

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

HISTORY WORKSHOP



STRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE MAKING OF APARTHEID

6 - 10 February 1990

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TITLE: Class and Social History : The Evolution of Class
amongst the African Peasantry in the Lichtenburg
District on the Western Highveld, 1914 - 1954.

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Introduction

The theme of this HISTORY WORKSHOP invites us to explore the relationship between "structure" and "experience" in the making of Apartheid South Africa. This paper focusses on this theme by considering the evolution of class differences within the African peasantry in the Lichtenburg Scheduled areas between 1936 and 1954.

This paper represents an aspect of work in progress on the broad theme of the "evolution" of Bophuthatswana - which means to imply a view of the Homelands not so much as the creatures of a Verwoerdian nightmare, but as the products of a complex historical process of rural class struggle. In this research I have begun to turn up very interesting case histories relating to the experiences of different strata within the African peasantry in the Lichtenburg district, on the western highveld of the Transvaal. This evidence spans the years between the passage of the Natives Land Act, and the launching of the Bantustan policy in the late 1950's, and although this research is still in its infancy, I feel that it can nevertheless afford us a vivid glimpse into the history of this Scheduled Area - the most visible symbol of the policy of territorial segregation in the district.

The history of African communities on the Scheduled Areas has not been written, in marked contrast to that of some of the Tribal Reserves. In addition, it is no easy task to unravel the complex issue of land ownership, and land tenure, in these areas. The history of various communities on the Trust is a very complex story because of their diverse origins and their different historical experiences. Much of what follows, therefore may appear murky and incomplete. In addition, this paper does not chart the origins of a dramatic outbreak of peasant resistance. Rather it traces some of the abiding themes of the politics of production on a Scheduled Area, which have implications for our understanding of the political processes within the Homelands.

This paper has three major concerns. Firstly, it demonstrates the participation of the African peasantry in the agricultural economy of the district. Secondly, it establishes the historical continuity of a class of "progressive" African producers in the district, and their relationship to the growth of territorial segregation in the district. Finally, it explores the impact of this heritage on the class composition of the farms on the South African Native Trust - the Scheduled Area of the Lichtenburg district - which evolved into Ditsobotla region of the Bophuthatswana Homeland.

I African Agriculture in the Lichtenburg District, 1914-1954.

One of the relatively unexplored vistas in South African rural studies is that which lies on the western axis of the South African maize triangle, on the ecological and meteorological border of the western

highveld. Here, where the agriculturally crucial 300mm isohyet meanders meaninglessly through the flat, featureless landscape of grass and thorn trees, the great maize revolution of the post-war decade achieved perhaps its greatest victory. In the space of less than one decade the previously credit starved, technologically poor, and price constrained white farming community transformed itself, and was transformed, by the power of an insatiable war-generated world demand for cheaply produced agricultural products, a firm bottom line price, and State aided co-operatives and marketing facilities.

Credit, technology and agricultural machinery flooded into the district, transforming the productive capacity of the Lichtenburg farming community as never before. The inter-war decades of stasis and struggle by the Lichtenburg farmers were soon a spectre in an agricultural nightmare, and the groundwork was now clearly laid for the capitalist transformation of agricultural productive relations in the district. A measure of this veritable revolution is available: in 1939 the total debt of the Lichtenburg farmers for machinery and farm supplies purchased at the Lichtenburg Co-Operative stood at a mere £13,000; by 1945 this figure had grown by a staggering 600 % to £74,000, and by 1953 to a monumental £601,000.¹

Much of this new maize production took place on white farms to the east of the Harts river, the traditional heartland of white settlement - and the home of white capitalist agriculture - in the district. Increasingly though, and this was a process already noted as early as 1912 when white settlement in the district began to increase significantly, much of this production began to shift to the lands to the west of the Harts river - the marginal, borderlands of the western Transvaal highveld. In the 1940's this area was the fastest growing portion of the district. By the late 1950's up to 30% of the maize delivered to the Co-Operative came from the depots at Delareyville, Geysdorp and Biesjesvallei in the Saltpan and Upper Harts River wards of the district.²

The new zones of agricultural production overlapped the old boundaries of the African Reserves drawn up by Beaumont in 1916. Lichtenburg, unlike other districts in the western and south-western Transvaal, was unique in that it contained two African Reserves, Kunana and Polfontein, of nearly 50,000 morgan in extent, both of which lay on the western boundary of the district, to the west of the Harts river.³ In addition there were two further substantial Locations, Rooijantjesfontein and Putfontein, as well as a good proportion of African privately owned land in the district.

With the exception of the private farms, these areas were either Reserved or Scheduled areas in terms of the Natives Land Act. More significantly for our study though, a further 120,000 morgan of Scheduled land lay between the two western reserves, and ran along the old Cape and Transvaal borders - and most of this land was owned privately, or by the African and European Land and Investment Company. This Scheduled land was purchased by the SANT in 1936. The imposition of the pattern of an old style of territorial segregation on a new pattern of agricultural productive relations makes for an interesting case study. Some African peasants who gained a foothold in the Scheduled areas were able to make fairly rapid progress toward economic self sufficiency. As territorial

segregation matured into Apartheid, these "progressive" farmers formed a distinct class within the Bantustan structure. And whilst opportunities for African farmers elsewhere declined in the era of Apartheid, this particular class on the Scheduled land continued to grow.

The "maize revolution" on the western highveld, viewed from the windows of the Lichtenburg Co-Operative, was a white-sponsored and white-dominated revolution. Enjoying the support of the local and central State, the skyline of the district was, from the 1940's, increasingly dominated by the grain silos and storage sheds of the Co-Operative, by the powerlines and telephone cables that followed the new tarred roads, and by the loading depots and sidings of the South African Railways. All this new development was State sponsored, and the white farming community almost, to a man, joined the Co-Operative in the post-war decade (even as they had failed to do so in the interwar years). Of course, the State had little to do with the broader swings of the world economic trade cycle that were largely responsible for this expansion of the South African economy. But the Nationalist government in the 1950's caught the upswing in the world trade cycle, and on the face of it, by a judicious mixture of expenditure and authoritarianism, firmly captured the support and loyalty of the Afrikaner farming community - something they had manifestly failed to do in the district from the outbreak of the Afrikaner Rebellion in 1914. ⁴

The white farming community of Lichtenburg was not the only beneficiary of this maize revolution. For much of the twentieth century, indeed up to the eve of the 1950's, African peasants, and African sharecroppers were responsible for much of the production of maize and sorghum that swelled the silos and sheds of the Lichtenburg Co-Op. ⁵ Their activities, whilst under-researched, hint at a most progressive economy. As is understandable, much of the evidence for this is hidden, the few fragments that remain partial and incomplete. What follows is therefore not a complete account, nevertheless I feel that a convincing case can be built for this line of argument.

The most comprehensive general account of the African rural economy in Lichtenburg appears in a report by a Committee of the Native Affairs Commission on the district dated November 1936. ⁶ It is useful because it identifies the "islands" of African enterprise, namely, the privately owned African farms, the Locations and adjoining farms, and the Scheduled areas beyond the boundaries of the major Reserves. The report notes the emergence of a distinct class of producer as the agent of this agricultural innovation. "A section of the native population of the Lichtenburg Native Areas is probably the most individualised in the Transvaal", they noted with alarm, and economic conditions in the district amongst this class of producer rivalled, and indeed surpassed, those of elements of the Marico peasantry, which as the work of Manson and Drummond has shown, was example of an thriving and prosperous "progressive peasantry" for much of the twentieth century. ⁷

This was a startling observation, and a matter of deep concern to Heaton Nicholls and Colonel Collins, the two Commissioner's who recognised the symptoms of severe and rapid class stratification in the district, and the attendant evils for "segregationists" of detribalisation and "a growing spirit of acquisitiveness" amongst the more progressive class of

African producer. "The investigation of the Committee", they reported, "has caused it to feel strongly that very grave danger to the success of the new native policy lies in allowing this private purchase of land by natives to continue. It means, and may mean very quickly, the creation of a landless black proletariat in the country districts." Let us quickly look at what had led them to this startling conclusion.

The first point that clearly disturbed them was the inequality in land held by certain individuals - that certain African farmers were expanding their holdings at the expense of others. This was evident in the Locations and on private farms, rather than in the Reserves. ⁸ What concerned the Commissioners though was that in the Locations, as opposed to the Reserves, there were certain individual farmers who were "buying up the tribal shares of other individuals" and therefore dispossessing others. Many of the leading "core" families at Putfontein and Rooijantjesfontein Locations, who had contributed to the purchase of the farms in the first place, extended their land by buying farms adjoining the Location, or by sharecropping for other tenants on an extensive scale. ⁹ There were 10 privately owned farms in the district ranging between 1000 and a 100 morgen, owned by individual African farmers and beyond the control of the Chiefs. A third anomaly was the concentration in the hands of a few African tenants of plots of between 100 and 150 morgen in the Scheduled areas, especially those rented from the NAD on the Middleton Estates - a portion of the Kunena Reserve that had been excised and sold in 1906 in lieu of debt owed by the BaRolong Chief, Moshoeette to white traders: "A striking anomaly in native land administration", they noted, "is to be found in the existence alongside of the Kunena location of an area known as the "Middleton Estates" which is divided into plots of 100 to 150 morgan, each with grazing commonage attached and leased to Natives on payment of rental of £10 to £12.10 per annum. The total area of this Estate is 7,932 morgen, and it accomodated plotholders". These plotholders were tenants of the State, and were considered to be "natives of the good type and progressive". In addition to this, at least 1000 morgen of the Middleton Estate was privately owned by Africans.

The attitude of the Commissioners to the Middleton Estate and the factors which led to its unique characteristics are most interesting. "This example of land disparity is lauded by the local (native) administration as the only system which will induce the native community of Lichtenburg to farm on modern lines: it was urged before the Committee that this system should be extended." This attitude was seen as being totally misplaced. As a result of the way in which the individual ethic was been encouraged in the district "individual ownership of land is much sought after by all the advanced elements, and the further it was away from the tribal lands the better they like it". In fact the argument was put to the Committee by some of these farmers that "since they were farming on European lines, they should be allowed to remain in white areas." ¹⁰

As a matter of urgency the Committee recommended the purchase of the Released Area No.2 in its entirety - the 32 farms in extent 96,405 morgen - by the SANT, to prevent the further acquisition of private property by individual Africans. However, and this is important for the analysis that is to follow, Africans had already purchased 7,296 morgen of this land

between 1916 and 1936, and were hiring much of the remaining areas for arable crop production from the African and European Company (A&E) and some of the private owners. In addition, the Committee recommended that the Locations, which were becoming troublesome hives of economic activity within "white areas" - and from which the local farmers were unable to extract farm labour - be de-scheduled and relocated within Scheduled Area No.2.

A final point should be made regarding the degree of economic advance evident here. Heaton Nicholls was most anxious to avoid the creation of a permanent landless black proletariat in Lichtenburg. But whilst he commented on the "varying status" of the Natives" in the district, he would have found little evidence, beyond that of the African proletariat on the alluvial diamond diggings, that such a class was in fact being created. We could probably interpret the endemic farm labour shortage on the farms in the district as evidence for the strength of the Lichtenburg peasantry up until the end of the 1930's (as by the way did the Lichtenburg Farmers Union). The permanent African labourers on the white farms were largely drawn from outside the district. It seems that the post-war "maize revolution" was the major spur to the dispossession of African "squatters" - labour tenants - on the white farms. Thus it is from the 1950's that a "landless black proletariat" became evident in the district, as the State supported the removal and expulsion of Africans living and working in "white areas", into "village settlements" (such as Polfontein/Bodibe), and the new rural peri-urban centres (such as Itsoeng).

The Report outlined above does not seem to have exaggerated the strength of the African rural economy in the district. Other evidence notes that these islands of economic prosperity were not swamped by the rising tide of white production and settlement for at least the following decade. In 1944, for example, the LNC reported that "The Natives in this district are on the whole good agriculturalists", and that modern farming methods were evident through the extensive use of fertiliser purchased from the NAD, and the appearance of a tractor at the Putfontein Location (this tractor was owned by the Chief, Boas Molete, and was soon to match by the purchase of another by "a syndicate of farmers" on the same farm). ¹¹ In 1945 he reported an increase in cases of sharecropping on white farms adjoining the Locations, where "In large numbers of cases landowners are paying a portion of the wages of Native's with maize". ¹² And in 1948 he noted that, in contrast to the Reserves at Kunana and Polfontein, African farmers on the Trust farms were "advanced" and "progressive", with none of the symptoms of overstocking and overcrowding in evidence.

On the farms within Scheduled Area No.2, the agricultural progress evidenced by African tenants earned the praise of NAD officials. On the Trust there was a clear willingness to embrace "scientific farming methods: "die meerderheid van die Naturelle op die Trust plase is ekonomiese goed af. Hulle maak goeie oeste en kry ook goeie pryse vir hulle vee. Hulle het volop geld en beklee daarom 'n baie hoer sosiale status. Op landboukundige gebied staan hulle ook baie hoer. Hulle het goeie landbou implemente en bewerk hulle grond uitstekend. Hulle is ook baie ywerig om beter landbou metodes te leer en toe te pas." ¹³ This

contrasted sharply with the Reserves: "Die Naturelle op die Reserwes... is ekonomies baie swak en vir die rede is hulle sosiale status ook baie laag... Die plase (is) ook oorbewoon en oorbewe en dat daar geen beheer toegepas (kan) word nie. Hulle is ook op landbou geskied baie agterlik en is gekant teen enige iets wat van die Departement of die Landbou voorgestel word." 14

By the early 1940's envious eyes were peeping over the Trust wall, and spying a disturbingly well-established, and relatively closely supervised farming settlement. This very clearly alarmed the less-successful white farmers in the vicinity who relied on a combination of coercion and blackmail to retain the services of their farm workers. The more valuable sector of their labour force - the relatively well-off tenants, whose working capital was central to their operations - were being increasingly attracted to the Trust, to which their stock and equipment was, initially at least, an open sesame. It is evident that white farmers of different class positions were taking up this attitude of antagonism for different reasons - a clear marker for class differentiation within the farming community. But at the same time it needs to be stressed that the NAD closely monitored and controlled the settlement of the Trust farms to prevent a repetition of the state of affairs evident on the Tribal Reserves, and on the Locations. Let us briefly examine this response of the white farmers to the creation of the Trust, for it illustrates quite nicely the continued viability of African agriculture in the district on the eve of Apartheid.

The LNC was bombarded with petitions and deputations from the Farmer's Union and the Co-Op. In 1941 complaints were lodged by the Executive of the Lichtenburg Distrik Boere Saamwerk Vereeniging concerning "Natives on certain Trust farms who had practically unlimited ploughing facilities and some of whom ploughed up to 100m each" and who were "affecting the labour position in the district". 15 This probably reflected the attitudes of undercapitalised farmers who depended upon the stock and equipment of their African tenants for production on their farms. Another complaint was presented by the Lichtenburg MP, Mr AP Swart, a farmer in the district and the Chairman of the Ko-Op, complaining that "Natives who have left the European farms without reasonable justification have been permitted to take up abode on Trust farms" - a more general complaint from the farming community that African tenants and farmworkers were being siphoned from the farms into the Reserves. The Secretary for Native Affairs was not surprised and stated that given the conditions of employment on white farms it was no wonder that there was a labour shortage. The two systems for hiring labour followed in the district - namely the payment of a cash wage of £3 per year and a 4 morgen plot, or the payment of no wage at all and 8 morgen - were hardly likely to improve matters. The Trust, for its part, was only accepting bona-fide applicants and these were tightly inspected and vetted. 16

As the SNA explained, Africans on the Trust (Scheduled Area No.2) were there largely on their pedigree. There were different classes of tenants on the farms, whose privileges as regards land, were directly related to their historical trajectory onto the farms. The most privileged tenants were the "old" inhabitants of the farms, who were living and working on the farms before their purchase by the SANT. Some ploughed up to 100

morgen, but most of them ploughed 30 morgen: "These Natives's originally hired the farms from the African and European Company and after acquisition by the Government continued to reside and farm thereon." These tenants therefore in no way affected the labour position, as they were always tenants, had never worked on the farms and were not available as farm labourers: "It would be a distinct hardship to limit them to the prescribed 5m for cropping and 5m for fallowing purposes".¹⁷

This was hardly an example of "unlimited land being thrown open for ploughing". In addition to this, the Department was strictly adhering to its admissions policy: "only Native's who are unable to obtain employment on European farms on account of old age, having too much stock or some other reason are allowed to take up their residence in the Trust farms".¹⁸ Among the new arrivals on the Trust farms, only 83 in 1940, were former farm labourers, and of them "only a very small percentage were farm labourers who left the employ of farmers." (see Table One for a detailed breakdown of origins of the Trust's population in March 1941) All the new arrivals were only allotted 5 morgen of land for cropping and 5 for fallowing - and as we shall see later this soon became a clear point of division between the SANT tenants.¹⁹

TABLE ONE: ORIGINS OF THE TRUST POPULATION,
LICHTENBURG DISTRICT, MARCH 1941.

1) Natives who were on trust farms when purchased.....	296
2) Natives placed on Trust farms by NAD	
a) Urban.....	4
b) diggings.....	7
c) Native areas.....	33
3) Natives from occupations other than farm labourer....	13
4) Farm Labourers:	
a) Natives who had too much stock.....	31
b) Who had left due to ill-treatment of some form...	15
c) From other districts.....	8
d) Dismissed for various reasons.....	45
e) Who had left farms with object.....	3
of setting up on the Trust	

Total=455

(Note that 19 of this figure were exempted from tax due to old age or ill health)

(Source: KLI 2/14/5, Report, LNC (HR van den Bergh) to Lichtenburg Magistrate, "Natives on Trust farms in the District of Lichtenburg", 14 March 1942.)

By 1950 this contrast was still evident: "the economic condition of the Natives are considered fair, although the standard of the Natives residing on the Trust farms is much higher than those..on Tribally and Privately owned farms". The reason for this, the LNC continued, can be attributed to the methods of control that is imposed on Trust farms".²⁰ In his submission to the Tomlinson Commission, a new LNC, SC Becker, in looking for a "more economical way" of accomodating African "squatters" now

streaming from the white farms to the already overcrowded Reserves, stressed the contrast in settlement between the Trust property and the Reserves. In his estimate, by enforcing a 10 morgan limit on each family, he could accommodate a further 1200 families, or 5600 people on Trust farms, if he were given a free hand to do so. The Reserves, he noted were totally overpopulated and overstocked. ²¹

A final point needs to be made regarding the continued viability of African farming in the district in the era of Apartheid. PL Breutz, the NAD Ethnologist, in his re-published survey of the Batswana Tribes, briefly relates the history of these Trust farms in Scheduled Area No.2 after 1959. A special Kopana Tribal Authority had to be created to administer this area, which had two distinctive features. Firstly, the farms on which the Kopano Tribal Authority exercised control lay beyond the jurisdiction of a Tribal chief, because the land was State or private land, and the farmers were a mixture of different ethnic groups, and secondly, the Tribal Authority was "known for its progressive agricultural development". ²²

We can thus construct a fairly convincing argument for the continued presence in Lichtenburg of a viable African agricultural class, which was increasingly concentrated in Scheduled Area No.2 in the district. We now turn to the second concern of this paper, which is to establish the historical continuity of a class of "progressive" African producers in the district, and the impact upon them of the imposition of Territorial Segregation.

II. Progressive African farmers and territorial segregation.

Scheduled Area No.2 consisted of some 32 farms, which were variously owned by the A&E, African tribal purchasers, and African and white individuals. The A&E owned most of these farms, which it had purchased in 1907 for £46,629. They tried to sell these farms to the Trust at the inflated price of £62,184 plus 20% "in accordance with the provisions of the Natives Land Act, in view of the fact that we must compensate our tenants in respect of the loss of tenure and.. improvements, for which the Company will have to pay them out", in 1936. The SANT eventually paid the A&E £50,000 for them. The Trust also purchased privately owned white farms in terms of its brief, which, as time went on, were sold to them for highly inflated prices, sometimes as much as 100% above market value. ²³ African private and tribal farms in the Scheduled areas (9 farms in total) were left in the hands of their present owners. ²⁴

The A&E had settled both black and white tenants on its farms. Two points are of interest here. Firstly, the purchase of the Scheduled areas resulted in the dispossession of the white tenants of the A&E. This is a phenomenon which deserves some further research, for it seems that these farms on the far western boundary of the highveld, were perhaps the last resting-places of the ubiquitous white "bywoner". By 1940, the last of these tenants was evicted from the Trust, and replaced by African tenants. It is possible that these farmers now joined the drift into the Bechuanaland Protectorate of many of the Union's "poor whites", a phenomenon of some concern to the British Administration there. ²⁵

Secondly, the relationship between the company and its tenants, and between the tenants themselves would make for a fascinating study. In an interview conducted in 1989, a former white tenant spoke of how the company's representative, Colonel French, made his rounds in the 1930's collecting cash rent or produce from the tenants, depending on their agreement with the company or on their economic state. Both white and black tenants cultivated comparable size plots, and examples of sharecropping as well as rent-paying contracts are found for both white and African tenants. From the available evidence it seems that the economic status of the African tenants - who were mostly former sharecroppers from districts in the Transvaal and Free State - matched those of the A&E white tenants quite closely, as Van Onselen has shown elsewhere, and that African tenants were as desirable to the company in the 1930's as were white tenants.²⁶

At the outset the NAD recognised that the fixed quantity of land available in the Trust areas would hardly be sufficient to allow all Africans to become full-time farmers, and that they would therefore follow a policy of encouraging only deserving tenants onto the farms - in essence therefore following the existing policy of the A&E and the private owners. This was important in preserving the old status quo on these farms - where well-off tenants had gained entry onto the farms before 1936 on the basis of their economic performance. In addition to this, the NAD stressed that other Africans who had a prior claim to land in the Scheduled areas²⁷ ought to exercise that right at the earliest opportunity: "It would be well for them to secure suitable and satisfactory ground in the released area now when it is comparatively easy for them to do so than to wait for some years until they find that their continued isolation is handicapping their development, and that ground in a released area is no longer available for their occupation"²⁸ It is ironic that communities which successfully resisted early removals to the Scheduled areas in the 1940's and 1950's, found they were not in a position to demand "equal" treatment or compensation when they were forcibly moved into Bophuthatswana in the 1970's and 1980's. A case in point here is the people in the Putfontein Location.²⁹

On the farms that became parts of the Trust in 1936, the progressive peasantry, who from at least the 1910's began to acquire land on freehold, or rented land for cash or produce, made the transition into the Trust without much difficulty. Here they were in a position to move beyond the economic and political shadow of the Reserve's traditional order, freeing themselves from control of the Chiefs and headmen. We have already briefly mentioned that when the Bantu Authorities were introduced, the Trust lay beyond the control of the nearest "tribal authority", the Ratlou Barolong Tribal Authority. Much more research is needed on this, but it nevertheless indicates that a more progressive elite in this district was moving beyond the "tribal" order, and seeking new forms of social organisation. In another instance of this, the ME, which was subsumed under the Ratlou Rolong Tribal Authority, elected its own Foreman (rather than Headman) to represent it on the Authority.³⁰

The case of Simon Tstasi is a good example of one of these progressives whose origins lie on an privately owned African farm in the Scheduled area.³¹ His family were one of the 18 original buyers of parts of the

farm Brooksby, and seem to have either come from the Hoopstad/Bloemfontein area of the Free State, or from Boons/Uitkyk in the Transvaal, in 1918/1919. In the 1920's Simon became a tenant on the A&E farm Driehoek 309 in the Scheduled area. In 1936 he became a tenant of the SANT when the farm was bought from the company. In 1940 he purchased 200 morgan of Driehoek from the Trust, at a time when land was at a premium, the sale being recommended by the LNC and the NAD Agricultural officer on the Trust because Tsatsi was a "hard-working, honest, and progressive native". By 1950 his was a model farm, with residential and arable allotments, a plantation of 1000 gum trees, and an orchard of 70 trees. He threshed sorghum and maize for his neighbours, sharecropped on their allotments with his new tractor, and pressed the Agricultural officer for more land. In 1954 he gave evidence, as a well-known progressive farmer, to the Tomlinson Commission. He became the Headman of the Driehoek Trust farm, and was authorised to issue passes to "native tenants". And in 1951 he was elected to the first of the Trust Management Committees in the Ditsobotla region. ³²

There are other examples of these progressives on other categories of Scheduled land, for example the ME. One of these was Jeremiah Lekgethu, one of the original buyers of Portions of ME. At his death he owned 100 morgen of Portion 3, and 71 and 5 morgen of Portion 4 of the farm. The economic history of African farmers, like Jeremiah Lekgethu, on the Middleton Estates, makes a fascinating study. We will briefly touch on some of the major aspects of this.

The early history of how this portion of the Kunana Reserve was lost by the RaTlou Barolong, and came into the hands of the Mafeking trader, HF Wirsing, in 1906, is wrapped up with the frontier history of the district, and the bitter conflict for arable land in the Molopo river basin, and southwards along the Harts river. Wirsing found that the running of a ranch of this size was a costly business, and he was soon raising working capital from the banks by mortgaging parts of the farm. With each successive economic setback, he attempted to raise new money to cover his debts by selling portions of the farm, mostly to his tenants. By 1925 Wirsing was bankrupt, and in 1926 he died impoverished, a tenant of the SANT on his former Estate.

Wirings' setbacks gave his African tenants, and other progressive farmers on white farms, the opportunity for the accumulation of freehold property outside the Tribal Reserves (on which expanded production was subject to the limitations of land and population pressure), and beyond the white farms, at precisely a time when pressure was mounting on African "sharecroppers" in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Africans acquired 3 major portions, nearly 75 percent, of the Estate between 1918 and 1936. However by 1936 only one of these portions was still registered to private owners, the balance of the sales having fallen through when the banks and investment companies foreclosed on the bonds. This experience of the open-market whilst brief and in most cases disastrous, nevertheless allowed these peasants to establish a moral claim to the land, which resulted in their privileged status in the Reserves. These sales were initially recommended by the NAD because the buyers were all "members of the Barolong tribe", and "Moshottes people" at Kunana, the headquarters of the Barolong Chief in the district and they therefore "merely provided

for the repurchase by Natives of what was formerly native land and which was not until 1884 part of the Transvaal".³³ From the evidence though, it appears as if they were not all of "Moshoettes people", and their origins were far more diverse and far-flung.³⁴

From the outset the purchasers began to run into financial trouble but this was due more to a series of natural disasters in the 1920's than their farming methods. The files of the NAD reveal the vicissitudes of African farming in this case, as Wirsing, the Bond Holder, who was in sequestration in 1925, peddled his bond from bank to finance company in a desperate bid to pay his own debts, until he was foreclosed. Two of the three portions of the farm were then sold from under the feet of the buyers to the NAD.³⁵ Jeremiah Lekgethu and his partners on Portion 3 were able to secure a bond on their property and hold onto their plots.³⁶

Despite a great deal of disagreement between the LNC and the SNA it was decided that the ME was a special case, and that the African farmers had a claim to the land, by virtue of the amounts they had already paid against the bonds. Whilst the SNA wanted to settle "dispossessed natives" under the usual "squattling conditions" - viz. "Natives be allowed to plough 5m of land, to graze 10 head of cattle or 20 small stock, on payment of £1.10 annual rental; for surplus stock they should pay 10/ per annum for each 5 extra head (2/6 for small stock)" - the LNC suggested that because the ME was already settled by the "progressive" type, the NAD should turn the estate into a "model settlement". In his eyes this meant that the "old tenants" be allowed to retain their allotments of 150 and 100 morgen, and that newcomers to the settlement be accepted only if they had the resources and skills to cultivate these amounts.

The ME attracted an increasing number of the "more progressive type" in the following few years. Applicants for holdings on the estate were uniformly well-off: for example, Abram Gaesali, with 35 cattle, 20 sheep and 4 horses; and Joel Manche, with 40 cattle, 58 sheep 2 horses. Both were Barolong from Kunana who had been sharecropping on the farm Makouspan 61 on the boundary of the Reserve and "They appear to be men of good type". Most, if not all, the applicants were former sharecroppers: as the LNC explained, "At present these boys are living on the farms of Europeans in this district, but as a consequence of the number of their stock they are experiencing difficulty in obtaining permission from the owners to live there any longer. They, being displaced natives and apparantly of good character, are considered desirable applicants".³⁷ The ME was thus kept for the "progressive type", and from the evidence available most of the settlers came to the estate from white farms. The majority, but not all of them, originated in the Reserves, but had left them many years before to seek land and opportunity on the white farms. The Reserves seemed to offer them little opportunity for arable production on the scale they were used to, and consequently, they looked for land beyond the Reserves and the control and exactions of the chiefs and headmen.

The LNC characterised these tenants in this remarkable way: "I beg to inform you that with practically no exception applicants for the lease of holdings in the ME belong to the progressive type of Native in whom has

to the later arrivals who received 5 morgen for cropping and 5 for fallowing - there was a group of at least 41 farmers who qualified to plough up to 100, and in a few isolated cases, 150 morgen, on the Trust. Oral evidence though has revealed that many farmers, especially those who mechanised in the early 1940's were sharecropping for other tenants, and ploughing areas of up to 1000 morgen. Further research will no doubt magnify the rather blurred picture of this "progressive" peasantry on the Trust. These farmers were concentrated in well-established areas, around which the tide of new settlement washed. These newcomers to the Trust formed a distinct group, united by a sense of grievance to the "privileged" old families. By 1947 the LNC stated that the Trust farms in the district were fully settled according to the rules of the Department. ⁴²

After the reigns of power within the NAD were rearranged in 1948, we can see a clear new priority regarding the settlement policy on the Trust. We might characterise this change as from "betterment to settlement". ⁴³ A survey of the Trust population was therefore carried out by the NAD in terms of its new directive. At least 40 % of the Trust farmers were working plots in excess of 25 morgen, whilst on the ME, there were farmers on plots of between 100 and 150 morgen. A total population of some 5400 souls were finding a living on the Trust. ⁴⁴ The Secretary of the Planning Committee in 1951 was astounded at the status of the African farmers on the Trust, noting that this was due to officials of the Department only allowing African farmers there in "exceptional cases". Although the NAD wanted "closer settlement", it is clear that the Department was not under any illusions as to the ability of the Trust to absorb most of the new "surplus" population now streaming into the Reserves: "In view of the fact that, as pointed out in the White Paper (GPS.13745) of 1948, there will never be enough land to enable every Native to become a full time, even part time, peasant farmer, your attention is directed to the creation of village settlements as mentioned by Dr DL Smit", the Chief Native Commissioner noted. The LNC set about, from 1951 drawing up plans for these village settlements which would accommodate the surplus population of "landless and stockless" Africans, from the Reserves and "squatters" from the white farms. ⁴⁵

III Social History and Class on the Trust, 1936-1954.

It remains now to very briefly sketch out some tentative ideas regarding the impact of the class heritage of progressive farmers on the Trust in the period between 1936 and 1954. A history of the "politics of resistance" to Betterment and Bantu Authority's, and the relationship between local politics and national organisations remains to be written for the Lichtenburg district. Although the few details we have seem to indicate that there was sustained resistance - from at least as early as 1939 - which climaxed in the period 1952 - 1955, it does not appear to have been anything as dramatic as that in the Marico district. It is possible that the roots of resistance were somewhat different in the BaHurutshe Reserve, and that the distinctive class composition of the Lichtenburg "Native" Areas played a important part in diluting this resistance. The theme of the "defence of traditional rights" does not appear in any of the evidence I have looked at, for example. Let us then explore these ideas in a little more detail.

As we have seen, the Trust population at the outset contained a disproportionate number of the districts most "advanced" farming elements. In most cases, they were full time farmers, who had little cause to undertake migrant labour, if the fragmentary evidence we have is correct. In a process that was probably closely linked with the capitalisation and mechanisation of the white farms in the 1940's, the trickle onto the Trust farms after their creation - the LNC could still point to surplus land in the 1940's - soon turned into a veritable flood as "surplus" Africans were endorsed out of the white farming areas. These "squatters" seem to have been "of the better type", that is possessing stock and agricultural equipment of their own, who had made their living as "labour tenants" on the farms of the district. In contrast to other more advanced parts of the highveld, as we have argued earlier, the Lichtenburg district was one of the last to experience the impact of capitalisation. It was also one of the last to establish Labour Tenant Control Boards. It seems to have been precisely this class of African peasant that made application for entry onto the Trust farms, and which bore the imprint of the early years of "Betterment Planning".

Not surprisingly within 3 years of the establishment of the Trust, the first ripples of an impending groundswell of opposition to betterment were evident - and their origins seem to have been amongst the later arrivals on the Trust farms. Of interest to me is that this opposition had a clear class basis - which was directed as much at the old residents of the farms with their large allotments, and in some cases their freehold rights, as at the LNC and Betterment officers. Petitions, and meetings by "all the natives on the Trust farms" protested the implementation of the 5 morgen arable plot allotments, which it was argued was not sufficient to provide a livelihood to a tenant and his family. "One of the organisers of this early protest was the Mooipan resident, SM Matlhatsi, Secretary of the Local Tenants Committee. As he explained to Rheinhold Jones, the new tenants objected to the 5 morgen limit because it represented an unequal division of the Trust between them and the old tenants. They also objected to the LNC allowing any further Africans onto the Trust who are "not so much in trouble of heavily dwelling in European areas", a reference to the well-off labour tenants no longer needed on the farms, or perhaps to the African landowners like the Molamu's who obtained freehold farms in the vicinity of Mooipan. It is clear that the 5 morgen allotment was quite unsuitable for even subsistence production, a theme which appears with regularity in the evidence. In a later letter (23 April 1940) Matlhatsi elaborated his argument:

"It is very difficult to us because at this land of us it is not a fertile ground(.) It grows a red rose bush killing the grains if man doesn't fertilise. Every morgan raise 5 bags and the prices are also too low. It does not fitting for a mans expenses per year because we are still very poor to buy fertiliser. (The yield of) 25 bags it only for a mans food on 1/2 a yr including his fowls and pigs.. The whole of the population are crying they wants this new law to be altered and we are told also to keep ten head of cattle and 20 sheep. ..We are told also to go to the farmers if we are found not doing the will of the commissioner." 47

awakened the lust for thrift, influenced by European Civilization. This class of Native finds it impossible to remain on European owned farms and is usually not desired owing to the number of livestock he has managed to accumulate. He wants to be independent and therefore requires and must have more scope to pursue the thrift he has commenced." He went on to note that only this class of African producer was now badly hit by changes in the white farms in contrast with "the poorer type of Native" who could still get place on the white farms. As far as the preference of this class it was not for the life as a "squatter" on the white farms: "the thrifty native dislikes to live under such circumstances because rights of ploughing and grazing are curtailed". "It will be observed", he concluded, that the applicants are owners of fairly large herds of livestock and that settling them on plots of 25 morgen each is out of the question, both from an economic and an administrative point of view. ³⁸

Jeremiah Lekgethu is but one example of the ME progressive farmers. He like most of them was able to accumulate land beyond his original holdings, by purchase, and by sharecropping arrangements. As we know from the Native Affairs Commission committee report, by 1936 the ME tenants were considered amongst the most advanced sections of the Lichtenburg peasantry. And by 1940 most of the original tenants and purchasers of plots on the ME were still to be found on the Estate. ³⁹ They formed a clear nucleus of progressive farming in the district, and a distinct class of producers.

The final group of progressive farmers on the Trust were the private farm owners. Most of these farmers were compelled to move to the Trust as their farms were considered "black spots" in white areas. Whilst this entailed in many cases a traumatic relocation, most of the owners accomplished the move with little more than a brief pause in production. They were able to select their farms on the Trust and it seems that some of them were rewarded for moving promptly with the offer of doubling the size of their farms. ⁴⁰ One of these families were the Molamu's, who had brought land in the district at Jaachtkraal and Enselsrust. Daniel Molamu, the owner of the farm Jachtkraal, was referred to in 1937 in the following terms: "This man is a progressive farmer who has his own farm in the middle of Europeans, some of whom consult him about farming methods. He is well-known in the Methodist Church and attends the Methodist Synod. I believe he has great influence in his area" ⁴¹ Forced to move in the 1940's, they swapped their farms for freehold property on the boundary of Kunana, from where they continued to farm on a large scale. Isaac Molamu became a well-known member of the Kopano Tribal Authority.

Further examples abound of this class of African farmer, but the major point is that they were a well-established, and reasonably coherent group well before "apartheid planning" after 1948. The Trust was thus clearly stratified according to the particular personal social history of the African farmers themselves. Those farmers who had leased land, or had bought farms in the Scheduled areas before 1936 continued their farming operations relatively undisturbed by the process of consolidation. The Trust, as the new owners of the property, encouraged them to continue their farming operations, and welcomed the opportunity to foster this "progressive" strata. Although the NAD in its official releases stated that these farmers were entitled to 30 morgen of arable land - in contrast

The 5 morgen plot was perceived as a mechanism for the enslavement and impoverishment of the African population: "The 5 morgen system should be avoided in this country as the land is not fertile. Under the system of 5 morgen it is an indirect way of putting people into slavery as they cannot live on 5 m. How will they educate their children? Do they mean that the people should go back to towns where they are entirely prohibited to become citizen of the locations? It is indeed definite that the natives will soon have no place of their own." (sic.) ⁴⁸

The other objection was directed at the prohibition on the purchase of land within the Trust area, which was another inequality between the new tenants and the old: "We have been taking it for granted that the area in question are Released and are subject to all, whoever is able to buy can do so. But this is also objected to by the authorities....we want to buy... "Why should we not (be) privileged to have the right to buying in an area belonging to a native section? What is the objection for? There are no farms cut (up) for our purchase (but)...native landowners (can) come (and) choose the sweetest farms in Released lands" (sic.). ⁴⁹ This refers to the provisions of the South African Native Trust and Land Act which made allowance for Africans holding private property in "white areas" to be compensated with freehold property on land within the Trust. Once again the Trust was suspected of upholding the class interests of the "progressive" African farming element, at their expense ⁵⁰

It would be unwise to labour this point much further on the fragmentary evidence that we have, but one more example will be given of the impact of this class conflict on the politics of the Trust population and this relates to the protests at cattle culling.

By the end of the war years, resistance to the Trust officials, and to the hardening of the administration of Betterment, was reflected in an outbreak of defiance of Trust regulations - especially those relating to stock limitations. Much of this defiance was orchestrated by a revived local branch of the ANC, which seems to have drawn, initially at least, much support from a broad spectrum of the Trust population. But as resistance became more spontaneous and wide-spread so we can detect a growing suspicion amongst the "influential residents" at the increasingly "populist" character of this protest, and a drawing away on their part. It is possible that this fear was responsible for many of these "big men" being drawn away from the national political struggle being waged by the ANC and the Congress Alliance at that time, and their willingness to participate in the Bantu Authority system.

The first outbreak of defiance of the culling regulations began in May 1952 on the farms Enselsrust and Gelukspan, and seven tenants whose stock had been earmarked for culling refused to obey orders from the LNC: "These Natives were very badly behaved, and threatened the officials with sticks. They are a small group of Xhosas living in the same residential area, and have been causing trouble all along... After causing this obstruction they followed the culling officer around to the other crushes and endeavoured to get the other Natives to join them..." ⁵¹ In June, 3 more tenants were arrested in a similar incident at another crush. ⁵² The impact of stock limitation was widespread, but, as in the case of the above tenants, seems to have fallen more heavily on tenants farmers who depended upon spans of

oxen or donkeys for ploughing their allotments. For example, the defiance of culling on Enselerust and Gelukspan was because "the natives find it increasingly difficult to plough as their existing teams for ploughing have been reduced, apart from losses in cows and other stock. They felt that with the present ploughing season they would be unable to do what they wished as far as ensuring good crops for the coming season are concerned".

In August 1952 the protesters had organised a deputation of tenants representing 13 Trust farms, who demanded to meet with the Chairman of the Culling Commission, de Wet-Nel, regarding so-called abuses of the "culling system". A central theme of their protest was that the implementation of stock limitation exacerbated the already prevalent unequal division of land and stock amongst tenants on the Trust. The deputation suggested than an alternative system be introduced "whereby a family head is limited to a maximum number of stock which he will be able to maintain on Trust ground and also that such a family head be given a definite and maximum holding of ground equal to that of other family heads".⁵³

The reply of the LNC to this demand is of particular interest to this section of the paper. He explained that the NAD considered it impossible to limit the number of stock which each tenant could keep on the Trust because of the different needs of the old "progressive" tenants (who were on the farms when the Trust brought them) and the newcomers. As he explained there were now 1093 squatter families on the Trust, which had a carrying capacity of 14,624 cattle units (in terms of Government Notice No.1837 of 15/8/52), which meant that, if an average quota were imposed no family would be allowed to retain more than 13 cattle units. The Department felt that this would discriminate against the "progressive" old tenants who had larger allotments and more stock, in favour of the new tenants who did not own any stock: "To give every squatter an equal holding of ground would mean that the progressive squatter will have to be penalised as there is not sufficient arable ground to give each squatter 30 morgen". At least 50 % of the Trust population would be discriminated against in this way, the LNC stated, giving a detailed breakdown of the Trust's population (Table 2)

TABLE TWO: LAND HOLDINGS AND FAMILIES ON THE LICHTENBURG TRUST FARMS

5m.....	669
5.1-10.....	27
10.1-15.....	28
15.1-20.....	25
20.1-25.....	15
25.1-30.....	351

54

The stock limitation proposals were implemented over the following two years - 1952 and 1953 - and a series of meetings were held by the tenants to try and resolve the issue, which were uniformly unsuccessful. The LNC remained committed to supporting the rights and privileges of the old tenantry, which underlined the class divisions within the trust

population.

In addition to this class division between old and new tenants, we can see the beginnings of a generational division as well. The sons of tenants were prevented from holding stock of their own on the Trust, until the death of their fathers. This subsumed them under the control of their parents, and elders, on whose allotments they were forced to live, and work. This aspect of resistance to culling deserves more research, for it opens up new ways of understanding the roots of resistance to culling, and the organisational basis of it. For example, Jerry Lekgethu, a son of one of the leaders anti-culling resisters, raised the question of who was engineering the protest. In his view, it was the older well-off tenants who had stock in excess of the regulations who were behind the attempt to subvert the implementation of the stock limitations. This they were attempting to do at the expense of the newcomers, and of the younger generation, who would be forced to accept an unequal distribution of stock in favour of the older tenants. ⁵⁵

This is an extremely complex issue which is deserving of more research. Nevertheless I feel that the few examples mentioned above have highlighted the ways in which the "pedigree's" of some of the Lichtenburg district's "progressive" peasantry imposed itself on the emerging class structure of the SANT farms, and generated class and generational tensions within the community.

Conclusion.

This paper has explored how the not-so "dead hand" of the past can be detected in the activities and tensions of succeeding generations. This case-study of the Lichtenburg "Native" Areas suggests that it is possible to trace a continuity in class terms between the years of "segregation" and those of "apartheid". The historical experiences of different African communities within this area have played a significant part in determining their class position, and perhaps their political relationship with the evolving Bantustan and Homeland structures. Further investigation of communities other than those on Trust farms, such as the Locations and Reserves will broaden our understanding of this process.

But this paper has addressed the issue of "structure" from a different perspective, by suggesting that Apartheid was not crucial in determining the class character of this Bantustan. Rather, we suggest that the struggles of individuals, and their capacity to mould their environment in a process of struggle, played an important part in determining the nature of the Bantustans, as they evolved out of the complex history of Reserves, Locations and private farms in the twentieth century. In this paper we have explored the history of an area which lay outside of the "tribal" Reserves, but which was, nevertheless, an important part of the "native" Area of Lichtenburg. We cannot simply characterise these Scheduled Areas as places where the Chiefs simply "took-over" after their purchase by the SANT. Neither were they blank sheets on which the State and the Chiefs could draw their own designs. The Scheduled Areas had their own social and political dynamic, their own heritage and history, which we need to trace before we can understand their own distinctive politics. And although we do not explore this theme of politics in this paper, we feel that this should be undertaken urgently.

¹Noord-Wes Ko-Operasie, 50 Jaar van die Ko-Operasie, p.31.

²Ibid.

³For a general account of African land in the Western Transvaal, see G. Relly's unpublished MA thesis, SOAS, 1979.

⁴This deserves further investigation, but details of the failure of the National Party to capture the political support of the white population of the district in the late-1920's are provided in my MA dissertation, Wits 1989, and in B. Bozzoli(ed), Class, Community and Conflict, "Community Politics on the Lichtenburg Alluvial Diamond Diggings, 1926-1929, pp.235-80, Johannesburg, 1987.

⁵For example, in 1944 African farmers in the district produced 70,000 bags of maize which was delivered to the Noord-Wes Ko-Operasie. (Central Archives Depot (CAD), Lichtenburg Native Commissioner (KLI), N1/15/6, Annual Report Native Commissioner Lichtenburg, 1944.) Other African producers on African owned farms delivered grain to the Co-Op independently of the Native Commissioner's Office; they were known as "non-lede", and their contributions were counted into the total delivery to the Ko-Op.

⁶CAD, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS), File No.1233/308, Native Trust and Land Act 18/1936, Native Affairs Commission, Inspection Report, Lichtenburg, "Report of GE Heaton Nicholls and Colonel WRR Collins, Committee of the Commission appointed to deal with Native Lands in the Transvaal and Natal, 4 November 1936, to the Chairman, Native Affairs Commission, for the Lichtenburg District".

⁷See for example their paper to this conference, "The Transformation of Moiloa's Reserve in the Western Transvaal: Politics, Production and Resistance in a Rural Setting, 1919-1986".

⁸Putfontein Location, for example, had a population density of 1:1.5 morgen in 1936, whilst the Kunana Reserve (Barolong), with a population of 3,153, had a ration of 1:15 morgen.

⁹See for example the Interview of George Stacey with Chief Kelly Molete, formerly of Rooijanjefontein in 1987, in which he describes the sharecropping activities of his father, and of himself, on the Location, on adjoining white farms, up to the 1940's. He also draws attention to the activities of other "big men", farmers who cultivated up to a few hundred morgen a season.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹See KLI N1/15/6, op.cit., Annual Report, Native Commissioner, Lichtenburg, 1944.

¹²See KLI N2/7/2 Administration SANT Lands, Telegram LNC to Chief Native Commissioner, Potchefstroom (CNC).

¹³KLI, N1/15/6, LNC to CNC, Potchefstroom, 19 July 1948, Ref.2/16/5.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵KLI N2/7/2, Lands. Native Affairs. SANT Land. Land (Main File), Report of Meeting LNC (W Ross) with the Executive of the Lichtenburg Distrik Boere Saamwerk Vereeniging, 10 June 1941.

¹⁶Note that this question of Africans living on the Trust was raised in Parliament by AP Swart, Lichtenburg MP, and Mr Labuschagne, MP for Sweizer Reneke. See reply by SNA, DC Smit, 27 July 1941, Ref.1645/297, in KLI 2/7/2, Lands. Native Affairs. SANT Land (Main File), "Verhuising van Plaasarbeiders na Trustplase".

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸KLI 2/14/5, LNC (HR van den Bergh) to Lichtenburg Magistrate (LRM), Report, "Natives on Trust farms in the District of Lichtenburg", 14 March 1942.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰KLI N1/15/6, Annual Report, LNC, 1949/50.

²¹KLI N2/11/3, Settlement and Rehabilitation. Main File, Returns by LNC (SC Becker) to Tomlinson, d.1954.

²²PL Breutz, A History of the BaTswana and the Origin of Bophuthatswana, Ramsgate, 1989, p.451.

²³See attempt to sell a part of the ME to the SANT in 1953 for \$24,190 (size 767 morgen), i.e. at \$20-\$30 per morgen (the ruling price was \$12-\$15 per morgen). Eventually bought by SANT for \$11,728.

²⁴These farms were Brooksby 360, Gelukspan 372, Vlakpan 395, Kapsteel 375, Schoongezicht 386, Verdwaal 343 (part Government), Shiela 49, De Hoop 94 (Tribal), De Hoop 302 (Tribal).

²⁵See M. Crowder (ed), The Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Rey, Botswana Historical Society, 1988. See also KLI N2/10/2, Native Owned and Tribal Land. Farms and Plots. Main File, Petition, "Huurders van Plase behorende aan die Firma African and European".

²⁶See KLI N2/7/3(6), SANT Land. Driehoek, Letter from J Marks, Manager, A&E Lands Department, to SNA, 29 September 1937, "Details of Rental Obtained by the Company from A&E Farms in Released Area No.2"; also Letter, A Saunders (Agricultural Officer) to LNC, 19 August 1938, "African tenants on Driehoek" which notes that prior to incorporation into the Trust, 5 Africans leased a portion of the farm for \$80 per annum, another 13 leased a portion for \$36, and 2 Africans worked for a white bywoner who paid the company with a share of his crop.

²⁷That is, who lived on privately owned, and in Tribally purchased Locations outside of the Scheduled areas. Note that i the Lichtenburg district both Putfontein and RooiJanjesfontein Location were de-scheduled in the 1930's in response to growing white settlement in their vicinity.

²⁸KLI N2/10/2, Natives Land and Trust Exchange. Rooijantjesfontein, LNC to Assistant LNC, 12 July 1937, "Natives Trust and Land Act, 1936".

²⁹See for example the unpublished Honours research paper of P Ntamu, "African land Purchase, with special reference to the BaTlounge", University of Bophuthatswana, 1989, which deals with the Putfontein community, and an earlier Research paper submitted for his BA degree, "BaTlounge - A Community on the Move", UNIBO, 1986.

³⁰Breutz, op.cit.

³¹See K Rymer's MA dissertation which deals with the changes in the social relations of production on Brooksby for a more detailed history of one of these communities over the 20th Century, University of the Witwatersrand, 1988.

³²This paragraph is built up from a variety of sources, including the following. KLI N2/14/5(23), SANT Land. General, Letter, Assistant LNC to CNC, 8 April 1940, 2 January 1940 ; KLI N2/7/3(6), SANT Land. Driehoek: Letter S Tsatsi to LNC, 12 November 1951, 23 August 1951: Report on S Tsatsi by Agricultural Officer (T Carroll), c.1951.

³³Ibid., Letter, Piet Mosebatsi to EH Mathews, 4 March 1921.

³⁴See Breutz, op.cit.

³⁵See for example the history of Portion's 1 and 2 of the farm which were sold on auction in their entirety to the NAD in 1926.

³⁶In 1925 Wirsing went bankrupt and the Bond was taken up by the National Bank. It was passed onto the Natal Investment and Annuity Company Limited, to the firm of Aldred and Fryer (Attorneys), who called up the bond in March 1940, when the SANT took over the bond on behalf of the owners. See NTS 16/308, Vol III Lichtenburg. Farm Kunana (Middleton Estates) 1)Board of Survey Portion Monamolela, Ref.47/337.

³⁷See also applications from Jan, Izak and Piet Mochumi, 31 March 1927. They have 4 horses, 46 head of cattle, 80 sheep, 60 goats and 17 donkeys. They were considered to be of the "desireable type". Ibid.

³⁸NTS 16/308, Lichtenburg. Farm Kunana No.1 (Middleton Estate). Part 2. Report, Director of Native Agriculture (RW Thornton) to SNA, 1 April 1930, "Inspection of, and Report on. Farm Kunana No.1, Middleton Estates, Lichtenburg District."

³⁹See NTS 16/308, Part III. Lichtenburg. Farm Kunana No.1 (Middleton Estates) for details of the history of each portion. In 1940 of the 18 original buyers of Portion 3, 13 were still alive, and the other 5 plots were still in the possession of their families.

⁴⁰See in particular the evidence regarding the land deals of the Molamu's provided in the South African Institute of Race Relations collection, University of the Witwatersrand, Church of the Province Archive, B Box Collection, AD 843, B101.25, Expropriation of land. Jachtkraal. Lichtenburg; AD 843/RJ/C3.6, SAIRR. Land. General. 1937.

⁴¹SAIRR, AD843/RJ/C3.6, SAIRR. Land. General, Letter, Rheinhold Jones to EW Lowe, 2 July 1937.

⁴²Even teachers on the Trust were unable to obtain plots. See application of the Lichtenburg Reserve Area Branch of the Transvaal African Teachers Association for subsistence plots for teachers. KLI N2/7/2, Administration. SANT Trust Land.

⁴³See Letter, CNC to LNC, 6 April 1949, "re' Trust farms Shiela, De Hoop and Verdwaal": "It seems impossible to settle only 99 families on almost 8000 morgen. I would suggest that more families be settled on these farms and the lye system should be brought in on the existing lands by means of different crop rotation system." He also refers to the need to use some of the land on the Trust for the purpose of "relieving the population pressure on the Polfontein Reserve" when Reclamation work was begun there.

⁴⁴KLI N2/7/2, Administration. SANT Land, Report by LNC to Secretary of Beplanningskomitee, 28 May 1951, "Position on Trust farms in the Lichtenburg District".

⁴⁵KLI N2/11/3, Settlement and Rehabilitation. Main File, Circular, CNC (HB Myburgh) to LNC, Ref. No.2/36/3, "Village Settlements: Establishment of", 12 March 1951.

⁴⁶For details see KLI N2/7/3(27), SANT Land. Siberia 357.

⁴⁷SAIRR, B Box, B101.3, Released Areas. Lichtenburg, Letters from SM Matlhatsi to Reinhold Jones, 23 April 1940.

⁴⁸SAIRR, RJ, AD843, Senatorial Correspondence for Lichtenburg, 1040-1, Letters from Local Tenants Committee Natives in Released Area, 11 May 1940 to Reinhalt Jones.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰See also letter from SJ Theleletsha, Naaupoort, to Reinhalt Jones, 9 May 1940, ibid., and Letter, Agricultural Officer (SS Tehetlhane) to LNC, 21 May 1947 in KLI N2/7/2, Administration. SANT Land.

⁵¹KLI N8/5/2

⁵²SAIRR, Ballinger Collection A410, C2.1.35, Correspondence: Constituency Lichtenburg 1952-59, Letter to WG Ballinger by Fraenkel and Gericke, Maafikeng, 19 September 1952.

⁵³Ibid., Letter from Frank Letoba, Gabriel Lehetla, Ephraim Kosa, Piet Marumo, William Monswagai, and Ruben Maleme of Lichtenburg Trust farms to LNC, 29 August 1952.


⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵See Letters by Gabriel Lehetlu, 17 August 1952 and 23 June 1953, "for people in Lichtenburg Trust Farms", Ibid., and KLI N8/5/2, Administrasie. Bantoe Landbou. Vee Beperkings, Minutes of Meeting between LNC and Residents of Trust farms, 21 April 1953.

PROVINCE OF TRANSVAAL.

MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT
OF

LICHTENBURG.



REFERENCE:

Territorial Boundaries

Background

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Magisterial District