Dissertation: The multiple transformations of peacekeeping and its actors: A comparative analysis of Burundi and Somalia

Dr Malte Brosig

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DECLARATION

I Liezelle Kumalo (773672) hereby declare in terms of student regulation that this dissertation is exclusively my own work and that all sources I have used has been acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography. I know that plagiarism (the stealing or unacknowledged use of another person’s ideas and written work) is an offence against the laws of South Africa and the regulations of the University of Witwatersrand. I also know that plagiarism constitutes a punishable intellectual malpractice.

Liezelle Kumalo

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**List of Acronyms**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>AU Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National la Defence de la Democratire-Forces de la Democratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>IGAD Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMIB</td>
<td>OAU mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>UN Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palipehutu</td>
<td>Parti pour la Liberation du People Hutu</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Parti Democrat Chretien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection Support Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Charter</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union pour le Progres National</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>UN Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>UN Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping operations often involve more than one actor. With regard to an intrastate war, a peaceful resolution of a conflict often involves external actors. For the purpose of this study the actors have been divided into three groups: local, regional and global, and four variables were identified to determine what influences a decision of each actor to deploy a peacekeeping mission. The study therefore seeks to understand the relationship and interplay between the various actors within the peace process. Recent studies have focused on different international organisations peacekeeping efforts, yet the transformations of one actor to another are not well understood. In this study two civil wars are explored and four hypotheses are identified to explain the transformations.
SECTION ONE: Aim, Rationale and Methodology

1.1 Research Title:

The multiple transformations of peacekeeping and its actors: A comparative analysis of Burundi and Somalia

1.2 Aim and Rationale

There has been an increase of peacekeeping missions on the African continent since the end of the Cold War. Of the 29 peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN) and resource cost of US$ 7.3 billion, more than half are currently taking place in Africa. There have been over 45 peacekeeping missions on the continent and African troops have been involved in most of them.

It could be argued that the efforts of keeping peace is expensive and that it needs to have clear mandates of what it would entail and who will be involved. However, it should be noted that the UN’s role is not limited to peacekeeping and that there are multiple actors with different roles and motives involved in the peace process.

Each actor in the peacekeeping missions are driven by their own values and particular peace doctrines, while still being part of a broader effort to bring peace to an armed conflict state involving a multiplicity of other actors and peace operations.

However, the term 'peacekeeping' implies that there is an organised body that is readily available in times of conflict that will intervene to keep the peace. But this is not the case. Peacekeeping missions follow a process that requires involvement from multiple actors that at times do not have the same objective in mind or deals with logistical and ideological consternation. Contemporary peacekeeping not only involves keeping the peace but also peace-enforcement and peace-building, which for the purpose of this study will be incorporated in the term 'peacekeeping'.

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Therefore, the problem lies in what exactly is the purpose of the mission? If it is required to monitor a peace-agreement, logistical support would be small, but if it has to enforce the peace, military personnel and equipment is needed which would require greater numbers and a support from a larger organisational body.

Moreover, as the mandate changes so does the involvement of an actor. The current literature on peacekeeping focuses on the success or failure of peacekeeping missions. It does not focus on what makes a peacekeeping mission transform from one actor to another to involve greater involvement with other organisations.

It is clear from various peacekeeping missions that there are stages of development, from the involvement of a single state, to regional organisation to a global or international institution. This transformation is considered the rule and not the exception and yet research has not been conducted on what conditions inform the rule.

This research report will investigate what conditions are needed or inform the transformation of actors in peacekeeping. It stands to reason that the more actors involved in peacekeeping the more complex the relationship is between them. If the relationship is complex does it allow for cooperation or a disjointed partnership? If the various actors involved do not cooperate it could have implications for foreign policy development and the success of the peacekeeping mission.

The transformation process is important for actors not only because of policy considerations but also because of the possible implications if said actors do not cooperate. It is important to understand the problems that can occur if there is no smooth transformation. For example, what are the implications to the peace process if there is no take-over from the UN to enable an international transformation? The UN has over 60 years of experience in peacekeeping whereas the AU only has 10 years. There are no guidelines or template that indicates how such a change will occur yet it happens on a regular basis.

The focus of this dissertation is to explain what circumstances led to South Africa’s engagement in Burundi. What conditions led to the transition from South Africa to the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)? How did AMIB give way to the UN? The circumstances in Somalia were similar and this dissertation will look at this case as well. For example, what circumstances led to Uganda’s engagement in Somalia? When and how did
the IGAD mission of Somalia (IGASOM) emerge as a peacekeeping actor? What led to the demise of IGASOM and the emergence AMISOM?

The process of transformation is an under-researched field within peacekeeping. Authors of various peacekeeping missions concentrate on either one or two of the actors but not on what causes a transformation. The purpose of this paper is to understand the conditions that inform the changes within a mission. This paper investigates the relationship between the two case studies presented in this paper. It must be noted that the findings are relevant for the two case studies presented in this paper and not other peacekeeping missions that are taking place in Africa or across the world. My findings are limited because only two case studies have been conducted and a broader spectrum of research is needed.

1.3 Research question:

Peacekeeping has multiple transformations from unilateral state intervention to regional and globalised peacekeeping. These steps of transformation have to be explained and analysed. For example, variables causing the change needs to be identified, whether it’s the mandate or the actors’ constellation. It is important to understand how quickly a unilateral intervention becomes a multilateral mission. It is also imperative to understand what the actors are doing. Because the phenomena is complex, this dissertation has one overarching research question with three sub-questions

Research question: What conditions explain the multiple transformations of the actors involved in peacekeeping?

Sub-questions:

What actor constellation is found in the mission? This is important because it investigates who the drivers of the mission are; and what is the politics behind the peacekeeping.

How are the mandates changing? The question relates to what is done on the ground.

How is the conflict impacting the actors’ capabilities? If the conflict is more severe, than greater capacity would be needed and would have an impact on what the actors do.

1.4 Methodology

The study uses qualitative research and makes use of four independent variables that explain peace missions. It is inductive research that will explain the evolution of various actors’
involvement in missions. It makes use of process-tracing method (George and Bennett, 2005: 207) to understand the empirical data that will be researched. Through the process-tracing method, the empirical information will allow the researcher to give evidence on potential processes and hypotheses, as it will allow for step-by-step trajectories of change and causation. Each step is described and the sequence of events analysed to better explain the evolution. It traces the process that causes causality, looking at the historical events and finding the link. This research is explorative and will look at what is the real impact of the different transformation. It will not assume deterministic causality, and not test theories against each other. As mentioned above the findings are based on the two case studies and the conclusions drawn from them inform the hypothesis. The paper is not theory testing but rather an investigation of the empirical data obtained through desktop research.

**Operationalisation**

The research identified four potential conditions (independent variables) that have a crucial effect on peacekeeping. It is inductive and is therefore open to finding and exploring these conditions that are guiding the transitions.

**Independent Variables**

*Doctrines or preferences of actors:* This variable will look at the foreign policy interests of the unilateral states and the peace doctrines of regional and international organisations. In other words, what exactly the AU and UN say regarding peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report (2000) of the UN and the AU Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (2003) define these organisations peacekeeping doctrines. The report specifies the impact of the transition and whether it is compatible with the doctrines and preferences of the actors and if these interest mesh. The ideas of individual state actor are also a determinant for a peacekeeping operation. The ideas of both institutions and states, both when they are right or wrong are very powerful. The ideas of actors are perceived as road map that influences the outcomes. Or ideas can help actors adopt a specific tactic or persuasion. It should be noted that this variable is based on the different policies that make up the doctrines of various actors. The actors do not apply the doctrines coherently but for this study is a useful tool as a starting step for a peacekeeping mission.

*Changing nature of the conflict:* Conflict has degrees of escalation that requires different actor involvement. A cease-fire monitoring mission would require only single state
involvement. However, if there is a greater need for security the peacekeeping mission will have to transform. If the conflict is not ending, a peacekeeping mission from a global actor is less likely to occur. In Burundi they were required to make certain reforms and then the mission concluded successfully. In Somalia the conflict is ongoing. The time that actors take to complete their mandate would be important to explain the transformation.

**Interest:** Power considerations largely determine the interest calculation of political elites and therefore foreign policy and interaction. What is important is the interest of the states and institutions will guide the architect of the peace process. State behaviour is driven by a quest to increase or preserve relative power. Powerful actors impact on the bargaining dynamics through their ability to create best alternatives. Interest predetermine possible actions and outcomes of the peace process

**Institutions:** Institutions aggregate the interest of the multiple actors involved in the peace process. Institutions are conceptualised as platforms that allow cooperation to occur and make peacekeeping operations possible and credible. They also affect the distribution of cost and benefits of state interaction. Institutions have distributional consequences, which can be used as devices to seek and maintain asymmetrical gains. They can also be used as a mechanism to control combatant’s behaviour.

Dependent Variable:

The phenomena have three outcomes but the unilateral state intervention is always part of the transformation of the mission. Peacekeeping can come in different forms and these forms are:

**Unilateral state intervention:** This relates to single state intervention, usually to ensure that a cease-fire agreement is adhered to. South Africa entered Burundi after there was a peace agreement in place. In Somalia, Uganda was the first country to enter the conflict and thereafter, Kenya and Ethiopia.

**Regional transformation:** This study will focus on the role of the AU. However, it should be noted that other regional actors such as ECOWAS and SADC also had peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Congo. Others, like ECOMOG interventions, clearly demonstrated their logistical weakness especially in peacekeeping; it still had peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau. ECCAS has to function in the contentious Great Lakes region and IGAD that started as a body that was supposed to focus on drought also has a security structure. The
Arab Maghreb also has a security dimension. The different regional economic communities are the support structure of the AU during its peacekeeping missions.

*Global transformation:* This is the UN’s involvement in the peacekeeping mission. The UN has a different mandate for each mission and that will be explored.

**Data collection**

Primary sources would be UN resolutions and Peace and Security documents from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. The information focuses on the UN Offices in Burundi (BNUB) and the instrumental role it played in ending the 13 years of civil conflict and the successful elections in 2010.

In Somalia, the UN does not have a mission but is currently in the country to assist the transition government and the political office (UNPOS). The importance of the sites is the amount of information about past interventions (intervening variable) and what is currently happening to support the transition.

The AU’s Standby Force published documents that would also provide primary data. Other sources include interviews that are available on the internet as well as the 1996 South African White Paper on National Defence and other policies that informed a certain decision. Speeches and statements by high-level officials and heads of government will also contribute to the study.

The study will also make use of books, journals and newspaper articles.

**1.5 Case Selection**

The two selected cases are used to show a variance on situations and outcomes. The Burundi case had a UN peacekeeping mission while Somalia does not have UN intervention, another reason for the case selection is to avoid selection bias. The case studies have been chosen because they provide for an empirical investigation for a comparative inquiry. Both are African countries that were involved in a civil war. The Burundi conflict started in 1993 and has had a full transformation, meaning that it has a global actor involved in peacekeeping. One of the severe conflicts in Africa with over a quarter of a million people killed, this ethnic conflict started during its first election 30 years after the country gained independence. The conflict had serious consequences for not just the country in terms of a humanitarian crisis and genocide, but also because the region could be seen as the precursor
for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Great Lakes region during the time had a number of other civil wars that led to an influx of refugees into Burundi and further destabilised it. Discussion was held in 2000 for a cease-fire but little was achieved. South Africa entered the country after other states refused to monitor the cease-fire agreement. The AU sent a force of just over 2500 men in 2003 to create the conditions for a UN peacekeeping force to take over. In 2004 the UN mission (ONUB) was deployed (Resolution 1545) in order to restore lasting peace. Within this case, the two variables that were deterministic in the outcome are the severity of the conflict and the capacity that is needed to complete the missions. The UN deployed military personnel of 5650, 200 observers; 125 staff officers; up to 120 civilian police and appropriate civilian personnel.

The conflict in Somalia started in 1991 and only had a regional transformation. Peacekeeping in this country had the near impossible task of not only creating a new state but also stop warring factions. The AU has a slow expansion and footprint in terms of peace and security. The focus currently in Somalia is on stopping the expansion of Al-Shabaab links in the country. The severity of the conflict at its height was the drought of 1992 leading to a famine that killed between 300 000 and 500 000 people. An analysis of the severity of the conflict should be aware of the drought aspect. The country suffers from a food security crisis that continued military operations have exacerbated. What is interesting with this case study is that the current lack of peacekeeping missions despite the ongoing conflict. Somalia had a previous UN intervention mission and that could explain why there is no global actor currently involved in keeping the peace. Operation Restore Hope, launched in 1992 under UN resolution 704, resulted in a contradictory multi-mandated intervention, with an annual expenditure of US$1.5 billion, the most expensive humanitarian operation ever undertaken. However, it still did not bring about conditions of peace. The AMISOM has also changed over the years in numbers and mandate.

Burundi and Somalia are interesting because they have some commonalities and differences that are useful for a comparative analysis. The two cases are also big interventions with different mandates. These two cases also represent what conditions inform a transformation.

1.6 Identification of the knowledge gap and value added to the literature

There is a vast range of peacekeeping literature in Africa and this study will add value to the different literature by investigating the transforming role of actors and how they interact with each other. It will also highlight the complexity through which different actors get involved
(their mandate) in peacekeeping and what they actually do in the mission. The study would also be useful to see if the interventions were peace-enforcement or if the external actors only hid under the rubric of peacekeeping.

1.7 Theoretical foundation

*Peacekeeping theories*

There is no clear theory on peacekeeping but numerous researchers have tried to define it and what it entails. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 13) define traditional peacekeeping as creating conditions for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. However, contemporary peacekeeping has moved away from the protection of the sovereignty of the state towards sovereignty with responsibility. According to Jeong (2005:2) not all peace processes are the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations, including the intensity and level of violence in intergroup relations and their impact on transformative dynamics. Even with a negotiated settlement, shooting, bombing, shelling and other types of violence do not necessarily stop immediately. Where there is violence or threat of violence, physical safety is an important concern. Peacekeeping missions are seen as a vehicle to help a country after the conflict to make the transition to sustainable peace.

The UN’s peacekeeping doctrine is focused on intervention in civil wars and/ or interstate wars or to prevent hostilities between possible belligerents from increasing, so that by acting as a buffer a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached. Peacekeeping is based on the principles of consent, impartiality, and the absence of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the international peace and security enshrined in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.

The UN Agenda on Peace (1992) states that the first attempt would have to identify at the earliest stage situations that could produce conflict and to try diplomacy to remove this danger. If conflict has already erupted, the aim of peacekeeping would be aimed at resolving the issue that has led to the conflict. Peace should be preserved after the conflict no matter how fragile.

Governments and international organisations have been prone to label many different kinds of military action as peacekeeping in order to legitimise their actions. The terms
'peacekeeping' and 'peace operations' are not found in the UN charter, but are informed by the author’s experience, interest and values (Bellamy et al, 2010: 14).

Moreover, there are number of peace strategies that are utilised by actors:

1. Peacekeeping: Effects by third parties such as the United Nations (UN) to intervene in civil wars and/ or interstate wars or to prevent hostilities between possible belligerents from increasing, so that by acting as a buffer a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached.

2. Preventive diplomacy: Diplomatic performance taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.

3. Peace making: the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful resolution that arranges an end to a disagreement and determines the issues that led to conflict.

4. Peace building: Post conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic that fortify and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to circumvent recourse to armed conflict.

5. Peace operations: A general category encompassing both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations undertaken to establish and maintain peace between disputants.

6. Peace enforcement: Use of military or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorisation, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (Kegley and Wittkopf: 2004: 589).

AU members were concerned about the continued prevalence of armed conflict in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to the socio-economic decline on the continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between African states. The conflicts have forced millions of people into becoming drifting refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihoods, human dignity and hope. The impact of the illicit proliferation circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa are undermining efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples (AU, 2008). The AU pretexts three legal exceptions that allow it to intervene in domestic disputes:

- Genocide
- Gross violations of human rights
• Instability in a country that threatens regional stability; and unconstitutional changes of government

The AU’s peacekeeping doctrine as stated by the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Security and Defence Policy Article 3 (f) notes that the Union shall promote peace, security and stability on the continent.

Boutellis and Williams (2013: 5) state that the UN-AU collaboration confronts four major challenges: the two organisations do not have a cooperative frameworks; what the AU wants to achieve in terms of peacekeeping; UN’s relationship with the African regional economic communities; and the lastly the divergent views on peace operations evident at the UN and AU.

International Organisations Interplay

It is important to understand how different organisations interact. In the case of the AU it would create the conditions for peace and security reform, but it would be a difficult task because it does not have the capacity. According to Brosig (2010: 330) two basic assumptions exist as to explain why organisations cooperate. Firstly, when institutions can realise a certain benefit from interacting cooperation is most likely to appear. Secondly, decision-making is based on individual actor’s preferences. Post-conflict and fragile situations create a legitimacy pull for organisations to set-up a peacekeeping mission and that motivates other organisations to get involved. Cooperation among the international organisations creates a perception of a legitimate mission. However, Shraga (2011: 351) views UN interaction with other third parties as disregarding international law principles - that responsibility for the conduct of military operation lies where operational command and control is vested. The realities of peacekeeping operations are complex and the perception that the UN has exclusive operational command and control is often deceptive, because the UN is keen to maintain the integrity of its operations in relation to third parties.

1.8 Literature overview

The most authoritative book relating to peacekeeping is Bellamy, Williams and Griffin’s Understanding Peacekeeping (2004). The book provides theory, practice and politics of modern peacekeeping. It examines the changing environment that peacekeeping operates in and the role of peacekeeping in the wider process that includes non-state actors. Challenges of peacekeeping are also examined. The book is helpful in understanding the dynamics of
conflict, security and the actors involved in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is distinguished from military intervention by the fact that peacekeeping forces usually arrive in a country only after a ceasefire has been agreed to between the warring parties and with permission of the host country. The functions of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in three directions: peacemaking, peace-building and peace-enforcement.

Much has been written about UN peacekeeping. For example, Sitkowski’s United Nations Peacekeeping (2006), investigates the idea of whether or not peacekeeping is a distinct form of peace-enforcement. The author also investigated the application of force only for self-defence purposes and lack of authorisation of the use of UN Security Council mandates.

There are numerous published works on the evolution of UN peacekeeping, especially since the end of the Cold War. An example of this is Thadar and Schabel’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagements. The book focuses on the thinking, experiences and frustrations in the field. It also brings into focus the regional experiences of peacekeeping missions.

The failures of peacekeeping missions have also been well documented. Shawcross’s, Deliver Us from Evil (2002) critically examines the UN missions after the Cold War with a specific emphasis on two peacekeeping missions. The two missions, Rwanda and Bosnia had serious flaws and resulted in great loss of life.

There have also been numerous works on conflict in Africa and peacekeeping where the role of regional actors have been analysed. Adebajo’s UN Peacekeeping in Africa: from Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflict’s (2011) examines the process of peacekeeping on the continent. More than half of the UN missions have been in Africa and the author investigates the resurgence of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa and their success and failure. African regional security is investigated as well.

Khadiagala and Lyon’s Conflict Management and African Politics: Ripeness, Bargaining, and Mediation (2008), focus on regional peacekeeping from different regional economic communities in Africa. The book investigates the capacity coordination of the members participating in international and regional peacekeeping.

Victor’s African peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics’ and State Legitimacy (2010) notes that African leaders, since the end of the Cold War have made the most determined strides in coming together to remedy regional ills. The most visible manner
of cooperation has been in the form of international peacekeeping. African peacekeepers less often come from the most developed states such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, but more often from poorer countries including Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda.

Victor further argues that peacekeeping contributions form African states mostly come from the most politically repressive regime in Africa, because it plays a diversionary role from internal problems. Furthermore, a major incentive for developing countries to participate is that they receive a monthly stipend per soldier, which is paid to the government. When large contingents of African peacekeepers are preparing to deploy, major powers often step in to provide sufficient equipment and training.

Stock’s Policy Analysis: A mandate is not enough: the Security Council and Peacekeeping (2011) highlights that a peace operation needs a peace process to have an achievable goal. Currently peace operations do not only involve ending the conflict between parties but also the protection of civilians; the restoration and/or extension of the authority of the host state, disarmament, and re-integration of combatants, de-mining and other tasks which extend partly into the area of peacebuilding. The Stock article (2011:13) underscores the four issues that must be dealt with in order to adept peacekeeping to contemporary challenge: peace operations have to be deployed more rapidly; the decision between only mandating or mandating and commanding a peace operation by the UN-SC is of critical importance; imbalance continues in the division of labour between different stakeholders in UN peacekeeping; and peacekeeping partnerships with single TCCs and particularly the regional organisations have a lot of potential.

1.9 Chapterisation of the study

Section 1: Research and methodology

This chapter will provide the introduction and scope of the study. It also provides definitions of the most important concepts, the analytical framework and the literature overview of this study.

Section 2: Background of Burundi conflict

This chapter will provide a background to the Burundian conflict. It is important to understand the possible causes for the conflict and to understand peace agreement that was put in place that allowed for a peacekeeping mission. The focus is on when the civil war
started and possible reasons for the conflict. It will discuss South Africa’s role and what made the country intervene in the peace process.

Section 3: The AU and UN in Burundi

The focus of this chapter would be on the evolution of the actors from South Africa to the AU and then the UN. The research will focus on the mandates of the two organisations and what they achieved in Burundi. It will focus on what conditions were needed for the transformation of actors. The focus will also be on the interplay between these two institutions to ensure a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Section 4: Background of the Somalia conflict

This chapter will focus on the reasons for the conflict in Somalia as well as previous interventions in the country. The focus will be on the role of IGAD as the local actor and what conditions were needed for IGAD to get involved in the conflict. An important aspect of this conflict is that it changed dramatically throughout its course.

Section 5: AMISOM and the UN

IGAD’s relationship with AMISOM is briefly discussed in this section. The mandate of AMISOM will be researched to establish whether it is peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. It will also focus on why the UN does not employ a peacekeeping mission, and what role the UN is willing to play in the post-conflict reconstruction.

Section 6: Conclusion and Main findings

The final chapter will have a summary of the main findings and if causality exists. It will provide a comparison between the two missions and what are the experiences in the contemporary forms of peacekeeping.
SECTION TWO: Burundi’s conflict and South African Intervention

2.1 Introduction

Burundi is the first case that this dissertation will examine on the investigation of what conditions affect the transformation of peacekeeping. This section looks at the conflict of the country and the role that South Africa played in bringing peace to the country. The actor constellation is investigated and what motivates an actor to become involved in a peace operation.

Burundi is a very small country, approximately 27 830 km. It is surrounded by very large nations, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Tanzania. The country is rich in resources such as nickel, uranium, cobalt and platinum. However, this small country has a very large population, over 8.7 million people living in that small space.

The population composition of the Burundi people is 14 percent Tutsi, 85 percent Hutu and one percent Twa (pygmy). Before colonisation the Tutsi and Hutu people lived peacefully with one another for centuries although the Tutsi were for a long period politically and economically dominant (Bentley and Southall, 2005:31).

Before the 1993 conflict, Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world. The majority of the people are rurally located and the densely populated country faced acute environmental challenges of over-cultivation, overgrazing, soil erosion and deforestation. The fact that the peasant population engaged in genocide violence, according to Bentley and Southall (2005:23), was prompted by a sense “that there are simply too many people living on the land, and that with a reduction in their numbers there would be more space for survivors.”

2.2 Tracing the roots of the conflict

Burundi was briefly controlled by Germany and thereafter for four decades by Belgium. In 1958 the Union pour le Progres National (UPRONA) was founded by Prince Louis Rwagasore, a son of a disposed king with close links to the Hutu community. To counter this movement the Belgian administration helped create the Parti Democrat Chretien (PDC). In 1961 legislative election, OPRONA gained 58 of the 64 seats and was a multi-ethnic party: 25 Tutsis, 22 Hutu and 7 Twa and 4 of mixed percentage. In October 1961, PDC agents assassinated Rwagasore, and during that same period Rwanda’s social revolution was taking place. For the next four years Burundian politics was extremely unstable and gridlocked. The
main parties became divided internally; the Hutu-Tutsi division became more apparent. In 1965 a failed Hutu coup d’état led to swift military retribution with thousands dead. The Tutsi military officer in charge of repressing that operation, Major Michel Micambero was offered a ministerial position. After a bloodless coup of a few months, he took over the government. Thus began a three decade military rule by a small group of Tutsi-Twa from Bururi province: Micambero (1966-76) Jean-Baptiste Bogoza (1976-87), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-93). This constituted the creation of a low-case Tutsi dictatorship (Uvin, 2009:9).

Furthermore, Uvin (2009:10) stated that during this time the country developed a system of almost total Hutu exclusion. By 1985 only 4 Hutu members were ministers in cabinet out of 20, 17 Hutu MPs out of 65, and only 2 Hutu members of UPRONA’s central committee out of 52. The state became a ‘milking cow’ for the elite that controlled it, which came under increasing attack. By late 1988, Hutu mobs organised by the Parti pour la Liberation du People Hutu (Palipehutu), a radical movement born in Tanzania refugee camps, were leading attacks in Burundi. Due to this pressure, Buyoya set out to introduce a system of reform.

2.3 The crisis begin

The unjust and inefficient system came under serious attack. The economy stalled and debts mounted. Although the structural adjust programs was partly implemented, it increased political and economic competition among elites and aspiring elites. The World Bank reported that the country experienced a negative growth rate of 6.2 of its GDP 1993 as well as a decline in GFP. The 1993 World Bank Report on the country highlighted that the country was ethnically and politically divided. This created conditions for the government to intervene in areas such as agriculture. This hampered private entrepreneurs in the production, trading and agric-processing arena. This lack of intervention led to management and investment inefficiencies in the public sector. The report further noted that government lacked the political will, administrative and legal institutions to implement the laws.

The violence that ensued because of corruption and ethnic divisions led to democratic elections. The Constitution Commission labelled it as a ‘national unity’ step. From the onset it was clear that ethnic divide would be a threat to a peaceful outcome if the cotes of the majority Hutu electorate were to prevail. Two parties UPRONA and FRODEBU dominated the election. Despite the fears a disruptive election it was conducted in a peaceful and calm atmosphere with small difficulties. Melchior Ndadaye won the elections, but the scale of UPRONA’s defeat added severe consequences for Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 205:47).
In October 1993, Hutu President Ndadeye was killed when some elements of the Tutsi controlled army attacked the Presidential Palace in the centre of Bajumbura. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly were killed and for five days there was no government. The military coup caused widespread fear among government leaders who fled to France (Watt, 2008:47).

Moreover, Watt (2008:48) noted that once news spread of Ndadeyes death violence erupted across the country. The targets were the Tutsi’s and certain pro-Buyoya Hutu’s were killed. Estimations of the death toll of the first five days are estimated to be 50 000 Tutsi’s. Thereafter the army began its revenge which resulted in 700 000 Hutu fleeing the country, the majority to Tanzania.

The magnitude of the resultant coup led to the massacre of hundreds of people and forced thousands of Burundi citizens to take refuge in neighbouring countries. By 1995 there were widespread violence, political assisinations and acts of ethnic cleansing in parts of the country. Moreover there was the militarisation of the Burundi society that resulted in the proliferation of militias (AU, 2013).

By 1996, the conflict was so precarious in Burundi that the UN viewed it as a possibility for a humanitarian catastrophe. Innocent people as well as humanitarian and aid-workers were brutally and murdered. A situation of generalised insecurity prevailed in the country in defiance of efforts undertaken to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict. By 1998, the country also faced a food crisis, and by 2000 there were persistent clashes between the armed groups and the socio-economic situation worsened (AU, 2013).

Moreover, by 2002 the political class was fragmented and tensions were exacerbated by the massacre of 173 people in the district of Ituba. In July 2002 there was a resurgence of violent attacks and an increase in assassinations targeting local administrators. Organised crime worsened as well as armed robbery.

As Fuhlrott (2007:325) stated, the conflict had less to do about ethnicity but more to do about power. The Tutsi minority had always been in power and this was reinforced through colonisation. Due to this, ethnicity was politicised and violence broke out along ethnic lines. After the assignation of Ndadeye, the predominantly Tutsi military fought against Hutu rebel groups, the largest of these was the Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie-Forces de la Democratie(CNDD-FDD).
2.4 The Arusha Peace Accord

The recurrent state of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability and severe exclusion of Burundi was first addressed through the Arusha peace processes. The negotiations started in 1995 and facilitated by Julius Nyerere and, after his death, by Nelson Mandela on behalf of the States of the Great Lakes region and international community. The negotiations took three years to get the parties participate and another two years before the Arusha peace Accord was signed. Thereafter, another three years went by before the Global Peace Agreement was signed in Pretoria in 2003. However the basis of the peace process is the Arusha peace agreement.

The agreement ultimately looked at the causes of the war and the circumstances that were sources for the injustice and frustration among the warring factions. The agreement ultimately found that the conflict was political with important ethnic dimensions that stemmed from a struggle by the ruling political class to accede to the accord and to remain in power.

Solutions proposed by the agreement had seven key strategies focused specifically on the redistribution of the State institutions to integrate and reassure all ethnic groups were incorporated into the Burundian society. The agreement specifically called for a new constitution to be drawn up that would focus on the rule of law, democracy, good governance, pluralism and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity and solidarity.

Furthermore, the agreements seek to shed light on the serious acts of violence that were committed during the cyclical conflicts that have been present since the country achieved independence in 1962. It further noted that the crisis was a profound one and that the reconciliation task would be a long and exacting one. The focus was therefore to ensure that all Burundian people felt they had a stake in the country, whereby all citizens were awarded equal rights and equal protection of the law. The objective of the peace agreement was to ensure that all Burundians were entitled to live in security and peace, and most of all in harmony with each other.

The agreement also had a very clear and specific deadline for a cease-fire, which would be two days after the signing of the peace agreement. It recognised that the belligerents were
government forces, combatants of political parties and movements, and political and ethnic militias. It made it clear that propaganda, within and outside the country would cease, as well as acts of violence against the civilian population.

Part of the cessation of hostility included the establishment of a Joint Commission for Peace and Security referred to as the Ceasefire Commission that was responsible for peace and security function and worked closely with the peacekeeping force. The Commission consisted of the transitional government, combatants, UN, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Regional Peace Initiative of Burundi.

2.5 South Africa’s interest for entering Burundi

As noted above, former South African President Nelson Mandela mediated the peace agreement. Together with Deputy President of South Africa Jacob Zuma, Mandela entered into eight years of negotiations in which he tried to bring the 14 political parties and movements to the peace agreement table. The first step in ensuring that hostilities would cease was an economic embargo that was put in place, especially because the country was landlocked and vulnerable to such pressure (Nijembere, 2009).

The success of the peace agreement and its implementation became the responsibility of South Africa. In August 2001, the South African government sent 700 troops as part of the SA Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD), which became part of the AU mission in Burundi (discussed in the next section). The mandate of the SAPSD was to protect Burundian politicians who were returning from exile to take part in transitional institutions. More troops were added to the military presence after the signing of the December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement. The SAPSD later also trained the Burundian soldiers.

As stated in the operation curriculum (DOD, 2003) for Burundi, the SANDF was deployed in Burundi in order to restore peace and allow opposition leaders to participate in the transitional government, this prompted South Africa to undertake the ambitious mission. General Godfrey Ngwenya (DOD, 2003) stated that the decision to deploy troops was not taken lightly, but it would have been impossible for South Africa to enjoy its newfound democracy with certain states of Southern Africa and the continent at large in a state of conflict. The task therefore was to restore and establish peace on the continent.

Gen Ngwenya stated that (DOD, 2003):
The SANDF got involved in the peace operations with the understanding that for South Africa to enjoy economic prosperity and all that democracy brings there needs to be stability in the continent. Indeed our country cannot survive as an island, as South Africa is inextricably linked to the continent’s stability.

At the end of October 2001, South Africa had sent two battalions to Burundi, while operating under the auspices of the AU, South Africa was essentially left to assure sole responsibility for the operation. The deployment of SAPSD initially encountered resistance from the Burundian army which tried to force President Buyoya to have them stationed outside the capital. South Africa refused to move but after a few months, Burundian officers came to accept that the South African troops were sticking to their mandate and had no intention of interfering with the autonomy of the Burundian army (HSRC, 2013).

South Africa’s national interest is linked to regional stability. The awareness has contributed to the change in attitude in South Africa for greater engagement in African conflict resolution. South Africa’s peacekeeping role emerged within a changed landscape in Africa. According to Accord (2007:13), the Burundian conflict was ethnically motivated where minority groups were categorised as superior and used their colonial masters to dominate and rule over the majority, granting them the power to subjugate the greater part of the population. The end f the Cold War saw the system of United States and Soviet Union backed parties dismantle and the emergence of an all out war. This is the environment in which South Africa had to characterise its peacekeeping in Africa.

The intervention of South Africa in Burundi, through Mandela provided a critical juncture for the country. For South Africa, emerging from post-apartheid transition, Burundi presented the opportunity to share its own experiences through a large-scale peace process and whose success would impact on the stability of the whole region. South Africa’s response to Burundi was a humanitarian one while efforts were made to find a political solution, but Burundi was important from a moral standpoint and the material interests for South Africa (Accord, 2007:17).

Furthermore, Accord (2007:17) stated that:

In the quest for its own development and its progression as a fledgling democracy South Africa’s achievements would be measured against the progress of those same goals for the rest of the continent, and more
specifically for war-torn Central Africa. Its interventions were also closely linked to South Africa’s support for the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was to serve as the vehicle for collectively addressing the continents’ lack of development through the promotion of political governance, regional integration and economic and corporate investment.

Both President Thabo Mbeki and Mandela’s administration placed a vested interest in strengthening South Africa’s role for conflict resolution in Africa. South Africa’s transition model was used by Mandela to initiate the peace process. Using the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) as his initial point of reference, the peace process included rebel groups in the negotiations.

General Ngwenya (DOD, 2003) also stated that South Africa was the first country to deploy military forces in support of the peace process. “We went to Burundi when no other country wanted to go there even though there was a prior agreement to deploy us with countries such as Senegal and Nigeria.”

2.6 South Africa’s idea of peacekeeping

The South African White Paper on the Participation in Peace Missions (DFA, 1999) stated that domestic and international expectations hoped that South Africa would play a leading role and became an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international conflicts. The White Paper states: “South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of the political and strategic environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing South Africa participation in such efforts. A precise understanding is required to the type of mandate that governs peace missions.”

South Africa’s foreign policy is guided by the affirmation that South African humanity is guaranteed when they affirm the humanity of others. This policy is similar in international relations whereby states are expected to respect all nations, peoples and cultures. The White Paper further states that the country’s approach to conflict resolution is strongly informed by its own history- which would entail not being a destructive force in Africa. South Africa works within a multilateral system to contribute to the professionalism of their personnel that participate in peace missions.
The White paper further states that South Africa acknowledged its global responsibility, but that SA’s foreign policy prioritised Africa. As a result the prime focus of South Africa's future engagement would be Africa. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa worked with international institutions to seek approval for its peace missions.

Therefore the deployment of the SANDF to protect political leaders marked South Africa’s first engagement in the peace operation in Burundi. For South Africa the Burundi experience represented a politically motivated and security related engagement of SANDF. Through its peace operations in Burundi the SANDF contributed to a foundation for sustainable development (DOD, 2001).

South Africa's involvement in the conflict shaped and developed its role as a Troop Contributing Country (TCC). It cemented the Country’s foreign policy commitment to the principles of multilateralism. Two important aspects of South Africa’s involvement in Burundi can be identified after the Arusha Agreements were signed. Firstly, as mediator, Mandela was charged with approaching African leaders for the deployment of troops to Burundi, which he initiated at home. Mandela persuaded Mbeki to deploy troops that no other country had the capacity or willingness to send (Accord, 2007: 25).

Secondly, Mbeki viewed the Burundian peace process as essential to concurrent initiatives to mediate peace in the DRC. Peace in Burundi was considered vital to the overall stability of the Great Lakes region. The initial deployment of troops to protect political leaders falls outside the purest definition of peacekeeping. But, Accord (2007:26) states that the deployment of the SAPSD to ensure the secure installation of the transitional government leaders in a suspicious political environment was essential to the peacekeeping process.

According to Rautenbach and Vey (2010: 11), the intervention in Burundi was a test for African Renaissance policy. It was the first time that South Africa set the tone and pace for a solution by Africa for an African problem. The then South Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (DFA, 2001) said that South Africa would make the contribution to build a new Africa in which there would be enduring peace and security. Because South Africa’s leadership was indebted to their neighbours for the end of apartheid in one way or another, there was a moral obligation to plough efforts back into the continent.
2.7 Interplay between South Africa and AU

The 8th Arusha Regional Summit tasked Mandela with the role of facilitator in the Burundi peace process. This was the prelude to South Africa’s physical intervention. Burundi is geographically far removed from South Africa; it therefore could be argued that it did not have direct interest in the country. The only interest it had was a strategic one whereby Burundi could be an ally on the road to stability for the continent (Rautenbach and Vey, 2010: 13)

The first mediator in Burundi peace process, Nyerere died in 1999. Mandela was chosen to replace him because of his long-standing relationship with Nyerere. Upon Nyerere death there was an urgent need to identify a new facilitator. As stated by Rautenbach and Vey (2010: 14):

There was an urgency to move forward with the process on the international, regional and Burundian levels, especially in the light of the fact that the process has been going on some time. It was time for change for a new approach by a freedom fighter who knew what suffering was about and who could identify with the plight of the Burundi people.

After consultation with the OAU and the UN, the communiqué issued by the 8th Arusha Regional Summit (2000) declared that Mandela would be the new facilitator. Judge Marc Bonani, informed Mandela of the importance of the peace process on the international and regional levels vis-a-vis the delays that had been encountered in the peace process. Although he remained chief facilitator, the stress of the Burundi process affected Mandel’s health. His physical mobility was affected and Zuma continued the task of seeking a ceasefire agreement (Rautenbach and Vey, 2010: 20).

After the signing of the peace agreement, Zuma started consultations with CNDD-FDD delegation. Because different grouping did not want to meet face to face with the Burundian government throughout 2001 Zuma held various meetings with rebel groups in Pretoria. By May 2002, the CNDD-FDD indicated they had no faith in the South African facilitation and requested a new facilitation and suggested Tanzania. Negotiations resumed in August 2002 in Der-Es Salaam and progress made towards a peaceful settlement. By 25 August 2002 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed and by 2002 Zuma succeeded in obtaining a ceasefire agreement (Rautenbach and Vey, 2010: 25)
By 13 March 2003 through various diplomatic shuffling the African Mission took over from South Africa in Burundi. Theoretically major facilitation was shifted from South Africa to the AU, even though Zuma remained as the facilitator.

SAPSD continued to carry out the protection function and formed the basis of the advanced deployment of the mission. The deployment of the main bodies of Ethiopia and Mozambique contingents, which started on 27 September 2003, was completed by 7 October 2003. Until the deployment of mission it was predominantly composed by South African troops (1550) with 43 observant members from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (Boshof and Vey, 2006: 22).

According to Boshoff and Vey (2010: 51) the Ministers of Defence of the three-troop contributing countries (South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique) mandated the deployment of the mission for an initial period for one year.

SAPSD military presence in Burundi made it possible for the AU peacekeeping force called Africa Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to be deployed in 2003. South Africa, together with Ethiopia and Mozambique, contributed a peacekeeping contingent of over 3000 troops. Then South African Minister of Defence Mosiuao Lekota said that the contingent of countries has been asked to coordinate and to examine what contribution can be made. Lekota (DOD, 2003) stated: “We are keen to fulfil the commitment...to contribute to this important mission who has been progressing very slowly. There is a lot of work that needs to be done yet, we see this mission as vital in creating the conditions necessary for our region and continent.”

2.8 Conclusion

The Burundi conflict can be viewed as an ethnic conflict but, as suggested by this section, the undertones were power motivated and that the political elites used ethnicity as the cause to propagate their own power ideals. This problem had to be addressed in the peace process and the peace agreement addressed and made provision to redress this. From this section it can also be deduced that a country’s involvement in another’s conflict has to be motivated by interest and ideas. South Africa, as the first actor in the peacekeeping process in Burundi, was motivated by national interest and by shaping their idea of peacekeeping. Another reason for the local actor involvement is the interplay between the local actor and the regional institution. Currently South Africa’s involvement in Burundi is focused on strengthening bilateral relations with a strong emphasis on Burundi’s post-conflict reconstruction and
development efforts. The following section will investigate the regional and institutional involvement in conflicts.
SECTION THREE: AU and UN involvement in the Burundi Conflict

3.1 Introduction

This section investigates what conditions are needed for a peacekeeping mission to transform the local actor to a regional and international actor. The transformation conditions that are investigated are that of the institution and interplay between them. Institutions ideas and information are key determinants for their involvement. South Africa requested that the AU take over the Burundi mission but as this section shows, the OAU/AU was involved in the process but later a decision was taken for the institution to become more than just an observer in the conflict.

3.2 OAU as an Institution in the conflict

As early as 1994, a few months after the assassination of Ndayeye, the OAU condemned the killing as a serious blow to the process of democracy. But because of the institutions golden rule, the OAU could not interfere in the affairs of African states. The sovereignty of states was very important (Landsberg, 2006: 2) and as a result the OAU did not get actively involved. However, the institution’s Secretary-General tried to promote dialogue and to mobilise the necessary resources to establish the OAU mission in Burundi (OMIB)

However, Resolution 1524 paragraph 4 of the OAU reconfigured the OMIB into a military component in order to assist the people of Burundi to pursue a process of national reconciliation. OMIB’s mandate was extended for a period of three years, but the OAU was dependent on the international community to provide financial and logistical support. Despite the presence of OMIB, by early 1995 the OAU was aware of the persistent uncertainty that prevailed in Burundi due to the activities of the armed groups and the assassination organised by extremist groups. Resolution 1560 noted that the presence of the institution was needed in Burundi in order to assist in its efforts to regain peace, national reconciliation and to focus on reconstruction.

But, by 1996, the OAU realised that an unstable political and security situation prevailed in the country and that the institution recognised the duration of the crisis was a serious concern and hampered restoration of peace and national reconciliation (Resolution 1619, paragraph 2: 1996). By mid-June 1996 the OAU realised that the precarious situation in Burundi was a humanitarian catastrophe. It became evident that despite OMIB presence, the mediators Presidents Nyerere and Jimmy Carter were unable to help the situation. The rebels and
political leaders mediated in an unstable, tense and politically polarised situation and insecurity prevailed in Burundi. OMIB not only had to contend with warring factions but innocent people and humanitarian aid-workers were brutally murdered (Resolution 1629, 1996).

By 1998 developments made by the Burundi people, particularly with regard to national debate regarding a partnership for peace, but the situation reached such seriousness that the international community was considering calling for sanctions. However, the OAU wanted leaders of the Great Lakes region to reconsider the call for sanctions

3.3 AU’s idea of the peace process in Burundi

During 2000 to 2002 the OAU was being transformed from the OAU to the AU. The AU had a more definitive role to play when it came to peacekeeping and setting an agenda for restoring peace to disruptive states. The old non-interference policy that had crippled the OAU also made it powerless in the field of preventing violent conflicts (Mwanasali, 2008: 41).

With political ideology largely achieved, the AU started prioritising economic development. Whereas the OAU rejected interference in the domestic affairs of states, the AU sanctioned intervention through the doctrine of non-interference to non-indifference. This was explained in Section one of the dissertation.

The process of restructuring Africa’s governance architecture (2000-2001) occurred when four leading African states-South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria- and their continental partners undertook eight new policy directives such as: African Renaissance. These policy initiatives propose a major restructuring of Africa’s development, governance and peace and security ethos (Landsberg, 2006:4).

This transition came about because apartheid and the Cold War ended. This created a space for the African Renaissance discourse to take place. The end of the Cold War pulled down the proxy cover for leadership and administrative inadequacies in and around Africa. The continent had remained volatile and vulnerable to external factors and factions; there was a need to initiate a process capable of operationalising emerging paradigms, concepts and new attitudes as a means of increasing the capacity of the continent to deal with its own problems by responding appropriately to the challenges posed by globalisation and the new world order. A strategic framework of African collective solidarity was needed on issues of socio-
economic development, integration, security and stability, democratisation and human rights. With regard to these broad challenges, the African Leadership Forum (ALF) in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the AU organised a series of consultative meetings concluded in May 1991 known as the Kampala Forum (ALF, 2008).

During the Lome Summit in 2000 the Heads of African states realised that they needed to work together to maintain regional and international peace and security. Leaders were conscious of the persistent conflict situations and acts of violence, which were seriously undermining the security and stability in African states and hampering development efforts (UNECA, 2008,).

Over 500 participants attended the forum from Africa and other parts of the world. The result of this meeting was the adoption of a comprehensive proposal for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA). This proposal is known as the Kampala Document. In part it stipulates that peace and security and stability are inseparable conditions and the basis for development and co-operation in Africa. The document also provides a framework for collective action and co-operation on continental, regional and international matters. It provides for co-operation amongst African states in the African Economic Community; joint development of common natural resources; inter-dependence based on beneficial co-operative relations with other developing and industrialised nations as well as supra-nationality based on the need to devolve certain key responsibilities to continental institutions (ALF, 2008). The CSSDCA is the adopted programme of the AU.

By 2001, it also became evident that previous efforts to stop the Burundi conflict were not working. The AU took greater steps to ensure that warring factions met at the negotiation table, by using the threat of sanctions. The AU realised that there was a need for effective operationalisation of the various segments of the African peace and security architecture. The AU also realised that peace in Africa relied on a bilateral and multilateral partnership (Resolution Dec 225, 2001).

The following year the first phase of Burundi’s transition was underway regardless of the difficulties that its government faced. There were persistent clashes between the armed groups, the socio-economic situation worsened and the political classes continued with their persistent dissension. The AU observed that there were serious violations to the Arusha peace agreement. To further frustrate peace efforts, there was latent conflict between the two large
political groupings of the country, namely the G10 and G7, resulting in what was considered the inequitable distribution of the post within the Transition Institutions. Within each of these groups there was also the discovery of massacres in the district that they occupied (Report on the 86th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ Mechanism, 2002).

Throughout September 2002, the AU expressed its concern regarding the massacres and political discord that was taking place. The AU was also aware that the massacres were perpetrated by the rebellion. The transitional government of Burundi had to deal with distinguishing rebel fighters from civilians who had been taken as hostages and used as human shields. The AU Commissioner appealed to the warring parties to refrain from violence and not to undermine the peace accord.

The following year the AU became very concerned over the continued clashes in Burundi and decided to intensify its efforts aimed at stopping hostilities. The AU’s Security Council supported the efforts made by Zuma as the mediator. The council, mediators and Regional Initiative decided to intensify contact with various armed groups to encourage the armed groups to seriously pursue negotiations.

The AU was in favour of the ceasefire agreement. The agreement provided for a monitoring and central mechanism led by the UN and AU. The document provided for the setting up of joint liaison teams that compromised of representatives of the signatory parties, the UN and the AU. Neither the UN nor the AU could get Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD to negotiate with the transition government during the early stages of the negotiations. Nkurunziza as the AU 89th Central Organ for Conflict Prevention Report (2002) stated that there were preconditions that he maintained posed considerable obstacles to the negotiation process.

The security situation in Burundi did not improve during this period. The cycle of violence varied depending on the context in which it was occured. In July 2002, there was a resurgence of attacks among the armed group. The 86th Report of the Conflict Prevention (2002) explained the situation as: “No doubt triggered by their determination to achieve success on the ground so as to engage in the ceasefire negotiations...from a position of strength.” The security situation was further threatened by the increased assassinations targeting local and administrative authorities as well as the increasing amount of organised crime and armed robbery situations.
Moreover, the violence that plagued Burundi during 2002 led to an increase of abuse and violence against the civilian population. Many people were displaced. During the period, the AU mission pursued contacts with other partners to exchange ideas on the best possible steps to soften the position of all parties. Not only was the AU involved in the ceasefire negotiations process but was also closely involved in various activities organised by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ministry of Reintegration and Rehabilitation of displaced person and returnees. The mission held regular talks with the two institutions on the progress of repatriation of the Burundian refugees residing in Tanzania. The AU also decided to create a construction project the “OAU village” for which the AU Commission made US$75 000 available.

3.4 AU as an institution involved in the peace process

By 2003 the situation did not improve, especially between the political groupings in the country. Several parties from all sides of the political spectrum claimed they were excluded from decision-making and were not adequately represented within the major institutions of the country. The differences that arose triggered tension that led to attacks. In October 2003 the Ceasefire Agreement was signed but there were various groups that opposed it and this led to socio-political turmoil. Before the end of that year the ceasefire agreement was violated and a resurgence of violence reached the capital (88th Session of the AU, 2003).

By December 2003, Zuma recognised: “that the uniqueness of the peace process in Burundi made direct involvement of the UN difficult.” Zuma therefore suggested that the UN should rather demonstrate creativity and innovation to support the African mission as well as other implementation structures and provide humanitarian assistance to the combatants. Mbeki, who was Chairperson of the AU, also took a number of initiatives aimed at backstopping the ceasefire implementation process. One suggestion was that an African Mission be deployed and countries to be approached to contribute troops (88th Session of AU, 2003).

Steps were underway to ensure the deployment of the mission, especially considering the fragility of the situation in Burundi. More specifically, both political and technical officials attended a meeting in Addis Ababa to exchange views of the nature of the mission, what it would entail, its conditions for its deployment, its modus operandi, its funding and the contribution that would be expected from the AU (88th Session of AU, 2003).
Although the combatants agreed to a ceasefire, the situation on the ground remained extremely fragile, especially when both Burundian armed forces and segments of the CNDD-FDD violated the agreement. Due to this, the timely deployment of the African Mission was important so as not to undermine the progress achieved after years of painstaking negotiations. The AU realised that the deployment of troops had to be sped-up. Through consultation with Zuma they had to find the best way and means to speed up the ceasefire implementation process. The AU Central Organ also reaffirmed its support for the on-going process, in particular the deployment of the mission (88th Session of AU, 2003). Member states were further urged to lend their support to the ongoing efforts of the AU and AMIB.

The principal mandate of AMIB, which was to be deployed for a period of one year, was to oversee and evaluate the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The mission also facilitated the activities of the joint ceasefire commission and the technical committees for the restructuring of the national defence and police forces; secured the identified assembly and withdrawal areas; facilitated the supply of technical assistance for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process; and facilitate timely supply of humanitarian assistance.

AMIB had a budget of US$190 million and a total strength of 3225 men for their initial period. One of the problems that the mission faced was the task of mobilising the required resources. As noted in the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council Report (2003), the AU stated that it devoted a lot of effort in the situation in Burundi and would “spare no effort to contribute to the final resolution of the Burundian crisis.”

By 2004 substantial progress was made in the peace process. Regardless of the limited financial resources at its disposal, the AMIB managed to carry out its mission with competence. Therefore, on 21 May 20014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Burundi. However, the ninth session of the Security Council Communiqué (2004) requested that the AU maintain an observer mission in Burundi to support the implementation of the peace process and to facilitate cooperation with the UN peacekeeping operation.

The UN peacekeeping operation took over from the African Mission by June 2004, thereby aiding the successful conclusion of the process initiated in that country through the signing of the 2000 Arusha Ceasefire Agreement. AMIB provided an invaluable contribution for the defrosting of the political climate and the restoration of security in 16 out of the 17 provinces.
Toward the end of AMIB’s tenure in Burundi, the only armed movement that had not joined the peace process was the Palipehutu-FNL.

3.5 Interplay between AU and International community

AMIB was set-up with the knowledge that the UN would take over the operation as soon as security was improved in the country. As noted above, the UN was asked to have limited involvement with the AMIB, but the UN did provide financial and humanitarian assistance during the process. As noted by the 5th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the UN (2004), the mission in Burundi (ONUB) had an initial duration of six months. ONUB had a maximum of 5650 military officers, which was initially composed of segments of the AMIB.

According to Bellamy and Williams (2005:192), AMIB became caught up in international differences on how best to resolve the civil war. “Zuma publicly questioned the Tanzanian and Ugandan role in supplying weapons to various factions and objected to these states’ troops being deployed as part of AMIB.” The financial difficulties were also great. Mamadou Bah pointed out in late 2003 that of the US$120 million funding that was required for the year, only US$20 million had been made available. Despite these difficulties, by December 2003 AMIB had contributed to a far more stable security situation in Burundi.

ONUB was conceptualised as a fully-fledged multifunctional mission. According to Boshoff and Vey (2010: 64), when AMIB was deployed in 2003 it was under considerable pressure from the transitional government of Burundi as well as the international community. When AMIB set up a cantonment at Muyange, the site had no infrastructure, food or medical supplies. By August 2003, the European Union (EU) had to supply the food.

The lack of infrastructure meant that ex-combatants/soldiers had to build their own shelters. UNICEF donated plastic shelters to AMIB. The German Cooperation Agency (GTA) supplied AMIB with protected conveys. The World Health Organisation (WHO) donated medical supplies. The World Bank provided finance for the DDR process (Boshoff and Vey, 2010:65).

According to Boshoff and Vey (2010: 75) the deployment of ONUB’s mandate was the result of a series of formal requests by the President of Burundi and the facilitation team led by Zuma to transform AMIB into a UN peacekeeping operation.
Zuma considered the situation stable enough to ask the UN to take over from AMIB as set out in the peace accord. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan suggested that the security situation remained precarious and that peace was more likely if the living conditions of the local population was improved. However, this was still a problem by December 2003. AMIB’s main challenge was that it could not make serious progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and to deter all spoiler groups who turned criminal as opposed to political violent (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:193).

3.6 UN in Burundi

As mentioned in section one, peace must be kept no matter how fragile it is. One of the conditions for UN peacekeeping is there should be peace to keep. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace building as a post conflict phase where international and national actors identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into armed conflict. Over the years the notion has been extended to re-building or establishing at least a minimally functional state in order to undertake political and economic reforms and maintaining peace in the long run. The focus of peace building is on the importance of state institutions while emphasis is placed on non-state actors (Menocal, 2011: 1717).

The UN determined that the situation in Burundi constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region. Therefore, under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter, the provision allows for the use of force to restore or maintain international peace. The Security Council, through Resolution 1545 paragraph 5 (2004), established the ONUB. The resolution stated that the ONUB’s mandate was to:

- Ensure respect for the ceasefire agreement through the implementation and investigate its violations;
- Promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces monitor and provide security at pre-disarmament assembly sites, collect weapons and military material to dispose of;
- Carry out disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national programme of DDR of combatants;
Monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilised;

- Monitor the illegal flow of arms across national borders;
- Contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of the humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- Contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement to ensure that a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections take place;
- Protect civilians under limited threat of physical violence without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi;
- Ensure the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB's personnel, and to coordinate and conduct mine action activities in support of its mandate.

Burundi’s peace came after 12 years of war. ONUB was deployed towards the end of a very long engagement. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in December 2002, UN officials revisited the question of mounting a UN peacekeeping operation. For months after, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was urged to be cautious. Internal discussions were held to consider whether the continued absence of FNL from the peace process was enough of a reason to continue urging delays. The continued difficulties AMIB was facing made a strong case for an operation (Jackson, 2006:9).

The 2004 Secretary-General’s Report on Burundi stated that despite the difficulties that existed in the country, his assessment found that significant progress had been made in achieving a comprehensive and all-inclusive peace process. The report further stated that the parties had an understanding that continued armed hostilities would not enable them to reach their political objectives.

In January 2004, two missions visited Burundi; first a joint AU/EU/UN mission to work with counterpart from AMIB, to review financial and logistical arrangements to sustain AMIB until the UN could take over. The second mission was a UN multi-dimensional reconnaissance mission to make recommendation on a possible UN peacekeeping operation including “rehatting” of AMIB. The two visit recommendations formed the substance of the
Secretary-General’s March 2004 Report and contributed to shaping the operation’s mandate (Jackson, 2006:9).

Canadian UN Special Representative Carolyn Metskie headed the mission. ONUB experienced delays in obtaining troops and deployment was slow. One of the UN’s earliest tasks was the provision of security to refugees after a massacre of 160 Congolese Banyamulengne refugees at a transit camp in the Burundian town of Gatumba. According to Adebajo (2011:77), by November 2004 despite the UN’s 5526 peacekeepers who were assisted by the ‘rehatting’ of AMIB troops, armed skirmishes continued.

Although 7329 Burundian combatants were demobilised between December 2004 and April 2005, internal political divisions among the members of the transitional government continued. The UN Commissioner with regional states and the transitional government mediated these issues through meetings (Adebajo, 2011: 78).

According to Jackson (2006:11), the conventional wisdom of the UN to try and keep peace “where there is peace to keep” is never clear in practice. ONUB’s history demonstrated that the UN successfully resisted significant pressure to deploy a peace operation until the peace process was all but irreversible ripe, and therefore the UN’s contribution could be more effective. The period to complete the transition established by the Arusha peace agreement was a strict one and any deviation risked creating the impression of a crisis in the peace process. When ONUB was deployed less than five months remained until the official end of the Transition was to be completed.

Over the course of such a lengthy peace process, an informal but mutually understood division of labour emerged among the regional and international actors. An overt relationship with armed groups became the preserve of South Africa. From late 2004 to 2005, ONUB had sent necessary signals and took actions towards the CNDD-FDD showing that it did not have an interest in who would take power after the elections. To ensure that ONUB remained objective, ONUB leadership took important steps to meet with Nkurunziza because the UN was aware that he would remain a key player in Burundian politics (Jackson, 2006:12).

Williams (2006:356) criticised the UNSC for taking a long time to intervene in Burundi: “In situations where the UNSC is actively engaged in a crisis, the AU should refrain from using force with the Council authorisation. The issue in more complicated in cases like Burundi where UNSC constituent refused to establish a peacekeeping force where one was needed.”
Schweiger (2006:656) in agreement with this view stated that the UN acted with hesitance in Burundi.

However, the UN did respond and ONUB’s mission was extended up until June 2006 when Resolution 1652 prolonged it to 1 December 2006. UNSC Resolution 1791 paragraph 5 (2007) replaced ONUB with the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). BINUB was a DPKO-led peace building support mission and included an integrated Sector Security Reform (SSR) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) section composed of both DPKO and UN Development Programs (UNDP) staff.

3.6.1 Challenges ONUB faced

The UN’s actions were not only hampered by the lack of comprehension of the SSR concept and strategy, but also had limited human and financial resources available. There was also the problem of coordination. Cooperation and communication within the UN system consisted of information sharing and dialogue. Cooperation worked well among UN entities on the ground with regular meetings between the UNDP, UNHCR and various sections of ONUB. However, coordination was lacking with Burundian authorities that had to frequently repeat themselves in interactions with multiple UN interlocutors who did not coordinate among themselves (Banal and Scherrer, 2007:51).

Although a productive working relationship was fostered, the relationship between the ONUB and Burundian authorities was at times troubled. Regular meetings were held twice a month to work towards different goals such as facilitation of the search for potential partners capable of filling gaps that the UN could not address. Another problem was that the needs of the Burundian authorities were not always understood or taken into account. For example, while some representatives of ONUB perceived the excessive military presence in the streets as a sign of the army's lack of professionalism, their national counterparts saw it as the concrete result of a lack of funds to build barracks. Another issue was the way ONUB handled the move from the transitional government to establishing a working relationship with elected authorities instead of being a neutral third party. International and local authorities were of the opinion that ONUB wanted to impose reforms after sufficient consultation with the authorised representatives of the government ministries were done (Banal and Scherrer, 2007:53).

3.7 Conclusion
According to Jackson (2006:3) the UN provided the people of Burundi with support and encouragement for a reform to peace:

Between 1993 and 2004, that support was limited largely to attempts at quiet diplomacy...Burundi’s success is thus the outcome of a sustained process in which domestic and international/multilateral actors were called upon to interact in complex complementary ways. The United Nations was challenged at each stage to identify the most productive mode in which to be of assistance.

As this section highlighted, each institution had ideas on how and what peacekeeping should entail. The transformation of peacekeeping from the regional actor to an international actor can be identified by the ideas or doctrines of peacekeeping; information that the institution receives and the whether the relationship that exists between the two can be of assistance to one another.
SECTION FOUR: Somalia conflict and IGAD intervention

4.1 Introduction

This section deals with the next case study, Somalia. In terms of peacekeeping Somalia does not have a full transformation, with only local and regional actors involved with its peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, Somali’s peacekeeping mission was supposed to be similar to that of AMIB’s. This is because it should have eventually become a UN mission. For the purpose of this section the study will focus on the Somalia conflict and the intervention of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).

Somalia is strategically located on the Horn of Africa along the southern approaches to Bab el Mondeb en route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The country suffers from recurring droughts, which is a cause for its insecurity as agriculture is the most important sector. Livestock normally account for 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists that are dependent on livestock make up a large portion of the population. 85% of the population are Somali, Bantu while other non-Somali residents (including 30,000 Arabs) make up the rest of the population (CIA, 2013).

As mentioned above the territory of Somalia can be identified by the former Somali Republic (1960-71), and the people are comprised of the Somali living in Somalia and from other communities including those living in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the wider Diaspora. Before the collapse of the government in 1991, the quest for a “Greater Somali” was a very real threat to neighbouring countries. Unsuccessful attempts to enforce this claim through military means in the 1960s occurred when the government in Mogadishu sent arms in support of the rebellions in the Ogaden, Bale and Sidand regions of Ethiopia and Kenya’s Northern Frontier Districts. Siyad Barre made the most forceful attempt in 1977 when his troops invaded Ethiopia. The claim to neighbouring countries has not disappeared (Anonymous, 2002: 249).

4.2 Tracing the Somali conflict

The Somali social and political structure consists loosely of clan families and clans who subdivide into sub-clans, primary lineages and “dia-paying” groups. The dia-paying (Jilib/Bah) is the most stable unit; membership is made of family units ranging from a few hundred to more than a thousand. Somali society has always been divided into nomadic
pastoralist in the north and the agro-pastoralists in the south, which have different cultural, linguistic and social structures (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 11).

Institutional structures incorporated concepts alien to Somali institutions under colonial rule. A consequence of this is that a discrepancy emerged between the highly decentralised pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the post-colonial state. A possible cause for the conflict can be traced to the rapid union of the two Somali territories to form a “United” Somalia state in 1960. The constitution of the unified Somali territories guaranteed democracy and a forum that sanctioned multiparty-ism and de jure freedom of expression. Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except in Israel. During the March 1969 election, more than 60 parties contested. Against this backdrop, in 1969 a successful coup brought Siad Barre to power (Ahmed and Green: 1999:115).

Once in power Barre immediately suspended the constitution and banned all forms of political and professional association. He promised to cure all problems that the country faced; he adopted Scientific Socialism, an ideology which was fully compatible with Islam. One of the political and legal changes that were introduced was a repressive security apparatus accountable to Barre himself. Furthermore, within a few years Barre’s socialised most of the sectors of the economy which were brought under government ownership (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 117).

4.2.1 Drought year’s start of dissension

Due to socialist experimentation and political hostility, the 1974 – 75 droughts were turned into a major famine in the north. There was a serious shortage of food and a collapse of entitlements throughout the northern regions. Government’s response was to force the pastoralists to engage in farming whether they had the experience or not. An attempted coup in April 1978 was crushed, but some of the Majerteen clan fled to Ethiopia and established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). By 1979 there were 1.3 million refugees in the country, and the pastoralists were reduced to second-class citizens. The second main opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), was formed in 1981 by a group of businessmen, religious leaders, and intellectuals and former army officers drawn from the Isaaq clan. In Italy 1987 the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) was formed. In 1989 the Ogandani-led Somali Patriotic Movement was formed (Ahmed and Green, 1999:19).
4.2.2 The conflict begins

On 9 July 1989, the bishop of Mogadishu was shot and killed. The violence increased on 14 July 1989 when government troops opened fire on Muslim worshippers as they were leaving Friday noon prayer. The violence sparked fear. According to Simons (1994: 818) it seemed that the city was becoming unglued as a result of a national government run by a president increasingly mocked as nothing more than the Mayor of Mogadishu. Two years later the government of Somalia fell.

Two powerful warlords, Mohamed Farah Aided and Ali Mahdi Mohammed from USC battled for control of the capital. In Kismayo two warlords, General Siad Moran and Colonel Oar Jess fought for control, while north-western Somaliland eventually declared itself an independent republic. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to Somali as his special representative in April 1992 (Adebajo, 2011: 174).

During this time, the UNSC established the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) which will be discussed in the next section. However, Somali warlords blocked food conveys and UNOSOM unarmed military observers were unable to stop them. 300 000 deaths resulted and one million refugees spilled to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kea. The deteriorating security situation led to a 38 301 peacekeeping mission led by 25 426 Americans entering Somali in December 1992 as part of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (Adebajo, 2011: 174).

Another drought hit the area in 1991-92 at the height of the civil war. Famine killed between 300 000 and 500 000 people and affected as many three million people. The war in the South created a huge displacement of people uprooting over one-third of the entire population in the South. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to pay factional militias to provide security for the distribution of emergency relief of US$100 000 per week, the CARE had to pay US$100 000 per month on bodyguards to carry out its relief distribution activities. The UN realised that through paying militias, even if involuntarily, the war economy was encouraged and disarmament discouraged (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 121).

4.2.3 Changing nature of the conflict
Attempts to carve out independent political entities after the collapse of the Barre regime have been hampered by the reluctance of most African countries and the OAU to recognise and accept the separatist movements. Despite the disappearance of its central government, Somalia continued to exist as a state. The Somalia seat at the UN remained vacant, and the OAU suspended, not abolished, Somalia’s membership. Numerous attempts between 1993 and 2000 were made to revive or reconstruct a central authority through various reconciliation conferences, but Somalia remained a failed state (Anonymous, 2002: 251).

Since the early 1990s significant changes occurred in the nature and intensity of the conflict. The conflicts became more localised and less bloody and criminality more constrained by customary law and private security forces. Somalia’s political elites that were quarrelling among themselves failed to establish a central administrative authority during the 1990s. This has led to many problems such as an increase in criminality and the armed conflict. However, there were certain places, communities, towns and regions that enjoyed relatively high levels of peace and lawfulness (Menkhaus, 2003: 407).

Armed clashes at the height of the civil war were generally localised, brief and much less costly. Some areas such as Puntland were almost entirely spared from war in the 1990s, while others have enjoyed relatively long periods of peace since 1995. In the early 1990s fighting was mainly inter-clan in nature, an example of which was the conflict between the largest clan families in the south, the Darood versus the Hawiye. Both sides committed atrocities (the massacre and rape of civilians from enemy clans or weak and defenceless clans caught in the middle of the clashes). Furthermore, the clan-families waged deadly internal quarrels. The intra-Hawiye spilt between Abgal and Gedir erupted into warfare. Extensive use of mortar and rocket propelled grenades levelled most of the capital’s centre and heavy fighting was waged over single city blocks. Tensions within the Darood culminated in clashes around Kismayo pitting Ogaden clan militias led by Colonel Oma Jess against SPM (Menkhaus, 2003: 410).

According to Menkhaus (2006: 83), from 1996 a type of sub-national governance was resented in the country. The politics found in these regional and trans-regional areas were similar to that of clan homelands. These regional and local administrations have tended to be tools of domination used by larger or more powerful clans to wield against weaker groups. Many self-declared authorities installed themselves as an occupational force. For example, in the Gedo region the Marehan clan monopolised political and economic life at the expense of
the Rahanweyn and other clans in the region. In return, the Rahanweyn declared non-
Rahanweyn clan members to be outsiders in the Bay region, even a sizable portion of the 
non-Rahanweyn Somali’s lived and worked in the Bay region prior to the war.

In 2004, national reconciliation talks produced an agreement for the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) led by President Abdullahi Yusuf. Many Somali’s viewed the TNG as a 
narrow coalition dominated by clans of the President and his Prime Minister, Mohamed 
Ghudi. By early 2005, a serious split emerged within the TNG between Yusuf supporters and 
the Mogadishu Group. By 2006 war erupted between the two wings of the Mogadishu Group 
themselves (Menkhaus, 2009: 225). The two-year period of 2007-08 was as bad and 
disastrous as the civil war and famine of 1991-92.


A fierce insurgency and counter-insurgency pitting Ethiopian occupying 
forces against armed resistance led by the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab 
devastated the country and polarised politics in Somali still further. Somalia 
staggered into the year 2009 as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with 1.3 
 million internally displaced persons and 3.5 million people in need of 
emergency aid.

4.3 The peace process

The first attempts at reconciliation aimed at re-establishing a government in Somalia took 
place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. The agreement endorsing Ali Mahdi as president was 
rejected and a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the rejected president ensued. Two years 
later, 15 parties involved in the civil war signed two agreements for national reconciliation 
and disarmament. However, fighting continued and the agreement fell apart. Between 
November 1996 and January 1997, a conference on national reconciliation was held in 
Sodere, Ethiopia. The meeting created a 41 member National Salvation Council (NSC) 
charged with arranging a transitional government. The government of Somaliland and 
General Aidid’s son Hussain Farrah Aidid who replaced him boycotted the conference. In 
December 2000 a fourth reconciliation meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt and had 28 
signatories. The agreement left Somalia without a national leader but provided for a 13 
person Council of Presidents, a Prime Minister and a national assembly (AMISOM, 2013).
Menkhaus (2009: 224) further noted that most Somalis were bewildered by the external policies that have laid waste to their already poor country while simultaneously promising to support peace-building efforts. At the start of the millennium Somali remained an orphaned country. Djibouti President, Ismael Omar Guelleh in early 2000, launched the Arta process. The Arta process focused on clan leaders and civil society and decided to sideline faction leaders. This was a daring approach because it not only ignored those who held military power, but tried to build national unity of the foundation of clan structures. By the end of August, the 25 000 delegates who gathered at Arta adopted a Transitional National Charter (TNC) and elected a 225 member Transitional National Assembly as well as a transitional president (Anonymous, 2002:252).

According to Mosley (2012:2), the decision-making around the transition was narrowed down to a handful of signatories and key international financial backers of the process. Dissenting voices were not only ignored, but were branded as spoilers by the TNG, IGAD, AU, UN and Western backers such as the US and UK. The establishment of the TNC widened the idea that the solution was imposed on Somalia.

In March 2001, Yusuf met with 17 other Somalian political groups and alliances in Awasa, Ethiopia, where the Somalia Reconciliation and Resolution Council (SRRC) was formed to oppose the Arta process and the TFG in order to promote the formation of a federal Somalian state (Accord, 2010: 33). The reconciliation meeting produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary one established at Arta.

In September 2003, at the 15th National Reconciliation conference in Nairobi, Kenya the TNG and the SRRC agreed to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The conference was successfully concluded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional Charter. In January 2004, a conference in Nairobi saw the development of the TFG. The major factions signed the Declaration on the Harmonisation of Various Issues proposed by the Somali delegation. The agreement established transitional institutions and elections, and in August 2004 a Transitional Federal Parliament was established.

4.4 IGAD’s idea of peacekeeping

IGAD’s efforts to mediate in the Somalia conflict were affected by the complex legacy of the Cold War on what were in effect regional conflicts. IGAD was established in 1984 and tasked
with addressing issues pertaining to drought and desertification. But the IGAD realised that it would be counterproductive to pursue these initiatives without addressing the issue of conflict in the sub-region. IGAD adopts different strategies to address some of the fundamental problems that the Horn of Africa faces (Murithi, 2009:139).

In 1884, the six countries in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda took action through the UN to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in the region. In 1993, Eritrea became a member but suspended its membership in 2007. On 21 March 1996 in Nairobi the intergovernmental body was revitalised to focus on regional cooperation (IGAD, 2010).

IGAD’s peace and security division has three main programme components: conflict prevention, management and resolution; political affairs; and humanitarian affairs. The objective was to ensure that there is security in the sub-region and that humanitarian suffering of the region is addressed. The region suffers from natural disasters and conflicts and as a result refugees and displaced persons are found in all member states. The agreement establishing IGAD (2013) article 7(g) states that the aim and objective of the authority is “to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue.”

Article 6 of the same documentation states that the member states principles are non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the peaceful settlement of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue and maintaining of regional peace and stability and security. As shown below IGAD members did not adhere to the principles.

In 2002, IGAD attempted to establish a peace process through a meeting. The meeting sought to address the obstacles to forging peace even as it faced “a combination of mismanagement, regional rivalry, insufficient outside political support and financial support” (Murithi, 2009:147).

In 2003, IGAD member states sought to intensify efforts aimed at enhancing democracy in order to ensure stability and security in the sub-region. Nonetheless, IGAD has been stymied by the mutually destructive Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, which has paralysed its functions at the highest level. After a bitter feud over Somalia during an IGAD summit in Nairobi in April

The Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Minister on the Somalia Reconciliation process drew a plan to deploy troops under the IGASOM mandate. A fact-finding mission was also sent to Somalia to assess the feasibility for such an operation. In May 2005 a coherent plan was presented to IGAD’s Council of Ministers and forwarded to the AU Peace and Security Council. But IGAD member states lacked the political will to see the initiative through (Murithi, 2009:147).

Murithi (2009:147) states:

> IGAD at the time did not possess an in-house capacity and framework to rapidly deploy peacekeepers to member states. Above all, IGAD’s charter did not have a provision for the deployment of a peace operation... there was also no consensus among the various Somali factions about the appropriateness of a peacekeeping force in the country.

### 4.5 The interplay between IGAD and Somalia

According to Khadiagala (2008: 10), the cycle of despair and disaster in Eastern Africa is reflected in fragile states, weak societies, and fragile socio-economic environments that have been buffeted by wars. Eastern African states have a history of weak regional institutions. The socio-economic disparities, social heterogeneities and geographical boundaries have made it difficult to create a stable regional security identity in the IGAD region. Culturally and historically various fault lines, which had been politicised, crisscross the region.

However, IGAD led to the mediation initiatives that produced the TFG in Somalia. Before the fall of the Islamist group in Mogadishu in December 2006, IGAD had been at the forefront of efforts to send missions to stabilise the situation. In March 2005, IGAD proposed a Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) including 10 000 troops, but the AU approved a smaller force of 8 000 troops in September 2006 (Khadiagala, 2008:10).

The presence of both IGASOM and the Ethiopian military presence did not guarantee that the TFG would restore peace in Somalia. The resurgence of the Islamists under Eritrean guidance added another layer of complexity to the regionalised civil war (Khadiagala, 2008:10). One of the challenges that IGAD faced in Somalia was that Somalis were unhappy with the results
of the peace processes and raised questions about the legitimacy of the leaders selected to represent Somalia. The Somalis claimed that the IGAD mediators had convened and empowered warlords in the talks (Menkhaus, 2007: 341).

4.6 Interest of IGAD in Somalia

In Somalia, some events have undermined the peace process to perpetuate the armed conflict, and others have added only to undercut local efforts to improve law and order and reduce criminality. By distinguishing between local interest on armed conflict, criminality and state collapse, one can make sense of the puzzling behaviour of Somalia’s political, civic and economic actors who promote peace and local policing systems, while quietly undermining efforts to revive the state. The tendency of external actors to conflate state building and peace-building initiatives has tended to obscure these important distinctions (Menkhaus, 2006: 76).

As mentioned above, the Arta process was initiated by Guelleh. Only at a later stage was it supported by IGAD. During the process IGAD members harboured their own individual agendas with regard to Somalia. In particular, Ethiopia sought to influence and control any IGAD initiative. In February 2005, the AU authorised IGAD to send a peace mission to Somalia. The IGAD’s mandate was to oversee the voluntary disarmament of the militia, while the IGASOM mission was to protect the TFN and prepare the ground for an AU force within nine months after its deployment (Murithi, 2009: 147).

In December 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia. The effect of the 2007-08 Ethiopian occupation made Somalia much more dangerous. Ethiopia had hoped that the invasion would make Somalia less of a threat. For some, the Ethiopian occupation was authorised and directed by the US (Menkhaus, 2006 and Adebajo, 2011).

The 33rd Ordinary Meeting of the IGAD’s Council of Ministers held in Djibouti in 2009 approved a strategic plan for the re-establishing of effective government institutions in Somalia. During this period, AMISOM was in place but extremist groups Al-Shabaab and Hezbollah Islam militia continued to carry out attacks against the TFG leadership and peacekeepers. Communiqué stated that extremist groups had the full backing and support of international terrorist groups and Eritrea.

Any IGAD mediation effort was subsequently undermined by this development since the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) refused to negotiate with the TFG as long as Ethiopian troops
were in the country. IGASOM never deployed to Somalia because it required that the UN arms embargo on Somalia be lifted so that its troops could be adequately armed to undertake its mission (Murithi, 2009: 48).

Furthermore, Ethiopia’s occupation represented a misguided mission that was utterly unable to stem the reckless bloodbath in Mogadishu. Adebajo stated that (2011: 75): “It was more of an auxiliary of Pax Americana’s erratic ‘war on terrorism’ than a mission to promote sustainable peace.”

Ethiopia has been deploying troops in Somalia since 1992 in order to protect its southern border and prevent a hostile government in Mogadishu from forging an alliance with Eritrea. Kenya’s interest in Somali grew from links between economic integration and security plus the terrorist attack on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. This forced the determination from security regionalism to supplement national efforts in the context of permeable borders and contagious conflicts (Khadiagala, 2009: 433).

Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and Egypt have contributed funds, arms and technical supports for UIC to gain control of Somali territory. Eritrea’s support for the courts rests on its strategic enmity towards Ethiopia. The Islamic Courts at one point held more territory than the TFG and had poplar support. Somalia’s fluid and undetermined political affairs have provided both Ethiopia and Eritrea with a proxy to use against the other. Kenya has been the most active and effective broker in the region on Somali issues, under the auspices of IGAD. However, by 2006 pressure from Kenya’s substantial ethnic Somali population had caused it to default to a position of neutrality, but Nairobi has pushed for negotiations. Uganda and Sudan have each supported each other’s rebels. Eritrea has clashed with Djibouti and Sudan (Ward, 2006:1).

Rivalries between Ethiopia and Somalia runs deep. The Ethiopian government, its allies and its enemies all understood that the prolonged Ethiopian military occupation of Mogadishu would be resented by Somalia and would trigger an armed resistance. The solution that was proposed was the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the Ethiopians. But African leaders were reluctant to commit troops into such a dangerous environment and after several delays were only able to muster 2 000 troops. Therefore the Ethiopian forces stayed and were joined in their efforts by the TFG security forces, which were trained by Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2009: 226).
4.7 Conclusion

The conflict in Somalia is a complex one that has experience a vast range of conflicts. It has had periods of all out civil war to war between clans and within clans. Somalia’s conflict has a changing nature and therefore can frustrate and hinder the process. Furthermore, the local actor in the peacekeeping, IGAD, has internal problems that make an effective peacekeeping force almost impossible. Once IGAD got approval for a peace mission in Somalia it could not be deployed because of a UN arms embargo on Somalia. However, IGAD intervention in Somalia does speak to the national interest of each of its members and a willingness to help the peacekeeping.
SECTION FIVE: AU and UN peacekeeping in Somalia

5.1 Introduction

Although a local peacekeeping mission was not deployed to Somalia, the interplay between IGAD and the AU is important in explaining why a regional peacekeeping mission was deployed. It’s especially important because the local actor did lay the foundations for the peace process. This section of the study looks at the interplay between IGAD and the AU. Thereafter, the OAU/AU interests are discussed as well as the reason for an AU peacekeeping mission deployment. The section ends with the UN involvement in Somalia past and presence.

5.2 Interplay between IGAD and the AU

The African mission in Somalia deployed successfully, despite the failure of IGASOM. Multiple organisations and states were involved in the planning process of IGASOM but the mission was not deployed. As mentioned in the previous section, IGASOM’s deployment did not take place because the UN did not lift the arms embargo to allow the local actors to keep their mandate. Furthermore, US interest in the terrorist activities in Somalia complicated the deployment of a local peacekeeping mission (May, 2009).

However, the AU stated that the reason IGASOM was not deployed was because at the time of the proposed March 2005 deployment, the UIC had not taken control of Mogadishu. By May 2006, the situation was radically different from that of the previous year. UIC was engaged in an armed conflict with the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) and was fighting for the control of Mogadishu. By June it had taken control of the capital (AMISOM, 2013).

Another problem that IGASOM faced was funding. IGAD members requested IGAD Chairman, Ugandan President Youreni Museveni to secure funding and technical support. Museveni was prepared to offer soldiers to the IGAD mission, but officials in Uganda made it clear that the state could not afford to pay for the deployment. The deployment date was April 2005 but by May 2005 the force had not materialised. IGAD’s reason was a lack of funding and the insecurity within Somalia prevented the materialisation of the mission. IGAD’s request for funding by the AU for US$ 10.3 million for airlifting the first two battalions of peacekeepers, by the first week of June did not materialise (May, 2009).
Furthermore, IGAD was supposed to be a peacekeeping operation with a multinational force that would act as a neutral body in support of the peace process. As mentioned in the previous section, national interest of Somalia’s neighbours hampered the neutral presence of IGASOM. Certain factions within the TFG itself were also opposed to IGASOM’s presence.

5.3 African Institution in Somalia

As noted in section three of this paper, the OAU had a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states. However, from 1992 the OAU was involved in trying to stop the violence that ensued after the fall of the Somali government. However, the UN undertook one of the most expensive peacekeeping missions in the country as discussed below. Therefore, the OAU function was to work with the UN.

As a peacekeeper the UN was in Somalia for three years (1992-95) but was unable to restore peace in the country. The UN withdrew its peacekeepers, but the OAU was determined to continue its efforts to resolve pending issues through its Ad Hoc Committee prepare for the national reconciliation conferences of Somalia. The OAU was also aware that the failure of UNOSOM would hamper the peace process in Somalia. OAU’s Resolution 1558 (paragraph 3) stated that the slow peace process of Somalia’s national reconciliation would not help the resumption of dialogue among the various parties. Somali’s factional leadership did not operate on goodwill to seek reconciliation and the OAU was aware that faction leaders were operating in narrow self-interest.

The OAU believed that the responsibility for peace in Somalia was ultimately the responsibility of the Somalis, and that the international community could only help them realise this objective. When the UN withdrew their troops in March 1995, the OAU realised that a stalemate was encountered during the peace process. OAU Resolution 1581 (paragraph 6: 1995) stated that the international community was still needed for humanitarian assistance, and thus entrusted the institution to become the main body to try and assist in the restoration of peace and stability.

OAU Resolution 1620 (paragraph 5: 1996) demonstrated that by 1996 the situation in Somalia deteriorated to such an extent that the OAU were concerned that the country would be plunged into generalised warfare. The OAU decided that the Tripartie Mission would undertake a visit to Somalia in order to maintain direct contact with the various Somali factions in order to determine the actual situation on the ground. The OAU was also aware
that other international states were supplying war material to factions in Somalia which was further escalating the crisis.

By 1998 it was clear that there were groups that were advocating the establishment of independent Somali states instead of one republic. This was because the groups were fighting between and within themselves. However, as stated in OAU Resolution 2062 (paragraph 3:1998), the OAU was not in favour of dividing the Somalia state. The institution reiterated that the primary responsibility for peace in Somalia rested squarely on the shoulders of the Somali people. The OAU called on international states and organisations to coordinate their efforts with the OAU and IGAD to facilitate a settlement that would sustain peace.

5.3.1 AMISOM

Once the OAU transformed into the AU, serious steps were taken to address the conflict situation in Somalia. From 2002 till 2006 the AU expressed their support for the IGAD-led Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. IGAD and the AU were in constant consultations on monitoring mechanisms in Somalia in order to cease hostilities. The Communiqué on the 94th Ordinary Session at the Ambassadorial level (2003) stated that the technical fact-finding mission to Somali between May 2003 and June 2003 conveyed: “a request from the Somalia parties and large sections of the population, to the AU to deploy a military force in Somali to carry out disarmament of military factions and other armed groups.”

Despite this the deployment of the AU mission only took place in 2007. The peacekeeping mission had a mandate of six months but at the time of writing this is still stationed in Somalia. The mission has the support of the UN. According to the 69th Communiqué of the meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (2007) the mandate (paragraph 33) of AMISOM is to:

- Provide support to the transitional federal institutions (TFI) in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation;
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- Create conducive conditions for the long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia.
The AU was aware that by the time the UIC established itself as a political and military force within Somalia, it had links to international terrorist groups and was receiving material support from foreign forces. Before the Ethiopian armed occupation in December 2006, the UIC declared “Jihad” against Ethiopia. The UIC also started attacking areas controlled by the TFG and the fears of the international community were renewed, as well that the confrontations that would likely have regional implications (69th Communiqué, paragraph 4: 2007).

Before the AMISOM’s deployment, the AU did request for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, it also called for the withdrawal of other foreign troops and foreign elements from Somalia. In a consultative meeting between the AU, the League of Arab States and IGAD at the end of 2006, the parties agreed that the three institutions would undertake the necessary steps to implement UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) and called for substantial international support for the TFG. The support would also enable the international community to provide assistance to address the humanitarian crisis in Somalia (69th Communiqué, paragraph 20: 2007).

The Communiqué in paragraph 20 further stated that between 7 and 9 January 2007, the US had launched air attacks on al Qaeda terrorist targets near the Somali/Kenyan border. This attack further complicated the situation in Somalia and compromised the chances of AU success in its peacekeeping efforts. By the beginning of 2007, Kenya already had over 250 000 Somali refugees.

Moreover, Communiqué paragraph 31 stated that the inadequate security forces of the TFG could lead to the potential resurgence of major conflict if the Ethiopian forces were to withdraw without the deployment of an AU peace operation. The report also noted that the TFG faced a few military challenges when it came to reconciliation. These were namely:

- Stabilisation of the security situation, including providing support for the demining and disposal of explosive ordinance devices;
- Create conditions for a comprehensive DDR programme as soon as possible to rid the country of illegal arms;
- Provision of technical support for the formation of the national army of Somalia by reforming, training and equipping it.
Furthermore, AMISOM was deployed with nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each and a police training team, supported by maritime coastal and air components and a civilian component. One of the main characteristics of the six-month period deployment was that it was armed at contributing the critical stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission would evolve to a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN mission would support the long-term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somali. This model was based on AMIB.

As noted by Adebajo (2011:176), the AMISOM consisted largely of Ugandan and Burundian troops, and they struggled to keep peace in Mogadishu. One of the immediate challenges that AMISOM faced was stabilising the capital city. By 2011 AMISOM had made progress towards pushing back Al-Shabaab and regaining Mogadishu. The AU was only slowly able to make progress in terms of peace and security.

AMISOM’s force is organised in the country. They are located on four land and maritime sectors. Section one is centred in Mogadishu and is used to secure the lines of communication for the key towns such as Afgage, Balad, Marka and Jawahar. It has 9 500 troops from Uganda and Burundi. Sector two is centred on southwest Somalia and is used to secure the towns of Afmadew, Jilib, Buale and Kismayo. It has 4500 Kenyan troops and 850 Sierra Leone troops. Sector three is centred on the stabilisation of Baida and its environs and it has 2500 Ugandan and Burundian troops supported by Ethiopian forces. Sector 4 has roughly 1000 Djiboutian soldiers with the support of Ethiopian troops in order to secure Belet Weyne and provide the Somali National Security Forces NSF assistance to secure other towns.

The transition period after countless extensions was scheduled to end by 20 August 2012. And by the time the deadline drew near the Somali people had established a new parliament and elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. After 20 years, the Somali people had a new political framework that was based on a popular and legitimate provisional constitute. The provisional constitution replaced the eight years old TFG and 215 MPs were sworn into the new Somali Federal Parliament.

By October 2012, all major strategic cities in Somalia (Mogadishu, Baida, Marka and Kismayo) were under the control of NSF and AMISOM. AMISOM was also about to reach its UNSC authorised strength of 17 731 uniformed personnel. Furthermore, there was a trend of surrender of hundreds of armed Al-Shabaab elements to the Somali government and to AMISOM (337th Communiqué of AU Peace and Security Council, 2012).
On 9 December 2012, the NSF with the support of AMISOM troops captured the town of Jawahar. The town was a major base for Al-Shabaab when they were pushed out of other southern Somali areas. The capture of Jawahar improved the security for the civilian population. Through AMISOM the NSF was enhancing its capability through training and mentoring (AMISOM, 2012).

At the 356th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council meeting (2013) AMISOM was enhanced to:

- Maintain a robust posture with the required multipliers and enablers in order to facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab
- Establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia’s national defence and public safety institutions; and
- Enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somali (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation human rights and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas.

The report of the 379th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (2013) stated that as from February 2013 the political situation in Somalia has been improving. President Mohamud adopted a six-pillar plan that includes: security on rule of law, economic recovery, dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building collaborative international relations and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of Somali.

The report also stated that although the security situation remained fragile it was continuing to improve. At the end of March 2013, AMISOM forces and NSF recovered the last stretch of the 240 km Mogadishu-Baida road from Al-Shabaab. However, Al-Shabba still had control of parts of the cities of Barawe, Jamaane, Jilib, Bualei, Baadhere, Dinsoor and Balo Bart. On 17 March 2013, in anticipation of AMISOM deployment, the Ethiopian Defence forces withdrew from Huduur in the Bakool area. Due to a lack of helicopters AMISOM was unable to deploy its forces quickly and therefore NSF was unable to control of the town. Another advantage for AMISOM is that there were power struggles within the hierarchy of Al-Shabaab, therefore the threat the group posed has decreased.

5.4 Interplay between AMISOM and UN

According to Schullam and Williams (2012:43), the massive expansion of AMISOM’s area of operation since early 2012, which include the whole of south-central and the associated
territorial waters, further stretched AMISOM’s resources. It also raised a huge logistical challenge because areas are difficult to reach because the roads between the cities are not being secured.

The international community has made continued pledges to substantially support the development of an effective NSF. However, this has not materialised. In reality, although AMISOM does have a military element, it is essentially a peace support operation with the additional tasks of acting as a VIP protection unit and facilitating humanitarian relief for some of Mogadishu’s residents. The temp of AMISOM’s operations has outstripped the UN’s ability to meet its logistical requirements and to make rapid operational decisions about procurement needs (Scullman and Williams, 2012: 43).

However, the UNSC through Resolution 1744 (2007) authorised an AU mission. The UN made it clear that the AU member states had to contribute to the mission in order to create conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somali. Despite authorising AMISOM, the UN decided to remain actively seized from the situation in Somalia.

The UN did not lift the arms embargo on Somali. However, it did lift the embargo according to Resolution 1766 (2007) for the supply and technical assistance from states intending to help develop security sector institutions consistent with the political process set out in Resolution 1744. The UN further stated that the flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia were in violation of the arms embargo and constituted a serious threat to its peace and security. The AU and the UN coordinated a mandate on what was need for AMISOM to succeed.

5.5 The UN in Somalia

At the time of writing this dissertation, the UN has remained actively seized from the situation in Somalia (Resolution 2124, paragraph 31: 2013). However, it is important to note that the UN has been involved in Somalia. Its first peacekeeping as noted in section four was in 1992, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I).

On 27 December 1991, outgoing UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Guellar informed the UNSC that he intended to take an initiative to restore peace in Somalia. In January 1992, Secretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah led a team of senior UN officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about an end to hostilities and acquire security access to the international relief community for civilians caught in the conflict. The results were shared
with then Secretary-General Bouros-Ghali who along with the UNSC decided on an appropriate cause of action (UNOSOM, 2013).

The UNSC, through Resolution 733 (1992), urged all parties involved in the conflict to end fighting and decided that states should immediately implement a general and complete embargo of all the deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. On 17 March 1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 746 to dispatch a technical team to prepare for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. On 24 April 1992, Resolution 751 established the UN operation in Somalia. The mandate was to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and to provide protection and security for the UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaport and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres.

The mandate of UNOSOM was further extended on 28 August 1992 through Resolution 775 to enable protection for humanitarian convoys. By December 1992, the situation in Somalia had further deteriorated and through Resolution 794 (1992) the UNSC authorised member states to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish a safe environment.

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report that requested the transition of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. UNITAF deployed 37,000 troops in southern Somalia, but its efforts did not create a secure situation in Somalia. Therefore, on 26 March 1993, the UNSC adopted Resolution 814 and established UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II’s mandate was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish a secure environment throughout the country. UNOSOM II was to complete the task begun by the UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. By June 1993, the situation became very volatile and through Resolution 837 the UNSC authorised UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for attacks against UN personnel. The operation’s mandate was again revised in February 1994 through Resolution 897 to monitor the situation. But by early March 1995 UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia.

According to Ahmed and Green (1999: 122), the failure of the UN operation was a result of a contradictory multi-mandated intervention involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The annual expenditure of the mission was US$1.5 billion and it was the most expensive humanitarian operation undertaken by the UN.

Ahmed and Green (1999: 122) viewed the intervention as:
The operation mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and was open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and maintain a secure environment, to capturing a leaders of one of the factions at one stage and later to encourage negotiations with that same leader.

5.5.1 Current UN involvement in Somalia

In April 1995, the UN Secretary-General established the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to advance peace and reconciliation in Somalia. UNPOS is a special political mission that closely monitors the situation in Somalia. The head of the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) provide periodic briefings and written reports to the Secretary-General and Security Council. UNPOS support various initiatives that promote peace and national reconciliation in Somalia (UNPOS, 2013).

The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) is a field support operation, which was authorised by Resolution 1863 (paragraph 9: 2009). Resolution 1863, noted that the AU called on interim stabilisation force in anticipation of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in order to take over from AMISOM. However, the UN acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requested AMISOM deployment to remain in Somalia and decided to renew the mission for a further six months. They were authorised to take all necessary measures to carry out this mandate. In the Resolution, the UN expressed its intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia but the decision was subject to further deliberations.

However, as stated by Resolution 1910 (paragraph 9: 2010), the UN was aware of the on-going instability in Somalia that contributed to piracy and armed robbery at sea. The UNSC instead decided to extend AMISOM’s mission for a year. It recalled its decision to establish a peacekeeping operation but noted that it would deploy a mission once the conditions of the Secretary-General’s April 2009 report were met.

The conditions that the UNSC wanted to be met according to Report S/2009/210 paragraphs 59-54 were:

- For the UN to assist the TFG in building support for the peace process in Somalia. The TFG should take forward key transitional tasks including the drafting of a constitution;
• The TFG should create a security condition in which the process of building the State institutions can take root, humanitarian aid is provided safely and recovery projects can progress. For this a legitimate locally owned and developed national security apparatus is needed.

• The strategic objective of the UN should be to help Somalia to move beyond the current emergency and ensure that its people experience some benefit from the peace process in the form of aces to basic services, livelihood support and opportunities.

The report further states that all the activities should not be externally imposed but should be owned by Somalia. Conditions for the deployment would also be dependent on a secure country. The deployment would follow a three-track approach. First, support AMISOM to ensure security. Once security is achieved the second track would be providing assistance in the planning and deployment of the African Mission. These two steps would be considered as transitional steps to implement the support package to AMISOM. The second track would be assessed three or four months after the commencement of its implementation, at which time the UNSC would review the UN’s role and then decide whether the conditions and timing are conducive for a shift to the final phase which would be a UN peacekeeping operation.

The conditions were not met by September 2010 and the UNSC, through Resolution 1964 (paragraph 1: 2010), extended AMISOM’s mission mandate till 30 September 2011. The resolution increased AMISOM’s force strength from 8 000 troops to a maximum of 12 000. The UNSC still reiterated that the UN peacekeeping was dependent on the April 2009 Report. Resolution 2010 (2011) extended AMISOM’s mandate to remain deployed in Somalia till 31 October 2012. The UN insisted that the AU would be supported in terms of technical and expert advice in planning and deploying AMISOM through UNPOS. The UN also decided that due to the unique character of the mission it would extend logistical support packages for AMISOM for a maximum of 12 000 troops.

Through Resolution 2073 (paragraph 1: 2012), UNSC decided to extend AMISOM’s deployment till 7 March 2013. AMISOM would maintain its presence in the four sectors in coordination with the NSF. The UN expanded its logistical support package for AMISOM to include reimbursement of certain contingent armed equipment including force enablers and multipliers. Through Resolution 2124 (paragraph 1: 2013) the UN decided that AMISOM would remain deployed in Somalia till 31 October 2014. The resolution stated that the
conditions in Somalia were not yet appropriate for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

5.6 Conclusion

The conflict in Somalia is complex. It has evolved to such an extent that there is a terrorist component in the situation. The conflict also has regional complications that spill over to neighbouring countries and ignites the fears of the international community. The peacekeeping process in Somalia has a regional actor that has to enforce and ensure peace, which stretch the limited resources that the AU has. After the failure of the UN missions in the early 1990s, the UN has made it clear that a peacekeeping mission from the institution would be dependent on a secure environment. The following section will discuss what conditions determine how a peacekeeping mission transforms into a local peacekeeping mission, then to a regional and thereafter a global mission.
SECTION SIX: Main findings and conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The previous sections provided background information to explain the peacekeeping operations of the two case studies. This section will draw together the main findings from Burundi and Somalia to answer the questions that were presented in Section One. The study investigated the conditions that explain the multiple transformations of actors in a peacekeeping mission. This will be discussed as well as the sub questions: what actor constellations are found, how the mandates are changing and how the evolution of the conflict impact on the actors’ capabilities?

6.2 Conditions needed for a peacekeeping

In the context of peacekeeping operations, each actor prefers for political reasons to gain greater control of the warring factions and help establish democratic institutions. Hence the actors have to please both domestic constituents and member states and achieve a peaceful settlement. As a consequence, a cooperative solution must be taken. An actor at various stages of the transformation has to rely on a third party to induce or enforce the peace agreements or be lured into a long-term interaction between the other actors in the operation. The main goal of the UN is to foster cooperation among the regional and at times local actors. From the study four conditions determine an actor’s involvement in a peacekeeping mission.

6.2.1 The changing nature of the conflict

\[ H_1: \text{An increase in the escalation of violence during the conflict decreases the probability of a peacekeeping transformation by not giving actors an incentive to form a mission} \]

The first condition looks at the changing nature of the conflict. It relates to whether violence and insecurity within the conflict escalates or ceases. In Burundi, the civil war was a power struggles among political elites. The elites used ethnicity to garner support for their political ambitions. Throughout the conflict power dynamics shifted between the Hutu’s and the Tutsi’s. The cause for the conflict was a power struggle between the two groups and the distribution of the country’s resources.
South Africa as the local peace actor entered the conflict in order to ensure that the warring elites found an amicable peace settlement, and ensured security for the elites. Once this was achieved in Burundi and disarmament was taking place, the AU deployed troops to ensure security in Burundi. The AU further strengthened South Africa’s role in the country by ensuring that the elites were protected and paved the way for democratic elections. The UN therefore deployed a peacekeeping mission to Burundi because the security situation would only be sustained once peace was fully restored. ONUB’s mandate also provided that UN personnel would contribute to the completion of the electoral process without prejudice.

In contrast, in Somalia the conflict started with the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. The Somali conflict then changed into warfare between the different clans within the country. Although the people in Somalia have a shared national identity, they are divided into sub-cultures that have different linguistic styles and cultural norms. Therefore, the conflict had an ethnic component.

The conflict then shifted to become more localised and criminals in its activities and clans started fighting within themselves. The capital became a battleground for the Hawiye tribe. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s the warfare became localised. Thereafter, the conflict changed again whereby the extremist group Al-Shabaab came into play. Al-Shabaab is still causing a condition of uncertainty in the country.

As stated, the changing nature of the conflict determines the type of peacekeeping in the country. Burundi’s peace process went from a local to a regional actor and then afterwards to a global actor. However, Somalia only has a regional actor because the changing nature of the conflict exacerbates the condition of insecurity within the country, making other actors unwilling to become involved. According to UN Resolution 2124 paragraph nine (2013), the conditions in Somalia was not appropriate for a UN Peacekeeping Operation. The UN expects AMISOM to develop an effective and tactical approach in dealing with Al-Shabaab to ensure a more secure environment.

Furthermore, the changing nature of the conflict impacts on the resources that each actor has to contribute to the mission. Planning on the best possible deployment and strategy for a secure environment can be made difficult because the conflict changes. Resources are critical in a deployment and can also frustrate the efforts of the peacekeepers. One reason for IGASOM not deploying a peacekeeping mission was because of lack of financial backing.
The changing nature of the conflict further frustrates efforts for effective manoeuvring of peacekeeping personnel on the ground.

The changing nature of the conflict discourages the means for obtaining a peace settlement for the conflict. The new dynamics of the conflict can provide incentive for new combatants to lengthen the warfare, therefore creating an additional burden on the peacekeepers. The changing nature also exacerbates principal-agent problems undermining peace efforts.

6.2.2 Peace doctrines and ideas of actors

\( H_2: \) If the actors’ ideas and doctrines of peacekeeping are in synch then a peacekeeping transformation will occur.

The second condition that determines the transformation of peacekeeping is the peace ideas and doctrines of the actors. From the Burundi case, South Africa’s peace doctrines are based on African Renaissance principles. This encouraged South Africa to take a leading role in the peace process. South Africa made a political and strategic appraisal of the environment in Burundi and decided to deploy peacekeeping troops to the country.

South Africa success in ensuring a peaceful environment made it possible for the AU to get involved. The policy framework of the African Standby Force (ASF) was created to enhance peace and security on the continent. Member States of the AU indicated through the framework that they would be willing to take risks for peace and accept their responsibility for ensuring durable development of the continent.

Furthermore, the document states that the conflict will guide at which level the AU would consider involvement. From the Burundi case, the AU deployed to share the burden cost with South Africa. The UN’s peace doctrine is that there should be a secure environment to keep the peace, thus the UN intervened.

However, the Somali case was not so simple. IGAD at the time of deciding that a peacekeeping mission was essential did not have a framework in which to rapidly deploy troops. As far as IGAD’s doctrine goes, IGAD would rather promote dialogue between the belligerents. IGAD’s security architecture is based on the non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. Despite the lack of a framework, IGAD was ready but unable to deploy IGASOM.
The ASF Framework (2003) states in times of emergency the speedy deployment of a peacekeeping mission is required. As a principle, the AU’s first initiative would be to approach the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency situation. If the UN is unresponsive, the AU will deploy an All-African peace operation, while still continuing to try and get a positive response for the UN.

The UN, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, will decide what measure shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 of Chapter VII states the UNSC may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. According to Resolution 2124, conflict conditions in Somalia were such that a deployment of a UN peacekeeping was not yet appropriate. It can be determined that the policies were not equally applied to the two case studies presented in this dissertation. There are many reasons for this, as in IGASOM’s case capacity limitation played an important reason for its lack of deployment. No single actor can do everything within in mission, therefore ideas that synch help with the transformation process.

6.2.3 Interest of actors

\( H_3 \): *If the hegemon within an organisation have an interest in the peace process it increases the probability that a peacekeeping mission transformation will occur.*

The third condition for a transformation to occur is that there has to be an interest from the lead member states. Actors’ positions are shaped by domestic interest. Political will is important to ensuring and establishing a peacekeeping mission. South Africa’s interest played a vital role in sending troops to Burundi. As stated in section two, South Africa’s achievement as a country would be measured against the progress of the same goals for the rest of the continent.

For South Africa, the Burundi conflict helped South Africa strengthen its role in terms of conflict resolution in Africa. The expectations of the domestic and international community’s also helped South Africa to play a leading role towards the conflict resolution.

Moreover, South Africa’s Foreign Policy highlights that intra-state conflict continues to frustrate sustainable development because of the disruptions in economic activity and political instability. De Kock (2011:6) states that with peace, opportunities for socio-political and economic growth open up.
However, a study of the Somalia case demonstrates that it was the lack of political will of IGAD members to find a real solution to the conflict. IGAD member states interest lies in trying to stop other members from gaining a strategic advantage in Somalia. Ethiopia is more concerned with deterring Eritrea’s influence in Somalia, and Eritrea is known to support Al-Shabaab with funding.

Furthermore, rivalry between Somalia and its neighbours runs deep. Somalia’s instability has spilled over to Kenya, Ethiopia and even Djibouti. Therefore these states protect their domestic interest instead of regional security. Despite these challenges, IGAD tried to establish a peacekeeping mission.

The interest of the regional actor, the AU, is to reinvigorate its peace and security initiatives. The establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council is a commitment by African leaders to promote a stable, secure, peaceful and developed Africa. The Council African leaders also demonstrated their desire to assume a greater role in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, because development is linked to these principles.

Mwanasali (2008:42) highlights this point by stating: “This body would make it possible for the AU, in the name of non-indifference to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in the event of an imminent threat to peace, security and stability.” Therefore the interest of the AU ensured that the AU deployed AMISOM.

Finally for the global actor, the UN, the interest can be found in its Charter’s Preamble which states: “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.” The UN’s interest is to have a world without war and establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations would be maintained. Moreover, the interest of the various actors must be aligned in order to resolve the conflict.

**6.2.4 Institutions in peacekeeping**

*H₄: If institutions are in agreement, then a peacekeeping transformation will occur.*

The last condition in determining a transformation is the institution. It is institutions that make operations credible and possible. Influence is reciprocal between international institutions. The principles, rules and institutions of a regime may have two types of effects on strategies. Firstly, it can create a focal point that allow for expectations to be met and provides guidelines for legitimate actors and for policymakers about feasible patterns of
agreement. Secondly, it can restrict state behaviour by prohibiting certain actions. Regimes have little enforcement power, and powerful states can take advantage of this and can take forbidden measures. However, this may damage their reputations and, in turn, their future arrangements (Keohane and Nye: 1987: 743).

As an institution the AU has repeated calls for a greater degree of African autonomy. However, they are contradicted by the unwillingness of many African states to commit significant amounts of their own resources to the building of the AU peace and security architecture. As Williams (2011: 16) states: “Although the Peace and Security is Africa’s most important conflict management institution it cannot be expected to do everything.” Therefore, within the peacekeeping missions of the two case studies, the AU harmonised and coordinated the activities of the two local actors. The local actors took a leading role in formulating the Peace and Security Council’s response to issues within their sub-regions.

When the UN as a peacekeeping institution is considered, its purpose is to maintain and ensure international peace and security; the institution takes effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. The UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and, between 2004 and 2009, it had played the most important role in relation to conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa.

The AU played a significant complementary role in Burundi but not so much in Somalia. These initiatives have helped to forge a reasonable working relationship between the UN and Africa’s various regional arrangements in the peace and security sector. But this also created tension. As Williams (2011: 17) states: “Some powerful members of the UNSC have worried that the interactions must not encourage the perception that the two institutions are equal partners in either form or substance.”

6.3 Actor constellation in the mission

From the above variables, the actor constellation that is/was present during a peacekeeping mission can be identified. In Burundi, once the warring factions signed the Arusha agreement, South Africa, due to its role in the getting parties to the peace table and through its interest and ideas of peacekeeping, deployed troops to Burundi. Within a year, the AU established AMIB in order for Africans to lead the peace process. Once AMIB established to secure Burundi, the UN deployed ONIB. And by 2006, ONIB completed its mandate and left Burundi.
The second case study is not so simple. The changing nature of the conflict in Somalia ensured that the arms embargo in the country could not be lifted. Therefore, despite the interest of IGAD to deploy IGASOM, it was unable to do so. However, the AU ensured that a mission was deployed in Somalia, AMISOM. But the UN’s peace doctrine would not deploy a mission in Somalia and instead the institution extended AMISOM’s mandate till 31 October 2014 and remained actively seized from the conflict.

6.4 The changing mandates of the actors

As a peacekeeping mission passes to various actors, the mandate changes. In the Burundi case, South Africa had to ensure that warring factions adhered to and implemented the ceasefire agreement and provided protection for the political VIPs. Furthermore, South Africa was tasked to approach other African leaders and persuade them to provide troops for the deployment of a peace mission in Burundi.

The AU’s mandate was to speed-up the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, because the situation, despite South Africa’s military presence, remained tense. AMIB’s mandate was to facilitate the activities of the joint ceasefire commission and the technical committees for the restructuring of the national defence and police forces; secure the assembly and withdrawal areas which have been identified; facilitate the supply of technical assistance for the DDR process; and facilitate timely the supply of humanitarian assistance.

Establishing a secure environment for the UN to deploy ONIB’s mandate required:

- A respect for the ceasefire agreement through the implementation and investigation of violations;
- Creating a re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces;
- The monitoring and provision of security at pre-disarmament assembly sites;
- Collection of and disposal of weapons and military material;
- The carrying out of disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national programme of DDR of combatants;
- Monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilised;
- Monitoring the illegal flow of arms across national borders; contributed to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian
assistance, and facilitated the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

- Contributed to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement to ensure that a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections took place;
- Protected civilians under limited threat of physical violence prejudicing the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi; ensured the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUBs personnel, and coordinated and conducted mine action activities in support of its mandate.

In the Somalia case, AMISOM’s mandate also changed from just providing support to the transitional federal institutions (TFI) in their efforts towards stabilisation of the situation in the country and furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and creating conducive conditions for the long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

The mandate was extended to maintain a robust posture with the required multipliers and enablers in order to facilitate the recovery of areas that were still under the control of Al-Shabaab; establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia’s national defence and public safety institutions; and enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somali (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote reconciliatory human rights and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas.

Therefore AMISOM’s mandate developed to include a policing component as well as a humanitarian assistance mission. AMISOM is also a peace enforcement mission that includes peacekeeping and nation building.

6.5 Capabilities of actors

From the study it is clear that the local actors cannot alone ensure the cost of a peacekeeping mission. South Africa required additional troop support from Ethiopia and Tanzania. IGAD’s deployment was not only hampered by the arms embargo in place in Somalia, but also due to lack of funding, troops and technical assistance.
The AU mission troops come from the institutions member states, but the cost of the mission are often fitted by the international community. The EU is providing financial support for the AMISOM mission and the UN is providing technical and political support. The longer an actor is involved in peacekeeping missions and with changing mandates, the greater troop contribution is also necessary. An example of this is Somalia. The original number of troops deployed was 8 000 but currently there are over 17 000 AU troops deployed in Somalia.

6.6 Conclusion

Armed conflict has a destructive impact on a country’s infrastructure and its people. It effects the socio-political and economic environment within the country. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the destruction and therefore efforts should be taken to prevent an outbreak. But once conflict has broken out, the next step should be mediation and a peace establishing intervention that focus on the immediate and most destructive manifestation of the conflict.

The purpose of this study was not to assess the success or failures of peace operations, neither was it focused on the strength and weaknesses of the mission, but rather what motivates and informs an actor to become involved in stemming the tide of intra-state violence. Two variables are very important for an actor to decide whether to become involved in a conflict. The first variable is the doctrines or ideas of peacekeeping that the actor has. The peace doctrines of an actor will make a transformation from one actor to another possible.

The second important variable is the changing nature of the conflict. An armed conflict that continues and creates conditions of insecurity and changes in terms of its historical context will be more likely to prevent the transformation of actors because actors are unclear of guaranteeing security for their troops.

The two intervening variables (interest of an actor and the institutions) make decisions of actors easier to transform a peacekeeping mission. However, the absence of the two important variables is less likely make a transformation possible.
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