozambique, a year that marked the 25th anniversary of the Mbuzini tragedy. The height of the celebrations began with a state

ceremony in Mbuzini on October 17, and culminated with the unveiling of a statue of Samora Machel in Maputo two days later (Anonymous 2011h). The event assembled Samora's comrades-in-arms, President Mugabe, former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda as well as the heads of state of South Africa, Brazil and Botswana (Anonymous 2011g). During the week preceding the celebrations President Guebuza made every effort in his speeches to assure people that he would do everything possible to reopen the Mbuzini dossier. But apparently, the message fell on deaf ears amongst the Machel family. Graça Machel delivered a powerful address at the unveiling of the Samora's statue at the Independence Square, demanding the full clarification of the circumstances that dictated her husband's death. 'This pain lives permanently with us. The pain refuses to die. In large part because we only know part of the circumstances of the death (…) and we, 25 years later, only want the truth', she said and added: 'if the governments of Mozambique and South Africa devote all the attention to bring truth into the light of day, I believe it may be known in my lifetime. It is our right as a family and as the people of Mozambique [to know the truth]' (Anonymous 2011g). Graça then turned to the podium and asked for help from President Mugabe to pressure his counterparts from Mozambique and South Africa on the matter, after asking Presidents Guebuza and Zuma to give priority to the Mbuzini dossier. Five years later, during the 30th anniversary of Samora's death in Mbuzini, the Mozambican Premier Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário, representing President Filipe Nyusi, stated 'We Mozambicans express our belief that the truth about the barbaric assassination of Samora Machel will one day be known (…) For Mozambique, the outcome of the dossier on the death of Samora Machel remains a national priority and a patriotic imperative' (Fauvet 2016). Speaking to reporters after the ceremony, Graça Machel recalled that successive South African and Mozambican governments had promised to bring the investigations into the Mbuzini crash to a successful conclusion, but so far these promises had not been kept. 'I will only believe it when there is a result', she said (Fauvet 2016).

Over the years several theories and explanations were put forward about the causes and 'mysterious circumstances' of Mbuzini tragedy (see e.g., Agência de Informação de Moçambique 1986; Marques 1987; Ramos 1998, Sopa 2001, LeFanu 2012) followed by an increasing resurfacing of new 'contradictory and inconclusive evidence' over the event. Given the fact that FRELIMO government, Machel's family and other segments of Mozambican society do not believe that Mbuzini accident was due *only* to a series of mistakes made by the crew, as argued by the Margo Commission and others (e.g. Cabrita

2005), and given the apparent interest of all parties (i.e. the Russian and South African current governments) to clarify this tragic event, one wonders why Mozambique has not taken the lead in effectively reopening the Mbuzini dossier. This has reinforced suspicion that the assassination of Machel was aided by some comrades within FRELIMO, probably from the army ranks: Machel had planned a major 'cleansing operation' to change most of the high-ranking officers on October 20, 1986, on his return from Zambia (Cardoso 2001: 148). The fact that Mozambique is the only country amongst the all other interested parties where the regime has not yet changed might be a significant factor for continued empty promises from the government regarding a closure of the Mbuzini dossier, as Graça Machel has recently suggested during an interview with a Mozambican broadcasting television - STV (Graça Machel, 27.10.2016). On October 19, 2016, former President Joaquim Chissano, was interviewed at the National Heroes Acre where he and other senior FRELIMO members have been going for 30 years to pay homage to Samora Machel. When asked what is missing for the closure of investigation into Machel's death, Chissano replied:

> What is missing here... I think that the main actors *they are either no longer on the scene or it is difficult to find them*. Because the Apartheid ended and the actors many of them also died. I'm talking about [Peter W.] Botha, I'm talking about [Magnus] Malan, I'm talking about other generals who could talk about this secret that was revealed by the black box of the plane. The navigator of the aircraft said 'the VOR tells us to follow this direction'. This matter was not dug [followed through at the time] and *it is difficult to dig now* (added emphasis in italic) (Joaquim Chissano, 19 October 2016).

Former President Chissano's reluctance seems to suggest that FRELIMO government should carry on organising official periodic renewals of the memory of Samora Machel and the liberation struggle through 'purposefully staged rituals and public performances (…) as a means of justifying the current socio-political order and endorsing the ruling party as liberators of the people' (Marschall 2010a: 170), while ignoring the 'right to truth' of the relatives of the victims of Mbuzini who thirty years on, are still calling for a closure of the investigations. Mbuzini is a telling case about how the recent traction of liberation heritage discourse and its claims to recognise and honour the sacrifices of the victims of the struggle ends up promoting 'official' celebrations and forms of remembrance that do not help the victims of struggle to heal from the traumatic experiences of the violent death, thirty years since the tragedy. Listening to Chissano's interview I could not help wondering, who benefits when the 'mystery' involving the death of Machel and other 34 passengers stay silent in the past.

6.3. Zimbabwe's chronopolitics of liberation heritage

The recent liberation heritage discourse has allowed former national liberation movement to established official time frames to define what should be considered part of the liberation heritage across the region. By so doing, it continues to marginalise other struggles for liberation, democracy and human rights as well as the memories of violence often suppressed by postcolonial regimes in southern Arica. The different political and historical trajectories and experiences that inform the different conceptions of liberation heritage across southern Africa also pose an interesting question regarding the timeframe of this category of heritage. Where does liberation - and hence its heritage - begin and where does it end?

Zimbabwe constitutes an interesting case in this regard. According to a Framework for Managing Zimbabwe's Liberation War Heritage drafted by the NMMZ in 2004, 'liberation war heritage' is defined as an inheritance from the struggle against colonial rule from 1893 to 1980. It comprises tangible and intangible and movable and immovable vestiges of the country's liberation struggle. The tangible movable elements include objects (weapons, machinery, vehicles, uniforms), photos, documents, diaries, films, statues, graves, etc. The tangible immovable elements include Heroes Acres, military camps, monuments, buildings, memorials, battle and massacre sites, etc. Intangible heritage comprises tradition, oral history, performance (songs and dance), ritual, memory, legends, skills, techniques and knowledge systems associated with the liberation struggle (Mupira 2010: 9). The year 1890 marks the beginning of the colonisation of Rhodesia, when the British South Africa Company Pioneer Column occupied Mashonaland a year after obtaining a Royal Charter granting extensive rights over present Zimbabwe and Zambia (Kriger 2003: xiii). And 1980 is the year of the independence of Zimbabwe. The celebration of events during these 90 years covered by liberation heritage is encapsulated by the notion of *Chimurenga*, a Shona word that refers to war or the struggle against any form of tyranny, popularly understood as the war for independence (Vembe 2004). Thus, the First *Chimurenga* as it is now celebrated in Zimbabwe, corresponds in specific historical terms to the 1896-1897 uprising, organized by the Ndebele in Matabeleland and then the Shona in Mashonaland (both in the then southern Rhodesia), against the British South Africa Company and white settlers (Dawson 2011). The First *Chimurenga* has been portrayed and used by the nationalistic historiography as a 'supra-tribal' (Ndebele-Shona) uprising led and organized by the spirit mediums (e.g. Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi) and political leaders, and representing the beginnings of a

national consciousness and in many ways connected to the mass nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Ranger 1967). However, some critics have suggested that the First *Chimurenga* was not a unified, anti-colonialist movement against the British South Africa Company and white settlers but a complex set of struggles over land, cattle and taxes (cf. Cobbing 1977; Beach 1998; Dawson 2011).

The Second *Chimurenga,* also known as the Zimbabwe liberation war, refers to the guerrilla war between 1966 (when ZANLA guerrillas engaged Rhodesian security forces at Chinhoyi in the northeast) and 1979 with the signing of Lancaster House agreement which led to the end of white-minority rule and to the *de jure* independence of Zimbabwe (Wiseman and Taylor 1981; Kriger 2003; Bourne 2011). Terence Ranger's interpretation of the First *Chimurenga*,[93] provided a nationalist-compliant narrative of primary resistance that was quickly appropriated by the nationalists for ideological purposes or what Ranger himself later called 'patriotic history' (cf. Ranger 2004, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2009) illustrate the crucial role played by cultural aspects of the First *Chimurenga* in legitimising the nationalist projects. The authors describe the dramatic and symbolic event that took place at the airport in 1962 when Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU leader) returned from a trip abroad and was met by 90-year-old Mr Nyamasoka Chinamhora, uncle to Chief Chinamhora and veteran of the First *Chimurenga* (1896–1897). Chinamhora handed over a war-axe (an important symbol of the living spirit of African resistance), sword and knobkerrie to Nkomo, encouraging him 'to fight to the bitter end' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 946). Similarly, the Chinhoyi Battle of 1966 (where seven ZANLA cadres were killed by Rhodesian forces) was celebrated as *Chimurenga* Day, marking the beginning of the armed liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). During the armed struggle, songs that capture the sentiment of war and the longing for freedom became *Chimurenga* music, often played in exile and in the rural areas where the guerrilla fighters operated. Musicians such as Comrade Chinx and the Light Machine Gun Choir led the *Chimurenga* songs/Ingoma zeNkululeko (liberation war songs) in Mozambique and Zambia respectively (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 949). In the 1970s Thomas Mapfumo performed *Chimurenga* songs inside Rhodesia to urge Africans to go to war against the white settlers (Vembe 2004).

[93] Particularly his book 'Revolt in Southern Rhodesia' (1967).

Chimurenga thus expresses political ideology articulated through the military and is a *sui-generis* expression of African nationalism in Zimbabwe. This ideology is premised on a doctrine of permanent nationalist revolution against imperialism and colonialism. It became the nodal point around which imaginations of a monolithic nation-state revolve (Vambe 2004:169). Accordingly, the nation was born because of two violent *Zvimurenga* (plural of *Chimurenga*) of the 1890s and 1970s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 4-5). Although this ideology constituted the leitmotif of ZANU-PF nationalism, Vambe (2004: 169) has argued that as a manifestation of the ideology of African liberation, *Chimurenga* represents communal African memory harking back to the time of Munhumutapa's struggles against the Portuguese in the early 17th century, and the Shona's struggles with the Ndebeles in the 1830s. The genre of *Chimurenga* constitutes a volatile cultural space through which African singers have sought to tell their stories and give meaning to their lives. Indeed, despite the support given to the liberation movements during the struggle for independence, the increasing poverty and a sharp rise in unemployment in the 1990s produced *Chimurenga* songs that protested corruption, poor governance, and the failure of the postcolonial government to deliver on the land question (Vambe 2004). For instance, *Chimurenga* maestro Thomas Mapfumo's songs shifted from celebration, in the 1970s until mid-1980s, to protest, criticizing the new black leaders for betraying the masses, Mapfumo criticizes the ZANU-PF leadership for running down the country[94] (Vambe 2004: 175).

When the ZANU-PF regime's popularity reached its lowest ebb in the late 1990s and beginning of 2000, due to the failures of developmental nationalism to fulfil the promises of liberation, the regime ratcheted the ideology of *Chimurenga* which, apart from the revival of anti-colonial rhetoric, was now accompanied with a careful re-packaging of the land question as not simply an economic issue but also a fundamental part of Zimbabwe's cultural heritage. So, land played a central but complex role in the cultural and symbolic politics of what was called the Third *Chimurenga*: a new phase of liberation struggle - economic liberation or the war for land reclamation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 952; Manyawu 2013: 78). President Mugabe's own speeches, which were collated into a book entitled 'Inside the Third *Chimurenga'* (published in 2001) explicitly linked land reform to the liberation struggle (the Second *Chimurenga*) and to the famous rebellions against colonial rule of 1896/7 (the First *Chimurenga*). This book became core reading for the so-called 'greenbombers' of the

[94] For instance, in the songs 'Disaster' in 1997 and 'Mamvemve [Tatters]' in 1998.

National Youth Service, established in 2001 to instil a kind of ZANU PF discipline onto the younger generation of so-called 'born frees' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 958). Thus, by 2000 the ideology of *Chimurenga* was being deployed by ZANU-PF as a new mobilisation technique to consolidate its hold on power and justify any form of nationalist violence against citizens, mainly members of the MDC (Kriger 2006: 1164; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 7; Chitukutuku 2013: 11). During the run-up to the 2002 Presidential elections, ZANU-PF appealed repeatedly to both the history of First and Second *Zimurenga* in newspaper articles, radio jingles and television programmes, to show the foolishness of voting for the opposition MDC, whose supposed sponsors were Zimbabwe's former colonial masters, and who would reverse land reform if elected. During those elections, the 'greenbombers' were instrumental in securing ZANU-PF's marginal, violent and contested victory (Ranger 2004: 228; Fontein *et al.* 2015: 20).

The ideology of *Chimurenga* was also mobilised to fragment the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, puppets, traitors, sell-outs, born-frees and enemies of the nation. These political identities have resulted in polarisation of the nation. The space of patriots and veterans is reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle (Second *Chimurenga*) in general and all members of ZANU-PF specifically. Members of MDC political formations are categorised as traitors, sell-outs and puppets that deserve to die if the Zimbabwe nation is to live. White commercial farmers constitute the enemies of the nation (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya 2011). Additionally, ZANU-PF began to incorporate new heroes into the Heroes' Acre; those who had not necessarily actively participated in the Second *Chimurenga* but who were loyal party members who had played an instrumental role in the Third *Chimurenga*. For example, although he did not have identifiable liberation war credentials, Chenjerai Hunzvi was declared a 'national hero' after his death in May 2001, for his leadership in the occupation of commercial farms in 2000 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 958). Aiming at re-asserting ZANU-PF legitimacy whilst also undermining the 'liberation credentials' of the opposition MDC, the Third *Chimurenga* also promoted a series of controversial and populist 'cultural galas' that were held at sites across the country (Fontein 2009: 15). In August 2002, the first 'heroesplush' gala took place in Chinhoyi complementing the official Heroes' Day celebrations in Rufaro Stadium in Harare. In addition to the galas held around Heroes' Day, the government also sponsored a one-off 'solidarity bash' music festival in Chimoio, Mozambique, in October 2004. The locations were chosen for both these events, implicitly served to emphasise the contributions of

ZANU-PF and ZANLA forces towards the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009: 956).

In the 2008 harmonised elections, the MDC won a majority in parliament and in local government seats. There was no winner of the Presidential election, with the required 50+1 % of the ballots cast (the MDC won 47,9% of the votes and ZANU-PF 43,2%), hence the two leading parties went for a Presidential run-off election, on June 27, 2008. After the MDC won the majority in parliament in March 2008, the Joint Operations Command, the highest organ of security comprising the armed forces, police and central intelligence, assumed the role of military junta backing President Mugabe, and taking over the presidential election run-off campaign. War veterans and youths were employed to keep people in rural areas and farms under 'surveillance' through the creation of bases. The Joint Operations Command gave the youth and war veterans power to organise ZANU-PF's rural campaign which was marred by excessive youth violence on suspected opposition supporters (Chitukutuku 2013: 3). During the Presidential campaign in Shamva district in Mashonaland Central province, President Mugabe warned that, 'the gun will lead the ballot' and that if ZANU-PF lost the election they would 'go back to the trenches and fight to get back the country' arguing that the MDC is 'a puppet of our erstwhile colonisers being used to reverse the gains of the struggle and the land reform' (Chitukutuku 2013: 24). President Mugabe won the run-off election by more than 70% as Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC pulled out of the run-off election citing violence and intimidation of his supporters by ZANU-PF (Chitukutuku 2013: 4).

The Third *Chimurenga* also entails the mobilisation of the victims of the Second *Chimurenga*. For instance, in 2008 in Bindura South during the Presidential run-off election campaign rallies, war veterans appealed to people's memories of the liberation struggle to give credence to ZANU-PF liberation narrative while demeaning the opposition MDC. They conjured war memories in the mountains (*mumakomo*), sacred caves (*muninga*), and in the rivers (*munzizi*) in the land (*nyika*) of (Chief) *Musana*, they urged people not to betray the ancestors of this land who protected them, and the many comrades who died in those places, some of whom were never identified, by voting for 'people who ran away from the war' (referring to MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai). Through such statements, war veterans entangled people in an inalienable assemblage of landscape, spirit mediums and the dead comrades (Chitukutuku 2013: 25). Chitukutuku (2013) also details an interview with a young Zimbabwe National Army soldier who narrated what happened on their recruit training trip to

Chimoio mass grave in Mozambique. The trip was part of the Zimbabwe National Army history lecture that is part of their training programme, aiming at giving the trainees the 'evidence that what they are taught is not fictional but a reality'. According to the soldier, the commanders told them: 'the trenches which we teach you to dig, are used in real warfare, we saw trenches in Chimoio and our instructors told us that these trenches were dug while bullets were firing. We were supposed to sleep in those trenches that were dug during the liberation war by the veterans some of whom died in those trenches' (Chitukutuku 2013: 26). By reviving memories of the liberation struggle in the population, especially in the youth, ZANU-PF wanted them to see that the Third *Chimurenga* was not a political gimmick meant to consolidate their hold on power but that they were continuing the struggle started by the heroes of the First and Second *Zimurenga*. According to Chitukutuku (2013: 27), the Chimoio experience had a profound impact on this young soldier who vowed to switch sides and not vote for the opposition MDC.

This case clearly demonstrates the complexity of establishing a timeframe to define what should be considered part of the liberation heritage in Zimbabwe. The concept and ideology of *Chimurenga*, which serves as the basis for defining the timeframe of the legacy of the liberation struggle, stretches beyond the events between 1890 and 1980. The definition of a timeframe for the liberation heritage by the NMMZ, which determines what should be identified and preserved as legitimate heritage of the liberation but does not acknowledge all cultural forms and manifestations related to *Chimurenga* in the post-colonial context, fails to encapsulate the other processes (e.g. remembrance of the victims of political violence in the mid 1980s in Matabeleland and post-2000 across the country or the new ways of memorialization amongst state and non-state political actors) and network of relations that constitute part of the liberation heritage in present day Zimbabwe.

In fact, while the bones of the dead in mass graves such as the one at Chibondo remain unidentified, relatives of deceased *Gukurahundi* victims in Bulawayo and Matabeleland have continued to demand 'to know where our loved ones are buried' (Fontein 2009: 7) complaining that their lives are deeply impaired and haunted by the unsettled spirits of the *Gukurahundi* dead and the unresolved violence of the 1980s (Fontein 2010: 429). Whilst the official liberation discourse conveyed to the public through exhibitions like 'Torturing a Nation' in Harare Heroes Acre claims that the bodies found in the mass grave at Chibondo are those of victims of colonial atrocities committed under former leader Ian Smith,

pathologists say visual evidence may point to more recent killings in a nation plagued by election violence and politically motivated murders (cf. Siamonga 2015). Some sources suggested that some of the bodies were still decomposing or still had flesh on them and the clothing of some victims had not yet decomposed and some clothing and shoes were recent brands such as Weinbranner shoes. 'This points to a possible double act by the Smith and Mugabe regimes as both may have used the same disused mine shaft to get rid of bodies of human rights abuse victims' (Benyera 2014: 50). Even more suspicious was that instead of allowing professional forensic experts to undertake the exhumations, the government decided to allow traditional religious leaders to perform rites to invoke spirits that would identify the dead. The exhumations were to be conducted by people with no forensic training, the Fallen Heroes Trust, aligned to ZANU-PF. Even though the ZIPRA (armed wing of ZAPU) Veterans Trust had secured a High Court order stopping the exhumations. During the exhumations, war veterans and predominantly ZANU-PF supporters sang songs that denounced former Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith, and then Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (Benyera 2014: 48-50). It seems that the exhumations were deliberately mishandled by the government presumably to conceal its role in one the several events of post-independence state-sanctioned violence while concurrently blaming on the colonial regime.

The above discussion on temporality of the liberation heritage illustrates how the official timeframe of what is considered heritage of the liberation clearly ignores the legacy of other struggles for liberation, other *Zimurenga,* including the one for meaningful democracy and respect for human rights: the thousands of people that were severely beaten and tortured, and other hundreds of people that were killed or disappeared in postcolonial Zimbabwe merely for exercising their right to choose not the 'liberation party' in a multi-party democratic dispensation. In fact, the estimated 20,000 *Gukurahundi* deaths in Matabeleland have never been officially commemorated, and President Mugabe's apology for the 'moment of madness' continues to be controversial and for many inadequate (Fontein 2009: 12). Despite all this, the timeframe of the Zimbabwe liberation heritage allows the reproduction and promotion of the official discourse of liberation and the NMMZ have now also identified, in line with recent UNESCO pronouncements on liberation heritage sites, 'opportunities to propose for listing on the World Heritage List some of Zimbabwe's outstanding Liberation War Heritage sites like Chimoio and Freedom Camp' (Mupira 2010: 11).

The South Africa Liberation Heritage Route provides another example this time of how liberation heritage discourse is constructed and shaped by other discourses and is deployed by former liberation movements now in government for nationalistic ends.

6.4. South Africa's Liberation Heritage Route

Shortly after UNESCO's endorsement, South Africa created its national chapter of the African Liberation Heritage Programme called the Liberation Heritage Route, which consists of a series of sites that express the key aspects of the South African liberation experience (National Heritage Council of South Africa 2011). In a 2013 report commissioned by the National Heritage Council of South Africa, 'The Liberation Struggle and Liberation Heritage Sites in South Africa', the legacy of the struggle is presented in terms of Route, which consists of a series of sites making key aspects of the South African liberation experience. It is divided according to the long history of the liberation struggle into three phases. The first phase deals with the wars of resistance and other struggles that arose during the period of initial contact between the indigenous population and the white settlers up to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The focus is on the Khoikhoi wars of resistance in the 17th and 18th centuries, the slave revolts in the early 19th century, and organised political resistance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the current Western Cape Province; the Battles of Ncome, Isandlwana, Rorke's Drift and Ulundi, the Langalibalele revolt and the Bambhata rebellion in KwaZulu-Natal; the various wars of resistance of the Bapedi, Venda, Ndebele, and Tsonga during the 19th century in the Limpopo Province (Houston *et al.* 2013: 7).

The second phase covers the liberation struggle in the period from 1910 to 1960. The focus is on the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the 1913 Land Act and resistance to these developments; the formation of key organisations, e.g. the South African Native National Congress (later the ANC), the Communist Party of South Africa, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa, the All-African Convention, the Non-European Unity Movement, the ANC Youth League, and the PAC; the key campaigns of the period, e.g. the campaign against the Hertzog Bills, the Indian Passive Resistance Campaign, the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department Campaign, the Defiance Campaign, the campaign against Bantu Education, and the Freedom Charter campaign; and significant massacres/acts of resistance, e.g. the Bulhoek Massacre, Sekhukhuneland Revolt, and the anti-pass revolt in

Zeerust. The final chapter in this section contains a list of potential heritage sites (Houston *et al.* 2013: 8).

The third phase is concerned with the liberation struggle from 1960 to 1994. This period is characterised by significant events that contributed to the steady escalation of the liberation struggle until it reached its conclusion with the first democratic elections in 1994. In the 1960s the focus is on the PAC anti-pass campaign; the ANC turn to armed struggle and the sabotage campaign; the activities of other organisations such as the African Resistance Movement, the African People's Democratic Union of South Africa and the formation of the South African Students' Organisation. In the 1970s, the focus is on the Black Consciousness Movement and the Azanian People's Organisation; the 1973 Durban strikes and development of the trade union movement; the Soweto uprising. In the 1980s the focus is on the formation and activities of the United Democratic Front and National Forum; political violence and security force violence (e.g. murders carried out by vigilante groups); the armed actions of the liberation movements; and significant campaigns and events of repression. Key features of the 1990-1994 period are political violence including the civic movement inter-organisational violence (Houston *et al.* 2013: 8). Each of the phases comprises a list of heritage sites in the different provinces for that period. All these sites are linked together by a common historical narrative of the liberation struggle and experience.

The idea of a Liberation Heritage Route was first proposed in 2001 by the Eastern Cape Department of Sport, Arts and Culture under the title of 'The Trail of Tears/Umzila Wenyembezi/Wars of Dispossession Development Project'. The pre-eminence of the Chris Hani District Municipality route was implicitly recognised by the National Heritage Council (NHC) when it elected to formally launch the National Liberation Heritage Route at Chris Hani's birthplace of Sabalele in April 2008 (Houston *et al.* 2013: 4-5). Through its connection with the NHC, the South African route aligned with the 2005 resolution of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee which contemplated the 'Roads to Independence' Liberation Heritage Route on a global scale (Houston *et al.* 2013: 4). The National Heritage Council (NHC), together with the Nelson Mandela National Museum and the Eastern Cape Department of Sports, Recreation, Arts and Culture, has undertaken to develop a National Liberation Heritage Route which was piloted on a local level in the Eastern Cape. One of the aims of the Liberation Heritage Route, emphasised by the Chris Hani District Municipality, is to translate the wealth of heritage knowledge and resources into economic capital (Snowball

and Courtney 2010: 569). It was also hoped that the Liberation Heritage Route, together with other Eastern Cape heritage routes, will be the foundation of a South African and African route that will ultimately form part of a UNESCO heritage route (Mqingwana and Peires 2008: 4). Thus, in 2009 South Africa inscribed a series of thirteen sites under the designation Liberation Heritage Route in the country's UNESCO Tentative List, signalling the intention to spearhead a transnational serial nomination of liberation heritage sites across the SADC region and to inscribe the Liberation Heritage Route on the World Heritage List. This serial nomination comprises the following sites: (i) Robben Island, (ii) University of Fort Hare; (iii) Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication (Kliptown - Soweto); (iv) Nelson Mandela Sites (Qunu, Mandela House in Soweto); (v) Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe House; (vi) Steve Buntu Biko House and Zanempilo Clinic; (vii) Constitution Hill; (viii) Chief Albert Luthuli Museum; (ix) Hector Peterson Memorial; (x) Sharpeville; (xi) Sol Plaatjie House; (xii) Liliesleaf Farm; and (xiii) Avalon Cemetery (World Heritage Centre 2009). A brief description of each site presented below in Table 3.

According to the justification put forward by the South African NHC, the Liberation Heritage Route represents a 'common heritage of shared global values such as human rights, freedom, democracy, promotes dialogue amongst nations and cultures and contributes to the memory of the world' (World Heritage Centre 2009). In a bid to explain the importance of the nominated property in its national and international context, it is stated under the comparative analysis section that:

> the proposed nomination in both the South African context as well as in the context of the 12 SADC countries demonstrates exchange of values, dialogue among people, cultures and experiences. In this way, the nomination is comparable to Struve Goedic Arc. This route (Arc) brings together 10 countries (Belarus, Estonia, Finland. Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Moldavia, the Russian Federation, Sweden and Ukraine). The idea and values that brought them together are captured in the scientific notion of 'triangulation' discovered by Fredrick George Wilhelm Struve. Similarly the notion of 'Liberation' was borne out of SADC experiences and is also captured in the Organisation of African Union (OAU) Declarations (OAU has been succeeded by the African Union – AU) (World Heritage Centre 2009).

Two key issues related to the concepts of a route and serial nomination within the framework of the World Heritage Convention deserve comment. According to the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 1972 Convention, 'a heritage route is composed of *tangible elements* of which the cultural significance comes from *exchanges* and a multi-dimensional dialogue across countries or regions, and that illustrate the interaction of movement, along the route, in space and time' (added emphasis) (UNESCO 2015: 99). All

these elements and points (e.g. tangible elements or the idea of exchanges, with continuity in space and time) are considered within the 'natural framework of the route' in which 'identification is based on a collection of strengths and tangible elements, testimony to the significance [its intangible and symbolic dimensions] of the route itself' (UNESCO 2015: 99). It thus appears that while all sites that comprise the Liberation Heritage Route are linked together by a common historical narrative of the liberation struggle, the Operational Guidelines clearly privileges the materiality (tangible elements of a natural route) instead of the deep emotional values associated with liberation struggle. In addition, when determining whether a heritage route is suitable for inscription on the World Heritage List, the concept of heritage route 'refers to a whole, where the route has a worth over and above the sum of the elements making it up and through which it gains its cultural significance' (UNESCO 2015: 99). Thus, a serial nomination should not be a catalogue of sites but rather a collection or ensemble of sites where each component part of a serial 'contribute to the Outstanding Universal Value of the property as a whole in a substantial, scientific, readily defined and discernible way, and may include, inter alia, intangible attributes' (UNESCO 2015: 38). It then appears that although the Tentative List document stated that 'SADC countries are in consultations to submit such a future transnational serial nomination' (World Heritage Centre 2009), the proposed Liberation Heritage Route was not suitable for World Heritage Listing, based on criteria specified in the Operational Guidelines.

Following the World Heritage Committee's Decision 32.COM 10B calling for States Parties to submit by June 2009 (the 33rd Session of the World Heritage Committee) a list of 'all known potential future serial nominations'[95], South Africa initiated a consultation with other SADC countries to submit such a future transnational serial nomination.[96] Tanzania failing to raise the necessary funds (about US$ 8 million) to spearhead the regional implementation of African Liberation Heritage Programme (e.g. building one stop liberation heritage resource centre in Dar es Salaam), South Africa has taken the lead in mobilising regional documentation and promotion of liberation heritage. In August 2011, the South African NHC, in collaboration with the AWHF, held a two and half day workshop on the liberation heritage of Africa in the city of Tshwane, attended by representatives of Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and

[95] Decision : 32 COM 10B. Point of information on the preparation of serial transnational nominations. Available online at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/1741/. Accessed on Macrh 18, 2017.
[96] Interview with GA, Harare, November 6, 2014.

Zimbabwe. The main objectives were to develop a draft regional strategic plan for the Liberation Heritage Programme with recommendations for regional and national activities and the creation of a network/database for heritage practitioners responsible for the management of liberation heritage in the Sub-Saharan Africa (National Heritage Council 2011: 4).

According to the workshop report, this initiative also aimed at exploring 'possibilities of bolstering the implementation of the Global Strategy (1995) aimed at bringing a thematic and representation balance between Africa and the rest of the World on the World Heritage List' (National Heritage Council 2011: 4). The importance of identification, presentation and conservation of African liberation heritage is presented not only in terms of contributing to the 'decolonization of the history of the continent' but also as a catalyst for 'unlocking compatible and sustainable economic values from the liberation heritage towards achievement of developmental goals' (National Heritage Council 2011: 5). From the above, it is noticeable that the South Africa's international discourse on liberation heritage is not only shaped by the discourse on 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention but also entangled with the discourse on World Heritage and Sustainable Development. By so doing, South Africa seeks to add layers of justification for the inscription of liberation heritage on World Heritage List by using universally accepted discourses to frame its nomination dossier.

Although it is not possible to ascertain indisputably, it seems that following years of consultation and preparations the NHC realised the 'technical' difficulties of nominating the Liberation Heritage Route in its current form. This is corroborated by the fact that in April 2015, South Africa updated its Tentative List, adding the 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' as another liberation heritage property to be inscribed on the World Heritage List (World Heritage Centre 2015). This newest proposed nomination was presented during a side event organised by the South African delegation during the 40th Session of UNESCO World Heritage Committee held 9th-20th June 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey, which effectively replaced the Liberation Heritage Route which had been placed on Tentative List since 2008. In the Tentative List the proposed serial nomination 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' comprises thirteen sites of which nine were transferred from the proposed Liberation Heritage Route nomination and four new sites (Union Buildings, Sophiatown and District Six Forced Removals Memorial Sites, Palace of Justice High Court and the Rivonia Treason

Trial (1963), Freedom Park National Memorial Site and Waihoek Site) were added to replace the sites of Avalon Cemetery, Sol Plaatjie House, Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe House and Robben Island in the Liberation Heritage Route (see Table 5).

Table 5: Comparative description and justification of the 13 heritage sites proposed in the 2009 'Liberation Heritage Route' and 2015 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' proposed serial nominations for the World Heritage List.

No	Liberation Heritage Route (2009)	Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites (2015)
Revised designations, description and justification of nine sites of the 2009 Tentative List which were incorporated in the 2015 proposed serial nomination		
1	University of Fort Hare	University of Fort Hare, Healdtown, Lovedale, St Matthews Complex
	The first Black University, famous as the learning centre of development and scholarship where most political leadership of both South Africa and Africa were educated, e.g Nelson Mandela (South African), Seretse Khama (Botswana), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Charles Njonjo (Kenya) and others.	Healdtown, Lovedale, Clarkebury and St Matthews are at an important interchange of dialogue of Africa and Europe. One of the defining aspects of the dialogue and conflict of civilisations in South Africa and globally is missionary education. These three became important centres of missionary education. They are located on landscape that had been ravaged by 100 years of wars of dispossession. They produced Southern African leaders who presented a synthesis of Western and African values. The University of Fort Hare is regarded as the melting pot of the African nationalism influencing other African countries in the liberation of the continent.
2	**Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication (Kliptown - Soweto)**	**Kliptown (Walter Sisulu Square) and the Freedom Charter**
	A site in memory of the great Walter Sisulu, but most of all for being the venue where the ANC's Freedom Charter was tabled at the Congress of the People in 1955.	This site draws attention to the Non-Racial Fight for Human Rights and Freedom, draws attention to the values contained in the SA Freedom Charter, a document that draws very strongly from global founding documents on Human Rights, which has a very strong emphasis on reconciliation and inclusion. The values of universal freedom, dialogue continue in this site.
3	**Nelson Mandela Sites**	**Nelson Mandela Sites (Qunu, Mvezo, Mqekezweni)**
	Qunu, home of Nelson Mandela where he spent his childhood and Mandela House (Soweto) home of Nelson and Winnie Mandela, renowned heritage site associated with the liberation history.	These sites collectively illustrate the role of traditional African values in democratic and participatory governance. The associated context shaped a leader like Nelson Mandela. They also signify the role of youth in achieving positive change. These sites collectively are a powerful symbol of the complex interaction between rural and urban in situations of a migratory labour system. They are one of the metaphors for the relationship of the urban and rural in the evolution of the modern political setup.
4	**Steve Buntu Biko House and Zanempilo Clinic**	**Steve Bantu Biko Associated Sites and Zanempilo Clinic**
	These are places associated	These are associated with the Black Consciousness

	with the freedom struggle led by Steve Biko.	movement which emerged in the 1970s to fight the repressive Apartheid regime after political formations were banned. The killing of Biko drew global attention, consolidated international solidarity and changed the tone, emphasis and focus of the SA human rights and liberation struggle in a big way. They are sites at which new and alternative engagements with the universal idea of Blackness were developed and demonstrated.
5	**Constitution Hill**	**Constitutional Hill and Truth & Reconciliation Commission**
	Once served as a gaol where the Rivonia trialists were detained and now it is a living museum.	Ideals of human rights and constitutional democracy; principle of restorative justices and reconciliation.
6	**Chief Albert Luthuli Museum (KwaZulu-Natal)**	– **Chief Albert Luthuli Home & Museum;** – **Howick Nelson Mandela Capture Site in KZN; Manaye Hall and Reconciliation Sites in Pietermaritzburg, &** – **Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory**
	Home of the first African Noble Peace Prize Laureate, who endured the leadership of the national liberation struggle and received global recognition.	Chief Albert Luthuli was probably the first ANC and liberation leader to gain the kind of international stature he gained and is acknowledged as the first African leader to become a Nobel Peace Laureate. His leadership inspired generations of liberation activists and yet he spent most of his later life under house arrest. His home and now memorial museum houses authentic collections of his times and role in the liberation struggle. When Mr Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962 at Howick in KZN, he was coming from consulting with Luthuli. His arrest was the catalyst for a series of trials, culminating in the Rivonia Treason Trial that would ultimately see him spend 27 years in prison. Manaye Hall in Pietermaritzburg was the site of the first major attempt to bring together all South African political role players to find a peaceful reconciliation to the conflict. From the 1980s to mid-1990s itbecame the epicentre of low intensity conflict that was aimed to delay the advent of human rights and liberation. This conflict was resolved through negotiation and reconciliation, testified to by diverse sites in the Pietermaritzburg area. The life and times of Nelson Mandela's generation of leaders is best represented by the collection at Mandela Centre for Memory. This place tells the story of Nelson Mandela and the values that he represented. It hosts documents speeches and photographs that reveal authenticity and integrity to the many events that unfolded in the liberation struggle for South Africa. It became the focal point for many gatherings by world's statesmen and women to collaborate on strengthening the global human rights and reconciliation agenda.
7	**Hector Peterson Memorial**	**Vilakazi Street Soweto & Hector Petersen Memorial Museum in Soweto**
	A memorial of the hundreds of students who were shot protesting against the use of Afrikaans as the medium of	Defiance; Liberation movement and ideals; human rights – produced 2 Nobel Laureates (Tutu and Mandela, and Chief Luthuli once had ties to the same street); Reconciliation; Memorial to Youth Activism and struggle for

	instructions in 1976.	equal rights and access to education, memorial to youth victims of the state violence.
8	**Sharpeville**	**Sharpeville & Langa 1960 Massacre Memorial Sites**
	It is associated with the burning of passes as a protest against the Pass laws (under Apartheid), and the shooting that followed thereafter.	Massacre Sites associated with passive resistance and search for human rights and justice. The events at these sites accentuated international attention, accelerated the emergence of UN Resolutions, consolidated the internationalisation of the South African question. These events were clear examples of the violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While they are evidence of the brutality of the oppressor, courage of the oppressed – they are also reminders of the value of peace, reconciliation and human rights.
9	**Liliesleaf Farm**	**Liliesleaf Farm Liberation Memorial Site**
	A historical place of the liberation movement where the ANC leadership (Nelson Mandela, Denis Goldberg, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Elias Motsoaledi and Raymond Mhlaba) were arrested.	Planning of armed struggle; Liberation Movement; First UMkhonto We Sizwe operations – change from passive resistance to military escalation, multi-racial fight for democracy.
Names and description/ justification of four sites of the 2009 Tentative List which were not incorporated in the 2015 proposed serial nomination and the four new sites integrated into the 2015 nomination		
Rejected sites in 2015		**New sites proposed in 2015**
10	**Robben Island**	**Union Buildings**
	A recognized world Heritage property renowned as a place of banishment and incarceration of freedom fighters who are the current political leadership of South Africa.	Governmental buildings, designed by Sir Herbert Baker, with towers and gardens, completed in 1913. Created to symbolise the Union of South Africa in 1910 which marked the exclusion of Africans; Seat of power for repressive colonial regimes including the Nationalists Apartheid regime; Target of protest and resistance to apartheid including the 1956 multi-racial Women's March; became symbol of democratic Reconciliation as new post apartheid government executive retained the Buildings as seat of the executive; Memory of class struggles.
11	**Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe House**	**Sophiatown and District Six Forced Removals Memorial Sites**
	Home of the founder and President of the Pan African Congress (which has been in opposition to Apartheid), where he was placed under house arrest.	Apartheid policy of racial separation; forced removal (creates area for whites), defiance campaign, efforts of working class, role of youths, reconciliation (rainbow nation). These sites demonstrate a particularly brutal form of town planning, and a way of living that has since been overthrown, but whose impact lingers on long after it is gone.
12	**Sol Plaatjie House**	**Palace of Justice High Court and the Rivonia Treason Trial (1963)**
	Sol Plaatjie devoted most of his life as a politician, writer and journalist to the course for the struggle of African people against the injustices and dispossession during the colonial and Apartheid	Venue of the Rivonia Treason Trial Where Mr Mandela made the speech: "I am Accused Number one … I am prepared to die if needs be" Speech. One of the sites of the subversion of justice in the service of violating human rights. It became a terrain of struggle where various political trialists indicted the colonial situation, and demonstrated links to the global human rights

	periods	struggle.
13	**Avalon Cemetery**	**Freedom Park National Memorial Site and Waihoek Site**
	A place where many combatants of the struggle are buried	Chronicles the journey of evolution of the struggle for human rights, freedom and justice; Celebrating democracy, human rights and reconciliation – the encompassing symbol of the story of South Africa. Freedom Park is situated on Salvokop in Pretoria. It includes a memorial with a list of the names of those killed in the South African Wars, World War I, World War II as well as during the apartheid era. Waaihoek site is an important representative of the domestication of international tools of political engagement, the transition to modern political movements with the formation of a National Liberation Movement that sought participation of the excluded in a united South Africa, rather than a reclamation of previous polities.

Source: Compiled from South African UNESCO's Tentative List: Liberation Heritage Route (World Heritage Centre 2009) and Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites (World Heritage Centre 2015).

The justification for inscription of 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' on the World Heritage List can be summarized as follows:

> The introduction of Apartheid in South Africa in 1948, the same year that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was formed, witnessed human rights violations on an unprecedented scale. The apartheid regime universally ranks as one of the world's most extremely oppressive and racist colonial rules. The story of South Africa's liberation immortalizes the struggle against human rights abuse, the achievement of freedom and magnanimous racial reconciliation through the tenacious efforts of leaders and civilians. This story is a chapter in the global story of African roads to independence and self-determination. This quest for human rights was given a soul when the Freedom Charter created by Africans, Indians and whites was launched in Kliptown. Through passive and active resistance such as the Defiance Campaign, South Africans protested against unjust laws which precipitated massacres of innocent masses at Sharpeville and Langa. As the repression intensified, political parties went underground but were heavily watched by the state repression apparatus. A number of influential liberation leaders were arrested at Liliesleaf Farm sparking the infamous Rivonia Trial where Mandela and other leaders were imprisoned for life. The excesses of Apartheid created an unprecedented global fight using arts, music, sanctions and resistance in pursuit of human rights and freedom. With the freeing of political prisoners, conflict-ridden negotiations for an independent South Africa ensued resulting in a multi-racial democracy in 1994. Mandela preached reconciliation and forgiveness, which rescued the nation from the throes of civil war thereby creating a global miracle. South Africa's quest for human rights, freedom and eventual reconciliation is truthfully etched at Sharpeville, Kliptown (Freedom Charter), Liliesleaf Farm, the Rivonia Trial and among others the Freedom Park. These places immortalize distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of exceptional importance to humanity (World Heritage Centre 2015).

It appears that faced with the difficulties of developing the Liberation Heritage Route into a successful nomination dossier couple with the lack of regional framework for the proposed transnational serial nomination, South Africa decided to frame its liberation heritage around the internationally acceptable discourse of human rights and reconciliation and reduce the liberation heritage to selection of sites associated Nelson Mandela and the ANC. For

example, sites such as the Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe house, who was the leader of the PAC (responsible for organizing on March 21, 1960 a peaceful protest in which around 19,000 black Africans burnt their passbooks (which had restricted them from entering certain areas) resulting in a massacre of 69 people was replaced with sites such as the Palace of Justice High Court, venue of the Rivonia Treason Trial of 1963 where Nelson Mandela made the famous speech: 'I am Accused Number one … I am prepared to die if needs be'. Furthermore, according to the NHC leaflet that summarizes and presents the 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites', the proposed serial nomination is comprised of only 10 sites out of the initial 13 presented on the Tentative List, some of which appear with a different designation (see Table 6).

Table 6: Comparison between the sites included in the Tentative List and the Nomination Dossier of the proposed 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' serial nomination.

No	Names of the Sites on Tentative List (2015)	Names of the Site on Nomination Dossier (2016)
1	University of Fort Hare, Healdtown, Lovedale, St Matthews Complex	University of Fort Hare (Old Building)
2	Union Buildings	The Union Buildings
3	Sharpeville & Langa 1960 Massacre Memorial Sites	Sharpeville: South Africa Liberation Heritage Legacy Sites
4	Kliptown (Walter Sisulu Square) and the Freedom Charter;	Walter Sisulu Square of Remembrance - Kliptown
5	Liliesleaf Farm Liberation Memorial Site	Liliesleaf: South Africa Liberation Heritage Legacy Sites
6	Vilakazi Street Soweto & Hector Petersen Memorial Museum in Soweto	Soweto 1976 Uprising & Hector Pieterson Memorial Museum
7	Constitutional Hill and Truth & Reconciliation Commission	Constitutional Hill Site and Truth & Reconciliation Commission
8	Nelson Mandela Sites (Qunu, Mvezo, Mqekezweni)**	Mqhezweni Great Palace/Royal Palace
9	Freedom Park National Memorial Site And Waihoek Site**	The Wesleyan Church – Waaihoek*
10	Steve Bantu Biko Associated Sites and Zanempilo Clinic**	Ohlange Institition and J. L. Dube Memorial*
11	Palace of Justice High Court and the Rivonia Treason Trial (1963)**	
12	Chief Albert Luthuli Home & Museum; Howick Nelson Mandela Capture Site in KZN; Manaye Hall and Reconciliation Sites in Pietermaritzburg, & Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory**	
13	Sophiatown and District Six Forced Removals Memorial Sites**	

* Sites not proposed in the Tentative List but included in the Nomination Dossier.
** Sites excluded from the Nomination Dossier.

The ‘Mandelanization’ of the proposed serial nomination led to further exclusion of six liberation heritage sites initially inscribed under ‘Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites’ (see sites on 2015 Tentative List on Table 6). Most importantly, the nomination dossier then included two new sites related to the history of the African National Congress (ANC): the Ohlange Institution and J. L. Dube Memorial, a site associated with John Langalibalele Dube, the first President of the African National Congress in 1912 and the Wesleyan Church – Waaihoek, the founding venue of the ANC (formerly known as South African Native National Congress), Africa’s oldest liberation movement (National Heritage Council 2016). According to the document presenting this serial nomination, the crux of the justification is that:

> the serial nomination proposes a network of sites that bear moving testimony to a sustained interaction of the universal values of Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation and their exceptional universal association with Nelson Mandela [who inspired actions that took place in the sites that are presented as Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites] to a point of having a global Nelson Mandela Day for freedom, justice and democracy (National Heritage Council 2016: 4).

There is no doubt that the processes associated with the struggle for independence in Africa are an important part of history and heritage of humanity as already acknowledged by UNESCO and African Union. Yet, the current South African drive to have the liberation heritage listed on the World Heritage List begs analysis. By emptying the Liberation Heritage Route Tentative List of its contents (through the removal of 9 sites) and ‘Mandelanizing’ the new proposed serial nomination (i.e. ‘Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites’), the NHC ends up reducing the cultural and historical processes related to the liberation struggle, which should constitute the solid link between the proposed network of sites, and makes Mandela the only prominent link between the series. On the culture side, ‘the World Heritage Convention is about monuments, sites and cultural landscapes and not individuals’, ICOMOS and World Heritage Committee has insistently warned States Parties, including in the recent evaluation of the nomination of the ‘Key Works of Modern Architecture by Frank Lloyd Wright’ put forward by the USA (see e.g., ICOMOS 2016: 200-202). Thus, there is a high possibility that the ICOMOS’ evaluation of the ‘Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites’ will argue that the justification for the series in term of the link between the ten sites and what they add up to cannot be the individual (i.e. Nelson Mandela). The Advisory Body could argue that as it is set out in paragraph 137c) of the Operational Guidelines: ‘it is the series as a whole – and not

necessarily the individual parts of it – which are of Outstanding Universal Value' (UNESCO 2015: 39), once Mandela is removed as the sole link between the ten sites (including the link between the ANC sites and the rest of the component parts of the series), the proposed nomination would consequently fail to convincingly justify why the whole series is said to be of outstanding universal value and how each component reflects the attributes that contribute to the potential Outstanding Universal Value of this proposed serial nomination.

Of course, one should also bear in mind that ICOMOS is often geared towards privileging pro-Western cultural norms and notions of heritage. The international community is still reluctant to acknowledge the listing of sites related to 'embarrassing' periods and events in world history (e.g. slavery and colonialism) as illustrated by the discussions concerning the nomination of Robben Island to the World Heritage List in 1999 (see e.g., Ndoro and Wijesuriya 2015). As a fellow African heritage professional puts it, 'the nomination of sites associated with liberation faces similar dilemmas as the nomination of sites related to slavery: it brings issues of conscience to the fore (…) while Africans would favour the term 'Liberation Route' the West would rather adopt and list something designated 'Roads to Independence' (…) it makes Europe not look bad'.[97]

Yet, South Africa seems determined to reduce liberation heritage to Nelson Mandela and its political party the ANC. It has lobbied SADC and many African countries on the World Heritage Committee now to support the new proposed serial nomination. In addition, South Africa bought into the highly appealing discourse of Human Rights and Reconciliation that were key in the construction of the 'success story of the Rainbow Nation' in the eyes of the world, to sell the nomination of its liberation heritage. These two elements, will inevitably play out with the politics involved in the World Heritage Committee's deliberations. There is a recent trend for the World Heritage Committee to overturn the recommendations presented by UNESCO's Advisory Bodies (see e.g., Meskell 2011; Meskell et al. 2014). During the 40th Session of UNESCO World Heritage Committee in June 2016 the Advisory Bodies recommended the inscription of only 13 out of the 25 sites. The rest were to be referred, differed and even not inscribed. Yet, the World Heritage Committee went ahead and listed 21 new properties. Thus, given the political manoeuvring, it is almost certain that once submitted, the 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela

[97] Interview with NW, Istanbul, July 13, 2016.

Legacy Sites' nomination will gather enough support amongst the 21 members of the World Heritage Committee and be inscribed regardless of any potential 'technical' argument from ICOMOS suggesting otherwise.

Despite the discourse that liberation heritage represents a common and shared heritage in Southern Africa, the push for the nomination of 'Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' clearly illustrates the nationalistic ethos that drives the current heritagization across the region. In fact, talking about liberation also causes 'conflict of heroes' because for ZANU–PF liberation in Zimbabwe is about Robert Mugabe, for the ANC liberation in South Africa is about Nelson Mandela, while for SWAPO liberation in Namibia is about Sam Nujoma and for the FRELIMO liberation in Mozambique is about Samora Machel. Thus, a key issue becomes, 'how to approach and celebrate liberation heritage in a way that goes beyond individual liberation egos'?[98] Similar concerns were expressed by CC, state official in Zambia, following the side event where the 'Human Rights, Liberation Struggle and Reconciliation: Nelson Mandela Legacy Sites' was presented to the States Parties' delegates. For CC, although South Africa claims that this is the first step towards a transnational serial nomination, but 'if they [South Africa] include Mandela in this nomination then they will face problems of justifying the OUV because it [the nomination] should be about monuments and not individuals' and he adds 'if you narrow [this serial nomination] to Mandela, FRELIMO and others [i.e. former national liberation movements] are excluded'.[99]

The above discussion illustrates how South Africa deploys the recent regional traction of liberation heritage discourse to mobilise regional support for a very nationalistic agenda of promoting Nelson Mandela as the icon of South African liberation and its party the African National Congress (ANC), as the sole liberator of the country. The framing of liberation heritage along the discourse of Human Rights and its entanglements with the discourse on the 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention will certainly open the path for this narrow vision of liberation heritage to be canonised in the prestigious World Heritage List sometime soon.

[98] Interview with NW, Istanbul, July 13, 2016.
[99] Interview with CC, Istanbul, July 17, 2016.

Following the analysis of the complex dynamics around the canonization of liberation heritage in the regional scene, the next chapter will focus on the politics of heritagization of the liberation struggle in postcolonial Mozambique.

CHAPTER SEVEN – THE HERITAGIZATION OF LIBERATION IN POSTCOLONIAL MOZAMBIQUE

In December 2012, I sat down with Mr. Fernando Dava the then Director of ARPAC, in their head office in the historic part of downtown Maputo. My quest was to understand the government-led liberation heritage drive and ARPAC was spearheading part of this. A series of publications under the title *vida e obra* (life and legacy) was to 'create' and help 'sacralise' national heroes by telling the stories of the lives and legacies of some of the freedom fighters. I asked Mr. Dava a burning question: why was the government so invested in promoting the legacy of liberation more than thirty years after independence? He told me that, 'the head of State [Armando Guebuza] is concerned about the crisis of ideology (…) the lack of ideology amongst Mozambicans.' He went on to explain that for Guebuza, the celebration of heroes was a way of showing respect for the liberation process, for the building of 'mozambicaness' (*mocambicanidade*), and that this also helped to strengthen self-respect and national pride among Mozambicans.[100]

Interestingly, the concern about the 'absence of ideology' among Africans in general was expressed more than half a century earlier by Frantz Fanon, one of the most important political-philosophical thinkers and a product of the African liberation struggle. His work had greatly influenced the various African liberation movements, including FRELIMO in Mozambique. In the summer of 1960, in a logbook entry entitled 'This Africa to Come', Fanon wrote that:

> Colonialism and its derivatives do not, as a matter of fact, constitute the present enemies of Africa. In a short time, this continent will be liberated. For my part, the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology (Fanon 1964: 186).

Indeed, Fanon was right. As several commentators have pointed out lately, what concerns us today is not 'colonialism' per se, but the painfully incongruent actuality of a post-colonial Africa (Serequeberhan 2004: 226. See also Mbembe 2001; Gibson 2012). But what is the appeal of the notion of ideology in relation to the legacy of liberation struggle that draws FRELIMO back to it more than thirty years after independence in Mozambique?

[100] Interview with Fernando Dava, Maputo, December 4, 2012.

The answer to this question lies in the scrutiny of the heritagisation of the liberation struggle within the formative years of FRELIMO during the struggle and the different socio-political and economic contexts of the successive presidencies in Mozambique and their efforts to undertake selective celebration and silencing of particular 'pasts' for particular 'presents'. Accordingly, Samora Machel's call for Mozambicans 'not to forget the time that has passed' (*não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou*), meaning the evils of colonialism and the sacrifices made during the struggle for independence; Joaquim Chissano's 'conspiracy of forgetfulness' and silencing of certain memories of the liberation struggle (including its heroes) and the recent Socialist-Marxist past in the neoliberal era; and Guebuza's renaissance of the memorialization of the legacies of the liberation struggle, represent the different ways in which FRELIMO elites tried to respond to changes of circumstances and the contestation by the different social groups over the content of the officially sanctioned discourse about 'the past'.

This Chapter is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the formative years of the liberation discourse built during the struggle. The second part analyses the dynamics and tensions resulting from the operationalization of this discourse in building the postcolonial nation during the presidency of Samora Machel. The third part analyses the processes that demanded the 'suppression' of the liberation discourse as well as the multiple threats to this discourse by different social groups during the presidency of Joaquim Chissano.

7.1. *A Luta Armada* [armed struggle]: The formative years of the liberation discourse

The construction of Mozambican nationalism can be divided into at least two historical periods: the first period comprises the earlier forms of (proto)-nationalism, which were expressed in the African press as early as 1910s, for instance, *O Africano* (The African) and *O Brado Africano* (The African Voice) that advocated for better treatment of African workers and a better education system. A second moment begins in the 1960s and is marked by the formation of FRELIMO, bringing together various movements, with the common goal of national liberation against Portuguese colonialism leading to political action and armed struggle (Prazeres 2012: 25; Paredes 2014: 132). It is within the later nationalist movement that we found FRELIMO's officially sanctioned grand-narrative of resistance, shared suffering, the hardships imposed by the colonial regime and the deprivations of war, the

sacrifices of the heroic youth for the sake of the nation and ultimate triumph over '500 years' of colonialism (Bonate 2013: 233). The liberation discourse has been summarized as follows:

> The struggle begins in 1960 with the Mueda massacre, which establishes the Makonde as the initiators; the unification of the three Mozambican liberation movements into the name of FRELIMO in 1962 with Eduardo Mondlane as the leader; the beginning of the liberation war with the 'first shot' by Alberto Chipande (who is also a Makonde) in 1964 in Chai, Cabo Delgado; the 2nd Congress of FRELIMO on July 20-25, 1968 in Madjedje, Niassa, which tackled the internal strife and initiated purging of the 'traitors'; the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane on 3 February 1969, after which Samora Machel became the head of the movement in 1970, and with whom the movement took a more populist and Marxist revolutionary form; operation Gordian Knot by Kaulza de Arriaga in 1970; António de Spinóla nominated Vice-Chief of the Major Estate of the Armed Forces of Portugal on January 17, 1974 and the fall of the New State through military and popular uprising on April 25, 1974; September 7, 1974, the signing of the Lusaka Accord, and establishing of the transitional government; and finally, the proclamation of the independence on July 25, 1975 with Machel hoisting the new flag and becoming the first president of the independent nation-state (Bonate 2013: 234).

On June 16, 1960, Diwane Vanombe, a leader of the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), formed by the Mozambican-born Makondes in Tanganyika, visited the colonial administration in Mueda Circumscription, Cabo Delgado, in order to meet with the Administrator. Many residents gathered in front of the Administration office for this meeting between the liberation movement leaders and the colonial administrator. When the Cabo Delgado district governor arrived, the administrator ordered the crowd to salute the Portuguese flag. People refused and the situation became tumultuous. The crowd intervened when two of MANU members were tied-up and taken to a car. In response, the administrator ordered the *sipaios* to fire at the crowd, resulting in many people being killed or injured. This incident is known as the Mueda massacre (Funada-Classen 2012: 221). The circumstances surrounding the massacre are still ambiguous today, particularly regarding the number of victims. While eyewitnesses claim that the number of 'deaths on the spot was seventeen', the official nationalistic discourse claims that the 'Portuguese colonial administration murdered more than 600 people' (Coelho 1993: 6; Adam 1993: 27; Adam and Dyuti 1993: 119). Hence, the Mueda Massacre is considered to have contributed considerably to the Makonde people's politicisation, influencing FRELIMO's development and its military campaign (see e.g. Pachinuapa and Manguede 2009; Tiane and António 2010; Schefer 2013). According to an interpretative display at the interpretation centre at the historical site of Mueda,

> the Mueda massacre aroused the awareness of the Mozambican people in general and the peasants of Mueda, in particular, that Portuguese colonialism was an evil whose end demanded the armed struggle; It was the turning point in the history of the Mozambican people in their struggle against Portuguese colonial occupation; and it contributed to the deepening of the nationalist conscience in

> the struggle against Portuguese colonial oppression (*Placa didática do Centro de Interpretação do Local Histórico de Mueda* 2010).

Thus, the official discourse also holds that the Mueda massacre 'showed that the independence would not be granted by the colonialists and that it was therefore inevitable to resort to armed struggle' (Coelho 1993: 5). The historical site of Mueda, requalified in 2010 as part of the recent heritagization of the struggle, comprises:

- The building of the former Portuguese colonial administration, where the Mueda Interpretation Centre was established;
- The mass grave and the massacre memorial, erected after national independence, rehabilitated in 1999 and requalified in 2010;
- Two camps of two leaders of the revolt against colonial oppression, namely Matias Shibiliti and Faustino Vanomba;
- Two camps of guerrillas from the national liberation armed struggle: Maria Chipande and Ernesto do Rosario Ndupa (Jopela 2014: 23).

The official discourse presents FRELIMO as the result of the amalgamation of disaffected southern intellectuals and central and northern embryonic political movements that had grown among migrant workers residing in neighbouring Tanzania, Malawi and Rhodesia (Sumich 2005: 66). FRELIMO formally unified the National Democratic Union of Mozambique [*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*] (UDENAMO) which had been formed in southern Rhodesia on 2 October 1960, and which drew support from Ndau ethnic group in central Mozambique, influenced by Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party; the Mozambican African Union (MANU) which was formed in Tanzania and modelled after the Kenya African National Union (KANU) of Kenya , and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanzania which grew out of the ethnic based Makonde African National Union; and finally National Union for Mozambican Independence [*União Nacional de Moçambique Independente*] (UNAMI) which was based in Malawi with support of the Malawi Congress Party and drew heavily on ethnic and regional support from Tete province (Funada-Classen 2012: 222). The unification of UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI to create 'the united movement' FRELIMO took place in Tanganyika on 25 June 1962. Eduardo Mondlane, a foreign educated prominent southern intellectual, nationalist figure and the first black Mozambican to obtain a PhD, was elected as the overall president. UDENAMO's Uria Simango was elected vice president, MANU's Matthew Mamole executive director,

UDENAMO's Paulo Gumane assistant executive director and David Mabunda head of the secretariat (Funada-Classen 2012: 230).

Since its formation, FRELIMO has been presented as a genuine nationalist organization that united all Mozambicans. In presenting FRELIMO as the merger of pre-existing parties, and not necessarily as a new nationalistic party, the official discourse attempts to promote the idea of continuity between former nationalist organizations and FRELIMO. In fact, although existing nationalist parties agreed to join the new party, differences between nationalist parties were seen in issues such as the nature of the struggle for independence, strategies and tactics to adopt and prospects of a postcolonial Mozambique (Adam 2006: 72-73). This is why the party was beset by factionalism and internal disputes immediately after its formation. The original leaders of MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI were soon displaced and leadership positions were often filled by an influx of educated southerners who were close to Mondlane, mostly coming from Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (*Núcleo de Estudantes Secundários Africanos de Moçambique* - NESAM), a movement founded by Mondlane and whose membership included future top-ranking FRELIMO officials such as Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza and Pascal Mocumbi, the later would become Prime-Minister (1994-2004) (Sumich 2005: 67; Funada-Classen 2012: 231). While FRELIMO absorbed most of the rank and file members of the former parties, especially MANU, these displaced former leaders responded with accusations of growing southern domination and attempted to reconstitute their organisations with small numbers of followers. The splits and expulsions within FRELIMO resulted in several rival nationalist parties, mostly paper organizations with no significant following or support (Opello Jr 1975: 79; Sumich 2005: 68).

On September 24, 1964, FRELIMO's national armed struggle for liberation (*luta armada de libertação nacional*) began when its troops launched attacks simultaneously in Chai Circumscription, Cabo Delgado District and in Lago Circumscription, Niassa District. FRELIMO guerrilla fighters attacked mainly colonial administration buildings in northern Cabo Delgado District and the western Niassa District (Funada-Classen 2012: 230). At the very beginning of the armed struggle, when FRELIMO controlled only areas of the Makonde territory and small territories within Niassa (which had a population of some 200,000 individuals), the population began to be concentrated in communal villages for 'protective effects' accompanied by creation of production and marketing cooperatives. Education and

health campaigns were also set up (Newitt 1997: 454). During its formative years (1962–1968), FRELIMO transitioned from a Liberation Front of militant fighters into a proto-state with aspects of governmental authority dedicated simultaneously to war and state-building. While mobilised as a military force of guerrilla soldiers to fight the Portuguese, it simultaneously established institutions and social services to benefit the lives of refugees in Tanzania and in Mozambique's northern 'liberated zones' of Cabo Delgado and Niassa (Panzer 2013: 6).

These liberated zones were conceived and based on the experiences of the Tanzanian *ujumaa* of Julius Neyrere. They were administered by the liberation forces. In the view of FRELIMO leaders, the 'liberated zones' were considered 'laboratory of revolution' since they marked the first experience in 'governing the people through the socialist principles of collective production, free access to education and health care and engagement in building new institutions based on people's power (*poder popular*)' (Fernandes 2013: 141). Although the official discourse about the 'liberated zones' was that they were constituted through an 'almost perfect symbiosis between FRELIMO and the people', in reality, however, they were also sustained by 'force and repression'; in some provinces, it is alleged that 'many recruits were executed', although 'little or no information exists about this type of action' (Igreja 2010: 785). The experiences of 'liberated zones' were considered sources of inspiration for FRELIMO's nationalist project in post-independence period.

Although FRELIMO had early successes in parts of Cabo Delgado, by 1966 they suffered a series of military setbacks. The campaign in Niassa stalled shortly after its launch and suffered some reverses. FRELIMO cells in the capital Lourenço Marques were discovered by the Portuguese International and State Defence Police (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* - PIDE) and rounded up. In addition, FRELIMO was seen as a Makonde movement by the Makua, a northern ethnic group that was probably the largest in the country with a history of hostility towards the Makonde. The Makua generally sided with the Portuguese. Efforts to open new fronts in provinces in the centre of the country failed and FRELIMO was driven back (Sumich 2005: 69). As the war progressed, lack of consensus on the priorities of the armed struggle coupled with internal struggles for control of the leadership resulted in numerous dissentions and assassinations, including that of Eduardo Mondlane on February 3, 1969 (Igreja 2015: 246). Internal disagreements had given rise to two divergent projects regarding the conduct of the struggle and in the projects to be developed after

independence (Mesnese 2015: 17). On November 3, 1969, FRELIMO vice-president, Uria Simango, published a letter 'Gloomy situation in FRELIMO' which identified the core of FRELIMO'S moral crisis as one of summary executions. Simango exposed the conflicts that FRELIMO was undergoing and accused FRELIMO's power clique of disposing of political adversaries by stirring up crowds in the war zones, who would eagerly stone to death anyone who was pointed to as a 'traitor' or a 'counter-revolutionary'. He also denounced the presence of a 'southern hegemony' in the leadership of FRELIMO, and urged its removal. The military sector of the FRELIMO leadership dismissed the letter of Simango as the voice of counter-revolution itself; he was an internal enemy, serving the interests of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism. Under the accusations of opportunism, corruption and irresponsibility, Simango and many others from the movement were expelled (Mesnese 2015: 18).

In the official discourse the crisis has since been described as a fight between a conservative (i.e. 'opportunists and reactionaries') and a revolutionary line. The heroes of this struggle, are described as young, more in touch with the Mozambican people, committed to the armed struggle, motivated by popular nationalist goals, and dedicated to total independence (which would ultimately require a social revolution). Their opponents are portrayed with the exact opposite characteristics, driven by narrow ethnic, sectarian and class interests. Yet, this discourse fails to acknowledge the divisions within the elite (i.e. age, ideology, personal differences, amplified by real or perceived ethno-linguistic, regional, class and racial cleavages) which have always entwined the movement rather than falling on either side of a revolutionary vs. reactionary divide (Poppe 2009: 94). For the losers of the power struggles within FRELIMO, and those that would later take inspiration from them (e.g. Renamo), the crisis within FRELIMO was one between pluralism and totalitarianism (Israel 2009: 122).

The ideological struggle between the two lines is presented as a frontier in the political history of FRELIMO. The Second Congress of FRELIMO, held in Matchedje from the 20 to 25 July of 1968, formalizes the transformation of the political line of the organization, from a nationalist perspective to a revolutionary nationalist strategy. The agenda was no longer simply an anticolonial agenda: 'it became a revolutionary agenda, which included the foundations of socialism, the end of the exploitation of man by man and the creation of the *New Man*' (Adam 2006: 76). Following the expulsion of Simango, Samora Machel was

installed as the leader in 1970 and held the post – which he later combined with that of President - until his death in 1986.

In 1970 the Portuguese launched 'Operation Gordian Knot' to destroy FRELIMO and the areas it controlled. Although the Portuguese captured many bases, most had already been deserted. FRELIMO pulled its troops back and then attacked in the centre of the country (Sumich 2005: 72-73). On September 7, 1974, Portugal and FRELIMO announced the terms of the transfer of power – the Lusaka Accord – that would culminate in Mozambique's independence. Although FRELIMO longed to be recognized as the only nationalist force in Mozambique, other movements emerged desirous of participating in the process and taking from FRELIMO the exclusiveness of political representation in the territory. For instance, in 1973 there was the United Group of Mozambique (*Grupo Unido de Moçambique*), a civic association based in Beira, which advocated the autonomy of Mozambique. As a political proposal, it defended the liberal principles of multi-partyism and free market (Meneses 2015: 22). Other groups, with little political impact included Federalist Movement of Mozambique (*Movimento Federalista de Moçambique*), the Independent Western Convergence Front (*Frente Independente de Convergência Ocidental*) and the Mozambican Liberation Movement (*Movimento de Libertação de Moçambique*) (Peixoto and Meneses 2013: 96).

The most significant opposition to FRELIMO came from the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (*Comitê Revolucionário de Moçambique* - COREMO) founded in 1965 and based in Lusaka which was the only nationalist movement besides FRELIMO to be involved in armed struggle: it carried out some military actions in Zumbo, province of Tete (Pekka 2003: 245). In 1974, following the *coup d'état* on April 25, the COREMO and other smaller parties that had emerged would be dissolved, giving rise to the National Coalition Party (*Partido da Coligação Nacional* - PCN) formed in August 1974 and led by Uria Simango (Peixoto and Meneses 2013: 96). The PCN, which included several African nationalists, argued in its political manifesto that no organization could claim the right to be the only representative of the population of Mozambique. In an attempt to challenge FRELIMO's centrality in negotiations for independence, several elements of the PCN were involved in a *coup* attempt on September 7, 1974, mostly in Maputo and Beira (Meneses 2015: 28). However, claiming both military and political victory, FRELIMO became 'the leading organization of the Mozambican People', and denounced the various political groupings that

emerged as ‘cooperative puppet groups’ in the service of colonialism (Peixoto and Meneses 2013: 100).

Between March and May 1975 seventy-three political figures were identified as ‘traitors to the cause of the people’, classified as ‘enemies’, they were subjected to a ‘revolutionary and popular judgment’, in a court presided over by Machel in Nachingwea, a central training camp which had been established in the far south of Tanzania in the 1960s. (Peixoto and Meneses 2013: 101). In May 1975, about four hundred ‘reactionary agents and traitors to the Mozambican people’ were presented as prisoners to the assembled cadres, journalists and distinguished guests. The group included such notable figures as Joana Simeão, Uria Simango, Lázaro Nkavandame, Basílio Banda and Verónica Anyayiva (Darch and Hedges 2013: 40). Following these trials, prisoners were considered traitors and sentenced to stay in re-education camps where they were later executed (Peixoto and Meneses 2013: 101). These practices of political silence and violence initiated during the struggle for independence constitutes a deep-rooted legacy of the liberation struggle. It remained in the ethos of FRELIMO and continued prominently through the 1980s and the political transition to peace and democracy in the 1990s, resurfacing again since the mid-2000s (cf. Coelho 2003; Igreja 2008; Machava 2011).

More than a military training camp, Nachingwea was also the place where the various traits of FRELIMO governance in post-independence were developed. It was here that FRELIMO militants developed principles and cultivated values such as ‘democratic centralism, respect for decisions taken collectively, respect for decision and hierarchy; mythical conviction that it was necessary to be alert, to train and to mobilize; the need to be united and constantly have the base within the majority of the population’ (Adam 2006: 75). All who went to Nachingwea had to go through a kind of ritual in which, in a sort of collective catharsis, they shared with the group the moment when they had become aware of the nature of colonial oppression. At the same time, they would talk about their land of origin, their customs, in order to build a collective identity that would extend beyond the limits of the ‘village’ (Thomaz 2008: 182-3). A war veteran recalled his visit to Nachingwea in 1974:

> It was there, in the early days of the armed struggle, that military preparation was complemented by an ideology which in turn conveyed new values for the construction of a ‘just, solidary, altruistic, cohesive, socially disciplined society’ with an economic vision founded on the principle of self-sufficiency and dependent essentially on *own forces* and of the

creative imagination of the people (Cabaço 2007: 412).

The long marches of the people carrying materials, and the complementary long marches of the leaders visiting the war zones, became the most iconic trope of the struggle, immortalised in *clichés* and songs (Israel 2009: 115). Party and military anthems occupy today's sound-scape of liberation termed *canções da Luta Armada de Libertação Nacional* ('songs from the War of National Liberation') (Israel 2009: 110). After the radicalization of 1969, culture came on the agenda, had to become a weapon of combat, part and parcel of FRELIMO's educational system (Israel 2009: 199).

A series of cultural seminars were organized by FRELIMO between 1969 and 1973 with the aim of developing policy guidelines for culture (Israel 2009: 125). For example, the Second Conference of the Department of Education and Culture of FRELIMO (*Segunda Conferência do Departamento de Educação e Cultura da FRELIMO*) in 1970 defined as a slogan 'educate the Man to win the war, to create the New society and to develop the Motherland' (Costa 2013: 218). At the First Seminar on Culture (*Primeiro Seminário sobre Cultura*) held in Tunduro, Tanzania, between December 1971 and January 1972, FRELIMO delegates from the liberated areas took stock of the situation of each artistic-cultural expression and reflected on issues such as 'what is the Mozambican culture'? (Costa 2013: 223). Subsequently, the First National Meeting of the FRELIMO District Committees (*Primeira Reunião Nacional dos Comités Distritais da FRELIMO*), held from 16 to 21 February 1975 in Mocuba, Zambézia, made several recommendations on culture in the same perspective that had been developed in the liberated areas (Costa 2013: 240). The ideological orientation initially constructed in the spaces of the liberated zones was later elevated to the category of national cultural policy and implemented throughout the country since the Transitional Government in September 1974 (Borges 1997: 98).

7.2. Samora Machel (1975-1986): *Não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou* [we shall not forget the time that has passed]

7.2.1. 'From Rovuma to Maputo': Building national unity excluding the 'other'

The liberation struggle, conceived as a continuous cultural process, was conducted on two fighting lines: the politico-military line against Portuguese colonialism and, after

independence, the destruction of the colonial structures and mentality, a process which was not always unambiguous (Schefer 2013: 301). Following the path, opened by the armed struggle, Machel led a 'cultural offensive' to create a new national cultural identity and to foster national unity (Barnes 1978: 36; Honwana 2008: 9; Macagno 2009: 20). The nations' political memory, defined as what was 'controlled by the authorities, who tried to turn it into collective memory', was based on the official selective memories of the armed struggle (Souto 2013: 281). The liberation discourse guided the revolutionary nationalist projects such as the construction of 'new men' (*homem novo*) and new society, the building of an imagined community from Rovuma to Maputo (*do Rovuma ao Maputo*) and the production of struggle heroes (cf. Coelho 2013).

Between May 24 and June 25, 1975, following the Lusaka Accord, Machel undertook a 'triumphal journey' (*marcha triunfal*) from the Rovuma River that marks much of Mozambique's northern border with Tanzania, to the Maputo River in the extreme south, aimed at building a functional national unity and setting the stage for the new phase of nation building (cf. Pachinuapa 2005; Dava *et al.* 2011). A torch with the 'flame of national unity' lit by solar rays illuminated the new nation starting from Nangade district, in Cabo Delgado province, running through all ten Mozambican provinces and arriving in Maputo (Machava Stadium) on the Independence Day (June 25, 1975) where the formal handing over of power by the Portuguese to FRELIMO took place. The symbolic meaning of the flame was to enlighten men, the pyre represented the 'passive and apathetic mentality' which had to be opposed. The 'flame of national unity' was meant to illuminate everyone's path towards freedom and progress (Borges 1997: 71). This 'triumphal journey' constituted the 'symbolic embodiment of the totality of the new territorial space that now made up independent Mozambique, and (…) summarised and encapsulated the idea of national unity as an overriding political virtue in post-independence Mozambique' (Darch and Hedges 2013: 28).

For FRELIMO leaders, Mozambican history was essentially the history of colonial oppression, but it was also the history of the Mozambican resistance in its highest form: the armed struggle (Fernandes 2013: 136). Thus, national unity was backed by the long history of suffering, slavery, massacres, deportations, forced labour and forced cultures imposed by Portuguese colonialism (Borges 1997: 94). This was often highlighted by Machel in his numerous public speeches like the one held on July 24, 1975, where he announced the first important measures adopted by the new government of Mozambique during a gigantic rally

at the Machava stadium with about 100 thousand people. He addressed the entire Mozambican people. 'We came here to share experiences, experiences of the suffering of our People. We came to share experiences of the common suffering of the Mozambican People from Rovuma to Maputo' (Machel 1975: 2). Machel would sometimes weave songs into his pedagogic speeches*(...) Não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou, não vamos esquecer o tempo que passou…quem pode esquecer o que passou?(...)*' (Let's not forget the time that has passed, let's not forget the time that has passed…who can forget what happened?).

Yet, after independence, and despite the words of the old revolutionary song, the public memories that served as the basis to build a common future came not from these numerous experiences of suffering and resistance to colonialism across the country, but exclusively from the 'liberated zones' in the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. In his speech on July 24, 1975, Machel recaptured the experience of 'liberated zones' in forming a set of practices and ideas that would mark the early years of Mozambique as an independent country:

> One of the essential things that our Revolution managed to liquidate in the liberated zones was exploitation, the People of the liberated zones have a rich experience in the struggle against the exploiters (...) You would ask: what kind of work in the liberated zones? In the liberated zones, we produced peanuts, maize, sesame, castor, beans, fisheries according to cooperatives. But once in Lourenço Marques [the capital], we have heard that this part of the south to the center, Mozambique imports peanuts to feed the People. You live on the peanut that comes from the outside, you live from the corn that comes from the outside. During ten years of war the People of the liberated zones lived on their work, produced, never received food from outside to feed them (Machel 1975: 6).

The historical experience of people's power in the 'liberated zones' emerged as a sort of 'fabricated reality' that tested and proved that the FRELIMO had the correct solutions to run the country (Coelho 2013: 22). Thus, the new attitude of FRELIMO's leadership ceased to be 'doing different from the colonialism' to become 'doing equal to the liberated zones' (Coelho 2015: 5). In fact, the announcement of the moral character of the revolution was immediately implemented during the Transition Government (*Governo de Transição*) - from the Lusaka agreement on September 7, 1974, until the Independence on June 25, 1975. On November 7, 1974, FRELIMO, together with the Portuguese forces, launched the so-called Cleaning Operation (*Operação Limpeza*). Military groups blocked the then *Rua* Araújo and other streets, alleys and squares in the center of Lourenço Marques, with the purpose of deterring 'agitators and vagabonds', mainly affecting the sex workers who worked in the region. At the end of the operation, 284 individuals, of which 192 were women and 92 men; of the 192

women, 50 were released and 142 were transported in buses for undisclosed destination under escort from the People's Liberation Army of Mozambique (*Exército Popular de Libertação de Moçambique*). Of the 92 men, 42 were released and the others were detained in the capital (Thomaz 2008: 178). This was one of the initial illustrative episodes of the compulsory character of the socialist project with the greater aim of overcoming the social 'vices' attributed to the past (now linked to racism and colonialism, to bourgeois values and capitalism, and even to ethnic, regional or traditional loyalties). It is, therefore, the key moment in the forge of creation of the 'new man' which was given mythical consistency through historical reference to *luta armada* (Israel 2009: 104; Paredes 2014: 149).

It seems that the nation-building process consisted in the 'nachingweazation' of Mozambique, understood as a process of mimetic reproduction to all Mozambican territory, of the praxis and discursive practices initiated in Nachingweia. This was considered the only model to follow in building the 'mozambican-ness' (Meigos 2016: 3). Capitalizing from the experiences of the struggle, the figure of the enemy was equally central to FRELIMO's nation-building. FRELIMO maintained the binary logic developed during the armed struggle: 'who is not with us is against us' (Meneses 2015: 10). Thus, the Mozambicans were divided into two macro categories: those who had fought for independence and the others who made up the mass majority of Mozambican society. Accordingly, there was the group of revolutionaries and their class allies (the workers and peasants) who encapsulated the idea of 'new man' as opposed to the group of reactionaries (internal enemy) seen as defenders of the colonial project (i.e. cowards and traitors detected and summarily dispatched by the vigilant guerrillas) (Meneses 2015: 29-30). The revolutionary (guerrilla nationalist) was projected as the icon of the truly Mozambican citizen, the model of the 'new man', the leader who embodied the qualities of the heroes who fought colonialism (Israel 2009: 104; Meneses 2012: 129).

The revolutionary was the one who had lived the events inscribed in the liberation discourse and could tell about them, while the others, the majority, blended the suffering under the colonial regime with vices acquired through contact with it. The guerrillas and other participants in the armed struggle came to play an important role as 'the witnesses' (*testemunha*) who could claim to be the bearers of that experience, the only truly important one. This excluded millions of Mozambicans deprived of the experience of the armed struggle but also many who had such experience but were not able to enunciate as witnesses

because not all the guerrilla fighters went through the canonizing process that elevated the mere protagonist of the event to the condition of witness. Becoming a witness presupposes having conquered and maintained in the postcolonial order a voice capable of telling the story. Those who have conquered, with a voice capable of telling the story. were those who entered the cities and came to hold important positions in the structures of FRELIMO and the state (Coelho 2015: 6).

Nevertheless, for the majority of the population who did not take part in the struggle, they could still acquire the 'revolutionary experience' in two ways: one was the 'narration of suffering' (*narração de sofrimento*) through which an applicant would submit before the collective his/her life experience under colonial rule, a sort of 'proof of suffering' as part of the procedure to join the revolutionary ranks; the other, in the transition period immediately before independence, was the sending of militants deprived of revolutionary experience for short internments in the guerrilla camps in order to acquire revolutionary experience (Coelho 2013: 23).

During FRELIMO's 3rd Congress in February 1977, the postcolonial state-building project was boosted when the liberation movement was officially transformed into a socialist party (FRELIMO) with Marxist-Leninist orientation. The guiding principle of socialism was democratic centralism, which meant that the executive, legislative and judiciary powers were vested in FRELIMO (Igreja 2013: 317). Consequently, FRELIMO's political project was marred by a persistent contradiction between its rhetorical commitment to mass participation (*poder popular*) and its hierarchical and centralised system of leadership, which became increasingly alienated from the aspirations and realities of the rural population (Pekka 2003: 246). Yet, the 'liberation mentality' of FRELIMO led to a teleological stance in the discourses on independence: 'We won because our struggle was right, because our line was correct' (Adam 2006: 72). Therefore, the widespread support for liberation and independence given the opposition to colonialism was erroneously interpreted by the FRELIMO elites as a support for socialism. Thus, the few changes FRELIMO had made in the 'liberated zones' were considered as a peremptory example of socialism. Being Mozambican meant being a defender of FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninist values and analysis (Adam 2006: 76-80; 86). Claiming a coincidence between the FRELIMO project as a representative of the aspirations of the 'Mozambican people from Rovuma to Maputo', a single-party model was adopted (Paredes 2014: 144).

As part of its policy of 'not forgetting the time that passed' FRELIMO carried out a complex political strategy to deal with the ambivalent identities that constitute the intricate colonial legacy. The initiative took place between 1978 and 1982 and consisted of purges of Mozambican collaborators, dubbed 'the compromised' (*os comprometidos*), for their alleged criminal deeds (e.g. participation in organised or spontaneous opposition against FRELIMO during the liberation struggle) while working for the Portuguese colonial state (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 153). The *comprometidos* were a significant and extremely heterogeneous group (around hundred thousand people), lumping together all who did not 'fit' into the epic story that fabricated the 'new man'. Among them were former members of the Portuguese political colonial police; soldiers in the Portuguese army; traditional authorities, politicians, members of the lower echelons of the administrative apparatus, or those who 'were not with us [with FRELIMO]' (Meneses 2012: 129). In mid-1982, after four years of vigilance, purges and re-education, a closure meeting took place, under the command of Machel who personally interrogated the *comprometidos* (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 154). In the aftermath of this political process, most of the *comprometidos* were recognized as politically re-educated and accepted as full citizens. Their subsequent rehabilitation was obtained at the cost of erasing their past from the public sphere and treating it as a past that was to be kept a private, silenced memory (Coelho 2003: 191; Meneses 2012: 129).

At the beginning of the 1980s Mozambique was already immersed in a civil war. In its Fourth Congress held in Maputo from the 26th to 30th 1983, under the motto 'Defending the motherland, overcoming underdevelopment, building Socialism', FRELIMO adopted the operation production (*operação produção*), presented as 'a political-administrative measure in the name of revolutionary legality to eradicate social evils (mainly crime and prostitution) in cities, and to render useful to society the 'unproductive', with a view to fulfil the objectives of developing a new Mozambican society, stripped of the values of the colonizer' (Quembo 2012: 65). Designed to 'protect and valorise the achievements of the revolution against the 'sabotage' of the armed bandits and the enemies of that revolution' (Quembo 2012: 69), *operação produção* is often remembered by its victims for the repressive police action destined to send to rural areas with low population density, in particular Niassa, those in the big cities accused of being 'unproductive' and 'living in delinquency, idleness, parasitism, marginality, vagrancy, prostitution' (Macagno 2009: 27). During *operação produção*, raids could occur at any time. Security forces waited in the streets and alleys of Maputo and Beira and requesting passers-by for evidence of work, in the case of men, and

marriage in the case of women. When they could not prove their activity or status, they were confined in trucks, concentrated near the city and then, at night, sent on the planes of the Mozambique Airlines, or on military planes, to Niassa, or on trucks to different areas. Far from finding an organized area, they were abandoned. Individuals who had often had no contact with rural life were obliged to farm, build their huts, and to create common facilities. Escape was impossible or led to certain death: Niassa is an immense and uninhabited province, largely covered by jungles and inhospitable terrain (Thomaz 2008:191). The numbers of deportees for the Niassa range from 50,000 and 100,000 people. There, concentrated in fields, they were to work throughout the day and take classes on Marxism-Leninism in the late afternoon (Thomaz 2008: 192).

Many of those sent to the camps as defendants or civil servants did not understand what was happening as part of a 'revolutionary' process, but rather as part of cycles of suspicion and accusation motivated by hate, jealousy and tribalism (Thomaz 2008: 193). For instance, one of my informants currently residing in Lichinga told me how he was arrested near Mafalala (one of Maputo's suburban neighbourhoods) and sent to Unango[101] in Niassa in September 1983.

> I was self-employed and had a *sapataria* [small informal shoe store] (…) One day *chefe do quarteirão* [the head of suburban sub-districts] asked to take a pair of shoes that I had just made, and to pay me at the end of the month. After a month, I went to his house and demanded my money. He started to tell me stories (…) ah, I do not have it today…or telling me to go back tomorrow. I got irritate and we had a discussion (…) Suddenly two days later, as I was leaving to town some PM [military police] caught me and put me in the lorry.[102]

This 63-year-old war veteran, left a wife and four children in Maputo in 1983 and never saw his family again. He says that it was the brutality and injustice of the FRELIMO-led government during the immediate post-independence period that led him to join Renamo in the war of 'brothers in arms'. A similar justification for joining Renamo was given by a war veteran who condemned FRELIMO's violent policies in the post-independence period, specially the re-education camps:

[101] For FRELIMO, the idea that Niassa, specifically the Unango district (the 'city of the future'), had a natural potential for the development of agricultural production for the whole country, was already present during the liberation struggle. This perception is reproduced in Samora Machel's discourse on the country's agricultural potential and led to the identification of 400 000 hectares of land for agricultural production in the context of the efforts for economic recovery and Operation Production (Quembo 2012: 70).

[102] Interview with VL, Lichinga August 23, 2013.

> For those who do not know, they are saying that it was a re-education. That was not education, it was FRELIMO's own plan after independence (…) 'since we [FRELIMO ruling elite] are from the south, the first language of Mozambique should be Maxangana [xichangana]. Now, how do we managed to expand Maxangana?' (…) Then they recruit men from the south to the north, make the Maxangana language be spoken from Rovuma to Maputo, which was not possible (…) They wanted to imitate Tanzania with national language like Swahili or Malawi with Chinyandja! (…) But we did not accept this, so that appears here the National Resistance [Renamo].[103]

FRELIMO's post-independence authoritarian socialist model of development achieved little and intensified the sense of alienation of significant segments of the Mozambican population, some of which ended up supporting the nascent rebel movement Renamo during the war between 1976-1992 (Igreja 2013: 319; Igreja 2015: 246). The designation and interpretation of the origins of the Mozambican postcolonial war remains a matter of polarised debate and point of deep political disagreement among politicians and academics. Mozambican authorities have insisted that the postcolonial war was illegitimate and that Renamo was constituted by a group of Mozambicans who were manipulated by the Rhodesian regime to destabilise the socialist revolution. During the initial period of the war, until the mid-1980s, the FRELIMO government treated the Renamo rebels as bandits (*bandidos*) and terrorists (*terroristas*) and continuously affirmed that 'Mozambique will not negotiate with kidnappers, bandits, criminals and wrongdoers. Wherever they come from, Mozambique will annihilate them and this is not far away' (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 156). Some analysts question the concept of a 'civil war' to characterize the post-independence war because the rebels were trained, supported and financed abroad, mainly by South Africa (Cabrita 2005; Geffray 1991). Although the war was fuelled by discontent due to FRELIMO's violent social revolution that alienated sectors of the population making them more receptive to anti-government rebels, it is extremely unlikely that the war could have reached such levels or lasted so long without the direct involvement of South Africa. It can be speculated that FRELIMO's more radical social programs, such as communal farms (*aldeias comunais*), would not have resulted in civil conflict without the encouragement of neighbouring hostile regimes, nor necessarily caused a wave of popular support for Renamo. But they caused an atmosphere of discontent that that the rebels took advantage of during the war. Although it is said that Renamo did not have broad popular support for much of its history, it is no less true that Renamo was perceived as 'liberator' in some areas under its control (Sumich 2005: 76-78).

[103] Interview with VW, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.

7.2.2. Politics of heritagization

The independence from Portugal brought about set of political and social changes that affected the management and presentation of cultural heritage. Emphasis was placed on the heritage that best served the construction of the identity that the postcolonial state wanted to portray. In terms of cultural heritage policy, the emphasis was placed on intangible heritage (songs, dance and music festivals), with the intention to 'follow the path, opened by the armed struggle for national liberation (…) to create a new national cultural identity and to foster national unity' (Honwana 2008: 9). The heritagization of the struggle was initiated with the creation and adoption of the new national anthem of the young Mozambican nation. A few months before the date chosen for independence, an appeal was published in the newspaper *Notícias* for proposals for the first national anthem aiming at making it 'everybody's voice' (Basto 2013: 189). The anthem,

> had to sing of 'the virtues of production in the service of in- dependent Mozambique', to show why it was that 'the struggle continues [...]', to exalt the 'powerful spirit of the Mozambican People, committed to the struggle for a future that is prosperous and free', to honour the 'armed struggle, the victories that were won in each battle, and the courage of our heroes,' and to tell of the birth of the new man who had to be 'dynamic, cheerful and popular like national liberation itself!' (Basto 2013: 190).

Due to the small number of proposals that were submitted and their poor quality in the end the anthem was created on the eve of Independence – not by the people, nor in the people's cause, but in the people's name by maestro Justino Chemane, in a single night, in a moment of inspiration after he had been contacted by FRELIMO (Basto 2013: 192). The words of the anthem were as follows:

Viva, Viva a FRELIMO	Long live, long live FRELIMO
Guia do Povo Moçambicano	Guide of the Mozambican people
Povo heróico qu'arma em punho	Heroic people which with arms in hand
o colonialismo derrubou	Overthrew colonialism
Todo o Povo unido	All the people united
desde Rovuma até ao Maputo	From the Rovuma to the Maputo
Luta contra o imperialismo	The struggle against imperialism
Continua e sempre vencerá	Continues and will always win
Coro:	Chorus:
Viva, Viva Moçambique	Long live, long live Mozambique
Viva a Bandeira símbolo nacional	Long live the flag, national symbol
Viva Moçambique	Long live Mozambique
Que por ti o Povo lutará	It is for you that the people will struggle

Unido ao mundo inteiro	United with the entire world
Lutando contra a burguesia	Struggling against the bourgeoisie
Nossa Pátria será túmulo	Our country will be the graveyard
Do capitalismo e exploração	Of capitalism and exploitation
O Povo Moçambicano	The Mozambican people
D'operários e de camponeses	Of workers and peasants
Engajado no Trabalho	Committed to labour
A riqueza sempre brotará	Will always produce wealth

(Source: Basto 2013: 193).

The lyrics of the anthem focus on legitimizing FRELIMO's socialist development agenda, and the movements status as the exclusive leader of the Mozambican people. FRELIMO's commitment to its socialist project can be found in the hymn's reference to 'The struggle against imperialism continues and will always win' or 'Our country will be the graveyard of capitalism and exploitation'. The focus on FRELIMO as the unifier and sole guide of the Mozambican people since the national liberation struggle can be found in references to 'Long live, long live FRELIMO, guide of the Mozambican people', at the opening of the hymn. The date of FRELIMO's creation as a liberation movement (June 25, 1962) coincided with the date of independence (June 25, 1975). The phrase 'from Rovuma to Maputo' repeats the slogan that the 'triumphal journey' of Machel echoed throughout the country during the period before independence. FRELIMO's leaders made sure that its foundation as a political party (February 3, 1977) coincided with National Heroes' Day (February 3), established to commemorate Eduardo Mondlane, assassinated on 3 February 1969 (Basto 2013: 200; Igreja 2013: 318). All this aims at conveying the idea that the struggle for national independence of Mozambique can be reduced to the history of FRELIMO.

Another interesting event in the heritagization of the struggle was the building of the National Heroes' Acre (*Praça dos Heróis Moçambicanos*) in 1979 on a large traffic circle on the road from the airport into town, at the intersection of Lusaka Accord Avenue (*Avenida Acordos de Lusaka*) and People's Forces of Liberation of Mozambique Avenue (*Forças Populares de Libertação da Avenida de Moçambique*). A Mozambican architect (José Forjaz) and a Portuguese painter and poet resident in Mozambique (António Quadros) designed a simple crypt (white marble structure) in the shape of a five-pointed star placed in the centre of the circle (see Figure 78). On the eastern side of the star a long (90 x 6 metres) curving wall was built on a piece of land across the road (see Figure 79). The wall was collectively painted by several artists but primarily by João Craveirinha. It described 'an epic journey' of struggle and ultimate triumph: slave trade, resistance, punishment, colonial oppression, Eduardo

Mondlane founding FRELIMO, the armed struggle and life in the 'liberated zones', the enemy repression, independence under the leadership of Samora Machel and the building of a 'new society' (Sahlström 1990: 138). The daily magazine *Tempo*, one of the most remarkable instruments of dissemination of pro-government messages and ideals since independence, described the *Praça dos Heróis* as being 'a monument that embodies the simplicity of the heroes (…) conveys the dialectical perspective of the struggle (…) and a monument that shows us the sacrifice of the people, their pain, their moments of struggle, joy and victory' (Anonymous 1979: 10).



Figure 78: View of *Praça dos Heróis* illustrating the crypt and the painted mural (2015).



Figure 79: View of the painted mural from People's Forces of Liberation of Mozambique avenue (2015).

On February 3, 1979, the day that coincided with the tenth anniversary of the assassination of Mondlane, Machel, cabinet ministers, representatives of FRELIMO, relatives of the deceased, and the public received the remains of Eduardo Mondlane, Filipe Samuel Magaia, Paulo Samuel Kamkomba, Mateus Sansão Mutemba, Josina Machel and Francisco Manyanga, at the Mavalane International Airport, located less than a kilometre away from *Praça dos Heróis*. The ceremony aimed at paying homage and returning the remains of these fallen freedom fighters by reburying them in the monument constructed for Mozambican heroes. Mondlane and the others had all died during the struggle. This ceremony aimed 'to celebrate Mondlane as the most important national hero' (Iguane 2007: 1). Still in the middle of the struggle, Mondlane was elevated to this category after his assassination and became a paradigm because his life was an example of personal sacrifice for the collective good: he is described as 'a man of responsibility, conscious of his duties, for he renounced a career in the

United Nations to fight for independence of his country, the greatest of sacrifices being death itself' (Anonymous 1979: 10).

In the process of choosing national symbols and valorising the liberation struggle, presenting it as a continuation of the wars of resistance against colonial occupation, FRELIMO decided to canonize Ngungunyane (the last Emperor of the Gaza Empire, that ruled a great portion of south-central Mozambique from the 1820s to 1895) as the hero of the colonial resistance. Six years after the reburial of liberation struggle heroes in the *Praça dos Heróis* and ten days before commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the independence of Mozambique, on June 15, 1985, Machel, cabinet ministers, FRELIMO members and the public were again stationed at the Mavalane International Airport, now to received the casket containing the remains of Ngungunyane (Iguane 2007: 1). A leaflet was produced containing a brief biography of Ngungunyane and justification for his canonization as national hero, and states:

> In commemorating the 10th anniversary of national independence, Mozambique receives the remains of Ngungunyane, *one of the great heroes of resistance* to colonial occupation. Deported 90 years ago, the return of his remains, represents for every Mozambican a reason of pride and patriotism. The homage we want to give him and which only national independence made possible, is based on the example that left us of his heroism and pride, when facing an enemy, who, being no more numerous, possessed powerful and unknown firearms of our warriors of that time. *But his struggle was not fought in vain. A few decades later, FRELIMO, knowing how important it is to unite an entire People in the same ideal, manages to win*, facing the superiority of the war machine that is also mounted against us. In this homeland, today, as we pay tribute to Ngungunyane, *we also want to remember the many thousands of Mozambicans who, from north to south of the country, leave us as an inheritance the example of their lives and their love for the freedom of the land and the people*. It is this homeland that we want to build, where there is no exploitation and oppression and our children can grow in peace and prosperity, which has joy and happiness with them (added emphasis in italics) (Barreto 2011: 216).

After the official reception at the airport, the casket was put into a military vehicle and taken not to the *Praça dos Heróis* but instead, to the noble room of the Maputo City Hall. Here Machel 'welcomed Ngungunyane to his free and beloved fatherland which he had left as a prisoner; qualified him as a hero in the resistance of the Mozambicans against foreign rule, and went as far as saying that Ngungunyane had been a magnanimous and generous leader' (Iguane 2007: 3). Interestingly, Ngungunyane has not been 'buried' at the *Praça dos Heróis*, despite his official status of a hero in 'the struggle of resistance of Mozambicans' against Portuguese domination. His casket is on public display at a fortress-museum (Nossa Senhora da Conceição) used as 'dumping groung' for colonial monuments and objects removed from the public space at independence (see Figures 80 and 82). One of the most important objects that are part of that history is the statue of the Portugese official, Mouzinho de

Albuquerque[104] (see Figure 81) that was once placed at the Indepence Square (*Praça da Independência*) which now hosts a large statue of Samora Machel built in 2011.



Figure 80: Exterior view of the Nossa Senhora da Conceição Fortress, downtown Maputo (2015).



Figure 81: The interior of the Nossa Senhora da Conceição Fortress illustrating the statue of Mouzinho de Albuquerque mounted on a horse (2015).



Figure 82: The casket, carved in wood with engravings of some images of Ngungunyane and his soldiers, containing the 'remains'[105] of the last emperor of Gaza (2015).

[104] Mouzinho de Albuquerque was the Portuguese official who led the Portuguese army that defeated Ngungunyane's army at the battle of Coolela, on 7 November 1895, in Mandhlakazi (the last capital city of Gaza Empire), and captured Ngungunyane, in Tchaimiti, on 28 December 1895. Ngungunyane was later brought to Lourenço Marques (what is now Maputo City), paraded in public, and then taken to Lisbon, in Portugal where he was given the same treatment. He was later jailed until his death (in 1906) on the Island of Açores (Iguane 2007: 4).

[105] Since the grave of Ngungunyane could not be located Mozambique only received a handful of sand collected from a prison in Açores Islands where Ngungunyane died.

The elevation of Ngungunyane who signifies invasion, death and destruction for many ethnic groups in south-central Mozambique, in disregard of historical figures from the centre and north of Mozambique, further reinforced people's perceptions that FRELIMO only recognised historical figures from southern Mozambique, particularly from the Gaza region where two monuments were built in Mandhlakaze and Chibuto the Emperor of Gaza. This is so because FRELIMO's first president Mondlane, as well as the country's first and second presidents, Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano, respectively, were all from Gaza province (Igreja 2013: 319).

With regards to heritage management praxis, the postcolonial Mozambican state needed to build a framework for popular education and to preserve a new cultural heritage as a prerequisite for the construction of the new national identity (Morais 1988; Sinclair 2004; Macamo 2006). An Archaeological Survey Programme was initiated between 1976 and 1984 by a team of Mozambican and international archaeologists based at the Archaeology Section under the Center for African Studies and later (since 1980) at the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology at the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM). It aimed to increase the number of known sites (addressing imbalances such as the overrepresentation of Stone Age sites and sites in southern Mozambique), and to establish suitable conceptual frameworks and appropriate research methodologies as the basis for the study of archaeology in postcolonial Mozambique (Morais 1988: 49; Sinclair *et al.* 1995: 410). From 1976 the Archaeology Section, and its successor, the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology ensured the availability of educational materials complete with regional examples, in particular by contributing to textbooks at different levels from adult education to university. The Department of Archaeology and Anthropology was also directly involved in the education of *agentes de cultura* (district culture delegates as well as Museum and Antiquities Services) at the secondary school level (Morais 1984: 124). In 1977 the National Services of Monuments and Museums (NSMM) was created and this institution carried out a national campaign to inventory, classify and preserve tangible and intangible heritage resources in Mozambique which resulted in the creation of a Cultural Heritage Archive (ARPAC) in 1980 (cf. Macamo 2006). In addition, significant steps were taken in the actual practice of heritage management such as inclusion of community participation in the conservation process of heritage sites (cf. Macamo 1996).

7.3. Joaquim Chissano (1986-2004): 'Conspiracy of forgetfulness'

7.3.1. From socialism to neo-liberalism

Profound changes followed the death of Machel on October 19, 1986 in Mbuzini. The country was living through a serious political, economic and social situation as well as the war between the FRELIMO government and Renamo (Souto 2013: 288). Machel was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano (1986-2004), whose presidency was characterized by the switch from socialist to neoliberal development polices, the end of a 16 years of war in 1992 and the introduction of multiparty-democracy. It is difficult to know exactly when and how the decision to drop socialism and adopt liberalism was taken by FRELIMO's Political Bureau. In 1984/85 FRELIMO began to allow its members to privately accumulate. This was not the recognition of a new practice, since there were already members of the party involved in private business, but rather the recognition of this practice in the official discourse. The discourse and legitimacy strategy used by Party and state leaders began to change after 1984/85 in order to align the norms and laws with non-socialist practices and convey a positive image of this 'new reality' (Adam 2006: 96-97).

After protracted negotiations which had been going on as early 1983, Mozambique became a member of the IMF in May 1987 and the World Bank in June 1987. It agreed with them upon a structural reform plan. In a clear demonstration of the domestic intentions the FRELIMO government had already embarked upon such structural reform autonomously in January 1987 before the agreement with the international financial institutions was signed. FRELIMO while clearly interested in economic liberalization was glad to let the donor community take the lead and blame for what are all too often politically unpopular measures. Yet, FRELIMO controlled to a large degree the pace and sequence of the privatization and liberalization process demonstrating its autonomy. The Party has since 'welcomed foreign investment wholeheartedly (instead of grudgingly) and affiliated elites' intent on becoming its junior partners' (Poppe 2009: 15).

FRELIMO held its Fifth Congress between 24 and 31 July 1989 in Maputo. At the Congress, it was decided to abandon all references to Marxism-Leninism, to adopt liberal values and to open the party to all social categories. Party members were now allowed, if not encouraged, to engage in capitalist enterprise, and previously excluded groups such as religious people

and traders were welcomed into the Party. In addition, FRELIMO undertook a complete overhaul of the Constitution, almost the drafting of a new document, between September 1989 and January 1990, when the new Constitution was published. The new text made no reference to socialist principles; instead it adopted a resolutely liberal understanding of the state and politics, with a separation of powers and an opening of the way for multiparty democracy (Morier-Genoud 2009: 154). While renunciation of Marxism meant abandoning the state's class character, adoption of market economy under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies meant curbing public expenditure, which had adverse effects especially on social services. This has contributed to increasing regional inequality and misery among those groups who have not been able to profit from economic growth that accompanied liberalization (Pekka 2003: 250).

Apart from the economic changes, Chissano had to transform the Mozambican political system into the opposite of 'Samorism', The only way to achieve this was to 'wipe a sponge over the past' by organising a real 'conspiracy of silence' in order to break with the memory of the socialist past and introduce the new ideological and economic discourse in line with the neoliberal course that FRELIMO has begun to pursue (Cabaço 2007a: 16). Consequently, the legitimacy of FRELIMO as the 'founding father of the nation' became suspect due to its alleged betrayal of the promise of the liberation struggle to build an egalitarian society (Bonate 2013: 232). In response, Mozambican government officials have deliberately pursued a strategy of manipulating history to obscure the fact that the same Party that embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology and tried to implement socialism in Mozambique is the exact same party that was now 'trumpeting neo-liberalism' (Fernandes 2013: 156). In fact, Pitcher (2006: 88) has argued that 'organized forgetting' has comprised a key component of a discursive and institutional strategy adopted by FRELIMO to navigate the transition from socialism to neo-liberalism. Such 'organized forgetting' has allowed the 'ruling party to engage in "transformative preservation", whereby it has remained in power following democratization and structural adjustment but has remade itself in the process' (Pitcher 2006: 89).

Chissano's 'organized forgetting' served many purposes. It obfuscated FRELIMO's own role in the failures of the past, and its reneging on promises made to the People (workers and peasants). It also distracted ordinary citizens from the effects of restructuring such as unemployment and inequality borough about by the new neoliberal order. Most importantly,

'organized forgetting' not just obliterated historical events, it also distorts them. For instance, during the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence despite the brief mention that Mozambique was an ally of other socialist countries, President Chissano portrayed the nationalization process that took place after independence as an affirmation not of socialism but 'mozambicaness'. It went further to stress the similarities between policy objectives adopted just after independence and current policy goals implying that there was historical continuity between the two periods (Pitcher 2006: 96-97). The concept that best describes the behaviour of FRELIMO ruling elite in the postcolonial period is the concept of 'transformism', that is, 'the continuous change of discourse, which does not correspond to changes in the social origins of those in power or in the objectives of their poliies. It corresponds to the change in the public record, in the official discourse, but not in the private arena, and therefore not in real policies' (Adam 2006: 98).

7.3.2. Silencing the guns: peace without accountability and memory struggles

The new multi-party constitution approved in 1990 by FRELIMO government constituted one of the demands from Renamo. Through two years of negotiation and mutual concessions, Renamo was swayed to recognize the legitimacy of state institutions under FRELIMO rule and the *Acordo Geral de Paz* (General Peace Agreement) was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. In Rome, both parties explicitly appealed to the people to forget past violations and encouraged them to focus on the future to rebuild the country and foster reconciliation (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 150). Chissamo stated that 'the national reconciliation is responsibility of all Mozambicans; all of us together must heal the wounds, replace hatred with understanding and solidarity, and revenge with forgiveness and tolerance'. Renamo president, Afonso Dlhakama, also pledged: 'There are no grievances. From today onwards the rule of trust will dominate our relations. The armed fight will be replaced by political struggle and democracy.' (Igreja 2015: 247). Yet, several elements need consideration to put the *Acordo Geral de Paz* into perspective and understand the future dynamics and power struggles between FRELIMO and Renamo. First, the Peace Agreement was more the result of the breakdown of both forces and their inability to continue the war in the context of the end of the cold war, than the result of a genuine will to negotiate and create mechanisms for the solution of differences (Brito 2014: 24). In fact, 'peace had to be sold to both parties in exchange for development aid, which raised the issue of what would happen once the money was gone' (Tavares 2016: 168). Second, historically, FRELIMO had conceived and

established itself as a single party and, despite having enacted a new constitution in 1990 adopting multipartyism, it only did so by external pressure and not because of a true evolution of its political thinking (Brito 2014: 25). Third, like FRELIMO who considered all the parties that appeared on the Mozambican political scene after April 1974 as 'puppets at the service of neocolonial interest', Renamo took a similar position, considering the parties that had emerged after the adoption of the 1990 Constitution as 'creatures of FRELIMO'. The only exception to this orientation was the establishment of the Renamo-União Eleitoral coalition in view of the 1999 elections (Brito 2014: 32). Lastly, given that no party was made accountable for the atrocities committed during the war, as part of a strategy to persuade both parties to negotiate, violence remained unchallenged as a means to achieve one's goals. This has inevitably resulted in either party resorting to it at a subsequent stage to legitimize their hold on or access to political power, as we witness since 2013 (Tavares 2016: 168).

Despite the claim that FRELIMO did not 'have blood on their hands', ten days after signing the peace accords, the FRELIMO-led government passed the amnesty (Law no. 15/92) in the national parliament. The initial amnesty draft law contained only one article, which stated that the law: '(…) grants amnesty to crimes committed against the security of the people and of the popular state between 1979 and 1992' (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 160). This amnesty clearly marked out the path that would guide politics in the post-war period, i.e. 'peace without truth, reconciliation without acknowledgement and suffering without compensation; violation without accountability' (Igreja 2008: 545). For the war survivors living in the former war zones, the peace agreement ended their direct exposure to the violence of war. Nevertheless, survivors were left on their own when it came to crafting solutions for consolidation of peace at a local level (Igreja and Skaar 2013: 159). The amnesty law postponed the resolution of serious grievances between FRELIMO and Renamo while allowing FRELIMO to implement the strategy of 'slow death' which consisted of buying time in the immediate post-ceasefire period by helping Renamo 'get rid of fear' of participating in the peace process and only later eliminating political contestation by driving Renamo into extinction (Igreja 2015: 248). For instance, although, the Peace Agreement contained provisions for ex-combatants from FRELIMO and Renamo to be demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life, and other combatants to join the new army of unity, a contingent of Renamo soldiers was not demobilized. According to Chissano this was so because of 'excess of zeal for reconciliation and to maintain peace.' Yet, it is also true that since 1992 FRELIMO Party strategically used the existence of Renamo soldiers to portray

Renamo as a subversive organization with bellicose appetites and to further discredit them as viable electoral contenders and political interlocutors (Igreja 2015: 250-51).

Since FRELIMO won the presidential elections and an absolute majority in parliament, the structure of the party-state, created since independence, remained essentially the same, despite the formal existence of democratic institutions (Brito 2014: 26). Yet, the environment created by the Peace Accord favoured the unpacking of the liberation discourse given the fact that the source for political legitimacy was to be transferred from the history of liberation to the electoral process. Thus, the official discourse about the liberation struggle and its heroes became a central matter of political dispute. The opposition forces sought to preserve the figure of Eduardo Mondlane as 'the father of the nation', challenging at the same time all the rest, 'charged as an anti-democratic communist deviation taken by FRELIMO under the leadership of Samora Machel' (Coelho 2013: 28). Despite the promises of forgetting the past, since the end of the civil war both parties have been engaged in serious political confrontations for the definition of the most adequate memories to give meaning to the national unity and identity in a context of political pluralism (Igreja 2008: 541). FRELIMO ruling elites have regarded the postcolonial war as illegitimate on the grounds that it was instigated by external parties since Renamo was created by ex-Rhodesian secret services and the South African apartheid regime to destabilize FRELIMO's socialist revolution (Igreja 2015: 240).

In their turn, Renamo uses memories with the goal of establishing counter-narratives about the origins of multiparty democracy in Mozambique. Renamo considers that the memories of their postcolonial war against the FRELIMO government political and ideological brutality which created communal villages, re-education camps and executed innocent citizens, should be recognized by the official structures of the Mozambican state as a continuation of the liberation struggle, 'the struggle for Democracy' that Mozambicans were denied by the one-party system imposed by FRELIMO in the post-independence era (Igreja 2008: 540; Igreja 2015: 240). On many occasions, Afonso Dhlakama, self-titled 'Father of Democracy', claimed his heroism in Mozambique arguing that, 'in the same way Eduardo Mondlane, considered a national hero for his struggle to liberate the Mozambican people from colonial rule, [he] fought for the achievement of democracy in the country' (Paulino 2015: 3). Renamo also claim that they were not the only ones to have killed and destroyed, but that

FRELIMO also participated in the process of destruction and the harrowing of Mozambique (Igreja 2008: 541).

During a session of the national parliament in 1995, Raul Domingos, a former key Renamo figure stated, 'although the end of the death penalty is an event to be praised, still it came too late, since it was after the executions of Uria Simango and his wife, Joana Simião, Lázaro Kavandame and others', hoping that 'one day the Mozambican people will condignly honour them' (Igreja 2008: 547). This was the first time the fate of these figures considered 'traitors' of FRELIMO's revolution had been raised publicly in Mozambique, since FRELIMO has never publicly disclosed the locations of the corpses. In response, Sergio Vieira, key figure in FRELIMO who acted as guardian of FRELIMO and of the country's official history in Parliament, responded: 'Kavandame was executed because he was a traitor of the country' (Igreja 2008: 547). In another parliamentary session in March 2004, Carlos Cilia, a prominent FRELIMO Member of Parliament (MP) and currently the director of the Research Centre of the History of the Liberation Struggle, asserted in parliament that 'Renamo will never create a government in this country because it is a terrorist party that killed people in the country (…) The history of Renamo is linked to apartheid, to the racists (…) You belong to the racists that created you'. In their turn, José Manteigas, a noticeable Renamo MP have accused important FRELIMO MPs of violations, asserting that

> many Mozambicans died in the prisons of SNASP [National Popular Security Service - *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular*] ordered by you [pointing to Sérgio Vieira] (…) Mozambicans will never forget this (…) some MPs such as Sérgio Vieira cruelly assassinated people in the open fields like they did in Zambézia [the constituency Manteigas represented in Parliament] (Igreja 2015: 253).

By alienating Renamo through the current politics of silence and the selective cultivation of memory, FRELIMO safeguards control of the official production and reproduction of history, and manages to perpetuate the image of a cursed Renamo and an immaculate FRELIMO. This allows FRELIMO party members to legitimise certain past violence such was Vieira's declaration on Kavandame's execution. Similar attitude was shown by one of the founding fathers of FRELIMO, Marcelino dos Santos, answering a question posed by the journalist about FRELIMO's killing of political dissidents (i.e. Joana Simião, Lázaro Kavandame and Mateus Guendjere), when he said: 'we are not repentant of the action because we acted using revolutionary violence against traitors of the Mozambican people' (Igreja 2008: 554). Despite increasing contestation, FRELIMO has managed to retain official control over the

mechanisms of engaging with the past and writing the national narrative of the war. Notwithstanding conceding Renamo's right to participate politically, it rejects Renamo's attempts to change the current version of the country's official history (Igreja 2013:321). But despite FRELIMO's efforts to limit the liberation discourse exclusively to the period between 1964-1974 and its refusal to recognize other 'struggles for liberation' as legitimate, for many different social groups the meaning of 'liberation heritage' cannot be dissociated from events such as the extreme violence of the sixteen years of civil war that has remained in a sort of 'limbo' of the collective memory of Mozambicans and the politics of the current multi-party dispensation.

7.3.3. Old ghosts rise their heads to contest the liberation discourse

Figures whipped out from history during the struggle days and Machel's presidency were now, during Chissano's presidency, re-emerging as heroes deserving a place in the pantheon, like Uria Simango, or even war veterans who were still alive and who even in FRELIMO's selective criteria, would be considered 'witnesses' by virtue of having participated in the struggle from early days. In 2000 Phanuel Guidion Mahluza, former leader of COREMO now integrating Renamo ranks took to the press with a series of interviews to shake some of the core foundation claims of the liberation discourse. At the age of 68, of which 40 were spent outside of Mozambique, Mahluza belonged to several movements of national liberation. He was one of the founders and vice-president of UDENAMO, in 1960 in Bulawayo; the person who suggested the name 'FRELIMO' to the movement resulting from the union between UDENAMO and MANU in 1962 in Acra (Ghana); assistant to Marcelino dos Santos in charge FRELIMO Foreign Affairs in Dar-es-Salaam in June 1962; Secretary of Defense of COREMO and Secretary of Foreign Relations of Renamo in the 1980s. He was detained in several prisons, including the infamous Mozambique D in Cabo Delgado, where several Mozambicans were executed in the 1970s and 1980s. In an interview to the weekly magazine *Savana* on October 20, 2000, Mahluza narrated how FRELIMO was initially founded in Accra on June 2, 1962, by the delegates of UDENAMO (himself, Adelino Guambe, Calvino Mahlayeye and Marcelino dos Santos) and MANU (Matthew Mhole, Samuli Diankali and Daud Atupale) under the patronage of President Kwame Krumah. He said:

> After sealing the union agreement of the two national liberation movements, Guambe the president of UDENAMO, suggested that the movement be called the 'Democratic Front of Mozambique, FREDEMO' (…) I, Fanuel Guidion Mahluza, gave the following suggestion: 'Liberation Front of

> Mozambique, FRELIMO'. Then Marcelino dos Santos said: FRELIMO sounds better (…) And we all agreed that the new movement was called the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), that night on June 2, 1962, in Accra, the capital of Ghana' (Moyane 2000: 3).

Mahluza furher claimed that 'Mondlane is not the architect of national unity' stating:

> It is a great lie that is spread by this country and is taught the same lie in schools. I do not know why it is hard to tell the truth. It's a lie, Mondlane did not join any movement. Mondlane was invited by us from UDENAMO to come and witness the integration of the three movements, already united by us in the absence of Mondlane. The union of the movements was a hard work of several months and Mondlane only arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on June 16, 1962 to be elected president of FRELIMO on June 25. Mr. [referering to the journalist] Do you think that in a week that Mondlane was in Dar-es-Salaam it is possible to join three nationalist movement? (…) We presented Mondlane to the leaders of other movements that were to sign the integration commitment on June 23 (…) It is a lie to say that Mondlane was the founder of FRELIMO. It's a lie. He was only the first president of FRELIMO. There is a difference between being a founder and being the first president of FRELIMO (Moyane 2000: 4).

When the journalist, Salomão Moyana, then asked Mahluza 'Who, after all, are the true heroes of our liberation?' he replied:

> Look, [Adelino] Guambe, at the age of nineteen, raises his head and forms a movement. This should be the Father of the Nation. I'm not afraid to say this. Write this down. Guambe is the father of this Nation. It is not Dr. Mondlane the Father of this Nation. I respect Dr. Eduardo Mondlane as a great statesman, but not that he bears the title of Father of this Nation. The other hero, before many heroes and heroines, and beginning with Guambe, the other hero of this country is Marcelino dos Santos who wrote the statutes of the first liberation movement that gives this country the promise to come and liberate it, which is UDENAMO. We founded UDENAMO and knew that it was difficult to write its statutes. Marcelino dos Santos, when he enters UDENAMO and finds that the movement had no statutes, writes its statutes, the statutes of UDENAMO. Therefore, Guambe and Marcelino dos Santos are the first heroes of our country. But when you look here, there is not a seven-meter road that calls Adelino Guambe nor even five meters road under the name of Marcelino dos Santos. We were taught that Adelino Guambe was one of the reactionaries of the revolutionary process. What bad thing did he do to FRELIMO? - It's like Urias Simango, is reactionary why? Simango is not reactionary. Simango can only be seen as reactionary due to Tsonga demagoguery (Moyane 2000: 5).

It is significant to note that Mahluza's claims and attack on the liberation discourse has not yet been challenged not even from the so called historic figures of FRELIMO. A key reason might be the fact that, from amongst the founders of FRELIMO, only Marcelino dos Santos remains as part of current FRELIMO elite. The other prominent FRELIMO leaders, some of them also refererd to as founders of the movement, were not actually there from the beginning, contrary to what it is often claimed. Therefore, FRELIMO has no choice but to remain in silence.

The monolithic vision of the liberation discourse was further challenged in July 2004 when the sizable theatre of Franco-Mozambican Cultural Centre in downtown Maputo was full to capacity to witness the launch of the book *Uria Simango - um homem, uma causa* (Uria Simango - a man, a cause). Written by a 46 year-old social science student Barnabé Lucas Ncomo, and presented by a prominent Renamo parliamentarian, Dionisio Quelhas, the book presents, as stated in its cover, 'The story of the painful political trajectory of a nationalist missionary whose commitment and dedication to the cause of his people's liberation has been denied by the collective memory of his country's recent history' (Ncomo 2003: cover page). Like other prominent FRELIMO opponents, Simango was arrested, taken to the FRELIMO training camp in Nachingwea, put on trial and subsequently transferred to re-education/concentration camps in Niassa (mainly M'telela in Majune district) where he would never be seen again. One of the main stains in FRELIMO's history is that Machel's public promise that the prisoners would not be killed was broken (Fauvet 2004). Simango, his wife Celina and the other 'traitors' were executed. The facts relating to the execution are written in a document dated of July 29, 1980, signed by the then Minister of Security, Jacinto Veloso, where the names of Sérgio Vieira, Óscar Monteiro, José Júlio de Andrade, Matias Xavier and Jorge Costa were nominated by Machel to form a committee that would 'compile the dossier and prepare the public communication of the executions'. The documents states:

> In *the spirit of traditions and customs of the national liberation struggle*, the Permanent Political Committee of FRELIMO met and *convicted by firing squad* the following *deserters and traitors of the people and the national cause*, which have already been executed: Uria Simango; Lázaro Kavandame; Júlio Razão Nilia; Joana Semião and Paulo Gumane. In order to avoid possible negative reactions, national or international, that may arise as a consequence of these counterrevolutionaries, the political commission publishes this act as a revolutionary decision of the FRELIMO party and not as a judicial record (added emphasis) (Ordem de Acção No 5/80 29 de Julho de 1980).

The document also makes clear that 'The Political Commission publishes this act as a revolutionary decision of the FRELIMO party and not as a judicial record' and states that 'the Comrade Commander-in-Chief [Machel] decided that the committee should be headed by Comrade Sérgio Viera'. The document ends stating: '*A Luta continua*' [the struggle continues]. (Ordem de Acção No 5/80, 29 July 1980).

Neither FRELIMO nor the government has given any further details about the execution of political prisoners. 'The Mozambican public does not know when or where Simango was executed, and his children were never told where his parents were buried' (Fauvet 2004).

Even historical figures from FRELIMO's intellectual wing like Sérgio Vieira, who despite being part of the process, kept the FRELIMO party discipline and did not disclose any information. Instead, he produced an overwhelming criticism of the book in his opinion column (*carta a muitos amigos*) published in the weekly magazine *Domingo* (19 May 2004). But it can be argued that the fact that the history of FRELIMO's most notable dissident became available in Mozambican bookstores was undoubtedly an important political fact that certainly pressed FRELIMO to have to tell their version of the events. In a note published on July 28, 2004, by the long-time journalist for the Mozambique News Agency, Paul Fauvet, regarding the launch of Ncomo's book, remarked:

> Perhaps the ghost of Uria Simango will finally force FRELIMO intellectuals to write their own honest memoirs, accounts of the liberation struggle and of the post-independence years. Mozambique's greatest poet, the late Jose Craveirinha, once wrote "Treason is knowing how to write, and not writing". On this severe definition, far too many FRELIMO intellectuals are committing treason. History will not tolerate blank pages for very long. Sooner or later somebody is going to write them. If FRELIMO members do not write their own honest and thorough accounts of the events that they have lived through, they simply cede the historical terrain, without a fight, to their opponents (Fauvet 2004: 1).

In fact, after the presidency of Chissano in which only one memoir was published by the former Health Minister, Helder Martins (*Porque Sacrani* in 2001) FRELIMO would respond to this threat to the liberation discourse by promoting the writing of the 'correct line' of the history of the liberation struggle by its members, during Guebuza's presidency.

7.3.4. More threats to the liberation discourse: forgotten veterans and disenchanted voters

Since independence, the appreciation of the sacrifices of the 'liberators and founders of the Republic' has always been one of FRELIMO's concerns as illustrated in the 1975, 1990 and 2004 Constitutions (República de Moçambique 1975, 1990, 2004. See also Anonymous 1983i). However, the reorganization of the armed forces through compulsory demobilization between 1977 and 1981 meant that the veterans of the national liberation struggle needed to be re-integrated into society. This was done through their integration into state enterprises and production centres (*centros de produção*). However, the veterans often complained about the salary disparities between the military and the civil services. Their integration into the civil service was also problematic due to their low level of education (Anonymous 1990; Naiene 2002). To solve the 'social problems' of veterans the government created the

Secretariat of State for Former Combatants in 1984 (Decreto Presidential n° 13/84 de 16 Junho) and in 1986 established the rules governing the right to a pension and allowance payments (e.g. retirement and disability pension, survivor's pension, subsidy of death, etc.) through the *Decreto n° 3/86 de 25 Julho*. Additionally, following the recommendation from the FRELIMO Political Bureau, in 1988 the Association of Veterans of the National Liberation Struggle (*Associação dos Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional* - ACLLN), was founded by the veterans on September 7 (Anonymous 1988). This is the same date that had marked the end of the armed struggle with the signing of the Lusaka Accords in 1974.

Despite several government initiatives aimed at supporting the veterans such as technical and professional training, microcredit initiatives for self-employment projects, payment of pensions and the creation of a Social Insertion Fund in 2005 (cf. Naiene 2002; Anonymous 2005a), there has been a continued discontent from the veterans due to the precarious living conditions in which many of them find themselves (Anonymous 1990; Anarça 2000; Anonymous 2005b). The reasons for this discontent are obvious. For instance, more than two decades after independence, in 2001, out of 60,000 known veterans of the national liberation struggle only 20,000 received survivor's pensions and only 15,000 were waiting for the finalization of the bureaucratic procedures to receive pensions (Anonymous 2001b). In 2007 *circa* 13 000 veterans had yet to receive their pensions and the government promised to rectify the situation by December of that year (Anonymous 2007a). In the same year, in Niassa province, out of the approximately 3,916 veterans registered only 2,300 received pensions while the remaining 1 616 were still awaiting administrative procedures and some 416 other veterans were not even registered on the system (Anonymous 2007b). In 2008, after the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the II Congress of FRELIMO in Matchedje, the weekly Sunday newspaper *Domingo* reported on November 2, that veterans living in the Ngungunhana Base (in Niassa) complained to the governor, Arnaldo Bimbe, about not receiving their pensions (Jonas 2008). Similarly, in 2013 some of my informants in the Aldeia II Congresso, on the outskirts of historical site of Matchedje confirmed that they were still waiting to receive their pensions from the Government.

Over the years the government, through the Ministry for Veterans Affairs[106] created in 2000 (now designated Ministry of Veterans[107] through the *Decreto Presidencial* nº. 1/2010 of January 15, 2010), has blamed administrative delays and difficulties in registering veterans that live in secluded areas of the country (Anonymous 2001b); the existence of illegal pensioners in the government database (Anonymous 2003; David 2015) and the unfamiliarity of veterans with the administrative requirements in order to qualify for government social assistance (Anonymous 2001b, Anonymous 2007b), as reasons for the poor social service delivery. However, the reality is that there are other factors at play: there are cases of discrimination between the treatment given to FRELIMO affiliated veterans and those affiliated to Renamo (Anonymous 2011c). Some of my informants, now affiliated to Renamo, narrated several instances when they felt segregated by the state institutions (i.e. Provincial Directorate for Veterans). Others even gave up chasing their pensions because it was clear that there was a deliberate move from the bureaucrats to discriminate against Remano members when it came to processing the paper work required.[108]

Although the official political discourse of FRELIMO still portrays the Renamo war as illegitimate, the FRELIMO government has been forced recently to legally recognize Renamo war veterans as 'fighters for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' (Lei nº 16/2011 de 10 de Agosto). In 2011 the Law 16/2011 and the *Decreto nº 68/2011* of December 30, established the legal basis for the 'protection of the rights and duties of the veteran of the armed struggle for national liberation' (numbering 74 496 veterans 2013) as well as the 'veterans for the defence of sovereignty and democracy', namely those who provided military service between 1974 and 1992. By 2013, 80 492 veterans were so registered (Iva 2015). It is worth noting that of the total of 154 988 war veterans, only 10 482 have received veteran's cards (*Cartão de Combatente*) under this new framework. Since 2013 there have been new demands, mostly from the 'veterans for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' associated with both Renamo and FRELIMO for the value of the pension to be raised (Anonymous 2013). In January 2016, an ordinary veteran (demobilized holding the lowest military rank) of the armed struggle for national liberation was receiving a monthly pension of 5933 Mt (about US$ 85), while the 'veterans for the defence of sovereignty and

[106] *Ministério para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes*.
[107] *Ministério dos Combatentes*.
[108] Interviews with VL, AJ and MB, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.

democracy' received only 700 Mt (about US$ 10) per month.[109] In 2013, a Renamo veteran for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' lamented in Lichinga:

> There are fighters so far who enjoy this combatant status, he has his pension as a salary of 500 Mt or 600 Mt…hum…500 Mt or 600 Mt, what is that? (…) of course among them there are already categories some receive two, three [2000 Mt or 3000 Mt] monthly, but us, many of us is 500 Mt, 600 Mt. Family members need to get to the hospital, they need to eat, or to do what not ... imagine, all that with 600 Mt! It is not a false thing, it is not a political thing, if you walk in other institutions where you passed, where you are going to pass, or in many provinces get to put this point of the combatants, ask them, you will come to this (…) We have the status of the combatant yes, but the right still lies with the combatant of national liberation struggle. We were integrated there only to calm the conflict, the demonstration, but we don't enjoy the same rights.[110]

The demands for government benefits are not limited to veteran pensioners. The political and military elite of FRELIMO have often pressed the government for allocation of funds for financing of their business initiatives as well as other social benefits (e.g. access to bank credit, housing, reduced transportation fare, tax benefits, medical assistance) both for them selves and their families (e.g. preferential access of their children to public institutions of higher education) (Anonymous 2006a, Anonymous 2006b). In fact, many veterans, 'even those who had important positions during the independence struggle, did feel marginalized and forgotten by the party and the nation' during Chissano's presidency (Bonate 2013: 235). These constant battles for recognition and beneficiation from the sacrifices made during the liberation struggle and during the post-colonial conflict have undoubtedly influenced people's perception and feelings regarding the significance of liberation and its heritage. It is against this backdrop that the government initiatives for promotion and celebration of liberation heritage should also be analysed and understood.

On a broader societal scale, 'after years of silence around his name, [Machel] suddenly began to be resurrected in the *chapas* [public transport], in the theatre, in the *rapes* [hip-hop or rap music], as a necessity to confront the new orientation of the country with ideals of the past, but perhaps not outdated' (Ngoenha 2009: 9). This is how a Mozambican philosopher, Severino Ngoenha (2009), described what some termed the 're-samorisation' (*resamorização*) of the urban soundscapes of Maputo through an increasing popular invocation of Samora Machel since the late 1990s. Suddenly, Machel's speeches were listened to on cassette tapes, on pirated CDs and MP3s in homes, cars, *chapas*, and even mobile-phone ringtones. Machel stickers and T-shirts became fashionable. Machel was being

[109] Interview with LO, Maputo, January 15, 2016.
[110] Interview with AJ, Lichinga, September 5, 2013.

mobilized by the people (or *Povo*, as he would have called the masses) to express the general dissatisfaction with the country's continuing poverty, rampant corruption and growing inequalities despite rapid economic growth (cf. Ngoenha 2009; Souto 2013; Rantala 2016). This followed the murder in 2000 of Carlos Cardoso, a Mozambican journalist whose newspaper had investigated the corrupt acquisition of US$14 million from the main state bank (*Banco Comercial de Mocambique*) prior to its privatisation in 1996 (Rantala 2016: 9). The man charged with killing Cardoso (Carlitos Rachide) told a court during a session broadcast by the state television service (*Televisão de Moçambique* - TVM) that the murder was ordered by the eldest son of the President, the late Nyimpine Chissano. Since then, there was an increasing movement, mostly by young musicians (*rappers,*) to mobilize Machel's ideas, to amplify criticism of Chissano's administration. Using Machel's voice,

> rappers not only evoke existing memory where voice functions as a soundtrack to the Mozambican revolution, but they also maintain and renew memory. His voice, expressing colonial suffering and anti-colonial struggle, and now heard in the songs, resonates with the youth's present-day experience of the neoliberal order (Rantala 2016: 16).

In 2003 a hip-hop group (GPRO Fam) released the song *O País da Marrabenta* (Country of Marrabenta) which presents a sad view of Mozambique's political situation after wild privatisations and structural adjustment programmes while evoking Machel and making direct reference to Cardoso's assassination. The song starts stating 'Pass the time that passes, a name will always be marked in Mozambique…the name of Samora Moises Machel'. The lyric moves on to show how and why the country has 'gone from bad to the worse': ten years after the civil war, the streets were still full of holes, poverty was widespread, justice was only for the rich, and the government was unable to resolve these problems. Politicians claim that 'it was the war that caused all this situation' but 'is the war also responsible for misappropriation of foreign aid?', the *rappers* asked.[111] In the middle of the rhymes and the black-and-white video, Machel suddenly declares: 'Mozambicans, our people's democracy was born from the people's blood', implying 'the people's sacrifices should have earned them a better consideration of their social rights' (Rantala 2016: 12). Despite being temporarily banned on national radio station (*Radio Moçambique*), it became very popular and won music awards. Not surprisingly, the song resonated with millions affected by the recurrence of crime and corruption, especially in public institutions. It was in Chissano's governance that the terms *deixa-andar* (let it go or let it be) and *o cabrito come onde esta*

[111] See https://www.letras.mus.br/gpro-fam/868760/. Accessed on September 10, 2016.

amarrado (the goat eats where it is tethered) and the term *cabritalismo* (conflation of *cabrito* [goat] and *capitalismo* [capitalism] emerged, refering to 'a socio-economic system characterised by the use of state resources for private profit' (Harrison 1999: 548). The popular invocation of Machel appears to confront the apparent state of anarchy in which the country found itself in.

Consequently, and despite an effort to adapt to the new conditions of a highly contested multi-party democracy through co-option of local elites figures to Party structures and the recognition of traditional authorities, FRELIMO saw its power threatened. Chissano officially won the presidential election by a short margin, in a situation in which the number of votes higher than the difference that separated him from his opponent, the president of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama was not counted. The electoral organs were accused of having 'fabricated' this victory (Brito 2014: 28). In fact, Chissano's strategy to drive Renamo to the point of fading away over time did not produce any result. By the end of the 1990s Renamo's inner circle remained loyal to the leader Dlhakama and the Party, and the National Defence Forces (*Forças Armadas de Moçambique* – FADAM) were still composed of former Renamo officials. Chissano somehow kept animating soft talks with Dlhakama whenever the latter threatened to 'return to the bush' following what he termed 'fraudulent elections' (Igreja 2015: 254).

It was in this context of a serious threat to its power and due to poor electoral performance, that FRELIMO engaged in the process of choosing a new presidential candidate in 2002 during its Eighth Congress, although Joaquim Chissano could still run for a third term. The risk of losing power was especially acute for a significant group of militants occupying prominent positions in the state apparatus, as well as for many who were engaged in business, since most of the new national entrepreneurs came from the leadership of FRELIMO and of the state; their economic success depended largely on links with political power. It was expected that the 'testament' from the generation of the liberation struggle generation would be passed on to a younger generation, to which four of the five candidates[112] (nominated by the *Comissão Política* of FRELIMO) belonged. Armando Guebuza, the only candidate that still belonged to the generation of the liberation struggle, was elected Secretary-General of

[112] These candidates were: Eduardo Mulembwé (former President of the Assembly of the Republic), Hélder Muteia (former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development), José Pacheco (Governor of the Province of Cabo Delgado) and Lucas Chomera (former Governor of the Province of Zambézia) and Armando Guebuza (then Head of Parliamentary FRELIMO).

FRELIMO and party candidate for the presidency. He began a vast 'revitalization' of FRELIMO party structures at all levels, travelling to all districts to prepare the party for the 2003 municipal elections. Not only did it begin to put pressure on the state administration (controlled almost exclusively by FRELIMO members), but it also mobilized liberation struggle veterans to play an active role in elections (Brito 2014: 28). Thus, the veterans began to resort to the memories of the struggle aiming at reaffirming their own heroic nationalist identity linked to the leadership of FRELIMO, whose past and present were already undergoing public scrutiny and re-assessment (Bonate 2013: 232).

I began this Chapter asking what draws FRELIMO back to the legacy of liberation struggle more than thirty years after independence. A key argument I make is that the recent traction that has led to the institutionalisation of liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, represents a specific way in which former national liberation movements, now in government, have tried to respond to changes in circumstances marked by an increasing contestation by the different social groups over the content of official discourse of the past in an increasingly disputed multi-party democratic dispensation. Thus, the above discussion sought to illustrate the different socio-political and historical contexts under which the liberation heritage discourse was promoted, mobilised, contested, and even suppressed in postcolonial Mozambique. The discussion on the formative years of the liberation discourse built during the armed struggle help us understand the underpinnings of the 'liberation mentality' initially constructed in the spaces of the liberated zones and later elevated to the category of national ideology in the postcolonial period. Consequently, despite the call for Mozambicans 'not to forget the time that has passed': the evils of colonialism and the sacrifices made during the struggle for independence, Machel's mobilisation of liberation discourse for state-craft and nation-building was fraught with numerous contradictions which alienated part of the Mozambicans with far-reaching consequences as some went on to support Renamo. Following Samora's death, Chissano's promoted a 'conspiracy of forgetfulness' and a strategy of silencing of certain memories of the liberation struggle (including its heroes) in order to steer the country from socialism to neo-liberalism. The terms that put an end to the 16 years of war between FRELIMO and Renamo were translated in practice into peace without accountability for the violence of the past, leading to memory struggles between both parties. The multi-party democratic dispensation also allowed an increasing contestation of the official liberation discourse by different groups. It was during Chissano's presidency that the liberation discourse was seriously threatened by forgotten

veterans and disenchanted voters. It is within this context that FRELIMO experienceed the inherent risks of losing power and therefore resorted to its exclusive source of a legitimate claim to power - the liberation struggle, as I illustrate in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT – GUEBUZA'S HERITAGIZATION OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

In his inauguration speech as President of the Republic on February 2, 2005, Guebuza stated:

> In the distant year of 1962, the Mozambican people decided to take decisive steps to free themselves from foreign domination, an essential step to begin the *fight against poverty* that was rampant in Mozambique (...) With President Mondlane we learned that, *united from Rovuma to Maputo*, we could overcome the foreign domination (....) *Mondlane's teachings were inherited and improved by Samora* who, with the steadiness of a commander, knew how to take his boat to safe harbour. In 1975 he proclaimed National Independence and led the process of construction of the Mozambican State until his assassination in Mbuzini (…) *Chissano* is admittedly *the Peacemaker* in Mozambique, the leader who gave a significant boost to the spirit of tolerance and concord. It was with him that *we deepened the democracy we had been cultivating since the founding of FRELIMO*, creating the conditions for the opening of the country to multipartyism (...) Today, we assume the leadership of the destinies of the Mozambican people so that, in the next five years, *we will step by step, continue to materialize their dream* (...) Therefore, what we are going to demand of ourselves [civil servants] is not to walk, but to *step up the pace in the march towards the 'better future'* we all hope for (added emphasis in italics) (Guebuza 2006a: 10-11).

This Chapter focus on two hallmarks of Guebuza's presidency that are captured in the above quotation The first is Guebuza's utilisation of FRELIMO's political ancestors and Mozambican national heroes in the construction of a national identity aiming to mobilise the Mozambicans to adhere to its government program, the 'fight against poverty'. Given his preoccupation with inculcating a notion of utopia capable of building a national identity to sustain the liberation discourse and therefore to legitimize FRELIMO's right to rule, Guebuza resorted to notions of 'mozambicaness' and to the already sacralised heroes of the liberation struggle to mobilize Mozambicans to adhere to the 'new struggle' (i.e. the fight against poverty), thus legitimizing the agenda of his governance. At the same time, through the exaltation of the national heroes and their monumentalization (with great infrastructures), Guebuza claims for himself a prominent place in the pantheon of the liberators of the nation, having as its political ancestors the 'Architect' (Eduardo Mondlane) and the 'Father' (Samora Machel) of the Mozambican nation. However, there is a great discrepancy between the liberation heritage discourse and the *modus operandi* of the current governance that this discourse is meant to serve, on the one hand, and the liberation discourse and the collective memory amongst the Mozambicans of some of the national heroes mobilised by the state, on the other. The second hallmarks of Guebuza's presidency was the rupture with previous governance model marked by generalized lethargy and corruption in the state apparatus, and introduction of a new model of decentralization and open governance encapsulated in the institution of Open and Inclusive Presidency. Guebuza's open governance model, provides

the framework under which his renewed heritagization of the liberation struggle took place during his presidency.

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I outline Gebuza's administration's efforts to recentralize power in order to recover the hegemony of the party-state together with the liberation discourse, and the processes through which the liberation struggle was legally framed as heritage. This provides the background against which the Guebuza's heritagization of the heroes of the liberation struggle is discussed in the second part of the chapter.

8.1. Recentralization: recovering the hegemony of the party-state

The open governance model in the form of Open and Inclusive Presidency (*Presidência Aberta e Inclusiva* - PAI) was launched in 2005 and became the milestone of Guebuza's leadership as head of state. Officially, PAI (which in lower case [*pai*] means father in Portuguese) aimed at allowing Guebuza to interact directly with the electorate, representatives of the administration and civil society at local government level; ensure the implementation and consistency of the government's five-year national program; and strengthen accountability, improve delivery of public services and presence of the state in rural areas. Guebuza aimed to visit all 128 districts during his five-year term (Leininger *et al.* 2012: 221). Open governance in general provides opportunities for leaders to hear from local representatives of the state about progress in the 'fight against poverty' but also to listen to the population's assessment of the performance of the local state representatives (Gonçalves 2013a: 59). Throughout his two terms Guebuza conducted numerous tours to dozens of urban and rural districts[113] where he met with local representatives of the state at different levels, members of the FRELIMO party, economic agents, groups of women and young people to learn about progress and difficulties in combating poverty (Gonçalves 2013a: 55). The exercise of open governance was gradually adopted by ministers, governors and leaders of the FRELIMO party at various levels.

For Guebuza, PAI was an important element in the consolidation of the national unity. As he stated in the opening ceremony of the Council of Ministers session extended to other cadres

[113] By the end of 2011 through his Open and Inclusive Presidency Guebuza had visited 44 District headquarters, 29 Administrative Posts, 17 Localities, 5 Cities (provincial capital) and 2 Towns (Gebuza 2011f: 157).

(district administrators and provincial secretaries of FRELIMO Party) on August 22, 2011 in Maputo:

> The National Unity is not built in the abstract. It's built with actions (…) The Open and Inclusive Presidency and its replicas are opportunities for re-encounter between the leaders and our People, where the representativeness of the Nation is reflected and exalted (...) Throughout our tour, we noticed that by promoting the spirit of citizenship and participation; by encouraging the enjoyment of freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms; and by creating space for the exercise of these freedoms, the Open and Inclusive Presidency contributes to enriching Good Governance in Mozambique, one of the central factors for our victory in the fight against poverty (Gebuza 2011f: 159).

Yet, it has been pointed out that while PAI contributes, on the one hand, to improving the coherence between the government's five-year plan and the subnational development plans, it was also expensive. It entailed an additional planning instrument, as well as the preparation and reporting of the presidential visit. Consequently, the action plans resulting from the presidential visits needed to be implemented in parallel with existing development policies. Without additional human or financial resources, there was pressure on existing resources and officials. In this sense, PAI 'led to a new centralization of political decision-making, rather than promoting decentralization and local governance' (Leininger *et al.* 2012: 232). Not surprisingly, the opposition parties consider the PAI to be an 'institutional incorporation of the patrimonial and hierarchical political culture' associated with the dominant party. They argue that PAI increases the risk of marginalization of formal institutions such as the Provincial and Municipal Assemblies by an already too powerful executive who continues to be closely controlled by FRELIMO. There is also a criticism of the vast consumption of financial and human resources during all stages of the PAI process (preparation, implementation and follow-up), particularly at the sub-national level (Leininger *et al.* 2012: 233-234).

Most importantly, Guebuza's PAI must be interpreted in the context of a strategy by FRELIMO to increase its power at the community level. Through PAI the Guebuza administration has combined monitoring of the implementation of government policy with the reconsolidation of FRELIMO's control of political processes at the sub-national level, rather than facilitating the consolidation of formal institutions such as district administrations or local councils (*Conselhos Consultivos*) at the local levels of state administration (Leininger *et al.* 2012: 237). For the opposition, political parties and various members of civil society PAI 'served merely to anchor the FRELIMO party grip on power' based on the fact that

Guebuza took advantage of his state visit to meet with the local committees of the FRELIMO party behind closed doors (Anonymous 2011). The President used these closed meetings to dispense *orientações superiores* (oral documents issued by figures and institutions of authority with the intention of advising on procedures for policy formulation and implementation) to the party cadres (Gonçalves 2013: 603). It also became public knowledge that in some closed-doors meetings at district or even provincial governments levels, the secretaries of the FRELIMO party would try to denigrate some district administrators, post chiefs and other state officials. The conflict between state officials and structures of the FRELIMO party makes administrators and other government officials afraid of the secretaries of the Party. Thus, in all state events, government officials at various levels must call the secretaries of the FRELIMO party to attend (cf. Leininger 2011; Mahadulane 2013). This ensures that the Party gains *de jure* powers to police the state and align government action with Party directives as it used to, during Machel's socialist regime.

Another important element of Guebuza's PAI is the highly ritualized nature of this public state event. For the components of PAI to be carried out, a set of preparatory activities are developed weeks or months in advance. These activities include the setting up of committees and the holding of multi-level preparatory meetings, the selection and survey of potential sites to be included in the visit programs, the choice of venues and the construction of stands for the rallies and the mobilization of associations and other population groups to participate 'massively' in the activities of the days of the visits. These and other preparations such as the cleaning of public spaces, the ornamentation and temporary rehabilitation of state buildings, the rehabilitation of access roads and roads through which the visiting dignitary will pass, the establishment of safety conditions for the event, and the inspections of evaluation of preparation activities are usually carried out several times. All this means that, at least in the areas covered by the visit, all local state representatives, structures and economic agents focus on the preparations for the visit (Gonçalves 2013a: 56). The preoccupation with the representation of the state can be captured by the way open governance visits are orchestrated. There are three characteristic moments:

> the receptions to the visitors, where the concern is expressed to represent control over the population; The rallies emphasizing the performative dimension of discourse and the presentation of great achievements, where visits to development projects and infrastructures are presented as evidence of progress in the implementation of government programs and in the fight against poverty (Gonçalves 2013a: 66).

The ‘warm reception or welcome’ (*recepção calorosa* or *calorosas boas vindas*) of the visitor should demonstrate the control of the population by the local representatives of the state and their support for the government of the day. An important element of this first moment of the open governance is the different social groups who produce the ‘warm welcome’. The first social group consists of those who are directly or indirectly involved in the preparation of the visits. This group includes the political-administrative structures of the province, district, post or locality visited. The representatives of the state are presented according to hierarchy from the lowest levels including representatives of the party and then the local structures at district, zone, circle, settlement, neighbourhoods, group of 10 houses, according to the administrative organization of the zone. These are joined by community leaders, authority figures and representatives of FRELIMO’s Women League (*Organização da Mulher Moçambicana* - OMM) and Youth League (*Organização da Juventude Moçambicana* – OJM), interpreters and civil servants. Both OMM and OJM play an important role in mobilizing citizens who do not necessarily have to be members of these organizations to prepare food and logistics for the visits. The Women League also take the lead in celebratory chants that enliven the different moments of reception and speeches, responding loudly and in unison to the party's slogans (Gonçalves 2013a: 67-68).

The second social group is composed of the members of the visitors’ entourage who include members of the government, ministers or provincial directors. Representatives of the party at various levels, elements of the security force, directors, journalists and guests may also be part of the delegation. The participation of civil servants is, where possible, coerced by senior officials and peer pressure. Non-participation of an official is interpreted as disloyalty. Among public officials, primary teachers are expected to participate in these events, it is their responsibility to lead dozens of students to participate in the visits. It is from among public officials, especially teachers, that Masters of Ceremony (MC) are chosen, should preference not be given to people with relevant positions in the Party. With the support of enthusiasts, MCs have the task of teaching the public new slogans and responses and at the same time ensuring that rallies are animated before and during the keynote address.

The third group that contributes to the ‘warm welcome’ is the population. In principle, the term ‘population’ is used to refer to residents of the areas visited that are not part of the local representatives of state and structures. In practice, this category includes most of the people

present at the event, except those who occupy seats in the entourage and in the gallery (Gonçalves 2013a: 69).

The second moment, the rally (*comício popular*), constitutes the central point of the visits. It usually begins with prayers from the predominant religions in the region, and the veneration of local ancestors. These rituals can be led by traditional leaders, religious leaders or, in their absence, someone who can ask for the blessing so that 'all the work that the visitor came to perform in the area goes well'. These figures of spiritual authority also pray for good-seating of the visitor and so that they have the wisdom to perform better their work in the conduct of the destinies of the country, province or district. The *comício popular* constitutes an occasion for direct contact between visitors and the population. It is during rallies that visitors 'learn' and 'exchange experiences' with the population. It is also during the *comício popular* that the population, represented by a limited number of participants, has the opportunity to thank and criticize government performance. In practice, however, all this happens with nuances of a monologue and a controlled 'participation' of the few that are allowed to speak in the tribune. As instructed by Party members and state officials, all interventions should commend the work and the great accomplishments of government. Even when the intention of the intervener is to criticize the government's performance, it must begin with praise so that the author is not perceived as a new 'internal enemy' or member of the opposition (Gonçalves 2013a: 71).

The intervention in the tribune, either by the visitors or the host community, always mention the great achievements of the government which constitutes the third moment of the open governance. Open governance visits provide occasions to inaugurate infrastructures such as schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, branches of commercial banks (Gonçalves 2013a: 73). Also, of interest to this study, to any monuments and other infrastructures built by the government to honour and celebrate the liberation struggle heroes. For example, the Samora Machel statue erected in Inhambane was inaugurated on May 28, 2012, during Guebuza's PAI to this province (districts of Panda, Inharrime, Massinga, Inhassoro, and Vilankulo, and the city of Inhambane, the provincial capital). In addition to inaugurating the monument, during his visit Guebuza led *comícios populares* and meetings with local governments, visited community forests, participated in tree planting events among other activities (Anonymous 2012a). Similarly, from June 26 to July 1, 2012, Guebuza held a PAI in Niassa province (the districts of Mavago, Majune and Cuamba and city of Lichinga), where he

began his visit planting trees and visiting a community forest, before guiding a popular rally in the town of Chala, in Chimbunila district. He then chaired an extraordinary session of the provincial government enlarged to include the district administrators and other FRELIMO cadres. In Lichinga, the provincial capital, his program included a visit to the Niassa forestry company and inauguration of the monument to Samora Machel and a *comício popular* (Anonymous 2012b). Following the same formula he inaugurated monuments with statues of Samora Machel in Quelimane in Zambézia province (April 22, 2012); in Machava in Maputo province (May 16, 2012) (Anonymous 2012c) and in Beira, Sofala province (June 4, 2012) (Anonymous 2012d).

PAI is thus a central strategy of Guebuza for recovering the hegemony of the party-state through revitalizations of the FRELIMO structures, the recentralization of power of state institutions while mobilizing the population to adhere to the government agenda of 'fighting poverty'. An illustrative example of state recentralization is provided by the events surrounding the opposition attempt to monumentalize a hero of the 'struggle for democracy'.

8.1.1. Liberation *vs.* democracy: Monumentalizing André Matsangaíssa

In June 2007, Renamo, which was in control of Beira Municipality, presented a proposal to the Municipal Assembly. The proposal was to name a square in Munhava neighbourhood after André Matsangaíssa. Renamo considers Matsangaíssa as the founder of their movement and hails him for his courage and for initiating the postcolonial armed rebellion against the FRELIMO authoritarian regime. Those who joined Renamo were known as *matsangas*. The proposal to attribute a name to a square was in accordance with Article 45, line 's' of Law 2/97, and therefore the initiative was legal (Igreja 2013: 324). The problem was not the initiative itself, but the figure that Renamo chose to honour by attaching his name to a square.

André Mathadi Matsangaíssa Dyuwayo, was born in 1950 in Chirara, in the province of Manica and joined FRELIMO in 1970. He received military training in Nachingwea and was later appointed as commander of FRELIMO in charge of heavy equipment in the Dondo barracks, 30 km from Beira (Ncomo 2005: 16; Anonymous 2017: 3). Matsangaíssa story provide an illustration of how some of former FRELIMO freedom fighters become major opponents of the regime. In a transcript of an interview published in the 1979 and recently reprinted in the *Canal de Moçambique* newspaper, Matsangaíssa recounted how it all begun:

> I thought, 'now that we are free and independent, it's time to enjoy life'. With the money I had saved from my work at Cahora Bassa, I bought a Mercedes-Benz Saloon. But my happiness was short-lived. The political commissar of the Dondo barracks, Fernando Tembe, informed me that under the new dictatorship of the proletariat the car belonged to the People. I went back, and lost. They invented a story to incriminate me (Guente 2017: 3).

Considered a 'reactionary', in February 1976, Matsangaíssa was sent to the re-education camp of Sacuze in Gorongoza. From there on, the trajectory of Matsangaíssa is recounted following the same constructive discourse strategy used by FRELIMO to canonize the bravery of its own heroes. As Ncomo remarks:

> Sacuze was to be, in his [Matsangaíssa] eyes, the living proof of the social injustice installed in the country. Hundreds of citizens were in that prison without guilt, most of them out of futility (…) Matsangaíssa realized that the struggle for the freedom of a people had to continue (…) On May 6, 1977, in the company of only two people, Manuel Mutambara and Marcos Amade (both ex-combatants of the liberation struggle), broke off from Sacuze and travelled 150 km from Gorongoza to Odzi in the then Southern Rhodesia (…) In August 1979 Matsangaíssa led a force of about a thousand men having moved from Odzi to Mozambique having set up headquarters at Gorongosa (…) On October 17, 1979, Matsangaíssa was killed in combat (Ncomo 2005: 17).

In the same line of thought, Guente states: 'His [Matsangaíssa] dream and his struggle was to stop the abuses of a FRELIMO with liberating insignia, the owner of people and things, and with a Samora of excesses, who, in his [Matsangaíssa] opinion, was already against the freedom for which he fought against colonialism' (Guente 2017: 3). For these reasons, Matsangaíssa is a hero for many and an eternal 'armed bandit' to others (Igreja 2013: 324).

During the debates in the Municipal Assembly, the FRELIMO members stated that the intention of the Municipal Council was legitimate, but that the act was illegitimate because the square already had a name, which was historical. It was known as the Munhava roundabout. Although the roundabout officially did have a number (2314), the name 'Munhava' was part of popular usage, but according to the state lexicon and its bureaucratic procedures, a popular nomenclature is not administratively valid. The failure of FRELIMO's argumentation was that 'a number is not a name' (Igreja 2013: 324). In response to FRELIMO's positions in the Municipal Assembly, the chief of the Renamo - Electoral Union said that 'FRELIMO will never accept the name of André Matsangaíssa for a public square, because in their understanding, the national heroes are emphatically only from FRELIMO. For this reason, they are making use of all stratagems for impeding the locals to nominate their own heroes' (Igreja 2013: 325). However, at the end of the debate, the resolution,

named Deliberation 51/2007, was passed favourably and the roundabout received the name of *Praça* André Matsangaíssa (see Figure 83).



Figure 83: View of *Praça* André Matsangaíssa, Munhava, Beira (2013).

When the roundabout was thoroughly transformed to receive Matsangaíssa statuette, its proponents feared vandalism from FRELIMO members. They placed, in the first phase, a small sculpture made of soap-stone which symbolizes a family (five-member family of father, mother and three children) that gets united to go to war (Timóteo 2009). It was complemented with a white marble plaque (see Figure 2) which has the following inscription:

> Square André Matade Matsangaíssa. For the determination with which you led the struggle for understanding and harmony in this land bequeathed by our ancestors. Here is recorded the homage, *the founder of the movement for the struggle for democracy* that we have conquered and continually perfected. Inaugurated on October 17, 2008 by the Mayor of City Council of Beira Eng. Daviz Mbepo Simango (added emphasis in italic).[114]



Figure 84: View of the pedestal of André Matsangaíssa monument with the statuette displaced (2013).

[114] The original text in Portugese reads: *Praça André Matade Matsangaíssa. Pela determinação com que conduziste a luta em prol do entendimento e da harmonia nesta terra legada pelos nossos antepassados. Aqui fica registada a homenagem, ó fundador do movimento de luta pela democracia que conquistámos e continuamente aperfeiçoamos. Inaugurada aos 17 de outubro de 2008 pelo Presidente do Conselho Municipal da Beira Eng. Daviz Mbepo Simango*.

Yet when the Renamo-Electoral Union experienced a serious internal crisis, which culminated with an internal split and expulsion of Daviz Simango (Mayor of Beira) from Renamo in 2008, the political elites of Renamo contradicted themselves by voicing their rejection, not of *Praça* André Matsangaíssa but of the statuette to honour Matsangaíssa. Renamo high officials, from the party President to the local Beira cadres, boycotted the inauguration of the monument arguing that the 'sculpture had nothing to do with Renamo'. Some people in Beira believed that both FRELIMO and Renamo, for different reasons, spread rumours to instigate popular sentiments against Matsangaíssa square. They gossiped that the statuette had been part of Daviz Simango's secret project to honour his father (Uria Simango) and mother (Celina Simango) and that the three children were Daviz Simango himself and his two other brothers. In spite of these rumours, the Beira dwellers did not vandalize or get involved in quarrels over the sculpture; instead they found ways of peacefully dealing with *Praça* André Matsangaíssa (Igreja 2013a: 190), which was. neither fenced in nor vandalised. Those in favour were usually unanimous in affirming that 'he deserves recognition because he fought for democracy' (Igreja 2013: 327).

Having lost the battle at the Municipal Council in Beira, in July 2007 FRELIMO-led government resorted to national parliament to affirm the necessity to alter some of the articles of Law 2/97, which institutionalizes the Local Authorities as a form of local power (Article 272). The government argued that this occurred 'as a result of the experiences of the application of this legislation during approximately ten years' (Igreja 2013: 330). Amongst the various articles to be changed was Article 45, specially line 's' which stated that: 'It is the competence of the Municipal Assembly, namely: '*to establish the name* of roads, squares, localities and places in the territory of the local autarchy' (added emphasis in italic) (Lei n° 2/97 de 18 Fevereiro). This line was changed to state: 'It is the competence of the Municipal Assembly, namely: '*to propose to the competent entity* the attribution or alteration of names of roads, squares, localities and places in the territory of the local autarchy' (added emphasis in italic) (Lei n° 15/2007 de 27 de Julho). This meant that from then on the municipalities were forbidden to attribute or change a name without a prior consultation and approval by the central state. In fact, since the decentralisation Law 2/97 inadvertently opened political spaces in the country's landscape that allowed local authorities to canonize other versions of the collective memory and public commemorations, FRELIMO amended the Law taking back to back to 'central state organs some aspects of state authority that had been previously devolved to local municipalities' (Igreja 2013: 332).

Later, the national parliament approved a law concerning the system of honorific titles and consecrations (Lei n°. 10/2011 de 13 de Julho) which establishes the system of honorary titles and decorations of the Republic of Mozambique and creates the national commission of honorary titles and decorations. Apart from one of Renamo's suggestions that October 4 (the date of the peace agreement and national day of peace and reconciliation) merited an honorific title, all their other proposals regarding central state recognition of Renamo heroes (i.e. André Matsangaíssa and Afonso Dlhakama) or iconic Renamo military camps and headquarters (Maringue and Gorongosa), like FRELIMO did for Nachingweia, were rejected. FRELIMO MPs justified their positions by saying that 'at the level of the African continent and in other continents, the name Mozambique is intimately connected to the name of FRELIMO (…) this is a reality that no one must deny; FRELIMO is Mozambique and Mozambique is FRELIMO' (Igreja 2013: 334). In sum, despite this contested multiparty context where memory became the object of political, social, ideological and even judicial disputation, FRELIMO has managed, through recentralization, to 'conceded Renamo's right to participate politically, but still rejects Renamo's attempt to change the current version of the country's official history' (Igreja 2013a: 186).

8.2. Framing the liberation struggle and its heritage

While battling to silence the increasingly contestant voices regarding the official version of the past, FRELIMO swiftly moved to canonize the concept of liberation heritage in the legislation defining it exclusively as 'the historic *material remains* of the struggle' (added emphasis in italic (Lei n°. 13/2009 de 25 de Fevereiro). But if cultural heritage was already defined as 'a set of tangible and intangible assets created or integrated by the Mozambican people throughout history, relevant to the definition of the Mozambican cultural identity (Lei n°. 10/88 de 22 de Dezembro) since 1988, why was liberation heritage defined exclusively in material terms? The answer to this question should be found in the notion of heritage (*património*) as 'property' amongst the elite veterans of the struggle and state officials as well as the national institutional politics related to the custodianship of this new category of heritage. In fact, while the cultural heritage protection Law was written and prepared by the Ministry of Culture, the Law for protection and enhancement of liberation heritage (Lei n°. 13/2009) was drafted by the Ministry of Veterans. The notion of cultural heritage in the cultural heritage protection Law was informed by the experience of the period immediately after independence whereby the emphasis in terms of cultural heritage policy was placed on

intangible heritage (songs, dance and music festivals) (cf. Honwana 2008). In addition, the cultural heritage protection Law was also inspired by international instruments such as the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention that the country ratified in 1982 (Resolução n°. 17/82 de 13 de Novembro).

The drafting of the Law for protection and enhancement of liberation heritage was informed by a different set of concerns and experiences. Apart from solving the socio-economic problems of veterans, the political elite of FRELIMO has also been concerned with the maintenance of the official history. In 2010 the government gave a mandate to the former Ministry of Veteran Affairs, and now Ministry of Veterans, to promote the 'valorisation of the history and heritage of the National Liberation Struggle' (Article 2 of Resolução n°. 22/2010 de 1 de Setembro). Thus, the organic statute of the former Ministry of Veteran Affairs included a National Directorate of History and Heritage of the National Liberation Struggle (now designated the National Directorate for History under the Ministry of Veterans) whose main role is:

> to propose legislation applicable to research, development and promotion of the history of the National Liberation Struggle; to select and propose the proclamation of the most historically important sites as national monuments; and to propose standards for the construction, preservation and enhancement of monuments and sites' (Article 9 of Resolução n°. 22/2010 de 1 de Setembro).

In order to fulfil its mandate, and to institutionalize the work of a commission created by the Party in 2008 tasked with collecting sources and systematizing narratives about the history of liberation of Mozambique (Tembe 2014: 3), the former Ministry of Veterans Affairs created the Research Centre of the History of the National Liberation Struggle[115] in charge of 'researching, promoting and disseminating the history of the National Liberation Struggle' (Paragraph 3 of Decreto n°. 3/2008 de 9 de Abril). This Centre sought to establish itself as an institution that coordinates research on the history of the struggle for national liberation. However, several investigators expressed their opposition to the existence of a research centre so closely linked to the Ministry of Veterans, considering it a kind of censure of their work (Anonymous 2011j). According to Carlos Silyia, the Director of the Centre,

> what we wanted, and continue to defend, is that the history of the national liberation struggle cannot be written without some guidance of what we want it to be written. This for some is a censorship, but the Centre is a state institution and as such follows a state policy. The Mozambican state, now under the FRELIMO government, has its beacons already defined (…) But I think we

[115] *Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de Libertação Nacional* - CPHLLN.

> have come to some conclusion: the Centre must investigate on its part and not use the coordinator's 'cover'. We will not coordinate any work from other institutions. The Centre has its functions, will continue to do its research and publish (Anonymous 2011j).

The Centre has since published several volumes concerning some of the key events that sustain the liberation discourse (see e.g., Dick 2011; Pachinuapa 2011; Siliya 2011; Pachinuapa 2012; Siliya *at al.* 2012; Zimba 2012). Similarly, the Ministry of Veterans has recently commissioned Mozambican historians to write an official history of the liberation struggle (see e.g., Tembe 2014) and encouraged them to collect veterans' memories. Yet, these endeavours cannot be considered 'bottom up' oral histories projects, which seeks to recover memories of forgotten or disenfranchised groups or individuals. Rather, the intention is to 'build an archival collection of the liberation struggle in general, and it privileges to a certain extent those who played the leading roles' (Bonate 2013: 235). In fact, one of FRELIMOs biggest concerns was keeping ownership over the liberation discourse while making sure that 'the opposition was kept out of it, on grounds of having been not more than a proxy force in the Rhodesian and South African aggression, deprived therefore of any roots in the liberation past, or if figuring there, as performing the role of traitor and loser' (Coelho 2013:28).

As a result of FRELIMO's exhortation of its liberation struggle veterans to write their testimonies, an increasing number of memoirs begun to flourished, mostly corroborating and even strengthened the liberation discourse (see e.g., Veloso 2006; Ferrão 2007; Mboa 2009; Moiane 2009; Vieira 2010; Langa 2011; Machungo 2011; Matsinha and Sampaio 2012; Ndelana 2012). Nevertheless, these 'decentralised' initiatives, produced a diversity of accounts, describing individual itineraries and serving individual and often conflicting purposes, which then began to affect the cohesion of the liberation discourse, exposing some loopholes. An illustrative case has been the challenge by a prominent veteran, of Alberto Chipande's claim to be the author of the 'first shot' against the colonial authorities (Coelho 2013: 29). According to the liberation discourse presented in the textbooks, the armed struggle began on the night of September 25, 1964, and in the first attack at least two people were killed, namely the chief of the colonial administrative post of Chai and the sentry guarding the residence of the head of the post (Ministério da Educação 2010: 7). Yet, a survey conducted by ARPAC, based on 35 interviews with 'elderly and native of Chai' who were around on the day of the attack, were unanimous in the view that 'no person was killed' (ARPAC 2011: 5). In addition, some voices have also claimed that the 'first shot' happened

on September 24, 1964, during an attack in Cóbuè, in Niassa province (Anonymous 2011k). The late General Bonifácio Massamba, known as the man who opened the military front in Zambézia province and awarded the title of National Hero after his death, stated in a public lecture at Mussa Bin Bique University: 'I personally do not agree and I do not see Chipande as the author of the first shot that kicked off the national liberation struggle' (Anonymous 2010f). Another General, Eduardo da Silva Nihia, who operated in the same front, tried to clarify the issue:

> It was [the first shot] on all fronts. What happened is that Cabo Delgado is near Tanzania. As soon as the comrades of Cabo Delgado, Chipande, and others, fired, the information was immediately taken to Tanzania where our headquarters were located reporting that the fighting had begun (…) The first information is the one that stays (Anonymous 2011l).

This challenge, while not of enormous consequence, has nonetheless an important symbolic value, since this event is considered one of the milestones of the liberation discourse: the beginning the armed struggle.

The emphasis on materiality in the definition of liberation heritage derives in part from a very specific understating and use of the term heritage, *património* in Portuguese, which in *stricto sensus* means 'inheritance, 'inherited property', 'legitimate' or just 'property' (Costa and Sampaio e Melo 1998: 1069). Within the state apparatus in Mozambique, the notion of *património* is frequently deployed to refer to assets or properties belonging to the state (i.e. *património do Estado*). *Património* conceived as property is thus often understood as a set of rights (or entitlements) to assets and, as a political institution, to the allocation of authority over assets to individual people, groups, or legal entities comprised of individuals (Johnston 2007: 754-6). Some of the most influential groups within the FRELIMO political and military elite, especially some members of the Political Bureau (*Comissão Política*) and the advisers of Guebuza, considered one of the most conservative groups within the Party (Anonymous 1990), seem to share this bureaucratic notion of *património*. This might have informed their conception of what would constitute *património* (implying the legacy or inheritance) of the liberation struggle.

Thus, in complete disregard for the fact that when FRELIMO spearheaded the struggle it was a movement made up of other liberation movements, today the Party considers all properties and spaces related to the liberation struggle as their exclusive inheritance and legitimate

property (cf. Souto 2013). Therefore, FRELIMO has to focus on tangible 'artefacts' of the liberation struggle upon which legal ownership can be claimed because property rights confer rights on owners (i.e. relationship of control of assets) and impose obligations on non-owners (i.e. command a significant degree of recognition and respect) (Johnston 2007: 755). This means that in a contested multi-party democratic dispensation only FRELIMO's heritage can be promoted as sites of memory of the struggle for independence in Mozambique. It was based on this idea of *património da luta de libertação* (liberation heritage) that the *Comissão Política* of FRELIMO decided, in 2008, to advance the process of acquisition in order to secure legal tenure of some properties in Tanzania. In the same spirit and making use of the Lei n°. 5/91 de 9 de Janeiro which establishes the framework for the sale of the buildings previously owned by the state to national tenants, FRELIMO decided to buy the property which houses the Museum of the Revolution, the only institution that details the history of the liberation struggle, the Mozambican revolution. In March 2010 the Museum of the Revolution was integrated as the 'historical heritage of the FRELIMO party' and has since been under the Foundation 25 of June whose primary aim is to preserve any Party property/assets within or outside the country (Souto 2013; Anonymous 2015). FRELIMO's appropriation of the Museum of the Revolution raised heated debates in the public sphere as many commentators could not understand how a museum that tells the story of the Mozambican revolution can belong to a political party rather than the Mozambique state (Anonymous 2015: 24).

It is also important to note that during the drafting of the Law 13/2009 the Ministry of Veterans was in direct competition with the Ministry of Culture for the leading role in the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the death of struggle heroes and other liberation events. Even though most of the technical staff at the Ministry of Veterans who spearheaded the drafting of the Law 13/2009 had no training in the heritage field and were mostly unfamiliar with the notions and categories of the dominant heritage discourse institutionalized through the international organizations such as UNESCO and ICOMOS and their charters and Conventions, thy failed to consult with the 'traditional' state custodian of cultural heritage in the country, the Ministry of Culture, through the usual inter-ministerial committees. All the Ministry of Veterans did with the new Law was to repeal the provisions of subparagraphs d) and e) of Article 7 of Law 10/88, which provided legal protection for the documentation of the Mozambique Liberation Front and other Mozambican nationalist movements as well as the main operational military bases of the Mozambique Liberation

Front used during the national liberation struggle. These material elements of the liberation struggle removed from the cultural heritage protection Law were considered the main heritage elements worthy of protection in the Law 13/2009 that defines what constitutes 'liberation heritage' in Mozambique.

This 'heritage-as-artefact' approach (cf. Breglia 2006) to the definition of liberation heritage might also be partly a result of the fact that its drafting in 2009 predated Mozambique's joining of the African Heritage Liberation Programme. The Mozambican National Committee of this Programme, chaired by the Minister of Veterans, was only created in 2012 (Decreto n°. 34/2012 de 13 de Setembro). Thus, the Law 13/2009 did not benefit from a broader understanding of what would constitute the heritage (namely the cultural significance) of the liberation struggle. During a regional Workshop on the African Liberation Heritage of Africa held in 2011 in Pretoria, South Africa (cf. National Heritage Council of South Africa 2011), the coordinator of the African Liberation Heritage Programme suggested that liberation heritage should include all testimony and evidence created during the process of the liberation struggle against colonialism, minority governments and all forms of domination including material culture (texts, documents, material culture, sites, monuments, etc.) and immaterial elements (songs, rituals, stories, folklore, etc.) (Ndagala 2011: 11). This limited legal definition 'liberation heritage' and its legal framework constitutes one of the sources of continuous tensions between government actors (i.e. Ministry of Veterans *vs.* Ministry of Culture and Tourism) and one of the challenges when it comes to ensure effective management of heritage sites related to the liberation struggle.

8.3. Monumentalizing the heroes of the liberation struggle

8.3.1. Celebrating national heroes

Along with open governance, the resuscitation and celebration of struggle heroes constituted another hallmark of Guebuza's presidency. The revaluation of national heroes was promoted through several projects:

- Celebration of 87th birth anniversary of Eduardo Mondlane as part of the celebration of the 45th anniversary of FRELIMO in 2007 (including declaration of Nwadjahane as national heritage site in 2008);

- Celebration of 75th birth anniversary of Samora Machel and the declaration of Chilembene as national heritage site in 2008;
- Celebration of the 40th anniversary of II Congress of FRELIMO in Matchedje and declaration of Matchedje as national heritage site in 2008;
- 2009 consecration of the year to Eduardo Mondlane, the 'Architect' of the National Unity;
- Celebration of the 40th anniversary of the death of 18 heroes of the 'Generation 25 of September' (the generation of the liberation struggle);
- 2011 consecration of the year to Samora Machel, the 'Father' of Mozambican Nation.

Each of these projects illustrates the way Guebuza sought to revive the national heroes in his 'patriotic discourse' to mobilize the Mozambicans behind his agenda which was discursively constructed around the 'fight against poverty'. With this 'patriotic discourse' Guebuza sought to promote the idea of national unity using the same logic of exclusion of the 'other' which was developed during the armed struggle and used by Machel in the first Republic (i.e. 'whoever is not with us is against us'), and which aimed at legitimizing the historical right of FRELIMO to continue to be the sole leader of the Mozambican people.

8.3.1.1. Celebrating the 45th anniversary of FRELIMO

After years of remembering without monumentalizing the figure of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO party decided to pay a tribute to Mondlane, on February 3, 2007, with the inauguration of a monument, a statue of his bust (see Figure 85), located in the prime neighbourhood of Maputo (*Bairro* Sommerschield, along FRELIMO street), right in front of the headquarters of the Central Committee of FRELIMO party.



Figure 85: View of the monument of Eduardo Mondlane inaugurated on February 3, 2007 (2014).

This revitalization of the figure of Mondlane was part of Guebuza's project to recover the hegemony of party-state by highlighting the liberation credentials of FRELIMO and the idea of a party of unity of all Mozambicans pursuing the same agenda since the days of the armed struggle. As Guebuza stated in his speech during the ceremony of unveiling the monument:

> This homage happens in the year in which FRELIMO, one of the most important works of Mondlane celebrates 45 years of its existence. Forty-five years of a Party:
> - Consistent with its agenda;
> - Persistent in its materialization; and
> - The results it pursues.
>
> Forty-five of a FRELIMO that continues:
> - To reflect the image of its founder;
> - To be the promoter of national unity, self-esteem, peace and the struggle for national development; and
> - Inspiring the Mozambicans to new victories (Guebuza 2007a: 8).

As part of the celebrations of the 45th anniversary of the founding of FRELIMO, on June 20, 2007, the day that Mondlane would have be 87th had he be alive and five days before the celebrations of the 32nd anniversary of the Independence of Mozambique, a state ceremony took place in the village of Nwadjahane, the birth place of Mondlane. This village is located 6 km from the Administrative Post of Chalala, in Mandlakaze distric, Gaza Province. This state-led public event was marked by the inauguration of the Open Museum of Nwadjahane which includes: (i) a house built in 1920 where Mondlane resided during his childhood (see

Figure 86); (ii) a house built by Mondlane in 1961 (see Figure 87); (iii) a didactic plaque in front of the '1961 house' inaugurated by President Machel in 1975, during his 'Triumphal Journey' from Rovuma to Maputo (see Figure 88); a memorial monument to Mondlane erected in 2005 (see Figure 89); (v) a sacred forest (*khokholo*); and (vi) a cemetery where several people of Mondlane's family are buried, including his parents Nwadjahane Mondlane and Muzamusse Mbembele, together with the first wife, Chude Bila, of his father.



Figure 86: The house built in 1920 where Mondlane lived during his childhood (2012).



Figure 87: The house built by Mondlane in 1961 (2012).



Figure 88: Didactic plaque in front of the '1961 house' inaugurated by President Machel in 1975.



Figure 89: The memorial monument in honour of Mondlane erected in 2005.

An in-depth study of this state ceremony has been made by Inguane (2007) in which he analyses of the processes of negotiating social memory through two cultural heritage sites in Mandhlakazi district: Nwadjahane and Coolela. It is worth highlighting elements of Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse' during his speech on the day of the event. It begins by emphasizing that 'the young Eduardo had an origin and youth surrounded by much poverty, exacerbated by colonial and fascist domination'. Modlane is presented as 'a young man of

exceptional qualities' who was 'persistent and determined to materialize his dreams', who overcame the various obstacles imposed on him by the colonial authorities who prevented him from entering any secondary school in Mozambique (Guebuza 2007b: 25). At one point Guebuza said:

> It was also thanks to his *persistence in the pursuit of his dreams* that Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane emerged and was consecrated as the Architect of National Unity, for having promoted the fusion of the three movements of the dawn of our nationalism. Mondlane has grown up as a figure of great prestige within FRELIMO, in Mozambique, in Africa, and in the world. *Mondlane created FRELIMO* and, in two years, led the preparation of political and military conditions for the launching of the National Liberation Armed Forces. Of the nearly two hundred and fifty initial men, politically and militarily trained, FRELIMO members were growing into the thousands either in front of the liberating fire or in the underground. *The FRELIMO of Mondlane, our FRELIMO*, thus showed to be a movement of an entire people, desirous of their freedom and independence. *FRELIMO thus had, as it has until now, its agenda synchronized with the agenda of the Mozambican People* and, therefore, was already unstoppable in its march (added emphasis in italic) (Guebuza 2007: 7).

Two ideas expressed in the passage above constitute the mark of Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse'. The idea that perseverance (e.g. 'persistence in the pursuit of his dreams'), as well as other values (e.g. 'self-esteem'), are authentic pillars that allowed the heroes like Mondlane to overcome the various obstacles imposed by colonialism. For Guebuza, these values embodied by the heroes of the liberation struggle must be a source of inspiration and therefore be mobilized by Mozambicans to face current challenges - mainly the 'fight against poverty'. The second idea is to present FRELIMO as founded by the heroic figure of Mondlane as the same organization as the FRELIMO party, created in 1977, that continues to direct the destinies of the country, following the teachings of this 'uncontested' national hero. In this sense, Guebuza appears as a political 'heir' of Mondlane which adds an historical layer of legitimacy to his current governance agenda. Yet, critics have pointed out that since the creation of the Party in 1977, FRELIMO used to celebrate its anniversary on February 3 as illustrated by a gazetted Ministerial Diploma 70/86, of December 24, 1986, which determined the issuing of a postage stamp commemorating the 'Tenth Anniversary of the Creation of the FRELIMO party' (Rapouso 2012: 17). Thus, the conflation of the Party (created in 1977) and the Liberation Front (created in 1962) not only aims at reminding the Mozambicans who 'liberated' them but also gives the public the idea that FRELIMO is the oldest Party and therefore 'experienced, more nationalistic and patriotic, simply the best to lead the country'. All these attributes end up weighing in the day-to-day speech of some FRELIMO members who then propagate the idea that 'It is a national imperative that

FRELIMO wins elections for the good of the nation' as the Party secretary for propaganda and mobilization once stated (Beúla 2007: 1).

The exaltation of Mondlane had its peak with the consecration of 2009 as 'Year of Eduardo Mondlane'. The main festivities took place in Nwadjahane on June 20, when Guebuza inaugurated the monument in honour of Mondlane (see Figures 90-92), the Resources Centre of Nwadjahane and launched the first computer *Made in Mozambique*, called Dzowo (a joint venture between the company SAHARA Computers and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Mozambique).



Figure 90: Monument to Eduardo Mondlane in Nwadjahane inaugurated in 2009 (2012).



Figure 91: Panels placed along the passage of the monument illustrating episode of Eduardo Mondlane's life (2012).



Figure 92: Pedestal for the statue of Eduardo Mondlane in the monument. Statue not placed until December 2012.

8.3.1.2. Celebrating the 40th anniversary of the 'Congress of the Victory'

The idea of celebrating 40th anniversary of FRELIMO's II Congress in Matchedje seems to have originated from a Technical Brigade (*Brigada Técnica*)[116] that was set up in 2006 by the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) to carry out a preliminary study in two districts of Niassa Province (i.e. Sanga and Lago), within the framework of the creation of the Institute of Cultural Heritage. According to the report of *Brigada Técnica,* one of the objectives of their mission was to 'develop a framework to transform the Administrative Post of Matchedje, the historical region where FRELIMO held its II Congress, into a place of tourist-cultural attraction' (Comissão Instaladora do Instituto do Património Cultural 2006: 3). After conducting fieldwork between November 30 and December 9, 2006, the *Brigada Técnica* recommended, amongst other things, to 'Transform the site of the II Congress into an open museum. In the short term, it would be necessary to develop advocacy, marketing, publicity and fundraising actions with a view to the 40th anniversary of the event in 2008' (Comissão Instaladora do Instituto do Património Cultural 2006: 15). In several discussions with some of the members of *Brigada Técnica* it emerged that this initiative of UEM was then taken up by FRELIMO's *Comissão Política*. The head of *Brigada Técnica*, Linguist Professor at UEM and currently Deputy Minister of Education and Human Development, described the process in the following terms:

> The project was conceived at UEM and went to the Party (…) our idea was to negotiate with the government to celebrate 40th anniversary of Madjedje and hold a big party there in Matchedje (…) I remember what I said to my colleagues, let's do something, let's get the project to the FRELIMO party, the FRELIMO party is going to buy it (…) and we are two years away from 2008 (...) that's how we negotiated with the Minister of Education and Culture at the time and he liked it so that he took the matter to the Party (…) later we went to present to the *Comissão Política* of FRELIMO (…) in this process the *Comissão Política* liked the project (…) I remember, the President of the Party [Guebuza] at that time asked 'What is necessary for that to happen, what do you want us to do for Matchedje to happen in 2008?' I said we only want financial resources…we have the human resources (…) then he said 'eh okay if that's all okay, in 2008 we will go to Matchedje' (…) can you imagine how we felt there?[117]

On July 25, 2008, the state broadcaster (TVM) broadcast live to the entire country the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the II Congress in Matchedje. At the entrance of the historical site there was banner with the words 'II Congress of FRELIMO source of inspiration for the fight against poverty'. A crowd of over a thousand people (according to

[116] The members of the commission included Armindo Ngunga (Linguist, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of UEM, President of the Commission), Tomas Muacahia (Ecologist, Inhaca Maritime Biology Station at UEM), António Manso (Historian, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of UEM), Vicente Joaquim (Architect and Physical Planner, Faculty of Architecture and Physical Planning of UEM), Matilde Muhocha (Cultural heritage professional, Ministry of Education and Culture and the Secretariat of the Commission) and José Mucavele (Musician, composer, interpreter and ethnomusical researcher).

[117] Interview with Armindo Ngunga, Maputo (Campus of UEM), February 16, 2014.

the TVM jounalists) from all over Mozambique gathered in front of the tribune (platform) where the *comício popular* would take place while Guebuza, some veterans who participated in the Congress and distinguished guests were taking a guided tour through the site. TVM did not broadcast the visit to the monument, perhaps for the simple fact that the most important moment of the event was the *comício popular*. However, during the field visit in September 2013, I was given insight into one of the episodes related to the visit of Gubuza, recounted by the site manager, Mr. Rachide Jafete with whom I had an interesting conversation:

> Mr. Jafete: (…) then this tree, this landmark symbolizes trees suffered by the bombs and was the tree that His Excellency the President was able to hide from the bombings (…).
> Interviewer: Who is this?
> Mr. Jafete: President of the Republic Armando Emílio Guebuza, a bomb nearly missed him (…)
> Interviewer: Where was he?
> Mr. Jafete: Here [pointing to the road] when two aircrafts flew pass he came to stop here behind [a tree near a riverine]. So when the planes went to that side, he came and stop here, so the bomb was dropped but he hid behind that tree (…) soon after he fled to the banks of that river.
> Interviewer: And who told you this account?
> Mr. Jafete: This account was told by the President himself at the inauguration of the 40th anniversary, when he came here, he knelt and began to cry (…) that's when most of us knew that this after all is the tree where the President of the Republic was nearly killed by a bomb (...) these marks [pointing to burnt side of the tree] show that the tree has suffered, suffered by the bombs.[118]

I recalled a similar account by the veteran tour guide on my earlier visit to the site, but I failed to trace the story further. Despite the apparent significance of this landmark to Guebuza (see Figure 93) and the narrative around it, this tree is not part of the components listed and gazetted as important heritage elements of the historical site of Mtechedeje, as is the case with the sacred tree *N'solo*. This account might also be a very recent 'invented tradition'.



Figure 93: The 'refuge' tree in the historic site of Matchedje (2013).

[118] Interview with RJ, Matchedje (Aldeia II Congresso), September 3, 2013.

Returning to the *comício popular*, the MC rises to the stage and stirs the crowd 'Matchedje *hoyee*! President Guebuza *Hoyee*!', before announcing the program. The first part was dedicated to cultural performances followed by the speeches from representative of various organizations. The first speech was given by the representative of the OJM, José Patrício. In his speech, he thanked 'the youth of the Generation 25th of September' (as the generation of the veterans of liberation struggle are commonly referred to) whom he considered to be a 'source of inspiration of the current generation'. Patrício ended his speech by stating that 'this [current] generation affirms today that its cause is participatory and inclusive development' before chanting the 'Youth *hoyee*! President Guebuza *hoyee*!'.[119] This intervention was aligned with official discourse that claims that the historic mission of the current generation, which he calls the Turning Generation (*Geração da Viragem*), 'is to fight and overcome poverty' (Guebuza 2011g: 91).

The second speech was delivered by the representative of the Opposition Parties in Mozambique (OPM), Miguel Mabote. One of the hallmarks of Guebuza's state ceremonies is the space that has been given to a self-designated group that speaks on behalf of opposition in Mozambique. This is a group of political parties without seats in the Parliament, so it includes neither Renamo nor the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), the only opposition parties represented in Parliament. The parties grouped under OPM appear only during elections and do not have an electoral base. Most importantly, they often align themselves with FRELIMO's official discourse on governance, as Mabote's speech illustrates:

> The diversity of ideas about how to build a prosperous Mozambique, when well managed, is like a garden where each flower has no other purpose but to make the garden beautiful and attractive. It is in this principle of diversity that 23 political parties still without parliamentary seat, impregnated with patriotism, are associated with this historic and great celebration to also be inspired, just as in 1968 it was defined in this place that colonialism was an evil and we have eradicated it today. In the past, all Mozambicans felt the need to combat colonialism. We are independent today. All Mozambicans felt the need to end the war of 16 years. Today we are in peace. All Mozambicans feel the need to fight against absolute poverty. Poverty will be overcome [on TV, the highlight of the image of Guebuza appearing very pleased].[120]

Mabote continued his speech, which could have been easily mistaken for an intervention of a government official or FRELIMO member, highlighting the achievements of the government, encouraging citizen participation in Guebuza's PAI to 'expose their concerns in an orderly

[119] Public speech by José Patrício in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.
[120] Public speech by Miguel Mabote in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.

manner'. Finally, Mabote referred to the municipal elections on November 19, 2013, urging all Mozambicans to register to vote.

This was followed by statements by the FRELIMO Party Secretary in Niassa, the representative of the Association of the Veterans of the National Liberation Struggle (ACLLN), and then the General Secretary of the FRELIMO party, all expressing their support to the government of the day, chanting slogans like 'President Armando Guebuza *hoyee*! FRELIMO party *hoyee*!' at the beginning and at the end of their interventions. The Governor of Niassa Province, Arnaldo Bimbi, spoke next, saying: 'We want to thank our glorious Party for the wise decision to carry out these celebrations in Matchedje. Special greetings to President Guebuza who has been carrying out the valorisation of self-esteem which contributes to the fight against poverty in the country, in Niassa and in Matchedje'.[121] Bimbi's intervention listed the 'great achievements' (infrastructures) brought in as part of the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the II Congress: namely the rehabilitation of more than 250 km of road from Lichinga to Matchedje which shortened the journey time from 8 to 4 hours; the electrification of the Administrative Post of Matchedje through groups of generators and solar panels; the construction of a telecommunications centre that made possible the use of a radio, television and mobile telephone networks; the construction of a Customs office on the Rovuma border; and the nearby airstrip and a tourist center.

Bimbi was followed by the Vice-Chairman of the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) party of Tanzania, Pius Msekwa, who recalled the contribution of the Tanzanians in material, logistical goods and even donations of blood to the freedom fighters of Mozambique and Southern Africa at large, highlighting the role of Tanzania in the OAU Liberation Struggle Committee based in Dar es Salaam. He also spoke about the close ties of cooperation between FRELIMO and CCM and the realization of joint projects such as the construction of a bridge over the Rovuma river (nearly completed at the time) and the abolition of visas for transit between the two countries. At the end of the speech he chanted, '*Viva* FRELIMO! *Viva* CCM! *A Luta Continua*! [the struggle continues]'.[122]

This ws followed by a 'cultural moment' in which the Choral Group of the Veterans sang a song in which at some stage the lyrics stated: 'Matchedje is a culminating moment for us,

[121] Public speech by Arnaldo Bimbi in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.
[122] Public speech by Pius Msekwa in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.

with rebirth, congressional act, confused and traitors, their ideas decimated'. So, Guebuza began his speech by referring to this song:

> When I heard this last song, about 'confused and traitors', I remembered another situation in our history: we were coming to the Congress but not everyone was clear about the objective, they were not seeing the people to be served, the struggle to liquidate colonialism. Many were only here to accomplish personal desires. So, they cause waves of confusion and sought to destabilize the liberation movement. The response of the artist Dolondolo Mindjingo was to create this song and denounce the provocateurs and stimulated the sons [of Mozambique] dedicated to the liberation struggle.[123]

It is significant the fact that Guebuza wanted to emphasize right from the beginning, before even reading his speech, that Matchedje signified the victory of the 'correct line' of FRELIMO denying the so called 'reactionaries' and 'traitors' any place in the 'rich and glorious history of the struggle'. He returned to this point later when he stated:

> There is, however, people who try to misrepresent this rich history, seeking heroism in betrayal, clairvoyance in those who have faltered, and vision in those who foment division, intrigue, tribalism and racism. Today some of these detractors of our history are seeking virtues in colonialism and try to convince the Generation of 25th September to regret having carried out a victorious liberation struggle and for giving the Mozambican people the right to own their own destinies.[124]

Guebuza's criticism was addressed to those calling for recognition of other liberation heroes marginalized by FRELIMO, such as that of his then Vice-President Uria Simango who, being the father of current MDM leader Deviz Simango, became also a 'political ancestor' of the supporters of this Movement with a considerable electoral base in Mozambique. As LeFanu (2012: 257) points out, 'People keep on trying to wipe Uria Simango from the visual record, but he just keeps on appearing'. She notices that in the first edition of Mondlane's book *The Struggle for Mozambique* published immediately after Mondlane assassination in 1969, a photo section includes a photo of Simango and Mondlane taken during the II Congress where both appeared in a friendly conversation. In the second edition of the book publish a year later, when Simango had been expelled from FRELIMO, that photo vanished from the book. 'But Simango's ghost remains'. In the photo of Mondlane giving the opening speech in Matchedje, one can see behind him the image of Simango deep in the shade of a thatched shelter, despite being omitted from the caption in the book (LeFanu 2012: 258).

[123] Public speech by Armando Guebuza in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.
[124] Public speech by Armando Guebuza in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.

Interestingly, António Manso, an historian who was part of the *Brigada Técnica* and in charge of producing a booklet as part of the celebrations, recounted how some young people in FRELIMO's *Comissão Política* (where his work had to be presented and approved before it could be publish) ordered him to replace the original photo of Mondlane's opening speech in the cover of his booklet by another photo, in which the image of Simango had been erased (using Photoshop software)[125] (see Figures 94 and 95). Yet, once again, this exercise of erasure proved fruitless as the original image of Mondlane's opening speech in the II Congress appears in the life-size exhibition in the interpretation centre at the historic site of Matchedje. The other image that appears in this permanent exhibition is the one of Mondlane and Simango erased from the first edition of Mondlane's book. However, Simago's name is not mentioned; the caption reads 'President and Vice President of FRELIMO in 1968'. It is worth notice that Manso also responded to the censorship of the cover of his booklet by including this photo of Mondlane and Simango in the last page of his booklet, although without caption (see Figure 96).



Figure 94: Cover of the booklet on Matchedje where the image of Uria Simango has been erased.



Figure 95: The original photograph of the Mondlane's opening speech during the II Congress where Uria Simango appears in the background.

[125] Interview with António Manso Maputo (Campus of UEM), December 13, 2012.




Figure 96: Photo of Mondlane and Simango erased from Mondlane's book (1970) but reprinted in the exhibition at Matchedje and in Manso's booklet (Manso 2008: 44).

Gubuza's criticisms during his opening remarks can also be understood as directed to a group he calls 'poverty preachers', 'prophets of doom' or 'refined demobilizers of the FRELIMO Government and all Mozambicans in their fight against poverty' (Guebuza 2006c: 30). These Mozambicans and foreigners are the enemies of the people. The main characteristic that defines this group is the criticism it makes of Guebuza's governance model. So Guebuza's intervention, even as it highlights the value of 'national unity' during the struggle days and now in the 'new struggle' against poverty, continues the distinction encapsulated in the official liberation discourse 'between the "good" Mozambicans, who became involved in the armed struggle, and their enemies, those who betrayed the national cause, either by allying themselves with the colonial regime or, subsequently, by criticizing and challenging the national political project advanced by the leadership of FRELIMO' (Meneses 2015: 12).

Continuing with his initial remarks, Guebuza said: 'When I see that space where the delegates gathered, there where the monument stands today, it was the space where delegates moved away to vote. Secret ballot 40 years ago. These things of elections are part of the FRELIMO traditions'. With these remarks Guebuza sought to promote the idea of the

longevity of the Party's democratic tradition, conveniently overlooking that the democratic centralism of the Liberation Front and then the Party (which still stands as a guiding principle today) did not mean a multiparty regime in post-independence. Therefore, by claiming that FRELIMO has had a democratic culture for as long as 40 years, Guebuza seeks to nullify the voices of the opposition (mostly Renamo), which claim the credit of having forced FRELIMO to abandon single-party regime in 1990 with the adoption of a multiparty Constitution.

Before reading his speech, Guebuza paused to ask the veterans who attended the II Congress in 1968 to stand up and asked for a 'photograph [of] the delegates 40 years later'. He then presented the main decisions of the II Congress while emphasizing the fact such decisions not only remain relevant in the present but they also guide the agenda of his governance. At one point, he said:

> In 1968 Mondlane said here in Matchedje and I quote: 'In the last six years, our people wrote with their blood new pages in the book of history of the struggle of man for his Freedom. In order for this struggle to continue, to progress and to succeed, we must all know how to help our homeland by uniting ourselves with other individuals, uniting ourselves with other ethnic and tribal groups, uniting ourselves with other peoples of this and of other continents, marching together and triumphant for the victory that is ours'. Forty years later, we can paraphrase the architect of national unity and say that in the last 33 years our people, with their commitment, have written some new pages in the history book of the struggle for their dignity. In order for this struggle to continue, to progress and to achieve success, we must all know how to serve our country, reinforcing national unity and national and international partnerships, marching together and triumphantly toward victory against poverty, a victory that is ours. That is why the spirit of the decisions made in 1968 continues to underlie the current governance agenda under implementation in this pearl of the Indic Ocean [i.e. Mozambique].[126]

8.3.1.3. Celebrating 40th anniversary of the death of national heroes

It is not possible to know for sure the process that led to the adoption of 40 years after the death of some figures of the national liberation struggle as the landmark for celebrations. In 2002, however, the government launched a project to collect sources, memoirs and narratives of the history of national liberation as part of commemorations of the 40th anniversary of the foundation of FRELIMO (Tembe 2014: 2). It seems that around 2008 there was a directive (*orientação superior*) from FRELIMO's *Comissão Política* instructing the government (mainly ARPAC) to write the history of the fallen heroes buried in the National Heroes Acre.[127] In fact, the heroes who died before 1968 (e.g. the 40th anniversary of death of

[126] Public speech by Armando Guebuza in Matchedje, July 25, 2008.
[127] Interview with Fernando Dava, Maputo, December 4, 2013.

Milagre Sebastião Mabote was in 2005 and Filipe Samuel Magaia was in 2006) did not benefit from the state ceremony in the same way that became common since 2008 (i.e. with the construction of monuments and state ceremony in their homeland). The Party's *orientação* for the 'exaltation of the fallen heroes' was then made government policy. A note circulated by the Ministry of Culture states:

> In the context of valorization and recognition of the National Heroes that celebrate 40 years after their physical disappearance, the Mozambican State has defined a National Program of exaltation for the best children of Mozambique as an opportunity to preserve and disseminate its legacy to present and future generations. In this context, local and provincial government and social authorities are urged to design programs that will include the following activities:
>
> - Conducting lectures, led by local personalities;
> - Carrying out voluntary work and cultural activities of diverse nature;
> - Building of monument of exaltation of the National Hero, in his/her native land;
> - Collection of testimonies and the production of written reports on the life and work of the National Hero;
> - Conducting radio, television and other programs;
> - Implementation of other programs, to be approved at the local/central provincial level, as appropriate (Ministério da Cultura 2013: 1).

The main elements of the national programme of exhortation of national heroes included the production of a biography on the 'life and legacy' (*vida e obra*) of the hero published by the ARPAC and a state ceremony forty years after each particular had died. The ceremony to honour the hero was to be led by the head of state and often within the framework of PAI, as described in section 7.1. The state ceremony included the inauguration of the monument dedicated to the hero, a *comício popular* of exaltation of the hero's deeds, a visit to the graves of the hero's relatives and the offering of a house to the family of the honoured hero. This national programme of exaltation included 17 of the 26 heroes whose remains are deposited in the National Heroes Acre (see Table 7). On the Heroes Day (February 3, 2014) all 26 heroes (plus Gruveta Massamba who was declared national hero but buried in his homeland Zambezia) were formally awarded a posthumous Honorary title 'Hero of the Republic of Mozambique', in accordance with the Law (Lei n° 10/2011 de 13 de Julho).

Table 7: List of National Heroes 'buried' in the National Heroes Acre in Maputo

Nr.	Heroes name	Place of birth		Date of birth	Date of death	40th death anniversary	
		Province	District			Date	Commemorations
1	Milagre Sebastião Mabote	Gaza	Xai-Xai	28.07.1934	May 1965	May 2005	– State ceremony in Chicumbane, Gaza, December 2, 2015, celebrating 50th anniversary of his death.
2	Filipe Samuel Magaia	Zambézia	Mocuba	07.03.1937	11.10.1966	11.10.2006	– State ceremony in Maputo, October 10, 2006 (homage without construction of monument). – Monument with a statue in Maputo in 2016.
3	John Issa	Niassa	Mecula	1940	24.03.1968	24.03.2008	– State ceremony in Macalange, Niassa, July 7, 2008.
4	Tomás Nduda	Cabo Delgado	Muidumbe	01.01.1936	27.03.1968	27.03.2008	– State ceremony in Nampanha, Cabo Delgado, March 23, 2008.
5	Mateus Sansão Muthemba	Gaza	Xai-Xai	25.07.1907	06.06.1968	06.06.2008	– State ceremony in Chicumbane, Gaza, June 6, 2008.
6	José Phahlane Macamo	Gaza	Chibuto	1936	23.09.1968	23.09.2008	– State ceremony in Mbambane, Gaza, October 5, 2008.
7	Paulo Samuel Kankhomba	Niassa	Lago	18.08.1938	22.12.1968	22.12.2008	– State ceremony in Chilola, Niassa, December 22, 2008.
8	Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane	Gaza	Mandlakazi	20.06.1920	03.02.1969	03.02.2009	– Monument with bust statue in Maputo, February 3, 2007. – State ceremony to celebrate 87th birthday of Mondlane and the 45 anniversary of FRELIMO. There was a requalification of Open Museum of Nwadjahane, July 20, 2007. – Classification of Nwadjahane as national cultural heritage in 2008. – Declaration of the year Eduardo

							Mondlane in 2009.
9	Belmiro Obadias Muianga	Inhambane	Zandamela	19.11.1942	30.09.1969	30.09.2009	– Name attributed to a street in the capital Maputo (next to the seat of Government) in 2009. – Name attributed to the Teacher Training Institute in Cuamba, Niassa, in 2009. – State ceremony in Zamdamela, Inhambane, August 10, 2010.
10	Josina Machel	Inhambane	Vilanculo	10.08.1945	07.04.1971	07.04.2011	– Monument with statue in Chilembene, Gaza in 2011. – State ceremony in Chilembene, April 7, 2011.
11	Robati Carlos	Cabo Delgado	Nangade	1936/40	05.03.72	05.03.2012	– State ceremony in Muadi, March 17, 2012.
12	Armando Tivane	Gaza	Chibuto	1937	September 1973	September 2013	– State ceremony in Maqueze, September 1, 2013.
13	Francisco Orlando Magumbwa	Niassa	Lago	28.11.1940	04.01.1973	04.01.2013	– State ceremony in Messumba, Niassa, June 17, 2013. – Name attributed to a street in the capital Maputo.
14	Romão Fernandes Farinha	Cabo Delgado	Muidumbe	1943	28.03.1973	28.03.2013	– State ceremony in Muatide, Cabo Delgado, April 23, 2013.
15	Luís Joaquim José Marra	Sofala	Caia	26.09.1946	05.07.1973	05.07.2013	– State ceremony in Caia, Sofala, October 25, 2013.
16	Francisco Manyanga	Tete	Mutarara	27.03.1931	29.07.1973	29.07.2013	– State ceremony in Chare, Tete, August 9, 2013.
17	Emília Daússe	Tete	Changara	1953	11. 11. 1973	11.11. 2013	– State ceremony in Nyaakamba, Tete, June 16, 2014.
18	Bernabé Adison Kajika	Niassa	Lago	29.08.1938	10.05.1974	10.05.2014	– State ceremony in Metangula, Niassa, June 11, 2014.
19	Samora Moisés Machel	Gaza	Chokwe	29.09.1933	19.10.1986	19.10.2026	– Celebration of 75th birth anniversary of Machel and the

							declaration of Chilembene as national heritage site in 2008. – Declaration of the year Samora Machel in 2011 – Construction of 11 monuments with statues of Samora Machel for all provincial capitals (inaugurated between 2011 and 2012).
20	Oswaldo Assane Tazama	Niassa	Lago	15.09.1940	07.10.2001	07.10.2041	
21	Sebastião Marcos Mabote	Gaza	Xai-Xai	18.05.1941	27.01.2001	27.01.2041	
22	Fernando Matavele	Gaza	Mandlakazi	05.05.1929	16.07.2001	16.07.2041	
23	Solomone Machaque	Sofala	Búzi	20.09.1920	09.12.2003	09.12.2043	
24	José João Craveirinha	Maputo	Mafalala	28.05.1922	06.02.2003	06.02.2043	
25	Justino Sigaulane Chemane	Gaza	Mandlakazi	15.10.1923	10.01.2004	10.01.2044	– State ceremony in Matola, Maputo, June 19, 2008 (homage without construction of monument).
26	António E. F. Langa	(?)	(?)		1972 (?)		

One aspect of this heroes' exaltation program that deserves attention is the centralizing nature of memorialisation process. Although the initial *orientação* from the Party and the government was to attribute to the provincial authorities and other constituencies the responsibility to design and execute the exaltation programme, the diversity of initiatives and outcomes were seen by the central government as problematic. As the architect Vicente Joaquim ,who designed some of the monuments, puts it:

> the problem is that the initial terms of references for celebrations were very vague (…) each province develop its own monument individually and some thought they could even build monuments of carving wood (...) these projects were being made and when presented to the ministry of culture it was realised that things were wrong.[128]

Consequently, the Ministry of Culture recentralized the decision-making powers by drafting 'Guidelines for Homage of Mozambican Heroes for the Commemorations of the 40th Anniversary of their Death).[129] According to the Ministry of Culture, the Guidelines were 'necessary to make the exaltation honourable and to confer a certain national uniformity to this noble recognition' (Ministério da Cultura 2013: 2). Thus, under the 'Terms of Reference for Commemorative Monuments of Exaltation to National Heroes' the Guidelines states:

> Within the scope of this program of exaltation, the memorial monument to be built, must symbolize eloquently the National Independence, the ideas of Freedom, the exaltation of 'mozambicaness', national unity and solidarity.
> - The monument must have an urban structure considered harmonic taking into account the surrounding landscape;
> - The place where the monument will be implanted should be easily accessible to the public and of good visibility: have good drainage conditions; be a space of urban value; allow population concentration for rallies or other events;
> - The dimensions of the monument should be of impact, with a minimum height of five and a half meters (5.5m), the other dimensions being calculated in proportion to the height;
> - The monument must include, among other elements, two plates with the dimensions (90 x 90 cm), one didactic and the other of inauguration; an approved official photograph/image; a device for the deposition of the wreath, with a minimum height of 1.15 m; a walkway of at least 15 m in length, properly paved to facilitate the ceremonial events;
> - The monument should be complemented by a mural of artistic interpretation of the exaltation, which should include, among other aspects, the biography of the Hero and images of emblematic figures such as the leaders of the historical process of the construction of the Mozambican Nation;
> - In the left front access of the Monument, a stone, with a height of 1.15 meters, must be constructed for the installation of the inauguration plaque with dimensions 90 x 90 cm;
> - To facilitate the ceremonial march, one must avoid the use of stairs in the front walkway of the monument;
> - The material to be used, especially in the noble part of the Monument, must be consistent and durable (Ministério da Cultura 2013: 2).

[128] Interview with Vicente Joaquim, Maputo (Campus of UEM), December 14, 2013.
[129] *Guião para Homenagem aos Heróis Moçambicanos, por ocasião das Comemorações do 40° Aniversario do seu desaparecimento fisico.*

In addition, the Ministry of Culture defined specific criteria to define which type of memorial or monument to construct for the heroes. They adopted three hierarchical categories:

> Category 1 - Monument with statue: The beneficiary of this category of monument is the National Hero who has distinguished himself in acts that have demanded sacrifice, courage, audacity and selflessness in the mentioned process, having occupied a position of leadership at the highest level, in the National Liberation Struggle or in the direction of the Mozambican State.
>
> Category 2 - Monument with bust: The beneficiary of this category of monument is the National Hero who has distinguished himself in acts that have required sacrifice, courage, audacity and selflessness in the referred process, having held a position of intermediate command or participated in exceptional acts of bravery and heroism in the defence of the Motherland and human life.
>
> Category 3 - Monument with other abstract and conceptual figurative representations: The beneficiary of this category of monument is the National who has distinguished himself in acts that have required sacrifice, courage, audacity and self-denial in the said process, having held a lower command post or Participated in exceptional acts of defence of national unity and promotion of socio-political, economic, cultural, sport and technical-scientific development of the Country (República de Moçambique 2012: 4).

The result of the implementation of these guidelines can be seen in two examples of monuments built in Niassa province: the monument to Samora Machel in the city of Lichinga and the monument to Francisco Orlando Magumbwa in Messumba, Lago district. The monument to Machel is located in the city centre of Lichinga, at the roundabout where two major avenues, Samora Machel and April 7th, converge, next to the seat of the Provincial Government. The statue of Machel, in the center of the roundabout, appears in a charismatic pose, with one hand on his waist and the other raised with the index finger pointing up (see Figure 97). A few meters behind the statue there is a crescent-shaped mural depicting the various events related to Machel's role in the struggle, from his life as an assistant nurse to guerrilla and leader (see Figure 98). On two ends of the mural there are stained glass windows with photographic exhibition on the 'life and legacy' of Machel. The monument

also includes two plates: the inauguration plate (*placa de inauguração*) which reads 'Monument in honour of the Founder of the Mozambican State and First President of the People's Republic of Mozambique Marechal Samora Moisés Machel. Inaugurated by His Excellency Armando Emílio Guebuza, President of the Republic of Mozambique. Lichinga, on 27 June 2012 (see Figure 99); and a didactic plate (*placa didática*) that reads 'Marshal Samora Moisés Machel (29.09.1933 - 19.10.1986) Founder of the Mozambican State and First President of the People's Republic of Mozambique' (see Figure 100).



Figure 97: View of monument to Samora Machel in Lichinga in 2013.



Figure 98: Partial view of the mural in the background of the monument depicting scenes of Samora's life.



Figure 99: The inauguration plate of the monument to Samora Machel in Lichinga (2013).



Figure 100: The didactic plate of the monument to Samora Machel in Lichinga (2013).

The monument to Francisco Magumbwa in the rural village of Messumba is less elaborate. It consists of a triangular concrete structure covered with stones in which is embedded an image of the hero and a didactic plaque below. A pedestal for placing the wreath is attached to the monument's base. The monument is circumscribed by the mural with illustrations of the flag of Mozambique, an abbreviated biography and image of Magumbwa, two scenes of the liberation struggle, followed by four large portraits of Mondlane, Samora, Chissano and Guebuza. The monument also contains the inauguration plate on the left side of the long pathway that leads to the monument (see Figure 101). The state ceremony on June 17, 2013 included the offering of a house to Magumbwa's family (see Figure 102) and, of course, a *comício popular* (see Figure 103).



Figure 101: Monument to Francisco Magumbwa in Messumba, Lago district, Niassa (2013). (Image Courtesy: Manuel Vene)



Figure 102: House given to the family of the hero during the state ceremony in 2013 (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).



Figure 103: People gathered in front of the platform for *comício popular* (2013) (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).

This standardization of the memorialisation of heroes, which aimed to make the state ceremony 'honourable', implied the adoption of Western notions of monumentality. Apart from the public engagement during the highly ritualised state ceremony during the inauguration, it is unclear how this model of heritagization fits in or is articulated with other notions of heritage amongst ordinary citizens in these rural contexts. There seem to be tensions between the Westernized conception of monument/memorial and notion of grave in many African communities. Contrary to the idea of a memorial where tribute is paid to the departed ones, in most of rural southern Africa the place people visit after a death is the grave or any other sacred place deemed appropriate, to interact with the spirit of the ancestor, who is very much part of the living. This invocation of ancestors only takes place on special occasions when there is a social need. My field work did not include research in the communities of the many heroes who were the target of this national exaltation programme. And due to time constrains during fieldwork in Matchedje and Chilemben I was not able explore residents' views of these new monuments, which had considerable visual impact in the local landscapes, many of them in places with considerable levels of poverty).

For Guebuza, however, it seems that these projects provided a unique opportunity to inscribe his name in the heritage landscape of Mozambique not only as someone who remembered the heroes of the nation and built monuments to honour them (as indicated in the inauguration plates of every single monument), but also as a veteran of the struggle who deserves a place in the pantheon of national heroes. For although the construction of the monuments and the imagery in the paintings of the events of the liberation struggle for each hero was executed by local agents, the orientations of what to represent and how to represent certainly came from structures high up in the Party and the government. This is why, for instance, in the mural of

the monument to Orlando Magumbwa the image of Guebuza is painted alongside the other FRELIMO heroes (Mondlane, Machel and Chissano), clearly highlighting his role in the movement's leadership genealogy.

It is also significant to note that despite the existence of criteria for each category of national heroes, there is still no mechanism that clearly defines which category of monument to build for each national hero. Consequently, only the 'Architect' (Eduardo Mondlane) and the 'Father' (Samora Machel) of the nation have been monumentalized with statues. The other national heroes fall into the second category of memorial monuments without statues. However a monument with a statue is now under construction in Maputo to honour of Filipe Samuel Magaia, as part of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of his death, to be inaugurated by Guebuza's successor, Filipe Jacinto Nyussi.

A matrix of activities and responsibilities of the multi-sectorial commission for the preparation of the tribute to the Filipe Magaia in 2015, provides an insight into the centralized nature of this memorialisation of the national heroes. In this case, a commission was composed by members of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Maputo City Council, Government of Maputo City, and Ministry of Veterans. The elaborate terms of reference for each institution included:

Ministry of Culture and Tourism

- Guarantee the launching of the first stone for the construction of the monument, on the day of the homage to the National Hero;
- Ensure the construction of the monument;
- Guarantee the rehabilitation of the Hero family's residence;
- Revise and publish a second edition of the book on the 'life and legacy' of the National Hero;
- Provide clothing to family members (notable cases);
- Prepare the speech proposal;
- Harmonize the proposed list of guests and submit to the State Protocol;
- Prepare the program proposal of the ceremony and submit to the State Protocol;
- Ensure scheduling of the event and articulation with relevant institutions.

Maputo City Council

- Improve the access (roads) to the family's residence (Bairro Chamankulo C) and the area around the roundabout in the avenue that hold the heroes' name;
- Present the terms of reference and estimates of the costs for the monument;
- Propose the site for the construction of the monument to the National Hero;
- Approve the project and its licensing;
- Decorate the places where the events will take place (Heroes Square, access roads to the residence, place of the rally - Kape-Kape Field, monument site and Filipe Samuel Magaia Avenue);
- Elaborate the proposal of intervention of His Excellency the President of the City Council;

- Submit the list of guests to Ministry of Culture and Tourism;
- Ensure the completion of the traditional ceremony.

Government of Maputo City

- Mobilizing and providing transport support to the population;
- Guarantee of infrastructures for the rally (grandstand, grandstands, stage, ecological toilets);
- Provide sound amplification equipment, chairs, shades and water;
- Elaborate and implement the cultural program of the event (mobilization of cultural groups);
- Elaborate the proposal of intervention of His Excellency the Governor;
- Submit the list of guests to Ministry of Culture and Tourism;

Ministry of Veterans

- Mobilize the Combatants for their massive participation in the homage to the National Hero ceremonies;
- Ensure the participation of the families of the National Hero who live outside the City of Maputo.
- Ensure social issues/rights for the National Hero's relatives;
- Identify personalities to give testimonials about the Hero and guide lectures/debates;
- Elaborate and implement a program of debates and lectures in institutions and media;
- Promote a massive dissemination of the event;
- Draw up proposals for interventions;
- Submit the list of guests to Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2015: 1-2).

It is seems that although this national programme for exaltation of national heroes sought to use these figures to mobilize the new nation-building process through grassroots participation, this heritagization process instead privileges the ritualization and ceremonialism of the state around the figure of the President. It should also be remembered that these exaltation projects are carried out within the framework of open governance and as such must meet the objectives of this governance model. One of Guebuza's main concerns was about the 'leaders who do not bother to quantify their accomplishments nor respect or demand compliance with established deadlines' (Guebuza 2007: 195). Thus, the slogan of the day was ‘decision taken, decision executed’ (*decisão tomada, decisão cumprida*). Consequently, in the implementation of each project, the concern of the local representatives of the state and public officials was firstly to show the ‘fulfilment’ of the plans [execution of the decisions taken], to ‘meet’ of the goals and to reproduce the official discourse’ (Gonçalves 2013a: 66), resulting in the adoption of *ad-hoc* measures and non-participatory approaches in the memorialisation process. For instance, reflecting on the political pressure for the completion of the project for celebration of Matchedje in time for the festivities, an official from the Provincial Directorate of Tourism in Niassa commented:

> (…) when these things are related to politics we have a very short period and things are rushed. You will not believe that the great part of those works [the tourist camp near the historic site] were undertaken at night (…) the masons, painters, plumbers, electricians did not sleep, 1 am, 2 am or

> even 3 am there were still working. Generators were used to make it to the deadline, so it was not such an easy task.[130]

One of the results of this *modus operandi* is that there is often not much space for planning and putting in place mechanisms for the management of such monuments once the inauguration is over. In Matchedje in 2013, five years after the celebrations large part of the thatched huts built in local material had collapsed due lack of maintenance (see Figures 104-108).



Figure 104: House of Eduardo Mondlane in 2010 (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).



Figure 105: House of Eduardo Mondlane in 2013.



Figure 106: House of delegates from Zambézia Province in 2010 (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).



Figure 107: House of delegates from Zambézia Province (2013).

[130] Interview with VM, Linchinga, December 14, 2013.



Figure 108: House of delegates from Inhambane Province in 2010 (Image courtesy: Manuel Vene).



Figure 109: House of delegates from Inhambane Province (2013).

The site manager lamented the lack of resources for daily maintenance activities such as cleaning because the regulatory document for the site had not been approved at the time. No funds had been allocated to the site from the state budget. The report of activities for the first six months of 2012 (dated of June 26, 2012) prepared by the site manager and sent to the Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture, states:

> It constitutes major constraints for workers the delay of their food subsidies, as well as the lack of material for our work, namely: axes, harrows, ink for the printer, fuel for the generator, cylinders and rear tire for motorcycle. On the other hand, they also constitute constraints to many huts that are destroyed, because of the lack of means of transportation to search for construction material (Matchedje Historical Site and Interpretation Center 2012: 3).

A hand written monthly report of March 2013, presents the same picture adding 'the lack of buckets, hoes, lanterns, firearm. For the technician [site manager], lack of residence, transport, pen, A4 and fuel for the generator'. The report also proposes 'that the subsidies being paid every two months, differing from the current scenario when they are paid every seven months' (Matchedje Historical Interpretation Center 2013: 2). The members of the *Brigada Técnica* that spearheaded the Matchedje project seems unanimous in stating that while there was much initial support for the project, after the inauguration there were no funds and no political will for the upkeep of the site. In addition, there were several tensions between some of the stakeholder groups. For instance, the academic group who masterminded the project felt that despite the willingness of the UEM to play a key role at the site (the university had included in its 2008 and 2009 budget a heading for maintenance of

Matchedje), at the end, they 'preferred to stay away' from the power struggles amongst different actors and institutions over ownership of the site.[131]

Another illustration of the negatives effects of the rushed heroes' exaltation projects can be seen at monument to Josina Machel Chilemenbe, built in 2011. As the official tour guide of the historic site of Chilemebene explained in 2015 while standing at the site:

> (…) this is what I was talking about ... this was built ... all these things, were built in a week. Can you imagine a week? It means that four days was for the excavations, I do not know what…then the foundations do not know what and the last two days were dedicated to the placement of this [pointing to the tiles on the monument] ... everything made in a hurry.[132]



Figure 110: View of the monument to Josina Machel illustrating an area with missing tiles in December 2012.



Figure 111: View of the monument to Josina Machel illustrating the area with missing tiles in October 2015.

Some professionals involved in these projects refer to the stress of having to finalise and fix monuments on the eleventh hour. The monument to Josina Machel is a case in point, it was built in 2011 when all attention was centred on the 'Year of Samora Machel' which had begun with the inauguration of the first monument to Machel on February 3 in the city of Xai-Xai. So, there was very little time to prepare the exaltation program for Josina Machel which had to be ready for inauguration on April 7, Mozambican Women's Day. Architect Vicente Joaquim suggested that these monuments built in extreme haste (referring in particular to the monuments of Samora Machel in Xai-Xai and Josina Machel in Chilemebene) should, after the inauguration, 'be dismantled and reconstituted in order to correct all mistakes and improvisations'. But state officials are often too busy implementing

[131] Interviews with MM, Maputo, December 16, 2013; Arimindo Ngunga, Maputo (Campus of UEM), February 16, 2014; and António Manso Maputo (Campus of UEM), December 13, 2013.
[132] Interview with Inácio Ossivane, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.

the ‘the next task’ with tangible results that can be showcased to their superiors. After the inauguration by the head of state, it was always time to rush to prepare the next inauguration ceremony for another national hero or undertake several other projects which results are constantly evaluated not only by other state official higher in the hierarchy, but by mainly Party structures in their constant visits as part of Guebuza’s open governance model.

A central element of this programme of exaltation of national heroes is of course Guebuza’s use of patriotism to advance his political agenda. Thus, in Nwadjahane in 2007, Guebuza depicts the struggle heroes’ lives as journeys of suffering and ultimate triumph as these figures willingly accepted to sacrifice their own lives to achieve independence, as he highlighted during the open ceremony of the military training camp in Manhiça (Maputo province) in March 2005:

> We bring these examples [after narrating episodes of liberation struggle] to demonstrate that our Independence was only possible thanks to the sacrifice of men and women, many of them young, who gave themselves up to the cause of the Liberation of the Land and the Men. Many of the protagonists of this struggle have abandoned the comfort of their families, the warmth of their friendships, to take risks, including the loss of their own lives (Guebuza 2006: 60).

This narrative was the trademark of Guebuza’s ‘patriotic discourse’ often presented during the state-ceremonies to remember and celebrate the ‘life and legacy’ of struggle heroes. For instance, in his speech during the inauguration of the monument to honor Romão Fernandes Farinha, in Muatide, Cabo Delgado, on April 23, 2013, Guebuza summarizes the biography of Farinha thus:

> Romão Fernandes Farinha is a reference when we talk about self-esteem, patriotism and National Unity in Mozambique. It should serve as a compass for those of us who are born with few possessions and in humble families so that they will not lower their arms and stop fighting for a better future. Romão Fernandes Farinha's example of self-esteem demonstrates that we can all dream higher and, if we believe in our abilities, we can overcome the obstacles that lie before us. (...) Believing, working and moving forward are the slogans that encouraged Romão Fernandes Farinha to fight and break the siege that foreign domination had built around him (…) We came to Muatide today to say: we want that the National Hero Fernandes Farinha continues to be one of those compasses that guide us in this fight [fight against poverty] (Guebuza 2013: 192, 196).

These attributes, ‘self-esteem’ and ‘patriotism’ are, for Guebuza, important elements that should be appropriated by Mozambicans in their identity representations as a collective, in

order to achieve a common objective: the elimination of poverty. Guebuza thus suggests that poverty can be eradicated in Mozambique by individual commitment. By inviting Mozambicans to reproduce the life example of Romão Fernandes Farinha (Posse 2015: 76) Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse' assumes that the genesis of poverty in Mozambique lies in the Mozambicans themselves. In his inauguration speech in 2005 Guebuza declared the elimination of poverty as his main policy goal. The official political discourse suggests this will be accomplished by economic growth and the transformation of the mind, (or culture), of the poor (implying that people are poor because they are 'sloth[ful]', they 'lack self-esteem' or they have a 'miserable mentality' [Chichava 2009: 10]). This means criticising the 'culture of poverty' and praising the 'culture of individual entrepreneurship', of the rich. Individual enrichment must be fostered as a precondition to fight national poverty (cf. Chichava 2009, 2010; Brito 2010). In this sense, poverty is a problem of mentality and culture for it is in the mind of the poor and their way of life. To put it differently, the belief is that 'the poor are materially poor because they suffer from mental poverty' (Castel-Branco 2010: 6). This analysis of poverty removes the responsibility from the state and FRELIMO-led government and places any failure of the 'fight against poverty' on the poor themselves. In fact, from the government's perspective there are always others (e.g. colonialism, the post-independence war of 'destabilization' of 'Renamo war') to blame for poverty (Gonçalves 2012: 5).

It is based on this conception of poverty that Gubuza's 'patriotic discourse' exalts the spirit of struggle, sacrifice and dedication of national heroes in facing the country's challenges. But despite Guebuza's claims in his inauguration for the second term on January 14, 2010, that 'poverty has declined considerably' (Guebuza 2011g: 89), there is little evidence for this claim. In 2008/2009, the national incidence of poverty was 54.7% (Posse 2015: 63), a clear failure to meet the goal of the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA II) 2006-2009, which was to reduce poverty in Mozambique from 54.1% in 2005 to 45% by 2009 (Governo de Moçambique 2006: 1). Despite the Government's defensive attitude, the publication of the third assessment report of poverty in Mozambique, based on surveys conducted by the National Statistics Institute, confirmed the view taken by some authors in recent years (e.g. Hanlon 2007, 2010; Cunguara and Hanlon 2010) that poverty was not declining (Brito 2012: 25). In 2011, the Government approved the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014 which had as its principal goal the reduction of the incidence of food poverty from the current level of 54.7% (in 2011) to 42% by 2014 (Governo de Moçambique 2011: 7).

Despite being contradicted by official statistics on poverty, Guebuza consistently invoked the examples of sacrifice and glory impersonated in the liberation heroes, mainly of Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, in his nation-building and state-crafting project. The celebrations around Samora Machel in 2011 provide an insight into another dimension of the heroes's exaltation programme.

8.3.2. Celebrating the 'Father' of the Nation: Year Samora Machel

8.3.2.1. Machel in bronze statues and infrastructure development

The consecration of 2011 as the 'Year of Samora Machel' aimed at celebrating the 25th anniversary of the death of the 'founder of the Mozambican nation'. Two major programs were launched: the construction in all provincial capitals and later in Chilembene of monuments with statues of Samora Machel, and the creation of the Samora Machel Center for Knowledge and Development (*Centro de Conhecimento e Desenvolvimento Samora Machel*), as a way of 'valuing the thinking, life and legacy of President Samora Machel' (República de Moçambique 2011: 2). For the construction of monuments, a strategy for decentralizing implementation and financing was initially adopted. The initial *orientação* (directive) from the Party was the inclusion of all activities within the government Economic and Social Plans, from 2006 to 2011.[133] The first statues produced and erected in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane and Nampula were disapproved because they 'did not dignify the honoured figure' (Republic of Mozambique 2011: 4). Thus, the statue, modelled for Niassa province, which was 3.27 meters high, was closely monitored by the central government. It was considered very satisfactory and adopted as the model for all provinces, including Chilembene. This recentralization was driven by the lack of adherence of the national contractors to public tenders for the first statues (Decreto nº. 15/2010 de 24 de Maio).

Thus, the process of construction of the monuments became centralized under the coordination of the Ministry of Culture who estimated the total cost of the production of 10 statues, each 3.27 metres, to be 58.89 million Meticais (approximately US$ 2 million)

[133] Interview with ME, Maputo, March 13, 2014.

(República de Moçambique 2011: 5). Given the limited availability of funds, it was decided to prioritize the production of only six statues in 2011 (for the provinces of Niassa, Nampula, Tete and Sofala, Maputo city and Chilembene). The estimated cost was 30.45 million Meticais (USD 650,000). Without public tender, the production was awarded to Nhatugueja Artes, a Mozambican company that modelled and then subcontracted the South African foundry, Godwin Foundry, to produce the bronze statue for Niassa province. Within this framework, the construction of the massive monument to Machel to be placed in Independence Square (*Praça da Independência*) in the capital Maputo, the place where the central ceremony of the 'Year Samora Machel' would take place on October 19, 2011, was estimated at US$ 20 million and a production time of approximately 23 months. Due to financial and time constrains, the Municipality of Maputo City came up with a 'Plan B', namely, the production of the statue by North Korea (Mansudae Overseas Project Group), at a fraction of the cost: US$ 1 million (República de Moçambique 2011: 3).

Although it was not possible to obtain any confirmation from authorities in Mozambique regarding the builder of the Machel's statue in *Praça da Independência*, several independent sources attribute the ownership of the design and foundry of the statue to Mansudae Overseas Project Group (cf. Anonymous 2011e; Glanfield 2016; Pollard 2016). The imposing bronze sculpture of Machel is 9 meters tall and weighs 4.8 tons. It sits on a marble slab of 2.7 metres high, at the beginning of the avenue with his name, overlooking Maputo bay (see Figure 112).



Figure 112: Monument to Samora Machel at *Praça da Independência* in Maputo city (2013).

The statue, a tribute to 'the man of the people' (*Homen do Povo*) was inaugurated during a state ceremony without the presence of the *Povo* (see Figures 113-114). In fact, *Praça da Independência* is considered to be the place where a strong relationship between Machel and his People was forged. It was here where Machel, a few hours after he proclaimed National Independence, was inaugurated President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and it was in the same space where the people bade farewell to their leader, following his tragic death in Mbuzini. *Praça da Independência* is also the space where Machel made some of his most vigorous speeches such the launching of the 'political and organizational offensive', or on the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of independence. During all these events the *Povo* massively joined Machel at *Praça da Independência*. But on the day he was returned to this space, the *Praça* was almost empty. Apart from the official guests at the ceremony, FRELIMO's masses organizations (OMM and OJM) and students from some schools around the city, there was little *Povo* (cf. Anonymous 2011m).

It can be speculated that this scenario is symptomatic of the difficulty of FRELIMO and government structures in mobilizing social groups outside the FRELIMO social organizations (the youth and women's league) in an urban environment. It may also mean that the great discrepancy between the modes of official memorisation (in bronze monuments) and the popular forms of invocation of Machel (see section 6.3.4. of chapter 6). It appears that for many Mozambicans who remember the 'time of Samora' (*tempo de Samora*) the greatest celebration of Samora is not to hold state-led ceremonies with monumental statues accompanied with hallow 'patriotic speeches', but to follow what Samora always believed: to fight present day deep-seated corruption ('the enemy of the People as he would put it') in state apparatus, to better serve the people through transparency and integrity in the public service and above all, for leaders to take a moral stand where they are 'first in the sacrifice, and last in the benefits' for the good of the people. But the public perception is that these values of Samora constitute a moral ground perhaps too high for the current leadership whose primary goal is self-enrichment through appropriation of state resources at all cost - as some iconic veterans of the struggle amongst the FRELIMO elite (e.g. Graça Machel, Sergio Vieira, Jorge Rebelo) have recently admitted publicly (cf. Manhice 2010; Rebelo 2013; Anonymous 2016a).



Figure 113: View of the platform at inauguration of the monument to Samora Machel during Graça Machel's speech (Image courtesy: Johane Zonjo).



Figure 114: View of the 'empty' *Praça da Independência* during the inauguration of the monument to Samora Machel on October 19, 2011.

The second major component of the celebrations of 'Year Samora Machel' was the development of the Samora Machel Knowledge and Development Center (CCDSM), a programme which aggregated 10 main areas of intervention under different government departments aiming to maximize social, economic and cultural potentialities of Chilembene. The CCDSM programme was structured in sectoral implementation units including cultural heritage, heritage of liberation struggle, fish farming, agriculture and agro-processing, tourism, public works, digital technology, environment and energy (República de Moçambique 2011: 3). Some of these projects were implemented outside the historic site of Chilembene but still within the *Posto Administrativo* of Chilembene such as the construction of new petrol station (see Figure 115) and a local hotel (see Figure 116) located some 8 km from the historic site.



Figure 115: Petrol station (*bombas de abastecimento*) of Chilembene (2012).



Figure 116: Hotel Kapulana in Chilembene (2012).

An inter-ministerial commission was created to oversee the programme coordinated by the Minister of Culture and assisted by the Minister of Science and Technology. The

operationalization of CCDSM was initially budgeted at 7.6 million Meticais (approximately US$ 254,000) to be obtained through the reallocation of funds by government departments at central and provincial levels (funds from the investment budget line). There was an additional 6.9 million Meticais (approximately US$ 230,000) for various works, such as the rehabilitation of infrastructures (República de Moçambique 2011: 3).

8.3.2.2. Valuing Machel's legacy?

The celebrations of 'Year Samora Machel' were officially started on Heroes Day (February 3, 2011) with the unveiling of the first of the 10 Machel's bronze statues that were to be built across the country. Like in other events, Guebuza's 'patriotic speech' during the state ceremony highlighted the continuity of the ideas that guided FRELIMO since the liberation struggle and the need for Mozambicans to use these values as inspiration in the current struggle against poverty. As he stated:

> When we celebrated the Year Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, we paid homage to the spirit of National Unity that he conceived and made it grow in each one of us. Throughout that year, we also extolled the values that we subscribe to as a Heroic People, values that President Eduardo Mondlane incarnated and instilled in the builders of our nation. President Samora Moisés Machel was heir, custodian and promoter of the commitment of President Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane with the National Unity and with all the noble values that characterize us as a People, a very special People (Guebuza 2011a: 21).

Guebuza, referring to Mondlane and Samora, rather than exalting their achievements, seeks to show that there is a close relationship between the three, as individuals who shared the same life experiences and ideals. In doing so, Guebuza seeks to win legitimacy for himself since Mondlane and Samora are national symbols generally accepted by Mozambicans (Posse 2015: 89).

In the same speech, Guebuza then moved to link Machel to his own political agenda by stating:

> The Year of Samora Machel, through which we mark the 25 years since the murder of our late President, has a very profound meaning (...) With this year, we are not just remembering:
> - the charismatic leader;
> - the galvanizer of the Mozambican People for the great battles;
> - the statesman admired by the outside world and feared by our internal and external enemies.
>
> In declaring the Year of Samora Machel Year, we are also, above all, crystallizing something that touches our hearts, in the context of our struggle against poverty and our well-being. For the swift

> success in the fight against this scourge, Mozambique clamours for more men and women who, like President Samora Machel:
> - believe in themselves;
> - have faith in their abilities;
> - are convinced of their objectives;
> - have enough individual discipline to carry out their plans, the plans for the well-being of the wonderful Mozambican People (Guebuza 2011a: 22).

Later during the celebration in Chilemebene, on September 29, 2011 (Machel's date of birth) while inaugurating the statue to Samora Machel together with the CCDSM, Guebuza stated:

> When we unveiled that monument, we did not put just one statue in the open. We did much more than that. We have created another opportunity for each of us to review the values represented by President Samora Moisés Machel. We want each of us to rediscover yet another glorious page of history that has made us a united and determined People, a very special People. We want that in this act, each of us also rediscovers the men and women who have marked this glorious, epic and heroic History (…) Samora Machel is a Hero in our History because of all the qualities and virtues that we would like to see emulated by All Mozambicans, who are now engaged in the fight against poverty (Guebuza 2011e: 75).

He repeated this theme during the celebrations in Mbuzini on October 17, 2011 :

> (…) to recall President Samora Machel is to seek the inspiration, the strength and the momentum for the continuation of the long march for the consolidation of peace and National Unity in Mozambique. (…) for us, President Samora Machel only disappeared from the our physical conviviality, for he lives in each of us through:
> - his ideals and vision;
> - the correctness of the causes he defended (Guebuza 2011c: 62).

As seen in the above, Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse' attributes 'belief in oneself, faith in skills, conviction in goals, and individual discipline' as values associated with Machel's figure, and promotes the idea that building bronze statues of Machel constitute 'an opportunity for Mozambicans to review the values represented by Machel' and to follow 'Machel's ideals and vision'. Guebuza seeks not only to appropriate the figure of Machel given the magnitude of this national symbol in the collective memory, but at the same time distort the values for which Machel is collectively remembered by much of the population in order to attribute to him new values that best serve the cause of the current government. Thus, while Guebuza praises Machel for values that could be understood as 'self-esteem', which is considered important in the fight against poverty, Machel is often remembered by the public for his stance against the suffering of the people due to corruption and appropriation of state resources by state officials for individual benefit, which is a hallmark of Guebuza's administration. There is a widespread realization that today's 'FRELIMO

leaders cannot set an example of transparency, honesty and simplicity, as it was in Samora's time' (Manhice 2010).

As Jorge Rebelo, one of the founders of FRELIMO seen by many as one of the last moral reserves of the liberation movement, commented in an interview in 2013:

> One of the things that marked Guebuza's presidency was the immortalization of the figure of Samora. The statues were built everywhere, benevolent tributes and speeches were made. However, simultaneously, the evils that Samora fought against increased. I speak of corruption and plundering of national resources. Is Samora figure really being valued? If we talk about the legacy of Samora we just say that he was a great leader, he was the first president of independent Mozambique. We do not enter into his thinking. It seems that the current leadership of FRELIMO and the country is not interested in Samora's thought. They hide his thinking. In his [Guebuza] speeches, he forgets that Samora despised corruption, the suffering of the people, the privatization and expropriation of common good to satisfy the appetites and greed of a small group of leaders (Rebelo 2013: 2).

In promoting the slogan 'Samora lives' (*Samora vive*) the political elite of FRELIMO do not necessarily want to live according to the ideas and vision of Machel, but rather to use the figure of Machel, for political gain. It has become common to hear ordinary citizens saying 'if Samora was alive, such thing would not have happened'. Some believe that Samora wouldn't have spent millions of meticais from the public treasury with monuments with bronze statues while millions of Mozambicans still live in deep poverty. Some episodes provide interesting insight into Samora's position with regards to a 'personality cult' hugely promoted by Guebuza administration.[134] It is reported that a conference was organized in the palace of the Presidency in late 1970s (supposedly by officials of the Ministry of Information or the Department of Ideological Work) and the room had a certain 'decorum'. When Samora entered the room, he ordered the staff to undo the scene and rhetorically asked: 'do you want to make me another Kim Il Sung?' On another occasion Aquino de Bragança (an advisor to Machel) reportedly suggested to Samora that FRELIMO's ideology and political line should be called *Samorism*, and Samora's response was, 'I am not Kim Il Sung, that is [could only happen] in North Korea' (Adam 2012: 1).

[134] Some examples include the over-ritualization of the figure of the head of state in its Open and Inclusive Presidencies with broad television coverage; the wide circulation of Guebuza's more than 480 official speeches (compiled in seven volumes under the theme *'Our Mission*') as authoritative documents for political orientation in matters of governance; or the campaigns of manifestation of support promoted by the Party in the periods in which Guebuza faced crisis of popularity, like the march and public rally of January 18, 2013, with banners place across Maputo saying 'Guebuza, the beloved son of the People', 'Guebuza, friend, the People is with you' or 'Viva Guebuza, undisputed leader of all Mozambicans'.

Despite leading a Mozambican delegation to North Korea between 14-21 May 1978 with the aim of taking note of the Korean experience regarding the methods and paths used to build socialist society (Gheorghe 2016), Machel was unhappy, it is said, with the large painting depicting his 'liberation' that North Korean artists contributed to the Museum of the Revolution. 'There was a problem about the eyes. They looked more Korean than African. Even now [1983], after considerable retouching at the President's behest, this representation of the arrival of the guerrilla leadership in the former Lourenco Marques might be subtitled, "Springtime in Pyongyang"' (Lelyveld 1983: 1). Ironically, Samora is celebrated in the same way that he strongly opposed during his life.

In a context characterized by fierce competition between FRELIMO, Renamo and more recently MDM, Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse', that mobilizes the memory of the martyrs who died in the name of FRELIMO, forging a group identity and legitimizing FRELIMO's claim to power, often fuels different forms of contestation, sometimes leading to outright boycott by opposition forces and those supporting alternative narratives of the past or not. For instance, the provincial delegate of the MDM described the reasons and circumstances under which his party attended the ceremonies of the inauguration of the statue of Samora Machel in Lichinga.

> Unfortunately some people can not live in diversity and people do not believe in democracy (…) When we went with MDM flags on the spot to receive, to attend an event to receive the President of the Republic, people felt as if we were offending and we tried to explain, even with threats from the police and threats of violence, we went there to participate, of course we went there with flags that symbolized our organization. So we had to resist (...) against all threats and weapons (...) We persisted there to listen the speech of the head of state because that was state ceremony, it was not a party ceremony. So that's the reason we resisted to attend such a ceremony (…) that's MDM's philosophy to participate in state ceremonies.[135]

The MDM party, being without parliamentary seats and hence excluded from formal invitation by the state, nevertheless has adopted a strategy of showing its party colours and symbols during state organized events. The MDM's motivation has nothing to do with the hero to be remembered or celebrated, it is all about claiming visibility in the public space and also distancing itself from the other opposition party, Renamo, who boycott state events. completely. This happened not only in Lichinga but in others districts across the province, as was noticeable during the celebration of Francisco Magumbwa in Lago district (see Figure 34).

[135] Interview with RP, Lichinga, August 30, 2013.



Figure 117: Member of the MDM attending the state homage to Francisco Magumbwa on June 17, 2013. (Imagery courtesy: Elisio Jossias)

The meeting between MDM and FRELIMO members in these state events has not always been orderly. During the inauguration in Beira on June 4, 2012, supporters of MDM and FRELIMO parties verbally and physically assaulted each other. It started when a group of FRELIMO members went to raise the flags of their party where the members of MDM were standing. This exacerbated the tension between the two groups. Independence Square, where the statue was placed, ended up divided in what was meant to be a ceremony aiming to build national unity. For the majority, the participation in the event was about showing party alliances. It had nothing to do with the celebration of Machel and his legacy. When the Mayor of Beira and President of MDM Daviz Simango spoke, the MDM vibrated, and when Governor of Sofala Carvalho Muaria spoke the MDM supporters turned away. The colours of the T-shirts and caps looked as if they were purposely dyed the same colour (green) to be confused. The only difference was in the logos and photos of the presidents of each party. FRELIMO T-shirts had been stamped with the image of Guebuza while those of MDM had the image of Simango (Anonymous 2012d).

Unlike MDM, Renamo has for years boycotted public official events. Two Renamo members, one of them veteran of the liberation struggle, shared their reasons for not taking part in the celebrations of 'Year Samora Machel' in Lichinga:

> One must have self-respect before it can be respected by others. What happens if we are even invited to these meetings, these celebrations, you arrive there the speeches instead of focussing on the issue at hand, then they pronounce defamatory words, contrary to the purpose of the gathering (…) many people never liked that, that's why we decide not to get there (…) actually, we do not even need them to invite us.[136]

> Attend the celebration in this roundabout? No. I stopped participating in these little things a long time ago. They use injurious terms and if one does not master his own temper, bad thongs may happen (…) to avoid that just stay at home, let them do (…) you see, these things should be nonpartisan but they want to pull everything to a 'single dish': FRELIMO. This is a mistake, it is a serious mistake, because we are also Mozambicans.[137]

It appears that like the past FRELIMO-led nation-building processes, Guebuza's 'patriotic discourse' that accompanied the exaltation of national heroes, deployed the rhetoric of national unity while clearly alienating all those who are not with FRELIMO. Thus, for many, the struggle for liberation and recognition in the nation continues, 'against amnesia, against attempts at silencing' (Meneses 2012: 125).

8.4. *A luta continua* [the struggle continues]

An important element of Guebuza's heritagization campaign is that it has, since 2013 been carried out in a context of instability and political-military tension across the country. The official message is that the current leadership is guided by values of national unity imbued in the national heroes. Yet, the same government seems unwilling or incapable of accommodating the demands of the opposition that calls for more inclusion in access to state resources controlled by FRELIMO.

Breaking away from Chissano's failed strategy towards Renamo, the radical sectors of the FRELIMO under Guebuza advocated that 'there was nothing more to negotiate with Renamo'. Guebuza imposed mandatory retirement on high-ranking individuals from ex-Renamo military forces without consulting or negotiating with Renamo (Igreja 2015: 255). Given the difficulty of access to governance and the resulting resources (hugely affected by the abstention of more than 50% in the 2004 and 2009 elections), Renamo grew impatient

[136] Interview with VL, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.
[137] Interviews with MB, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.

and increased the tone of the war speech, threatening to return to 'the bush', as its leader Dlhakama transferred his offices first to Nampula (in 2009) and later (in 2012) to Santundgira, near its former headquarters in the province of Sofala. This 'return to the origins' was accompanied by threats and provocations, which gave the pretext to the FRELIMO government to intervene militarily, practically creating a situation of undeclared war (Brito 2014: 34). From October 21, 2012, to early 2014 the leader of the Renamo hid in 'undisclosed location' (*parte incerta*) in the bush (Bertelsen 2016: 2). In parallel with these military confrontations, the government and Renamo officials engaged in peace talks for almost two years, which culminated in a second peace agreement on September 5, 2014, also termed 'agreement for the cessation of military hostilities' (Igreja 2015: 240). This new 'peace accord' allowed for the modification of the electoral law, as requested by Renamo, the creation of a new amnesty law approved by both parties (and once again without any kind of accountability for the death of civilians), and the establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Fund (Guebuza 2015: 5; Igreja 2015: 258).

The 'peace accord' paved the way for general elections in October 2014, which were won by FRELIMO's candidate and Mozambique's fourth president, Filipe Nyusi. Renamo immediately claimed that the election results were fraudulent, and to this day they still demand to be allowed to govern the six provinces (Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambézia, Nampula, and Niassa) in which they claimed victory. Since then, political instability and a climate of suspicion and fear continue to dominate current affairs, with both parties increasing militarization and firmly moving away from the commitments made at the time of the signing of the 2014 peace accord (Tavares 2016: 170; Bertelsen 2016: 1-2). Renamo blames FRELIMO for their continuous need to resort to violence, and insists on a belligerent, threatening, and separatist rhetoric as the only means to bring about political change. During a Parliamentary session on March 2016, the head of the Renamo party caucus, Ivone Soares, stated: 'We, the Mozambican National Resistance, are for peace, democracy, social justice, market economy! We never had the war as an option (…) any confrontation in Mozambique is provoked by the FRELIMO government' (Caldeira 2016: 3).

For its part, FRELIMO has returned to labelling Renamo as terrorists, enemies of the Mozambican people who are financed by external forces and therefore have no legitimacy. 'Mr. Dhlakama continues to take the position of a terrorist man who has no human feeling and is an enemy of peace and development', said Damião José, spokesman for FRELIMO,

during a press conference in Maputo on September 5, 2015 (Chavisso 2015). Latent in this current political discourse of FRELIMO, is the idea of 'looking at the political opposition as an 'enemy', without the possibility of any political pact' which derived from the 'liberation struggle mentality' seen in the guiding principle developed during the armed struggle that 'those who are not with us are against us' (Meneses 2015: 10). FRELIMO has been reluctant to accept political pluralism, i.e. ideological difference between individuals or political parties (Pekka 2003: 253) and any other sort of power sharing with the opposition. For instance, responding to Renamo's demand to be allowed at least to appoint Governors in the province where it calmed victory, FRELIMO accused the opposition of wanting to divide the country propagating a narrative that 'Mozambique is one and indivisible' (Arnaça 2015: 1). And this official narrative was obviously reproduced by FRELIMO members at local level, as evidenced at the historic site of Chilembene in October 2015, when Mr. Inácio Ossivane, a veteran of both the liberation and postcolonial wars and the sole guide working at the site, said

> We have here the statue with the configuration of the finger (...) the finger that in many cases many people say that represents a kilo [kg] of rice, but in fact, in fact the raised finger of President Samora means that the Mozambican territory (…) eh this territory that was conquered based on the bloodshed of thousands of children of Mozambique, the best children of Mozambique, this territory is one and indivisible. The Mozambican territory will never be divided and will remain united.[138]



Figure 118: View of the monument to Samora in Chilemebene during the guided tour led by Mr. Ossivane in 2015.

[138] Interview with Inácio Ossivane, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.

Adding to the politico-military instability, in 2013 Mozambican government officials negotiated a secret loan agreements with Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas and VTB Capital for the companies EMATUM (US$ 850 million), ProIndicus (US$ 622 million) and Mozambique Asset Management, MAM (US$ 535 million), and just over US$ 221 million for order and security, totalling about US$ 2.2 billion. This amount is equivalent to 15% of GDP of the country. The loan was executed in the form of government guaranteed bonds bought by the lending banks. None of the loans were approved by the Mozambique parliament, breaching the country's Constitution (Article 179) (Castel-Branco and Massarongo 2016: 1). Apparently, the 'illegal loan' was for a tuna-fishing project but it turned out to be a loan mostly for military equipment. Military equipment not being an income-generating asset, Mozambique had no means of making the first interest payment of US$ 60 million in January 2017. It defaulted on the loan. As a result, in April 2016, when the existence of the hidden debts was finally revealed by investigative journalists (cf. Wirz and Wernau 2016), the IMF suspended the next tranche of US$ 283 million credit to the country, followed by the World Bank and Western governments and the national currency fell by 70% (Serumaga 2017). The fall in the currency has also increased the country's debt, thought in 2017 to be US$ 11.6 billion, 93% of GDP. Without the loans from the IMF and World Bank to pay off other lenders, the debt cannot be paid (Jones 2016). International rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, which report financial markets on financial risk, have reduced Mozambique's rating from B + to CCC in just over two years, resulting in higher interest rates debt and future loans, making the economy more expensive and debt more unsustainable (Castel-Branco and Massarongo 2016: 1).

The officials involved are former president Guebuza, former finance minister Manuel Chang and a senior Intelligence and Security Service (SISE) official, António Carlos do Rosário. They have appeared before a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry, and their defence was they did it 'for the protection of the country' and 'benefit of the people' (Serumaga 2017). During his turn in the Parliamentary Enquiry Commission on November 28, 2016, and before any inquiry was made, Guebuza narrated his biography highlighting the sacrifices he made 'to join FRELIMO, to fight and liberate the beloved motherland' (Caldeira 2016: 1). Guebuza then went on to decribe the maritime insecurity of Mozambique, giving an example of the kidnapping of the fishing vessel, Vega 5, off the coast of Inhambane on December 27, 2010 and the fact that Renamo declared 'war' on June 19, 2013, to justify the debts. Questioned about the fact that the former finance minister signed state-guaranteed contracts well above

the limit authorized by the Assembly of the Republic, (in the State Budget Laws of 2013 and 2014), Guebuza replied: 'I can affirm that throughout our governance we have always had a concern the observance of the Constitution and the laws (…) if we had to be in the same conditions and to make the same decisions, we would do just the same way today, in defense of the beloved motherland and the wonderful Mozambican people' (Caldeira 2016: 2).

Guebuza's reluctance to provide any meaningful information to the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry was banking on three things: (i) the fact that FRELIMO controls the Parliament (i.e. out of the 11 members of the Commission of Enquiry only one was from the opposition Party); (ii) one of FRELIMO's guiding principles since the liberation struggle is maintaining unity at all costs. That means no one is expelled from the party no matter how corrupt or incompetent they are. Disputes are settled within the party and the aim is for win-win agreements; (iii) the fact that most of his allies in the Party and government benefited from the 'illegal loans' including the current head of state Filipe Nyussi who was the Ministry of Defense, the government department that created ProIndicus and MAM, therefore, one of the key actors in the loans that were secretly contracted (cf. Hanlon 2016; Gil 2016; Caldeira 2016b).

The Administrative Court and the Parliament concluded that state guarantees for loans of the three state-owned enterprises violated the Constitution of the Republic as well as the budgetary laws of 2013 and 2014. However, instead of declaring them 'illegal', the Executive 'legalized' the loans by transforming them into public debt (Caldeira 2017). This despite the loud position of civil society organizations[139] stating that,

> (…) in defence of the common good and against the continued impoverishment of the Mozambican people, WE DO NOT WANT, DO NOT ACCEPT AND WILL NOT PAY THE DEBTS OF EMATUM, ProIndicus, MAM and others that may be disclosed in future and which may have followed the same illegal procedure! (Budget Monitoring Forum *et al.* 2016: 1).

[139] Including: Centre for Civil Society Learning and Capacity-Building; Mozambican Debt Group; N'weti – Communication for Health; Centre for Public Integrity; Community Development Foundation; ActionAid Mozambique; Rural Observatory; Mozambique NGO's League; Civil Society Forum for Children's Rights; Community Radios Forum; Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation; Muleide – Women, Law and Development; Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection; WLSA – Women and Law in Southern Africa; Associação Progresso; Kulima; TEA; Fórum Mulher; Rede Activa; Rural Women's Association; Mozambique Workers Organization; The Oppressed Theatre Group; Open Society; The Christian Council of Mozambique (Branches of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and Cabo Delgado); Association for Women Empowerment and Development; The Basic Education Development Unit – Laboratory.

As a result, the secret borrowers Guebuza, Chang and do Santos would get to keep any payments received for their signatures on the bonds, any kick-backs from the vendor and their status as 'patriots' (Serumaga 2017). In fact, interviewed during the state ceremony on Heroes Day on February 3, 2016, Guebuza advanced the new official discourse about the current financial crisis created by the 'illegal loans' stating that the country's economic problems stem from the difficult international situation and natural calamities, adding that 'fighting poverty and consolidating peace must remain at the center of the country's priorities' (Anonymous 2016b). Yet, economists have demonstrated that the bulk of Mozambique's unsustainable debt is the product of development options based on large multinational corporate capital and the financing of national oligarchs (Castel-Branco and Massarongo 2016). As a Mozambican sociologist put it:

> Today, we see high-ranking leaders telling the nation they fought to get rich; We witness the turning of the vanguard party into a corporation. People join FRELIMO not to serve but to serve themselves. FRELIMO became a platform for payment of favors, to the patronage, by means of political positions in the state (MPs) and in the government (differentiated positions); We now see, in the processes of internal elections of FRELIMO, acts of payment of votes for the occupation of managerial positions and entrance in the collegial organs like the central committee, for example. These practices literally contrary to the spirit of Nachingweia reveal a setback and disrespect to the social pact signed in Nachingewia (Meigos 2016: 10).

The allusion to 'high-ranking leaders telling the nation they fought to get rich' refers to the opinion made public by an influential veteran of the liberation struggle and a member of the FRELIMO *Comissão Política*, Alberto Chipande, who launched a violent attack on public opinion that accuse leaders of the FRELIMO party of enriching themselves at the expense of the Mozambican people. 'Today there is a tendency to say that all the leaders of FRELIMO are rich. I ask: rich of what and in what? (…) and if they are rich [the FRELIMO leader] what is the problem? After all, aren't they the ones that brought you the independence that you are enjoying?'. Continuing with the explanation for the accumulation of wealth, Chipande then said: 'These men [the leaders of FRELIMO] have not changed anything. They have been the same for 40 years (…) if Mondlane and Machel were alive, they would also be accused of being thieves. Are we thieves because we are alive?' (Anonymous 2009a). Jacinto Veloso, another influential veteran of the struggle, says that 'although there is a very large gap between the poor and the rich, 40 years after the country's independence, it is only fair that first-line combatants have wealth' (Novela 2015: 4). In fact, despite rapid economic growth, investment expansion and doubling the number of billionaires in the decade 2005-2014, poverty has not declined, inequality has increased significantly and working conditions have

tended to become more precarious (Castel-Branco and Massarongo 2016: 2). Yet, it the ordinary Mozambican, already living in extreme austerity that will have to repay US$ 2.2 billion (with interest) to the creditors who now have a claim on the country's yet unexploited liquid natural gas deposits estimated to go on the market in 2023 (Serumaga 2017).

Clearly, the September 25th Generation, which is very proud to have 'liberated the beloved homeland' from the colonial yoke through ten years of armed struggle, is the same generation that almost 40 years later 'sold' the country by allowing it to be recolonized by international financial capital in order to further its group objective of accumulating capital and forming national oligarchies. Thus, while many have praised Guebuza's heritagization projects for reviving most of the 'forgotten heroes' and promoting some development projects as part of the state-ceremonies, others have highlighted the incising discrepancy between the patriotic discourse that accompany these heritazigation projects and the current administration's failure to live up to his words of promoting national unity that does not allow all social groups to feel part of the nation. As a disenchanted veteran of the liberation struggle put it:

> My last words are the very first ones, make room for everyone, huh! For all those who deserve a better recognition! Everyone contributed to independence, not just a small group (...) this question that you are asking me, who are the heroes, you see, for us there are no heroes in Mozambique since only FRELIMO heroes are considered Mozambican heroes. We will meet [see] the heroes only after Mozambique is truly liberated (…) but only to do statues and I do not know what, this does not make sense. What we want is that Mozambique be united, Mozambique be [for all] Mozambicans. In a house where there is no understanding there can be no peace.[140]

In this Chapter I sought to illustrate that given his preoccupation with inculcating a notion of utopia capable of building a national identity to sustain the liberation discourse and therefore to legitimize FRELIMO's right to rule, Guebuza resorted to notions of 'national unity', 'mozambicaness' and to the already sacralised heroes of the liberation struggle to mobilize Mozambicans to adhere to the 'new struggle' (i.e. 'the fight against poverty'), thus legitimizing his political agenda. At the same time, through the exaltation of the national heroes and their monumentalization, Guebuza claims for himself a prominent place in the pantheon of the liberators of the nation, having as its political ancestors the 'Architect' (Eduardo Mondlane) and the 'Father' (Samora Machel) of the Mozambican nation. One of the traits of this heritagization process is the

[140] Interview with VL, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.

continuous failure to incorporate a multitutde of voices not aligned with the offical liberation heriatge discourse.

CONCLUSION

Through the analysis of the politics of liberation heritage in postcolonial southern Africa with special reference to Mozambique, this study aimed at achieving four main objectives.

The first was to conceptualise heritage as discourse in order to explore the way Western understanding of 'the past' has influenced the conceptualization and practice of heritage in southern Africa in the colonial and postcolonial periods. Departing from the dominant conception of heritage as exclusively the historic material remains related to the struggles for independence, in Chapter Three I have adopted the conceptualisation of heritage as discourse and put the hegemonic Western heritage discourses into historical perspective in order to explore how this Western understanding of the past has influenced the official discourse and practice in southern Africa in the colonial period. I have illustrated how the Western heritage discourse and its associated conservation ethics have become hegemonic and globalised in the form of international heritage conservation treaties and conventions and how this hegemonic Western conception has been transferred to Africa following the colonial period limiting the official definition of heritage to material terms. In Chapter Four, I explored the dynamic processes through which hegemonic Western heritage discourses produced in the colonial period were carried over and re-appropriated by the postcolonial countries. I have argued that this process of re-appropriation and 'mimicry' which allowed the perpetuation of Western paradigms in the conception of heritage result from a combination of geopolitical and socio-economic contexts and circumstances at play nationally, regionally and globally combined with the strategies adopted by former national liberation movements ruling elites to pursue their own nationalist agendas related to state crafting and nation-building. Thus, I have used the concept of 'glocalisation' to contextualize the authoritative heritage discourses in postcolonial southern Africa focussing on three main discourses and their related practices: (i) the decolonization of heritage policies and landscapes, (ii) local community 'participation' in heritage and 'community benefits' through heritage management and (iii) the 'domestication' of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in southern Africa.

With regards to the first discourse, I have looked at how several post-independence African governments have selected designs that clearly foreground a foreign visual culture for architectural works to symbolise and celebrate their liberation struggle and independence. I have argued that such examples clearly illustrate, firstly, the disjunction between the rhetoric

of liberation and the constraints imposed by the need of ongoing nation-building and state crafting in the postcolonial period; secondly, the 'glocalised' nature of heritage and its associated discursive practices, where African states are able to rework aspects of global phenomena that originated from the West and appropriate such aspects for their own nationalistic projects, informed by ideological legacy of the liberation struggle and, to some extent, non-Western modes of monumentalization; and, thirdly, the failure of African ruling elites to 'indigenize' the modes of memorialization of the liberation struggle in the public space.

Regarding the second discourse, I have highlighted some of the key issues of 'participation' often employed in the 'community conservation discourse' in the field of environmental conservation, which resonates highly with the challenges of participatory approaches to management of cultural heritage across the region. I have argued that although some heritage sites have generated forms of economic development, mostly at World Heritage sites, generally, the supposed benefits generated by global tourism rarely materialise, and when they do they are, with very few exceptions, limited. Thus, although local communities are yet to see significant improvements in their lives and livelihoods, the discourse of 'community benefit' through 'cultural heritage' continues to be promoted by officials who frequently overstate the tourism potential in a bid to sway the often 'impoverished local community' to support projects, such as the nomination of a site to UNESCO's World Heritage List.

This has led me to the analysis of the third discourse, where I have illustrated that despite the efforts of different actors to advance the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Africa, the 'domestication' of the Convention is still marked by tensions resulting from the divergences between, on the one hand, local understanding of heritage as well as domestic agendas and nationalistic interests, and on the other the agenda of international organizations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS or IUCN, which often advise States Parties on the type of sites that have a potential to demonstrate outstanding universal value, based on the dominant Western notions of heritage. I have argued that the hegemony of Western heritage discourse does not reside exclusively on the imposition from the West through conservation principles and guidelines associated with the World Heritage system. It also lies in the ambiguous position created by the postcolonial state adoption of the European model of nationalism to monumentalize itself, based on the narrative of liberation struggle (at the national level) and the use of World Heritage processes to pursue nationalistic agendas at the global stage.

The second objective of this study was to discuss the concept of liberation as the ideological basis of the struggle against colonialism in Africa and its relationships with notions of power, memory and history in order to understand the complexities and contradictions of the current liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa. Thus, in Chapter Five, I have discussed the notions of liberation and the way that this concept was translated, transformed and lost during the transition to the post-colonial dispensation. I have focused on the (i) particular history of the transition to democracy, (ii) the 'liberation mentality' of former national liberation movements and (iii) the attitudes of former national liberation movements once transformed into 'party-machines' to illustrate the reasons why national liberation movements now in government have betrayed the cause of true liberation once made to the peoples they claim to represent across southern Africa. Acknowledging the specificities of individual cases, as well as the myriad of agendas and motivation for different interested groups that engage with liberation heritage, I have argued that the recent traction that has led to the institutionalisation of liberation heritage discourse in southern Africa, represent a specific way in which former national liberation movements, now in government, have tried to respond to changes in circumstances marked by an increasing contestation by the different social groups over the content of official discourse of 'the past', based on selective memories of the liberation struggle, in an increasingly disputed multi-party democratic dispensation.

The third objective of this study was to scrutinise the different ways in which the liberation heritage discourse is used and mobilised to construct a range of socioeconomic and political values in the southern African region, with consequences of this discourse for the broader heritage landscapes, especially in Mozambique. In keeping with this objective, in Chapter Five, I have illustrated the way 'liberation parties' have responded to the current challenge to their hegemonic power by strengthening the solidarity of former liberation movements and, at times, 'inventing traditions' that did not exist in practice during the struggle. In Chapter Six I move on to demonstrate how former liberation movements mobilised and canonized the liberation struggle by writing the official 'history of the liberation struggle in southern Africa' (i.e. the SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project) and institutionalising liberation struggle as a specific Pan-African category of heritage under the 'Roads to Independence: African Liberation Heritage Programme'. I argue that although the SADC Hashim Mbita Research Project makes a valuable contribution to the documentation of liberation struggles in the region, its main objective is to canonise the official history of the liberation struggle. Thus, although the nine volumes of *Southern African National Liberation Struggles*

Contemporaneous Documents 1960-1994, include substantial sections of 'personal stories' told by the veterans themselves, this SADC initiative perpetuates the exclusion of many 'other voices' that are not aligned with the official liberation discourse (i.e. those who do not belong to the group that 'won the struggle' or held leadership positions in the current ruling parties and post-independence governments).

With regards to the African Liberation Heritage Programme, I have argued that this Programme can be criticised on at least five points. First, while the liberation heritage discourse was formalised through the adoption of African Liberation Heritage Programme, numerous local, national and transnational processes of heritagization of the struggle were already underway at the grassroots as well as at the nation-state levels. Thus, the Programme is not an initiative but a response to events already happening on the ground. Second, the recent drive of liberation heritage discourse epitomised by the African Liberation Heritage Programme has broadened the recognition of the contribution of the heroic struggles of anonymous men and women for political independence including countries in the region (e.g. Swaziland and Botswana) seen as not having liberation credentials. However, unfortunately (my third point), this recent liberation heritage discourse has allowed almost all SADC countries led by both the 'liberation' and 'democratic' parties, with few exceptions (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles), to sanitize the often conflicting and messy histories of the 'struggles within the liberation struggles' across southern Africa and therefore has accelerated the 'invention of new traditions'. Fourth, despite the integration of grassroots memorialization practices as part of the Programme, the emphasis on official celebrations and forms of remembrance frequently fails to help the victims of struggle to heal the traumatic experiences of the violence in the aftermath of the struggle. Fifth, the Programme has established official timeframes that define and therefore limit what is considered part of the liberation heritage across the region. By doing so it continues to marginalise other struggles for liberation and memories of violence often suppressed by postcolonial regimes in southern Africa. Lastly, liberation heritage discourse is constructed and shaped by other discourses (i.e. the discourse on 'community's benefit' through cultural heritage and the discourse on the 'domestication' of the World Heritage Convention) and is deployed by former liberation movements now in government for nationalistic ends.

Lastly, the fourth objective of this study was to examine in some detail the processes of

heritagization, in which the past, in particular the liberation struggle, is being created and negotiated by different social groups. Two national heritage sites (Chilembene and Matchedje) in Mozambique serve as case studies. Thus, Chapters Seven and Eight focused on the politics of heritagization of the liberation struggle in postcolonial Mozambique. To understand what draws FRELIMO back to the legacy of liberation struggle more than thirty years after independence, I looked at FRELIMO's efforts to undertake selective celebrations and to silence particular 'pasts' for particular 'presents' during the struggle years as well as through the different socio-political and economic contexts of the successive presidencies. Thus I examine Samora Machel's call for Mozambicans 'not to forget the time that has passed', meaning the evils of colonialism and the sacrifices made during the struggle for independence; also Joaquim Chissano's 'conspiracy of forgetfulness' and silencing of certain memories of the liberation struggle (including its heroes) and the recent Socialist-Marxist past in the neoliberal era; and Guebuza's renaissance of the memorialization of the legacies of the liberation struggle. Each represents the different ways in which FRELIMO elites tried to respond to changes of circumstances and the contestation by the different social groups over the content of the officially sanctioned discourse about 'the past'. Following the outline of the formative years of the liberation discourse built during the struggle, I have analysed the dynamics and tensions resulting from the operationalization of liberation discourse in building the postcolonial nation during the presidency of Machel (1975-1986); the processes and contexts that demanded the 'suppression' of the liberation discourse; and the multiple threats to this discourse by different social groups during the presidency of Chissano (1986-2004). I have argued that the multi-party democratic dispensation also allowed an increasing contestation of, and threats to. the official liberation discourse by different groups including forgotten veterans and disenchanted voters. It was within this context that FRELIMO experienced the inherent risks of losing power and responded by resorting to its exclusive source of a 'legitimate' claim to power - the liberation struggle.

Thus, in Chapter Eight, I looked at the heritagization of liberation struggle under the presidency of Guebuza (2005-2014). I have argued that given his preoccupation with inculcating a notion of utopia capable of building a national identity to sustain the liberation discourse and therefore to legitimize FRELIMO's right to rule, Guebuza resorted to notions of 'national unity', 'mozambicaness' and to the already sacralised heroes of the liberation struggle to mobilize Mozambicans to adhere to the 'new struggle' (i.e. 'the fight against poverty'), thus legitimizing the agenda of his governance. At the same time, through the

exaltation of the national heroes and their monumentalization (with great infrastructures), Guebuza claims for himself a prominent place in the pantheon of the liberators of the nation, having as its political ancestors the 'Architect' (Eduardo Mondlane) and the 'Father' (Samora Machel) of the Mozambican nation. Yet, while many have praised Guebuza's heritagization projects for reviving most of the 'forgotten heroes' and promoting some local development initiatives as part of the state-ceremonialism, others have highlighted the increasing discrepancy between the liberation discourse that accompany these heritazigation projects and current political agenda of FRELIMO that still excludes certain social groups from being part of the 'liberated imagined community'.

Does liberation heritage represent anything more than the 'appropriation' by southern African governments of former liberation movements, and the adoption of 'political pageantry' to legitimise their power? This study clearly illustrates that the recent heritagization of the liberation struggle is orchestrated with the view to legitimating those in power. Yet, to limit the analysis to this question (i.e. illustrating that liberation heritage is mobilised to legitimise power) does not in itself help us to understand why these multitudes of events and practices, that are part of the current heritagization processes, are brought to the centre stage at this particular historical juncture and how they operate. So it is by addressing the question of *why* and *how* the heritagization of this particular category of the past accomplishes the reproduction of state power held by ruling elites of former national liberation movements, and by illustrating the networks of meanings and practices on which liberation heritage rests, as well as the socio-economic, cultural and political work it does, that this study makes its key contribution to the embryonic body of knowledge about heritage processes in Mozambique in particular, as well as in the southern Africa region. Thus through the analysis of the politics of liberation heritage in postcolonial southern Africa with special reference to Mozambique, this thesis explores the processes of heritage formation, mobilization and consumption at the intersection of state power (including the performative dimension of political practice seen in state-organized public events), discourse and memory in postcolonial southern Africa.

Due to constraints in time and resources for prolonged fieldwork, I was not able explore local views and perceptions of heritage held by the residents who benefited from and engaged with the highly ritualised state-led heritagization projects which resulted in the construction of new monuments (for the deceased heroes), many of them with considerable visual impact in

the local rural landscapes marked by considerable levels of poverty. The inquiry into the relationship between the Westernized conception of monument/memorial promoted by the state-led heritagization of the liberation struggle heroes and other notions of heritage (i.e. that mediated through places of cultural significance such as graves of the ancestors) constitutes one of the areas for future research.

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ME, State official (Ministry of Culture), personal interview, Maputo, March 10, 2014.
Fernando Dava, State official (Ministry of Culture), personal interview, Maputo, December 4, 2013.
LO, State official (Ministry of Veterans), personal interview, Maputo, January 15, 2016.
RA, State official (Ministry of Veterans), personal interview, Maputo, December 16, 2013.
MS, State official (Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture of Niassa), personal interview, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.
VM, State official (Provincial Directorate of Tourism of Niassa), personal interview, Maputo, December 14, 2013.
ST, State official (Provincial Directorate of Veterans of Niassa), personal interview, Maputo, March 10, 2014.
IJ, State official (Administrative Post of Matchedje), personal interview, Maputo, December 14, 2013.
BQ, State official (Administrative Post of Chilembene), personal interview, Maputo, March 10, 2014.
Vicente Joaquim, Architect and Urban Planner (Eduardo Mondlane University), personal interview, Maputo, December 13, 2013.
António Manso, Historian (Eduardo Mondlane University), personal interview, Maputo, December 13, 2013.
Armindo Ngunga, Linguist (Eduardo Mondlane University), personal interview, Maputo, December 13, 2013.
MM, Heritage practitioner and lecturer (Higher Institute of Arts and Culture), personal interviews, Maputo and Chilembene, December 16-17, 2013.
SV, Lecturer (Higher Institute of Arts and Culture), personal interview, Maputo and Nwadjahane, February 2-3, 2014
AC, Lecturer (Eduardo Mondlane University), personal interviews, Maputo, December 20, 2013.
GP, Heritage professional (State official) in Botswana, personal interview, Midrand (South Africa), May 7, 2015.
SS, Heritage professional (State official) in South Africa, personal interview, Mbuzini (South Africa), October 16, 2015
José Forjaz, Architect (José Forjaz Architects), personal interview, Maputo, May 15, 2015.
GA, Archaeologist (Consultant), personal interview, Harare, November 6, 2014.
NW, Archaeologist (Non-Govermental Organization), personal interview, Istanbul, July 13, 2016.
CC, Heritage professional (State official), personal interview, Istanbul, July 17, 2016.
CM, Veteran of the liberation struggle (Secretary at ACLLN), personal interview, Lichinga, September 8, 2013.
BTM, Veteran of the liberation struggle (Farmer), personal interview, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.
NG, Veteran of the liberation struggle (Member of Municipal Assembly), personal interview, Lichinga, August 29, 2013.
FS, Veteran of the liberation struggle (President of ACLLN), personal interview, Lichinga, August 30, 2013.
MB, Veteran of the liberation struggle (small trader), personal interview, Lichinga, August 28, 2013.
VXC, Veteran of the liberation struggle (Head of Department at Provincial Directorate), personal interview, Lichinga, August 25, 2013.
VL, Veteran of the liberation struggle (Farmer), personal interview, Lichinga, August 23, 2013.
SF, Secretary for Mobilization and Propaganda of FRELIMO, Lichinga, September 7, 2013.

RP, Provincial Delegate of MDM, Lichinga, August 26, 2013.
AS, Community Leader (*Líder Comunitário*) of Aldeia II Congresso, personal interview, Matchedje, August 27, 2013.
Inácio Ossivane, Tourist guide at Historic Site of Chilembene, personal interview, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.
VLM, Renamo member (Farmer), Aldeia II Congresso, September 2, 2013.
VW, Renamo member (Retired teacher), Lichinga, August 27, 2013.
GK, Veterans of the 'war for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' (MDM member), Lichinga, September 5, 2013.
AJ, Veterans 'for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' (Renamo member), Lichinga, August 28 and September 5, 2013.
RJ, Manager of the Historic Site of Matchedje (Aldeia II Congresso), September 3-5, 2013.
BC, Veterans of the 'war for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' (Farmer), personal interview, Chilembene, October 19, 2015.
SLN, Veterans of the 'war for the defence of sovereignty and democracy' (small trader), personal interview, Chilembene, October 22, 2015.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - RECONSTITUTED LIST OF 103 DELEGATES TO THE II CONGRESS OF FRELIMO IN 1968

1. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane
2. Urias Timótio Simango
3. Marcelino dos Santos
4. Samora Moiséis Machel
5. Joaquim Alberto Chissano
6. Armando Emílio Guebuza
7. Jorge Rebelo
8. Silvério Rafael Nungo
9. Mariano de Araújo Matsinha
10. Jonas Geraldo Namashulua,
11. Manuel dos Santos,
12. Raul Casal Ribeiro,
13. William Boodya Kadawele,
14. Samuel Robrigues Dhlakhama,
15. Olímpio Vaz,
16. Francisco Manyanga,
17. Alexandre Magno,
18. Marcos Sebastião Mabote,
19. Joaquim Manuel Munhepe,
20. Pedro Odelah,
21. Fernando Raul Guezimane,
22. Rafael José Rohomoja,
23. Cândido Jeremias Mondlane,
24. Mário Sive,
25. Dinis André Moiane,
26. Francisco Manuel Sumbana,
27. Xavier Baptista Sulila,
28. Raimundo Domingos Pachinuapa,
29. Oswaldo Assael Tazama,
30. Pedro Juma,
31. Fernando Matavele,
32. Tomé Eduardo,
33. Wehia Mwanacacho Ripua,
34. Calisto Madjigo,
35. João Facitela Pelembe,
36. Sansão Kambaco,
37. Lopes Tembe Ndelana,
38. Zacarias Manuel Maurício,
39. Celestino Gabriel Faria de Sousa,
40. Bernardo Goi-Goi,
41. Francisco Langa,
42. Solomon Machaque,
43. Marina Mangedye (Pachinuapa),
44. Mónica Chitupila,
45. Teresa Amuli Nhalingue,
46. Alberto Sithole,
47. Inácio António Nunes
48. Josina A. Muthemba (Machel)
49. Aurélio Beueli Manave
50. Paulina Mateus N'kunda,
51. Miguel Murrupa,
52. Sharfurdine khane,
53. Jocob Jeremias Nymbir,
54. Lourenço Mutaka,
55. Lourenço Andre Cumbe,
56. André Moyo,
57. Celina Simango,
58. Focas Zacarias Assikulava,
59. Pedro Simango,
60. Francisco Ndeyo M'tamanga,
61. Romão Fernandes Farinha,
62. Bartolomeu Nkunduma Ntika,
63. Gertrudes Daniel (Fumo),
64. Rosa Macassange,
65. Anselmo Grégório Anaíva,
66. Bernabé Kajika,
67. Alfredo Manuel Faria,
68. João Muchanga,
69. Manuel Chitupila,
70. Mónica chilenje,
71. Alfredo Warcinene Wacira,
72. Gabriel Cassimo,
73. Júlia Muchanga,
74. Eusébio Rodrigues Murebo,
75. José Natal Sululu,
76. Fernando Mungaka,
77. Manuel Tristão Lisboa,
78. Cândida Cassimo,
79. Teresa António,
80. Matias Chissancho,
81. Mário Eugénio Chaomba,
82. Fatenda Hoje,
83. José Manuel Maurício,
84. Rolando Polomola,
85. Bernardo Buanali Chilombe,
86. Julieta Alves Aíde,
87. Lúcio Jigueira,
88. Felizarda Matavata,
89. Geraldo Malalia,
90. Eugénio Matusse,
91. Leão Semana,
92. África Curaia Kanyungu
93. Essaia Banda,
94. Bartolomeu Sambili,
95. Jorge Vicente,
96. Rafael Alberto Fumo,
97. Manuel Chico Almeida,
98. Francisco Faustino,
99. João Aleixo Malunga,
100. Manuel António,
101. Mateus Carlos 'Kavandame,
102. Assumane N'Taula,
103. Mponda Macanjila.