



FIFA's Goal: The Role of FIFA in International Football Development

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Acronyms

AFC: Asian Football Confederation

AFCON: African Cup of Nations

CAF: Confederation of African Football

CAS: Court of Arbitration for Sport

CBF: Brazilian Football Confederation

CONCACAF: Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football

CONIFA: Confederation of Independent Football Associations

CONMEBOL: Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol

FA: The Football Association of England

FASA: Football Association of South Africa

FIFA: Federation Internationale de Football Association

FLN: National Liberation Front of Algeria

GI: Government Interference

IFAB: International Football Association Board

ISL: International Sport and Leisure

OFC: Oceania Football Confederation

PSG: Paris Saint-Germain

RICO Act: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act

SAFA: South African Football Association

TANU: Tanganyika African National Union

UEFA: Union of European Football Associations

Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis investigates and seeks to understand and explain what role FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association), football's world governing body, plays as an international organisation within the world of football. The central research question that this thesis seeks to answer is "Do FIFA's actions towards African football associations stimulate development of football in those nations?" Other research questions that this thesis would seek to answer include: What role does FIFA play as an international organisation? What do states gain out of hosting sporting mega-events such as the World Cup? Do these events aid in development? And finally, does FIFA suspend states from developing nations more often than those from developed nations despite similar offences being committed? This thesis hypothesises that FIFA structures perpetuate a certain level of underdevelopment in developing states by promoting a status-quo designed mainly to increase FIFA's profits, and ultimately this status-quo undermines the development of the game in Africa. In attempting to answer these questions, this thesis examines the role that sport (and more specifically football) plays in politics and society. This thesis examines the structures that exist within FIFA and whether these structures perpetuate the status quo in terms of development. Finally, this thesis examines cases of FIFA suspending nations for government interference, and what bearing those suspensions have on development.

In approaching this subject, we also need to define what constitutes development within football, and what would then constitute developmental failures and successes within football, as well as the relationship between football and development.

From increasing awareness of health issues such as HIV/AIDS and the rehabilitation of people with disabilities, to community unity and discouraging criminal behavior, sport, both competitive and recreational, has long been used to foster social cohesion and community understanding. Sport also has the ability to improve economic development through its impact upon society (Levermore and Beacom 2019). As will be discussed later on in this paper, football in particular has been used in Africa to foster nation-building in post-colonial African states.

Within football, defining what can be constituted as failures and successes in terms of development is also important. Obviously, a notable indicator of successful development would be success on the pitch itself, such as winning a continental competition or even the World Cup itself; not just at senior level, but across all age groups and genders. For example, while Nigeria has reached the final of multiple FIFA U-20 World Cups, they have not yet won, nor have they managed to advance beyond the first knockout round of a FIFA World Cup. However, they have won the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) three times. Similarly, the Nigerian Women's national team has won the Women's AFCON eleven times (out of thirteen tournaments), and are one of seven nations to appear at every FIFA Women's World Cup, yet they have only advanced out of the group stages twice (Nigerian Football Federation 2019). This suggests an imbalance of development not just between age groups and gender, but also in comparison to the rest of Africa, and the rest of the world. As a developing nation, it is no surprise that Nigeria have not been able to develop their football team as much as developing nations have.

However, being a developed nation is also not a guarantor of successful football development. The United States of America, for example, is a relatively weak footballing nation in the men's game, across all age groups, and failed to qualify for the last FIFA World Cup, in 2018. However, they have reached the final of the CONCACAF Gold Cup eleven times, winning the tournament six times, and they have hosted or co-hosted every tournament since 1991. Conversely, the US Women's national team is one of the most successful and dominant teams in the game, winning the CONCACAF Women's Gold Cup eight times (out of ten tournaments), winning the World Cup three times, more than any other nation, as well as winning the Olympic gold medal on four occasions (USSF 2019).

Successful development off the pitch can be defined as successful grassroots programs both in terms of player development and coaching development, as well as the existence of professional leagues for clubs. Players earning a living wage from their clubs and having their rights protected by their federations, in the event of non-payment or the collapse of a club are also indicators of successful development.

While all but the lowest-ranked nations host a professional domestic league for men's football clubs, the same is not true in the women's game. Very few nations have fully professional leagues and clubs, and as with other industries, players are underpaid in comparison to male

players. Indeed, players from the US women's team are currently involved in a legal battle with the US Soccer Federation over their lack of equal compensation (McCann 2019). Across the world, women's football is rife with tales of lack of funding and women being either not paid or underpaid (Udoh 2019). It has resulted in a situation where a number of teams playing at the FIFA Women's World Cup have squads made up of players who have either recently turned professional, or are still amateurs, requiring them to hold full time jobs in order to support themselves and their families. This then leads to an under-performance on the pitch, against players who are professional, as was evident in the United States' 13-0 dismantling of Thailand in the 2019 World Cup.

Thus, the successes and failures of development within football involve not just performance on the pitch, but also performance off of it. It also involves the care given to players across age groups and genders, as well as the quality of the coaching that players receive.

The second and third chapters of this thesis discuss the research methodology and the theories applied in this thesis respectively. The fourth chapter is an examination of FIFA as an organisation, incorporating the history and governance structures of the organisation, as well as a discussion of the organisation's finances, the importance of the FIFA World Cup to FIFA and the 2015 Corruption Scandal. Chapter five discusses the relationship between African football and FIFA, including pre-decolonisation, as well as the African political bloc within FIFA. Chapter six discusses the findings related to FIFA's use of the rule surrounding third-party interference, and how that rule affects each confederation. Chapter seven analyses FIFA's role in football development, and concludes the thesis. Chapter eight contains the bibliography. There is an appendix attached containing all the instances in which a FIFA member was facing suspension or was suspended between 1961 and 2018.

Over the centuries, certain states have developed faster than other states. The reasons for this are myriad, but it has resulted in a world where there is a global north and a global south. Since the end of the Second World War and the advent of decolonisation, states in the global south have embarked upon numerous development programs in order to try and attain the level of development achieved by states in the West and the global north. Many of these programs are in fact recommended by Western bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank. This is because the standard of development has been set by Western powers. Other paths towards development include attempting to attract foreign investment. One way in which many states have attempted

to attract foreign investors is by hosting sporting mega-events such as the FIFA Football World Cup (the most prestigious event in the most watched sport in the world) and the Olympic Games (Cornelissen, Bob and Swart 2011). The BRICS states in particular have chosen to go down this route in the last ten years.

Of the nine editions of the World Cup and Summer and Winter Olympic Games between 2008 and 2018, BRICS nations hosted six of them; comprising all three FIFA World Cups¹ during that period; as well as the 2010 Commonwealth Games²; the 2008 and 2016 Summer Olympic Games³, and the 2014 Winter Olympic Games⁴ (Grix and Lee 2013). Hosting such mega-events is thought to attract not only foreign investment, but also in attracting heavy tourism long-term. However, in many cases (such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa), the increase in tourism does not last for a significant period of time after the event has taken place. Of course, there are also many drawbacks to hosting such events, including exorbitant building costs and stadia which do not pay themselves off for decades to come, such as the Olympic Stadium in Montreal, which took thirty years to pay off (Dowse and Fletcher).

When states wish to host a World Cup (or any other mega-sporting event), they go through a bidding process whereby the state's existing infrastructure (both sporting and general) is investigated by FIFA in order to assess the capacity that the state has to host the tournament. This is coupled with an assessment of the states future plans to improve not only existing infrastructure but also to build new infrastructure, and the viability of those plans. Following on from this process, the bids are voted on by members of the FIFA Congress, which comprises all 211 member-nations of FIFA (Tang 2017). Recently this bidding process has come under scrutiny amid claims of corruption and bribery. These claims relate especially to the bidding processes for the 2010, 2018 and 2022 World Cups, hosted by South Africa, Russia and Qatar respectively.

While the bidding process obviously involves the national government of a bidding nation, FIFA places restrictions on the amount of involvement that those governments can have in the general running of the national football association (FIFA 2018). FIFA requires that all member

¹ South Africa in 2010, Brazil in 2014, and Russia in 2018

² In Delhi, India

³ In Beijing, China, in 2008 and in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2016

⁴ In Sochi, Russia

associations are run independently of their national governments, with no involvement at all from national government in the running of the member associations. Should FIFA find that national associations have been unduly influenced by their governments then they suspend the national association from participation in FIFA-sanctioned competitions. A major criticism of FIFA's actions in this regard is that they appear to ban countries from developing nations more than those in developed nations, despite similar offences by developed nations (Hylton, 2017). Suspending or banning national associations from FIFA events can be hugely detrimental to the national association in question, as well as to the state from which the association hails.

It should also be noted that FIFA has designed the World Cup in order to maximise its own profits. This has been done through extremely lucrative sponsorship deals with (amongst others) the likes of Adidas, Coca-Cola and Budweiser, as well as through imposing laws upon host nations which ensure that FIFA pays no taxes to the host nation and that the brand power of their sponsors remains intact. This means that for FIFA, the World Cup is pure profit, while for host nations it can result in massive losses of capital (Tang 2017).

Europe and South America have dominated international football on the pitch for the last century. Because of this, the two continents have also dominated FIFA's governance of the game. This began to change in the 1970s, with more and more attention being given to Africa and Asia. This came about through former FIFA president Joao Havelange, who promised African nations in particular that he would expand the World Cup and also help to improve football development in Africa, should they vote for him to become FIFA President (Jennings 2007). Havelange won and remained president for the next twenty-four years, before being replaced by his protégé, Sepp Blatter, who continued Havelange's tactic of appealing to developing states for political clout (Jennings 2007). Sepp Blatter was forced out of office in disgrace in 2015 after the US Justice Department launched an investigation into corruption within FIFA, and many officials from developing states who had become his strongest allies were also implicated in the scandal (BBC 2015).

Blatter's replacement, Gianni Infantino, appears to have also recognised the power that developing states have within FIFA. When Havelange was elected president of FIFA in 1974, there were forty-two independent African nations, but only one guaranteed World Cup spot in a sixteen team World Cup. By the time Blatter took office in 1998, there were fifty-two independent African states, and five guaranteed World Cup spots in a thirty-two team World

Cup. Gianni Infantino has proposed to expand the World Cup to forty-eight teams by 2026 and grant nine guaranteed spots to African nations (Gibson 2016). There are currently fifty-four African members of FIFA. To contextualise this, there are currently fifty-five European members of FIFA (including Israel, who compete as a European team), with thirteen guaranteed spots in the thirty-two team 2018 World Cup, and this number would expand to sixteen guaranteed spots in a forty-eight team World Cup (Guardian Sport 2016).

However, while FIFA's rhetoric over the last five decades has increasingly focussed on improving the game within developing nations and trying to help developing nations reach the standard of football found in developed nations, FIFA's actions have often demonstrated a preference for maintaining the status-quo. While steps have been taken to increase the access to the World Cup for regions such as Africa and Asia, FIFA's use of warnings and suspensions against its own members appears to disproportionately affect associations from those two regions in comparison to those from Europe and South America.

Based on the above information, we can see that while FIFA has long claimed to be a champion of the developing world and has long made promises to assist the developing world, there is clear evidence that FIFA acts in entirely self-interested ways and is mainly focused on maintaining the status-quo in order to ensure its profits. By and large, development in football is still delineated along colonial lines, much like many other industries across the developing world. This has manifested itself in the gap between European and South American associations and African and Asian associations. FIFA as an organisation has largely focused its actions on developing football in Europe and South America while talking about developing football in Africa and Asia and not adequately investing in football in those regions.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The methodological approach taken in researching this thesis was a mixed-methods approach, combining the congruence method and process tracing (George and Bennett, 2015). Additionally, the thesis will be using a deductive approach to theory, as the thesis will be testing theory against cases as opposed to trying to generate a theory from existing cases. The outcome being investigated is the role of FIFA in development. The independent variables (IV) are corruption and suspension, and the dependent variable (DV) is developing states. The case studies used were sixty-four instances of an association being warned or suspended by FIFA, as well as the corruption crisis. Additionally, the African context was used to help understand the effect that FIFA has on developing states in Africa. The actual research was conducted through an investigation of news and journal articles, as well as official FIFA statements. As the congruence method does not require a causal link to be established between the independent and dependant variables, process tracing was used in order to assess the relationship between the variables and the outcome, in order to explain why or why not the research corresponds with the theory (Waldner, 2012).

An examination of the literature available was fairly extensive. Numerous books and journal articles were read in order to understand the role of sports governance in society and the impact that FIFA has had on development. Books and articles about the corruption crisis and the history, structure and finances of FIFA were used to understand how these aspects impacted upon FIFA's capacity to involve itself in development. While books and journal articles were key to the research conducted, the nature of sports reporting, particularly within football, meant that non-traditional forms of media, such as blogs were also crucial in the research process. News articles were also thoroughly examined, particularly surrounding the case studies and the 2015 corruption scandal.

There was a strong attempt to avoid a selection bias in the case studies chosen, and so the table compiled of the suspensions and warnings handed out by FIFA (see Table 1 and Appendix A) is more comprehensive than any encountered in the existing literature. This does not, however, mean that it is the most comprehensive table or that it is an exhaustive list of the warnings and suspensions handed out by FIFA. In order to limit the scope of the research, the table only includes sanctions where the possible punishment faced by an association was suspension by

FIFA. Offences where the punishment faced was a fine, a stadium ban, or a points deduction, were therefore not included nor investigated. Extreme difficulties were encountered in the research stage with regards to compiling the sanctions table, as FIFA does not maintain a list nor a database of associations which it has sanctioned throughout its history. There was also a dearth of documents available online relating to FIFA's disciplinary measures prior to 1995 and finances prior to 2002. Furthermore, a lack of transparency by the organisation meant that the reasons for warnings and suspensions were not always given in the statements published by FIFA relating to why an association was warned or suspended. In those cases where information could not be found from the primary source (FIFA), the research turned to news articles. Here, again, a lack of widely available documents online prior to 2000 posed a problem, but this was overcome with further extensive research. Another prominent issue was the reliability of FIFA. Given the organisation's history of corruption and lack of institutional transparency, it is unclear how trustworthy FIFA's published accounts are. As these are the only publicly available documents, however, a true interrogation of the trustworthiness of these documents was not possible. A large amount of academic research on FIFA, football development and sports governance is available, and this was researched quite extensively.

This thesis focussed its scope upon men's football and all references to the World Cup and to on-pitch events relate to men's football. This was chosen because it is the most widely researched area of the sport, as well as the most developed area. While other areas of football exist, such as women's football and futsal, the lack of research on those subjects and the small size of their industries in comparison to men's football make them unviable as research areas for the purposes of this thesis.

Chapter 3: Theory

Several theories can be applied in this thesis. Constructivism, Liberalism, Marxism and world systems theory all have a role to play in explaining the relationship between FIFA, developing states, and developed states. Constructivism aids in explaining why there is a disparity in the number of World Cup places given to European sides compared to African sides, despite having the same number of FIFA members. Marxism aids in critiquing FIFA's profit-making, and the effect that that profit-making has on states. World systems theory helps to describe the nature of the international system within FIFA, and the interaction of actors within that system. Liberalism aids in explaining how actors within FIFA work together.

3.1: Constructivism

Constructivism is about what forces cause actors to act. Constructivism argues that in the international system, states behave within socially and historically created structures (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011). This theory can be seen quite clearly within the context of post-colonial relations between former colonial powers and their former colonies (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011). Due to the historic oppression by the former colonial powers, many former colonies interact with these former colonial masters in a very exploited way (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011). This includes allowing multi-national corporations based in former colonial powers greater autonomy within the borders of former colonies. In these cases agency and structure have a mutual effect on one another. While former colonies may have the agency to act in a way which prevents exploitation by their former colonial masters, the nature of the structures that exist between these states means that by and large that agency becomes eroded, as former colonies often cannot afford to not engage with their former colonisers on their colonisers' terms. This is also as a result of the set-up of the international system. Constructivism is about what causes actors to act.

Constructivism is applicable in this context due to the fact that developing nations which host the World Cup are left with the high long-term costs of hosting the World Cup, while the bigger foreign powers (in this case, FIFA, though this term does usually refer to a state, as opposed to a non-state actor) reap large profits. FIFA can be likened to a foreign, developed power (as a

multi-national corporation, rather than as a state) due to the nature of its profit margins and proliferation around the world. This is a result of socially constructed interactions, as FIFA was set up by individuals from the developed world and is based in a developed world. As will be explored throughout the thesis, FIFA behaves in ways very similar to large multi-national mining companies. Multi-national corporations are a notable aspect in which former colonial powers continue to exploit their former colonies through the use of soft power. Constructivism is also applicable in the area of African football and the impact that FIFA has had on African football development, especially as regards players moving in between Africa and colonial powers. It helps to explain the way in which FIFA acts towards developing nations and how those nations interact with FIFA and other nations. Constructivism also aids in understanding the legal order that FIFA has set up which perpetuates the system which earns it profit above all else.

A key component of Constructivism is also the adherence to social norms by actors within a system. FIFA's construction of its own legal order and its own system of governance, and the history behind that construction has led to actors adhering to norms which are associated with their identity within football (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011). For example, the British Home Nations adhere to norms which relate to their identities as separate entities within FIFA and their roles in not only shaping the game during the early days of its development, but also their on-going roles in shaping the Laws of the Game through IFAB.

In a footballing context, teams also adhere to certain norms relating to their tactics, abilities and levels of football development. These norms are also shaped by the footballing culture in various nations and regions and how players respond to those cultures. For example, the football culture in South America is wildly different to the culture in Europe and Africa, and this plays itself out in the style of play employed by South American teams on the pitch.

Norms also play a role on an individual level within the organisation. Sepp Blatter, for example, will have adhered to norms he developed while he was one of Joao Havelange's underlings, and then further norms that he developed after his election as President of FIFA. These norms will have shaped the decisions he made and the actions that he took.

3.2: Liberalism

Liberalism in this context is relevant to understand how various associations interact with one another and how FIFA's political system operates. A key tenet of liberalism is the idea that nations desire to work together to help one another as opposed to being in conflict with one another. Additionally, liberalism promotes self-determination of actors. This can be seen in FIFA's insistence on associations being independent of government influence; a key aspect of FIFA's legal order.

The existence of FIFA and the agreement of associations to work with one another under FIFA's banner can be considered to be in part a result of the spread of liberal ideals such as international cooperation and the spread of democracy throughout the period of FIFA's growth, which spanned the first three-quarters of the 20th century. While FIFA's relationship with democracy or the lack thereof in its members' home nations is inconsistent, its own political system and systems of governance in the FIFA Council and FIFA Congress are democratic, with each member association holding an equal vote (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011).

Co-operation between member associations under FIFA's umbrella can also be considered a result of liberal ideals. Teams agree to co-operate in the sense that they agree to play matches against one another and adhere to the Laws of the Game. FIFA as an international organisation also plays a role as a restraint (through norms and its own legal order) on certain powers gaining full control of the game itself, a core aspect of liberalism, which argues that unchecked power is a threat to individual liberties. Within FIFA's system, the insistence upon the independence of its member associations from government interference can be analysed through a liberal lens as a manifestation of the liberal ideals of the freedom of the individual. This can also be seen in FIFA's protection of players' rights in terms of their transfers between clubs (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011).

3.3: Marxism

Marxism's approach to the nature of the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can also be applied to football in understanding the hegemony of UEFA – and particularly western European countries within UEFA (Murphy 2017). Indeed, the game was spread

throughout the world by travelling merchant sailors from Europe who played the game in the various ports around the world in which their ships had docked. It was further developed by Christian missionaries from Europe before colonial governments took over the running of the game from them and used it as a tool with which to force assimilation into European society. The game then began to grow in influence as a tool for resistance against the colonial powers, and many football clubs became front organisations for political expression (Murphy 2017). Numerous revolutionaries used football as a tool for nation building in the post-colonial era, and from this we can say that in a small way, the means of production were seized by the proletariat (Murphy 2017).

In the football industry, UEFA has created a hegemony within FIFA and as the cultural centre of football. It has created this cultural hegemony by employing the “Big Five” football leagues of the Premier League from England, Ligue 1 from France, La Liga from Spain, the Bundesliga from Germany and Serie A from Italy, as well as the UEFA Champions League. These five leagues are broadcast around the world to a global audience and they boast the twenty-five richest football clubs in the world, and some of their clubs are amongst the most valuable sports clubs in the world. The Champions League Final is one of the most-watched sporting events in the world (Murphy 2017). UEFA has established itself within FIFA as a political hegemony as well, by holding more power on the FIFA Council than the other confederations. Through the British associations it also has control over the laws of the game via their presence in the IFAB, which decides on rule changes in the game. Thus we can say that from a Marxist perspective UEFA is the bourgeoisie.

African players are exploited legally by European clubs and national teams, who create a pull where the best African players want to play in Europe to test themselves at the high standard of football in Europe, and through national teams both historically and in contemporary times by perpetuating colonial migration patterns between former colonies and former colonial powers (Darby et al 2007). One need only look at the roots of much of the French squad who won the 2018 World Cup to see evidence of this. While all but two members of the squad were born in France, twelve of the twenty-one French-born players had African roots, with the economic pull of France being too strong for their parents to resist migrating towards. Europe has established itself as having a high standard of football through its dominance of the market, particularly the market for broadcasting rights, as well as the high level of development inherent in those countries making it a lot easier to develop the game there without needing to

rely on external bodies. The sale of broadcasting rights around the world has helped promote its football clubs culturally and has helped make them the richest clubs in the world.

Capitalism drove the growth of the game through the sale of broadcasting rights for international tournaments which helped to expand the coffers of FIFA. Within FIFA's structures, the bourgeoisie (UEFA) worked hard to protect their capital, fighting back against the push by the proletariat (CAF) for further representation and access to the capital by increasing access to the World Cup. The bourgeoisie long resisted efforts to reduce their access to the capital provided by the World Cup, resulting in a situation where the increase of any other body's access to the World Cup requires the increase of UEFA's access to that capital.

3.4: World Systems Theory

In understanding the convergence of economics, politics and society within football and how this affects actors within the system, world systems theory provides a good lens through which we can shape our understanding (Darby 2000). World systems theory centres around the idea that states can be divided into the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. In the core states, production is capital-intensive, with a focus on manufacturing. In peripheral states, production is focussed on the extraction of raw materials. The semi-periphery consists of states declining from the core or states aiming to grow into core states.

In the context of football, however, we cannot rely purely on economics to determine the core and periphery, as football prowess is also an indicator of strength within the system. The FIFA rankings also have a role to play here as a determinant of the relative football strength of FIFA's members. It can also be argued that the make-up of the core and peripheries change with each new World Cup cycle, as this greatly affects the ranking of teams.

In a general sense, we could constitute the core of the top nations across the confederations based on the teams who qualified for the six most recent World Cups, spanning a time period of twenty years. The core would consist of those teams who qualified for all or all but one of the World Cups during that period. For example, though they did not qualify for the most recent World Cup (2018), Italy would still be considered a core association. The core would consist

of fourteen nations⁵; seven from UEFA, two from CONCACAF, two from the AFC, two from CONMEBOL, and one from CAF.

The semi-periphery could consist of the teams who qualified for just three or four of the six most recent World Cups. Notably, despite their perceived footballing strength, three-times runners-up, the Netherlands would fall into the semi-periphery due to their failure to qualify in 2002 and 2018. The semi-periphery would thus consist of twenty-two nations⁶; eight from UEFA, five from CAF, five from CONMEBOL, three from the AFC, and one from CONCACAF. The periphery then would be made up of the remaining 175 FIFA members who have qualified for two or fewer World Cups in the last 20 years.

The World Cup is an important benchmark for national teams, as not only do they receive the prestige of playing in the biggest competition in the biggest sport in the world, but they are able to measure themselves against the best thirty-two nations in the world in a competitive game. Furthermore, the FIFA rankings are used as a guide to seeding of teams in the draw in the World Cup, its qualification systems and continental competitions and their qualification tournaments. Seeding is important as it aims to ensure that the best teams go further in the competition. Therefore, qualifying for the World Cup gives nations a better chance to qualify again for the next World Cup and for nations to do well in their continental competitions.

Rankings also provide a decent guide to how teams compare with one another. Given that the top twenty-five FIFA-ranked nations rarely change drastically over twenty years, the rankings are a very good indication of the best teams in the world over that period. Using the World Cup over twenty years as the benchmark for which teams can be considered amongst the best in the world also allows for top teams to have a slump (such as the Netherlands and Italy) and not have their overall achievements be completely disregarded. It also allows for a more diversified core and semi-periphery, as it overcomes the bias in the World Cup slot allocation, as Europe receiving twice as many slots as any other region means that they would otherwise dominate the core. Expanding the scope to twenty years takes into account the strength of teams such as Mexico, Japan and Nigeria, all three of whom come from otherwise underdeveloped regions.

⁵ Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, United States of America.

⁶ Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Ghana, Iran, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Uruguay.

Chapter 4: FIFA: The Organisation

In order to understand FIFA's role as an organisation and the capacity that it has to stimulate football development, it is important to give an overview of the history of the organisation, its structures and finances, the role that the World Cup plays, and why the 2015 corruption scandal is so important an event. This chapter, therefore will cover those topics.

4.1: History (1904 – 2019)

While various forms of football have been played throughout recorded history, the initial Laws of the Game which define association football as we know it today were not codified until 26 October 1863, with the creation of The Football Association (the FA) in England (FIFA 2017). The first ever international match took place on 30 November 1872, a 0-0 draw between Scotland and England played in Partick, Scotland. However, it was not until 1904 that a truly international governing body was constituted, the Federation Internationale de Football Association, or FIFA. FIFA began with just 7 nations as members, all European⁷ (FIFA 2017). The first non-European teams to join were South Africa in 1909 (although South Africa was suspended in 1964 due to Apartheid, with reinstatement coming only in 1992, when it was clear Apartheid was coming to an end); Argentina three years later, in 1912; and Canada in 1913. The first Asian member of FIFA was Japan in 1921 and the first Oceanian member was New Zealand in 1948.

The FA and the other British associations (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), also known as the Home Nations, refused to join FIFA in 1904, as they believed themselves to be the foremost bodies in the organisation of the game at that point, having been established forty years prior. However, by 1908 they had changed their minds and joined FIFA (Jennings 2007). In 1920, after the end of the First World War, the Home Nations withdrew from FIFA in protest at the idea of organising football games against Germany and the other defeated powers from the war. This self-imposed exile lasted for a further four years, but then all four nations withdrew again in 1928 in protest at FIFA insisting that players be compensated for playing in the Olympics (the Home Nations wanted to maintain the Olympic spirit of

⁷ Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland

amateurism). The Home Nations only re-joined in 1946, no longer able to ignore the authority that FIFA possessed over running the game (Jennings 2007)

In 1921, despite the loss of the four British Home Nations, FIFA President Jules Rimet managed to rejuvenate a flagging post-WWI FIFA. He began by ensuring FIFA took control of the organisation of football at the Summer Olympic Games in Paris in 1924 (Conn 2017). By 1928, FIFA decided that it was time that an exclusively football World Cup took place. To this end, the first World Cup took place in July 1930, in Uruguay, and was won by the host nation (FIFA 2017). The World Cup has taken place every four years since, apart from in 1942 and 1946, due to the Second World War. The previous World Cup trophy, awarded to Brazil in 1970 for becoming the first team to win the World Cup three times, was named after Rimet (FIFA 2017).

In 1932, after FIFA nearly went bankrupt due to the Great Depression, it moved its offices from the home of secretary general and treasurer Wilhelm Hirschman in Amsterdam to Zurich, in Switzerland. According to FIFA, Switzerland was chosen because of its neutrality during the First World War and because the International Olympic Committee had been moved there in 1915 (FIFA 2017). However, given that sporting federations in Switzerland enjoy tax free status – they are seen as serving a public good – and are not legally required to meet the same transparency standards as commercial companies, the move made good financial sense too. The lack of taxation and transparency also came in handy to those controlling FIFA from 1974 onwards (Conn 2017).

The 1974 presidential election changed the trajectory of FIFA forever. It was at this election that the former head of the Brazilian Sports Federation, Joao Havelange, was chosen to be the seventh President of FIFA, succeeding the Englishman Sir Stanley Rous. Havelange won the election mainly by appealing to the African and Asian members of FIFA to vote for him (Horsfield 2017). In exchange he promised to increase the number of spots at the World Cup, thereby increasing the number of spots afforded to both Africa and Asia. At the time, African and Asian nations were only afforded a single spot each in a sixteen team World Cup. Along with promising development programs that would help to improve the standard of football in Africa and Asia, Havelange proposed increasing the participants in the World Cup to twenty-four teams, and doubling the number of spots available to Africa and Asia. This, along with a

campaign that saw Havelange travel to eighty-six member associations, saw Havelange elected ahead of Rous (Horsfield 2017).

Havelange was also a ruthless businessman, and so once he assumed office, he set about increasing FIFA's bank balance, partially in order to fund the development programs he had promised. He initially achieved this by signing long-term sponsorship deals with Adidas and Coca-Cola, relationships which continue to this day (Conn 2017). Havelange's use of sponsorships was relatively new in the world of sports governance, and other sports federations followed suit with their own sponsorship deals. Today, FIFA has six main sponsors; Adidas, Coca-Cola, Wanda Group, Hyundai-Kia Motors, Qatar Airways, and Visa (FIFA 2019).

He also negotiated large fees for the broadcasting rights to the FIFA World Cup, which were exclusively distributed through International Sport and Leisure (ISL), a company that was specifically set up in the 1980s to buy broadcasting rights from FIFA and to then distribute those rights to national broadcasters around the world (Stuan 2006). ISL also expanded to buying the rights to other sporting events and leagues around the world such as the Olympics and the IAAF World Championships in Athletics as well as the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP). However, buying these rights eventually led to ISL's bankruptcy in 2001, despite a loan from FIFA (Stuan 2006).

In 1982, Havelange made good on his promise to expand the World Cup to twenty-four teams. This increased access for African teams, and came just four years after Tunisia became the first African nation to win a World Cup match⁸ in the 1978 World Cup in Argentina. Cameroon became the first African nation to reach the quarter final stage in 1990, and by 1998 the World Cup had been expanded again to 32 teams, giving Africa five spots and Asia four (FIFA 2017). One other notable development initiated by Havelange was the creation of the FIFA Women's World Cup, held in China in 1991 for the first time (Horsfield 2017). 1998 was also the year in which Havelange stepped down from the presidency and his protégé, the then-FIFA secretary general and FIFA's first-ever development officer Sepp Blatter, was elected.

After retirement, Havelange was appointed honorary FIFA President for life, though he resigned this role in 2013, after being exposed for having taken bribes from ISL to sell the

⁸ 3-1 against Mexico

company broadcasting rights to FIFA tournaments during the 1990s (Gaines 2015). Also exposed in the scandal was Havelange's former son-in-law and the head of the Brazilian football association (CBF), Ricardo Teixeira. While the evidence of these bribes, as well as evidence that Blatter knew about the bribes, had been handed to Swiss prosecutors in the early 2000s, FIFA later managed to reach a settlement with the prosecutors not to press charges (Conn 2017). As FIFA did not then pursue Havelange and Teixeira, it can be assumed that the main reason for settling this case was to keep it out of the public eye and avoid an embarrassing corruption scandal involving their former president (Conn 2017).

It was during Blatter's presidency that the scale of FIFA's corruption truly began to be exposed. The corrupt culture at FIFA is one that flourished under Havelange, and continued unchecked under Blatter. With more and more money flooding the game, it became easier and easier for executives to take kick-backs and bribes. These bribes would mainly be from potential sponsors to executives in order to ensure the company would be awarded the sponsorship contract. One notable allegation is that in 1996 Nike paid a \$40m bribe to the CBF, in order to become the sole sponsor of the Brazilian national team (Conn 2017). This is a sponsorship relationship that continues to this day (Conn 2017).

Blatter won the presidency using similar methods that Havelange had used in 1974. He travelled to numerous smaller nations and promised them support and development programmes, most notably the GOAL programme, which he launched in 1999 (Rawlinson 2015). His opponent, Lennart Johansson, the then president of UEFA, employed similar methods, but faced criticism after making racist remarks following a trip to South Africa (The Independent 1996). Blatter was also supported by the Qatari government, and in 1999 there were allegations that the Qatari government had bribed African officials US\$50 000 each to vote for Blatter (Conn 2017).

Blatter's 2002 re-election campaign came in the midst of further allegations of corruption, this time from the then-FIFA secretary general Michel Zen-Ruffinen. Zen-Ruffinen claimed to have a 21-page document that showed the scale of corruption at FIFA and particularly showed how involved Blatter was in the corruption (Conn 2017). However, a Swiss prosecutor declined to press charges and Blatter was re-elected ahead of Issa Hayatou, the then-President of CAF. Blatter was re-elected unopposed in 2007 and again in 2011.

Blatter's presidency is also, however, one which saw football becoming increasingly accessible to the wider world. During Blatter's reign, women's football grew, with the Women's World Cup growing from 12 participants to 16 participants to 24 participants. The broadcasting rights to the Women's World Cup also began to be sold to more and more broadcasters, further spreading the game. Development money from FIFA also often came earmarked for developing the women's game (FIFA 2018). More and more women's teams are now able to pay their players as full-time professionals, in part due to the increased revenue that has come with more and more sponsors seeing women's football as financially viable, which was not the case when it was not as easily accessible as it has become. That said, there is a long way to go before women's football is at the same level of development as men's football.

Blatter also pushed for the men's World Cup to be hosted in new regions, and the 2002 World Cup in Japan and South Korea was the first World Cup to be hosted in Asia and the first World Cup to be hosted by more than one nation. In 2000, FIFA decided to rotate the host nation between its confederations, and this led to South Africa becoming the first African nation to host the World Cup, in 2010 (Cornelissen, Bob, and Swart 2011). This rotation policy was discontinued in 2007. Despite the controversy surrounding the decision, the selection of Qatar as 2022 World Cup hosts means that the World Cup will be held in the Middle East for the first time. Blatter was, however, very resistant to the introduction of technology such as goal-line technology and video assistant referees in football games (CNN 2015). These technologies have since been introduced, but have not remained free of controversy.

Blatter's tenure as president was also, however, littered with bizarre incidents, such as in 2004, when asked how women's football could grow as a sport, he responded: "Let the women play in more feminine clothes like they do in volleyball. They could, for example, have tighter shorts. Female players are pretty, if you excuse me for saying so." (Paul and Christenson 2004) He also followed up the appointment of three women to FIFA's Executive Committee with "We now have three ladies on the board. Say something, ladies! You are always speaking at home, say something now!" (CNN 2015) Blatter also insisted that Nelson Mandela be wheeled out on a golf cart at the 2010 World Cup Final despite his ill health (Guardian Sport), and when Mandela died in December 2013, a few days before the 2014 World Cup draw, Blatter interrupted a planned minute's silence after just ten seconds (CNN 2015).

Perhaps the most illustrative example of how Blatter viewed his own tenure came in 2015. In the midst of the FIFA corruption crisis, FIFA released a film entitled “United Passions.” It is a dramatisation of the history of FIFA up until that point and depicted Joao Havelange and Sepp Blatter as crusaders against corruption within football. By the end of the film Blatter discovers Havelange’s corruption and begins to weed out corruption amongst his own board, who are cast as trying to force him out of office for his noble efforts. The film cost \$25m to make, funded mostly by FIFA, and made just \$907 in its opening weekend in the United States. It is generally considered by critics (both film and football) as one of the worst films ever made (Gold 2015).

On May 27th 2015, fourteen FIFA officials from CONCACAF and CONMEBOL were arrested in a joint operation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Swiss authorities (Gibson and Gayle 2015). The arrested officials were charged with racketeering and money laundering in connection with the sales of media rights. A full discussion of the corruption scandal can be found below. Two days after the arrests, Blatter won re-election as president for the fourth time, this time defeating Jordan’s Prince Ali bin Hussein (Conn 2017). On June 2nd 2015, Blatter announced that he would be stepping down as president, but on June 26th he claimed that he did not say he would resign, but rather that he was returning his mandate to the FIFA Congress (The Independent 2015). In September 2015 Swiss prosecutors announced that Blatter was under investigation for illegal payments that were made to UEFA president and French football legend Michel Platini (Conn 2017). In October 2015, under pressure from major sponsors such as Coca-Cola and Visa, Blatter and Platini were suspended by FIFA for ninety days. In December 2015 that ban was extended to eight years, but later reduced on appeal to six years (Conn 2017).

In February 2016, Gianni Infantino, the UEFA secretary general, was elected as the new president of FIFA. He promised to implement a sweeping reform programme that would attempt to address the endemic corruption within FIFA. Infantino also promised to quadruple the money given out to each member association (Gibson 2016). One of Infantino’s first acts was to appoint Fatma Samoura as the FIFA secretary general. Samoura became the first African and the first woman to hold the position (Gibson 2016). However, in July 2016, Infantino came under investigation by the FIFA ethics committee for charging personal expenses to FIFA and for conflicts of interest. He was cleared of misconduct a month later (Conn 2017).

Infantino's biggest policy change as FIFA president so far has been the implementation of reforms known as "FIFA 2.0." These reforms aim to address the systemic issues exposed by the corruption scandal, and are discussed in more detail later on in this chapter.

Infantino has also announced an expansion of the World Cup from 2026 to forty-eight teams (Guardian Sport 2016). The new format will see sixteen groups of three teams, with the top two teams in each group going through to the knockout round, expanded to thirty-two teams. The slot allocation has also been increased, with the OFC now gaining a guaranteed spot; CONCACAF and CONMEBOL receiving six spots each; the AFC receiving eight spots; CAF receiving nine spots; and UEFA receiving sixteen spots (Conn 2018). The two remaining spots will be decided by a six team play-off tournament, with one team from each confederation except for UEFA participating. The sixth spot will be taken by a second team from the host confederation (Conn 2018). Given that the 2026 World Cup will be jointly hosted by the United States, Mexico and Canada, it has not yet been decided how many automatic spots will be given to the host nations. As he is considered to have taken over Blatter's final term in office, which began in 2015, Infantino is up for re-election in June 2019. He is running unopposed (FIFA 2019).

4.2: Current Governance and Organisational Structures

While FIFA has near-complete control over the running of football off the pitch, it does not unilaterally control the Laws of the Game. Instead the laws are controlled by the International Football Association Board (IFAB). IFAB is comprised of the associations of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and FIFA (FIFA 2018). Each of the associations has one vote each, while FIFA has four votes. In order for a rule change to take effect, it must be approved by six votes (FIFA 2018). This means that while FIFA cannot change the laws of the game alone, FIFA's approval must be given to any rule change. This is the only area of professional football in which FIFA does not have sole control. FIFA's structure allows it to control the game all the way down to youth football and football clubs (Meier and Garcia 2015). This goes beyond the simple organisation of tournaments and the rules of the game. For example, even players as young as ten years old wishing to move from, say FC Barcelona in Spain to Arsenal FC in England will have their transfer examined by FIFA (Meier and Garcia 2015).

Today FIFA comprises of 211 member associations – more than the United Nations. While the vast majority of FIFA members represent sovereign states, there are some exceptions. Most prominently, due to their role in the history and formation of the modern game, the United Kingdom has four associations representing it – as mentioned above, they are England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, known as the British Home Nations (FIFA 2018). Other examples include autonomous territories such as Montserrat, a territory of the United Kingdom, and Guam and Puerto Rico, both territories of the United States. Kosovo and Palestine, two partially recognised states, are also FIFA members. Associations are also comprised of members; local or regional associations (e.g. the Randburg Football Association is a member of SAFA), and football clubs.

All members of FIFA are required to belong to one of six confederations. The six federations are: Confederation Africaine de Football (CAF)⁹; Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)¹⁰; the Asian Football Confederation (AFC)¹¹; Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF)¹²; the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC)¹³; and Confederation Sudamericana de Futbol (CONMEBOL)¹⁴. These confederations are responsible for football in each continent, and for the most part their members are based on geography. Not all members of the six confederations are FIFA members. CAF¹⁵, the AFC¹⁶, CONCACAF¹⁷ and the OFC¹⁸ all have associate members. While these associate members are eligible to compete in continental competitions, they are not eligible to compete in World Cup Qualification, as they are not FIFA members (FIFA 2018).

⁹ Founded in 1957. 56 members, with 54 being members of FIFA.

¹⁰ Founded in 1954. 55 members, all members of FIFA.

¹¹ Founded in 1954. 47 members, with 46 being members of FIFA.

¹² Founded in 1961. 41 members, with 35 being members of FIFA.

¹³ Founded in 1966. 14 members, with 11 being members of FIFA.

¹⁴ Founded in 1916. 10 members, all members of FIFA.

¹⁵ Zanzibar and Reunion.

¹⁶ Northern Mariana Islands.

¹⁷ Bonaire, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin and Sint Maarten.

¹⁸ Kiribati, Niue and Tuvalu.

Three of the six confederations; CAF, CONCACAF and the AFC, have smaller, regional federations. CAF has five¹⁹, the AFC has five²⁰, and CONCACAF has three²¹. The Union of Arab Football Associations is also a regional federation consisting of members from both CAF and the AFC. Eleven²² of the fourteen regional federations also organise a cup competition for their national teams (FIFA 2018).

Each confederation also organises a continental competition for its national teams. The Copa America, organised by CONMEBOL, is the oldest continuously running international football competition in the world, having first been played in 1916. The Copa America is also the only continental competition for which all the members of the confederation automatically qualify. To create a twelve-team tournament, two associations from other confederations are also invited to take part. The winners of each continental competition have the right to take part in the FIFA Confederations Cup, which takes place the year before a World Cup in the World Cup host nation and also features the World Cup host and the World Cup winner. If the World Cup Winner is also the confederation champion, the runner up participates on behalf of the confederation.

On the club side, each confederation also organises two continent-wide club competitions, apart from the OFC, which only organises one competition. The winner of the more senior club continental competition qualifies for the FIFA Club World Cup.

While the composition of each confederation is based on geography, there are some exceptions to this. Two prominent exceptions are Israel and Australia. Israel competes as a part of UEFA, rather than as a part of the AFC, as with the other associations from the Middle East (Meier and Garcia 2015). This is due to protests from other Middle Eastern members of the AFC in 1974 who refused to play against Israel as a result of the Arab League boycott of Israel. Until

¹⁹ Council of Southern Africa Football Associations (COSAFA), Council for East and Central Africa Football Associations (CECAFA), Central African Football Federations' Union (UNFFAC), West African Football Union (WAFU-UFOA), and Union of North African Football Federations (UNAF).

²⁰ South Asian Football Federation (SAFF), ASEAN Football Federation (AFF), East Asian Football Federation (EAFF), West Asian Football Federation (WAFF), and Central Asian Football Association (CAFA).


²¹ Central American Football Union (UNCAF), Caribbean Football Union (CFU), and North American Football Union (NAFU).

²² UNCAF, CFU, WAFU-UFOA, COSAFA, CECAFA, and all the AFC federations except the CAFA.

1994, Israel participated in the UEFA²³ and the OFC²⁴ qualifying stages of the World Cup. In 1994, it was granted full UEFA membership.

Australia was previously a member of the OFC from 1966-1972 and from 1978-2005. In 1972 they resigned from the OFC in order to seek membership of the AFC, but were rejected and forced to re-join the AFC. In 2005 Australia applied again to become a member of the AFC, citing the low quality of competition in the OFC and the fact that the OFC is not guaranteed a spot at the World Cup as reasons for wanting to join the AFC. Australia also used the precedent set by Israel joining UEFA as justification for joining the AFC (Meier and Garcia 2015). Figure 1 below (CSC 2019), illustrates the regional confederations within FIFA.

Figure 1: FIFA's Confederations



Source: CanadianSoccerClub.com

FIFA has two main institutions: The FIFA Congress, which is comprised of all 211 member associations, and the FIFA Council, which replaced the FIFA Executive Committee in 2016 (FIFA 2018). The Congress is the legislative body of FIFA, while the Council is the oversight and strategic body. The FIFA Congress meets each year, with the possibility of an Extraordinary Congress at any point, so long as one-fifth (currently this would be forty-two

²³ 1982 World Cup Qualifying stage.

²⁴ 1986 and 1990 World Cup Qualifying stages.


associations) of the associations request as much in writing (FIFA 2018). In World Cup years, the Congress meets in the largest city of the host nation, but in non-World Cup years the Congress meets in various other nations. Prior to 1998 the Congress met every two years. The Congress is a one member one vote body, and it directly elects the president of FIFA, and in a separate capacity the member associations of the Council elect the members of the Council (FIFA 2018). The Congress is also responsible for voting on changes to the FIFA Statutes, which must be done by a vote of three quarters or more in favour. Apart from elections, which are conducted by secret ballot, decisions made by the Congress are done by acclamation. The Congress is also responsible for selecting the host nations for the FIFA World Cup. Previously this was decided by the Executive Committee, but following on from the corruption scandals in 2015 and 2016, this power was transferred to the Council (FIFA 2018). The Congress has the power to suspend associations, though the Council may suspend and unsuspend associations temporarily in the periods between Congresses. Should an association be suspended by the time of a Congress, a three-quarter majority vote by Congress is required to confirm the suspension (FIFA 2018).

The Council consists of thirty-seven members, including the president of FIFA. There are eight vice-presidents, one from each confederation except for UEFA, which has three vice-presidents (FIFA 2019). Six of the vice-presidents are also the presidents of their respective confederations. In the event that the FIFA president is unable to perform their duties, the longest-serving vice-president on the Council takes over until the president can resume their duties or until a new president is elected (FIFA 2019). Currently the senior vice-president is the president of the AFC, Sheikh Salman Bin Ibrahim Al-Khalifa of Bahrain. Including vice-presidents, each confederation also elects the members of the Council (FIFA 2019). The OFC elects three Council members, CONMEBOL and the CONCACAF elect five members each, CAF and the AFC elect seven members each, and UEFA elects nine. Each association is required to elect at least one female representative to the Council (FIFA 2019). Council members, including the president, are restricted to three four year terms. The terms do not have to be consecutive. The Council also appoints the members of each of FIFA's nine standing committees²⁵, and these committee members (who may also be members of the Council) are subject to the same term limits as Council members. The Council also has the power to remove

²⁵ Medical, Players' Status, Member Associations, Football Stakeholders, Development, Governance, Referees, Finance, and Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions.

members of any committee except for the Governance Committee, whose members can only be removed by the Congress and who may not be Council members (FIFA 2019). Figure 2 below (FIFA 2019), illustrates the composition of the FIFA Council.

Figure 2: How the FIFA Council is Composed



Source: FIFA.com

There have been nine permanent Presidents of FIFA, with only one, Joao Havelange of Brazil, coming from outside of Europe. Issa Hayatou, from Cameroon, was appointed as acting president of FIFA in 2015 after the impeachment of Sepp Blatter, becoming the first African to hold the office. Hayatou was also the President of CAF at the time. The current FIFA president is Gianni Infantino. In order to stand for election as president of FIFA, an individual requires the support of at least five associations, and is required to pass a fit and proper persons test (FIFA 2018).

FIFA has also had eleven secretaries general in its history. The current secretary general is Fatma Samoura. The secretary general is appointed by the Council and is the CEO of FIFA and the head of the general secretariat, which is the administrative body of FIFA. The general secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day running of FIFA (FIFA 2018).

FIFA has three judicial bodies. These are the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee, and the Appeal Committee. (FIFA 2018) The members of these three committees are elected by Congress on the proposal of the Council. The members of the judicial committees are bound to the same rules on term limits as the Council members, and they may not be members of any other FIFA committee (FIFA 2018). The Disciplinary Committee rules on the sanctions applied to member associations based on FIFA's disciplinary code. The Ethics Committee is further subdivided into two chambers. The first is the investigatory chamber and the second is the adjudicatory chamber (FIFA 2018). The Appeal Committee hears appeals against decisions by the Disciplinary and Ethics Committees, though their decisions may be overturned by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (FIFA 2018).

As FIFA's statutes state that only one football association per country may be a FIFA member, apart from the four British associations, and that in order to be a member association, an association must represent an independent state or, failing that, represent a dependent region with the permission of the member association upon which it is dependent (FIFA 2018). As a result, certain regions and groups which are not FIFA members have joined a second football governing body: the Confederation of Independent Football Associations, or CONIFA (CONIFA 2019). CONIFA consists of fifty-four football associations which cannot qualify for FIFA membership, for the main part because they are not considered to be sovereign states (such as Zanzibar, which is a CAF associate member but not a FIFA member as it is part of Tanzania) (CONIFA 2019). There are CONIFA members representing provinces and regions within sovereign states, such as Yorkshire, from the United Kingdom, and Quebec, from Canada. CONIFA's membership mainly consists, however, of associations from partially-recognised states or disputed territories (such as Abkhazia, Tibet and Western Sahara), and associations representing transnational ethnic groups and refugees, such as Romani people, Darfur, Rohingya, and United Koreans in Japan (CONIFA 2019).

4.3: FIFA's Finances

For much of its history, FIFA made its money from membership fees paid by its member nations and a percentage of money earned from international matches, as well as the profits from the World Cup (FIFA 2002). In 1906, its total annual revenue was CHF500, the equivalent of US\$2380 today (FIFA 2002). By 1970, FIFA was earning CHF1.5 million per year, or

US\$1.6 million today. What sponsors FIFA had did not input the kind of money seen in the game today. Each association had to pay its own fare to and from games and to and from the World Cup, except for in 1930, when Uruguay offered to pay for the travel of all the World Cup participants - a gesture which secured it the hosting rights to the World Cup (FIFA 2017). Nowadays, things are very different. While associations are required to pay their membership fees in order to remain members of FIFA, this amount is just US\$300 (FIFA 2017). With 211 members, these fees bring in just US\$63300, which is less than 0.01% of FIFA's total revenue in 2017 (FIFA 2017). These days FIFA makes its money from sponsorships and the sale of broadcasting rights, as well as the World Cup (FIFA 2017). As it is registered as a charity in Switzerland, it does not pay tax on its earnings.

FIFA's financial fortunes changed thanks to the efforts of Joao Havelange and Horst Dassler, son of Adi Dassler, who had founded the sports merchandise company Adidas (Conn 2017). Horst had joined the company in the 1960s and by 1974 he had forged strong ties with FIFA; Adidas had supplied the footballs for the 1970 World Cup in Mexico (and have supplied to footballs for every World Cup since). By the time of the FIFA elections in 1974, he was looking to tap into the potential that FIFA had for sponsors, and to this end he backed Havelange for the FIFA presidency (Conn 2017). Havelange had run a campaign for the presidency which saw him travel to nearly ninety members of FIFA from developing countries and promise them development money and increased power within FIFA. However, in order to carry out these promises, Havelange and FIFA required money. Havelange saw sponsorship as the way forward, and so he and Dassler forged a strong partnership. Not long after Havelange had been elected, Coca-Cola also signed on as a FIFA sponsor (Conn 2017). Initially Coca-Cola mainly sponsored FIFA development programs around the world. Both Coca-Cola and Adidas remain FIFA sponsors to this day. With the advent of live football in the home, the potential for advertisements and sponsorships was realised (Tyers 2014). To this end, Dassler founded International Sport and Leisure (ISL), a company affiliated to FIFA which bought the broadcast rights from FIFA in order to distribute them around the world (Staun 2006). ISL later began buying broadcast contracts for other sports and other events, including the Olympics. Consequently, the price for the broadcasting packages skyrocketed over the years, as the large viewership numbers meant that advertisements would reach all corners of the globe (Tyers 2014). For the 2010 World Cup, the broadcasting rights were sold for US\$3.1 billion. The sponsorships of Adidas and Coca-Cola alone account for nearly US\$610 million of FIFA's

revenue, which was 41% of FIFA's sponsorship revenue of US\$1.5 billion over four years from 2010 - 2015 (Fraser 2015).

The sale of World Cup broadcasting rights is hugely important to FIFA's finances. While they bring in money on their own, being able to attract fans to watch the World Cup around the world is also hugely important for sponsorships. However, it was not always possible for fans to follow the World Cup as easily as it is now, and the increase in the visibility of the World Cup has also resulted in the increase in the value of the broadcasting rights. Due to the limitations of technology at the time of the first World Cup in 1930, football fans around the world had to wait until reporters in Uruguay could wire their match reports to their respective news agencies in order to find out results. There is however, some limited footage of the 1930 World Cup that FIFA filmed for posterity. With the World Cup taking place every four years, the next edition was hosted by Italy in 1934, and the final was broadcast live on radio. After a break from 1938 until 1950, due to the Second World War, the first World Cup to be broadcasted live on television was the 1954 edition, hosted by Switzerland (FIFA 2017).

Thereafter, television played a prominent part in ensuring that football became even more popular around the globe. The first World Cup to be televised live in colour was in 1970. More recently, the online streaming boom has opened up new markets for live viewers of the World Cup. By the final of the 2018 World Cup, all 64 matches of the tournament were being broadcast live around the world, and the viewership for the 2018 final (between France and Croatia) reached nearly one billion people (Keslassy 2018).

FIFA goes to great lengths to ensure that both FIFA and its sponsors are protected, lengths which some have called draconian. This includes forcing the arrest and prosecution of fans who are caught promoting products of rival companies, as happened numerous times during the 2010 World Cup (Hyde 2010). Other measures taken by FIFA in the context of the 2010 World Cup include the forced passage of laws surrounding the protection of FIFA's intellectual property. As part of any official bid for the World Cup, FIFA requires potential hosts to sign an agreement that they will protect FIFA's sponsors' exclusivity and FIFA's own intellectual property rights. FIFA also requires that countries pass laws granting FIFA a measure of control over aspects such as visas and labour regulations (Tang 2017). This agreement thus fundamentally changes a state's constitution in favour of FIFA for the period from the awarding of a bid for the World Cup to the World Cup itself, which is usually a period of six years.

Added to this is the fact that FIFA requires stadia with large capacities as venues to host matches, increasing advertising reach. Fans within the stadium are exposed to FIFA's sponsors and their products (such as food and drinks, which are marked-up within the stadia for the duration of the tournament). Viewers at home watch the football while advertising hoardings around the edges of the pitch display FIFA's various sponsors in the background. The average attendance for the 2010 World Cup was just below 50 000 people per game and the average viewership around the world was estimated at 400 million people per game. Thus the FIFA World Cup can be seen as a highly lucrative sponsorship opportunity for companies around the world. In addition to the massive television contracts and food and drinks contracts, there is also a huge market for World Cup branded merchandise, such as clothing and accessories. These products can also be marked up in price and be hugely expensive for the average fan, but very profitable for FIFA and its sponsors.

For associations which qualify for the World Cup, there is also prize money available, divided between the different stages a team reaches. In 2018, France earned US\$38 million by winning the World Cup, while Croatia received US\$28 million as runners-up. Belgium and England received US\$24 million and US\$22 million for finishing third and fourth respectively, while the teams that reached the quarter-finals received US\$16 million each. The eight teams that were knocked out in the round of 16 earned US\$12 million apiece. Teams who did not progress past the group stage took home US\$8 million each. This amounts to a total prize money allocation of US\$400 million, out of FIFA's total contribution of US\$791 million. In 1982, the total prize money allocation was US\$21 million, the equivalent of US\$42 million today (FIFA 2017).


In the published accounts for the 2018 financial year (the latest available), FIFA reported cash reserves of US\$2.7 billion, and revenues of US\$4.46 billion and a profit of US\$1.81 billion (FIFA 2019). FIFA's expenses amounted to US\$2.89 billion. This contrasted with the results reported in 2017, of cash reserves of US\$930 million, and revenue of US\$734 million and a loss of US\$189 million. In 2017, FIFA's expenses amounted to US\$923 million (FIFA 2018). This loss in 2017 was partially due to the effects of the 2015 corruption scandal, which saddled the organisation with US\$50 million in legal debt and led to the loss of a number of key sponsors such as Johnson & Johnson and Castrol (FIFA 2016), as well as the cost of the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup.

The increased revenue in 2018 was in part as a result of the sale of the rights for the 2018 FIFA World Cup. This includes the rights for TV broadcasting, marketing, licensing, and hospitality, as well as ticket sales from the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Licensing rights alone generated over 200% more than FIFA had initially budgeted for, which is partially a result of the FIFA eWorld Cup, which had been rejuvenated and rebranded for the first time in 2018 (FIFA 2019).

Figures 3 and 4 below (FIFA 2019), illustrate FIFA's total revenues and expenses for the financial cycle 2015-2018

Figure 3: FIFA's Revenues For Financial Cycle 2015-2018


REVENUE 2015-2018 (USD MILLION)



Source: FIFA Financial Report 2018

Figure 4: FIFA's Expenses For Financial Cycle 2015-2018

2015-2018 EXPENSES (USD MILLION)



Source: FIFA Financial Report 2018

In 2008, FIFA reported revenues of US\$957 million, expenses of US\$773 million and a profit of US\$184 (FIFA 2009). It did not report its cash reserves in 2008. In 2008, FIFA's development-related expenses amounted to US\$133 million, 17.2% of its total expenses (FIFA 2009). While in 2017, FIFA's development related expenses amounted to US\$477 million, or 51% of its total expenses, in 2018, development-related expenses increased to US\$578 million, just 20% of FIFA's total expenses (FIFA 2019). In 2008, income from broadcasting rights (including for the 2010 World Cup) was US\$555 million, while marketing rights accounted for US\$253 million, together they accounted for 84% of FIFA's total income (FIFA 2009). By 2017, these amounts increased to US\$229 million for broadcasting rights, and US\$245 million for marketing rights, accounting for 65% of FIFA's income. In 2018 these amounts increased further to US\$2.5 billion for broadcasting rights, and US\$1.14 billion for marketing rights, accounting for 82% of FIFA's income. Again, this is as a result of the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

The figures above show the increase in monetary flow into and out of FIFA as a result of major tournaments such as the Confederations Cup and the World Cup. It also shows the increase in income from both marketing rights and broadcasting rights over a ten year period. It also shows how FIFA has increased its spending on football development over the last ten years, with FIFA spending 33% more of its budget on development in 2017 compared to 2008. This percentage of FIFA's expenses dropped in 2018 (despite the actual amount spent increasing), due to the costs of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. This can be attributed in part to the replacement of FIFA's GOAL and Financial Assistance Programmes with the FIFA Forward Programme in May 2016.

The FIFA Forward Programme is the centrepiece of Gianni Infantino's reforms introduced after his election to president in 2016. Prior to this, FIFA's main development programme was the GOAL programme, introduced by Sepp Blatter in 1999. A big part of Blatter's election campaign in 1998, the programme went hand-in-hand with the Financial Assistance Programme which had begun under Havelange (FIFA 2002). The Financial Assistance Programme was centred around providing direct funding to associations in order for them to create their own development projects, and associations were entitled to US\$250 000 per year, and confederations were entitled to US\$5.5 million per year. The GOAL Programme consisted of funding invested directly by FIFA into specific projects. FIFA's standard investment amount was US\$500 000, but in 2015 it increased to US\$600 000. GOAL was designed to invest in infrastructure, administration, education, and youth football. A major part of the GOAL Programme was also the building of association headquarters (which FIFA referred to as "houses of football") in multiple developing nations (Conn 2017). This was proposed by Mohammed Bin-Hammam, who later became the head of the GOAL Programme, to serve as permanent reminders of FIFA's assistance in developing football (Conn 2017). Between the FAP and GOAL Programme, FIFA distributed US\$778 million to its members over the sixteen years between 1998 and 2014. Confederations received US\$331 million over that period (FIFA 2016). US\$284 million was spent on 668 projects around the world through the GOAL Programme. Of those 668 projects, 349 built association headquarters and other football-oriented facilities; 191 in Africa and 158 in Asia (FIFA 2016). US\$120 million went towards special projects such as building artificial turf pitches around the world.

FIFA Forward increased the funds released to each association. Through its FIFA Forward programme, FIFA sends funds to all 211 of its member associations. Each association is

entitled to US\$1.25 million per year between 2016 and 2018. This amount consists of US\$750 000 for FIFA-approved projects proposed by members (but mainly focussed on facilities for women's and youth football) and US\$500 000 for operational costs (Infantino 2016). This amount is available to any FIFA member association, regardless of the existing infrastructure and existing football projects. Each confederation receives US\$10 million a year for football projects, and regional bodies (such as COSAFA) receive US\$1 million a year specifically for women's and youth tournaments. Associations and confederations may also reassign some or all of the funds allocated to them to other associations or confederations. FIFA also assists in the management and implementation of the projects funded by FIFA Forward (FIFA 2016). The operational costs of members covered by FIFA range from governance to training for administrators and volunteers. Furthermore, US\$400 000 of the US\$1.5 million per year funding is divided into US\$50 000 instalments released contingent upon associations meeting certain requirements, such as running league competitions for women and girls. FIFA also allocates funds for equipment and travel and accommodation of national teams and officials, though this amount is only available to associations who cannot otherwise afford it or are geographically isolated (FIFA 2016).

The execution of the projects funded by FIFA Forward funds is overseen by the general secretariat of FIFA, which conducts audits of member associations who use the funds (Infantino 2016). The funds are released on a project-by project basis, deposited into a separate bank account set up by the association or confederation specifically for the funds, and a designated official from the association must be appointed for the monitoring of the projects and funds. Any funds not used by the end of the funding cycle roll over to the next cycle. FIFA also requires that associations indemnify FIFA from damages relating to the use of the funds (Infantino 2016). Advance payments are also allowed, but only on the approval of the Development and Finance Committees. FIFA also has the ability to deduct monies owed to FIFA by an association from the FIFA Forward funds allocated to them. The responsibility for paying the taxes on these funds lies with the association the money is allocated to, though the legal backing for the funding regulations is governed by Swiss law.

As access to these funds is controlled by FIFA regulations, meaning that countries who are currently sanctioned by FIFA do not have access to the funds. Of the US\$715 million total allocation of funds for 2016 and 2017, FIFA released only US\$393 million. US\$297 million went towards associations, and US\$96 million went to confederations and regional

associations. UEFA and the AFC claimed their full allocations, CONCACAF, the OFC, CONMEBOL, and CAF claimed 94%, 84%, 61%, and 28% of their allocations (FIFA 2016). Seven associations²⁶ accessed over 100% of their allocation, none of whom came from Africa. Of the amounts allocated to associations, those in the AFC claimed 47% of their US\$131 million allocation. 41% of CAF's US\$158 million was claimed, 57% of CONCACAF's US\$98 million was claimed, 52% of CONMEBOL's US\$26 million was claimed, 66% of the OFC's US\$32 million was claimed, and 58% of UEFA's US\$138 million was claimed (FIFA 2016). Obviously these totals differ due to the varying numbers of associations in each confederation.

Only twenty-two of Africa's fifty-four member associations claimed more than 50% of their allocation. Of the thirty-two African associations which claimed less than 50% of their full allocation of funds, twelve had been previously suspended by FIFA, with two nations (Sierra Leone and Sudan) suspended between 2016 and 2018. Sierra Leone is still banned, as of January 2019. However, given that Sudan were only suspended for two weeks, it is unlikely that the suspension completely prevented them from accessing their FIFA Forward funds (FIFA 2017). Nigeria and Sudan claimed none of their funds, two of just seven associations to do so. The other five associations are in the AFC: Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen (FIFA 2017). Given that Syria and Yemen are in the midst of civil wars, it is no surprise they did not claim any of their funds. Pakistan has faced a number of football administration issues, having not played any matches between March 2015 and August 2018 due to administrative in-fighting. They were also suspended from FIFA for five months in October 2017. Kuwait was banned between October 2015 and December 2017, which prevented it from accessing FIFA Forward funds during that time (FIFA 2017). Given that Nigeria were not banned during the period, a more likely explanation for the relative lack of funds released is that they simply did not need them or did not have any projects which met the scope of the funding. This is also likely the reason for the other associations who did not access their full FIFA Forward funds, in addition to a lack of capacity to implement the funds. South Sudan, like Syria and Yemen, is in the midst of a civil war, and claimed just 5% of their funds.

The majority of nations around the world who claimed less than 50% of their funding claimed no project costs, only operational or equipment and travel costs. Every European association bar Gibraltar and Greece claimed their full allocation of operational cost funding, but only four

²⁶ Chile, France, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, and Tahiti.

claimed travel and equipment costs (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kosovo). By comparison, twenty-four African nations claimed travel and equipment costs, with thirty-one claiming their full operational cost funding. Given that operational costs were worth US\$1 million over two years, associations may have claimed their operational costs from FIFA and used money from other funding sources that had previously been allocated to operational costs for projects instead. This is one way in which associations may have found a way around the stringent funding requirements imposed by FIFA.

4.4: The World Cup

On a sporting level, the FIFA World Cup is the ultimate prize for any player or manager. Because of this, players will give their all for their teams in order to win, more so than during the regular club season. Players can build their careers on the backs of World Cup performances, as representatives from every club in world football will be watching, and the biggest clubs will send scouts out to the tournament itself in order to find the best players for their teams. For players from the host nation, that desire to win only increases. All of this usually results in a greater spectacle for fans to enjoy, in turn increasing interest in the tournament.

It has been hosted in Europe eleven²⁷ times, South America five²⁸ times, North America three²⁹ times, and in Asia once³⁰ and Africa once³¹. Qatar is scheduled to host the next World Cup, in 2022, which would make it the first Middle Eastern country (and second Asian country) to host the World Cup. The 2022 World Cup will be the first World Cup to be held outside of the Northern hemisphere summer, due to the extreme summer temperatures in Qatar. A triple bid by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to host the 2026 World Cup has been accepted, which would make just the second World Cup to be hosted by more than one nation, after Japan and South Korea in 2002. The 2026 World Cup will also be the first World Cup to be contested by forty-eight teams (FIFA 2017).

²⁷ Italy, Germany, and France have each hosted twice, and Switzerland, Sweden, England, Spain, and Russia once.

²⁸ Hosted by Brazil twice and Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina once.

²⁹ Hosted by Mexico twice and the United States once.

³⁰ Jointly hosted by Japan and South Korea.

³¹ Hosted by South Africa.

Qualifying for the World Cup also provides associations with prize money which they can then invest back into improving the local game. It also acts as an important benchmark by which to judge the quality of national teams (and thus the development of the game in that country) in a four year cycle. Hosting the World Cup, and other sporting mega-events, is also considered important as an economic boost by many governments around the world.

In order to host the World Cup, a nation prepares a bid to present to the FIFA Congress. The bid includes arguments for why a World Cup hosted by that nation would be unique, the stadiums that the proposed World Cup would use, and existing infrastructure in the nation which would aid in the smooth running of the World Cup. The bid also includes plans for upgrading existing infrastructure if necessary. The bid is then presented to the Congress, which votes for their preferred bid (FIFA 2016).

The process has changed over the years. Previously, rather than the entire Congress voting for the host nation, the bid would be presented to the Executive Committee, who would then tour each bidding nation to examine the facilities. The Executive Committee would then vote in secret for its preferred host. However, after the corruption scandal in 2015 exposed how susceptible to corruption and bribery this method was, it was decided that the Congress would vote as a whole for the host, and the votes of the Congress members would be published.

Sporting mega-events are seen by potential host nations as an important stepping stone in development, both social and economic. Mega-events, it is argued, provide an opportunity to unify a society and to provide a boost to their economy by stimulating development through investment in infrastructure. Governments tout sporting mega-events as highly lucrative, but in reality they result in high costs for the hosts and often stunt growth. Socially, these events are seen as opportunities to change perceptions about the host nation and promote social cohesion. These intangible benefits are crucial for governments to remain in power, as they provide a sense of social legitimacy for governments to play on when elections take place (Black and Van der Westhuizen 2004).

In terms of developing nations, big one-off events that could provide a catalyst for their economies are highly attractive, because a developed economy allows for a greater standard of living for every citizen – including government officials. The social benefits also help to provide public support for governments, which can be crucial in unstable developing nations.

Additionally, the social benefits can help to reshape how the host nation is viewed globally, which can lead to greater foreign investment and tourism benefits. For the most part, developing nations do not receive much positive exposure on the global stage, which affect how the economically developed world views it, resulting in lower investment in developing nations that are seen as “unattractive.” (Black and Van der Westhuizen 2004).

On a diplomatic level, these events provide an opportunity for the host nation’s politicians, diplomats and civil servants to network with foreign dignitaries in settings to which they would not otherwise have access. Again, this allows access to the developed world and provides developed nations with a different, more positive, perception of a host nation. They also allow nations looking to gain a larger foothold on the global stage to promote their status as global powers (Grix and Lee 2013). Emerging powers such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Qatar have all used sporting mega-events to boost their soft power on the global stage. This is a clear trend indicating how seriously emerging powers are taking these events as opportunities to increase their soft power (Grix and Lee 2013). However, it is questionable as to how much soft power these countries actually manage to gain through these events. Certainly in the case of South Africa it can be said that while serious efforts were made to prove that South Africa was the dominant power in Africa, these efforts largely failed, as for one thing, Nigeria overtook South Africa as the continent’s largest economy. Additionally, the Presidency of Jacob Zuma, coupled with the global financial crisis, has led to a declining South African economy, as investors become discouraged by constant political manoeuvring and cabinet reshuffles and pull out of the country, causing the economy to decline further (Suttner 2017). This shows that the purported economic gains from the World Cup did not last very long beyond the World Cup itself.

Politically, sport can be a tool for growing agency on the global stage as it can be used to spread common values around competition and thus attract those who share such values to the same cause. Sporting mega-events have long been used for this purpose by states which are run by less than desirable regimes, such as the 1936 Summer Olympics held in Berlin during Adolf Hitler’s regime or the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina held during the dictatorship of Jorge Videla (Grix and Lee 2013). Two earlier sporting mega-events, the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 1996 African Cup of Nations, were used by South Africa to demonstrate to the world that it could move beyond the turmoil of the end of the Apartheid era and build a successful, inclusive state. South Africa won both tournaments, aiding in state-building and unifying the

country, as rugby had long been seen as the “white” sport under Apartheid, while football had been seen as the “black” sport. South Africa also used the FIFA World Cup to promote itself as the main power in Africa, as it was the first African state to host the World Cup, and it played on this fact to promote the World Cup as a pan-African event, rather than just a South African event, further using soft power to try and increase their global standing (Grix and Lee 2013).

Ultimately, the World Cup is the event which most of FIFA’s activities are surrounded. FIFA earns most of its money from the World Cup, it puts most of its money towards helping nations to qualify for the World Cup, and it is the ambition of most of its members to qualify and play in a World Cup. It is around the World Cup which the corruption at FIFA has been exposed, and it is the World Cup which has provided the battleground for numerous political battles within FIFA.

4.5: 2015 Corruption Scandal

The 2011 FIFA Congress was overshadowed by the events and fallout of the selection in December 2010 of Russia and Qatar as the hosts of the 2018 and 2022 editions of the World Cup, as well as the revelation that Blatter’s opponent, his former ally and President of the AFC, Mohammed Bin-Hammam of Qatar, had been heavily involved in bribery (Conn 2017). Bin-Hammam was accused of offering bribes in exchange for votes, and was also later revealed to have misappropriated funds from the AFC (Conn 2017). A probe into the claims was launched by FIFA’s ethics committee at the behest of Executive Committee member Chuck Blazer. Three days before the election Bin-Hammam withdrew. It emerged that Bin-Hammam, via his ally Jack Warner, the then-President of CONCACAF, had offered US\$40 000 in cash to members of the Caribbean Football Union, who comprised thirty-one votes (Conn 2017). Despite protests from the FA to postpone the election due to this latest corruption allegation being added to the several allegations which were already hounding FIFA, many smaller nations who had benefitted from Blatter’s development programmes made speeches defending him, the election went ahead³² and he was re-elected unopposed, with seventeen abstentions (Conn 2017).

³² In farcical fashion, the electoral process was still closely followed, with voters receiving ballots with only Sepp Blatter’s name on them.

On December 2nd, 2010, Russia and Qatar were announced as the hosts of the 2018 and 2022 editions of the World Cup respectively. The selection of these two nations was highly controversial. Apart from the evidence of corruption surrounding the selection process, Russian football fans have a reputation for racism towards African players, and the Russian FA (RFS) has a history of handing out fines to African players, rather than to clubs or fans in the wake of racist incidents (Arnold and Veth 2018). Qatar is a nation who had never previously qualified for a World Cup, and had a climate which reached average temperatures of 50° Celsius and above in June and July, when the World Cup is traditionally held, making it very dangerous for athletes and spectators alike (Conn and Jenkins 2018). Furthermore, many of the proposed stadia were in cities which had yet to be built at the time of the bidding process. In order to combat the climate issue, Qatar's stadia are being built with air conditioning and the World Cup will be held during November and December 2022, during the cooler months (Conn and Jenkins 2018). Both Russia and Qatar have dubious human rights records, particularly when it comes to LGBT people.

It has also been revealed that the stadia and cities being built for the 2022 World Cup are being built mainly by impoverished workers from Bangladesh and Nepal who pay exorbitant amounts of money to recruiters in their home nations (Conn and Jenkins 2018). These workers also often have their passports and other travel documents confiscated by their employers upon arrival in Qatar. These employers also have the ability to restrict workers' movements within Qatar and to cancel residency permits. There have also been reports put out by Amnesty International showing that stadium workers in Qatar often are left to go hungry, and often have their salaries withheld by their employers (Conn and Jenkins 2018). On top of this, unsafe working conditions on the stadium construction sites resulted in the deaths of forty four Nepalese workers between June and August 2013. A 2013 investigation into these practices by The Guardian newspaper in the UK and the private foundation Humanity United estimated that by the time the World Cup starts in 2022, 4000 stadium workers will have died (Conn and Jenkins 2018). After the raft of criticism directed at Qatar after these facts came to light, the nation improved its working practices and standards. It is important to note however, that pressure did not come from FIFA to change these practices, but rather from the International Labour Organisation and the wider global community (Conn and Jenkins 2018).

The host selection process for these two World Cups came under fire for bribes being traded for votes two days before the vote was to take place in a BBC Panorama documentary (Gibson 2010). The documentary mainly surrounded the collapse of ISL nine years prior and accused a number of members of FIFA's Executive Committee of receiving bribes from ISL in the 1990s. This led to the suspension of two Executive Committee members, Reynald Teymarii of Tahiti and Amos Adamu of Nigeria, prior to the vote (Conn 2017). The documentary was seen as particularly damaging to the England bid for the 2018 World Cup, despite efforts from the English bid committee to have the BBC postpone the documentary and despite letters sent to each member of the Executive Committee apologising for the allegations made in the documentary (Conn 2017).

In the months after the vote further allegations were made by members of the England 2018 bid team regarding the members of the Executive Committee expecting favours in exchange for votes, such as knighthoods and opportunities to meet the Queen (Rumsby 2017). A whistleblower also claimed that the members of the Qatar 2022 bid had paid for votes, though they later withdrew this allegation, before claiming that they had been pressured by the Qatari government into withdrawing (Conn 2017). Blatter rejected all claims of corruption and denounced Britain for "acting like a sore loser." Bin-Hammam was banned for life from all football activity by FIFA as a result of his trying to buy votes, but Jack Warner escaped sanction by resigning from all his football-related positions (Conn 2017). After he was banned, an audit of the AFC's finances showed that Bin-Hammam had been using AFC bank accounts to channel money to key supporters around the world, such as Issa Hayatou, and that he had charged personal expenses to the AFC (Conn 2017).

In 2012 it was also revealed that Jack Warner had committed a similar fraud to Bin-Hammam's, though Warner's crime related to the building of a CONCACAF Centre of Excellence (named after Joao Havelange) in Trinidad, Warner's home nation (Conn 2017). Warner managed to defraud FIFA to the tune of \$26m over nearly 20 years, some of which had been earmarked for the building and maintenance of the centre, but a lot of which had in fact been designated for development of football in the Caribbean (Conn 2017).

Chuck Blazer, the CONCACAF secretary general who had launched the investigation into Bin-Hammam in May 2011, was also exposed as having misappropriated FIFA and CONCACAF funds for his own personal use (Vardi 2015). However, Blazer had also failed to pay any taxes

between 2005 and 2010, and as he was an American, the FBI became involved, and in 2013 he became a confidential informant for the FBI, wearing a microphone to meetings to try and gather evidence of corruption against other FIFA officials (Vardi 2015).

After all the revelations of corruption in 2011, Blatter announced that he had appointed a consultant to look into FIFA governance structures and make recommendations. One notable recommendation was the ethics committee become more independent from the president's office, as previously investigations were only undertaken on reports from the president (Pieth 2014). Additionally, the investigation and disciplinary processes were split, with an adjudicatory chamber now decided whether the evidence gathered during the investigation by the investigatory chamber was worth acting upon. Despite the necessity of these reforms, Blatter's decision in 2014 to run again for the presidency in 2015, as well as resistance for the reforms from UEFA, led to the consultants stepping down in protest (Conn 2017).

At the end of 2014 came the long-awaited report into the 2018 and 2022 bidding processes prepared over two years by investigator Michael Garcia. Rather than immediately release the full report, the chairman of the Ethics Committee's adjudication chamber, Hans-Joachim Eckert, released a forty-two page summary of his reading of the report (Rumsby 2017). This summary was denounced by Garcia and others as a sanitisation of Garcia's findings. Garcia resigned in protest at FIFA's refusal to release his report in full. In 2017, the full report was finally released, but only after the German newspaper, Bild, announced that it would be releasing a leaked copy of the report. While many in 2014 had been expecting the hosting rights for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to be stripped from Russia and Qatar as a result of the report, Eckert's summary recommended that there was not enough evidence to indicate that the rights needed to be taken away (Rumsby 2017).

Garcia reviewed over 200 000 documents, and conducted more than 75 interviews of stakeholders in the bidding process. Notably, the Spain-Portugal joint 2018 bid did not cooperate with Garcia's investigation (Garcia and Borbely 2017). The Russian bid claimed they could not submit documents for review as the computers used by the bid had been rented and subsequently returned to the owner, who had then destroyed them. Russian emails could not be recovered because although they had used Gmail accounts, Google did not respond to a request for access to their servers (Garcia and Borbely 2017). Based on the evidence reviewed, Garcia found that while there was misconduct by bid teams during the selection process, this

misconduct did not have any substantial effect on the final outcome. The England and Australia 2018 and 2022 bids respectively came under criticism for being willing to acquiesce to the requests for bribes from individuals such as Jack Warner (Garcia and Borbely 2017).

While FIFA was trying to clean itself up from within, the FBI was making moves to prosecute officials who had committed fraud in their roles as football administrators. On May 27th, 2015, Swiss police arrested seven senior FIFA officials at their hotel in Zurich while they were awaiting the start of that year's FIFA Congress (Sky Sports 2015). On the same day the list of charges against these officials was released. All had been charged with racketeering³³ and money laundering, under the United States' RICO Act³⁴, which had initially been created in order to combat the mafia (Chen 2018).

Seven further individuals were charged that same day. Of the fourteen charged officials, all were from CONMEBOL or CONCACAF nations. Five were current or former members of FIFA's Executive Committee at the time of their arrest (Conn 2017). All five (plus a further three officials) were at one point either the head of their national association or of CONMEBOL or CONCACAF. Jack Warner was arrested, as was his replacement as head of CONCACAF, Jeffrey Webb. Webb had made repeated statements upon taking over from Warner about how he would be working hard to clean up CONCACAF and weed out the corruption within it (Conn 2017). The arrests also resulted in the Swiss authorities beginning their own investigation into FIFA. In December 2015, further arrests were made, again, all those arrested were from the Americas and all held high positions either within their own national associations, their continental bodies or FIFA. The second batch of arrests included Ricardo Teixeira, Joao Havelange's former son-in-law, Jeffrey Webb's replacement as CONCACAF president, Alfredo Hawit, and CONMEBOL president Juan Angel Napout (BBC 2015).

Much like the ISL debacle a decade earlier, the indictments mostly related to the sale of broadcasting and marketing rights dating back to 1991, more specifically for the CONCACAF Gold Cup; the CONCACAF Champions League (club competition), CONMEBOL's Copa America; and CONMEBOL's Copa Libertadores (club competition) (O'Reilly 2015). These four competitions are the four most prestigious competitions in the Americas. The rights were

³³ The action of creating a business in order to extort illegal money, often via bribery (Chen 2018).

³⁴ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act, passed in 1970 (Chen 2018).

sold to a company named Traffic Group. Traffic Group had paid numerous bribes in order to secure contracts from the indicted officials. It also was instrumental in securing Nike a sponsorship contract with the CBF (O'Reilly 2015).

Also included in the indictments was the allegation by a number of the individuals who were charged that the South African Football Association (SAFA) had paid a \$10m bribe to Jack Warner in 2007 as a bribe for the votes he secured for South Africa's bid in 2004 to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Conn 2017). This was in addition to Warner's demand that Nelson Mandela fly to Trinidad in 2004 to meet him to personally help to secure his vote. SAFA did not deny that a \$10m payment had been made to Warner, but they furiously denied that it was a bribe (Sport24 2015). SAFA claimed that the payment was made as part of the legacy of the first African World Cup was to help develop football in the African diaspora, including the Caribbean (Sport24 2015).

The indictment claims that the bribe was sent by Jerome Valcke, the then-FIFA secretary general, to Warner, on the request of the head of the Organising Committee for the 2010 World Cup, Danny Jordaan, but SAFA claim the reason that the money came from FIFA was that the money for the legacy programme needed to come from the budget given by FIFA to the Organising Committee. It says that the money went directly to Warner, rather than to CONCACAF because at the time they trusted him to implement the project correctly. FIFA has since made the same allegation as the FBI in regard to the payment. This came in document demanding restitution from the individuals arrested in 2015 that FIFA submitted to the US court system in 2016 in response to the prosecution of those individuals. SAFA also reacted angrily to this and repeated that the money was for a diaspora project (Sport24 2015). It is still unclear whether or not any work has been done on a diaspora project in the Caribbean.

A few months after the arrests in Zurich, Swiss authorities announced that they were investigating a CHF2m (US\$2m) payment from Sepp Blatter to the president of UEFA, Michel Platini, in February 2011 (Conn 2017). Blatter and Platini claimed that this payment was backdated to work Platini did as a consultant in 1999. Platini is a French former footballer considered to be one of the greatest to ever play the game, and in 1998 when Blatter was first elected president of FIFA, Platini was the co-chair of the organising committee for the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France (Conn 2017). He later ascended to the presidency of UEFA with Blatter's close support, defeating former Blatter opponent Lennart Johansson.

In the course of investigating this payment, it was revealed that Blatter and Platini had no written agreement over the payment, and that it had come just days before Platini was re-elected president of UEFA, and a few months before Blatter was re-elected president of FIFA (Conn 2017). It was also discovered that during the bidding process for the 2022 World Cup, Platini had been planning to vote for the USA's bid to host, but changed his vote to Qatar following a meeting with the French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the crown prince of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, who has since become the Emir of Qatar (Conn 2017).

In December 2015, both Blatter and Platini were banned from all football activities for eight years. They both appealed to the Court of Arbitration for sport in 2016 and their bans were reduced to six years. The Swiss authorities' investigation into the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups is still on-going (Conn 2017).

Infantino's biggest policy change as FIFA president so far has been the implementation of reforms known as "FIFA 2.0." These reforms include: twelve year term limits for the president, members of the FIFA Council, and members of the FIFA judicial bodies (three four year terms) (Infantino 2016); disclosure of compensation given to the president, Council members and committee chairpersons; and eligibility checks by FIFA for all new council members (Infantino 2016). FIFA now also publishes how each member association votes in selecting World Cup hosts. It also publishes the agendas of all FIFA meetings, from the Council to various committees (Infantino 2016). The reforms were passed unanimously by the FIFA Congress.

Despite the importance of the corruption scandal in exposing the systemic corruption within the organisation, and the reforms that were implemented as a result of the scandal, corruption within FIFA has not been completely eradicated. Infantino himself faced an investigation over inappropriate use of FIFA funds soon after he was elected as president. The corruption scandal also provided a clearer image of how much importance is placed upon the political power of developing nations in not only providing power to the FIFA president, but also in choosing the host nation of the World Cup. Given that the World Cup is FIFA's main source of income and the event around which it centres most of its activities, the selection of a host nation become hugely important to the organisation as a whole.

The corruption scandal also provided clarity on how much “hidden money” flows throughout the game, particularly as regards the power of broadcasting contracts. Despite the fact that FIFA has consistently increased the percentage of its budget allocated to developing the game throughout the world, the fact that so much money went into the pockets of FIFA officials instead of the organisation means that there was less money available for FIFA to put into development than there should have been. It is impossible to measure the impact that this money may have had on development.

Examining FIFA’s finances also reveals that contrary to popular opinion, the majority of corruption within the game does not take place through FIFA’s development programmes. While these programmes were used as political tools by Blatter and his cronies, the fact that they remained subject to extensive and thorough audits meant that laundering money from those programmes was extremely difficult. Instead, the corruption took the form of cronyism and bribes.

Chapter 5: African Football and FIFA

As this thesis focusses for the most part on FIFA's impact on African football, a thorough examination of the history of African football and what the game means to various African societies is imperative. This chapter will examine how the game developed from the late colonial period through decolonisation and up to the present day. It will also discuss how Africa became an important political bloc within FIFA and how crucial African associations became to consolidating the power of Havelange and then Blatter in their tenures as FIFA president. It will also pay attention to the role that football played in nation-building within emerging African states, and how the game has continued to be linked to society in a number of nations. This chapter will also discuss the role that the African diaspora has played in former colonial powers' footballing histories.

5.1: African Football and Nation-Building

Despite South Africa becoming the first non-European member of FIFA in 1909, prior to the 1960s, Africa did not have much influence on FIFA as an organisation as most countries in Africa were still colonial possessions of European powers until the 1960s. Because of this, most football associations in European colonies were considered to be affiliated to their ruling power's football association, and not necessarily FIFA members in their own right. In 1950, just two³⁵ of FIFA's sixty-nine members came from Africa. By 1975, this number had grown to thirty-five out of 139 FIFA members. Today, there are fifty-three African members of FIFA (Darby 2007).

Much like the spread of other sports, such as cricket, football in Africa was spread by both the colonial powers themselves and missionaries (Darby 2000). Sport was long viewed by religious bodies as a tool with which to further educate and civilise indigenous peoples in various European colonies. It also served to further assimilate colonial subjects into European society. Football was no different. Governments initially supported missionaries in spreading sport throughout indigenous societies, but took over the administration of sport from missionaries after they began to worry about the extent to which sport and social revolution were linked. As

³⁵ Sudan and Egypt

with their approaches to governance within their colonies, European powers differed in their approach to football. For example, in French colonies, the approach in Equatorial Africa differed to their approach in North Africa. In French Equatorial Africa, the French-run football bodies ran the game in way that alienated the indigenous population, and this, combined with a lack of adequate funding to keep up with the rapid growth of the game, led to a collapse in organised football by 1940 (Darby 2000). In French North Africa, however, while the game grew at a similarly rapid pace to French Equatorial Africa, there were professional leagues set up, and cup competitions took place between teams from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Players from colonial North Africa also played in France³⁶ and represented the French national team during this time (Darby 2000). In British-run Zimbabwe, the colonial powers utilised a more autonomous system of government, and this was reflected in the administration of their sporting bodies as well. This also led to massive growth of the game, and in Bulawayo alone there was a successful sixteen team league running. It is important to note, however, that in both French and African colonies, the structured administration of football was restricted to urban centres, with the game growing much more slowly in rural areas (Darby 2000).

Football also became an outlet for political expression by indigenous populations - a phenomenon not unique to Africa. Like the rest of the world, supporters began to flock to clubs which spoke to their identities. This meant that while the colonial powers had initially introduced football (and other sports) as a tool with which to further force indigenous populations to assimilate to European society (which had worked with some members of the indigenous elite), working-class participants used football as a method of protest against their colonial oppressors. In Tanzania, for example, clubs such as Young Africans SC was used by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) as a front to hide their activities from the colonial government (Darby 2000). In Algeria, the National Liberation Front (FLN) founded a “national team” which was comprised of Algerians who had been playing in France prior to returning to Algeria to join in the push for independence. This FLN team played fifty-three games over four years and was directly succeeded by the Algerian national team. After achieving independence in 1962, many FLN XI players were given posts in the Algerian government.

³⁶ This includes future President of Algeria Ahmed Ben Bella, who played one game in 1940 for one of France’s top teams: Olympique Marseille. Any football career he may have had was curtailed by the German invasion of France a few weeks after his debut.

Football in Africa later became closely linked (and remains so) to nationhood during the wave of decolonisation, with Kwame Nkrumah using Ghana's win in the 1963 African Cup of Nations (AFCON) to help foster national pride amongst Ghanaians (Heffernan 2014). He also invited Real Madrid, the best club side in Europe at the time, to play Ghana's national team in 1963. As nations achieved independence, their membership with bodies such as the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity went hand in hand with their memberships of CAF and FIFA. Nkrumah allied himself quite closely with CAF, later donating seed money for an African version of UEFA's European Cup, to be competed for by the national club champions of CAF's members³⁷ (Heffernan 2014).

However, state investment in football in Africa was not always positive. Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator of Zaire, invested heavily in football during the 1960s, and in 1974, coming off of winning AFCON earlier that year, Zaire became the first Sub-Saharan nation to qualify for the World Cup (Crist 2018). Mobutu rewarded the members of the World Cup squad with a house and a car for qualifying, and granted them use of the presidential jet to travel to the World Cup. Mobutu also paid for pitch-side advertising hoardings at the tournament to display messages promoting Zairian tourism (Crist 2018). However, after losing their first World Cup game 2-0 against Scotland, the players threatened to go on strike and withdraw from the World Cup over unpaid wages. Eventually they were convinced to play their second game against Yugoslavia. They lost 9-0. It was after this that Mobutu phoned the team and threatened their families if they lost to Brazil by more than three goals. He also sent presidential guards to watch over the team. Zaire kept the score to 3-0 but returned home to an angry Mobutu, who promptly ended his investment in football. Many players from that World Cup squad died penniless (Crist 2018).

5.2: Africa's Struggles in Qualifying for the World Cup Prior to 1970

As most countries in Africa were not independent until the 1960s, Egypt became the first independent African nation to join FIFA in 1923. It was followed by Sudan (though Sudan was not yet an independent nation) in 1948, just three years after the end of the second world war.

³⁷ The first trophy for this competition was named after Nkrumah, and after it was awarded to Hafia Conakry permanently for their third win in the competition, the new trophy was named after Guinean president Ahmed Sekou Toure, himself a keen proponent of football's role in aiding nationalism.

South Africa (re)joined FIFA in 1952³⁸, and Ethiopia in 1953 (Darby 2000). In 1954, these four African nations, as well as a number of Asian associations, joined together at the extraordinary FIFA Congress in Bern to demand that they be granted representation on the Executive Committee. The previous year, African and Asian representatives had pushed for representation within FIFA, but were met with strong opposition from European representatives, who asserted their belief that neither Africa nor Asia were organised enough to earn a place on the Executive Committee. Some European representatives, did however, back their cause and a compromise was reached: once Africa and Asia had organised themselves into organisations that could directly elect representatives to the Executive Committee, then they would be represented (Darby 2000). This was despite Europe not having such a formal organisation at the time (UEFA was only founded in 1954). However, in 1954, despite having met in Bern before the FIFA Congress and nominating an Executive Committee representative from Africa, the four African nations were told (by future FIFA President Rodolphe Seeldrayers) that this did not meet the requirements for a body to elect a representative. Eventually the matter was put to a vote by the Congress, and Africa and Asia were granted representation on the Executive Committee (Darby 2000).

The events of 1953 and 1954 led to the formation of the Confederation Africaine de Football, or CAF in 1957. The same four nations who had represented Africa earlier in the decade at the FIFA Congress were the founding members of CAF. CAF was founded on the principles of pan-Africanism and a key requirement for membership when it was founded was that member associations be from independent states. In 1960, five³⁹ new African nations joined FIFA, and in 1962 nine⁴⁰ more joined. CAF took a strong stance on its philosophy of pan-Africanism (Darby 2000). From the start, it pushed against South Africa's racist policies by banning it from AFCON participation unless it entered racially integrated teams. In 1961 South Africa was formally banned from CAF (Darby 2000). That same year South Africa was also suspended, but not banned, from FIFA, avoiding an outright ban at least partially due to the support of FIFA's new president Stanley Rous (Conn 2017).

³⁸ South Africa had initially withdrawn in 1928 along with the Home Nations and the UK's affiliated colonial associations, but in 1931, South Africa had been granted sovereignty from the United Kingdom in 1931, and so when the Home Nations rejoined in 1946, South Africa was required to reapply to FIFA in its own right.

³⁹ Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, and Uganda.

⁴⁰ Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, and Togo.

Rous was an advocate of the separation of sport and politics, for example in 1950 he pushed for the readmittance to FIFA of the three new German football associations⁴¹, saying that if a nation was recognised politically then its membership should be accepted, and that it was not for FIFA to stand as judge of its social and political cultures⁴² (Conn 2017). In 1963 he visited South Africa to assess the football in the country and decided that the South African federation was only following government policy on racial segregation, but not practicing that discrimination itself. At this time football, like all aspects of society in South Africa, was racially divided, with the all-white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) being affiliated to FIFA, while the anti-apartheid, racially mixed South African Soccer Federation (SASF) was marginalised (Chibba 2015). After the lifting of the ban in 1963, FASF announced that it would send an all-white team to the 1966 World Cup, and an all-black team to the 1970 World Cup. This led to more pressure being placed on FIFA from African nations, as well as the suspension being re-imposed in 1964. South Africa remained suspended until after the Soweto Uprising in 1976, when a full ban was applied. This ban lasted until 1992, when South Africa, now represented by the South African Football Association (SAFA), rejoined both CAF and FIFA. In 1996, South Africa hosted and won AFCON, defeating Tunisia 2-0 in the final, and in 1997 qualified for the World Cup for the first time (Chibba 2015).

Meanwhile, CAF still faced a number of challenges on the international front. While it had managed to secure a place on the FIFA Executive Committee, it still faced opposition from European powers who did not want to risk Europe losing its hold on the game. Attempting to limit a growing African and Asian electorate in the FIFA Congress, UEFA pushed hard to implement a pluralist voting system, but this failed. Instead it maintained its hegemony by limiting the number of World Cup places available to African and Asian nations. There were no guaranteed World Cup spots for African nations until the 1970 World Cup (Darby 2005).

1934 was the first World Cup with a formalised qualification tournament, with qualification groups based on geography (Horsfield 2017). Egypt was the only African team to enter qualification, and was placed in a qualification group competing for a single spot with Turkey and Palestine (then a British Mandate), who were considered to be Asian nations. Egypt

⁴¹ West Germany, East Germany, and Saarland, which was absorbed into West Germany in 1957. West Germany won the 1954 World Cup.

⁴² This reached new heights in 1973 when he ordered the Soviet Union to play a World Cup qualifier against Chile in a stadium in which dictator Augusto Pinochet had murdered numerous left-wing Chileans. The Soviets refused and were promptly kicked out of the competition.

won and became the first African side to qualify for the World Cup. In 1938, with the qualification system the same as in 1934, Egypt was again the only African nation to enter, and it was placed in a group with Romania (Horsfield 2017). However, FIFA scheduled the qualifiers during Ramadan, and so the Egyptians refused to play and withdrew from the tournament. No African nations entered in 1950. In 1954 Egypt was again the only African nation who entered and was drawn against Italy, but failed to qualify. 1958 was the first tournament to take place after the creation of the confederation system, and so qualification was based around the confederations (Horsfield 2017). This time, Africa and Asia competed together for a single spot at the World Cup, and Egypt and Sudan were the two African teams to enter, with FIFA having rejected Ethiopia's application. As Israel was competing as a member of the AFC at this time, every nation it was drawn against withdrew, including Egypt and Sudan. Because FIFA did not want a team qualifying without having played a single game, they organised a playoff between Wales and Israel, which Israel lost. 1962 saw African sides competing for a play-off spot against a European nation, with Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic entering qualification, with Ethiopia competing in the UEFA qualifying section. Morocco won the African section, but lost in the intercontinental playoffs to Spain (Horsfield 2017).

By the time of the 1966 World Cup qualification tournament, Africa was fairly fed up with this state of affairs (BBC 2016). Quite apart from a lack of access to the most prestigious competition preventing African success on the football pitch, off it, the lack of participation in qualification was leading to an erosion of Africa's strength in the Congress. FIFA's statutes contained a rule which stated that failure to take part in two successive official FIFA tournaments (i.e. the World Cup or Olympic Games) would result in an association being stripped of its right to vote at the FIFA Congress. This is a rule which still exists today. Additionally, associations at the time were required to pay \$150 (equivalent to around \$1200 today) in membership fees to FIFA, which at the time was beyond the budget of many new African members (Conn 2017). Thus, these associations were paying money that they often could not afford in order to lose on the pitch and have very little say in the organisation of the game off of the pitch. African nations, led by Kwame Nkrumah, therefore decided to boycott the 1966 World Cup⁴³ entirely. While Africa, Asia, and Oceania were left to qualify for a single spot, Europe was allocated ten spots, including one for the hosts. Most Asian nations soon

⁴³ Significantly, the 1966 World Cup was hosted by England, a major colonial power in Africa.

followed suit in boycotting the tournament (Darby 2000). This left only North Korea and Australia to compete for the spot, and North Korea qualified, going on to reach the quarter-finals. FIFA responded to the boycott by imposing a fine of CHF5000 on each association, which was later reduced to CHF1000 (around CHF1400, or US\$1403 today) on appeal (BBC 2016). In 1965, UEFA members numbered thirty-five, compared to sixty-five from Africa, Asia, and Oceania, yet UEFA received more than half of the total spots at the World Cup. FIFA eventually relented and awarded Africa and Asia a spot each at the World Cup from 1970 onwards. This increased to two spots in 1982, three in 1994, and finally five in 1998. In 2010 Africa was represented by six nations thanks to South Africa hosting the tournament and receiving an extra spot. In 2026 this number will increase to nine spots with the expansion of the World Cup to forty-eight teams.

However, African nations are still struggling at the World Cup relative to European and South American nations. Just thirteen⁴⁴ African nations have ever competed at the World Cup. As a comparison, UEFA currently receives thirteen spots at the World Cup. Africa's first win at the World Cup came only in 1978, when Tunisia beat Mexico 3-1 (Malit 2015). No African team has ever reached the semi-final stage, and just three African teams have reached the quarter-finals: Cameroon in 1990, Senegal in 2002 and Ghana in 2010. In addition to those three nations, only three other teams have qualified out of their groups at the World Cup: Morocco in 1986, Nigeria in 1994, 1998 and 2014, and Algeria in 2014. As is evident, only the 2014 World Cup featured two African nations in the knockout stages. In 2018, not one of Africa's five representatives made it to the knockout round (Round of 16) of the World Cup.

5.3: The Realisation of Africa's Political Potential

In 1974, Africa's potential as a political bloc within FIFA was realised. Joao Havelange, the former head of the Brazilian Sports Federation, launched a campaign for FIFA President. His opponent was Stanley Rous. Havelange won the election mainly by appealing to the African and Asian members of FIFA to vote for him. In exchange he promised to increase the number of spots at the World Cup, thereby increasing the number of spots afforded to both Africa and Asia. At the time, African and Asian nations were only afforded a single spot each in a sixteen

⁴⁴ Egypt, Morocco, DR Congo (as Zaire), Tunisia, Algeria, Cameroon, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Angola, and Cote d'Ivoire.

team World Cup (Darby 2000). Along with promising development programs that would help to improve the standard of football in Africa and Asia, Havelange proposed increasing the participants in the World Cup to twenty-four teams, and doubling the number of spots available to Africa and Asia. This, along with a campaign that saw Havelange travel to eighty-six member associations, saw Havelange elected ahead of Rous. Havelange was also aided by the animosity many African nations felt towards Rous for his handling of the South Africa question a decade earlier (Darby 2000).

Under the new president, African and Asian nations continued to push for further representation at the World Cup. They were met with strong resistance by European nations, who insisted (as they had been for decades) that increasing the allocation of spots would reduce the competition by allowing too many weak teams to enter (Darby 2000). This, of course was countered with the suggestion that only by increasing access would weaker nations become stronger on the pitch. With Havelange sympathetic to their cause (and wanting to fulfil an election promise), African and Asian nations won further representation at the 1982 World Cup, albeit by just a single additional spot each, in comparison to Europe's four additional spots (FIFA 2017).

Africa's performances at the World Cup improved exponentially compared to their previous showings after this, with eight successive World Cup tournaments from 1986 to 2014 featuring an African team in the knockout stages. In 1990, Cameroon beat world champions Argentina in the first game despite having two players sent off (Malit 2015). It became increasingly harder for UEFA to argue that more African teams would dilute the quality of the competition. After the massive political upheaval in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s, UEFA's membership grew, and they too began to push for an expansion of the World Cup. The 1990s also marked a change in attitude towards Africa by UEFA within FIFA, with UEFA President Lennart Johanssen even arguing that Africa's allocation should be increased during discussions in the mid-90s (Darby 2000). Given that Johanssen ran for FIFA president in 1998, this new recognition of Africa's power was probably not purely egalitarian. In any event, UEFA and CAF signed a partnership agreement called the Meridian Project towards the end of the decade with a view towards a cultural exchange between young African and European footballers (BBC 2005). UEFA also provided direct development assistance to two African associations under the Meridian Project.

5.4: African Football Today

African football (like many other sports on the continent) were hit hard by the debt crises in the 1980s, as this greatly restricted government investment in the game. As a result, the development of the game stagnated and left a gap in the market for the commercialisation of the game. This coincided with the increasing commercialisation of football around the world. When more and more European football began to be televised live on TV on Africa, attendances at local games dropped as fans preferred to watch higher quality games (Malit 2015). More and more African players were able to play overseas, and players such as Tony Yeboah, Phil Masinga and Lucas Radebe paved the way for players such as Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mane and Mohamed Elneny to play in the biggest league in the world, the Premier League in England. As players can earn far more money and can play at a much higher level playing overseas than playing in Africa, it has resulted in a talent drain in African football (Malit 2015).

A problem for African football over the last 20 years has been the advent of academies which offer the opportunity for young African players to play in Europe and been seen by the scouts of some of the best teams in the continent. This has resulted in a system where many families bankrupt themselves in order to pay for their children to have this kind of access, but as the odds of turning professional are slim, and the odds of turning professional in Europe even slimmer, many of the players are unable to provide a return on their families' investment (Rowe et al 2018). Those players that do manage to become professional and play in Europe often never return to play in Africa, or only return to play at the very end of their careers. Additionally, while many of these academies are completely legitimate and do have this access to European clubs' scouting networks, it has opened up an area of the game to human traffickers who claim to be agents representing academies, then charge families a fee (often far beyond the family's means) for their child to join an elite European club, before disappearing with the money (Rowe et al 2018). Sometimes these "agents" convince the player that for a fee they can secure a contract with a club overseas as a stepping stone to a bigger club, then abandon the player in a foreign country, with no contract, and no football to play (Rowe et al 2018). While FIFA has taken steps to closely monitor player transfers around the world, combatting human trafficking in these situations is far beyond its means and scope. However, a more stringent

transfer system than the one currently implemented may have an effect in reducing the number of players who fall victim to these schemes (Rowe et al 2018).

African football remained largely unscathed in the wake of the 2015 corruption crisis, but this does not mean that corruption in football is non-existent on the continent. Multiple officials have been banned by FIFA for corruption, most notably Issa Hayatou and Amos Adamu, and efforts to fight corruption in African football are often met with strong resistance. As most of the corruption in African football is only hinted at and is largely hidden, it is difficult to determine how far it has gone and how much of an impact it has had on the development of football in Africa. As sport is not an industry which generally helps to grow the economy as much as agriculture or mining, it is not a focus of many governments when it comes to investment that will help it to grow as an industry.

5.5: The African Diaspora in Football

As previously mentioned, there is a long history of African players playing for European national teams. Just Fontaine, the French striker who holds the record for the most goals in a single World Cup tournament with his thirteen goals in 1958, was born in Morocco, and started his career there before moving to France. Eusebio is considered to be the second greatest Portuguese player in history, but he was born and raised in what was then Lourenço Marques in Mozambique, before moving to Portugal at 18, having already started his career in Mozambique (Darby et al 2007). Since the wave of decolonisation in the 1960s, fewer and fewer players born in former African colonies have played for European national teams, but more and more children of immigrants have been playing for their countries of birth. Players such as Zinedine Zidane and of France and Mario Balotelli of Italy are examples of children of African immigrants born in Europe and playing for their birth country (Pattisson 2018).

Conversely, there are numerous examples of European-born players of African descent playing for their parents' or grandparents' nations. A good example of this is the Moroccan national team at the 2018 World Cup, where seventeen members of a twenty-three man playing squad were born outside of Morocco (Pattisson 2018). Fourteen members of France's victorious squad at the 2018 World Cup were of African descent, with two players being born in Africa⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Samuel Umtiti and Steve Mandanda.

and moving to France at a young age. More recently the long tradition of politics and football in Africa being closely interlinked has also continued. For example, George Weah, the only African to win the prestigious Balon d'Or (given to the player judged to have been the best footballer in the world that year) and FIFA World Player of the Year awards, went into politics in his home nation of Liberia after retiring, and is now the president, having been elected in 2017 (Pattisson 2018).

Despite the struggles Africa has faced in gaining a foothold within FIFA, it has since become one of the most powerful voting blocs within the organisation. Both Blatter and Havelange used Africa to consolidate their power within the organisation and remain President. However, despite the fanaticism that the game inspires in Africans from all walks of life across the continent, football is no different to any other African industry in that it has not truly realised its potential in a tangible way. Again, like many other African industries, football has suffered badly from colonialism and neo-colonialism from European powers. The comparative lack of representation at the World Cup to Europe, despite CAF and UEFA having the same number of members, is clear evidence of this. The fact that African nations underperform on the pitch at the World Cup has long been used as a justification for the continuation of this lack of representation, despite the evidence that the teams that regularly qualify for the World Cup (such as Ghana and Cameroon) perform better than those teams who do not. It will be interesting to see how African teams perform in the expanded World Cups starting from the 2026 edition.

Given the success that African players and members of the African diaspora have found playing for European club sides and for European national teams, it is clear that Africans do not suffer from a lack of talent relative to the rest of the world, but the lack of development of the game in Africa relative to other regions has clearly stunted the growth and development of many talented footballers on the continent.

Chapter 6: FIFA and Third-Party Interference

As discussed above, in FIFA's governance structure is a pyramid with FIFA at the top. FIFA regulates football both on and off the pitch, and is autonomous from any national government. It also requires its members to be autonomous from national governments, despite the fact that most of its members represent sovereign nations. FIFA also has the authority to sanction members for not adhering to its statutes. On the whole, the majority of FIFA's sanctions placed upon members relate to on-pitch infractions, or infractions relating to fans. FIFA also sanctions officials and players. The sanctions take the form of fines, stadium closures, match bans, warnings, bans and suspensions. The final two sanctions may apply to both associations and individuals. It is upon the final two sanctions which this chapter will focus.

6.1: FIFA's Football Legal System

FIFA has a Dispute Resolution Chamber, designed to resolve issues between clubs and players, as well as an Appeals Committee, which hears appeals against decisions made by the Ethics and Disciplinary Committees. However, stakeholders also have the recourse of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in which they can challenge FIFA's decisions (FIFA 2018). The Court of Arbitration for Sport is an independent arbitral body which was established in 1984 in order to settle disputes relating to the regulation of sports. The majority of the cases that it hears in relation to football surround doping sanctions, though it has also been involved in a number of disputes around FIFA sanctions and was involved in settling the separate disputes between Sepp Blatter, Mohammed Bin-Hammam, and Michel Platini and FIFA. FIFA only recognised the power of the CAS in 2002. The CAS usually uses FIFA's own rules in deciding matters related to football, but has used Swiss law in certain cases as well (Meier and Garcia 2015).

By creating a system in which it controls both the on and off-pitch aspects of the sport, FIFA has created a set of norms and behaviors in which associations are required to operate. It has also created a legal system of its own which stakeholders at all levels of the game have access to (Meier and Garcia 2015). While the norms do govern behavior, they do not always result in positive relations, mainly due to the fact that external factors such as political relations between

nations⁴⁶, past meetings between teams⁴⁷, and local rivalries⁴⁸ all affect how clubs and associations interact with one another. Additionally, clubs may also experience difficult relations with other clubs due to transfer negotiations which go sour.

FIFA's role as the hegemon of football also adds weight to its disciplinary process. Failure to enforce the decisions of FIFA's disciplinary bodies also brings further punishments, and so while associations can withdraw from FIFA, they are not inclined to do so, and are also only permitted to do so once they have fulfilled all their financial obligations to both FIFA and the other associations (FIFA 2018). However, withdrawal from FIFA also essentially means a withdrawal from professional football, as other governing bodies of the game (such as CONIFA) do not have the control over the game that FIFA does, nor can they provide the same level of income from the game (Meier and Garcia 2015). This helps maintain FIFA's monopoly on football.

6.2: FIFA and Suspensions of Member Associations

FIFA uses one of its most serious sanctions; the suspension of an association, to ensure that disputes do not spill over into regular courts of law. For example, if a club defies a FIFA transfer ban by signing players, then obtains a court order stating that a club can register and use those players in a FIFA-sanctioned competition, FIFA threatens to suspend the national association that the club is registered with, meaning that not only is the club suspended, but all the other clubs in the country are suspended as well. This is as a result of FIFA's rule about the interference of third parties in their football associations. Taken very seriously by FIFA, this rule most often comes into play when national governments attempt to take over or succeed in taking over the running of football in their country from their football association. This has taken the form of governments summarily removing an association's board, or the president of a national association being removed by that nation's minister/secretary for sport. In some cases, there is a so serious a lack of agreement between a government and its football association that FIFA steps in in order to ensure the smooth administration of football in the country, appointing normalization committees. FIFA does not immediately suspend an

⁴⁶ For example, England vs Argentina is always a heated game due to the Falklands War, and matches between former Yugoslav nations often descend into violence.

⁴⁷ Such as Stoke vs Arsenal games.

⁴⁸ For example, El Clasico in Spain and the North London Derby.

association, with a warning issued to the offending association before any further steps are taken. Associations are also given deadlines by the end of which they are required to have complete autonomy from their national governments.

Table 1 below includes a summary of sixty-four instances in which FIFA has either warned or suspended an association. Spanning from 1961-2019, the table includes fifty-four instances in which an association was warned or suspended for government interference as well as when an association was warned or suspended for other offences. The sixty-four instances span forty-five different associations across all six of FIFA's confederations. The table does not take into account offences where the offending association did not face suspension from FIFA, and so, for example, the issue of British teams wearing poppies on their kits in order to commemorate the First World War has not been included in the table, as those associations faced only a fine from FIFA. Similarly, incidents such as racist fans at games have not been included, as the punishment for such an offence is playing a game in an empty stadium. The full table of incidents can be found in Appendix A.

The discrepancy between the total number of incidents and the number of associations affected is as a result of associations being sanctioned more than once. Greece, for example, has been sanctioned by FIFA five times, more than any other association included in the table. The seven occasions in which a nation has been suspended for reasons other than government interference include South Africa, which has been included twice for being suspended due to Apartheid on two separate occasions⁴⁹ before being expelled from FIFA entirely in 1976. It also includes Yugoslavia, which was suspended by FIFA in 1992 as a result of its civil war, and the passing of UN Resolution 757⁵⁰ (Meier and Garcia 2015). As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia after the civil war, the records and history of Yugoslavia's national teams have been assigned to Serbia by FIFA, in order to prevent erasure of Yugoslavian football achievements.

FIFA tends to sanction lower-ranked associations more than higher ranked associations. Of the forty-five associations which have been sanctioned, twelve are currently ranked 53rd or higher (i.e. ranked in the top 25%) by FIFA, thirteen are ranked between 54th and 106th, twelve are ranked between 107th and 159th, and seven are ranked between 160th and 211th (FIFA 2019).

⁴⁹ Between 1961 and 1963, and again between 1964 and 1976.

⁵⁰ This suspension came just before the 1992 European Championships, in which Yugoslavia was due to participate. They were replaced by Denmark, who went on to win the competition.

Of the twelve associations in the top 25% of associations, only x were ranked in the top 26 nations when they were sanctioned. Just two associations, Brazil and Spain (also the only two World Cup winners on the list), are ranked in the top 10, and seven associations competed in the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Twenty-five of the forty-five associations have never participated in a World Cup, with Brazil, Spain and South Africa are the only World Cup hosts who have been sanctioned. Of the twenty associations who have competed in a World Cup, six have only competed in a single World Cup.

Suspension lengths are not consistent, with most being lifted soon after the suspension was first applied, as associations acquiesce to FIFA's demands quite quickly to avoid lengthy absences from the game. The longest suspension given out is the suspension of South Africa in 1964, which lasted for twelve years. Of the forty suspensions dispensed, twenty-nine were longer than one month, with ten lasting a matter of days. A further ten have lasted for a year or more. After South Africa and Yugoslavia, the longest suspension handed out was to Antigua and Barbuda, for two years. In the case of Yugoslavia's suspension, we can consider it to have ended in 1994, as it was in December of that year when the newly reformed Yugoslavian team played their first game since they had been banned.

Table 1: Summary of Sanctions Given to FIFA Member Associations which led to a warning or a suspension between 1961 and 2019

Regional Body	FIFA Member Associations	Associations Sanctioned	Government Interference (GI)	GI Suspension (SUS)	GI Warning (W)	Total SUS	Total W	Incidents	Percentage of members warned or suspended per region (%)	Percentage of GI cases which led to suspension per region (%)
CAF (Africa)	54	19	24	15	9	17	10	27	35	63
AFC (Asia)	46	10	12	10	2	10	3	13	22	83
UEFA (Europe)	55	9	14	5	9	7	10	17	17	36
CONCACAF (Central and North America, Caribbean)	35	4	2	2	0	4	0	4	10	100
CONMEBOL (South America)	10	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	29	50
OFC (Oceania)	11	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	9	0
Total	211	45	54	33	21	40	24	64	21	61

Source: See reference section “Suspensions Table Bibliography”. For full details of each sanction, see Appendix A.

Note: GI – Number of sanctions for government interference.

SUS – Suspension.

W – Warning.

“Total SUS” and “Total W” alone account for the total occasions in which an association was warned or suspended, including occasions that an association was sanctioned for an offence unrelated to government interference.

As is evident from the table, African associations are sanctioned by FIFA more often than associations from other confederations. Africa’s nineteen sanctioned associations account for 35% of its total FIFA membership. The twenty-seven occasions that an African association was sanctioned account for 42% of all the incidents compiled in the table (even though Africa provides just over a quarter of FIFA’s members), and an African association was suspended in 63% of the incidences that an African association is sanctioned. With twenty-four instances of government interference, African associations account for nearly half of all instances in which an association was sanctioned for that offence, more times than any other region.

The one occasion on which an African nation was warned for an offence other than government interference came in June 2006, when Togo⁵¹ was warned over a player strike at the 2006 World Cup when players threatened to refuse to play their second group game due to unpaid bonuses from their association for qualifying. Eventually the game went ahead (Hylton 2017). Togo, along with Zambia, Uganda, Tunisia, Ghana, and the Gambia, also account for the nine instances of an African association being warned but not suspended by FIFA for government interference. The Gambia, Uganda, and Zambia have all been warned on two occasions. Cameroon, Kenya, and Nigeria are the only CAF nations to have been suspended for government interference twice. As stated above, South Africa accounts for the two instances in which an African association has been suspended other than for government interference. Sierra Leone is the only association in the table which is still suspended from FIFA. With fifteen suspensions for government interference, African associations are suspended more for government interference than other region, though it is tied for most instances of being warned for government interference with UEFA.

The AFC’s ten affected associations account for 22% of its FIFA membership. With just thirteen instances in which an association was suspended or warned, the AFC accounts for half

⁵¹ Togo were later banned from the 2012 and 2013 AFCON tournaments by CAF following a terrorist attack on their team bus at the 2010 AFCON in Angola two days before the tournament began, which killed three members of Togo’s support staff and injured nine other people. Togo withdrew from the tournament immediately and flew home. CAF did not lift their ban.

as many sanctions as CAF does. Similarly, with twelve occurrences of government interference compared to twenty-three CAF occurrences, the AFC is again sanctioned almost half as often as CAF is. Of the twelve instances of government interference, a ban was applied ten times, accounting for 83% of the incidents. Kuwait and Iraq have been suspended twice each. Thailand and Afghanistan are the only AFC associations that have been banned for government interference but not suspended, while Indonesia was warned for having two separate professional club league systems at the same level, though they avoided a suspension on that occasion, making them the only AFC member to be warned for an offence other than government interference. No AFC member had been suspended for a reason other than government interference.

Nine UEFA members have faced sanction from FIFA, accounting for 17% of UEFA's membership. This includes the former Yugoslavia. Of the fourteen instances of government interference in UEFA members, a suspension was applied five times, accounting for 36% of the incidents. However, this also means that on nine occasions a UEFA member was warned, accounting for the remaining 64% of instances, and the joint-most warnings over government interference with CAF. With seventeen sanctions, UEFA members account for the second most sanctions after CAF. However, UEFA members have also received more warnings overall compared to other associations, with twelve. Greece is the only UEFA nation to be warned for an offence other than government interference, after it suspended its league system after the chairman of PAOK Thessaloniki stormed the pitch after a game in order to threaten the referee with a pistol. Greece has also been suspended for government interference twice (as has Albania), and warned for government interference twice. With five instances of a suspension or a warning, Greece is the most sanctioned member of FIFA.

The two UEFA members who have been suspended for offences other than government interference are Yugoslavia, mentioned above, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was suspended as a result of the association's unusual board structure, which, as a result of Bosnia's history and the ethnic tensions in Bosnia, consisted of a presidency shared between a Muslim representative, a Bosnian-Serb representative, and Bosnian-Croat representative. While FIFA had accepted the arrangement, in November 2010, it announced that this structure now flouted FIFA's statutes and gave Bosnia three months to comply. Bosnia did not comply and was suspended.

Four CONCACAF members have been sanctioned by FIFA, accounting for 29% of its FIFA membership. There were two instances of government interference, from Belize and El Salvador. Guatemala was suspended in 2016 partially as a result of the 2015 corruption scandal, while Antigua and Barbuda was suspended due to mismanagement by the association. With no warnings given to CONCACAF members, it has the highest percentage of suspensions for sanction, with 100%.

Two CONMEBOL members have been sanctioned, accounting for 20% of its membership. Both associations were guilty of government interference, with Peru being suspended and Brazil being warned. This means that 50% of the instances in which a CONMEBOL member was sanctioned resulted in a ban, and 50% of instances resulted in a warning. Only one Oceanian nation has been sanctioned, accounting for 7% of its membership. This occurred when Samoa was suspended for two months in 2008 for mismanagement of its association after its board refused to comply with FIFA's normalisation committee. 100% of sanctions involving OFC members have resulted in a suspension.

The general hypocrisy within FIFA is also evident in its use of the rule surrounding government interference. As there are no set guidelines for what precisely constitutes "government interference" in FIFA's eyes, the rule is open to misuse, both intentional⁵² and unintentional. This lack of clarity is also exacerbated by FIFA failing to include the exact actions that led to an association being sanctioned in most of their statements relating to sanctions handed out for government interference. Reasons range from the removal of all or part of the association's board, interference in board elections, and arrests of board members.

FIFA's lack of transparency in providing details of the exact nature of associations' actions which led to their sanction for government interference means that it has almost become an excuse for FIFA to use to ensure that its members remain independent from their national governments, to the extent that FIFA prevents governments from exercising the rule of law over their own national associations. This can be seen in the case of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone had removed its association's board due to corruption, but FIFA stepped in with a warning and

⁵² For example, in 1997, Pele, the then-Brazilian Minister for Sport, wanted to implement a law which would give players at Brazilian clubs stronger control over their own contracts. Joao Havelange, who had had numerous disagreements with Pele, then warned that Brazil would be removed from the 1998 FIFA World Cup if the law was passed.

then a suspension, which Sierra Leone is still under today. In nations such as China and North Korea, which operate under a communist system of government, FIFA does not intervene, despite the lack of independence that the association (or any national body) must have in such a system. In China, some of the association's board members had been arrested and imprisoned for corruption, yet FIFA did not suspend China from the organisation.

Chapter 7: Analysing FIFA's Role in Development

National teams from the developing world often find it difficult to challenge national teams from the developed world on the pitch. For example, while there are an equal number of associations in Africa and in Europe, no African nation has made it past the quarter-finals (final eight teams) of the World Cup, whereas twelve⁵³ of the twenty-one World Cups to date have been won by European nations, including the last four World Cups. In the same vein, nine⁵⁴ World Cup Finals have been all-European affairs, and of the remaining twelve Finals, only two⁵⁵ were contested by two South American nations. Argentina⁵⁶, Brazil⁵⁷ and Uruguay⁵⁸ are the only non-European teams to have won the World Cup - though it must be noted that Brazil are the most successful nation in World Cup history, winning five times. Teams from North America and the Caribbean have only reached the semi-final stage twice: the United States of America in 1930 and South Korea in 2002⁵⁹. Only three African sides have reached the quarter-final stage: Cameroon in 1990, Senegal in 2002 and Ghana in 2010 (FIFA 2017).

No nation that was a European colony in the twentieth century has made it past the quarter-finals of the World Cup. As discussed above, the role of colonial governments in African football was largely detrimental and resulted in the stunted growth of former colonies within the game. When the wave of decolonisation was coursing across Africa in the 1960s, FIFA, though it welcomed African nations as members, perpetuated a colonial system, due to the control of UEFA within FIFA. UEFA was, at the time, the largest confederation within FIFA, though it was soon overtaken by CAF. This was also reflected in the allocation of World Cup places across the confederations. UEFA has always been allocated more than double the number of places at the World Cup as any other confederation, and is the most successful continent at the World Cup, as well as having hosted it more times than any other continent.

European football is also the cultural hegemon, driven by its football clubs, rather than by its national teams. Games from Spain, Italy, Germany, England and France are broadcast around

⁵³ Italy in 1934, 1938, 1982 and 2006; Germany (previously competing as West Germany) in 1954, 1974, 1990, and 2014; England in 1966; France in 1998 and 2018; and Spain in 2010.

⁵⁴ 1934, 1938, 1954, 1966, 1974, 1982, 2006, 2010 and 2018.

⁵⁵ 1930 and 1950

⁵⁶ 1978 and 1986

⁵⁷ 1958, 1962, 1970, 1994 and 2002

⁵⁸ 1930 and 1950

⁵⁹ Lost to Argentina and Germany, respectively

the world, and the Premier League and UEFA Champions League are broadcast in over 200 nations around the world. The sale of merchandise from these clubs is vast, and most football fans around the world support a European club (Freeman 2012). Players also strive to play in Europe, as the level of football there is seen as the highest in the world. During the colonial era, European powers brought players from colonies to play for their national teams, such as Eusebio and Just Fontaine, who flourished at the World Cup. This trend of players from former colonies has not stopped in the present day, with players with roots in former colonies playing for France (such as N’Golo Kante and Paul Pogba), England (such as Raheem Sterling and Kyle Walker) and the Netherlands (such as Justin Kluivert and Virgil Van Dijk). This has also increased Europe’s pull as a cultural and sporting power. These days players playing for former colonial powers is mainly as a result of economic migration, with FIFA regulations around player nationalities also preventing players from playing for more than one nation in a competitive game, and residency rules restricting which players born in one country can play for a different national team (FIFA 2018).

FIFA has also allowed this structure to persist with its approach to distributing development money across the world, as the money is allocated fairly evenly across all associations, regardless of the level of economic development in a nation or access to other sources of funding available to associations. This has resulted in the formation of a culture within FIFA of developing nations asking developed nations for funding directly. The differentiation in funding between CAF and UEFA associations does reach the hundreds of thousands of dollars, but given the difference in economic development between nations in CAF and UEFA, this money impacts in different ways, and so while a nation such as Zambia might need to use US\$2.9 million to bring their infrastructure up to the level of, say, Austria, it will always be playing catch up when Austria is given a further US\$2.5 million to improve its infrastructure even further.

UEFA’s hegemony is also seen in the structure of the FIFA Council. While the membership of the Council is proportioned according to the size of each confederation, UEFA is given three vice-presidents to sit on the Council, while the other confederations are given one association each (FIFA 2019). Given that it is the Council which oversees the running of the game, having more votes in this body allows UEFA to have a stronger hand in guiding the Council towards protecting their interests in football.

7.1: FIFA and Hosting the World Cup

FIFA's promotion of the hosting of the World Cup is also detrimental to development. Hosting the World Cup is promoted as a great honour, as it is not only lucrative for the economy of the host nation, but means that the host football association has a chance to prove themselves on the world stage. While there are clear benefits to hosting a mega event such as the World Cup, hosting the World Cup can be a burden on the host nation, and result in large scale wastage of public funds. These funds, it has been argued, could instead be used to develop the economy in other ways, such as by building housing for the poor. In 2008, it was calculated that the budget allocation for the World Cup stadia of R19.4 billion over four years could fund the building of 90,000 new houses per year, in addition to the 225,000 new houses that had been planned between 2006 and 2010 (Gelb 2008).

A rationale used to promote the hosting of such mega events is that the World Cup provides host nations with the chance to showcase themselves to a global audience. This then can lead to increased tourism beyond the event itself, as the event usually only lasts for around a month. Showcasing a nation through a sporting mega-event is also useful as it provides nations with an opportunity to demonstrate the quality of their infrastructure and to show the wider world the standard of their infrastructure compared to other countries around the world. This could then lead to greater foreign investment in that nation. This is more of a factor for developing nations, as opposed to developed nations, due to the perception of developing nations in the wider world (Cornelissen, Bob and Swart 2011). On their website, FIFA describes the positive impact that a World Cup can have on a host nation. In addition to the benefits described above, FIFA also places emphasis on the footballing legacy of hosting the World Cup; such as providing investment for new and improved footballing infrastructure, especially at grassroots level as well as improving the existing development programmes of the host nation and providing new programmes. FIFA also places emphasis on the fact that involving local stakeholders in the World Cup phenomenon empowers the community and opens up new opportunities for skills and training within those communities (FIFA 2017).

Critics of hosting sporting mega-events (especially the World Cup) say that in actuality, hosting these events does not stimulate the economy, and in fact leaves it rather weakened and results in misallocation of public funding (Cornelissen, Bob and Swart 2011). This criticism is

especially prominent in the cases of South Africa and Brazil, due to their status as developing nations. This criticism is a result of the fact that FIFA requires certain standards for their stadia and (especially in developing countries) places great importance on having functioning infrastructure in host cities, which critics say often only are used for the duration of the World Cup before becoming millstones around the necks of the local governments after the World Cup due to underusage. Indeed, in order to meet the infrastructure requirements for hosting the World Cup, South Africa implemented an extensive high-speed train system and Bus Rapid Transport system in Gauteng, both of which were barely completed in time for the World Cup, and were dogged by controversies after the World Cup. A further criticism of the World Cup is that while the World Cup is promoted as a positive event in terms of providing business and employment opportunities for the poorest of the poor, in reality the major benefactors of the World Cup are a group of small elites within the host nation, though no single domestic group benefits more than FIFA itself (Cornelissen, Bob and Swart 2011).

7.2: Corruption and Football Development

Development in football was almost certainly hindered by the corruption culture which flourished under Joao Havelange and Sepp Blatter. Contrary to common perceptions, the majority of the corruption propagated within FIFA was not mostly through FIFA's development programmes, but rather through patronage. This was exposed most clearly in the 2015 corruption scandal, when it was revealed how many bribes had changed hands not just over the bidding processes for multiple World Cups, but also over broadcasting rights for major tournaments. The majority of the allegations stemmed from the Caribbean, and centred around Jack Warner, the CONCACAF president. Warner in particular was exposed as having employed corruption through patronage.

The scandal also exposed Blatter's deep involvement in the corruption culture at FIFA. Despite Blatter having pushed hard for the spread of the game across the world and for the game to develop around the world, his own vanity and refusal to admit that FIFA was corrupt, in addition to the exposure of his own corruption has ruined what legacy he may have had in the game. Ultimately, he helped to foster a system in which cronyism and patronage were promoted. Blatter's attitude towards the corruption within FIFA was that it was the work of a few corrupt individuals within FIFA, as opposed to a systemic issue within the organisation.

This meant that while individuals who were caught being corrupt were suspended or banned, the deeper-lying issues were not addressed, so any corruption that was dealt with was only done so to avoid bad publicity. This method blew up in FIFA's face quite spectacularly. His own nephew was the head of a company appointed to resell tickets for the 2010 and 2014 World Cups, and was later appointed the head of the sports division of the Wanda Group, which signed a sponsorship agreement with FIFA in 2016 (Conn 2017). One of Blatter's main allies early on in his presidency, Mohammed Bin-Hammam, was exposed as having sent CONCACAF officials literal envelopes of money in exchange for votes for Bin-Hammam's presidency bid in 2011, by which time he and Blatter had become political opponents (Guardian Sport 2011).

The act for which Blatter was eventually banned by FIFA was a payment made to UEFA president Michel Platini in 2011, just before the UEFA Congress at which Platini was re-elected and a few months before Blatter's unopposed re-election to the FIFA presidency that year. Platini was also a close Blatter ally in the early days of Blatter's presidency, having been Bin-Hammam's deputy in FIFA's GOAL Programme at the start of the 21st century before becoming UEFA's president, allegedly with much help from Blatter. Platini had changed his vote during the bidding process for the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar. During the later investigation around the bidding process it was alleged that Platini had changed his vote after a meeting with the president of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, and the Crown Prince of Qatar. Sarkozy wanted to seal trade deals with Qatar, and also wanted to convince the Qatari government to buy Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), Sarkozy's favourite club (Conn 2017). After Platini changed his vote, a subsidy of a Qatari sovereign wealth fund bought PSG in 2011, and in 2012, beIN Sports, a Qatari media company was launched, which has since bought the broadcasting rights to France's Ligue 1 for more than half a billion Euros (Conn 2017). Nasser al-Khelaifi, the chairman of PSG is also the chairman of beIN Sports, and has just been appointed to the Executive Committee of UEFA. Platini's son was later given a job at a Qatari sports merchandise company (Conn 2017).

7.3: FIFA and National Governments

It was under Blatter that the rule surrounding third-party interference was applied most stringently. During his presidency, forty-five suspensions were handed out to associations for government interference. The exact nature of what that interference was differed amongst the cases, with some suspensions coming as a result of national governments removing the board of an association, and some coming as a result of invalid board elections.

FIFA's use of suspension as a blanket response to any instance of what it perceives as government interference also raises the question of if this in fact violates the sovereignty of the states of the associations which it suspends. When an association board is removed by the government due to corruption, such as in the cases of Sierra Leone (which remains suspended), and Belize, FIFA still steps in and suspends the organisation. However, in other cases of the government cracking down on corruption, FIFA does not seem to deem it government interference. In the case of Spain, the government demanded that the association hold elections to replace the former FIFA vice-president and head of the national association, Angel Maria Villar, who had been arrested for embezzlement (Rick 2018). FIFA deemed this to be government interference and warned that they would suspend Spain, but ultimately did not follow through on that threat. When an organisation is suspended and can't participate in qualifying competitions or access funding for projects, it hampers the development of football in that country, and so most governments back down and reverse the action which resulted in the suspension quite quickly.

FIFA also appears to not intervene over government interference in the People's Republic of China and other communist states. Given that China operates in communist political system, all the members of its association's board were appointed by the Central Committee until 2015 (Rick 2018). In 2015, the Chinese Football Association announced plans to separate itself from the government, as part of overall football reforms pushed by Xi Jinping to bring China's men's team up from 72nd in the world rankings to the top echelons of world football. In 2012, the Chinese government arrested two former heads of the CFA, and several other officials and sentenced them to prison for taking bribes and for match-fixing as part of a wider government crackdown on corruption in the game (Rick 2018).

Despite being publicly controlled by the government until 2015, and the arrest and jailing of several football officials, China has never been suspended or even warned over government interference. FIFA treats North Korea in a similar fashion. North Korea is notorious for its self-isolation from the rest of the world, and very little information not provided by the government makes it out of the country (Montague 2017). This extends to its football association. Despite having qualified for two World Cups, in 1966 and 2010, and reaching the quarter-finals in 1966, FIFA seems not to be able to reliably contact the association. The league structure is also unorthodox, with fixtures only being announced the day before, and teams being ranked on their performances over six tournaments during the year. In 2002, Blatter travelled to North Korea, ostensibly to discuss football development, but in reality to try and show North Korea that FIFA was engaged with football in the country in order to avoid incidents such as the bombing of a plane in 1987 right before the Seoul Olympics being repeated in response to South Korea and Japan hosting the 2002 World Cup (Montague 2017).

More recently, FIFA has appointed what it terms “normalisation committees” which go into associations on the verge of suspension, and work with authorities to improve the football governance situation as quickly and sustainably as possible. Since 2014, thirteen normalisation committees have been appointed, with only one committee going into an already suspended association, with a suspension being avoided in every single case (FIFA 2018).

Given the propensity with which FIFA sanctions associations from Africa and Asia in comparison to associations from UEFA, it is clear that these sanctions impact developing nations more than developed nations. Twenty-nine associations from Africa and Asia have been sanctioned by FIFA, nineteen from Africa and ten from Asia. Just nine associations from UEFA have been sanctioned, and only one of those, Spain, is from western Europe. Interestingly, despite the large number of officials from CONCACAF and CONMEBOL who were implicated and arrested in the corruption scandal, just six associations from those two confederations have been sanctioned by FIFA. Given that just twelve of the forty-five associations sanctioned are ranked in the top 25% of FIFA members, it also shows that FIFA’s application of suspensions for government interference adversely affect weaker nations. The only two World Cup-winning associations to be sanctioned were just warned, not suspended, and twenty sanctioned associations have even appeared at the World Cup.

FIFA's statutes require associations to agree not to pursue FIFA through ordinary legal courts, meaning that challenging FIFA's legal decisions is difficult, and is essentially restricted to one route: the Court of Arbitration for Sport. This has resulted in FIFA creating its own private legal order. There is little external oversight of FIFA, with only the Swiss government having some modicum of regulation of it. FIFA is thus the government of football in many ways. Its use of suspension as a blanket response to government interference, and to intimidate national associations into falling into line with FIFA's regulations has resulted in a disproportionate response to the various reasons that a government might intervene in the administration of the game. This is especially evident in the cases where it suspends nations who have removed their association's board due to corruption. FIFA's use of suspensions in these cases also interfere with the ability of a nation to carry out its own justice processes.

This inconsistency in the application of suspensions and warnings is also seen in FIFA's approach to political and humanitarian issues. While stating that FIFA must remain neutral in matters of politics and religion, unless the issues affect its statutes, it also states that discrimination on the basis of, amongst others, gender, skin colour, religion, disability and political opinion violate FIFA Statutes. Despite essentially stating that it will intervene and suspend or expel associations over issues which affect players, clubs and associations as well as having a clearly defined human rights policy, FIFA is reticent to intervene when the time comes. It has not suspended Sudan, for example, for the Darfur crisis. Nor has it suspended North Korea for perpetrating what the United Nations has described as crimes against humanity. Nor did it suspend Honduras and El Salvador after underlying tensions between the two nations manifested themselves in the fans at three World Cup qualifiers between them in 1969, and sparked a brief conflict known as the Football War (On War 2019).

7.4: FIFA, Politics and Football

FIFA is also inconsistent on whether it sees politics and football as related or not. Evidence of this can be seen in its accommodation of both Israel and Palestine (albeit only allowing Palestine to join in 1998), both the PRC and the Republic of China (as Chinese Taipei in order to placate the PRC), and Kosovo and Serbia, despite Kosovo having very limited recognition in the global arena. It also accommodates tensions between nations by trying to keep apart nations such as Turkey and Armenia and North and South Korea in order to limit the number

of matches they would have to play against each other. It had awarded the hosting rights to the 1940 World Cup to Germany despite the Nazi regime, though it was later cancelled, and it did not remove the World Cup from Argentina in 1978 despite the military dictatorship of Jorge Videla. Yet it continues to insist that sport is not political, and that the two must remain separate. It hands out fines to associations and players which display what it deems political iconography, such as the fines handed out to the British associations for wearing poppies to commemorate the First World War on their shirts, or the fines handed to Swiss players of Kosovar-Albanian descent for their celebrations after beating Serbia in the 2018 World Cup.

A good contemporary example of FIFA's reticence to act is that of Hakeem Al-Araibi. Al-Araibi is a Bahraini footballer who fled the country after being arrested and tortured for speaking out against the government during the government's crackdown on sportspeople in the country as a response to the Arab Spring protests in 2011, allegedly led by Sheikh Salman Al-Khalifa, a member of the Bahraini royal family (Worden 2018). He took refuge in Australia, was given refugee status, and in November 2018, he visited Thailand on his honeymoon. While in Thailand, he was arrested by Thai authorities as a result of Interpol placing a "red notice" on his name for terrorism-related offences at the request of Bahrain, even though under Interpol regulations, "red notices" cannot be placed on individuals who have refugee status. The crime for which Al-Araibi was originally arrested for committing in Bahrain was committed while he was playing in a football match, but despite this, he faces torture and possibly death should he be deported to Bahrain (Worden 2018). Al-Khalifa is currently the president of the AFC, and the senior vice-president of FIFA. Despite repeated calls for FIFA to intervene on Al-Araibi's behalf, FIFA has not done so, and at the 2019 Asian Cup final (won by Qatar), Gianni Infantino's presence at the trophy ceremony meant that there were uncomfortable pictures of Infantino and Al-Khalifa smiling and shaking hands while FIFA did nothing about Al-Araibi's imprisonment (Worden 2018).

The images of Infantino and Al-Khalifa also speak to FIFA's issues with how it is perceived by the wider public, by both football fans and non-football fans. Far from being seen as the benevolent oversight body that it claims to be, FIFA is seen as a corrupt institution focussed mainly on increasing its profit margins as opposed to trying to help grow the game throughout the world. However, perception and reality often differ, and it is no different with FIFA. While FIFA's actions over the last 20 years do (as I have illustrated above) demonstrate both the organisation's commitment and its leaders' commitment to perpetuating a system of patronage

and corruption, there is no denying that overall, the picture of development within football is at the level that it is at because of FIFA. Each year more and more people are being exposed to the game and are able to access it. FIFA has helped to foster the growth of the women's game, which, like many women's sports has suffered stunted development due to a number of sexist bans on women playing football by national associations. FIFA's insistence of independent audits for all project which it gives money to help to ensure that the money is spent in the right way and achieves the goals it was designated for. In Africa, much of the infrastructure and facilities that exist for football are because of FIFA, though we do not know how African football may have developed without colonial legacies hampering development on the continent.

7.5: Further Reforms

FIFA's reforms in the wake of the 2015 corruption scandal have been noted above. However, given the fact that there are still numerous controversies dogging the organisation, and the fact that there is still further work to be done regarding the development of the game, there are further steps that it could take to reform.

FIFA's governance structures still operate for the most part as it did during the Blatter and Havelange eras. FIFA also faces little external oversight of its actions. As a non-profit organisation registered in Switzerland, FIFA, like many other sporting governing bodies registered in the country, does not pay tax, nor does it face much pressure from Swiss authorities to adhere to Swiss law, as Switzerland is fearful of losing out on the US\$1bn in revenues that these organisations contribute to the Swiss economy, should they decide to move their headquarters (Jaberg and Keiser 2019).

While the steps taken by Gianni Infantino to turn FIFA into a more transparent organisation have been very effective in terms of FIFA's published accounts, there is still work to be done in terms of making its sponsorship contracts more transparent. For example, FIFA could implement a public bidding system for sponsorships, as well as publish how much money exactly is generated by each FIFA sponsor. This would go a long way in terms of illustrating the true size of the economy of the football industry. FIFA should also require all member associations and confederations to publish their full accounts under the same accounting

standards as FIFA and on the FIFA website. A number of smaller associations do not even have up to date websites with recent contact information for local administrators. Those associations which do not have the capacity to publish their accounts in full can be subsidised by FIFA.

In terms of governmental transparency, FIFA ought to introduce independent members of the FIFA Council who would ensure that the integrity of the Council remains sound and that the Council makes decisions that are in the best interests of the game. While there are already term limits introduced for Council members, this practice could be extended to confederations and member associations, in order to further avoid the corruption perpetrated by the likes of Jack Warner. Of course, for a number of smaller associations this is not always possible due to a lack of individuals with the capacity to participate in the administration of the game. For these associations exemptions can be made along with increased oversight by FIFA.

In the FIFA Congress, FIFA must take steps to encourage suitable candidates to run in FIFA Presidential elections. As with Sepp Blatter in 2011, Gianni Infantino was re-elected unopposed at the 2019 FIFA Congress (Conn 2019). Regardless of the final results of the election, a genuinely competitive election is far healthier for an organisation such as FIFA because it shows a willingness by stakeholders of the game to involve themselves in progressing the organisation by bringing to the table fresh ideas on how to properly run the sport. It also would provide alternatives to members of the Congress. FIFA should also take steps to ensure that delegates to the FIFA Congress vote in-line with the wishes of their association, and not necessarily with their own wishes, as is the current practice. This would be a measure towards avoiding bribery by candidates or bids. A way to ensure this could be by the board of an association holding a meeting with recorded minutes in which they decide on how to vote or on what approach their delegation will take to the FIFA Congress.

The actual process of implementing these government reforms is, of course, difficult. A big obstacle in the way of implementation is an unwillingness by stakeholders to engage in an extensive reform process. Another obstacle is FIFA's own rules against government interference. Under normal circumstances, governments around the world would be able to put pressure on their associations to force through changes to FIFA, but because FIFA would consider that to be governmental interference, and would therefore suspend or ban any association whose government did pressurise them, this option is not viable. Instead,

governments could take the route that the US government did in 2015, where they laid charges against corrupt officials and then arrested those officials. This would bypass national associations entirely. Of course, one government (even if it is the US) is not enough to force reform on its own, and this would require a collaborative effort by various states around the world to indict corrupt officials. Some form of this was also seen in 2015 with the involvement of the Swiss government in the arrests of corrupt officials. Governments could also put pressure on sponsors of FIFA who are registered in their countries to withdraw or reduce their sponsorship monies contingent upon FIFA reforming adequately.

Admittedly, measures taken by external bodies to force FIFA to reform are very difficult to implement due not only to the massive international cooperation it would require by governments across the world but also because of FIFA's size and strength. Beyond the simple fact that no matter how corrupt FIFA is, the vast majority of football fans across the world will always consume the product that FIFA puts out, FIFA itself has taken measures to protect itself against external pressure. As mentioned above, FIFA could simply suspend a member association for governmental interference. FIFA has also increasingly turned towards Chinese companies as sponsors. Of FIFA's twenty largest sponsors, seven are now Chinese companies (Conn 2019). The Chinese government is unlikely to want to restrict what its companies can do in the global economy, as this would go against many of its foreign policy objectives. This would alleviate much of the issues that would be caused by sponsors withdrawing due to pressure from governments.

Beyond structural reforms, FIFA needs to take stronger steps towards developing less financially profitable areas of football. For example, women's football has huge market potential, as is evidenced by the massive interest in the game generated by the 2019 FIFA Women's World Cup (Ingle 2019). However, the game is extremely underdeveloped as a result of social attitudes and apathy towards women playing sport. In the UK, for example, organised women's football was banned by the FA between 1921 and 1972 (Associated Press 2015). The first FIFA Women's World Cup was only held in 1991, and while it has been held every year since, the conditions have not always been equal to that of the men's World Cup. For example, at the 2015 World Cup was played largely on artificial pitches, as opposed to natural grass, something that FIFA would not even consider for the men's World Cup (Kessel 2015). Despite a lawsuit by players to force the World Cup to be played on grass, the tournament went ahead on artificial pitches (Kessel 2015).

Female players also have to contend with a wage gap in comparison to male players, as with other industries. In order to redress this imbalance, players from the US women's team are currently involved in a legal battle with the US Soccer Federation over their lack of equal compensation (McCann 2019). Despite winning the World Cup three times, the US women's team earns far less than their male counterparts, who failed to even qualify for the most recent World Cup. Across the world, women's football is rife with tales of lack of funding and women being either not paid or underpaid (Udoh 2019). It has resulted in a situation where a number of teams playing at the FIFA Women's World Cup have squads made up of players who have either recently turned professional, or are still amateurs, requiring them to hold full time jobs in order to support themselves and their families. This then leads to an under-performance on the pitch, against players who are professional, as was evident in the United States' 13-0 dismantling of Thailand in the 2019 World Cup. A number of teams at the 2019 World Cup, including Thailand, are reliant upon benefactors for their funding.

FIFA should step up and take over the financing of these teams in order to help them to develop. It should also subsidise professional women's leagues in its member associations until such a point as the association is able to fund the league itself. As the world football governing body, FIFA has a duty to stimulate development of the game in this way. Once FIFA helps to stimulate the women's game, for example, there is little doubt that it will reach its market potential and become as profitable as the men's game, which in turn will generate further profits for FIFA. This is because the reason that women's football in general is not as profitable as it could be is as a result of a lack of adequate marketing and investment (Alvarez 2019).

7.6: Concluding Comments

Based on all of the information provided in this thesis, we can partially reject the hypothesis that FIFA structures perpetuate a certain level of underdevelopment in developing states by promoting a status-quo designed mainly to increase FIFA's profits. While FIFA's structures are set up to increase its own profits, the fact that it reinvests over 50% of its revenues into developing the game around the world mean that the underdevelopment of football is most likely attributable to external factors beyond FIFA's control, such as capacity to implement development projects and political and social instability. The current level of development of

the game in Africa has, however, undoubtedly been enhanced as a result of FIFA investment and FIFA development programmes. In this regard, FIFA has acted as a body in its position should: stepping in as the governing body to ensure the development of the game when national governments are unable or unwilling to invest adequate funds to stimulate the game.

However, there are a disproportionate number of developing countries who are suspended by FIFA compared to developed countries, despite similar offences being committed. This has affected Africa more than any of the other regions. Given that when a nation is suspended it cannot access FIFA's funds or play matches against other nations, it makes it difficult for an association to continue to develop the game in those periods when it is suspended. African nations are also held back by the lack of representation at the World Cup, stemming from too few qualification spots being allocated to the region as a result of historic disregard of African abilities (not restricted to football of course), and the appeasement of Europe. The more often a team qualifies for the World Cup, the more likely it is to go further in the competition. Going further in the World Cup grows a nation's prestige and, as significant, leads to more funding coming into the country, which allows the association to invest more money in grassroots development. As Africa is currently only allocated five places at the World Cup, this greatly limits the opportunities available for most African nations. Accordingly, just thirteen African nations have qualified for the World Cup, out of a possible fifty-four members.

FIFA is attempting to redress the imbalance between Europe and the rest of the world through its FIFA Forward programme, but the relative allocation of funds to the rest of the world compared to Europe is unlikely to be enough for that imbalance in development to be eradicated in a generation. This is because of the starting point of development in European associations in comparison to the rest of the world. FIFA is also, however, fighting against negative public perception of its ability to adequately govern the game and adequately distribute funds. While this perception was proved largely accurate by the corruption scandal, there is still much evidence that FIFA's positive involvement in the development of the game around the world has been crucial.

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF FIFA SANCTIONS

Confederation	Association	FIFA Ranking in January 2019	Offence	Suspended?	Dates
AFC	Afghanistan	147	Government Interference	Warned	Apr-15
UEFA	Albania	60	Government Interference	Yes	27/11/1996 - 04/12/1996
					14/03/2008 - 26/04/2008
UEFA	Azerbaijan	106	Government Interference	Warned	25/01/2000
				Yes	15/04/2003 - 23/05/2003
CONCACAF	Antigua and Barbuda	126	Mismanagement	Yes	20/05/2003 - 29/06/2005
CONCACAF	Belize	160	Government Interference	Yes	18/06/2011 - 07/07/2011
CAF	Benin	94	Government Interference	Yes	09/05/2016 - 10/06/2016
UEFA	Bosnia-Herzegovina	34	Flouting of FIFA Statutes	Yes	01/04/2011 - 30/05/2011
CONMEBOL	Brazil	3	Government Interference	Warned	Dec-97
AFC	Brunei	195	Government Interference	Yes	29/09/2009 - 01/03/2011

CAF	Cameroon	55	Government Interference	Yes	04/01/1999 - 08/01/1999
					04/07/2013 - 22/07/2013
CAF	Chad	175	Government Interference	Yes	28/03/2008 - 07/05/2008
CONCACAF	El Salvador	70	Government Interference	Yes	11/05/2010 - 27/05/2010
CAF	Ethiopia	151	Government Interference	Yes	29/07/2008 - 22/07/2009
CAF	The Gambia	168	Government Interference	Warned	Mar-12
					Nov-17
CAF	Ghana	52	Government Interference	Warned	Aug-18
UEFA	Greece	43	Government Interference	Warned	1993
				Yes	13/05/1996 - 20/06/1996
				Warned	2001
				Yes	03/07/2006 - 12/07/2006
			Extreme Violence	Warned	May-18
CONCACAF	Guatemala	149	Corruption	Yes	28/10/2016 - 31/05/2018
CAF	Guinea	66	Government Interference	Yes	02/03/2001 - 05/09/2002

UEFA	Hungary	51	Government Interference	Warned	29/04/1999
AFC	Indonesia	159	Uncertain League Structure	Warned	30/03/2012
			Government Interference	Yes	30/05/2015 - 13/05/2016
AFC	Iraq	88	Government Interference	Yes	26/05/2008 - 29/05/2008
				Yes	20/11/2009 - 19/03/2010
AFC	Iran	29	Government Interference	Yes	23/11/2006 - 20/12/2006
CAF	Kenya	105	Government Interference	Yes	02/06/2004 - 06/08/2004
					24/10/2006 - 09/03/2007
AFC	Kuwait	158	Government Interference	Yes	29/10/2007 - 20/12/2008
					16/10/2015 - 06/12/2017
AFC	Macau	183	Government Interference	Yes	15/02/2005 - 06/03/2005
UEFA	Macedonia	68	Government Interference	Warned	14/04/2007
CAF	Madagascar	106	Government Interference	Yes	19/03/2008 - 19/05/2008
CAF	Mali	64	Government Interference	Yes	17/03/17 - 28/04/17

CAF	Niger	109	Government Interference	Yes	07/10/2004 - 20/12/2004
CAF	Nigeria	44	Government Interference	Yes	04/10/2010 - 08/10/2010
					09/07/2014 - 18/07/14
AFC	Pakistan	199	Government Interference	Yes	11/10/2017 - 13/03/2018
CONMEBOL	Peru	21	Government Interference	Yes	25/11/2008 - 20/12/2008
UEFA	Poland	20	Government Interference	Warned	31-Jan-07
					01-Oct-08
OFC	Samoa	197	Mismanagement	Yes	24/10/2008 - 20/12/2008
CAF	Sierra Leone	115	Government Interference	Yes	5/10/2018 - Present
CAF	South Africa	73	Apartheid	Yes	1961 - 1963
				Yes	1964 - 1976
				Expelled	1976 - 1991
UEFA	Spain	9	Government Interference	Warned	18-Feb-08
					15-Dec-17
CAF	Sudan	127	Government Interference	Yes	29/06/2017 - 14/07/2017

AFC	Thailand	118	Government Interference	Warned	Jun-13
CAF	Togo	123	Player Strike	Warned	18/06/2006
			Government Interference		12/10/2010
CAF	Tunisia	26	Government Interference	Warned	27/09/2013
CAF	Uganda	75	Government Interference	Warned	23/07/2013
					17/06/2016
AFC	Yemen	135	Government Interference	Yes	12/08/2005 - November 2005
UEFA	Yugoslavia (Now Serbia)	30 (as Serbia)	Civil War	Yes	31/05/1992 - 23/12/1994
CAF	Zambia	83	Government Interference	Warned	20/03/2009
					15/09/2015

