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1979-05
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A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW
4.00pm MAY 1979

Title: Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body": An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations. (1882-1944).

by: Jonathan Clegg

No. 078

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

AFRICAN STUDIES SEMINAR

Paper for Monday, 7th May 1979, at 4.00 p.m. in Room CM 319

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(Work in Progress)

UKUBUYISA ISIDUMBU - "BRINGING BACK THE BODY": An examination into the ideology of vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations. (1882-1944).

This paper attempts to shed some light on the 'inter-tribal faction fighting' which has rocked the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations for many decades. In this examination I have chosen to investigate the Tembu/Mabaso - Tembu/Majozi disturbances of 1922 because they have a long history which is fairly well documented and more importantly, the 1922 disturbances were a watershed in the relationship between tribes in Msinga and set a precedent for other tribes in the area with similar land problems and boundary disputes. Most importantly I think the war provided a model for local level politics among the districts within each tribe and was an important contribution to the development of a'feud'(1) ideology in Msinga. Thirdly the war effectively broke Tembu dominance in Msinga politics and paved the way for the Chunu people to consolidate their power base and influence among those tribes which had been at loggerheads with the Tembu. The final blow to the Tembu power came in 1944 when they were defeated in massive clashes with the Chunu. The Chunu's slowly assumed the leadership role in Msinga after this and their chief SiMakade, has now been elected by the KwaZulu government to represent all the other chiefs in Msinga at important KwaZulu government functions. The first section deals with a vast period of history and is necessarily brief in sections.

Whereas the first section deals with the 'inter-tribal' wars between the major tribes in Msinga, the second section deals with a new phenomenon which starts appearing in the early 1930's - warfare between districts of the same tribe and even more stunning, fighting between sections within a single district within the same tribe. This breakdown of tribal cohesion into territorial opposition between districts and subsections within districts goes hand in hand with development of what I have called the 'ideology of vengeance' in Msinga. (2) In the pages that follow I think it will become clear that in trying to understand the conditions under which this new social phenomenon developed, there is among all the other numerous factors, a single underlying element which seems to pervade the fighting at every level - the problem of insufficient land.

Historical background:

Before 1910 the rural location of Msinga was situated within the magisterial district of Helpmekaar and before that of Klip River although a large portion of the reserve spilt over into the adjoining county of Weenen. This section in Weenen was refered to as 'Pakade's' location, Pakade being the Chunu chief whose people, were the most numerous in this area. In 1910, 'Pakade's' location became the 'Mpofana' location and the boundary between the Msinga and the Mpofana location was the Mooi River. This distinction was more of an administrative one than anything else and the peoples living in these two areas form a cultural and political whole as the major tribes in the area live in both locations.

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The Msinga and Mpofana locations are formed around 4 major tribes. These are the Chunus, the Tembus, the Bomvus and the Majozi or Amaqamu. The Chunus, Bomvus, and Tembus are all pure Ntungwa Nguni stock and Bryant suggests that some 250 years ago the Tembus and Chunus were related. The Majozi are an amalgam of tribal fragments which were formed into a 'new tribe' by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1869. (3) The Chunu and Tembu were and still are the most powerful tribes in Natal. Just before the rise of the Zulu power, the Tembus were subjects of the Bhutulezi who were in control of the area around the white Umfolozi. The Chunus were settled below the eTaleni Hill and they stretched to the banks of the Buffalo River. Below the Chunus resided the Amabomvu people. The Tembus fled when Shaka attacked and defeated their overlords the Bhutulezi. The Bhutulezi chief sought refuge among the Ndwandwe while the Tembus led by their ledgendary chief, Ngoza, fled in the opposite direction towards Natal. The Tembu carved their way through many other tribes and kingdoms during those initial years of wandering. They attacked and defeated the Amakhuze people who became vassals to the Tembu and incorporated into the Tembu army. The Tembu army reached a peak of military capability during this period under Ngoza and they even defeated two regiments sent by Shaka to 'eat them up'. This battle was fought over the Buffalo River. Soon after the Tembu exodus Macingwane, chief of the Chunus, became nervous fearing quite astutley that the Chunus were next on Shaka's demolition list. The whole tribe decamped en masse and followed the path of destruction created by Ngoza's people, hacking their way through those smaller and remoter chiefdoms that the Tembus had spared. After several years of roaming aimlessly around Natal both the Tembu and Chunu people straggled back to Zululand and to Shaka after their respective chiefs had been killed. Ngoza was killed in a battle against the Pondos and Macingwane "disappeared into a cannibal's bowels". (4) Shaka received the Tembus graciously and placed them under the control of a headman by the name of Sojoyisa who was based in Northern Zululand while the Chunus received a somewhat harsher response from the Zulu king. He had Mfusi, the heir to the Chunu throne murdered. But Pakade, Mfusi's brother, managed to conceal his identity and survive to lead the Chunus back into Natal during Dingane's reign. He settled his people in the area now known as Msinga. Nodada, the heir to the Tembu throne waited until Mpande revolted against Dingane and then moved his Tembu people to the Bushman's River. Here he was soon evicted by immigrant Boers and Nodada finally led his people over the Tukela River to settle in Msinga along the Klip (Mnambithi) River. The Tembu by 1882 had given rise to a number of sub-tribes which had become politically and territorially independent and autonomous. These were the Sithole, the Amangwe, the Emabeleni, the Abakwaqunta and the Mabaso. This last tribe is very closely related to the Tembu and one of the Tembu chiefs, 'Mvelase owavela enyandeni', is reputed to have been a Mabaso clan member. Nodada married a woman of the Sithole people who bore him a heir named Mganu. Mganu begat Mabizela who begat Ngqambuzana. Pakade of the Chunus begat Gabangaye who begat Silwane who begat Muzikayise who begat the present incumbent Simakade.

The following section deals with the first inter-tribal war that was fought in Msinga over land. Although the main fighting occurred in 1922, there were skirmishes earlier on the 1905 and stick fights and general tension between the two peoples since at least 1881. Before examining the 1922 war which was by far the most bloody, it is necessary to briefly study the events leading up to the 1922 disturbances.

The Msinga location in 1881 was an undefined sprawl of 14 tribes none of which knew exactly where their respective territories began or ended. Of the 14 tribes only 3 were,

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> "...entirely within the division. The remainder have the bulk of their peoples in the adjoining divisions , having points running into Msinga. These tribes have no laid-off locations but reside chiefly around that portion of the location (or farms as the case may be) where their chief's kraal is - kraals most distant from the chiefs intermingling with the kraals of the next tribe". (5)

This situation was untenable for many reasons, the most important one being that traditionally, the number of followers a chief had, reflected his power and authority but this in turn was determined by his ability to allocate land and secure tenure for his tribe and for other clans which wished to KHONZA him, i.e. cede their loyalty to him in exchange for land and grazing rights.

As the population of the tribes in Msinga grew, due to natural growth as well as to other factors like the eviction by the government of squatters and their subsequent placement in the Msinga reserve , it became more and more important for the tribes to define the exact limitations of their respective territories. Although the number of followers a chief had reflected his power and prestige, too many followers could in fact undermine his power in a situation where all the tribes were working within an absolute and fixed amount of land. In other words, a chief would reach the stage where there was no more land left for him to allocate to new followers without encroaching on other tribal territory. However he had no real control over the influx of people entering his region, especially if they were sent there by government decree. By 1906,

> "...the most fundamental prop of chieftainly power, the chief's power to grant to his followers land and cattle had been seriously undermined by pressures of population within the reserves. While theoretically chiefs could still allocate allotments of land this was not always practically possible". (6)

The chiefs however tried to overcome this threat to their authority and prestige by simply allowing new followers and KHONZA-ing clans to build their homesteads in the undefined 'grey' areas that lay in between each tribe in the reserve. Thus wars between tribes over boundaries in Msinga and Mpofana became a means by which the chiefs could increase their constituencies and attempt to maintain their vanishing power base, - their ability to provide land to their people. Another aspect of the office of the chief which acted as an incentive to allowing encroachment on other tribal territory was that the chiefs were paid a salary through the magisterial division in which the chiefs kraal was located and this salary was calculated according to the size of his tribe and his rank. (7). Thus when members of his tribe attacked another tribe in a boundary dispute a chief was under immense pressure to support his people. and it was very seldom that he did not, even though he would have to answer later to the magistrate.

Population pressure was a very real problem in Weenen county's native rural location and in 1880 the magistrate was already expressing concern about the eviction of squatters and farm labourers from farms and crown lands in the district:

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> "There is a great question looming in the future which will ere long call for the very serious consideration of the government, and that is the location of the natives. Whilst the native population is increasing in great numbers and wealth they are getting less and less inclined to regular labour. The quantity of stock which they possess is also a source of annoyance and inconvenience to stock farmers, and all up-country farmers are more ore less such. From these causes many natives are called upon to remove from occupied farms. The natives residing on town lands are for similar reasons also being required to remove, as the European population of the village to which such crown lands or commonages are attached becomes more numerous. Crown lands are also about to be purchased or leased to a large extent by Europeans and this will involve a considerable removal of natives there also, and farms hitherto unoccupied except by natives are being occupied by Europeans. On the other hand there is not suitable accommodation in the locations for any considerable increase in the present population". (8)

In 1887 the magistrate, commenting on the widespread fencing of farms in Weenen, points out that,

> "Again fencing of farms involves to a great extent, the eviction of natives residing thereon and as almost every head of a kraal is a small farmer and stock breeder, the difficulty of the evicted natives to find suitable places wherein to dwell will increase with the extent of fencing. I therefore beg to invite the attention of the government to a serious consideration of these difficulties." (9)

In 1881, the issue of boundaries became acute between the Tembu and Mabaso people. The magistrate reports:

> "it has been found necessary in some instances for the magistrate to proclaim imaginary boundaries between tribes to prevent quarreling over gardens, it being found that disputes were becoming so serious as to be dangerous. There is at present a dispute of this kind existing between the Amabaso tribe under Tulwana, and the Amatembu under Mganu. It has been going on for many years and it is my intention to finally separate the disputants this winter. I am informed that the matter was brought to the notice of his excellency (Sir Henry Bulwer) during his short visit to the division, when such steps were taken to mitigate matters to a certain extent". (10) - my emphasis.

And indeed by 1884 Henry Bulwer had authorized the fixing of the boundaries between the Tembus and Mabasos. (11) In this first official deliniation between the two tribes, the government had decided to cut the Mabasos off from what appeared to them to be a natural boundary, the Tugela River, and Tembus were now as far as the authorities were concerned, entitled to build their homesteads on the Baso side of the Tugela River. Thus Tembu 'land encroachment' now received what both tribes saw as official the support of the government and the Mabasos began a campaign of petitioning the magistrate and government for a revision of the boundary. (12)

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The main point of antagonism between the two tribes was the,

> "...small Nokeshe plateau where the grazing servitude overlapped and remained a constant source of dispute". (13)

The Mabasos and Tembus were not the only tribes with boundary disputes. By 1895 other tribes in the reserve had begun agitating for boundaries to be demarked between their respective peoples. In this year the powerful Chunus were involved in a dispute with the Bomvu people,

> "...which led to the murder of a native policeman while the then under-secretary for Native Affairs, Mr Samuelson and the then magistrate for Msinga, Mr Fynn were at Tugela Ferry discussing the dispute". (14)

Their boundaries were fixed in 1895. The Magistrate stating that,

> "the result has been little or no trouble has eventuated since between them". (15)

However in the following year the Magistrate reports that:

> "Owing to the boundaries having only been partly defined between several of the tribes, numerous attempts were made to encroach on land under the occupation of adjoining tribes, and several fights were the natural result. In one disturbance, 210 natives took part; they attacked their opponents no less than 5 distinct times, and to show them that such small wars were not conductive to the welfare of the country, the 2 indunas were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment and 15 lashes each, 64 of the ring leaders were fined..... The boundaries have now been clearly defined between the tribes of Kula (Majozi), Mabizela (Tembu), Maweli (Bomvu), Tulwana (Mabaso), and Silwane (Chunu). They fully appreciated the action of the government in doing so, which will encourage them to improve their own districts without fear of being overrun by adjoining tribes". (16)

However the Magistrates assessment was a little premature for in 1902 he remarks somewhat sheepishly,

> "There has been a good deal of friction between tribes owing to disputed boundaries. I have informed the chiefs that the government boundaries must be observed and that any persons not observing them will be punished. The invariable reply is that the lands of their forefathers have been given to other tribes and the people have not been consulted. I told the chiefs that the country belonged to the king, and that they are allowed to live on His lands as long as they behave themselves, otherwise they may be removed to where the government may direct". (17)

This kind of warning of course did not take into account the growing pressures put on tribes as they steadily increased in numbers and the boundary issues between them began to assume a critical survival significance. In 1905 the dispute between the Tembus and the Mabasos came to a head. As their consistent petitioning for a revision of the boundary met with no success, the Mabasos had no option but to gradually encroach on what was in the eyes of the authorities, the Tembu side of the border. The Tembus also resorted to self help. In his annual report the Magistrate for Msinga declares:

> "Owing to an abundance of beer, several faction fights occurred during the year, the most serious of which occurred on the 23rd of November, 1905, between the Tembu and Mabaso tribes. Had this faction fight not been detected in time by the police and energetic measures at once taken, it might have ended in the most serious native disturbance that has ever taken place in the history of Natal since European occupation, as three of the largests tribes would probably have taken sides and joined in. As it was, the Tembu tribe which outnumbers the Mabaso tribe ten to one and is the 2nd largest in the colony, killed 5 of the latter tribe, burnt eleven of their kraals, destroyed a large number of stock, and looted a great many huts, and kraals. These two tribes have been fighting between themselves for the last twenty years and will probably continue to do so until their respective boundaries have been altered or the smaller tribe has been exterminated". (18)

As pointed out earlier, the Msinga location had a large portion of its tribes residing in the neighbouring district of Weenen, in fact the Mabaso chief lived here. The fight in Msinga thus had repercussions in Weenen as members of the Mabaso tribe, living both in the location and on farms, attempted to rush to the scene of the hostilities. The Magistrate in Weenen describes the occasion:

> "A long standing feud between the Tembu and Amabaso tribes led to a disturbance in the Umsinga division which might have resulted seriously for the Mabaso had the police not intervened. With the usual rapid mode of communication known to the natives, word was sent to the members of the tribe in this division, some of whom live more than 30 miles distant, and brought a large number of men into the locus in quo". (19)

The authorities arrested those involved in the disturbances but the prosecution

> ".....was withdrawn at the instance of the government who contemplated a revision of the boundary but allowed it to pass neglected". (20)

This failure of the government to prosecute individuals involved in the 1905 hostilities, pending the readjustment of the boundary, was a tacit recognition of the fact that the fighting was generated by very real and valid grievances which were rooted in the problem of the general land shortage experienced by the tribes and it was a problem over which they had no control. Their only answer was to confront the problem immediately, securing by force of arms, their territorial integrity and trying when possible to encroach on other tribes' land. In these wars over boundaries, hut burning assumed a crucial strategic role. The burning of huts was a means whereby land hungry tribes could remove people from the area that was coveted, forcing them to rebuild their huts closer together for general protection and discouraging them from rebuilding their homes near the 'front'. In other words, the tribe being so 'moved' would find that the area which had previously constituted 'no-man's land' had been pushed into their own territory. They would retaliate and move the 'no-man's land' back at least to where it was initially or if they could, push it into the aggressors territory. This would go on until one tribe gained a tactical

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> at that time cut the Mabaso off from what would appear to be a natural boundary, the Tugela River. Within recent years boundaries have been beaconed with the exception of that between the Amabaso and Abatembu. A dispute arose in consequence previous to my assumption of duty last August I discussed the matter personally with the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg and he agrees that this boundary should be beaconed. I trust that this work will be undertaken at an early date and will result in these two tribes becoming as friendly as they were in the days before the Zulu war." (29)

On the 6th April 1922, the Magistrate for Mpofana decided to implement his plan for bringing the enmity between the two tribes to an end by setting up a beacon on the highly sensitive Nokeshe plateau as a provisional redefinition of the boundary between the Tembu and Mabaso people. The Tembus were,

> "...annoyed at the provisional redefinition.... and they decided to take the law into their own hands, and did so in a very complete manner". (30)

This redefinition of the boundary on the Nokeshe grazing plateau brought to a head 40 years of tension and hostility generated by the land-boundary dispute. On the 25th of April 1922 a Mabaso man was stabbed and thrown off a precipice on the Nokeshe hill. The following day a fierce battle took place on the Penduka Ridge about two miles from where Kula, the chief of the Majozi people had his kraal. The Majozis were at this point on very friendly terms with the Mabaso and Kula's people were hostile toward the Tembu after a boundary dispute between them that took place before 1906.(31) In this preliminary battle the Mabaso managed to repulse the Tembu who withdrew leaving 4 of their men dead. The fiery Mabaso chief Gqikazi was a notable contributor to the Tembu retreat using his rifle with great effect. The Tembus withdrew and waited for reinforcements. They camped opposite Gqikazi's kraal which was called Emahashini - the place of horses. On the following morning the Tembus attacked the Mahashini kraal. the Magistrate from Helpmekaar describes the scene:

> "Immediately on entering the gate we saw dead Mabasos lying in all directions, each on his back, each minus his beshu, disarmed, each bearing assagai wounds, and each having died in action. The body of chief Gqikazi lay some two hundred yards to the west of the kraal. I recognized him. He had been stabbed in the right chest and had received several stab wounds in the back, his left ear had been removed, and his bowels opened". (32)

In this action, the Tembus killed 24 Mabasos, most of whom were leading headmen and indunas. the Tembus lost seven men. The killing of the Mabaso chief deeply stirred all the tribes in Msinga, especially the Majozi. Almost all the Mabaso kraals in the location were burnt down and the women and children of the Mbaso fled and sought refuge with the Majozi people while small bands of Mabaso men swiftly retaliated by burning down about 100 Tembu huts. (33) There were allegations that before the battle on the 26th at Penduka Ridge, Gqikazi the Mabaso chief had been to see Kula. This Kula denied. The Mabasos on the other hand accused the Bomvus of assisting the Tembus in the Emahashini battle, which was denied by the Bomvu. On the 28th of April a Majozi impi entered Tembuland and burnt down 5 huts. A small party of Mabasos was seen accompanying them. by this time the police, assisted by a special squad of reinforcements had arrested over 200 men and confiscated many weapons.

By the end of April the whole of the Msinga and Mpofana locations were in ferment. Impis of Majozi were periodically seen in the hills itching to exact punishment on the Tembus for the killing of the Mabaso chief . A small impi of Chunu was seen in the Mpofana location observing the situation and apparently ready to assist the Majozi if the Bomvus helped the Tembus in any way. Apart from isolated incidents, the month of May was relatively calm and police reinforcements had been withdrawn at the end of April after the clash between the Tembus and Mabasos. In the middle of May the Tembus were reported driving their cattle into the Bomvu territory to safeguard them in case of a clash with the Majozi. These cattle were expelled a little later by the Bomvu chief who did not want to incur the wrath of the Magistrate or give the Chunus the idea that the Bomvus were assisting the Tembus. However it is clear that the Bomvu people wanted to help the Tembu. At the end of May, 1922 the Magistrate for Mpofana writes:

> "Arising out of the recent disturbances there will be many preparatory examinations, including two for murder, 1 (at least) for faction fighting with some hundreds to be charged, numbers for arson, many more for stock theft. Wholesale looting took place and over 3000 goats, 600 sheep and 250 cattle have disappeared" . (34)

A calmness prevailed until the 16th of June. On that day while the Majozis were paying their taxes at Pomeroy, the Tembus burnt down one Majozi kraal. The kraal,

> "stands on the inter-divisional and inter tribal (Tembu/ Majozi) boundary and is actually intersected by the boundary line" (35).

Shortly afterwards another 'Jozi kraal went up in flames'. Before this, the Majozi impis had been rather uncoordinated and their retaliation sporadic. However, after the Tembus had burnt down the two above mentioned kraals, the Majozi chief mobilized his entire tribe. Majozi farm labourers living outside the locations began to arm, especially around the Elandskraal area near Helpmekaar (36). The Majozi then swept into Tembu country and burnt down 23 kraals, a total of 92 huts, including grain huts. Ngqamuzana the Tembu chief had been specifically told by his magistrate that:

> "on no account must he allow his tribe to retaliate in any way whatsoever". (37)

On at least one occasion Nqgamuzana admitted to the Magistrate that he could not stop his people, however after the 'Jozi attack,'he managed to persuade his people not to retaliate. The Magistrate had on the 17th of June evacuated all the Whites living in Tugela Ferry and by this time troops from Durban and Dundee had arrived. The troops consisted of 70 odd men with 3 junior officers. Before their arrival the available police force was 3 White sergeants, 4 White constables and a few Black constables (38) After the evacuation of the Whites from Tugela Ferry, scores of Tembu women and children sought refuge there, as everyone was certain that a major war would break out between the Tembus and Majozis. The special police squadron did however manage to dissuade the Majozis from any further provocative acts, and apart from wild rumours that the Chunus were arming to attack the Tembus, the hostilities gradually lost impetus and by the end of July it was all over. An interesting aspect of the Mabaso/Majozi alliance and the potential alliances between the Tembus and Bomvus against the Chunus and the Majozi/Mabaso is that these alliances reflect the political divisions between the tribes during the Bambatha rebellion in 1906. (39)

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The board of inquiry into the Tembu/Mabaso-Tembu/Majozi disturbances found that the Tembus had been the aggressors and accordingly the Tembus were severly punished. Traditional Tembu land was taken away from them and portioned out to nearly all the surrounding tribes, so that a war that was ostensibly fought to gain land, i.e. to remove the Mabaso people off the NOKESHE plateau, resulted in whole tracts of it being given to other tribes:

> "The Tembus have ever since 1922 read insults into every word of the tribes around them. In that year they lost some of their territory by a decision of the government, several of the other tribes gaining at their expense - the Majozi, Bomvus, Mabasos and the Chunus. the Tembu tribesmen remained in the area and have never really become assimilated with their new fellow tribesmen". (40)
>
> and....
>
> "Trouble exists between the Mtembus and Mabasos regarding some land which the government confiscated from the former and handed to the latter as punishment for a fight which took place in 1922. The Mtembus had to clear out or become Mabasos and would do neither, with the result that hut burning has occurred periodically since". (41)

The statements above suggest that the Tembus had some kind of choice, i.e. to "become Mabasos or clear out". This can hardly be construed as a choice as there was no where they could go even if they wanted to. Their tribal territory had diminished considerably and in handing Tembu territory over to other tribes the Tembus residing on this land were not offered alternative areas on which to reside by the government. They were expected to KHONZA the new chiefs of the tribes with whom they had been at war (Mabaso and Majozi) and who were in Tembu eyes responsible for the fighting in the first place because they had encroached on what was officially defined as Tembu land. The chiefs and tribesmen who had been awarded tracts of Tembu land, were equally disenchanted with their new subjects who were responsible for mass hut burning as well as looting and killing in their areas. There was absolutely no way that the 1922 land award could alleviate the tension over land, and if anything it simply added fuel to the preexisting tension. Thus the relations between the Tembus and their new chiefs and tribesmen was strained to say the least, and it would not be surprising if they were discriminated against as far as allocation of fields for cultivation and grazing for their cattle was concerned. The Tembus were in fact punished twice, once by the government in that their land was ceded to other tribes, and punished again by those tribes with whom they had fought what was, in terms of the 1905 criteria, a 'just' war.

In losing land to other tribes, the power and prestige of the Tembu chiefs was severely curtailed. They had less land then before the war to allocate to new subjects who were either moved off farms as squatters, or had come from other areas to try and reside with relatives living in the location. In this situation, the Tembus, the second largest tribe in Natal became exceedingly land hungry. The Tembu had up until 1922 dominated Msinga and Mpofana politics for nearly 40 years, and had been involved in boundary disputes with nearly all the other major tribes. The Tembus were also the first tribe in Msinga to actively implement their political and territorial ideals using force of arms to accomplish their aspirations.

Simakade, a cousin of Muzikacithwayo would assume the regency. Although Giba as the dead chief's brother had a strong claim, and although he had the majority of Chunu support, the government decided to honour the dead chief's wishes and appointed his cousin as regent. (48) Muzikayise rapidly formed a small and loyal following around him. His war 'general' was a man by the name of Vukuza who fought in 1906 and saw service in France (49). At this time Vukuza was considered to be "... the finest leader of an impi in Zululand and Natal"(50). On June 1931 a couple of thousand Chunu tribesmen assembled near Weenen to hear the government's decision as to who was to become regent of the Chunus. The government's choice was delivered to the vast gathering by the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal, escorted by the Magistrate's of Weenen and Mpofana and an assortment of lawyers and police. When the gathering heard that the dead chief's cousin and not Giba was to be installed and that

> "....they must give him the respect of the salute 'Bayete', the crowd began to growl and surge forward, while stones began to fall among the Europeans..(who)...retreated to Lakhi's store...(where)... the windows were quickly smashed. Suddenly a lull occurred and the natives were seen trooping over the nearby hill. It was surmised that they were going for weapons and it was decided to make a getaway"(51).

Before they could escape, Giba arrived and told the Chief Native Commissioner that Muzikayise had no legitimate claim to the regency and that if Giba was recognized the white party would be allowed to leave unmolested. The Native Commissioner and his aides managed to escape in two cars however, which were stoned by women and children as they drove off (52). After this incident Muzikayise's warriors led by the famous 'general' Vukuza, attacked and decimated Giba's larger following. Vukuza's men, "...routed Giba's impi so thoroughly that only a few hundred are now in the location"(53). Between July and August an estimated 500 people died in the civil war(54). The government decided to withdraw their support for Muzikayise but still refused to install Giba, especially after the incident at the first installation which was thought to have been engineered by Giba. Giba was banished for life to Harding, and a son of the deceased chief was chosen instead. He was Bulawayo, the 19 year old brother of the heir. The government, fearing a repetition of the violent confrontation which took place at the previous installation ceremony took no chances this time:

> "Facing two machine guns and fifty armed police over 100 leading Mchunu natives received the government's decision that Bulawayo Mchunu... is to be regent of the tribe in place of Muzikayise... A realistic note of warning against further trouble was afforded by a machine gun demonstration in which wooden boxes were shattered at 500 yards. The natives were deeply awed" (55).

The Chunu people accepted this choice and the hostilities slowly came to an end, although the effects of the war were felt for many years after. In trying to contain the sudden outbreak of fighting in the Msinga and Mpofana reserves in 1931, the government had to rush a mobile squadron of police into the area. The authorities also resorted to "aeroplane demonstrations" which were apparently designed to impress upon the natives the need to co-operate with the government and reinforce the presence of the police.(56)

> "....these have cost some thousands of pounds to the country and it is held by some closely in touch with the position that this money and a great deal of ill-feeling between Giba's followers and the police would have been averted if the government had asked Solomon KaDinizulu, head of the Zulu royal house to step in and order the natives to stop fighting" (57).

Although the press and government opinion emphasized the civil war as a dispute between two potential regents, there were definitely other factors which affected the overall condition of the tribes in Msinga in 1931. Commenting on the civil war the Magistrate for Msinga observes that:

> "The depression in the towns is largely to blame. More natives have returned to the locations, and without good land for ploughing, and scarcely enough scrub for cattle and goats, their thoughts naturally turn to their old grievances and fighting. They openly admit that when the mobile squadron leaves Umhlangana - where police have been stationed for more than a month - more fighting will break out" (58).

With a large influx of people from the towns during the depression years, tremendous strain must have been placed on the traditional mode of subsistence with its roots in land, which would account for the sudden upsurge in inter-tribal fighting and tension. This influx from the towns was supplemented by the steady eviction of farm labourers from the Weenen and Helpmekaar Magisterial districts which surrounded the Mpofana and Msinga locations. In 1921, the rural black population, of Weenen was given as 20,799(59). In 1936 it was recorded at 20,953(60). Allowing for natural population movement, and other factors, the negligible growth of the population over a 15 year period seems to indicate that a considerable number of farm labourers were moving out of the county and the nearest reserves were Mpofana location. The figures for Helpmekaar show a negative growth rate. There were 10,376 blacks in the rural areas in 1921(61), as against 8,666 in 1936(62). Again the nearest location which these farm labourers could head for was the Msinga reserve. Thus the Chunu tribe must have felt the results of a steady influx of evicted farm labourers and squatters together with unemployed migrant workers who were returning to the reserves for some sort of security, and their civil war, although ostensibly fought over the regency dispute, must have been affected by the sudden strain placed on the reserve lands.

The clashes between the Chunu and the Tembu which were temporarily lulled by the general disturbances in 1931, resumed again in 1933 when members of the two tribes clashed on 28th October, just outside Tugela Ferry. In July 1934 they fought outside Weenen and they fought again on the 12th, 20th and 21st of November, of that year. These clashes were not on a large scale and although occasionally someone was killed, they remained at the level of skirmishing. Farm labourers were also very much involved in these small sorties. The antagonism between members of the two tribes continued and reached a pitch during the Second World War. There were two clashes in 1942, and in 1944 the Tembus and Chunus mobilized their entire available forces for a final showdown over the Tugela River. The trouble started on a farm where a marriage was taking place between a Tembu man and a Chunu girl. The farm was on what was considered to be 'Tembu' land. A group of Chunus accompanying the father of the girl to the marriage became involved in a stick fight with some Tembus who were beaten. The Tembus, beaten on their 'own' land, fetched spears and stabbed and killed four Chunus. Bulawayo, the Chunu chief, mobilized his entire tribe and the Tembus took similar steps. On 30th September 1944, the Tembus and Chunus fought each other on the boundary between Weenen and Msinga districts. Each tribe fielded approximately 3000 warriors. The clash lasted twenty minutes and the official death toll was put at 65 - 49 Tembu and 18 Chunus.(63) It is interesting that the confrontation developed on farmland and one of the most intriguing aspects of all the inter-tribal

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wars since at least 1905 is the role of the farm labourers and the relationship with their tribes in the reserves. In all the major inter-tribal wars, farm labourers were either involved or as in 1944, the fighting actually had its roots in the farm area. Farm labourers living as far away as 30 miles from the reserves took part in the fighting and were loyal to their respective tribes. A crucial question now arises and that is if the tribes in the reserves were fighting over land, why did tribes who were settled on farm lands so far away take such an active role? None of their homesteads were being burnt down, and the land shortage in the reserves did not affect them in any immediate sense. The answer I think is to be found in the fact that farm labourers and others who were squatting on Crown Land were quite aware of their insecure tenure and that they could be dismissed or evicted out of hand. In this case they would have to seek residence either on a new farm, or ultimately go to their respective chiefs in the reserves and plead for an allocation of land. In participating in the politics of the reserve and actively aiding their respective tribes in war, the farm labourers were simply hedging their bets and identifying themselves with that last bit of land which could, if the crunch came, supply them with some kind of permanent, secure home. In requesting an allotment of land from their chiefs, the evicted squatters and farm labourers could argue forcefully that they had fought in their chief's wars and had not forgotten him even on the farms, he now must not forget them in their plight. This I think sheds some light on why farm labourers got involved in inter-tribal wars in the reserve. It does not explain why people in the reserves fought each other over disputes which eminated in the farm lands. In attempting to answer this problem it is necessary to look at the territorial models used by the farm labourers. First of all, it is important to note that each tribe in Msinga and Mpofana spilt over into the adjoining farm areas. Before they were declared Crown Land or sold as farms, these areas had formed part of the districts of the different tribal territories. Whenever these areas were sold as farms the people living there were either moved or tried to stay where they were and sold their labour to the owner in return for the right to remain on his farm. By the turn of the century all of these traditional districts had been over-laid by farm boundaries. But the indiginants did not relinquish their own conception of their districts which had now been completely disfigured as far as the farmers and the government was concerned. The refusal of the farm labourers to relinquish the idea that they still belonged to a traditional district served to emphasize the fact that these were connected to the reserve and this link was at the least a conceptual source of security. The labourers operated with two territorial models. One was a small model which comprised of boundaries based on the farm on which they resided. These farm boundaries were however incorporated into a much larger model which was based on the now defunct, boundaries of their 'phantom' districts. Thus the old and indigenous model incorporated many farms and cut through farm boundaries and determined where one worked and which farms were "in your district". Any tension between districts was reflected in the pattern of alliances and employment over a number of farms which most farmers could not understand. Secondly, in times of depression members of tribes which were living in adjoining districts would 'encroach' on each others farms and fighting would result. Although the farms belonged to whites, the 'phantom districts' into which the farms were incorporated 'belonged' to the labourers. Thus hut burning was, as in the case of the reserves, a martial device where by encroaching labourers could force those from another tribe out of their traditional district (territory) and take over their 'land'. If a farmer happened to buy a farm which straddled two or more 'phantom' districts, he could be buying himself a lot of trouble, because he could be drawing labour from two or more antagonistic districts. The indigenous territorial model was further enhanced by the fact that most of the farmers in the 19th Century around Weenen were absentee landlords

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who simply used the farms as winter grazing and levied a rental on those people residing on their farms. However, this still does not explain why tribesmen in the reserves should become agitated about skirmishes between farm labourers. Again the answer is, I think, to disregard the strict magisterial divisions and farm boundaries and look at these 'phantom' districts. One of the most crucial problems of people living in the reserves was to find suitable grazing for their cattle, especially in the Mpofana reserve. The tribesmen living on farms, especially stock farms(64) could, and still do perform a crucial function in that reserve cattle could, in lean years, be 'SISA'D' out to relatives and members of their tribe living on farms. These facilities were however limited as they were only available to those people living along the borders of the reserve. These tribesmen living inside on the borders of the reserve, were very interested in maintaining good relations with their fellow tribesmen living in the 'districts' which had been bought by white farmers. If a tribe, say the Tembus, living in one of these 'districts' was displacing members of another tribe living on a farm (perhaps Mabaso) members of that tribe living in the location would also suffer in that their farm contacts would no longer be able to furnish them with grazing facilities if they lost their hold over the farm. They therefore occasionally assisted their fellow-tribesmen on the farms although not to the extent that the latter assisted the former in the reserve. This was I think due to the fact that in the last instance, the tribes in the reserve had more to offer the farm labourers in the form of potential secure tenure if required, than the farm labourers' ability to provide the tribes in the reserve with occasional grazing.

Today there are many ways a man living on the edge of the reserve can secure enough grazing for his cattle. The first and most common is simply to approach the owner if he lives on his farm. If he is agreeable then a grazing rental is paid for a specified period of time(65). Thus money earned as a migrant worker in the city can land up paying for grazing rights on a white farm. If the farmer is absent, then the manager can be approached and he is usually more amenable than the owner, because the rent he charges is his and the owner does not need to know about it(66). If the farm is left in charge of an induna, then he can be approached and bribed UKUDIZA as the case may be. If none of these options are open then the cattle can be grazed on the farms without anybody's knowledge. This is called UKUNTSHONTSHISA IZINKOMO or UKUKHOTHISA IZINKOMO (67). In this situation the cattle are removed from their kraal at about 10 p.m. They are driven to the farm fence which is then lifted, twisted and laid down flat on the ground. The cattle are driven into the farm and allowed to graze until about 3 a.m. whereupon they are removed, and the fence is restored to its upright position(68).

The analysis offered above reveals the complexity of the relationship between tribal reserve and farm labourer - tribesmen as far as inter-tribal politics in Msinga and Mpofana are concerned. There were obviously other factors which also played a role in this relationship, for instance kinship. When the members of a 'phantom district' which consisted of a number of farms, fought against another 'phantom district', the hostilities obviously assumed an immediate meaning and autonomy. In such a situation kinship became a crucial means of binding members of the different farms together, also enabling them to recruit kinsmen living on other farms in other 'districts' further away. This of course could expand the hostility so that many districts landed up fighting. The initial structure of the fighting was inter-tribal, i.e. a number of 'phantom districts' associated territorially and perhaps through kinship with a tribe in the reserve, would be opposed to another collection of such 'districts' belonging to another tribe in the reserve. These collections of districts had their own chiefs who were usually appointed by the government,

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but some were actually related to the ruling clans of tribes in the reserve.

While the fighting on the farmlands still retained its inter-tribal character a new and startling phenomenon began to develop in the reserves. This was the fighting between districts within the same tribe. The Chunu tribe was the first tribe to experience this breakdown of internal tribal solidarity, and although the Chunus could present a united front to other tribes, the nation was beset by an internalization of the land hunger as districts began to regard their territories and grazing facilities as sovereign entities, to be guarded and fought for in the event of encroachment by other districts. The breakdown of tribal cohesion into feuding between districts within the same tribe is intrinsically linked to the increasing pressure of over population which generated a fierce competition within the tribe over grazing grounds and land for cultivation. Whereas initially the tribes and their chief could attempt to cope with the severe land shortage by encroaching on the land of other tribes which also had the effect of reinforcing tribal solidarity, this strategy became futile when the districts in the central parts of the tribal territory began to experience severe pressures from over population. In other words boundary disputes between tribes only really benefitted those districts of the tribe which were on the border. If they were successful in displacing the other tribe, it was the districts on the border which gained more land. This gain however had little or no effect on the districts in the middle of the tribal territory and these areas began to explode into open hostility just after the Chunu civil war.(69) Before proceeding any further with this line of argument it is necessary to highlight the structural strengths and weaknesses of the Zulu political and territorial organization.

In his article "Die Zoeloe Isigodi"(70) J.F. Holleman presents an excellent description and analysis of the political organization of the Zulu and its reflection in the organization territory:

> "The political organization of the Zulu may be regarded as a system of concentric units: The kraal (UMUZI), village group, (ISIQINTI), ward (ISIGODI) district(ISIFUNDA) and the nation (UMHLABA, or IZWE). In this system each smaller unit is partially independent of and partly embodied in the next greater one. The ISIGODI develops as a territorial unit after the establishment of an INZALAMIZI ("progenitor of Kraals) which has sprung up from an already existing ISIGODI. But since the latter ISIGODI is part of a greater unit (the ISIFUNDA) and the head of the ISIFUNDA usually takes the initiative in the establishment of a new ISIGODI, the new INZALAMIZI is regarded as an extension (in a territorial as well as in an administrative sense) of the ISIFUNDA. Kings (AMAKHOSI) and chiefs (ABANUMZANE BEZIFUNDA) can establish new IZIGODI in order to increase their authority and territory"(71)

The above model was obtained from the Nongoma, Mahlabathini and Nkandla areas of Zululand by Holleman in 1940. The territorial organization of the Msinga tribes assumes a similar format except for the role of the chiefs which was greater than their counterparts in Zululand. All the land traditionally belonged to the Zulu king who installed loyal princes and chiefs over the many clans and tribes, and who ruled in the king's name. These rulers were called ABANUMZANE BEZIFUNDA (lit. regional headmen). In Msinga however, the tribes were not united under one king. In other words, each tribe regarded itself as a sovereign nation and until 1925 did not really recognize the Zulu royal house above the power of their tribal "chiefs". This of course had been actively encouraged by the Natal

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UKUDLALA KWEZINSIZWA (lit. 'the playing of men'), or UKUDLALA NGENDUKU ('to play with sticks). Although it is admitted that serious injuries can be inflicted with sticks and that in some instances people are killed, this does not alter the fact that the men were 'playing'. The death is an unfortunate event but one which does not invalidate the 'play' nature of stickfighting. 'War' (IMPI) is essentially associated with stabbing (UKUGWAZA, UKUHLABA) and any weapons which puncture the body are weapons of war i,e, spears, battle axes, firearms, (i.e. bullets) knives etc.

Traditionally, then 'playing' between districts was a means by which districts could cope with this structural tension in the territorial and political organization of the Zulu. Among many Zulu traditionalists, district opposition is considered to be quite desirable and even 'healthy' as long as it was expressed in the UMGANGELA mode. It is argued that a tribe with no inter-district oppositions could not possibly be a powerful one because the warriors could not know, develop and trust each others fighting abilities. So as long as the expression of the district opposition assumes a "play" mode, it is quite acceptable. In the UMGANGELA each 'cheek' (UMHLATI/ISIQIMTI) contributes fighters to its districts forces. The UMGANGELA takes place after weddings and for the young men involved the wedding is often simply regarded as the channel through which the UMGANGELA can find its expression. All through the wedding one notices little groups of armed men from different 'cheeks' arriving singing UMGAMGELA songs and shouting war cries. All the cheeks of a district march independently to the wedding and on arrival melt into each other to form a unified fighting body representing their district. The district 'captain' (UMPHATHI) then takes command of the whole group. The captain elected by a vote from all the 'cheeks'. No individuals within the 'cheek' or its district may fight each other at the UMGANGELA and if there are differences between such individuals they must fight before the UMGANGELA or afterwards, but never in the presence of other districts. The districts form a semi-circle of fighters and shout war cries at each other over a distance of about 30 meters. There is extreme tension and the captains of each group control their men with absolute authority. Those eager to fight will dash out and GIYELA the other district (i.e. perform a war antic) aimed at provoking a man from the other district to also step out at which point the two will engage in battle. Under no circumstances can any fighter:

1. hit someone on the ground
2. stab him with the sharpened ends of his blocking stick or with the point of the striking stick (INHLABELO)
3. continue fighting when a captain comes between the two combatants for any reason (usually because they are holding each other's weapons in a clinch)
4. continue beating an injured opponent after the latter has shouted out "maluje!" or "khumu"!

When a man is killed at an UMGANGELA, the killer 'has no court case' because they were both 'playing' and it was an unfortunate accident.

Today the UMGANGELA operates only in the Mahlabathini, Nongoma, and more northern parts of Zululand. Versions of it occur in many other districts. In Msinga it is totally absent and inter-district stickfighting here assumes what a traditional Zulu in Mahlabathini would call 'war'. This is an interesting expression of Msinga's historical experience. The loss of the capacity to contain the opposition between districts by means of ordered inter-district 'play' fighting, can I think be seen in terms of the following argument.

As more and more people entered the reserves to find a home, districts began to stress their autonomy and independence. This was due to their interest in guarding and protecting their already over-strained grazing

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grounds from encroachment by cattle from other districts. Each district had its own grazing area and:

> "Communal land tenure meant that boundary disputes could not be resolved by litigation between individuals but were likely to mean confrontation between whole districts".(72)

Districts in this situation began to develop an exaggerated sense of corporateness.(73) Each district had an appointed war captain (UMPATHI WEZINSIWZA) whose job it was to coordinate the districts martial capabilities in order to maintain the integrity of the district's 'estate'(74) In Msinga inter-district stick fighting was called UDEDE which basically means a no-holds-barred clash. While a structural need to express district opposition was present, the means to do so ("play" fighting) was not. Although they still used the word play, its result in Msinga and in the Zulu UMGANGELA was totally different. The reason for this is that no matter how much the fight was called playing, the 'play' aspect of it had been over-laid by a whole new set of connotations. Losing a 'play' stick fight with another district immediately reflected on your ability to defend and protect your district's estate. This added a very serious element to the 'play' fight. This was compounded by the fact when a man was killed in such a clash, the dead man's district had to revenge his death, for to neglect to do so would give the killer's district the impression that the dead man's district was incapable of standing together as a corporate group to protect its estate. If vengeance is not exacted it will be said that the people of such and such a district 'have not built their homestead's firmly', and reflects on the district's "firmness" (UKUQINA KWESIGODI)

Now within each district, 'cheeks' also started to compete with each other over land for cultivation and grazing which was held by the community as a whole. This tension was contained simply by the fact that if the 'cheeks' fought each other, their collective corporate estate which was held at a district level, would be threatened by other districts and could not be defended because its corporateness was being undermined by internal strife. All the methods that the border districts used to sneak their cattle onto farms were used by central districts on each other(75). In some districts the tension between 'cheeks' became so great that the district collapsed into a state of war between the different 'cheeks'. When this happens a district is said to "QAMULA PHAKATHI" which means to 'break in half' or 'turn in on itself'. The first Chunu district to turn in on itself was the district of DUNGAMANZI ('Muddy waters') round about 1929(76). The district's 'cheeks' fought a bitter struggle against each other in which many people died, neighbour killing neighbour. This district still has trouble keeping its 'cheeks' together and they are presently still feuding. The next district to 'break inside' was the district of UTHULI LWEZULU ('Zulu dust') in 1935(77). One cheek led by Chunus attacked the other which was led by Zulus (i.e. of the Zulu clan). The Zulus lost seven men(78). These cheeks fought again in April 1957, and 15 people were killed and 18 wounded(79). The phenomenon of 'breaking inside' of districts is considered to be a terrible abberation (UMKHOKHA) by the Msinga people but once it starts there is no mechanism which can bring the hostilities to an end.

In the 1940's the district of DUMAKUDE fought with the district of UMBANGO(80). The DUMAKUDE district also fought the district of EMADULANENI in February 1950 leaving ten dead and 9 seriously wounded. This fight errupted after the Native Commissioner at Tugela Ferry had

> "decided a dispute over the boundary of certain mealie lands in the EMADULANENI and DUMAKUDE zones of the Chunu tribe".(81)

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In analysing the structure of the hostilities between 'cheeks' and between districts, a startling fact emerges. Because the feud has its roots in boundary disputes and land hunger, territorial affiliation to a district overrides your loyalty to your clan and even your immediate family, if they reside in another district. An interview with a war captain from ENKANENI in the Chunu reserve reveals this point quite clearly:

Q. "You are of the Ndawonde clan. What happens if your district fights against another district and there are members of your clan among them?"

A. "We beat them, we kill them. Perhaps I have a brother who is younger than I who has built his homestead on the other side. We will try and avoid each other in battle but my neighbours will beat him. I hear later that they have killed him. I take something and cover him so that others can see that there was someone on the other side who knew him. Your clan name is not important but the place in which you live, there where you have raised your homestead".

Q. "But it does happen that sometimes a man will join the other district because he has lots of family and relatives there ?"

A. ".. yes, but then he must move out of this district and go and build his homestead with them".

Q. "So I am a Clegg who lives in Hillbrow, but my family and relatives live in Bellevue and its induna is a Clegg. If a war breaks out between Hillbrow and Bellevue I have to fight my own people. The question is now who can I ultimately trust?"

A. "Your immediate neighbours, your neighbours are the ones who you trust. When you shout across to them that you are being attacked, they will help you. If they don't help you, you will move away and say: "This place has no men. Such and such befell me and you never came, such and such occurred and you never saw me. In other words you do not regard me as one of you." You see your neighbours are your family. He is your brother."

Q. "Does this mean that your neighbours are more important than you clansmen?"

A. Yes. For instance, my brother lives over there and he is on the way to visit me. Suddenly my neighbour arrives. I will give him the beer. I won't wait for my brother. I build a relationship with my neighbour because he is the one who will see me through difficult circumstances".(82)

From this it is clear that kinship cannot act as a mechanism for bringing the feud to an end, although it can be used to identify powerful clans within a district. In Msinga the feud is referred to as a blood debt between two feuding 'cheeks' or districts. (In Zulu: ISIKWELETE from the Afrikaans 'skuldt' - 'a debt, fault, blame, etc). The act of feuding is referred to as UKUKHOKHISA (lit.'to enforce payment'), or UKUBUYISA ISIDUMBU ('to bring back the body).

The Feud starts when one district or 'cheek' kills a member of another district/'cheek'. The latter district must then attempt 'to bring back the body' of the deceased member by means of a body from the killer's district. The people of Msinga explain this by using the proverb: "Iva likishwa ngelinye (a thorn is removed by means of another thorn)".

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If the killer goes into hiding and cannot be located, any member of his district can be substituted due to the corporate nature of the district. When he is killed, his district must also 'bring him back' with a body from the other district.

Before the advent of the feud 'assassination squads' so prevalent today, the hostilities between districts or 'cheeks' took on the form of a regimental confrontation. The problem with these big clashes is that members of the district working in the towns were required to take a few days off work in order to go back to the reserve to confron the members of the other district who had also left their jobs to come home and fight. The confrontation would take place and those left alive would return back to work as soon as possible to find that their employers had not taken kindly to the worker's sudden absence, and they were accordingly dismissed.

This gave rise to the assassination squads. A few trusted fighters usually referred to as AMASHINGA would be delegated the task of 'bringing back' the bodies of murdered district members and to generally keep ahead in feud by keeping the other district's 'score' down. This little group of full-time professional 'feuders' are supported by a fund created by those men working in the city who would have had to leave their jobs periodically in order to participate in the feud. The assassination squad performed a crucial function in that it enabled members of the district to fight 'by proxy', and keep their jobs. These squads are also powerful forces within their own district by virtue of the fact that they are very well armed and hold the lives of the district's members in their hands as they try to ensure that the other district's'assassination squad'is not effective. Although the scale of the fighting has been reduced by the squads they kill more people than would have been killed in a big confrontation because they are highly mobile, small and ruthless. The squads have their disadvantages which are pointed out by older men who were involved in the very early regimental confrontations. The advantages of a big confrontation was that it was an event in which both districts mustered all their men, faced each other, and in a huge clash re-affirmed their districts' intergrity. The battle would become a major aspect of the district's history because it was a <u>social</u> act and the deaths took on an air of legitimacy and appropriateness. This is because each and every fighter, was able to defend himself and the clash would therefore reveal the true mettle of each district's men. It was more 'fair' and acceptable than an anonymous assassins bullet in the night. After the big regimental confrontation it was said that those involved became 'satisfied'.

> "The war must be fought. If the war is not fought then the feud does not end. On that day many people will die as both sides sleep in the hills and wait for the confrontation. They will die in front of your eyes and you will die in front of their eyes too. That day the feud will lose its impetus".(84)

The feud would die down until the generation of youngsters began to BODLA (bellow, come of age). They would tell the other district's men that:

> "You beat our fathers, but we were not there".

And the scene would be set for another big regimental confrontation.

Another interesting observation by older men of the regimental tradition of feuding, is that the assassination squad stands to lose in a way if the feud comes to an end. They are being paid to fight and perhaps it is not in their interest to allow hostilities to cease.

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Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to trace the development of the 'ideology of vengeance' in the Msinga and Mpofana rural locations, revealing its roots and emergence in the acute land shortage experienced in the reserves. I have tried to show that the general land squeeze both in and outside the reserve generated inter-tribal wars which developed into a tradition of self-help. The continual influx of people into the reserve placed an enormous strain on the tribe's territorial resources. Competition over grazing grounds and land for cultivation caused districts and 'cheeks' to stress their corporateness and autonomy as each territorial unit sought to preserve its estate. This brought out and emphasized the ever present but latent tensions inherent in the structure of the territorial organization of the Zulu. Traditionally the latent opposition between districts was allowed to emerge in the UMGANGELA which was a cultural device ritualizing and containing these potential disrupting forces and facilitating their expression. No such institution developed in Msinga becase all 'play' fighting was inevitably linked to the ability of the district to protect its estate and 'play' fighting in Msinga assumed connotations which the UMGANGELA sought to suppress. The constant emphasis on the corporateness of the district and its ability to defend its estate from other districts generated a powerful idea of territorial affiliation which played down and over-rode kinship considerations in the feud. This de-emphasis on the role of kinship in the feud simultaneously stripped the feud of a potential mechanism which could bring pressure on the feuding districts to end the hostilities.

The struggle over land gave rise to strategies like hut burning where each tribe/district/'cheek' as the case may be tried to force the boundary back into its opponent's territory.

Finally 'faction fighting' must be seen as an active attempt on the part of the traditionalist to maintain the infra structure of his rural economy. The threat to this economy, is diminishing land created by overpopulation. The colonial government gave the reserve an external boundary but left the people in the reserve to sort out their own internal boundaries, paving the way for the emergence of an 'ideology of vengeance.'

FOOTNOTES

1. A feud is..... "a series (at least three instances) of acts of violence, usually involving killings, committed by members of two groups related to each other by superimposed political-structural features (often involving the existence of an over-all political authority) and acting on the basis of group solidarity (a common duty to avenge and a common liability)." Quoted in W.J. Argyle "Faction Fights and the Problem of Explanation in Social Anthropology" (n.d.)

2. 'Vengeance' is a certain kind of praxis which has a set of ideas making the act intelligible and meaningful to the people involved. "Bringing back the body" is such an idea. The ideology of vengeance therefore refers to the logic behind such statements which legitimize the act of feuding.

3. "Reluctant Rebellion" - S. Marks, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970. p. 217

4. "Olden times in Zululand" - A.T. Bryant. Logmans and Green

5. Blue Book on Native Affairs Magistrates Reports 1879-1882 Umsinga division 1881 p. 208

6. "Reluctant Rebellion - S. Marks. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970 p. 41-42

7. Natal Blue Book, Departmental Reports. 1893-1894 Umsinga division, p. B.16

8. Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs 1879-1882. Magistrates reports Division of Weenen, 1880, p. 102

9. Natal Blue Book, Departmental reports 1887 Weenen county, p. 64

10. Blue Book on Native Affairs. Magistrates reports 1879-1882. p. 208

11. Justice Department, Correspondence, 4/158/22. Letter from Magistrate to Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg. 8/3/1923.

12. "The Nongqai" July 1923 p. 379.

13. Ibid

14. Justice Department, Magistrate of Mpofana, annual report 1921 4/158/22. p. 3

15. Ibid

16. Natal Blue Book, Departmental reports. 1896. UMSINGA Division p. B.18

17. Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1902 District of MSINGA, p. A5

18. Natal Blue Book, Deaprtmental reports. 1905 UMSINGA division p. 3

19. Ibid p. 23

20. The Nongqai, 1923 p. 379

21. Ibid

22. Justice Department, Correspondence 4/158/22 letter from Magistrate of Mpofana to Secretary for Justice. 25th Oct. 1922

23. Justice Department, Correspondence, No. 5; (1/811/12)

24. Ibid

25. Ibid

26. Third census of the population of the Union of South Africa 3rd May 1921 Parts 1 to 9, p. 4.

27. Ibid

28. Ibid p. 37

29. Justice Department. Correspondence - Annual Magistrates report for Mpofana. 1921. 1/811/12

30. Justice Department. Correspondence 4/158/22 letter from Magistrate of Mpofana to the Secretary of Justice 25/10/23 p. 1

31. "Reluctant Rebellion" S. Marks, Oxford 1970, p. 319

32. Justice Department. Correspondence 4/158/22 Letter from Magistrate of Helpmekaar division to Chief Native Commissioner 1, 5, 1922 p. 4

33. Justice Department. Correspondence 4/158/22

34. Justice Department - Correspondence. Letter from Magistrate 4/158/22 of Mpofana to Mr Keay. 31/5/22 p. 2

35. Justice Department. Correspondence 4/158/22

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. "Reluctant Rebellion" S. Marks Oxford 1970

40. The Star, 12th November 1934

41. The Rand Daily Mail, 24th August 1931

42. Justice Department. Correspondence 4/158/22. Magistrates Annual Report for Mpofana. 1921.

43. The Nongai(The Natal Police Magazine)Vol. 1 1907 pg. 79-80

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45. The Star, February 1926

46. The Star 26/11/1926 and 11/12/1926

47. The Star 24/8/1931

48. The Star 21/8/1931

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50. Ibid

51. The Star 12/7/1931

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60. Ibid

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63. The Star 12/1/1945

64. Magistrates report, Msinga district. Natal Blue Book 1883 "As usual natives prefer to congregate on farms , the owners of which are stock farmers... I am informed that they carefully avoid farms where much agriculture is carried on". p. G.G. 11

65. Interview with M. Zulu, of UTHULILWEZULU district, EMACHUNWINI

66. Ibid

67. Interview with B. Qoma from MHLANGANA district, EMACHUNWINI (now residing in MAHLABATHINI

68. Ibid

69. Interview, with M. Zulu

70. "Die Zulu Isgodi" African Studies Vol. 15:2 1941 p. 115-116 J.F. Holleman

71. Ibid

72. W.J. Argyle "Faction Fighting and the Problem of explanation in Social Anthropology" Seminar paper p. 11. (n.d.)

73. Ibid

74. An estate includes "....not only natural resources (such as land, livestock and water) and other property (moveable and immoveable), but also rights in rem over their members, together with their collective status and prestige." W.J. Argyle "Faction Fighting and the Problem of Explanation in Social Anthropology" p. 7.

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