Title: Reaction to State Control: The Case of the Mid-Eastern Transvaal 1955-1960.

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No.: 293

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REACTION TO STATE CONTROL
The Case of the Mid-Eastern Transvaal
1955 - 1960

The growth of the bureaucracy is, according to Merton et al, "widely recognised as one of the major social trends of our time". In South Africa this trend has been identified by a number of writers, many of whom have focused on the Native Affairs Department (NAD). Dubow has shown how the Native Administration Act of 1927 laid the foundation for the NAD's growing involvement in matters affecting Africans. Yudelman, referring to the bureaucracy as a whole, has identified the revenue generated by gold mining as the element that financed the expanding bureaucracy. Thus, he links significant periods of bureaucratic growth with improvements of the gold price. The overall picture that emerges is a state (particularly the NAD) concerned with control; a concern that, to some extent, manifests itself through the medium of an expanding bureaucracy.

However, the relationship between this concern and bureaucratic expansion found its fullest expression when the National Party came to power in 1948. Posel has argued that, in the environment created by the alliances that the National Party represented, the NAD's most immediate and pressing concern was the construction of 'better control'. The bureaucratic structures that resulted laid the foundations for an unprecedented level of state interference in the lives of South Africans. The effects of this interference are the subject of this paper.

Essentially, the new NAD policies were aimed against Africans. In the white farming areas of the mid-eastern Transvaal, the policies attempted to undercut Africans' bargaining position on the farms. However, while this state intervention was partially an attempt to bolster the position of white farmers, these intended beneficiaries were also forced to accept bureaucratic regulation in many spheres of their lives.

The establishment of this kind of control often leads to conflict. When the state takes it upon itself to make decisions for the individual, some individuals' interests will be undermined. This occurs for two reasons. Firstly, because the state represents a centralisation of decision making, the resulting decision will be based on the basis of common denominators rather than the variety of interests held by individuals. Secondly, the state has its own agenda which does not always coincide with the interests of the individuals it claims to represent. Thus, the state is often involved in a balancing act between its own interests and those of its constituents. These processes produce what Burnheim has called, "an insidious tyranny of numbers. The state homogenises and atomises social relationships. The horizons and expectations of people contract to the limits of those variations that the system constitutes as practical possibilities." However, this kind of bureaucratic concordance does not establish itself automatically. Resistance by people who perceive that their interests will be best served by acting outside the sphere of the bureaucracy can undermine the efficacy of bureaucratic control.

In South Africa, new bureaucratic structures were to be established in areas where Africans had never been inclined to passively accepted any proposed restrictions.
The extent of the control which others were able to exercise over them was determined by day to day struggles that had a long history. Particularly, the terms and conditions of labour tenancy were influenced by Africans' ability to use the threat of withdrawing their labour. This ability was predicated on African mobility and the existence of viable alternatives to farm labour. The new bureaucracy threatened to radically undermine those options that still remained for tenants. But, these measures were not implemented unproblematically. Nor were they merely shaped by the intentions of officials and legislators. Instead, the reactions of the people who were the bureaucracy's intended subjects fundamentally affected the effectiveness and the form of the new controls and enabled Africans to sustain labour tenant relations.

This paper will concentrate on the reactions of the inhabitants of the mid-eastern Transvaal to the bureaux and boards created by the state. In this way it is hoped that valuable insights into the process of the establishment of the new bureaucracy will be provided. Much has been said about the implications of the labour legislation of the 1950s. However, the actual effect that this legislation had on the rural areas is still an opaque issue. In this paper the danger of accepting legislation without analysing its actual impact will become clear. In the mid-eastern Transvaal, the uneasy relationship between farmers and the bureaucracy, the resistance of labour tenants and the Department of Justice's refusal to give up areas of authority to the NAD, all helped to undermine the effectiveness of the labour bureaux. Similar forces made the implementation of the Labour Tenant Control Boards an even more difficult process.

Although labour tenancy was the dominant labour relationship on the farms of the mid-eastern Transvaal during the 1950s, this was a period when it was being threatened on numerous fronts. The first years the decade have been identified as a time when the labour shortage, which had been such a prevalent feature of the previous decades (especially in Agriculture), was slowly coming to an end. At the same time tractors were becoming common on the farms, enabling farmers to do a lot more work themselves. This meant that the demand for labour on the white farms began to ease and the bargaining power of labour tenants was reduced. The NAD, the department responsible for the Native Laws Amendment Act, was determined to undermine this bargaining power still further. By promoting the establishment, in terms of this act, of at least two labour bureaux in each district, it was hoped that labour tenant mobility would become a thing of the past. However, despite the apparently favourable position produced by the changes outlined above, the labour bureaux system faced a number of problems from the time of their establishment in the mid-eastern Transvaal.

Changes that were discernible at a macro, national level, were not always apparent at the local level. Although the tide was turning against labour tenants, a number of factors that were in their favour continued to influence the regional struggle between master and servant. Such factors could even have an important influence as residues or memories. In the mid-eastern Transvaal a number of farmers continued to suffer from labour shortages. This was usually a seasonal labour
shortage but some farmers still struggled to meet their permanent labour needs. Thus, at this transitional stage, a labour surplus was by no means an obvious and guaranteed phenomenon. It seems likely, therefore, that farmers often kept labour as an insurance against renewed shortages. The memory of the difficulties experienced in the past seems to have made farmers wary of losing any labour; even if they now had more labour than they needed. Thus, labour tenants were still able to use the threat of withdrawing their labour, against farmers.

Thus, the NAD implemented its policies in an area that, from their point of view, was far from stable. Furthermore, their difficulties did not all originate from African opposition. During the initial establishment of local labour bureaux, it became evident that the co-operation of the relevant municipalities was not always guaranteed. Local labour bureaux were designed to regulate labour in the 'prescribed' or urban areas. The NAD was determined to establish one of these bureaux in every town where Africans lived in so called 'locations'. In this way they hoped to prevent any Africans from living in urban conditions outside the direct control of the state. These bureaux would also prevent farm labourers from using residence and employment in the 'locations' as an alternative to farm labour. The state realised that effective control could only be achieved if this control extended over the entire country. The inception of the labour bureaux immediately demonstrated the willingness and ability of Africans to resist controls if alternatives continued to exist. Districts where new labour bureaux were set up often complained of an escalating labour shortage. Africans would leave and go to areas "waar daar nog nie arbeids buros bestaan en hy nie lastig geval word nie." While this opposition was clearly a prime motivation for the concern about the blanket establishment of bureaux, it was also effectively used as a threat against recalcitrant municipalities. In the eastern Transvaal town of Belfast the town council did not want to form a local labour bureau. They felt that they did not have the personnel or the finance to manage such an undertaking. In response, the Chief Native Commissioner warned the town to expect a major influx of Africans escaping from other areas where the bureaux were being established. This prospect was clearly unattractive to the councilors of Belfast. They reversed their earlier decision and a local labour bureau was established on the 11 June 1954. Similar processes, with the same result, occurred in the towns of Machadadorp and Waterval Boven.

The district labour bureaux were usually the responsibility of the local Native Commissioners who were, in most cases, directly accountable to the NAD. Thus, the establishment of these bureaux was less problematic and most eastern Transvaal districts received labour bureaux in 1953. However, in Carolina and Belfast the NAD did not exercise direct control. As a result, these bureaux, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice, gave NAD officials numerous headaches and prompted farmers' opposition in various ways. The details of this process will be discussed below.

In general, the district bureaux's main aim was to supply farmers with labour and prevent the uncontrolled movement of Africans. If farmers filled in the appropriate
form (N.A.84) then it was up to the labour bureaux to find labourers that would meet this demand. No African could leave a district without the permission of the bureaux. The district bureaux also worked in close conjunction with the local bureaux to ensure that no 'unnecessary' movement between town and countryside took place. Furthermore, no African was permitted to leave a district without the permission of the labour bureaux.

On paper, this looked ominous for Africans living on the farms and it will become clear that these regulations affected farm labourers in a pernicious way. Nevertheless, the impact of the bureaux was uneven and not nearly as effective as most National Party supporters would have hoped. Labour tenants were able, throughout the period being studied here, to find gaps within the system, which enabled them to maintain some control over their own lives.

In 1955, two years after the establishment of the local and district labour bureaux in Lydenburg, Mrs Nic Fourie complained that she and her husband were unable to farm effectively because they could not get any labour. She also claimed that in the Oshoek area near Dullstroom, in the southern part of the Lydenburg district, there were seven other farmers that were almost on the verge of leaving their farms. Most of them had no labour while others had one or two labour tenant families. There was one farmer in the area, however, who had so much labour that he had lost track of their number. The labour conditions on his farm closely approximated the original labour tenant conditions that had been laid down in the 1913 Land Act. Each labour tenant family was expected to supply one member who had to work three months for the farmer. According to Mrs Fourie, there were no other obligations and the tenants were largely free to do as they pleased. She also claimed that there were numerous examples of this kind of unequal distribution of labour amongst farmers within a single farming area. It seems that labour tenant-farmers had plenty of labour while others struggled to find someone that would work for them.

Mrs Fourie and the farmers like her, refused to give in to the pressure exerted by African's congregation on farms where labour tenant conditions prevailed. She claimed that, "ons ander boere sien net eenvoudig nie kans om die kaffers onder so 'n kontrak op ons plase te hou nie en darom kan ons nie volk kry nie". The labour shortage produced by their stance made it difficult for Mrs Fourie and her neighbours to keep their sons interested in farming. She reported that a number of their children found farming unattractive and were leaving the rural areas. Still, Mrs Fourie refused to give in to the labour tenant demands of Africans. While not abandoning the labour tenant system entirely, the Fouries were adamant that tenants should work six months for their land. For the rest of the year tenants had to continue in employment on the farm for about £ 3 a month. Sheep herders got £ 3.10 and tractor drivers £ 5.

The intransigent position that the Fouries took seems to reflect a stubborn clinging to principles in the face of reality. However, their 'idealism' was facilitated by two factors. Firstly, despite their inability to attract labour, they were able to obtain some workers in the form of prison labour. In this way they kept the farm going. They also used a tractor, which eased the need for labour. Secondly, the Fouries
believed that help in the form of further Government intervention was imminent. They clung to this belief despite the labour bureaux's 'disappointing' impact and in the face of constant taunts from farmers opposed to the National Party. These opponents claimed that the relevant law would never be applied and that it had only been passed so that the National Party could win the following election.

The law that they were referring to, the one that the Fouries pinned their hopes on, was the amendment to Chapter Four of the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act, which was passed in 1954. In terms of this amendment, Chapter Four would be proclaimed for the whole of South Africa and Labour Tenant Control Boards would be set up in all the farming districts where there were labour tenants to control. So far Lydenburg had not heard any news that such a board would be created in their district. Many farmers were unsure but hopeful about the precise provisions of the law. Their was much speculation and the law was discussed eagerly by farmers like the Fouries. It was hoped that Chapter Four would bring about an equal distribution of labour that would finally undermine the ability of Africans to bargain for labour tenant conditions.

The NAD gave Mrs Fourie the assurance that Chapter Four would be implemented. The difficulty lay in the department's lack of confidence in its capacity to control the resistance that would emerge once the chapter was enforced. The NAD would only engage in this exercise when they became convinced that the 'machinery' they were in the process of setting up, was strong enough to prevent Africans from deserting rural areas in large numbers. It was also explained that the boards would determine how many labourers a farmer could keep according to their assessment of how many would be needed to effectively engage in productive farming. This clearly threatened the position of labour tenants who congregated on farms, but, it is equally clear that the application and interpretation of this ruling would be subject to struggles at various levels.

In the mean time the NAD was determined to solve problems like those of the Fouries by means of the district labour bureau. After looking into the matter it became evident that about 1/6th of the actual people looking for employment in Lydenburg passed through the bureau in Lydenburg. The rest managed to evade the system because they could find employers who did not register their labourers. Without this registration, the hiring and firing of labour occurred largely outside the sphere of the labour bureau. The bureau officer claimed that Africans avoided the bureau because they would not willingly sign themselves over to an employer if they had not seen and spoken to him. Even those who were channeled by the bureau would find a way to avoid employers who had a bad reputation. For this very reason, all attempts to supply the Fouries with labour failed. The sergeant at the Dullstroom police station claimed, "dat Mnr Fourie baie haastig en hard is en nie arbeiders kan behou nie. Selfs bandiete wat aan hom verhuur word, loop weg van hom terug tronk toe." It took the labour bureau only a few weeks to contact four labourers that were willing to work on the farms. However, when they arrived at the bureau and discovered who their employer to be was, they refused point blank to accept the employment. Mr Clark, the official in charge of the bureau, declined to force these
Africans to take up employment with Fourie. He argued that this kind of coercion would put the labour bureaux system into disrepute with Africans. Thus, while the bureau struggled to attain the all encompassing function for which it strove, local officials continued to be concerned about the NAD’s image amongst Africans. This concern led them into decisions that were sometimes directly opposed to the short term interests of local farmers.

Over the following months the Fouries’ position did not improve. The two prisoners that were in their employ decided to leave and go back to jail. Within a period of three weeks, the labour bureau sent 34 Africans, who were looking for work, to Mr Fourie. Not one of them arrived at Mr Fouries farm. On the way they must have become aware of Fourie’s reputation and decided to find work elsewhere. Thus, in Lydenburg at this time, it was clear that the bureau was not very effective in controlling African labour. The pervasiveness of such evasions made farmers very reluctant to use the bureau. Word got round that it was a futile exercise to register a claim for labour. Those farmers who had done so, claimed that absolutely no labour was forthcoming. Even the Native Commissioner was reported to have assured farmers that, "die Naturelle weier beslis om na die boere te gaan - waar hy hulle heen aanraai. Hulle se hulle wil self werk en woonplek soek".13

Other districts experienced similar evidence of tenants’ refusal to let bureaucratic machinery control the terms of their employment. A German couple in Middelburg found 1955 as difficult as the Fouries of Lydenburg. The Hengherrs complained that: "We farm since five years, and farming is not easy, believe me, and it becomes impossible and a killing profession if there is no labour available."14 In reply to these complaints the NAD assured Mrs Hengherr of the positive impact that the labour bureaux had made since its inception. However, subsequent investigations proved that the Hengherrs were unable to benefit from the establishment of a labour bureau in Middelburg. The NAD official investigating their plight discovered that they were the victims of a boycott.15 Because the Hengherrs interfered in and attempted to control all the aspects of their labourers’ lives, no one would work for them. Attempts by the bureau to send labour to their farms did not succeed in changing this situation. Mr Hengherr had initially been filled with hope by the assurances sent by the NAD and he went to the bureau on the 3 May 1955. Subsequently, two Africans were sent to him but they never arrived on his farm. As in Lydenburg, the boycott proved more effective than the bureau.

The Hengherr’s had been living in South Africa for twenty eight years but had only been farming for five years. Their farm in Middelburg was 500 morgen in size. 100-120 morgen was ploughed in the summer and planted with maize and beans. They also kept about 60 head of cattle which facilitated a small dairy, of which only the cream was sold. Despite realising that labour tenant farmers experienced "little or no trouble" with their labour, the Hengherrs were determined to rely on other labour methods. It was estimated that the Hengherrs needed three Africans in winter and five in summer. Instead they managed to employ one "getroude Nyasaland naturel" and an African youth who herded the cattle.
Nevertheless, despite their lack of success in attracting labour, Mrs Hengherr was proud of the conditions they offered their employers. She proclaimed: "We pay three to four pounds per month plus food which I prepare myself and which is very good. In addition a bed is provided for each labourer ... and also facilities for a daily bath." These conditions failed to impress the local African population. Freedom to maintain their own social practices, without interference from their employers, determined African's decisions about where to work. This was an impulse that Mrs Hengherr, who presumed the universal superiority of 'European' culture, could not understand. Consequently, she continued to cook her 'very good' German meals for the solitary farm labourer. He, however, did not appreciate Mrs Hengherr's German cooking. Instead, he wanted her to give him the ingredients so that his wife could cook them in the way that he preferred.

Because of their prejudice and inflexibility, the Hengherrs were unable to acquire any voluntary labour. As a result they had to rely on convict labour which, according to Mr Hengherr, was also becoming scarce. Farmers were coming from twenty five miles to collect prisoners from Middelburg prison every morning. The prison could not spare guards to oversee these prisoners. Instead, Mr Hengherr had to stand guard with his gun from morning to night, a task about which he complained bitterly.

The evidence on general farming conditions in Middelburg shows that the Hengherrs tribulations arose primarily from their refusal to adapt themselves to the local conditions. The chairman of the Middelburg Farmers Union, Mr J L Brits, who was probably well placed to judge, stated that Middelburg still suffered from a labour shortage. However, seventy five per cent of this shortage was seasonal. Farmers in Middelburg often tried to meet their seasonal demands by going to the nearby reserve area of Nebo to recruit. Not many farmers made use of the bureau. Even when they did, they often frustrated officials by not following the correct procedure. Failure to sign the passbook or return the bottom of the N.A.85 form meant that even those Africans who had moved into the sphere of the bureau's control often slipped out again. Thus, most farmers operated outside the sphere of the bureaux and managed to maintain an adequate, permanent labour force. This can only be attributed to the fact that the majority of farmers were willing to offer labour tenant conditions. Mr Hengherr on the other hand stubbornly attempted to persuade a labour tenant, who had previously worked a six month contract, that his offer of three pounds a month plus food for continuous work throughout the year was a far superior working condition. He was astounded when "the Native refused".

Evidence of the conditions in Lydenburg indicates even more strongly that most of the farmers who had an adequate labour supply were those that offered labour tenant conditions. According to the official in charge of the labour bureau in Lydenburg, the overwhelming majority of people looking for farm work were labour tenants, and were only prepared to work under a labour tenant contract. They found work on farms where the expected labour period was usually six months labour, for no pay, and six months free time, during which they could work for anyone they chose. For their labour they received land, which the farmer often helped them plough, and the right to graze a limited number of cattle.
The evidence outlined above gives a sense of the general labour conditions in the Lydenburg district. However, by looking at the conditions on one farm in the district, Rooikrans, owned by Wessel Davel, it is possible to get a clearer and more detailed sense of the kind of conditions that effectively attracted labour in 1955. Davel was a fairly large farmer. He owned 10000 morgen, he planted crops on a wide scale and at the same time kept a substantial flock of sheep. To manage this large and diverse enterprise, Mr Davel kept 21 labour tenant families on his farm. These people were, mostly, descendants of five families that had come to the farm about sixty years previously. As soon as a young man from the farm got married, Davel would approach him with an offer of a labour tenant contract. The conditions of this contract basically consisted of the six months unpaid labour, six months free time system prevalent in Lydenburg at this time. All the members of the tenant family were expected to offer some labour and at harvest time Davel would demand maximum labour which was rewarded with a 'bonus' cash wage. Despite the fact that these conditions were harsher than conditions that had prevailed in the 1930s, Davel maintained the loyalty of the resident families by preserving the essence of the labour tenant system. The loyalty of the tenants can also be explained by Davel's professed determination to go out of his way to treat his labour well: "Want, hy redeneer, dan kry hy bevriedigende diens uit hulle." Davel's farm was not an anomaly in Lydenburg. One of the most prominent farmers in the district, Mr Louis de Souza, was reported to have the same labour conditions on his farm. Furthermore, it is clear that the treatment of labour played a determining role in the maintenance of an adequate work force. According to a labour tenant who worked for Louis de Souza's father, the conditions were attractive on that farm because the tenants were able to have a say about their working conditions. This meant that, "problems could be resolved through discussions with the farmer." If an Induna on the farm was treating people badly, the families could complain to the farmer and that Induna would be removed from his position of authority. As a result of these practices, this farm worker, Mr Sekwati Hlatšwayo, stayed with De Souza, "for a long time". Mr Hlatšwayo also claimed that, "we preferred a farmer who handles people well, a farmer who did not beat people. If we needed a place we would go to such a farmer." By 1955 the labour bureaux system was experiencing severe difficulties in making any impact at all on the districts of Lydenburg and Middelburg. The majority of Africans avoided it. Those that were registered as 'work-seekers' were able to find ways of by-passing the controls that attempted to limit their ability to regulate the conditions of their employment. Farmers who treated their labourers in an unacceptable fashion still faced labour shortages as Africans refused to work for them. Another farmer in Middelburg was unable to get labour despite all the efforts of the labour bureaux. This was attributed to his bad reputation amongst the local Africans. To them he was known as "the bull that shoves". Largely as a result of this successful African resistance, farmers were often wary of the new system and continued to deal with Africans outside the sphere of the bureaux. In Belfast the establishment of a labour bureau was even more problematic. In 1954 two dairy farmers in the district complained that their production was threatened because their labour tenants had left the farms. According to the one
farmer, Mr Kobie Viljoen, the local Native Commissioner knew nothing of the scheme "waar deur arbeid vir die boere gewerf kan word nie." By 1958 the matter had not been cleared up and the Belfast Farmers Union launched a comprehensive attack against the local state officials. The Union claimed that the local bureau was giving labour tenants permission to leave the district for the cities without consulting the farmers. They also maintained that the bureau did not function properly because it lacked the trained personnel to handle 'native affairs'. When farmers made requests for labour they were simply told that no labour was available. Contrary to proper procedure their requests received no further attention. As a result, labour tenants could come and go as they pleased and labour was extremely difficult to obtain.

The reason for this unsatisfactory situation, according to the NAD, was that Belfast fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. Thus, the local Magistrate, accountable only to the Department of Justice, also served as the Native Commissioner. The NAD claimed that local administration of 'native affairs' in such areas suffered because of the lack of personnel that was available to Justice. Justice was a smaller department than the NAD and was not allocated the same resources to employ people. In Belfast, the labour bureaux was run on a part time basis by a pensioner who was assisted by an African constable. It was also felt that Justice officials did not have the necessary training and did not display the proper amount of enthusiasm for their duties in the sphere of 'native affairs'.

The NAD put pressure on the Department of Justice to fill the labour bureaux post with a permanent official. Justice replied that this was only possible when the general personnel situation had improved. They did not seem overly concerned about the situation in Belfast and claimed that running the bureau did not require any 'specialised' skills. The failure to appeal to Justice, led the NAD to apply direct pressure on the Magistrate of Belfast through the 'Streekswerksverskaffings-kommissaris' (SWVK), a new position in the Chief Native Commissioner's office that held responsibility for the efficiency of labour bureaux in most of the Transvaal. This pressure initially led the Magistrate to expel all labour tenants from the town of Belfast. Although this action was favourably received by the local farmers, tension between farmers and the Magistrate continued. In July of 1959 a meeting was held between the two parties under the chairmanship of the SWVK. At this meeting the Magistrate claimed that he supplied the labour bureaux machinery but that farmers never made use of it. Farmers on the other hand claimed that they were unaware of any such facilities. It was agreed that the Magistrate would in future endeavour to inform farmers about the bureau. Thus, although some form of cooperation between the Magistrate and farmers was achieved in 1959, the bureau had not yet made an effective impact on the district of Belfast.

A problem that was faced by the bureaux in all the districts under discussion was the reluctance of farmers to register their tenants. Despite farmers' vociferous calls for the strengthening of state control over Africans, they were reluctant to take a direct part in this process. Farmers had an ambiguous attitude to bureaucratic control. On the one hand, involved in a daily struggle with Africans over the terms
of employment, they saw the benefits of state intervention on their behalf. On the other, however, they were unwilling to allow the state to make crucial decisions about their employment practices. They preferred to be personally involved in this process. For example, a number of farmers believed that their ability to attract labour lay in their 'knowledge' on how to conduct relations with Africans. They were convinced that this gave them an advantage over other, less 'knowledgeable' farmers; an advantage that the bureaux threatened to undermine. Similarly, they believed that the bureaux jeopardised the general farm labour supply because personal contact with Africans had always been one of the attractive features of the farms. Such farmers were aware that they could not compete with urban industries in terms of wages. Thus, they attracted labour by being sympathetic to other demands made by Africans. These demands included land, cattle and social activities like beer drinks. This does not mean that farmers were genuinely more sympathetic to Africans' demands, but the labour bureaux threatened to undermine the farmers' ability to negotiate on these issues.  

27 It also happened that farmers did not necessarily regard Africans as being 'all alike'. Thus, some were concerned to meet the people that were to live on their farms, before they hired them. If they operated through the labour bureaux they would be forced to accept the labour of particular Africans who were at that time available as unemployed, registered 'work seekers'.  

28 Another reason why farmers were reluctant to undertake registration lay in the sheer hard and difficult work that was involved. A number of wool farmers protested against the time consuming need to travel all over the farm to collect and sign pass books and then commute all the way to town to get them stamped at the Native Commissioners office. The farmers were especially upset because this process had to take place every year.  

29 However, a more important cause of farmer's unenthusiastic response to registration, especially in the district of Lydenburg, lay in a strong tradition of African resistance to such Government control. When Chapter Four was proclaimed in Lydenburg in 1938, labour tenants had effectively opposed registration.  

30 At the time many had preferred to leave farms in protest. Instances of mobilisation and mass action also took place. In response, many farmers realised that government action produced a situation where labour tenants fought as a group against farmers. Demands that occurred in the isolation of the farm, on the other hand, kept the labour tenant community divided.  

It is not surprising then that farmers were wary of registering their labourers with the labour bureaux. If farmers had no confidence in the ability of the bureaux to keep their labour within the district, they were unlikely to take the risk of a mass exodus of labour tenants, a situation which had nearly occurred in 1938.  

31 It follows then that farmers needed time to gain confidence in the system and that the bureaux had to prove itself to the farming community before it could work in the hoped for, close alliance with farmers. Ironically, it was precisely the farmers' reluctance to register their labour that threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the labour bureaux.  

Over the next few years the labour bureaux in the districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal strove to win the confidence of farmers and prove that the bureaux could
supply the control that would undermine the ability of tenants to resist. The first area where labour bureaux began to have an effective impact was in the ‘locations’ of the rural towns. These areas where much easier to police because of their more concentrated and manageable character. The local labour bureaux in most districts kept strict records, listing all the female and male Africans that were living in the ‘location’ and the ‘white area’ of the town. Most of the local bureaux in the mid-eastern Transvaal reported that regular raids were carried out against both illegal foreigners and ‘leegleërs’ (wont works). The latter group were persecuted in terms of section 36 of the Native Laws Amendment Act. This legislation gave ‘any authorised officer’ the right to evict a person he believed was habitually unemployed. Most local bureaux reported successes and effective monitoring in this regard. For example in 1956, Middelburg reported that there were only four ‘leegleërs’ left and that these would be dealt with shortly.

The local labour bureaux co-operated with the districts by not permitting the right of residence or employment in town to anyone unless it was approved by the district labour bureaux. This agreement eventually grew into a determination by the local bureaux to not let any one employed as a labour tenant, presently or previously, into town. The extent to which this policy was successful is difficult to assess. Despite bureaux claims to the contrary, it seems probable that tenants could still find people in town who were prepared to employ them, especially if they had worked for such people for a long period of time. Regional conditions also had an effect on the success of this policy. The size of the Lydenburg ‘location’, for example, made the effective implementation of this policy problematic. According to the town clerk, the ‘location’ was only able to provide twenty per cent of the labour needs of the town. The rest of the work in the town was carried out by migrant labour from the farms and the African settlement called Boomplaats. The labour supply from Boomplaats was also threatened because the government had decided to remove this ‘black spot’. Because of this situation, the town clerk asked for permission to hold off the law barring labour tenants from the town. In the mean time the town would proceed with plans to build housing for an adequate labour force. The only way to populate this expanding ‘location’ was to allow labour tenants and people from Boomplaats to be considered for this housing. Thus, in Lydenburg, at the end of 1955, labour tenants were still given a local, ‘urban’ alternative to work on the farms. It was also agreed that labour tenants could work in the towns in their free period as long as their employers made sure that they got back to the farms on time.

By 1958, many of the local bureaux claimed that all ‘leegleërs’ had been expelled and that no labour tenants were being permitted to work in the town. Regular raids were reportedly being carried out in the districts of Middelburg, Ermelo and Carolina. By 1959, Belfast also claimed to have cleared the town of labour tenants. In Carolina it was discovered that absentee farmers who lived in the town were employing Africans from their farms, in the towns. It was emphasised that the bureaux would not tolerate such exceptions to the rule. These Africans had to go through the registration process. Africans who were outside the control of the local labour bureaux could not live in the town. From the bureaucratic point of view, the situation in Lydenburg also became ‘more satisfactory’ by 1958. The shortage of labour had been overcome and the ‘location’ had been expanded to
accommodate three quarters of the town's labour requirements. A large proportion of the remaining demand was met by Africans from the reserves who had been registered with the district bureaux. The opportunities for labour tenants had thus, significantly diminished.  

Thus, the attempt to diminish the movement between town and countryside in the individual districts seems to have been quite successful by 1958. The effect that this had on the lives of Africans can be demonstrated by the problems faced by Mr Abram Nkosi. He had been working, on and off, at an old age home in Middelburg. However, he now faced eviction because he did not qualify for residence in town. He had not been working for a continuous period of 10 years for one employer, which would have qualified him for section 10 rights. Furthermore he was born on a farm and had spent some time working on the farms. This caused him to be classified as a labour tenant. He was thus advised to look for work on the farms. The alternatives to this option were rapidly vanishing. An area in Middelburg which had always presented a less controlled alternative to residence in the town and on the farms, was the African settlement of Doornkop. However, this settlement was now facing a full scale removal. Furthermore, the implementation of Chapter Four in Middelburg had made 'squatting' on the farms more difficult. As a result of Mr Nkosi's inability to find residence, his employment in town, which probably paid very well and at which he was extremely proficient, was threatened. His employer made a plea to the government on his behalf, but, to no avail. In the end Abram settled in Doornkop to await the removal, and the destruction of his career as a respected attendant at the old age home.  

In the case of Abram Nkosi, the implementation of Chapter Four in Middelburg affected his ability to find residence on the farms. The much awaited implementation of this chapter did not, however, have a uniform effect in the districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal. The chapter was perceived as an extremely sensitive subject by the state because its provisions allowed for the state's direct intervention in the labour practices of certain farmers. Although this action was to be in the interest of other farmers, who were presumed to be the majority, the National Party government was extremely wary of alienating any section of the farming community. Thus, in 1956, after a number amendments had made the chapter ready for implementation, Verwoerd warned the officials of the NAD to exercise extreme caution. Verwoerd was particularly worried that grievances against Chapter Four and the Labour Tenant Control Boards would become 'political issues' in the upcoming general election. As a result he advised the boards to take action only if blatant transgressions of the act occurred. He hoped that, for the time being, the boards would concentrate their efforts on gathering information concerning the labour situation in their districts.  

Thus, Labour Tenant Control Boards were tentatively set up in the districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal in 1957. These boards consisted of two appointed, bona fide farmers, and the Native Commissioner who served as the chairman. The basic task of the boards was to redistribute surplus labour tenants. A farmer found to have more labour tenants living on his land than he needed to effectively run his farm, would be asked to evict those surplus tenants. These labourers would then be
made available to other farmers by means of the labour bureaux. The provision of the 1936 version of Chapter Four, that made it the responsibility of the state to find accommodation for evicted labour tenants, had been repealed. In the new system, section 38 (b) (ii) directed "that every endeavour should be made to place ejected labour tenants in employment". Those tenants who refused this employment were expected to find another place of residence. The fact that residence rights could only be granted by the labour bureaux was expected to make such refusal extremely difficult. In particular, urban areas were to be barred to evicted labour tenants by such means. Farmers were also, once again, asked to register all their labour tenants.

In addition to the hesitant Government backing that they received, numerous other factors also contributed to the boards' problems. In the middle of 1957 the Native Commissioner of Middelburg outlined some of the difficulties experienced by his board. The Commissioner felt impelled to undertake some action because of the reports of large scale 'illegal squatting' that his board was receiving. It was alleged that Africans were living on farms in the vicinity of coal mines, where they worked. The squatter communities that facilitated this migrancy also brewed liquor and provided a place where mine workers could congregate without supervision. Some of these farms were alleged to contain villages consisting of seventy five huts.

The Labour Tenant Board found it impossible to prosecute these cases because they were unable to distinguish labour tenants or squatters from full time servants. If a farmer claimed that the Africans on his farm were full time servants, there was little the board could do. There was no limit on the full time servants that a farmer could keep. The Native Commissioner also complained that his board was handicapped by the nature of its personnel: "My committee members are farmers and find it difficult to spare the time to make thorough investigations."

In Lydenburg the board also became incapacitated when faced with farmer's refusal to co-operate. C.F. Ackermann owned six farms in the Lydenburg district but lived two hundred miles outside the district. When the board requested him to do so, Mr Ackermann refused to appear before it. The farmers that sat on the board, in turn refused to take action against a fellow farmer who had not had a chance to defend himself. The Native Commissioner declared himself helpless to undertake any further action. The state was unwilling to bring Mr Ackermann before the board by force and the matter seems to have been dropped. The attitude of the farmers on this board reflects a general tendency identified by Senator Le Roux of the SAAU Liaison Committee: "In die algemeen is 'n boer nie geneig om teen 'n burman klagtes in te dien." In the absence of effective farm inspections, the boards had to rely on such complaints, which, as a result of farmers attitudes, were not as forthcoming as expected. The NAD did appoint inspectors in an attempt to overcome this problem. However, there were only two for the Northern Areas and by 1960 they had only carried out inspections on some of the farms in the districts of Louis Trichardt, Pietersburg and Tzaneen.

In Carolina, the failure of the board to proceed according to NAD guidelines caused farmers to protest about over-zealous inspections. Whereas Justice
Department jurisdiction had produced an inactive labour bureaux in Belfast, in Carolina it had the opposite effect on the Labour Tenant Board. Instead of proceeding at the cautious pace recommended, the Carolina board ascertained the labour supply on all the farms in the district. Following this survey the board proceeded to send recommendations to all the farmers on how many labour tenants they were allowed to keep. More than seventy farmers were told to reduce their labour in this manner. Farmers voiced loud protests about this large-scale and arbitrary interference in their affairs. In the uproar the board defended itself by claiming that these were only recommendations that would probably not be carried out. Nevertheless, farmers complained to their member of parliament, who was also the Minister of Post and Tele-communications, Dr Hertzog.\textsuperscript{46} The NAD emphatically pointed out to the Department of Justice that these procedures were contrary to Article 29 of the chapter as well as NAD policy, and should cease before more friction between farmers and the bureaucracy resulted.

From the evidence outlined above, it is not surprising that in 1958 the NAD felt that, "met die uitvoering van Hoofstuk Vier is miskien nie so flaks gevorder as wat verwag kon word nie maar dit is 'n nuwe skema wat tyd geneem het om by die boer gemeenskap bekend te word".\textsuperscript{47} Nevertheless, despite the problems, the NAD seemed to hold out some hope for the future. In Middelburg this optimism seemed justified as the Labour Tenant Control Board there reported a number of successes. The farmers Davel, Steenkamp, Weimer, Louw and De Villiers were held to collectively have 58 families in excess of their needs. Most of these families were subsequently removed by order of the board. Only five managed to stay on the farms.\textsuperscript{48} Reports of forced removals were also starting to reach NAD head office. In cases where tenants refused to move, it was decided to issue them with a 'heavy suspended fine' in terms of section 1 of Act 22 of 1951. If such tenants still refused to move they would be served with an ejectment order in terms of section 3 of Act 52 of 1951. These tenants would then be carted off the farms in NAD 'trust lorries' with the assistance of the police.\textsuperscript{49}

Despite their patchy effectiveness, the Labour Tenant Boards interfered in the labour relationships on the farms in an unprecedented fashion. When, during the 1940s, the NAD had proposed farm inspections, farmers raised a storm of protest. The new NAD measures raised less protest because they were perceived as being much more directly in the interest of farmers. However, it is evident that not all farmers were prepared to cooperate with the boards. This lack of enthusiasm was sometimes caused by the nature of relationships on the farms. Despite the overwhelming evidence that farmers strove on a daily basis to increase the oppression and exploitation of their labour, some farmers, in the isolation of their farms, developed a genuine allegiance to the Africans living and working with them; especially when labour tenant families had been resident on a particular farm for a number of generations.\textsuperscript{50} In Badfontein, Lydenburg, a farmer refused to comply with the ruling of the board. He referred to the labour tenants as "my volk". His father had grown up with the heads of the tenant families when they were children. Under pressure from the board, he called together all the Africans living on his farm and told them of the ruling. He told them it was up to them to decide who should leave and who could stay. He himself could not undertake the cruel act of evicting African families he had known all his life.\textsuperscript{51}
The conclusion drawn from the evidence presented above is that Chapter Four did seriously affect the freedom of some labour tenants. But, by 1960 these effects were still only thinly spread over the districts of the mid-eastern Transvaal. In that year, the Machadadorp Farmers Union in the district of Belfast claimed that the main objective of Chapter Four had not been reached: "Daar is nog steeds geen reelmatige verspreiding van plaasarbeid nie." The union claimed that on a number of farms, the increasing congregation of labour tenant families was taking place. Some of these families paid rent to the farmer and most of them were expected to work for a very short time. Farmers that could or would not offer such conditions were often forced to rely on prison labour. The Belfast Labour Tenant Control Board was more specific about the conditions in that district. The distribution of labour ranged from no workers on a farm to seventy Africans on one farm. It was estimated by the board that a particular farmer who kept seventy Africans on his farm needed only twenty of these people to run his farm. As a result of these practices, the board claimed, thirty percent of the farms housed Africans that were thirty percent in excess of their labour needs. The board also stated that in its three years of existence, not one of its many resolutions had been put into effect.

Chapter Four had no effect in Belfast. In Lydenburg and Middelburg the Labour Tenant Control Boards faced many difficulties and were only partially successful. In Ermelo protestations about absentee farmers that permitted Africans to 'squat' where still widespread in 1960. Complaints from all over South Africa about the ineffectiveness of Chapter Four led, in the same year, to the calling up of an inter-departmental committee that, rather than persisting with attempts to redistribute labour tenants, decided to consider the total abolishment of the labour tenant system. This decision to abandon the policy, proves that, despite the devastation of a number of peoples' lives, in the final analysis, Chapter Four failed as a state policy.

Labour Bureaux, on the other hand, were not abandoned as a farm labour policy. At the end of 1956 the Lydenburg labour bureau reported that the situation was improving. A number of Africans were beginning to use the labour bureau. This allowed the bureau to meet the demand for labour of those farmers that made use of the 'proper channels'. However, they continued to represent a minority. Most farmers persisted with their own labour recruiting and were still not prepared to register their labourers. But, in 1958 a further change in attitudes was reported. In March of that year it was claimed that farmers were now arriving regularly to register their labourers. By 1959 some farmers were even handing in written requests for labour. In Middelburg things also improved slightly by 1958. Africans were using the bureau and were being sent out to the farms with the proper form in their possession. However, farmers hardly ever returned the bottom of this form which made it impossible for the bureaux to maintain tabs on who was working for whom. In Ermelo, 1958 saw an appreciable increase in registrations. Many farmers still preferred to 'find' their labour themselves. However, the first 20 days of the month of May saw the registration of three hundred farm labourers. According to the bureaux the 'big employers' in the district had registered practically all their labour. By 1959 nearly all the labour had been registered and registration was regularly being renewed. In Belfast, during 1959, farmers were
reportedly regarding the bureaux in a more favourable light. However, by 1960 still hardly any registration was taking place.\(^{57}\)

On the whole it would seem that the co-operation between the bureaux and the farmers had improved by 1960. The increase in registrations can be explained by a number of factors. The increasing ability of labour bureaux to control Africans, especially in the prescribed areas, could have given farmers greater confidence in the ability of the bureaux. People eager for redistribution of labour in terms of Chapter Four, which also required registration, could have become more aware of the benefits of registration. Furthermore, the supply of labour in the farming districts grew steadily during the fifties. In Lydenburg the number of Africans resident in the district grew from 40000 in 1955 to 47000 at the end of 1956.\(^{58}\) In Carolina there were approximately 32000 Africans in 1957. By 1958 this figure had expanded to 36000.\(^{59}\) This expansion can partly be explained by the effects that the urban bureaux were beginning to have at this time.\(^{60}\) Marcus claims that the bureaux were instrumental in channeling urban Africans back into the rural areas, thus reversing the ever increasing flow of rural Africans into the towns.\(^{61}\) Lazar's figures support this contention: "by 1953, 21,823 African workers from urban areas had been placed by the labour bureaux in employment in agriculture; and between the middle of 1954 and the end of 1957 another 268,705 workers were directed back to white farms".\(^{62}\) The generally increasing supply of labour naturally made farmers less nervous about Africans leaving their districts and thus, made them less wary of registering their labour. Furthermore, these uprooted urban dwellers were probably happy to find any kind of labour and were not as ready to 'boycott' farmers.

Despite these improvements, a number of farmers continued to express dissatisfaction with the bureaux. A prominent member of the Transvaal Agricultural Union maintained in 1960 that farmers and Africans did not like using the bureaux system because of its impersonal nature. This farmer was of the opinion that the system needed to be revised. He believed that, "as jy daar die boer in persoonlike kontak met die naturel kon bring, dat hy dan 'n kans het om sukses te behaal om hom te ooreed om na die landbou te kom. Dit is 'n kwessie van man tot man kontakt - menslike verhoudings. Hy moet verhoudings op bou met die naturel. Soos ek die naturel ken hou hy daarvan om sy eie base te soek. Die buro's behandel hom te veel as 'n kommoditeit."\(^{63}\) Thus, reservations about the effects of bureaucratic control continued to be expressed.

Apart from these reservations, farmers were still not totally convinced about the bureaux's ability to control the movement of labour tenants. Thus, despite the increase in registration, the relationship between many farmers and the bureaucracy remained uneasy. In 1957 a farmer in Lydenburg reported that his farm workers were leaving the district to work at the dam construction on the Pienaars River. According to the farmer, the labour tenants, "trek eenvoudig sonder toestemming van die naturelle kommissaris".\(^{64}\) The Native Commissioner assured him that these labour tenants should be brought back to Lydenburg but, no action had been taken. The NAD found that the families of the labour tenants were still living on the farm, which indicated that they intended to come back to the farm when their 'free period' had elapsed. However, it is clear that what made the
farmer nervous was the labour bureaux's inability to prevent Africans from moving beyond the borders of the district. Farmers hoped that labour tenants would now use their free time to work only in the district of the farm. This would make control and the certainty of their return a much more manageable task. This is borne out by a farmer in Middelburg who was upset about the freedom of his labour tenants to go where they pleased in search of work. This farmer gave his labour tenant a 'work pass' for the specific purpose of finding temporary work in the town of Middelburg. Instead, this African went to Pretoria and found work in a building company. The labour bureau clearly had no knowledge of this move.

Labour bureaux in the districts were more successful in preventing labour tenants from taking up employment, without farmer's permission, at relatively well paid road works. This was partly because the farmer and the illegal employer both fell under the jurisdiction of the same bureaux. In Ermelo this practice, which had been a source of farmer's complaints for decades, was effectively reversed. The bureau forced the roads department to register all the workers in their employ. Subsequently, all those Africans who originated from the farms, had to be sent back.

However, the district bureaux could not be very effective in preventing Africans from leaving their jurisdictions. The real onus fell on the bureaux of the urban areas, to which labour tenants often migrated in their free period. It has been shown that the urban bureaux were successful in forcing large numbers into the rural areas. It is less clear, however, how successful they were in keeping migrating labour tenants out. In Pretoria, the evidence indicates that, by 1960, it was becoming increasingly difficult for labour tenants to find accommodation and work. Labour tenants were still allowed to work in Pretoria. However, this only applied to 2261 labour tenants that had been registered before 1960. No new registrations were permitted. Further, if a labour tenant stayed away from Pretoria for a period of twelve months, his registration would not be renewed. Labour tenants, during their six to eight month 'free period', lived in the hostels and backyard shacks of Pretoria's 'locations'. This residency came under fire in 1960. In that year the town council was in the process of 'removing' all farm labourers from the backyard shacks. They intended to only permit residence in the hostels where control was easier. Sixteen new inspectors had been appointed to make regular inspections of the backyard residences, with the aim of arresting 'illegals'.

Despite the tightening of control, numerous Africans were entering Pretoria illegally. Many of these were discovered and expelled when they tried to find jobs. However, a number managed to stay on in Pretoria. One method of avoiding detection was to acquire two pass books. Labour tenants would claim to have lost their books and would duly be issued with a duplicate. They would then use this duplicate only when they were in town and keep the other pass for the farms. There would thus be no evidence of their origins from the farms when they looked for jobs in town. In 1960 there were 112 labour tenants from Belfast and 358 from Middelburg, working in Pretoria with the knowledge of the town council. An unspecified number were there without official knowledge. However, due to tightening controls and the expansion of bureaucratic personnel, the movement between town and country was becoming more and more difficult.
The increasing effectiveness of labour bureaux in districts, rural towns and cities was undermining the capacity of labour tenants to use mobility and alternative employment as a threat against farmers. Other factors were contributing to this dilemma. The fact that farmers were generally less desperate for labour meant that fewer farmers were willing to take in Africans on the terms they demanded. According to Mr Petrus Magolego, the introduction of telephones in the 1950s also served to limit African mobility because it gave farmers the ability to confer with each other before hiring anyone. If an African came to look for work, the farmer would first phone his previous employer. If the African had left the farm because of a dispute with the owner, then the farmers would often decide to deny this person a job because he was marked as a 'trouble maker'.

The bureaucratic control of African farm workers in the mid-eastern Transvaal, implemented by the National Party controlled state, brought the state into the lives of both whites and blacks in an unprecedented way. The largely negative reaction of these people combined with a number of administrative problems, served to inhibit the new bureaucracy. But, throughout this process, the NAD attempted to implement its new vision without alienating white farmers. Eventually this patient approach began to win a number of farmers over. The growing confidence in the system displayed by the farmers began to combine with an expanding, increasingly efficient bureaucracy. These factors were, by 1960, seriously affecting the ability of labour tenants to move freely and find alternatives to farm labour. In the words of Mrs Rose Masilela: "It was difficult to move from place to place if you already had a pass. Before this boys could run away if conditions were not good on the farm. But, the pass put restrictions on this through registrations."

Africans' struggle to maintain a capacity to control the conditions under which they lived, has a long history. A number of significant successes, both big and small, were achieved along the way. But, the expanded policies of the National Party made the possibilities of such successes much more remote. The horizons of rural Africans were effectively being narrowed by state control.

NOTES

1. Robert Merton et al - Reader in Bureaucracy pg 11
2. Ibid. pg 11
3. John Burnheim - Is Democracy Possible? pg 37
4. See especially M Morris - "State Intervention and the Agricultural Labour Supply Post-1948" in Wilson, Kooy and Hendrie - Farm Labour in South Africa
5. According to Simkins - Four Essays on the Past, Present and Possible Future Distribution of the Black Population of SA: "Population growth in the metropolitan areas reached a not very clear defined peak in the period 1936-1951." pg 8. The drop in urbanisation in conjunction with increases in the population in general, meant that the rural population began to grow at a significantly heightened rate after 1951.
6. Figures for numbers of tractors in the mid-eastern Transvaal districts of Belfast, Ermelo, Lydenburg and Middelburg reflect a rapid expansion. Tractors increased from 532 in 1947 to 1268 in 1950 and 2757 in 1955. See Agricultural Statistics of South Africa.

7. NTS 897/280 A V2316 In Lydenburg for example it was claimed in 1955 that "Sodra 'n plakker 'n trekpass kry, het hy alreeds nuwe woonplek gekry, sodat daar baie min los arbeid is." In the same year the Magistrate, Lydenburg claimed "Boere ondervind moeilikheid met arbeids behoeftes."

8. NTS 3/280 (3) PT1 V1994 Chief native Commissioner, Northern Areas, Memo; 9/November/1953

9. NTS 222/280 Pt10 V2096 Secretary of Native Affairs to Koos Jonkers; 16/September/1948. The National Party perceived the bureaux scheme in the following terms: "'n breedvoerige plan vir die beperking van oormatige toevloed van naturelle na sekere gebiede en vir die inwerking-stelling van 'n stelselmatige reeling van naturelle-arbeid."

10. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) Mrs Fourie to Minister of Native Affairs; 30/5/1955

11. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) Private Secretary of Verwoerd to Mrs Fourie; 13/June/1955: "Daar [is] honderd duisend plakkers oor die hele land wat daar onder sal moet hanteer word en dit sou die grootste verwarring afgee indien hulle na die stede toe gedryf word omdat die masjinery nie reg is om hulle beter te verspry oor die plase."

12. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) Streekswerkverskafingskommissaris (SWVK) to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 21/July/1955. Mrs Mashego also remembers the farmers of Dullstroom as very harsh. Although it got very cold in this area, farmers would not allow Africans to wear shoes, "because they were thought to be imitating the 'miessies' ". Interview with Mrs Mahlako Mashego; Jane Furse; 07/02/91

13. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) Mev Nic Fourie to Secretary of Native Affairs; 16/August/1955

14. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) Mrs Hanna Hengherr to Minister of Native Affairs; March/27/1955

15. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) Streekwerksverskaffingsbeampte to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 12/5/55: "Dit wil voorkom as of hulle hulself te veel inmeng met die Naturelle se geskilletjies. Die naturelle neem hulle dit kwalik en dit lyk asof hulle besluit het om hulle te boikot."

16. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) Mrs Hanna Hengherr to Minister of Native Affairs; March/27/1955

17. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) Mr Hengherr to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 31/5/55
18. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) SWVK to Chief native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 22/September/1955

19. Interdepartmentele Kommittee van Ondersoek van die Plakkerdiensbodestelsel 1960 Evidence of J.P. Joubert. In 1959 Lydenburg had 922 white farmers. 722 farmed with labour tenants. This represented a significant change. In 1958, only 50 farmers had engaged the services of permanent labourers - the rest were labour tenant-farmers.

20. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 22/September/1955

21. Interview with Mr Sekwati Hlatšwayo - Jane Furse, 08/02/1991

22. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) Native Commissioner, Nebo to Secretary of Native Affairs; 22/Feb/1956

23. NTS 289/280 (3) (21) Kobie Viljoen to Secretary of Native Affairs; 24/6/1954

24. South African Official Year Book 1956 - 57 In the budget for 1956, Justice was allocated £ 292299 for salaries and wages compared to the £ 2076678 of the NAD.

25. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) NAD Memo; 17/3/1958

26. This is also an example of the expansion of NAD personnel that was taking place.

27. See oral evidence given by the TAU to the Interdepartmental Committee of Inspection into the Labour Tenant System; 22/July/1960. Also See C. van Onselen - "The Social and Economic Underpinnings of Paternalism and Violence on the Maize Farms of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900-1950" Unpublished ASI paper. Van Onselen shows that paternalism, the ideological framework of black-white relationships on many farms, was necessarily, to some extent, a reciprocal relationship.

28. NTS 222/280 V2097 Mr S.D. Van Wyk to the Secretary of Native Affairs; c1956: Mr Van Wyk, a farmer in the Cape, hired five Africans from a certain village which, he believed, produced particularly good workers. When he applied to recruit more workers from this village he was denied permission by the bureau because none of these people were registered as 'work seekers'. He was forced to accept the workers that were registered at the bureau. These people, Mr Van Wyk claimed, were unsuitable and unproductive workers. Mr Van Wyk complained bitterly against the system that took the ability to determine which workers to hire, out of the hands of the farmers.

29. NTS 97/362 V8835 SWVK to Secretary of Native Affairs; 6/March/1959


32. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 4/May/1956

33. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) Lydenburg Town Clerk to Director of Native Labour; 16/September/1955

34. NTS 289/280 (3) (10) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 28/May/1958. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 11/Feb/1958

35. NTS 289/280 (3) (21) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 21/January/1959

36. NTS 289/280 (3) (17) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 16/September/1958

37. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 22/August/1958

38. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) M Schloemann to Dr Eiselin; 25/1/1960

39. NTS 97/362 (43) V8848 H.F. Verwoerd to Secretary for Native Affairs; 8/November/1956.

40. NTS 97/362 (43) V4884 NAD General Circular; 24/August/1956

41. NTS 97/362 V8836 Meeting of the Liaison Committee (SAAU); 18/March/1959: Plakkerdienis Kontrol Rade funktioneer nie reg nie omdat 'n boer net se dat sy naturelle diensbodes is en dan is die raad magteloos.

42. NTS 97/362 V8833 Native Commissioner Middelburg to Secretary of Native Affairs; 26/June/1957

43. NTS 97/362 V8833 Native Commissioner Lydenburg to Secretary of Native Affairs; 26/July/1957. NTS 97/362 V8833 Secretary of Native Affairs to Native Commissioner Lydenburg; 23/9/1957

44. NTS 97/362 V8836 Meeting of Liaison Committee (SAAU); 18/March/1959

45. NTS 97/362G V8837 Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas) to Secretary of Native Affairs; 29/August/1960

46. NTS 97/362 (52) (1) V8849 Secretary of Justice to Secretary of Native Affairs; 5/3/59

47. NTS 97/362 V8835 NAD Memo: Application of Chapter Four; c1958

48. NTS 97/362 V8835 Chief Native Commissioner (Witwatersrand) to Secretary of Native Affairs; 4/9/1958

49. NTS 97/362 V8835 Secretary BAD to Chief Native Commissioner (Northern Areas); 16/12/1959
50. See C. van Onselen - "The Social and Economic Underpinnings of Paternalism and Violence on the Maize Farms of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900-1950" Unpublished ASI paper pg 9 for the paternalism in which these relationships were usually formulated.

51. Interview with Mrs Bryna Davis; Lydenburg, 15/9/1990

52. NTS 97/362 V8836 Machadadorp Boerevereniging to Inter-Departmentele Kommissie van Onderzoek van Plaasarbeid; 25/July/1959

53. Interdepartmentele Komitee Van Onderzoek Van Die Plakkerdiensbodestelsel; Oral evidence in Ermelo; 9/August/1960

54. Marcus - Modernising Super-Exploitation pg 83 The Labour Tenant Control Boards were turned into Labour Control Boards.

55. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 11/Feb/1958

56. NTS 289/280 (3) (10) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 16/March/1959

57. NTS 289/280 (3) (21) Native Commissioner Belfast to Chief Native Commissioner; 15/1/60

58. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 26/Sept/1955 & 13/Dec/1956

59. NTS 289/280 SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 23/Jan/1957 & 11/March/1958

60. NTS 3/280(3) PT1 V1994 Chief Native Commissioner Pietersburg Memo for Period: 7 July - 30 September 1953; 9/November/1953: As early as 1953 farmers from Belfast, Nelspruit, Lydenburg and Ermelo, reported that Africans that had left the rural areas for the urban areas were returning and asking for permission to re-establish themselves in these districts. They were forced into this because they were being driven out of the urban areas; they could not qualify for permanent residence there.

61. Marcus op. cit. pg 65: "In 1952, when the labour bureaux were first established in most major urban centers, of the 28,545 African men "placed" in Agriculture by them, 21,823 came directly from urban labour bureaux".

62. Lazar op. cit. pg 98

63. Interdepartmentele Komitee Van Onderzoek van die Plakkerdiensbodestelsel TAU Evidence; 22/July/1960

64. NTS 289/280 (3) (7) S.N. Du Toit to Minister of Native Affairs; 2/5/1957

65. NTS 289/280 (3) (11) C. Smit to Minister of Native Affairs; 29/April/1957

66. NTS 289/280 (3) (17) SWVK to Chief Native Commissioner; 11/March/1958
67. Interdepartemente Komitee Van Onderzoek Van die Plakkerdiensbodestelsel
Evidence of G.M. Retief - Assistant Director of Non-White Department of Pretoria
Town Council; 5/August/1960

68. Interview with Mr Petrus Magolego; Jane Furse; 09/12/90

69. See Posel - "Influx Control & The Construction of Apartheid 1948 - 1961"
Unpublished PhD Thesis pg 72: "In two years Jansen [Minister of Native Affairs]
created 308 new positions for whites and 203 for Africans."

70. Interview with Mrs Rose Masilela; Jane Furse; 08/02/91