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Title: Changing Forms of Resistance: Braklaagte and Leeufontein
1906-1991.

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CHANGING PATTERNS OF RESISTANCE - THE CASE OF LEEUFONTEIN AND BRAKLAAGTE IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL, 1906-1991.

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On the 1st July 1989 Bophuthatswana police dispersed a meeting of villagers in Leeufontein, situated about fifteen kilometres north of Zeerust in the western Transvaal who were protesting against their forced removal into the Bophuthatswana homeland. The crowd was sprayed with teargas and rubber bullets. In the ensuing confusion nine policemen and two civilians were killed and almost the entire village fled to neighbouring white farms or made their way to Johannesburg's black townships to seek sanctuary with friends or relatives. The village immediately was surrounded by patrols of the South African and Bophuthatswana Police Forces who systematically searched and detained anyone suspected of complicity in the killings. Many suspects were routinely assaulted and over the next six months four residents were killed by pro-government vigilantes supported by the Bophuthatswana Police.¹ Subsequently the nearby village of Braklaagte, whose fate was closely bound up with that of Leeufontein, was also abandoned. Most of the villagers found their way to Zeerust where they spent over six months as refugees living in tents in the grounds of the Anglican, Catholic and Methodist churches.² Their plight became almost a cause célèbre, gaining the attention of the international community and eliciting the personal intervention of the President of the A.N.C. who attempted to secure a safe return for them back to their homes. Their defiance was held up as a symbol of the determination of rural Batswana to resist the homeland system.

These events were however the culmination of a long saga of opposition by the two communities to forces bent on undermining their political independence and social cohesion. This story stretches over eighty years and contains within it many of the elements which comprise the experience of rural communities in South Africa in this century. Also discernible are the shifts and moods of the modern South African state as it manoeuvred to control African rural society and to execute more effectively its ideological goals. This paper then examines the history of these people and attempts to locate the changing pattern of their resistance in the context of twentieth century developments. Such a task requires a close examination of the dynamics of the internal political functioning of these communities, without which the pattern and intensity of their defiance has little meaning.

The Origins of Leeufontein and Braklaagte

The communities of Braklaagte and Leeufontein belong to a Tswana-speaking community, the Hurutshe, who have for close to four hundred years occupied land in the Marico district close to the border with modern Botswana. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Hurutshe established in what was known as Moiloa's Reserve, a politically cohesive and economically productive polity.³

The origins of Braklaagte and Leeufontein can be traced to developments following the death of the Hurutshe chief Ikalafyn in 1893. Ikalafyn's son Pogiso was too young to assume leadership and Ikalafyn's brother, Israel Keobusitse, was appointed regent in his place. In 1903 Pogiso came of age but it was only in 1906 that the state acted to resolve the question of chieftaincy.

The reason for this belated intervention lay in the wider ambitions of the Milner administration rather than in any notions of governmental regard for questions of chiefly legitimacy. Milner's post South African War government was intent on restoring the mining industry to pre-war levels of

production which entailed, among other things, the provision of adequate labour to the mines. An important element in the State's plan was the re-ordering of rural African society through the Native Affairs Department, to allow for a stricter control over the provision of labour.⁴ Chiefs considered inimical to British interests in the Transvaal consequently were forced into line or removed from their posts. Israel, in the opinion of British officials, fell into such a category and Pogiso's claim to chieftaincy suddenly presented them with the opportunity to replace him.⁵

Though Pogiso had an undeniable claim to chieftaincy of the Hurutshe, Israel refused to step down. The reason for this was that after Ikalafyn's death, Israel had married his brother's chief wife and had "raised up seed" with her. In terms of a Hurutshe custom which conferred succession upon the eldest son of the first wife, regardless of whom the real father may have been, Israel considered the son of this union to be the rightful chief, Ikalafyn not having fathered a son with his chief wife. (Pogiso was his son from another wife.) Israel considered that he should continue as chief until this boy, Maje, reached his seniority.

Though an identical situation had given rise to a schism within the chieftom in earlier years which the British authorities had sanctioned, they chose on this occasion to oppose Israel's claim, undoubtedly because the Government was determined to install a more compliant and co-operative leadership in the Hurutshe reserve. In April 1906 therefore, the Executive Council approved Pogiso's appointment as chief, believing that Israel would quietly relinquish his authority. It proved a critical error on the State's behalf. Not only was Israel's support far stronger than local officials had estimated, but he was also able to mobilise this support in a most effective way. Israel presented Pogiso as an "outsider", a Christian who would undermine traditional practises such as bogadi and rainmaking activities. Israel also shifted his attack from appeals to tradition to the arena of modern colonial public contestation. Firstly he sought the advice of a local attorney in Zeerust (who was warned off from taking the case by the Commissioner for Native Affairs),⁶ and secondly he collected £150 from his supporters and travelled to Cape Town where he engaged the services of Francis Peregrino, the West African editor of the South African Spectator -actions remarkably resolute for one considered "weak and vascillating" by the Colonial authorities.⁷ Israel also headed a deputation to see Lord Selbourne, the High Commissioner, who happened to be touring the district in mid-1907, and put his case to the "Great Father" (as Selbourne self-effacingly described himself).⁸

The government, sensing that it had a fight on its hands, banished Israel from the reserve. Following a common Hurutshe expedient, Israel slipped across the border to the sanctuary of the Bechuanaland Protectorate while his followers moved onto two farms, Petrusdam and Leeufontein. Leeufontein had been purchased by the Hurutshe in 1876, though this fact appeared to unknown to the government in 1907.⁹ Windham, the Secretary for Native Affairs, consequently ordered them to move off the two farms, a command which was ignored, the Zeerust magistrate reporting in January 1908 that "the attitude they have now taken up is of absolute defiance to my authority".¹⁰ This defiance was based on the fact that the Hurutshe could prove that they had legal title to the eastern portion of Leeufontein.

Consequently, the pattern of control that the government wished to impose over this remote rural community was disarranged, not only by the determination of Israel's people to resist but also because the Hurutshe, like many African communities in the western Transvaal, were quick to see the advantages of purchasing land outside their reserve.¹¹ Security on the land thus enabled them to mount a successful defence of their political independence. Moreover, in August 1908,

Israel despatched five of his leading men to buy a neighbouring farm, Braklaakte, for £1.500. Rather shrewdly these men, led by Israel's brother, Malebelele, did not disclose their association with Israel when the transaction was conducted.¹² Thus in 1911 the government was forced to accept Israel's chieftaincy over the Hurutshe who had moved onto the two farms.

A notable feature of the struggle to preserve their identity in this early period was the support given to Israel himself by his followers. This attraction for chieftaincy was common among rural communities facing a threat to their traditional rural identities and claims to land in the early decades of the twentieth century at a time when productive enterprises were organised around the chieftaincy.¹³ The apparent inability of the state to shake this support for Israel was because it could not immediately find, in Pogiso, an effective collaborationist base on which to rebuild an alternative chieftaincy at Dinokana.

In Limbo, 1911-1940.

Although the two Hurutshe groups were now recognised as legal occupiers of their farms it did not follow that they were to be accorded "independence" from the main house at Dinokana. The following thirty years were characterised by attempts to encourage a "healing of the breach", and by efforts to coerce the breakaway factions to accept the authority of the chiefs at Dinokana. The attitude of the Department of Native Affairs appeared to shift in response to the attitudes of the chiefs at Dinokana themselves- when such chiefs were in favour with the administration then unity was encouraged, when they were unco-operative then unity was shelved. This changeable and contradictory situation arose out of the colonial desire to bring the local ruling classes into the centre of the colonial state and the simultaneous determination on the part of many chiefs to hang on to all possible areas of administrative, judicial, executive and economic control. A proliferation of chiefs claiming separate powers further militated against efficient administration. Attitudes also altered in response to new policy, especially from the late 1920's when "legitimate authorities" were sought out in rural areas to support the segregationist principles which then infused official thinking.¹⁴

Up to the death of Pogiso in 1908 the relationship between the separatists and the Dinokana section remained fairly hostile. The prospects of reconciliation looked so slim that the idea was not even mooted. However, after Pogiso's death, the Native Commissioner (N.C.) considered reconciliation to be inevitable.¹⁵ When this again appeared illusory official attitudes hardened, especially towards the people in Braklaagte. "It would create a very bad precedent", wrote the N.C. in 1922, "to now recognise this body of malcontents"(in Braklaagte).¹⁶ Shortly thereafter, in 1924, Israel died and prospects rose once again for a re-unification of the Dinokana house and the Leeufontein separatists. There were reasonable grounds for thinking this, for Israel's son, Monnamere, who had formerly quarrelled with his father (over the taking of a wife) had not moved to Leeufontein with his father, and chose to remain in Dinokana.¹⁷ This fact allowed relations between Dinokana and Leeufontein to remain at least stable.

On the other hand, relations between Braklaagte and Dinokana remained very tense during the 1920's and after. Malebelele continued to challenge the right of Pogiso's descendants to the chieftainship of Dinokana. A faction within Dinokana consequently opposed a reassertion of authority over Braklaagte, believing that this would destabilise political conditions in their town. This bedevilled further the state's attempts to force recognition of the seniority of the Dinokana chieftaincy. The NAD nevertheless continued to exert pressure upon the Braklaagte community by

delaying registration of the transfer of their land, an act which it recognised would have accorded them "a separate tribal identity". In 1924 the NC made this point absolutely clear when he told Malebelele that he would refuse transfer of ownership until "the occupiers of the farm (Braklaagte) recognise the Paramount chief at Dinokana".¹⁸ It was only in 1929 that E.Jansen, the Minister of Native Affairs, signed a special consent form registering Braklaagte in his name in trust for the Hurutshe at Braklaagte.¹⁹

This was not the end of this particular episode by any means. Transfer of the farm was delayed because by 1930 a conflict had broken out between George Moilola, the new chief at Braklaagte following Malebelele's death, and Abraham Moilola, the new chief at Dinokana. The root of this conflict lay in Abraham's determination to unify and integrate all the various Hurutshe factions during a period of internal challenge to the traditional authorities from a small but increasingly powerful class of wealthier farmers in the reserve.²⁰ This attempted concentration of power occurred at a time when the "tide of state policy was flowing towards a more substantial role for chiefs".²¹ Allied to this was the state's need to prevent a proliferation of jurisdictions jockeying for a share in the hegemony and revenue afforded to functionaries who became integrated into the state system. Thus in Moilola's reserve the laws and customs of the Hurutshe had been assiduously researched by the NAD ethnologist, G.Lestrade, who identified Abraham as the legitimate customary ruler. Thus for the sake of rationalisation and the symmetry of traditional order, it was felt that the Braklaagte faction should not be granted full "independence" from the Dinokana house.²²

Consequently in 1936 the government actually reversed the tendency to accord Braklaagte a degree of autonomy and redefined "Dinokana Location" to grant Abraham civil and criminal jurisdiction over Braklaagte in terms of the Native Administration Act of 1927.²³

However three years later events took another unexpected turn. By 1939 Abraham's behaviour had become a threat to orderly administration in the reserve. His attempts to mobilise support against "progressive" elements undermining his position in Moilola's reserve had led him to overstep the acceptable bounds of his jurisdiction.²⁴ In 1939 the NC advised that as "the chief's attitude makes proper administrative control impossible, I can suggest nothing short of summary dismissal."²⁵ One of Abraham's punishments was to strip him of his powers in Braklaagte. Therefore the Braklaagte faction was once more recognised by the government as a "separate tribal entity" under George Moilola and the Governor-General cancelled the definition of the location as proclaimed in 1936 to now exclude Braklaagte.²⁶

Thus the destiny of the Braklaagte community lay entirely in the variable and contradictory nature of state policy as it struggled to tighten the reins of its control over the complex web of institutions and customs that prevailed in the African rural reserves. A further contradiction was introduced in this instance by the government's desire to develop Moilola's reserve, in 1920 designated as "a model native area",²⁷ and the quite blatant efforts of Abraham to marginalise the very class of producers identified by the NC and agricultural extension officers as being the key to increased production. This contradiction between Abraham's intentions and the state's plans for the economic and administrative future of the reserve led to the need to replace Abraham. In trying to arrive an idea of the consciousness of individual rural communities it is important elucidate in some detail these manifold contradictions and their specific consequences for African producers attempting to eke out an existence on the land.²⁸

On the other hand the disruptions faced by the two communities examined here were due to the determination of chiefly lineages to maintain some influence while the state sought to instal conservative rural hierarchies in the reserves. "Chieftaincy", as Beinart has argued, "provided the kind of institution, and set of symbols, behind which rural people could unite at a local level and stake claims to land and communal rights."²⁹ However, as Beinart rightly notes, such support for chiefs did not necessarily imply a yearning for a return to pre-colonial rule with its numerous tributary obligations. "Rather, they (rural people) hoped to instal a political process which would allow popular participation in decision making and popular control over (their) bounded world."³⁰

Internal Ruptures 1940-1984.

The recognition by the Executive Council of Braklaagte's autonomy lent a certain stability to political affairs in the village, but soon internal divisions began to surface. Similar divisions too were faced in Leeufontein. While this internal dissension itself was not particularly unique, the way the state later intervened to refashion circumstances to its own wishes was, and provided the prelude to the disastrous events which later engulfed these settlements.

In order to set out these divisions clearly we need to return to Israel's death in 1924. When Israel fell sick in 1923 he was invited to spend his last days with his brother Malebelele, in whose district he died. Israel's son, Monnamere, then ruled in Leeufontein, being recognised formally as "headman" with civil and criminal jurisdiction in 1941, just a year prior to his death.³¹ Monnamere was followed by his son Israel Seruthe Moiloa. (Seruthe for easy identification). At Braklaagte, the succession question became a lot more confused and blurred. Israel apparently appointed George, his son from his second wife, to be the new chief, but his brother Malebelele appointed his son, John Sebogodi, as the next in line. This dual appointment occurred because Malebelele considered Braklaagte and Leeufontein to be separate tribal entities thus giving him the right to appoint an heir, while Israel considered himself chief of both communities. This predicament did not immediately pose a problem because John Sebogodi left the village, thus temporarily relinquishing his right to leadership. For many inhabitants however, George was considered as only a regent, and indeed when he died in 1948 Sebogodi returned to take over. The Native Affairs Department accorded him the status of "acting headman", but the version preferred by many was that Sebogodi was the rightful claimant, having been confirmed in his appointment by Abraham who was the chief of the senior section of the Hurutshe. In the meanwhile George's son, Moitasilo Edwin, remained in the wings awaiting his chance to advance his claim.³²

In the 1950's, the residents of the two farms faced yet another threat to their existence as separate communities. The National Party, in pursuance of a more complete separation of land ownership in South Africa, designated the two areas as "black spots" amongst white farmland. In 1954, a Native Affairs minute directed that the inhabitants "must be advised that all possible steps will be taken to have them removed."³³ Failure to co-operate would lead to direct expropriation. This edict obviously created alarm when conveyed to the people against whom it was directed. In January 1955 chief Abraham from Dinokana headed a delegation to see the Secretary of Native Affairs in Pretoria to seek assurances that the people of Leeufontein and Braklaagte would not be removed from their farms, though the outcome is not clear from the evidence.³⁴ Its significance lies not only in the fact that it introduced a new element of fear and mistrust, but also that it opened up new divisions in the community at Leeufontein where Seruthe colluded with the authorities- a line of action that later culminated in his sudden flight from the

village.

It was not however Seruthe's collaboration in this case that led to his precipitous departure, but his role in the anti-pass struggle that suddenly gripped the attention of all residents of Moiloa's Reserve in 1955. The curiously worded Abolition of Passes Act of 1952 forced African men and women to carry reference books. However the issuing of reference books was interpreted, by rural women especially, as a constraint upon their ability to move to urban areas to seek work and the advantages flowing from such contact.³⁵ The story of the opposition mounted by the Hurutshe to the taking of these reference books has now passed into the history of rural resistance in South Africa in the 1950's and 1960's.³⁶ In general terms, this resistance was related to a wave of revolts throughout South Africa directed against the symbols of influx control or against rehabilitation measures which were perceived as a threat by most sectors of rural producers. The Bantu Authorities Act created the "authorities" who were to be accountable to the NAD for the implementation of these measures. Thus it was that in Leeufontein Seruthe found himself at odds with most residents who actively opposed acceptance of the reference books. The village descended into violence as scores of men and women were arrested, harassed, and beaten by the South African police. For his own protection Seruthe was forced to accept a bodyguard, upon whom "fell the privilege of conducting raiding columns through the village in the dead of night and indicating (to the police) the inmates whose households required attention."³⁷ (A euphemism for assault or arrest). In the end, civil conflict led to the burning of fifteen homes belonging to those who accepted, or had indicated acceptance, of the despised reference books.³⁸ According to Hooper, a Zeerust based Anglican priest who was in close contact with Leeufontein at this time, the village experienced the most "concentrated and intense brutality" of any in the district.³⁹

Leeufontein and Braklaagte's response to the imposition of passes was shaped by the experience of migrant labour and the changes it had wrought over the years. Although the land occupied by the two communities was favourable for grazing, it had become overstocked by the 1950's.⁴⁰ Moreover land in Moiloa's Reserve, to which many residents still appeared to have had access, was being increasingly utilised by the "progressives". Using the Moiloa Reserve Local Council as a base for their operations, this group had monopolised the benefits of agricultural expenditure in the Reserve.⁴¹ Faced with increasing rural pressures, a growing number of men and women began to tramp the well-worn path to the Reef in the 1940's and 1950's to form part of the migrant proletariat. In 1951 Breutz estimated that eight to ten thousand of the Reserves approximately 50,000 population were migrants.⁴² In Braklaagte and Leeufontein, Breutz estimated about a third of the residents to be migrants.⁴³

As was the case in Sekhukhuneland migrant organisation played a crucial role in sustaining the resistance.⁴⁴ Significantly, Hurutshe migrants in the city were able to thrust aside local squabbles and grievances and when the threat of state interference raised its head they were in a position to act swiftly and decisively. This was facilitated by the formation of the Bahurutshe Association on the Reef whose staunchest supporters came from the Braklaagte and Leeufontein villages.⁴⁵ Hurutshe migrants met on a regular basis at Newclare (termed their "headquarters") or sent representatives from the mines principally employing Hurutshe migrants -such as Rand Leases, Durban Deep, Crown Mines. Men from the East Rand would also make their way to Newclare on appointed Sundays. During 1956 and 1957 meetings were chaired by Abraham Sebogodi, the chief's brother. Their business centred around the organisation of stokvels and burial societies, the latter, as Delius has shown in his study of Pedi migrants, increasingly "claim(ing) widespread

migrant membership".⁴⁶ Once the trouble flared up in the reserve it was relatively simple to arrive at decisions and to act swiftly upon them. For example funds were immediately released to hire cars to ferry the migrants home to Moiloa's reserve (though the A.N.C. also provided cars) and lawyers were contacted in Johannesburg to defend Leeufontein residents who had been arrested for burning down the houses of people loyal to the government.⁴⁷ The nucleus of resistance had by the 1950's shifted to well organised migrants who were leading, rather than being led by, supportive chiefs-the official Commission of Enquiry established afterwards is replete with instances of "Johannesburg Natives" simply taking over meetings in the makgotla and instructing chiefs to take appropriate measures.⁴⁸

After the disturbances the Commission mentioned above recommended that both Leeufontein and Braklaagte be "expropriated as soon as possible since ...the delay in doing so is one of the causes of the unrest."⁴⁹ Not surprisingly Seruthe, whose position at Leeufontein had become untenable, in 1958 gladly accepted an offer to move to Driefontein, an area within Moiloa's reserve. He was accompanied by only a handful of supporters, the rest successfully launching a court application to prevent their removal.⁵⁰ Seruthe thus relinquished his authority over Leeufontein but was shortly thereafter installed as chief at Dinokana after the incumbent Abraham, the leading chief in the resistance, had been deposed. Ironically, a chief from Leeufontein thus became head of the Dinokana faction after years of refusal to recognise the independence of the Leeufontein chiefs from the Dinokana house. This occurred simply because it was now no longer expedient to support the ruling family at Dinokana and because Seruthe had shown himself to be loyal to the state. Seruthe's brother, Moswana David Moiloa, became chief at Leeufontein. Moswana's position during the revolt had not been as unambiguous as that of his brother however and consequently he was not accorded legal recognition by the government.

To summarise the situation regarding leadership, by the beginning of the 1960's there was in each community an alternative authority -in Braklaagte in the person of Moitasilo Edwin and in Leeufontein in the person of Seruthe and later his son Godfrey- which could be promoted to leadership if the need arose; and indeed, as subsequent events will show, this need did arise. The presence of this alternative chieftaincy at the same time weakened the capacity of the two communities to act in unity and raised the level of civil conflict in the communities.

Bophuthatswana - A Cloud on the Horizon, 1960-1983.

Probably the intensity of opposition deterred the government from immediately incorporating or removing the people of Leeufontein and Braklaagte. The inaccessibility of official records makes it difficult to determine what the reason for the apparent delay was. The plan was not retracted however, for in 1966 the farms were expropriated by the South African Trust with the intention of resettling the population within the Tswana Territorial Authority, an interim stage on the road to the creation of an independent Tswana "state". Thus the two settlements were inexorably swept along in the current of the Grand Apartheid policy. However because of the cumbersome and labyrinthine nature of this system the affected communities were not able to find either the appropriate time or issue to fight their case.

A lengthy period of time was to elapse before the incorporation plan was set in operation. The expropriation did not entail any change of status as far as the chiefs were concerned, but the insecurity caused by the delay must have hung over the community like a sword of Damocles. In 1975 consolidation proposals suggested that two farms, Bergvliet and Rietgat, be given over as

land on which to settle the two communities.⁵¹ This was never carried into effect, though a Bophuthatswana Commission of Enquiry into Local and Regional Government in 1981 described the Hurutshe at Leeufontein and Braklaagte as "tribes still to be resettled."⁵² By the late 1970's however, Bophuthatswana had become a reality and provided apparent "evidence" of the viability of the homeland policy. Thus the idea of consolidating these areas into Bophuthatswana superseded the scheme to resettle the population at Bergvlei and Rietgat. This shift was indicated more clearly in the 1977 Status of Bophuthatswana Act which effectively deprived Leeufontein and Braklaagte residents of their South African citizenship. Despite the recommendations of a Commission (of Co-operation and Development) report which suggested the farms be retained as "black spots", the South African government persisted with the plan of incorporation. The proposals were announced on the 5th. of June 1983 and the advice or objections of interested parties was called for.⁵³

"Spiked by the Prickly Pear" - The Contest over Incorporation , 1983-1990.

When it became known, this decision sparked off another round in the bitter and prolonged attempt by the two communities to preserve a measure of independence. It was only in 1986 that Braklaagte residents got wind of what was happening, for the proposals calling for objections received limited coverage in the media and did not therefore come to their attention. Thus incorporation plans, in the face of no apparent objections, were presented as a fait accompli at the end of 1986. The community responded by signing a petition, with 3,000 signatories, rejecting incorporation. They offered the following reasons for doing so:

- a) That they would permanently lose their South African citizenship and become citizens of a state not recognised internationally.
- b) They would lose their right to work in South Africa.
- c) Having indicated their opposition to incorporation they would be likely to face discrimination from the Bophuthatswana authorities- a point which became evident later on.
- d) Social, Educational and Health services were of an inferior standard in Bophuthatswana and there was the possibility that they would be denied access to these services.
- e) That the Bophuthatswana government, by foisting an unpopular and illegitimate chief upon the community, would destroy the fabric of social order that had long existed.⁵⁴

The South African government in June 1987 agreed to consult the community regarding incorporation but in fact failed to do so until December 1988. At the meeting which finally did eventuate between the residents' leaders and government officials the latter agreed to consider the views of the community.

Notwithstanding this undertaking, the attorneys acting for the Braklaagte residents were informed that incorporation (of both areas) would be gazetted on the 31st of December 1988. A rule nisi was granted and the state was forced to supply reasons why the case should not be set aside. During this hearing it became evident that papers incorporating Braklaagte had been signed a full week before the meeting at the beginning of December, indicating that the government had no intention of considering the opinions of the Braklaagte residents. The state's intention to press ahead with incorporation was, to use the words of the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC)

"to say the least, puzzling".⁵⁵ Previously communities such as Moutse had deliberately been relocated outside Bophuthatswana and "black spots" in the Eastern Cape had been reprieved from removal into the Ciskei. Moreover from late 1988 the South African government had committed itself to a reform policy, which was allegedly to be more sensitive to the plight of black South Africans. A possible reason for the refusal to recind the decision was the fact that Bophuthatswana was considered at the time to be a model homeland which needed support.

On the 10th March 1989 the Supreme Court ruled the proclamation (no.R220) incorporating the area, to be valid. Within a fortnight Braklaagte was plunged into a spiral of disorder and violence. A police camp was established to guard the state's protege Moitasilo Edwin and his property, and police roadblocks were set up to identify anti-incorporationists. School children especially were targeted. Once identified, these opponents of the homeland system were assaulted and detained. When the angry and frightened villagers attempted to meet to discuss these incidents, their gatherings were violently broken up by the security forces. Pupsey Sebogodi, the acting chief was detained, along with over a hundred others, under Bophuthatswana's security measures. Sixty-five people subsequently were charged with public violence. Access to support from the outside was cut off -for example the village doctor was refused entry (presumably because he would observe the extent and seriousness of the beatings), and TRAC and Black Sash officials were banned from operating in the district. Lawyers even had difficulty in getting access to imprisoned clients, having to threaten to issue court interdicts in order to see them. Finally, the only hope for a reprieve failed when the Braklaagte appeal against incorporation was rejected.⁵⁶

A short distance away at Leeufontein the residents observed these developments with growing alarm, for their fate obviously was bound to that of Braklaagte. Meetings of the *lekgotla* (tribal council) were held in January and further meetings held with the community occurred on an almost weekly basis. A petition signed by the chief, his councillors and most of the residents rejecting incorporation was forwarded to the authorities. In March Bophuthatswana police encamped at Edwin's farm began to intimidate residents and to question them about their allegiances. Following the assault of high school pupils at a roadblock and their subsequent arrest, a school boycott was mounted to protest against police actions and the forced re-incorporation. In April the police attempted to arrest two men at Leewfontein. A confrontation between the crowd which gathered and the police took place and the latter used teargas and rubber bullets to disperse the onlookers. At this, the community took fright and nearly 4,000 fled to a neighbouring white farm. The owner, a Mr. Paul van der Merwe, in a gesture unusual for the conservative white farmers (although many were his own labourers) gave them sanctuary and protection from further police harassment.⁵⁷

In May, in an attempt to defuse a dangerous situation, the South African ambassador to Bophuthatswana agreed to meet the community. He did little other than to restate the official position of the two governments and left the meeting precipitously without addressing the residents' complaints. Just over a week later, on May 19, Bophuthatswana's President Mangope visited Leeufontein together with a large police contingent. Mangope threatened the villagers, warning them not to "abuse" him. "Do not play games with me", he is reported to have added, "if you do, I will prick you and curse you like the prickly pear".⁵⁸ Such threats only incensed the villagers even more and it needed only a spark to ignite a dangerous conflagration. This is precisely what happened on the 1st July when police arrived to break up the meeting to protest against incorporation and it was this act that led to the tragic events described at the beginning

of this article.

As reference to the schools boycott and the assault of schoolchildren would indicate, more light needs to be shed on the role played by the youth in the defiance. In January 1989 they formed themselves into a Youth Association with representatives in each of the wards (kgoro). Later this organisation affiliated to the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). On the 29th December 1990 almost 2,000 students from the two villages joined the A.N.C. Youth League. Meetings of this Youth Organisation took place outside the villages so as to avoid detection. Amongst their activities were the collection of bail money, the organisation of protest meetings against police conduct, the school boycott and "conscientising" activities such as the performance of plays depicting oppression in the villages.⁵⁹ To summarise, though the population at large opposed incorporation, the youth played a central role in organisation of the resistance, and in combatting both those elements favouring links with Bophuthatswana as well as the police. A measure of this participation is reflected in the fact that 129 scholars were arrested and charged with a range of offences under the category of public violence. This is not to suggest that migrants played no role - the fact that meetings were held on week-ends when they could be present testifies to their continued involvement in affairs.⁶⁰ Similarly the role of chiefs remained crucial, particularly as the issues of leadership and local autonomy were central to the affair. As the crisis deepened the part played by Pupsey Sebogodi, son of the deposed chief, became fundamental. He remained in close contact with support groups in Johannesburg which took up the cause for the two communities and he travelled abroad to seek support for their plight. He was one of the first chiefs to join the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) in the Western Transvaal where he holds an executive position. Nevertheless, a significant feature is the increased involvement of younger people in the events between 1989 and 1991.

The Manipulation of Authority.

A noteworthy feature of government strategy in the incorporation issue was its attempts to legitimise its actions on the grounds of traditional or customary practise, an obsession which had preoccupied officialdom from the onset in its relationship with the two communities. In the colonial era the institution of chieftainship was recognised as an essential political instrument of control and its value persisted into the apartheid period, despite the arsenal of legislation which the modern South African state had at its disposal to impose control over the African population. Furthermore, having once created a system based on "traditional" structures it became necessary to pursue it to its bitter (though not necessarily logical) end. As this discussion has indicated, this intervention had the added effect of dividing, or further dividing, rural society and thereby weakening its capacity to resist state intervention.⁶¹ The state's gambit in dividing the leadership of the Hurutshe was laid in the 1950's with the deposition of Abraham Moiloa and the co-option of a significant section of the chiefship, most notably the Mangope family based at Moswedi. Whereas the colonial administrations had failed to effectively identify and entrench a collaborationist base, the National party government was more successful at doing so.

In the past decade or so the primary purpose of the South African and Bophuthatawana regimes in their dealings with the communities under discussion has been to reduce the powers of the anti-incorporationist chiefs by dismissing them and strengthening those elements in favour of homeland policies. This course of action was legitimised on the grounds that the Leeufontein and Braklaagte factions were subordinate to the Dinokana house, an argument which had been used

at convenient points in the past. Government ethnologists were thus engaged by the South African Department of Development Aid to support this contention, and a carefully constructed argument was devised to try and justify the Dinokana chiefs' paramountcy over those at Leeufontein and Braklaagte.⁶²

Its confidence sustained by this supposedly authoritative and authentic information, the government then manoeuvred to oust the anti-incorporationists. In 1983 Edwin Moitasilo was appointed to administer a Braklaagte cattle post at Welverdient, an area that had been incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1979 amid much acrimony over the loss of land. In 1984 Godfrey Moiloa visited Braklaagte, accompanied by Bophuthatswana officials, to try and persuade the community to accept him as chief. This overture was firmly rejected. Tribal records however were loaned to Godfrey for him to consult, an act which Moiloa interpreted as "acceptance" of his jurisdiction. In May 1988 John Sebogodi was removed from the headmanship of Braklaagte by the Department of Constitutional Planning and Godfrey was appointed as chief in both Leeufontein and Braklaagte. It should be noted that prior to this Sebogodi effectively administered both villages, for Moswana David Moiloa had left Leeufontein for the Witwatersrand in 1965 leaving Sebogodi as acting headman. Though Moswana returned in 1975 he had continued to allow Sebogodi to administer affairs, acting as his assistant. In August 1988 Godfrey Moiloa, now in charge of the entire district, appointed Edwin as "traditional headman" in Braklaagte.⁶³ No attempt was made to inform either community of these appointments, a strong inference that the two administrations wished to delay the announcements until after incorporation. As the attorney for the Leeufontein accused charged, the decision to recognise Edwin and Godfrey Moiloa as headman and chief respectively was "clearly part of a strategy to enable the minister (of Education and Development Aid) to contend that the Leeuwfontein chief and his tribe had agreed to incorporation".⁶⁴

What emerges from this discussion regarding chieftainship is that both the South African and Bophuthatswana administrations intervened decisively in the affairs of the two communities in order to prop up "legitimate" authorities who would promote both the ideology and functioning of the homeland system. Such an intervention flies in the face of local leadership patterns and characteristics and severely disrupted and disturbed social and economic life in the villages. Beyond this, such interference contradicted earlier official statements of recognition of the of the two communities as independent, though junior, sections of the Hurutshe. To have taken away this recognition was to deny and negate their history.

Conclusion.

Three broad points will be made here. Firstly, the struggle waged by the residents of Leeufontein and Braklaagte against incorporation represented a serious though recurrent episode in a long and varied history of resistance to attempts to circumscribe and limit their independence and autonomy. This has imbued these people with a deep sense of interdependence and, in the words of an anthropologist who has studied them, "a profound collective consciousness which dominates their perception."⁶⁵ This perception has grown out of their experience of being harried and provoked by regimes which imposed intermittent and often contradictory legislation and strategies upon them. It was this common experience and perception which led to the spontaneous and collective actions of July 1st. 1990. Conversely it was this very unity which the authorities sought to destroy by favouring and supporting the interests of a group of rural sympathisers who could be found to have traditional claims to control of the Hurutshe at

Leeufontein and Braklaagte.

Secondly what also emerges from this study of these two villages is the vitality and ingenuity of political life in a rural area of South Africa. The inhabitants demonstrated a sound conception of the importance of linking their struggle with wider political forces and structures, and of exploring avenues of action afforded by the urban/rural connection which was developed through the migrant labour system.

Thirdly one has to consider the implications of all this for the economic security and wellbeing of the two communities involved. Each round of crises disrupted economic activities. In 1957 and 1958 a significant number of people fled from Moiloa's reserve (and from Leeufontein and Braklaagte) and this abandonment of lands has been put forward as an important reason for the collapse of agriculture in the region.⁶⁶ The loss of the cattle post and land at Welverdient in 1977 when it was incorporated into Bophuthatwana "seriously depleted the communities' capacity to engage in certain types of agriculture."⁶⁷ Similarly, in 1990 and 1991 activities again came to a virtual halt and some villagers who had left could not find cattle and other possessions on their return.⁶⁸ In assessing the capacity of rural communities to reconstruct the local economy one needs to bear in mind that progress in the past has been impeded by political actions and imperatives that theoretically should have less impact in a more democratic dispensation.

A final significant feature of the history of Leeufontein and Braklaagte is the changing context of resistance and the consciousness of those who were in the forefront of this resistance. Their battles in the 1910's and 1920's were directed largely to securing certain title to land and a recognition of their separation from the main Hurutshe house at Dinokana. After a quiet period in the 1940's this gave way to the 1950's fight against a policy which threatened the tenuous rural base which they clung to, and to the last decade when they resisted the culmination of the apartheid policy in the form of the homelands system. Significantly, in each phase of this conflict different elements in their society -chiefs and elders, migrants, youth- assumed the limelight, though none departed the stage entirely.

¹For an account of these events see Grasping the Prickly Pear: The Bophuthatswana Story, (March 1990), pp. 13-22. Published by the Black Sash for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC).

²"South Africa-Out of Sight :The Misery in Bophuthatswana," Africa Watch, Sept.16. 1991.

³For an account of this development see A.Manson, " The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1848- 1913", unpublished Ph.D thesis , University of Cape Town, 1990.

⁴A.Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy, (Johannesburg 1985), pp.149-150.

⁵The local Native Affairs Commissioner in Zeerust, Ernst Stubbs, described Israel as "weak, vacillating and most unreliable." Furthermore he was considered to be an inefficient tax-collector and addicted to liquor. See T.A. (Transvaal Archives) Gov. vol. 1090, 50/10/07, E.Stubbs to C. Griffith, 29 January 1906.

⁶T.A. Gov. 1090, 50/10/07, G.Lagden to W.Windham, 26 October 1906.

⁷This information is contained in T.A. NTS vol. 324, r28/55, Acting sub-Native Commissioner, Zeerust, to Native Commissioner, Rustenburg, 7 June 1907.

⁸See Rand Daily Mail, 8 July 1907.

⁹T.A. SNA vol.371, no.2054, E.Stubbs to C.Griffith, 3 May 1907. The colonial government was busy sorting out the tangled issue of claims to land in the western Transvaal at the time.

¹⁰T.A. SNA vol.394, no. 94, J.S.Leary to W.Windham, 8 January 1908.

¹¹For an account of this phenomenon see G.Relly, "The Transformation of Rural Relationships in the Western Transvaal", M.A. thesis, University of London, 1978.

¹²See T.A. NTS vol. 324, r43/92, Resident Magistrate, Marico, to Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA), 18 January 1908.

¹³For an account of this development in other colonial contexts see W. Beinart, "Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa c.1900-1950" Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol.19, no.1, (1985); W.Beinart and C.Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, (Johannesburg 1987) pp.106-137. Another useful comparison is with Basutoland; in J.Kimble, "Clinging to the Chiefs; Some Contradictions of Colonial Rule in Basutoland, c.1890-1930." in H.Bernstein and B.K.Campbell (eds.), The Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa, (London 1984).

¹⁴See S. Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa. 1919-36, (London 1989).

¹⁵T.A. NTS vol.324, r28/55, Native Commissioner to SNA, 28 March 1922.

¹⁶T.A. NTS vol.3132 r18/308, N.C. Zeerust to SNA, 28 March 1922.

¹⁷See D.M. Tiro, "Chieftainship in Lekubu Village", Final year Long Essay, University of Bophuthatswana, 1987.

¹⁸T.A. NTS vol.3123 r18/308, NC Zeerust to SNA, 9 July 1924.

¹⁹T.A. NTS vol. 3123 r18/308.

²⁰The genesis and resolution of this conflict is explained in A.Manson and J.Drummond, "The Transformation of Moiloa's Reserve in the Western Transvaal; Politics, Production and Resistance in a Rural Setting, 1919 -1986 ", History Workshop Paper, University of Witwatersrand, 1990.

²¹Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p.37.

²²T.A. NTS vol.3123 r54/409 ,SNA to Chief Moilola, 13 June 1932.

²³See Schedule B to Government Notice no.1818 of 4 December 1936.

²⁴For an account of this see Manson and Drummond, "The Transformation of Moilola's Reserve".

²⁵T.A. NTS vol. 326, r.40/65, Chief Native Commissioner to NC Zeerust, 6 November 1939.

²⁶T.A. NTS vol.326 r40/65 SNA to Chiefs and Headmen, Marico district,n.d.

²⁷T.A. NTS vol.8537 r360/37, NC Zeerust to SNA, 17 November 1920.

²⁸For an interesting comparison see J.Kimble, "Clinging to the Chiefs".

²⁹See W. Beinart, "Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa ca. 1900-1950 ", Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol.19 no.1 (1985), p.94 .

³⁰Beinart , "Chieftaincy and Articulation",p.95.

³¹It has been pointed out that a headman appointed in terms of the Native Administration Act of 1927 had "virtually the same powers as a chief recognised ... in terms of Section 32(7) of the same Act".See affidavit of M.W. Prinsloo (Randse Afrikaans Universiteit) in Court Records of the matter between M.D. Majafa and State President of South Africa(and others), Supreme Court case no. 13145/89.(Hereafter referred to as the Court Record.)

³²See Breutz, Tribes of Marico, p. 179; Evidence of Pupsey and John Sebogodi, interviewed 18 May 1990 in Lekubu by A.Manson.

³³The Minute is contained in Report of Commission of Enquiry into Recent Disturbances in Linokana and other Native Areas, District of Marico, House of Assembly Annexure no.229, 29 December 1957, p.47.

³⁴Report of Commission of Enquiry, p.17.

³⁵For a interesting account of the benefits to Tswana women of migrancy in the first four or five decades of this century and their response to attempts to control the conditions of migranct see B. Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng:Consciousness, Life Strategy and Migrancy in South Africa, pp.106-121 and pp.165-197.

³⁶See for example T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, (Johannesburg 1983) pp.272-279; C.Hooper, Brief Authority, (Cape Town 1989); A.Manson, "The Hurutshe Resistance in the Zeerust District of the Transvaal, 1954-1959" Africa Perspective (1983).

³⁷Hooper, Brief Authority, p.212.

³⁸See Manson , "The Hurutshe Resistance", p.68.

³⁹Hooper, Brief Authority, p.229.

⁴⁰It is difficult to obtain statistics to prove this but the frequency of its mention in the oral record suggests it is stronger than mere impression. See Interviews with J.Sebogodi, P.Matsobe, S.Makgayane and P.Rantau , Lekubu village, 6 and 10 November 1991, recorded by A.Manson.

⁴¹Manson and Drummond, "The Transformation of Moiloa's Reserve", pp.6-7.

⁴²See Breutz, Tribes of Marico, p.38.

⁴³Breutz, Tribes of Marico, p.177.

⁴⁴See P. Delius, "Sebatakgomo; Migrant Organisation, the A.N.C. and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt", Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 15 no. 4 (1989).

⁴⁵Interview with P.Matsobe, Lekubu, 6 November 1991.

⁴⁶Delius, "Migrant Organisation....and the Sekukuneland Revolt", IASAS, 15, 4, (1989), p.597.

⁴⁷See Manson "The Hurutshe Resistance", pp.68-69; Report of Commission of Enquiry , pp.48-49.

⁴⁸See for example p.15 and 18.The chiefs Witkleigat and Haartebeestefontein were made to collect money for the defence of those arrested.

⁴⁹Commission of Enquiry,p.63.

⁵⁰See Court Records, Affidavit of K.Kutsa, p.401.

⁵¹Court Records, Minutes of a meeting between Dr. N.Viljoen, Minister of Education and Development Aid, and a Delegation representing the Braklaagte and Leeufontein communities.15 December 1988. pp.100-101.

⁵²See 1981 Commission of Enquiry into Local and Regional Government, annexure 6.11, Bophuthatswana Government.

⁵³These facts are drawn from the Court Records and from "Fighting the Drawings of a Pen"- Braklaagte's Struggle Against Incorporation, Published by the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), A Black Sash Publication (1989), pp.8-9.

⁵⁴See Court Records, Minutes of Meeting between N.Viljoen and Braklaagte and Leeufontein communities, 96-101; and in "The Chronology of Events prior to Incorporation".

⁵⁵See Fighting the Drawings of a Pen, TRAC publication (1990), p. 10.

⁵⁶Grasping the Prickly Pear, pp.30-31.

⁵⁷These events are chronicled in Fighting the Drawings of a Pen and in the Court Records, Chronology of Events Prior to Incorporation, pp.3-5.

⁵⁸See Court Records, Chronology of Events, p. 14.

⁵⁹Interviews with A. Motsosi and G. Motsamae, Braklaagte, 6 November 1991; Court Records, Chronology of Events After Incorporation, pp.4-12.

⁶⁰See Court Records, Chronology of Events After Incorporation, p.2.

⁶¹This is a well documented and researched topic in South African political, historical and anthropological literature. See the comments of A. Spiegel and E. Boonzarier in "Promoting Tradition: Images of the South African Past," in E.Boonzarier and J. Sharp (eds.) South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts, (Cape Town 1988),pp.40-57 and also W.D.Hammond-Tooke , Command or Consensus: The Development of Transkeian Local Government, (Cape Town 1975).

⁶²See Court Records, Affidavits of M. Cilliers pp.150-183 and of A.G.Bam and F.G.J Wild, pp.230-243. The Lawyers acting for the accused submitted counter-claims. See affidavit of M.W.Prinsloo, pp.445-483.

⁶³See Court Records, Chronology of Events, pp.56-58.

⁶⁴Court Records, Chronology of Events, p.60.


⁶⁵Court Records. Anthropological Report by J.C.Kotze, Rand Afrikaans University, p.12.

⁶⁶J. Drummond, "Rural Land Use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", GeoJournal, vol.22, (1990), pp.335- 343; A.Manson, "The Troubles of Abram Moiloa", Institute Of Race Relations mimeograph, 1983.

⁶⁷See Court Records, Agreed Statement of Facts Between the Accused and the State, p.5.

⁶⁸See evidence of P. Rantau, interviewed at Braklaagte 6 November 1991.

Genealogy of Leeuwfontein and Braklaagte Chiefs



INTRODUCTION

A viable transport infrastructure is crucial for economic development. Such an infrastructure usually converts a country into a compact economic unit, linking up areas of economic significance. An economic utility of such vital importance must be operated efficiently and in the interest of a wide range of economic stock holders. Given the high propensity for private capital to accumulate profit at the expense of broad development objectives it is economically rational to place a public utility, such as the railways, under the control of the state. State control ensures that the vital utility is available to all who need its services. Public control ensures that market failures associated with the private ownership of railways are to some extent eliminated. Such market failures, caused by private capital's narrow concern with the maximisation of its own profits, include high railway rates and insensitivity to issues of efficiency such as the timely delivery of goods and competent management. The government can control such market failures by taxing the owners and using the revenue to subsidise the users, or by controlling the activities of inefficient firms. However, it is important to note that private firms are able, via "their superior information, to get the upper hand over the regulators and to take advantage of any improperly designed regulatory provisions."¹

Some economists believe that publicly owned enterprises are inefficient and that attempts to regulate privately owned enterprises usually result in distortions. Regulations, they argue, serve the interests of special interest groups that are often economically uncompetitive. It has been argued further that the slight advantages that might be produced by public ownership are usually not large enough to compensate for the inefficiencies arising from state intervention.² The major reasons for these inefficiencies are cited as bureaucratic red tape, rigid regulations, incompetence and corruption, but such mistakes are also prevalent in the private sector. In addition, I would argue that during specific historical moments private interests should be subordinated to the broader economic interests of a country if that country is to meet the objective of developing a strong, viable economy.

The struggle for the control of railways in southern Rhodesia should be viewed within the above context. The British South Africa Company <BSACo> was the major shareholder of Rhodesian railways. The company also monopolised the management of the railways. Although the company handed over power to the Responsible Government in 1923 the company nevertheless retained control of the railways. Subsequently, the BSACo was accused of exploiting the recently enfranchised settlers. The settlers argued that extremely high railway rates rendered Rhodesian products uncompetitive on international markets despite government measures to curtail the cost of production. Given that the survival of the export-orientated Rhodesian economy hinged on the low cost of production, the economic stake holders of the country demanded state control or outright nationalization of the railways. The railways became the focus of settler agitation because the state had already implemented policies making access to land, labour and marketing less of a problem for white settlers. Railway rates were therefore a major obstacle which had not received any state attention. This paper endeavours to show that, while the need to control the railways was apparent to both the settlers and government, powers beyond their control militated against effective government intervention.

When the BSACo handed over power to the whites settlers in Southern Rhodesia, they did not hand over the control of company assets to the responsible government. The BSACo continued to operate its assets in the interest of shareholders. This is reflected in the rise of railway rates.

Different members of both economic and political groups expressed their dismay and their disapproval of what they saw as extensive exploitation of the settler community in the interest of exploitative international capital. They lobbied for the nationalisation of the railway network, an objective shared by most members of the settler community. The government of southern Rhodesia responded to the pleas of the community by requesting, via the intermediation of the British government, the relinquishing of BSACo control of the Rhodesian railways. This request was met with resistance from both the British government and the BSACo. These two connived to hand over the control of the railways in circumstances that left the BSACo in control of the most important aspects of the railway operations, the railway rates. Local settlers responded to this situation by putting more pressure on the responsible government to nationalise the railways. This objective was finally realised in 1949. This paper analyzes the debate and the struggle for the Rhodesian railways that occurred from 1923 to 1930, and effects of the Railway Act was passed in Southern Rhodesia.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When the settlers achieved political autonomy in 1923, the main objectives of the new government was to speed up the economic development of Rhodesia. The new government had to protect the developing economic sectors, namely the agricultural and mining industries, from exploitative international capital.³ Geographically, Rhodesia is a landlocked country and transportation of export commodities like minerals and agricultural products to the world market depended on the railways. R. Martin, a member of parliament (MP) from the Eastern District, argued in 1925 that:

The future development and prosperity of this country depend if not exclusively, then very largely on the railways and lines of communication. Without the railways we are not going to bring the desired development. The government should ascertain the intention of the railways for the future, whether they are going to run the railways as a monopoly to drain this country for their benefits, or whether they are out to give and take and be satisfied with fair profits and help in making this country what it should be. The mining section, commercial, if they are joined together for the development of Southern Rhodesia and the railways left out, there is no success. The ton-mile rate in Southern Rhodesia is the highest or one of the highest in most of the civilized world.⁴

Complaints about high freight charges were also made by commercial farmers especial those represented by the Farmers Co-op and the Rhodesian Agricultural Union. On the twenty-third annual congress of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, the President of the Union commented that the government should seriously consider the question of controlling the railways.⁵ In his own words he said:

The government should be able to exercise such control over the railways as would enable the people of the Colony to have an effective voice in the railway policy and in the fixing of railway rates, and that they should have power to obtain such detailed information as regards to the finance and administration of the railways as would enable them to ensure that while the rates should be so calculated as to enable the railways to pay interest on their debenture, and a reasonable dividend on their share capital, any surplus over the standard revenue required for these

objectives should accrue to the public by being devoted to the reduction of railway rates.⁶

A member of the Farmers Co-op, Mr. Laurie, also complained that export rates for grain were excessive. The railways, he argued, "took the gilt off the ginger nut .".⁷ To prevent this from happening, Mr. Laurie wanted the railways to reduce their rates. In view of the above, the new government in S. Rhodesia had to give serious consideration to the railway issue from the time it came to power.

THE ORIGIN AND OWNERSHIP OF THE RAILWAYS

The railways which served S. Rhodesia depended on private enterprise for their construction and development. The construction was financed by six private companies: The Rhodesia Railway Company Ltd., The Beira Railway Company Ltd., The Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd., The Blinkwater Railway Company Ltd., The Rhodesia Kafānga-Junction Railway and Mineral Co. Ltd. and The Mashonaland Railway Co. Ltd. These companies managed to raise both authorised and issued share capital. The BSACo was the largest shareholder in all the companies.⁸ The company therefore had the greatest say in the management of the railways.

The BSACo had acquired its controlling interest over a period of time, through the manipulation of various financial strategies. In 1899 the railway companies formed the Rhodesia Trust as a holding company with capital to the value of £1 million. Through the transference of shares, the trust acquired a controlling interest in both the Mashonaland railway Co. Ltd. and the Rhodesia Railway Co. Ltd. By 1922 the BSACo's interests in the Rhodesia railway Trust Ltd amounted to 85% of issued capital. The BSACo also held shares in other railway companies. Hence it was the BSACo which provided most of the financial capital needed by the railway companies. Before the Responsible Government, the BSACo was the government, and the company therefore exercised both political and financial the control over the railways. When company rule ended in 1923, the BSACo remained as a private international company in possession of the "life blood of the whole country".⁹

One of the first issues faced by the Responsible Government was the question of railway rates which played an important role in the development of a largely export oriented economy. The issue therefore served as a test case of the political strength of the newly independent government. It was in this context that the Responsible Government became determined to control the railway company. The state believed that the railways had to be operated to the best advantage of the members of the community in which the railway was situated. They attempted to bring this about either by forcing railway companies to lower their freight charges or by taxing profits and using the derived revenue to subsidise railway rates. These were the only viable alternatives available to the government. Outright nationalisation was out of the question as the government did not have finances to fund such an undertaking and had already borrowed about six million pounds from the international capital market.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION AND ITS CONSTRAINTS ON RAILWAY POLICY

The railways were ".. in the hands of a small group in London whose interest are purely financial."¹⁰ This is reflected by the increase in railway rates. In the 1920s the railways

increased their rates and began to show profits. Prior to 1923, Rhodesia Railways Ltd., had payed out £160,000 in two dividends. In that year they had paid another £43,000.¹¹ In 1924, there was a marked change in profits which led to a dividend of £64,000 being paid to shareholders.¹² As the ordinary capital stood at £586,000 the dividend realised was approximately 14,5 percent by the time that the income tax relief had been added. In addition to the latter, a further £137,148 had been added to the credit balance. Mashonaland Railway Co. had never paid dividend before 1924. Up to 1921, it had shown net profits on two occasions only. In 1924, it paid £300,000 of £1,675,227. Losses had been made up by Rhodesia railway Trust Co., with the ordinary capital of the company standing at £281,280. The net profit in the year 1923/24 of £177,835 allowing also a suitable amount of pension liability.¹³

The increase in railway rates reduced both the agricultural surplus and mining income as their cost of production went up. Their product's international competitiveness was equally reduced. This problem was also acknowledged by Newton, the High Commissioner of S. Rhodesia. He argued that most of Rhodesia's exports were raw materials whose prices are controlled by world wide competition. Profit margins under these conditions are generally small and high railway rates greatly reduce profits. He then recommend that transport costs be kept as low as possible to maintain low cost of production a reasonable profit margin for exporters of raw material.¹⁴ This recommendation was rejected by the Railway company and the British government. The British government actually protected company interests in legislation provision of the Letters Patent of 1921 which were enshrined in the S. Rhodesia' Constitution. Such "Reserved Clauses" were an obstacle to economic development in the colony. They precluded the settler government from passing laws dealing with:

railways within the colony until legislation had been passed adopting with modification the United Kingdom law dealing with the Railway and Canal Commissioners and the Rates Tribunal provided for it in the Railways Act of 1921... and from any laws amending the constitution.¹⁵

Thus the constitution largely protected the capitalist and powerful financial groups which included the BSA Company and its subsidiary companies. This pro-company feeling is clearly reflected in a comment made by Churchill, the Colonial Secretary in 1921, that:

.we need.. complete good will towards enterprises which have contributed in so large a measure to the development of Rhodesia and now so plays a part in the scheme of Imperial Communication ... I have been impressed ... by the magnitude of the investments made by the BSA Company in the Railways and the very heavy burden of financial obligation assumed by the BSA Company in guarantees which they have given to the Debenture holders.¹⁶

This shows that the settler government could not win control over the railways which had such great a protection from the Imperial Government until 'suitable' legislation had been passed by the new government to give due protection to companies with imperial backing. However, law over the railways was difficult to implement because the constitution which was handed over to the settler-government, was, "pared down to the minimum, hemmed in with limitations and loaded with servitude".¹⁷ That constitution was designed to perform three main functions "to protect the right of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation against Africans without

Imperial Sanction and stop Rhodesia from passing laws incompatible with the more ... interests of the Imperial connections".¹⁸ Thus the constitution was designed to protect British interests as far as the Africans were concerned they were discriminated. The Settler-Government was not going to get control until it had passed the required legislation.

The New-Government, had some urgency in gaining control of the railway rates or at least some say in the fixing of tariffs and limitation of company profits. There was also a desire by the government of opening up new areas and the development of more established parts and all this largely depended upon the railway services. Sir Charles Davis, the Permanent Under Secretary at the colonial office, advised Newton, Southern Rhodesia's High Commissioner in London that it was imperative that Legislation be passed as soon as possible after the granting of the Responsible Government. The Legislation had to be made along lines indicated in Letters Patent of 1921. The Responsible Government decided that an enquiry into the railways in general and the position of each of the companies in particular be carried out. The information so found, would enable the government to negotiate with the BSA Company with sound bases, on matters concerning the control of railways which was so vital economically and politically to the colony. Before the Railway Enquiry was started, a statutory authority was first sought. A Railway Enquiry Bill was passed on Bill number 22 of 1924. It was presented to the Colonial Secretary of State for royal assent, with the express object of allowing the Rhodesian Government to arrange the enquiry without in any way contravening the provision of the 1921 Letters Patent. After some delay, the Act was approved. The Government of Southern Rhodesia, was given power related to:

Clause 2 and 3 under which Government take powers to appoint persons(s) to hold at any time an enquiry into conduct, administration, finances and general affairs of any railway with the result that under the Act, there could be set up permanent Magisterial Court carrying a continuous inquiry into ... companies.¹⁹

The railway companies complained that under the above circumstances, they would be unable to work properly and efficiently. On learning this attitude of the companies, Coghlan, the Premier of Southern Rhodesia, said that the Railway attitude was "actually marking the parting of ways between the Government and them as regards future policy."²⁰ The Act was approved by the Imperial Government and an expert in railway matters was elected. His name was Brigadier-General F.D. Hammond.

Hammond was well qualified to conduct the enquiry. He was Royal Engineer, he had considerable experience on railway matters and had only recently been to Nigeria on a similar mission on behalf of the British Government.

THE HAMMOND REPORT

General Hammond was given by the Government of Southern Rhodesia in 1924, the memorandum of instruction on which he based his investigations. In general, Hammond was summoned by the Southern Rhodesia Government to enquire into the conduct, administration, finance, general affairs of the Railways and to advise the government on nationalisation. In a large measure, he was appointed to advise the growing agrarian capital on how to reduce the extent to which the colonial State was straddled between the metropole and the satellite

because of incompetence and lack of business ability of metropolitan capital, which inhibited the expansion of settler capital. Hammond encountered few problems in his investigations, the most difficult and controversial part, was on the recommendations. With regards to the operation of the railways and nationalisation question, Hammond recommended that:

It is now recognised universally that a railway company is not on the same footing as an ordinary commercial concern. It performs services of public utility which are vital to the community and enjoys in varying degrees a monopoly which has been conferred on it by that community, its operation must therefore be subject to some form of control.²¹

Hammond described the general lack of public control of the railways in Southern Rhodesia, which formed the subject of his enquiry as "Unique". He warned the Government that:

It is not merely a question of whether it has been abused or is abusing the extensive powers with which it is endowed so long as it remains uncontrolled it is in a position to do so and no civilised community can allow such a potential danger to remain unchecked.²²

The position of Railway Companies in Southern Rhodesia were unique in that they were not subject to any form of control either over rates or profits. This situation was caused by the fact that the BSA Company which owned the railway companies, was once the government. After Company rule, the railway companies were regulated by Clause 20(c) by which laws dealing with the Railway companies in the colony had to be approved by the Imperial Government. This would operate until the legislation had been passed by the settler government. The legislation had to adopt the provisions of the British Railway Act of 1921 with particular emphasis on the law relating to the Railway and Canal Commissioners and to the Rates Tribunal. Beside the difficulties imposed by the implications of the reservation regarding the railways contained in Clause 29(e) of the Letters Patent, General Hammond observed that control of the railways by the Southern Rhodesia Government within its own borders, would no solve the major problem of the control of rates for imports and export. The Southern Rhodesia Government, would not be able to legislate for those parts of the system outside the country's border. In fact, the more profitable rates for the companies, were located outside Rhodesia like the Congo system.²³

General Hammond emphasised the problem of rates among other things. The problem of rates stemmed from the main provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894 of the United Kingdom, relating to the Railway and Canal Commissions. The latter Act was detrimental to the users of the railways in that, when rates were increased, they were not asked to prove the unreasonableness of the new rates. It was the railway companies views which were considered only. The chief problem of the British Railway Act, 1921, was that standard charges, which acted as a ceiling were to be drawn up by the Railway Companies. The standard charge was then handed to the main provision of the Act, which was a Railway Rates Tribunal consisting of three members. The standard charges had to be formed in such a way "as to yield to the companies a standard revenue equal to the net revenue earned in 1913, a year in which the net revenue reached the highest point together with various allowances for capital which has been raised since ... 1913".²⁴ The Rate Tribunal would then settle the actual schedule to be charged, and if the average annual net revenue proved to be less than standard revenue and

deficit not due to lack of efficiency the tribunal had power to modify the standard charges in an upward direction. The tribunal had the power to determine questions in regard to conditions of carriage, alterations of rates classification, reasonableness of charges for any services or accommodation, the appointment and disintegration of rates.

In Southern Rhodesia the application of the British Railway Act, 1921 was going to be complicated and of little use. The major reason for the above contention was that there was a great difference between the British railways and the Rhodesian Railways. The former railways consisted of complete units all of which could be made and were made subject to the Railway Act. Southern Rhodesia railways were not complete in themselves but had to be considered with reference to the whole railway system of which the lines in Southern Rhodesia were only a working part. That is to say, in Britain, the whole of the operations of English railways come within the terms of the British Act. In Southern Rhodesia that could not be so. The government of Southern Rhodesia could legislate only in respect of those portions of the whole railway system which lie within its borders. The legislation could not embrace the railway operations outside Southern Rhodesia. This meant that a large part of the railways would not come under the terms of the contemplated legislation. Thus, the Act could only offer an incomplete or partial solution. The country could not obtain full control or the most important rates, those on export and import. It could not prescribe rates over the line which lay outside Southern Rhodesia: for example, it could not regulate charges between Beira and Umtali and beyond Plumtree. In fact, it was those lines outside Southern Rhodesia which were showing more profits to the companies.(see footnote 23). This in reality meant that rates on those lines were higher and the distances along them longer as well as the volume of traffic higher. So the users of these lines suffered most, particularly, the landlocked Southern Rhodesia settlers. So even if the local rates in the colony were low but export rates outside the colony high, the settlers still suffered.

Over the specific issue of the control of the railways, Coghlan, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia did not wish to nationalise the railways. This was clearly expressed in his letter of 1925 to the High Commissioner in London. Coghlan stated that, "my idea, of course, is to assume by legislation if possible, sufficient control of the Railways to prevent them from raising rates against this Colony in the event of any shrinkage or loss of their Cargo traffic.. Newton, the London High Commissioner also agreed with Coghlan. Newton was well aware of the nature of Government finance such that he could not opt for nationalisation. On the other hand, there was a strong opinion in the country supported by among others, Downie, M. U. Moffat and F. Johnson, a prominent farmer in favour of nationalisation of the railways or purchasing the rights/shares of the BSA Company in the railways. However, the Government could not raise money to nationalise the railways.²⁵

General Hammond held the view of Coghlan, the Prime Minister. He said, that he was opposed to the government taking over the railway. On his discussion of the possibilities of expropriation, Hammond, estimated new profits for Southern Rhodesia in 1923/24 were approximately £82,400. Railway Companies had to pay £140,000 for the year 1923/24 as income tax to the S. Rhodesian Government. By applying a bonus - mileage to the Beira - Salisbury section in pursuit of a rates reduction policy, he estimated that the net profits would fall to £38,000. In the same year, the Railway companies would pay nearly £140,000 in income tax to the Southern Rhodesian government so that there would be a net loss of the general revenues of the country of some £73,000 if the railways were expropriated.²⁶

Determination of the price of expropriation was going to be difficult because of the nature of the companies involved in the construction of the Railway system. They did not know the right criterion to follow whether to do it on the basis of net profits, or the original cost of construction. Expropriation, could not bring prospects of any reductions in rates since the country could not effect control over the import and export rates. The portions of railways in Southern Rhodesia and outside, would both suffer from separation. The railways, would be on both sides, more expensive to run. Duplication of management, would increase expenses. Above all, Southern Rhodesia would lose support which it was getting from wealthier sections. Hammond finally stated that, "the advantage which Southern Rhodesia obtains from the connection with the other more paying sections of the system is clear... From every point of view, it is to the advantage of both the country and the Railway Companies that the system should be maintained... as one organisation".²⁷

In the memorandum of instruction, Hammond was advised to deal with the question as to whether it would be in the interest of the colony to acquire financial control of the whole system. This was to be done through purchase of the holdings and rights of the BSA Company in the various undertakings by which its control was assured. This position was the one made by the Union of South Africa when the question of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union was under discussion. The holdings and rights consisted of 1 740 151 out of 2 005 767 shares of the Rhodesia Railways Trust Limited 423 583, 6% cumulative preference shares of the Beira - Junction Railways and the rights of the BSA Company under the trust of Deeds relating to the Beira company and its opinion to purchase the line and equipment of the Rhodesia Katanga Junction Railway and the mineral Company Ltd. The colony would substitute the BSA Company as the guarantor of debenture of the Rhodesia Railways and Mashonaland Railway Company. The Blinkwater Railway Company would have been purchased from the Beit Railway Trustees. The other share of the Beira and Beira Junction Railway Companies would also be purchased. Under the provisions of the Union Government, the Union Government was to take over the whole of the ordinary shares of the Rhodesia Railways Ltd, and Mashonaland Railway Company held by the Rhodesia Railways Trust Ltd. A Sum of £6215,000 was mentioned as the purchase consideration for the whole rights, interest and assets included in the agreement.²⁸

Hammond, after spelling out the difficulties involved if the government decided to control the Railways by purchase, did not advocate for the step. He believed that there would be opposition from Portuguese East Africa and Northern Rhodesia. He argued that the Northern Rhodesia government would not like to see the railway being controlled by a competitor with them. The Portuguese government would not favour the control of railways which pass through its State, passed into the hands of a neighbouring State because the degree of exploitation could have been higher. The financial considerations were quite huge and frightening, argued Hammond. The government would have to undertake the guarantee on debentures and the interest, the total contingent liability being nearly £10 million for capital and £570,000 a year for interest.²⁹ In addition, Hammond argued, there was a grave political danger. Employees of the Railway system in Southern Rhodesia were nearly 2000, of whom 1800 had votes. If wives and dependents were added, the votes would be 2,700. Total voting population amounted to 22,000, railway votes were therefore one eighth of the total electorate.³⁰ This was quite a high proportion. Hammond believed that the railway workers were capable of wielding great powers and added, "It needs no words of mine to point the political dangers of a state where one in every eight of the votes is personally interested in donating as high wages as possible out of railway administration".³¹ Hammond went on to argue that, there could be political pressure

to obtain as low rates as possible in certain sectors of the economy at the detriment of others or the public in general. This will cause a distortion in the development priorities based on non-economic factors and this erodes the supportive role railways should play in developing all sectors of the economy irrespective of regional political affiliation.

Another alternative which Hammond had to inquire into was the control of the railway system through agreement. He was in favour of this alternative. An agreement was to be made between the railway Companies and the Government. He felt that the few advantages of purchase, such as control over profits and rates and power to build railways in undeveloped areas could be obtained without incurring the risks and responsibilities attendant on state ownership. He also believed that the BSA Company would not refuse a fair and reasonable agreement with the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Hammond believed that the railway companies would "recognise that the present uncontrolled situation of the railways is unique and (that) they cannot expect it to continue".³² Agreement would specify that the net revenue of Rhodesia Railways Ltd, Mashonaland Railway Company together should after allowances had been made, interest and discounts on debenture and notes, income tax on the two Railway Companies and renewals and pension liabilities on agreed scale not be longer than were necessary to pay an agreed reasonable rate of interest on the share capital of the Trust. The latter is the Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd.

In the event of revenues exceeding the stated amount, the surplus should be used to reduce the rates and encourage the railway companies to render good service. Three-quarters of the surplus revenue would be used to reduce rates and one-quarter would be used as an inducement to stimulate traffic. In order to ensure that the surplus revenue was distributed as agreed, Hammond suggested that a Government representative be elected. The representative would be at the Railway Headquarters. His function would be to see that rate reductions were made and that Southern Rhodesia got its fair share of the rate reductions. Rates changes would have to be done only after he had been consulted. This involved a complete change in rate policy publication if the final annual railway accounts was to be done after the representative had gauged with accuracy the annual results. The Government representative would therefore ensure that the government maintained up to date knowledge of the Railway's financial activities.

In support of control by agreement, Hammond argued that the agreement would gain all the advantages of controlling the profits and ensuring the application of low rates without any risk and responsibilities of ownership. Such an agreement would free the country from the necessity of raising some money to purchase the railway interests, many on foreign soil. The country would be left with a large credit and when it wished to borrow money for development purposes it would be limited. Hammond also stressed that control by agreement was a scheme which would meet with support from neighbouring countries instead of their opposition. He further anticipated that Northern Rhodesia might even want to enter as a party into the agreement and this would act further to strengthen their position.

In the event of failure to secure an agreement with the BSA Company, Hammond advised the government that it should request from Imperial Government authority to build a connection from Rhodesia Railways joining with a Northern extension of South Africa Railways from Messina. Thus the goods for export and import would use this new line and leave the Railway company lines. The Southern Rhodesia Government was also going to introduce legislation in

their colony in line with the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894. Under that Act, no rate or charge could be increased without proof by railway companies before a tribunal. The railway companies had to prove the reasonableness of any increase. This would make any increases, a matter of difficulty.

The government also asked Hammond to investigate and comment on the idea of constructing competing lines which would compete with the ones in existence. On this issue Hammond noted that:

Under no circumstances would I recommend the building of competing lines. The Railways in Rhodesia do not carry traffic up to anything like their capacity. To build lines in competition would result in neither the existing lines nor the competing ones earning revenue enough to meet the expenditure incurred. Competing railway systems mean an enormous duplication of capital, a waste in equipment, operation and in the end public loss.³³

The Hammond report was published in September 1925.

REACTION TO THE HAMMOND REPORT

When the report was out, it was severely criticised by both government officials and ordinary people. These people felt that Hammond's report was biased and in favour of the BSA Company. Among the leading critics of the Hammond Report were Downie, Fulton, Moffat and Gilchrist. Downie was heavily in favour of nationalisation. In a letter to Moffat, the Minister of Mines and Public Works, Downie stated that he had been disappointed by Hammond's Report, especially his recommendation on the control. He said that he held, "isolated views as to the best method of dealing with the Railway Companies and those controlling the system".³⁴ Downie accused the General of having a bad view of Southern Rhodesia, that being landlocked, it was confronted with insurmountable difficulties in introducing legislation to control the Railway Companies serving the economy.

In dealing with capital, of the Rhodesia Railways Co. Hammond made the point that:

...practically the whole capital for construction was raised by debentures and the interest on one was guaranteed by the BSA Company. These onerous conditions explain why the debenture capital forms such a large proportion: if it had been possible to raise capital on more favourable terms from the public, it may be for granted that the others, the BSA Company would have done so, without saddling themselves with the severe obligations.³⁵

Downie went on to argue that the assumption of General Hammond as to the need for debenture was quite unwanted. He accused Hammond for not being able to deal with the real reason for his inquiry. The problem was "how best to liquidate our indebtedness to the BSA Company for guaranteeing and assisting in the financing of the railways and how best to see to it that the railways are administered for the benefit of Rhodesians..." The Government gave Hammond instructions to investigate on the issue of control through purchase. The General did not agree with the suggestion on the grounds that there would be opposition to ownership by Southern Rhodesia. The opposition, Hammond anticipated, would come from Northern

Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa. Downie argued that, "there was no such opposition suggested when the BSA Company made an agreement for sale to the Government of the Union of South Africa."³⁶ Downie further argued that "the purchase of the assets of the Railways Company would be by the purchase of their shares. The shares could be bought and sold like anything else... there was nothing to hinder their being sold to the Government of the Union of South Africa".³⁷

Hammond warned the Government of financial dangers which they would face after purchase. There were to be dangers of guaranteeing principal, premium and interest on £4,260,000 debentures of Rhodesia Railways Ltd and £2,560,000 of Mashonaland Railways Company. After calculating the finances of other companies, Hammond stated that the total contingent liability was approximately £10 million for capital and £570,000 a year for interest.³⁸ However, Maguire, Chairman of Rhodesia Railway Trust Co. addressing BSA Company shareholders in 1923 said:

On the other hand we do not consider the burdens of these guarantees so onerous. As I have said, these Railways are sound supporting concerns. They pay their debenture interests and work at a profit. No call has been made upon us under our guarantees since 1911 and unless very unforeseen circumstances arise, we do not expect any calls will be made. That is not merely a pious aspiration.³⁹

The Railways had shown Maguire's judgement to be correct up to the beginning of 1926. Further Downie went on to discuss over the possible loss of the Congo traffic and the political repercussions following purchase by the state. He disagreed on the two issues above with what Hammond had suggested.

There were others who thought that nationalisation was not a good idea. These people opposed to nationalisation thought that the railways were a bad investment and that the railways could become a public liability if purchased. Hammond had emphasised that the guarantee liabilities had to be achieved by the Government. On the same issue of purchasing the railways, Newton wrote to Coghlan advising that:

McQuiston...Chairman of the Globe and Phoenix an M.P... impressed with Rhodesia and its possibilities advised us to be very careful about taking over the railways and is strongly of the opinion that, if only we can secure sufficient control so that the railway companies may not exact inordinate profits it would be better to leave them in their hands.⁴⁰

As observed from the discussion above, the settlers were basically in two camps. There were those who were for the purchase of the railways at once and for full control of them by the state. These saw in Hammond's Report, a bias towards the Railway Companies. The other camp consisted of those who wanted effective control of the Railways not through purchase but legislation. They viewed purchase as too expensive to the government which was in financial problems. The latter was both the result of the world depression and internal economic problems of Southern Rhodesia. Even if the Southern Rhodesia government had decided to purchase the railways, this could only be done with the BSA Company's consent. If the BSA Company had agreed to sell its shares, then the Southern Rhodesia government would attain

control over the most important rates. Those external to the colony as well as the internal rates. However, if the BSA Company refused to sell their shares and then the government nationalised railways, inside the colony, then the problem would have only been partially solved.

The Railway Companies also criticised the Hammond Report. They argued that the delays in rates reductions were due to the complicated procedures involved in the process of reducing rates. They also gave a reason on this same issue that it took a long time, about three months, to get a reply from their headquarters in London. There was inefficiency as far as communication was concerned. The General Manager, Colonel Birney's late replies to crucial issues was due to the fact that their headquarters were in London. Hammond had also criticised the Railway Companies method of estimating reserves for renewal. Hammond had suggested that revaluation of the cost of renewals be carried out so that over subscription to the reserves could be prevented. Colonel Birney commented that the amount of the annual appropriations for providing for renewals was based upon the estimated costs of replacement. The appropriation was carefully and periodically renewed. It was proposed to make in 1926 a revaluation of the cost of renewing the permanent way.⁴¹ Colonel Birney disapproved Hammond's suggestion that rates be made equal throughout the whole railway system. Hammond had suggested that the branch lines be subsidised by the main lines. Such a subsidisation, suggested Hammond, would help to increase the main line traffic. Birney said that it was previously not possible since, "having regard to the special interests of the separate Railway Companies and to the various series of debentures issue...."⁴² would be made difficult.

Finally the Southern Rhodesia government and the BSA Company agreed to meet in London and discuss the issue of the control of the railway system. The BSA Company had "realised" that their position was unique the world over. According to Downie, they had to meet in London because the BSA Company headquarters was there, Imperial government, Nyasaland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Portuguese representatives were there. The government had discovered according to the Hammond Report that effective control could only be gained if the railways were legislated and then controlled as one indivisible unit. Coghlan, with the instruction of the Legislative assembly, wrote a letter to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, requesting him to inform the British Government that the people of Southern Rhodesia wanted to have control over the railways. The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State on behalf of Southern Rhodesia government that:

representatives of Southern Rhodesia be allowed to go to London, to discuss in advance, proposed railway control legislation embodying a general code suitable to the circumstances of this colony which it is intended to place before the legislative assembly at the forthcoming session.⁴³

THE LONDON NEGOTIATIONS

The Government of Southern Rhodesia asked for advice from Hiley the Railway expert of the United Kingdom. Hiley agreed with Hammond's recommendation that the Railways should be operated as one indivisible transport system. He suggested that a Tribunal to be called the Railway Commission be set up to control not only rates but finance policy in general throughout the whole system. In 1926, April, Coghlan discussed the question of the control of the railways,

he was in line with Hiley's advise. He put the matter as follows: the bill had three principles. These were that the Railways be worked as one indivisible unit, that rates should be controlled by an independent statutory body and finally that there would be a limitation of profits which the railways were entitled to earn.⁴⁴ Legislation had to be passed to limit returns to the capital, debenture and proprietary interests in the railways. Regard had to be paid on the efficient and economic working and management of the railways. Part of the total surplus revenue was to be used for reduction of rates. Control of rates had to be made in line with Hammond's recommendation that a public utility like a railway company had to be subjected to some form of control. In the assembly, some members agreed to the proposals made by Coghlan but others insisted on buying the railways even if it meant the lines inside the Colony only. However, it was finally agreed that Coghlan's proposals be sent to England for approval in the negotiations. The Southern Rhodesia delegates were sent to London for the negotiations in May 1926.

Present on the negotiations were the representatives of the three British territories namely, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Portuguese East Africa was also present. The BSA Company and the British representatives were present. The discussion started off by the comment that the BSA Company appreciated that the position of the Railways Companies within the system was anomalous in that it was not subjected to any statutory or governmental control in regard to the rates and fares they might charge or profits they might derive through what in fact has been a monopoly. The BSA Company also realised that with other governments succeeding to that of the company that old situation could no be sustained and,

It is agreed on all hands and by none more readily than the BSA Company itself that the legally unchecked power of the Railway Companies to make what rates they pleased and make what profits they can should come to an end...and should be subjected to a reasonable measure of state control.⁴⁵

The burning question was to decide the limit within which and the method by which that control should be exercised by the governments of the British territories served by the Railways system. The BSA Company wanted to be allowed a sufficient standard revenue. The fixing of the standard revenue according to the British Railway Act of 1921 proved to be very difficult. It was discovered that the Railway Act of 1921 was not applicable to Southern Rhodesia in that, unlike the British system, where there was an adequate previous performance by which to judge what standard revenue should be. The Rhodesian system had a recent history with a too recent growth to enable past years to provide satisfactory criterion by which to ensure future revenue earning capacity. An agreement was finally reached under which the revenue would be calculated with reference to an agreed return. There was another difficulty resulting from the fact that the capital to construct the railways was borrowed. It was then agreed that the proprietor receive a certain return, a founder royalties which would give a fair enumeration to the paper capital.⁴⁶

Another difference between the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesia situation was that the whole Railway system was owned by six different companies and they entered into three British territories and one foreign country. In Britain, the railway system was in one country. All the countries, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Portuguese East Africa, agreed that the whole system be operated as one entity. The British

Railway Act of 1921 provided a Rates Tribunal, the Rhodesian Railway had to be controlled by a Tribunal to be called the Railway Commission. The Tribunal had to fix a set of rates and charges and leave the companies to get what they could out of them and to do what they liked with the product. The Tribunal had to fix rates upon a national basis calculated as near as possible to yield a return at a stated rate upon the capital of the companies collectively. The Tribunal had to consider their calculation at the end of each year to examine how they worked out. The Tribunal would "distribute the results so realised so as to protect the debenture holders of different companies and to conserve the future of the Railway system by proper allocation of reserves".⁴⁷

Negotiations continued up to 2 September, 1926. During that month, Coghlan wrote to the Colonial secretary that they had reached an agreement. Coghlan gave him the definite proposals in regard to the control of the Railway system and he stated that in his opinion, the proposals afforded a fair and equitable settlement. When Coghlan and other S Rhodesians returned home they were heavily criticised by legislative assembly members and other settlers who were against the Bill. Among the leading critics were prominent figures like Downie, Colonel Frank Johnson, R A Fletcher and Gilchrist. They argued that the negotiators had made a bad bargain especially in regard to the fact that the railways continued to be owned by the BSA Company and its subsidiaries. They argued that the whole exercise in London was a waste of time and was costly. The Railway Act, No. 25 of 1926 was despite these objects passed. Colonel Frank Johnson heavily criticised clause 2 of the Act which made provision for the Railway commission. The commission was to be constituted by four members. Three had to be elected by each government representative. The Chairman was to be elected by the three governments, and the BSA Company with the approval of the Secretary of State. On this clause, F. Johnson commented that, "even on such a matter of supreme importance, to the users of the railways system as the appointment of a chairman, the Railways are to have a say".⁴⁸ The portions of the system in the territorial jurisdiction of the three governments concerned were as follows: Southern Rhodesia had 1 252 miles, Northern Rhodesia 506 miles and Bechuanaland Protectorate 394 miles.⁴⁹ The Bechuanaland Protectorate with less than one-third of the railway mileage and infinitely less than one third of the traffic had a voice equal to that of the representative of Southern Rhodesia. This was unfair to the government of Southern Rhodesia. It was true that the decision of the commission was not apparently based on voting and that if any one member differs from his colleagues, "the question at issue shall be decided by the chairman"⁵⁰ Colonel Johnson argued that the decision by Chairman was some what far stretched for if his decision was not liked by any government representative, or the Railway Companies, he would refer the issue to a referee appointed by the Secretary of State. This showed that the powers of the commission were limited. All expenses of the commission were to be met by the Railway companies and treated as working expenses. This according to the Railway Vigilance committee was only a different way of saying that they will be paid by the users of the Railways and so become a prior charge before and possible reduction of rates.⁵¹

The Railway Commission had to ensure that charges were adjusted to ensure that standard revenue calculated in terms of the Act was received by the railway companies. Thus the Commission had to wring from the available traffic standard Revenue to meet all debenture interest, provide dividend for the BSA Company and build a reserve fund. The total standard revenue was £1,244,000. As long as traffic was maintained, the standard Revenue could be provided without increasing rates and charges. Before 1930, two great competing lines for the

Congo traffic had to be completed. The lines were from Lobito Bay and Boma at the mouth of the Congo Elisabethville, the capital of the Congo trade is nearly 400 miles nearer to Lobito Bay and Boma than to Beira. It was clear that if the traffic to and from Congo fell away to any considerable extent, the effect would be to jeopardize the economic position of the lines and to defer the introduction of lower scales of rates and fares for which the public clamoured. Rates would be increased to meet standard Revenue stipulated. The value of the railways were inflated and that meant that if the government decided to purchase the railways they would have been cheated. The Commission could not control the Beira line because out of 600,000 shares the BSA Company had only 295,000 shares. The rest were under the control of the Mozambique company. Thus the Mozambique company had more say over the Beira line and the Southern Rhodesian Government could not legislate over that line.

Another criticism levelled on the Railway Act was that with the confirmation of the Railway Act, 1926, indicated that Southern Rhodesia had placed the Railways in the hands of an absolute monopoly. In the Act, it was stated that even if the reservation under the constitution regarding Railway legislation would be removed, by passing the Bill, the position remained unaltered. The Majesty's instructions to His Excellency the Governor remained under which it was provided that, "His Excellency shall not assent in His Majesty's name to any law of any extraordinary nature and importance whereby the rights and property of His Majesty's subjects not residing in the colony may be prejudiced".⁵² This instruction was aimed at the protection of the BSA Company whose property was the railways and who were not residents in the colony. The Railway Act analysis showed that it had disastrous impacts on the future of the railway rates, value of the railways when the State in desperation decided to purchase the system and on future construction of competing lines. It was against this background, that the Railway Act, 1926, was passed. The opponents of the Act, condemned the Southern Rhodesian government for passing the transport system, the very life blood of the colony's future in absolute monopoly. The BSA Company was the monopoly which would perpetuate its economic exploitation of the country. Thus, the opponents argued, the Act indicated a handicap in the future development and prosperity of the colony. The Act was passed in September 1926, leaving the railways in full administrative and financial control of the Railway Companies. Phimister correctly argued that in attempting to deal with Rhodesia Railways in isolation the Act simply encouraged the diversion of profits from railways to other BSA Company concerns. By limiting the dividends of the railways, said H. Williams, a leader of the Reform Party, "you have merely succeeded in making the Railways which should be used to develop this Colony a pawn in other games. Profits that might have been made are diverted to promote other interests of this corporation".⁵³

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1926 RAILWAY ACT AND RESULTS

After the Act was passed, the Railway commission was chosen and Hiley was the Chairman. The Commission began its work. From the birth of the railways in Southern Rhodesia, settlers were ever complaining of railway rates. The first railway rates reductions, in the history of the railways were made in 1918 and this reflected coincidence of interests between settler agrarian and international capital. The Rhodesia Railways reduced rates for Southern Rhodesia maize destined for Congolese markets on the ostensible ground that the Railways did not want to lose traffic. Pressured by 214,257 bags of maize for export and the prospects of falling war time demand, E R Ross, General Manager of the Railways justified reductions in railway rates.⁵⁴ That reduction was done in order to facilitate outside markets trade and also because the

railways were in great need of finance with which to repair equipment which had been overworked during the war while settlers were in dire need of capital. In 1921, after the Arcworth Report, ~~there were rate reductions on the overseas maize for export from 21s 11d to 17s 6d a ton.~~ This was necessary to assist the farming community over a critical financial period according to the General Manager's view.⁵⁵ However, in reality, the railways badly needed financial help. In 1924, rates were reduced by 25 percent for 313 585 bags of maize hauled over distances exceeding 600 miles. In 1925, the reductions amounted to 20 percent over 800 miles. In 1930, with the highest exportable surplus of 745 010 bags, a flat rate was introduced to enable farmers in Mashonaland to obtain a share in the expanding market in Northern Rhodesia.⁵⁶ From 1930, there was no further reductions until 1942. The 1929/33 world market crisis meant reduced railway earnings and inability to surrender any more revenue. All the above reduction of rates made should be viewed in the light of the relationship between railage reductions to a principle which is commonly used in determining rates. The principle is called "charging what traffic will bear".⁵⁷ According to Frankel, this is determined by considering the flow of traffic.

Thus the railways were reducing rates in order to stimulate traffic and they were charging what the traffic could bear. This is made clear by the fact that despite these reductions made, the farmers still complained of high rates. The rates though reduced were still very high compared to those in the neighbouring countries. Colonel F. Johnson wrote to the Rhodesia Herald complaining of high railway rates in 1925. Johnson complained that railway rates on the following commodities were extremely high compared to other African States, for example, eggs rates were 60% above the South African rates. Rates for milk and cement were also higher to those of South Africa.⁵⁸ In 1925/26 the Rhodesia Railways were going to produce net profit of over £800,000 which was about half the total net revenue of the colony. Against such statistical evidence, rates on Rhodesia Railways were crippling the development of the economy.⁵⁹ The major reason which lead to the creation of the Railway Act, 1926, was to help reduce rates to enable the economic development of the colony. According to the provision of the Act, the Railway Commission was going to facilitate this settler objective. However, to their amazement, "no"⁶⁰ effective railway rates reductions were made after the commission was created. Reductions made before were made with the objective of stimulating more traffic for the railway companies and thus not for the benefit of the settlers. Throughout the commission's history, no rates reductions were made, instead, rates were increasing. This indicates the failure of the Railway Act of 1926 to solve the most important problem which had led to its creation.

In 1926, the companies were requested to show how they used their interests and how the interests so accrued had increased. The government then asked the Railway Companies to improve port facilities at Beira and to construct a 20 mile Umvukwese line in 1928.⁶¹ In his letter of December 1928, Downie said that the railway companies failed on purpose to understand that the settlers interests were in the Beira Port. Downie wrote that, "this is our home, our whole future including our political destiny is bound up with the Port of Beira and we cannot stand by...watching our position being undermined".⁶² The railway did not pay much attention to Beira Port request. Downie wrote another letter to Newton asking him to urge Birchenough⁶³ to build the Umvukwese line. The Railways did not show interest. In that letter, Downie warned Newton that the railways were pursuing "a policy which if persisted in, will place themselves and the government in separate camps".⁶⁴

By 1929, it had become clear that there was a fault in the Railway Act. Gibbons states that the flow was in the wording of the section dealing with the way in which the Reserve Fund was to be built up. In the provision of the Railway Act 1926, the Reserve Provision was set at £350,000 per annum until the Reserve Account stood at £1 million and thereafter £150,000 per annum until the account was £1,5 million when the reserve provision would cease.⁶⁵ The difficulty, argued Gibbons, lay in the fact that there was a delay of nearly six months in the finalizing of the Railway Accounts, after the end of each year the budget for the next year was fixed at the beginning of another year. At the end of 1929, the government wanted to ensure that no more than was necessary was allocated to the Reserve Fund. In support of the government view that the railway in budgeting for £350,000 for the year 1929/30 were getting more than they should. Moffat sent Newton following figures "showing roughly how the Reserve Fund would have piled up under the claim of the Railways:

Reserve Account at the 30th Sept, 1928	£932 000
Reserve Provision for 1828/29 less tax	£278 000
Reserve Provision for 1929/30 less tax	£278 000
TOTAL	<u>£1 488 000</u>
Reserve Provision for 1930/31 less tax	£120 000
Reserve Provision for 1931/32 less tax	<u>£120 000</u>
Approximated total at the end of 1932 financial year would be ⁶⁶	<u>£1 728 000</u>

Gibbons explains the point emphasised by Moffat in support of the government. He argues that, the figure on the books at the beginning of 1929/30 year was only £932,000 or less than £1 million and the Railway Administration could be by letter of the law budget for the full account of £350,000. Thus the amount was in excess of £1 million but less than £1,500,000, the total in the reserve could be at lease as much as £1,728,000 before the reserve provision ceased.⁶⁷ Downie suggested then that the Railways look upon the reserve as full at 30 September 1930 and make no provision for the Reserve Fund but the Railways budgeted £150,000 for the year 1929/30. The complaint was passed to the Railway Commission and the latter supported the railways.

On learning of the reaction of the railway company to Downie's recommendations, the Southern Rhodesian government was displeased. Downie wrote a letter to the High Commission in London asking for legal advice as how to amend the Act in such a way that the Railway would not get more than £1,500,000 in the Reserve Account. Downie also complained of the agreement entered into by the Beira Railways. The agreement permitted the latter to impose such rates as it thought fit to the possible detriment of Southern Rhodesia. By the agreement, Southern Rhodesia had been subjected to unfavourable conditions. Downie said on the issue "I find it very difficult to make up my mind as to what is the attitude of the Railway Companies and the BSA Company in their relation with the people of this country. It seems...that the railways speak with two voices and...act with two minds".⁶⁸ Downie felt that the Railways were most ungenerous and that the continued control of the railways by the BSA Company was a great menace to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

I regret to say that I have reached a stage when I am of the opinion that it is not in the best interest of this country that the Railway Management and direction

should remain in London and it will be necessary for me (Downie) to consider what steps can be taken whereby the railways will be controlled from and managed from Rhodesia⁶⁹.

Downie's complaint reflected the failure of the Railway Act.

CONCLUSION

The Railway Act of 1926 was, according to Newton, a very much underrated instrument, which held the railway companies to a profit and reserve balance. The Railway Commission, a baby of the Railway Act 1926, failed to operate as was anticipated. In fact Leggate, the Colonial Secretary of S Rhodesia, informed Downie that "the commission is not able to function in the most important part of its activities."⁷⁰ This had been displayed on the issue of determining rates, the acceptable level of profits and the amount to be accumulated in the Reserve Fund. The foregoing proves that regulations are not always adequate in checking the activities of a private company as the companies with their superior inside knowledge are able in most circumstances to "twist" regulations to work in their favour. This is to some extent what happened in the struggle for the control of railways in S Rhodesia as the indirect mechanism to control the railways proved a dismal failure. The regulation instituted in the 1926 Railway Act contained many flaws which were exploited by the BSACo to its advantage. The failure of indirect state control of the railways should also be seen within the broader political perspective where imperial (British) interests were in conflict with those of the subordinate colony. This perspective is best reflected by Ian Phimister who argues that:

Although S Rhodesia won Responsible Government from Britain in 1923, it was on terms circumscribed by the interest of the metropolitan accumulation. As the dependent partner, S Rhodesia was obliged to accept constitutional provisions seeking to guard against initiatives which might disturb that process. Consequently the settler state found itself ham-strung when it tried to gain some way over how the railway system was operated.⁷¹

It is within this broader context that the S Rhodesian government failed to effectively control the railway operation to the advantage of its community and within the context of a broader economic development plan which guarded the interest of Rhodesians. Given the limitations of regulations aimed at controlling private companies in charge of public utilities it is no wonder that the government finally decided to control this life line of its citizens by opting for nationalization even though it was a costly adventure to the state. The government finally nationalised the railways in 1949 in the interest of its settler community. The government directed control of the railways in the interest of a small section of its community. This can be criticised on the grounds that the white community received too much protection and that it operated inefficiently given all the favours it got from the state. However, it is important to note that despite the settler community's inefficiencies, they managed to develop certain aspects of the economy to a relatively significant level. If the level of economic development within different colonies were to be compared it is interesting to see that settler dominated economies fared better than those which did not possess a significantly high white population. Several reasons account for this higher level of development and chief among them is the fact that the settler communities pressured the state to promulgate legislation that protected their interests,

albeit at the expense of the black majority. This is true if one compares such countries as Kenya, S Rhodesia and South Africa with Ghana and Nigeria which had an insignificant number of white settlers.⁷² In the former three the level of industrial sophistication, economic growth rates and the social over-head capital investment at independence was much higher.

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ANNEXURE "A"

SCHEDULE TO SHOW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BSA CO. AND THE VARIOUS RAILWAY COMPANIES.

RAILWAY COMPANY	TOTAL SHARES ISSUED	RHODESIA RAILWAY TRUST PARTICIPATION	EXTENT OF CONTROL BY BRITISH S.AFRICA COMPANY
Rhodesia Railway Company Ltd	8 000 shares of £1 each.	7 989 shares	Total through approximately 85 % stake in the Trust Co.
Mashonaland Railway Co. Limited	450 000 of £1 each	449 612 shares.	
The Beira -Junction Railway Co. Ltd.	250 000 ordinary shares 425 583 cumulative preference shares at 5/-each		All 425 583 cumulative preference shares held giving BSA Co.full control.
Beira Co. Ltd.	600 000 ordinary shares no value expressed		Voting power in respect of 306 000 ordinary shares in vested in BSA Co.to 1942.
Blinkwater Railway Company.	200 000 shares by £1 shares.		All shares held by Beit Railway Trust and most of Trustees were on BSA Co. Board so in the same hands.

The Rhodesia Katanga Junction Railway and Minerals Rail Company.	£800 000 each 5.5 % debentures. Bulk of shares held originally by Tanganyika Concession Ltd. but in 1925 Hamwood was unable to state exact position.		BSA Co. represented Rhodesia- Katanga Co. but not a sufficiently large holding either directly or indirectly to give it control. the actual line leased by Rhodesia Railways and Mashonaland Railway Companies.
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The Background to the Rhodesia Railways Act 126.

TABLE TO SHOW THE PROPORTION OF REVENUE DERIVED FROM TRAFFIC WITH THE CONGO DURING THE YEARS 1924 TO 1929
ANNEXURE "B"

DESCRIPTION OF TRAFFIC	<u>1926</u>		<u>1925</u>		<u>1924</u>	
	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS
General Goods	617 205	1316 046	343 925	1136 800	234 823	985 910
Railway Construction Materials	125 426	-	313 845	-	89 986	-
Coal and Coke for the Public	551 634	149 527	398 083	135 945	341 079	136 090
Copper for export	413 294	3 344	515 239	9 803	493 618	15 828
Other materials excluding chrome ore and lead	900	77 399	88	99 010	2 277	96 852
£	1708 459	1546 316	1571 180	1381 558	1211 783	1201 680

£3 254 775

£2 952 738

£2 413 463

52,5%

47,5%

53,2%

46,8%

50,2%

49,8%

1

Information obtained from the Report of the General Manager of the Railways for the years 1924 - 29.


ANNEXURE "B" cont.

Table To Show The Proportion Of Revenue Derived From Traffic With The Congo During The Years 1924 to 1929

DESCRIPTION OF TRAFFIC	1929		1928		1927	
	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS	TO & FROM THE CONGO	TO & FROM OTHER POINTS
General Goods	691 840	1775 909	567 189	1601 853	662 159	1613 362
Railway Construction Materials	-	16 650	125 849	2 619	260 323	30 315
Coal and Coke for the Public	724 452	210 413	710 680	208 122	521 644	195 651
Copper for export	516 264	42 107	519 310	38 137	394 759	22 470
Other materials excluding chrome ore and lead	1 103	238 727	63	149 224	10	87 906
	1933 659	2283 806	1923 091	1999 925	1838 900	1949 704
	24 217 465		33 923 061		33 788 604	
	45,85%	54,15%	49,02%	50,98%	48,54%	51,46%

¹Information obtained from the report of the General Manager of the Railways for the Years 1924 - 1929


THE RAILWAY LINES



KEY



Boundary lines



Railway lines



Towns

TABLE SHOWING DIFFERENT RATESRAILWAY RATESA. FOR HAULING OF 375 MILES PER TON

Commodity	S. Rhodesia Rates			S. Africa Rates		
	£	s	d	£	s	d
Rails and sleepers	6	13	8	5	8	4
Cement	4	15	0	1	4	2
Fencing	1	13	2	1	4	2
Flour	4	15	0	1	4	2
Cheese	9	13	4	2	10	0
Wheat & all grain	1	13	2	0	15	0
Petrol	8	11	3	7	1	3
Fresh fruit	3	2	4	2	0	0
Eggs	8	11	3	1	4	2
Cotton Lint	1	5	2	1	4	2

B. A SHORT HAIL OF 40 MILES COST PER TON MILE 3000 LBS

Commodity	S. Rhodesia Rates			S. Africa Rates		
	£	s	d	£	s	d
Becon	1	3	4	0	11	3
Beer	1	3	4	0	11	0
Cream & milk	1	3	4	0	6	0
Tobacco	1	5	0	0	11	3
Vegetables	0	13	4	0	6	0

Quoted in the Rhodesia Herald 23/10/25.

NOTES

1. J.E. Stiglitz, *Economics of the public sector* (New York, 1988), p. 191.
2. Ibid . p 192
3. International capital refers to the different railway companies including the British South Africa Company (BSA Co.) which owned shares in the railway companies.
4. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates 1925 p. 1476.
5. The President of the Rhodesian Agricultural Union was H.G.M. Huntley.
6. Quoted in The Rhodesia Herald, 19 October, 1925.
7. Quoted in The Rhodesia Herald,
8. See Annexure "A".
9. Downie, the Minister of Agriculture and Lands to the member of the Assembly in: Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 1926. p. 389
10. Southern Rhodesia Debate In The Legislative Council, 1921 CC-1139-1152.
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22. Ibid p.72

23. See Annexure "B"

24. Hammond Report op cit p72.

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26. Hammond Report op cit p74

27. Ibid p.74

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29. Op cit p.76

30. Ibid p. 76

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34. HMss NE 1/1/7 Downie to Newton 11-9-25.

35. Ibid

36. Ibid

37. Ibid

38. Ibid

39. Quoted in Ibid

40. HMss NE 1/1/7 Newton to Moffat, 3-9-25

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42. Ibid

43. HMss LE 3/1/1 Governor of S. Rhodesia to the Secretary of State 12-3-26.

44. Legislative Assembly Debates of S. Rhodesia Vol. 4. 1926. p. 532

45. Quoted in Gibbons, E. G. op cit p. 58

46. Quoted in Ibid p. 57.

47. Hammond Report op cit p. 57

48. The Railway Vigilance Committee, Pamphlets No.2, 1926

49.Ibid

50.Ibid

51.Ibid

52.Ibid

53.Quoted in Phimister, I. op cit p.284

54.Kanduza op cit p. 31

55.Ibid p. 8

56.Ibid p.9

57.Ibid p. 9

58.Jonhson, F. to the Editor The Rhodesia Herald 1925

59.See Annexure "D" for more statistical evidence of high railway rates in S. Rhodesia in comparison with South Africa.

60. "No" in the since that all the reductions made were not beneficial to the settlers given that the sole objective for the reductions was to stimulate more traffic.

61.HMss NE 1/1/1 Downie to Newton 29-12-28.

62.Ibid

63.Birchenough was the Chairman of the Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd. after Maguire.

64.HMss NE 1/1/1 Downie to Newton 29-12-28.

65.Quoted in Gibbons, E. G. op cit p. 62

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