Title: The Road to Sharpeville.

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INTRODUCTION

The Sharpeville shootings are a landmark of the South African past. People with only a fleeting knowledge of South African history are aware of the events of 21 March 1960 and Sharpeville Day is annually commemorated by opponents of apartheid all over the world. Nevertheless, there is remarkably little awareness of the local history of Vereeniging that led up to the shootings. This history makes fascinating reading. For one of its distinguishing characteristics was the success of the Vereeniging Town Council’s administration of its two African townships, Sharpeville and Top Location. Throughout the 1950s Sharpeville was recognised across the country as the model African township, and the Council was able to censor almost all local African political activity (1). In the light of this it was particularly anomalous that the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1960 should have been prompted by events in Sharpeville. However, most accounts of the Sharpeville shootings have not even noticed this anomaly, let alone offered any explanation for it (2). Rather, they look at the background to the shootings only in terms of the PAC’s national campaign against the passes. It is a central premise of this paper that such an approach to the problem of explaining the Sharpeville shootings is inadequate. For it begs the question of why it was in Sharpeville as opposed to anywhere else in the Union that the PAC’s campaign received its strongest response, a question that can only be answered by examining the local history that led up to the shootings.

It is to this history, then, that I address myself in the following paper. The paper’s first two sections describe the social and economic development of Vereeniging up to the 1950s and the administration of its African townships. I then examine tensions around police raids and rising rents that built up in Vereeniging’s townships over the 1950s, and relate these to processes described in the first two sections. Finally I look at the Council’s removal of Top Location residents to Sharpeville in 1958/59, and show how the PAC was able to capitalise on the residents’ grievances relating to the removal and to the issues of raids and rent (3).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN VEREENIGING

The development of heavy industry in Vereeniging started in 1911 when Sammy Marks founded the Union Steel Corporation to recycle scrap metal. Two years later the steelworks were completed and the first steel melted in South Africa was rolled into a bar on November 15th 1913. The First World War boosted USCO’s operations by protecting it from foreign competition and providing it with a vastly expanded market for its products in the form of the munitions industry (4). In the years that followed, the presence of USCO served to ensure the development of Vereeniging into one of the largest centres of South Africa’s metal industry. In 1927 Stewarts and Lloyds followed USCO to Vereeniging and set up the
first South African tubemaking plant there (5). During the '30s and '40s numerous smaller metal industries were established in Vereeniging to take advantage of local steel and tubing supplies. Many of these infant industries were helped onto their feet by the offer of USCO to provide compound accommodation for their workers (6). The Second World War triggered off a renewed boom in Vereeniging's metal production as the South African government geared itself to the requirements of military production and large-scale import substitution by designating the Vaal area as the country's heavy metal industrial growth point (7).

Initially, the establishment of ISCOR works at Vanderbijlpark in this regard in 1944 had threatened the survival of USCO, and with it, Vereeniging's share of future Vaal industrial development. USCO could not hope to compete with a state subsidised corporation on the scale of ISCOR, but some skillful lobbying on the part of the Vereeniging Town Council ensured that it would not have to. An agreement was reached with the central government to rationalise Vaal steel production. ISCOR would gain a controlling interest in USCO and USCO would be assigned the role of producing certain steels (8). Thus USCO's future was guaranteed and Vereeniging continued to expand through the forties and fifties. By 1959 the Mayor was able to talk of his town as "the premier industrial centre of the Union" (9).

Vereeniging's rapid post-war industrial development was premised on its established record as an industrial centre. Whereas other municipalities had to prove to industrialists that they were capable of providing adequate infrastructural facilities before they could sell their industrial erven, Vereeniging could point to its successful history of providing for manufacturers that included USCO and Stewarts and Lloyd. To capitalists looking for a location for a factory this history was worth a great deal. Thus the Vereeniging Town Council was able to sell heavy industrial erven in its Duncanville township which was developed in the early 50s, at as much as $700/acre (10), while in Springs, the local Council could only find buyers for similar erven at $100/acre (11).

The proven facilities that Vereeniging could offer in the early '50s were wide-ranging. They included, most obviously, abundant supplies of water from the Vaal Dam and cheap coal from surrounding collieries. From 1945 Vereeniging could draw electricity from the Klip and Vaal Power Stations with respective outputs of 424MW and 330MW (12). These power supplies were strained in the early fifties as the town expanded even more quickly than anticipated (13) but the construction of Taaibos and Highveld Power stations in 1954 and 1959 respectively added an extra 960MW of output that forestalled any serious power shortages (14). Vereeniging was on the main rail line south from the Rand to the Natal coast, and boasted impressive marshalling yards that were built by the Council in 1952 (15). The Council had also built a rail link to Duncanville and sidings on all the heavy industrial stands within the township (16). This was a
particularly important service for manufacturers as the South African Railways did not have road transport facilities to bring plant and machinery from the Vereeniging station to factory sites (17).

In addition to providing infrastructural facilities that compared favourably with any in the Union, the Vereeniging Town Council showed themselves to be remarkably flexible in dealing with local industrialists. They were content to leave the larger employers to run their compounds with as little municipal interference as possible. Compound inspections were infrequent and were always preceded by a minimum of seven days' notice (18). As we shall see later, they repeatedly turned a blind eye to influx control violations committed by employers and their workers and were generally quick to retract any measures that led to protests from local industry as was the case when they attempted to introduce pollution regulations along the lines of those of the Johannesburg City Council (19).

Good council/industry relations that this sort of flexibility produced were cemented by a number of joint lobbying projects. The first of these was the successful campaign to ensure the survival of USCD when ISCQR came to Vanderbijlpark. Close cooperation between representatives of the Council and local industry was also instrumental in influencing the government to site SASOL 1 opposite Vereeniging in Sasolburg and another ISCOR plant in Meyerton, some seven miles north of the municipal boundary (20). Another display of joint Council/industry mobilisation came in the publicity campaign to sell industrial stands in Duncanville. Advertisements were taken out in all major newspapers in the Union as well as in the Times and Guardian in England (21) and arising out of the campaign, a Vereeniging Publicity Committee was formally established with representatives from the Council, the Vereeniging Chamber of Commerce, the Vereeniging and District Chamber of Industries and the Vereeniging Afrikaanse Sakekamer (22).

The Publicity Committee's Duncanville campaign was highly successful. Duncanville was bought by the Council for $250 000 in 1950 (23) and the sale of stands started almost immediately. By the end of the year sales were proceeding ahead of schedule and the Council was particularly pleased to note that prominent British multi-nationals, Babcock and Wilcox Engineering and Raleigh Cycles had chosen Duncanville as the site from which to commence their South African operations (24). But Council plans for the development of Duncanville soon ran into problems. Bureaucratic delays in the offices of the Administrator of the Transvaal and the Surveyor General (25) meant that the proclamation of Duncanville as an industrial township was delayed until mid-1952. Prior to the proclamation industrial production in Duncanville was not permissible and the years 1950-52 witnessed a stream of angry letters to the Council from Raleigh,
Babcock and Wilcox and other companies who had been attracted to Duncanville by the advertising drive, demanding to know when they would be able to start production (26).

the Council's Duncanville problems did not end in 1952. For barely three years after the proclamation, demand for industrial stands had outstripped Duncanville's capacity (27) and Council attempts to have an extension to the township proclaimed were running into more bureaucratic obstacles. The natural development of Duncanville was onto land that was currently occupied by the municipal African township, Top Location or Topville. When Duncanville was being planned in the late '40s, this had not seemed a problem because Topville was in the process of being demolished. Residents were steadily being removed to Sharpeville, some two miles out of town and the removals were projected to be complete by the early '50s (28). By April 1951, however, the removals had, for practical purposes, stopped. There were still over 9000 residents living in Topville (29), but the Council was unable to remove them because it had no approved housing schemes into which they might be transferred. This remained true for the next seven years, and development in Duncanville ground to a halt.

The sequence over these seven years of unsuccessful Council attempts to arrange housing that would provide for the demolition of Topville reads like a bureaucratic nightmare. A plan for a proposed Sharpeville Extension 1 was submitted by the Council to the Native Affairs Department in April 1951 (30). Two years later it was returned to the Council so that it could be amended to meet new Native Affairs Department requirements that all African townships should be separated from European residential areas and national roads by a 500 yard buffer zone of unused land (31). The necessary amendments were duly made, but the plan could still not be approved because in the interim the Mentz Commission had been appointed to plan all African housing in the PWV area (32). When the Mentz Commission finally endorsed the plans in October 1955, Sharpeville Extension 1 could be proclaimed, but finance still had to be arranged for housing in the new township. So, November saw the submission of housing plans for Sharpeville Extension 1 to the Native Housing Office, where they were promptly rejected for failing to comply with certain technical requirements as laid down in the Native Housing Commission's Green Book (33). Revised plans that followed the requirements of the Green Book to the letter were resubmitted to the Native Housing Office but by the time they reached this office in March 1956 it had experienced a change of staff, and the new officials had new objections to the plans (34). In desperation, the Council sent a delegation in March 1957 to see the Minister of Native Affairs about arranging funds for housing in Sharpeville Extension 1. This finally had the desired effect. Verwoerd gave the latest plans his approval (35), and after another year's delay for them to be rubber stamped by the relevant authorities, the Council was at long last able to complete the removals from Topville.
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The delay in the construction of Sharpeville Extension 1 was to have crucial effects on the events in Sharpeville that led up to 21st March 1960, but these are discussed later in the paper. Here, I will only focus on the tensions it gave rise to in Council/employer relations.

African housing had always been the greatest issue of contention between the Council and local industry. Initially, the Council had refused to consider itself responsible for providing accommodation for the local black workforce. It was unwilling to invest municipal funds in African housing which, it maintained, should be the concern of employers. The large-scale nature of production in Vereeniging meant that many companies could afford this expense (36) while for some of those who could not, USCO was prepared to make available sections of its own compound (37). By the early 1940s, however, companies were beginning to run out of compound space, as their labour forces increased in the war induced boom. The lack of accommodation began to be a limiting factor on the expansion of production and the Council came under pressure from local industrialists to provide more African housing.

The construction of Sharpeville temporarily resolved the problem, but it resurfaced soon after the township's accommodation capacity was reached early in 1951. Somewhat ineptly, the Council chose this time to impose a licensing fee on compound accommodation. The licensing fee elicited an unequivocally hostile response from all local compounded industries and the Secretary of the Association of Industrial Managers wrote an acerbic letter to the Town Clerk:

A fair figure of the number of native workers housed in industrial compounds is 8,000. Your Council will appreciate that it is definitely in the Council’s interests that the members are prepared to arrange their own native accommodation, and any suggestion that this number should be housed under schemes controlled and financed by the Council would cause embarrassment. It is suggested that the Council should regard the number so housed as accommodated by the employer companies at the Council’s tacit request and, therefore, not subject to the licence under discussion (38).

There was not much in this letter that the Council could dispute and it gladly took advantage of the advent of the Native Services Levy the following year to abandon the licensing fee (39).

This eased much of the tension in relations between the Council and the compounded industries but the seven-year delay in the construction of Sharpeville Extension 1 would place new strains on these relations. For the bureaucratically imposed moratorium on new housing schemes was accompanied by a Native Affairs Department drive to remove all industrial compounds from white
residential areas. Thus the Council received strict orders from the Native Affairs Department not to allow any extensions to existing compounds at a time when it was unable to offer employers any Sharpeville accommodation for their workers (40). On various occasions during the fifties the Council tried to point out to the Native Affairs Department that departmental intransigency on the issue of compounds was placing municipal authorities in a compromising situation, but the Department showed a remarkable insensitivity to their position. Thus the Council was forced to tell USCO in 1953 (41), Houtkop Brickworks in 1954 (42) and Vereeniging Brick and Tile Company in 1956 (43) that the Native Affairs Department was not prepared to authorise their applications to extend their compounds.

After the application of Houtkop Brickworks had been rejected the Council offered to build houses in Sharpeville Extension 1 for workers currently accommodated in compounds, if employers would pay for the housing, but no employers volunteered (44). By 1956, however, conditions in the USCO compound had deteriorated to such an extent that USCO approached the Council once again with a request to find space in Sharpeville for the company’s married quarters (45). The Council offered to let USCO build houses in Sharpeville Extension 1 which would be paid for by the Council as soon as loans from the Native Housing Commission came through, but USCO could not afford this option as in 1956 they were engaged in a heavy capital development programme (46). With the Council’s consent they tried to raise a loan from ISCOR to cover the costs of the housing (47), but when this was not forthcoming all that the Council could offer USCO and the other compounded industries was first choice on whatever houses remained in Sharpeville Extension 1 after the residents of Topville had been transferred to the township (48). This turned out to be of no use whatsoever, because the houses in Sharpeville Extension 1 were not even able to accommodate all the residents removed from Topville, let alone any of the compounded workers, and the problem of overcrowding in the compounds persisted well into the sixties.

The Native Affairs Department’s intransigence over compounds was not simply the product of an urge for racial segregation, it was part of a broader policy of attempting to reallocate labour in the South African economy (49). In the early fifties, at least, the Department was trying to stop the flow of migrant labour into the urban areas and to restrict urban employment to workers with permanent urban rights. Thus the Department could rationalise its refusal to allow compound extensions even when no alternative accommodation was available by arguing that Vereeniging companies should be using labour drawn from the unemployed residents of Sharpeville and channelled through the Vereeniging labour bureau (50). This policy was motivated by the need to provide township residents with jobs so that they could pay for the administration of the new townships of the fifties and so that unemployment and associated problems of social control could be kept to a minimum (51). But township administration and social control were not the
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immediate concerns of industrialists, many of whom had powerful material reasons for preferring to employ migrant labourers over township residents. The Native Affairs Department anti-migrant policy thus encountered strong resistance from employers on the PWV. They refused to allow their workforces to be regulated by the labour bureaux and privately continued to recruit migrant labourers in defiance of influx control laws (52).

Right across the PWV, municipal authorities found themselves caught between the Native Affairs Department that was insisting on tighter influx control and the expansion of labour bureaux authority over the allocation of labour, and employers who demanded the right to employ migrants if they so desired (53). This conflict was particularly acute in Vereeniging, because the relative size of the local migrant population was much larger than in most other PWV municipalities. The Manager of Non-European Affairs reported in 1953 that out a total male workforce of 19,442 in Vereeniging, four manufacturing industries that depended almost exclusively on migrant labour from Basotholand and the Orange Free State Reserves employed 11,016 men (54); Tom Lodge cites figures from the 1960 census which indicate that the Vereeniging migrant population was as high as 15,000 (55).

This predominance of migrants in the Vereeniging workforce, was partly a result of the unwillingness of local residents to work under the unpleasant and dangerous conditions of local heavy industry:

USCO had a boer mentality. The white supervisors didn't care about safety... The Basothos could get adjusted to it because they had mouths to feed back home but we youth would look for a work with a bright future (56).

The local registering officer complained to the Top Location Advisory Board in 1956 that "the board should educate the people to realise the value of manual labour". The board tried to comply with this request, but it clearly did not meet with a very receptive audience. A resident recalled: "The work was too heavy and the pay was too low... I could not stand being degraded in this way" (57). Moreover, local industrialists had a preference for employing migrants. Migrants were able to cultivate an image of being more reliable and physically stronger than urban Africans (58) and employers built up longstanding relationships with groups of migrants from a particular district so that they could recruit people who were recommended to them by workers whom they trusted (59).

The "circle of labour", as this recruitment practise was referred to by employers, provided the most common route taken by migrants coming into Vereeniging. There were, however, other ways for people to get into the municipal area. The farms in the surrounding district provided a convenient staging post between countryside and town. Labour hungry white farmers were more than
willing to employ a migrant for a few months until he managed to arrange a better job and/or accommodation in Vereeniging (60). The farms were also used as a staging post for whole families that migrated. It was common practice for farmers to charge families a rent in cash and in the labour of women and children while the household head worked in Vereeniging (61).

Once within easy access of Vereeniging, migrants could look for work at factory gates, or ask workers from their home district to keep an eye out for any vacancies (62). It was even possible to obtain documentation that made their search for work "legal". Permanent residents regularly sold work-seeking passports while contract labourers who did not intend returning to their jobs would often send fellow countrymen in their place with their papers (63), and advisory board members in the Top Location could be bribed to arrange lodgers permits and passes (64). In any event, the need for documentation was, at least until the late 1950s, not that pressing. Migrants without papers could present themselves at the Vereeniging labour bureau which was run by the Council and would often be placed in jobs in the metal industries. If the labour bureau had no record of available jobs it would refer "illegal" migrants to the district labour bureau to be allocated to farmers. However, as the bureau took no steps to ensure that they duly presented themselves at the district labour bureau, migrants could happily ignore the directive (65). The failure of most "illegal" migrants to reach the district labour bureau was the subject of a heated dispute between the Council and the Native Commissioner. The Commissioner made repeated requests to the Council to provide municipal police and transport to ensure the arrival of all migrants referred to the district labour bureau, but the Council refused to cooperate (66). It was not prepared to run the risk of alienating local industrialists by denying them a readily available pool of migrant labour.

The Council still had to address the issue of local unemployment. This it attempted to do with a variety of piece-meal measures. It approached new companies setting up in the area individually to request that they employ local people, and was able to record a number of successes in this regard. These included the most notable case of Raleigh Cycles who declared in 1951 that their Duncanville factory would be worked exclusively by Vereeniging residents (67). The Council also took measures to make the employment of local youths more attractive to industrialists. It offered to establish a pre-employment school so that "the juveniles who were at present roaming the streets, could be trained in the various branches of the industries, and by inculcating upon them a sense of responsibility they might become useful operatives" (68) and arranged a special dispensation from the Department of Labour for the paying of sub-minimum wages to local youths (69).
But neither of these offers met with a positive response from industry (70) and as youth unemployment increased steadily over the decade, the Council started to reassess the stance it had taken between the Native Affairs Department and local employers. The rise in unemployment had seen a proliferation in the operations of youth gangs (71), and when this threat to the Council's control over the townships was greatly aggravated in 1957 by an increased Russians' presence in Vereeniging (72), the Council started to clamp down on influx control. The tightening up of influx control in Vereeniging took place at the same time as the Top Location population was finally removed to Sharpeville. These simultaneous processes were to provide a crucial background to the Sharpeville shootings. I will return to examine their effects, when I look at the background to the shootings in some detail in later sections of this paper. Prior to doing so, however, it is necessary to describe the conditions that prevailed in Vereeniging's townships in the fifties, and the Town Council's system of administration of these townships.

THE TOWN COUNCIL AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHARPEVILLE AND TOP LOCATION.

The African population of Vereeniging in the '50s was housed in the two starkly contrasting townships of Sharpeville and Top Location. Sharpeville was a tightly controlled township some four kilometers outside Vereeniging. It was recognised by parliament as the best administered township in the Union (73) and was to become the prototype for all the planned townships that were built in the 1950s.

Top Location, on the other hand, was an unregulated inner-city township that had sprung up more-or-less against the will of the Vereeniging Town Council in the 1920s and '30s. the Council's rather short-sighted policy during the inter-war years of refusing to take responsibility for providing accommodation for Vereeniging's African residents meant that, by 1939, it had built only 42 houses in Topville (74). As was shown in the previous chapter, some companies could afford to house their labour force - in 1937, 3898 out of an estimated 9638 workers in the Vereeniging area lived in industrial compounds (75) - but this still left 60% of the urban workforce without accommodation provided by industry or the local state. The result was a proliferation of shacks in Top Location, and as the township expanded at roughly the same rate as the development of industry in Vereeniging - from 299 stands in 1923 to 419 in 1927, 621 in 1931 and 807 in 1937 (76) - it grew into an unregulated shantytown.

It was primarily in an effort to increase its control over the township population that the Council decided in 1941 to build Sharpeville and to demolish Top Location. The need for greater control had been thrown into relief by unrest in Topville in 1937 which had left two white policemen dead, but there were other
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factors motivating the decision to remove the township. These included the belated acceptance on the part of the Council of industry's demands for decent municipal housing for the African population of Vereeniging and the genuine concern of both industry and the Council about sanitary conditions in Top Location (77). The latter were indeed alarming. In two months in 1946 out of a population of 15,000 there were 150 deaths of pneumonia, 85 of gastro-enteritis and 24 of Tuberculosis (78). Removals from Top Location started in 1943 and continued steadily until 1951 when Council attempts to build alternative accommodation for the remaining residents of Topville ran into the bureaucratic obstacles described in the previous section. Thus a Top Location that had been reduced to 426 stands (79) survived through most of the '50s.

The population of Topville had always been riven by tensions between landlords and tenants and this continued to be the case through the '50s. The source of these tensions can be traced to the Council's original housing policy, for the housing shortage that it produced allowed for widespread rack-renting. On the 426 stands in Topville in 1951 there lived 1,588 lodging families who paid rent to a standholder (80). Shack rents were usually 15/- per stand and each stand accommodated on average 21 people (81). Standholders were able to make as much as $21 in rent each month and were understandably reluctant to be removed to Sharpeville where this source of income would no longer be available to them.

But a preference for living in Top Location was not limited to landlords. Top Location's municipal facilities included a communal hall, a beerhall, a clinic, a Tuberculosis hospital, football grounds and tennis courts (82). These were not on the same scale as Sharpeville's, but they nevertheless compared favourably with those of other contemporary townships and their shortcomings relative to what was on offer at Sharpeville were definitely not seen as sufficient reason to move. For Top Location held many attractions over Sharpeville. It was not as impersonal as Sharpeville; it was smaller and more neighbourly. A member of the Sharpetowne Swingsters, a jazz band that came from Topville, captured this in explaining how the band got together: "we knew each other because Top Location was not as big as all the townships today... most of the families knew each other" (83).

The greatest advantage of Topville to its inhabitants, however, was that, compared to Sharpeville, it was practically free of municipal control. The slumyards of Old Location could not be patrolled as effectively as the neat rows of houses in Sharpeville, and they provided shelter for gangs of unemployed youths and for prostitutes and beer brewers who serviced the nearby industrial compounds. Sporadic police raids served to disrupt the activities of the Topville lumpenproletariat, but they never seriously threatened its continued existence. Indeed a substantial part of the Topville population managed to escape the
attention of the municipal authorities altogether. In 1950 the Manager of Non-European Affairs reported that he had encountered a man who had been living in Topville for 37 years without a lodger's permit (84) while the final removal of Topville revealed the existence of hundreds of other people with similar histories (85).

Beyond this, life in Top Location was considerably cheaper than in Sharpeville. Rack-renting in Top Location might have been resented, but many people preferred to pay 15/- per month for a one-roomed shack in Topville than at first 27/- (86) and later as much as $3.0.0 for a four-roomed house in Sharpeville (87). Top Location was within easy walking distance of most parts of Vereeniging, including all industrial areas. Thus its residents had no transport expenses and did not have to deal with the unsatisfactory bus service from Sharpeville to town (88).

Understandably, then, there was considerably resistance to the removals. This resistance was initially sporadic - partly because it was at first possible to avoid removal by moving to a stand that was not scheduled for demolition. However, as the pace of removals quickened towards the beginning of 1950 and the scope for escaping removal narrowed, resistance increased. It reached a peak in August 1950 when ten standholders and their tenants, led by the popular Advisory Board member, Moses Sheshe, refused to be removed (89). The resisters were ultimately ejected from Topville, but only after Sheshe had taken the Council to the Appelate Division. Sheshe himself refused to go to Sharpeville and moved to Evaton when the Council finally demolished his home in Topville (90).

Those residents that did go to Sharpeville found themselves living in what was regarded by the Vereeniging municipality and by the Native Affairs Department as a model township. From the point of view of both facilities and control, Sharpeville was a native administrator's dream. Sharpeville had six schools, nine churches, two communal halls, a chiefs' resthouse, a beerhall, a library and a creche (91). Its municipal sporting facilities included a cycle track, five football fields, four tennis courts, a boxing gymnasium and a stadium with seating for approximately 10 000 people (92). Its streets were lit and lined with over a thousand fruit trees (93). It also boasted the best banking facilities of any African township in the country with branches of both the Standard Bank and the United Building Society (94).

These facilities can be explained partly in terms of the Council's eagerness to maintain Sharpeville's status as the best township in the country. This was a source of great pride to the Council and there are constant references to it in the minutes of Council meetings (95). But the facilities were also part of a more sophisticated approach to administration. The motivation provided by the Manager of Non-European Affairs for the construction of Sharpeville's two communal halls illustrates this.
If better recreational facilities could be provided for the residents, they will have something to keep themselves beneficially occupied and many complaints will disappear and less offences will be committed (96).

In keeping with this approach, the Council showed more sensitivity to local needs and grievances than most other municipalities. It annually made available free beer and the use of its stadium for Moshoeshoe Day celebrations which were organised by residents of Sharpeville (97). It regularly donated blankets to the township’s indigent in winter (98) and when coal supplies to Sharpeville ran low it held a meeting with representatives of Amalgamated Collieries of South Africa to arrange for the adequate provision of coal in the township (99).

Housing in Sharpeville had much in common with other facilities in the township. Before work on the first Sharpeville housing scheme began in 1943 the Council had, as we have seen, built hardly any houses for the African population of Vereeniging. When Sharpeville was completed in 1951, however, Council officials were able to boast that they led the Union in terms of both the cheapness of their African housing and the number of houses they provided relative to the local African population (100). Sharpeville’s housing was also qualitatively better any municipal African housing that had preceded it. The Vereeniging municipality was exceptional in the way it paid at least some attention to local needs when providing housing. On the strength of a population survey that revealed a large number of families with less than two children it decided to build one bedroomed houses that could be let at a reduced rental in addition to the standard two bedroomed houses (101) and as early as 1950 it had provided electrical extensions to some part of Sharpeville in response to requests from residents (102).

The Council were clearly sensitive to the link between housing and social control. This sensitivity underpinned the project of removing Top Location residents to Sharpeville and was occasionally articulated in this regard (103). Its most explicit formulation, however, came from the Vereeniging Convenor for Housing of the National Council of Women, Mrs A Smuts-Muller, a women whose views on housing were shaped in close consultation with officials of the Council:

Providing housing for non-Europeans is one of our very urgent problems, and it is not absurd to say that the menace of Communism and the Mau Mau movement which has brought Kenya to the brink of ruin can be stemmed here by regarding housing as absolutely essential (104).

But just in case the odd Communist or stray forest fighter was unmoved by the Sharpeville housing scheme, the Vereeniging Town Council also took care to keep tight control over all political activity in Sharpeville. It rigidly enforced the NAD regulations
banning political groups from the townships and prohibiting meetings of more than ten people from being held there (105). In 1956 it withdrew the Advisory Boards of Sharpeville and Top Location from the South African Location Advisory Boards Congress because the latter body had become "too political" (106) and it generally attempted to censor all political life within the townships. An indication of the extremes to which the Council was prepared to go was that it would only allow Lever Brothers to give cooking and washing demonstrations of new products in Sharpeville on condition that the "company produce proof to the satisfaction of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department that its employees do not belong to any undesirable organisation" (107).

The Council was also quick to pre-empt any potential political unrest. It responded to the May Day stayaway call of 1950 by calling a joint session of both Advisory Boards at which the District Commissioner of Police made it clear that any attempt at a stayaway would be met by police violence. A message from the Paramount Chief of Basutoland calling on people to go to work was broadcast in the days leading up to May 1 and all meetings in the townships were banned. On May Day a strong contingent of police patrolled both townships and the stayaway was wholly unsuccessful (108). The June 26 stayaway later that year was dealt with in a similar fashion and with identical results (109). Indeed, the Council were effectively able to insulate the Vereeniging townships from the political turmoil that many other parts of the country experienced in the '50s. Attempted recruitment for the Defiance Campaign in Sharpeville was a total failure and all the Freedom Volunteers that were arrested in Vereeniging came from outside the district (110). There was no response whatsoever to the Anti-Bantu Education Campaign and in 1958 the Assistant native Commissioner observed of Vereeniging that "there were no outbreaks of violence, boycotting or riots and when women in most PWV towns were demonstrating against the issue of reference books to women, Vereeniging was quiet and peaceful" (111).

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Fig. 1 Sources of Council Revenue (112)
The considerable achievements of Vereeniging's Non-European Affairs Department must be seen within the context of the success of the municipal beerhalls in Sharpeville and Top Location, for it was this success that made effective administration of the townships financially viable (see Fig. 1). The Top Location beerhall was built in the late 1930s but its first few years were relatively inauspicious. In 1939 it was boycotted in a campaign organised by women brewers and it ran at a $1329 loss. In 1942 it was still losing $842 over the year and the Council seriously considered closing it down before deciding that its losses was worth underwriting in order to hamper the activities of illegal brewers (113). The Sharpeville beerhall was initially built with similarly unambitious hopes in mind, but over the '40s the fortunes of the beerhalls improved and by the end of the decade they were running at a modest combined annual profit of $4272 (114).

Then, in 1950, three members of the Non-European Affairs Department discovered a new recipe for brewing beer that produced dramatic results. The new recipe was cheaper than its predecessor and much more popular. It was introduced to the beerhalls in March 1950 and beer profits shot up from $1870 over the period October 1949 to February 1950 to $4420 over the next four months (116). In the following years beer sales and profits continued to rise dramatically (see fig 2). Construction on a new brewery in Sharpeville to meet the expanded demand for beer began in June 1950 (117). The most up-to-date malting equipment available was bought for the brewery (118) and new Council posts were created to take on a maltster and a second brewer (119). By 1953 the Sharpeville brewery was being operated on round-the-clock shifts and was producing more than any municipal brewery in the Union other than those of Durban and Johannesburg (120). Output continued to expand until in 1959 it exceeded 2 million gallons per year for the first time ever. By this stage the Council was retailing beer at eight off-sales depots and two beerhalls and was about to start supplying beer to the industrial compounds.
The Road to Sharpeville

(121). The Council became acknowledged as the leaders in the field of municipal beer production. It was asked to supply beer to the Vanderbijlpark Health Committee and to the Kroonstad Municipality (122) while the advice of the Manager of Non-European Affairs on beer was sought by the municipalities of Randfontein, Westonaria and Bethlehem and the Manager was invited to deliver a paper on beer production to a conference organised by the CSIR (123).

Expanded beer sales provided the Council with a crucial source of revenue. Section 19 of the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 eased the restrictions on the use of beer profits (124) and the Council took advantage of this to balance its African housing budget with $16 138 appropriated from the beer account (125). Soaring beer profits enabled the Council to show a surplus on its Native Revenue Account for the first time ever in 1954/55 (126) and also financed the development of Sharpeville Extension 1. The Chairman of the Finance and General Purposes Committee reflected on the importance of beer revenue for African housing in his introduction to the annual estimates in 1959: "There is no doubt that beer profits have saved the situation insofar as Native sub-economic Housing is concerned" (127).

So by the late 1950s the Council seemed to have good reason to feel satisfied with its Non-European Affairs Department. Sharpeville was acknowledged as the best equipped and best administered township in the country. Its beerhall continued to record impressive profits and its population had proved itself to be remarkably docile in a period where much of South Africa had witnessed a dramatic upsurge in African political activity. Top Location continued to provide a source of uneasiness but its removal seemed ultimately to be in sight.

The fifties had not been completely trouble-free – a number of potentially explosive situations had developed but none of them turned out to be unmanageable. Over a thousand people had attended a protest meeting in 1951 against proposed stock regulations which prohibited the keeping of cattle in the townships (128) but when the Council had introduced the regulations some three months later, it encountered no resistance whatsoever (129). Complaints about police raids were made repeatedly but the Council had grown to expect a certain degree of residents' hostility to the police and the advisory boards' warning "that these raids would be the cause of large-scale trouble eventually" (130) seemed a little exaggerated. The Council had matters firmly under their control and "large-scale trouble" appeared most unlikely. The atmosphere of the time was recalled by a resident of Sharpeville:

There was nothing. Sharpeville, it was quiet all along... Sharpeville used to be quiet all along – there were no problems in Sharpeville – that is why it was quiet in Sharpeville for quite a long time (131).
RENTS AND RAIDS

But beneath the calm exterior described in the previous section, processes were at work that were to have a profound effect on the political history of Sharpeville. One of these was the steady rise of rents in the fifties (see Fig.1). The cost of providing housing in Sharpeville was a heavy burden on the Council's financial resources. As has been shown, some of this burden was relieved by revenue from beer, but beer profits alone were not enough to cover the cost of housing. From 1952 the Council also diverted funds from the Native Services Levy Account to the Native Housing Account wherever this was possible (132) and in 1954 it decided to use black builders on all future housing projects, in an effort to cut costs (133). Ultimately, however, a significant proportion of the housing deficit had to be borne by Sharpeville residents in the form of increased rents. In 1950 the boast of the Manager of Non-European Affairs that Sharpeville's housing was the cheapest in the Union in addition to being the best might have been tenable but as the decade progressed, this ceased to be the case.

The first rents in Sharpeville were 27/6 for a house without a bathroom and 28/6 for a house with one (134). These rents remained constant until 1952 but even before they started to rise they were felt by the residents to be excessive (135). In the years following 1952 they quickly became the major grievance of the Sharpeville population. 1952 saw in Sharpeville the beginnings of a nationwide trend to make township rentals economic. The first annual income survey of Sharpeville was carried out to assess the number of residents that qualified to be transferred to economic rentals of $2.5.0 per month and on the basis of its results 355 houses were converted to economic rentals (135). The following year a further 79 houses were converted (137) and in 1954 the Council made economic rentals the norm. From then on tenants automatically paid economic rentals unless they could provide proof that their income did not exceed $15.0.0 per month (138). Later in 1954 a new sliding scale of economic rentals was introduced on the recommendation of the Native Affairs Department. Basic economic rentals now were $2.0.0, $2.13.6, $2.14.6 or $3.0.0, dependent upon what sort of house was occupied, and for every 10/- greater than $15 per month earned by a tenant, the rent increased by 3/- (139).

Simultaneously, the Council embarked on a massive rent drive which enabled the Manager of Non-European Affairs to report in August that $54 000 had been collected in Sharpeville in the previous month and that there were no bad debts or irrecoverable rentals in the township (140). Annual rent drives of this sort characterised the Council's approach to the problem of financing its housing schemes in the fifties. It was only in 1959 that they displayed a more enlightened attitude:
The strong movement which is afoot to improve the earnings of our lowest paid workers is to be encouraged because sub-economic housing surely has no place in a well-balanced economy (141).

But by this stage hostility to the Council's housing policy was already far advanced. For as the decade progressed, Sharpeville had become seriously overcrowded. Thus residents felt that they were paying steadily increasing rents for housing that was becoming more and more inadequate. The original Sharpeville housing scheme of 3163 houses was completed in 1951 (142) and while the Native Affairs Department, National Housing Office, Mentz Commission and Transvaal Provincial Administration variously rejected Council proposals for additional housing schemes, no building of African houses took place in Sharpeville or, indeed, anywhere else in the Vereeniging area. The result was that by 1956 repeated complaints about overcrowding were filtering up through the Sharpeville Advisory Board (143). Nor did the eventual construction of Sharpeville Extension 1 in 1958 improve the housing situation. All the new houses were occupied by people removed from Top Location and even for this purpose they proved inadequate. Thus many newly arrived families from Topville found themselves sharing houses in Sharpeville (144) and no houses at all were made available to relieve the congestion in Sharpeville that had predated their arrival. The office of the Manager of Non-European Affairs was inundated with complaints from the Sharpeville Advisory Board about overcrowding in the township and in exasperation he could only "rig 'n ernstige versoek tot by die Adviserende Raad om 'n bietjie geduld te gebruik" (145).

While the Sharpeville Advisory Board might still have been prepared to show the Council some patience in 1958, the same could not be said of the township's youth. Sharpeville's population was overwhelmingly young: in 1960 it was composed of 8655 men, 6843 women and 20863 children (146). The first generation of youths born in Topville had reached the Vereeniging job market towards the end of the 1940s only to discover that their chances of finding employment were minimal. As was shown below, the major employers in the Vereeniging area were metal industries which depended upon migrant labour and were highly resistant to the notion of employing local youths. Large-scale youth unemployment was attracting the attention of the Council from as early as 1951 (147). As the decade drew on, and the number of youths entering the job market increased, unemployment rose at an alarming rate. The situation was further aggravated by a tendency among some of the larger industries - most notably USCO and Stewarts and Lloyds - to increase the capital intensity of their operations (148). Thus while USCO's production and investment levels expanded steadily through the 50s, the total number of workers employed by them peaked in 1952 and slowly decreased over the next eight years (149).
Years of unemployment produced a culture of recklessness and resistance among the black youth of Vereeniging. A delegation of industrialists complained to the Council in 1958 that they were "concerned over the lack of a sense of responsibility in the rising generation of non-European males who presented themselves for employment". The delegation proceeded to complain about "cheekiness" and "insubordination" on the part of African youths (150). By all accounts the youth of Sharpeville and Top Location seemed to be reckless in the factory. Informants have told me that youths did not conceal their contempt for the "boer mentality" and that it was common practice for them to be dismissed for assaulting their white supervisors (151).

Inside the townships this recklessness expressed itself in an increase of the membership of youth gangs operating in both Top Location and Sharpeville. Gang activities were focused on the beerhalls. Gang members would congregate outside the halls harrassing passers-by and flaunting taboos against drinking beer in public. This arrogance did not endear them much to the rest of the township population. The Russians found them particularly offensive and would regularly wage campaigns against them. Petrus Tom explains:

Township gangs were very weak because they were not national like Basotho gangs... If one Russian got assaulted by tsotsis he could summon his gang and they would attack any tsotsi in sight. Tsotsis were local gangsters and they didn't have a chance against the Russians (152).

The hostility of the Russians to youth gangs was shared by the advisory boards. Board members complained that the gangs' practice of "drinking kafir—beer outside, in public was a shame according to native custom" and that "it was disgraceful to see it misused in this manner" (153). In response to board requests boys younger than 18 were banned from the beerhall (154) but gang activities continued to flourish as unemployment and the youth population increased over the decade. Gangs still operated from the beerhalls (155) and now expanded their activities to include the regular robbing of school pupils on buses and between the bus terminus and Lekoa Shandu Secondary School in Top Location which drew pupils from Sharpeville (156).

the Council initially attempted to combat the juvenile delinquency through non-coercive means. It tried to promote greater youth employment locally but its efforts met with little support from industry. Industrialists were not interested in employing youths, even at the reduced wage levels for which the Council had obtained a special dispensation from the Department of Labour. The Secretary of the Association of Industrial Managers explained their feelings on this matter:
The members of our Association feel that the employment of native juveniles does not offer material advantages and that the lower wage rates are of secondary importance in relation to the numerous advantages to be obtained by employing adult natives (157).

A Council plan for pre-employment training for youths met with a similar response from industry and had to be abandoned (158).

Without the assistance of employers, the Council could not hope to strike at the root of the problem of juvenile delinquency—unemployment. Its own youth employment projects—a township vegetable garden (159) and vacation employment schemes (160)—were obviously unable to absorb a significant proportion of the total unemployed youth so it was forced to concentrate most of its resources on combatting the activities of gangs. The first step it took in this regard was to exert tighter control over the Sharpeville cinema. The cinema was well patronised by gang members who would identify with the villains in the films shown. The Manager of Non-European Affairs called for Council censorship of all films shown at Sharpeville in 1950. He explained the need for this by quoting a remarkable extract from the report of the commission of enquiry into the unrest in Krugersdorp, Randfontein, Newclare and Newlands: "The mental capacity of the audience is unable to grasp the fact that the hero succeeds in the end and that crime does not pay" (161).

In the years that followed the Council took various other steps to assist the gang audience in grasping this fact. They granted the advisory boards greater powers to administer corporal punishment to youths (162) and made the carrying of knives an offence (163). They attempted to have a curfew imposed on all African youths under Section 31 of the Urban Areas Act but were told by the NAD that this was not possible (164). Then in 1958 the Non-European Affairs department launched a concerted attack on the activities of gangs. The Manager declared that the department had "decided to root out the tsotsi element" (165). All suspected "tsotsis" were to be banned from the beerhalls and depots, and expulsion to labour camps would be used "to prevent unhealthy conditions such as in Johannesburg" (166). Thus in 1958, the beerhall regulations were amended to provide for easier searches for weapons (167), an advisory board led vigilante group was set up under the supervision of the Council to deal with gangs (168) and the first large-scale expulsions of unemployed youths from Vereeniging to the Native Affairs Department labour camps began (169).

But by 1958, the Council had to deal with a much greater threat to its control over the townships, because the previous year had seen a dramatic increase in Russian gang activities in Vereeniging. There had always been a Russian presence in Sharpeville and Top Location. Vereeniging's compounded workforce would visit the townships to go to stokvies, to see relatives or to look for women (170). Top Location was a short walk from all
the major compounds and it was easy for workers to sneak through the fence at nights or over weekends (171). Sharpeville was further away, but gaining entry to it was even simpler as it was unfenced until 1959 (172). Thus both townships were accessible to the Russians but from 1950-57 neither witnessed much Russian activity. In November 1949 the Manager of Non-European Affairs complained about Russians coming "in lorries from as far as Benoni to fight in Vereeniging and vice versa" (173) but over the next seven years the Russians' presence in the Vaal appears to have been concentrated in Evaton (174). Over this period there were no major clashes involving Russians in Vereeniging and each year the Mayor was able to compliment the Non-European Affairs Committee and the advisory boards for yet another trouble-free holiday season (175).

Then, towards the end of 1956, a tightly enforced visiting permit system was introduced in Evaton and this prompted an exodus of Russians to Sharpeville and Top Location (176). In the next few months the advisory board minutes were filled with worried references to the Russians. In February 1957, the Top Location Advisory Board wrote a letter to the Non-European Affairs Committee requesting them to do something about the "trouble at the Beerhall because of the clash between two Basotho rival gangs" (177) while a Sharpeville board member warned "that the Township [had] experienced many years of peace and tranquility, but if people from the compounds have free ingress (sic) and egress to the Township, trouble might result" (178). Both boards urged that the regulations confining women to a special enclosure in the beerhall be more strictly enforced as they "behave in an unbecoming manner and are the cause of faction fights" (179).

When the manager was initially confronted by the advisory boards with the need to control the Russians, he insisted that the municipal police would be able to deal with the situation (180). But while youth gangs might have found the threat of municipal police action intimidating, the Russians clearly did not. Thirty-six unarmed policemen (181) held no fears for veterans of township gang battles "who could summon reinforcements from the different compounds on the East and West Rand and as far afield as Johannesburg" (182). Understandably, then, the municipal police backed away from a direct confrontation with the Russians and when a Sharpeville board member complained that the police were doing nothing about the Russians because they were afraid, the manager had to admit as much by conceding that the Russian problem could only be directly tackled when the new Sharpeville police station was completed (183).

In the meantime the Council tried to deal with the Russians by indirect measures. It toyed with the idea of banning compound dwellers from the townships but ultimately abandoned it in the face of considerable advisory board opposition (184). Instead, it decided to close the beerhall premises on Sundays. It would remained possible to buy beer from the beerhall or off-sales depots on Sunday, but not to drink it there. The Sharpeville
board had asked for all Sunday beer sales to stop (185), but the Council was unwilling to take so drastic a step for fear of the loss of revenue it would involve and for the stimulus to illegal brewing that it would provide (186). It did, however, enter into negotiations with USCO with a view to directly supplying the USCO compound with beer and thereby helping to stem the influx of Russians into the townships on Sundays (187).

In addition to these measures, the Council started to tighten up on the influx control of Basotholand nationals. Of all the steps it took to counter the Russians, this was to have the most significant consequences, but not necessarily in the direction which the Council had hoped. Out of respect for the needs of local industry, the Council had traditionally not strictly enforced the influx control regulations that applied to Basotholand migrants. By the mid-fifties, however, this was beginning to change. The first signs of a new approach came in a memorandum entitled "Buitelandse Naturelle - die probleem", prepared by the Manager of Non-European Affairs in 1954:

Werkgeleentheid wat die Unie-naturelle op aanspraak kan maak as deel van hul geboortereg, word hul ontreem deur die duisende Buitelandse Naturelle. Hierdie feit kan nie oorbeklemtoon word nie... Die insypeling moet gekeur word en drastiese maatreels is hiervoor nodig. Dit help nie om Buitelandse Naturelle te probeer beperk te sekere bedrywe soos die landbou of mynwese nie. Hulle bly nie daar nie...

The memorandum proceeded to bewail the loss of spending power that left the Union in migrant remittances and concluded with a diatribe against foreign migrants that reached extraordinary levels of invective:

Vergelding in sy nuwe omgewing kan hy maklik vryspring deur eenvoudig uit te verdwyn. daar is niks in daardie nuwe gebied wat hom bind soos b.v. familiebande, diendom of so iets nie... Geen wonder dat die stamme van die Noord-Transvaal na hulle verwys as muishonde nie. Die stank van hulle seksuele losbandigheid sal nooit uit daardie geweste verdwyn nie want hul nalatenskap is talle buite-egtelike kinders wie se versorging die gemeenskap te laste val (188).

The onslaught on Basotho nationals that this memorandum called for was facilitated by amendments to the Urban Areas Act in 1955. These amendments changed the status of Protectorate migrants to that of prohibited immigrants. Workers from the Basotholand were now only allowed to remain in an urban area if they were legally present there on 6 May 1955. They were entitled to change jobs in the urban area, but they forfeited their urban rights if they left an area for any purposes other than authorised vacational leave (189). The amendments brought howls of protest from local industry (190) but by 1958 they were being enforced. The Director of Non-European Affairs explained why:
Een van die oogmerke van die terugtrekking van die voorbehoudsbepalings by Artikel 12 (1) [of the Urban Areas Act] is om 'n maklike manier te skep waarop die land van ongewensde elemente ontslae kan raak, soos byvoorbeeld die wat onrus veroorsaak of aan gevegte deelneem as "Russians" (191).

This situation presented residents of Sharpeville and Top Location with a paradox. For while they would have been perfectly happy to be rid of the Russians, they did not want tighter influx control, still less the increase in police raids that came with it. In the event, they lost out on all counts. The Russians were not troubled by the municipal police and only left Vereeniging after the Sharpeville shootings; most of the early victims of the tightening up of influx control were illegal relatives of residents in possession of urban rights (192), and the late fifties saw an intensification of police raids in the townships. The Council’s crackdown on youth gangs was more successful than its attempt to limit the operations of the Russians, but in terms of the response it produced from township residents, there was not much difference between the two. The gangs were hardly popular, but given the choice between reduced gang activities and less police raids, most residents would have opted for the latter.

Petrus Tom’s description of a police raid helps to explain this:

The white S.A. Police reinforcements from Heidelberg would be called. With .303 rifles they would surround the location. Police in vans and on foot raided the location from house to house. Peoplehid under beds, in toilets, inside wardrobes, and in dirty washing tubs. The raids started as early as 1.00 am (193).

The raids were carried out with no respect whatsoever for the possessions of residents. A lawyer representing the victim of a raid wrote an angry letter to the Manager of Non-European Affairs in which he commented on this: "In conducting searches in the houses, the methods of turning everything upside down and leaving the house in a state of chaotic confusion cannot breed goodwill towards the officials concerned" (194). There were repeated complaints from advisory board members that arrests at raids were made arbitrarily (195) and that people were pressurised into paying admission of guilt fines against their will (196). These were usually dismissed by the Council authorities on the grounds that they should be made through the correct channels but complaining about raids through the official channels was impossible. Attempts to lodge a complaint with the Location Superintendent encountered the response that he refused to "meet with Kafirs or Kafirmeide" while letters to his office received no reply (197). It was clear to residents that as far as the
Council was concerned the police were free to do as they pleased on raids and that the police had every intention of exploiting this freedom to the full.

Thus the increase in police raids in towards the end of the 1950s was the source of considerable discontent among township residents. It placed an additional strain on a population that already had to deal with ever-increasing rents and widespread youth unemployment. It was in this context that the Council undertook the final removal of the residents of Topville, and their relocation in the Sharpeville Extension 1 housing and site-and-service schemes.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROAD TO SHARPEVILLE

The Top Location Residents awaiting removal had an additional reason to feel hostile towards the Council. Over the 1950s conditions in Topville had steadily deteriorated and the Council had done nothing to counter this trend. On the contrary their administration of the township had actively encouraged it. As far as the Council was concerned the continued existence of Top Location was an anathema. Topville represented everything that Sharpeville was not and for that alone the Council looked forward to the day when it would finally be demolished, but there were also sound financial reasons why the survival of Topville was resented. Topville not only held up the expansion of Duncanville, thus seriously obstructing the Council's long-term development plans, it was also a direct drain on Council finances. Unlike Sharpeville, Top Location had never been able to pay for its own administration, and its partial removal aggravated this situation. The removal of half of the township's population did not significantly cheapen its administration but it halved the revenue accruing to the Council from stand rents and beer sales. Thus by the 1954/5 financial year, the deficit on the Old Location administration account was $5567 (198).

Under these circumstances, the Council was determined to cut administration costs in Topville as much as possible and to ensure that the enforced delay in the removal of the township did not lead to developments that would make the removal process more difficult to carry out. Thus Council services to Top Location were cut down to a minimum. Rubbish removal took place only once a week (199), the township's dirt roads were left to deteriorate (200) and requests for more communal taps and for street lighting were ignored (201). Schools in Top Location were shut down or moved and by early 1951 all primary school pupils in the township had to attend school in Sharpeville (202). The Lekoa Shandu Secondary School remained in Topville through the fifties, but only because the Bantu Education Department would not approve Council plans for its removal to Sharpeville until 1959 (203).
To limit the expansion of Topville while it awaited its demolition, the Council placed a moratorium on all building in the township. With no new houses allowed to be built and repairs and extensions to existing houses banned Topville degenerated into an appalling slum (204). Conditions had deteriorated so badly by 1956 that a member of the Non-European Affairs Committee insisted that residents of Topville at least be allowed to make improvements to their own homes, but he was overruled by the rest of the committee (205). The building ban was accompanied by a freeze on the issue of new lodgers permits. From 1950 no new lodgers were allowed into the township, even if they had parents living there (206). This had the effect of breaking up many families, for there were a large number of parents in Topville who had sent their children to live with relatives in the rural areas only to find now that they would not be allowed to rejoin them in the township in later years (207).

Topville residents thus had good reason to feel particularly resentful of the intrusion of the municipal authorities into their lives prior to their removal. The way in which this removal was to be carried out was to aggravate their hostility to the Council and to provide a crucial backdrop to the Sharpeville shootings.

Permission from the central government for the establishment of Sharpeville Extension 1 was finally granted in 1957 (208) and after one last delay while the Council wrangled with Vereeniging Estates over the rate at which compensation was to be paid for the expropriation of land on which the new housing schemes were to be built (209), no further obstacles to the removals remained. The Council had waited for this opportunity since 1951 and it moved ahead eagerly. It immediately applied for the Proclamation of Duncanville Extensions 1 and 2 (210) and started to remove people from Top Location at a furious rate. In October 1958 the population of Topville stood at 9763 (211). By August of the following year it had been completely evacuated (212).

To sustain this pace, the removals had to be carried out without any consultation with the people who were being removed. Residents were simply given the number of their new house in Sharpeville. Stands in Topville were demolished row by row, so people had an approximate idea of when their turn to be removed would come, but no more than that (213). Petrus Tom describes his family’s experience of removal:

There was a truck doing the removals which was paid for by the Municipality. We had lunch at twelve o’clock and then found that all our belongings were no longer there. They’d already moved them to Sharpeville. We’d got a number in Sharpeville but we didn’t know Sharpeville very well... I [sic] we didn’t know where to look for our number. I asked some people who gave me directions. We spent one or two hours looking for our new home. The next day one still got
lost because one was not used to the place. It took us about two weeks to learn how to get home, where to get off the bus and where to board the bus to town. We did not use buses in Top Location. We used bicycles or simply walked because Top Location was next to the factories (214).

Petrus Tom’s family moved into a house in Sharpeville Extension 1 but most of the former residents of Topville were removed to stands in the site and service scheme. Site and service schemes had their origin in the Native Affairs Department’s need to provide cheap municipal housing for the squatter populations that had sprung up on the PWV in the 30s and 40s (215). The principle that underpinned them was that it would be significantly cheaper and quicker to allow Africans to build their own houses according to approved plans, than it would be to build these houses for them. Residents of a site and service scheme were provided with a stand which on which there was a temporary housing structure and a toilet. Cheap building materials were made available to them and they were expected to have built a house after at most five years, failing which they would lose their rights to remain on the stand (216). While some case could possibly be made for the removal of squatter communities to site and service schemes, there was very little that could be said in favour of removing residents from a settled municipal township like Topville onto stands that contained nothing more than a single roomed shack and a toilet. The Vereeniging Medical Officer of Health pointed this out in a letter to the town Clerk about the proposed site and service scheme:

The site-and-service scheme, the way I understand it, has been primarily established to solve the native squatting problem. As there is no real squatting problem as such in Vereeniging, I cannot for the life of me see that a site-and-service scheme could in any way improve matters for the present residents of Top Location. An undertaking was given the residents of Municipal Location that they would eventually be moved to similar houses [to those] which are at present occupied in Sharpeville, and to now transfer these people to a site-and-service scheme would in my opinion be a serious breach of faith with the community concerned (217).

The Council, however, could see no alternative to this breach of faith. The Native Affairs Department had made it clear in 1954 that at least for the foreseeable future, a site-and-service scheme was a precondition to their approval of any new housing schemes in Vereeniging (218) and the Council urgently needed to remove Topville. Initially it tried to make the site-and-service scheme less offensive than others on the PWV by applying for enough funds to provide larger than average and more durable huts (219) but its efforts in this regard were vetoed by the Native Affairs Department. A request for $32 500 for 500 huts was rejected by the department on the grounds that it was unnecessary to spend more than $35 on a hut (220). So residents removed to
the site-and-service scheme had to make do with the standard huts. To aggravate matters, loans for building materials which the Council had promised were only made available after the Bantu Housing Office had spent the better part of two years processing the Council's application for funds (221). People who were prepared to finance their building without Council loans found that it took months for their plans to be approved (222), and in any event, with only one communal tap for every thirty stands, there was not enough water to meet the residents' daily living requirements, let alone to build with (223). On top of this all, the roads in the site-and-service scheme were inadequate and many of the huts would not lock properly. Moreover, for occupying one of these huts, people had to pay $1.15 (224) - over twice as much as average rents in Topville (225). It is understandable, then, that the PAC would receive a particularly good response from the site-and-service scheme residents (226).

Conditions in the housing scheme in Sharpeville Extension 1 were considerably better than those in the site-and-service scheme but they were nevertheless the source of much dissatisfaction. 270 of the 644 houses in Extension 1 were shared by two families (227). The Council maintained that this was only done to enable poorer families to pay rents that they would otherwise not have been able to afford (228), but in actual fact, it was because there was not enough housing for all the people removed from Topville. The number of complaints from the Sharpeville Advisory Board about overcrowding in the township left the Manager of Non-European Affairs in a state of exasperation (229), but many residents had long despaired of working through the advisory board channels and were seeking alternative ways of concentrating the attention of the Council on the housing shortage in Sharpeville. In May 1953 a group entitling themselves "The New Arrivals from Topville" wrote a letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs requesting "that if there is insufficient houses (sic) to accommodate the residents of Topville, it be considered the responsibility of the Town Council to get them accommodated elsewhere" (230). The next month over 200 people met to protest about overcrowding and high rentals, and a deputation was elected to convey their complaints to the Council (231).

The Director of Non-European Affairs claimed never to have heard from the deputation and denied that there were any complaints about the housing in Sharpeville Extension 1 (232). This was symptomatic of a general tendency on the part of the Council to ignore all signs of African dissatisfaction (233). Thus the mayor could jubilantly report at the end of 1959:

Die noodsaaklikheid vir beter behuisingsomstandighede vir die inwoners van die Ou Lokasie, wat alreeds in 1941 besef is, het nou 'n voldonge feit geword (234).

But this claim must have sounded a little hollow when popular antipathy to the site-and-service scheme had forced the resignation of the Chairman of the Sharpeville Advisory Board,
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Blockman Kolisang, a man who, in ten years of service on the board had displayed a remarkable capacity for ignoring the sentiments of the township’s residents (235), and when only two months previously the Manager of Non-European Affairs had reported that over 2000 of the inwoners had chosen to leave the urban area for Lesotho, Qwa-Qwa and Evaton rather than to avail themselves of the beter behuisingsomstandighede (236). In fact, 2000 was an extremely conservative estimate of the number of people who left the Vereeniging municipal district. A more realistic figure would be 5000, as Lodge has shown (238). (The dramatic drop in population over 1958/59 can be seen in fig. 3).

To many residents it must have seemed that the people who left Vereeniging in 1959 had made the correct choice. The removals were accompanied by new Council attempts to assert municipal control over township life. Over the course of 1959 the Council began systematically to enforce stock regulations that were introduced in 1956, but had previously been ignored by residents without any Council response (239). The regulations banned private stabling of stock. All draught animals were now to be kept at the municipal stables. Stock owners were fiercely opposed to this partly because of the extra expense that it involved - stable rents were to cost 6/6 per month (240) - but also because municipal stabling was inadequate. The stables were not large enough for horses and they offered inadequate protection from the elements (241). These objections, however, were dismissed by the Council and the regulations were rigidly enforced as soon as construction work on the stables was completed in October 1959 (242).

The same month witnessed another ominous development for the Sharpeville population - on 23 October the Sharpeville Police Station was opened by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, MC de Wet Nel (243). The Sharpeville Commission of Enquiry would later report that
Die getuenis dui daarop dat voor die gebeure wat in hierdie verslag ter sprake is, daar 'n goeie gesindheid tussen die Polisie te Sharpeville en die inwoners bestaan het (244).

This conclusion seems highly unlikely, to say the least. But even if one accepts it one can see that the opening of the police station would have intensified pre-existing grievances about raids. The 3 white and 35 black SAP members who staffed the new police station (245) freed the municipal police from all their previous responsibilities other than raids. The municipal police could now ignore criminal activities in the township and concentrate their energies on turning residents' houses upside down in the search for illegally brewed beer and people without the necessary documentation.

In addition to tighter Council control over Sharpeville, residents had to deal with sharp increases in the cost of living. Over the course of 1959 bus fares, which were already an additional expense for erstwhile Topville residents, doubled (246). Ultimately, however, the greatest drain on residents' incomes came from rent. The outgoing mayor reported at the end of 1959:

The time has arrived when the impact of expenditure on both non-productive capital works, and those capital works which have not yet reached their maximum stage of productivity, is making itself felt on the finances of the Council. The result is that the Council has had to defer some of its cultural and amenity projects for the time being, and allow only such expenditure as is necessary for, and compatible with the growth, expansion and improvement of the town and the prestige which it enjoys as the premier industrial centre of the Union (247).

![Fig. 4: Council Rent Retrieval (248)](image-url)
The suspension of municipal cultural and amenity projects was not a grave concern of the Sharpeville residents but the drive to balance arrears that accompanied the mayor's statement, most definitely was (see Fig. 4). In November 1959, 1500 rent notices were served on Sharpeville households (249) and by January 1960, the corresponding figure had risen to 2310 (250). Early in March, The Star reported that 300 women protesting about rents had marched to the Location Superintendent's office and stoned his car (251). At the next Non-European Affairs Committee meeting, the manager "contested that more than ninety percent of the report was false". He claimed that the protest was the product of ANC and PAC intimidation, that it had involved less than seventy people, and had quickly dispersed without any stone throwing. He further reported that the mayor was going to take up the matter of the report with The Star and would issue a statement at the next Council meeting (252). However, this confidence was belied by the manager's admission later in the meeting "that the position in Sharpeville was crucial and that further trouble was brewing". He urged the Council to meet with government authorities immediately so that a reduced sliding scale of rents could be introduced in Sharpeville and that government funding could be arranged to finance the deficit this would produce (253). The proposed meeting never took place. For by the time the manager made his call, an incredibly strong PAC anti-pass campaign had been organised in Sharpeville and March 21 was only a week away.

PAC activists had come to Sharpeville from Johannesburg in the middle of 1959. A local branch was set up in July and by the time of the shootings its membership had grown to 150 people (254). The PAC's organisational style was low key but rigorous. Prior to 21 March it did not arrange any large public meetings, but relied on intensive personal canvassing (255): "PAC members would address us at lunchtimes, in the buses, and in the township. They were campaigning everywhere," a resident remembered (256). PAC activists were able to provide local grievances with a political coordinating principle, albeit a crude one. Sharpeville's youth (257) and the residents of the site-and-service scheme (258) were particularly receptive to the organisation's rhetoric, and with the support of these two constituencies, the PAC anti-pass campaign gathered momentum quickly. Petrus Tom recalls:

It was the strongest campaign I've ever seen... You couldn't go and drink at any of the stokvels with a pass or without a sticker showing you were supporting the campaign... This thing was very very hot. Everybody was prepared (259).

On the night of Sunday 20 March, the telephone lines from Sharpeville to Vereeniging were cut and groups of youths went from house to house through the township warning people not to go to work in the morning (260). The stage was set for the biggest political event in Vereeniging's history.
POSTSCRIPT

The events of 21 March 1960 have been extensively chronicled elsewhere and need not be recounted here but a few words about their effect on the Council are in order. The shootings left the Council in a state of shock and disbelief. It could not bring itself to confront what had taken place on March 21st. The only reference to the shootings in the first meeting that followed them concerned the donation of $200 of Council funds to a relief fund for the dependents of victims. In subsequent meetings the subject of the shootings was avoided completely. However, at a less public level the shootings clearly had a considerable effect on the thinking of Council officials. For the annual estimates in July 1960 revealed trends towards significant shifts in the Council's policy with respect to the Sharpeville population. Introducing the estimates, the Finance and General Purposes Committee Chairman, JJ van Eeden gave a speech that would have been unthinkable six months earlier:

The total inadequacy of native wages is a matter that can no longer be ignored. It is common knowledge that wages for unskilled labour are less than half of a bare subsistence wage; that is to say they are half way between complete destitution and the breadline. To say that higher pay must go hand in hand with increased productivity is begging the question: a man cannot increase his output if he is hungry, cold and miserable. Government policy is that the Bantu must pay for his housing, schools and other so-called amenities in the urban areas. It is also said that rent should be no more than one fifth of income, but no attempt is made to lay down officially what income a man should earn to enable him to pay an economic rent and to have enough over to provide himself and his family with food, clothes, education and the minor luxuries of an urban existence... It is said that natives spend $1 million a day in South Africa. The sub-economic wage is then surely short-sighted and inexplicable, because a bare subsistence wage would double this spending power and the country is sorely in need of some such stimulus to restore prosperity.

The estimates themselves provided for a minimum of 20% wage increases to all African employees of the Council, the creation of more municipal clerical posts for Africans and a slight reduction of rents. They were followed by a meeting between the Council and local industrialists at which van Eeden managed to obtain a commitment from employers to match the Council's 20% wage increases. Thus the Sharpeville shootings heralded the end of an era in township administration in Vereeniging. In the years that followed a more enlightened approach of people like van Eeden became the norm. This shift, effected in the decade of consolidation of the Apartheid state would, in turn, create new contradictions and provide new areas of conflict.
between the African population of Vereeniging and the municipal authorities, but an examination of these lies beyond the scope of this paper.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. There was an ANC branch in Sharpeville/Top Location with over 200 members by 1956. However, it was remarkably inactive. The only ANC campaign that was taken up locally was the potato boycott. Apart from this the activities of the branch seem to have been limited to collecting membership subscriptions and taking members to ANC meetings in Sophiatown, Orlando, Evaton and Pimville. (Interview with Mr Simanga, 6 September 1986; Interview with P. Thapeli, 30 August 1986).


3. My treatment of the PAC in this paper is extremely cursory. This is not an attempt to underplay the role of the organisation in the events of 21 March; rather it is a shortcoming of the paper that I am in the process of rectifying through interviewing ex-PAC people in Sharpeville.


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16. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 August 1952. Report of the Finance and General Purposes Committee for August 1952. The free provision of railway sidings on industrial stands was only possible because the Council could find buyers for its industrial stands at prices high enough to cover the cost of sidings. In most other towns on the PWV, this was not the case, and municipalities could not afford to offer sidings as an industrial service.


20. See V.A. 100/4 vol.2. Correspondence between Town Clerk of Vereeniging and USCO, Vereeniging and District Chamber of Industries, Vereeniging Chamber of Commerce and Vereeniging Afrikaanse Sakekamer.


25. See V.A. 190/7. Correspondence between Town Clerk of Vereeniging and Administrator of the Transvaal and Surveyor General between 19 January 1950 and 27 November 1951.


28. See Shakinovsky, 'The Local State'.


38. V.A. 130/4 vol. Secretary of the Association of Industrial Managers of Vereeniging. Letter to the Town Clerk, 13 July 1951.

39. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 26 August 1952. Report of the Non-European Affairs committee for August 1952. The Native Services Levy was a levy imposed by the central government on employers in 1952. It was seen as a temporary measure that was needed to finance the provision of essential services (water, sanitation, lighting and
roads) that would make possible the establishment of townships on an economic basis. The levy was later used to finance site and service housing schemes as well. See J. Matthewson, *The Establishment of an Urban Bantu Township*, Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Ltd, 1957, pp.111-13.


52. D. Posel, ‘Providing for the Legitimate Labour Requirements of Employers’, paper presented to the African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 29 October 1984. This point is worth stressing because it contradicts much of the original revisionist literature on the early years of apartheid which argued that apartheid was devised as a system to provide for the survival of urban migrancy after the subsistence base of reserve production.
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53. See Posel 'Providing for the Legitimate Labour Requirements of Employers'.


57. Interview with G. Mabinetsa, 30 August 1986. See also Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 August 1956. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 25 July 1956.


61. V.A. 130/2 vol. S.J. Parsons. Letter to Secretary of Native Affairs, 7 July 1945.

62. Interview with 'Z'. It appears that all over the PWV, peri-urban farms and smallholdings were used by migrants as a staging post to the towns. What distinguished Vereeniging from other PWV towns was that municipal attempts to evict 'squatters' from nearby farms met with strong opposition from white farmers who valued their African tenants highly. See V.A. 130/2 vol. S.J. Parsons. Letter to Secretary of Native Affairs, 7 July 1945. Cf. P. Bonner "'Siyawughoba, Siyawugebhula Umhlaba ka Maspala' ['We are Digging, We are Seizing Great Chunks of the Municipality's Land'] Popular Struggles in Benoni, 1944-1952'. Paper presented to the African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, October 1985, pp.18-19.


64. V.A. 130/2 vol. Manager of Non-European Affairs. Letter to Town Clerk, 28 July 1950.


67. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 May 1951. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26 April 1951. The agreement of Raleigh to employ local residents must be seen within the context of their need for a stable workforce. They were exceptional among local industries in that their production process called for some semi-skilled labour. They therefore could not have afforded the high turnover of migrant labour that most heavy metal industries operated with.


71. See ch.3 below.

72. See ch.3 below. The Russians were a gang of Basotho migrants that dominated the PWV in the 1950s. For the fullest published examination of their activities see J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'The Ma-Rashea: a Participant’s account'. Paper presented to the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984.

73. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1 December 1949. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 17 November 1949.

74. Shakinovsky, 'The Local State in Crisis'. By way of comparison, the Springs Town Council had, by the same year, built 561 houses and a block of 48 municipal rooms in Payneville. See Gilfoyle, 'An Urban Crisis'.


77. Shakinovsky, 'The Local State in Crisis', pp.36-8. See also Mayoral Minute for year ending October 1959, Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959.

78. Lodge, Black Politics, pp.205-6.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.

80. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 January 1951.
Report of the Town Clerk.


83. Transcript of an interview with The Sharpetown Swingsters conducted by Ian Jeffrey, 22 January 1985.

84. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 14 November 1950.
Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.

85. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.
Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 28 July 1959.


89. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 September 1950.


91. V.A. 130/15. Town Clerk of Vereeniging. Letter to Native Commissioner, 16 September 1957; Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 February 1956

92. V.A. 130/6. Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs, Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No 25 of 1945. Questionnaire to be completed in respect of the Urban Area of Vereeniging - Sharpeville, 1957; Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 December 1954.


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95. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1 December 1949. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 17 November 1949; Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 September 1955; Report of the Town Clerk; Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959. Mayoral Minute for year ending October 1959.


98. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1951. Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.


100. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 15 November 1951. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24 October 1951.


103. See for example Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959. Mayoral Minute for the Year Ending October 1959.


110. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 2 December 1952. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26 November 1952.


112. Source: Minutes of the Non-European Affairs Committee, meetings from 14 November 1949 to 8 February 1960. Monthly Reports of the Manager of Non-European Affairs. ('Passes' refers to registration of service contract fees; 'Levy' refers to the Native Services Levy)


123. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 October 1951.

124. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 July 1952. Report of the Town Clerk. In theory, beer revenue could still only be used for projects "certified by the Minister of Native Affairs as being calculated to improve the social or recreational amenities available for the native residents or otherwise to promote the social welfare of such residents". However, the 1952 amendments to the Urban Areas Act provided for up to two thirds of beer profits to revert to the main native revenue account where they could be used to offset losses on housing schemes, and capital expenditure on any works and services in connection with a township, housing included. See Matthewson, The Establishment, pp.121-22.


132. This had to be done in an indirect way because there were constraints placed on the use of Native Services Levy Funds by the Native Affairs Department that prevented the Council from simply transferring them to the Housing Account. Thus Levy funds could only to cover expenses like those incurred on providing electricity extensions, running water and fences to houses in Sharpeville. See Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1955. Report of the Town


135. See the complaints in Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 March 1950. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 27 February 1950.

136. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 February 1952. Report of the Town Clerk. The drive towards economic rentals in Sharpeville actually preceded similar developments elsewhere in the country by almost two years. It was only when the Finance Act was passed late in 1953 that Section 19 of the Urban Areas Act, which had provided statutory support for sub-economic rentals for African housing, was amended. See Matthewson The Establishment, pp.113-14.


139. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 16 August 1954. Report of the Town Clerk. By 1954 the Native Affairs Department had committed itself to making all township rentals economic. Two years later this had been effected and Matthewson wrote: "Housing funds for current developments are thus provided at economic rates of interest and local authorities are expected to recover their costs through rents", The Establishment, p.114.


143. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of August 1956. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26 July 1956.

144. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 January 1959. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 8 December 1958.
145. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 28 July 1959 in Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.

146. Union of South Africa. Verslag van die Kommissie wat benoem is om ondersoek in te stel na en verslag uit te bring oor die gebeure in die distrikte Vereeniging en Vanderbijlpark, Provinsie Transvaal, op 21 Maart 1960. (Copy held in University of Witwatersrand Library, hereafter Verslag) ch.2, p.12, para.19.

147. See Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951. Report of the Town Clerk.


149. USCO. Annual Report of the Union Steel Corporation, 1960, p.22.


152. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.10. Russians' antipathy to youth gangs was a feature common to townships across the PWV. See Guy and Thabane 'Ma-Rashea', pp.11-12.

153. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 March 1954. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 22 April 1954; Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 October 1952. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 15 September 1952.

154. Public Health, Licensing and Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 March 1954. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24 February 1954


156. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 18 January 1958. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 22 November 1957.


171. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.7.


174. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20 February 1957. See also Guy and Thabane 'Ma-Rashea'. Evaton was a peri-urban freehold township, much less regulated than both Sharpeville and Top Location and thus a preferred environment for the Russians.
175. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 May 1955 and Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 February 1952. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23 January 1952.

176. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20 February 1957. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 1 October 1957. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23 September 1957.


178. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 February 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24 January 1957.


180. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 March 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20 February 1957.


183. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 July 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 26 June 1957.


185. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 3 September 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 22 July 1957.


192. Interview with ‘Z’.


195. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 April 1954. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 25 March 1952.

196. See for example Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 April 1954. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23 February 1953.


199. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 August 1950. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 27 July 1951.

200. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 6 July 1953. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 23 June 1953.

201. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 5 May 1955. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 15 April 1955.

202. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 8 February 1951. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 30 January 1951.

204. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 11 June 1956. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 21 May 1956.


207. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 June 1950. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 26 May 1950.


213. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.22.

214. Tom, My Life Struggle, pp.22-3.

215. Verwoerd explained the rationale behind site and service schemes to the Federated Chambers of Industry on 26 May 1954: "We accept that for quite a long time to come these Bantu in the urban areas must be accommodated. Huge numbers must, however, sometimes be dealt with in as short a time as possible - numbers so large that this country cannot undertake the financial burden if we must house them within a brief period on lines which would fully fulfil all expectations. Everybody realises that to build houses for the Bantu on the basis of a structure costing $600-$800 is an impossible task - even though the cost of housing has been brought down, it is quite impossible to find either the funds or the material or the labour to build within a short period and even in this fashion for all those who may legitimately be said to beed (sic) housing. What must be done? Must we build for the 5 per cent or 10 per cent and
forget the other 90 per cent? Must we have them as illegal squatters or illegal lodgers either in the Bantu residential areas or European backyards? We must discover that alternative method by which we can aid the whole 100 per cent to some extent as rapidly as possible with the object of them effecting further improvements gradually. There is only one way in which this can be done. That is by laying out a whole village or the villages needed, and bringing in the squatters and placing each family on one site of roughly 60 by 40 feet... The services are provided which are needed - water, sanitation, roads, perhaps even light, possibly in rudimentary form. Then the person can build himself, especially under guidance, and primarily perhaps only an ordinary squatter’s home. But this is the beginning of village development." Quoted in Matthewson, The Establishment, p.66. See also V.A. 130/15. Medical Officer of Health, Vereeniging. Letter to Town Clerk, 6 July 1954.

216. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 7 May 1957. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 21 March 1957.


221. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 28 July 1959.

222. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 12 October 1959. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 28 September 1959.

223. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 9 June 1959. Minutes of Old Location Advisory Board meeting held on 27 May 1959.


226. The meeting to organise the march to the Sharpeville Police Station was held in the site and service scheme, which was also where the march started. See Verslag p.71, para.122 and p.94, para.145.


233. It was almost as though the Council was so caught up in its image of Sharpeville as the best administered and equipped township in the Union that it refused to accept that residents of Sharpeville could have any grievances at all and it consistently ignored the advice of the Sharpeville Advisory Board on a wide range of issues. In the long run this proved to be a costly mistake, for the conservative board members shared many of the concerns of the Council but were, of necessity, a little more sensitive to the grievances of the Sharpeville population. This greater sensitivity should not be overstated - the board's constituency was the Sharpeville petit bourgeoisie and it was not generally able to identify, a political community beyond this constituency. Thus the chairman of the board could argue that if the Council accepted the Board's request for lower rents for shopkeepers, "people will learn-that the Board is their mouthpiece and this will hamper the activities of agitators if there be any" (Non-European Affairs Committee meeting of 7 March 1957. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 20 February 1957). Nevertheless, had the Council cooperated more closely with the board, they would have been better able to identify the tensions building up in Sharpeville over the fifties and would have been in a stronger position to prevent their ultimate explosion on 21 March 1960.

234. Town Council of Vereeniging, meeting of 28 October 1959. In context it is clear that voldong feit refers to beter behuisingomstandighede and not to noodsaaklikheid.
235. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 13 October 1958. Minutes of Sharpeville Advisory Board meeting held on 24 September 1958 (Kolisang withdrew his resignation at the next board meeting).

236. Non-European Affairs Committee, meeting of 10 August 1959.

237. Source: Non-European Affairs Committee, meetings from 10 November 1949 to 16 November 1959.

238. Lodge, Black Politics, p.208.


244. Verslag, p.14, para.27.


246. Source: Non-European Affairs Committee, meetings from 10 November 1949 to 16 November 1959.


252. The next Council meeting only took place on 30 March and unsurprisingly did not include a statement about the report in The Star.
   Report of the Manager of Non-European Affairs.

254. Verslag p.45, para.84 and p.19, para.35.

255. Lodge, Black Politics, p.208.

256. Tom, My Life Struggle, p.23.

257. See Verslag p.45, para.84; pp.96-7, para.147. It seems that the PAC were able to tap into Sharpeville youth gang networks. The Commission of Enquiry reported that the PAC had deliberately attempted to recruit gang members. Whether not this was the case, the fact that groups of youths went through the entire township from house to house on the night of Sunday 20 March, demanding that residents support the demonstration the following day, indicates at least a probable link between the PAC and the youth gangs. See also Tom, My Life Struggle, pp.24-5.

258. See Verslag p.71, para.122; p.94, para.145. Two marches converged on the police station prior to the shootings. The one came from the site-and-service scheme the other from the housing scheme in Sharpeville Extension 1.


261. In addition to forming a well known part of the popular traditions of resistance in South Africa, they are covered in Lodge, Black Politics, Tom, My Life Struggle and Roux, Time Longer than Rope. For the most detailed accounts see Reeves, Shootings at Sharpeville and Verslag.

