

***Socio-spatial Exclusions and the Urbanisation of
Injustice: A Case study in Northern Johannesburg***

Author: James Brett

Student number: 9604733H

Political Studies Department.

Faculty of the Social Sciences

Supervised by: Professor R Taylor.

This Dissertation serves as partial fulfilment of a MA (Political Studies) degree, at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2005/2006.

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Introduction

The dawn of the democratic political era in South Africa with the dismantling of the Apartheid racial ideology in the late 1980's and early 1990's marked a liberal watershed in the country's political history, a history characterised by oppression and 'racialized' exclusion of the indigenous 'non-white' populations. Ascendancy to power of the first non-racial, democratically elected government in 1994 has signalled a major turning point in political focus in the country. In the initial years of democracy, the new government has embarked on ambitious programs aimed at the promotion of socio-economic integration of the previously disadvantaged populations, and attempts to redress the numerous inequalities resulting from racial segregation and oppression dating back to the colonial era. The legacy of race-based politics in South Africa has produced countless such inequalities between the privileged predominantly 'white' population, and marginalized communities defined as 'black' or 'non-white' under the Apartheid discourse. This legacy has involved the systematic identification and classification of the entire population into specific categories on the basis of socially constructed notions of 'race', and allowed for the forced exclusion of the majority 'non-white' population by the supposedly superior 'whites'.

Exclusion has possessed many differing mechanisms and diverse forms throughout the history of race-based politics in South Africa. The zenith of this program was reached with the National Party government's Apartheid ideology, which was to emerge as the ideal model of race-based socio-political exclusion; serving to formalise racism in legalistic terms and allow for the systematic reordering and reproduction of society to reflect this bias. The forms of social exclusion of racially marginalised populations are

numerous, with marginalized populations in South Africa suffering economic, political and social burdens at the hands of the exclusively ‘white’ government. Despite the transformation to democracy and over a decade of reform and development initiatives, this legacy of race-based politics and exclusions continues to pose a significant challenge to the new government’s attempts to promote integration, and the effects of over a century of racial bias are still keenly felt.

This study is located generally in the intellectual fields of urban development and comparative environmentalism relating to a number important aspects of exclusion and race-based political theory; but more specifically in the literature concerning spatial/geographic exclusions, environmental exclusions and in particular the arguments presented by Goldberg (1993) in Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning¹, and the discourse of Environmental Justice. The paper has two principal aims. First the study aims to serve as an examination in the South African context of the means whereby racially marginalised populations are excluded from space and attempts to promote urban development, healthy environments (and their benefits), community and policy-making concerning the places where they live, resulting in the deepening of inequalities between these marginalized populations and the affluent groups in society. By proceeding from an examination of development initiatives undertaken in terms of the dominant development discourse in South Africa – the study aims to link the continued existence of racially-constituted spatial forms to root causes in this specific development strategy, which allows for the covert operation of racial spatialisation to proceed unfettered.

¹ Oxford, Blackwell publishers, 1993

The second aim of the paper is an examination of the nature of development projects undertaken in the post- apartheid era; ostensibly with the aim of promoting integration and the formation of sustainable human settlements for the marginalized in South Africa's urban context. Through a critical analysis of these projects and policies, the study aims to show how contemporary development has yielded inherently unsustainable outcomes – resulting in the exacerbation of the spatial, environmental and socio economic exclusion of the marginalized.

The case study presented as part of the examination examines two wards in the Johannesburg Municipality and the specific manifestations of these issues in these areas, placing the theoretical issues within the context of urban development on the fringes of Johannesburg's sprawling suburbs and the numerous informal settlements located therein.

Brief Outline to the Paper

The first chapter in the discussion serves to introduce the notion of social exclusions in terms of space and the environment, providing an important link between the concerns of social justice and those relating to urban spatial geography in the South African setting and social and environmental exclusions. The legacy of Apartheid's urban settlement patterns and racial marginalisation is examined to the extent to which it impacts on contemporary urban spatial configurations, particularly the creation of periphractic spaces such as informal settlements and townships; identifying a number of practical problems concerning the concentration of large numbers of the marginalised in these spatially dislocated and environmentally desolate and untenable regions. Through an examination of the mechanisms which act to normalise and reproduce racial configuration of human settlements, in particular through a close examination of Goldberg's (1993) argument; the

chapter introduces a number of important mechanisms which feature in the context of South Africa's post-Apartheid human settlement formations. Included in this discussion is an examination of the existence and operation of a number of socially constructed pathologies concerning inhabitants of the margins – which act to normalise or legitimise their ongoing confinement in the urban margins.

Part two of the chapter extends these theoretical notions to an examination of the environmental spaces occupied by the marginalized in the context of South Africa. Beginning with a historical assessment of black environmentalism since the colonial period until the inception of the environmental justice movement in the 1990's, the chapter examines the effects of degradation and dangers faced by residents of South Africa's blighted margins.

Chapter two extends the discussion through an examination of the spatial and environmental exclusion of the marginalised in terms of development discourse in the post-Apartheid era. The chapter begins with a discussion of the three mainstream approaches to development at the global level; neo-liberalism, sustainable development and environmental justice. The chapter introduces the discourse of Environmental Justice and its acceptance, both internationally and locally, as an important body of theory in the promotion of awareness concerning those environmental issues facing marginalised populations throughout the world. Numerous successes, criticisms and dilemmas concerning the environmental justice discourse are examined, specifically those relating to its genesis as a reaction to environmental racism in the United States of America, and the racially based marginalisation of poor communities of colour with respects their environments. This marginalisation assumes numerous different types: including

marginalisation in terms of quality of environments, policy-making and management.

The second portion of the chapter attempts to place development initiatives undertaken since 1994 in context of these discourses, and in particular the dominant accepted discourse of neo-liberalism. By alluding to a number of shortcomings in the areas of human settlement formation and the provision of housing and basic services to the marginalised – the chapter identifies a number of dominant features of the discourse of neo-liberalism which assist in the formation of un-sustainable development practices – further affecting the marginalisation of vulnerable groups in South African society.

The final chapter forms the body of the case study. Beginning with a general introduction to the case study through an examination of the demographics and main concerns of the areas which form the main body of the case study, the chapter introduces two wards within the Johannesburg Municipality which form the main area of study, namely Wards 95, 96. The area forms an incredibly interesting area of study, as it is located in the North of Johannesburg in relatively newly settled high-concentration residential spaces, characteristic of the rapid suburban sprawl occurring in most of Johannesburg. The surrounding areas are also examined to show high degrees of disparity between inhabitants in relation to affluence, class and employment; with the region serving as host to one newly formalised predominantly ‘black’ residential settlement, two informal settlements – as well as some of the highest-cost residential spaces in Johannesburg. Problems facing each of these wards are highlighted in turn, with important challenges facing the populations within being elaborated upon. The chapter includes discussion of a number of pertinent issues relating to the Integrated Development Plan in the region, including the discussion of disputes relating to social exclusion; in the ongoing attempt to

relocate the informal settlement of Zevenfontein, and sections of the informal settlement at Diepsloot in the area by the 'white' residents; and the formalisation of road closures in the area creating isolated high-security (predominantly 'white') residential communities, in response to the encroachment of 'black' settlements on these spaces.

Finally, the second part of the chapter forms the main body of the case study, that of residents' reaction to exclusion within the periphractic spaces in the study region.

Reactions can be roughly divided into different categories: that of reaction to their general environment, reaction to exclusion from space, and finally to exclusion from integration from the 'white' residential areas through the proposed relocation, and the security enclosures of the 'white' residential areas. A final portion of this chapter deals with the wishes of the population with regards their integration into the broader community.

Methodology

The study is the culmination of a process involving a wide variety of primary sources as well as the secondary theoretical sources mentioned. Primary sources included the analysis of local community newspapers, a national newspaper, Integrated Development Plan for the region, Spatial Development Plans for the region, census data and approximately twenty to thirty household visits in the informal settlement of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein. During the course of these visits a number of informal discussions with families and friends, as well as private interviews were undertaken. Further, in each ward, the ward councillor was interviewed as to development issues facing the region, environmental issues and reaction to exclusion brought to their attention by the public.

Social workers in the area of the informal settlements were also contacted and interviewed concerning a number of pertinent social issues brought to their attention.

The case study serves to dispel a number of myths concerning the spatial and environmental awareness amongst diverse populations in South Africa. The prevalence of crime in contemporary South African society features as an important variable in the determination of spaces and their quality across both groups. Crime has two varying interpretations as both something that is ‘outside and inflicted upon’, among inhabitants of the affluent areas who continue to see the spatial configuration of society as one which demands rigidity, a sense of place or structural order; to a sense of ‘in and among us’ amongst inhabitants of the periphractic spaces, with varied prospective solutions being proffered most often dealing with the provision of basic needs, such as electricity and increased integration. Both landscapes reflect these orientations in the case study, with affluent areas exhibiting a concerted (and often very expensive) attempt to keep those who don’t belong out, or at least to deny their proximity in large concentrations. The operation of various social pathologies which equate the prevalence of crime with ‘black’ or marginalised populations, is a particular concern of this discussion, as it dictates the construction of urban spatial formation in profound way.

The final experience of exclusion as examined by the document deals with the aspirations of the marginalised and their reaction to their blighted margins. Perceived exclusion was found to feature highly in the mindset of the South African marginalised with special emphasis on a continuation of Apartheid issues relating to places of inhabitancy. The abilities of affluent populations to insulate their communities through private interests in security mechanisms, and their support of local metropolitan programs for the provision

of security such as road closures discussed in detail in the case study; generates a sense of exclusion for marginalised populations. The erection of fences, 'Berlin walls', or cages as described in numerous retorts from those inhabiting the margins reflects a distinct racial bias to the construction of social space, one which most often represents a perversion of democratic rights to private property and the right to self-protection.

With regards environmentalism, contemporary wisdom concerning environmental awareness often assumes environmentalism to be the domain of white, predominantly middle-class members of society – the paper both in its theoretical content and in the findings of the case study reveal a strikingly different reality. Whilst media reports concerning the environment in the affluent areas focuses predominantly on issues such as species conservation and anti-development articles arguing for the preservation of the commons, the situation in informal settlements reveals a markedly different focus. For the most part, the populations of informal settlements were found to exhibit a remarkable awareness of the negative aspects of their unhealthy environmental existence, despite the paucity of efforts to improve them. In particular though, the disparities between environmental concerns across the racial groups can be said to be illustrative of what has grown to be termed the 'green versus brown' debate in environmental theory. Issues affecting those inhabitants of informal settlements tend to be restricted to the provision of basic needs, such as water, sanitation and waste collection; the availability of employment; the prevention of social ills, including crime, promiscuity and substance abuse; and the promotion of pride and permanence. These issues are often referred to as brown considerations. Green issues by contrast involve issues of conservation of species, both plant and animal; preservation of natural habitat; and in some cases sustainability of

natural resources necessary in capital intensive industrial production. Analysis of community participation, charitable donations and leisure option in the affluent areas in the study confirmed conventional wisdom dealing with awareness amongst the affluent, with concern primarily being addressed in terms of the aesthetic enjoyment of natural spaces and species, in contrast to the bitter struggle for basic needs which is characteristic of inhabitants of the two informal settlements.

This paper hopes to present the experiences of exclusion in space, environments and broader society from the standpoint of those inhabiting the margins, from the point of reference of informal settlement residents. Reactions to their conceptions of place in society, their environments, and as communities in search of wider integration into this newly democratic South Africa present a challenge to the contemporary urban and sub-urban spatial configuration supported by government, policy-planning and affluent populations.

Chapter I

The Legacy of Spatial Exclusion in South Africa

Despite the process of transformation and democratization, South Africa's cities for the most part continue to display many of the hallmarks of their racialised history. Notwithstanding the legislative and policy enactments of the newly democratically elected African National Congress –lead government, newly urbanized 'blacks' flocking to urban centres in search of employment continue to face numerous challenges as a result of the perpetuation of boundaries which have survived the liberalisation of the racialised colonial- and Apartheid-cities.² After over 10 years of democracy, the government remains confronted with the increasingly desperate challenge of re-ordering South Africa's Apartheid cities, which combine "planning problems of both First World and Third World urbanism and the huge headaches of an Apartheid inheritance."³ The outcomes of this challenge will have profound and lasting effects on social justice in South Africa's post-Apartheid cities, and the future spatial form which these cities are to adopt.

Following the arguments of Iris Marion Young (1990), cities often exhibit clearly determinable scars of the inequalities of distribution evident in broader society, yet despite this visible evidence, "The social structures, processes and relationships that produce and reproduce these distributions, however, are not so visible...."⁴

² Lemon, A (eds); Homes Apart: South Africa's Segregated Cities; David Philip, Cape Town, 1991, p. ix

³ Ibid, p. ix

⁴ Young, M (1990) :241, cited Smith, D, *Urban Fragmentation, Inequality and Social Justice: Ethical Perspectives*, in Harrison et al (eds), Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and urban development in a democratising society, chp 2, Cape Town, UCT Press (2003)_

South Africa's urban centres are vivid examples of this argument. The spatial separation of racially-defined populations, advocated and enforced during Apartheid remains stamped into the contemporary urban structure despite liberalism of the legal superstructure which enforced it, with the result that;

democratic space is still subject to contestation because, although people have the political freedom to move around, they are confined to the spaces of old, spaces that defined people on the basis of colour.⁵

Despite valiant attempts under democracy to extend service provision to the victims of oppression and exclusion under Apartheid – the ordering of South Africa's cities continues to pose a daunting experience of marginalisation and exclusion to these populations, suggesting that for the most part, "The Apartheid legacy has been carried in to the new era largely intact."⁶

Following Young's argument then, what is necessary to reform and eradicate these symptoms of decades of inequality, and indeed to explain why attempts to do exactly this over the past 10 years of democracy have failed; is the identification of the underlying processes and relationships which support, reform and reproduce marginalisation and social exclusion in the urban makeup.

Of crucial value in this attempt, is an understanding of the mechanisms whereby spaces are constituted, how they are maintained and the processes and social relations they dictate to inhabitants.

⁵ Mayekiso, M; *South Africa's Enduring Urban Crisis: the local State and the Urban Social Movements with Particular Reference to Johannesburg*, in Harrison et al (eds), Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and Urban Development in a democratising society, chp 4, Cape Town, UCT Press, 2003, p 58

⁶ Smith, op cit, p. 30

Polluting the Body Politic and Creation of Urban Peripheries

Goldberg (1993) argues that space is rationally structured in most instances to institutionalise categories of difference and relations of power underlying society.⁷ The spatialisation of racial categories in geographies serves to normalize these categories of difference, while social space is allowed to appear as natural when based on rationalized forms. Goldberg argues that the construction of racialised space in South Africa under Apartheid is the limit of an extension of the practice of racialised spatial configuration throughout the history of Western involvement in Africa, both in the colonial context and post-colonial context.⁸

Spatial ordering of society is determined and refined by power relations; and nowhere is this as obvious as in the structure of urban centres, where the relations and ordering of power relations are reflected in the differences within the urban make-up.

The history of colonial expansion is one of population subordination, spatial expansion and mediation. Colonial conquest was often rationalized in terms of;

spatial vacancy: the lands' emptiness or emptying of human inhabitation. The drive to racialize populations rendered transparent the people so racialised; it left them unseen, merely part of the natural environment, to be cleared from the landscape – urban or rural – like debris.⁹

The division of space according to 'difference' allows for both the physical and social control of inhabitants – both those desired inhabitants and the undesirable. This ordering of society creates an implication of a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'; 'sameness' and 'other'; 'inside' and 'outside'. Those on the outside, the 'other', are constructed as

⁷ Goldberg, D,T; Racist Culture: Philosophy and the politics of Meaning; Oxford ;Blackwell, 1993 p.183

⁸ Ibid, p. 185

⁹ Ibid, p. 186

different, strange and eventually as deviant from those standards which 'we' on the inside represent. This estrangement is reproduced in the forms developed in the territories its application has assisted to procure.

Spatial differences have profound implications for the social identification of populations, which in turn are reflected in the subsequent reordering of social space. The process of colonial conquest involved the bloody purification of the 'other';

Whether the bodies of the racialised other were to be killed or colonized, slaughtered or saved, expunged or exploited, they had to be prevented at all cost from polluting the body politic or sullyng civil(ized) society.¹⁰

The creation of the 'other' as impure, polluting, diseased allows (or necessitates) their definition as undesirable and structures subsequent spatial containment accordingly. In this way, racialised discourse with its inherent conceptualisation of 'Truth', its ascendancy of values whereby all aspects and members of society can clearly be categorized as 'good' and 'bad'; has existed as a powerful weapon for the social organization of space, including exclusion from space or its segregation.

Spatial Formations and the Changing Nature of Peripheries

The West's program aimed at the racialisation of urban geography has its genesis in the colonial experience. Throughout the passage of colonialism the subjugated racial 'other' was constructed as different in terms of capacity, morality and even biology. The passage of urbanization to urban centres necessitated the creation of means whereby the other was forced into a spatial distance from the Western Colonizer or its agents. It was here where

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 187

segregation was largely developed as a process of administration of a conquered 'deviant' population.

While the spatial reordering of Western cities was not required at this juncture, with the end of World War II immigration to the metropolises in the wake of rapid dismantling of the colonial order necessitated the domestication of foreign exclusionary/ segregation practices.¹¹ The domestication of "exclusion and exclusivity"¹² is most obvious in the programs of slum administration adopted by Western powers in this period. White-flight to the suburbs as a result of fear of contamination by the racialised inner urbanized slum locations, and the subsequent rationalization of these locations into high-density racialised structures further cemented the racialised 'other' in the periphery of power and spatial concerns.

It is important in this regard to note the relative locational variable of periphractic space, a term which does not necessarily denote the displacement of the marginalized to the extremities of urbanized spaces. Rather, the periphery denotes the actual or imagined circumscription of populations in terms of locality or their access to the apparatus of power, enjoyment of rights, procurement of goods and enjoyment/ benefit from services.¹³ In this way the periphery denotes far more than a mere location, but rather it is the actualisation of a constructed and reproduced dislocated racial marginalization.

A second important feature of periphractic space is the fact that it appears as both fluid, and internally differentiated. In the metropolises of the western powers, this has been illustrated in changing patterns of urban marginalization, inverted in the 1960's and 1970's. The new patterns were again consistent with racially determined class lines as

¹¹ Ibid, p. 188

¹² Ibid p. 188

¹³ Ibid p. 188

significant 'white-flight' by previously urbanized middle-class workers left the swelling urban centres which were rapidly becoming increasingly dislocated between poverty-stricken whites and even worse-off racialised inhabitants.¹⁴ The suburbs too reflected the class and racial division of the society as a whole. Suburban space was differentiated and graded in desirability – roughly determined to their remoteness and permeance to the detrimental effects of the urban racialised spaces housing the 'other'. The further the white suburban space was situated from the depravity and contamination of the racialised space; and the greater is potential to restrict the traversing of its boundaries by the people or values of the 'other' – the greater the desirability of occupancy. Suburban spaces further encouraged occupancy by predominantly 'white' middle classes by situating themselves in proximate locations to places of leisure and commercial consumption – shopping malls and parks, herby structuring environmental aesthetics as separated centres of 'white' middle class enjoyment – and away from the industrial sectors which employed racialised cheap and unskilled labour, producing the pollution associated with the other as well as that associated with industry. The inner city became the periphractic space of the 'other' – the dark, bleak and crumbling sector of depravity.

Definitions of periphractic space were again to change in the 1970's with the resultant urban renewal or gentrification of the inner urban localities. This process was triggered by increasing opportunities for skilled employment in the urban centres and a growing discontent amongst middle-class professionals with tedious commutes from the suburban areas.¹⁵ The flow of capital into the renewal of urban centres displaced the racially marginalized further by driving up rentals and prices of proximate luxuries of spaces in

¹⁴ Ibid p. 188

¹⁵ Ibid p. 189

the urban sector. Increasingly concentrated into expanding slums in remote/ undesirable high density zones in the urban sector, or displaced to the outer city limits; the inner subjected were once again turned out. The complexities of existence in the midst of a rapidly expanding capitalist profit maximization project in the urban centres left the displaced racial groups with little recourse to defy their estrangement from community structures and concentration in high-impact; racially defined class-determined spaces. Whilst the mechanisms of the marginalization of racially defined groups act in various ways, their marginalization in the manner depicted above (economically) is perhaps the most encompassing form – with lack of opportunity for employment in specific industries yielding middle to high incomes; access to mortgages and housing loans; low levels of personal savings and income spent on education of its members; low levels of consumption – all being defining characteristics of the racially excluded ‘Other’.¹⁶ According to Goldberg the implications of these factors on class position is important in highlighting the fact that for marginalization to occur, not all members of a racially defined population need suffer commensurate levels of dislocation in the physical sense.¹⁷ Skilled, professional members of the marginalised racial group may be allowed to live amongst ‘whites’ – and in fact these members are further alienated through cultural and identity based factors.

These changing boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ have found reflection in the various forms of urban modelling over the decades.¹⁸ Aestheticism of the pre-war years was replaced in the post-war years with rationalization models which aimed at the greatest efficiency in the delivery of services and social organization. The 1960’s saw the

¹⁶ Ibid p. 189

¹⁷ Ibid p. 189

¹⁸ Ibid. p 189

renewal of interest in the urban centres with higher regard for effectiveness in urban development and efficiency in utilization of urban space. Finally, the culmination of the process in the 1980's to one based on purely economic rationale, where planning is undertaken on the basis of expertise in pursuit of profit maximization from urban development, signals the triumph of the capitalist productive forces over contemporary urban spatial forms.

The process of slum clearances from the inception of the slum as a solution to the problem of the racialised poor further serves to highlight the dislocative nature of urban planning throughout the decades.¹⁹ The project of slum clearance was initiated in the colonial period by the Western governments as a bulwark against the transmission of infectious disease from the colonized subjects to the colonizers. The racialised 'Other' were seen as polluting or infectious, and with the arrival of plague means were developed for the urgent further segregation of the population and their dislocation in the guise of public ('white') concerns.

In the South African context, the outbreak of plague in Cape Town and Johannesburg was to result in the forced relocation of slums to the periphery where they were settled on undesirable lands without basic infrastructure.²⁰ These new settlements were to develop into permanent segregated townships or localities in the periphractic space. In this way the impure 'other' was relegated to a smaller portion of the urban landscape but in far greater concentrations, while those not being desirable for their value as labour were relegated to the city limits. These spaces are identified by the 'white' population as

¹⁹ Ibid p. 190

²⁰ Lemon, op cit, p. 4

polluting, dirty and barely habitable; living space suitable only to the marginalized other forming “the metaphorical stigma of a black blotch on the cityscape....”²¹

Constructing the Apartheid City

The processes of city formation, urban influx control, segregation, and spatial and social exclusions have developed concurrently through all the predominant phases of urban development in South Africa; as the predominantly ‘white’ settlers sought a solution to the quandary of requiring indigenous labour power, while demonstrating an unwillingness to integrate with those they perceived as both ‘racially’ and culturally inferior.²²

Davies has argued urban policy in South African cities in the pre-democratic era is characterized by three distinct phases: the settler-colonial period, from 1652 until after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910; the second phase, with the passing of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 marking the onset of formalized, structured and premeditated urban segregation and control; and the third period, marked by the passage of the Apartheid regime’s Group Areas Act of 1950, continuing for the most part despite varied attempts at reform until the transition to democracy – beginning in the early 1990s.²³

Each of these phases reveal a number of strong similarities which run continuously, and indeed in some cases have persisted in to the post-1994 urban policy; as policy-makers, government, civil society groups and citizens attempt to reform and integrate the discontinuous nature of the Apartheid city. It is important not to divorce the Apartheid

²¹ Ibid p. 192

²² Lemon, op cit, p. 1

²³ Davies 1981 cited : Lemon, op cit, p. 1

city from its roots in British Colonial practice and segregation. Indeed, it has been argued that for the most part, South African cities until the passage of the Group Areas Act can comfortably be viewed in context of other African- and colonial cities with which they share numerous similarities.²⁴ In both South African- and other colonial cities – mechanisms of coercion and control, and the distribution of access to political power, land, employment and resources – were employed to ensure the dominance of those in political power. In this manner, control of the means of production, socio-economic mobility, and ownership of wealth, land and space was effectively placed firmly in the hands of the dominant social group in society (the colonial authority) – a process followed invariably by conscious administrative, political and social engineering; designed to protect these socio-economic gains from the threat of the ‘other’.²⁵

Controlling Populations and the beginnings of Exclusion

While African urbanization in South African cities was considerably lower than ‘white’ urbanization in the early 1900s, the growing necessity of unskilled African migrant labour to support South Africa’s rapid industrial development, especially the mining centres of Johannesburg and Kimberly, lead to a significant boost in urbanization; with urban Africans numbering approximately 587,200 in 1921, as opposed to 847,400 urban ‘whites’ – amounting to approximately 55% of the ‘white’ population.²⁶ Initially, little formal or legislative state influx control or segregation existed for African workers in urban centres; and while various municipalities throughout South Africa’s cities devised

²⁴ Simon, 1984 cited : Lemon, op cit, p. 1

²⁵ Lemon, op cit, pp. 1-2

²⁶ Lemon, op cit, pp. 2-3

a variety of mechanisms of population control – in none did these form a comprehensive policy or system of influx control or segregation.²⁷

Whereas the compound system acted as the dominant model of housing and control of mine workers in Johannesburg and Kimberly, these measures were by no means pervasive – and throughout South African cities large numbers of Africans were housed in municipal run townships; on vacant land (some privately owned and leased to residents); or as tenants on ‘white’ properties both within the cities, and on the urban-fringes within proximity of employment opportunities.²⁸

Segregation during this period was commonly achieved through private-choice mechanisms at the level of community or municipality. Typically these measures were fundamentally difficult to enforce, characterised increasingly by attempts at the level of community- or municipality interaction, as opposed to national or provincial policy-making. A significant catalyst to the growth of municipal segregation was the ‘white’ fear of the spread of contagious diseases, commonly associated with the perception of the ‘other’ as pathogens and dirty.²⁹ Outbreaks of epidemics of influenza and similar diseases were often precursors to new attempts at relocation of Africans away from urbanized ‘whites’ – often relegating these populations to the peri-urban margins away from service delivery, sustainable environments and employment opportunities.

Segregation in the Cities 1923-1950

Dramatic upsurges in urban migration between 1923-50 as a result of the burgeoning urban economies and declining rural opportunities for Africans, resulted in the first state-

²⁷ Ibid, p. 3

²⁸ Ibid, p. 3

²⁹ Ibid, p. 4; Goldberg, op cit p. 190

lead interventions at urban influx control and segregation.³⁰ The outcome of the Stallard (Transvaal Local Government) Commission of 1922, which championed tighter influx controls and attempts to minimize state accountability for the housing- and service needs of urban Africans, soon became accepted policy – the arguments of which were to form the basis of all future segregation attempts until the period of democratic transition; arguing that,

the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister.³¹

The ensuing Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 entrenched these beliefs, laying the legislative foundation for local authorities to designate segregated localities to house African migrants, and establishing responsibilities for municipalities to account for migrant labour influx – establishing the basis for a systematic state-supported and legislated system of segregation and influx control, to be expanded and strengthened dramatically in future policies.³²

Subsequent amendments to the 1923 act in 1937 served to centralize the operation of control and segregation in the centralized office of Native Affairs, compelling municipal implementation of the 1923 Act and its amendments – and further allowing for the 'rustication' or return of migrant labourers unable to secure employment, while curbing the entrance of African women to urban centres.³³ Following the extension of controls to women, the targets of the policies were again expanded in the 1940's to Indians, as

³⁰ Lemon, op cit, p. 4

³¹ Transvaal 1922, para 42 – cited Lemon, op cit p. 4

³² Lemon, op cit, p. 5

³³ Ibid, p. 5

increased movement into formally 'white' populated residential and commercial areas in the period 1930-1940, threatened 'white' economic interests and the securing of areas of 'white'-only ownership of property.³⁴ Despite burgeoning industrialization in the 1940s as war shortages necessitated the expansion and diversification of the South African industrial and manufacturing workforce; contradictory state attempts to enforce tighter influx controls lead to the hugely unpopular 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act – which aside from restrictions as to types of employment and demarcation, in section 10 of the Act allowed for qualification for permanent urban residency for Africans only if they had “resided there continuously since birth, had lawfully resided there for 15 years, or had worked there for the same employer for 10 years.”³⁵

Wartime production towards meeting import shortages crippled already dismal state-housing provision for urban Africans, as resources were directed towards the satisfaction of shortages. The resultant mushrooming of informal settlements on the fringes of South African cities bred a new tide of discontent amongst an increasingly militant and radicalised 'black' leadership.

Yet, despite increasing liberal condemnation of the migrant labour system and influx control, such as that embodied in the 1948 Fagan Commission – the limited ability of liberals and 'black' leaders to realise their demands in decision-making and the exclusion of populations from community- and municipal-fora and political activity; resulted in these grievances being trumped by the fears of 'whites' at the continued African urban population explosion.³⁶ Manipulation of these fears by the National Party in their 1948 'swaart gevaar' election campaign, contributed in no small part to their victory – resulting

³⁴ Ibid, p. 5

³⁵ Ibid, p. 6

³⁶ Ibid, p. 6

in the extension of segregation policies to the ideology of Apartheid – which sought to deepen and entrench the expression of ‘white’ dominance of the urban centres of South Africa.

Whereas South African cities pre-Apartheid were segregated to some extent, the result was by no means the ‘total segregation’ envisioned by Apartheid idealists due to the practice of African tenancy and the lacklustre enforcement of existing legislation by certain municipalities.³⁷ Yet under Apartheid the extensive movement, relocation and forced occupation of specific racially constitutive zones aimed at the deeper and more exclusive dominance of South African society than had hitherto been witnessed.³⁸

Johannesburg since its proclamation in 1886 has rapidly grown to become the economic centre of South Africa; yet accompanying this growth has been the entrenchment of injustices relating to the ‘race’-based segregation of residential and urban spaces, divergences in economic opportunities for inhabitants, restrictions on movement for ‘racially’ defined undesirables, and the political marginalization of those excluded from local and municipal division making – which despite the transition to democracy in the 1990s still scar both urban landscapes, and the social and economic lives of the city’s population. Since its founding, Johannesburg has been the site of residential segregation and the forced relocation of marginalized populations; the earliest of which removed populations from the urban centre to the African residential settlement at Klipspruit in 1904, located on the periphery of the city.³⁹

³⁷ Ibid, p. 8

³⁸ Ibid, p. 8

³⁹ Parnell and Pirie; case study: Johannesburg in Lemon, A (eds): Homes Apart: South Africa’s Segregated Cities; ch9, David Phillip; Cape Town, 1991, p. 130

Despite prevailing acceptance of segregation, the reality of the earliest years of Johannesburg was that many urban Africans remained in urban centres despite the formation of separate residential space; either in compounds on the gold mines, or through tenancy as ‘illegal’ occupants in designated ‘white’ urban areas, or further in residence in the freehold locations of Alexandra or Sophiatown where the majority were able to rent backyard rooms – hereby minimizing transport expenses. With the passage of the Natives Urban Areas Act in 1923, a fresh wave of forced removals proceeded to affect the segregation ideals envisioned in the legislation – resulting in the formation of formally exclusive residential space for Johannesburg’s urban African population being restricted to the freehold areas, and the newly formed Western Native Township, later known as Soweto.⁴⁰

Critical housing shortages in these areas compelled numerous urban Africans to seek shelter outside defined areas, resulting in a massive proliferation of slums and informal settlements during this period; as well as an increase in tenancy and backyard living in ‘white’ areas. Increased urbanisation amongst both ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ in the depression and war years compounded already failing housing stocks, with the result that of the estimated 400,000 strong ‘white’ population in 1931 in Johannesburg – 8,000 were unemployed and 1,200 households resided in slum areas.⁴¹ Increased racial mixing in these areas catalysed the 1934 Slums Act, used to affect the second great wave of relocations of urbanised Africans in 1937 to segregated townships about the city. Despite these measures, the years of the Second World War were to see an intensification of informal settlement formation and illegal squatting in urban areas, including those

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 131

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 132

areas designated 'white' by municipalities. These challenges to established 'white' areas resulted in higher priority being given to the housing of Africans after the war, allowing for some marginal redress of the extensive housing backlog for Africans after 1946 – yet still affecting the removal of Africans from 'white' areas to newly developed locations set aside for their exclusive occupation.

Fragmenting the cities: The Group Areas Act

The Group Areas Acts passed in 1950 and 1966 formed the core of the Apartheid regimes racialised segregation ideal, resulting in the dramatic and far-reaching reconstruction and redefinition of urban space in South Africa; the effects of which were felt in the education system, service provision, in representation in municipal and local authorities, and in employment.⁴²

Group Areas served to effectively translate into spatial realities the central tenet of the Apartheid ideology; that differences based on socially constructed notions of 'race' and 'ethnicity' result in integration between different groups being fundamentally dangerous, and a threat to the established 'white' dominance of South African society. What was envisioned in order to promote harmonious 'race relations' and the continuation of 'white' dominance, was the minimization of contact between the 'racially' and 'ethnically' defined groups through a process of race-zoning – limiting inter-group contact and preventing the formation of a collective revolutionary consciousness.⁴³ The practical operation of Group Areas legislation resulted in the extension of 'racially' categorised land apportionment throughout South Africa, having significant impact on the country's urban settlement patterns. Accordingly the 1950 Act tightly controlled the

⁴² Lemon op cit, p. 8

⁴³ Ibid, pp, 8-9

development and transfer of property – particularly that occurring between the clearly defined ‘racial groups’ – in order to affect the ‘racial’ compartmentalization of South African society.⁴⁴ The policy thus acted to proclaim areas of ownership or occupation by different ‘racial’ groups; while in urban planning departments areas were set-aside as buffer zones or sites for the future expansion for specific ‘racial’ groups.⁴⁵ Group Areas legislation had an enormous impact on ownership and occupation of private property – providing the legislative means for state regulation, zoning and expropriation for Group Areas development programs.⁴⁶

The overwhelming majority of victims of this process were those deemed ‘non-white’ by the Apartheid regime. Forced removals affected under the auspices of Group Areas Development are estimated by authors to number over one million Africans between 1950 and 1990,⁴⁷ as well as the over 125,000 families officially recorded – the overwhelming majority of which were categorised as ‘coloured’ or ‘Indian’.⁴⁸ The enforcement of ‘race’ zoning required an enormous state expenditure; resulting in the creation of large settlements on the periphery to achieve the goal of Apartheid planning. The process of Apartheid forced removals caused tremendous damage, not all of which is measurable in economic terms of property loss and livelihoods destroyed – but also in terms of psychological damage to the excluded, and the significant destruction of self-help and social capital networks as communities were scattered. Additionally, excluded populations suffered the humiliation of a vast number of wide-ranging social pathologies as cause of their expulsion to the peripheries of society. Exclusions coupled with

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 9

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 9

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 10

⁴⁷ Platsky and Walker 1985 cited: Lemon, op cit, p. 10

⁴⁸ Lemon, op cit p. 10

dispossessions – did little to assuage ‘racial antipathy’ as the thinkers of Apartheid claimed – but merely exacerbated it.⁴⁹ At the level of planning, Apartheid cities aimed at an exclusively ‘white’ CBD with ‘white’ residential space in close proximity, separated by ‘racial’ buffer zones on all sides and by zones set aside for future expansion. Conversely other ‘racial’ groups including ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘blacks’ were relegated to the peripheries in townships, or hostels within industrial zones – separated as far as possible from ‘white’ areas by buffer zones and through the provision of separate amenities and recreational zones.⁵⁰

Despite state rhetoric of the period claiming the creation of exclusively ‘white’ zones, the tenure of Africans, coloureds and Indians on ‘white’-owned land continued – yet invariably those housed were engaged in menial work within these ‘white’ areas in exchange for housing within proximity of urban employment and commercial opportunities, and constituted only a very small fraction of the excluded populations. The application of Apartheid Group Areas legislation to Johannesburg extended existing measures at the segregation of the urban populations – with formalised, legal measures to support the process. Forced removals in 1950 resulted in the moving of 58,000 Africans to the peripheral locations of Meadowlands and Diepkloof, despite resistance from the local authority; and after the forcible enactment of the Natives Resettlement Act in 1951, government was able to by-pass the resistance of the Johannesburg City Council to resettle African residents from Sophiatown and the Malay Location – constructing low income white housing in its place.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Pirie 1984 cited Lemon, op cit, p. 10

⁵⁰ Lemon, op cit, p. 11

⁵¹ Parnell and Pirie, op cit, p. 134

Within the townships themselves, the Apartheid machinery set about to re-define urban Africans in terms of a supposed 'ethnicity' or 'tribal group', linking Africans to their defined rural areas – attempting to segregate townships by imposing a constructed 'ethnic' difference to those residing in them. To enforce the 'temporary status' of African workers in townships in Johannesburg, Apartheid legislation decreed urban Africans unable to hold title deeds to township properties – in essence reducing all inhabitants to state tenants who, once employment in the urban centres was unavailable – would return to locations assigned to them by 'tribal' differentiations in the rural areas.⁵² Attempts to eradicate the settlement of the 'other' in 'white' designated suburbs met with relative success, supported by legislation in 1954 to combat 'locations in the sky' – setting a limit on the numbers of Africans allowed residence outside of their defined areas, and accompanied by increased relocations from African labour compounds within the urban centres to Soweto.⁵³

The regulation of urbanisation through the tight influx measures adopted under Apartheid, policed vigorously by authorities; lead to some easing of the African housing shortages in townships until the late 1960s, when a shift to housing allocation in the Bantustans diverted attention away from housing Africans in the urban centres in an attempt to quell new urbanites. Despite these measures, African urbanisation proceeded in growing numbers as the relative poverty of rural locations and the hardships of life in the Bantustans resulted in enormous numbers of Africans risking deportation, imprisonment, and the harsh living conditions of urban informal settlements and backyard sub-letting in formal townships.

⁵² Ibid, p. 136

⁵³ Ibid, p. 136

Urban Africans Under Apartheid

Urban centres under Apartheid were a planned and constructed attempt at the permanent segregation of the South African population, allowing for the future development of those 'race' groups viewed as vital to the Apartheid ideology; whereas the urban centres were orientated towards the containment and exclusion of 'non-whites' regarded purely as a 'necessary evil' by virtue of their necessity as a labour force, but beyond this as undesirable and not belonging to the urban ideal.⁵⁴ The delimitation and exclusion of urban Africans necessitated the extension of state control over African influx control, labour regulation, housing, service provision and all aspects of social life. From 1954, official state policy extended the exclusion process, advocating the identification and separation of Africans in the urban centres according to their supposed ethnicity – mimicking the situation in the Bantustans of the state's Separate development policy.⁵⁵ In large urban centres such as Johannesburg, this resulted in massive upheaval in townships as 'ethnic' zones were proclaimed for the occupation of Urban Africans, further adding to the housing backlog already present and further alienating and excluding Africans from one another.

Influx controls for urban centres, although present to some degree prior to Apartheid were radically extended after 1950 with the passage of the 1951 Illegal Squatting Act, governing and restricting the settlement of Africans on the peri-urban fringes of the city, in the hopes of locating employment; and further by the Native Laws Amendment act in 1952.⁵⁶ The amendment not only extended the requirements for permanent occupation in the cities by virtue of employment status and an extension of section 10 rights to all urban

⁵⁴ Lemon, op cit, p. 17

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 18

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 18

Africans; but also introduced stricter measures for the expulsion of unemployed urban Africans, held to have no purpose in the cities; and measures for re-directing surplus labour to other urban centres through the establishment of labour bureau in the Bantustans.⁵⁷ Tighter influx controls had the effect of compartmentalizing the urban African labour force in South African into two groups: the larger fluctuating unskilled migrant labour force denied permanent residence within the urban centres; and a smaller group of permanent residents determined according to section 10 of the Native Laws Amendment Act, who by virtue of their relative permanence in employment developed into a semi-skilled labour force housed in ‘ethnically’ and ‘racially’ zoned townships on the urban fringes – far removed from designated ‘white’ areas, yet within proximity of employment.⁵⁸ State policy involved the regulation of migratory flows to and from the Bantustans, which as industry and manufacturing became more sophisticated and developed, lead to a decreased reliance on migratory labour. Thus, by the 1970s fewer Group Areas for Africans were proclaimed in urban centres, as official policy shifted to retain Africans in their Bantustans – resulting in “the damming up of rural-urban migration behind artificial boundaries which has continued ever since in both townships and informal settlements.”⁵⁹

By the 1970s labour demands for urban centres had dictated a complex influx control system characterized by a clear division between what was described by the Riekert Commission (1979) as urban ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’,⁶⁰ those skilled labourers possessing section 10 rights to permanent residency and those who did not – the

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 18

⁵⁸ Wilson 1975, Hudson 1987: cited Lemon, op cit pp. 18 - 19

⁵⁹ Lemon, op cit, p. 19

⁶⁰ Lemon, op cit, p. 19

‘insiders’ having employment preference and the ability to relocate to areas where labour was required – hereby reducing the flow of ‘outsiders’ wherever possible in order to limit the overall number of urban Africans.

Yet, the proclamation of new residential spaces still served de facto to segregate the population based on ‘race’, and according to Mabin, took advantage;

of informal settlements on the metropolitan peripheries and further a field to fragment the African urban population in ways which facilitated indirect political control.⁶¹

Two further bills were introduced post-1985 to deal with the burgeoning informal settlement populations in major urban centres. The Slums Bill and Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1988, allowed for state demarcation of land for occupation by informal settlements and measures whereby government could affect the eviction and relocation of illegal land occupants.⁶²

Reforming Group Areas

Until the late 1970s, Group Areas legislation proved fairly successful in segregating the urban population of Johannesburg according to the doctrine of Apartheid. Despite official reforms only being introduced after the Riekert Commission proposals in 1979; in reality, urban Africans had begun to permeate ‘white’ designated residential and inner urban centres from 1970 onwards.⁶³ In residential suburbs, ‘black’ corporate businessmen, foreigners and government dignitaries steadily began to relocate to formally ‘whites only’ suburbs in small numbers. Yet these small numbers of ‘black’ residents in ‘white’ suburbs were tiny compared to the rapid growth of Africans into Johannesburg’s inner

⁶¹ Mabin 1989 cited: Lemon, op cit, p. 22

⁶² Lemon, op cit, p. 22

⁶³ Parnell and Pirie, op cit, p. 139

city residential spaces; resulting in formerly habitable areas developing into “overcrowded, crime ridden black ghettos.”⁶⁴

Despite the illegality of settlement and the hardships and dangers of inner-city occupation; shortages of housing in the townships and the dangers of life in informal settlements surrounding the city – compounded by increased capital expenditures on transport to employment in industrial and commercial centres in the city, resulted in many more Africans flocking to the inner city.⁶⁵ The progressive relaxation of influx controls and designated ‘racial’ areas in the 1980s promoted further incursion into formerly ‘white’ suburbs, resulting in a number of responses from ‘white’ residents. Increased expenditures on security by ‘white’ property owners and the growth of the private security industry have had dramatic impact on the aesthetic environments of affluent neighbourhoods.

Concerns over security prompted by ‘black’ infiltration into ‘white’ neighbourhoods has resulted in a documented flight of large numbers of working class ‘whites’ to the urban peripheries, often near to affluent suburbs to small properties or townhouses where security interests can be shared amongst fellow local residents.⁶⁶

In the formerly bleak and uniform housing projects in the city’s townships of Alexandra and Soweto – the right to home ownership has allowed for a number of visible changes to the appearance of African owned dwellings – as well as the development in the late 1980s of middle class areas in these locations. Yet, despite these positive developments, relaxed influx controls compounded the problem of backyard living and shack settlements. Shortages of formal housing and employment opportunities in the late 1980s

⁶⁴ Van Niekerk 1990 – cited Parnell and Pirie, op cit, p. 139

⁶⁵ Parnell and Pirie, op cit, p. 139

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 142

lead to an estimated 2.5 million people occupying informal housing in Johannesburg, 50,000 of these in shack settlements.⁶⁷ Further, in the 1990s as influx controls were repealed, the growth of informal settlements in the periphery of the city intensified dramatically, prompting land invasions and illegal occupation of land as thousands migrated to the economic hub of Johannesburg to escape life in the repealed Bantustans.

Apartheid's Urban Areas

In Goldberg's view the Group Areas Act under Apartheid in many ways is the idealistic, legalistic product of a history of racialised marginalization and exclusion in the West. His central claim is not that Western governments have formalized Apartheid in their own right, but merely that the practices of marginalization of a racially defined Other hold within them the seed for the Apartheid ideology underlying the Group Areas Act; and further that despite the transition to Democracy undertaken in South Africa, urban spatial arrangements will continue to mimic the Western racialised locational model.⁶⁸

Goldberg identifies five noteworthy structural features of the Group Areas Act to be particularly enlightening to the practice of dislocation and reproduction of the racially marginalized.⁶⁹ The core of the Group Areas Act was the division of the population into specified racial groups and the delineation of a residential or specific area for each defined racial group. The concept of 'race' is here conceptualised as 'white' or 'non-white', but most often as 'black'. The informal extension of the concept of 'blackness' to include racial groups other than whites, suggests that often racial identification is a

⁶⁷ Mashabele 1990 cited Parnell and Pirie, op cit, p. 141

⁶⁸ Goldberg, op cit pp. 192-193

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.193

fabrication.⁷⁰ Racial classification impacts as much here on class, as class is likely to be delimited by racial classification. Those groups who are racially marginalized are faced with various aspects of social exclusion, including their removal (directly or indirectly) to periphractic spatial zones.

Two further noteworthy characteristics of the Group Areas Act concern the means whereby racial groups are controlled in the spaces they occupy, and the measures undertaken to delimit these spaces in such a way as to clearly identify these spaces with the racial group concerned. Consider in this regard the planning mechanism of Apartheid which aimed at the erection of strong boundaries between racially stratified spatial arrangements, defined passages and terms of access to and usage of shared space, and in some cases differentiated leisure spaces again with defined routes and mechanisms for access and mandates for usage. The ordering of these boundaries was specifically orientated to minimize contact between the excluded racial margins and the broader sectors of accepted society, and as such undertook both physical demarcations and imaginary – however, for both the excluded and the accepted these boundaries were always visible, each group being consciously aware of the existence of spatial locations specifically created for the excluded ‘Other’. Under Apartheid numerous examples of this existed as townships were both fenced off and access-controlled as well as being internally divided according to ‘ethnic’ division and the degree of permanence of the migratory inhabitants; while ‘white’ residential spaces in the defined areas were often protected by high fences and walls, patrolled by private security companies and supported by the local police forces. Access and passage by the racialised ‘other’ was

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 193

strictly controlled at the height of Apartheid by the Pass laws, which ensured that not even the most casual encroachments on 'white' delineated space were tolerated. Racialised exclusions have not disappeared with the end of Apartheid or South Africa's transition to democracy; instead the relationship of space has merely been reordered and complicated. With the repeal of restrictions on previously subjugated populations taking up residence in urban centres, mass movements of these racial groups into the city-centre have occurred; seeking escape from the stigma of living in township spaces and relief from crumbling environments they were forced to occupy. Accompanying this 'black' inner-city migration is the resurgence of the flight to the suburban areas of the 'white' population, this time encompassing not only the middle classes but a greater proportion of less economically powerful 'whites' as well, to less racially threatened areas outside of the urban centres. In this way the ordering of a specific racialised spatial arrangement is reconstructed and reproduced although without the formalistic legal exclusionary mechanisms provided by the Apartheid legislative bodies. Instead exclusions on racial grounds are determined by private preference, "...the inadvertent outcome of private choice and informal market mechanisms."⁷¹ The post-apartheid form of municipal administration divides residential space into localized units, each administered by representatives of the communities concerned with wide-ranging discretionary powers over land usage, protection of resources and local policies within their communities and residential localities. In many of these residential spaces the economic supremacy of the 'white' populations make for an unequal power representation in local community forums and planning offices – reproducing an element of 'white' control over a defined spatial ordering of the population reflecting the racialised marginalization of the

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 195

Apartheid years. Through these mechanisms affluent communities are able to either prevent or to administratively and legally forestall the settlement of both informal residential spaces by the racially marginalized, and by controlling the standards of new development in their areas to limit new formal settlements by driving up real estate prices and setting standards for town planning, inclusive of formalized leisure spaces and laws to prevent overcrowding. These measures serve to restrict access to these residential spaces by the racially excluded representing the lower echelons of the population with regards affluence.

These processes underlying the privatisation of the definition of racialised urban spatial arrangements is a cornerstone of exclusionary relations.⁷² Exclusions are exercised according to private preferences relating to liberally accepted notions of freedom of association or the operation of the free-market where political realities make more legalistic attempts to segregate or exclude racial ‘Others’ impossible.⁷³

Further notable aspects of the Group Areas Act concerned the placement and structuring of industrial and commercial areas within this racialised spatial arrangement. The exaggerated control of capital by the ‘white’ classes has influenced the historical flows of employment into and out of the urban centres. The flight of middle class ‘white’ workers into the city as a result of gentrification as well as the subsequent flight into the suburban areas following the removal of formalized Apartheid has produced corresponding flights of capital. The movement of capital into and out of urban centres has proved to be essentially exclusionary in nature, as the workforce in these capital intensive areas becomes steadily ‘whiter’ – excluding the racially marginalized to periphractic spaces of

⁷² Ibid, p. 195

⁷³ Ibid, p. 195

confinement. This displacement from centres of employment has proved disastrous for the marginalized groups as difficulties of employment are exacerbated by high additional costs relating to travel and rentals in premium locations as close as possible to desired employment, within the periphractic space. The additional economic burden imposed on the already economically marginalized cements their racially determined class position. The close connection between racialised class and private space is reflected in the degradation of the environment in periphractic spaces. This in turn is reproduced in the realm of public space in terms of the disparities in public versus private health care facilities, educational facilities and the availability of consumer centres such as shopping malls between the 'white' and 'black' areas. The repeal of Apartheid legislation has done little for the moment to dramatically alter these realities, with previously excluded groups still suffering increasing concentrations in periphractic spaces due to new urbanizations in the wake of relaxed migration laws; as well as suffering extended journeys to centres of leisure, employment and consumerism due to the flow of private development capital into the 'white' residential spaces.

Peripheries and Pathologies

Evidence of urbanisation and influx control under Apartheid shows the structure of residential spaces in the post-Apartheid era bears striking similarities to those under the Group Areas Acts during Apartheid; and indeed with the underlying processing operating in racialised exclusions through the Western nations.⁷⁴ The resultant spatialized racial exclusion serves to compartmentalize, monitor and manage the composition of urban and suburban spaces according to engendered racial and class stereotypes; and effectively to

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 196

dislocate the excluded both physically and in their subjective experience of the urbanized environment.

The factors examined thus far show spatial control and the dislocation of racialised populations to be mutually reinforcing. As much as perceived of socially constructed racial bias results in a segregation of groups into racially conceptualised margins, so their concentration into specific locations renders as criminal or deviant the activities which take place in these localities. As a result of a number of incumbent social pathologies, the concentration of deviant behaviour in periphractic locations according to Goldberg,

magnifies the image of racialised criminality, and it confines the overwhelming proportion of crimes involving the racially marginalized into racially marginal space.⁷⁵

In this way, spatial limitations and boundaries act to monitor and control the members of the marginalized, while also affecting the changing of the 'white' residential landscape to reflect the construction of these social pathologies. 'White' or affluent areas respond to the pathological assumption of 'non-whites' as being involved in all manner of criminal activity by transforming their dwellings into secure fortresses against the deviant others infiltration, with high walls and sophisticated security measures,

Commercial companies now offer 24 hour 'armed response' service to protect domestic premises against theft and unlawful entry. In the affluent white northern suburbs the logos of these security firms as well as the boards of 'neighbourhood watch' societies are prominently displayed on the high perimeter walls that characterize many of the wealthiest districts.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 197

⁷⁶ Parnell and Pirie, op cit pp. 141-142

Added to the pathology of the breakdown of law and order are other pathologies representing a wide variety of social disorders including pollution, disease and promiscuity. In this way the spatial location of the marginalized is seen as the embodiment of these social pathologies.

Informal settlements and RDP housing in the post-apartheid era are typical of mechanisms to concentrate the racially marginalized in high numbers into clearly defined and limited city spaces, allowing for little interaction with other marginalized groups in spaces constructed to represent,

a generic image without an identity: the place of crime; of social disorder, dirt and disease; of teenage pregnancy, prostitution, pimps, drug dependency; the workless and shiftless... centralized in this faceless space, peripheral at the social centre.⁷⁷

This type of housing does little to encourage that pride or the sense of community or acceptance from its inhabitants which is typically associated with home ownership elsewhere. Rather the lack of pride contributes to the degradation of the local space, while strong resistance is faced from the more privileged property holders in the areas.⁷⁸

In the South African model, this often lead to the wholesale removal of the marginalized from the high premium bureaucratically important inner city zones to other locations, allowing projects to be destroyed or their inhabitants to be recycled with new migrant workers. This results in the residential confinements of the marginalized becoming internally disordered; allowing for decreased chances for the formation of resistance or any notion of permanence, and in so doing facilitating the discipline and management of the inhabitants.

⁷⁷ Goldberg, op cit, p.198

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 199

Similarities in the housing administration and spatial configurations of the Western nations and certain structural aspects of Apartheid's Group Areas Acts, suggests there exists,

a common (trans-spatial) history of racist expression [which] prescribes the range of acceptable city planning for the racially marginalized and circumscribes the effects of such plans.⁷⁹

This process is driven to a large extent by historical and contemporary recourse to a number of socially constructed pathologies dislocating the other from those accepted within broader society. The 'other' is inherently linked with a wide range of negative social traits in this way, and the accepted are set in opposition to guard against the spread of this social decay.

The policies and processes outlined above have historically contributed to the spatial dislocation of marginalized groups and their differential inclusion into the body politic and access to its services, resources and opportunities. The process of spatial concentration which gives rise to a pathological distinction between the included and excluded, the pure and the deviant, is the reflection of an internalised racist discourse which it necessarily supports and reproduces in turn. Exclusion whether expressly constituted in a formalistic manner as in the Group Areas Act under Apartheid, or in the spatial configurations which have emerged in the post-Apartheid era and are reflected in the spatial configurations of Western urban centres; is an inherently political expression of racial differentiation, oppression and social injustice. The atomisation of populations and their distancing from other racial groups according to the constructed

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 199

conceptualisation of otherness and sameness is the structural realization of an underlying racially constituted order.

The repeal of Apartheid legislation and the transition to democratic governance in South Africa has seen new reproductions of spatial configurations steeped in the racialised discourse of the past. Although not having recourse to the previous legal arsenal of discriminatory laws, 'white' capital has been able to reproduce the long-standing power relations which have under girded racially constructed identities and exclusions throughout history. The marginalized remain tied to their incumbent social pathologies, and development initiatives are conceived of as means whereby these populations can be integrated into the world of the dominant 'white' population.⁸⁰ These development initiatives are in turn forestalled by recourse to liberal laws in the name of anti-racism or discrimination. The operation throughout history of these same legal values and abstract rules to limit agency and particularities in favour of universalistic commitments, denies marginalized populations the recourse to their own history as a means to mobilize resistance to this continued social exclusion.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 204

Apartheid's Spaces: Environments of exclusion

In South Africa, marginalised populations continue to suffer the brunt of environmental and spatial exclusion as a result of environmental injustices. The National Party government's Apartheid policy served to racially categorise and systematically exclude communities on the basis of 'race' (ascribing the term 'non-white' in the Apartheid discourse to those not of colonial or Afrikaner descent) from the rest of society. Policies aimed at the protectionism of the 'white' populations relegated 'non-whites' to only the most menial of jobs offering low wages and exempting them from qualifying for even the most rudimentary benefits of citizenship. The Apartheid policy's systematic and legalistic segregationist policy, including legislation such as the Group Areas and Separate development acts, impacted directly on where non-white communities could live – forcing them into tiny demarcated areas where overcrowding and poverty contributed to further damaging the environments in these localities.

South Africa's experience of environmental ideology until the 1990's was largely characterized by concerns for species preservation and natural park conservationism; and was largely the domain of the affluent 'white' middle classes.⁸¹ Environmental 'victories' won by these activists were often opposed to the wishes and needs of the majority poor population. Further, the experience of economic exclusions resulting from dispossession of marginalized communities, were joined by their physical exclusion from these spaces, their political exclusion from membership in the environmental movements, and their

⁸¹ Khan, F; The Roots of Environmental Racism and the Rise of Environmental Justice in the 1990's; McDonald (ed), Environmental Justice in South Africa; ch 2; University of Cape Town press, Cape Town, 2002 p. 15

social exclusion from the benefits of the areas with which these environmental movements were concerned – resulting in a typically hostile perception of environmental groups among the marginalized, as being concerned with “...elitist concerns peripheral to their struggle for survival.”⁸²

The specific nature and history of ‘race based’ marginalisation in South Africa has had lasting structural and psychological effects on access to environments and membership in environmental movements; benefits relating to the enjoyment of the aesthetic quality of environments, quality and safety of residential spaces, access to environmental resources, and a wide variety of other considerations.

The Evolution of Environmentalism in South Africa

Contemporary environmentalism in South African remains like the entirety of socio-political and economic life in the democratic period, heavily scarred by the legacy of the racialised oppressive system of Apartheid – resulting in environmental discourse and activity in this setting emerging as a highly politicised and racially constituted concept. Despite emerging global environmental awareness, Apartheid era education and environmental discourse continues to view environmentalism in terms of conservationist and preservationist terms – preferring to construct environmental spaces as sites of leisure or recreation, whether local parks or zoos, or in the form of National Game Reserves where conservationist were engaged in preserving indigenous species such as the African Wild Dog, or guarding the White Rhino, one of Africa’s “big five” against the onslaught of poaching.

⁸² Ibid, p. 15

As late as the early 1990's, whilst a few children in affluent 'white' schools were conscious of such global concerns as the erosion of the ozone layer as a result of pollution, and the dangers of impending global warming – few if any were conscious of ground-water pollution in poor (most often 'black' or 'coloured') communities as a result of mine dumping, the siting of refuse landfills or hazardous chemical disposals near to these communities, or as a result of inadequate service provision – particularly sanitation and refuse removal services.

This 'blind spot' in environmental consciousness in the pre-democratic era is not wholly surprising when viewed in context of the racialised legislative and social ideology of Apartheid's spatial and environmental exclusion – a program involving the physical and psychological exclusion of the majority of the country's racially constituted population from environmental space and discourse. While the focus on conservationism and climate effects as examples of environmental consciousness of the period, exist in of themselves as immeasurably important crises in environmentalism globally; the almost total absence of concerns of justice for local marginalised populations in the dominant discourse of the period is emblematic of the historical oppression and exclusion of the marginalised with regards space and environmental discourse – a history with roots as far back as colonialism and the growth of urbanisation in South Africa.

Pre Apartheid Conservation in South Africa

The history of South African environmentalism under colonialism is largely dominated by the actions of various 'white' affluent preservationist groups with little concern for meeting the basic needs of the majority of South Africa's marginalized. Whereas laws did not extend at this stage to precluding membership in environmental organizations to

marginalized populations based on ‘race’ specifically, the existence of *de facto* segregation and exclusions typically isolated these communities in terms of class. The class base of these environmental movements thus made membership extremely difficult for those populations viewed as undesirable and classified as ‘non-whites’. As a result, the environmental movement was seen by these marginalized populations to exist as a means whereby the environment could be maintained for the enjoyment of the privileged ‘white’ classes, a belief with more than a little justification if seen in light of the initiatives of these movements.⁸³ The establishment of numerous national parks and wildlife protection areas which occurred in this period signalled the first in what was to be many, forcible removals and physical exclusions with relation to space of indigenous populations from their traditional lands, and outlawed the practice of hunting in these areas – destroying local livelihoods and scattering locally established communities. During the period of colonialism then, the environmental movement reflected the dominant belief of their cultural superiority in the minds of the ‘white’ European colonizers. This fostered a conversationalist ideology which regarded ‘blacks’ as uncaring towards the environment and as such inherently destructive. Driven by a Darwinian belief that the European colonizers had certain knowledge, privileges, power and rights of possession due to their inherently more ‘civilized’ society, colonizers were quick to place notions of environmental conservation over the interests of those of the ‘uncivilized’ marginalized population;⁸⁴

The fact that this perception was rooted more in racial bias and greed than in reality did not prevent the acceptance of a concept of the ideal protected natural area as one which was uninhabited, which catered to mobile,

⁸³ Ibid, p. 17

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 18

affluent visitors, and from which the indigenous were excluded, except to serve in menial roles.⁸⁵

The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 marked the beginning of formalized legislative racism in South Africa. Apart from the various laws promoting the economic and political superiority of those classified as ‘whites’, other laws and private-practices also facilitated the spatial exclusion of ‘black’ populations through removals and dispossession. These communities were subsequently spatially, economically and politically marginalized in the new Union; resulting in numerous devastating blows to the physical and psychological connection between the local ‘black’ populations and their traditional environments.⁸⁶ During this period ‘black’ representation in environmental movements was minimal, and their exclusion from ‘natural’ areas and certain environmental leisure spaces was common.

Environmental rhetoric used by the government often depicted these marginalized populations as inherently anti-conservationist, uneducated and destructive; an image that was to be rapidly recycled to justify their exclusion from environments of agriculture; residence, both in rural and urban settings; leisure and industry.

The Apartheid Era

The formalization of racial segregation and political exclusion by the National Party after achieving political victory in 1948, was to cement the systematic separation of the racially constituted marginalized ‘non-white’ populations from the dominant ‘white’ population in a wide variety of ways. A legal arsenal of prohibitions and directives managed the totality of the marginalized’s access to spaces constituted as exclusively

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 18

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 18

‘white’ areas, their ability to construct their own sustainable environments through economic marginalisation and frequent relocations, and prohibited their membership in environmental organizations.

The processes of marginalisation deserve some closer attention, having numerous mechanisms.⁸⁷ The formation of the ‘homelands’ policy lay at the centre of the Apartheid state’s ideology concerning the forcible exclusion of marginalized populations to the rural areas. Relocations were often violent, while the areas where the marginalized were eventually settled were small and barely tenable for the sustenance of the populations. Here the populations were divided along socially constructed ‘ethnic’ lines into separate territories, further dislocating them from one another despite their sharing of a common fate in marginalisation. Environmentally these areas were barely suitable for survival and in the majority of instances, remain so to this day. Lack of developed infrastructure and service delivery, the concentration of poverty and its incumbent social ills, and the sheer number of inhabitants – lead to a rapid degeneration of these locations; creating an environment of violence, pollution, disease and insurmountable hardships. In this way, “...Africans were treated as foreign migrants in the place of their birth,”⁸⁸ relocated to the rural peripheries of the country to be housed in unsustainable locations.

Movement from these and other areas where Africans were settled, both in the urban or rural settings, was made incredibly difficult by legislation such as the Group Areas Act, the Pass Laws and the Separate Amenities Act, proscribing certain amenities for ‘white’ use only.⁸⁹ The urban settings into which the Group Areas Act confined the racially marginalized exhibited similar hostile settings to those in the rural areas; lacking places

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 20

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 21.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 21

of leisure or the enjoyment of nature. Due to their political marginalisation, inhabitants here could organise little resistance to the siting of toxic industries or other locally unwanted land uses in their proximity.⁹⁰

This cumulative effect of Apartheid legislation and policies has resulted in the alienation of marginalized inhabitants from their local environments, having profound effects on attitudes towards environmental issues among Africans today; effectively excluding the majority of the population from mainstream environmental thought and participation. Apartheid legislation further extended the marginalisation of excluded populations through the imposition of numerous laws regulating their economic development. By restricting the types of jobs ‘blacks’ could enter into, and prescribing an unequal share of the benefits of employment; Apartheid acted to entrench these marginalized populations in debilitating poverty, compounding their dismal existence in dangerous local environments and removing all chance for socio-economic upliftment. Faced with the task of eking out a living under these circumstances, few among the marginalized could avail themselves of the meagre opportunities for enjoyment of the environment, or the engagement in resistance to their plight.

Linking Notions of Exclusion and Environmental Justice

Hallowes and Butler⁹¹ argue that Environmental Justice is a rights based discourse which assists with the framing of environmental issues in the broader socio-political context.⁹² Accordingly, environmental justice assists in placing environmental concerns within

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.: 22

⁹¹ Hallowes, D & Butler, M; *Power, Poverty; and Marginalised Environments: A conceptual Framework*, cited McDonald (ed), Environmental Justice in South Africa: ch 2; University of Cape Town press. Cape Town, 2002.

⁹² Ibid, p. 51

broader contexts of socio-economic power relations, development and issues concerning social justice – particularly the notion of social exclusions or inclusions. The inherent value of the ability of environmental justice to ‘bring-home’ issues relating to the environment in the contemporary South African context cannot be overstated. Notable in this regard is the environmental justice understanding of the concept of development as being inherently concerned not only with issues relating to sustainable use of environmental resources, but also with the power relations which underlie interests and notions concerning where development is to take place.

If we were to identify the presence of environmental injustices with regards development then, one could argue that injustices occur most often where power relations or underlying interests associated with development act to either unfairly exclude populations from the benefits of developments, or unfairly bear the brunt of developments externalities.⁹³ Accordingly the aim of environmental justice in this instance must be to provide an accurate analysis of the underlying power relations defining development, and affect a restructuring of these relations to include in their considerations the socially marginalized. Apart from the externalisation of negative environmental losses through development already covered in this discussion, the principal means whereby environmental injustices are created affecting the poor or marginalized is that of social and spatial exclusions.

Exclusion may relate not only to unequal representation of populations in socio-economic terms or even their spatial dislocation with regards living and working environments, but also to their unequal membership or visibility in social institutions. These features are inherently reinforcing, and exclusion in this sense denotes the means whereby the

⁹³ Ibid, p. 52

marginalized are limited or implicitly denied access, control and management of resources made available by development projects.⁹⁴

South Africa's history of segregation and the legacy of Apartheid has had profound implications for the administration of environmental and developmental concern, reflecting the radicalised discourse underlying marginalization of the racially identified non-white populations. Racial marginalization has not appeared as the totality of marginalization of the population, as profound differences exist in terms of gender and class as well.⁹⁵

Environment, Poverty and Marginalization

The process of marginalization of the majority in South Africa under Apartheid has involved a process of alienation of populations from their environments; both physically as in the form of spatial social exclusions, economically through programs producing trends of unequal access to the modern economy, and psychologically by disempowering individuals within decision-making and ownership processes concerning the spaces they inhabit. Development at both the international and national level has followed the lines of these internal divisions, with costs visited on the marginalized disproportionately to the benefits gained from development projects. The wide array of attacks from development on the rights of varied populations results in huge difficulties for resistance, while the tendency for negative impacts to be externalised on the economically marginalized groups renders whatever unlikely opposition should form, relatively powerless when faced with the economic might of those driving development for their own unequal gains.

The separation in the dominant discourse of notions of development and the environment

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 56

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 56

excludes the fact that environmental degradation caused by unequal development or resultant social exclusions can compound into further environmental degradation which may increase the yoke of poverty on the marginalized.⁹⁶ Dominant neo-liberal tenets concerning development regard poverty as the failure to enter the market economy, and prescribe programs to facilitate this entry despite evidence that the poor entering the market on an unequal footing will prove beneficial only for the exceptional few. Thus, it is evident that the history of development and the distribution of resultant negative effects have profound impact on the marginalization of populations in relation to society and the environment.

Danger In The Margins

The spaces housing the marginalized majority 'black' population throughout South Africa's history of Apartheid have suffered the full brunt of a massive concentration of people into a very small area. Environmental problems suffered here include chronic soil erosion, scarcity of resources other than land such as fresh water supplies and suitable fuels; absence of proper sanitation and transport infrastructure and in some places the absence of electricity to drive local production.⁹⁷

The areas are beset with the social ills associated with exclusion and extreme poverty, whilst reliance on fossil fuels and paraffin for heating results in a highly dangerous environment, especially for the young.

Attempts following the collapse of Apartheid by conservationists to assist these areas to integrate in a sustainable manner through wise-use of local resources have understandably met with suspicion and distrust of government attempts to manage

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 60

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 70

production. This suspicion is often based on the history of similar programs under Apartheid to limit production in these areas to cement the cycle of poverty amongst the inhabitants.⁹⁸

In both formal and informal settlements the level of environmental degradation has precipitated a debilitating health problem.⁹⁹ Apartheid's Group Areas Act and homelands policies have typically located 'black' settlements in environmentally unfavourable areas. Apart from unequal exposure to locally unwanted land usages, such as waste treatment plants, landfills, incinerators and toxic industries; these settlements have often been subjected to water pollution from industries situated miles away due to their reliance on natural water sources.¹⁰⁰

The absence of access to clean water is a major concern in these areas as many still use polluted water supplies, suffering from a wide variety of water borne diseases. Reliance on fuels like coal and paraffin have contributed to air pollution and associated health problems. Endemic poverty and restricted access to health care have resulted in catastrophic levels of the population suffering from treatable diseases. Coupled with increasing rates of transfer of incurable diseases such as HIV/AIDS – this situation results in large economic losses being suffered by the spatially marginalized; due to the cost of treatment and care, as well as days lost from employment due to illness. The relative economic hardships to the already poor populations here places further strain on life, and by extension the natural environments.

Attempts by privatised service providers to supply basic services such as water and electricity in recent years have done little to relieve this strain. While large numbers of

⁹⁸ Khan, op cit, p. 15

⁹⁹ Hallowes and Butler (2002), op cit, p. 70

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 71

connections to these services have been made, their management has proved in some instances to be disastrous. Faced with water metering and the metering of electricity, many poor have incurred additional economic strain in paying for these services. Further, meter tampering in order to take advantage of these basic necessities for survival is constructed as criminal by local authorities. Despite the criminalisation of populations desperate for the basic amenities of survival, the supply of these services has been related to a number of hidden costs to the marginalized. Among these are included the conversion of appliances in the households to electricity.¹⁰¹ Additionally, the monitoring of water and electricity usage in these settlements where metered connections are installed most often is the responsibility of females in the home, further increasing the already disproportionate burden these women faced in marginalized spaces. The provision of health care to the sick due to worsening environmental conditions is also most often undertaken by females, decreasing their opportunities for holding employment and earning wages to increase their dismal economic prospects.

Apart from the hazards associated with health risks, the poor planning of informal settlements as a consequence of racially orientated spatial arrangements gives rise to an increased exposure to natural disasters and other crises. Settlements often form close to rivers due to their need for water. This arrangement can prove costly in times of heavy rains and flooding, when the collapse of flimsy structures from flooding or erosion during rains presents a significant problem.¹⁰² Stress caused by economic hardships and compounded by environmental degradation and un-sustainability is further implicated in increasing violence in these areas. Cramped living conditions and lack of leisure activity

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 70

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 73

is compounded by competition over scarce resources. Insecurities and the absence of a sense of belonging and permanence engendered by a history of social exclusion contribute to these stresses. Outbreaks of violence are common in these areas both domestic and otherwise. Again these negatives are most often borne disproportionately by women and children.¹⁰³

The tendency of the government and local administrations to site dirty industries and the most harmful of potential environmental hazards according to a racial bias is unmistakable. Increasing poverty in these areas has reinforced environmental degradation, which in turn has impacted again on the ability of the communities in question to develop means whereby they might escape their situation. Although the Apartheid system has collapsed, these distributions persist to a large degree. Those populations classified as ‘non-white’ under Apartheid continue to live in much the same areas in which they were concentrated under Apartheid as they lack the necessary capital to relocate. ‘Whites’ in South Africa on the other hand often live in the most desirable environments, often fenced off to disallow access to outsiders to their pillaged environmental benefits. Whilst similar acts of racism such as those under Apartheid are no longer tolerated through new legislation, “...anecdotal evidence suggests that it still pervades environmental decision making at the local government level.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 73

¹⁰⁴ McDonald 1997 – cited: Ruiters, G; *Race, Place and Environmental Rights*; cited McDonald (ed), Environmental Justice in South Africa: ch 4; University of Cape Town press, Cape Town, (2002), p. 115

Chapter II

Unsustainable Development in South Africa

In attempting to explain the continuation (and in many cases exacerbation) of drastic inequalities between the affluent (predominantly ‘white’) populations and a rapidly growing poor in South Africa despite the country’s adoption of a liberal governmental framework; many academics, authors and activists have turned to an examination of the particular development discourse adopted by the ANC-led government towards the end of the 1990s. In particular, many of these authors argue the reconfiguration of the dominant development and economic project in South Africa from one sensitive to power imbalances underlying society and supportive of redistribution of wealth to the victims of Apartheid (as embodied by the RDP program); to a neo-liberal market orientated approach which favours the ‘commodification of everything’¹⁰⁵ in order to extend the rational laws of market-management and their supposed benefits to all society¹⁰⁶ - lies at the very core of the continuation of spatial marginalisation forms and the exacerbation of dramatic inequalities between the rich and poor in economic, social and environmental terms.

¹⁰⁵ Bond, P (eds); Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest; University of Natal press: Pietermaritzburg, (2002), p. 17

¹⁰⁶ Bond (2002), op cit; Bond, P; *The degeneration of Urban Policy after Apartheid*; cited Harrison et al (eds); Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and urban Development in a democratizing society; Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press, (2003); Hallows & Butler (2002), op cit; Pape, J & McDonald, D, *Introduction*, chap 1, Cost Recovery and the crisis of Service delivery in South Africa, London Z Books, (2002); Hallows and Butler, *The Balance of Rights*, The Groundwork Report, Pietermaritzburg, (2004); Bond & Hallows, *The Environment of Apartheid-capitalism: Discourses and Issues*, in Bond (eds), Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest, chap 1, University Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg (2002); Greenberg, S, *Post Apartheid Development, Landlessness and the Reproduction of Exclusion in South Africa*, Centre for Civil Society Research Report, no 17, May (2004), Centre for Civil Society, Durban South Africa.

Bond (2003) has argued the eradication of the legislative basis for racism under Apartheid has in this way been replaced with “an equally oppressive structured process that can be termed *class apartheid*”¹⁰⁷ resulting in an ever broadening inequality between the rich and poor.

Contestation over development in the post-1994 period in South Africa has typically followed similar cleavages evident at the global level – tending to relate to conflicts between three dominant distinctive ideologies: namely neo-liberalism; the doctrine of sustainable development; and finally that on Environmental Justice.

This chapter in its initial part aims to introduce these three distinct development discourses in turn, positing the emergence of the final discourse of Environmental Justice as the organisational response to the dominant global trend of development under the neo-liberal model, and further as a result of an incomplete attentiveness of the current dominant paradigm of the sustainable development discourse to the needs of poor populations in the developing world.

The latter portion of the chapter serves to examine the particular trajectory of post-1994 development in South Africa, with the aim of illustrating the competing claims by advocates of Environmental Justice and sustainability in the context of development in South Africa. For the most part, the examination focuses on the issues of human settlements formation in terms of the South African development response to spatial marginalisation, and the maintenance of environmental spaces for the poor – including the provision of core infrastructural services.

¹⁰⁷ Bond (2003), op cit, p. 30 (Emphasis in original)

This examination will serve to introduce a number of key themes to be examined in the case study to follow – particularly the effects of **un-sustainable development** projects and their effects on the marginalised.

Neo-liberal Development and Nature in Crisis

The standard model of neo-liberal development relies extensively on the historical pattern of development which occurred in Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, a pattern emulated worldwide towards the middle of the 20th century, primarily through the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as other International Non-governmental Organisations and donors. The ideology represents progress as a linear movement from poverty to wealth, highlighting the process of capital accumulation as the ultimate aim of development strategies. Mechanisms to achieve capital accumulation were again modelled on those used in the West; the expansion of the capitalist economic model, the growth of free trade and the opening of markets to outside investors and products, and the stimulation of a high consumer culture to cultivate growing demands for new products and innovation. Viewing the history of development in this way, contemporary development projects undertaken in context of neo-liberalism place capital growth as the unquestioned arbiter of success – while cultural practices, traditional economic practices and the subsistence of livelihoods, which fail to generate profit are considered backward or inefficient.¹⁰⁸ Ultimately, the standard neo-liberal

¹⁰⁸ Shiva, V; “World Summit on Sustainable Development or World Summit for supporting destruction”; *African Wildlife*, vol 56, no. 3, (2002) p. 20

model represents an attempt to compel all states and communities “to converge into a homogenous monolithic order modelled on the particular evolution of the West.”¹⁰⁹

The tying or paring of world aid and programs of foreign direct investment to the meeting of the structural adjustment criteria closely modelled on the neo-liberal approach, has effectively subjected countries in the developing world to the market economy and the pitfalls of free-trade at the global level, involving “the imposition of the will of the economic powers of the North on the rest of the world.”¹¹⁰

The standard view of environmental management is derived from the many challenges posed to the environment by the advance of capitalism. Environmental management under the standard neo-liberal model is characterised largely by after-the-event solutions, a tendency influenced by the central tenet of neo-liberalism, that;

No general environmental concerns should stand in the way of “progress” (more precisely, capital accumulation) and that any “after the event” environmental difficulties can be effectively cleared up if need be.¹¹¹

The standard model therefore clearly reflects a supposed dominance of human scientific understanding over Nature, a factor which denies both the irreversibility of environmental damage, or the existence of a pervasive burgeoning environmental crisis. Environmental issues according to this model are regarded as “the results of ‘errors and mistakes’ [...] that should be dealt with on a case-by-case (and most often place-by-place) basis.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 20

¹¹⁰ Shiva, V, *Ecological balance in an era of globalisation*; in Nicolas Low (ed); Global Ethics and the Environment; Routledge, New York; (1999) p. 49

¹¹¹ Harvey, D; Justice, Nature and the geography of Difference; Oxford, Blackwell (1996), pp. 373-374

¹¹² Ibid, p. 373

Accordingly then, this discourse favours the economic interests of established firms and places the burden for environmental management of ‘market failures’¹¹³ on the state.

Whilst relegating the management of environmental issues to the state domain, these market based discourses uphold the neo-liberal defence of private property, preventing the encroachment of the state on established rights relating to use and alienation of private property.

By subjugating the environment to the market in this way, attempts at environmental management undertaken under the neo-liberal model are faced with two important limitations: firstly, that intervention must occur on a case-by-case basis, only once clear evidence of degradation has occurred; and secondly, due to the existence of a neoclassical market belief in a zero-sum trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth, the pursuit of capital is the ultimate goal – a goal which rejects subjugation to other concerns.¹¹⁴

Determining the tradeoffs involved in environmental degradation versus economic production, results in the placing of environmental management in expert technocratic discourses of finance, economics and science; facilitating its submersion in the state regulatory apparatus, often under the influence of corporate and state driven research. These processes often exclude the wishes of broader society or local communities from influencing the management of environmental problems which may affect their environmental interests and local livelihoods.

Environmental management under the neo-liberal model of development is for the most part, perfectly in connivance with the interests of capital, and environmental protection

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 374

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 374-375

involves more a process of conserving and appropriating environmental resources for use in economic production, than attempts to mediate concerns for broader social justice or scarcity;

The view that capital accumulation is fundamental to human development is never challenged. The right of humanity to engage in extensive environmental modification is tacitly regarded as sacrosanct.¹¹⁵

In the name of high productivity and capital growth, the standard model has operated to promote high resource intensive production processes. Often the net effect of these processes are the 'hidden externalities' of resource deterioration and ecological destruction; whilst promoting a transfer of the benefits from production (resources and wealth) from the poor nations and the poor, to the wealthy both in underdeveloped countries and those in the Northern industrialized states. Yet for many opposed to neo-liberal development, the operation of the neo-liberal development model entrenches poverty in the Third world or underdeveloped nations, while simultaneously supporting the high consumerism and wealth-operated culture of affluent nations;

The impoverishment of the peripheries and the erosion of the resources and rights of marginal communities actually pay for the material basis of the prosperity of the enclaves.¹¹⁶

It is this conceptualisation of development at the global level that lies at the heart of the now often used narrative of the Summers memo, widely used to criticise growth-centred development and introduce claims for justice and sustainability in environmental management. This 1991 World Bank internal memo from the desk of Lawrence Summers, Harvard economist and chief economist of the World Bank was leaked and

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 375

¹¹⁶ Shiva, (2002) op cit, p. 20

published in *The Economist*, February 8, 1992. Herein Summers seems to argue for the World Bank to encourage more migration of dirty industries to less developed countries.

He based this statement on 3 reasons:

1. That since the population of the Third world and Less Developed Countries (LDC's) have a much lower wage-earning potential than the populations in the First world, the economic costs of deaths and illnesses from pollution are lowest in developing countries. Summers argues the logic behind the dumping of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is "impeccable".¹¹⁷
2. Summers argues that in relation to the First world countries, Africa is vastly under-polluted. Thus he argues it makes economic sense to introduce pollution.¹¹⁸
3. Since the poor are more concerned about poverty, they will not worry too much about environmental conditions. In Summers's words "...the concern over an agent that causes a one in a million change in the odds of prostate cancer is obviously going to be much higher in a country where people survive to get prostate cancer than in a country where under-five mortality is 200 per thousand."¹¹⁹

The leaking of the memo caused a media scandal world-wide. While environmental groups declared Summers public enemy number one, and the World Bank made open moves to distance official World Bank policy from the content of the memo; some within development studies have commented that Summers logic is indeed impeccable viewing his logic as an accurate description of the material realities in the modern global economy. Poverty stricken areas and LDC's can indeed be paid to accept toxic waste and they often are - often involved in bidding wars with one another to act as such dumping grounds. In often-desperate attempts to mobilise employment and other social benefits for their communities, many leaders of poor communities have sought to entice potentially dangerous industries to site themselves in or near their communities. This phenomenon is

¹¹⁷ Harvey, op cit, p. 365; Shiva, (1999) op cit, p. 54

¹¹⁸ Harvey, op cit, p. 365

¹¹⁹ Harvey, op cit, p. 365; Shiva, (1999) op cit, p. 54

not exclusive to the Third world and admittedly it is not exclusive to communities defined as 'black'; but occurs in areas of poverty throughout the globe. 'Black' or 'coloured' workers in South Africa and in poor communities globally are more vulnerable to these pressures than their 'white' often more affluent and educated counterparts as they suffer higher proportionate burdens of unemployment, and most often lack the necessary skills or capital required to secure more favourable employment, or to relocate to other communities.

The reality of the modern world economy is that capital possesses numerous advantages over labour with regards space. If capital senses its interests are threatened it often is able to relocate to areas of reduced labour and legislative resistance. Capital further has the ability to recoup losses by other means, either by relocating (and often taking employment with them), or by externalising costs to consumers or other communities such as those in the third world.¹²⁰

Aside from illustrating the inequalities present within the world capitalist economy, essentially the text of the memo further reveals a number of assumptions and outcomes implicit in the underlying discourse of neo-liberalism. Firstly the memo would seem to suggest that the lives of those living in the third world are worth less, than those of first world countries due to the nature of their earning potential. Secondly, according to Summers the level of pollution in the third world is inefficiently low – meaning that the number of sinks and resources going unused in these zones contributes to a wasteful system – and that waste of this nature cannot be tolerated in the context of profit maximization. And finally, the memo suggests healthy environments to be luxury objects,

¹²⁰ Ruiters, G; *Environmental Racism and Justice in South Africa's Transition*; Politikon, (2001), 28(1), 95-103 p. 121

affordable only by those in the highest income-earning bracket,¹²¹ presumably communities in the affluent centres in the first world.

While undeniably, few liberal governments in the first world can justify principles that evaluate groups of citizens differently, in practice “such differences in valuation [...] are at the very core of the capitalist economy and state.”¹²² Under the capitalist world market, hazards are regarded as most efficiently distributed if distribution results in the poor being most affected. Pollutants are thus regarded as necessitating management and distribution in accordance with the free market – an approach extended to issues such as climate change, erosion of bio-diversity and other environmental crises. These arguments are based on laws of economics which under-appreciate human issues, ecological sanctity and irreversibility in their calculations.

The unfortunate reality then, is that it **is** indeed sound market economic logic to situate undesirable waste disposal units in poorer communities where land prices are not going to be as adversely affected as if they were situated in richer areas, and if justice was allied to pure market whims this would be the only acceptable outcome. As Harvey argues, unfortunately “...the market mechanism “naturally” works that way.”¹²³

The placement of dumping grounds in the USA and around the world for toxic wastes in those areas with a geographical concentration of people of low-income and colour supports this claim; and the practice of Summers’s logic has sparked a mass outcry world-wide, giving significant impetus to the movement against what has been defined as ‘environmental racism’.

¹²¹ Foster, J; “Let Them Eat Pollution: Capitalism and the World Environment”, Monthly Review 11 (8): 21-30 (1993) p. 1

¹²² Ibid, p. 2

¹²³ Harvey, op cit, p. 368

Further, Summers's argument has been used as fuel by many scholars embroiled in North-South and Dependency theorist development arguments for a reformation of global trends in development and as evidence of the First world's support of a system of environmental 'apartheid' – and as fuel for arguments in favour of sustainable development.

Shiva is a notable advocate of the theory of global developmental 'apartheid' and the resultant growth in global environmental apartheid. Her argument briefly, revolves around the fact that the Northern countries appropriate resources and wealth of LDC's through the activities of the world market, then systematically dump their pollution and waste on the poor. Whilst Shiva argues that the current environmental and development crisis in the Third World would suggest that the world economy should adjust to the ecological limits and needs of human-centred survival; instead through adjustment programs advocated by donors, international monetary institutions and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) the Northern states are forcing the third world into an increasing 'open dependence'. The effects of the global policy of the "holy trinity"¹²⁴; multinational corporations from the North, their supporters in governments and the wasteful lifestyles of the rich in the North, serve to effect the further under-development of the Third world – by externalising their environmental costs to these countries through export.

Under the phenomenon of globalisation, even toxic waste is treated as a commodity and its disposal is subject to the requirements of profit maximisation. The US generates 275 million tonnes of toxic waste every year and is the leading producer in the world;¹²⁵ with

¹²⁴ Shiva, (1999) op cit, p. 54

¹²⁵ Mpanya, M; *Dumping of Toxic waste in African Countries*; ch 15, Nicolas Low (ed); Global ethics and the Environment; Routledge, New York (1999) p. 208

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries¹²⁶ producing 98% of the 400 million metric tonnes generated worldwide. Further, the costs of burying one tonne of waste in the North is vastly more expensive than the costs of shipping it to the South. In Germany, it is USD2500 cheaper to ship a single tonne of waste to the LDC's than to process it in Germany.¹²⁷ Thus, Northern states justify dumping as a type of economic efficiency.

Third World countries are often powerless to resist this trend. Northern states pay huge amounts of money for dumping in Third World countries like those in Africa. Thus the North-South orientation of the world economy allows for the practice of environmental racism to be perpetuated at a global level.

Development under the standard liberal model has allowed the North to be largely powered by the removal of scarce resources in the South. While benefits are concentrated in the North, the costs of this mode of development are visited on the South, including environmental hazards associated with production and the effects of poverty.

The failure of the neo-liberal model has left a polarized world, "the world might have developed – but in two opposite directions."¹²⁸ The bifurcation of the industrialized North and underdeveloped South is further mirrored within nations, as the gap between economically powerful elites and socially marginalized poor populations continues to grow. Thus the notion of North and South have become,

less and less geographical categories but rather socio-economic ones,

¹²⁶ Member countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America.

¹²⁷ Shiva, (1999) op cit, p. 58

¹²⁸ Sachs, W; "Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature on the Political Anatomy of an Oxymoron, in Fischer and Hajer (eds), Living with Nature; Oxford: Oxford University press, (1999) p. 25

referring to the line which divides the strong world-market sectors from the competitively weak, economically superfluous sectors in society.¹²⁹

It becomes obvious in light of the current crises, that neo-liberal development is indeed neither universal or equitable, nor can it be expected to be durable at its present pace.¹³⁰

The major challenge which has confronted those seeking to challenge the standard model of development is that of the crises of justice versus the crisis of nature.¹³¹ Under the standard notion of growth-led development, these views are naturally opposed to each other; any attempt to do justice to marginalized populations threatens the crisis of nature, while any cessation of development to ease the burden on nature threatened to condemn the rights of the poor to achieve the standard of living in the Northern industrialized states.¹³²

Ecological Modernization and Sustainable Development

The ascendancy of the neo-liberal standard model and the crisis of eco-social injustice were soon to give rise to the Environmental Modernization model of environmental management and social development. At the centre of this discourse lies the notion that capitalist production is inherently damaging to the environment, and that environmental management requires a proactive response by society to manage these issues in the form of pre-emptive regulations and control.¹³³ In place of the post-fact market-driven case-by-case management practices of the market model, what is proffered is the formation of a systematic body of policies and regulations aimed at the promotion of **sustainable**

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 26

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 27

¹³¹ Ibid, p. 28

¹³² Ibid, p. 28

¹³³ Harvey, op cit, p. 377

economic development, which takes cognisance of the fact that many of the detrimental effects of capital accumulation on the environment are irreversible. This represents an acceptance of a basic ethic concerning the need for conservation of the environment for the enjoyment of future generations, a notion lacking from the standard model. The notion of sustainability is equally important. The standard models rejection of any attempt to limit the use of resources required in production has raised questions in the last decade of the dangers presented by the fact that these resources are not infinite. Further, the appropriation and use of land in production which damages the quality of the environment and local livelihoods is also seen as contrary to sustainability, exemplified in practices such as deforestation or water pollution.

Thus the environmental modernization model serves to internalise notions of risk facing the environment; as well as internalising the fact that effects of human use of the environment as a productive resource, and as a site for the externalisation of costs arising from production is likely to have long-term, and some times even permanent, effects on the quality of environments. It thus summarily rejects those aspects of the standard model which allow for post-fact interventions.

Issues in the discourse of environmental modernization have become adopted in many subsequent theories concerning the management of the environment, as well as the environmental agendas of many non-governmental organisations (NGO's), government and environmental pressure groups.

Much of the success of this discourse resides in its ability to appeal to some extent to capital for support. By arguing that capital accumulation serves to impair the ability of environments to sustain long term efficient production, environmental modernization is

able to some degree to convince capital of the benefits of resource conservation and the preservation of resources and environmental ‘sinks’, and to consider long-term effects of their policies.¹³⁴

Critically, notions of environmental justice have also resulted in certain concessions being made in environmental theory to notions of environmental equity, and the integration of the environmentalism of the poor and marginalized into the discourse in the search for long-term sustainable environmental management. This attempt to integrate notions of development and environmental justice was instrumental in the formation of the World Commission on Environment and Development’s Brundtland Report in 1987.¹³⁵ This document where “...economic development (improvement in human capacities and conditions) is seen as quite distinctive from economic growth...”¹³⁶, has served to introduce a wide variety of ‘brown’ issues commonly held to refer to environmental issues of pertinence to the poor or marginalised, into development discourse. This recognition of a number of inherent rights on behalf of all people to the enjoyment of safe environments has allowed environmental management to take cognisance of the wishes and demands of broader democratic society.¹³⁷

The Contested Notion of Sustainable Development

The Brundtland report introduced the notion of Sustainable Development, a term which has become widely appropriated by environmentalists, development organisations, government officials, corporations and donors – all who share disparate competing interests in continuing economic development, while simultaneously mediating the

¹³⁴ Ibid, p.378

¹³⁵ Ibid, p. 379

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 379

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 379

effects of development on the environment, and in the case of environmental justice activists - effects on marginalised local communities in both the developed and developing world.¹³⁸ Whilst historically environmental protectionists have had a tenuous relationship with those striving for economic development, the doctrine of Sustainable Development is proffered in many arenas as an all-encompassing framework for cooperation in meeting the needs of continued development and environmental protection, while paying heed to social justice demands of local populations. Despite this rather triumphalist claim, sustainable development has evolved to offer very little in respect of a manageable common ground between competing interests, primarily due to the highly contested nature of the definition of the concept; and the competing paradigms which have emerged within the discourse. The Brundtland Report defines Sustainable Development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”¹³⁹ Yet, beyond this definition, Sustainable Development continues to suffer difficulties arising from a lack of clarity or cohesion between various interested parties, difficulties which have given rise to a number of competition claims and interpretations. Indeed, Vaillancourt argues sustainable development exists as less of a theory for development, than as “a vague and complex theoretical category, which also serves partly as an ideology, and partly as a loosely operational concept, for various groups of actors.”¹⁴⁰

The absence of definitive meaning and application lends the concept to varying interpretations and perspectives. Sustainable Development has gained significant favour

¹³⁸ Vaillancourt, J; *Sustainable Development: A sociologists view of the definition, origins and Implications of the Concept*, in Mehta & Ouellet (eds), Environmental Sociology, Captus Press, Toronto (1995), p. 226

¹³⁹ Ibid, p.: 226

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 227

in an era of rejection of the notion of limitless growth (as advocated by neoclassical economics) and heightened environmental awareness; particularly in terms of the effects of development programs and capitalist economics on nature. Yet aside from this rejection, aspects of neoclassical economic thought are clearly discernible in some of the perspectives on Sustainable Development; particularly amongst those donors, corporations and international organisations using elements of the Sustainable Development discourse in promoting development programs in the less developed countries (LDC's).

Environmental modernization discourse has been successful in its attempt to encourage awareness and action concerning a number of important environmental issues in the promotion of development, despite embodying minimal challenges to the ascendancy of the capitalist market economy. Whilst it does impinge on property rights to some extent, and can act to curb unlimited capital accumulation; the ability of the movement to promote efficient and moderate usage of environmental resources in the interest of long term development has enabled the discourse to appear as acceptable to many within the capitalist market economy.¹⁴¹ Harvey however warns against its inherent ease of corruption by capitalist interests for their own gain, fearing a situation,

In which big industry, big government and establishment, and high-tech big science can get to dominate the world even more that they currently do in the name or 'sustainability', environmental modernization and appropriate global management of the supposedly fragile health of planet earth.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Harvey, op cit, pp. 381-383

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 383

The Crisis of Justice in Development.

Since its emergence in the 1989 World Commission for Environment and Development's Brundtland Report, the discourse of sustainable development has attempted to marry the notions of 'environment' or nature, with that of 'development' or justice.

The definition of Sustainable Development as given in the Brundtland report internalises questions over whose 'needs' are to be met and how these needs are defined. These questions are largely unanswered in the text of the Brundtland report, and as such the definition serves to avoid the crisis of justice.¹⁴³ It is therefore left up to those seeking to allude to the discourse of Sustainable Development in their attempts at environmental action to clarify their understanding of the term – which often reflects directly their position with respect to justice and development. However, what is apparent is that sustainable development rejects the notion of any ecologically imposed limitations to further development, assuming them away in the interests of becoming more agreeable to vested capitalist interests. Instead, what is proposed is continued economic development proceeding from increased ecological attentiveness, internalising in Sustainable Development a notion of the domination of Nature by human technology and scientific understanding. Nature is held to possess certain natural capacities or productive boundaries; and while these boundaries are to be respected they are also to be overcome through science, innovation and technology.¹⁴⁴

Sustainable development discourse further recognizes the existence of a network of social and political groupings other than the typically neo-liberal recognition of states and

¹⁴³ Sachs, op cit, p.29

¹⁴⁴ Dryzek, J.S; "Global Ecological Democracy"; in Low, N (ed); Global Ethics and the Environment; New York, Routledge (1999) p. 270

various supra-national economic actors.¹⁴⁵ Included in this recognition are a number of interests varying from national civil societies and reform groups, to international organizations. While recognizing their existence however, the discourse often falls short of recognizing the complex interplay of power relations that make up interaction between these groupings and local communities. These shortcomings hold potentially damaging consequences for attempts at promoting environmental justice concerns, particular those relating to the protection of local livelihoods. The discourse typically overestimates the ability of local communities to express their concerns and desires with regards development programs undertaken in their local area – while simultaneously neglecting the ability of capital to exclude poor communities from the benefits of development activities, while dispossessing them of livelihoods.

For Shiva, the contradictory claims in the Sustainable Development debate in general emerge from the conflict between two paradigms emerging in the contestation over beneficiaries of development; one ‘ecologically-based, people-centred and earth-centred’, and the other based on economic development and increased global trade.¹⁴⁶ This clash between the ecological and commercial paradigms has resulted in the Sustainable Development discourse evolving as a highly contested discourse. According to Shiva, the commercial paradigm has represented,

an attempt to reduce the WSSD to WTO, and in the process destroy the sustainability of peoples livelihoods, the ecosystems that support livelihoods and our very survival.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 270

¹⁴⁶ Shiva, (2002) op cit, p. 19

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 19

The destruction of local livelihoods illustrates the changing interpretations of the terms poverty and development between the ecological and commercial paradigms. Often the projects advocated by those in the commercial development paradigm are responsible for destroying local livelihoods in the name of growth, deepening the effects of poverty amongst local populations “by robbing them of homes, communities, livelihoods and cultural security”¹⁴⁸ In order to allow the industrial modern economies to retain the advantage in light of new scarcities, notions of sustainability cannot be allowed to inhibit further growth – and rather these strategies are to be reined in to compliment the search for greater economic output.¹⁴⁹

The commercial paradigm then utilizes growing environmental concern as an engine for further economic development and capital output, advocating innovation in technology both in terms of products to be marketed to environmentally conscious consumers, or as a means to promote more efficient usage of the environment as a natural resource in production. In this way, Sustainable Development is constructed as complementary to a capitalist mode of production, as increased efficiency and innovation stimulates maximization of profit. In light of new scarcities, both of raw materials for production and more importantly of environmental sinks for the disposal of waste, emphasis shifted from attempts to secure bilateral agreements for the procurement of resources – to securing multinational arrangement to secure access to environmental sinks.¹⁵⁰ Such agreements aim to reduce the extent of emissions from the South in order that sinks will be available for use by the North in order to continue economic development in the future.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 20

¹⁴⁹ Sachs, op cit, p. 31

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 31

Viewed in this light, the term sustainable development seeks to preserve development in spite of natural limits, through careful management of access to nature.¹⁵¹ The exact character of this ‘development’ remains unclear.

A final distinguishing characteristic of this perspective is the apportioning of blame for environmental hazards on states in the underdeveloped South; and in so doing, marking these countries as requiring change to circumvent further ecological disaster while positing the globalised ‘north’ as the technological model to be adopted in the furtherance of development ideals.¹⁵²

Environmental hazards and poverty are explained as responsible for the continued underdeveloped nature of countries, as opposed to actions of the capitalist industrial world market economy. In this way the burden for change is passed to the poor, with the solution offered by increasing the openness of local markets to more efficient technology, and through greater investment of the affluent to extract or utilize resources in more efficient ways.¹⁵³

The influence of the standard model of development is clearly determinable in the contest perspective.¹⁵⁴ Just as the underdeveloped South was to be revived by following the development of the North, allowing for greater openness to exploitation of the South by the North; the environmentally unsound practices of the South are constructed as requiring the efficient management and expertise of the North. The result can only be the same, continued exploitation of countries in the South for resources and sinks required to fuel the ‘sustainable’ economic expansion of the North.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 33

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 34

¹⁵³ Ibid, p. 34

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 35

The Ecological Paradigm: Towards Eco-social Justice

The ecology paradigm arises in response to the nature of development projects undertaken in accordance with the standard neo-liberal development discourse.¹⁵⁵ In contrast to the commercial paradigm, the ecological paradigm rejects the crass equation of development with capital, arguing the issue of development,

is not merely a trade-off of costs and benefits because the cost of destruction of the conditions of life and well-being is not merely a matter of money, it is a matter of life itself.¹⁵⁶

In mounting their challenge to the standard notion of development, those among the ecological paradigm argue for alternatives to equating development with commodity or capital production,

since it treats sustainable and unsustainable production alike [...] while largely ignoring processes of recycling and energy conversion which do not lead to the production of goods or marketable services.¹⁵⁷

Alternatives to these measures include the meeting of basic human needs and the maintenance of natural ecosystems integral to local livelihoods in underdeveloped nations,

Sustenance and basic needs satisfaction is the organising principle for natural resource use in the survival economy, in contrast to profits and capital accumulation being the organising principles for the exploitation of resources for the market.¹⁵⁸

For those in the ecological paradigm the contradiction inherent within Sustainable Development discourse is not merely the environment versus development, but rather the

¹⁵⁵ Harvey, op cit, p. 370; Shiva, (2002) op cit, p. 20

¹⁵⁶ Shiva, (2002) op cit, p. 20

¹⁵⁷ Redclift, M, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions; London, Routledge (1987) p.16

¹⁵⁸ Shiva, (2002) op cit, p. 21

actions of ‘resource-destructive’ economies operating to value natural resources based on their role in economic production, versus that of ‘resource-conserving’ economics operating to preserve local livelihoods and the natural resources integral to their operation, and indeed the promotion of life itself.¹⁵⁹ Whilst there are many in the commercial development paradigm that would argue their goals are the same, that promoting a process of technological management is necessary to sustain natural environments, a necessity for sustainable economic growth – overwhelmingly evidence of development outcomes does not stand in their favour. Rather the continued operation of the standard model through the commercial paradigm serves to destroy local livelihoods through short-sighted resource accumulation programmes while drawing local populations into capital intensive wage labour – giving little thought to cultural traditions, basic needs or local community upliftment. In the process, negative externalities are created; in the loss of productivity of resources, local livelihoods and pollution – leading many to assert that if allowed to continue in this way, Sustainable Development holds not the upliftment of populations at heart but their continued and future impoverishment. Sustainable Development thus becomes unsustainable if allowed to proceed purely according to the commercial paradigm.¹⁶⁰

In light of the evidence of competing paradigms and perspectives presented, it becomes obvious then that the discourse of Sustainable Development is not a coherent notion, but rather represents a wide variety of interests, paradigms and perspectives on both the environment and development.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 21

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 21

Interests of capital find expression in the commercial paradigm, continuing attempts to develop the North at the expense of those nations in the South – yet with renewed justification on the basis of technological efficiency and increased scientific understanding of the management of Nature.

Contestation over the discourse of Sustainable Development would seem to indicate a sense of “business as usual” for all interested parties; with the only significantly novel idea coming in the form of a growing realisation by all concerned parties of the urgency of achieving their aims in light of mounting scarcities, and a burgeoning and increasingly visible global environmental crisis; accompanied by some attempt to give lip service to ‘basic needs’ provision for those marginalized.

Future challenges to a redefinition of development in terms of sustainable development remain the same as those which have informed the debate for the past few decades. Will environments benefit the poor, or increase the profits of the rich? Will the terms of development redress inequalities between North and South or exacerbate them? Will the North be allowed to continue to pilfer the resources of the South? And ultimately, will people begin to respect the natural limits to growth on Earth, or will development continue to spiral out of control to the detriment and destruction of the planet?

The question of justice for local populations marginalized by the global flows of capital remains largely unresolved due to the trade-power and fluidity of capital in development, and crucially Sustainable Development only internalises these debates, while further being ‘captured’ by corporations and First world countries and affluent centres of economic power – interested in preserving their own form of unlimited expansion based on the exploitation of those countries in the underdeveloped worlds. The result in South

Africa has been as Hallowes argues, the maintenance of old power relations, as in questions as to maintaining corporate power in the face of local needs,

In virtually all the highest-profile examples since 1994, expediency prevailed, corporations got their way because of power, and the needs of the environment and society were denigrated.¹⁶¹

Environmental Justice

The failures of development according to the neo-liberal model generally (and the sustainable development model more recently) to advance the cause of justice for local populations in development programs in favour of the interests of capital, have prompted the gradual emergence of the final discourse to be examined, that of Environmental Justice.

The campaign for Environmental Justice has developed in recent decades to present a powerful force challenging the established domination of environmental theories by affluent communities, corporate powers and their role in pollution, governments and their role in supporting unequal distributions of the harmful effects of industrial production and finally the lack of representation of marginalized populations in the decision making apparatus of environmental procedure, distribution and production.

Environmental justice is concerned with answering the questions: Why are certain 'communities of colour' and 'the poors' bearing an unequal distribution of pollution and environmental hazards? What are the mechanisms supporting this distributive inequality? How can these trends be eradicated? And finally, what organisational structure will be able to effect such a reformation of environmental injustices?

¹⁶¹ Hallowes, (2002) op cit, p. 32

In brief, Hallowes argues the concept attempts to resolve injustices perpetrated in development projects at both the local and global level, in that it,

Sites ecological problems and possibilities within a socio-political context first and foremost, and poses firm moral and distributional questions about that context.¹⁶²

Environmental Justice has since its inception, emerged internationally as a powerful environmental discourse challenging the established forms of power which act to marginalize populations from the benefits of healthy environments. The discourse focuses on a broad range of issues pertaining to power relations underlying society, 'race', poverty, social justice, and the unequal distribution of environmental hazards at both the global and local level.

Environmental Racism and the Movement for Environmental Justice

Local and global incidences of 'environmental racism' have been the main reasons for the development of the ideal of environmental justice, an ideal formed in the United States (US) in the civil rights movement of the late 1960's and 1970's; which achieved a wide degree of support both in the USA and internationally since its inception.

Environmental racism has been described by Benjamin Chavis as:

Racial discrimination in environmental policy making and the enforcement of regulations and laws... the deliberate targeting of people of colour communities for toxic and hazardous waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the life threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the history of excluding people of colour from the leadership of the environmental movement.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 33

¹⁶³ Dorsey, M; *Race Poverty and Environment*; Legal Studies Forum: vol XXII, (1998), P. 1

Historically the environmental movement in the US has been a typically affluent middle class ‘white’-dominated movement. Even the most progressive of these organisations, the Sierra Club, in its infancy denied membership to Jews and ‘blacks’ through sponsorship policies. National parks and beaches were further closed off to people of colour until the civil rights movements in the 1960’s, representing them as ‘uncaring’, ‘naïve’ and even as contributing to the pollution of their own communities.¹⁶⁴

The 1970’s were to see a growing frequency of struggles in the United States against environmental racism as part of the debate surrounding environmental injustices.

These struggles mobilised local poor communities of African-Americans, Hispanics and Native American Indians and a range of progressive groups – most notably churches and civil rights organisations – that sought to oppose and change the racially discriminatory distribution of hazardous waste and high-pollution industries in the US.

This grassroots development was not allied with the mainstream environmental consciousness movement; which was purported to concentrate mainly on the concerns of ‘white’, middle class Americans, and throughout history had largely failed to pay adequate attention to the disproportionate burden of pollution on minority communities. This burden has been attributed to “...the often racist, activities of major corporations who target them for high technology industries, incinerators and waste.”¹⁶⁵

A critical turning point in the movement against environmental racism in the United States was the protest in 1982 in Warren County, North Carolina against the development of a PCB (polychlorinated-biphenyl) landfill in a black community. Various minority

¹⁶⁴ Di Chiro, G, “Nature as Community – the convergence of Environmental and Social Justice”; in M Goldman; *Privatising nature, Political Struggles for the Global Commons*, (1998), p. 121

¹⁶⁵ Nicolas Low and Brendan Gleeson, (eds); *Justice Society and Nature*; Routledge; London, (1998)

groups and civil rights leaders joined church and political representatives in uniting the local community in a civil disobedience campaign against the proposed development. Shortly after the Warren County action, a federal government study revealed evidence of racial discrimination in the location of toxic waste landfills in one region of the US. This study was followed up by analysis by the United Church of Christ (UCC), a relatively small yet very influential African American church, which published its findings in 1987 demonstrating that race was the crucial determining factor in the distribution of chemical hazard exposure throughout the US.¹⁶⁶

The findings of the UCC report were generally taken to heart by the population, and have formed the backbone of activism against environmental racism since their publication.¹⁶⁷ The growth in local based community movements against environmental racism was rapid, and by the 1990's literally thousands of groups had achieved a broad spectrum of successes throughout the US.

In 1991 approximately 650 activists from 300 of such groupings met in Washington D.C. at the First National People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit. This meeting marked the first concrete step towards the movements refocusing of its character along global political and ethical ideals. The summit culminated in the adoption of 17 key principles for effecting the promotion of "environmental justice" – extending the ambit of the environmental racism movement to broader notions such as justice, class, gender and protection of non-human species. In Cutters view, the meeting signifies the environmental racism movements growth from a movement focussed mainly on racial

¹⁶⁶ Bullard, R; *The Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement*; in Frey (ed), *Environment and Society*; ch 2; Abacon (2001), p. 96

¹⁶⁷ Goldman,B.J; *What is the Future of Environmental Justice?*; *Antipode* 28:2, (1996), p. 132

issues, to “...include other (regardless of race or ethnicity) who are deprived of their environmental rights, such as women, children and the poor.”¹⁶⁸

The genesis of the environmental justice movement with the summit and the subsequent broadening of political purpose of the Environmental Racism movement, further served to extend the social and institutional bases of the movement; enabling activists and academics to influence important environmental justice concerns being institutionalised within government, academic institutions, corporations, business and academic research. Environmental Justice advocates have provoked numerous changes in government agencies and their policy formations world-wide.

A further area of success for the Environmental Justice movement has been the challenge to historically ‘white’ dominated environmental groups. In the sphere of corporate power and polluting business enterprises, environmental justice theorists have noted that contaminations in poorer communities are so prevalent due to the fact that as Bullard argues, these communities present the path of least resistance for the pollution industry. Here the Environmental Justice movement has answered the mainstream environmental organisations’ call of ‘not in my back-yard’ (NIMBY) which typically has meant “not in a white persons backyard”, with their own policy of Not In Any Man’s Backyard (NIAMBY). Further, the influence of the movement has made prosecutions and fines against offenders more frequent, and has proved instrumental in denying the building of many new dump sites and landfills in areas of poverty and social marginalisation.

¹⁶⁸ Cited: Bullard, (2001), op cit, p. 96

Environmentalism in South Africa Post -Apartheid

According to Cock and Fig, environmentalism in South Africa has historically reflected the many social cleavages inherent within the historically divisive society, to the extent that it has never “constituted a social movement in the sense of a co-ordinate formal alliance that is mass based and has a shared vision and set of objectives.”¹⁶⁹ Prior to democratisation, environmentalism in South Africa was dominated by an authoritarian conservation perspective,¹⁷⁰ a reflection of the broader systematic exclusion of marginalized groups from the benefits of the environment. The overwhelming legacy of this perspective has resulted in “the gradual but relentless alienation of blacks from the environmental sphere, and the growth of hostility to conservation issues as defined by the mainstream.”¹⁷¹

Throughout the term of colonialism and Apartheid, ‘blacks’ and other marginalized communities were excluded from environmental organizations by a barrage of legal and social mechanisms designed to implement their political, physical, socio-economic and psychological marginalisation. The success of this program is reflected in the continued existence of these constructed margins to this day, as well as the ongoing hostility on behalf of the previously excluded to the broader issues of environmental management.

The Rise of Environmental Justice in South Africa

Collaborative attempts in the 1990s to address these issues of exclusion and environmental degradation found representation and expression in an adaptation of the

¹⁶⁹ Cock, J & Fig, D; *The impact of Globalisation and Environmental Politics in South Africa*, (1990-2002), paper presented to the Kyoto Environmental Sociology Conference, 21-Sociology Conference 21-23 October, (2001), p. 2

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 2

¹⁷¹ Khan, (2002) op cit, p. 16

international movement for Environmental Justice. McDonald defines environmental justice as being the process of,

incorporating environmental issues into the broader intellectual and institutional framework of human rights and democratic accountability.¹⁷²

The movement which developed from Environmental Racism protests in the United States, regards the environment as all spaces which people inhabit - whether in the workplace, or at home, as well as recognised conservation spaces. In this manner the theory attempts to link formally 'green' concerns of conservation or species protection, with 'brown' or urban issues relating to living and workplaces, and finally 'red' issues of social justice.¹⁷³

It is this linking of environmental degradation to social issues which Castells regards as evidence of a dramatic extension of the scope and diversification of environmentalism – a 'coming-of-age' as a truly universal concept extending across the various class, income, spatial and ideological cleavages of the advanced industrial society.¹⁷⁴

Importantly, environmental justice accepts the notion argued by Mittelman that the environment is a "social construction that is contested"¹⁷⁵, and as such "views environmental issues as deeply political in the sense that they are embedded in access to power and resources in society."¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² McDonald, D; *Up Against the Crumbling Wall: The Privatisation of Urban Services and Environmental Justice*; cited McDonald (ed), *Environmental Justice in South Africa*; ch 11; University of Cape Town press; Cape Town (2002), p. 3

¹⁷³ Cock, J; *Connecting the Red, Brown and Green: The Environmental Justices Movement in South Africa* (2004)

¹⁷⁴ Castelle, M, *The Greening of the Self: The Environmental Movement*; in: *The Power of Identity*, Blackwell, Oxford, (1997), p. 133

¹⁷⁵ Mittelman, J; *Globalisation and Environmental Resistance Politics*; in: *Third World Quarterly*, 19 (5); pp. 847-872, (1998), p. 849

¹⁷⁶ Cock and Fig, (2001), op cit, p. 2

The spread of environmental justice concerns in South Africa has been instrumental in the promotion of a wide-range of environmental discussion and development among previously marginalized populations in South Africa since the period of democratic transition. The relaxation of discriminatory legislation and policies which took place in the early 1990's was to form the catalyst for this growing environmental awareness throughout the entire population.¹⁷⁷

Despite this watershed in South African history with the dismantling of Apartheid discriminatory structures and legislation, the effects of over a century of marginalisation are far from repealed; power relations, affluence, employment and even the environment are still largely skewed in favour of the 'white' populations as they were defined under Apartheid. The acceptance of democratic politics however was of paramount importance to the inclusion of environmental issues in the agendas of many political groups and civil society organisations.¹⁷⁸ The degree of local support for environmental justice endeavours to date, and the success of a number of endeavours to mobilise popular support for environmental initiatives at the grassroots level in South Africa, has shown the need for environmental groups to take into account a number of 'brown' environmental issues, such as the provision of healthy, clean and appealing environments for all, and the provision of basic needs such as clean water, sanitation, food and health care – if they hope to win broad-based political support; and that efforts undertaken should extend to an understanding of the underlying power relations which act to entrench poverty in marginalized poor communities.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Khan, (2002), op cit, p. 25

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 28

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 28

The Structure of Environmental Justice in South Africa

The political euphoria of the early 1990s due to the un-banning of political opposition to the white institutions of Apartheid created enormous collaborative opportunities for a dramatic resurgence in democratic civil society in policy making. This collaborative spirit produced a number of “rainbow alliances”¹⁸⁰ involving formally estranged groups, resulting in a wide-variety of important legislative breakthroughs in terms of environmental policy and social justice, not least of which was the inclusion in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa¹⁸¹, of the right to a healthy environment for all South Africans regardless of race or gender. Despite these collaborative tendencies, environmentalism remains split between contemporary mainstream ‘green’ environmentalism, and a rapidly growing discourse of environmental justice.¹⁸²

Despite the fact that environmental justice has attracted a wide degree of organisational support in South Africa since its inception in the early 1990s, Cock argues that there is no single environmental ideology operating in South Africa – but rather that environmentalism remains divided into two streams: those accepting the principles of Sustainable development, “marked by technicist, pragmatic and reformist attempts to bring environmental externalities into the marketplace through ecological modernisation”; and those advocating environmental justice.¹⁸³ The result is that often, environmental struggles are undertaken by a variety of different groups, some not typically falling into contemporary definitions of environmentalists – such as trade unions. Not only do these groups mobilise different sections of the population, but

¹⁸⁰ Cock and Fig, (2001), op cit, p. 3

¹⁸¹ Act 108 of 1996

¹⁸² Cock: (2004), op cit p. 7

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 4

different claimants tend to mobilize around a wide variety of iconic struggles particular to their relative constituencies,¹⁸⁴ often resulting in undertakings being ad hoc instead of part of a concerted and ongoing program.

Added to these capacity constraints, a marked decline in government willingness to engage in participatory democracy with civil society has been noted with the steadily growing acceptance amongst the African National Congress (ANC) leadership of neo-liberal economic policies, a commitment enshrined in the 1997 Growth Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR).¹⁸⁵ Conjoined with the negotiated transition's failure to effectively challenge certain key elements of Apartheid's privilege and power structure, most notably the unequal distribution of private property and wealth,¹⁸⁶ the gradual withdrawal of civil society from the political sphere or cooptation into government departments have resulted in the declining significance of hard-won legislative enactments – particularly in the lack of implementation of these policies.¹⁸⁷

Whilst the South African Constitution is committed to the goal of the provision of environments for all that are not harmful, as well as the ongoing de-racialization of society, Ruiters argues the failure to address the underlying power relations surviving the Apartheid society limits the extent of change and redistribution by framing contestation within the guidelines set by the contemporary neo-liberal approach to economics; respecting rights to private property despite the fact that this respect internalises dramatic inequalities between the have's and have-nots. This apparent necessity to pander to the 'graces' of the dominant capitalist class has resulted in a situation where, "at best the

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 2-5

¹⁸⁵ Cock and Fig, (2001), op cit, p. 12; McDonald & Pape, (2002) op cit

¹⁸⁶ Cock and Fig, (2001) op cit, p. 11; Ruiters, (2001), op cit; McDonald, (2002) op cit

¹⁸⁷ Cock and Fig, (2001) op cit, p. 8

‘realistic’ solution acceptable [...] is affirmative action, reconciliation and the widening of a co-opted black middle class.”¹⁸⁸

An inability to redress the deeper issues of economic power relations underlying society, has further cemented the inherited class relations of the Apartheid era. Despite *de jure* inclusion and Affirmative action programs, employment and incomes continue to unjustly favour the ‘white’ minority populations. Paucity of employment and the failure of employment generation strategies, have served to entrench ‘black’ populations in the same environmentally unsound localities they occupied under Apartheid, with all the incumbent dangers of poverty and environmental degradation. Thus, in a final analysis,

While the racial legal superstructure in post-apartheid South Africa has changed, the spatio-economic order that naturalized racial division has not.¹⁸⁹

A number of encouraging trends in South Africa seem to suggest the steady growth of an “embryonic environmental justice movement [...] made up of highly interconnected networks clustered around a few key nodes or hubs.”¹⁹⁰ Examples of these trends stem from the cooperation of diverse civil society organisations mobilising around a number of issues pertinent to environmental justice advocates, such as those forming the South African Water Caucus (SAWC) which has successfully engendered cooperation between trade unions such as the Congress of South African Trade unions (COSATU), the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and members of local communities against water privatisation;¹⁹¹ and again in actions of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) which collaborated with members of COSATU and SAMWU against electricity

¹⁸⁸ Ruiters, 2001 op cit, p. 96

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 99

¹⁹⁰ Cock, (2004), op cit, p. 1

¹⁹¹ Ibid, p.16

privatisation and cost recovery in Soweto, Johannesburg.¹⁹² Increased cooperation has been bolstered in part by the adoption of new legislative basis for rights-based claims to service provision and environmental quality in South Africa, which in the context of the environmentally degraded legacy of Apartheid has provided a powerful basis for mobilisation for environmental justice concerns.¹⁹³

Through its abundance of member organisations and network structure, the emerging Environmental Justice movement serves to connect and represent an impressively diverse segment of the country's population. Additionally the recognition of environmental issues as socially constructed, conjoined with a commitment to issues in both rural and urban contexts, and a broad definition of 'environment' to include the workplace – has allowed the environmental justice movement to appeal to a broad social base. This broadness is further complimented in the extent to which these networks act to connect local grassroots activists to the global movement for environmental and social justice – a fact evident in the cooperation in 1990 of local organisations including Earthlife Africa and local labour union, the Chemical workers Union, with Greenpeace International in activism against Thor Chemicals in KwaZulu-Natal, found guilty of importing toxic mercury and poisoning local water supplies.¹⁹⁴ Global connectedness allows local activists a significant advantage in terms of both resources such as funding and information transfer; as well as providing for confidence among local organisations through the linking to a global moral argument for social justice and cosmopolitan democracy.

¹⁹² McDonald and Pape, (2002) op cit

¹⁹³ Cock, (2004) op cit, p. 17

¹⁹⁴ Khan, (2002) op cit, p. 29

Strategies and Challenges Facing Environmental Justice in South Africa

The South African model while sharing a number of similarities with the US model has gradually evolved to a number of unique responses to the particular socio-political and environmental context of South Africa.

Cock argues the South Africa adaptation of the concept represents a number of differences to the US model, with organisations and activists focussing on “total change driven by majority rather than minority interests, [...] includes class issues, whereas in the US it is class-blind, focussing exclusively on environmental racism.”¹⁹⁵

Environmental justice in the South African context has focussed primarily on attaining juridical definitions of justice necessary to effect a redistribution of environmental hazards, improved environmental regulations and a redress of the Apartheid era’s legacy of dispossession of the ‘non-white’ community.¹⁹⁶

The embryonic Environmental Justice movement has engaged in a variety of activities encompassing a response to a plethora of issues, bridging notions of social equity with those environmental issues affecting marginalized populations while encouraging the linking of local injustices to root causes in broader government policy.¹⁹⁷

The strategy of mobilisation around rights is the key strategic model adopted by the moment.¹⁹⁸ This strategy emerges from the introduction of a number of key legislative entitlements offered in numerous pieces of legislation and policies adopted since 1990,

¹⁹⁵ Cock, (2004) op cit, p. 6

¹⁹⁶ Ruiters, (2002), op cit, p. 112

¹⁹⁷ Cock, (2004), op cit p. 20

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.22

including the Constitution – which are used both as sites of focus for social mobilisation, and as sources of legislative legitimacy.¹⁹⁹

The constitutional provision of rights to a healthy environment has enabled activists to focus on the basic needs inherent in the promotion of life and healthy environment. By linking basic needs to sustainable environments, environmental justice advocates are able to frame basic needs as rights; a strategy aimed to mobilise support amongst excluded populations in mass protest against the denial of these rights, while simultaneously using litigation and legal challenges to claim these rights for affected populations.²⁰⁰

Mechanisms like the Constitution and new legislation, including but not limited to the National Management Act,²⁰¹ aim to establish minimal environmental regulations for businesses and local administrations. Implicit in these policies is the right for all people to be treated fairly regardless of income, class, religion or race. Further implications of the focus on judicial justice have been the introduction of mechanisms whereby local communities may enter into litigation, “...allowing for private prosecutions as well as protection from liability for court costs if the action is in the public interest.”²⁰²

However, reliance on litigation and the strategy of framing basic needs as inherent rights has come in for a fair amount of criticism.

Increased judicial mechanisms whilst providing disadvantaged communities with some legal recourse, have done little to assist impoverished communities in achieving a more equitable distribution of environmental hazards or improve access to service delivery. Ironically this increased legislative regulation requires a large degree of both expertise

¹⁹⁹ Ruiters, (2001) op cit; Cock, (2004), op cit, p. 22; Cock and Fig, (2001) op cit; Hallows & Butler, (2004) op cit

²⁰⁰ Cock, (2004), op cit, p. 22

²⁰¹ Act 107 of 1998

²⁰² Ruiters, (2002), op cit, p. 117

and wealth which often is not available to the communities in question. Legal proceedings are costly, and while poor communities do have rights to legal representation, corporate interests and polluting industries are often able to stall proceedings in legal red-tape, as well as hire specialist legal representation to arm themselves against claims of environmental racism. Furthermore, legal proceedings are often lengthy processes, often involving independent expensive research studies on the part of those accused of environmental injustices to discredit the claims. Ultimately legal procedural options may just as easily limit the options available to communities as they can only follow policies for which legal precedent or legislation already exists.

The legalistic basis of environmental justice also has the effect of ensuring that the discourse remains entrenched in the broader legalistic and economic programs of the country. While South African economic policies and courts value the protection of existing property rights (those inherited from the Apartheid regime), as well as touting the principles of free markets, enterprise and deregulation of restraints on the economy including environmental regulations; environmental justice remains constrained by these policies in its attempts to decasualise society and introduce greater environmental equity.²⁰³

Narrowly defined legalistic interpretations of environmental rights fall short of offering promising solutions to the ongoing crisis, due to an increasing reliance on litigation as a means to combat discrimination. Marginalized populations are subdued by the power of capital in these proceedings, due to the costly nature of research, legal representation and losses incurred in absenteeism from employment during what is often a long and

²⁰³ Ibid, p. 119

protracted legal process.²⁰⁴ The poor suffer from the burden of proving environmental wrongs, while those under accusation typically possess the wealth and legal expertise to both recover costs from these processes, as well as conduct extensive research by highly specialised professionals to muddle the facts of inquiry. Visible effects of environmental degradation are often further not immediately determinable. Micro-pollutants in groundwater for example, defy visibility and often the effects of their existence may only become apparent in sicknesses of populations over a course of years. Further, pollution is often not localised in space, with upstream dumping often travelling to communities in distant locations – dislocating pollution in terms of both space and time.

These factors; the ascendancy of respect for property rights, the burden both economically and a burden of proof on poor populations to prove causality, and the specific dislocated nature of environmental hazards spatially and temporally – reveal the litigation process as limited in its capacity to provide adequate solutions to environmental and social injustices.

Therefore, the ideal strategy in Cock's analysis is that of the combination of legal measures such as litigation to claim rights or court actions to halt the abuse of rights, **combined** with grassroots collective action.²⁰⁵

The Challenge of Distributive vs Procedural Justice

The increasing tendency of environmental activists in South Africa to link environmental issues to issues relating to social justice, has proven complimentary to the development of this embryonic consciousness by identifying spaces for engagement- and populations for mobilisation at all levels of society.

²⁰⁴ Ruiters, (2001), op cit, pp. 101-102

²⁰⁵ Cock, (2004) op cit, p. 22

Perhaps the principal challenges facing the movements result from capacity constraints and the difficulty of stimulating what Cock has termed “deep mobilisation”,²⁰⁶ the dual strategy of mass collective action supported by litigation; challenges which necessitate the building of strong, durable coalitions to challenge more than just the distributive nature of environmental justice – but incorporating critically “an understanding of how social difference and environmental problems are produced and distributed.”²⁰⁷

The re-focussing of struggles against these procedural aspects of environmental injustices as Ruiters suggests, and avoiding an over-reliance on legislative entitlement, is essential if the embryonic movement is to continue to grow to maturity as a fully fledged environmental movement challenging the underlying power relations of our socially-divisive, unjust, and environmentally unsustainable neoliberal society.

What is needed to overcome these limitations is an extension of environmental justice to concerns of procedural and productive justice.²⁰⁸ This point is argued over and over again by progressive environmental theorists, however its value cannot be over emphasised. The various limitations placed on environmental justice through organisational inefficiencies, lack of funding and popular support issues require urgent attention. The movement therefore needs to apply itself with other deeper concerns of justice to appeal to broader constituencies. Only then it is argued will true procedural and production justice be possible, as only with popular support and funding can the movement hope to challenge the entrenched inequalities within the decision making process predating the distributive process of environmental hazards.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.30

²⁰⁷ Ruiters, (2001), op cit, p. 102

²⁰⁸ Ruiters, (2002), op cit, pp. 123 & 117

Critical to this program is a broadening of both definitions of inequality, understanding of how these are produced, and an increase in the democratic process to challenge distributive, procedural, judicial and productive conceptions of justice. Finally, Ruiters argues that justice needs to project itself as a process rather than as an end-point as is common in the current sustainable development thesis of basic needs fulfilment.²⁰⁹ Merely focussing on basic needs has a disheartening affect on communities leading to increasingly dependence, and a situation where the marginalised expect little more than the barest minimum. For environmental justice to be appealing and empowering to these communities it needs to be conceptualised as a process whereby communities are empowered to rise above the preoccupation with third world political rhetoric of basic needs. Convincing communities that organisations will continue to fight for their rights long after basic needs are met will likely go a long way to garnering support for the fledgling movement in South Africa.

The Challenges to the Environmental Justice Movement:

The ability of the movement for Environmental Justice to effect such far reaching changes in legislation, distributive equity and public awareness of environment hazards in their immediate communities – and indeed their successes in mobilisation local communities in protest against powerful corporate polluters; has necessarily captured the attention of both corporate producers and academics alike.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p124

As a results the movement and its practices have been the target of a plethora of criticisms, both from a corporate perspective which attempts mainly to derail the movements legitimacy – as well as from academics critical of the movements potential to sustain and direct social mobilisation effectively beyond short-lived distributive outcomes, to achieve a broader realisation of justice.

Broadly speaking, these criticisms can be divided into methodological challenges, criticisms as to the usage of ‘race’ or racism as a means of mobilisation by the movement, and finally criticisms arising due to the movement’s over-indulgence in affecting distributive outcomes rather than involving itself in procedural or productive processes of environmental hazards.

The Challenge of Race

The newfound prestige and community-based awareness of the principal claims of the Environmental Justice movement has produced a dangerous threat to the established exercisers of power. Accordingly, policy makers responsible to affluent political hegemony and capital accumulation have prompted a number of academics to challenge the idea and existence of ‘environmental racism’. In this discussion, “...a Weberian conception of class is typically used, with income, property value, and educational attainment serving as the key variables.”²¹⁰

Bullard argues that there is little doubt as to whether racism influences the likelihood of an increased exposure to detrimental environments, as well as the accessibility of communities to health care facilities, or even a clean water supply.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Pulido, L; *A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research*; *Antipode* 28:2; (1996), p. 146

²¹¹ Bullard, (2001), op cit, p. 98

Whether by conscious decision, or unconsciously in their roles as primary owners and administrators of the means of production, government administration and policy making; 'white' populations at all class levels the world over have a distinct advantage in choosing and gaining access to the most highly valued, clean, healthy environments - the net result of which has been to relegate poorer 'communities of colour' to spaces where they are exposed to harmful local environments. This tendency has been observed throughout history in the times of colonialism; during the conquest of the America's where the native populations were forced to cluster in Native Reservations; during the decades of slavery in the USA and continuing until the civil rights movement of the 1960's, where vast numbers of African-Americans were confined to urban ghettos; and in the South African era of Apartheid and Separate Development, where entire populations of 'non-whites'²¹² were forcibly resettled on 'homelands' and denied access to certain institutions and areas delineated as 'whites-only' spheres of society.

Bullard has argued that the tendency of 'communities of colour' in the US to be more likely to be exposed to the harmful effects of pollution or other aspects of environmental degradation than the 'white' affluent population cannot be explained purely on the basis of income. Models of urban development and the demographic makeup of communities are largely influenced by the forces and relationships of production within them, which in turn are influenced by ownership and the regulations brought to bear on them by government, or subsidies offered them by local government administrations seeking to attract investment.²¹³ Further, Bullard has argued that in the USA, "...vestiges of race based decision making still influence housing, education, employment, and criminal

²¹² As defined by Apartheid classifications.

²¹³ Bullard, (2001) op cit, p 99

justice.”²¹⁴ The lack of representation of minorities within the decision making apparatus in question has resulted in a biased process, influencing decisions such as: new industry sitings, siting of local unwanted land usages (LULU’s), degree of enforcement of environmental regulations, sewerage treatment, availability of water and power resources, and even the location and access to systems of transport. Lack of representation is a symptom of a historically ‘race-based’ society, and without an active role in the institutional decision making apparatus, poverty-stricken disempowered communities will continue to suffer the burdens of pollution and environmental injustices to which they are presently exposed.

In the US, both class and perceptions of ‘race’ interact to produce certain vulnerabilities for environmental injustices and other health inequalities. Bullard notes however, that “people of colour [...] face elevated toxic exposure levels even when social class variables (income, education, and occupational status) are held constant.”²¹⁵ Bullard further argues that race is a central determining factor independent of class concerns in predicting the distribution of a wide number of environmental inequalities, including but not limited to air pollution, location of waste disposal mechanisms and other LULU’s, and incidence of lead poisoning of children and entire communities.²¹⁶ Bullard squarely places the blame for this uneven distribution of harms and benefits on the history of ‘white-lead’ racism in the USA, but also argues that its perpetuation has been worsened by the inability of marginalised communities to empower themselves and their communities to influence the decision-making which produces these very inequalities.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 99

²¹⁵ Ibid, p. 101

²¹⁶ Ibid, p. 101

Indeed Pulido does seem to agree that the evidence would suggest a strong correlation between both 'race' and class, while 'race' emerges as the strongest correlation.²¹⁷

Proving a correlation between 'race' and pollution adds impetus to the arguments of those wishing to divert attention towards recognition of the problem of racism and its impact on society. Those wishing to deny this correlation often find a favourable correlation for class, manipulating this outcome to deny that there exists an underlying racism to distribution within society and the problems facing communities of colour are the same problems facing poverty stricken communities of any racial classification.²¹⁸

The second major challenge to the Environmental Racism thesis, argues a correlation between LULU's and communities of colour are erroneous as land use policies existed before these communities settled there – thus denying the existence of a racist predisposition to land usage. Whilst Bullard would argue this is irrelevant since discrimination is the end-result, Pulido disagrees. She argues that conceptualisations of 'race' as a conscious act such as this problematic implies serves to deny the existence of other covert forms of racism.²¹⁹ Pulido regards the monolithic understanding of racism which this promotes as preventing,

a nuanced understanding of how racism interacts with various economic forces, including, relations of production and regimes of accumulation, to create highly oppressive circumstances.²²⁰

The conceptualisation of racism as an overt, deliberate act has a number of basic shortcomings. Firstly it presents racism as a complete act, a corporeal whole which we can view, separate, criticise and contain separately. Such projections then would imply

²¹⁷ Pulido, (1996), op cit, p. 147

²¹⁸ Ibid, p.147

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 148

²²⁰ Ibid, p. 148

that the separation of causes and effects of racism can be neatly compartmentalised and dealt with.²²¹ The reality however is that just as society is fragmented, and decision-making processes and institutions exhibit a fragmentation, specialisation and diversity unparalleled historically, the various incidences of racism in society do and should permeate these many fragmentations. Consequently racism avoids detection by underlying every aspect of social institutions.

Secondly, presenting a conceptualisation of racism as an overt action against communities obscures discrimination which occurs as part of an overarching ideology of racism.²²² Restricting racism to overt acts disadvantages communities victimised by underlying racial attitudes. Pulido argues that covert racism exists and functions as “...ideology works to create meaning itself, racism infuses society, including culture, politics and economic structure, and helps, in turn to shape these forces.”²²³ Defined in this way, the project of alienating racism from society becomes much larger than merely tackling overt incidences of racist action, but involves institutional change to reverse the ideological tainting of decision-making and policy formulation.

Finally, Pulido argues that the above conceptualisation of racism serves to create the image of a single or fixed racism, where in fact it cannot be defined in this manner. The diversity of racial attitudes and the mechanisms by which racism is propagated allows racism to become elusive, indefinite, and fragmented.

Increasingly however while proving incidences of Environmental Racism have undoubtedly in many instances improved the lives of communities unfairly exposed to environmental hazards; the question remains as to what extent concentrating on

²²¹ Ibid, p. 149

²²² Ibid, p. 150

²²³ Ibid, p. 150

distributive outcomes in the production of environmental hazards for social justice at both the local and global level.

At the local level, concentrating on distributive processes often only occurs in many instances once pollution or hazards already exist. However, even in instances where communities are able to sustain protest in order to block the siting of hazards – the dangers of potentially forcing another community, whether ‘white’, affluent or not – contains within it the very real potential to fragment communities into opposing camps based on some perceived socially constructed notion of difference. The operation of NIMBY-like discussion and protests thus contain within them the very real potential of inciting increased local group identity particularist associations; an outcome which in many instances results in increased fragmentation and social antipathy.

Local protests against environmental racism further have the disadvantage of being inherently localised in both time and space. While few would argue against the fact that Environmental racism protests are able to achieve mass mobilisation of local communities in order to effect their environmental desires, whether to block distribution or hold corporations accountable for pollution – the degree to which social protest is sustainable once the desired outcome has been achieved is questionable, failing a broadening of aims or goals from notions of purely distributive equity outcomes narrowly defined towards the achievement of ‘deeper’ aims such as those advocated in the broadened principles of the Environmental Justice movement. Failing this, environmental racism protests may never in most cases progress beyond transient social mobilisations which are localised in time and space, towards a more inclusive and enduring form of social movement.

In light of this, it is necessary for the Environmental Justice movement to progress beyond their increasing fetishism of ‘race’ in their policies and categorisations. For if the main task of the movement in the future is the unification of diverse and competing groups within working society as we have argued, the ongoing distributive racial preoccupation which saw the foundations of the grassroots campaigns for distributive justice is unlikely to win much new support amongst white workers.²²⁴ Thus the distributive fuelled policy program needs to give way to concerns of poverty, inequalities in income between the upper and lower classes, inequalities in representation of the working class in decision making bodies within society, and last but certainly not least the movement must move to appeal to working women from all racial groups and cultures – in order to address social inequalities within a non-racial framework.

A closer look at the historical fortunes of narrow race-based particularistic politics would seem to support our findings. ‘Race’ based political movements have historically been unable to mobilise popular support outside of their narrowly defined constituencies and as such have been largely unable to challenge the ‘white’ domination of global and national societies. Whilst it is true that the civil rights movements in the 1960’s and the spread of environmental justice concerns in the decades to follow did much to advance the rights of African Americans in terms of legislative provisions, the reality is that the popular support necessary for an empowerment of African Americans in the institutional decision making structures of society at large was never fully realised. So too in South Africa we find a similar problem existing since the collapse of the Apartheid system. While in these instances the ‘black’ majority government has indeed managed to win

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 152

control of the state and local government apparatus, the continued existence of 'white' dominated economic systems and a widening gap between the rich (predominantly 'white') upper class, and the poor (predominantly 'black') underclass still bear testament to inherent domination of the various protectionist mechanisms of society which lie outside of government control.²²⁵ Further, attempts by the government to adopt land reform policies, or to entrench Black Economic Empowerment concerns within the institutional framework of societies has often been met with charges of counter-racism. The dangers of claims of counter-racism cannot simply be ignored if we are to build coalitions in support of governments acting to empower the majority of our population to influence the unequal distribution of power in our society. These claims are quick to progress towards similar processes of 'white' middle and working class protectionist measures being undertaken by those believe themselves to be victims of these policies, and may ferment growing covert racist ideology which preying on fears and anxieties of workers, may illicit racial and class conflict within our newly democratic (yet still fragile) society. Perhaps a more valuable program for the advancement of environmental justice is one which attempts to enter into coalitions with these opposition bodies within a broader policy framework of the Environmental Justice movement. In order for such coalitions to succeed though, it is perhaps necessary to 'tone-down' the movements overly distributive discourse, by reforming discourse along less socially charged formulations such as equitable representation in decision-making bodies along racial, class and gender divisions. By including inequalities in income-distribution and gender, notions which unlike racism do not carry as heavy a stigma nor the same narrow focus can assist in mobilising popular support for the movement for environmental justice. The

²²⁵ Ruiters, (2002), op cit, p. 113

1991 Summit was a crucial turning point in expanding the policy focus of the environmental justice movement in the US, a process bolstered in the South African context in the formation of the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) in 1992. The underlying motive for the formation of the EJNF was a recognition that “ongoing cross-sectoral cooperation was required to redefine and transform the dominant middle-class, alienating and conservative understanding of the environment.”²²⁶ Subsequent recognition in the Charter of the EJNF of the need to instigate social transformation through a challenge of the dominant power relations in society, which result in the poor suffering the brunt of environmental hazards; signalled the adoption of a broad policy focus for environmental justice in South Africa – committing the organisation to look to other categories of injustice affecting the country’s poor.

The Challenge of Distributive versus Procedural Justice

Perhaps the most salient of criticisms levelled at the Environmental Justice movement has resulted from the fact that often the operation of environmental justice and environmental equity has served to thwart local autonomy and to challenge the very core of democratic practice. This dilemma surfaces where “...the principles of justice underlying claims of environmental equity encounter the pragmatic demands of local communities or conflict with local community sentiment.”²²⁷ The net result then is the creation of a situation where principles of distribution underlying environmental equity are placed in opposition to local working class autonomy and self-determination.²²⁸

²²⁶ *The Networker*, 14, Winter 1997, cited Cock, (2002), op cit, p. 7

²²⁷ Lake, R.W; *Volunteers, NIMBY's, and Environmental Justice: Dilemmas of Democratic Practice*; *Antipode* 28:2, (1996), p. 160

²²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 160

The problems underlying this dilemma have been attributed by Lake to the historical preoccupation of the Environmental Justice movement with distributive justice.²²⁹ The successes won by environmental justice advocates in areas throughout the US and globally, have served to place this process as the central preoccupation of the many environmental justice organisations working throughout the world today. The emphasis on reaching distributive equity has served to alienate higher ideals of procedural justice, and often has served to relegate them to mere legislative enactments or policies which facilitate the action of groups seeking to promote distributive equity. This preoccupation with proving distributive injustices in the literature, and well as the successes in the eradication of distributive injustices in communities throughout the US and the rest of the globe, has resulted in procedural equity and justice being sidelined.

Procedural justice seeks to influence decision-making in the processes of siting of environmental hazards, yet Lake argues that even this is insufficient,²³⁰ as it regards the procedures relating to the initial production of these environmental problems as being out of reach. Instead of regarding production as a fore-gone conclusion, theorists such as Young and Ruiters²³¹ have argued that what is desperately needed is a broader focus in influencing decision-making and policy formulation. The broader focus in discussion advocates rather that environmental justice should not just be content to focus on empowerment in decision making for the distribution of environmental problems; but rather should empower their communities to influence decision making which decides

²²⁹ Ibid, p. 162

²³⁰ Ibid, p. 164

²³¹ Young cited Lake, (1996) op cit, p. 165; Ruiters, (2002), op cit, p 112

what is produced for distribution in the first place, how these problems should be addressed, and finally the means of distribution itself.²³²

Once procedural justice is conceptualised in these terms, it is possible finally to reconcile the current dilemma of environmental justice concerns existing in opposition to local autonomy and self-determination. The attainment of true procedural equality helps to involve local populations more completely in decision-making which will ultimately determine what hazards they will produce in their own communities, and how these will be dealt with. Self determination is thus satisfied in the democratic sense as communities are able to choose from a set of options that which they are most comfortable with, and exercise autonomy in rejecting the arbitrary exercise of external forces seeking to declare the production of waste as a foregone conclusion.

Overcoming Obstacles to Promoting Environmental Justice

However, Goldman has argued that a crucial obstacle facing coalition building, and by extension the progress of the Environmental Justice movement - is the phenomenon of 'the disappearing middle'.²³³ The world economy at large is no longer best illustrated as the pyramid structure typical of the capitalist industrialisation in the 19th century, with few on the top controlling the means of production and the vast majority at the bottom in poverty. Instead, this has been replaced by the "hourglass of inequality",²³⁴ as technocratic employment opportunities have catapulted a growing number of middle class workers to the upper echelons of society. The common factor in Goldman's analysis in this our modern economy, is "...a dwindling supply of the kinds of secure, well-paid, full-time

²³² Lake, op cit, p. 165

²³³ Goldman, op cit, p. 122

²³⁴ Ibid, p. 122

jobs that have defined middle class existence.”²³⁵ The result of this process is an increase in fall of middle class workers to the lower classes, where they produce an increase in competition for employment, resulting in increasing unemployment amongst marginalised workers who lack comparative levels of education, or who are merely discriminated against by the ‘racial’ leanings of the administrative institutions of production.

The need for environmental justice movements to fashion an organisational structure which can transcend historical preoccupations with racial prejudice and which can appeal to the working class majority regardless of ‘race’ divisions - is particularly salient, and the future of environmental justice will increasingly be reliant on the extent to which it can market itself to appeal to the middle class, broadening its appeal in order to attract greater following without alienating those members it already has or becoming embroiled in many of the limiting policy debates which characterise many of the mainstream environmental organisations. Ultimately the movement faces the task of becoming a mainstream organisation, without succumbing to the pit-falls which have characterised these organisations along the way.

Despite the increasing popular following of the Environmental Justice movement and the adoption of many of its principles in policy making processes in government, local institutions and indeed in many mainstream civil society organisations; Goldman has observed that,

people of colour in the United States are now even more likely than whites to live in communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities than

²³⁵ Ibid, p. 123

they were a decade ago. 236

It would seem therefore that although public awareness has been focussed on the dangers of the environmental degradation likely to be caused by polluting industries or the siting of waste disposal sites in their communities, the situation of the poverty stricken communities marginalised from the procedural processes of production has by and large worsened due to the fact that these communities remain the path of least resistance to corporations looking to dispose of toxic and other types of waste products, as well as dirty industries seeking to establish themselves in areas with little to no resistance from the local community. Marginalised communities will continue to be soft targets for corporations relative to integrated middle class communities, or even poor 'white' working class communities unless they are able to challenge and redress the inequalities present within the decision making institutions which regulate the production of these types of environmental hazards.

The process of globalisation has further exacerbated the development of a growing income disparity internationally. The ever widening gap between incomes of the have's and have-nots at a global level, where economies are increasingly being forced to exhibit a greater degree of openness to comply with international donor requirements creates ample opportunity for the NIMBY-ism of the first world industrialised economies to produce environmental hardship in countries around the globe. Thus whilst the Environmental Justice movement in the past has indeed managed to produce a number of gains,

the leadership of the movement has only begun to scratch the surface of

²³⁶ Ibid, p. 127

the complex global and domestic forces that underlie the paramount trend of increasing inequality.²³⁷

Increasing inequalities brought about by globalisation in the context of the post Cold War triumph of capitalism has spawned an increase in particularistic identity politics.

In order to successfully challenge the environmental injustices in the South African setting, these fractured political groupings will have to deepen their concerns, involvements and popular support base. Failing this; Environmental Justice movements will either disappear, or forever be confined to simple NIMBY-ism instead of radically empowering poverty-stricken communities to facilitate social justice at a local, national and global level. For Harvey the challenge amounts to the adoption of,

a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space, across the multiple environmental and social conditions that constitute the geography of difference [...] without abandoning its militant particularist base.²³⁸

Neo-Liberalism and Development in Post-Apartheid South Africa

With the transition to democracy in 1994, the new ANC-led government set about on an ambitious plan to restructure institutions and break down the inequalities of Apartheid. Service delivery and its extension to all of South Africa's people regardless of race, gender or economic standing was key to this process as embodied in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The programme articulated ideas of service

²³⁷ Ibid, p. 130

²³⁸ Harvey, cited: Dobson, B; *Searching for a Common Agenda: Ecofeminism and Environmental Justice*; cited McDonald (ed), Environmental Justice in South Africa; ch 3; University of Cape Town press; Cape Town, (2002), p. 85

delivery and the reformation of development of local government which were popular in the Mass Democratic Movement in the 1980s and 1990s.²³⁹

Increased production of housing and other basic services, and their provision to all South Africans was integral to the ideas of redistribution advocated by labour groups such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), civics groups such as the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and various scholars and politicians in the pro-democracy movement. Redistribution was held to be most effectively driven by state-led initiatives utilising existing civic associations dealing with issues of service delivery, emphasising the need to work with the community to redress issues of inequality in the past and present.²⁴⁰

Privatisation as an acceptable option was rejected in favour of state-community partnerships, “The state must ensure that these basic services are retained in public hands and any such services that have been privatised should be renationalised.”²⁴¹

These ideals of state involvement in redistribution of benefits to previously excluded groups were immensely popular in the years leading up to the 1994 elections, and continued to garner much support until the government’s adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in 1996. According to Pape and McDonald, the move from the RDP to the GEAR framework was informed through a number of meetings between ANC leaders and various international financial organisations such as the World Bank, some meetings as early as 1990.²⁴² Eager to see the end of protectionist measures formulated under Apartheid, these institutions

²³⁹ McDonald, (2002), op cit, p. 294

²⁴⁰ McDonald & Pape, (2002), op cit, p.: 3

²⁴¹ Resolution of COSATU 1992 Economic Planning Conference, cited: McDonald & Pape, (2002) op cit, p. 3

²⁴² McDonald & Pape, (2002), op cit, p. 2

advocated neo-liberal principles of market-lead development, cost recovery and privatisation; principles which were to later underlie the GEAR framework, a series of legislative and policy prescriptions which acted to entrench neo-liberal economics and transfer immense benefit to corporate capital. Despite the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa in the same year as GEAR, a document which grants equality to all citizens as a fundamental right, and further allows citizens rights to a healthy environment, access to food and water; the adoption of the neo-liberal GEAR framework effectively linked the realisation of these rights to issues of affordability, market availability and cost recovery – shifting emphasis “from the redistribute state to the neo-liberal “enabling” or “facilitating” state.”²⁴³

The particular course of post-Apartheid development ideology premises the development of the formal market economy, as a means for the socio-economic upliftment of the entirety of South Africa’s population. Benefits gained from the ANC’s market economic policy are believed to produce beneficial results for those in the informal economy through a “trickle-down effect”, allowing recipients to rise from the informal economy to the market economy, so that growth at the top of the economic spectrum for ‘the few’, is rationalised as translating into the eventual growth for ‘the many’. The development discourse of the post-Apartheid government views the capitalist world market-economic model as the appropriate mechanism both for the production of wealth as well as the distribution of goods and services to populations.²⁴⁴ However, as the majority of the country’s population are unable to effectively engage the capitalist market, the net result

²⁴³ Ibid, p. 4

²⁴⁴ Greenberg, op cit, p. 2

of such a policy results in the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of the affluent – and the further exclusion of the majority poor population.²⁴⁵

The current developmental model applied by the ANC-lead government can be seen as a clearly negotiated and structured program; wrought in partnership with global multilateral financial lending institutions, the economically powerful elite and key members of the government.²⁴⁶ Ideologically, the program adopted corresponds to central tenets of neo-liberal development. Economic stagnation in the late 1980s offered significant challenges to the National Party rule, resulting in growing pressure for the massive restructuring deemed necessary for competition in the world market economy. As it became obvious towards the late 1980's and early 1990's that the National Party was unwilling to affect the meaningful democratisation or redistribution envisioned, economically powerful sources of capital sought opportunities to closely ally themselves with the ANC led majority, in order to secure an end to Apartheid and National Party rule; agreeing to “concede to majority rule if there was only limited economic redistribution, and if the political framework allowed for renewed accumulation.”²⁴⁷

While the particular form of neo-liberalism adopted in South Africa still permits a certain degree of state involvement in the economy, permitting state subsidisation of certain developmental aims and black economic empowerment; Greenberg (2004) argues state assistance in these forms do not contradict the dominant global neo-liberal project;

Where markets are not functioning effectively or where no markets exist, the role of the state is to improve their functioning, or to create markets [...] to provide a basic level of resources to enable participation in markets for housing, services, land and so on for those excluded.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p.3

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 3

²⁴⁷ Wood (2002): cited Greenberg, op cit, p. 4

²⁴⁸ Greenberg, op cit, p. 4

Despite this, the outcomes of the policy have shown little in the way of a transfer of political and economic power has resulted to date. Whereas the political elite of the National Party was replaced, the ruling elite formed by the interests of local capital has remained at the helm of political, economic and social power in post-Apartheid South Africa – albeit with new alliances and partners, in the form of the ANC and its allies. Rather, the hegemony of Apartheid has been re-established, allowing neo-liberal development and the ascendancy of capitalist market economy to be presented by this dominant ruling class as being in “the universal interests of the citizenry as a whole.”²⁴⁹

The Socio-Economic Costs of Restructuring in the post-Apartheid Era

The application of the ANC’s GEAR policy and the interests of capital have had profound impacts on urban centres in South Africa. In line with neo liberal economic policies, urban planning and development in the post Apartheid period has involved a trend to address spatial integration and build partnerships in service delivery through privatisation programs, hereby limiting state expenditures in the interests of fiscal restraint at both the local and provincial government level. Despite rhetoric of the benefits of privatisation, the outcome of this process has been the exorbitant increase in tariffs for basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation – costs which have been unjustly borne by the most vulnerable – the country’s poor.

In terms of urban integration, the effects of Apartheid city spatial dislocation of the country’s marginalized poor (most often ‘black’) populations by the practices of ‘race-zoning’ and urban influx control; gave rise to significant support for plans to adopt a

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p.5

‘compact city’ approach to promote integration.²⁵⁰ However, urban planning post-Apartheid has done little in the way to provide redress to marginalized populations. Urban development programs have clearly reflected the logic of capitalist economic development – prioritising the expansion of market-enhancing commercial development over meeting the interests of the marginalized poor. Housing provision to those excluded under Apartheid has followed a similar trend, with a market-centred housing policy despite the provision of a state subsidy to enable market access to a broader sector of the population; and developments involving private sector providers to construct housing.²⁵¹ In both urban and rural centres, the promotion of the ‘willing seller – willing buyer’ approach to land reform places rural land reform firmly within the realm of the capitalist market economy, despite the existence of small state subsidies. Thus, in keeping with neo-liberal development, the promotion of integration in both the urban and rural centres post-Apartheid serves to prioritise the interests of the capitalist market economy, placing it at the very centre of policy at both the national and local level, following the logic that economic gains at the upper echelons of society will eventually permeate the lower levels of society – extending the capitalist market in order to capture the broader population into the formal market economy. Accompanying the adoption of GEAR, civil society in the post-Apartheid era has witnessed the re-alignment of post-Apartheid civil society with the interests of the dominant ruling class program of neo-liberalism and capitalist market economics,

²⁵⁰ Greenberg, op cit, p. 6; Todes et al; Urban Restructuring and Land Availability, in Khan, F & Thring (eds); Housing Policy and Practice in post-Apartheid South Africa; ch 7; Sandown: Heinemann Press, Johannesburg (2003), p. 256; Harrison, P; *Fragmentation and Globalisation as the new Meta-Narrative*; in Phillip Harrison, Marie Huchzermeyer, Mzwanele Mayekiso (eds); Confronting Fragmentation: housing and urban development in a democratising society; ch 1; Cape Town, University of Cape Town, (2003)

²⁵¹ Greenberg, op cit, p. 6

reflecting a changing enemy from ‘oppression’ or ‘racism’ as under Apartheid, to the new political objective of “nation building with the enemy now being an apolitical ‘poverty’”.²⁵²

This re-alignment of formal civil society with the dominant development ideology has created a vacuum at the level of grassroots engagement.

Whereas, the period following the 1994 election until the second election has been described by numerous analysts as one of government willingness to engage in collaborative arrangements with civil society in policy making;²⁵³ with notable successes being won for the advancement of various concerns relating to the poor, this collaborative spirit was short lived. For many in civil society, the adoption of the GEAR program in 1996 was seen as a dramatic signal to those advocating social justice and redistribution that the neo-liberal demands of business, the World Bank and foreign investors would assume the primary focus of government.

Whereas few disagree that Apartheid was responsible for a large portion of the current crisis, many have argued the increasing adaptation of South African development to the neoliberal model as a result of policies such as GEAR have resulted in inequality and poverty being worsened after a decade of democratic government.²⁵⁴

Despite optimism in the early 1990s that democracy would herald the delivery of land and services to those dispossessed during the forced removals of the Apartheid years; the adoption of cost recovery mechanisms and a “willing seller, willing buyer” policy by the

²⁵² Ibid, p.25

²⁵³ Cock (2002), op cit; McDonald (2002), op cit; Ballard et al; Globalisation, Marginalisation, and Contemporary Social Movements in South Africa; online at <http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs/files/Ballardconf50.pdf> (2005), p. 12

²⁵⁴ Bond, P; *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms*, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press (2004), p. 131; Ballard et al. (2005), op cit, p.: 14; Hallows & Butler (2004), op cit, p. 3

ANC led government have all but dashed hopes for a meaningful land reform program benefiting the poor – in favour of a commitment to capitalist economics and neo-liberal development.²⁵⁵

This adoption of a development discourse which acts to reinforce exclusion – both social exclusion, economic exclusion, and political exclusion through inadequate reform and insensitive local government – has resulted in what Greenberg terms “the re-establishment of hegemony in the post-Apartheid era.”²⁵⁶

The Crisis of Local Government

A significant portion of the critical theory of neo-liberal development under the GEAR framework has pointed to the existence of a crisis at the level of local government in South Africa; relating directly to the ability of local government to effectively formulate development initiatives and effect their delivery to populations.²⁵⁷

The contemporary crisis at the local government level in South Africa has its roots in the political exclusion of Apartheid. Apartheid entrenched the political exclusion of those populations marginalized by the socially constructed ‘race’ based ideology, through exclusion from political processes at both the national, as well as local government level. In both urban and rural centres, ‘white’ local governments were given jurisdiction over ‘black’ populations – while ‘black’ populations were given virtually no voice at the level of the ‘white’ local councils. Service provision was held to be the responsibility of local

²⁵⁵ Greenberg, op cit, p. 1

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p.2

²⁵⁷ Bond & Hallows (2002), op cit;

Hallows & Butler (2004), op cit;

Greenberg, op cit;

Bond, P, et al; Eco-social injustice for working-class communities: the making and unmaking of neoliberal infrastructure policy, in Bond, P (eds); Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest; ch 4; University of natal press: Pietermaritzburg (2002);

McDonald (2002), op cit

government, with the result being the dismal level of basic service provision and housing provision which characterised the residential spaces for Apartheid's excluded populations.²⁵⁸ As the urban populations in areas like Johannesburg swelled after the 1970s, local governments were given wide discretionary powers to affect influx control policies, and the policing of key Group Areas legislation such as the Separate Amenities Act and the monitoring of racially segregated urban spaces. Local governments were further responsible for housing schemes for those marginalized populations legally resident in urban spaces, a process which with increased attempts to limit the numbers of urbanised 'blacks' through influx controls – lagged far behind the numbers required, resulting in massive overcrowding in formal residential spaces and the dramatic growth in informal settlements in areas with no service provision.²⁵⁹

Local government in the post-Apartheid period has been the site of major restructuring in order to meet the demands of the capitalist market economic system. Local government has a pivotal role in the development model adapted post-Apartheid, specifically in the management of state subsidies and the extension of the market economy to the previously marginalized.²⁶⁰ At the municipal level, the process has prescribed an end to the racial segregation of municipalities, joining those previously fragmented under Apartheid into large Metropolitan municipalities, a process which reduced the number of municipalities from over 800 in 1994 to approximately 250 by the year 2000.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Greenberg, op cit, p. 8

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p.8

²⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 10

²⁶¹ Khumalo, G; Ntlokonkulu, L; & Rapoo, T; *Alternative Service Delivery arrangements at municipal level in South Africa: assessing the impact of electricity service delivery and customer satisfaction in Johannesburg*; Centre For Policy Studies; research report 102; Johannesburg (2003), p. 3

With the adoption of the Constitution in 1996, responsibility for the provision of basic services was passed on to local governments and their institutions – tasking these bodies with the enormous goal of extending delivery to previously un-serviced areas and populations.

Local government and municipalities are tasked with the responsibility of designing mandatory integrated development plans (IDPs) for the urban planning aims and integration of local government policies in order to meet service delivery needs and the political, economic and social integration of previously marginalized populations.

Whereas formally, the governments land reform and redistribution program falls firmly in the ambit of the national and provincial governments responsibility – local government are able to influence discussions and policy governing local land use through the process of Land Development Objectives, which find expression in IDPs.²⁶² Yet under neo-liberal development programs, with increased fiscal accountability on local government, and increased investment competition between local governments – local land usage becomes subject to capitalist market production; resulting in the most acceptable land use favouring income generating strategies as opposed to redistributive outcomes, with the consequences being an increased commodification of land, specifically unoccupied land creating “incentive to landowners and local councils alike to move tenants from the land.”²⁶³

The Failure of Neo-liberalism’s Economic Project

After almost a decade of development under the GEAR program, promises of the rhetoric of neo-liberal development and the adoption of capitalist market economics have not

²⁶² Greenberg, op cit, p. 11

²⁶³ Ibid, p.11

been fulfilled, and while “the time frame for change recedes ever further into the future [...] fallout from the developmental and growth path adopted is experienced every day by millions in insecure locations across the city and beyond.”²⁶⁴ This failure of neo-liberal development has not only reproduced the exclusion of those marginalized by Apartheid, but indeed in many cases has deepened the burden on the country’s poor. Despite liberalisation, “formal deracialisation is accompanied by continued exclusion based on economic ‘value’.”²⁶⁵ In all spheres of the proposed plans for urban integration, the supposed beneficiaries of the programs have suffered disproportionate costs of market economic logic. Whereas housing provision has begun to address the enormous backlog left by Apartheid; the entrenchment of market logic has resulted in the practice of constructing new housing schemes far from employment and commercial opportunities on the peri-urban fringes of urban centres – hereby reproducing the phenomenon of spatial dislocation of marginalized populations. The commodification and application of principles of rational use and efficiency to land under the post-apartheid development path has further resulted in a need by provincial and local government to eradicate informal settlements – resulting in a fresh phase of population relocations, reminiscent of forced removals under Apartheid rule.²⁶⁶

Despite the constitutional protection of tenure for communities of persons, “legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices”, and the entitlement “either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress”²⁶⁷; populations relocated under the current development policy are rarely offered improved

²⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 12

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 12

²⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 13

²⁶⁷ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996

circumstances – primarily as a result of an increasingly narrow interpretation of the right to property. As Greenberg states, “Improvement of conditions is separated from removals. Thus the situation where the council (Johannesburg City Council) plan(ned) to remove 36,000 households from 26 settlements by 2004, yet only plans to eradicate the housing backlog by 2007.”²⁶⁸

Forced removals of populations from land in urban areas remains a tool in state urban planning initiatives despite the demise of Apartheid – with populations often being resettled in remote un-serviced locations or in government housing developments on the urban fringes – thus reproducing the Apartheid tendency to treat entire human settlements in informal conditions as local unwanted land uses; if not in terms of Apartheid’s ‘racially’ constructed ideology – then in terms of market economic logic.

Despite Constitutional imperatives, tenure security in the post Apartheid era remains a significant area of concern for the vast majority of South Africa’s poor housed in informal settlements or in illegal tenure on formal land. Evictions and relocations act not to redress past inequalities – but rather to reinforce the Apartheid era social and economic exclusions – by the resettlement of populations far from all but the most menial forms of employment, education and opportunities for financial remuneration. Coupled with this has been the emergence of a plethora of ‘hidden costs’ to relocated populations, in particular those resettled in formal housing for the first time and subjected to exorbitant costs of newly privatised service provision – as well as increased transport costs associated with life on the urban fringes. Limited access to skilled employment, training and education has effectively resulted in the transition to the modernised capitalist economy in South African resulting in a dramatic swelling of the poverty-stricken urban

²⁶⁸ Greenberg, op cit, p. 13 – parenthesis added.

underclass, without access to the means for socio-economic upliftment; a reproduction of the Apartheid eras unskilled labour pool – hounded for profits by newly privatised service delivery firms and forced into inter-urban flows from fringe settlements to employment and commercial opportunities.

The Ascendancy of Neo-liberal Service Delivery

Service delivery to resident populations has been a second major sphere of restructuring in terms of the market model. Whereas under Apartheid, local governments routinely utilised cross subsidisation schemes in the delivery of basic services; under the post-Apartheid market model this process has been replaced with the economically efficient (neo-liberal sanctioned) program of ring-fencing and privatisation of service delivery. Accompanying privatisation has been the implementation of cost-recovery mechanisms with cut-offs for non-payment, with disproportionate costs being visited on poorer populations in the interests of reducing the practice of industrial and commercial sector subsidisation of residential service users.²⁶⁹ Privatisation of municipal services has not only involved the passing of a disproportionate burden to the country's more vulnerable, previously marginalized poor – but has also amounted to a severe blow to hopes for redistribution of opportunities to the previously marginalized.

Yet despite the sanctioned program of local government delivery, evidence from the beginning of 1996 has shown that many local government municipalities and other authorities suffer a wide range of capacity and institutional weaknesses, including but not limited to inadequate training and expertise, and declining levels of staff and new

²⁶⁹ Greenberg, op cit, p. 11

appointments to deal with the enormous increases in demand from the previously unserved populations under Apartheid.²⁷⁰

Coupled with issues of capacity facing local authorities, have arisen problems stemming from an acute lack of funds to overcome the services backlog, estimated to amount to between R47 billion and R53 billion in 2003.²⁷¹ These financial difficulties at the local government level were exacerbated by declining levels of fiscal transfer from national government in keeping with the GEAR framework, a factor which reduced local government effectiveness in extending or upgrading service infrastructure to improve the quality and extent of delivery of basic services.

As a result of institutional weaknesses, capacity issues and fiscal constraints, as well as the gradual ascendancy of the GEAR neo-liberal market logic at the national level, policy makers steadily began to alter their views from the promotion of state-control of service delivery, to alternate methods involving the private sector in a variety of state monitored partnerships.

Aside from a number of successful instances in extending infrastructure networks to previously excluded areas, increasingly neo-liberal market forces became visible at all levels in national and local government, undermining service delivery initiatives and redistribution agendas. A salient example of this is that,

while two million households may have been given access to water between 1994 and 1999, cost recovery measures and bureaucratic inefficiencies made many such projects inoperable.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Khumalo, Ntlokonkulu & Rapoo, (2003), op cit, p. 3

²⁷¹ Ibid, p. 3

²⁷² McDonald & Pape, op cit, p. 4

This inoperability was often caused by the cutting of budgets, lack of follow-up with maintenance and the reactions of local communities to cost recovery mechanisms through vandalism or illegal connections.²⁷³ Despite objections from local populations, cost recovery became gradually entrenched in government policies in service delivery after 1996, systematically eroding the quality of a number of the basic rights of citizenship as granted by the Constitution.

Scaling back of budgets and a rationalisation of administrative personnel through the GEAR framework dictated at the national level often resulted in the outsourcing of service delivery to private contractors by local governments, a process actively promoted by national government through the Department of Provincial and Local Government's Municipal investment infrastructure Unit (MIIU).²⁷⁴ The inevitable outcome of these factors was the growing promotion and acceptance of the practise of cost recovery, and declining control of municipalities over service delivery – transferring power to private interests. As a result, poor populations were once again excluded, both through the imposition of high costs for these basic services which amounted to a disproportionately high burden in comparison to their income earnings – and by denying their inherent right to dignity, equality and services as set out in the Constitution.

The scale of privatisation projects after 1996 often made public opposition difficult, yet numerous public-private partnerships (PPPs) were vehemently opposed by members of local communities and organisations such as COSATU, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Anti Privatisation Forum. One of the most notable examples was the reaction to the implementation of the iGoli 2002 privatisation and rationalisation

²⁷³ Ibid, p.4

²⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 5

programme. At the heart of this programme was the attempt to implement cost recovery, cutbacks and privatisation on a large scale – entrenching market logic within service delivery. Numerous organisations protested the campaign, most notably the SECC which launched a varied program of illegal reconnections, mass protests and legal measures to combat Eskom's attempt to institute cost recovery in Soweto.²⁷⁵ Yet despite ongoing protests and opposition, government remained committed to market logic at all levels, and throughout the country the incidence of privatisation and cost recovery escalated – translating into an affordability crisis with respect to these supposed rights for the majority of the country's poor.²⁷⁶

While issues of affordability remain the central complaint for activists and residents, a second common form complaint typically relates to issues of differential quality of service to marginalized populations.²⁷⁷ A study by the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 2003 concerning service delivery in Johannesburg by City Power showed considerable customer reaction as to the effectiveness of communication and customer care in newly privatised service delivery arrangements.²⁷⁸ Respondents from two previously racially defined areas (namely Alexander Township and Lenasia in Johannesburg) further gave evidence alleging unequal treatment in comparison with those in affluent areas, claiming,

smaller users were being left to fend for themselves while City Power provided better quality of service and care to bulk users of electricity with larger accounts.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 6

²⁷⁶ Khunou; G; “*Massive Cutoffs*”: *Cost Recovery and Electricity Service in Diepkloof, Soweto*; in McDonald & Pape (eds); *Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa*; London Z books (2002), p. 65

²⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 65

²⁷⁸ Khumalo, Ntlokonkulu & Rapoo, op cit, p. 42

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 30

The crisis of affordability of basic services is a common dilemma facing many poor families in SA, with the poor often being burdened with an unequal proportion of costs for services relative to their socio-economic standing. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of distributions in income, with the poorest 20% of the populations earning a mere 1.6% of the total country's income in 2000.²⁸⁰

Due to declining levels of job creation and an alarming growth in unemployment statistics, poor families throughout the country often have to make do with the income of one family members or pensioner in order to survive. Newly privatised service delivery divorces these more vulnerable people from their socio-economic context, and often among those people targeted for cut-offs are pensioners, indigents or people with other economic difficulties.²⁸¹ Here the GEAR framework and privatisation has failed the poor, resulting in job losses despite programs aimed at the creation of secure employment.

Whilst the sources of economic pressures vary, the overall result is a decreased income earning potential for South Africa's poor.

Many residents responded to affordability issues and cut-offs by framing access to service with the realisations of basic rights inherent to citizenship, and moreover as having the right to income to pay for these services.²⁸² This notion of realisation of the rights to citizenship is of profound importance in South Africa's transition to Democracy. Whilst the Constitution of South Africa acknowledges the basic rights of citizenship to include access to services, employment and other social goods; the ascendancy of neo-liberal market tendencies embodied in the GEAR framework has resulted in a situation

²⁸⁰ Hallowes & Butler, (2004) op cit, p.: 8

²⁸¹ Khunou, op cit, p. 68

²⁸² Ibid, p. 69

where “residents are defined and treated first as customers before they are treated as citizens.”²⁸³

While GEAR has in some cases successfully extended cost recovery mechanisms to these populations, other elements of the framework such as the promotion of employment creation have not matched these extensions. Thus rising unemployment exacerbated by privatisation schemes have resulted in poor communities bearing a disproportionate burden for services in relation to economic opportunity. Further, service delivery is seen by many to enforce difference within society through the provision of unequal services to the poor. Despite the extension of services to previously excluded populations, the quality of services in SA remains heavily skewed in favour of traditionally white areas, arguing “willingness to pay is linked to government’s political will to upgrade service quality in historically black areas.”²⁸⁴ In the Lenasia region in Johannesburg, CPS researchers reported inconsistencies in the willingness of City Power to upgrade electricity infrastructure in this area, some of which is over 30 years old, as opposed to frequent upgrades and maintenance in white areas - resulting in a high frequency of power outages to these less affluent communities.²⁸⁵ These factors reinforce a sense of inequality in these areas, with private service providers being seen to respond more efficiently to affluent ‘white’ concerns in contrast to the concerns of poorer formally racially defined communities.

The crisis of affordability and differences in the relative quality of services provided threatens to further erode the gains of citizenship as stipulated by the Constitution, a

²⁸³ Ibid, p. 74

²⁸⁴ McDonald and Pape, op cit, p. 7

²⁸⁵ Khumalo, Ntlokonkulu & Rapoo, op cit, p. 17

situation which Khunou argues carries the threat of producing “a negative definition of democracy.”²⁸⁶

The practice thus contains within it the ability to erode a number of the benefits to South Africa’s transition, and to affect the continued exploitation of the vast majority of the country’s population by the priorities of fiscal restraint and profit maximisation inherent in the GEAR logic.

The Un-sustainability of Current Housing Delivery

Despite massive attempts by the South African government over the past decade to address the enormous housing backlog resulting as a legacy of Apartheid urban development; the rate of housing delivery in the Post Apartheid period has failed to keep pace with the formation of new urban households.²⁸⁷ As a result, informal settlements continue to dot the urban landscape of all major urban centres, with residents in these types of settlements being unable to transcend the various health implications, economic strains, or the various incumbent social pathologies associated with their entrapment in poverty and inadequate housing.

Yet despite the predominance and prevalence of informal human settlements, the response by the ANC-led government has left much to be desired in supporting the socio-economic and socio-political implications of poverty to residents, preferring instead to

²⁸⁶ Khunou, op cit, p. 74

²⁸⁷ Marx, Colin; *Supporting Informal Settlements*; in Khan, F & Thring, P (eds); Housing Policy and Practice in post-Apartheid South Africa; ch 9; Sandown: Heinmann Press; Johannesburg (2003), p. 299; Bond, (2003), op cit; Mayekiso, M; *South Africa’s Enduring Urban Crisis: The Local State and the Urban Social Movement with Particular Reference to Johannesburg*; in Phillip Harrison, Marie Huchzermeyer, Mzwanele Mayekiso (eds); Confronting Fragmentation: housing and urban development in a democratising society; ch 4; Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press (2003); Khan (2003); Baumann (2003)

structure delivery “through the narrows lens of housing policy.”²⁸⁸ Yet the operation of Goldberg’s argument show that spatial dislocation and unequal settlement patterns emerge not as an accident or incidental outcome of contemporary urban development,²⁸⁹ but rather these patterns relate directly to a plethora of implicit development beliefs which reinforce categories of difference in spatial terms, underlying power relations and the operation of social pathologies at all levels of societal engagement.

The argument for an adaptation of the international policy of a ‘compact city’ approach to the South African context is a widely accepted notion in Post-Apartheid urban development policy.²⁹⁰ This approach is seen as vital if the South African government is to meet the aims as highlighted in the 1994 Housing White Paper of “viable, social and economically integrated communities situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, education and social amenities.”²⁹¹ Yet despite these aims current developments have done little to address the glaring spatial differences inherited as legacies of Apartheid planning; while considerable evidence suggests these spatial divides are being reinforced allowing for the continued socio-economic and spatial marginalisation of the poor on the urban peripheries.²⁹² Todes et al argue a key reason for these continued and indeed exacerbated spatial imbalances is the government’s focus on accelerated delivery in “sterile and dormitory suburbs on the urban periphery” in

²⁸⁸ Marx, op cit, p. 299

²⁸⁹ Marx, op cit, p. 299

²⁹⁰ Todes et al, op cit, p. 256; Harrison, (2003), op cit

²⁹¹ Cited: Todes, op cit, p. 256

²⁹² Royston, L; *On the Outskirts: Access to Well-located Land and Integration in post-Apartheid Human Settlement Development*; in Khan, F & Thring, P (eds); Housing Policy and Practice in post-Apartheid South Africa; ch 6; Sandown, Heinemann Press, Johannesburg (2003), p.234

favour of compact development on well-located land; a practice which has “militated against a consideration of spatial factors.”²⁹³

Given the history of this type of settlement pattern both in South Africa and throughout the world being linked to race-based marginalisation, the question naturally arises as to why this extent of dispossession and inequality continues to exist in the context of South Africa’s newly democratic polity. For Marx (2003), part of the explanation emerges from the dualistic conception of ‘informal’ versus ‘formal’ patterns of human settlements; and partly from the inherent spatial complexities of informal settlements, particularly the fact that they represent the “legal, social, economic, environmental and political forces of the day.”²⁹⁴ As to the first of these arguments, the operation of the formal/ informal dualism creates a perception of formal as being desired or superior, while informality is seen as requiring change or improvement – often improvements defined in terms of those occupying the ‘formal’ world. In this way, those living in the formal world are able to construct informality as deviant or other, and in doing so, set the basis for improvements, a process “rarely defined by the voices and needs of the informal settlement dwellers by powerful people in the formal realm of society.”²⁹⁵

Failing to view informal settlements as both a commonplace occurrence in urban development and as intimately related to the dominant socio-economic and political context in which they occur, naturally supports this simple dualism and validates the seemingly simple technocratic solution of ‘formalising the informal’. The danger of such a view, is that it carries with it the tendency to obscure the underlying grounds for the

²⁹³ Todes et al, op cit, p. 256

²⁹⁴ Marx, op cit, p. 300

²⁹⁵ Ibid, p.300

existence of informal settlements in their current urban positions in the first place²⁹⁶, a factor which in the case of relocation of human settlements as part and parcel of the formalisation process – has enormous implications for the sustainability of newly relocated ‘greenfields’ developments.²⁹⁷

In contrast to this view then, it is important in the interests of sustainability to locate the reasons for the formation of informal settlements and the various relations they incur within a broader framework. The vast majority of informal settlements in urban Johannesburg form in relation to proximity to employment opportunities, and as such relate to questions of access – both to employment, areas of consumerism and (to some extent) service delivery associated with existing urban service provision.²⁹⁸

Dangers of unsanitary living conditions in these locations are to some extent offset by their proximity to job centres – both in the informal and the formal economy, with residents not only able to secure scarce employment but also avoid high transport costs associated with residence elsewhere. Further, the visibility of informal settlements in built-up or developed urban areas allows for a number of hidden subsidies to residents, as government, local authorities, businesses and local residents amongst other concerned actors may attempt various forms of intervention to alleviate the burgeoning health crisis associated with informal life.²⁹⁹

A critical question relating to the sustainability of South Africa’s new urban development framework, relates to the relationship between human settlement development and the

²⁹⁶ Ibid, p.300

²⁹⁷ Baumann, T; *Housing Policy and Poverty in South Africa*; in Khan, F & Thring, P (eds); Housing Policy and Practice in post-Apartheid South Africa; ch 2; Sandown: Heinemann Press, Johannesburg (2003)

²⁹⁸ Marx, op cit, p. 301, Todes et al (2003), op cit; Baumann (2003), op cit

²⁹⁹ Marx, op cit, p. 301

process of integration and poverty alleviation – and in particular whether new forms of urban development are seen to alter the lives of the poor for the better.³⁰⁰

Whereas housing policy and service provision in the post-Apartheid era have achieved some measure of success in extending both delivery of housing and basic services to populations identified as ‘previously disadvantaged’; overwhelmingly evidence suggests a number of alarming incidences where development projects are seen to worsen the lives of the most marginalised populations. Activists and authors would seem to agree that a significant cause of these failures is to be found in an incomplete or narrow understanding of the power relations underlying poverty amongst South Africa’s marginalised, resulting in development strategies which entrench or deepen poverty by impacting on the survival strategies of the poor.³⁰¹

Neo-liberalism and Housing in South Africa

In keeping with the neo-liberal GEAR strategy, South African housing policy has primarily been understood in macroeconomic terms, with inadequate housing link to income poverty.³⁰² As a result, the development policy aims at increased macroeconomic performance in order to improve delivery and access to housing, effectively subjugating housing delivery to the economic outcomes of the GEAR strategy. Yet while the GEAR program further directs both national and local government to conservative fiscal spending, limiting the availability of funds for service provision until economic goals of the program have been met; the macroeconomic outcomes of the GEAR policy have

³⁰⁰ Baumann, op cit, p. 85

³⁰¹ Ibid, p.85

³⁰² Kentridge (1996) cited Baumann, op cit, p. 92

failed dismally to provide the benefits to the lower strata of the populations envisioned in the rhetoric.³⁰³

In terms of eradicating the spatial exclusion of South Africa's informal settlement residents, the Housing policy has adopted the subsidy program. This measure is not wholly anathema to the neo-liberal development program adopted by government in that subsidies are "seems as a temporary measure, pending the growth of the economy and the trickle-down of resources to the poor."³⁰⁴ The housing policy separates beneficiaries based on formal incomes, with these households earning less than R1,500 a month qualifying for a full government subsidy. Thus the housing policy identifies recipients not on the history of racial based oppression and dispossession under Apartheid, but rather as a result of poverty of the inability to participate effectively in the formal market economy.

By identifying beneficiaries purely in market terms, this view obscures a plethora of underlying relations of power which serve to marginalise populations in poverty – both as a historical legacy of Apartheid and as an ongoing effect of narrow-focus neo-liberal market driven development strategies. For true sustainability and integration to occur, the environmental justice perspective requires that we take cognisance of these underlying political, social and economic relations underpinning informal settlements, in order that a lack of adequate shelter is understood not purely in market terms, but further in relation to a host of issues which propagate the ongoing intentional racial-spatialisation of residence and social life in post-Apartheid South Africa.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ Baumann, op cit, p. 94; Marx, op cit, Khan, (2003), op cit

³⁰⁴ Baumann, op cit, p. 86

³⁰⁵ Ibid, p.87

An examination of income levels in South Africa has shown a significant correlation between those having to rely on the full government subsidy for housing and those denied by the Apartheid policy as 'black' or 'non-white', amounting to 75% of the 'black' populations.³⁰⁶ Further, a significant number of these households (15%) are currently housed in informal settlements or informal housing.³⁰⁷ Whereas these figures have undoubtedly been severely influenced by the legacy of oppression and dispossession under Apartheid, the question arises to what extent these inequalities can be effectively dealt with under the current neo-liberal development strategy employed by the South African government.

Subsidies allocation for housing are directed by local government to private contractors and developers, with the subsidy being spent on land, service provision and finally the top structure itself. Often the result are tiny, uniform houses located in unsustainable locations of the urban peripheries. The decision by government to progress with housing developments despite these outcomes suggests that; "for poor people living in informal settlements, a cement-block structure with a tap and toilet, no matter how small or poorly located, is an improvement."³⁰⁸ This interpretation is directly in conflict with the more social-minded outcome envisioned by activists and NGO's, "Basically adequate housing has to provide shelter from the elements, provide suitable living for the inhabitants, be located within a pleasant living environment, and be well located for economic and social opportunities (such as shops and places of employment)."³⁰⁹

³⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 87-88

³⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 91

³⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 94

³⁰⁹ Built Environment Support Group 1999; Towards the Right to Adequate Housing: Durban and Pietermaritzburg; BESG: cited Pottie, D; *Challenges to Local Government in Low-income Housing Delivery*, in Khan, F & Thring, P (eds): Housing Policy and Practice in post-Apartheid South Africa: ch 13; Sandown: Heinemann Press, Johannesburg (2003) at p 432

For Marx, the contemporary system reinforces informal settlements due to a focus on informal settlements which are project-based; driven by a conception of informality as a housing issue; and that reinforces Apartheid-era spatial, economic and social exclusion.³¹⁰

The Projectisation of Housing Delivery and Policy

In keeping with the basic tenets of neoliberal development which defines poverty as the root cause of underdevelopment, the dominant logic of the current approach to informal settlements in contemporary South Africa regards residents of informal settlements as the 'other', defining them as the problem which requires their relocation elsewhere.³¹¹ In this way, attention is diverted from the system-wide inequalities in relation to economic access or property rights in favour of focussing on the internal characteristics of informal settlements and their residents.

These factors facilitate the process of greenfields developments in large project-based attempts to relocate residents in peripheral locations, under the guise of pro-active development through formalisation. Yet, despite the dominant logic, the result of these attempts often serves to entrench residents as outside the broader urban framework, hereby depoliticising the development process and reinforcing inequalities relating to spatial dislocation and the dominant national integration objectives.³¹²

Eradication of informal settlements is driven through the housing policy, as informal settlements are typically viewed as existing due to a lack of affordable housing. The provision of housing in the post-apartheid era has been hampered by a variety of

³¹⁰ Marx, op cit, p. 302

³¹¹ Ibid, p. 302

³¹² Ibid, p.302

institutional factors and limitations – resulting in difficulties for government in the building of sustainable human settlements to cope with the burgeoning informal settlements populations.

Arguably the greatest obstacle to the fulfilment of these aims have been the lack of government willingness to expropriate land in the public interest.³¹³ Despite the existence of provision in section 25(2) and 25(4) enabling the state to appropriate land in order to meet the goals of equitable integration; the overriding sanctity of private property and the need to protect private property prices, a by-product of the government's commitment to neoliberal development policies, has restricted the ability of housing development on well-located land close to employment and other development imperatives.³¹⁴

The acquisition of well located land and the promotion of integration remain as fundamental challenges to the building of sustainable human settlements in South Africa. Despite this, within the dominant discourse a number of factors have hampered the promotion of well-located sustainable and integrated settlements.

The Greenfields development model is widely regarded to be more favourable for developers as opposed to upgrading, which due to the project nature of development projects makes vacant land more suitable. This bias causes many developers to look to the urban fringes for vacant land perpetuating the peripheral locations of poor settlements.³¹⁵

The result is the increased relocation of residents of informal settlements in peripheral spaces, internalising not only increased socio-economic costs to the marginalized in the

³¹³ Royston, op cit

³¹⁴ Marx, op cit, p. 303; Ruiters (2002), op cit; Royston, op cit; Baumann, op cit; Todes et al, op cit; Khan, (2003), op cit

³¹⁵ Royston, op cit, p. 241

absence of proximate employment and increased transport costs to centres of consumerism; but further serving to recreate or perpetuate the spatial, economic and environmental inequalities of the Apartheid urban model. These contemporary peripheries bear many of the hallmarks of their apartheid era counterparts – often existing without adequate service provision, health-care facilities, environment quality and prospects for sustainable job creation.³¹⁶ The socio-economic shocks of these and other hidden costs to relocated populations despite their sudden ‘formalisation’ – shows the dominant logic of housing provision as a wholesale solution to informal settlement to be unsustainable and a potential contributing factor to the further impoverishment of marginalized populations. What is ignored in this approach, are the underlying power relations relating to spatial, environmental, economic and social exclusion which foster the creation of informal human settlements in their original locations and forms.

The Hidden Costs of Social Exclusion

Informal settlements in South Africa’s urban areas then cannot be viewed in isolation from a number of internal and external underlying power relations; relating to their social, economic, environmental and political exclusion of the marginalized from all but the most abstract interpretation of rights to citizenship. Marx argues an inadequate understanding of the specific forms of exclusion facing residents of informal settlements informing current discourse for the ‘improvement’ of these settlement patterns, has resulted in a number of disparities between the intended and real outcomes of formalisation projects.³¹⁷ Whilst it is commonly accepted that residents of informal settlements suffer debilitating insecurity as a result of their informality and intransigent

³¹⁶ Marx, op cit; Hallows & Butler (2002), op cit

³¹⁷ Marx, op cit, p. 305

way of life, resulting in an increased vulnerability to local leadership and politics coupled with a corresponding lack of investment in housing; evidence from projects has shown formalisation to have little effect on bolstering security in other aspects of life. Market logic that formalisation will foster increased property development falls short of expectations as residents are confronted with the hidden costs of new service provision and other incumbent costs of formalisation. Increased economic strains compound the vulnerability of these residents, with the most severely marginalized often being women.³¹⁸

A narrow focus on formalisation through housing obscures acute differences between residents of informal settlements, the effects of which often increase pressure on the most marginalized, such as women or the elderly. Current policy obscures the lasting effects of decades of not only racial laws, but gender-biased laws as well, largely ignoring the fact that 20-25% of households in informal settlements are female-headed, and that access and remuneration from employment remains the site of a profound gender bias.³¹⁹ Often relocation projects negatively affect the various coping mechanisms adopted by residents, such as tenancy or the use of private household space for business to off-set mounting economic pressures. Instead exacerbation of access to sites of employment, the paucity of opportunity for job creation from within newly formal settlements, and a plethora of economic strains to residents as a result of formalisation – forces many residents (particularly women) into the informal economy.³²⁰

A further enormous threat to informal settlements is the number of residents who will not qualify for housing subsidies, either on the basis of too high an income or (more often)

³¹⁸ Ibid, p.306

³¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 306-307

³²⁰ Ibid, p. 307

those who do not qualify at all for the full subsidy. The numbers of those not qualifying for housing subsidies are a significant threat to the process of formalisation, as are the numbers of those not qualifying at all because of a lack of positive identification of citizenship or residence. Invariably these populations will typically join other informal settlements in other areas – hence perpetuating the cycle of settlement formation.

A significant problem in the South African context is the selling of RDP housing by those relocated to subsidised houses, often at a price significantly lower than the projected value advertised by the Housing Department.³²¹ This phenomenon suggests that the net gain of a formal house advocated by the market model, is often not perceived as beneficial by previous residents of informal settlements – a fact which relates directly to the policy's insufficient understanding of poverty and the building of sustainable settlements.

Any number of the negative effects of South Africa's housing policy's tendency to increase the economic burdens on poor populations can help to explain this phenomenon – where increased economic burdens for relocation, new services or employment loss can result in relocation presenting too great an economic liability to residents. Selling of dwellings in this context often emerges as the only option to residents from a survival perspective.

Yet aside from the negative reasons for abandoning or selling RDP housing typically associated with economic stresses, Baumann (2003) further identifies a number of issues relating directly to sustainability of livelihoods promoted by newly formalised housing schemes, and in particular the impact of formalisation on the various livelihood

³²¹ Baumann, op cit, p. 94

protection strategies employed by poor households in informal settlements.³²² Informal settlements exhibit a high vulnerability to a variety of economic and income based shocks which necessitate their building up of other assets not typically regarded in economic terms to cope with these shocks. Formalisation, particularly in cases where it involves relocation of informal settlements can serve to diminish stocks of these assets – resulting in poor populations suffering a loss to their assets **despite** formalisation.

As argued, the poor availability of well-located land and the inadequacies of the ANC-led government land reform program, has resulted in the majority of housing projects being ‘greenfields’ developments, that is on previously undeveloped land often of a low-cost which allows the maximum portion of the subsidy for services and the housing structures themselves.³²³ The relocation of residents of informal housing to greenfields locations places enormous stresses on those currently employed close to the original settlement, especially where the relocation site is far from alternate opportunities as in the case of urban periphery development. Informal settlements typically are sited by necessity close to employment opportunities – and over time develop sophisticated internal economies relating to both informal and formal economic production.³²⁴

Relocation of settlements necessitates both a reformation of household expenditures patterns to meet increased transport costs, but also may serve to disrupt internal established informal economic practices. Increased shocks of an economic nature, when coupled with additional expenditures on services and rates, place strain on newly formalised households’ ability to save personal capital, decreasing the likelihood of

³²² Ibid, p.95

³²³ Ibid, p. 97

³²⁴ Ibid, p. 95

improving their current socio-economic standing – and their ability to mitigate the detrimental effects of environmentally unsound locations.

Residents in newly relocated and formalised settlements are often further constrained by regulations against supplementing their income through the use of informal additions to their dwellings, whether for use as workspaces or for the purposes of rental to others to increase the overall household income. This results in a dramatic restriction on the use of the household by residents, which destroys households' abilities to employ tenancy or the lease of backyard shacks as a survival strategy to compensate for economic losses suffered as a result of relocation and formalisation.³²⁵ The inability to extend houses in this way further results in a diminished capacity for residents to provide support networks to extended family in other areas in times of need; or indeed to accommodate aging or sick relatives of the family for care purposes – resulting in a reduction of reciprocity for residents themselves in times of need.³²⁶

Finally, relocation of entire informal settlements seldom results in neighbours being relocated alongside the same families they shared neighbourhoods with previously, a fact which often can have detrimental effects on residents. Relocation may disrupt a wide variety of support groups varying from saving schemes, burial societies and church groups, to crèches and after-school care groups. Community and neighbourhood networks are integral contributors to the livelihood strategies by the poor; allowing for both economic alleviation in the sharing of costs relating to childcare or care of the indigent members of households, to promoting a neighbouring spirit allowing for mutual

³²⁵ Ibid, p. 99

³²⁶ Ibid, p. 100

support of one another in coping with income shocks.³²⁷ Knowledge of ones neighbours also serves to safeguard residents against crime – an enormous concern to all residents of both informal and formal settlements.³²⁸

When examined from a deeper livelihoods perspective, the simple arguments of market driven approaches to development obscure the potential destruction of a number of key poverty reduction strategies for poor populations involved in formalisation schemes – and thus interventions which proceed purely in terms of providing formal housing are often inadequate to address the problematic of populations living in informal conditions.

Given that the formation of informal settlements are related to a complex set of underlying power relations, viewing the solution to their occurrence in isolation from coordinated development attempts becomes unsustainable. Merely providing formal housing or service provision is not enough if this is done in areas far from employment or economic potential in order to enable residents to pay for these opportunities. What is required is a multi-faceted approach to development which recognises the underlying relations inherent both within and external to settlements in order to affect the integration of settlements at all levels; including housing, employment or economic opportunity, social, environmental and political. Project-based approaches are insufficient as they fail to link the problem of informal settlement creation to broader social and economic trends affecting residents, but exacerbate both the spatial and economic marginalisation of populations through relocation to peripheries. Further, the process fails to acknowledge the heterogeneity of informal settlements residents, in favour of advocating a single

³²⁷ Ibid, p. 100

³²⁸ Ibid, p. 100

solution to all regardless of difference, thus “reinforcing the institutional exclusion that underpins the ‘informal’ urban existence.”³²⁹

As Todes et al (2003) argue, there is a critical need to move beyond policies which offer only a single outcome or possibility to all residents of settlements in favour of one able to support and maintain the diverse survival strategies of residents and households.³³⁰

One such option relates to the demand for upgrading of informal settlements in their current locations. Where calls are evident for the upgrading of informal settlements on present sites, these are seemingly beneficial as this type of settlement management would act to preserve exiting social capital networks, and acts to recognise the reason for the exiting of these settlements at present locations – that of proximity to employment often not possible in urban fringe settlements. Present site upgrading, although popular with residents – is not always feasible from a technocratic stand-point,³³¹ as often land occupied is not state-owned, and settlements are often far from existing developed service grids or more frequently, attract a high degree of opposition from surrounding landowners concerned about the effects of large settlements of the country’s poor on land prices adjacent to their own.

However, from a poverty perspective, a significant degree of the detrimental outcomes of greenfields-model developments relate directly to relocation rather than the delivery of housing in particular.³³² As a result, a fair assessment of the relation between poverty alleviation and the delivery of formal housing would suggest that present-site or in situ

³²⁹ Marx, op cit, p. 313

³³⁰ Todes et al, op cit, p. 272

³³¹ Greenberg, op cit, p. 15

³³² Baumann, op cit, p. 103

upgrading exists as a preferable option to relocation on the periphery of urban centres – a model which would preserve existing livelihood strategies of poor populations.

Yet for a number of reasons, in situ upgrading has not featured as a popular outcome of the current housing strategy.³³³ Present locations of informal settlements by design are most often in developed areas for the employment opportunities these present to residents, with the result that land costs are high; and in economic terms land-owners benefit more from development of housing for the formal market than for low-cost delivery to the urban poor. Nevertheless, amongst informal settlement residents, the development of present sites remains a popular call at local development meetings.

An inherent strength in the South African adaptation of the global discourse of Environmental Justice, is the recognition of the underlying dynamics which serve to entrench the marginalized in poverty and unsound localities.

In this way, development undertaken according to this approach are often increasingly sensitive to the underlying survival strategies adopted by those living in poverty.

Despite government ‘lip service’ to notion of sustainable development at both the national and international level; from the perspective of Environmental Justice, the current administration’s housing and service delivery scheme remains fundamentally unsustainable – in that it reinforces spatial dislocation and compounds pressure on the country’s poor.

The demonstrated inability of the neo-liberal model to view individuals as anything save as customers in service delivery; or residents in informal settlements as possessing uniqueness in terms of needs and wants not defined in terms of formal housing alone – is

³³³ Ibid, p. 103

highly expressive of the oppressive and inherently exclusionary nature of this particular development discourse.

Aside from illustrating the dislocative and un-sustainable nature of the GEAR framework, the examination thus far has shown the potential dangers to notions of citizenship presented by neo-liberalism. While the Constitution acts to promote a right to housing provision, service provision and the right to a healthy environment, for many living in poverty the application of neo-liberal development has resulted in a situation where these rights can only be enjoyed in their simplest, most abstract forms.

The tension between this abstract conception of rights to citizenship versus the real enjoyment or wholesale realisation of rights – is a glaring symptom of inequality in the post-Apartheid era. While the Constitution accepts the real enjoyment of all inherent rights as owed to all citizens, the effects of neo-liberal development have effectively set aside key entitlements only for those able to afford them.

The exploitative nature of this process of subjecting realisation of rights to the performance of the capitalist market, assists in the reinforcing of racial inequalities inherited from Apartheid due to a continued refusal on behalf of government to effect meaningful redistribution. Overwhelmingly, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the ‘white’ minority population has not been effectively challenged by the laissez-faire attitude of the GEAR discourse – while simultaneously the discourse has rallied to protect this unequal distribution through the sanctity of private property rights in the Constitution.

The dramatic power possessed by capital as a result of neo-liberal concessions has allowed for the continued ability of ‘whites’ in South Africa to give expression to their

wants and needs at the expense of the poor predominantly 'black' populations through market mechanisms – allowing for a continuation of the exclusion, oppressions and marginalisation of this vulnerable group.

An example of the power which capital possesses in development is given in the case study to follow – in the NIMBYism of the 'white' dominated policy of relocation of informal settlements in Johannesburg, raising crucial questions as to the ability of capital to perpetuate unsustainable development projects in order to achieve a realisation of their interests despite the damage done to local poor communities.

Chapter III

Introducing the Case Study

The focus for the case study includes two different wards in region 3 of the Johannesburg Municipality; namely wards 95 and 96.³³⁴ Additionally, the study briefly examines developments in neighbouring, predominantly affluent wards of 101 and 106.³³⁵ The choice of wards is important as each is contiguous and as such are interconnected economically, insofar as each contains centres of employment and consumerism for the other. The study area provides an area of great interest due to the fact that it is host to a large proportion of Johannesburg Municipality's informal settlements – three of which fall in the demarcated area namely Diepsloot Informal, Zevenfontein informal, and the Honeydew/ Kyasands informal settlement; as well as contradictory concentrations of very high-income residential areas in the neighbouring affluent wards of 101 and 106. Within each area chosen, there exists an enormous variance in housing types, property prices; income; extent of service delivery; quality of environments; and access to employment and housing.

The chapter initially serves to provide a brief historical, social and geographical background to this rather large area north of Johannesburg. The chapter will examine the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of the region, specifically insofar as it relates to the future of the informal settlements in the area, the provision of housing and local infrastructural development in service delivery. Plans for the development of Cosmo City,³³⁶ a new formal 'Greenfields'-model location proposed as the site for the relocation

³³⁴ Please see maps 1, 2 and 3 – Appendix I (this document).

³³⁵ Please see maps 4 and 5 – Appendix 1 (this document).

³³⁶ Please see map 6 – Appendix 1 (this document).

of a number of informal settlement dwellers in these wards will be discussed, as well as the ongoing debate between advocates of the relocation and its opponents, the Jukskei Crocodile Catchment Area and surrounding property owners in particular.

The final portion of the chapter will examine a number of residents reactions to life in informal settlements, from the reaction to local environments, exclusion in spatial and economic terms and finally the reaction to relocation to the new Cosmo City project; including reactions from a number of residents relocated in the November 2005 – January 2006 period to the ongoing Cosmo City development.

The Region's Integrated Development Plan and Informal Settlements

In line with the Municipal Systems Act (2000), Johannesburg Municipality has drawn up an integrated development plan (IDP) which acts as a single, strategic development programme; linking all plans, policy frameworks and budgetary demands of the municipality. The Johannesburg 2003/4 plan is based on Johannesburg's long-term 30 year development plan, Joburg 2030; and on the short-term Mayoral Priorities plan – which runs over 5 years. Included in the IDP, is the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) dealing with the spatial ordering of the municipality, including its formal and informal settlement patterns. In the case of the study area, the IDP states the intention for the relocation and formalisation of most of the current informal settlements in the region at a new site (Cosmo City), whilst sections of the Diepsloot informal settlement in proximity to the current formalisation and extension of service delivery program ongoing in Diepsloot formal settlement will be included in this project, while those unable to be accommodated due to capacity constraints will join the Cosmo City program in the final stages of its expansion.

The 2003/4 IDP lists the provision of housing as an important strategy in fulfilling the objectives of the five-year development program. According to the document, Johannesburg suffers from a housing backlog of 120,000 units, while the rate of population influx into the city has increased dramatically;³³⁷ estimating between 101,940 and 114,275 new households earning less than R3,500 to be formed by 2010. The city hopes to address this housing backlog by the end of 2007. In addition, the document identifies approximately 117,000 households in shack settlements, and 418,000 backyard shacks within the municipality as significant challenges to be faced.³³⁸

Speaking in Pretoria in September 2004, Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu released figures of over 2.4 million households country-wide living in shacks or informal dwellings, of which a mere 800,000 had approached the government to be wait-listed for government subsidised housing.³³⁹ The minister further committed the government to addressing informal settlements countrywide by 2014.³⁴⁰

Further, the IDP reveals a commitment on behalf of the municipality to zero tolerance with respects to land invasions while recognising that many of the new arrivals in the city will most likely join one of the vastly expanding informal settlements in the region. In meeting its ambitious plan to “be rid of informal settlements by 2007”³⁴¹, the IDP proposes to continue with the development and formalisation of well located settlements, providing proper infrastructure and creating employment opportunities.³⁴² The program envisages a situation by the end of 2007 where “...existing shack settlements should have

³³⁷ Johannesburg IDP, 2003: 52

³³⁸ Ibid

³³⁹ *New Housing policy unveiled*, 3 September 2004, South Africa.info

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Johannesburg IDP, 2003: 53

³⁴² Ibid

made way for serviced stands owned by people who have title deeds to their properties.”³⁴³ The upgrading of informal settlements is a key strategy in the achievement of this aim.

Johannesburg currently comprises 89 informal settlements, housing approximately 117,000 households.³⁴⁴ The IDP plans to relocate 26 settlements, upgrade 54 and include 9 in the Alexandra Renewal Project.³⁴⁵ A number of these projects are already in process, including the formalisation of Diepsloot in ward 95 and the development of the Cosmo City housing scheme. Apart from the provision of RDP housing programmes, the Gauteng Provincial government has also instituted the People’s Housing Process, the model adopted in the formalisation of ward 95 (Diepsloot) yielding a large degree of support from the local community, whereby under supervision and with the logistical and technical support from local government developers, “...people are helped to build their own houses in serviced land supplied by government.”³⁴⁶ This approach is slowly gaining recognition as the preferred option with regards the formalisation of existing settlements.

Cosmo City: Advocates and Opposition

The development of a R1.5 billion integrated housing development north of the Randburg CBD known as Cosmo City is touted as a housing solution to at least 4 of the informal settlements in the region – Zevenfontein, Diepsloot informal, Riverbends Informal settlement and Kyasands/ Honeydew informal; while providing employment and the stimulation of economic activity for neighbouring communities in Honeydew and Zandspruit. The project was approved in February of 2003 by the Gauteng Provincial

³⁴³ Ibid, p. 68

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 53

³⁴⁵ Ibid

³⁴⁶ Ibid

Legislature, announcing the project will be composed of “more than 15,000 housing units with various tenure options including low cost, medium density as well as bonded houses”³⁴⁷ upon its completion.

The announcement in February 2003 was the result of planning and policy formation concerning the region, ongoing since 1996.³⁴⁸ From 1999 until the present, the project was bolstered by the development of the Zevenfontein Community Development Forum (CDF) – formed with the assistance of Planact, the CDF sought to provide for local community development and upliftment, and coordinate local participation concerning the community’s relocation to Cosmo City.³⁴⁹ The CDF further played a key role in negotiations between local government, the Johannesburg City Council and the local population of Zevenfontein, concerning the re-settlement of the areas of Zevenfontein informal and Riverbends informal settlement.³⁵⁰ However, since its inception the project has met with significant resistance, resulting in the stalling of the project in the planning stages by countless objections from property owners in the area lead by the Jukskei Crocodile Catchment Area (JCCA) – a residents association of landowners in the vicinity of the proposed development.³⁵¹ These objections typically argue a potential negative influence of the settlement on their property prices and the threat to the local environment as a result of the planned construction and re-settlement of these informal settlement

³⁴⁷ MEC Housing Paul Matshile cited: Majola, B; *Cosmo City to get off the Ground*, p.1; Moilou, *Zevenfontein Residents relived after Como City Proclamation*; p.4

³⁴⁸ Private Interviews: Mulauzi, Ward Councillor ANC Ward 95 (20.01.2004); Lorimer, Ward Councillor DA Ward 101 (21.01.2004); Dela, Ward Councillor ANC Ward 96 (18.01.2004)

³⁴⁹ Moloi, 2004: 5

³⁵⁰ Ibid; Private interview: Dela (18.01.2004)

³⁵¹ *Cosmo city hit by legal wrangling*; The Star, Mon 26 January 2003, p.4

residents.³⁵² The JCCA further claimed the area to be highly eco-sensitive – referring to the existence of a number of rare species, including a wetlands area.³⁵³

In considering objections, the Johannesburg City Council proclaimed the process would involve a four to six month time frame, while the initial phase of development would involve the building of 5,000 units of low cost housing by August 2003.³⁵⁴ Apart from housing, the initial phase of planning for Cosmo City would have included the building of school and health care facilities, as well as the establishment of open recreational spaces for the population, the building of a police station and the upgrading of the transport infrastructure.³⁵⁵

However, resistance by the predominantly white residential owners in the surrounding area eventually boiled over towards the middle of 2003, with the granting of a Johannesburg High Court interdict to halt the development until a ruling could be made over the future of the settlement and a comprehensive redress of all objections is achieved.³⁵⁶ Claimants, the JCCA, argue the development approval process was flawed and failed to take their wishes into consideration.³⁵⁷ On the 23rd February 2004 the local population of Zevenfontein were bussed to the Johannesburg High Court to protest the lodging of the objection to their right to housing as the Cosmo City Project, at the opening of the legal inquiry into the relocation;

we did try to avoid the courts because it is going to take long – even after it has taken us so long for this process already, from 1997 until now. It is a

³⁵² op cit Majola, Private interview: Dela (18.01.2004)

³⁵³ Moloi, op cit, p. 5

³⁵⁴ Majola, op cit

³⁵⁵ Johannesburg IDP, 2003: 53; Majola, op cit; Moilola, op cit

³⁵⁶ op cit Majola; Private interview: Lorimer, Private interview: Mulauzi, Private interview: Dela

³⁵⁷ *Cosmo city hit by legal wrangling*; The Star, Mon 26 January 2003, p.4

very long time, we are tired of this place.³⁵⁸

Objections to the Cosmo City scheme have not only been brought by the landowners surrounding the prospered area of development. Significant criticisms have arisen from both within the informal settlements themselves, from the Democratic Alliance opposition, and even from within the ANC itself. These objections will be considered in detail later in the chapter.

Despite objections from surrounding landowners and a protracted legal battle; compounded by a series of administrative delays and bungles, particularly in the conducting of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by the local council³⁵⁹ - in February 2004 the Johannesburg High Court overturned the objections to the development by ruling in favour of the City of Johannesburg. An appeal from the JCCA was dismissed by the Provincial Township Board in October of 2004.

Construction on the housing project began finally in March of 2005, with media releases proclaiming a target of 12,500 housing units to be completed by 2007.³⁶⁰ Housing types are to represent options for diverse income groups; with plans including 5,000 fully subsidised units of 32m²; 3,000 partially subsidised units at 60m², 3,300 bonded houses for sale on the housing market, and 1,000 rental apartments.³⁶¹

Despite plans to relocate the first households in July of 2005 – construction and administrative delays resulted in the first families only being relocated in November of 2005.³⁶² By July 1st 2006, estimates made by newly elected ward councillor for the ward

³⁵⁸ Private interview: Dela

³⁵⁹ Moloi, op cit, p. 9

³⁶⁰ *Cosmo City: A place to call home*, 1 July 2005: South Africa.info

³⁶¹ *Cosmo City: A place to call home*, 1 July 2005: South Africa.info; Dhlamini, N, *Cosmo City on track*, May 24 2005, Joburg.org

³⁶² Private interview: L Kekane (14.04.2006)

96, Isaac Maila claim the successful relocation of approximately 500 households, the vast majority from the settlements of Zevenfontein and Riverbends, all of whom have taken up residence in the fully subsidised RDP-model housing.³⁶³ All current units have metered electricity connections and metered water, and incorporate flushable toilets. Further planning released by developers Codevco,³⁶⁴ show intent to build 12 schools, clinics, libraries, 40 churches, sports fields, taxi ranks, markets and shopping centres.³⁶⁵ Currently none of these have been formally developed, yet construction has begun and is pending on a school in the area.³⁶⁶ Further, currently all roads are fully completed to occupied houses, are tarred and have street lighting.³⁶⁷

Diepsloot West and Diepsloot Informal, Ward 95

Ward 95 encompasses the newly formal Diepsloot areas, Diepsloot West and parts of the surrounding area referred to as Diepsloot Informal. The history of Diepsloot is similar in many respects to the other burgeoning informal and formal settlements in and around the Johannesburg municipality. According to statistics from Statistics South Africa, Diepsloot comprises a population of approximately 33,129, in 15,906 households of which 13,890 (87%) are informal.³⁶⁸ Mmatlou Mulauzi, local ward councillor for the African National Congress in ward 95, acknowledges this is a conservative figure;

Most of the people that settle here have been here for a long time, but every week many many more arrive. Every week new shacks are going up around here, mostly near building 1 [East Diepsloot away from the administrative section in the informal zone, where they are likely to remain

³⁶³ Private interview: I Maila (telephonic 24.06.2006)

³⁶⁴ Codevco is a partnership of Basil Read and the Kopano Ke Matla Trust

³⁶⁵ *Cosmo City: a place to call home*, 1 July 2005, South Africa.info

³⁶⁶ Private interview: L Kekane (14.04.2006); Private interview: A Mneswa (21.06.2006), Private interview, I Maila.

³⁶⁷ Personal observation.

³⁶⁸ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

undetected], but sometimes even on adjacent land where we have no control.³⁶⁹

Population breakdowns by ‘race’ reveals that the vast majority, 33,029 of the inhabitants are African, while only 5 ‘whites’ were recorded³⁷⁰, mainly due to the ward overlapping a number of fairly large equestrian farms on its western border.³⁷¹ Despite the repeal of Apartheid era racial categorisations, these figures are important in demonstrating the longevity of the race-based marginalisation – in that the data shows the current excluded to be precisely those same populations excluded under Apartheid, despite the repeal of the regimes racial categorisation practices.

Despite the ongoing infrastructural and formal housing upgrading of sections of Diepsloot and Diepsloot West to a formal settlement and the subsequent provision of basic services (electrical, sanitation, refuse removal, and water provision) from the municipality, the provision of basic needs in Diepsloot remains a problem from a public health perspective – particularly in the informal section of the settlement.

Only 771 (5%) households report having water piped into their dwellings, with another 5,787 (41 %) households with running water on site.³⁷² This leaves 54% of Diepsloot forced to use either public taps (2,217 households) or water tankers (1,926 households) for water.³⁷³ These access/non access arrangements are significantly lower than national averages.³⁷⁴ With regards sanitation services, 5,850 (37%) households report indoor flushable latrines – a huge increase from the 1996 figure of 807, but an overwhelming

³⁶⁹ Private interview: Mulauzi – parenthesis added

³⁷⁰ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁷¹ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁷² Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁷³ Ibid

³⁷⁴ See Statistics South Africa, 2001 Census.

8,757 (55%) have access to only a bucket latrine, with collections taking place once a week on average. Most alarming for the local environment though, is the 579 (4%) households with no access to any kind sanitation whatsoever, even though this reveals a decrease from 1996 figures of 937.³⁷⁵ These households, mainly in the informal dwellings of the settlement resort to all manners of unsustainable methods of human-water disposal – including the pollution of the nearby Juksei River³⁷⁶, the disposal of sanitation waste within the normal refuse collection bins for non-human waste, and indeed the practice of merely dumping effluence in neighbouring open stretches of unsettled land.³⁷⁷

An area of significant improvement in recent years has been with regards electrification.³⁷⁸ According to the statistics confirmed by the councillor, approximately 5 718 (36%) households have access to electricity through the local service provider Eskom,³⁷⁹ of which all utilise pre-paid access.³⁸⁰ Unlike Soweto, most Diepsloot residents interviewed were quite happy with prepaid access, yet a number of those interviewed confessed difficult with sub-standard wiring in RDP provision housing – as well as a lack of understanding concerning pre-paid utilisation statistics. As a result, many continue to use paraffin, candles and solar energy. A staggering 9,183 (58%) households utilise candles for lighting³⁸¹, while a television set may be running off prepaid electricity.³⁸² This shows a complex set of responses by residents in managing their own reproduction. Councillor Mulauzi acknowledges the benefits that electrification has brought to the area

³⁷⁵ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95

³⁷⁶ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁷⁷ Private interview: M. Mlambo

³⁷⁸ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁷⁹ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁸⁰ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁸¹ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁸² Private observations based on 20 homes visited

– particularly an overall decrease in reliance on paraffin for cooking and heating.³⁸³ This decrease has helped the prevention of shack-fires in the area; which occur frequently in informal shack settlements due to the high concentration of structures in small areas, typically causing widespread damage, deaths and injuries as they spread unabated due to the inadequacies of infrastructure to combat fires. Despite these apparent dangers, 879 (6%) households continue to use paraffin for lighting³⁸⁴ and a large number still make frequent use of candles; particularly those where employment scarcity or low-incomes prevent households from the enjoyment of the electrification advancements. In a significant portion of houses with the wiring and means for electrification, these facilities go unused due to affordability – raising crucial questions in provision of these services relating to the provision of the means (abstract realisation of rights to basic needs), versus the actual realisation of these rights.

In an interview with Councillor Mulauzi, a number of the issues affecting this community and their environments were raised. According to the councillor, the chief problem underlying much of the hardship to be found in Diepsloot, is that of rapid population influxes from rural areas and outlying informal settlements. Population figures from the 2001 census reveal a 143.94 % increase in the numbers of people inhabiting the settlement from the 1996 figures.³⁸⁵

The following excerpts from one interview with Councillor Mulauzi (MM) provide a snapshot of some of the socio-political dynamics in Diepsloot.

JB:³⁸⁶ In terms of population growth, why do so many come to Diepsloot?

³⁸³ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁸⁴ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁸⁵ Ibid

³⁸⁶ JB denotes the author.

MM: You see this areas here where we are currently is Diepsloot West. This is the formal area here where we are. At the other end where you came in, is the reception area. People collect there in shacks, waiting to be processed for settlement here in Diepsloot West. Once we have processed them, they receive a plot, with a 'C form' – and they are then relocated. Diepsloot is a very fast developer compared to the other areas... there is a lot happening here since we have been formalised. Because we have the developments, people just come to Diepsloot thinking they will get a house. They settle anywhere just believing, or let me say, hoping they will be... included.

JB: Have there been attempts to control the massive influx, the settlement of people here?

MM: The population growth is incredible, you wouldn't believe it. In one stand in the reception area, people there they sub-let plots, so you go in and you get 8 shacks. We try to control this by processing the formalisation of new areas, but we cannot keep up. For formalisation we need planning and only one family per stand [...]
We have a big problem with people who invade land here zoned for a school, or a church. Overnight they build shacks there and you wake up and they are there. If you haven't seen them there after 48 hours you cannot just tell them to go, it is now for you to find them an alternative. This is how they hope to get a place here.

Numerous problems serve to compound the challenges of housing provision. Two solutions were proffered at formalisation for the provision of housing; namely the granting of serviced sites, providing plots to families with sanitation services whereupon

individuals could build their own houses; or the second option of waiting for the development of RDP housing. The new formal housing has reflected an equal distribution between each of these options. RDP housing built by the government comprises a single room, with water piped into the dwelling, a flushable toilet and provisions for electrification, "...the cables and plugs are there and the meter is built in. Whether the people use it is up to them."³⁸⁷

Many residents however have selected not to live in RDP housing but to rather build their own dwellings on a designated serviced plot. In the words of one resident,

The RDP house is too small. Look you can see here how many people are we in this house. These are all my children here, we can't live in that place. It is better that give us land like this and you see I am building now. I work for 12 years building houses... there is not work for me there now so I'm making my place here [...] This is my job now and it looks nice, ne?³⁸⁸

The average numbers of people per household according to Statistics SA in the formal areas of Diepsloot is 3, typically 1 adult and 2 children, but as the councillor explains this can be misleading,

Many people here working as domestic [workers] work in the built-up areas in Johannesburg and Sandton. Lots of them have a place to stay close by their work and they only return to Diepsloot on the weekends.³⁸⁹

This situation has lead to numerous problems regarding the provision of water. Whilst the supply of water to the area from Johannesburg Water has been successful in many respects, the local community is again confused over billing procedures. All water connections are metered in the area yet readings are seldom taken on a monthly basis;

³⁸⁷ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁸⁸ Private Interview, Isaac Ngwenya (07.01.2004)

³⁸⁹ Private interview: Mulauzi

Many of these places are being billed on deemed consumption, or they get an account for two months at a time. Like I was saying some places are only used on weekends, they return home for few days. Yet they are charged on deemed consumption.³⁹⁰

Admittedly, billing concerns have not been confined to the Diepsloot settlement however, and in the 2003-2004 period a large segment of the region experienced a plethora of billing issues and inaccuracies addressed with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.³⁹¹ Of principal concern in the face of burgeoning population growth has been the allocation of housing. Whilst the government has had relative success in the area in building houses, local community organisations have argued these are not being distributed fairly. In a report, local community newspaper *The Fourways Review*, commented on a public meeting with the Johannesburg Mayor, Amos Masondo.³⁹² Here Susan Modise, chairperson of the South African National Civic Organisations (SANCO) commented;

People in possession of the correct forms (C forms) promising them houses since 1996, have remained homeless, while people without these forms are already living in the new houses.³⁹³

Aside from housing issues, the population explosion of Diepsloot is linked to a plethora of social problems. Most notable is that of unemployment. Statistics SA estimates the number employed at approximately 11,475 (53%) out of a total labour force of 21,762, with 10,287 unemployed.³⁹⁴ Of those employed, 2,361 (21%) are employed in private households, either as domestic workers, care-givers to children or the elderly, or as gardeners.³⁹⁵ Councillor Mulauzi attributes this problem to a number of factors;

³⁹⁰ Ibid

³⁹¹ Private interview: Hunt; Private interview: Lorimer; Private interview: Dela

³⁹² *Mayor addresses Diepsloot gripes; Fourways Review*, 6 February, 2004, p. 4

³⁹³ Ibid

³⁹⁴ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 95.

³⁹⁵ Ibid

MM: Again like I said we are overcrowded, if there is a job here everybody wants that job... the competition is very fierce... we also do not have many people here with the skills and training to start businesses here in Diepsloot.

JB: What level of job creation has come from inside Diepsloot itself?

MM: Where can we work here? There's nothing here we can use. We have to go out to find work for the people here, there is nothing happening inside here.

The Diepsloot settlement is typical of the peri-urban spaces in South Africa which form part of the legacy of Apartheid and the marginalisation of a racially defined population of Africans. The area developed largely in the 1970's and 1980's with the increase in construction projects in the surrounding designated 'white' areas, and to this day a significant percentage of the population living here are employed in the construction industry, 1,971 or 17% of the total employed.³⁹⁶ The landscape is bleak, the surrounding areas consisting of small equestrian and other agricultural holdings. Numbers in the area have sky rocketed with the increased suburban expansion of the affluent predominantly 'white' areas of Fourways, Fourways Gardens, Chartwell, Lonehill and Dainfern (including the areas of Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge). Despite the rapid urban sprawl in the region, Diepsloot is still relatively removed from centres of development and employment;

[...] we are far from skilled employment here. Not everybody can work as a domestic [worker]... and taxis while they run all the time are not really affordable and if not regulated they can cause big problems. Most of the people here work in houses in these neighbouring areas, but many skilled jobs are in Johannesburg. Those who have to travel there are suffering terribly.

³⁹⁶ Ibid

Development of new housing projects in the surrounding affluent areas has shunned locating too close to Diepsloot, resulting in the maintenance of informal buffer zones of privately owned but undeveloped lands between the settlement and the affluent surrounding areas.

Waste collection in the area has also proved a problem in the past, yet here formalisation has served the area well. The concentration of many shacks on a single stand makes the process very difficult. Local waste company, Pik-it-up who won the tender, have performed this service well despite the challenges – with regular pick ups and the supply of large numbers of containers to the area. Councillor Mulauzi comments,

...the informal sections present a much bigger problem, here the houses are very dense and not much of the local wastes makes it into bins. The company does their best though, and have performed well.³⁹⁷

Zevenfontein, Kyasands, Dainfern, Ward 96

The area which comprises Ward 96 includes part of Diepsloot formal (intersecting with ward 95 at Northern Farm), the sprawling informal settlement of Zevenfontein, Dainfern (including Dainfern Estate, Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge), parts of Fourways, Chartwell and the Kyasands Industrial Farm.³⁹⁸

The ward is one of the largest in Johannesburg and forms an interesting segment of the municipality due to the large differences in income distribution, real estate values and development. The ward comprises a population of approximately 49,208 – an increase of 212.47% since 1996 – in 18,363 households, of which 6,627 (36%) are informal; of these

³⁹⁷ Private interview: Mulauzi

³⁹⁸ Municipal Demarcation Board; Ward stats: cited <http://www.demarcation.org.za>

approximately 37,762 (78%) are African as opposed to 10,458 (21%) whites.³⁹⁹ Again, ward councillor until March 2006, Sipiwe Dela acknowledges these statistics to be fairly conservative owing to the presence of two ever-swelling informal settlements in the area; Diepsloot informal and Zevenfontein.⁴⁰⁰

Contrasted to the informal settlement spaces, the Dainfern Estates and Dainfern Ridge comprise some of the most affluent areas in the Johannesburg municipality. The area is situated in close proximity to numerous areas of consumerism within Fourways and Lonehill; while it is composed of a number of high security areas with strict access control to residents, non-residents and workers. Dainfern further contains within itself numerous spaces for leisure activities, including a golf course, lake and park area, and numerous playground and park areas. All these spaces are maintained by the Dainfern Body Corporate through the local Dainfern Residents Association, and fall outside of the management responsibility of Johannesburg City Parks due to their nature as privately owned, developed and serviced spaces.

The predominantly affluent areas of the ward are taken to include Dainfern, Chartwell and parts of Fourways.⁴⁰¹ The environments and infrastructure in these areas are very well development, with little in the way of complaint from these areas being registered with ex-Councillor Dela;

They don't have any issues to raise with me about their environment because they have everything. That they raise with me is around the road closures, boom gates... and even if there are some developments taking place and they have objections or issues – I am brought in to speak with the developers. But that concerns the local areas, the Dainfern place itself is maintained by themselves in there, the people living in there. They did bring to me some problems with billing, but nothing about their

³⁹⁹ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96.

⁴⁰⁰ Private interview: Sipiwe Dela, (18.01.2004)

⁴⁰¹ Ibid

environment.⁴⁰²

Within these predominantly ‘white’ areas of Dainfern, Chartwell and Fourways there exists a well-developed infrastructure and services. The overwhelming majority of these have water in the dwellings supplied by Johannesburg Water, and flushable toilets with sanitation services. Those isolated households not serviced by Johannesburg Water in the areas, typically utilise borehole water – and according to demarcation statistics, 123 households receive part or all of their water in this way.⁴⁰³ Further, the vast majority of these households have electrification through the local service provider Eskom. The informal settlement of Zevenfontein forms a complete contrast to the development in these areas.

Councillor Dela explains the figures for population in Zevenfontein are incredibly difficult to determine;

There are many shacks on a single plot here, the people were given a plot to build a shack and they sub-let. So you get lots of houses on one stand, it is difficult to stop them from going up all the time so it is very difficult to manage all the numbers of people living here [...] many of the families living here are having the mother or the father away for work in the other place where they can find jobs. They leave the children here with the grandmother or someone who is not working. They normally come back to bring money on weekends or at the last of the month.⁴⁰⁴

Zevenfontein comprises a significant fraction of the total number of households in the ward. Despite the muddling of true numbers through the sub-letting process, statistics for the ward reveal 2,733 (15%) households which have to rely on water tankers as a supply of fresh water, while 2,037 (11%) households utilise community stands, with 1,467 (8%)

⁴⁰² Ibid

⁴⁰³ Demarcation – Ward stats 1996

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid

using community stands over 200m.⁴⁰⁵ Further, 171 (1%) households use the natural water supply in the areas, most often the Jukskei River which flows within a few metres of the northern border of the Zevenfontein informal settlement, and still 225 households use stagnant water.⁴⁰⁶ The majority of these households without formal access to water in their dwellings are within the Zevenfontein settlement and the tiny portion of Diepsloot informal, which has expanded to overlap the ward boundaries.⁴⁰⁷

The situation with regards sanitation is equally illustrative of the vast disparities at the ward level. Out of the total number of households in the ward only 10,092 (55%) have access to a flushable toilet⁴⁰⁸, predominantly in the white areas.⁴⁰⁹ On the other hand, 3,306 (18%) households are listed as having only access to a bucket latrine, with 630 (3%) using pit latrines. Most alarming, is the 2,394 (13%) households in the ward which have no access to sanitation services of these types at all.⁴¹⁰

An interview with then Councillor Sipiwe Dela (SD), reveals that these issues are frequently relayed to the ward councillor in private and public meetings;

JB: In Zevenfontein itself, what are some of the issues people bring to you?

SD: There are so many, because they... we didn't think at this stage we will still be living here. So they will be complaining that our shacks are so close to each other, when one burns it spreads to all the other. Sometimes the truck which is bringing us water doesn't come so they will complain about that. Shortage of toilets, grading of these sand roads... there are the things we are looking at. But the biggest problem is that one of land.

JB: What land issues are brought to you?

⁴⁰⁵ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid

⁴⁰⁷ Private interview: Dela

⁴⁰⁸ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96.

⁴⁰⁹ Private interview: Dela

⁴¹⁰ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96.

SD: Well you see out here, you can look around and there is nothing from here up until you reach Diepsloot. So the people say there is still much land that is open – but we cannot just... take up too much room, because the land doesn't belong to the state. If we allow the shacks too much room it will impact on the Cosmo City development.

JB: How do people feel about the issue of space? Do they understand why they cannot use it?

SD: Well we explain to them, last year the MEC for housing explained to them; we opened a new section here because of heavy rains that were here. It was a disaster and we had to relocate some of the families... those close to the river there. Some people put others in their backyards. But if we put other people on that land, it becomes a big problem for the municipality... and it delays our move from here.

JB: Now I see people are still living by the river there.

SD: What can we do? There is nowhere else, we warn them but they can't listen.

JB: What about recreational facilities or playgrounds?

SD: In Diepsloot we have soccer facilities – some well developed and some still under construction. There are youth centres where these are sited. Here we have only minor facilities because we are temporary... whereas in Cosmo City they will be formal.

For the past 5 years, the IDP has been jointly configured with that for Diepsloot, and aims at the promotion of infrastructural development, economic development with priority focus on the Kyasands industrial Park, the establishment of the CBD and various job creation strategies.⁴¹¹

The focus of job creation has been the Kyasands industrial areas and the surrounding predominantly 'white' suburban areas. Out of a total labour force of approximately

⁴¹¹ Private interview: Dela

30,474 in 2001, the area lists approximately 20,319 (67%) employed with the numbers unemployed at approximately 10,155, a 629% increase from 1996 figures.⁴¹² Further, 7,170 are recorded as being under the age of employment.⁴¹³ As in the case of Diepsloot, a high degree of employment is undertaken in private households, as domestic workers, gardeners or child minders – with 3,762 (19%) people employed in this field. Further, owing to the genesis of the settlement, 2,595 (12%) are employed in construction programs. Within Zevenfontein, the numbers of young adults entering the market place is a significant worry, “...many of them are now leaving school and will join the many others who journey from here every day to find jobs in the surrounding areas.”⁴¹⁴

In terms of infrastructural development the area has seen little in the way of improvement over the term of the last 5-year IDP, specifically for the Zevenfontein area itself. Aside from moderate attempts to induce public-private partnerships within the area, attempts at infrastructural development have concerned upgrades in more remote areas in Fourways for the ever expanding consumer centres in this area and the rapidly expanding housing developments in the affluent areas - rapidly becoming populated by sprawling complexes of townhouses and cluster units, all barricaded behind high security walls and marketed as secure housing options for the young affluent. For the most part, infrastructure within the ward as a whole has concerned the settlement of the areas of Cosmo City, and the continued development of RDP housing in Diepsloot.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹² Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96.

⁴¹³ Ibid

⁴¹⁴ Private interview: Dela

⁴¹⁵ Private interview: Mulauzi; Private interview: Dela (18.01.2004)

History of Zevenfontein Informal

The informal settlement at Zevenfontein is now situated on an area known previously as the Zevenfontein Farm, harkening back to the period when all land in this now largely developed area was comprised of mainly large agricultural units with only a small number of dwellings per hectare. ‘Non-white’ settlements in these areas were small, but significant enough to produce uproar in recent months over past histories of exclusions and Apartheid era evictions. An article in the local *Fourways Review*,⁴¹⁶ recalls how in 1971 a number of families were removed from the area to make space for the encroaching white residential spaces. In the *Fourways Review*, Lucky Moshimane a local resident seeking to reclaim the lands rights where the Dainfern Valley, and Dainfern Estates complexes exist today, land which he claims previously housed a cemetery; recalls how, “In 1971 we were given 5 days to move out of our houses... Who were we to fight against in those days?”⁴¹⁷

Families were evicted from the land by force losing possessions and considerable livestock in the process.⁴¹⁸ The farm was subsequently subdivided by mining group JCI after 1985, and portions subsequently sold to developers. The dispute is still being waged between Lucky Moshimane representing 220 families claiming prior residence on the Zevenfontein farm, the current development of Dainfern Valley, JCI (now Johnnic holdings), and local funeral services home Avbob.⁴¹⁹ Moshimane and families have been demanding the disclosure of the whereabouts of approximately 590 graves, allegedly removed without records in 1987 from land which relatives who were evicted from the

⁴¹⁶ Land claims could shake foundations; *Fourways Review*, 16 January, 2004, p.1

⁴¹⁷ Ibid

⁴¹⁸ Ibid

⁴¹⁹ Bones to pick with Dainfern valley; *Fourways Review*, 21 November, 2003; Land claims could shake foundations; *Fourways Review*, 16 January, 2004

land recall stretch from the current Dainfern Valley to the Dainfern Golf estate. Further, they have entered into legal proceedings to claim compensation for land lost, as well as the loss of possessions and livestock.⁴²⁰ While 2005 saw a number of these disputes being settled with the exhumation of a number of these sites, the dispute continues for the identification of a number of missing burial sites and redress for families concerned – a dispute with a significant degree of publicity in the settlement of Zevenfontein, contributing to the growing animosity between the informal settlement and the neighbouring Dainfern residential complex.

The site bears reminders of a mass cemetery as offerings and small collections of graves continue to be tendered to, immediately adjacent to the massive security walls of the two disputed white residential complexes.

Initial attempts by Avbob funeral services to relocate the graves were fruitless due to lost records. Moshimane believes racial issues have prevented the proper reburial of many of the graves found belonging to black families. He believes many were buried in mass graves, while others still lie unmarked beneath the ground now covered by the Dainfern residential complex, walled off by residents.⁴²¹

Forced removals from the area of Zevenfontein farm caused many to be displaced in the surrounding areas into other informal settlements, whilst in some cases the populations were forced to move to the homelands or join other peri-urban settlements in the margins of the rapidly developing Johannesburg municipality.

Resettlement of the Zevenfontein area began in the mid 1980's, and with the relaxation of influx laws towards the end of the decade, the numbers in the area increased dramatically.

⁴²⁰ Land claims could shake foundations; *Fourways Review*, 16 January, 2004, p.1

⁴²¹ Bones to pick with Dainfern valley; *Fourways Review*

The present site of Zevenfontein informal has not been the permanent site for this community however, due to all the development in the area attracting movements and involving some relocation. However according to Councillors Mulauzi of Diepsloot, Dela of Zevenfontein and Dainfern, and Councillor for the DA Kate Lorimer (ward 101) amongst other respondents; the present site has been occupied for approximately 15 years.⁴²² All respondents except one interviewed now living in the community, claim to have been born in or around the area of Zevenfontein farm, with one respondent Felicity Sithole (62 years old) having previously held residence on plot 172 of the Farm, adjacent to the alleged site of the now disputed relocated graveyard;

I can't even go there now to visit my ancestors because it is closed. They move all the bones from that place and now I can't see which of those bones is my grandfather. I think about it and I get very cross, I just want to cry.⁴²³

Dainfern and Zevenfontein

Zevenfontein informal is located at the boundary wall of the Dainfern Golf Estates and within clear view of Dainfern Valley and Dainfern Ridge on the other side of the banks of the Jukskei River. At some points less than a hundred metres separate the shacks, where rentals of plots reach at most R50 a month; from the razor-wire enforced boundary walls of the multi-million Rand housing complex.

According to Councillor Dela, while Dainfern have little complaints about their internal environment, their attitude towards the informal settlement of Zevenfontein is often expressed to him; "They say the life here is not conducive, that we are making the

⁴²² Private interview: Dela (23.11.2005); Private interview: Mulauzi; Private interview: Lorimer

⁴²³ Private interview: Felicity Sithole, Zevenfontein Resident, FS.

environment unhealthy, they do not want to see us living here.”⁴²⁴ The majority of reasons given by the Dainfern objections to the location of Zevenfontein refer to the environmental damage which the area precipitates. The *Fourways Review* reported in June 2003 of objections to both the Zevenfontein settlement and Diepsloot based on the number of coal burning fires polluting the atmosphere.⁴²⁵

However, Councillor Dela argues that other factors have been expressed to him in meetings concerning the settlement;

Dainfern is in support of the move of the people here in Zevenfontein, because of the value of their properties next to the informal settlement and because the land where we are now, it is not state land. Dainfern is a multi stakeholder of the land here so they say they want to develop.⁴²⁶

Concerns about road closures in ward 96 did not feature as highly on the agendas of community meetings since their re-introduction in 2003 in comparison to other wards.

JB: How many closures do you know about in your ward?

SD: Not so many, I only know of... not more than 5 were approved.

JB: These are all in Chartwell and Dainfern?

SD: No, not really – Chartwell and Bloubostrand. Not Dainfern, they have their own access control and security there. They don't need the boom gates.

JB: What do you believe is the main motivation behind these closures?

SD: Well you see all the suburbs within the city, they don't just develop 10 houses and leave them anymore. They have to fence... they have these high walls and gates with security – all over. This is because people want to protect themselves. The

JRA (Johannesburg Road Agency) has decided because of problems to make each

⁴²⁴ Private interview: Dela

⁴²⁵ Smokeless Drum beats Urban Fog, *Fourways Review*, 4th July, 2003 p.1

⁴²⁶ Private interview: Dela

boom gate need an application, because they have no right to close the road unless they get permission. If there is no objection from surrounding areas – then there is no problem.

JB: What is the response from the community here about road closures and security such as this?

SD: I have had some people ask me about them and complaining they cannot go in to these places. Yes, I think the people here feel bad, they can't even look for jobs in there now [...] Because of the fences and the booms we cannot have access there now. I cannot just go there and sign in and say I want to sit on the grass there under the trees – [laughs] that will not happen.

JB: Do you feel these closures which divide different communities' impact negatively on integration of the population?

SD: These areas are scared of crime. They don't want anybody who doesn't belong there to get in to commit crime inside. They have a right to protect themselves and their families. But... well the Constitution... it does not allow for white and black areas anymore – the people have to be integrated and live together, the rich and the poor. This we can't do here because there are many objections. But the style of Cosmo city that is going to be developed - the rich, the middles and lowest will be living together. So the environment will be one.

JB: Have there been programs to stimulate partnership between areas such as this and affluent areas, to promote integration, as well as upgrading of the environment here?

SD: The programs we have in this area where we are staying now, it is just to educate our people here, you know the type of situation we are living in here, it demoralises the people – so to uplift morale of the people while we are waiting and we are sitting in these tin houses [...] we have to clean up the area. But since we have started that there is not any other from the surrounding areas who come to appreciate that. Because they are already living on their healthy environment – they don't know or think about what is happening here. What they want to see – if they still see these shacks here they still see an unhealthy environment for them there.

Douglasdale, Jukskei Park, Northriding, Ward 101 and Fourways, Ward 106

The areas surrounding the two wards serving as hosts to the informal settlements of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein form a complete contrast to these settlement patterns – again highlighting the vast inequalities present in this relatively proximate region of the municipality. Only two of these wards will be examined in any significant detail for the sake of brevity – namely wards 101 and 106.

In terms of the surviving 'racial' demographics of Apartheid classifications – statistics for these wards assessed in 2001, show a population of 31,378, amounting to approximately 12,981 households in ward 106, of which 1,845 (25%) fall into the Apartheid category 'black' while 71% are 'white'; while neighbouring ward 101 houses 30,993 in approximately 12,147 households, amounting to 5,683 (18%) 'black' and 23,760 (76%)

‘whites’.⁴²⁷ The extent of ongoing development attempts in these areas is illustrated in the growth figures in terms of households from 1996 of 38.36% and 51.70% for wards 106 and 101 respectively.⁴²⁸

In terms of housing provision, the vast majority of houses in both ward 106 (98%) and ward 101 (97%) reside in formal dwellings. Service delivery levels are equally impressive. Of the total households in ward 106, 98% possess flushable toilets, 99% bear some form of electrification through local provider Eskom, and 88% possess piped water into their dwellings, services by Johannesburg Water.⁴²⁹ Ward 101 is a similar case with 99% electrification, 97% with sanitation in the form of flushable toilets, and 88% piped water provision.⁴³⁰

Dramatic differences in terms of socio-economic opportunity in these wards is further exemplified by the enormously favourable employment statistics. Out of a total labour force of approximately 19,245 in ward 106, 18,585 were recorded as having employment in 2001, with only 600 (3%) unemployed.⁴³¹ These figures are again represented in 101 with 18,171 (96%) employment from the total labour force in the ward of 18,957.⁴³² Both of these areas then reveal dramatic advantages over the national averages for employment, which listed the national unemployment figure at 26,7% in September of 2005.⁴³³

A number of methodological shortcomings are present in the study of the affluent surrounding communities, not unrelated to the relative ignorance of these populations of

⁴²⁷ Statistics SA, demarcation.org.za.

⁴²⁸ Ibid

⁴²⁹ Ibid

⁴³⁰ Ibid

⁴³¹ Ibid

⁴³² Ibid

⁴³³ Ibid

both the existence of informal settlements (aside from that in Diepsloot due to increasing local press coverage of formalisation efforts); or indeed the scale of the problem involved. The relative isolationism of informal settlements in terms of the affluent spaces in this region, is typical of exclusionary spatial relations in post-Apartheid urban development, despite the repeal of discriminatory legislation.

In an attempt to overcome these methodological complexities, close analysis of the local community newspaper, *The Fourways Review*, provides tremendous insight into these two predominantly white suburban areas. The paper is free weekly to residents and businesses in the ward relying on advertisements for its production. Through analysis of roughly a year's worth of issues, a number of casual findings can be inferred and key topics of concern identified which affect the region. Based on a year's analysis, the average edition of the paper comprised 30 pages of news and advertising concerning the area which includes the main areas of study in this dissertation; wards 95, 96, 101 and 106.

Aside from providing an insight into the consumerism of the region, the main body of the newspaper deals with a number of issues pertinent to the community. Issues which the paper addresses over time can be placed (albeit rather generally), into a number of broad categories: local issues (21%); crime (10%); environmental (10-12%); social happenings (12%); local sport (10%); community empowerment and outreach endeavours (10-12%); and happenings and achievements at local schools (10%). Admittedly these categories often assume a significant degree of overlap, for example reports on local community greening project could fit into either environmental projects or local community empowerment endeavours. Neither category is typically impermeable.

Environmental issues typically relate to issues surrounding the activities in the region of local groups involved in species conservation of animal rehabilitation in the region. Apart from the society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), which operates country wide, two further non-profit animal rehabilitation centres are housed and operate in the region, the FreeMe Animal rehabilitation project⁴³⁴, and the Centre for Animal Rehabilitation and Education (CARE) in the Douglasdale area.

Apart from the average 10% of reports which concentrate on crime in the area, each issues typically features a column entitled 'Police Bulletin', where local police report back on crimes solved, request information relating to crimes, identify hot spots for criminal activities and release statements on crimes committed within the precinct.

Tying into broad themes in environmental racism and exclusionary communitarianism,⁴³⁵ in the affluent area around Fourways, the single most common source of articles and fervent readers' letters in the local paper over the course of 2003 and continuing through 2005, were the challenges relating to the provision of security through road closures.

Ward councillors for the wards 101 and 106, Katherine Lorimer and Dennis Hunt respectively, confirm that coupled with issues surrounding general crime and municipal capacity; these issues serve to dominate local community meetings, residents' and ratepayers' meetings and many instances of private communication between individual members of the public and ward councillors.⁴³⁶

Closely linked to these demands for increased security among the affluent are beliefs relating to a number of social pathologies relating to the marginalized. Numerous reports in the local community newspapers of the surrounding affluent area reinforce a

⁴³⁴ example: *Fourways Review*; FreeMe gets 10 years; November 14, 2003; p. 14

⁴³⁵ Harvey 1996, chapter 13.

⁴³⁶ Private interview: Hunt Ward Councillor DA, Ward 106; Private interview: Lorimer

connection between homelessness or informality and elevated crime levels. In two of such reports, *This is Home* (Fourways Review: July 14 2006) and *No Shack, no Hope* (Midrand Report, June 2 2006); informal populations were alleged to have been directly linked to a series of crimes in the adjacent areas despite both reports containing little in the way of concrete evidence from the authorities. In both reports, the informal residents in question were labelled as ‘vagrants’ and possibly ‘illegal immigrants’ in the country for employment in construction jobs.⁴³⁷

These two examples provide evidence of the continued operation of a number of social pathologies in the surrounding affluent areas relating to the ‘others’ preoccupation with deviance and crime. Further, the pathology of the poor as uncaring or naïve about the dangers of their environments is reproduced in “No Shack, No Hope”, where the local ward councillor justifies to the informal squatters that they have to move based on health reasons relating to waste disposal and sanitation, despite admission that the council had made no arrangements to resettle the families in improved circumstances.⁴³⁸

While it would be impossible to infer a general belief in social pathologies of this nature in the surrounding affluent areas, the prevalence of articles reinforcing these beliefs in local newspapers hints at the growing insecurity on behalf of these populations as to the presence of the marginalised within proximity of affluent predominantly ‘white’ residential spaces. The equation of poverty and informal living with social decay in crime or deviant behaviour – and with environmental degradation in terms of litter and disease in these pathologies – allows insecure populations in the affluent areas to justify their attempts to externalise the ‘other’ through relocation on the basis of personal security.

⁴³⁷ *Fourways Review*, *This is Home*, 14 July 2006; *Midrand Report*, *No Shack, no Hope*, 2 June 2006.

⁴³⁸ *Fourways Review*, *This is Home*, 14 July 2006; *Midrand Report*, *No Shack, no Hope*, 2 June 2006.

The outcomes of these proceedings are often the oppressive and inherently exclusionary practices of increased relocation of the marginalised and often ‘criminalised’ populations away from ‘white’ areas – accompanied by the increased fortification of affluent areas against future deviant transgressors on their boundaries. Road closures and the formation of gated communities is one method adopted in the area of the case study to achieve the insulation of these communities against the ‘other’.

Road Closures

The debate surrounding the closure of roads in the Johannesburg Municipality was sparked by a decision by the Metro Council in May 2003 to force the reapplication of all areas closed off with vehicular booms. The motive behind forcing the reapplication was the extent to which these deprived motorists of alternate routes, resulting in high traffic flows on mains roads.⁴³⁹ The Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) made the decision to re-open applications to areas, forcing existing closures to reapply to keep their security, and sparking off a host of new claims.⁴⁴⁰

Three important policy directives were listed in the JRA’s guidelines for application.⁴⁴¹

The purpose of access restriction must be to enhance safety and security – closures will not be granted for any other reason.

Unrestricted public access to an area must be available at all time.

Access personnel may not search or register through traffic, and it may not incur lengthy delays.

⁴³⁹ *Fourways Review*; Booms go bang; May 16, 2003; p. 32

⁴⁴⁰ *Fourways Review*; Booms go bang; May 16, 2003; p. 32; and see: <http://www.jra.org.za>

⁴⁴¹ *ibid*

The JRA admits the closure of roads is undesirable in Johannesburg, with one respondent from their offices quoted as remarking, “The policy has to be the vehicle which balances the security desires of one group against the access rights of others.”⁴⁴²

Residents’ responses to the issue of road closures in the areas of Fourways, Douglasdale and the surrounding areas have generally been favourable. Ward Councillors acknowledge a great deal of support for these structures,⁴⁴³ despite the huge costs involved; the application alone to the JRA carrying a R6,200 fee. A report in the *Fourways Review* in August listed an overwhelming 91% support for applications in nearby affluent areas.⁴⁴⁴

This phenomenon it is often argued has developed because of the alarmingly high crime rate in the Johannesburg area,⁴⁴⁵ yet the closing of suburbs is often seen by ‘white’ residents in affluent communities outside of these structures as damaging to their interests. As one Fourways resident Adrian Burford argues in a letter to the Fourways Review,

These structures concentrate crime into nearby areas where communities do not possess the resources necessary for the erection of booms, resulting in a situation where only the rich can stay protected. Why should I suffer a further burden because I don’t have the money or support in my area?⁴⁴⁶

The extent to which there is a violation of rights by these structures then is dependent on - and perceived differently according to social-economic situation. A report published in March of 2005 on the subject of Road closures in South Africa by the South African Human Rights Commission, while acknowledging the high incidences of crime in South

⁴⁴² Hendrik Van Tonder - quoted: *Fourways Review*; Residents hope to find Closure; May 16, 2003; p.32

⁴⁴³ Private interview: Hunt, Private interview: Lorimer

⁴⁴⁴ *Fourways Review*; Support for booms; August 1, 2003; p. 5

⁴⁴⁵ Private interview: Hunt, Private interview: Lorimer, Private interview: Dela

⁴⁴⁶ *Fourways Review Letters*; 20 June 2003, p. 9

Africa and accepting the Constitutional right to self-protection; nevertheless the Commission condemned these measures on a number of bases – arguing road closures “...cause social division, dysfunctional cities and lead to the further polarisation of our society.”⁴⁴⁷ The report further found these features to violate a number of fundamental rights as stipulated in the Constitution, and further that the Commission remained unconvinced both in the effectiveness of these measures, and that in most instances “...alternative measures for safety and security had been sufficiently explored.”⁴⁴⁸ Apart from a growing amount of evidence suggesting that these measures in fact do little to prevent crime in these areas; a principal concern to Jody Kollapen, Chairperson of the SAHRC was that,

Given our own history of exclusion and separation we should be extremely careful, even if our motives are otherwise commendable, in embarking on an urban design that works against the notion of a united society. There was considerable evidence that booms and closures do indeed exclude and separate in a manner inconsistent with the idea of an open city.⁴⁴⁹

However, despite these objections the power of capital proved successful in forcing through the process – enabled by Constitutional rights to self-protection and private property superseding the rights of less affluent citizens.

⁴⁴⁷ SAHRC; Report: Road Closures/ Boom Gates, 2005

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid

The Experience of Exclusion

The final portion of the chapter deals with responses to exclusion in all its manifestations amongst the settlement populations of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein. Public-private partnerships in the two settlements are compared in respects of community response and support for these attempts to manage their living spaces and improve their general environments. Involved in this discussion will be an illustration of many of the social problems faced by the various populations, as well as a significant degree of feedback concerning resident reaction to examples of ownership, in opposition to social exclusion suffered by settlement inhabitants. Exclusions will address environmental exclusion, exclusion from settled land and spaces, and exclusion from those areas delineated as the affluent and predominantly white urban spaces.

Plans for the settlement of Cosmo City will be examined to the extent that these introduce a wide variety of practical problems to inhabitants of the settlements in the areas.

Residents' reactions as to the nature and desirability of relocation to the proposed Cosmo City development will provide a significant portion of this discussion, as will a discussion of resident and local councillors' visions for the future of informal settlements in the area concerned.

Public – Private Participation in Diepsloot

Numerous projects involving private-public participation and local community empowerment have originated in Diepsloot since its formalization; including community greening and gardening campaigns, the establishment of recreational facilities for schools in the area and the formation of a literacy project, extended to the building of a public library in the area.

The literacy project run by Meinis Hattingh with donations from international organisations and the Rotary Foundation has been successful in establishing local school libraries at three schools in Diepsloot's newly formal areas.⁴⁵⁰ Still in process is the establishment of a public library in Diepsloot West made possible through various charitable donations and the work of the Gauteng Provincial Library Service. A 'mobile library' is also in the pipeline to service areas of the informal settlement.⁴⁵¹

Community greening projects have included numerous projects from non-profit organisation Food and Trees for Africa, Eduplant and recent donations from business group Barloworld to celebrate their centenary.⁴⁵² Barloworld's centenary was marked by a decision to plant 23 000 trees in disadvantaged communities throughout South Africa, 690 of which were earmarked for Diepsloot West.⁴⁵³

This scheme has complimented many attempts by Food and Trees for Africa undertaken since Diepsloot's formalisation. The company acts to encourage environmental awareness, planting of trees, and the establishment of local gardening projects.⁴⁵⁴

According to Jeunesse Park, CEO of Food and Trees for Africa, the effects of the project have been;

...increased property values, encouraging people to plant gardens, settle erosion, cleaned the air, controlled noise levels, provided shade and increased civic pride.⁴⁵⁵

Councillor Mulauzi is in awe of the effects of these and other partnerships;

⁴⁵⁰ Diepsloot a place of Few Words; *Fourways Review*, 28.11.03; p. 28

⁴⁵¹ Ibid

⁴⁵² Diepsloot Goes Green; *Fourways Review*, 02.05.03, p.11

⁴⁵³ Ibid

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid

MM: The community love them, if you can see when we have trees the people come in numbers to try and get one or two. The gardening programs assist people here a lot too. It really helps the development of the community because it is not just a giving of something. Building partnerships it is much better because it involves people working with their own hands. Like the new sports grounds here, the people see it as positive. Every new development... every piece gives them new hope.

JB: Is there a transfer of skills involved?

MM: We try to get as much skills development from each one as possible. For example there is a lot of involvement from the areas around and schools like St. Peters in the schools here in Diepsloot. Those are very successful.

JB: How has formalisation assisted in this process?

MM: Formalisation has been the main reason behind so many improvements here... ownership of this place for the people has helped a lot. Companies and individuals are more ready to help us here now, because they see it will now last a long time.

The success of building private-public partnerships and service delivery in newly formalised Diepsloot as opposed to the difficulties of those of building similar projects in informal settlements is often related to questions of ownership of land.⁴⁵⁶ Ownership is often touted by residents and administration officials as a prime solution to questions of transient populations. Ownership and formalisation bring numerous advantages;

...it is very important [...] you can see if you walk around which areas are settled now, the difference is there. We know we belong here now, that if

⁴⁵⁶ Private interview: Mulauzi; Private interview: Dela (18.01.2004 & 09.01.2006)

we move it is because we decide.⁴⁵⁷

However, ownership and formalisation are not without their own problems. Ownership of property in newly formal settlements is hampered by the legacies of Apartheid's Homelands Policy;

Under the previous government, Tswanas were settled in one place... Zulus in another, people had little plots there which still exist. People call this place 'home' like we have 'roots'... we have this thing of 'going home' all the time [...] The problem is a big one, the challenge is to make here their home, because otherwise people get a house from government, stay for few years and can't get a job. So they sell it and go 'home' [...] we need to remove this mindset. There are now some people who call Diepsloot home and they are very proud of it. You can't get these people to leave... that is the way we want to build it.⁴⁵⁸

This discussion highlights an important issue concerning the sustainability of the formalisation of informal settlements. Efforts aimed at the provision of housing have suffered numerous setbacks due to the resale of government allocated housing by those struggling with poverty in peri-urban settlements. Typically, those selling their properties return to a shack settlement often in the same area, or resettle in settlements in the rural areas – often in former homelands.

Development projects and job creation projects are key to overcoming this problem. The formalisation of housing for those unable to afford the added (yet often hidden) economic burdens which housing brings is often counter productive due to this phenomenon.

Without increases in economic opportunity in the form of employment and wages, the sustainability of permanent populations within newly formalised settlements is often impossible. Ownership is therefore not without its problems, presenting a number of

⁴⁵⁷ Private interview: Mulauzi

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid

significant challenges relating to the socio-economic development of informal settlements. However, in the instance of Diepsloot the advantages of formalisation and ownership have been proved, and as such have allowed for stimulation of a notion of permanence amongst the population.

Public-private Partnerships in Zevenfontein

Numerous small public-private partnerships exist within the Zevenfontein informal settlement which impact on various brown issues. With regards waste, local contractor for the Johannesburg Municipality, Pik-it-up has instigated a waste collection program as response to President Thabo Mbeki's program of *Zivuseni* (pick yourself up). In keeping with the rhetoric behind the programme, the project aims at involving the local community in the areas involved to assist in the improvement of their areas. Both Diepsloot and the Zevenfontein settlement are involved;

The focus is on education of the people on the environment because the whole thing is on environmental health and people taking care of the environment. We still want to develop further programs to involve the people. because we don't want the people to just sit down and say the environment is negative... they have to do this on their own as well.⁴⁵⁹

The program employs local labour from the area to collect waste in the streets and spaces around the settlement. Whilst as facilitators, Pik-it-up claim to be sponsoring some degree of education about waste disposal and its importance to the local community, the program has been hugely advantageous in providing much needed employment. The local community has acknowledged some of the successes of the program,

⁴⁵⁹ Private interview: Dela

It is much better than before, but still it is up and down. When it rains here it is very terrible because the litter runs through the streets from these big skip bins. But still it is better than before.⁴⁶⁰

Dela agrees with this assessment saying community response has been good,

The people highly appreciate [the program]... it has assisted so many people who are just sitting around doing nothing, having nothing to eat, at least now they are getting paid a little bit... R400 every two weeks.⁴⁶¹

A second set of programs in the Zevenfontein settlement concern the provision of health, sponsorship of education, and local empowerment. Key to these programs has been the work of the Rotary Ann Foundation in conjunction with the Bryanston Anglican Church, St. Michaels. The program has three primary forms: empowerment of local women in Zevenfontein through a sewing program; distribution of food parcels to crèches and the sick; and sponsorship for local schoolchildren in both Zevenfontein and Diepsloot. The entire project has been running for 10 years, and is supervised by Arena Brombacker, relying on charitable donations from private donors and businesses.

Arena Brombacker (AB) argues that the major concerns in the area are a lack of health care compounded by the unhealthy environment, problems with schooling and the absence of recreational facilities.

AB: Lack of health provisions for me is the worst problem. If somebody gets ill, I have seen them get brought to the gate in a wheelbarrow, as sick as can be....

JB: Are there a lot of children that get sick here as a result of their environment?

⁴⁶⁰ Private interview: Sonia Pitso, Zevenfontein Resident. (17.01.2004)

⁴⁶¹ Private interview: Dela

AB: Absolutely, in fact I'm surprised that more children don't get sick, but they are remarkably resilient to these things here [...] but there are definitely limits, and the situation here is not a joke....

JB: Problems with water sources?

AB: I have never seen it personally, but I have heard some dig holes and collect spill over water with bags, also some the river. The women also wash in the river and they wash their clothes. When the river is streaming it is one thing, but when it is still... well you can imagine.

Rotary Ann has been instrumental in the provision of a container for the settlement to function as a basic clinic, and in the subsidising of a 'mobile clinic', literally an ambulance with a dispensary for generic medicines.⁴⁶² The impact of these achievements are difficult to measure within the unhealthy local environment.

Malnutrition and the rate of infections of HIV/AIDS in the settlement are growing at an alarming rate, and part of the Rotary program has involved the distribution of food,

We hand out E-pap, a special type of porridge which for many of the malnourished children here is the only staple source of food. We try to confine this to the crèche children and those AIDS patients we have identified, as it is an extremely expensive project.⁴⁶³

Arena Brombacker has been very critical of recent attempts at partnerships in the settlement, especially the Pik-it-up program,

The people picking up paper and picking up dirt, I don't know how much that is a political joke... because they say we are now providing employment. In this weather, fine... but when it is hot it is another story. They work in the sun all day and put the bags out for collection. But by the time the truck comes to collect them they have broken, or the people have

⁴⁶² Private interview: Arena Brombacker; Rotary Ann Social worker; Zevenfontein.

⁴⁶³ Ibid

broken them looking for recyclables, the whole thing flies all over again. And so, the joke begins again. I suppose it keeps the program going, but how efficient it is... I'm just not sure. Added to this those involved have to travel far to collect their wages.⁴⁶⁴

The inadequacies of waste removal carries not only the danger of infection from contact with waste, but also the increased activity of disease vectors. Rats and other vermin are drawn to discarded waste in large populations of informal settlements. Despite infections from these pathogens and their biological waste, their presence is an indicator of severely negligent hygiene levels,

...the E-pap we hand out, we have an incredible problem with storage. The rats are constantly running here [...] you've seen the hundreds of dogs too, they breed all the time. There is no vet here for them, most are sick and unfed. They disturb bins and toilets and some get so hungry they eat human waste. Some of them are eaten by the starving people here as well. [throws up hands] I have no answers, we just carry on.⁴⁶⁵

The Rotary Ann schooling program sponsors 87 children in Zevenfontein. Each child is sponsored by a R2,000 per annum contribution to the program, which provides for school fees, uniform and transport. The lack of infrastructure in Zevenfontein makes transport a huge problem, with dirt roads meaning collections cannot be organised internally, and with all schools being a great distance from the informal settlement;

The transport is pathetic, the busses although they are government buses [...] are always hopelessly late, if they come. The solution is, that these pupils that we now sponsor already, have to come here in the afternoons and while we have no formal teachers, we try and teach them something [...] at best it keeps them off the streets and away from the non-working adults.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

Education in the Zevenfontein settlement is severely lacking, with ward statistics revealing 3,129 (6%) with no schooling of any kind, and 7,125 (14%) with only access to some primary- or having finished primary schooling in the ward.⁴⁶⁷

Social problems resulting from poverty in Zevenfontein are prevalent, with high incidences of abuse, teenage pregnancy and alcoholism. The lack of recreational facilities, crèches, child care and money for schooling in the poverty stricken settlement has resulted in a place of extreme danger for the youth.

AB: Here there are no recreational facilities at all. The young children are amazing, these children are never bored, playing all the time [...] our biggest worry are the teenagers. We have amongst the children we sponsor, 4 pregnant girls, 2 in high school and 2 in primary school.

JB: What programs have been put in place to combat teenage pregnancy?

AB: Nothing outside of the Rotary project... this year we try to give counselling to all the bigger children, at least the high school children. So when they come in the afternoons we have counselling, life skills and... they can come with all the questions. But that is a big problem, there is nothing for these children, nothing at all.

JB: What about crime towards that age group?

AB: It is endemic, what is shocking is that very often it is from within their own families. The number of stories is just too shocking. Fathers molesting children, happens all the time. The drinking problem here is terrible, and when they get drunk they get abusive. Abuse is often by the parents, and then of course the 'uncle', the 'good neighbour' ... the situation is very unsafe.

⁴⁶⁷ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96

The final tier of the Rotary Ann program in Zevenfontein is the empowerment of the local women through the teaching of sewing classes, providing skills which are then advertised by Rotary Ann to local clothing manufacturers.⁴⁶⁸ Further, the program has selected a number of dedicated women from Zevenfontein to work in a group, sewing and embroidering orders for companies, and for sale at local flea markets. Women are paid a percentage of the earnings, with the remainder being redirected into the sewing project and feeding scheme.⁴⁶⁹ Since its inception the sewing project has been the victim of at least 5 attempts at break-in and theft of both materials and equipment.

This demonstrates again a highly complex set of responses by the local community to programs aimed at stimulating empowerment in informal settlements. Examinations of community responses to private-public partnerships in informal settlements such as that above, are useful in identifying a number of issues affecting emotions of pride and permanence felt by inhabitants in periphractic spaces. Profound differences in the public response to these partnerships between the Zevenfontein settlement and those in the Diepsloot new formal settlement; may be interpreted as symptomatic of inhabitants general attitude towards their local environments. Again discussions here are often directed to the numerous advantages to be gained by formalisation, that of a feeling of permanence and pride of place through ownership. The lack of permanence suffered in the psyche of inhabitants of Zevenfontein has often lead to a lack of both pride and value for these projects, which makes for their extension into a wider-community integration project all but impossible.

⁴⁶⁸ Private interview: Arena Brombacker; Rotary Ann Social worker; Zevenfontein.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid

Juxtaposed to these considerations are the local community's attitudes towards permanent structures or ownership. This discussion will turn to responses to the ongoing relocation and granting of ownership at Cosmo City. First the practicality of the relocation will be addressed in the next section, where after the local response will be examined.

Cosmo City – Paradise or Pipe Dream?

Amongst the many policy considerations and social justice issues surrounding the Zevenfontein informal settlement's ongoing move to Cosmo City housing development, exist a plethora of practical problems.

First among these concerns are issues of the availability of employment and proximity to jobs and areas for consumerism. The area of Zevenfontein developed largely due to increased migration to the predominantly 'white' affluent areas in search of employment and basic needs. Proximity to areas of skilled employment is already listed as a problem affecting inhabitants of both Diepsloot and Zevenfontein,⁴⁷⁰ with many technical and skilled jobs requiring long commutes to the Johannesburg business districts or the Randburg CBD, incurring high transportation costs to those already in the margins of economic poverty. For the unemployed, proximity is a crucial facet in the search for jobs while not being able to afford even the most rudimentary of public transportation services. As already mentioned, the vast majority of women employed in both Diepsloot and Zevenfontein are employed in private houses, relying increasingly on proximity to areas of high density residential development in fairly affluent communities able to afford domestic employment.

⁴⁷⁰ Private interview: Mulauzi; Private interview: Dela

With these considerations in mind, the relocation of a portion of the populations in informal settlements in these areas to a location further away from their areas of employment⁴⁷¹, presents a greater burden in terms of employment and economics to these populations. For these reasons, Arena Brombacker, social worker in Zevenfontein is sceptical of the merits of the Cosmo City project;

It is very far, the ones that have a job will lose it immediately or at least in time. There is not space at present for a school I have heard, why are they moving there? The schools are here and transport is already a nightmare, they use these government buses without a brake between them⁴⁷²

Despite the opportunities for employment in the initial stages of the construction of the Cosmo City project, the area is not one with a high distribution of residential space to support the current number of workers employed in private households which would allow them to forego their current jobs in distant areas. In short,

...the entire project is premised on the successful development and reconstruction of the Randburg CBD and Kyalasands Industria. These programs haven't even begun to be successful yet.⁴⁷³

The lack of employment in these areas has raised questions as to the sustainability of the relocation and formalisation, problems which are not uncommon in the development of Greenfield developments on the peri-urban fringes.

Those already relocated to Cosmo City have begun to feel the effects of the decline in employment opportunity. One resident who runs a shebeen from her new RDP house commented, "Business has become very bad... nobody has the money anymore because

⁴⁷¹ Cosmo City would require an additional 15km journey to reach the areas of Dainfern and Fourways (ward 96 and 96)

⁴⁷² Private interview: Arena Brombacker

⁴⁷³ Private interview: Katherine Lorimer, DA Ward Councillor, Ward 101.

they lost their jobs [...] every day you see lots of people here because they must walk so far to get the jobs.”⁴⁷⁴

Attempts by some residents to compensate for losses by working from home have been met with resistance from local leadership and developers. Leslie Kekane, a welder by trade received numerous threats from developers for running a welding shop from his stand;

LK: The People we are not just allowed to use this space for anything... the CLO she comes to tell us we must stop these things here.

JB: CLO?

LK: Community Liason Officer... but there is nothing else what we can do [...] we can't put the security gates because we have no permit. So the tsotsis break in... we can't put a fence because we must all have the same so it looks like the same. But this is not what we want.⁴⁷⁵

Alterations or additions to RDP housing have been tightly policed by the developers in the area – leading to a significant degree of animosity between developers and residents; “This CLO she is not for the community... she must be a DLO because she is for the development.”⁴⁷⁶

A further major concern to the residents of Zevenfontein is the degree of capital loss likely to be incurred in the relocation. Within the informal settlement there exists numerous dwellings which have involved relatively large expenditure to the inhabitants in their construction. During the interview process in Zevenfontein, three out of the five

⁴⁷⁴ Private interview: Alina Mneswa

⁴⁷⁵ Private interview: L Kekane (21.06.2006)

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid

households visited were engaged in the process of building or improving various sections of their dwellings; while in Diepsloot, one such project was visited. Whilst many of the poorest shack dwellings are constructed from corrugated iron, wooden boards, discarded scrap metal and empty metal transport containers; a significant number of dwellings have involved more formal building materials. One respondent, Sonia Pitso (SP), a resident in Zevenfontein has built a home consisting of four rooms on her allocated plot in the settlement;

JB: Most of the shacks here, where do the people living in them get the materials to build them?

SP: Most of them are buying the tin from scrap dealers, or from traders, or from people who left this place [Zevenfontein] to go somewhere and do not need the shacks anymore. Some get bricks and wood from the hardware, or from the dumps at construction places around.

JB: You stay in one of these houses?

SP: No, I am in a brick house, it is much better than the old house I had close to the river, that one was tin... they moved me after the heavy rain to my new place higher up.

JB: How much money have you spent on building your new house?

SP: I'm not really sure... I bought the bricks from another place which was broken down – four loads and it was about R100 a load. Then the cement, I bought only ten bags because I did not plaster inside because we are moving. I think about R2,000 for all of it, maybe a little bit more than that.

If seen in light of statistics for ward 96, which lists 26,715 people not having any formal monthly income at all⁴⁷⁷, this expenditure is quite significant. The respondent is engaged in domestic work for a family in the Fourways area, earning less than R500 a month. The house she has built serves as home to herself and five children, two of which are still attending schools in the area; the father of her children having left the family 5 years ago, and not contributing in any way to their children's upbringing. This respondent is very apprehensive about the move away from Zevenfontein, but welcomes it, in final summation as preferable to the current state of impermanence,

Being here are not knowing where we stand is not the right thing, we need a permanent place. Even if it is this Cosmo City, if they give us a permanent place there, I will go. But not an RDP house, that is going to take too long and I don't want an RDP house, just my own stand. I will have to build my house again – but I am very tired of Zevenfontein. They have been trying to get rid of us here since 1994, I don't want to stay here where I'm not wanted by people – it's not the right thing.⁴⁷⁸

Added to the financial implications of relocation are considerations concerning the psychological and physical burden on inhabitants; particularly the elderly. Felicity Sithole (65) resident in Zevenfontein comments,

My main problem now is they say I must move from here... I am old now and I must move again. I just make my house nice after they move me from there to here. I want to make my house nice here, but they won't let me build anymore because they say they want us to move. I don't know where I'm going to be this time again next year. I'm scared to carry on here. I lost everything when they moved me last time.⁴⁷⁹

The emotions expressed by these respondents were typical of those amongst the wider population of informal settlements in the area. A history of relocation and forced

⁴⁷⁷ Stats SA; Ward Statistics – Ward 96

⁴⁷⁸ Private interview: Sonya Pitso (19.01.2004)

⁴⁷⁹ Private interview: Felicity Sithole, Zevenfontein Resident.

exclusion has fostered emotions relating to dispossession, both of land and of other tangibles. Crime and the threat of theft has left a life of deprivation for some residents, “living in these situations, you can’t just buy anything... in the shacks they remove the roof and just climb in, if you have a door they put the chain on and pull the wall down, you can’t stop it.”⁴⁸⁰ Apart from material deprivation, informal settlement dwellers due to their history are deprived of a feeling of permanence and belonging, again illustrated in differences amongst inhabitants over the treatment of public spaces and involvement in local community clean-up programs;

JB: What has the local response been to attempts to improve the general environment here?

QK⁴⁸¹: We have got the people working in the area – but because of the conditions we are living in it remains bad. Some appreciate the help, but still there are those who think ‘what for?’

JB: Do you feel the people in this area suffer from a lack of pride in their living spaces?

QK: You can see here which of the people don’t care. Some of these place, even that they are shacks, the people try and look clean. Some people they don’t want to. They come with rubbish and plastic bags, throw cleaning water in the streets... so the place is always dirty, it’s always stinking.

⁴⁸⁰ Private interview: Leslie Kekane, Zevenfontein Resident (14.04.2006)

⁴⁸¹ Private interview: Queenie Khumalo, Zevenfontein Resident.

The lack of pride generated in some by the lack of permanence in settlements can have extremely negative effects on both economic potential and social ills. Compounded by a lack of employment in proximity to the settlements, the effects can generate high incidences of alcoholism, abuse and crimes such as theft and assault amongst the population;

Some of these people here are so creative, so good with their hands building such nice houses. But some of the women are very flat and I can understand that. They sit in these places all the time and just do nothing. They don't think they are a person who means anything, and they have a right to do something and just be. That I find is the most difficult thing; to give them some pride, it is very very hard.⁴⁸²

Emotions of insecurity and a lack of self-esteem have not been addressed in many instances through formalisation at Cosmo City. The settlement has further served to recreate some of the more commonly listed sources of new insecurities, by separating neighbours of the Zevenfontein settlement in the relocation process. Of all the newly relocated residents of Cosmo City interviewed – only one reported being relocated in proximity to one of her previous neighbours.⁴⁸³ While some answered that forming new neighbour bonds has been a relatively easy process – most agreed the loss of old trust networks was a significant concern to them – particularly in the initial weeks of relocation.⁴⁸⁴ The lack of knowledge to the ability to rely on ones neighbours is a significant loss to many residents, many of whom remain concerned over intra-settlements crime activities, particularly amongst the large unemployed populations resettled without the means to adequately cope with the costs of the relocation process.

⁴⁸² Private interview: Brombacker

⁴⁸³ Private interview: Ivy Sibanda

⁴⁸⁴ Private interview : L Kekane (21.06.2006)

Electrification and the first time acquisition of electrical appliances by some residents increases their visibility and insecurity, with many residents demonstrating this new insecurity with the erection of security gates and burglar proofing despite development regulations prohibiting these.⁴⁸⁵

A further area of concern relating to the move to Cosmo City is the qualification for housing in the new housing location both among those living in Diepsloot and Zevenfontein. Assuming the problems with the legal stalling of the new housing development can be rectified, the problem of qualification for plots or new houses is still a grave concern. Qualification requires that each person applying for a new house in the location be in possession of a South African Identity Document (ID), have an income and at least in the first phases of housing provision the process is accelerated if the applicant has a number of dependents.⁴⁸⁶

Whilst the problem of a lack of income has already been elaborated on, the problem of identity books in informal settlements poses a significant problem to Ward Councillors and administration staff.⁴⁸⁷ Many in the informal settlements of Zevenfontein and Diepsloot are not in possession of a South African ID book.⁴⁸⁸ Two reasons typically exist for this problem; that of the existence of illegal immigrants in the settlements, and the legacy of population registration under the previous Apartheid regime. The immigrant problem is a significant one in both settlements. Drawn by the vast numbers of people living in a small place and the provision of services (although of the most basic kind), illegal immigrants flock to these areas due to the relative ease of non-detection among the

⁴⁸⁵ Personal observation.

⁴⁸⁶ Private interview: Mulauzi, Private interview: Lorimer

⁴⁸⁷ Private interview: Mulauzi

⁴⁸⁸ Private interview: Mulauzi, Private interview: Dela, Private interview: Brombacker

masses of shack dwellers, and the possibility however remote of finding employment in the surrounding centres;

There are a lot more illegals here than I expected, I found this out when I tried to sell clothes [from the Rotary sewing project] to the broader community, and when organising UIF⁴⁸⁹ payments. There are so many – it creates such a problem when you try to find employment for these people. I'm not interested in it (politics of citizenship) personally. People have to eat, so I don't care.⁴⁹⁰

Issues arising from illegal immigrants in these settlements are often brought up as concerns in community meetings and protests, such as the demonstrations in Diepsloot in February 2004 by SANCO, the South African Civic Organisation. In this protest approximately 5,000 people marched on the Ward councillors office to protest the allocation of housing to those without the correct documentation. A central claim of the demonstration was that many illegal immigrants had been allocated government housing in the newly formalized areas of Diepsloot, before those South Africans who were in possession of the correct documentation.⁴⁹¹ With regards those born in SA not having the correct ID books, this problem stems from the Apartheid homelands policy, where the racially marginalized were concentrated in remote areas under the jurisdiction of local 'tribal' authorities. The registration of births in these areas proved to be remarkably deficient, especially relating to female births. Many in South Africa are as a result without birth certificates or identity documentation of any kind. According to Councillor Mulauzi;

At least three times a week I have members of the public come to me for assistance in getting a South African green ID. Most were born here but do

⁴⁸⁹ Unemployment Insurance Fund.

⁴⁹⁰ Private interview: Arena Brombacker

⁴⁹¹ *Fourways Review*, Diepsloot Marchers Wait in Vain, 13.02.04, p.10

not have any proof... because Apartheid didn't care how many were born in Venda or Bophuthatswana, just as long as they stayed there. ID books have become very important now for the people to vote or to get C forms for housing.⁴⁹²

Whilst the granting of ID books to those denied under Apartheid is a central program in the government's policy with regards Home Affairs, the process will undoubtedly take time. Illegal immigrants on the other hand remain outside the borders of legality despite having taken up residence in these informal settlements. The immigrant question stands to be one of the more significant challenges to these settlements during formalization, as the question over what will happen to the thousands living in informal settlements around the country is addressed.

Within Cosmo City itself however, many have alleged that despite not having the correct documents, many non-South African citizens have received housing.⁴⁹³ Claims such as these resulted in an outbreak of violence in the areas in February of 2006 – during which time the then ward councillors house was burned to the ground.⁴⁹⁴ The appointment of the new councillor for the ward heralded the solution to the violence along with the promise that exemptions for non-South African citizens who had been residing in South Africa for a lengthy period would be made a transparent process for monitoring by the community.

⁴⁹² Private interview: Mulauzi

⁴⁹³ Private interview: L Kekane (21.06.2006) & Grace Dhlamini

⁴⁹⁴ Private interview: L Kekane (21.06.2006); Private interview: Maila (telephonic)

Chapter IV

Reactions to Exclusion, Affluent Areas and Dainfern

The experience of decades of exclusion on populations in the informal settlements is expressed in many ways. The initial experience of exclusion involves the populations alienation from their environments through the inadequacies of service provision to which the settlement is subjected, whilst other manifestations include exclusion from space and permanence. These emotions are common in most respondents, particularly in response to issues of environmental equity with their affluent neighbours.

Residents Reaction to the Environment in Zevenfontein

Inhabitants of the Zevenfontein informal settlement were found to be far from callous or naïve about the quality of their environments. Apart from issues of spatial marginalisation, common issues of concern for those living within the settlement focussed on water, waste (both human and otherwise) and electricity.

The settlement varies between those using water from water tanks, community stands and other ‘natural’ sources. Reliance on natural resources often relates to the inadequacies of service provision from communal water tanks;

SP: We want things that go forward, we want things that work now. Like the water – you see where we must go to get water.

SN⁴⁹⁵: Sometimes we drink water from the hole. There is a hole at the back here.

JB: Borehole?

⁴⁹⁵ Private interview: Selena Ndabani, Zevenfontein Resident.

SN: The water coming down here....

JB: Rain water?

SN: Ja, it runs down the hill here into the hole, because the tanks here are not right.

Sometimes the people are going to get water and they get the condoms coming from inside the tanks.

MN⁴⁹⁶: Everything, dirty things... panties, cats, the rotten food....

SP: Really it is true.

SN: They are throwing all those things in there, we don't know where that water is coming from to have all this inside.

The health implications of informal water collection, although well known by inhabitants, are mitigated by the necessity of water collection in context of scarcity of even these more formal sources. Problems with service provision to growing number within the settlement make scarcity a common experience;

JB: Do you fetch water from the [communal] tap?

QK: No it is from the tanks, but the tender which is in this place now, service is very poor. We have had at times... 3 maybe 4 weeks, no water in the tanks.

JB: Is it difficult to get the amounts you need?

QK: Very difficult yes, we have to wake up very early in the morning to fetch water. Otherwise you are going to stand here 3 days with no water in the tanks. We have to store it in these containers here so we can have water when we need.

⁴⁹⁶ Private interview: Mmapule Ndabani, Zevenfontein Resident.

Scarcity and the physical burden of water collection often translate into a further economic and time burden on the population. Quite separate from economic losses suffered from unclean water supplies in the form of illnesses, the necessity of water collection creates additional burdens on the population, a burden typically visited disproportionately on women. Consider part of the continuation of the above interview;

JB: How often for you go to fetch water?

QK: Maybe 6 times? I don't know because you see why... we don't do cleaning every day so it is different.

JB: How long does each trip take?

QK: About 10 or 15 minutes 'cause I have to walk from here.

JB: Do you have to queue?

QK: Sometimes on weekends the queues are very bad.

JB: So that's quite a lot of time from your day?

QK: Yes, and then we must still go to work. After that we are already tired.

Whilst these effects are already significant on families where able-bodied persons exist to perform this function, the problem is compounded in those instances where the inhabitants are elderly or frail. Further, in instances where either single mothers are working to support a household with young children or elderly relatives, the effects of fatigue can add additional burden and work-stresses on the households economic situation. Single parent households are common in informal settlements due to the paucity of employment. One parent typically leaves to find employment elsewhere.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁷ Private interview: Brombacker

Further, the prevalence of social ills leads to a high incidence of single mothers, either because of extra-marital promiscuity, or abandonment by either parent.⁴⁹⁸

The issue of waste removal and sanitation is often dealt with by respondents under the same reference of waste or rubbish, a situation which is fairly fitting since often it is difficult in informal settlements to distinguish the two because of the inadequacies of service provision, “The people here with no toilets sometimes use the toilets in these big dustbins here.”⁴⁹⁹

Environmental problems of service delivery are further compounded by the resultant lack of pride by those faced with deteriorating living conditions;

MN: Many people don’t want to live nice anymore. Look there is running water all over, there is rubbish all over. It is not safe here so you can’t to the toilet at night so people just throw their urine in the streets, the place is very dirty.

SN: We are staying in a pig’s place here, nobody can stay like this.

MN: What about the kids? They play here in this rubbish because you can’t tell them.

This is further illustrated by comments from another respondent, “We are in the dustbin here, some of us want to get out of this dustbin but we have no power to do it because the other people make it rubbish again.”⁵⁰⁰ The numbers of people using the public toilets and issues of safety has lead many to build make-shift untreated toilets in their own stands, often by merely excavating a deep hole in the ground and building a structure around it. These are often serviced by the contractors emptying the public toilets for a

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹⁹ Private interview: Felicity Sithole, Zevenfontein Resident.

⁵⁰⁰ Private interview: Elsie Mahape; Zevenfontein Resident.

charge.⁵⁰¹ The informality of construction and the relative economic burden of emptying these toilets regularly creates a situation where waste is allowed over time to seep into the ground, where it might have detrimental effects on the groundwater table. Inhabitants feel they have little choice in the matter;

Sometimes they [sanitation services] don't come for a long time, like over Christmas they didn't come. These toilets here were very bad at that time [...] and you can't just send your children off to the toilets alone, you must go with in case... it is not safe for the children.⁵⁰²

Despite physical safety, all respondents reported illnesses or other health problems arising from the level of waste, human and otherwise, in the settlement. Particular concern was felt by those with children, with the lack of safe clean recreational spaces meaning that often children are at play in and amongst waste.⁵⁰³

A further issue, the prevalence of animals in the settlement compounds these problems.

Within Zevenfontein, a large number of animals, particularly dogs are clearly visible; both those kept as pets by inhabitants, and those running the streets due to a low commitment towards ensuring pets are sterilised, both because of a lack of services and funds; or merely as a result of abandonment, again as a result of economic hardship.

Some of these are bred for sale to animal loving members of neighbouring white residential areas.⁵⁰⁴ Despite the immediate dangers associated with disease transfer from these animals because of the lack of veterinary services, their frequency in the settlement compounds problems of waste removal and the control of human and other waste. Many

⁵⁰¹ Private interview: Dela (23.11.2005)

⁵⁰² Private interview: Selena Ndabani

⁵⁰³ Private interview: Elsie Mahape

⁵⁰⁴ *Fourways Review*, Profiting from puppy love, August 1, 2003 p.1

animals here are on the brink of starvation,⁵⁰⁵ and frequently disturb bins and tear plastic bags in search of food;

Sometimes in the morning the dogs go from here and they go out and bring back the plastic bags where somebody has gone to the toilet and they drag it around. We have to wonder why the white people don't want to live with us... it is because of these things too.⁵⁰⁶

Erosion presents a related problem to sanitation. Rain in the settlement not only erodes roads and washes waste into dwellings, but the lack of groundcover ensures deep troughs whereby waste can be washed from one area of the settlement into another. Further, waste is often washed into the nearby river resulting in high concentrations of bacteria such as E-coli in the water,⁵⁰⁷ which is used by many both in Zevenfontein and elsewhere for water supply and bathing. E-coli in the Jukskei river in September 2003 showed the levels of this bacteria which is an indication of sewerage contamination at 14 million per 100ml of water, whereas acceptable levels are 200 per 100ml.⁵⁰⁸

Lack of basic services is often related to the prevalence of social ills in the Zevenfontein settlement. For example, a discussion about crime or rape may lead to a discussion concerning the lack of electricity to light the settlement, a lack of security services, the absence of day care options or safe spaces for children for recreation away from potential offenders. Crime is prevalent in the community, with women, the elderly and children bearing its harshest manifestations;

People are beating each other, raping the women... even the old women. The other one was an old woman the other night she was crying for help, and when the people got there they found this very young guy trying to

⁵⁰⁵ Private observation

⁵⁰⁶ Private interview: Elsie Mahape

⁵⁰⁷ *Fourways Review*, Yuk! It's the Jukskei, 5 December, 2004 p. 32

⁵⁰⁸ *ibid*

rape this old lady. And he was very small to try and rape her.⁵⁰⁹

In any discussion on services the issue of electricity for safety emerges;

SN: We want electricity badly here for lights, because it is very dark here. There is many places for people to hide here, and lots of roads that people can run away.

JB: Is the violence worse because of the conditions here?

EM⁵¹⁰: You see how many we are here, there are lots without work and too many criminals.

SN: When there is no light you can't even see who is there... or what is happening.

Both the provision of sanitation services, and electricity are implicated in many health issues then, with high opportunity for crime existing where these are absent. Fire is a further worry to residents, with increased reliance on paraffin and candles in lieu of electricity;

The shacks are made of tin and wood, and do not hold the heat inside like bricks. In winter they get cold and put on stoves and have blankets, which make the fire.⁵¹¹

Members within the community have tried in the past to find solutions to these problems,

I was doing volunteer work for 'Children of fire' and I spoke to the director about this place and I organised that they must come and put tanks here, these high tanks with the water from the fire department for the cooling down of the shack fires. But now the people who run this place say we are moving and we don't need anything here. How long have we been moving from here? But the people die from the fires all the time and the

⁵⁰⁹ Private interview: Elsie Mahape

⁵¹⁰ Ibid

⁵¹¹ Private interview: Mmapule Ndabani

children are left without mothers while we are waiting.⁵¹²

Whilst the dangers of the unhealthy environment are felt by all; children are often the more severely affected. The prevalence of health issues, security concerns and social ills affecting these age groups are often related to the fact that clearly defined safe spaces for children are unavailable. Despite the building of various crèches both by private inhabitants as a source of income, and by various charities as donation to the settlement; numerous children are left without place of supervision while adults are either at work or looking for work opportunities. This problem is compounded by the scarcity of resources for schooling of children. Despite the government's program of free education, numerous factors limit the availability of this to inhabitants; including the costs of transport to schools, uniforms, school supplies and the problem of illegal immigrants with children in the settlement. The lack of education, supervision and money for food makes these children targets for the perpetuation of various social ills, a situation not only visited on the young children, but on teenagers as well;

EM: There is a lot of problems here with the young children here, taking the drinks, stealing and playing with drugs all the time. Our children are losing hope here. There is lots of children here with talents, but they lose hope here.

SN: You can't get help from anywhere, can't take money from the bank because we are not permanent here.

EM: Like my eldest daughter, she finished school and now she can't find any job. Now she is having a baby two months ago and still there is no chance for her here. What is going to happen now with that baby? We are in darkness here.

⁵¹² Ibid

SN: I'm feeling pain, like a mother – nothing is sweet for me here. I don't mind telling you... look at this place here. Your children get healthy and play nicely... our children they don't get healthy [...] But they say we are leaving... how many years have we been leaving? The children growing up here, I can just tell you this child [indicates to a small girl of around 7 years old] ... in December this child was raped.

MN: And you call the police or the ambulance, if you call the ambulance they will come in about five hours somebody already died. And the police, you call them but they don't come.

Close associations and proximity between the settlements of Diepsloot and Zevenfontein have lead many to envy the benefits which formalisation has brought the area of Diepsloot. Ownership is a hotly debated topic in the informal settlements of both locations. In contrast Zevenfontein inhabitants must deal with exclusions from the benefits of ownership of land, particularly the issues of exclusion from Dainfern and attempted exclusion from the area of Cosmo City through the actions of white landowners there. The emotions of exclusion are widely expressed throughout the settlement, and it is these emotions to which the discussion now turns.

Reactions to Land, Affluence and Exclusion

Amongst those living in the settlement of Zevenfontein, the main reason expressed for the current move to Cosmo City does not relate to concerns for unhealthy environments where they are now, but rather an attempt to push them away from the affluent areas,

“The white people don’t want us here, they want to build on this piece of land where we are staying... and they have a lot of lawyers.”⁵¹³

Popular anger towards this process is most often directed at the Dainfern establishments;

MN: Dainfern, they treat us like the monkey, you know? They build this fence here... it’s like a border gate, they see us like monkeys.

SN: They don’t take us like people.

SP: They want to keep us away because they want to build for themselves where we are.

SN: Those people in Dainfern they just want to put their own money and play the golf. What about us? They tell us this place must also be a golf place. Where are we supposed to go?

MN: They must move the lions to the Lion Park!⁵¹⁴ Next to Cosmo City! [Laughs]

SP: No, we must stay here. We can clean it here ourselves.

But Dainfern doesn’t bear the sole brunt of responsibility for exclusionary practices.

Even amongst the newly formalised Diepsloot residents a degree of animosity is present,

It is a very strong feeling here in Diepsloot too, not only in Zevenfontein. The white people of Fourways and Lonehill say we are right in their backyard – which we are not, not even the whites now can have a backyard this big – and they don’t want us here. Whose land is this really? Is it for the whites? Or is it for all the people of South Africa? We don’t really have a democracy if it is not for everybody. Somewhere, some how we have got that, but is it really practical when you come and see what is here? We have offered to develop the informal spaces here and in Zevenfontein as formal place, to try and build up there. But then they change from saying the place is unhealthy to just ‘No we don’t want this

⁵¹³ Private interview: Elsie Mahape

⁵¹⁴ Cosmo City is located near to the Chartwell Lion park – a popular leisure spot for those in the surrounding affluent areas.

here'. Where are we supposed to stay now?⁵¹⁵

These feelings of exclusion often lead to strong feelings of alienation amongst the population, including feelings of inadequacy such as expressed by this respondent,

“It is because I don't have money, I can't build a big house like them. They don't treat me like a person. When I see the people living there – the white people, I think maybe God doesn't love me.”⁵¹⁶

Exclusion is also often expressed as an absence of acceptance or belonging, a feeling compounded by the existence of road closures and the erection of high security complexes;

JB: How do you feel about things like these high walls erected by the affluent areas or things like boom closures?

QK: It makes me feel like we are strangers – we are from here and lived here for a long time but we are still strangers. And the people from the outside they are the beneficiaries of this place. I am not a stranger, I am not a criminal.

JB: How do you feel to know the same problems exist at the new location for the Cosmo City complex? That you are not wanted there?

QK: It is very painful. The worst is that a lot of the people in Dainfern are there by contract, they are coming from overseas. But we are born here – look here is my ID. And we have no place. I am a criminal here, but this is my own country.

JB: So you don't feel like you belong?

⁵¹⁵ Private interview: Mulauzi

⁵¹⁶ Private interview: Elsie Mahape.

QK: Ja, which is why I say we are not the beneficiaries of this place. If you see the people in Fourways and Dainfern it is simple. They are the beneficiaries of this country.

Those in favour of road closures, particularly those in the ‘white’ areas have typically argued these exist and function as a deterrent against criminal activity, that exclusion is not the purpose of these structures. Consider the following conversation with DA Councillor Kate Lorimer (KL);

KL: The main problem with road closures is that in the past these haven’t been managed properly, management has been left up to the communities enclosed and they have been the ones excluding people. Now we have policy in place we can begin to monitor these types of issues more effectively. You have communities who took ID books away from black people entering – they are not allowed to do that.

JB: And yet the issuing of permits and checking of ID books is common.

KL: Well communities have to understand that they can’t exclude people from these areas, and it’s all very well to say that people are being excluded, but they all have to understand they have rights as well.

JB: Is that a realistic expectation considering the history of –

KL: [Interrupts quickly] Look, guards from security companies are told that they are not supposed to let anybody in that doesn’t belong there – I accept that it happens. This is why closures have these types of negative reputations. And it’s perfectly understandable for me, that any black person who comes along... because

restricted access is taboo, of course they are going to feel like that. It's almost a self-imposed exclusion though.

JB: You have a population here which has been kept in that role for so long, how can you distinguish between their reality of physical exclusion and a psychological exclusion to these communities? They do feel left out or unwanted.

KL: I'm sure that feeling is there. But also with the rate of crime in our country... I think people have the right to protect themselves.

Others within the white residential areas where the road closures occur are not always as forceful;

I accept, and I have had it mentioned to me before, that it [exclusion] is a huge problem and no doubt as time progresses these communities within will get more insular or more paranoid about individuals from the outside, questioning their bona fides – wondering why if they don't live here they should be allowed in. It undoubtedly promotes such insular thinking. I think most of us are unhappy with these consequences. But the whole problem with road closures is the fact that it is this choice between two unsatisfactory arrangements, crime is in a very bad state [...] No doubt people on the outside feel excluded, but talk to those on the inside and they are so convinced that it works. It is a strange social phenomenon we have gotten ourselves into.⁵¹⁷

The Politics of Road Closures: the “Berlin wall” and Abstract Rights vs Demanding Rights

The apparent reality of road closures and security complexes however, is that amongst residents of the informal settlements, they are perceived as a mechanism to halt their integration into broader society;

⁵¹⁷ Private interview: Hunt

FS⁵¹⁸: They make my heart sore, this is no good. When I want to go and visit my friends who are staying in there I am sometimes told I cannot go in. It is not alright like that, they are keeping us separate.

JB: What do the guards tell you when you ask to go in?

FS: I am told that it is not our place. We must just shut up.

It is not only the ill educated, elderly or otherwise disempowered members of settlements who are excluded, Councillor Mulauzi of Diepsloot herself has had these experiences. Often perceived exclusion is reinforced by real or tangible objects signifying the persons status as an outsider;

Often I can't go into these places either, unless I'm organised to be there. You have to have a card which they give you to wear if you going in on foot, like a pass. And I don't think white people have the same thing, they normally just sign in with their cars. People talk about these issues in our meetings... a lot. But because people who have money – they own these opportunities [...] Many of those people are not even South African, and the people here know this too. But they have a right to stay and own property in Johannesburg. But people who are born here like myself cannot live there. Even enter! They can't even enter into those places.⁵¹⁹

Exclusionary practices have often been the source of many indictments of those communities involved, as being concerned with an attempt to segregate the population along the racial lines established by Apartheid;

SN: I'm sorry to say this, but those people are still in a big Apartheid. Sometimes I'm asking myself, why... because Apartheid is finished.

MN: Apartheid is still here... nothing is finished.

⁵¹⁸ Private interview: Felicity Sithole.

⁵¹⁹ Private interview: Mulauzi

SN: These people are really in a deep Apartheid. There are some really good white people – but most they don't like us and they don't respect. Else how come we are living here.

MN: They don't want to live by us.

This identification of contemporary exclusion with the terrors of forcible relocations and the separate development of the Apartheid years is an intensely worrying one. The continuation of large bodies of those racially marginalised in transient peri urban existence bears little hope for the future of integration and development of these marginalised into broader society. The idea that relocation for formalisation is akin to relocations based on racial categorisation under Apartheid cannot be wholly justified, in so far as the planned contemporary relocation does not form part of an overarching program of racial subordination and exploitation.

Yet in many respects the connection in the minds of those inhabiting the margins is hardly surprising. The fact that many in the white residential areas surrounding informal settlements perceive these as unwanted, its inhabitants as other or something to be externalised is hardly in doubt.

What is apparent from the research, is that the practice of exclusion through the mechanisms of private choice and legal measures is exemplified in these 'white' residential spaces. Crime and social ills characteristic of a spatial setting where the overwhelming majority of the population are marginalised economically is undoubtedly to blame for an increased paranoia with regards security measures undertaken by inhabitants of 'white' affluent areas in South Africa. Areas in wards 106 and 101 reflect

this expenditure, with high walls and sophisticated security measures introduced to keep those who do not belong, out.

The high visibility of these measures to those marginalised is of profound significance to their effective operation. The erection of high boundary walls in white neighbourhoods, and enormous expenditures on security patrols and sophisticated alarm systems with large warning stickers in all the black languages, is keenly felt by those still reeling from decades of spatial separation.

Road closures and security complexes then are perhaps the clearest example of what Goldberg refers to in his argument to the effect that the Group Areas Act is remodelled and reproduced in the context of seemingly democratic and integrated communities the world over. These arrangements serve to implicitly deny, or at least create the perception of an ability to do so, not only the marginalised's access to private property – but further denies access to thoroughfares in the form of roads, economic opportunity by sealing off places of employment or merely extending transportation costs; and in the least, isolating individuals from broader community integration through the creation of isolated micro-communities within these enclosures.

In this way then it may be argued that exclusion is merely altered in terms of those methods employed to ensure its operation. Exclusion based on the legalistic operation of a racially constructed ideology gives way to the process of economic and private choice based marginalisation. Freedoms of association and the right to protect ones property form the mechanism whereby an infinitely more subtle process of racialized exclusion can be maintained.

The process further acts to reinforce itself by its very nature. By isolating communities the burden on marginalised populations to reach the level of economic competence to enter or at least challenge these types of arrangements increases dramatically, as employment opportunities decrease, and the chances for economic opportunity resulting from even casual social integration is impaired.

Reaction to Cosmo City: Party Politics in Zevenfontein

Despite the various protests from residents as to their exclusion from the proposed Cosmo City development, a significant portion of the population are against the move. A key reason for many of these objections deals with the inadequacies of communication between the local government representatives of the settlements and the people they represent. This interview from mid-2005 is a case in point;

SP: We have many times heard of this Cosmo City. They took us there about a year ago, but there was nothing there yet, just a stand they showed us the whole day.

SN: How can they show us something that is not there? We can't see Cosmo City; there is nothing there for us but the leadership's promises.

The issues arises in conversation with another respondent,

Our leadership, those people who are the leaders here. If they are telling the people the truth, that Cosmo City is delayed about this and that – the people will understand. But they are only promising Cosmo City is near, it is coming next month – when they know exactly that those people at Cosmos City they are in court day and night because they don't want it.⁵²⁰

⁵²⁰ Private interview: Queenie Khumalo; Zevenfontein Resident.

Despite issues with the transparency of leadership of the informal settlement of Zevenfontein, a more sinister charge of ethnicism regarding the leadership of the settlement has been expressed. There is no doubt there exists amongst residents a general feeling that the interests of ANC members are paramount in the minds of the settlement leadership, followed by interests of those of Xhosa ethnicity⁵²¹;

SP: We ourselves also have 'Apartheid' in here as well – we are divided between Xhosa and everybody.

MN: The ANC supporters too....

SP: If you want to go up to the gate (Administration building) to use the computer up there to type up some CV, they ask you “where is your ANC card?” If you don't have it – you can't use.

SN: They want is to vote ANC, but they don't want to help us. They are not 'for the people' here.

These claims were confirmed in part by DA ward councillor Kate Lorimer, who runs a trauma centre at the Witkoppen clinic which caters to Zevenfontein, and who sits on the Community Policing Forum for the Douglasdale Police precinct responsible for the Zevenfontein settlement;

Zevenfontein is very political, their community development forum, which as far as we are concerned is an ANC body – will only look out for those who vote ANC. They rule it with an iron fist.⁵²²

The politicisation of ethnicity in the informal settlement of Zevenfontein further exacerbates the poor level of community integration. Poor transparency of the local

⁵²¹ The ANC is historically a Xhosa dominated political party.

⁵²² Private interview: Lorimer

leadership underlies many of the reasons behind resistance to the relocation of the settlement. Most hard-felt is the burden which relocation will entail on the population economically, as well as a desperate need to realise a continuation of each person's history;

JB: Given the opportunity, would you prefer to stay?

QK: Yes, the schools are here, the churches are here, jobs are here. Most of us were born here as children.

SN: We went to Witkoppen school, we attended high school in Alexandra but we come back here everyday.

QK: This is our place here.

These emotions are echoed by numerous residents. Despite the fragility of attachment to space incurred by a legacy of forced exclusion, there exists numerous other more pragmatic attachments,

I don't want to leave from here, I must stay where I can work. So they must come and build Cosmo City here... this can be our place and the place for our children.⁵²³

Pressure from within the settlement for formalisation of the existing settlement is intense, with many looking to the example of Diepsloot as one where formalisation in greater proximity to the white residential areas has brought with it numerous advantages. Consider this discussion;

⁵²³ Private interview: Mmapule Ndabani

QK: I hear from people that if you are in a settlement for more than five years you can overpower that place. Why can't we do that here? We've been in this area much longer than that.

JB: How do you feel when you see the advantages gained by Diesploot through formalisation? Do you not hope you can gain the same at Cosmo City?

QK: Why Cosmo City? The same thing can happen here. Councillor Mulauzi has done a good job there – but the leadership is strong in Diepsloot and they tell the truth. Here they are shy and are telling us lies.

It is unclear to what extent the desire to remain at Zevenfontein exhibits the general will of the entire population of the settlement. Some seem genuinely optimistic about the various improvements in services to be offered at the new location, while others yearn for ownership of even a small dwelling removed from the suburban centres where they work. Consider again the following statement;

Being here and not knowing where you stand is not the right thing – we need a permanent place. Even if it is this Cosmo City... if they give me a permanent place there – I will go.⁵²⁴

The issues of a division in the wishes of the inhabitants concerning the relocation relates to the prevailing uncertainty of the future of the settlement, but also more often to the indignity of what is felt to be a forced exclusion from land which inhabitants have occupied for a great length of time, and which psychologically some lay claim to as their own from the past. Those opposed find little difficulty interpreting the apparent support for relocation;

⁵²⁴ Private interview: Sonia Pitso

JB: How do you explain the mixed feelings about Cosmo City? Some seem happy that you are moving.

QK: How can these people be happy here like we are now? They only have Cosmo City, they only hope for Cosmo City. The leadership know this and they want the people to think Cosmo City is here for everyone. The people don't know... they are dying each and every day. They are scared to lose Cosmo City because they have nothing.

These sentiments are echoed by social worker Arena Brombacker concerning the apparent support for relocation;

They are excited because the place is still just a promise, a dream. But as soon as they stop and think and are faced with their reality, the problems of moving, of jobs, of schools – they want to stay.⁵²⁵

Alternatives to Relocation from Within the Margins

Whilst inhabitants of the informal settlements remain divided between the merits of relocation and those of formalisation, various political alternatives have been proffered from those engaged in political campaigning in the area. Councillor Mulauzi, herself a resident of Diepsloot West, is full of praise for the government's decision to formalise Diepsloot on its existing site, arguing formalisation is the key to true sustainable integration;

[...] there is not representation here... not at the moment, and there won't be for a long time until... it is something we are working for, developing for. But we want to be next to the white areas like Dainfern. Myself, I would love to be next to Dainfern. [laughs] The people want... what can I say... a multi-development – the poor here, the others there. Why can't we

⁵²⁵ Private interview: Brombacker.

live like this?

The construction of informal settlements precludes permanence, to the extent that even public-private partnerships are unlikely to develop past simple charitable exercises.⁵²⁶

A further supporter of the formalisation of Diepsloot informal and Zevenfontein is the DA's Kate Lorimer, ward councillor for ward 101. She argues that practical problems such as qualification for housing and the un-sustainability of relocation do not present viable options.⁵²⁷ Lorimer shares Mulauzi's view, as she argues;

I'm a big believer in the fact that in the next few years we'll have developing across the city small pockets of slightly less well-off people in the suburbs. The only way this is going to work is if they are properly formalised. But you have this white fear, they forget that these people have been living in their backyards for the last 40 years anyways.⁵²⁸

Unfortunately history would argue that both these statements suffer from the same misguided view of democratic society in Western nations; a view where democracy has lead to true integration- that is of the whole population into a single landscape unmarred by boundaries based on 'race', separating the marginalized from society – or from equal opportunity. As we have argued in Goldberg's analysis, the existence of race-based political marginalisation does not depend on concrete absolutes or actual legal mechanism – but rather that marginalisation in space is often more subtle. The interconnectedness of marginalisation in economics with other typologies of marginalisation, including that related to space; are as evident in settings such as Compton Los Angeles as it is in the settlement of Zevenfontein. Differences of method and scale notwithstanding; both serve as sites for the physical concentration of a racially

⁵²⁶ Private interview: Mulauzi; Private interview: Dela

⁵²⁷ Private interview: Lorimer

⁵²⁸ Ibid

determined Other, through a complex weave of mechanisms encompassing economics, social pathologies, and a denial of true permanence or place.

The solutions proffered by political pundits in the area of the case study then remain naïve in light of these findings, and represent an optimistic interpretation as to the abilities of our integration agenda, which at present can only hope to promote development for a future attempt at true multi-racial or multi-class based procedure in policy making. For the moment however, the situation facing the marginalized remains as described by Mulauzi in the following passage;

The people here know the saying ‘how we treat others...’; what are these people here saying to us? We do not make this mess because we like it, we want our own areas, we want to belong in the same South Africa – not in black South Africa alone. But instead we have this ‘Berlin Wall’! Why do they need this wall? For now we have one thing to do – we have to convince these people to move, because really they are not wanted there. The problem is very difficult, they can’t stay – the courts will be full of complaints night and day. They can’t stay.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁹ Private interview: Mulauzi

Conclusion

This study attempts to place a discussion of informal settlements of the studied region into a conceptual framework of Goldberg's notion of social exclusion, particularly that relating to space and spatial configurations in the suburban context in South Africa. By elaborating on the discourse of Environmental Justice, the study further attempts to reveal the inadequacies of the current development discourse managing the post-Apartheid government's approach to informal settlements, undertaken in terms of the neo-liberal development model.

The study of the four wards above demonstrates the intensity of the contestation over the definition of environments, their beneficiaries and permanent spaces for the marginalized in the contemporary suburban landscape of Johannesburg. The surviving 'racial' pathologies whether express or bearing a covert reformulation and reproduction of centuries of racially configured settlement patterns, which alienate uniqueness and reconstruct difference along socially constructed racial lines as 'Other', bear testament to the serious nature of this conflict.

The contestation places those among affluent white communities who would embrace the spatial dislocation of the contemporary urban landscape, complete with the alienated and marginalized black non-permanent population; against the marginalized, those inhabitants of periphractic spaces striving to overcome their exclusion from all aspects of contemporary society, in the search for integration.

The re-occurring notion of integration, or in most cases **truer** integration, in the responses from those interviewed is somewhat positive in light of the theory – yet it is hardly surprising if one considers the price to be paid by the marginalized in terms of

their environments as well as other social concerns. The case study is illustrative in this way of Goldberg's assertion that "...race is more than simply the site of stratification, for the latter merely presupposes the establishment of levels of socio economic being."⁵³⁰

Rather in light of the evidence we can argue 'race' to be a significant catalyst in the construction of contemporary spatial forms – where space is atomised, areas are insulated through a non-acceptance and reconstruction of difference and subjugation.

Analysis of the spatial configuration of the areas in the case study assists in an understanding of how spatial subjugation learned and habituated by systems of racial bias, are reproduced in polities with a supposed liberal demeanour. The operation of abstract rights to property, the freedom of association and rights to guard ones life and property – though indispensable for the operation of democracy; act to limit integration if their meaning is allowed to become perverted by an over-eager universality or abstractness. Abstract freedoms and universally constructed rights often fail the poor and marginalized by depriving them recourse to uniqueness and individual histories in the process of policy-making or decision-making in wider democratic society. Thus in the operation of abstract rights, opportunity is presented as equal despite the respective histories, experiences and burdens of agents.

Finally the case study catalogues many of the subjective experiences of those marginalized within the periphractic spaces. Despite commitment to democratic integration; policymaking and the operation of private choice has evolved to allow the erection of increasingly insular, racially defined residential spaces. The identification of these practices with the erection of new 'Berlin Walls' amongst the marginalized as illustrated by the case study, highlight the divisive nature of their underlying ideology; of

⁵³⁰ Goldberg, op cit, p. 203

race-based socio-political contestation in the politics of spatial configuration. Further, the implication of a continued acceptance of relocation of the marginalized as an option to contested space, points to a reconstruction of Apartheid Bantustanization, based on allusions to environmental sustainability – as an acceptable outcome to the failures of democratic integration.

Evidence from the case study is highly illustrative of the fact that often urban integration proceeds from an uninformed standpoint. The dangers of such an approach are illustrated by the study and may be seen as proof of Harrison's assertion that "there clearly are forms of fragmentation that add extra burdens to people's lives, and that detract from the possibility of safe, liveable, sustainable urban environments."⁵³¹

The emotional responses of residents of the margins may be seen as inherently grounded in their day-to-day lived experience of social and environmental exclusion, and as such provide a telling testimony of exclusion and oppression in the post-Apartheid era.

Responses from these residents exhibit a sophisticated understanding of their local environments and spaces – providing an important account of life in informal settlements and the experience of 'racial' and class exclusion of residents in both political, spatial and socio-economic, and environmental terms.

While it is acknowledged that spatial integration by necessity has evolved in cities the world over, protecting a significant degree of difference and separation of racial, class and cultural groups; the extent to which dramatic inequalities pervade these different groups in the South African context resulting in highly oppressive circumstances for the marginalized results in the status quo being un-sustainable and detrimental to the realisation of true integration. In short, while difference is widely held in liberal theory to

⁵³¹ Harrison, op cit, p.22

be desirable or a necessity – policies and practices in South African which have allowed for the preservation of ever-widening inequalities between groups within society – compounding the economic, social and environmental burdens of one clearly defined group in order to achieve the material and social prosperity of another – exists as a profound example of pervasive socio-economic, political and environmental **injustice**.

From a social justice perspective then, these spatial dislocations and social inequalities **do** matter and **should** form the basis for concerted effort aimed at the promotion of justice for all citizens as expressed in the realisation of the rights to citizenship entrenched in the Constitution – as opposed to their contemporary abstract application to the marginalized.

This highlights a crucial element in the discourse of ‘brown’ environmental theory and in particular the discourse of environmental justice. Whilst contemporary environmental activism not following environmental justice discourse could foreseeably praise the relocation of informal populations to areas such as Cosmo City, based on quality of environments or threats to their sustainability; many environmental justice activists would find it difficult to agree. The crucial factor in this discourse’s rejection of the relocation would relate not so much as an attempt to deny a wholesome environment to those marginalized, or to prevent the further degradation of occupied spaces; but rather opposition is directed at the construction of entire marginalized populations as LULU’s, or as the barely tolerated by-products of capitalist production (labour), whose negative qualities demand externalisation at any opportunity.

Environmental Justice, to the extent that it is situated within the conceptualisation of social justice, allows for a broader consideration of the demands and wishes of

marginalized populations, specifically as they relate to brown issues such as employment and equal exposure to benefits of ones environment. In this way, the discourse avails the marginalized of mechanisms for the realisation of their autonomy, with the implication that relocation no longer exists as the only available policy option.

Finally then, the extension of environmental justice aims to construct equity in procedural policy making processes involved in the treatment of informal settlements, and the structuring of urban settlement patterns, allows for many opportunities for integration and social justice to be realised.

What is most evident from the case study is the need for development programs to move beyond the macroeconomic entrapment that allows for the perpetuation of social and spatial dislocation.

Environmental Justice, to the extent that it is situated within the conceptualisation of social justice, allows for a broader consideration of the demands and wishes of marginalized populations, specifically as they relate to brown issues such as employment and equal exposure to benefits of ones environment. In this way, the discourse avails the marginalized of mechanisms for the realisation of their autonomy, with the implication that relocation no longer exists as the only available policy option.

The recognition of the complexities of social forces underlying informal settlements is tantamount to the reversal of these tendencies and the building of sustainable outcomes; which are not only non-destructive of the livelihood strategies of the poor and marginalized, but further can act to support and extend these underlying networks of social capital to assist populations to cope with material inequalities in broader society.

What is crucial then in light of the evidence, is the need to reform the dominant neo-liberal development path as embodied in the GEAR framework, to a development path more committed to meeting the needs of redistribution and livelihoods-sensitive development.

Neoliberalism in the South African adaptation has proved to exacerbate differences inherited from Apartheid while simultaneously divorcing these from their historical political and socio-economic legacies. The result has been burgeoning poverty and the tendency for activists to argue the promotion of distinct graded classes of citizenship in South Africa – those able to manipulate the market-orientated discourse to achieve prosperity and the incumbent enjoyment of newfound liberal freedoms, and the overwhelming majority of the poor not able to enjoy any but the most abstract rights to citizenship.

The end result of these policies has been the enabling of affluent ‘white’ communities to affect the relocation and dislocation of the ‘other’ and the insulation of their residential spaces against this enemy, while simultaneously the only rights to environments or space for the marginalized are to dust-bowl developments in isolated peripheries such as Cosmo City, or in formalised locations such as Diepsloot which appear as islands of the poor in affluent zones – complete with vacant surrounding buffer zones to prevent future encroachment. The demonstrated absence of the political will on behalf of the ANC-led government to affect a more equitable distribution of assets and a reformation of the market-led neo-liberal development approach, suggests that this model of spatial dislocation will persist for years to come – entrenching social injustice in South Africa’s urban centres.

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Smokeless Drum beats Urban Fog, Fourways Review, 4th July, 2003 p.1

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Diepsloot Goes Green; Fourways Review, 2 May 2003, p.11

Diepsloot a place of Few Words; Fourways Review, 28.11.03; p. 28

Mayor addresses Diepsloot gripes; Fourways Review, 6 February, 2004, p. 4

FreeMe gets 10 years; Fourways Review; 14 November, 2003, p. 14

Booms go bang; Fourways Review; May 16 2003; p. 32

Residents hope to find Closure; Fourways Review; May 16, 2003; p. 32

Support for Booms; Fourways Review; August 1, 2003; p. 5

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Moilola, B; Zevenfontein Residents relieved after Cosmo City proclamation decision; Urban Sector Network; Feb 2003, p. 4

This is Home; Fourways Review; July 14, 2006, pg. 1

No shack, no hope; Midrand Reporter; June 2, 2006; vol 28 (22), pg 1.

Appendix A: List Of Interviews

Interviews Ward councillors

Siphiwe Dela – Ward councillor ANC ward 96 – 18.01.2004 – denoted by: SD.

- 27.06.2005
- 23.11.2005 (telephonic).
- 09.01.2006

Mmatlou Mulauzi – Ward councillor ANC ward 95 – 20.01.2004 – denoted by: MM.

Kate Lorimer – Ward councillor DA ward 101 – 21.01.2004 – denoted by: KL.

Dennis Hunt – Ward councillor DA ward 106 – 21.01.2004 – denoted by: DH.

Isaac Maila – Ward Councillor ANC Ward 96 – 24.06.2006 (telephonic)

Interviews Diepsloot residents

Isaac Ngwenya - 07.01.2004

Maria Mlambo – 20.01.2004

Portia Dhlamini – 20.01.2004

Interviews and informal discussions Zevenfontein

Sonia Pitso 17.01.2004 and 19.01.2004 – denoted by: SP

Selena Ndabani 17.01.2004 – denoted by: SN

Mmapule Ndabani 17.01.2004 – denoted by: MN

Felicity Sithole 17.01.2004 – denoted by: FS

Elsie Mahape 18.01.2004 – denoted by: EM.

Queenie Khumalo 18.01.2004 – denoted by: QK

Rosa Phaleng 15.03.2006 and 29.07.2006 (relocated to Cosmo City).

Social worker in Zevenfontein

Arena Brombacker 24.01.2004 – denoted by: AB

Kate Lorimer (also DA councillor but runs trauma unit in Diepsloot.) 21.01.2004

Interviews and Informal Discussions Cosmo City.

Leslie Kekane 14.04.2006 and 21.06.2006 – Denoted by LK.

Alina Mneswa 21.06.2006. - Denoted by AM

Albert Mneswa 21.06.2006.

Ida Ngwenya 25.06.2006 – Denoted by IN.

Grace Dhlamini 25.06.2006.


Julia Malete 14.05.2006

Samuel Phaleng 01.02.2006


Sarah Mojela 21.11.2005


Ivy Sibanda 21.11.2005


Maps – Appendix 1



Map 1: Johannesburg Municipality – Source: Demarcation Board, Municipality map;
<http://www.demarcation.org.za>







Map 6: Cosmo City Locality plan, showing existence of the settlement on the periphery – source: Joburg. Org.za Official Website of the City of Johannesburg, link: <http://www.joburg.org.za/2004/dec/>