

**CHALLENGES TO INCLUSIVE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

Research Report

Student: Tumisang Motsepe

Student No: 2402346

Supervisor: Mr. Murray Cairns

Wits School of Governance

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ABSTRACT:


Public participation is a fundamental component of good Security Sector Governance (SSG), allowing those who are affected to participate in decision-making processes. Although inclusive participation is recognized as fundamental, this has not translated in its universal application, particularly when it relates to matters of national security. South Africa's 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) has taken a similar approach, drawing criticism for its lack of inclusivity.

In light of this, this research seeks to explore the challenges that exist within South Africa's security sector that limit inclusive public participation.

The paper employed a qualitative case study and purposive sampling to collect textual data on challenges found in other contexts, and the perspectives of security experts familiar with practices in the country's security space. Findings from the research show that the country's historical legacies, as well as institutional practices and relationships among various stakeholders, limit public participation in South Africa's security sector.

DECLARATION:

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Security) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. Motsepe', is written over a horizontal line.

31 March 2023

DEDICATION:

This paper is dedicated to my late grandmother, Ntokwane Christina Lehasa. I hope to forever make you proud.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who has supported me throughout this process. My family for all their love, patience, and support. My supervisor, Mr. Murray Cairns, who shared his knowledge in the pursuit of this degree. Above all else, I thank the Almighty God, who continues to show me His grace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	5
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH	8
1.1. BACKGROUND	11
1.2. OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH.....	14
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT	15
1.4. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH.....	16
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION	16
1.6. SUB-QUESTIONS	16
1.7. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS	16
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	18
2.1. THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	19
2.1.1. The need for Substantive public participation as opposed to Tokenism	20
2.1.2. Challenges to Public Participation	22
2.2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE SECURITY	
SECTOR	26
2.2.1. Expanded actors in security sector governance and security provision	27
2.2.2. Public Participatory processes in South Africa	29
2.2.3. Challenges of inclusive public participation in matters of national security	31
SECURITY SECTOR	35
2.3. THE NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION	36
2.4. CONCLUSION	37
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH REPORT	38
3.1. RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN	38
3.2. DATA COLLECTION METHODS.....	38
3.3. SAMPLING STRATEGY	39

3.4. DATA ANALYSIS	41
3.5. LIMITATIONS, FEASIBILITY, AND POSITIONALITY	42
3.6. ETHICS	43
3.7. TRUSTWORTHINESS, TRANSFERABILITY AND DEPENDABILITY	43
3.8. CONCLUSION.....	43
CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION.....	45
4.1. DATA PRESENTATION.....	47
Theme 1: Lack of Social Cohesion and Common National Interests	49
Theme 2: The Lack of Real Representation in Public Participation	52
Theme 3: Parliament as a Key Representative for Public Participation	56
Theme 4: The Public Central in determining National Security	58
Theme 5: The Media as a Driver and Influence on Public Opinion	63
Theme 6: Secret Classification of the NSS	64
Theme 7: The Silo Approach	68
Theme 8: Remnants of a Security State	71
Theme 9: Effect of Leadership on State Security Organs and Their Mandates	72
4.2. REFLECTION ON OTHER COUNTRIES	75
4.2.1. The NSS of the United States of America (US)	76
4.3. CONCLUSION	77
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS	78
5.1. CHALLENGE 1: THE EFFECT OF HISTORY AND LEGACIES OF APARTHEID ON CONTEMPORARY SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE.....	78
5.2. CHALLENGE 2: CATEGORIZATION OF CIVIL GROUPS AND MEDIA DRIVING TRUST DEFICIT	82
5.3. CHALLENGE 3: INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES	86
5.4. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSS	93
5.5. THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY SECTOR	94

5.6. CONCLUSION	97
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	98
REFERENCES.....	104
APPENDICES	115
8.1 APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS.....	115
8.2 APPENDIX 2: THEMES AND CODES	117

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

This research sought to explore the challenges that exist within South Africa's (SA) security sector, that constrain inclusive public participation in the development of a National Security Strategy (NSS). A National Security Strategy is an integral part of a nation-state, directing the means by which a country will achieve its desired security goals. Scholars and policy researchers, (Brands, Feaver, Inboden, & Miller, 2017), have described the NSS as a strategic document, outlining how a nation will undertake its actions to attain its national interests. The significance of the NSS stems from its overarching role in directing a country's national security policies and approach.

The processes underlying the development of the NSS are similarly important, as they encompass the various methods that countries will employ to design their strategies (Stolberg, 2012). According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (2017), processes surrounding the development of any strategy will influence its outcome, with various components contributing to the design and delivery of the strategy. During the formulation phase of developing a strategy, decisions are taken on a variety of issues, among these being a particular focus of this research: who participates in the development of a strategy (CSIS, 2017). As a result, the process of developing an NSS is an important scholarly endeavor.

The United Nations (UN) has established in its *Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) on Security Sector Reform* (2012) that the development of the NSS is the sovereign prerogative of a country, though such a process should be in accordance with the principles of good Security Sector Governance (SSG). The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF, n.d.) describes SSG to involve the manner in which those entrusted with securing the public should operate and conduct themselves while upholding democratic processes and principles. Essentially, good SSG serves as a "normative standard for how the state security sector should function in a democracy," (DCAF, n.d., p. 2)

Among the principles that govern the NSS, is for the strategy to represent the interests and values of the country, its government, and the public (UN, 2012). To achieve this representation, the development of the strategy is done through public participation (DCAF, n.d.). Through participation, nations can ensure inclusivity in governments' decision-making and promote legitimacy in the country's security structures. In both scholarship and policymaking, the value of inclusive participation is considered a key instrument for good SSG, though; its application has not always translated into its universal application (Bingham, Nabatch & O'Leary, 2005).

Public participation has been identified to promote stronger relations between state institutions and citizens, allowing credibility in government decision-making processes. The need for participatory processes also derives from the South African Constitutional imperatives, which state that "people should be actively involved in the government's decision-making process to promote transparency, representative governance, and affect the outcomes of government" (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). In highlighting the critical aspect of inclusivity and public participation, the African Union (AU) Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), adopted at the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union (2013) has also called for member states to allow public participation in the development of their National Security Strategies.

Even though the concept of public participation is used widely, it is acknowledged that there is no universal definition of what constitutes the public, and public participation, with each concept derived from different perspectives. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), the public includes all key nationwide stakeholders. While for Baker (2010), public participants include a diverse range of actors including non-governmental organisations, interest groups, and civil society. In defining public participation, Quick and Bryson (2016) suggest the concept to mean the "direct or indirect involvement of stakeholders, (p.1)" to ensure more inclusion in government decision-making. When governance is done in an inclusive manner, all stakeholders are given the opportunity to direct outcomes (Africa, 2011). In applying public participation in developing the NSS, nations can ensure inclusivity in decision-making and promote legitimacy in

security structures. In contemporary democratic settings, public participation and consultation have become key elements in the development of an NSS.

On the other hand, while the majority of literature on good SSG promotes the principles of participation in the development of an NSS, there are differing views on the value and scope of participation, as well as how this relates to outcomes. While proponents have advocated for public participation to achieve representation and promote legitimacy, "some governments" believe that the development of the NSS is solely the responsibility of securocrats and "not the general public" (DCAF, n.d., p. 2 and Boucher, 2009, p. 2). Further to this, in many contexts, national security has come to be synonymous with secrecy, with Kisoona (2009) noting that access to information remains restricted when it relates to matters surrounding national security. The secrecy surrounding national security has thus been criticized by multiple authors, who cite a lack of accountability, checks and balances, and openness when it concerns national security matters.

The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has also conceded that the formulation process in the development of an NSS may give way for "sensitive information that could make a state vulnerable, to be put in the public domain," (DCAF, n.d., p. 8). This acknowledgment is in line with that of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (2021) which indicates that some aspects of the NSS "can and should be classified." (p. 44). It has thus been challenging for most policymakers to find a balance between openness and transparency versus the secret nature of the national security environment. As a result, developing the NSS can be challenging, as there is no standard for how inclusive the process should be, resulting in a conflict between participation principles and actual practices. Furthermore, as Mbeche (2017) notes, while participatory processes are essential, involving all individuals affected in decision-making processes would become a time-consuming undertaking.

Acknowledgment must also be given to the challenges that may be presented as a result of broader consultative and participatory processes and outcomes. Whereby a broader process may present inclusivity, it may equally result in divergent and competing interests. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017) description of the 2015 United States (U.S.) NSS was a "lengthy process," with divergent and competing interests that

“came to dominate the process” (CSIS, 2017, p. 13). As a result, this NSS fell short of achieving its desired security goals, (CSIS, 2017, p. 13).

1.1. BACKGROUND

For several years following democracy, South Africa did not have an overarching NSS, with various legislations and policies directing the country's national security interests (Hough, 2006). In 2007, the administration of President Thabo Mbeki drafted the first NSS framework, which involved extensive "governmental and public consultation" (Daniels, 2019, p. 8). In enabling for public participation, this NSS proposed a collective body through “the establishment of a National Security Advisory Council that would include public sector, private sector and civil society representatives,”(Daniels, 2019, p. 8). Since then, the most recent NSS was developed in 2013, during the administration of President Jacob Zuma. This NSS has been classified as top secret, which has resulted in its criticism, primarily due to the lack of inclusion in the development process and lack of accessibility outside of government security structures (Daniels, 2019).

In 2018, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa established the High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency (SSA) to review the "capability and organizational integrity" of the country's intelligence arm, the SSA (South African Government, 2018). Among the recommendations of the High-Level Review Panel, was for South Africa to urgently develop an updated NSS, which would serve as an overarching premise, for the country's national security policies and approach (South African Government, 2018). The High-Level Review Panel has prescribed for this NSS to be “widely consulted with the public,” (South African Government, 2018, p.3). This recommendation by the High-Level Review Panel has come on the backdrop of a security environment compounded by allegations of fraud and corruption, and the inability of state security organisations to fulfill their mandate. Testimonies at the Zondo Commission on State Capture have supported this observation, revealing that South Africa's security structures have been beleaguered by malpractice (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2021). These shortcomings have necessitated the need to rebuild confidence, transparency, and legitimacy in South Africa's security structures.

Prior to South Africa's democratic transition, the apartheid government used security systems as a repressive instrument, with "institutions, laws, and practices" "aimed at ensuring the political domination of the country by a minority regime" (Africa, 2011, p. 1). According to O'Malley (n.d.), apartheid Prime Minister PW Botha's definition of governance resulted in state mechanisms that were entirely securitised and consolidated under the Prime Minister. "Security governance in the apartheid era was ultimately vested in the executive, with little parliamentary, judicial or civilian involvement," (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010, p. 120).

The apartheid regime ruled the country using an authoritative security architecture under the auspices of the 'national security management system.' This system was created to safeguard the apartheid government from perceived internal and external threats (Cawthra, n.d.). The State Security Council (SSC), a component of the national security management system, was also in charge of drafting the country's Total Strategy (Paltiel, 25 July 2021). The Total Strategy, which was a comprehensive blueprint identifying existential threats to the apartheid regime and response systems, was analogous to a national security strategy. During this time, a limited governance framework existed, allowing for intrusive measures, a lack of accountability, and a lack of transparency (Kasril, 2009). As attributed by Hendricks & Musavengana (2010), this system of governance relied on the security apparatus for its sustenance.

The post-apartheid era saw widespread reforms, among these being the country's security sector. In their writing, Africa (2011) and Cawthra (2005) concede that during this period of transformation, the security sector was one of the most challenging to reform. The reform process resulted in among others, the development of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which has become one of the cornerstones of South Africa's national security approach. The advent of democratic South Africa has also given rise to a vigorous civil society demonstrated by the participation of civil groups in government decision-making. In their writings, authors including Daniels (2019), Africa (2011) and Cawthra (2005) each concede to the role of civil organisations as instrumental in the outcome of security related policies.

For Cawthra (2019), following the country's transition into a democratic dispensation, South Africa's good SSG has however been on a gradual decline. For him, the reduction in participatory processes and norms is reflected by the decrease in consultation with civil groups (Cawthra, 2019). This reduction in broader participatory processes coincides with testimonies given at the Zondo Commission on State Capture, regarding the deliberation over the country's state security structures (Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2021). Cawthra (2005) has expressed that while South Africa's post-apartheid security sector reform process enabled a vigorous civil movement through various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), since then the role of and consultation with these groups has waned, and it limits the extent of influence these groups have in national security outcomes.

With these expressed challenges from scholars, the Zondo Commission and the High-Level Review Panel, the role of the NSS is therefore critical, in ensuring that the country's security structures receive their directive from the NSS. Given the challenges confronting the South African security sector, Cole, Shanahan, & Fluri (2009) assess that the development of the NSS can provide the opportunity to review and transform the security structures. The role of the NSS is therefore critical, in commanding the type of work the security structures embark on (Chuter, 2007, in Boucher, 2009)

With the recommendation of the High-Level Review Panel, processes are underway for the country to develop an updated NSS, under the administration of President Ramaphosa, (Africa, 2021). In his State of Nation Address (SONA) President Ramaphosa directed for all South Africans to participate in the development of the NSS, (South African Government, 2022, 10 February).

Both the 2007 draft NSS under President Thabo Mbeki and the 2013 NSS formulated under the administration of President Jacob Zuma were respectively prepared by the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), (South African Government, 2018). According to South African legislation, NICOC is a coordinating structure responsible for the collation of "information from all the intelligence services as well as other government departments and external experts," (South African Government, 2018, p. 37). NICOC's responsibilities include the development of the NSS, which is then

approved by the country's National Security Council (NSC) (Putter, 2011). The NSC, which is led by the country's president, is a sub-committee of the Cabinet of ministers that includes all ministries involved in providing security services for the country.

Given the challenges associated with participation in South Africa's recent NSS and the shortcomings in the country's security governance, this research explored the challenges within the country's security sector that limit inclusive participation. In addition to the principles of good SSG, the need for a participative approach and consultation also arises from the South African Constitutional imperatives. In alignment with the prescript for participatory processes, Chapter 11 of the Constitution further prescribes for national security to “reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation,” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).

1.2. OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

The research will be conducted in South Africa's security sector, as this is where those tasked with the development of security strategies are placed (CSIS, 2017). In this regard, the public is all-inclusive, comprising of the nationwide stakeholders who form part of South Africa's security sector, with these actors directly or indirectly influencing “the delivery and governance of security,” (Ebo & Powell, 2010, p.46). The UN describes the security sector to include both formal and informal bodies that manage and oversee the provision of security,” (UN, 2008: para. 14, cited in Ebo & Powell, 2010, p. 46). As there is no existent model, methodology, or process as to how each country is to develop its NSS, there is a need to understand the role of the public in the development of the South African NSS, while further exploring how to safeguard national security, while enabling an environment of openness and transparency in the security sector.

Drawing from the tools required for good governance in government decision-making, this research focuses on public participation as an instrument of good governance. The research has further drawn on perceived best practices, which provided a framework on how countries should develop their NSS based on principles of good SSG. The research also reflected on countries that have deliberated on their processes of developing such a strategy.

1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Current practice in South Africa's security sector demonstrates a lack of participatory and inclusive processes in terms of national security. This assessment is supported by the lack of consultation and accessibility to in the development of the 2013 NSS, which results in low efficacy outside of the state's security structures (Daniels, 2019). One of the drawbacks of the most recent NSS, according to Cawthra (2013), may be related to its development within intelligence structures. Cawthra (2013) further concedes that, in terms of national security, post-apartheid South Africa still faces a lack of transparency and access to information.

Existing literature on security sector governance recognises the need for participation and inclusion in the government's decision-making. This is supported by various authors including Ball, Bouta and van de Goor, (2003, p. 34), who state that policy and strategy development can lead to participatory policies and practices that aid in the achievement of good SSG. The public is encouraged to participate in the development of the NSS so that the strategy can reflect the security needs of all. Despite this, the majority of research has acknowledged state security actors' limited participation norms, with Nathan (2009) confirming the steadfast classification of information when it comes to national security. There is therefore an existing gap between promoted principles of participation and existing practice, particularly when it relates to national security, including in the development of the NSS.

Challenges posed by state security structures have also been brought to light by the Zondo Commission findings, which revealed the misappropriation of state security structures for political ends. These findings have expressed the urgent need for South Africa to reformulate its national security priorities and objectives. The Report of the Expert Panel into the July 2021 Civil Unrest has also expressed that through the NSS, can the country formulate an agreed upon instrument that binds all South African's regardless of "political affiliation or social standing," (South African Government, 2021, p.129).

The lack of participatory processes in the development of South Africa's 2013 NSS necessitated this research to allow for the exploration of the challenges that limit participation in national security matters within the South African context. As the country looks to develop an updated NSS, the investigation aims to assist in the determination of these obstacles and identify the tools needed to increase inclusive public participation. There is a need to further understand the role of the public in the development of the South African NSS, while further exploring how to safeguard national security.

1.4. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of the research was to explore public participation as a challenge in South Africa's security sector in developing an inclusive National Security Strategy. The research also unpacked the role of the public in such a process.

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION

The question this research sought to explore was, "What challenges exist in South Africa's security sector that constrains inclusive public participation in the development of a National Security Strategy?"

1.6. SUB-QUESTIONS

- a) What role should the public play in the development of the NSS?
- b) What obstacles impede participatory norms and meaningful inclusion in developing the NSS?

1.7. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 2 will present the literature review that served as the basis for this study. The research used Arnstein's (1969) 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' as a base for the literature on participation. Furthermore, it drew on the literature on public participation based on research conducted in a variety of contexts, which served as an analytical framework for this study.

Chapter 3 will provide the methodology and analytical tools used in conducting the research. The paper used a qualitative case study as the views of different participants was sought to identify the challenges that exist with South Africa's security sector that constrain inclusive public participation. A purposive sampling method was used, to allow

for the selection of a set of texts/documents and participants who could respond to the set question.

Chapter 4 will provide a presentation of the data gathered from the texts/documents and participants. Thematic Analysis was used in the research to create the codes and themes that emerged from the data.

Chapter 5 analyses the data gathered and highlights the key findings.

Finally, Chapter 6 will provide the answer to the research question and sub-questions that brought about the research. The Chapter will also provide recommendations that can enhance public participation in the security sector.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review for this study will be presented thematically, covering three primary themes and relevant concepts related to the challenges to public participation and the development of National Security Strategies.

The literature review will begin with a discussion of the concept of public participation and its significance as a tool of good governance. It will draw on Arnstein's (1969) 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' as a base for the literature on participation. This theory contends that different levels of citizen control or power exist through the concept of participation, and that the level of participation citizens have determines how much influence they have over outcomes (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein's (1969) theory has been criticised for being linear and hierarchical (Treseder, 1997), but offers one of the simplistic variance of participation across different contexts.

The theory acknowledges that those in positions of authority have the power to control levels of involvement of affected parties, with the development of a country's NSS following the same political process and those with authority over the country's security apparatus directing the degree to which the public can participate (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021). Arnstein (1969) also acknowledges the political and economic facets of society, as well as how minority and marginalised groups may be excluded from decision-making processes that directly affect them. Recognition is given that the NSS has a broad societal role in directing a country's national security approach, and despite its effect on all spheres of society, its decision-making can be limited to only a few parties. Given the similarities between Arnstein's (1969) context and the context for developing the NSS, this theory is consistent with the study. Newer models of participation have emerged, such as White's (1996) Typology of Interests, Treseder's (1997) Degrees of Participation, and Shier's (2001) Pathways to Participation, which look at factors that encourage participation and opportunities that give rise to it. Each has incorporated Arnstein's (1969) theory, which remains one of the most widely used methods by authors in their more recent participation models.

The literature review will also reflect on research conducted on public participation in varied settings, and draw the challenges identified in applying public participation in these contexts. These challenges served as a framework for measuring the challenges to public participation in the South African security sector, toward the development of an NSS.

Finally, the concept of public participation is applied to the security sector, beginning with a definition of the security sector and the relevant participants or stakeholders who influence national security and are participants in its governance. A review of the literature on security sector governance in South Africa is also drawn, to facilitate an understanding of public participation in South Africa's security sector. The literature review will then follow the same structure as in the first half, looking at challenges identified in applying public participation in this sector. Figure 1: Overview of Literature Review (p. 35) provides an illustration of the literature review focusing on the first two sections.

The last part of the literature review will look at why there is a need to rethink security sector governance in South Africa, even though the country has effectively implemented security sector reform and democratic principles.

2.1. THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Many academics agree that public participation in decision-making supports democratic values (Clark, 2018 and Rowe & Watermeyer, 2018). Within systems of governance, different participants will influence decisions, with public participation used as an instrument to ensure inclusivity and allow credible processes (Shapiro & Murphy, 2013). The World Bank's Learning Group on Participatory Development, as cited by Mbeche (2017), defines public participation as "a process through which stakeholders influence and share control" (p. 428). In a manner similar to Mbeche's (2017) linkage of stakeholders, Arnstein (2019) holds that, public participation enables democratic processes, by allowing those who are governed to become stakeholders within their own government. In areas of service provision and delivery, public participation may further facilitate in improving the quality of the service rendered (Speer, 2012).

Authors writing on participation within SSG, similarly take this approach, with Ball, et al., (2003), alongside Cole, Shanahan & Fluri, (2010), highlighting the value of involving all relevant actors in decision-making processes to enable good Security Sector Governance.

The authors underscore that for the security sector to function effectively, the participation of all relevant actors is essential, with inclusion in decision-making necessitated by the process of public participation. This belief is similarly taken in the formulation of national security policies and strategies, with the AU (2013), DCAF (2005) and UN (2012) all advocating for inclusive processes, to promote participation and inputs from a wide spectrum of society.

2.1.1. The need for Substantive public participation as opposed to Tokenism

Different scholarly work on participation has acknowledged Arnstein's (1969) 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' as a model for translating theory into practice in the conceptualization of public participation and its application to empirical studies. For different authors, Arnstein's (1969) theory has enabled an understanding of the differing degrees of control citizens have over outcomes through the concept of participation.

Public participation involves "power redistribution," in which those who are marginalised are given the ability to influence decisions, which would typically be granted to the privileged (Arnstein, 2019. p, 24). Every step taken to achieve substantive public participation provides citizens more authority over the decision-making process, whereas less substantive public participation leads to either symbolic or a token type of representation, where the public has little to no impact (Arnstein, 2019). Based on this theory, substantive participation can then be defined as a redistribution of power across the populace. When having the highest level of public participation, the public is "delegated Power and Citizen Control," and "citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power," (Arnstein, 2019. p, 25).

Drawing from Arnstein (2019); other authors writing on public participation identify that the most effective form of involvement is when there is a transfer of power across the populace, which can be classified as substantive public participation, (Mbeche, 2017 and Turner, 2014). Though the concept is acknowledged to be abstract, with no specific measure, it can be equated with citizen control (Tshoose, 2015). The process adopted forms a central part of substantive participation, with those affected by the decision, being

comfortable with the democratic and participatory process undertaken (Mbeche, 2017; Shasky, 2013 and Turner, 2014). In such a context, participants may not necessarily agree with outcomes, but have the confidence in knowing their views are heeded and have an influence or power over the decisions taken, (Andrasik & Mead, 2019; Arnstein (1969); and Tshoose, 2015). Through such citizen control, those affected can direct the agenda and become active participants in participatory processes (Andrasik & Mead, 2019 and Tshoose, 2015). Therefore, for participation to be considered substantive, the public should be given the opportunity to express their views openly and be informed of both the processes and decisions adopted.

The 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' theory also outlines other variations of public participation that exist, ranging from a symbolic or token types of representation to having no form of public participation at all (Arnstein, 1969). The variation includes symbolic or a token type of representation. Token type of representation or 'tokenism', involves some form of communication between the public and authorities, though in such a context the public has limited power and no assurance that this form of public participation will result in the public's opinions guiding and affecting outcomes (Arnstein, 2019). In studies where tokenism was identified, decision-making processes or representation frequently result in concentrated or centralised participation of a selected few (Mbeche, 2017 and Fung, 2015). In such processes, it was observed that the public was consulted or informed, though they had no direct control over outcomes (Mbeche, 2017 and Turner 2014). Tokenism, unlike substantive participation, may lead to rhetoric that is suggested to imply public participation but falls short of truly including those who are affected (Arnstein, 2019). Tokenism, as a symbolic form of participation, can demonstrate or symbolise legitimacy by involving some sectors of the public who are perceived as legitimate parties but fall short of involving the affected interests. (Andrasik & Mead, 2019 and Topal, 2009).

The lowest variance in the 'Ladder of Citizen Participation' theory is in cases where there is no form of public participation that exists. In such contexts, there may be pseudo-participatory processes, and the public is primarily spoken at rather than with (Arnstein, 1969). According to Arnstein (1969), this context is defined by those in power retaining control over the decisions taken and directing solutions for affected parties.

2.1.2. Challenges to Public Participation

Across different literature, the concept of public participation is acknowledged as a prerequisite for participatory democracy and decision-making, yet there is also an acknowledgement of its limitations. International literature from Pakistan (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011), the United States (US) (Turner, 2014), Denmark (Lyhne, Helle & Aaen, 2016) and Uganda (Mbeche, 2017), has identified these limitations and challenges surrounding the conceptualization and application of public participation. Some authors argue that a review is needed before the concept is accepted as the panacea for good governance, while others argue that the processes adopted are what falls short of achieving set objectives (Mbeche, 2017; Nadeem & Fischer 2011 and Speer, 2012).

The below outlines themes drawn from these different contexts, which highlight the challenges to public participation. These drawn out themes served as a theoretical framework for exploring the challenges of public participation in the development of an NSS in the South African context. The research expanded beyond the outlined key challenges from the scholarly work, adding and eliminating existent challenges in light of South Africa's security sector context.

a) Expert participants' and the shortcomings of this approach

Literature from Uganda, Denmark and the US, listed expert participants as some of the prominent groups in public participation processes (Mbeche, 2017; Nadeem & Fischer, 2011 and Turner, 2014). Some authors refer to these experts positively as educated professionals, researchers, or groups with specialised knowledge, while others refer to them as elitists or privileged (Mbeche, 2017 and Nadeem & Fischer, 2011).

Studies critical of expert participants suggest that public participatory approaches that rely heavily on expert opinions frequently succumb to tokenism (Turner, 2014.). In such contexts, a large reliance is placed on a select few participants who are labelled as experts, and their opinions serve as an "authoritative source" of information (Nadeem & Fischer,

2011, p.36). It is identified though, that in the studies where such expert opinions were used, they fell short of truly understanding affected parties (Mbeche, 2017; Nadeem & Fischer, 2011 and Turner, 2014). Where there was a large scope of expert views, it was also identified that this then limited the scope of representation from the local communities, falling short of the primary purpose of involving local views, (Mbeche, 2017 and Turner, 2014). It is acknowledged that this approach runs the risk of excluding significant portions of a society, propagating a feeling of exclusion, (Rowe & Watermeyer, 2018; Shapiro & Murphy, 2013 and Turner, 2014). A further criticism found with this approach from the study in Uganda is in its top-down communication, where there is no cycle of dialogue, and instead, locals are informed as opposed to being contributors (Fung, 2015; Mbeche, 2017 and Mmutle & de Beer, 2021).

b) Lack understanding of local issues

A lack of understanding of local contexts, which affects how groups interact with one another, has been identified as another obstacle to participatory processes (Gaventa, 2003 and Nadeem & Fischer, 2011). Such societal factors can include language barriers, social and class divisions or gender polarization, which may present as power disparities in groups. This is due to the fact that the spaces in which public participation takes place are not neutral, affecting how people interact with one another.

In societies where power disparities have been found, the power relations affected interactions, shaping “the boundaries of participatory spaces, what is possible within them, and who may enter, with which identities, discourses and interests,” (Gaventa, 2003, p.7). These power dynamics manifest in a variety of contexts, including religious or cultural settings. Studies on public participation have shown that power relations can limit or hinder how individuals within groups interact with one another or with authorities (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011 and Tshoose, 2015). A description of power relations in Pakistan (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011) demonstrated a context where police officers constrained the public participants from fully expressing their views due to the power disparity that manifested through intimidation or domination. Those who were in the positions of power held authority over the general public (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011). Participatory processes can also give rise to societal divisions if one group is oppressed or perceives to be dictated by

another, (Arnstein, 1969 in Shasky, 2013). Language as a barrier to communication can also act as a power disparity, restricting public discourse and understanding (Arnstein, 2019; Nadeem & Fischer 2011, Tshoose, 2015). Similarly, structural conditions and capabilities that groups possess within a specific space carry factors such as access to financial resources or capabilities, distinguishing groups (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011 and Speer, 2012). As such, a lack of understanding of local contexts may lead to circumstantial or uncontrollable hindrances that withhold public participation.

Due to these different dynamics, one grouping may be more dominant in a setting due to its capacity, taking over platforms and eroding the positions of smaller or less privileged actors (Nadeem & Fischer, 2011; Speer, 2012 and Tshoose, 2015). While the methods employed for public participation are crucial, the plethora of participants, which are diverse in character, should be taken into consideration. The societal context will always affect how groups interact in certain forums.

c) Reliance on representative (non-real representatives)

Much like the reliance on expert views, public participation that is based on representation has raised questions on whether it can always be referred to as true representation. The reliance on representation is drawn from the traditional theory of representative democracy, whereby through an electoral process citizens elect those who will represent them (Fung, 2015 and Gaventa, 2003).

A reliance on representatives is argued to have a drawback, as it may not accurately reflect public opinion, and instead succumb to token presentation (Andrasik & Mead, 2019). Those who raise this argument critique representation as not truly reflecting the represented, and instead limiting the power of the public, (Andrasik & Mead, 2019; Mbeche, 2017 and Shasky, 2013).

To measure the credibility of representation Andrasik & Mead, 2019, Arnstein (2019) and Mbeche (2017) indicate that true representation should be determined by how well those participating reflect the resolve of their constituency and are "responsive to the needs and aspirations of the represented" (Mbeche, 2017, p. 428). To counter the shortfall of representation, contemporary arrangements look towards giving citizens more direct

control over decision-making processes as a way to address the lack of true representation, (Andrasik & Mead, 2019; Fung 2015 and Gaventa, 2003).

d) Complexities of applying public participation

Various complexities, which come with undertaking participation, are among the obstacles to meaningful public participation. The methods used to conduct public participation and the institutions in charge of carrying it out influence how processes unfold (Mbeche, 2017 and Turner, 2014). While the public's willingness to participate, which is influenced by a variety of factors, also plays a role in whether or not public participation takes place effectively (Arnstein, 2019 and Nadeem, & Fischer, 2011).

Methods identified in the studies that hinder public participation include top-down communication and a pre-set agenda by authorities, which serve to hinder public participation (Arnstein, 2019 and Mbeche, 2017). The studies from Uganda and the US identified that limited time and resources were among the complexities that inhibited substantive public participation. In most public participatory processes, to overcome time and resource constraints only small selected groups may be sought as representatives of the broad public (Rowe & Watermeyer, 2018 and Shapiro & Murphy, 2013) However, in such circumstances, the limited scope of stakeholders runs the risk of not representing the interests of all parties.

These actions may either be circumstantial, with authorities and administrators lacking the knowledge on how to undertake substantive public participation, or deliberate, where there is a conscious shortcut undertaken, to conclude processes (Turner, 2014). The study from the US exemplified this (Turner, 2014), as it was found that those undertaking participatory processes held the view that "involvement by the public can unnecessarily complicate the planning," (p.887).

Some methods employed also appeared to simply serve as tick boxes for compliance, aimed at simply legitimising processes, without undertaking substantive public participatory processes (Arnstein, 2019; Fung, 2015 and Speer 2012). These shortcomings juxtapose the 'manipulation' classification of Arnstein's (2019) ladder theory, whereby those undertaking participatory processes merely undertake the process as a

form of compliance, falling short of a commitment to undertake substantive public participation.

Levels of public participation are also identified to be fundamentally dependent on the institutions that carry out the process, (Lyhne et al., 2016; Mbeche, 2017 and Mmutle & de Beer, 2021). Depending on the outlook the institutions carrying out participatory methods have, this will influence decisions such as who participates, and the extent of their participation. The findings from Denmark found that “public participation practices do not take place in a vacuum, but in a context of politics, institutions, and resources,” (Lyhne et al., 2016, p. 314).

The outcome of participation shortfalls from the different studies resulted in those affected distrusting the aim of public participation and those entrusted with undertaking the process (Gaventa, 2003, Mbeche, 2017 and Turner, 2014). Even in contexts where substantive public participation was sought after, and processes put in place to attain this, communities’ mistrust of those employed to undertake processes limited their willingness to participate, (Fung, 2015, Nadeem & Fischer, 2011 and Shasky, 2013). This creates a distance/wedge/gap between the public and the institutions entrusted with the authority over decision-making processes.

From the above literature, it is observed that though the concept of public participation is fundamental for good governance, its application in some contexts does not result in substantive public participation. These challenges may be either unintentional or deliberate, with other factors such as the context in which public participation is taking place also playing a role.

2.2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

The concept of public participation has been recognized as a fundamental tool in ensuring good Security Sector Governance (SSG). Authors writing on SSG, such as McCandless (2019), Jackson & Beswick (2018), have acknowledged that inclusive participation in the security sector provides a people-centered approach to security, which is consistent with the notion that public participatory methods aid in the achievement of sustainable peace.

This approach is further in line with the human security paradigm, which views individuals within a state and various local groupings as security referent objects (Jackson & Beswick, 2018). The people-centered approach to human security is also reflected in South African government security policies, which direct that national security should move beyond a state-centric approach to one in which societies are the primary focus of security (Hutton, 2009; Kasril, 2019 and Ramokgadi, Beukes, & Liebenberg, 2020).

2.2.1. Expanded actors in security sector governance and security provision

The involvement or participation of a broader range of actors is a necessity to address the complexities of contemporary security challenges, (Ball et al., 2014; Jackson & Beswick, 2018, and McCandless, 2019). There is also widespread agreement that a diverse set of actors can contribute a range of perspectives in addressing these security challenges, (Ball et al., 2014; Jackson & Beswick, 2018; McCandless, 2019 and Nadeem & Fischer, 2011). In aligning the views of authors writing on good SSG to those writing on public participation as a principle of good governance, there is then a general agreement that contemporary literature on public participation must contend with the quality of public participation, but further draw on aspects such as who should participate, and the level of such participation (Ball et al., 2014; Jackson & Beswick, 2018, and McCandless, 2019).

In working to outline the literature on the expansion of actors involved in addressing the complexity of contemporary security challenges, it is necessary to first define what constitutes the security sector. Scholars writing on security matters define the security sector as all institutions responsible for and contributing to the safety and security of the public, (Ball et al., 2014; Ebo & Powell, 2010). This includes government entities such as "armed forces, police and intelligence agencies, related ministries and departments," (Ball et al., 2014, p.7). Ebo & Powell (2010) expand on this definition, stating that the security sector includes a wide spectrum of actors who "directly and indirectly influence the delivery and governance of security" (p.46). Such organisations may be independent of the state, and ensure there is accountability within the security sector. A report by Ball et al., (2014) has identified that "in some countries, civil society organisations such as research institutes, universities or non-governmental organisations may provide an additional

source of the requisite technical assistance,” to the security sector (p.16). In the development of an NSS, non-state actors who contribute to this process can take many forms. These can include external actors such as the AU or UN, and on the domestic side, civil society groups, who have acquired “a greater voice and role in determining national security policy” (Boucher, 2009, p. 2).

In literature focused on the African context, non-state actors have included “informal authorities and private security services” which have come to play a role in the formation of the security apparatus (United Nations, 2008, in Powell & Ebo, 2010, p. 46). These can also include traditional structures such as customary courts, “traditional chiefs” and “heads of informal institutions,” as key players at the local level (McCandless, 2019, p. 27). Where states could not fulfil their role adequately, non-state actors have been found to flourish at an accelerated rate, becoming providers of services where state structures are lacking (Haider & McLoughlin, 2016; McCandless & Abi-Nimer, 2007 and Powell & Ebo, 2010).

In conflict-affected states, the participation of civil society groups has been fundamental in strengthening relations between the state and the public and in building societal trust in government institutions, (McCandless, 2016). Previously, efforts in conflict-affected states frequently focused on statebuilding, with the state as the primary focus, falling short of building state-society relations and public trust in the institutions that govern them (Haider & McLoughlin, 2016 and McCandless, 2016). Newer approaches to peacebuilding have recognized the importance of a “bottom-up civil society approach,” in which inclusive processes involving the public are considered critical to developing state-society relations and responsive institutions (Haider & McLoughlin, 2016, p.2).

It can then be prescribed that whatever efforts are made by authorities, the different security actors should play a role in the management of security, which will enable the delivery of security to affected parties. The participation of all affected groups has thus been highlighted as a principle of good security sector governance, with Ball et al. (2014) indicating that for good SSG to take place, the role of each actor should be defined and embedded as part of a framework for the management of the security sector. The framework highlighted by Ball et al., (2014) is consistent with literature from McCandless

and Abi-Nimer (2007), who indicate that these actors "should be recognised and efforts made to incorporate them into an integrated governance structure."(p.1).

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the country's security institutions, as outlined in the country's Constitution, have been redefined to include the defence force, the police service, and intelligence services (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The South African government has placed the South African Police Service (SAPS) as one of the country's national priorities, (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012).

The security institutions outlined in the country's Constitution are fundamentally similar to those described by Ball et al., (2014), and extend to also include security services that are not directly derived from the state security structures, such as actors in the private security space, (Ramokgadi, et al., 2020, and Cilliers, 2021). Through public-private-partnerships, Hendricks and Musavengana (2010) highlight that such security actors have become prominent, and are utilised by state actors through the employment of security corporations.

As part of the governance of the security sector, the sector is regulated by national legislation, (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Through Parliamentary Committees, public elected representatives oversee the governance of the state security ministries, in the approval of security budgets, legislative approval and oversight, (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010).

2.2.2. Public Participatory processes in South Africa

Public participation has been crucial within the South African security contexts, such as in the development of post-apartheid security policies and how the country's security strategies would be implemented under the new democratic dispensation (Africa, 2011, Cawthra, 2005 and Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010). The role of civil society and non-state actors allowed for the comprehensive reformative measures that were implemented in the country's security sector, (Africa, 2011 and Cawthra, 2005). Authors Stolberg (2012), Ramokgadi, Beukes and Liebenberg (2020), alongside Africa (2011), Hendricks and Musavengana (2010) highlight the country's Constitution, the Defence Review of 1998

and the 1996 White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa as among such policies.

Participation in the development of the South African Constitution was demonstrated through the inclusion of various political actors in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), with the established Chapter 11 directing the governance of the security structures (Africa, 2011, Hendricks and Musavengana, 2010). The Defence Review (1998) and the White Paper on Defence (1996) have given rise to what Ramokgadi, Beukes, and Liebenberg (2020) call "constitutional state civil-military relations" (p. 131). Such relationships have enabled civilians to contribute to the legislative architecture of the country's defense force and decision-making, (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010).

Public participation in the South African security sector has also been identified through Community Police Forums (CPF), where civil society groups have had an oversight role in the safety and security of local communities (Cawthra, 2005 and Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010). According to Hendricks and Musavengana (2010), the philosophy for CPFs was introduced after 1994 "to shift the police from its regime focus to that of the community being served," (p.127). Another way the general public participates in public safety is through public safety committees, which are made up of local council members and civilians in charge of the oversight of the Municipal Police Services (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010). The challenges surrounding the country's insecurities have also given rise to new players in the private security sector, who have emerged as a crucial component of the security sector (Cilliers, 2021; Ramokgadi, Beukes & Liebenberg, 2020).

While South Africa's security sector reform process has been cited as a model for other post-conflict scenarios, Africa (2011) and Cawthra (2005) highlight that some of the transformative goals have not translated into success, with the country still suffering from security sector governance shortfalls. For Cawthra (2005), the early stages of South Africa's democracy saw an increase in the number and magnitude of security actors, but their participation in the development and review of current security policies and strategies appears to have decreased. Though Cawthra (2005) expressed this decline, others have stated that civil groups in South Africa continue to play an important role through partnerships with various spheres of society, as well as in uncovering governance gaps

and government corruption (Alence & Pitcher, 2019; Gumede, 2018 and Lupin, 2022). Financial constraints, a lack of capacity and a professional exodus are however, among the contemporary challenges faced by many civil groups, (Marc, Willman, Aslam, Rebosio, Kanishka, & Balasuriya, 2013).

2.2.3. Challenges of inclusive public participation in matters of national security

While public participation is regarded as a component of good SSG and an essential part for attaining security, some literature has also highlighted the limited participatory norms adopted by state security actors, (McCandless, 2016). The following illustrates main challenges identified by authors writing on security studies and how these can limit or inhibit public participation in matters relating to national security.

a) Characterisation of civil society groups

Though civil society groups and non-state actors are categorically classified together based on their characteristics, they are not homogeneous, with each grouping having its own motives, ideals, and interests; and frequently representing divergent groups (Arnstein, 2019 and McCandless, 2016). Given the diversity of these groups, an understanding of what constitutes non-state actors or civil society groups can vary. A study on civil society groups by McCandless (2016) reflects the differences in how liberal and Marxist ideologies view the role of civil society groups. While liberal scholars see civil groups as protectors of civil freedoms, Marxists see them as servants of capitalism (McCandless, 2016).

Similar to the findings by McCandless (2016), other scholars also raise the point that non-state actors may simply mean civil society for some, while the concept may have negative connotations for others (Clapham, 2009 and Shasky, 2013). In African contexts, civil society groups have also represented a plethora of hybrid interests, (McCandless, 2016, and McCandless & Abi-Nimer, 2007). Some of these groups may be viewed as enhancing a state's national security, while others may be viewed as a source of insecurity (McCandless, 2016 and McCandless & Abi-Nimer, 2007).

With these distinctions, civil society groups and non-state actors have also been identified to be reflective of the public they serve, with a degree of effectiveness also dependent on

the context and authority they wield in the areas in which they operate (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016; McCandless, 2016 and Shasky, 2013). Such an outlook is consistent with Arnstein's (2019) observation that public participation reflects on power distribution, with the influence of these groups reflected in the power they possess in a given context.

Drawing on the earlier literature on civil society facilitating state-society relations in conflict-affected settings, it can then be concluded that non-state actors may provide the necessary bridge for state-society relations; however, this will be influenced by a variety of factors, including the power these groups wield and how they are perceived in the contexts in which they operate.

b) Classification of information in matters relating to national security

The security sector has been identified as one of the most challenging to broaden public participation, given its limited accessibility, (Aftergood, 2010 and Fayemi, Olonisakin & Williams, 2004). This has been attributed to the association of national security with secrecy and the classification of information, in which the public is frequently unable to participate significantly, (Ball et al., 2003). Within African contexts, this limitation is even more compounded given the frequent concentration of power in the hands of the executive (Fayemi, et al., 2004 and Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016). The practice of participation, therefore raises various questions when it relates to national security, as to who should be involved in security processes, the quality of participation, and who decides and designs participatory processes (Barnes, Newman, Knops & Sullivan, 2003; Fung 2015, and McCandless, 2016).

These complexities, inquires and divergence between public participation theory and existent practices raise the gap around public participation in matters relating to national security. In this regard, Ball et al. (2014) prescribe that different forms of inclusive processes may be required when it comes to national security, and a balance is required in maintaining the classification of information and transparency.

c) Conflicting interests and spoilers

Different interests drive civil society groups, and these interests have a significant impact on their actions in developing policies and strategies (Ball et al., 2014 and McCandless,

2016). In some scenarios, non-state actors or civil society groups have been identified as working in direct competition with the state and purposefully undermining the state's authority (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016 and McCandless, 2016). In such cases, trust between security actors is broken, and there is a lack of cooperation between actors (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016 and McCandless, 2016).

Such perceptions may be influenced by civil society groups knowingly or unknowingly acting as proxies for external interests, or by a perception of such groups undermining state authority (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016). If there is a lack of trust between civil society groups and state authorities, inclusive participation can be constrained, and such groups may be viewed as spoilers in the policy and strategy development process.

Alternatively, state actors may also dilute or co-opt the role of non-state actors or civil society groups to represent their interests rather than the interests of the public they serve (Marc et al., 2013). Such outcomes jeopardise the legitimacy of civil groups as representatives of the public's interests.

d) Reliance on the Context

Civil society and the role they play is also embedded in the contexts in which they exist, with issues such as state-society relations and the extent of resources they possess, extensively qualifying their impact (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016 and McCandless, 2016). A study in the United States found that, "corporate interests dominate participation in the legislative rulemaking process" (Shapiro & Murphy, 2013, p.490). As a result, a process intended to allow for participatory processes is distorted. Theodoulou (1995) describes the types of actors with such capacity as the elite group, whereby "public policy is not then determined by the masses but by a minority who have political and economic power," or influence (p. 6). In such settings, the interests of one group may override those of a minority, or be discriminatory toward one group over another (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016 and Shasky, 2013).

Multinational organisations may also favor some interests and groups over others, influencing how civil society organisations operate in a given context (McCandless, 2016). A study published by Marc, et al. (2013), found that "unconstructive interactions between

types of institutions—which can take a variety of forms—tend to harm social cohesion by reinforcing divisions between groups" (p. 89).

Regardless of how ideal inclusive public participation is, a number of factors will affect and potentially complicate the process. The effects of the aforementioned difficulties should then be taken into account, as to how they may impact on outcomes. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).




Figure 1: Overview of Literature Review (Adapted by Author)

2.3. THE NEED FOR SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION

In South Africa, various pieces of literature have lauded the reforms implemented during the period of transition from apartheid to democracy, which served as Security Sector Reform (SSR), though at the time these reforms were not labelled as such. Such reform responses are aimed at improving security institutions, adopting new tactics, and drafting and updating the country's strategies and policies. Among the major areas of reform post-1994 was the demilitarisation of the country, reducing the mandate of the defence force from the domestic sphere, to acting as a peacekeeping force abroad (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012).

For many authors, South Africa was therefore the epitome of good SSR, but has since been on a gradual decline (Cawthra, 2019). Both Cawthra (2019) and Nathan (2009) underscore this decline, emphasizing the stagnation of democratic norms that allowed for good governance. This brings us to the gap in the literature on good Security Sector Governance, as to how countries that have undergone reform and uphold democratic principles, can work to maintain and improve standards of governance.

Though the concept and principles of SSR have been widely accepted, some of the contemporary literature has emphasised the limitations the concept and its models are producing. This is because the majority of the literature on security sector governance has concentrated on SSR and its development, with a need to further explore the preservation and upholding of good governance norms. Sedra (2010), McCandless & Abu-Nimer (2007), also concede that one of the issues surrounding SSR has been its limited outcomes and Western-centric approach. SSR interventions have frequently failed to bring significant reforms or ensure that good SSG practices are upheld. Literature on the NSS has taken a similar path, with frameworks and literature established from the approaches of countries like the United States and disseminated by multilateral organizations from a macro perspective, (Boucher, 2009 and Noteboom, 2008). More recently, recognition has been given to the different security contexts in the Third World, where systems of governance and norms may be more complex and in their infancy or weak.

As an alternative to the limitation of SSR, some scholars have identified the need for Security Sector Transformation (SST) (Ball, et al., 2005 and Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010).

Though some writers have used the two concepts interchangeably, proponents of SST including the Ball, et al. (2005), DCAF (n.d.) and Donais & McCandless (2017), view SST to involve systematic, and fundamental behavioral changes in the governance of the security sector.

SST extends beyond the narrower structural programs of SSR, which involve the formation and establishment of reformatory programs, to a substantive shift in the values and ideologies of security actors. Challenges in South Africa illustrate the need to move beyond SSR, toward a transformative approach to national security governance.

2.4. CONCLUSION

This literature review has highlighted both the need for public participation, and some of the existing challenges around it, including its application in the security sector. Challenges in South Africa's national security, illustrate the need to move beyond SSR, toward a transformative approach to national security governance. The necessity for a rethinking of SSR illustrates that while using models that are thought to be best practices, it is still necessary to determine whether they apply to specific settings. Such an approach can help to create a transformational culture in the sector's governance (Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010). The literature review has also shown the growth of non-state actors, despite the gap between public participation ideals and practice. Many local contexts, particularly those in Africa, have not fully recognized or applied internationally endorsed practices of public participation in security sector governance. This has been demonstrated even during the development of South Africa's NSS, and provided the need to explore public participation in the South African security context, through the development of the NSS.

Based on the challenges drawn from the literature review, these served as a theoretical framework for exploring the challenges which exist within South Africa's security sector that constrain inclusive public participation, as well as in relation to the development of the NSS.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH REPORT

The methodology used to complete this research is described in Chapter 3. To answer the main research question and subsequent sub-questions, a qualitative research approach was used. In each section of the chapter, the methods that were used are indicated, along with the reason why it is the best fit for this research.

3.1. RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

The research was conducted using a qualitative case study, as it intended to understand the varying perspectives of different participants. The security sector has different stakeholders whose views are shaped by their experience and context. This will impact on their views on the role of the public in the development of an NSS, the extent of such a role, and whether the security environment fosters participation ideals.

The case study further enabled the identification of patterns, which supported the analysis of practices related to the development of the NSS. This approach further allowed the research to understand the universal approaches based on existing literature, against the contextual conditions within the security environment, while also enabling an exploration into some of the challenges or circumstances such a process presents.

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3.2. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

As a means of collecting data, two methods were utilised, namely semi-structured interviews, and document analysis. The semi-structured interview was selected as the sample included two groups of participants. The first group was inclusive of experts

employed within government departments that are responsible for national security and executing the role of developing security strategies. The second group comprised experts who are not employed by the state, but are similarly involved in the discipline of security. It was necessary to use the method of semi-structured interviews to allow for questions to adapt to each group, with the assumption that there may be contrasting views on certain matters. The semi-structured interview thus allowed flexibility, enabling the researcher to be directed by prior constructed questions, while also allowing the participants' responses to direct follow-up questions.

The interviews were conducted both virtually and face to face, which was dependent on the location and comfort of the participants, as well as cost consideration. For those participants who reside outside of Gauteng, where the researcher is based, only the virtually interview was provided as an option, due to the cost implication of traveling outside of the province. For those participants who were in Gauteng, face-to-face interviews were presented as an option; however, where this was not possible for the participant, a virtual interview was arranged.

The research also used desktop research/document analysis. Based on existing literature, perceived best practices exist, which were aligned and compared with existing South African processes. The sample of the documents included literature from the DCAF (n.d.), UN (2012), Kuol (2021) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017). This literature is of relevance as it focuses on reasons the public should be a stakeholder in government decisions and the challenges thereof. The semi-structured interviews and secondary desktop research will further facilitate a combination of primary and secondary sources for the analysis.

3.3. SAMPLING STRATEGY

The research adopted a purposive sampling approach since the topic of the research required a specific group of people who have knowledge of South Africa's security environment and hold the necessary experience to fit the criteria to respond to the research question. As identified under the data collection, the sample of the research included two groups of participants, namely experts employed by government, or

categorized as state actors, involved in matters relating to national security. The second group selected were regarded as public participants or non-state actors who are involved in the discipline of security. The sampling frame or criteria for the state actors included public sector members affiliated with security departments. Affiliation to security departments was important, as Daniels (2019) has highlighted that the NSS directs the functions of the state security apparatus, making state security departments paramount to the study. These departments are also the primary drafters of national security strategies. Participants with experience in developing security-related strategies falling within these structures also formed part of the sampling frame. The criteria for public participants included those who understand government processes and are involved in the discipline of security and work in South Africa's security sector. These individuals came from think tanks, civil society and experts aligned to such outcomes.

Going into the research, equal samples were aimed at, between those in the public security sector, against those outside, with a total of 10 participants, 5 from each grouping, to have a balance of views. A list of the departments, organisations and individuals was made, and those who responded to the criteria in the allocated time were selected to participate in the semi-structured interviews. Those able to participate in interviews during the allocated time of the research were selected as the final participants. However, due to the challenges that emanated, which included a lack of response from some identified participants, the lack of attendance on scheduled appointments from some of the participants, and the inability to replace the participants timeously, at the end a total of 7 participants were interviewed, 3 who were state actors and 4 who were public participants involved in the discipline of security. The approach of having two groupings facilitated in extracting varying views from each grouping for analysis, with all views considered equally. The sample size was based on the available time in conducting the research.

Concerning document analysis, a range of pre-existing secondary data was used in conducting the research (Braun and Clarke, 2013). The research used both academic and grey literature from the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, the United Nations (UN), the Center for Strategic and International Studies and DCAF, on best practices around

developing the NSS with public involvement, which provided a framework on how countries should develop their NSS based on principles of good SSG.

The criteria for sampling the documents began broadly, which was later refined to establish a sampling frame. The first sampling frame used was a selection of articles which were no older than 2011, as the research began in 2021. This was done to enable a selection of as much contemporary information as possible. The second sampling frame was a selection of articles that reflected on developing an NSS in varying contexts, to enable for comparative analyses of existing South African processes against those identified in other contexts. The last sampling frame used, involved a selection of articles and speeches that reflected the current national security environment, and the types of challenges that impact upon it.

Literature focusing on processes undertaken by varying countries who have deliberated on developing an NSS, with a focus on both theory and practices was also sought. Finding such data, however, proved challenging, as most documents deliberated on the content of the NSS, with limited discussion on the processes followed towards their development. Thus, only the article from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017), which focused on developing the NSS from the United States, met this criterion.

3.4. DATA ANALYSIS

The research used Thematic Analysis as a means for data analysis. The Thematic Analysis enabled the identification of patterns from the various viewpoints of the different participants who partook in the study, and the analysis of data found through document analysis. These patterns were placed into codes, which ultimately were drawn into themes for the research, in line with the process of undertaking Thematic Analysis.

Because different participants (who work in state structures and those outside), were interviewed, this method was useful to identify common themes and patterns, and the varying views underlining each of these themes. The TA approach is also in line with a case study, which considers the perspectives of different views, while also being aligned with the data collection techniques of semi-structured interviews and data analysis.

8.2 APPENDIX 2: THEMES AND CODES, reflects a tabulation of the identified themes and codes. Following the first two interviews, similarities in the data were already identifiable, already allowing the creation of themes. The document analysis was carried out following the semi-structured interviews, which also followed the Thematic Analysis process. As the data collection progressed, some codes, which were placed into one theme, were later separated, as it was identified that they represented an additional theme on their own. Conversely, other themes were combined as they had similarities. Several of the themes identified during the Thematic Analysis were found to be consistent with the themes from the literature, with a total of nine themes emanating from the data gathered.

3.5. LIMITATIONS, FEASIBILITY, AND POSITIONALITY

Based on my location, the cost of travel and time constraints, participants residing outside of Gauteng province were initially excluded from participating in the interviews. However, to overcome this limitation, participants who reside outside of the province were contacted virtually, which allowed for a broader sampling of participants.

Since the onset of COVID-19, more participants had also adopted and preferred virtual communication to face-to-face interviews. And when this preference arose, the virtual meetings were set up to accommodate this preference.

Given my professional background in the security sector, it was necessary for my professional views not to interfere with the research. This required clear recordkeeping of data collected and analysed to ensure transparency and trustworthiness of findings.

Going into the research, my assumption was that state security actors would be opposed to public participation towards the development of an NSS, with this assumption influenced by existing literature expressing a lack of participation in the South African security sector. Following the completion of the research, it was found that there is agreement between government experts, including those who are public participants and state actors that there should be public participation towards the development of the NSS.

3.6. ETHICS

An ethical clearance was obtained from the Wits School of Governance and Wits University Ethics Committee before pursuing the study. The study did not use any vulnerable groups, and the identity of participants was secured and the information they shared kept confidential at all times.

Prior to conducting an interview, permission was obtained from all individuals who participated in the study to hold the interviews, and for the information provided to be used for the study. For the virtual meetings, permission was sought verbally, while for the face-to-face interviews, consent forms were provided so the participants could read and agree to the interviews conducted.

3.7. TRUSTWORTHINESS, TRANSFERABILITY AND DEPENDABILITY

To ensure the dependability of the research, there has been a clear account of the theoretical framework and methods used, to enable the trustworthiness of the research. Furthermore, the employment of triangulation as a form of data collection, using both semi-structured interviews and document analysis, was used to facilitate the collection of broad perspectives on the research question. Several of the codes and themes identified in the semi-structured interviews were found to be consistent with the document analysis, including the difficulties that countries frequently face when developing an NSS, as identified by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) and the United Nations (2012). Some aspects of the South African context were however distinctive, while other data identified in the document analysis was missing from the data that described South Africa. While this research focuses on South Africa, it is hoped that this research can inform the approach to public participation in Security matters to other contexts with similar prescripts.

3.8. CONCLUSION

The preceding chapter described the research design used for this study. A qualitative case study was used in conjunction with purposive sampling to identify the security experts who were best suited for this study, which then enabled an exploration of the viewpoints of these identified experts. Baxter & Jack (2008) indicate that a qualitative case study allows for the exploration of a phenomenon in a given context through a variety of lenses. The process of developing an NSS is examined in this study within the context of South

Africa's security sector. Different lenses are used to investigate the same phenomenon by sampling two groups of security experts, with the understanding that each view will be based on each individual's perception. Furthermore, because each country develops its process according to its own prerogative, the challenges that exist in South Africa that limit inclusive public participation will be based on the country's context.

Each of the seven experts was interviewed, using a semi-structured interview process. A list of interview questions that formed the basis of the semi-structured interview is attached to this paper, listed as 8.1 APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, document analysis was useful to supplement the data collected. The design employed aided in the identification of patterns required for data analysis.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION

Chapter 4 of this research is focused on data presentation, reflecting on the data collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis, as was highlighted in Chapter 2 of the paper. The data will be presented in tabulation and make use of direct quotes derived from the interviews.

The criteria used for the sampling of participants selected to participate in the semi-structured interviews, as reflected in the methodology chapter, included a selection of experts who work within South Africa's security sector environment. These experts fall into one of two categories. The first group consisted of state actors involved in national security issues and working in departments responsible for maintaining South Africa's national security. The second group was made up of experts from outside the government who work in the field of security. The second group of experts is classified as public participants in South Africa's security sector since they come from various areas of work such as think tanks, research, and academia.

Table 1: Descriptive overview of interview participants i.e. security experts

Participant	Category	Experience
A	State actor	• Senior Manager in a state security organ • Expertise in academia
B	State actor	• Senior Official in a state security organ • Expertise in policy development
C	State actor	• Manager in a state security organ • Expertise in communication
1	Public participant	• Former official in a state security organ • Expertise in academia and research • Government consultant
2	Public participant	• Former official in a state security organ • Expertise in academia and research • Author • Government consultant
3	Public participant	• Former official in a state security organ • Expertise in academia and research • Participation on a panel reviewing security issues • Author

4	Public participant	• Expertise in academia and research • Participation on a panel reviewing security issues • Author
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To distinguish between the two groups in the data presentation, the experts who are state actors working within security departments will be referred to using alphabets, namely respondent A, B, and C. The experts who are outside of government will be referenced numerically as respondents 1, 2, 3, and 4. For ease of reference, respondents A, B and C will at times also be reflected as 'state actors' when referring to them collectively, while respondents 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be categorized as 'public participants'.

The research instruments for the semi-structured interviews were derived from the literature review. To avoid confining the interviews, a non-standardised approach to the questions were used, while still allowing the responses to remain relevant to the purpose of the research.

Data gathered through document analysis also forms part of the presentation. Two types of documents were selected towards the data analyses. The first type of documents selected were media articles, consisting of a published Parliamentary speech delivered in 2021 by the Deputy Minister of the State Security Agency (SSA), Zizi Kodwa. This speech reflects on the existent national security practices and culture in South Africa. The second media article was written by journalist, Marianne Thamm and was selected as it reflected on testimonies by the former Acting Director General (DG) of the SSA at the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture. The data used in the articles were only the former DG's testimonies, as he is someone who works in the security sector. No journalistic viewpoints were used because they could be subjective. The former Acting Director General's testimony reflected on the challenges of administering oversight over those mandated to safeguard national security. The third article, compiled by David Africa, executive director of a think tank 'specialising in national security and intelligence,' outlines some of the requirements for South Africa to develop a public-led NSS (Africa, 2021, 10 July).

The Second type of documents emanate from multilateral organisations and think tanks, the UN (2012), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017), the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (n.d.). These articles discussed how countries should develop national security strategies in accordance with good SSG. These findings by the institutions were incorporated into the data analysis and compared to the prevalent themes and codes found in the South African context. Table 2: Summary of Challenges identified by the Africa Centre for Strategic studies (2021) and the United Nations (2012) summarizes the findings of the two institutions.

Each interview was transcribed after it was completed. Following the first transcription, a list of codes was generated. The second interview was then conducted, and the same transcribing and listing codes procedures were used. The same procedure was followed for all seven interviews. After reviewing a document, a list of codes was also created. These were either added to the codes in accordance with the relevant theme. No new themes were derived from the documents.

In presenting the data, this Chapter will be structured according to the identified themes emanating from the data collected.

4.1. DATA PRESENTATION

To begin with, all the documents analysed, which reflected on the development of an NSS, were in support of an inclusive process, in line with the respondents from the semi-structured interviews. According to the UN (2012), the importance of an inclusive process allows states to legitimize the process and allows for a wide range of views from all parties to be considered. While Africa (2021, 10 July) indicated that “the development of a new national security strategy,” “must reach out to the public at large, as well as the academic and policy community in order to seek input while simultaneously using the process itself as an opportunity to build the resilience capability that comes with a strong bond between the government and people.” In line with the documents, all of the respondents drew criticism for not having public participation in the development of South Africa’s 2013 NSS, with the respondents acknowledging public participation as a challenge in South Africa’s security sector. For the respondents, the outcome of not having public participation in the

development of the 2013 NSS resulted in its limited effectiveness, as was similarly indicated by Daniels (2019).

Respondent A stated that the state security services or security forces are only one aspect of administering national security, but without the public, this approach which was adopted towards the development of the 2013 NSS has caused a lack of a "comprehensive approach to national security" (Respondent A, November 2022). Respondent B stated that with the limited public consultation in national security-related matters, the public sector does not receive the value it should from the private sector.

In agreement with the public participants, a respondent said that public involvement in formulating and debating security-related issues "is almost nonexistent at the moment" (Respondent 1, November 2022).

All the respondents also reflected that some challenges and limitations exist, within South Africa's security sector that constrain inclusive public participation.

The below summarises the pertinent challenges identified by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) and the United Nations (2012) that countries frequently face when undertaking the development of an NSS:

Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (2021)	United Nations (UN) (2012)
<u>Legacies of Abuse and Mistrust:</u> In several African states, there exists a fracture in the state-civil relations, particularly if the state has been a source of insecurity or corrupt practices. When there are such legacies, it becomes challenging to create a relationship between the state and society towards developing collective national security strategies.	<u>Managing fragile transitions:</u> The social fabric of society may be weakened in conflict, post-conflict, or fragile states. In such a setting, there is frequently insecurity and a lack of trust among groups, including distrust between state security actors and stakeholders. Such a context impacts negatively on bringing stakeholders together.
<u>Cultures of Secrecy:</u> "The security sector in most countries remains over-classified and susceptible to cultures of exceptionalism with the notion that national security is a no-go zone for civil authorities", (ACSS, 2021, p: 44).	<u>Fostering political will and leadership:</u> In some contexts, there is a lack of political will/or leadership capacity to hold inclusive engagement on the NSS. This could be due to a number of factors, including a secrecy culture, a lack of interest in such a process, limited capacity, or fear of the state delegating power to external stakeholders.
<u>Overcoming Differences in Technical Background and</u>	<u>Building trust and confidence:</u>

<u>Knowledge:</u> An inclusive process necessitates the gathering of diverse expertise, which may be based on gender, language, age, or ideology. This may propel differing opinions by different groups, necessitating mediation and openness among the various groups with opposing viewpoints.	A lack of trust or confidence in state security actors may be an impediment to holding an inclusive process to develop an NSS. This could be due to a number of factors, including a repressive government or a perception by those in power that security lies solely with state structures.
<u>Agreeing on a National Vision:</u> “When an NSS is drafted, there will be diverging priorities and a level of resistance from various groups, especially in relation to changes in how the security sector is run, as this normally imbues a fear of losing power or privilege. In some contexts, especially where a history of conflict lingers, it can be difficult to define a shared vision on an aggregated level,” (ACSS, 2021, p: 46).	<u>Supporting a consultative or governance-driven process</u> A lack of will from decision-makers or belief in the significance of public participation in national security matters may be a major impediment, especially if the bureaucrats leading the process hold such views.
	<u>Dealing with a culture of secrecy</u> “The culture of secrecy is frequently cited as a key challenge to developing inclusive policies in the area of security and is often the source of significant tension between security actors and civilians,” (UN, 2012, p: 133).
	<u>Addressing capacity shortages – financial resources:</u> The UN expresses that having public participatory processes towards the development of an NSS may carry financial responsibilities, especially if stakeholders are wide and vary across a large populace. Financial limitation may inhibit substantive public consultative processes.
	<u>Addressing capacity shortages – human resources:</u> Similar, to the financial requirements, undertaking such a process requires the correct personnel to undertake the process. A limitation in capacity or skills may present as a challenges.

Table 2: Summary of Challenges identified by the Africa Centre for Strategic studies (2021) and the United Nations (2012)

Theme 1: Lack of Social Cohesion and Common National Interests

When asked whether the country’s social structures have an impact on inclusiveness and how they can affect public participation, a number of the respondents were of the view that the country lacked social cohesion. When delving deeper to understand the causes for the

lack of cohesion, many of the responses revealed disparities in the political transformation of the country as compared to the state of economic transformation.

Respondent A and respondent B indicated a lack of common national interests within the South African society as a key inhibitor to constructing common goals towards national security. For respondent A, the country has divisions, which fundamentally run along class and racial lines. The respondent stated:

You have got business, you have workers. These are the motive forces. These are forces of power. These are the forces that actually hold power. We have got the rich and the poor, and we have got blacks and whites. So the South African problem, is a racial problem. The South African problem, is a class problem. Which actually makes it very difficult for the country, to have any meaningful dialogue, and reach consensus. And, when there is no consensus, its everybody for himself, or herself, or themselves. So that is the problem of South Africa. ... when transformation is effected, it's very superficial. Black capitalist has just replaced white capitalists. Exploitative. (Respondent A, November 2022)

For these participants, the lack common national interests arise from a lack of shared experiences by the public, whose views are sought after to make a common and coherent NSS.

For this respondent A, the highlighted divisions lead to non-shared experiences among the public and non-agreement on the pace of transformation, which ultimately affects matters such as equality and poverty levels. These divisions run primarily between the different class groups and racial groups. Thus, it also leads to non-shared approaches to national security matters. The respondent further elaborates that

one of the social problems in South Africa, is disagreement in terms of the pace of transformation – which leads to the development of various interests. (Respondent A, November 2022).

Like respondent A, respondent B has similar connotations on non-shared experiences due to group interests. This respondent said:

When you go to consult the private sector they probably going to look at their own private interest 'what is important for me' and have a confined contribution into the consultation process. That is our experience. In fact, most of the laws and everything that had to do with national security, you find those people you consult look at what is in their best interest. (Respondent B, November 2022).

Both the respondents saw a push-back from some quarters of society for transformation, with respondent B saying the approach to transformation tends to be an area of contestation between the public sector vs those in the private sector. Respondent B said:

You get a sense that, it then becomes an area of contestation for some of us in the public sector. We are for transformation and reform. We saying the status quo must be changed so the majority feels accommodated by the status quo. But because business and the nature of South Africa is, you get a sense that the minimalist approach... We have not been able to bridge the gap between public and private sector and approaches to this. Now that really restrains the whole concept of consultation, in fact and reform. (Respondent B, November 2022)

For respondent A, cultural and linguistic imperialism also contributes to South Africa's social division and non-commonality, with those who speak English fluently perceived as more educated than those who do not.

For the experts outside of the state security departments, the issue of lack of cohesion and common national interests came out strongly from respondent 1, with other respondents reflecting on it as a key issue, though not as robustly as the former.

Respondent 1 indicated that the legacies of South Africa's past made national security projects very difficult:

In the South African context, the legacies of slavery, colonialism and apartheid still heavily affect and impact on the polity and the society...We have society where the sector is still here – because it was colonialism – so what it basically means, is that you have a state apparatus, that was absorbed into the new system. And it was quite a strong state apparatus that was absorbed into the system. Now that state apparatus was designed as apartheid colonial institutions. And before that, of course slavery. So, this means our society is a society in transition – because it suffers, from these legacies. And now, we have democratized, the political system, the polity, and as a result of that, the voices of the people who were the oppressors, have to be taken into consideration but of course is constrained by certain parameters. So that's why the legacy argument, which means these ensuring effects, of these three enormously impactful processes, are with us, and will be with us for quite some time. Now, their representatives have not yet let go fully of these beliefs, in this regard. That's the one problem. (Respondent 1, November 2022).

What respondent 1 reflects on is similar to the connotation of respondent A and respondent B who indicated the non-shared experiences due to group interests as a challenge to building common approaches to national security and common national interests.

The views from the participants is also in line with data from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) which indicates that divergent priorities that run along social structures may serve as a hindrance to developing an inclusive NSS. This can be attributed to a perceived loss of power or privileges from one group to another. It states that, “some contexts, especially where a history of conflict lingers, it can be difficult to define a shared vision on an aggregated level when discussing the security architecture,” (The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. p: 46).

In line with this, Africa (2021, 10 July) has indicated that social cohesion is central to developing an inclusive NSS, further indicating that South Africa suffers from a lack of social cohesion, which manifests in racial and class divisions. The author indicates that (Africa, 2021, 10 July) “societies that are divided as we increasingly are — along not only traditional racial lines but along class lines too — struggle to maintain their national cohesion. Such societies have a limited wherewithal to resist efforts by other states to shape the thinking and actions of its publics, and are minimally effective in advancing its interests abroad. National cohesion therefore becomes a central element of a national security strategy,” (Africa, 2021, 10 July). The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), has similarly acknowledged that finding commonality on national security issues is fundamentally challenging, which is among the factors that necessitates involving different stakeholders. It directs for the various social factors such as “location, age, ethnicity, gender, religion, and poverty,” each being important considerations in how people experience security. Thus indicating that these factors are required “to be considered when developing an NSS” (The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. p: 6).

This theme deals with common national interests and social cohesion being critical contributors to developing an inclusive NSS. The lack of commonalities in the South African society has been regarded as a challenge for the country to collectively agree on certain parameters of national security.

Theme 2: The Lack of Real Representation in Public Participation

The next theme that emerged dealt with the lack of true representation in public participation. The theme emerged when participants were asked about the quality of

representation and the relationship between civil society and the state security departments. Some respondents saw the need for the public, in particular those affected by insecurity, to be direct contributors to the development of the NSS, as opposed to relying solely on public representatives. The respondents leaned to more grassroots type of participation, with respondent 2 stating:

But when we talk about the public it's important that we speak of the people...not the experts...I mean there's no reason why, ordinary people in Diepsloot, or Kwamashu or whatever, cannot contribute, to firstly, what does national security mean. And this is a very important thing.

There was also a concern from some participants, mainly those who are part of the state structures, on how some civil society organisations seemingly operated.

Respondent A said:

Let's not talk about civil society, as if its ordinary South Africans. What matters is ordinary South Africans. But in many instances, people claim civil society, when they are academics, professionals. Can speak big English, confuse people, and rent statics. But they not with those people down there. I always say, if this civil society, if these people who care about South Africans, were so good, why don't we see change in our communities. Why do we continue to have the numbers of unemployed? If we have a caring civil society. Now, that is a problem. (Respondent A, November 2022)

On the same issue, respondent B said that,

Most of the civil society groups, were either supported by the private business and the international donors – which are also having interests in South Africa, from a business point of view and all of that. Of course there is a linkage between the business point of view and how SA is governed. Now as they support – it's not a free lunch. They support, because they want to achieve something (Respondent B, November 2022).

Respondent C saw it as the ability by some groups to negatively influence public processes for their own ends, and the need for government and the security apparatus to guard against this when it comes to having a public process in developing the NSS. This respondent said:

There are obviously other risks we must guard against which looks at our own security consciousness...Guarding against influencing by other state and non-state actors, who might seek to use the process to suit their own needs – we need to guard against that (Respondent C, November 2022).

These views were in line with the first theme on Lack of Cohesion and Common National Interests in the country, with respondent A and B both taking a position that illustrates that some civil groups and NGOs who would be involved in creating the NSS through a public participatory process might seek to advance particular interests. Such narrow interests are reflected as working against the development of the NSS and other initiatives and are instead intended to uphold the social structures that are based on racial and class divisions. Respondent A indicated that these groups might want to form part of the process, to make sure that the outcome serves their own interests. The respondent said:

Some South Africans under the guise of Non-Governmental Organisations that are foreign funded, and they are actually doing the bidding for foreign government, comes, and they want to access this, or they actually want to make sure that the outcome of that process, does not actually dent or hurt the interest of some people out there. (Respondent A, November 2022).

In addition to the posture of not exclusively relying on civil society or NGOs, and the possibility of these groups serving narrow interests, the respondents within the state security departments also highlighted the existence of foreign influence within some civil society or NGOs, which ultimately impacts the work they do. They believe that civil society, NGOs, and other types of public representation every so often do not work to advance the interests of the people they claim to represent, which may include the marginalized. Instead, that these public representative groups may fulfill the mandate of those that fund them, which primarily emanate from external sources. Furthermore, some within these groupings were seen as possible spoilers of the process and transformative strategies. These responses highlighted a level of apprehensive relations between state and public representatives who would form part of the development of the NSS. Respondent B said:

What we have learned and what we have seen, is that you have, sometimes, private sector wanting to dictate the actual writing of the document. Saying 'no no no this sentence must... We think that is too detailed... they tend to look for certain words so that they make sure that those words, are not in those documents or strategies. Because its particular words that impose on them a certain obligation, to do certain things. Then you will find that we go to parliament, we go wherever, we fight over a construction of a particular sentence. Even when you consult them, then they now propose a writing of a particular sentence. Which we don't think this is necessarily how consultation should be. (Respondent B, November 2022).

From those outside of the state security structures, it was respondent 2 who held similar concerns as those of respondent A, B, and C. Respondent 2's view was in line with respondent A, B and C, saying that

The public moves beyond think tanks, and NGOs – which often when there is a workshop, these are usually invited. The people invited are experts – but when we talk about the public it's important that we speak of the people...not the experts, (Respondent 2, November 2022).

The respondent also indicated the important role of experts though. Respondent 2 said there was a large presence of foreign-funded NGOs and civil society groups operating in South Africa, whose work is constrained by the mission and mandates of their external funders. This respondent also indicated a professionalisation of these NGOs, with their mandate or presentation determined not by whom they represent, but by these funders.

The respondent said that:

NGOs are professional organisations. They employ people, they raise funds, and so on. Mostly these funds are from abroad. Now, it doesn't mean just because the money is from abroad, either the money is intended for bad purposes, or the people using this money are sort of bad people, but, what you saw sort of post 1994, is the professionalisation of community politics. And by that I mean that until 1994, and immediately aftermath of 1994, the strongest civil societies, were mass organisations, they were the trade unions, they were youth organisations, they were civic organisations, they were religious organisations that represented you know, many churches, sports organisations, and so on. So they had a mass base, right. So when they spoke about something, they spoke with a measure of popular support. The legitimacy was based in the fact that they had constituencies. Now what has happened in the last 20 odd years, is that you have seen a professionalisation, and almost corporatization of let's say community politics. They are professional people, claiming to represent communities. And these are NGOs. They are paid very significant salaries, and they speak on behalf of people. Some of these speak on behalf of women, but they have no constituency amongst women, I mean they are composed of 10, 20, 30 professional people, who earn big salaries, but no one has elected them. You know in the civic you are elected...so, so, so you have a situation where, the more NGOS proliferate, the weaker the community and mass based organisations – the real civil society, have become – they are like business (Respondent 2, November 2022).

For respondent C, the quality of leadership appointed to represent the public's interests has also influenced public participation, as many public representatives take on such roles to gain access to resources.

The participants' perceptions of civil society organisations were shown through this theme, which revealed apprehension in the manner in which some civil groups conduct their

operations. The theme also indicates a preference for a more grassroots form of participation from communities and direct involvement from affected groups, as opposed to a reliance on civil groups.

Theme 3: Parliament as a Key Representative for Public Participation

The South African Parliament was the best instrument identified for public participation and representation, with this theme arising in response to the quality of representation in South Africa. Looking at the performance of the South African Parliament in carrying out this public representative mandate, some challenges were revealed. Equally, data from the document analysis also described parliament as a key player that countries should use in the development of an NSS.

Respondent B said:

Parliament becomes a component that represents the people of South Africa. You can't then say you have not consulted if you go to Parliament. You are assumed to have consulted almost everybody because those who are MPs are representing constituencies, and they feeding up into the constituencies. They represent constituencies across the country. There is no constituency that is not represented by an MP. (Respondent B, November 2022)

Respondent 2 said:

Parliament should play an important role. And obviously Parliament has public participation processes built into the parliamentary process, of you know, adopting legislations and so on. So Parliament could be one instrument that can be utilized, to obtain public participation (Respondent 2, November 2022).

For respondent 4, Parliament becomes the best form of representation for public participation given the country's form of democracy, whereby it's the people who get to elect who represents them, and mechanisms such as the Parliamentary Monitoring Group enables the public to follow its proceedings.

With that, the respondents also indicated some shortcomings of Parliament, with respondent A criticizing parliamentarians for a heavy reliance on consultants, which results in some externally sourced solutions (Respondent A, November 2022). The respondent said,

Given illiteracy in the country, a few of our parliamentarians, given the apartheid problem, cannot write, they may read, but cannot write – but also government and legislatures as well, researchers, consultants. To the extent that you may find that most of the legislation, are being processed, but are not owned by our people (Respondent A, November 2022).

For respondent B, the shortcoming of Members of Parliament (MPs) as a tool for public representation is their primary focus on the political advancement of their political party, as well as internal political leadership dynamics. The respondent indicated that these priorities by political MPs were over-emphasized ahead of engaging and educating their members and various constituencies on national security matters (Respondent B, November 2022). The respondent indicated that:

Most parties that are representing the black majority, I don't think for me, have been – to them it has always been about voting us in. 'vote us to go to parliament' and making noise – and 'vote for us again'. There are no practical ways to say 'how do I equip my followers to understanding what is the political problem in South Africa, that needs to be resolved'. Because if these parties were not your one man parties, because I think all of them including the ruling party is turning out to be a one-man problem – because now what becomes important is who becomes the president (Respondent B, November 2022).

Respondent C believes that Parliament's shortcomings stem from a lack of time and resources for the public participation process. For this respondent:

The outcome that we derive is not as qualitative as maybe it should be because maybe it is impacted upon by resources, and time and so on (Respondent C, November 2022).

Respondent 3 indicated that when it comes to security matters, the South African Parliament has not been particularly proactive in leading debate, as Members of Parliament tend to be executive-driven. The respondent also said that Parliament has also tended to be fragmented among the various security streams such as police, defense, and intelligence, without bringing these in coherence to responding to national security, (Respondent 3, November 2022).

Respondent 4 suggested that there might be tensions between Parliament and certain spheres of national security organs, specifically the State Security Agency (SSA) and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). This tension centered on whether this Parliamentary mechanism had the right to access the SSA's financial records, as the

Committee responsible for public accounts. Due to this tension, Parliament is kept in a box – they can only go so far, (Respondent 4, November 2022).

Taking into account the collective views from semi-structured interviews, over the role of Parliament in representing the public in developing the NSS, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) has similarly reflected that a country's parliament was critical in enabling participation. It indicates that “whether parliament explicitly initiates or approves an NSS, they are always the authority responsible for allocating public resources to the security sector, so involving parliamentarians in NSSD (National Security Strategy Development) is more likely to lead to a strategy that can be implemented with full parliamentary support,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. p. 6).

Like respondent C, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) also emphasized the need for adequate time and funding to ensure the success of such a process, saying, “a high-quality process cannot be conducted in a rush. Discussion and dialogue that leads to consensus over difficult issues takes time,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021, p: 15).

According to the data on this theme, based on the mandate of the South African Parliament, it is then one of the best instruments for public representation and a representative of the respective public groups in the development of an NSS. However, Parliament also faces some challenges in carrying out its responsibilities effectively.

Theme 4: The Public Central in determining National Security

This theme responded to role the public should play in the development of the NSS. Both similar and different motivations were provided for this. Among the main takeaways was that the public should define what national security is based on their own experiences.

For respondent C, the impetus for inclusive public participation towards developing the NSS extended to the value add that such an approach can bring to the ultimate NSS and towards resolving the country's national security threats. For this respondent the public are the most useful insight, as they, “interface with a lot of insecurities,” and in so doing,

the public would also be able to contribute to the execution of the NSS, which ultimately is the safeguarding of the country (Respondent C, November 2022).

Respondent A emphasized that, given South Africa's current state of insecurity, the country needed an inclusive process for the development of the NSS now more than ever. Though not explicitly stated, this posture was attributed to the current state of the country, in which national security threats are prevalent. In the response, respondent A indicated that

Unlike in other countries, under the circumstances, we should be having South Africans as a whole having serious business to do with the development of the National Security Strategy. (Respondent A, November 2022).

While respondent B indicated that,

It comes back to public consultation. South Africa has not reached...and that a worry for people like us in the public sector. Our worry is that; we don't get the value we should be getting from the private sector (Respondent B, November 2022).

Respondents 1 and 2's responses on the contribution of the public echoed the same sentiment as those of the respondents within state security departments, with respondent 1 indicating national will, which emanates from the people, being a key success factor to national security theory. This respondent, alongside respondent 2, say the NSS would be incomplete without the people, (Respondent 1 and 2, November 2022)

Respondent 1, said:

The NSS must therefore be owned by the people if it is to fulfil its function properly - like the making of the Polity, being the democratic Constitution - it must involve them, and the key success factors in standard national security theory are the national will of the people, (Respondent 1, November 2022).

In extension to respondent C, for respondent 1 and 4, the public can also serve as a weapon for the safeguarding of the state, or they may present as a threat. Respondent 1 indicated that through public participation or inclusion, could the public be more committed to the safeguarding and the realization of the NSS. This respondent said:

So the national will, why it is important is when you do a National Security Strategy, and you involve people in it, and they become committed, to the key concepts, and tenants, and values of the National Security Strategy, you actually building your security. So it's really central to how you build security, (Respondent 1, November 2022).

Conversely, respondent 2 said the lack of public participation could threaten national security. This respondent indicated that

Once the state is weak, and the relationship between the state and the people becomes frayed, it starts breaking up, anyone can exploit it. Anyone meaning domestic interest, or foreign interests. Now, it means that in the event that a political or a security, or some or other threat is directed at us, we need to have the people on board – our main instrument of power, will be the people. Now the extent to which people would be prepared to sacrifice and fight for the national sovereignty, of the republic, is partially dependent on whether they see their interests represented in the republic. So when you involve the public, in the participation, in the development of the national security strategy, for example not only are you legitimizing it, but means you are creating the grounds for weaponising the people. if you have not involved them, in the process of developing a national security strategy, you will struggle to sell it to them , (Respondent 2, November 2022).

In addition to the determination of national security and the value add of public participation to securing the state, inclusiveness in developing the NSS was also indicated as a way of creating national contentment, and legitimizing its process, (Respondent 2, 3 and 4, November 2022). For respondent 4:

When you say to the public, 'we have a National Security Strategy,' is it credible? Has the right people been consulted? But most importantly, for the Policy, Strategy, the framework, to be taken serious, to enjoy support, you need to talk to the affected parties (Respondent 4, November 2022).

Respondent 3 drew an example from the July 2021 riots in South Africa, where the state security departments were seen as inadequate and lacked credibility in the eyes of the public, with the event expressive of the lack of legitimacy of the state security structures, and their existing strategies.

For respondents 1, B and 2, inclusive public participation towards the NSS and national security as a whole, further thus lies as a Constitutional imperative. For respondent A, this is embedded in Section 198 of the South African Constitution, which governs national security, (Respondent A, November 2022). The respondent noted that the Constitution enjoins all South Africans "to be part of maintaining national security" (Respondent A, November 2022). Similar to this respondents' position, respondent B and respondent 2 also highlighted the inclusive public participatory approach as one of the requirements for national security according to the Constitution.

Respondents B, 2 and 4, on the other hand, distinguished between the roles that the public should play and those who will draft the NSS. Respondent 2 said:

The participation in the process is obviously different – the drafting of the strategy itself, where you need expertise. Because, then when you draft the actual strategy, I mean you need a certain level of sophistication – a certain level of concept appreciation of geopolitical appreciation, and so on – to draft the actual document. But the participation of the public, I think is very important, firstly because it provides legitimacy in the public mind, to whatever comes out at the end. Assuming that what comes out is related somehow to what people actually express (Respondent 2, November 2022).

Respondents A, 1 and 2, each also highlighted the need to conceptualize what is national security according to South Africa, and not have a reliance on internationally sourced definitions.

Respondent 2 said:

The question of developing an understanding of firstly what constitutes national security for South Africa specifically, is something that can benefit greatly from the participation of the public...I mean there's no reason why, ordinary people in Diepsloot, or Kwamashu or whatever, cannot contribute, to firstly, what does national security mean. And this is a very important thing because our whole premise, and the premise of the Panel, for example, is on a particular interpretation or conceptually of security. I mean the whole human security concept – but we have not gone to the people, to ask them what is security to you, (Respondent 2, November 2022).

Like respondent 2, respondent 1 noted that public participation was critical so South Africans could define what security means to them. The respondent said:

So this is an epistemological problem. There is importance of not just taking these concepts that they get from everywhere, and uncritically applying them to South Africa. Because this creates more problems than what it solves. And that's again why the people are important. Your own context, your own people, are more important, in determining, what is and makes them secure (Respondent 1, November 2022).

The human security approach is explained as being embedded into South Africa's Constitutional imperative. Respondent 1 further indicated that some concepts which were adopted by the governing party (the African National Congress) towards the governance of South Africa's security, such as the human security paradigm, were incompatible with the party's ideological approach, which resulted in incoherence and confusion towards policy framing (Respondent 1, November 2022). The respondent (1) said:

Human security is a kind of Liberal understanding of security. And certainly I kept saying, be careful with these concepts – because the governing party, the ANC is not a Liberal party, is a social democratic and if you start with security contexts that are not fitting with our ideology, then you are going to create incoherence and confusion (Respondent 1, November 2022).

The solution, according to this respondent is to rely on the public to define security according to their lived experiences, and for South Africans to write documents such as the NSS. Through that there is no reliance on external consultants who adopt externally sourced solutions, which are a misfit for the country (Respondent 1, November 2022).

In line with the security experts, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) has also expressed that it is imperative that each country develops its own definition of national security, which is embedded in its own experiences. It has further indicated that, “this definition should be commonly agreed to and accepted by a wide range of stakeholders,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021, p: 24). This idea reflects the importance of public participation in defining each country's definition of what it means to be secure. The inclusion of public representatives and role players is also shown to “promote multi-stakeholder partnerships,” with marginalized groups such as women and youth able to provide a better understanding of their own needs rather than those sourced from those who do not have such experiences (DCAF, n.d.).

In addition to defining national security, Kodwa (2021) also indicated that the public also serves as a means to safeguard national security. The view by Kodwa (2021) is consistent with respondents C and 1, who both emphasized the importance of the public in the safeguarding of the state.

For Africa (2021) “a national security strategy can only be effective if it can build its core elements around the resilience of the people. Consequently, the citizens must be central to the process of crafting such a national security strategy. The idea that such a strategy can be developed entirely in boardrooms while gaining the legitimacy and potency that can only be achieved through the consent of the people, will not survive the slightest assault” (Africa, 2021, 10 July).

In light of this theme, the public is seen as crucial to both defining the fundamental principles of national security from their experiences, as well as the safeguarding of the

country's national security. As a result, the public is an important stakeholder in the development of the NSS.

Theme 5: The Media as a Driver and Influence on Public Opinion

The theme of media influence as a driver of public opinion emerged from different questions, from data of the state security actors and the document analysis. It first emerged when participants were asked to describe the relationship between state organs in charge of security and non-state actors such as civil society, NGOs, and other types of public representatives. It was brought up again in relation to the participants' responses on common societal interests. In both cases, media organisations were perceived as impeding societal relations and government initiatives. Within document analyses, this grouping was depicted as an instrument the government could use to gain public support for the objectives of an NSS.

Respondent A and B saw the media as a possible inhibitor to developing an inclusive NSS that involved public participation, if the narrative it drives is influenced by external influences that are critical of transformative government initiatives (Respondent A and B, November 2022).

For both respondent A and B, the media, like civil society and NGOs, is capable of serving their own interests as well as those of external funders. Respondent A indicated that:

You see the media, the media in South Africa – media is one of the pillars of cultural imperialism. My finding was that most the media stations which are very good for communicating, for the development of society, for languages, for commercial purposes – these things are funded by external multinational organisations. And they even take some of these, participants, to international programmes. Media is a pillar of cultural imperialism. And those who owns it, will even go to an extent of ring-fencing it, so that you don't touch it. Don't even touch the content, because the content, is a weapon. Is a weaponized content. It might as well be propaganda. So it actually sells something in the sense of tall lies, to become truth to South Africans (Respondent A, November 2022).

Respondent B indicated that,

the use of mass media, or mass communication, and...and, driving a particular point, is probably confusing the majority into refocusing in or focusing them or defocusing them on the critical issues – to those issues that are important to the owners of mass media (Respondent B, November 2022).

Though respondent 1 did not mention the media as a driver of influence and capable of influencing society at large, this respondent believed that the public could be 'weaponized,' (Respondent 1, November 2022). This view was similar to the notion that foreign funders influence civil society and NGOs who are meant to be representatives of the public, as well as the media.

Document analysis from the DCAF (n.d.) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) also reflected on the role of the media in the development of an NSS. The DCAF (n.d.) reflected the media as an important ally of government, as a driver of national consensus and to effect public support. For the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), the media is the primary tool for the public to receive information on security policies and initiatives, and thus plays an instrumental role in communicating between the government and the public. The UN (2012) also points to a national communication programme being imperative for developing an NSS, as it may focus public interest on the project, making this media a key instrument in the process. These positions are in line with those of respondents A and B on the influence of media on public opinion.

Africa (2021, 10 July) has also indicated that public opinion can be critical of the state. According to the author, "the omnipresence of social media and the intrusive access of private companies over our communications is the largest facilitator of the ability to weaponise information against states".

Based on both the semi-structured interviews and the document analysis, the media is thus characterised as a significant contributor to the creation of an NSS. However, there is a difference in how the participants portray the media compared to the DCAF (n.d.) and the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2021). While the state security actors' assert that the media can be a biased source for government initiatives, document analysis explains it as able to be positive for processes.

Theme 6: Secret Classification of the NSS

The next theme that emerged was the need to strike a balance between information classification to protect national security and transparency. Both data sets agreed on the general customary requirement to classify information if it put a state at risk. Participants

in the semi-structured interviews also indicated that some information had been over-classified, and there was a disagreement with the secret classification of the 2013 NSS.

Respondent A and C commented on the posture taken regarding the 2013 NSS over its classification as top secret and its accessibility only to those in the state security departments. Respondents A, B and C all saw the NSS's classification as top secret as limiting who could access it and further limiting public participation processes.

Similarly, the respondents outside the state security departments also had the same view, with the respondents indicating that such an approach also limited Parliament's role as a democratic representative of the public from considering the contents of this NSS.

For respondent A, the need for the classification stemmed not from a desire to protect state information and safeguard the contents of the document, but from levels of wrongdoing, as expressed in Chapter 1 of this document, which highlighted maladministration in the country's state security structures. This viewpoint was consistent with the revelations of malpractice and abuses in state security departments made during the Zondo Commission on State Capture. Respondent A highlighted:

the country suffers from a lot of self-interests, thus there may be a diversion on tackling issues such as corruption, sabotage or other social ills. (Respondent A, November 2022)

Thus for some within national security, the motivation for the classification was motivated by hiding wrongdoing. For respondent B, the approach to the classification stems from the apprehensive relationships between state and public representatives who would be involved in the development of the NSS, as indicated under Theme 2. For this respondent, the classification of certain information is required due to a lack of common national interests and trust between state security departments and external stakeholders such as public representatives and the media (Respondent B, November 2022). Respondent B said that:

If we were a society that has a common purpose, what would happen is that even if government makes one of those proposals, we wouldn't dismiss them. We would say, we can see where you want to go, but how about looking at it this way, and this way. But now, government refuses sometimes to share this information because the next day you are a laughing stock in the media. A person who does that is not your partner...Because are you at a level as a country where you have an appreciation

which is similar on national security issues? Can you keep confidential information that is shared with you on national security issues, and if you can't what is the purpose of consulting with you because you going to take the information and go to our opponents and competitors, and tell them what we are going to do. Now that is why you find that government in most cases is very reluctant to go to consult everybody. Because they are scared about that. It's not even that government is trying to hide anything, it's about what is the risk attached to this consultation (Respondent B, November 2022).

For respondent B the approach towards the classification of the NSS is also not only found in South Africa but is an approach adopted by other countries, saying:

Americans are very transparent and other countries, but they are transparent in their own way. But there are things that they would never tell us (Respondent B, November 2022)

Similarly, respondent C indicated that:

Our security consciousness as a country, is at a point where it needs some serious work. Because not all of us, as a country and inhabitant of the country are as security conscious as we should be. And this impacts also in the manner on how we do things.... But as time moves, and as thinking happened in the security, people realise there's no point in still keeping this closed, cause [because] it defeats the purpose...it's not to say there is no role for us to be as rigid, as secretive as best, definitely – it's about finding a balance – right now we are still very much skewed towards secrecy thinking. But we should be trying to come somewhere in the middle, where we can find a balance (Respondent C, November 2022).

Thus for this respondent, a middle ground should be sought that enables the protection of sensitive information, while still allowing engagement on national security matters.

For the respondents outside of the state security departments, respondent 1 and 3 felt it was necessary to classify aspects of national security and the NSS itself, but they did not support a full classification, as was the case with the 2013 NSS. The reasons given for such an approach were cited as part of the barriers to public participation, citing a lack of trust from those in state security departments to external role players and a preference for an insular approach.

Respondents 1 and 3 each indicated a need to classify operational information to protect the sources of information it is received. Both respondents, alongside respondent 4 felt that those responsible for the drafting of the final NSS have to find a balance between protecting classified information that could make the state vulnerable, vs still making the public feel that they own the final NSS. Respondent 4 said:

I'm not sure you always know where to find the balance. And many democracies, and advanced economies, the Global North, they struggle themselves, to achieve this balance. When you face an existential threat, for example, after 9/11, you pay lip service to certain sets of values, and you securitise everything. That allowed the US and Britain, to run into Iraq, to just destroy a whole civilization. It also allowed them to destroy Libya – completely. Look at the consequences of all of that, so to find the balance is very difficult, maybe understandable, when you feel completely threatened (Respondent 4, November 2022)

Respondent 2 like respondent B said that the classification of the NSS as a secret document, might limit who gets to participate in its development. This respondent said:

There is no advantage to classifying it top secret or secret (Respondent 2, November 2022)

Respondent 3 explained this approach as also linked to the reason stated by respondent A, where some in the state security departments could aim it at hiding wrongdoing.

Respondent 3 said:

We've come to see there [are] very deliberate reasons that some of the secrecy was to hide wrongdoing. Where even Parliament was not privy to some of the misdeeds, that happened. In the name of national security - the resources were being abused, and people were being victimized when they tried to expose that. So, there was an agenda, and that agenda is now coming to be seen. So there's reasons that were unearthed and that is, the instruments of state were captured, and misdirected for particular ends. Was part of the reasons why we had such secrecy around these processes (Respondent 3, November 2022).

The respondent's comment on the "instruments of state being captured" is in reference to the allegations of state capture, as unearthed by revelations at the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (Respondent 3, November 2022 and Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, 2021).

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) and the UN (2012) all recognized the universal secret classification of information as a critical feature in matters relating to national security. Equally, Kodwa, (2021) reflected in his Parliamentary speech that the secret classification of information originated not only in current practice, but has been an approach long used historically in times of conflict.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) and the UN (2012) further reflected that given this characteristic, the need to classify national security has however served as a challenge towards the development of an inclusive NSS, with the classification of

information also potentially serving as a means to deny or conceal misconduct by the state security apparatus. The UN (2012) reflected that “the culture of secrecy is frequently cited as a key challenge to developing inclusive policies in the area of security and is often the source of significant tension between security actors and civilians. It should be noted that the ‘need’ for secrecy can be used as an excuse to avoid inclusive consultations,” (p.133). Though not linking it directly with the NSS, in an article Thamm (2021) also reflected on testimonies given by former Acting Director-General (DG) of the State Security Agency, in which the DG reflects that South Africa has experienced incidents where the classification of information towards the maintenance of national security has been used to cover up wrongdoing, a notion shared by respondent A and respondent 3.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) and the UN (2012), like respondent C and respondents 1, 2, and 4, saw a need for some level of public access if states want to communicate the key national values outlined in their NSS. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) indicated that, “while some aspects of an NSS may entail discussion of classified or secret information, these discussions can be limited to a smaller circle of participants among those who have been vetted and approved to handle sensitive information according to the requirements of the law. However, the majority of discussions of the content of an NSS should not require such a degree of sensitivity,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021, p: 9).

This theme indicates that information classification is a universal practice, however it can detour public participation and the involvement of external stakeholders in the security sector. Furthermore, the motives for information classification range from concealing information, concealing wrongdoing, or protecting against those who cannot be trusted to protect the information shared.

Theme 7: The Silo Approach

The next theme that emerged arose based on the description of the relationship between state organs in charge of security and non-state actors, with a view that state security organs prefer a silo approach. This theme emerged based on the data from both the state security actors and public participants.

Respondents B and C emphasized that those in state security departments frequently refuse to engage with external stakeholders or limit their own scope of engagement. Respondent B stated that this silo approach existed not only between state security departments and external stakeholders, but also within the state security structures themselves. Respondent B indicated that:

The silo approach is a criticism you can level against the national security departments. They've fragmented themselves and never created a sense of working together! As a group. Well the cluster approach has tried to really create ahhh, that common approach to things, even though in some instances they have succeeded, but in the main, within government, within the public sector we've tried. But you can see, if it had been difficult within those entities in the public sector, it means getting to the private sector will take much and time, (Respondent B, November 2022).

Respondent C indicated that:

There isn't that constant engagement all the time. And of course, when you try dig deep, you find why is that, you find there is underlying reasons as to why. Maybe there is distrust, you know, people feel that they not being taken notice of, when they bring issues. There could be poor management that could be cited, that contributes to the poor relationship (Respondent C, November 2022).

Both respondent B and C noted that in some instances, and with certain public groups, relations between state security departments and non-state actors have been strengthened. Respondent B used the example of collaborations between state security departments and certain business sectors, such as banking. While respondent C said:

It varies, I think from province to province. Sometimes region to region. Because in some areas, you find there is a very active element of participation, and they engage their group regularly. Where for instance, there will be standing meetings agreed upon between the two stakeholders (Respondent C, November 2022).

This theme of a silo approach by the state security departments came out strongly from the respondent 2, 3 and 4. Respondent 2 described it as an insular approach by the state security departments', which stems from their preoccupation with secrecy. The respondent said:

They work in a very insular fashion. They are not relating on a day to day basis either to communities, or to think tanks, to NGOs. They are not alive to the national security thinking community. They are just working in the office, and they are getting reports, but their actual connection, to the broader community, of thinking. Meaning for example the academic community, is very limited – because they are obsessed with secrecy. So because they are living in this insular world, there are two things that happen, the one thing that happens is that they start believing very firmly, that

they know exactly what is happening – but, they know this without actually being connected to the outside world. The other things is, they become very suspicious of people out there, experts, and - who are these people, what do they know anyway, and so on, and so on. What happens here then is, when you thinking, okay we need to develop a National Security Strategy, you then logically conclude that you are the only people who can do it (Respondent 2, November 2022).

Respondent 3 attributed this to the existing orientation within the state security departments, with the current orientation aimed at saying

We are in charge of security, and you know nothing about it (Respondent 3, November 2022).

And like respondent 2, respondent 3 located this orientation towards excluding external stakeholders such as the public, as a driver that contributed to the classification of the 2013 NSS as a secret document. For respondent 4, this approach has led to a situation in which state security departments preach to external stakeholders, with the expectation that those outside will simply co-sign, agree to, or approve what the state is putting forward, without disagreement (Respondent 4, November 2022). And, as a result of the potential for disagreement, the classification of information arises.

The UN (2012) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021) have also reflected on the general notion which exists, that matters of national security should only be the ambit of the state. Frequently a challenge lies in that those who have access or influence the outcome of security policies, including the NSS are state professions or high-level politicians. This creates a situation whereby there is a silo approach to national security, with affected parties excluded from decision-making. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), states that, “security in many African countries has traditionally been handled by a narrow constituency of high-level politicians and security sector officials,” “the perception that security is a taboo subject that only security professionals are qualified to address hampers public discussion and marginalizes the views of those whose security is at stake in the use of public resources for security provision. The fear that discussing security publicly poses a personal risk of harm is particularly corrosive to public confidence in the government and its security sector,” (p: 43).

The cause for a silo approach or public exclusion from security issues, as expressed by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), may be similar to those indicated under the

previous theme about the classification of information, in that it may be resultant from an existing culture of secrecy or intended to maintain wrongdoings. The UN (2012) has also attributed such an approach to deter perceived interference or from fear of delegating decision-making authority to a party outside the state.

The silo approach of state security organs is thus demonstrated to be a source of concern in South Africa and other contexts. Such an approach has been shown to discourage engagement across the security sector, while also limiting the scope for diversity of viewpoints from various stakeholders.

Theme 8: Remnants of a Security State

In response to the description of the current state of relations in the security sector, the theme on the remnants of a security state also emerged. Some of the respondents criticised the state's interface with the public, citing events like the FeesMustFall and COVID-19.

Respondents 1, 4, and A noted a growing posture in South Africa, resembling the remnants of a Security State. Beginning with respondent 1, this respondent believed that South Africa was reverting to a militaristic state, similar to what had occurred during the apartheid-colonial era. According to this respondent, one of the challenges brought about by this was that the public began to be perceived by state security structures as a threat to the state's security (Respondent 1, November 2022). Respondent 4 sees this manifested in the over securitization of everything. Respondent 1 attributed this to the remnants of apartheid era security officials who remain in democratic dispensation security departments but retain the oppressive apartheid regime's training and culture. Respondent 1 said:

A lot of the black apartheid policemen, they stayed on, and went through the ranks, and many of them were kits constable – they were recruited by Adriaan Vlok – purely trained Vader, of repression – because they helped to repress Soweto uprising, especially 76, that era. So many of them stayed on, and they worked through the ranks – if you look for example, at senior police officers. Now, they were all trained, by this militarized apartheid government, who put certain ideas into their head, but also certain practices. And, you know the thing of Institutional Theory, called Path Dependency. Institutions are very path dependent. To try transform them, takes a long time, you have to really focus on the transformation, you have to do it

fundamentally, you cannot do it superficially. And I think what has happened, is there's too many remnants of these old guards, that are today, trying to resurrect some of the culture, organizational culture, I'm talking about, organizational culture, and structural elements of the old order. Now, our architecture, is completely outdated, it is unfit, our national security architecture, is unfit. (Respondent 1, November 2022)

Similar to respondent 1 and 4, respondent A had the same notion. Both respondent 1 and respondent A reflected on the practices the government employed during COVID-19 and the FeesMustFall protests, with respondent A saying:

Some structures are behaving funny. Right now, we had COVID. What did we do, we sent police and defence force to reign on people...? We had a student must fall campaign. Instead of dealing with policy, we are sending NATJOINTS [National Joint Intelligence and Operational Structure], to go beat students. It doesn't make sense (Respondent A, November 2022).

Respondent 4 described those in powerful positions in the state security departments, as "Men dressed in black suits" and "hostile" which builds a division between those in powerful, state security positions and external stakeholders, (Respondent 4, November 2022).

The manner in which state security organs interact with the public, has thus affected how relations develop in the security sector. Both those in the state security organs and the public participants indicate a negative approach adopted by state security organs when interacting with members of the public.

Theme 9: Effect of Leadership on State Security Organs and Their Mandates

Leadership has been noted as a key determiner of processes adopted by the state security departments. The theme arose in characterizing relations in the security sector and in relation to why participants believed the secret classification approach was chosen in the 2013 NSS process. This theme indicates that those in positions of authority within state security structures directly affect how the security sector functions, which in turn influences whether or not public participatory processes should be implemented. The current state of the state security organs have also been deemed as inadequate to positively fulfil their mandate.

Tying in with the remnants of a security state, respondent C reflected that depending on who was at the helm of the state security departments, direction differed as to how far they were engaging with external stakeholders and willing to adopt public participation:

Another issue for me is the particular posture we took when it comes to engaging with external stakeholders. And this posture from time to time will be influenced by who is at the helm – so who's leading. And who is leading will have an influence on the extent to which we are open to engage with the external world – especially the public. Some will say, ours is a secret environment - a closed environment, we can't engage – some will say we need to demystify us being a secret society. Now in one year there's a communication strategy that takes us forwards, and in another they say there's no importance attached to having this thing in place, (Respondent C, November 2022).

Respondent 4 compared the level of engagement the government had with external role-players during the administrations of President Thabo Mbeki and President Jacob Zuma. The respondent stated that during President Mbeki's administration, some believe that this was the beginning of a trend of lack of engagement, which was later exacerbated by President Zuma's administration (Respondent 4, November 2022).

Both respondent C and respondent 4 also attributed the level of engagement to the age of thought, with those of an earlier age believing that national security should be a closed environment. Respondent 4 said:

A lot of securocrats have aged, past their prime, waiting for pension – they don't like what those outside have to say, they feel that they may be too cocky, or don't understand what is being said – or don't want to adopt a visionary approach to saving the security sector (Respondent 4, November 2022).

Respondent C said:

And again the issue is also those advising our leaders. Those who are advising our leaders and our leaders themselves, some of them are still come from a particular school of thought which still believes in heightened secrecy (Respondent C, November 2022).

The UN (2012) has further characterised the development of an NSS, as a “highly political process which relies on the will and capacity of the State to convene dialogue involving all national stakeholders and segments of society,” (p. 118). Given the reliance on the willingness and capacity of the state, the approach chosen will rely on the leadership undertaking the process. The view of the UN (2012), is thus in line with the view of respondent C, who had reflected that the extent to which security departments “were open

to engage with the external world - especially the public" was affected by who was at the helm of security institutions.

The same notion was indicated by the former Deputy Minister Kodwa, who indicated that "some of the most dramatic and far-reaching changes in the limits to public knowledge of national security matters are directly attributable to individual leadership— both at the top of the executive branch and throughout the agencies. The simple fact is that some officials favor openness and disclosure—either as a matter of principle, or for tactical political reasons—and some are hostile to it," (Z. Kodwa, speech, 1 June, 2021).

The current state of these state security organs have also been viewed as inadequate to fulfill their mandate positively. The current state of the state security organs have also been deemed as inadequate to positively fulfil their mandate

It has been drawn that if those who are in leadership do not positively direct the institutions, the country will fail to develop an inclusive NSS.

Respondents 3 and 4 also described the state security departments entrusted with developing and carrying out the NSS as weakened.

So where is that impetus for having such a dialogue, and discussion around the Strategy, going to come from? But it's all the more reason, why we need to have a far more open process. (Respondent 3 November 2022).

The security sector is failing us. Has become dysfunctional, and enjoys no support, from the public at large (Respondent 4, November 2022).

In line with these responses, Respondent 1 said a lack of strategic direction from the government to lead the development of the NSS:

The real problem lies with the government. There's no strategic direction, and as result of that, it's not possible to do a really good national security strategy – we all improvising, for the failure of the government to lead properly. (Respondent 1, November 2022).

The UN (2012) has highlighted the importance of public trust in those leading the development of an NSS. For the UN (2012), public trust in state institutions is based on previous experiences and the state's ability to deliver. In cases where the state has lost this trust, having an inclusive process can be hampered because the public either lacks faith in the capacity of state organs or views the state as a source of insecurity (UN, 2012).

“In many contexts the security sector may have been implicated in abuses against the population, making trust building all the more challenging. For example, open, participatory approaches may be viewed with suspicion and mistrust, as stakeholders fear reprisals or repression.” (UN, 2012). Thus, as highlighted by respondent 3, states that suffer from weak institutions or leadership deficits as South Africa is described, may find it challenging in undertaking such a process, given the state of its institutions.

As a result, leadership has emerged as a factor in how state sector organs function and the decisions they make. How the state security organs are directed is seen as having an effect on public participation and the capacities of these organs.

4.2. REFLECTION ON OTHER COUNTRIES

While conducting semi-structured interviews and document analysis, a reflection was made on how other countries conduct their national security practices and develop their NSS. This data was useful in providing guidance on how other countries develop their NSS in comparison to South Africa. No specific country was chosen, with the data derived from what was retrieved during the interviews and sampled documents.

In addition to the respondents from section 4.1 and the documents from section 4.2, this section used textual data from The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2017), which focused on the NSS of the United States during the various administrations.

As a starting point, the UN (2012) has stated that there is no set practice for how countries should develop their NSS, with each country developing it in accordance with their own standards. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), “every country is different and a NSS must reflect the unique situation and priorities of the society that produces it,” (p: 10). It goes on to say that “case studies of African experiences clearly show that each process is context specific,” and that there is “no universal blueprint, no one size-fits-all approach,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021, p: 10).

However, all data collected has reflected and advocated for the development of a country's NSS through public participation. Respondent 3, however reflected that there was no country that could be identified that was doing inclusive public participation towards

developing an NSS perfectly, with the respondent (3) further expressing a leniency by most African states towards retaining secrecy around national security.

Furthermore, respondents' B and 2 both expressed that South Africa, in comparison to Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, had more transparency in national security matters, with these Western countries frequently having a more extensive culture directed toward the classification of information in the name of national security. Respondent 4 also highlighted that the United States has adopted a more securitised posture in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Respondent B, in relation to the theme on social cohesion and common national interests towards developing an inclusive NSS, stated that in countries where there is a common understanding or common national interests and values on national security, developing an inclusive NSS may be easier, as the goal is the same across the populace. The respondent emphasized the United States and most European countries' as examples of states that shared common national security goals (Respondent B, November 2022).]

4.2.1. The NSS of the United States of America (US)

According to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017), the US NSS has been classified or unclassified depending on the administration of the day. Each approach used, produced different outcomes, with the CSIS (2017) stating that an unclassified NSS allowed the administration to justify budgetary expenditures, while a classified NSS provided "the opportunity for greater candor" on the government's approach, to national security issues, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017, p. XV). As a result, the US government may choose to have both a classified and unclassified NSS to serve both purposes.

However, the CSIS (2017) has recommended that "consultation with "outside" experts chosen by the secretary is a useful check on the system, and some consultation should be made in every strategy formulation process." (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017, p. XVI). Having a smaller circle of consultation is expressed to also facilitate lesser leaks of the classified document.

Like the expressions made by respondents 1-4 and A-C on the role of Parliament, the US Congress is expressed as playing a critical role in the process surrounding the development of the country's NSS. The administration's NSS will be sent to members of Congress for discussion by the president of the United States. The challenge expressed by CSIS (2017) in such an approach arises if Congress and the executive have opposing views on the document's strategic decisions. "Congress has a constitutional duty to provide oversight, and there will inevitably be tensions between Congress and the executive branch over particular strategic decisions," (CSIS, 2017, p. XVI). Thus, while respondent B viewed a country such as the US as having common interests as compared to South Africa, the study by CSIS (2017), underscores possible tension over the country's strategic direction, between Congress and a sitting administration.

4.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews with the security experts and the documents analysed. The themes that emerged from this data have shown the institutional practices that exist within the security sector, as well as the relationships and perceptions that exist among stakeholders in the sector. The data has also reflected on the role of public participation in the development of a country's NSS and how the United States undertakes such a process. Based on the data presented in this chapter, the following chapter will provide an analysis of the data gathered and the findings for this research.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS

Chapter 5 will provide an analysis, using the data gathered and presented in Chapter 4, as well as the literature review that provided the study's theoretical framework.

From the onset of this research, public participation has been identified as a challenge in South Africa's security sector, with the country having had no participation towards the country's 2013 NSS. Data from the UN (2012) and the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2021) have also demonstrated that such a challenge is not only presented in South Africa but that in other contexts, there are also identified challenges that also constrain inclusive public participation towards developing the country's NSS. The purpose of this research was therefore to identify the challenges that exist in South Africa's security sector that constrain inclusive public participation towards the development of an NSS.

The Chapter will begin by providing an analysis of the key challenges shown by the data, which constrain inclusive public participation within South Africa's security sector. Through this analysis, the key findings will be presented, which will answer the main research question: What challenges exist in South Africa's security sector that constrains inclusive public participation?

After addressing the challenges, the sub-question that reads: What role should the public play in the development of the NSS, will also be addressed, based on the data and the literature review. The last section of this chapter will then provide other findings from the research.

To represent the results of the analysis, extracts from the data will be presented along with the literature.

5.1. CHALLENGE 1: THE EFFECT OF HISTORY AND LEGACIES OF APARTHEID ON CONTEMPORARY SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE

From the literature review, under the Theme: The Need for Security Sector Transformation, it was indicated that though South Africa had undergone a period of Security Sector Reform, the country's security sector governance has been on a gradual

decline. Both Cawthra (2019) and Nathan (2009) underscore this decline, emphasizing the stagnation of democratic norms that allowed for good governance. Data show that elements of the old apartheid regime were transferred into the new state security institutions during the transition from apartheid to democracy. This transfer brought with it the governance shortfalls of the apartheid government, which now affect how current state security organs interact with the public. The formation of social divisions is another ramification of the country's history that has migrated into the current democratic society. These factors are now being identified as having an impact on how state security organs interact with the public and the formation of common national interests, both of which appear to be challenges to developing an inclusive NSS.

The theme 'Remnants of a Security State', indicated that the former security personnel who formed part of the apartheid system were incorporated into the new democratic state security structures (Respondent 1, November 2022 and Respondent A, November 2022). Respondent 1 said:

A lot of the black apartheid policemen, they stayed on, and went through the ranks, and many of them were kits constable – they were recruited by Adriaan Vlok – purely trained Vader, of repression – because they helped to repress Soweto uprising, especially 76, that era. So many of them stayed on, and they worked through the ranks – if you look for example, at senior police officers, now, they were all trained, by this militarized apartheid government, who put certain ideas into their head, but also certain practices. (Respondent 1, November 2022).

South Africa's legacy of apartheid and the political and security policies adopted at the time still affect the contemporary forms of security sector governance and may have also created new cultures. As reflected by Hendricks and Musavengana (2010), during the system of apartheid, there were limited aspects of good governance such as oversight, transparency, and civilian involvement, and security was primarily consolidated under the Prime Minister, who was the centre of leadership. Based on the organisational cultures that were adopted, some who formed part of the apartheid system still adhere to the old forms of security governance, which are rooted in a militaristic view of security in which the public is seen as a potential threat to national security.

In the South African context, some of the legacies through the institutional culture of the old apartheid system have thus migrated into democratic security institutions, and now

pose a challenge to the state-society relations that are required to facilitate public participation. In line with this, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2021) has also identified legacies of abuse and mistrust as a barrier to developing an NSS through participatory processes, arguing that legacies can affect state-society relations. Through such an outlook, a combative relationship emerges between the state security apparatus and the public, with this militarist form of security risking the employment of coercive engagements. Data from respondent 4 demonstrated this, with this respondent noting an over securitisation of everything by the state security sector and describing some state security members as hostile when engaging with external stakeholders (Respondent 4, November 2022). Nadeem and Fischer (2011) underscored the negative effect power relations between security officials and the public can have in participatory settings if those in the security apparatus command a feeling of intimidation in society. For some, these legacies and practices may not be deliberate, as they may stem from ingrained cultural norms, whereas for others, these practices may be a deliberate choice made to retain certain practices. Therefore, transferring apartheid-era organisational cultures into the democratic security sector only serves to limit relations between the state security apparatus and the public.

These expressions also support the notion that, while SSR was extensively pursued during South Africa's democratic transition, there are indications that these interventions fell short of enabling substantive changes, as would be required by the concept of SST (Nathan, 2009). In contrast to SSR, SST moves beyond security reforms to involve systematic structural changes, that alter cultural norms of security institutions and personnel, which would be required to redirect the organizational culture of a security state. (Ball, et al., 2005; Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010). The Legacy of the Institutional Culture of the Old Apartheid System Migrating into the Democratic Security Institutions thus poses a challenge in that it affects how current relations between those in state security organs and the public are, with these existing cultures restricting positive relations, which poses a barrier to inclusive public participation in the development of an NSS.

The next challenge that emanates from the country's history and migrated into the democratic society was the formation of social divisions. Respondents 1 and A, each

indicated that the country has divisions, which fundamentally run along class and racial lines. Respondent A noted that:

We have got the rich and the poor, and we have got blacks and whites. So the South African problem, is a racial problem. The South African problem, is a class problem. Which actually makes it very difficult for the country to have any meaningful dialogue, and reach consensus. And, when there is no consensus, its everybody for himself, or herself, or themselves. So that is the problem of South Africa... When transformation is effected, it's very superficial. Black capitalist has just replaced white capitalists. Exploitative. (Respondent A, November 2022)

South Africa's historical past which was embedded in racial divisions, gave rise to race being a key determinant of socioeconomic status in the country. Post-apartheid South Africa has seen the continuation of some of these divisions, which manifest as horizontal inequality along racial lines. Over and above this, new inequalities have emerged since the democratic era, resulting in class formations that cut across racial lines.

This data has shown that there is a lack of shared experiences among the general public, whose perspectives are being sought in order to develop a common and coherent National Security Strategy (Respondent A, November 2022 and Respondent B, November 2022). Africa (2021, July 10) has noted that when a society has deep-seated divisions, this creates an impediment to bringing together the various stakeholders to develop a cohesive NSS. The UN (2012) and the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2021) have also highlighted social division as one of the main impediments to bringing divergent groups together.

Tying in the remnants of a security state and the country's class divisions, South Africa's insecurity can be described as having taken a new form, as evidenced by widespread protests and events such as FeesMustFall and the 2021 July unrest. Some segments of society are involved in such unrest as a result of the emerged inequality, poverty, and unemployment levels. Because of the magnitude of the chaos caused by such unrest, these segments of society may be labelled as a threat to the country's stability and apprehended by state security organs using militaristic practices. Respondent A noted that:

Some structures are behaving funny, imposing as a security state. Right now, we had COVID. What did we do, we sent police and defence force to reign on people? We had a student must fall campaign. Instead of dealing with policy, we are sending

NATJOINTS to go beat students. It doesn't make sense. Cause students were asking for free education. And you cannot attach price on education. Because it's a national security imperative. That's very wrong. Your defence, police, they represent your hard power elements or national power. But must be used sparingly, as the last resort. (Respondent A, November 2022)

As an inhibitor to developing an NSS, these inequalities present a challenge in bringing different groups in agreeing on a coherent NSS. Respondent A said:

one of the social problems in South Africa, is disagreement in terms of the pace of transformation – which leads to the development of various interests. (Respondent A, November 2022).

The literature review has also expressed social class or power disparity amongst groups as among the social structures that may pose a challenge when undertaking participatory processes (Gaventa, 2003). Within the South African context, class disparities, which may also be presented as power disparity among different groups, thus raise a challenge in building cohesion and common national objectives, critical in developing an inclusive NSS. Such disparities may further raise the challenge reflected by Ball et al. (2014) and McCandless (2016), who showed that in policy spaces, conflicting interests may rise in societal settings, fundamentally if one group's interests override those of another which may give way for discrimination. As a result, South Africa's inequalities and divisions present a challenge to those attempting to bring different stakeholders, to agree on common security strategies and what the state's key security priorities and objectives should be (van Nieuwkerk, 2020, May 10).

5.2. CHALLENGE 2: CATEGORIZATION OF CIVIL GROUPS AND MEDIA DRIVING TRUST DEFICIT

The second challenge shown by the data is based on the literature on the classification of civil society and media groups, and the context in which these groups operate. According to the literature from Arnstein (2019), Clapham (2009) and McCandless (2016), civil formations, which include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), civil society, and other forms of non-state actors, who may represent the public when engaging in public participation, are not homogeneous in nature, with each holding their own mandate, vision, and principles. The way these groups are perceived generates a plethora of meanings. In developing an inclusive NSS in South Africa's security sector, some of these groups have been seen to counter government efforts towards such initiatives.

McCandless (2016) has also noted that links between multinational organisations and civil formations may have an impact on how the latter operate in a given context. Data from the respondents show that this is one of the challenges, with civil society organisations, NGOs, and media outlets that are primarily externally funded seen to prioritise their funders' mandates over those of their constituencies or the interest of the country.

State security respondents, alongside respondent 2, from the non-state actors, each expressed an apprehension in relying on public representatives such as civil groups and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) for participatory processes. Respondent 2 noted that:

what has happened in the last 20 odd years, is that you have seen a professionalisation, and almost corporatization of let's say community politics. They are professional people, claiming to represent communities. And these are NGOs. They are paid very significant salaries, and they speak on behalf of people. Some of these speak on behalf of women, but they have no constituency amongst women, I mean they are composed of 10, 20, 30 professional people, who earn big salaries, but no one has elected them. (Respondent 2, November 2022).

The main issue revealed by this data was a lack of true representation when there is a reliance on NGOs or civil groups, with the data also suggesting that such formations may act as a barrier to public participation as they may fail to truly represent their constituents. Respondent A said:

Some South Africans under the guise of Non-Governmental Organisations that are foreign funded, and they are actually doing the bidding for foreign government, comes, and they want to access this, or they actually want to make sure that the outcome of that process, does not actually dent or hurt the interest of some people out there. (Respondent A, November 2022).

From this data, some non-governmental organisations and civil groups are seen to act as spoilers of government efforts or driving the mandate of external stakeholders, especially if they are financially dependent on external organisations. A link was also made between these groups and a lack of cohesion among different social groups if they only advocate for their respective constituencies at the expense of others. In the data, some of the respondents from the state security structures had reflected that some civil formations were against government transformative initiatives, aimed at safeguarding the interests of their constituencies over those of the general public (Respondent B, November 2022).

A reliance on external funding is thus seen as a challenge, capable of undermining the mandate of civil organisations, as it redirects such groups' commitments to their funders rather than the public they represent. Speer (2012) has also explained that the capacity of civil society actors influences their role in public participation, with stronger groups with access to resources able to take over platforms due to their capacity, eroding the capabilities of smaller groups. From this, it can thus be drawn that participation spaces will be shaped by the political and economic power groups have in society, with external funding contributing to the influence of civil formations in contexts where they exist. Thus, the data's assertion that NGOs and civil groups may be influenced by external funders corroborates the impact that such makeups have on decision-making processes

This characterisation of NGOs and civil groups gives these representatives a negative connotation, indicating that there are apprehensive relations between state and public representatives who would be involved in the development of the NSS.

In both the literature on public participation and security sector governance, the role of civil society, NGOs, and all-encompassing expanded actors is reflected as critical (Ball et al., 2014; Ebo & Powell, 2010). These civil formations are also important in the development of an inclusive NSS as they are seen to provide different perspectives in addressing security challenges and representing their constituencies. The views arising from the data also reflect the critique from the literature from Arnstein (2019), Gaventa (2003) and Mbeche (2017) that indicate that reliance on experts or representatives may succumb to tokenism, and not truly reflect the views of affected parties. Arnstein (2019) reflected that the credibility of representation can only be legitimate if those who represent the public reflect the resolve of their constituents. The makeup and role of these groups in the South African context are thus crucial, as they will have a direct effect on the public participation and consultation these groups play in the process.

The literature shows that civil society and the role they play is linked to the contexts in which they exist, therefore such groups will align their actions or mandates with existent social structures and issues that exist in the country (McCandless, 2016). Thus, in contexts where there are social divisions, as shown in relation to South Africa's class and racial structures, such issues will align with the mandate of civil formations. In such contexts,

those who appear to be in conflict with such efforts will draw in the connotation of being spoilers.

Fundamentally, civil society and NGOs play a crucial role in the development of an inclusive NSS, through their capacity to provide wider perspectives on security challenges and represent the public's views. However, such formations may also present a challenge to the process.

The media's influence has also been indicated as capable of impeding government initiatives, such as the development of an inclusive NSS, especially when this influence is swaying public opinion negatively. The data from the state security respondents indicates that media reporting has leaned towards negative publication against the government, pursuing political ends (Respondent A, November 2022 and Respondent B, November 2022). Respondent B indicated that the use of mass media, or mass communication was driving a particular point, and confusing the majority into “defocusing on the critical issues – to those issues that are important to the owners of mass media,” (Respondent B, November 2022).

The data also indicates that media reporting is affected by those who own it, want to drive their own interests and set the agenda in the country. Respondent A stated that:

Media is a pillar of cultural imperialism. And those who owns it, will even go to an extent of ring-fencing it, so that you don't touch it. Don't even touch the content, because the content, is a weapon. Is a weaponized content. It might as well be propaganda. So it actually sells something in the sense of tall lies, to become truth to South Africans (Respondent A, November 2022).

Media ownership is therefore indicated as a key influence as to how media reports information, which then has an effect on public opinion, with media houses that are owned externally viewed as the main architects of negative publications. These views on the challenge posed by the media primarily emanated from the state actors and were in line with the textual data from the UN (2012) and the Africa Centre of Strategic Studies whose data indicated the media can serve as an ally of government to drive consensus. From these expressions, it can be deduced that media is a key instrument for creating cohesion for inclusive processes. Contrarily, it can thus also act as a spoiler.

Media organisations and civil society organisations have also taken the role of watchdogs, exposing "abuses and cases of mismanagement" by security sector institutions (Alawna, Cottier, Masson, McAndrew, Friedrich, Itawi, & Luethold, 2012). In the periods of reported state capture, parliament and security organs were ineffective and compromised in bringing cases of criminality to light (Gumede, 2021, September 9). The South African civil society and media were instead regarded as among those at the forefront of effective investigations (Gumede, 2021, September 9). Similarly, state security organs have been at odds with media organisations over matters such as the classification of information to protect information versus what media organisations consider access to information (Broughton, 2022, 19 October). Such cases demonstrate the intricate relations between media and state institutions, and the differences in opinion and how media groups administer oversight and accountability.

If the media is perceived as a spoiler by those undertaking a participatory process in developing an NSS, there will be limited partnerships with media houses to carry government messaging that promotes public participation. Equally, if media is indeed driving a negative narrative that influences the public, this will mean that the messaging will be critical of government efforts, limiting public participation.

Drawing from the categorization of NGOs/civil society and media, when such sectors of society are viewed as spoilers towards government initiatives, it will become challenging for these groups to be incorporated into public participatory processes required to develop an inclusive NSS, or for the state security actors to engage openly with them. This data thus shows a level of trust deficit within the security sector from the state security actors towards some public representatives and sectors of society. McCandless (2016) has underscored that a lack of trust between civil society groups and state authorities, will inhibit the role of inclusive participation.

5.3. CHALLENGE 3: INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES

Mbeche (2017) and Lyhne, et al. (2016) each found that levels of public participation were dependent on the institutions that carry them out. Various institutional practices were found to be in existence in South Africa's state security departments, which limit consultation and engagement with the public. Among these practices, include the classification of

information, which warrants secrecy, alongside a preference for a silo approach. A lack of confidence in the ability of the state to develop an NSS as well as the approaches taken by those in leadership were also among the challenges reflected.

The data and the literature reviewed show the secret classification of information as a common feature in national security matters, however, no set standard exists as to the extent states should classify information. Deductively, this has obscured the boundaries of what states are permitted to withhold.

To develop inclusive policies in the area of security, the UN (2012) has reflected that in different contexts “the culture of secrecy is frequently cited as a key challenge” and is “often the source of significant tension between security actors and civilians (p.133). The multilateral organisation has also noted that “the ‘need’ for secrecy can be used as an excuse to avoid inclusive consultations,” (UN, 2012 p.133). As a hindrance to public participation, the challenge in the classification of information arises in what can or cannot be expressed to the public, to enable the public to participate fully in the governance of the security sector.

The data has shown that in South Africa’s security sector, the country’s approach towards classifying information as secret to safeguard national security, is in line with universal practices, with respondents 2’s expression indicating more levels of transparency in the country as opposed to some western states. Respondent 3 stated that in countries lauded as highly democratic, levels of classification are even more extensive than in South Africa.

In neither of these countries [Germany and the United Kingdom], does the public, or even parliament have the kind of oversight of the intelligence services, like they have in South Africa. I mean there are quite draconian, especially in the UK – there are very draconian laws about the activities of Intelligence services. For example, where a newspaper wanted to publish something [in South Africa], you have to go through a long legal process, to prevent that independent newspaper from publishing the document. In the UK, if an intelligence service found out that a newspaper wants to publish something of national security interest, they would simply go to that newspaper, inform them that they cannot publish without a court order, and that newspaper would oblige. (Respondent 3, November 2022)

Respondent 4, similarly indicated that

I'm not sure you always know where to find the balance. And many democracies, and advanced economies, the Global North, they struggle themselves, to achieve this balance. (Respondent 4, November 2022)

Under the literature theme, Classification of information in matters relating to national security, Ball et al. (2014), prescribes a balance to be struck between maintaining the secret classification of national security information and enabling public participatory practices and oversight. However, the data demonstrates that finding that balance is a challenge in itself.

In South Africa, the challenge that also arises when the classification of information hinders public participation and when the motives for this classification are contrary to the safeguarding of national security. The barrier identified within the South African context lies in the classification of information to conceal wrongdoing. According to Respondent 3:

We've come to see there [are] very deliberate reasons that some of the secrecy was to hide wrongdoing. Where even Parliament was not privy to some of the misdeeds, that happened. In the name of national security - the resources were being abused, and people were being victimized when they tried to expose that. So, there was an agenda, and that agenda is now coming to be seen. So there's reasons that were unearthed and that is, the instruments of state were captured, and misdirected for particular ends. Was part of the reasons why we had such secrecy around these processes (Respondent 3, November 2022).

Data from both state security departments and those outside of these departments thus indicates, that the classification of the 2013 NSS leaned towards the concealment of malpractice within the state security sector, as opposed to the safeguarding of information (Respondent A, November 2022 and Respondent 3, November 2022).

It can then be argued that in the South African context, there is an existing challenge in using classification and secrecy to serve narrow interests. The data further indicated that some matters were excessively concealed, which should ordinarily be in the public domain and not require classification. Respondent 3 said,

They are obsessed with secrecy. You know most of the time these type of things are not the real secrets...It cannot be classified, there's no reason for this thing to be classified. Many countries publish their National Security Strategy. China and Russia and the US and so on. There is no advantage to classifying it top secret or secret. None at all. (Respondent 3, November 2022)

In the development of an NSS, the misapplication of secrecy to conceal wrongdoing served as a challenge in that it completely disabled any form of public participation.

Among other institutional practices identified in South Africa's security sector, which present a barrier to inclusive public participation, is the culture of a silo approach. In the data, it has been reflected by both state security experts and those who are non-state actors, of an inclination in state security departments towards not engaging with external stakeholders, due to the perception that those within these institutions know more than those outside (Respondent 3, November 2022 and Respondent 4, November 2022). The respondent 2 said:

they work in a very insular fashion. They are not relating on a day to day basis either to communities, or to think tanks, to NGOs. They are not alive to the national security thinking community...their actual connection, to the broader community, of thinking, meaning for example the academic community, is very limited – because they are obsessed with secrecy. So because they are living in this insular world, there are two things that happen, the one thing that happens is that they start believing very firmly, that they know exactly what is happening – but, they know this without actually being connected to the outside world. The other things is, they become very suspicious of people out there, experts, and - who are these people, what do they know anyway, and so on, and so on. What happens here then is, when you thinking, okay we need to develop a National Security Strategy, you then logically conclude that you are the only people who can do it (Respondent 2, November 2022).

This data shows a culture of marginalising public opinion and devaluing the views of the public. The cause for this marginalisation could be linked to the challenge of secrecy, as well as the existent negative categorization of civil groups and media, which is driving a trust deficit within the security sector. When security organs have few avenues for engagement and maintain secrecy, governance functions such as oversight and accountability are inevitably hampered, allowing wrongdoings to occur, as documented in the South African context.

The preference for a silo approach thus poses a challenge in developing an NSS in that those responsible for creating avenues for participation relegate public opinions which are necessary for a comprehensive NSS, while further straining relations between state and public stakeholders that are required to create an inclusive process.

The capability of South African state institutions to carry out the development of a quality NSS is another demonstrated challenge, which reflects the lack of trust and confidence in

the security sector. Data from respondents showed that the state security departments, in their current form were failing to provide security for the state and instead faced numerous allegations of malpractice (Respondent 3, November 2022). Respondent 4 said the security sector was failing and had become dysfunctional, enjoying no support from the public at large (Respondent 4, November 2022). Respondents reflected on various allegations from Commissions and events that occurred in the country to demonstrate the government's inability to perform. The High-level Review Panel, also referred to as the Mufumadi Panel (as it was led by Sydney Mufumadi), was among such examples. Respondent 3 said:

You had your Mufumadi Panel, we waiting for the Human Right Commission on the July, and a number of other panels and processes...they all have been quite critical. So certainly, the irony is the justice and security institutions are weakened. (Respondent 3, November 2022).

Like the notion that the classification of information was done to conceal wrongdoing, a general notion appeared that the state security structures were deliberately incapacitated to undertake their mandates, to conceal the allegations that propelled the various Commissions (Respondent 3, November 2022). Similarly, the UN (2012) identified a lack of capability and skills as one of the impediments to developing an NSS.

The perception of a state security apparatus that is incapable of administering its mandate reflects that South African institutions are weakened and may fail in ensuring the development and implementation of the NSS. This also indicates a lack of confidence and trust in state security structures by the public whose views are sought after to develop the NSS.

It can also be drawn that, if inclusive public participation promotes legitimacy in government decision-making, the lack of participation in the 2013 NSS may be one of the factors that contribute to the negative perception of the state security structures as lacking the capacity to safeguard security. The challenge raised in the lack of confidence in the state's capability to undertake security presents a constraint to inclusive public participation in that those tasked with undertaking such a process may lack the capacity.

Leadership is also important in directing institutional practices. The UN (2012) identified "political will and leadership" as among the frequently identified challenges when

developing an NSS (p. 130). Within the South African context, the data has shown that different administrations or a sitting leadership may not view inclusion and public participation in matters of security as their responsibility or not as part of their main priorities (Respondent C, November 2022). Respondent C said:

Who is leading will have an influence on the extent to which we are open to engage with the external world – especially the public. Some will say, ours is a secret environment - a closed environment, we can't engage – some will say we need to demystify us being a secret society. (Respondent C, November 2022)

Therefore, a sitting administration's approaches may instill a culture that is not open to inclusive processes, creating the institutional practices expressed above. A correlation can also be made between leaders directing the concealment of information, to weaken state institutions. According to Fayemi, et al. (2004), limitations to public participation are common in African contexts where power is concentrated primarily in the executive.

Respondent 4 noted that the administration of President Mbeki was seemingly the first to engage less frequently with external stakeholders, with the administration of President Zuma criticised for having even less engagement (Respondent 4, November 2022). When compared to Cawthra (2005), the country appears to have decreased levels of engagement over time, which may be related to the approaches taken during these administrations. Fundamentally, since leadership directs the organisation, the state security structures and the methods they take will be significantly impacted by the views held by those in positions of leadership. When it comes to the NSS, the approaches taken are determined by the political will of those in power, with those who are opposed to public participatory processes posing a barrier to developing an NSS in an inclusive manner.

The above institutional practices found in state security departments are fundamental, as these institutions are in the position to carry out the participatory processes required to develop an inclusive NSS. The institutional practices that are found in relation to the excessive classification of information and the silo approach may also be assessed to emanate from apprehensive relations shown in the categorization of civil groups and the media as well as the noted revelations of wrongdoing.

The challenges outlined are consistent with the literature by Lyhne et al. (2016), who state that public participation will be determined by the attitudes of the institutions carrying them

out, with those in state security departments having a large influence on who participates and the quality of such participation. Looking at the literature review, South Africa has a large number of similar challenges, which are found in other contexts. The way in which these challenges manifest themselves will, however, vary according to each setting.

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South Africa's historical legacy is unique to the country and has impacted its governance and social structures. The challenges posed by historical legacies are inherited and, to some extent, remain beyond the control of institutions and authorities engaging in participatory processes. The challenges posed by institutional practices, on the other hand, lie in the ambit of those carrying them out, and it has been demonstrated that those at the helm direct the approaches taken. Those undertaking processes are expected to simply implement the leadership's set directives.

The categorizations that are reflected concerning civil formations and the media are an indication of how much distrust exists among those involved in the security sector. These concerns are likely to cause friction between the institution in charge of making decisions and the representatives of the public, which does not bode well for the relationships among these actors.

Based on the above analysis, three overarching challenges have been identified. First, South Africa's history and the legacies of apartheid are identified to affect contemporary forms of security sector governance. Second, due to the categorization or characterisation of civil groups and the media, this has created a trust deficit among security sector stakeholders, impacting relations in the sector. The third challenge lies in the existing institutional practices that limit public participation.

5.4. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSS

The data from the respondents interviewed, demonstrate a desire for more inclusive public participation in responding to the country's security needs and developing the country's NSS.

Respondent A stated that the state security organs are only one aspect of administering national security, but without the public's involvement, the NSS will be short of being comprehensive in its approach (Respondent A, November 2022). Respondents C and 1 were in line with this view, seeing the public as important in providing more useful insight into the NSS, as they "interface with a lot of insecurities" (Respondent C, November 2022). Respondent 1 indicated that the public was "important in determining, what is and makes them secure" (Respondent 1, November 2022). The DCAF (n.d.) is similarly in line with the security experts stating that the inclusion of public representatives and marginalised groups allows such groups to provide a better understanding into their own security needs. Some of the respondents also stated that the public played an important role in the actual implementation of the NSS, (Respondent C, November 2022; Respondent 2, November 2022, and Kodwa, 2021).

Based on this data, it can then be said that for the country to take a comprehensive approach to the NSS, both state security organs and the public should be involved in defining the issues to be addressed. The state security organs cannot solely represent the lived experiences of those whose insecurity it seeks to resolve, with the public necessary in defining the country's national security approach. As a result, the public would play an important role in defining the national security threats and vulnerabilities that the NSS would address, as well as its implementation.

The data also indicated that the NSS should be a national endeavour, brought together through national consensus, which can be found through public participation. Involving the public allows for national ownership of the NSS and provides legitimacy to the process, with some expressing this as a constitutional imperative (Respondents 1, B and 2, November 2022). Respondent 2 stated that having the public provides legitimacy to the outcome of the NSS. Respondent 2 said,

when you involve the public, in the participation, in the development of the national security strategy, for example not only are you legitimizing it, but means you are creating the grounds for weaponising the people. if you have not involved them, in the process of developing a national security strategy, you will struggle to sell it to them , (Respondent 2, November 2022)

Respondent 1, said

the NSS must be owned by the people if it is to fulfil its function properly...The national will, why it is important is when you do a National Security Strategy, and you involve people in it, and they become committed, to the key concepts, and tenants, and values of the National Security Strategy, you actually building your security. So it's really central to how you build security. Respondent 1, November 2022).

For Africa (2021) “the legitimacy and potency can only be achieved through the consent of the people,” (Africa, 2021, 10 July). The public's role can then be expressed in two ways: first, as a facilitator for the development of a comprehensive NSS that responds to the security needs of affected parties as expressed by those living in those circumstances, and second, as an enabler for the development of a national consensus and the legitimisation of the process. This supports McCandless (2019), Jackson & Beswick (2018), who argue that inclusive participation in the security sector provides a people-centered approach to security. This is also in line with the human security paradigm, which sees people as security referent objects within a state (Jackson & Beswick, 2018). Such an approach is also consistent with the theory on substantive participation, according to which Those Who Are Affected Are Given Power Or Citizen Control Over Decision-Making.

5.5. THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY SECTOR

Drawing from Arnstein (2019), public participation enables democratic processes, by allowing those who are governed to become stakeholders within their own government. Based on the author's conceptualization of participation, and the data gathered, public participation in developing an inclusive NSS is lacking in South Africa's security sector, with the public having no avenues for participation in directing the NSS. Respondents have expressed that currently, public participation in formulating and debating security-related issues is almost nonexistent in the country's security sector (Respondent A, November 2022).

Since South Africa never applied public participation towards the development of its 2013 NSS, there is no form of comparative analysis that can be applied to indicate the country having substantive public participation towards developing the NSS. For participation to be regarded as substantive, the public must be “delegated Power and Citizen Control,” as well as “the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power” (Arnstein, 2019, p, 25). Based on this outline from the literature, it can then be deduced that South Africa lacks substantive public participation within the country's security sector, as the state security has not enabled any form of inclusion or decision-making for the public towards developing the 2013 NSS.

When comparing South Africa to other countries, the data has also shown that many democracies, including those considered advanced, struggle to strike a balance between participatory processes and transparency when it comes to matters of national security (Respondent 4, November 2022). Different authors (Mbeche, 2017, Nadeem and Fischer, 2011, Turner, 2014), have also found that in most contexts, the application of substantive public participation is challenging to implement. An analysis of the process undertaken in the USA reflects that the process towards developing the NSS is fluid, depending on the approach of each administration (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017). However, this country has been able to develop certain democratic processes in this regard, such as Congress's role in the development of an inclusive NSS (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).

Overall, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2021) shows that the process of developing an NSS is a highly political process that remains a country's sovereign prerogative. Because there is no set standard for how countries should carry out such a process, each process adopted must be determined by the context in which it exists.

Different areas in the data underscore the existence of various other forms of public participation and democratic processes in the country's security space. South Africa's Parliamentary processes are among those that are seen as the best instruments for public participation, as this form of governance allows the public to choose their representative through the ballot box, with those elected then representing their constituents across the country. Respondent 4 said:

Parliament is a good representative. In our form of democracy, we can't avoid the system, whereby people, rightly or wrongly, choose for a political party. Whether its small or big, driven by one man or one woman. Or not. The people choose. And that's where the representative at Parliament come from. (Respondent 4, November 2022)

Respondent B also said:

How parliament is structured is such that each MP has a constituency that they are representing. And you have an NCOP which also is a house that is intended to make sure that provinces are represented. (Respondent B, November 2022)

On a more local level, the country's Community Police Forums (CPF) have been cited as some of the avenues for public participation (Respondent 3, November 2022). The country's constitutional framework is also expressed as a good tool for directing public participation and enabling for the effective governance of the security sector. Respondent C stated that:

In South Africa we have an established framework of public participation – I think we don't suffer from not knowing how to conduct this. There's already an established framework in place, and I think to some extent it is legislated. I think it is an aspect in terms of how we can do certain things. (Respondent C, November 2022)

A lauding of Parliament as a form of public representation assumes that the best form of representation is through a cycle of voting for political representation. Respondent B has stated that this instrument does not come without its drawbacks, indicating that:

it was always about voting us in. 'vote us to go to parliament' and making noise – and vote for us again. There are no practical problem, to say 'how do I equip my followers to understanding what is the political problem in South Africa, that needs to be resolved'. Because if these parties, were not your one man parties, because I think all of them including the ruling party is turning out to be a one-man problem – because now what becomes important is who becomes the president. (Respondent B, November 2022).

This form of representation is thus based on the assumption that MPs will seek constituent views and that their input will be accurately reflected when issues affecting them arise. However, a reliance on elected representatives ignores the criticism that representation limits the power of the public, by not providing citizens with more direct control over decision-making processes, (Andrasik & Mead, 2019).

Based on the levels of public engagement, consultation, and representation in the country's security space it can then be deduced that South Africa's security sector has a

greater propensity for Tokenism. Token representation, as stated by Arnstein (2019) and Mbeche (2017), centralises decision-making to technocrats or a select few, and those that are affected are either informed or consulted, with a limited capacity to direct outcomes.

5.6. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the research data. The chapter outlined three major themes from the data that present as challenges. These include the country's legacies, relationships between civil groups, media, and state security organs, and institutional practices, all of which present as barriers to public participation in the security sector. Based on the practices in the security sector, it has been determined that the sector has a propensity for token participation.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this paper, inclusive public participation has been recognized as a key component of good Security Sector Governance, as it allows those who are affected to become stakeholders in government decision-making. Though public participation is described as fundamental, this research has demonstrated that this does not always translate into its universal application, with various limitations, whether intentional or unintentional, presented that constrain substantive public participation.

Practices in South Africa's security sector have demonstrated the lack of inclusive public participation, as evidenced by the lack of participatory processes towards the development of the country's 2013 NSS. Concerns surrounding the lack of public participation in the 2013 NSS also arise based on the strategic nature of an NSS, which sets out how a country will safeguard its national interests and achieve its desired security goals. "Given the interdependence of security and economic factors, the way in which a country structures its national decision-making can have a direct impact not only on what are traditionally thought of as security concerns, but also on the broader, but no less crucial, socio-economic development of a country,"(Bearne, et al.,2005, p. iv).

Based on the lack of inclusive public participation and the strategic nature of an NSS, this research set out to identify the challenges that exist within South Africa's security sector, that constrain inclusive public participation. The research found that, despite having participatory mechanisms such as the Constitutional framework, democratic processes through Parliament, and forms of local participation through the CPFs, the country's security sector has a greater propensity for token participation, as opposed to substantive participation.

The below represents the main challenges found through the research, which constrain inclusive public participation:

South Africa's history and the legacies of apartheid still affecting contemporary forms of security sector governance:

The country's history and legacies that come with it have been shown to still affect contemporary ways of Security Sector Governance and power disparities among groups. Institutional cultures which were adopted during the country's apartheid system of governance, which took an authoritative posture, have been found to have migrated with some of the personnel who were employed in that system, into the security sector of the democratic dispensation. South Africa's history was also embedded in racial divisions among groups, which have now transferred into class disparities. These class disparities have promulgated into both horizontal and vertical inequalities, creating social class divisions.

The outcome of the migration of institutional cultures presents a challenge in that it indicates that the reformative interventions that took place post-1994 were not sufficient to alter the hard power posture that some within the state security structures maintain towards the public. The result of this affects negatively the relations between the state security apparatus and the public. The social division that is presented in inequalities also presents a challenge in building common interests and social cohesion. Both these factors are necessary for having a common approach to national security objectives.

The categorization of civil groups and media driving trust deficit among stakeholders

Different factors affect the manner in which state security organs categorize civil society formations and the media. Among these is the possible impact external funding may have on civil formations' mandates, as well as the perceived disproportionate preservation of one group's interests over another. The negative categorization and perception of these groups by state security structures have created a barrier to public participation due to the resultant trust deficit between stakeholders. The research also found that the media plays an important role in acting as an ally and garnering support for government initiatives. In

the South African context, some respondents viewed the media in the country as critical of government efforts, and swaying public opinion negatively.

When pursuing inclusive processes to develop an NSS, the role of civil groups and the media as a facilitator of state-society relations is critical. Civil groups may represent their various constituencies, and the media may become an ally in distributing government messaging. Based on the negative categorization of NGOs, civil society, and the media, this poses a challenge for public participation, as these organisations can be viewed as spoilers of government efforts.

Institutional Practices

The institutional practices adopted by the state security structures have also presented a challenge to public participation. Excessive classification of information, as well as intentional concealment of information to cover up wrongdoing, have limited the scope for engagement between state security structures and the public. While there is a universal standard for the classification of information when it relates to matters of national security, practices within South Africa's security sector have indicated the motive for classifying information has been misapplied to conceal wrongdoing. It is also reflected that there is no universally accepted standard to the extent to which states should classify information, with the 2013 NSS exemplifying an excessive level of classification, even on matters that should be for public knowledge. The preference for a silo approach in state security departments has also resulted in a practice of not engaging with external stakeholders and marginalising public opinion.

The reliance on a current leadership's preferred approach has also influenced how the state security structure engages, with some administrations preferring a closed-off state security structure than others. The deliberate weakening of state institutions has also been reflected as an impediment to the state's ability to carry out its duty and develop a quality NSS. These institutional practices have a fundamental effect on public participation, as they prevent state security structures from carrying out the participatory processes necessary to create an inclusive NSS.

Parallel to the notion that inclusive public participation is a fundamental tool for good Security Sector Governance, is the response to the sub-question: What role should the public play in the development of the NSS? It has been found that involving the South African public in the development of the NSS will promote national ownership and legitimacy of the process employed. The role played by the public also allows those who are affected by the outcome of the NSS, to become stakeholders and contributors in the identification of the country's insecurities, which the NSS aims to address. Post the development phase of the NSS, the public is viewed as essential for the execution of the NSS, with the backing of the public essential for it to be carried out effectively.

In reaching the results of this research, a qualitative case study and purposive sampling approach were employed. This enabled the selection of experts in the security sector who were able to reflect on their experiences with public participatory processes in South Africa's security sector. The approach of categorizing the experts into two groups, between those working in the state security structures, and those who were classified as public participants, allowed for data differentiation and comparison. It was expected that through this approach differing views would emerge based on each grouping, but it was discovered that there were also commonalities in many areas. Both groups held the view that public participation was fundamental in developing an NSS, and each also indicated the need to not classify aspects of the NSS.

Textual data was also used to enable triangulation, which aided in validating the data gathered through semi-structured interviews. Purposive sampling was used to identify the security sector experts and the textual data. The approach adopted can also be applied in different contexts, which can provide context-specific challenges based on those unique contexts.

As reflected in Chapter 1 of the research, the High-Level Review Panel on the SSA has recommended for the country to urgently develop an NSS that is "widely consulted with the public," (South African Government, 2018, p.3). Following the recommendation, President Ramaphosa in his 2022 State of the Nation Address (SONA) called "on all South Africans through their various formations to participate in developing" the country's NSS (South African Government, 2022).

Recommendations

Based on this, the following recommendations are made for the country's security sector in order to promote public participation in the development of the NSS. These recommendations are based on the results from the data gathered and the findings of the research.

Those responsible for developing the NSS process should identify various interest groups before the project begins, to ensure inclusive participation. This will allow a reflection of the different stakeholders, and avoid a reliance on a select few participants, such as expert groups. Such an approach will also allow affected parties more distribution of power that adds legitimacy and credibility to the process. The role of the public should also be defined, with the outcome of the NSS reflecting the perspectives of those affected.

The media should be a good partner in broadcasting the NSS process by clearly and openly communicating its purpose and how the public can meaningfully contribute to its development. In order to foster more stakeholder engagement and a less siloed approach, the security sector should create avenues for more stakeholder engagement on security issues.

Concerning the NSS's secret classification, a correlation was found between the views of security experts, document analysis, and literature, indicating a preference for a limited, to non-classification of the document if it is to fulfil its function of expressing the nation's security objectives, (UN, 2012 and The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021). A limited classification will allow aspects of the document that may put the state at risk to be classified, while still keeping the NSS accessible to the public.

The South African Parliament should be brought in as among the contributors to the participatory process of the NSS, using the constituent outreach of Members of Parliament. Both literature and data have shown the importance of parliamentary representation in carrying out the NSS.

While there is no universal standard directing how countries should develop their NSS, having a specific framework that each administration adheres to, such as the one identified

in the United States, will create a standardised approach, reducing reliance on how each administration chooses to have the NSS process unfold.

South Africa has undergone extensive Security Sector Reform; however, from the research there is an indication that more substantive transformative interventions are required to enable the state security apparatus to better engage with the public.

From the findings of this research, there are two gaps that require more in-depth analysis and further studies that constrain public participation in South Africa's security sector. The first gap is in South Africa's social makeup, which is characterised by class divisions. This makes building social cohesion and common security objectives a challenge as there is a wide disparity in how different social classes perceive security. More in-depth analysis can be done in understanding how the country's social makeup affects an inclusive society, and the manner in which people experience security. While this research was able to identify the broad challenges that strain relations between civil society formations and state security organs, more research should be conducted to delve deeper into each of the identified issues

The purpose of the research was to explore public participation as a challenge in South Africa's security sector in developing an inclusive National Security Strategy. The question that the research sought to answer was: "What challenges exist in South Africa's security sector that constrains inclusive public participation in the development of a National Security Strategy?" The answer to this research question is that the country's history and the legacies of apartheid, as well as identified institutional practices and trust deficit among stakeholders, pose a challenge and limit public participation in the security sector.

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APPENDICES

The below appendices include 'research instruments' and the 'themes and codes'. Appendix 1 contains a list of the questions that formed the basis of the semi-structured interviews conducted with the seven security experts chosen through a purposive sampling approach. Appendix 2: Themes and Codes contains the derived codes and themes that were drawn during the Thematic Analysis process.

8.1 APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

The following Research Instruments were used for the semi-structured interview with the security experts. The Research Instruments were constructed based on the literature and what the study aimed to achieve. There was no chronology used when conducting the interview, with the responses provided by the security experts directing the flow of the interview, thus why a semi-structured interview approach was utilised and best suited for the study. However, in each interview, it was ensured that each expert responded to the research instruments. As a result, the research instrument served as a guide and checkbox for each interview.

- Can members of the public contribute to the development national security strategies, and if so, how?
- What would be the disadvantages/drawbacks of not involving the public in such a process?
- Given South Africa's current social structures, does the country have the necessary tools/or capability to develop an inclusive process, towards developing the National Security strategy?
- Describe the relationship that exists between public organisations/representatives (i.e. NGOs and think tanks, civil society groups etc.), and security services/departments (i.e. the State Security Agency, the South African Police Service, and the South African National Defense Force etc.).
- From you view, what do you believe may have impeded inclusion in the development of the 2013 NSS?

- What obstacles may be presented in allowing broader public participation in such a process in South Africa's current environment?
- How can the security sector maintain information security while adhering to participation ideals in national security matters?
- What tools or measures are required to improve inclusivity in the development of national security strategies?
- To what extent does South Africa possess these tools?

8.2 APPENDIX 2: THEMES AND CODES

The below table reflects the themes adopted through Thematic Analysis, following the semi-structured interviews and document analysis.

Themes	Codes
Public involvement is crucial in National Security matters	• Public participation, is a constitutional imperative in South Africa • Public central to defining what is national security in the South African context • Enables national ownership/legitimacy • Key success factor in standard national security theory is the national will, • when there is national will, people are willing to sacrifice for the safeguarding and maintenance of the state security • national will is important when you do a National Security Strategy. • When you involve people in it, and they become committed, to the key concepts, and tenants, and values of the National Security Strategy, you actually building your security. • The center of gravity, for a Comprehensive Security is the people (their will and cognition). • the cognitive (including emotion) and commitment of the people is not only critically important, but also a key domain and site of struggle (Cognitive Warfare/Influence) • The NSS must therefore be owned by the people if it is to fulfil its function properly – like the making of the Polity (the democratic Constitution) - it must involve them • A new paradigm - The people, state and society therefore live under the threat and vulnerability of being instrumentalised and weaponized against its own Government, State or interests • The people are not only critical because of Historical Context,

	Constitution, but also because of new types of Threats and Vulnerabilities • The NSS is a national endeavour - it ideally should be brought to a national consensus • People central to defining what is national security • technicians, or administrators, or government officials miss out on a lot of dynamics • to enjoy support, you need to talk to the affected parties • the affected people must also be involved • at the broadest level, you may have the resources to anticipate the threat picture issues, but I do think you need to colour in the gaps, by the sense that you can only get from people who have lived the reality
The need for a South African led concept for national security	• People central to defining what is national security from their own perspective ('freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want') • A need for conceptualisation of the national security threats, vulnerabilities and opportunities of the country – should not be externally led • External conceptualizations influencing our epistemological thinking on national security i.e. SSR/Human security • Some of the concepts contrary to the governing party's ideologies (liberal vs socialist democracy) – causing incoherence • Lack of common understanding/appreciation on what constitute national security and national interests – different needs among social classes/races • different schools of thought as a country • Public central to defining what is national security in the South African context

	• people will rise up in popular anger • Go to people, in the market place, in the street, in the village, in the township, the church gathering, the soccer field, and ask them, 'what will make you secure'. • A need for a true reflection of what people want – not from the UN, Europe, America and so.
South Africa's history: acting as a limitation (social divisions)/ lack of social cohesion as an inhibitor	• different schools of thought • In the South African context, the legacies of slavery, colonialism and apartheid still heavily affect and impact Society • Affects and impacting on social relations and structural conditions of the current day • Lack of common national identity/Lack of common/shared values/Lack of overarching nations interests – thus no common national interests • Social divisions remain (language/religion/race/class/tribalism) • Social and economic inequality a key social divider • different schools of thought as a country – driven along racial lines • weakness in South Africa's democracy – failed to bridge the gap on divisions • judicial inequality • inequality constrains consultation and reform • private business still dominated along racial lines • there is a requirement to the undoing of the legacies of slavery, colonialism and apartheid as a national, consensus project as demanded by the democratic Constitution – thus a need to have a national strategy, before an NSS, - The Country therefore has a problem of National Strategy (it is absent but must guide the NSS and the people)

	• The national security culture in South Africa has regressed back to the militarism of the apartheid-colonial era in part because a large number of senior bureaucrats - particularly in SAPS and the HAWKS - are all old remnants of the apartheid-bantustan security establishments. • we have a state apparatus, that was absorbed into the new system - the people who were the oppressors, have to be taken into consideration • apartheid era organizational culture
Social structures affecting common vision	• racial past causing racial division • class structure caused inequality • black capitalist • Political economic misalignment is one of our biggest threats. The longer this misalignment continues, the more the risk that economic mess will undo the advantages of the polity. • The old guard in the new system, have not completely let go of their beliefs, • Large number of self-interest in South African society, constraining contribution • we do have democracy, but there are such tensions and polarization, including around security

The country lacking a common national strategy to guide the national security strategy/Weak institutions	• The Country lacks a National Strategy • A National Strategy is needed to build national consensus project • The security sector failing, become dysfunctional, and enjoys no public support • security sector on brink of dysfunctionality • And many democracies, and advanced economies, the Global North, they struggle themselves, to achieve this balance (transparency, vs the secrecy) • a need to reset security • There are unraveling in very alarming ways. • Weakened institution, exemplified through the various Panels/Commissions (Zondo Commission) • Forums such as the July Unrest, Mufumadi Panel, Human Right Commission - critical of the state of the security institutions to respond. • justice and security institutions are weakened • when you have huge moments like July 2021, you left with the feeling that the Strategy was completely inadequate
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Limitation to real representation	• Foreign funded representatives • Self-interests • Corporatization of NGOs • A deliberate minimalistic approach on the NSS from private sector • Pushback from private sector who are beneficial of the current status of events – driving a lack of transformation/reform • Contestation between public vs private stakeholders • private business still dominated along racial lines • some of the stakeholders stemming from the old apartheid regime • Foreign funding/external influence driving NGOs, which ultimately drives the role/mandate of NGOs • Professionalization of non-state actors – who have become corporate driven • Private sector, looking at their own interests, as opposed to the country's overall interests – confined contribution to the consultative process • NGO funder driving their own interests in South Africa. • Private sector/non-state actors not acumen to honoring confidentiality – may serve opponents/ competitors • Pushback from private sector who are beneficial of the current status of events – driving a lack of transformation/reform • Inhibiting government transformative efforts • Demonstrating an anti-classification of information. • A change of alliances post-1994, which now is more postured at anti- the ANC government • View some decisions by government as repressive • a new paradigm - The people, state and society therefore live under the threat and vulnerability of being
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	instrumentalised and weaponized against its own Government, State or interests • • Probably as Zuma and his guys came in, and said we don't need clever blacks, and we don't need these cumbersome intellectuals and academics, who pretend to know better • some of the stakeholders stemming from the old apartheid regime • our civil society, echo system, is populated, mostly, by foreign funded institutions, critical of government, who sees their function, of what civil society means, as being in opposition to government • NGOs driving political ends • Many of the NGOs and civil society groupings, were sponsored or funded by well-meaning outsiders meaning Europeans, Scandinavians, Nordics, Germans, as part of the opposition to apartheid, and as part of building up the ANC.
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The role of media	• Driving a narrative • Highly critical • Negative characterization of government as obsessed with power/dictatorial • not acumen to honoring confidentiality – may serve opponents/ competitors • may be influenced by external role players, with their own agenda, • People can be influenced at a higher rate now due to the different forms of information • Influencing how people think • Driving public opinion • People can be influenced at a higher rate due to Intelligencization
Government central to the process	• part of the Governance responsibility of Government (which sets its strategic direction) • some administrations do not view inclusion as their responsibility • should be led by constitutional requirements • must be substantive over tokenism • open to consulting - lack of trust hindering engagement with private sector/non-state actors • Government not receiving the value of private sector • Silo approach from national security departments – limiting engagement between them and the public among the departments themselves. • Projects where public and private work very well. Have managed to build relations with some industries more than others – driven by common security concerns, telecom, banking etc. • See trust as critical to forming relations for engagement among stakeholders. • Some government decisions seen by civil groups as repressive.

	• Government decisions will not always be popular • Private sector sometimes wanting to dictate write up of policies/strategies/ as opposed to imputing – minimalist approach
Education	• lack of basic education of social values
Legislative outlook that promote participatory processes	• participation, is a constitutional imperative • section 198 should be the cornerstone of national security • NSS is one of the requirements of the South African Constitution
Parliament plays a critical	• represents the people of South Africa • through parliament this enables public participation • MPs representing constituencies across the country • we want to see for example Parliament, playing a more proactive role, in debating issues of security • NCOP representation of provinces • Whether you like MPs or not, they ask the very pertinent questions • The people choose. And that's where the representative at Parliament comes from • NCOP is a waste, Portfolio Committee system works, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group allows people to listen. • parties represent interests through their constituencies, the voting pattern • SCOPA, can look at aspects of finances, and budgeting and spending • Parliament is kept in a box – they can only go so far • Parliament has not been overly proactive in leading debate around security...they have tended to be executive driven • we have proactive Parliamentary Committees

Secret classification of information	• classification/categorization presents limitations to public consultation (what can and cannot be said) • Classification important for safeguarding national security • Private sector/non-state actors not acumen to honoring confidentiality – may serve opponents/ competitors • Parts of it need to be classified – not all of it. • But classification should not hinder inclusive participation/national ownership • A need to strike a balance • A lack of engagement in the country – on a regular basis • When you deal with the complexity of governance, and of management, you always have to optimize between competing interests and values. – a paradox • this will be an ongoing dynamic – will never be at a point of resolution • You have find a balance • It belongs to faceless insiders • We say top secret. Cause don't really want people to read it, because it's not good enough • Reference to previous lack of engagements - if we repeat those mistakes, the product, will not be credible. • We have come to see there was very deliberate reasons that some of the secrecy was to hide wrongdoing. • what ought to be a vehicle that acted in the public's interests, the national interests, was serving narrow party values • resources were being abused, and people were being victimized • Reasons that were unearthed and that is, the instruments of state were captured, and misdirected for particular ends. Was part of the reasons why we
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	had such secrecy around these processes
Requirements for effective consultative process	• “In countries where there is common understanding or common national interests, on national security interests, - public consultation process becomes very effective.” • National interests driven by a common goal • Appreciation of similar national security issues • common vision between public and private stakeholders for their country • Do a stakeholder analysis and you get who are the interested and affected parties.
Principles to supersede the content of the NSS/lack of commonality	• More emphasize has been placed on categorization/classification than content/agenda of the NSS • Focus should be on the principles • A deliberate minimalistic approach on the NSS from private sector – emphasize of the write-up • Lack of common vision inhibiting inclusive process • Private sector sometimes wanting to dictate write up of policies/strategies/ as opposed to inputting • Opposition among stakeholders over minor details
South Africa in Comparison to other nations	• In other countries, there are noted common goals between public and private stakeholder, and a common vision for their country • examples: US, Europe, maybe Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Rwanda, Ghana, Mauritius • In South Africa divisions dominated along racial lines (public sector dominated by African, private sector dominated by white) • Even most democratic states have secrecy or make unpopular decisions • America has pride in democracy, yet has many enemies.

	• Many 'democratic societies' very draconian • No country is doing it perfectly • There isn't a great culture of openness on the continent about these matters.
Marginalization of peoples views/a sili approach	• Silo effect • Lack of engagement between state security departments and communities • No efforts for engaging the people – particularly on a regular basis • Assumption of state security departments knowing it all • tendency to tell people things, or not take their views into consideration • "Politics is politics of parties, not of politics of the people." • the state of affairs of the government and of the state, involving society at large, in a dynamic way, in formulating and discussing security issues, is almost non existent. • Reliance on think tanks and NGOs • it can't be that a room full of bureaucrats know everything • they don't like what those outside have to say • there is an orientation that says we are in charge of security, and you know nothing about it
Leadership as a driver	• Lack of good leadership May inhibit processes • part of the Governance responsibility of Government (which sets its strategic direction) • Government has lacked in providing strategic direction – limiting the country's national strategy \Presence of an old guard mentality • Apartheid security personnel still imbedded in the current state security democratic structures – driving institutional cultures negatively. • Militarized form of security governance, inherited from apartheid era

	• Culture of the past repressive regimes, can easily slide and revert to conceptually • framing “the people as the enemy that needs to be disciplined or repressed” as the old colonial-apartheid saw and did to the masses (the majority). • . Good people moved on. Under Zuma there was an exit of, smart people, in my view. And so how do you rebuild failed policy framework strategy, with a reduced intellectual capacity. • political heads of the security sector – non inspiring. • A lot of securocrats have aged, past their prime, waiting for pension
Securitisation of the state	• The ANC lost a bit that democratic vigor • disabled the civil society, NGO, your academic space. • there are Men in Black, bureaucrats, seemingly not accountable to the people