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Mr. Osward, Mulenga; Mr Stephen, Porter

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STUDY ON THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF EVALUATION IN ZAMBIA

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Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA)

Graduate School of Public and Development Management,

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Drafting team: Mr. Osward Mulenga (Country Consultant), Stephen Porter (CLEAR-AA/Wits)

Management Team: Stephen Porter, Osvaldo Feinstein, Salim Latib, Anne McLennan, David Rider Smith
Reference Group: Michael Bamberger, Derek Poate, Zenda Ofir, Robert Picciotto, Nidhi Khattri, Howard White, Jessica Kitakule-Mukungu, Ian Goldman

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Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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STUDY ON THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF EVALUATION IN ZAMBIA[1]

[1] For further information on this study please contact CLEAR.AnglophoneAfrica@wits.ac.za. The content of this study is the responsibility of the team alone, and should not be ascribed to the University of the Witwatersrand, DFID, or any other organisation or individuals.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report seeks to present in relation to evaluation in Zambia: (i) the conditions under which demand is generated for evidence; and (ii) the areas in which supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand. This report shows that there is currently active, latent and potential evaluation demand and supply in Zambia. It is argued that in Zambia each entry-point for evaluation is partial and is mediated by aligned interest groups rather than a neutral role-player seeking to expand evidence-based practice. This demand is set within a context where there is a high degree of political competition between political parties and various interest groups. In the political economy, loyalties to informal networks of power are in many cases more important than performance.

The latent and potential demands are nested within the Executive, while there is active demand for evaluation in the Ministry of Finance. This demand is conditioned by the political economy where both formal and informal agendas determine how policy is implemented. Supply could be strengthened through the various think tanks, the newly merged Evaluation Association, and through work with the well-resourced Centre of Excellence at the University of Zambia.

Evaluation supply is limited in the country. International consultants, rather than local ones, often lead evidence gathering or evaluation exercises. The expertise to undertake evaluations in Zambia has some islands of well-connected evaluation practice that works both in the formal and informal political domains. The university sector has some research capacity, especially in the social science sector, but indications are that there are structural challenges in the sector with qualified staff leaving for better paid positions elsewhere.

There are entry points in policy processes for improving evaluation capacities in Zambia with ongoing policy initiatives of the government as well as the Sixth National Development Plan. Functional sector working groups are lacking but are needed to feed into the governance of evaluations.

The approach for evaluation capacity development suggested in this study is to work across multiple entry points simultaneously to improve evaluation practice. This has the advantage of being able to interact with different points in the political economy, while also only resourcing different stakeholders to the degree that resources can be absorbed. This means that some institutions, such as Parliament, may require sensitisation activities and modest technical support rather than large-scale interventions. Meanwhile, entry-points, such as the Ministry of Finance, can be worked with to respond to new demands in a systematic manner that already builds on their successes.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
AfrEA	Africa Evaluation Association
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ART	Anti-Retro-viral Therapy
ARV	Anti-Retro-Viral drug
CCJDP	Catholic Commission for Justice and development and Peace
CLEAR-AA	Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
DFID	Department for International Development
ECD	Evaluation Capacity Development
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FISP	Farmer Input Support Programme
FNDP	Fifth National Development Plan
FRA	Food Reserves Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoZ	Government of Zambia
GW-MES	Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immune Virus
HMIS	Health Management Information System
IAPRI	Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute
IIAG	Index of African Governance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INESOR	Institute for National Economic and Social Research
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for International Development
LCMS	Living Conditions Measurement Survey
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MESSY	Zambia Evaluation Association and Monitoring Evaluation Support System
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MOE	Ministry Of Education
MOFNDP	Ministry of Finance and National Development
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NDCC	National Development Coordinating Committee
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Coordinating Council
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
P&DM	The Graduate School of Public and Development Management
PAC	Policy Analysis and Coordination
PEMFA	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability
PMRC	Policy Monitoring and Research Centre
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS	Permanent Secretary
RDP	Research and Development Programme
SAG	Sector Advisory Group
SNDP	Sixth National Development Plan
SWAps	Sector Wide Approaches
TI-Z	Transparency International Zambia
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United National Development and Analysis Framework
UNDP	United National Development Programme

UNFPA	United Nations for Population Analysis
UNICEF	United Nations Children s Educational Fund
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
UPND	United Party for National Development
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank
ZDHS	Zambia Demographic and Health Surveys
ZEA	Zambia Evaluation Association
ZIPAR	Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmers Union

1. INTRODUCTION

1. This report presents a mapping of the parties involved in evaluation practice in Zambia, namely the principals (demand), government agents (commissioners) and evaluation agents (supply). In Africa there is now evidence of emerging country-led demands for evaluation (Porter and Goldman 2013), which is consistent with the general emphasis of the Paris Declaration on the use of country-owned systems. It is hoped that national stakeholders and those supporting them will use this report to better structure their assistance to evaluation capacity development (ECD). Consequently, the main audience of this study is intended to be those interested in ECD in Zambia. The Regional Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA)[2] conducted this study for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as one of a set of cases covering five countries[3]. Fieldwork for this study took place between 17 and 21 June 2013.

2. A secondary audience of this study is people who are in general interested in the development of evaluation systems. The analysis in this report presents a range of opportunities for capacity development in relation to government agents (central and line departments), the evaluation agents (consultants, think tanks and universities), and principals (development partners, Parliament, the Executive and civil society). In undertaking the mapping of the evaluation context in Zambia, the study identifies latent, potential and actual demand, the conditions under which demand is generated and potential sources of supply, with an explicit sensitivity to the political economy of the country.

3. This study refers to evaluation as covering both evaluation and evaluative research and therefore uses the terms interchangeably. The primary objectives of the study are to explore:

    1) The conditions under which demand is generated for evaluation evidence; and
    2) The areas in which evaluation supply can be strengthened to meet and foster this demand.

    The guiding questions that interface with these objectives are:

    (i) On the demand side:
        a) What has been the actual demand for evaluation from principals?
        b) Where is there latent and potential demand for evaluation?
        c) How is evaluation demanded in the current organisational arrangements?

    (ii) On the supply side:
        a) What is the range and capacity of entities supplying evaluation services?
        b) How relevant are the managers and producers of evaluation to the actual demand for evaluation?

    (i) On matching evaluation supply and demand:

[2] CLEAR-AA is based at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. CLEAR-AA aims to enhance development anchored in learning, evaluation and results.

[3] Beyond Rwanda, the other case countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Zambia.

c) Where can evaluation supply (actual, latent and potential) be strengthened so that it meets and fosters demand?

4. This report finds that in Zambia there are multiple entry points to improving evaluation demand and supply. However, the entry-points are partial and mainly represent aligned interest groups rather than neutral role-players seeking to expand evidence-based practice. There is active demand for evaluation within some government ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, and some potential demand to explore within the Cabinet Office. Outside of government there are well-connected organisations who seek to use evaluative information to engage in advocacy with government. This demand is set within a context where there is a high degree of political competition both between political parties and various interest groups. In the political economy, loyalties to informal networks of power in many cases are more important than performance.
5. The supply of evaluation expertise in Zambia is diverse in its quality. In response to the historical demand from development partners and locally commissioned activities (using development partner funding) a range of consultancy companies and individuals have arisen with particular areas of strength. In the health sector, for example, a lot of resources have been put into the generation of evidence, particularly in regards to HIV/AIDS and malaria. The university sector has some research capacity, especially in the social science sector, but indications are that there are structural challenges in the sector with qualified staff leaving for better paid positions elsewhere, as President Michael Sata (2013) observed at the opening of Parliament "our universities and colleges do not only have dilapidated infrastructure but are also faced with shortage of staff and apt teaching and learning materials."
6. When conducting evaluations in Zambia there needs to be an awareness that the official objectives contained in development plans are only partial articulation of the informal objectives of interest groups. In some cases personal interests are pursued through the state. Within these constraints there are examples of evaluation being successful at informing strategy and policy and contributing towards development results. This means that when supply is being strengthened the emphasis is not only technical, but also on identifying entry points in the state where development agendas are being pursued for the benefit of the population.

1.1 Methodology

7. This study was carried out through a combination of desk review, including an analysis of existing evaluation products, and direct semi-structured interviews with a selection of informants from across critical stakeholder groupings. The rest of this section presents the methodology of the study, and provides an overview of the stakeholder groups that were engaged with in the study. The study methodology encompassed the following overlapping stages:

    1. Establishing study commitment and support from key stakeholders;
    2. Collating and analysing primary and secondary data and information of the evaluation system (including available academic and popular literature);
    3. Conducting a series of interviews with actors; and
    4. Producing a draft paper.

Each of these stages is discussed in more detail below.

8. ***Establishing support from key stakeholders:*** Given the nature of the study, an important initial step was to identify relevant national stakeholders who would be engaged prior to, during and after the collection of data. Whilst the study was conducted independently, it is helpful that there is some level of active buy-in from key stakeholders to support the use of the study. In Zambia, letters were sent to the Government via the Evaluation Association to ask for interviews, while the country researcher made contact with a range of stakeholders.
9. ***Collating and analysing secondary data and information:*** The collation and analysis of secondary data covered policy, academic and grey literature relating to the political context and the demand and supply sides of evaluation. Included in this was data on the size and scope of evaluation initiatives within government and the supply that emanates from outside of government. Following the country research phase, further primary and secondary documentation was referred to in order to substantiate the claims of the interviews and further develop findings.
10. ***Interviews with key informants:*** A series of interviews were arranged with key in-country stakeholders (see Table 1 for details). The design of these interviews drew upon the literature reviewed and responded to themes that emerged in the country mapping process. In particular issues around the political economy, potential and latent demand and the ability of supply to invoke demand were explored through the interview process. Data collection took place in a semi-structured fashion that allowed people to narrate their story – with some probing taking place based upon the guiding supply and demand questions. The data from interviews was analysed during the fieldwork with emerging conclusions refined.
11. ***Production of a draft and final country report:*** Following the completion of first draft of this study, it was reviewed by the reference group. In addition this case was reviewed by the DFID country office and then also by the Government of Zambia. During these processes adjustments were made to the report to aid the clarity and accuracy of the core findings.

Table 1: Mapping of stakeholders in evaluation supply and demand

Government Agents	Evaluation Agents	Principals
Ministry of Health	Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR); Policy Monitoring and Research Centre	Parliamentary research section
Central Statistical Office	The University of Zambia – INESOR & Population Studies Department Centre of Excellency for M&E	Civil Society Organisations – JCTR, NGOCC, CSPR
Ministry of Local Government and Housing	Private Institutions and individual Consultants engaged in M&E	Development Partners - GIZ; UNDP; AfDB; EU Delegation; Irish AIDA; Norwegian Embassy
Ministry of Finance	Evaluation Associations – ZEA and MESSY Group	The cabinet office

12. The findings of the country of case of Zambia are presented in the following manner: first, the development context is described in relation to evaluation; second, the state of the current evaluation demand and supply is mapped; third, illustrations of how the development context interacts with evaluation supply and demand are detailed; and finally, pathways to improve the national evaluation context are suggested in alignment with the objectives of the study.

2. DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

13. Zambia gained its independence on 24 October 1964, with Kenneth Kaunda as the first president. Although Zambia has not had a major civil war, its geographical positioning placed it at the heart of liberation struggles on the continent. This difficult position, along with internal politics, has meant that its development path has witnessed large scale declines since the 1970s before revivals in the 2000s. Zambia is regarded as one of the richest African countries in mineral wealth, but its development path has been stunted, with the country being unable to grow GDP per head and lengthen life expectancy until recently. On average people in Zambia today are poorer than they were in 1965 and live shorter lives than they did in 1971. The UNDP noted (2001: 1) that Zambia "is the only country in the world for which data on the human development index is available with lower human development indicators in 1997 than in 1975"

14. After independence, Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) declared a one -party state in 1972. During the late 1970s, the price of copper, which is Zambia's primary export, weakened worldwide resulting in a major contraction of the Zambian economy. In the late 1980s the one party state of UNIP became increasingly unpopular. In June 1990 riots against Kaunda accelerated. Many protesters were killed by the regime. In 1990 Kaunda survived an attempted coup, and in 1991 he agreed to re-instate multiparty democracy and following multiparty elections Kaunda was removed from office.

15. The elections were won by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD, which was born out of a mix of trade unions and civil society organisations) and Frederick Chiluba became president. In order to try managing its debt burden, in 1991 Zambia undertook a range of economic liberalisation policies, such as privatisation, trade liberalisation, subsidy cuts and public sector wage freezes. The Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts (NORAD 2011: xv), points out that although there is

> *…no empirical evidence on the causes and drivers of corruption in Zambia. Studies nonetheless agree that liberalisation in the 1990s introduced a 'new culture of corruption' in the country. A presidential slush fund, infamously used to obtain political buy-in during Frederick Chiluba's regime, and privatisation, supported by World Bank-led structural adjustment programmes, have allegedly triggered high-level corruption.*

16. Frederick Chiluba was replaced by Levy Mwanawasa (also MMD) after failing to win support for a third term. Levy Mwanawasa undertook efforts to curb corruption. Mwanawasa's death in 2009 led to Rupiah Banda becoming the President until 2011. Both Chiluba and Banda were indicted for corruption following their terms in office. Chiluba's indictment was withdrawn prior to his death in 2011 although a court in London found him guilty of stealing more than USD 40 million. In 2011 there was a

change of ruling party from the MMD to the Patriotic Front, led by a former UNIP and MMD politician, Michael Sata.

17. Zambia's economic record since the oil price shocks of the 1970s was woeful until around 2005. Real GDP per capita fell from US$1455 in 1976 to US$1037 by 1987, an average of -3.6 per cent per year. This decline stabilised from 1987 to 1991, before the economy entered a massive recession again in 1992, the year an extensive programme of structural adjustment began. By the mid-1990s Zambia had one of the highest per capita foreign debts. After the external economic shocks suffered in the early 1970s, Zambia's total external debt rose from US$814 million to US$3,244 million by the end of the decade. The situation then further deteriorated with Zambia's external debt more than doubling to US$6,916 million by the end of the 1980s. By 2000, real GDP per capita had fallen to US$892 (Focus 2004).

18. From 2002 onwards, however, the country has been enjoying consistent economic growth. Table 2 below is taken from the World Bank and illustrates the change in the various economic indicators and life expectancy over 2002 and 2011. Meanwhile

19. Table 3 shows that aid has consistently become less important to the Zambian economy.

Table 2: Summary of Zambia's Economic Indicators, World Bank (Bank 2013)

Indicator	2002	2003	2010	2011
GNI per capita PPP (current international $)	950	1000	1390	1510
Population total (in millions)	10.6	10.9	13.2	13.6
GDP (current US$) (in millions)	3711.3	4341.8	16190.2	19204
GDP growth (annual %)	3.3	5.1	7.6	6.8
Life expectancy at birth total (years)	43	45	55	56

Table 3: Aid Trends in Zambia

Indicator	2008	2009	2010	2011
ODA (Millions US$)	1116	1267	914	1046
Aid (as % of GNI)	8.4	10.2	6.2	5.8
Aid per Capita (US$)	90	99	69	77

20. Since 2006, Zambia achieved single-digit inflation along with GDP growth of roughly 6% per year. In 2010 the World Bank (WB) named Zambia one of the world's fastest economically reformed countries. However, the evidence is this economic growth has not cascaded down to the rural areas. Equitable distribution of the national wealth still remains a challenge. In Zambia, the World Bank's poverty headcount (measured by the percentage of people living under $2 per day) is one of the highest in the world at 86.6% in 2010. This has risen since 2006 when it was 82.6% (Bank 2013). This reinforces key statistics in relation to Zambia's development which generally show a similar picture of inequitable distribution of development. The United Nations Development Programme (2013: 10) reports that, "Zambia's Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality, has worsened, from 0.60 in 2006 to 0.65 in 2010." The UNDP Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report stresses that economic activity is largely centralised in urban areas, leaving rural areas underdeveloped and unable to access economic ventures because of unequal opportunities. Zambia has a life expectancy of 56 years (Bank 2013), which is comparable to relatively poorer countries like Rwanda and Uganda. Recent

improvements in life expectancy appear to be related to advances in response to the generalised HIV epidemic.

21. Zambia's 2013 UNDP Report shows that the country has made progress towards reaching its targets for some of the MDGs. The report identifies

> *the country's remarkable progress over the past decades in achieving certain targets", but emphasises "the need to sustain these gains, while greater policy focus and investments are required to improve progress on other targets. (UNDP 2013: 56)*

22. Zambia needs to pay particular attention to finding ways in improving MDGs related to secondary education, reducing child and maternal mortality, ensuring environmental sustainability, and reducing hunger (UNDP 2013: 53). Zambia's efforts to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS are on target, while efforts to reduce malaria in Zambia are off-target following a reduction in funding (UNDP 2013: 39-40). So while there have been increases to access to health and education, Zambians have yet to benefit from more efficient and effective service delivery systems. The reasons cited for this are that: there are human resource constraints and that all sectors are characterised by weak accountability for results at the local level; the complementary role of non-state actors in service delivery has not been fully harnessed; and there is heavy dependence on aid for education and health services (UNDP, 2011).

23. The judicial system in Zambia lacks the capacity to deal effectively with the proliferation of litigation and cases, which tend to drag on for years before they are finalised. This source also notes that this situation has deterred foreign investment due to fear on the part of investors that the judicial system is so badly run down that it cannot offer adequate legal protection for investments.

24. Zambia is ranked at 12th out of 52 countries on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The largest improvement in the index in Zambia has been in the health sector, which has shown an improvement of +11.6% over a 6-year period (www.moibrahimfoundation.org). According to the IIAG, Zambia has witnessed a decline in rule of law since 2006, while accountability as remained pretty much stable with a slight increase of 0.5%.

2.1 Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring and Evaluation framework

25. There appears to be broad consensus on three strategic challenges facing Zambia between government, civil society and development partners. First, that economic growth at a rate over 6% needs to be maintained over a 25-year period in order for Zambia to become a prosperous middle-income country (GoZ 2005). Second, the Zambian economy remains too dependent upon copper exports that make up around 60% of the country's total exports (Economics 2013). Finally, it is recognised that the decade of economic growth has not benefited the masses or translated into improved human development (Front 2011; UNDP 2013; USAID 2011).

26. In responding to these challenges, the current strategic response focuses very much on the provision of infrastructure, although official documents point to a range of other priorities. Currently slightly different drivers of policy can be identified in three main documents, namely: The Sixth National Development Plan (incorporating Vision 2030),

the Patriotic Front's manifesto, and the national budget. An analysis of all of these documents shows that although there are overlaps they do not completely align.

27. The Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) is the current official development planning framework dated as effective from January 2011, having been released before the elections in September 2011, and the subsequent change in government. National planning, which was undertaken during the single party state, but not during the 1990s, came back into existence initially in the form of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and then the Fifth National Development Plan for the period 2006 - 2010. The final evaluations of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) are currently being completed.

28. The strategic focuses of the SNDP are infrastructure, rural development, and human development. Within these focuses the priority sectors are agriculture, livestock and fisheries, mining, tourism, manufacturing, and trade and commerce. The SNDP is cited as the basis for development partners' assistance. For example, the Joint Assistance Strategy, signed by fifteen bilateral and multilateral agencies, supports the SNDP. The largest allocation of the itemised support goes to infrastructure development (the largest package of overall assistance is project grants, followed by general budget support) (Partners 2013).

29. However, the challenge with treating the SNDP as an operational policy is twofold. First, implementation mechanisms for national plans have historically not been consistently put into practice. For example, the mid-term evaluation of the Fifth NDP noted that "there is a vacuum in the institutional set up because there is no planning authority to ensure that sector planners followed the FNDP" (MoF 2009: 152). Further to this point there is no evidence that the National Development Coordinating Committee (NDCC), a core body for supporting development between various actors, has actually been convened. Additionally, sector advisory groups are not consistently convened or if they are a number have been recorded as ineffective (Leiderer and Faust 2012: 167; USAID 2011: 154). Second, following the election the Patriotic Front according to interviews has emphasised that their manifesto takes precedence over the SNDP. This has led to a review period of the SNDP to align it to the Manifesto. The current Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), for example, recognises both as sources for policy, stating that the MTEF has "been guided by the... [SNDP] and the aspirations of the Government as set out in the Patriotic Front Manifesto". In the body of the MTEF the key strategies for growth are mainly aligned to the SNDP.

30. The second document that can be considered to be a source of strategic policy direction for Zambia is the Patriotic Front's manifesto. Central to the Patriotic Front's manifesto is a core programme based on the aspiration to create pro-poor growth, generate access to quality education and health care and implement decentralisation of the government's administration (Front 2011). Within some of these core programmes there are indications that the manifesto is being implemented. For example, a bill has been introduced to create a higher education authority in Zambia, a stated priority for tertiary education in the manifesto. In another example, the tax regime for mining companies has been reviewed, which has increased revenue. Further, there is momentum on decentralisation of administration power with the launch of a new policy initiative. However, the constitutional reform process, which the Patriotic Front

government had promised to complete within 90 days of coming to power in 2011, seemed to be stalled at the end of 2013.

31. The final document that could be taken to represent the strategic priorities for the country is the national budget. The theme of the 2013 budget address in October 2012 was "Delivering Inclusive Development and Social Justice". Within the budget overlaps can be noted with the Patriotic Front's Manifesto and the SNDP, for example, in the areas of infrastructure, decentralisation, agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing. Education and health feature less strongly than the Patriotic Front's manifesto implies, while the emphasis on infrastructure development is increased. The issue with taking the budget as a firm statement of intent is that the execution is very different. Issues with budget execution are further discussed below.

32. Zambia has undergone a range of public finance reforms linked to planning and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) over the past decade. Three phases of reforms have been undertaken since the year 2000. These are: (i) initial reforms according to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; (ii) Poverty Reduction Budget Support and the Fifth National Development Plan; and (iii) National planning and budgeting reforms along with implementation of the Sixth National Development Plan. In reviewing this history some important progress can be identified with some on-going issues.

33. **Phase 1 - HIPC 2002 - 2005:** Following the unsuccessful third term re-election bid of Chiluba, the new government applied for the HIPC Initiative. In the initial phases of financial reforms in the early 2000s it was recognised by the IMF (IMF 2005) that Zambia's public expenditure management system was not a functional tool for the implementation of fiscal policy. An activity-based budgeting system and MTEF were implemented in 2003 and 2004 to financially remedy this situation. Both of these systems are still in place today. In order to qualify for the HIPC Initiative, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was implemented. At the end of this first round of public finance and planning related reforms a range of issues emerged. In this first phase the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2005) reported the dominant challenge that was identified by implementing agencies was the inadequate and untimely disbursement of funds. It was also noted that at the end of the period poverty rates remained largely unaffected. Furthermore there was no monitoring and evaluation of targets. One of the chief recommendations of the IMF was that there is a need to carry out regular evaluations to assess progress on outcome and impact indicators."

34. **Phase 2 - Poverty Reduction Budget Support and Fifth National Development Plan 2005 – 2010:** This second phase of national planning and finance reform saw an increased emphasis on budget support mechanisms with implementation defined through a national development plan. Framing this process has been Vision 2030, an aspirational document with general development aims. During the period 2005 – 2010, external and domestic debt in Zambia was brought down to moderate levels, international reserves increased significantly, and inflation reduced to single digits *(*Kemp *et al.* 2011). Reform of the budget calendar was undertaken during this period to support Parliament to have oversight of a full twelve months of implementation. With support from the Ministry of Finance, "the *de facto* independence of the institution [of the Auditor General] has increased" (Kemp *et al*. 2011: 108). An assessment of public financial management noted

significant improvements in various dimensions of [Public Finance Management]…in particular an improved basis for strategic budgeting, greater comprehensiveness of fiscal information (including systematic reporting of arrears), improvements in internal auditing and improved oversight, yet, all in all, Zambia's… system continues to exhibit significant weaknesses." (Kemp et al. 2011: 113 & 15)

35. Improvements in public finance in 2008 – 2009 have been difficult to maintain since Banda's election. Getting a more complete picture on budget execution has been hampered by a declining level of transparency. These issues are discussed in Box 2. Financial releases are reported to be a continued problem, while the decentralisation plan was not implemented. Further, challenges in in the distribution of funds and coordination continued to affect the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery. It was recognised in a mid-term review of the FNDP that the statistical services were not up-to-date and that there is a lack of coordination and harmonisation of M&E systems between ministries. Importantly,

> *two Annual Progress Reports on the FNDP revealed the inability of several sectors to report against the [key performance indicators]. Six sectors could not report against any of the indicators…, while other priority sectors, notably Agriculture and Water and Sanitation consistently appear to have difficulties in reporting against some of their major KPIs.*[4]

36. **Phase 3 - New Reforms 2011 – Present:** The current reform phase is being undertaken in the context of a 2010 evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration. The evaluation report of implementation of the Paris Declaration states that "the findings highlight the need for a more balanced donor-recipient relationship in Zambia which requires fundamental changes in the underlying principles and incentives of aid." (Chigunta and Matshalaga 2010: vii). In particular it noted that there was a tendency for development partners to entrench their own positions through parallel forums in the context of the government of Zambia not being assertive about development priorities.

37. As part of a response to these issues a draft National Planning and Budgeting Policy (GoZ 2013) was being circulated for comments in 2013. This policy (GoZ 2013: 6), recognises that challenges have persisted across the two previous waves of reforms, stating that there is:

> *…weak linkage between budgeting and development planning procedures; ambiguous and variable processes used in practice for preparing MTEFs, budgets and development plans; and no legally binding institutional structures in place to undertake budgeting and development planning procedures in a manner that ensures informed participation by relevant stakeholders and effective oversight by the National Assembly.*

38. In particular the new draft policy notes that the implementation of activity based budgeting was not undertaken with a significant mind-set change to support a more results/performance orientation, while the credibility of the annual budget itself has been undermined for many years by wide in-year variations between appropriated amounts and actual expenditures incurred by ministries, provinces and other spending agencies. In their analysis a challenge with the earlier phases was that accountability


[4] http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/24448805?access_key=key-2c5ih9mr1xbvtix0a22z&allow_share=true, accessed 20/10/2013

mechanisms were not included in the reforms. The draft policy notes that the "effectiveness of SAGs has been compromised by the perception that they are often donor- driven" (GoZ 2013: 10). Reporting on budget execution, the draft policy states that "significant variances are belatedly regularised by submitting large supplementary budgets to the National Assembly at the end of the financial year, in the last week of the National Assembly session" (GoZ 2013: 11). The challenges noted in the analysis above were confirmed in civil society submissions responding to the draft policy. A recent report by Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (Cheelo and Banda 2012) that analysed the Auditor General's reports notes that financial irregularities in Zambia have increased 2.5 times from 2008 to 2010 (which also demonstrates challenges in Parliament's oversight capacities to call departments to account). These issues appear to continue to this day according to reports in the Zambian press.[5] As a result, the policy proposes a variety of technical and political fixes to better align the national planning cycle with the vagaries of a five year electoral cycle.

39. In this third phase, the SNDP is an important document for undertaking M&E within Zambia. As can be seen from Figure 1, according to the SNDP the Ministry of Finance is at the heart of the planning, budgeting and M&E system in Zambia. All information from sectors and lower tiers of government are collated in the Ministry of Finance, before being reported to the cabinet and Parliament. (i) Budget Execution Monitoring; (ii) Project spot monitoring; (iii) Analysis of administrative data or Management Information Systems; (iv) Surveys; and (v) Research and Development. Evaluation in the SNDP document appears only being undertaken mid and end-term. However, in reality the Research and Development Programme in the Ministry of Finance has been established to undertake ex-ante and ex-post evaluative exercises of sectors in relation to the SNDP. The role of the Research and Development Programme is discussed further in the mapping section.

[5] http://lusakavoice.com/2013/06/18/auditor-generals-reports-reveals-weaknesses-in-parastatals/; http://www.times.co.zm/?p=18831

Figure 1: Monitoring and Evaluation Institutional Arrangements



Source: Sixth National Development Plan

40. Separate to the SNDP, the proposed policy framework (GoZ, 2013) suggests further evaluation mechanisms. For example, it suggests that major capital projects and recurrent programmes will undergo appraisals and/or evaluations (2013: 15). These may well compliment the existing annual review processes of the National Development Plan. Indeed, currently the Ministry of Finance has produced Annual progress review reports is finalising a range of evaluations. This process will be discussed further in reference to government agents.

41. Three challenges to implementing the M&E plans of the SNDP have been noted. Firstly, there is still no National Development Coordinating Committee to review information and guide implementation. Secondly, the capacity for M&E at all levels is quite low especially at provincial and district level. For example, data quality challenges in reporting and setting targets have all been cited as current issues with the system in interviews. Thirdly, while funding might be in place, it is rarely actually expended on M&E.

42. In summary, there have been advances in planning, budgeting and M&E in past decade. Most notable is the currently stable macroeconomic environment and improved financial management processes. However, there is also a continuity of challenges over the past decade. Chief among these is that poverty has not decreased. Meanwhile, there has been an ongoing challenge of budget execution. Across the phases efforts have continued to increase rule-based accountability. However, the challenge may not solely lie in a lack of rules, but with tensions that exist between differing aims of interest groups. This is further discussed below.

2.2 Political Economy of Evaluation

43. In Zambia stated policy intent is strongly mediated in implementation by the informal objectives of a variety of stakeholders. In other words, although policy intent may appear developmental, actual implementation is negotiated between interest groups, often to the benefit of the powerful. This leads to a situation where loyalty often matters more than performance (Leenstra 2012). Formal rules and systems can act as a façade for interests within an informal system of rules and decision-making that is broadly dispersed amongst those with power. This has otherwise been called neo-patrimonialism. A range of commentators and a number of interviews highlighted that pecuniary interest and the extension of state power competes with poverty reduction in the objectives of powerful interests within the state (FODEP 2011; Leenstra 2012; Rakner 2012). For evaluation this means that openings for evidence to inform policy are much more tenuous than they may appear at face value with change likely to be very incremental.

44. This means that the constitutional values of democracy, transparency, accountability and good governance are subordinate to the informal power structures within the state. Perceiving that formal rules often become vehicles for informal objectives helps to unravel a variety of seeming contradictions that inhibit or enable Zambia's ability to improve learning through evaluation.

45. An in depth case study of the Zambian health sector that was conducted by Leenstra (2012) provides an illustration of the connections between the formal and informal system within Zambia. This study connects the micro-level behaviours in the health system to the macro context. The author finds that while rules do exist and are followed, these are also on occasions warped and used to justify behaviours that are against the public interest, such as health professionals "stealing government time" (Leenstra 2012: 11) to pursue their own business interests. In interviews during this study it was confirmed and accepted that professionals use their government position to pursue their own interests. However, there is no simple pattern: people can choose to follow patronage-driven or rational legal behaviours, or even combine them. As Leenstra (2012: 302) argues in relation to donor interventions in Zambia, this means that

    > *the results of …interaction can never be planned or foreseen: the arena is complex, made up of competing and conflicting interests, and what is articulated is never a complete and accurate representation of real interests.*

    A structure or process can become ordered or disordered so as to enable personal, group, or institutional benefit to be derived. On the one hand, disorder such as poor record keeping and information management can be not due to a lack of capacity, but a strategy to avoid accountability. Similarly, order, such as in the form of public service reform programme can provide an opportunity for consolidating power, diverting assets and resource accumulation. On a large enough scale these behaviours transcend the personal interests and become a way groups accumulate entitlements.

46. The interplay of formal and informal logics can be identified in mediation of presidential power, the differentiated approach to public debate, and within divisions of civil society. Since 1991, presidential power has been both supreme and severely curtailed in Zambia. The constitution of 1991 gives the President supreme power within the state over the allocation and oversight of the business of government. The President appoints the heads of the judiciary, the public service, the Auditor General, eight members of

Parliament out of 150 and the attorney general. Although all of the appointments have to be vetted by Parliament, the President can either overrule this or secure the votes of opposition MPs to get to a majority of support (in addition to the 8 MPs he has the power to appoint). Further there is very limited decentralisation of decision-making and political power. Decentralisation has been discussed in Zambia since the 1990s, and a renewed policy was put in place earlier this year[6]. Yet historically little has been achieved on this front, which places a limit on the entry points for evaluation practice into the main central ministries.

47. The political manoeuvres since 2011 highlight the power of the President over the legislature in the political economy. In 2011 just following the general election there were 18 deputy ministers (Times 2011), while today there are 41 deputy ministers (P. o. Zambia 2013). According to the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), 13 of these deputy ministers are formerly opposition MPs who have resigned their seats and triggered by-elections of which the government has won five out of six (Geloo 2013). As Table 4 shows, this has led to an outright majority for the Patriotic Front by May 2013, even without opposition ministers voting for the government. In effect, the President has the power to limit the actual power of parliamentary oversight. Yet, in spite of the supreme power granted by the constitution, two presidents have been removed from office by popular processes when they sought to extend their rule: Kaunda by civil society and then an election, and Chiluba by members of his own party and civil society (Phiri 2003). In both cases it appears that the President seems to have alienated important power networks.

Table 4: Members of Parliament by Party

Party	**Seats Following General Elections**	**Seats as of May 2013**
Patriotic Front	60 (+8 appointed)	68 (+8 appointed)
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD)	55	43
United Party for National Development (UPND)	28	30
Independents (IND.)	3	2
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)	1	1
Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD)	1	1
Vacant	2	5
Total	**150**	**150**

48. Contradictions between the operations of formal rules are also in evidence in regards to reporting in the public space. Although within the constitution of Zambia the founding values of transparency and freedom of speech are enshrined there is evidence that control over public debates is sought by politicians especially in regards to the media. According to Freedom House, all governments have harassed critics within Zambia's press since the end of one party rule. The government also broadly controls the media through the issuing of licences through the Ministry of Information. Currently Freedom House rates the Zambian press as "Partly Free", although is it on the borderline of "Not Free" (House 2013). Rakner (2012: 12) reports that "there is clear evidence that licenses are used in order to control the private media." Defamation laws and website blocking

[6] http://allafrica.com/stories/201307170250.html

are other tools used to control negative reporting. For example, the Zambian Watchdog, a critical website, has been shut down through a combination of court action and blocking of the website (Carlucci 2013). On the other hand, government officials and ministers are available and accessible. Political parties can also advertise in the daily newspapers and there is debate in public spaces, which was reportedly more thoroughly curtailed during Kaunda's regime (Kasoma et al. 1997).

49. One final role-player that requires consideration in the political economy is civil society, especially organised interests. Civil society has sections with political power, although these tend to represent organised interest groups. Civil society has played an important role in bringing an end to the one party state and in opposing Chiluba's attempt to run for a third term (Leenstra 2012). A well-cited example of civil society momentum was the OASIS forum, a grouping of NGOs and opposition parties formed to oppose Chiluba's bid for a third term. It is currently reported that civil society activism is weak in Zambia (Rakner 2012). It was perceived during interviews that Zambian civil society weakness is based upon a highly polarised political environment with different civil society organisations supporting different political parties. A sign of this is the report by Coalition for the Defence of Democratic Rights to the Commonwealth Secretariat outlining a range of reported abuses by the Patriotic Front government (Bandow 2013)[7]. A further issue that arose that during the research is that the rooting of sections of civil society in the country is shallow and responds rather to donor funding. One respondent referred to the 'Lusaka Consensus' in policy processes.

50. Against these challenges in civil society there remain strong interest-based organisations that have insider links to government, such as the Farmers Union and the churches. These examples, which are further discussed in the body of the report, demonstrate that, just as with other institutions, the power of civil society is based upon its ability to access both formal rule-based mechanisms and informal relational spaces. Where they are unable to do this their power relies upon those who do have access and form alliances to further specific agendas.

51. Understanding that complex barely visible forces whose objectives are focused on securing group interests have a range of consequences for identifying and interpreting the supply and demand for evaluation. It means that ECD work needs to recognise that policy influence, even when there appears to be a clear cut opening, is tenuous and incremental. Issues in state performance cannot be understood solely as a lack of capacity to implement formal bureaucratic norms, because more rules will only have a limited effect. ECD therefore needs to recognise that the use of evaluation is achieved by working in both the formal and informal spaces. The informal space is, however, very difficult to penetrate.

3. MAPPING OF THE EVALUATION SUPPLY AND DEMAND SYSTEMS

3.1 Principals

[7] http://cddr-zambia.org/; http://cddr-zambia.org/2013/02/12/full-text-of-commonwealth-report/ (since first accessing this site it has now become infected with malware); http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/democracy-under-challenge-zambia?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)

52. Principals are stakeholders that in the main demand evaluation (although can supply and mange evaluations on occasions) as a result of their political power and positioning. In this study, principals include the Executive, civil society, the legislature and development partners.

The Executive: The Presidency, Vice President and the Cabinet

53. There is some latent demand for evaluation in the Executive. Transforming this to consistent actual demand within the political context will be challenging as a variety of other considerations come into play. The latent demand for evaluation is embedded in an Executive that demands on-going monitoring reports of implementation. Large changes in policy on important issues can spring from the Executive without public discourse. This curtails transparency and access to information. Seemingly in contradiction, the Cabinet Office emphasises transparency of participation in policy processes and is open to the use of evidence. This apparent contradiction highlights the meeting of different objectives within the policy process from the more political and bureaucratic parts of the Executive given the political economy.

54. In the interviews it was reported that the Presidency has been demanding monitoring reports of programmes currently being financed and implemented by government. For example, according to the *Zambia Daily Mail* "the President could not comprehend why it is hard to obtain up-to-date developmental information on provinces when permanent secretaries exist."[8] On-going monitoring takes place through a budget tracking tool, a sample of which is shown in Appendix 1. The nature of the demand for monitoring, however, needs further investigation. First, evidence could not be found of poor performance being censured as a result of the monitoring. Second, it was reported in interviews that it was felt that this monitoring was not necessarily development results-orientated, but focused on priorities of the presidency. Third, it needs to be ascertained whether the political Executive has interest to go beyond monitoring and to establish through evaluation the quality of outcomes.

55. The Cabinet Office, which is under the Presidency, oversees and coordinates all policy emanating from government ministries through the Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division. A Permanent Secretary, who the President has the power to appoint, heads this division. The formulation of policy can be based on some evidence defined at the sector level, but it is not standardised to conduct evaluations or identify evidence in the policy process. It was reported by the Cabinet Office that the process of policy formulation is consultative involving a wide range of stakeholders. There were different perspectives on the extent of the consultation processes. Some reported that it was limited to Lusaka. Other reports, however, emphasise bottom-up aspects of the Zambian policy process[9]. Ostensibly, the centralised policy process supports transparency and participation in decision-making. This means that the Cabinet Office is a potential entry point for demanding evaluations within policy consultation processes.

56. In contrast to the open processes of the Cabinet Office, there is evidence of restrictions which have been put in place by the Presidency on the flow of information from

[8] http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/uncategorized/18238
[9] http://lusakavoice.com/2013/07/10/govt-embarks-on-national-social-protection-policy-consultations/

different sources. For example, challenges accessing the Zambian Watchdog website[10] are reported to be a result of government action[11]. Rapid and important policy decisions are sometimes made by the Executive which are then debated in the public media and general society, for example, changes to fuel and maize subsidies in the month of May, 2013. Major civil society stakeholders were not consulted in the decision process. According to two media statements attributed to the President, Mr Michael Sata, the removal of fuel and maize subsidies is justified on the grounds that the subsidies do not actually benefit the poor and, therefore, funds saved from subsidies if applied to construction of infrastructure such as roads, schools and health facilities could benefit the poor more (Chellah 2013). This case is considered in **Error! Reference source not ound.**.

57. According to interviews there are certain sectors that the Presidency pays more attention to if undertaking evaluations. One such is infrastructure development, particularly roads. Recently the Roads Agency has been centralised in the Presidency, with the contracts from the previous administration cancelled. The evidence from the interviews suggests that procurement, especially of infrastructure, is an area where the political Executive remains quite hands-on and so may be a sensitive area for evaluative activities.

Box 1: Farmer Input Subsidies Programme

The current national debate on maize subsidies highlights the interplay and possible entry points for evaluation that arises in the interplay between various interest groups around policy processes. Although actual informal agendas are difficult to pin down there is enough information around this issue to demonstrate points of entry for evaluation in the debate. A national debate in the media between a various interest groups was sparked by an announcement by the President of a change in the subsidies regime (widely reported as subsidies removal) on the basis that the money could be better spent on infrastructure development.

Farming subsidies in Zambia cut across the value chain with three main forms of intervention. The first is the Food Reserves Agency (FRA), which purchases maize from farmers. The second is the farmer input support programme (FISP), which provides targeted households with fertiliser. The third are subsidies to millers of maize aimed to help control the price of maize. Together these three programmes account for 80% of government spending on agriculture and suffer regular and very large overruns, as reported by the President:

…during 2012, the budget allocation for the FISP was K500 billion against actual expenditure of K1.181 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K681.2 billion; while during the year 2011, K485 billion was budgeted against actual expenditure of K1,354.70 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K869.7 billion….In addition, during 2010, K100 billion was budgeted under the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) maize marketing programme against actual expenditure of K2.6 trillion, representing a budget overrun of K2.5 trillion; while in 2011, K150 billion was budgeted against actual expenditure of K3.2 trillion representing a budget overrun of K3.0 trillion[12]*.*

These subsidies operate to achieve multiple objectives. Ostensibly, the aim of these interventions is to provide cheaper food and reduce poverty in rural areas, but according to

[10] A controversial website that contains allegations of government mismangement
[11] http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/02/23/zambia-chinese-experts-to-monitor-internet/
[12] http://www.times.co.zm/?p=10777

research and reports actual benefits accrue to more specific groups (Mason et al. 2013). Purchasing of food by the FRA has provided above-market prices for maize for a number of years. For example, FRA purchased 83% of the marketed surplus between 2010 and 2012[13]. Mason and Myers (2013: 203) show that that the FRA's intervention in maize

"…raised mean prices between July 2003 and December 2008 by 17–19%...which assisted surplus maize producers but adversely affected net buyers of maize in Zambia, namely urban consumers and the majority of the rural poor".

As a consequence the study concluded that:

…the increase in maize price stability is unlikely to have had substantial welfare effects on poor households. In contrast, relatively wealthy producers are likely to have benefited from the higher average and more stable maize prices resulting from FRA policies.

Research on FISP has found very little evidence of poverty reduction through the maize subsidies (Mason et al. 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2013). In investigating the net impact of the scheme on food prices, Ricker-Gilbert found that doubling the size of the input scheme would reduce maize prices by a maximum of 1.6%. On the other hand research by the same group (Mason et al. 2013: v) found that the FISP was "being disproportionately allocated to better-off households above the $1.25/day poverty line." Further, prior to 2011 constituencies won by the MMD received "significantly more subsidised fertiliser than those in areas lost by the ruling party". Media, Auditor General and civil society investigations into the allocation of FISP have confirmed challenges in its targeting with their own investigations[14].

The organisation Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) is opposing the reduction in subsidies claiming that it is critical to smallholder farmers. The Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) has claimed that hunger will increase with a change in subsidy, arguing that "providing support to poor rural farmers in form of agricultural inputs is not a subsidy but a mandatory responsibility on the part of Government."[15] Finally, subsidies to millers have not been passed onto consumers in the form of cheaper maize meal from larger millers. Instead the informal sector has been able to process maize meal at lower costs leading to a reduction in price, though large millers are able to negate competition through the subsidy[16].

Against this background, where the benefits of subsidies currently consistently accrue to those who are better off rather than the poor, government has been attempting to reform maize subsidies. For example, this has resulted in the introduction of a barter system and electronic distribution for the beneficiaries of FISP. The government has subsequently been reported as stating their support for FISP, rather than a focus on the long-term removal of subsidies[17]. The 2013 citizens' budget, which is a simplified version of the annual budget, highlighting popular expenditure and revenues, notes that the 2013 FISP and FRA are still budgeted to receive K800 billion between them[18].

What this case illustrates is the gap between formal policy intent (poverty reduction) and actual implementation (rents accruing to more powerful interests) and the complex array of interests mobilised around a policy shift. Given this, there are potential entry points for evidence to retarget the subsidy, and also to remove the subsidy, by conducting evaluations with civil society, farmers or the government. On the other hand, long-term research advice is harder to come by generally, but in this instance was provided by Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI), which is supported by SIDA and USAID.

[13] http://allafrica.com/stories/201307151916.html?viewall=1
[14] http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/features/19918
[15] http://www.zambianintelligencenews.com/2013/06/03/maize-production-may-go-down-and-hunger-increase-znfu/
[16] http://allafrica.com/stories/201307151916.html?viewall=1
[17] http://www.statehouse.gov.zm/en/govt-to-continue-fisp/
[18] http://eaz.org.zm/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Zambia-2013-Citizens-budget.pdf

However, what actual policy implementation ends up looking like is difficult to predict given the array of vested interests and the potential that actual interests are only being partially articulated publically as those who gain through large budget overspends on the programme will use the language of poverty reduction to defend their interests.

Civil Society Organisations

58. Civil Society and its role in politics in Zambia has been shaped by a history of authoritarian traditions, first during the colonial area, and later on during one-party rule. For several decades, civil society was largely restricted to activity within the agendas and control of the state, until it coalesced on two separate occasions into a major opposition movement (1991 and 1999). This means that civil society has shifted between supporting and opposing government in various phases. Though civil society has some broad challenges (discussed below) which reduce its ability to engage in advocacy through evaluation, there are some organisations identified during this study who are well equipped for presenting their interests in both the formal and informal political economy, namely: Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR); the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR); Transparency International (TIZ); and the Zambia National Farmers Union. This list could be expanded, but in the scope of this research it gives a feel for some of the entry points for evaluative activity by civil society and its connections with policy.

59. A robust and balanced participation of the civil society is still impeded by five factors even though the role of the civil society has continued to grow[19]. First, there is a lack of institutionalised mechanisms for citizens' participation in decision-making other than elections and political parties. An example of this is the current constitutional development process. The Oasis forum, a body made up by a range of civil society groups, recently bemoaned the lack of participation in the process that has been undertaken over six years[20]. Second, the relationship of government and civil society has been confrontational with regard to issues of governance, participation, human rights and the rule of law. An example of this is the recent NGO Act that was enacted in a short space of time without consultation and has led to tension between civil society and government[21]. Third, a large number of civil society organisations are based at national level, and have limited local representation. For example, Civicus (2010) found that 49% of civil society organisations in Zambia operated in Lusaka. The rest of the operations are spread out over the 9 other provinces with no more than 13% of the civil society organisations working in any other single area. This analysis reinforces a term that emerged during interviews that there can be a 'Lusaka consensus' in decision-making. Fourth, organisational and monetary constraints often force organisations to serve their own survival needs and compromise on larger goals of development and change (Civicus, 2010: 12). For example, Civicus (2010: 73) found that the focus of civil society more or less mirrored the development partner priorities and that organisations were almost entirely dependent upon funding from these agencies. Finally, there are challenges around the coordination and collaboration within and between actors. For example, the organisational survey findings from the Civicus (2010: 45) study shows that

[19] The following list has drawn from Maitra's (1998) observations and recent work by Civicus (2010).
[20] http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1851&Itemid=1
[21] http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=35440

networking and communications tends to be more within the membership of umbrella groupings, rather than across the looser networks or alliances formed to address topical issues.

60. These issues mean that although there are some stronger civil society organisations, broadly the sector has little collective weight and reach through which formal or informal policy networks are influenced. Concisely put, civil society lacks many institutional entry points with government or the formation within itself to act as a persuasive agent. An example of this is the constitution process in which civil society has been involved that has not been finalised in six years. There are some examples that have more reach, which are discussed below.

61. CSPR, established in 2000, is an anti-poverty advocacy network of over 140 organisations, whose objective is to work for pro-poor development in different parts of Zambia. CSPR seeks to ensure that civil society participates effectively and meaningfully in design, formulation, implementation and monitoring through sourcing evidence-based data. Budget tracking and service delivery monitoring are listed as current projects. Although no project reports have been updated on the website since 2010, CSPR provides regular commentary in the media on poverty reduction efforts and budget allocations. CSPR also provided inputs to the recent draft policy for planning and budgeting following a submission to Parliament on the same issue. Given this ongoing activity, CSPR is an entry point for demanding evaluation activities to inform advocacy and policy influencing activities of civil society. In this regard, ECD activities could focus on identifying and demanding evaluative activities and perhaps managing these in a manner that could further feed into CSPR's and other similar organisations' policy-influencing work.

62. JCTR is a research, education and advocacy organisation that promotes study and action on issues linked to Christian faith and social justice in Zambia. JCTR began operating in 1988 as a project of the Zambia-Malawi Province of the Society of Jesus with similar orientation and activities as other Jesuit social centres around the world. JCTR is an important research advocacy organisation politically, based upon their history and the prominent position of Christianity in the Zambian constitution. In the preamble to the constitution, the country is defined as a Christian nation and society. According to Afrobarometer, an independent, nonpartisan cross-country research project that measures the social, political, and economic issues, religion is very important for 93% of people in Zambia, the joint second highest out of 31 African countries[22]. It is reported that for Kaunda and Chiluba, losing the support of the churches was a major blow to their efforts to remain in power (Phiri, 2003).

63. The JCTR produces the basic needs basket analysis. This analysis compares a basket of basic goods with the take-home pay of Zambians. This analysis is conducted in both rural and urban areas and is used for advocacy purposes with government, communities and NGOs[23]. The rural analysis is important as it provides external verification of ongoing poverty issues in Zambia. The JCTR used the basic needs analysis as a base for inputs into major policy decisions. Recently, it has provided input to the new draft planning and budgeting policy discussed in the previous section.

[22] http://www.afrobarometer-online-analysis.com/aj/AJBrowserAB.jsp
[23] http://www.jctr.org.zm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=27

64. Transparency International Zambia (TI-Z) was established in 2001. TI-Z is a professional membership organization focused on anti-corruption, integrity, leadership and good governance. TI-Z has been a vocal campaigner on corruption issues in Zambia. For example, it has openly criticised the current administration and powerful actors such as the Police Service. A major publication towards which the local chapter contributes is the corruption barometer. In addition, TI-Z is pushing towards commissioning more advanced evaluation activities such as public expenditure tracking surveys.

65. The Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) is an organisation that has high-level access and the ability to influence policy based on its representation in the formal and informal agrarian sectors, representing a sizable economic and employment interest. Its breadth of membership makes it one of the few organisations in Zambia to be able to claim country-wide reach. Its website claims that apart from churches, the ZNFU is one of the oldest associations in Zambia, having existed from the early 1900s.

66. One of the main evaluation and advocacy mechanisms used by the ZNFU is the Agriculture Production Survey for which "data was collected from a sample of 4,000 households."[24] Further the ZNFU makes detailed budget submissions drawing upon a range of evidence sources[25]. It was reported in interviews that the ZNFU enjoys high-level access to the government with ministers regularly attending ZNFU events. Notwithstanding the recent reduction in the maize subsidy the ZNFU has been able to defend a variety of protections enjoyed by the farming industry. For example, a wheat import ban still remains in force, while the ZNFU is advocating strongly on payments to farmers for government maize purchases and for quotas for trade with the Democratic Republic of Congo[26].

67. Overall this mapping shows that there are a variety of entry points for evaluation activities through civil society organisations in Zambia, although there are issues in the structure of civil society. Organisations can be identified that can demand, manage and implement a variety of types of evaluation exercises and take these into both formal and informal policy spaces. There is no single champion within civil society: instead, as with policy influencing in general, there are multiple entry points with a variety of skills that may be better placed for different roles and interests in supporting opportunities for evaluation.

The Legislature - Parliament

68. Across a wide number of sources consulted during this study the message consistently arose that the legislature in Zambia has limited power of oversight in relation to the Executive (Rakner, 2012: 16; Civicus, 2010: 31). The turnover in Parliament has been high, for example, in 2011, 60% of parliamentarians were new, especially in the ranks of the Patriotic Front[27]. Subsequent by-elections have increased the number of new members in the chamber. This means that the Parliament is currently operating with a relatively inexperienced number of representatives with an assertive Executive. Further,

[24] http://www.znfu.org.zm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=619:agriculture-production-survey-results-and-the-current-state-of-agriculture&catid=46:press-statements&Itemid=67
[25] http://www.znfu.org.zm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=538:znfu-2013-national-budget-submission-&catid=35:position-papers&Itemid=66
[26] http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=11950
[27] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/119/119vw.pdf

key committees such as the Parliamentary Accounts Committee are reconstituted every year. This means that only half the members of the committee serve for the full term of the Parliament[28]. Parliament provides limited oversight on the Executive through its parliamentary committee system, as well as through the Vice President's (rather than President's) question time every Friday when Parliament is in session.

69. There are some mechanisms for evaluation in the legislature. For example, there could be some ECD opportunities within the Research Section of the legislature. The Research Section of the National Assembly of Zambia was established to serve parliamentarians in two main ways: i) provide information and evidence to Members of Parliament (MPs) who wish to make a private members motion; and ii) prepare background papers (briefs) for MPs who may attend local or international workshops or seminars. The Research Section has twelve researchers. For the most part, the Research Section does not establish its own research agenda. It responds to MPs' information requests and requirements. Recently, however, it has started conducting research in anticipation of the information that might be required and needed by the MPs. The Research Section is currently conducting evaluative research to ascertain the effectiveness of some of the aspects of the parliamentary reforms whose implementation begun towards the end of 2002. The funding of this research is coming from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

70. The Public Accounts Committee reviews and makes recommendations on the reports from the Auditor General (which receives around 70% of its budget from Norwegian Aid). The reports of the Auditor General, with the responses by Parliament, are released electronically more than a year after the period reviewed. For example, the report for the year ending 31 December 2011 was released on 18 July 2013. The Auditor General also undertakes audits of other public entities, such as parastatal bodies. Among parastatals there are failures to convene boards of directors, failure to prepare financial statements and poor management of infrastructure (A. G. Zambia 2011). Among museums, there are no strategic plans, weaknesses in the documentation of artefacts, and transportation is not maintained. Responsibility for the remediation of the issues rests with the Secretary to the Treasury, who must enforce these with line departments. The main challenge is that the Treasury struggles to enforce change. This will be discussed in the next section. Although Parliament can only offer recommendations there might be scope for improved use and follow-up of the audit products as well as increasing the scope of performance audits. Given the rapid turnover in committee staff, capacity development efforts might well focus on the staff of committees.

71. Although firm oversight is limited, the legislature does have a role in convening processes to discuss policy with multiple stakeholders, although final decisions are made in the Cabinet Office. For example, digital migration for the SADC region was implemented in Zambia through participation of relevant stakeholders such as the media, civil society organisations and interested individuals.

[28] Implementing the Good Practice Principles and SADCOPAC conference resolutions: the Case of Zambia, presented by Hon Vincent Mwale, Chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee of Zambia, Mpumalanga, South Africa 3-6 September, 2012.

Development Partners

72. There is limited evidence that evaluations in Zambia are conducted as country-led process. This finding is in alignment with the Second Phase Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, which notes that mutual accountability mechanisms are weak between development partners and the Government[29]. However, there are some existing mechanisms that are being used to support ECD which could be built upon.

73. Interviews with evaluators conceded that most evaluations were commissioned and managed by development partners. Recent evaluations related to cash transfers[30], European cooperation[31], the joint assistance strategy[32] and anti-corruption efforts[33] were all commissioned and managed by development partners, and led by evaluators external to Zambia, with some cooperation from government. These findings highlight those important evaluations on development, which have resource implications are regularly conducted exogenously to the state. On the other hand, development partners have supported a range of activities related to completing important surveys and developing statistical capacity.

74. There are development partner efforts that are directly and indirectly supportive of ECD within Zambia. The largest amount of efforts quantitatively seek to engage in performance and accountability related reforms, especially related to public finances (including the Auditor General), with 8 out of the 11 development partners reviewed supporting this area of work (see Table 5 below). This work should be coordinated under the Joint Assistance Strategy as there is an outcome focused on the area. Another focus of development partners that provides indirect support to evaluation is in funding civil society organisations ability to demand accountability and to advocate with government. Here 6 out of 11 development partners have related funding.

75. A challenge with leveraging this support is in understanding how the political economy is interacting with these programmes. The evaluation of the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programme, a major initiative that lasted six years and cost USD 74 million, highlights the risks, especially of public finance interventions. The evaluation concluded that:

> *In all of the twelve technical components, goals and objectives have either not been achieved at all or they have been delivered much later than programme design had envisaged. Where PEMFA has attempted directly to improve PFM processes, procedures and human resource capacities, in many cases this has not been achieved.*[34]

The challenges around this large and important public sector reform programme highlight that case-by-case analysis (perhaps from a political economy perspective) needs to be undertaken to understand the value of each reform initiative to ECD.

Table 5: Development partners and the nature of their assistance

[29] http://www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/47673599.pdf - 68
[30] http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer/countries/zambia/AIR_Child_Grant_Baseline_Report_FINAL.pdf;
[31] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/evinfo/2012/1316_ev_en.pdf
[32] http://www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/46286085.pdf
[33] http://www.oecd.org/countries/tanzania/48912843.pdf
[34] Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programme Evaluation - Overview Report - 3

#	Development Partner	Related Support to Monitoring and Evaluation
1	UN system	**Direct**:[35] Contributed funding to evaluation of the Fifth National Development Plan; Demographic Health Survey (UNFPA) **Indirect**: The Technical Facility for Strategic Response – This is aimed at enhancing the attainment of national development results and is implemented by the Ministry of Finance. This programme has been responsible for completing the country MDG report – No budget recorded; Governance programme - This initiative is largely focused on technical skills development, pay reform and right-sizing the public service - US$7,280,000
2	World Bank	**Indirect**: [36]Research on economy, poverty and governance.
3	African Development Bank	**Indirect**: [37]Governance Reform Support Programme – Through Improved budget execution and oversight.
4	Irish Aid	**Indirect**:[38] Increasing accountability to citizens – E1.1m (approx. 2012)
5	Swedish International Development Agency	**Indirect**[39]: Strengthened democratic accountability and transparency, and increased awareness of human rights – USD6.4million (2012)
6	Norwegian Embassy	**Indirect**: [40]Transparency International – NOK3.5million (2012-2013) Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council (NGOCC) – NOK18.8 million (2010- 2013) Office of the Auditor General – NOK45 million (2010 – 2014)
7	Embassy of Denmark	Phased out governance support projects in 2013[41]
8	GIZ	**Direct**:[42]Strengthening Good Financial Governance in Zambia, including support to strengthen M&E systems in order to provide evidence-based development planning, budgeting and programme implementation (coordination of the evaluation of the FNDP, Gender analyses, and support to national strategy for the development of statistics, LCMS 2010 etc.) Civil society participation in governance reform processes and poverty reduction **Indirect**: Support of the Zambian Decentralisation Process
9	EU Delegation	**Direct**: Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) programme (programme ended) New strategy currently being formulated
10	DFID	**Direct**:[43]Budget and Public Service Delivery Monitoring by Civil Society – GBP662k (2006- 2014) Public Financial Management Zambia – GBP1,805k (operational 2011 - 2014) GBP138k (planned) Support to Zamia 2010 Census – GBP3,150k (2010 – 2013)

[35] http://www.undp.org/content/zambia/en/home/operations/projects/overview.html
[36] http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/projects/all
[37] http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ZAMBIA%20-CSP%202011-2015.pdf
[38] http://www.irishaid.gov.ie/what-we-do/countries-where-we-work/our-partner-countries/zambia/
[39] http://www.openaid.se/en/countries/zambia;
http://www.sida.se/Global/Countries%20and%20regions/Africa/Tanzania/Results%20strategy%20Zambia.pdf
[40] http://www.norway.org.zm/News_and_events/norwayzambia/Active-Projects-and-agreements/
[41] http://zambia.um.dk/en/danida-en/
[42] http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/338.html
[43] http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=201618

		Indirect: Public Sector Performance Programme – GBP535k (planned) Management of Public Services Zambia – GBP1,833k (2006 – 2014) Economic Advocacy Programme – GBP – 3,454k (2010 – 2016) Zambia Anti-Corruption Programme – GBP6,318k (2009 – 2015) Democratic Empowerment and Accountability Zambia – budget in planning
11	USAID/PEPFAR/ CDC	**Direct**: M&E Centre of Excellence University of Zambia – USD5.6million (2013 – 2016) Demographic Health Survey (2013) Strategic Information Central Initiative (2012-2015) **Indirect**: Assistance in the management of public resources - USD300k (2013) Increase the ability of civil society organisations to advocate and engage with government on service delivery - USD500k (2013)

76. Direct support to developing evaluation demand amongst principals is somewhat limited in scope. The three main areas of support have been to the evaluation of the FNDP through the Ministry of Finance (to be discussed later), the upcoming demographic health survey, and a centre of M&E excellence at the University of Zambia that mainly conducts training. Only the support to the evaluations of the FNDP has some local demand-side linkages.

77. Two additional support mechanisms exist for evaluation through the coordination mechanisms of development partners, Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) and the new Joint Assistance Strategy. First, there does seem to be some promise in Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) to support ECD. The potential of SWAps to support ECD is emphasised within the evaluations on the Paris Declaration (Chigunta and Matshalaga 2010). All of these documents emphasise that SWAps have produced improved coordination and lead to more evaluative activities taking place. Second, the Joint Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015, which is aligned to the SNDP, is a point of reference for development partners. For example, both USAID refers to the strategy in outlining their own country strategies (USAID 2011). In this joint assistance strategy there is an emphasis placed on "using systematic information to improve decision-making" (Partners 2013: 14). It is intended that capacity development efforts are to be undertaken with the Ministry of Finance and Central Statistics Office. In addition, the partners have formed an M&E group through which monitoring and evaluation issues are discussed, strategy developed and funding coordinated to some extent.

78. The above analysis reinforces that a number of entry points for supporting ECD do exist in Zambia. The challenge is that many of the opportunities are latent within larger public service reform efforts. Further, there are limited functioning coordinating mechanisms, such as SWAps or Sector Advisory Groups. This means that entry points need to be nurtured in a context where there is a limited history of country-led evaluations and the potential support to evaluation is in the main indirect. The direct work in ECD, with the Ministry of Finance, University of Zambia, and Central Statistics Office are considered separately below.

3.2 Government Evaluation Agents

Ministry of Finance and Sector Ministries

79. In restructuring the Ministry of Finance 2008 a separate M&E Department was established with a mandate and responsibilities to monitor and evaluate the national development plan. Since 2010, a separate programme for evaluations and research exists, Research and Development Programme (RDP), which has coordinated sector specific analyses but also the final evaluation of the FNDP. Within the Ministry of Finance there is an actual demand for evaluations to support with policy processes, especially to ensure that the MTEF and annual budgets are based on analytical research and M&E results. Responding to this, within the RDP an annual research and evaluation plan is issued in conjunction with the line ministries. In interviews it was emphasised that the Ministry of Finance has decent technical skills, a degree of management buy-in to evaluation and a commitment to implementing policy in accordance with rules (although at times these are circumvented). In other words, the Ministry of Finance was considered to have a commitment to development in alignment with formal rules and processes.

80. There are three overarching challenges to implementing the annual research and evaluation plan, the first is human, the second is financial capacity, the third, institutional. Interviewees reported that currently, the M&E Department spends a good amount of time on the monthly monitoring exercise as part of supporting the new government wide M&E system (GW-MES) demanded by State House using the tool provided as a sample at Appendix 1. Stakeholders reported that the monthly reporting system has posed a challenge as most other ministries have limited capacity to populate it with the required data and information. This means that staff from the M&E Department need to spend time following-up with line Ministries. The issue here is that monitoring might crowd out attention to evaluation. It is also important to note that the implementation of Government Wide M&E is a new demand and represents a potential expansion of the mandate of the Ministry of Finance. However, it was reported in interviews that there is ambiguity around who owns the M&E system as there is an M&E unit in the cabinet office. This study could not find any evidence of their activities.

81. The human resource challenge is reinforced as currently the coordination of the evaluations of the FNDP is carried out by an external consultant. The consultancies to undertake the evaluations of the FNDP have been paid for by development partners (EU, UN, JICA and GIZ) and only one component by the Ministry of Finance. The contribution of the Government / Ministry of Finance is significant for all consultations, technical committee, publications and dissemination of results; the Cooperating Partners were approached to sponsor the consultancies only. This demonstrates a commitment within the Ministry of Finance to support ongoing evaluative exercises.

82. Institutionally, the Ministry of Finance in Zambia is still developing compared to other very strong centre of government Finance Ministries in other African countries (e.g. Rwanda, South Africa). Consequently, it may not have the institutional legitimacy to be able to implement, advocate for and maintain a government-wide evaluation function. The challenges around the authority of the Ministry of Finance have been raised explicitly and implicitly. Explicitly, Leiderer and Faust (2012: 167) state that “in contrast to several of its counterparts in the region, the Zambian finance ministry is relatively weak politically and, as a consequence, has not been able to involve the sector ministries in an effective reform of public financial management.” Implicitly, the

challenges around exerting power from the Ministry of Finance can be identified in ongoing expenditure management challenges. Although this judgement does not directly extend to the M&E unit, it does raise questions about the institutional strength of the Ministry. This is explored in Box 2.

Box 2: Evidence in the Budget Cycle

A review of the documents and announcements surrounding the budget cycle present a differentiated picture. The Open Budget Survey of 2012, for example, rates Zambia in the global bottom ten of its ranking with a score of 4 out of 100. Previously in 2010, Zambia scored 36 out of 100. In the current budget cycle, it appears that improvements are being put in place, which may facilitate improved entry points for evidence in the budget cycle.

The national budget cycle in Zambia has four main stages: a) budget preparation by the Ministry of Finance based on submissions by ministries and departments and by various stakeholders, including the civil society and private sector; b) budget authorisation or approval by Parliament; c) budget execution by ministries and departments; and d) audit by the Auditor-General's office with follow-up by Parliament.

A number of documents to improve the budget process became publicly available in 2013. A citizens' budget has been put in place; public submissions to the budget process are being invited[44]; the MTEF, and the full activity-based budget, are available on the Ministry of Finance's website; and budget performance figures are available for the first quarter[45].

The national budget as prepared by the Ministry of Finance has the potential to be informed by a range of recent surveys produced with the Central Statistical Office and development partners, such as, the Census, Crop Survey's and the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Reports. It was reported in interviews that analyses like the gender assessments have fed into budgeting processes. The results of the Annual Progress Reports (APR) of the National Development Plan are utilised in drafting the MTEF and the annual budgets, when available. As noted in the earlier section there are civil society organisations that play a role, in monitoring the implementation of the national budget.

However, there remains a gap in transparency around government expenditure until the Auditor General report becomes available, up to 18 months after the end of the budget year. This usually leads to additional budget votes to make expenditure legal.

During the preparation stage there is potential for the influence of evaluations. Those making submissions such as the JCTR, Economics Association of Zambia, CSPR and the ZNFU have the burden to prove their case to the Ministry of Finance. Past this initial stage, it is difficult to track implementation. According to interviews there is some evidence of technical demand for evaluation to feed into the budget process, for example, through the current round of evaluations and research being conducted by the Ministry of Finance.

83. For line ministries and agencies there is no consistent system and mechanism to evaluate policy performance beyond annual performance reviews, which mainly focus on monitoring information. This study was unable to identify any electronic copies of annual programme review documents although evaluations do confirm that they have taken place[46].

[44] http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=35015

[45] http://pmrcblog.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/treasury-information-release-on-budget-performance-pmrc-infographic-2013.pdf

[46] Evaluation of Paris Declaration

84. The Ministries of Health and Education have recognised M&E systems. The Ministry of Health has an active M&E Unit in the Planning Department which is also home to the Health Management Information System (HMIS). However, the M&E unit is much stronger on monitoring, which is undertaken monthly and reported on quarterly, than evaluation. The Ministry of Health undertakes a Joint Annual Review with their partners which have evaluative dimensions as well conducting mid-term reviews of its strategic plans. HMIS enables the Ministry to collect data and information on three major diseases, namely: malaria, tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS. The Ministry of Education also manages the Education Management Information System (EMIS).

85. The mid-term and the end-term review/evaluation of a policy are seldom undertaken except in situations where a development partner is nudging and financing. As a case in point is the Ministry of Education HIV/AIDS Work Place Policy which was financed by UNICEF. Table 6 highlights some of the evaluations that have been undertaken beyond routine information collection. Box 3 explores the links between evidence and policy.

Table 6: Selected ministries and evaluative exercises undertaken

MINISTRY NAME	EVALUATION/SURVEY UNDERTAKEN	PERIOD/YEAR
Ministry of Education	Review of the Ministry of Education HIV/AIDS Work Place Policy 2006-2011	2012/2013
Ministry of Health	Zambia Country Report for the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS	2008/2010/2012
	Global Fund review of the M&E System	2007
	Annual Programme Reports	

Source: Compilation by authors

Box 3: HIV and AIDS Response

In Zambia there is a history of developing an evidence-based response to HIV with work between development partners, civil society and the government. This shows that development partner led efforts can support development results and capacity development. The development of the evidence base over the last 25 years has meant that the drivers of the epidemic have been understood. HIV transmission in Zambia is primarily through heterosexual contact and this mode of transmission is exacerbated by the high prevalence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), the poor socio-economic status of women and high-risk sexual practices (such as age at first sex debut, multiple and concurrent partners and condom use).

Evidence is then taken into practice through a consultative process that involves the National AIDS Council (which is a form of Sector Advisory Group). For example, in November 2009, stakeholders at the National HIV Prevention Conference reviewed the drivers of the epidemic and these were included into the National HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework 2011 – 2015, which included prevention and control of tuberculosis, treatment of other opportunistic infections, access to anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs, utilisation of alternative and/or traditional medicines, promotion of appropriate nutrition, support to the infected and affected, support to orphans and vulnerable children as well as support to high risk and vulnerable groups (disabled groups, commercial sex workers, prisoners, refugees and long distance truck drivers). While all these measures have been implemented, their success rates differ from one to the other with the most successful being provision of free ARVs through the ART programme. Appreciable gains have been made in the area of HIV and AIDS with the assistance of evidence.

However, there still remain some key challenges to accessing the many services that are available in the country. Again evidence is available to help shape the changing nature of the

epidemic. For example, it is known that HIV and AIDS related stigmatization and discrimination threaten the effectiveness of HIV prevention, care and support programmes.

Much of the HIV and AIDS work is funded by development partners yet it has led to a range of research publications that have involved Zambians and helped build local capacities in evidence-based participatory policy definition. This shows that development partner efforts can be a pre-cursor to endogenous activities, for example, through the new Centre for Excellence in M&E at the University of Zambia.

The Central Statistical Office

86. The Central Statistical Office, the custodian of official government data, has conducted a range of important statistical surveys. Organisationally, it is a department that reports to the Ministry of Finance. There is evidence of some of these products being used in public debate and for government planning documents. However, the Office has capacity issues and needs external assistance to complete products. The Office completes regular inflation figures and GDP figures. Some of the surveys undertaken in the last four years are listed in Table 7.

Table 7: Central Statistics Office surveys

Survey	Last time completed
Zambia Sexual Behaviour Survey	2009
Living Conditions Measurement Survey (LCMS)	2010
Population Censuses	2010
Zambia Demographic Health Survey	2013 (ongoing)

87. Central Statistics Office gets both financial and technical assistance from development partners to complete these surveys, particularly USAID, DFID, GIZ and Macro International. While the Census received a large amount of government funding (approximately USD 50 million) there was a DFID contribution of GBP 3.5 million.

88. Some staff members are provided with advanced training in statistics especially by Macro International and Measure Evaluation. The M&E Centre of Excellence at the University of Zambia's Department of Population Studies also provides some training on statistical approaches.

89. A number of challenges with the management of statistics were identified. During interviews it was reported that datasets often required substantial work before they could be used for analysis. This account is substantiated by other sources. For example, the GDP indicator has been rebased. Further, in supporting the completion of the LCMS, DFID reported that the 2006 data needed to be rekeyed. Additionally, issues around the project management of both the LCMS and Census led to delays in the release of data. It seems to be agreed that the Central Statistical Office needs long-term support, but the extent to which this is in-country or remote needs further clarification.

90. In spite of the challenges there does appear to be demand from the Ministry of Finance to improve and use statistical information. For example, it was reported that the re-keyed data from 2006 was used in the formulation of the SNDP and the new data from 2010 was used in the final report of the FNDP. Both LCMS 2006 and 2010 have also been used in the micro-macro simulator ZAMMOD, which is used for forecasting impact and expenditure of major GRZ policies and programmes. Further the health surveys are used in formulating development partner and the ministries responses. However, there is no

report of high-level political demand for using survey information or systems that entail review by politicians.

3.3 Evaluation Agents

Think Tanks

91. In Zambia there is an interesting emerging array of think tanks conducting policy relevant analysis in important and sensitive policy areas. The Zambia Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) undertakes good quality, policy relevant economic analysis, linked to government agents and provide evaluative recommendations to principals. ZIPAR's focus is on the production of high quality analysis that feeds into public debate and public education on economics. ZIPAR was set-up with support from the previous MMD Government and only became operational in 2011, as the government was changing, although it still received financial support from the public funds and development partners into 2012. This formation led to the impression that it was an MMD think tank. After the 2011 election when the Patriotic Front formed a government a new Director was appointed and has been working to establish ZIPAR as a non-partisan think tank

92. ZIPAR's strategy is to build slowly. During interviews with ZIPAR it was emphasised that they focus upon undertaking in-depth analysis rather than rapid reviews. This approach is verified in their products, for example, they have produced detailed public analysis of the auditor general's reports, the 2012 budget, and of the implications for the reduction in fuel subsidies for the poor. ZIPAR does undertake commissioned work. For example, they undertook an analysis of the constituency development fund for the Presidency, recommending and starting to develop an allocation formula. Further they have presented work to the Committee of Estimates in Parliament on Mining Taxation.

93. Managing this range of work was reported to be challenging as the capacity on both the demand and supply sides is limited. For example, although they are interested in engaging in experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations, they have not had the opportunity to do so, nor do they have the capacity to lead one. Other than the Executive Director, who is a PhD holder, other staff members are at master's degree level and are having to learn quickly on the job.

94. ZIPAR reported that in their experience there are some pockets of demand for evaluation, but the Government does not seem to be organised to actually commission evaluation studies. Although in their work they have not undertaken many projects with the Ministry of Finance, they recognise that there is political will within the Ministry for supporting evidence in policy processes.

95. The Policy Monitoring and Research Centre (PMRC) is a relatively new think tank that was incubated in the structures of the Patriotic Front with some core funding from DFID. Since the 2011 election, it has received funding from the government. The composition of its board includes Wynter Kabimba, the Secretary General of the Patriotic Front and current Justice Minister. The management of the PMRC state that they have independence from the government and the party and have on occasions produced information that is critical of government performance and plans. For example, on the implementation process of the SNDP. The PMRC has access to government agents and political principals.

96. The PMRC generate produces Policy Analysis, Infographics, and a variety of special discussions named Series and Hard Talk[47]. Policy briefs have been presented to a range of Ministers. Hard Talk is a recorded interview with Ministers where they are presented with and questioned on various challenging pieces of information related to their departments. PMRC appears to have good access to political principals and is able to leverage these to enter into discussions.

97. PMRC, in contrast to ZIPAR, have focused on generating a large quantity of products on a wide range of subjects. A lot of these products use cartoons and graphics as part of their style of communication making them quite accessible. PMRC, similar to ZIPAR, does not have postdoctoral researchers and relies on people with masters degrees. In its work with government, PMRC had identified health and education as organised and interested in using evidence.

98. The Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI) is a non-profit company limited by guarantee and collaboratively works with public and private stakeholders. IAPRI exists to carry out agricultural policy research and outreach, serving the agricultural sector in Zambia so as to contribute to sustainable pro-poor agricultural development. Their website currently lists seven researchers in addition to management structures. Their main funding comes through USAID and SIDA. Michigan State University support their research development. They publish technical, policy and working papers. Their research products are often based on quantitative studies. During the recent food subsidies debate their evidence featured prominently in the national media.

Universities

99. It is difficult to get an overall picture of the state of university research and education in Zambia as the Higher Education Council is only now going to be set-up and the universities do not keep records of their research output. In Zambia the Universities of the Copper Belt and Zambia are the only ones to offer their own PhD degrees. The third public university, Mulungushi, was founded in 2008 and is accepts only undergraduate students. There are also a number of private Universities that offer postgraduate qualifications either through linkages to public universities or foreign universities.

100. Zambian universities' ability to produce research is limited. The Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA) reported that in Zambia "the majority of universities are characterised by low research output and few scientific publications (as is common in most African countries)". The SARUA 2012 profile of Zambian universities noted that there were only 11 PhD students enrolled in universities. Out of 1024 university staff, only 255 (about 22%) have doctoral degrees (Kotecha et al. 2012). Currently Zambia has only one active journal publication in the last year identified in this study, the medical journal was last published in 2012[48]. The Schimago Institutions Ranking, that produces a ranking against some main dimensions of research performance, rates only the University of Zambia. Currently the University of Zambia is top of the country ranking, 51 in the Africa region and 1881. The University of Zambia has increased its research output from 353 articles over 2004–2008 to 510 articles from

[47] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYMW1DphJAc
[48] http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajol/browse/country?countryId=238

2007– 2011[49]. This is the only current collated information on research output in Zambia (SARUA, 2012).

101. Against this background the "demand for higher education institutions is very high and is far from being satisfied" (SARUA, 2012: 108). A recent World Bank report found Zambian higher education to be regressive, only being open to a rich segment of the population. The challenge with the sector was recognised by the President who noted during his first opening of Parliament that "our universities and colleges do not only have dilapidated infrastructure but are also faced with shortage of staff and apt teaching and learning materials."[50] A higher education bill has been introduced to Parliament to help to address the coordination and resource challenges.

102. Although there are challenges, there are social scientists who can engage in evaluation, specifically in health, agriculture and demography. The Institute of National Economic and Social Research (INESOR) is active in research. INESOR has qualified staff with PhD and masters level qualifications and it is headed by a professor who is the director of the institute. Currently they undertake research on agriculture, economics, governance, health, urban development and socio-cultural research[51]. It is the research and consultancy arm of the University of Zambia. INESOR has been involved in a number of high profile evaluations including evaluation of some components of the FNDP.

103. Meanwhile, the M&E Centre of Excellence has received a sizable grant of USD 5.9 million over five years that can help develop the research and teaching based for evaluation in the country. In achieving this aim the University has four short courses on data analysis, epidemiology for data use, the integration of population variables to development planning and planning monitoring and evaluation. In addition they have a module for fourth year undergraduate students on M&E and are planning to launch a Master's degree in Monitoring and Evaluation.[52]

Evaluation Associations

104. The Zambia Evaluation Association (ZEA) has been in existence for close to 10 years. Most of the members are independent evaluators. However, its membership base has failed to expand over this period. ZEA is not established by an Act of Parliament and, therefore, it has no powers to mete out or enforce professional conduct among its members like other professional bodies. However, it has managed to establish links with some funding agencies. For example, GIZ funded the Association's strategic plan and some monthly dissemination meetings. The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) has funded the Association to publish a book on M&E practice in Zambia from the point of view of various disciplines, HIV/AIDS and poverty among others, but only one paper has been written and so the funds would be surrendered back to ACBF. While ZEA does not itself undertake evaluation it does so through its members. Most of the people interviewed on the supply side are not members of the ZEA.

105. MESSY is a grouping of M&E practitioners who have come together to support each other professionally and also to create a platform for sharing M&E information. They

[49] http://www.scimagoir.com/
[50] http://www.educationworldwide.dk/Africa/Zambia/Michael%20Sata.html
[51] http://www.unza.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=331&Itemid=406
[52] www.unza.zm/unzadps/

facilitate some presentations from among members and non-members on M&E topics of interest. ZEA and MESSY are merging to form one evaluation association. Both are affiliated to the Africa Evaluation Association (AfrEA). Most members of MESSY are in active employment implementing monitoring systems and working as managers of evaluations. The membership bases of a merging could therefore be complimentary.

4. PATHWAYS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

106. This report finds that in Zambia there are multiple entry points to improving evaluation demand and supply. However, each entry-point needs to be considered in terms of the aligned interest groups. There is active demand for evaluation within some government ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance who could play a broader role clarifying standards and expectations from government. Outside of government there are well-connected organisations who seek to use evaluative information to engage in advocacy. This demand is set within a context where there is a high degree of political competition between political parties and various interest groups.

107. The supply of evaluation expertise in Zambia is diverse in its quality and needs further development. In response to the historical demand from development partners and locally commissioned activities (using development partner funding) a range of consultancy companies and individuals have arisen with particular areas of strength. In the health sector, for example, there have been a lot of resources put into the generation of evidence, particularly in regards to HIV and AIDS. The university sector has some research capacity, especially in the social science sector, but indications are that there are structural challenges in the sector with qualified staff leaving for better paid positions elsewhere.

108. This report finds that in Zambia there are multiple entry points to improving evaluation demand and supply. However, each entry-point is partial and often represents aligned interest groups rather than a neutral role-player seeking to expand evidence-based practice. Some of these entry points are outlined below.

4.1 Demand

109. Currently there is very little actual demand from Principals outside of development partners and to some extent civil society. Development partners are the main managing and commissioners of evaluations in Zambia. Even the current evaluations based within the Ministry of Finance rely upon external development partner funding. Civil society, meanwhile produce useful analysis that feeds into policy debate. Latent and potential demands for evaluations are discussed further below.

110. **The Executive:** The Cabinet Office process for policy submissions provides a potential entry demand for evaluation. Further investigation needs to be undertaken of the monitoring processes being requested by the Presidency as it is not clear how the demand for information feeds back into accountability and performance. The Presidency is both the centre of formal and informal power and demand for evaluation could have an important effect that serves broader development outcomes if it is received at the right time. Evaluations that touch on sensitive areas of resource allocation, such as, infrastructure need to be undertaken with consideration.

111. **Civil Society Organisations:** There are a variety of pathways for evaluation work to be undertaken with civil society. The pathway chosen depends very much upon how commissioners of evaluation wish to position themselves in the political economy. For example, evaluations could be supported with existing influential interest groups such as the Farmers Union that seek to establish evidence for the benefit of their members, or with those groups with have a more hostile stance with the current government. If the concern is in undertaking evaluations that will be used and useful in the policy process for the broader aims of development then supporting organisations like JCTR who already conduct evaluative activities and have strong formal and informal legitimacy may prove to a useful entry point.

112. **The Legislature:** Currently, the legislature provides a limited entry point for ECD activities. Focused work on specific research issues of interest to parliamentarians especially on strategic issues could be helpful to generate an overall orientation to evidence-based practice. Further, the current hearings and submissions on policy although not currently far reaching do provide potential entry points to introducing evaluation through external organisations.

113. **Development Partners:** This group is currently supportive of evaluation through funding and in-kind support. Getting sector working groups and SWAps functional will help to interact with the demand-side as they provide a useful entry point for the identification and management of evaluations. This kind of support would need to be undertaken in alignment with the findings from the Paris Declaration Evaluation. On the supply-side there could be a greater emphasis by development partners on commissioning in-country think tanks by themselves or as part of their own evaluation agenda.

114. **Ministry of Finance and Sector Ministries:** The Ministry of Finance demonstrates an actual demand for evaluation. They are currently undertaking evaluations and are interested in setting-up an evaluation function. An issue with the demand is that it requires development partner assistance to undertake the evaluations, both financially and technically. Yet, the Ministry of Finance can play a key leadership role in evaluation in accordance with the SNDP in terms of setting out the rules and incentives around the conduct of evaluation. In doing this the evaluations could get greater resonance with the Executive if they focused on priority areas and overlaps between the SNDP and the Patriotic Front's Manifesto.

4.2 Supply

115. **Think Tanks**: Working with the think tanks profiled in Zambia can provide an entry point to undertake evaluations and also provide ECD services. Both provide access to high-level decision makers through their boards and so could present evaluations or undertake orientation to the importance of evidence in decision-processes. Both provide different kinds of entry points: ZIPAR research quality products and PMRC rapid turnarounds on that are well communicated. For both organisations, the ECD activities would need to be sensitive to the politics surrounding the organisations.

116. **Universities**: The Centre of Excellence initiative at the University of Zambia provides a well-resourced entry point to strengthening the supply of evaluation in the country. Working with this project would provide synergies with existing funding and support mechanisms. A challenge will be to support the initiative so that gains can be extended past the immediate funding period. This might require the centre to conduct evaluations as well as research on evaluation. There are broader issues around the capacity of the university sector in Zambia to be strengthened so that it fulfils research objectives rather than just providing consultancy opportunities. This would require longer-term interventions. Potential areas that could be considered are those where research capacity is required in the current SNDP, for example, infrastructure development.

117. **Evaluation Associations**: With the merging of MESSY and ZEA there is now a boundary crossing community of evaluators. This provides a useful entry point for the discussion and clarification of standards and competencies for evaluators and an ongoing site of engagement around evaluation activities in Zambia especially the diverse array of consultancy companies and individuals have arisen with particular areas of strength.

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Appendix 1: Sample Budget tracking tool

Sector	Programme	Overall Budget (K)	Current Year Budget (K)	Annual Budget/Allocations 2011[53] (K)				Total Actual	% of Actual over Budget	**Comments** (focus on deviation from plan and impact on sector programme)
				First Half		Second Half				
				Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual			

[53] Changes with each year within the SNDP