Title: Authority and Control in a South African Goldmine Compound

by: Patrick Pearson
The goldmine compound conforms fairly closely to what Goffman describes as the "total institution". He defines it as "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life". (Goffman, 1968 p. 11).

It is the last element of his definition - that which points to the intervention of the authorities into many aspects of the inmate's daily life which is the most important for the purposes of this paper. I seek to examine three aspects of the exercise of control in the compound situation.

The first part will describe the authority roles of various personnel in the compound and evaluate the usefulness of applying Gluckman's concept of the interhierarchical (or inter-calary) role position. I will argue that only when authority and power are derived from different and conflicting sources, can a role be accurately described as being interhierarchical.

The second part will look more generally at the nature of the total institution as manifested in the compound situation and the way in which this environment contributes to the effective control of the resident and subjugates the worker in his environment through assaults on his identity.

The third part will seek to identify worker/inmate reaction to the compound
system and show how the organization of the room serves to recreate with varying
degrees of success, an identity which has been assailed by the needs of mine
management.

Compound Authorities

The superior compound authority is the white manager. Ideally he should
have a "knowledge of African customs" and be capable of speaking one or
more Bantu languages. A knowledge of mining procedures and conditions is
also considered desirable. He is responsible for all aspects of the
organization including feeding, administration, welfare, sport and dancing,
maintenance and discipline. His attitudes can play an important part as
regards the severity with which the rules of the system are applied.
At the particular compound they were applied in a rather more liberal
fashion than they might have been and, from what I could gather, this is
also the case in other compounds on the mine. There is a limit to what can
be done within the system, so that its authoritarian character tends to remain
in spite of efforts by the management. (1)

Any attempt by the manager to ease the lot of his charges simply makes him
a better father-figure, a strict but kindly sort of fellow who understands
the 'boys', as they are commonly called, and knows when and how to manipulate
the rules for certain favoured individuals. Because there is usually no

1. At another compound on the mine skylights were installed in some rooms
so that the rooms should not be so dark during the day. Appreciation
was expressed to the Compound Manager, but I was told privately by
clerks and Indunas that the skylights were unpopular because they
tended to leak and to make the rooms hot. It appears that the
authoritarianism of the system meant that the men believed that they could
not express their opinions openly without displeasing the compound manager.
other white in the compound for most of the day, he will often tend to establish this paternalistic type of relationship with a small group of rather obsequious black staff.

Apart from legal action the Compound Manager may take administrative action against defaulters. He may ban men from going to the beer garden for offences involving alcohol, and "black-list" a man considered to be undesirable. This involves returning the worker to the recruiting agency for re-allocation to another mine in exchange for a new worker. Since the particular compound is a small one, the manager is also responsible for an underground section. He therefore holds the power of Departmental Personnel Officer and is able to demote and cut the pay of workers who misbehave underground. Under none of these circumstances may a worker resign, while The Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act No. 70 of 1973 which permits legal strikes by Blacks under certain circumstances, specifically excludes mine-workers from its provisions.

Control is exercised through five Indunas and ten policemen. In addition to maintaining order, they are responsible for the handling of complaints, although they may be by-passed and men often consult the Compound Manager directly. The ethnic distribution of these officers appears in Table 1.

An Induna is appointed to his position by the Compound Manager. He is a uniformed officer who lives in single quarters which he will often share with a friend. In addition to this preferential accommodation the Induna receives extra beer and meat rations as well as being paid a relatively high salary of about R100 per month. He is seen by management as a tribal leader of tribal people and acts as an intermediary, passing information from the Compound Manager to members of his particular ethnic group, supervising
his policemen, and reporting to the manager everything from potential
disturbances to such mundane matters as burnt-out light bulbs. His most
important function is to settle disputes and problems of a minor nature, and
investigate the more serious ones so that the facts are available for the
manager's consideration. Invariably the Induna has been a policeman of
long standing who has proved himself as reliable and loyal to the management.

Policemen, like Indunas, are uniformed, but they live in ordinary rooms,
along with the workers. Their duties are to maintain order and assist
workers. They are responsible for taking new arrivals on a tour of the
compound, showing them important places like the dressing station, the kitchen
and the manager's office, as well as explaining regulations to the men,
particularly complaint procedures. Men may also go to them for help and
information. They are also required to investigate thefts and assaults,
break up fights, keep queues orderly, apprehend dagga-smokers and "loafers"
and search rooms for illicit alcohol, dagga, dangerous weapons and stolen
goods. They may also search men entering and leaving the compound for these
objects. Although they are not provided with weapons except in the case of
serious disturbances, most carry knobkierries or sticks in the course of their
duties. They do not appear to mediate in disputes, the matter usually
being immediately taken to the Induna or Indunas concerned, and while they may
act as councillors to the workers, I do not have any evidence of this. They
are also appointed by the Compound Manager, usually being recruited through
other policemen (2), and together with the Indunas, form a category which
van Onselen (1973b) has called "collaborators".

2. The fact that the Compound Manager showed preference for"Shangaan"
policemen, a common occurrence in the mining industry, accounts
for the disproportionate number of officers from this ethnic group.
The mine management calls them "Tribal Representatives" but in fact they are neither "representative" nor "tribal"; they are minor bureaucrats in the administrative system. They hold their position not by means of a consensus among those subject to them, but by virtue of the support of the mining company. They are appointed by the company, financially supported by it, deposed by it occasionally, and, most significantly, are responsible to it. They must see that its often petty regulations are enforced, and inform on any illegal attempts to challenge its authority. In the event of any serious disturbance they wield force in the form of a riot stick issued by the company, while in untroubled times they bear authority buttressed by the force of the South African State and its law courts.

Gluckman has examined the roles of headmen, colonial administrators and factory foremen, and has described these positions in which are focused the clash of interests of both those below and above as being "interhierarchical" (1969), or in earlier writings as "inter-calary". He suggests that they represent the "...positions in which distinct levels of social relations, organized in their own hierarchies, gear into each other". (1969, p. 71). These roles are characterized by conflicting ideas as to what is expected of the incumbent of the position, and this leads to his being hamstrung by differing obligations. Thus the village headman, as the most junior official of the colonial administration was expected by his seniors to enforce their often unpopular measures, while his subjects expected him to defend their interests and air their grievances.

Adam Kuper (1970) has called for a modification of Gluckman's paradigm, because he maintains that it sees the headman as being hamstrung, when in fact he often has considerable room for manoeuvre in the position. He may play off the needs of one interest group against those of another, and may manipulate both to his own ends.
A further problem with Gluckman's formulation derives from his failure to differentiate between an allocated right, and the power derived from consensus, the distinction between which is the source of the dilemma in which the incumbent of the interhierarchal role is caught. Unless this distinction is made, it is difficult to specify where the two hierarchies "gear into each other" as thus almost any role might be described as being interhierarchal. A conflict between sources of support is necessary for a role to be truly interhierarchal.

An incorporation of the dichotomy noted by M.G. Smith (1956) may be helpful. Writing about government, he notes two types of action which make up the "process by which the public affairs of a people or any social group are directed and managed". These are "administrative" and "political", the first of which "consists in the authorized process of organization and management of the affairs of a given unit", while political action is a competition between equals for power. Administrative action is backed by authority which is "an allocated right to the use and control of force" (p.50), while behind political action is the power gained from the creation of consensus among followers. Once power is gained, it may be rendered into authority, and the administrator may delegate duties by virtue of the legitimacy of his authority.

The Compound Manager is required to meet the needs of both the administration and the compound residents, so that his position might be seen as having elements in common with that of the interhierarchal role. He is the only white forming a link between the white management and the black compound resident and these two might have differing expectations as to his obligations. The workers are not in a position to withdraw support from him however because he does not rely on any power deriving from them. In the unlikely
event of their making known their disapproval of him, he is almost
certain to be supported in his position by the administration from which his
authority derives, as long as he has been applying the official policy.

Some Compound Managers seem to see themselves as being in an interhierarchical
position however, or may assume the role in order to protect themselves from
criticism. When the compound cooks were called in to be told that the
disproportionately high wage increase they had been given was a mistake, and
that the increase was to be far more modest, the Compound Manager took great
pains to explain that the mistake was not his, but had occurred "higher up",
as he put it. He also suggested that they accept it like men, just as a father
would persuade his disappointed sons to do.

The term 'Tribal Representatives' would suggest that those who bear this title
were in an interhierarchical role position, but like the Compound Manager,
they are actually part of the administrative hierarchy alone. They are in
no way obliged to meet any needs of those beneath them which conflict with
company policy. They are in a perfect position however, to manipulate
situations to their own ends through their particular knowledge of both
underlings and superiors. A most ingenious "racket" was run by the Malawian
Induna.

When someone came to him with a plea to cancel his contract and be allowed to
go home, the Induna would maintain that this could be arranged providing that
the "airfare" of ten to twenty rands was paid to him. When this was paid
the Induna would take the man to see the Compound Manager, having given him
firm instructions to remain silent during the interview. The Induna would
then tell the Compound Manager in Fanagalo that the man refused to return to
work and recommend that he be charged and sent to jail. The manager would
refuse to do this (because the relevant Act had recently been scrapped) and would ask the Induna to explain to the man that it was impossible to repatriate him and that if he refused to work he would be returned to the recruiting agency to be allocated to another mine. Because many Malawians have difficulty in understanding Fanagalo, particularly if they are recent arrivals; and because of the manager's lack of any Malawian language, the Induna could translate this as a favourable reply to his request. The man would then be black-listed and could never return to the mine to enquire as to what had happened to his "airfare".

Eventually, one particularly vociferous victim managed to persuade the recruiting agency that he had been promised that he was going home; the matter was referred to the mine, and the Induna was exposed.

Management decided that the reason for the Induna's dishonesty was that he had been an acting Induna earning a lower salary for some months - the permanent Induna was in Malawi on leave when labour recruiting there was stopped following the air disaster in Botswana, and would not be returning in the foreseeable future. He was then given the permanent appointment at the higher salary. This offers an indication of the extent to which the mine authorities support Indunas.

Neither the roles of the "Tribal Reps" nor the Compound Manager are truly interhierarchical roles then, since their ability to act derives purely from the authority bestowed upon them by the company and they do not rely in any way on power deriving from consensus of their charges. Compliance or subservience is necessary however, and this is achieved by subjecting the worker to the demands of the total institution.
The Total Institution

The effective control of such large numbers of people by so few authority bearers would scarcely be possible were it not for the way in which the compound system operates as a total institution to facilitate the control of workers in their living quarters as well as at the workplace. Susceptibility to control is achieved through a process which Goffman calls the "curtailment of the self" (p.24).

He argues that isolation from the wider environment is the first stage of this process, since this prevents the man from maintaining the role he played preceding his incorporation into the institution, and also prevents him from creating new role opportunities other than those into which the institution wishes to force him.

In the compound, this is achieved through the migrant labour system, which not only ensures that the worker is employed at a place far from his home and thereby reduces his ability to maintain the role with which he enters the system, but also ensures a low level of sophistication about town life and a low standard of living and income which makes few townspeople willing to associate with him. (3)

The second stage involves an actual assault upon the self. In order to successfully absorb the newcomer, it is necessary to strip him of his individuality so that he becomes a uniform entity along with his fellow inmates, performing his tasks in a manner least likely to disturb the effective functioning of the institution. A large number of attributes relevant to him in

3. In a survey of friendship patterns, no respondent mentioned a friendship with any person in the area who was not also a mineworker, either on the same mine or on another mine in the vicinity.
his home environment may be irrelevant on the mine; indeed, some may be disruptive to its smooth functioning. His marital, parental, social status and age are of no concern to the company, except in the event of the worker's death, and apart from noting the facts, the mine authorities take no cognizance of them.

Administration is far simpler if one does not have to contend with African names which are often unwieldy and unpronounceable to the Western tongue, so that workers are numbered. His finger-prints and his number become the most important means of identifying a man, and in the vast majority of interactions with the authorities his name, his most distinctive personal characteristic, is never used.

To maintain uniformity obedience is necessary, so that a high degree of intervention by the authorities is practised. In some circumstances this may be to the advantage of the individual in protecting him from his fellows; but curtailment of a man's freedom is also an attack upon his personal identity because it restricts what he might become.

In order to control effectively it is necessary to limit privacy and so increase the potential for surveillance. Thus lavatories and shower rooms as well as the sleeping quarters serve only to ensure that the man may perform his bodily functions while being protected from the elements. Ablution blocks are large rooms with overhead showers where no privacy is possible. Likewise, lavatories consist of long rows of seats without divisions between them. Recently walls have been built along the rows so that the visibility of a man seated on the lavatory is limited to sidelong glances at his neighbours, where previously frontal views of those sitting on the opposite row of seats were possible. Even this attempt by the authorities to improve privacy was
appreciatively noted at a sibonda's meeting.

In the rooms the men must undress and sleep in view of their fellows, while lighting is continuous through the night. The invasion of physical privacy in this way is felt by the authorities to be necessary for the surveillance, and consequent control, of violence, sodomy and theft. The invasion of the privacy of a man's possessions in the form of searches is intended to discourage the harbouring of dagga, alcohol and dangerous weapons, as well as to uncover stolen property. The searches are justified by management by maintaining that they serve to protect men from their fellows and also from themselves, but the fact that the possession of some of these items would not constitute a serious offence, if any offence at all, in their home areas, means that freedom of the individual is reduced by the authorities. Personal possessions represent an extension of the self, and this is violated by the policeman rummaging through them.

The aim of the authorities is not simply to strip the new arrival of his identity however; it is intended that a conception of self which best serves the needs of the organization be substituted for it. In the case of the mining company the intention is to create a disciplined, subservient, and contented labour force.

The first two are achieved through the efforts of the authorities by means of surveillance and punishment of recalcitrance, while recreational activities such as drinking, sport, church going and dancing are provided for by the company in order to reduce boredom during leisure time.

When a man accepts the aims of the institution and operates according to the regulations it imposes, he has performed a "primary adjustment". As
Goffman notes, this requires accepting the institution's perception of oneself (p. 172).

Not everything necessary for the individual to create and maintain his identity is provided by the mine company, so that "secondary adjustments" are also required. These either provide what the company neglects to supply or they may work against the company's ends. They may thus be loosely divided into two types - those which are contained, and those which are disruptive (Goffman, p. 180). A contained secondary adjustment is one which does not obviously contradict what is required for the maintenance of the organization. Providing for one's financial needs by sewing or selling goods during leisure time is an example of this type of adjustment. Because the formal system is not threatened by them, the activities of entrepreneurs are condoned. Indeed cobbling and sewing are necessary in some respects for the smooth operation of the formal organization. One man who was selling cigarettes from his room was ordered to stop this however, when a cigarette machine was installed in the hostel. Likewise the selling of alcohol in competition with the bar is forbidden, and represents a disruptive secondary adjustment.

The unofficial organization and authority system of the compound room are perhaps the most significant of these secondary adjustments, and contain elements which both supplement and operate against the aims of the mining company. In general they serve to create roles other than those enforced by the authorities, and provide the inmate with the opportunity to exercise a measure of control over his situation.
Organization and Authority in the Rooms

The compound rooms serve primarily to house the company's labour units in batches of twenty, but often the workers have more in common than purely their status as workers of a particular ethnic category. Those who have such features in common as the same district of origin, similar religious convictions, interests in dancing or even tailoring, tend to congregate in a particular room. This tendency provides the opportunity to create identities greater than those afforded by the company, since other room members will give recognition to the status of people who are for example, church deacons or dance team members.

Apart from this attempt to provide alternative structures in which the individual may play a role, the room also creates an authority structure additional to that of the compound as a whole. The elected leader of the compound room is the sibonda. From the point of view of management he is useful for passing on messages to his room mates, and is expected to air their grievances at regular sibonda's meetings which are presided over by the Compound Manager. He is also expected to maintain order in the room and to report misdemeanours. The most important of these is "loafing" or being absent from work without authorised reasons and is a misdemeanor least likely to be reported by a sibonda.

He is elected by means of a secret ballot. Usually two candidates are chosen before voting begins, and the losing candidate automatically becomes second sibonda, who may perform his duties in the sibonda's absence and refer problems to him on his return. Room-mates expect these men to stop fights, control drunkenness, settle disputes and delegate the duties of fetching coal and beer rations for the room.
Definite ideas exist as to what constitute those desirable qualities which a sibonda should exhibit. These include adult status, physical strength, good manners, and experience as a compound resident. Before an election takes place a few weeks may elapse while room-mates observe one another and come to decide who is the most suitable man in the room.

I could discover only one case in which a sibonda was deposed. The sibonda of a particular room had the habit of playing his gramaphone late into the night, dismissing the pleas of his room-mates who complained at this disturbance of their hard-earned rest by saying that as he was sibonda he could do as he pleased. Eventually the second sibonda, with the support of the other men informed him that he had been expelled from the position. The man refused to accept the dismissal however, and after prolonged debate the matter was referred to the Induna who agreed that if the room members were not satisfied with the sibonda he should be deposed. Still not content with the decision the man appealed to the Compound Manager who ruled against him and also banned the playing of gramaphones and radios after 8 p.m.

The sibonda had claimed a broader base of legitimacy than was recognized by his electorate. Having gained authority through the power achieved from political competition, he later denied its source and claimed his allocated right to administer as deriving from the compound administration, to whom he appealed in the final instance. In exceeding the bounds of his authority, he lost both power and authority to the second sibonda who took over his role.

The referring of serious offences to the compound authorities is one of the duties expected of the sibonda by these authorities, but there is a reluctance on the part of the sibonda to do so. Even thefts of money and possessions are dealt with within the confines of the room and punishments of extra duties are meted out by the sibonda.
People occupying positions in the compound administration are not eligible as sibonda candidates. The reason offered by inmates for the unsuitability of policemen, cooks and clerks was that people in these jobs were always required "here and there" by the Compound Manager and others, and could therefore not perform the sibonda function adequately. The assertion by the residents that it is impossible to be in two places at once may reveal the fact that compound authorities who were also room authorities would be in a position of role conflict. They would have differing bases of support and might even be responsible for implementing rules in one situation which would be in conflict with those in the other.

The reason offered certainly becomes untenable on a closer examination of the facts. In the one exception which I discovered, the second sibonda concerned was a cook who worked twelve-hour shifts seven days a week. Secondly, night-shift workers do occupy the positions in some rooms, although they are away when the majority of the room members are in the compound. Thirdly, policemen and clerks are very rarely required when they are off duty. Fourthly, the group excluded are known to the ordinary workers as "staff"; that is they are categorized by the workers as being members of the compound administrative system, and all wield authority of one form or another.

While Indunas told me that the functions and status of sibondas differed little from their own except in terms of scale, certain essential differences are present. The sibonda is elected to his position by his equals, and his authority is based on the consensus necessary for his election. In order to maintain his position he must maintain the consensus which legitimizes it. In this way he is responsible, like the Induna, to those through whom he has secured his position. In the sibonda's case however, this is directed to those
of lesser authority, while the Induna has responsibility to his superiors. The sibonda is unpaid and the sugar which he receives as a "perk" is most often redistributed amongst his fellow room-mates. He has no rights to the use of force unless he refers a case to the Induna, but even this is not a specific right, since any compound resident may approach the Induna or even the Compound manager. If the sibonda plays any part in worker/management confrontation it will be on the side of the workers, despite the fact that he is viewed by the authorities as being integrated into the formal authority system.

The way in which he hears cases; by allowing all parties to be present in contrast to the Induna's practice of separating litigants and their witnesses, and his seeking of the advice of older room-members in deciding on cases and punishments point to the sibonda's "rule by consensus", and the way in which workers are able to exercise a measure of control over their affairs in the room.

As one sibonda told me, "The rules of the house (room) are to make every man free". Unlike compound rules which are often seen as being irksome and petty, the room rules claim to promote harmonious living together. Punishments for infringements emphasize this in that the fetching of supplies benefit all those who would normally be required to do these duties.

The exclusion of "staff" from positions of authority in the room, the failure to report absenteeism, and attempts to maintain conflict within the confines of the room may all be considered as evidence of the manner in which room members seek to separate their affairs from those of the formal compound organization and achieve control within this limited sphere.
The Chief Compound Manager was able to defuse the situation at a meeting with the dissatisfied men. Virtually no Nguni were present at this meeting. It is significant that the spokesmen of the strikers, and the men who were said to be responsible for first mooting the idea were the sibonda and second sibonda of a particular room.

The room organization, which I have suggested is the most significant example of reaction to the authoritarianism of the total institution, is geared to serve the needs of the man as an inmate and not as a worker. Those who occupy supervisory positions at work are not excluded from positions of authority in the room in contrast with the practice as regards compound authorities. Similarly, the allocation of the preferred lower bunks is made without reference to the position occupied by a man in the work situation.

Team leaders and "boss boys" have the same duties in the room as have any other inmate, while sibondas have no special rights beyond the room arena.

The lack of transference of work relationships to the room situation is also evident in the friendship patterns investigated, where it was found that a mere 7% of friends had met in the work place. Thirty-four percent had met for the first time in the compound room, while 38% were friends at home. Only three friendships were interethnic.

While ethnic divisions may serve the purposes of the authorities through the principle of "divide and rule", they are a double-edged sword, since heightened ethnic awareness manifests itself in sporadic outbursts of inter-ethnic violence which do not serve the interests of the mining company. However they do not serve the interests of consolidating worker action either, since they may increase suspicion of attempts to unify workers across ethnic boundaries.
As it existed on the mine studied, the room organization did not provide an important base for worker action, but with the recent efforts by a particular mining company to house workers according to their membership of work sections or gangs, the ability to organize in the living situation for the bargaining of better employment conditions may be increased to a significant degree.
TABLE 1: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF 'TRIBAL REPRESENTATIVES'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>INDUNAS</th>
<th>POLICEMEN&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSWANA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWIAN</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST COAST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOTHO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PONDO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Additional policemen, responsible to the licencee maintain order at the beer garden and are not included here.

<sup>2</sup> Includes one working only night shift.

TABLE 2: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF HOSTEL RESIDENTS
AS AT JUNE 13, 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>LABOURERS</th>
<th>STAFF&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGUNI</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOTHO</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST COASTERS&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWIAN</td>
<td>1422</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2394</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Includes cleaners, cooks, policemen, barmen, clerks.

<sup>2</sup> Being workers recruited in Mocambique.
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A.C. Cilliers' reaction to the 'Economie Volkskongres, Hertzogian' 
W. A. Hendersen, (Stellenbosch, 1941).

rehabilitation, some Nationalist historians have claimed he withdrew his 
allegations against the Bond. W. G. D. Scholtz on the A.B., Die Transvaler 
25/10/72.

54. A.B. elements in fact pressurised Malan to form a new Party in the 
spirit of the Fees, Moodie op. cit. 186-9.

55. C.B. membership claimed by Dr. E. van den Berg, House of Assembly Debates, 1940- 
Column 2195. On the HNP/V - O.3. division see Boberts & Trollip op. cit. 
and Moodie op. cit.

rehabilitation, some Nationalist historians have claimed he withdrew his 
allegations against the Bond.

57. G. D. Scholtz on the A.B., Die Transvaler 25/10/72.

58. C.M.O. Beleid by the P.A.K.'s Instituut vir Christelik-Kasionale Onder- 
ya, (Johannesburg 1948); Interview with Dr. P. J. Meyer 10/6/75; A.B. 
resignations, The Star 21/1/45.

59. On the significance of the choice of the Fine workers' Union, see 
D. C. Seera, "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner National's 

60. Prof. E. J. du Plessis's dissatisfaction is noted by L. Naude, 
Dr. Albert Hertzog, Die Nationalist Party en die Lynkers, (Pretoes 1969), 
pg. 161. In 1944 the A.B. withdrew its subsidy for the A.B.

61. J. Seera, "The 1946 African mine workers' strike and the political 
economy of South Africa" Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 


63. For a description of this incident, Ibid 109-114.

64. Vol II, no. 1. August 1944.

65. This had apparently always been envisaged "though not announced at the 
time". The cooperative form was initially adopted "to gain the cooperation 
of the Afrikaner masses", and the board was very sensitive to the charge of 
having misled the public. Volkshandel, VIII, 4, June 1947. For the Bond's 
acknowledgment of paternity, see Die Transvaler 30/12/1944.

66. Quoted E. J. du Plessis op. cit. pg 114.

67. See W. J. Bezuitenhout, Dr. Minie Louw: 'n Kykie in die Economie Ge- 
skiedenis van die Afrikaner (Johannesburg 1960) pg. 63-4.

68. See E. J. du Plessis op. cit; Chapter VII.

69. Insun, V, 4, January 1946.

70. Handelingsinstituut survey, Volkshandel, VI, 7, Sept. 1950. On the effect 
on declining retail profit rates see W. J. Potgieter, Die Ekonomie van die 
Afrikaner on sy Landgoed in die Sakeleer, unpublished M. Comm. Potchefstroom 
University 1954, pp 28-44.

1950, and Insun, Vol J, Nos. II & 12, August Sept 1950 and Vol K, No. 1, 
October 1950.

72. See D. W. Schoeman, Vorster se 1000 dae Op. cit. and J. PH. Serfontein, 
op. cit.