This thesis is my own unaided work and has not previously been submitted to any other university or for any other degree.

Susan Parnell

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ABSTRACT

Between Union in 1910 and the start of World War Two, urban racial segregation in South African cities evolved through three distinct periods. Initially, the predominantly white cities were the target of colonial planning initiatives to reduce overcrowding and prevent the development of industrial slums. After World War One, the regulation of African urbanisation was the primary focus of urban policy. The living standards of the urban workforce were to be improved and controlled by excluding unemployed African people, by forcing the majority of the urban African workforce into compound quarters, and by establishing limited accommodation for African families in town. The racial administration of urban poverty was entrenched in the 1930s when, faced with the persistent growth of slums, the state bolstered white welfare initiatives and imposed even tighter residential restrictions on blacks living in urban areas.

The form and pace of urban segregation policy was dictated by the conditions of working-class life in South Africa's economic heartland. In cosmopolitan Johannesburg, slums had a diverse socio-spatial form. Racial mixing notwithstanding, there were different residential experiences within two-miles of the city centre. Poor whites typically lived in boarding houses or in rooms which they rented in private houses. Africans dominated the industrial compound facilities at factories and in nearby private yards. Rental of back-yard shacks was the least racially exclusive form of cheap accommodation. It was also the preferred form of shelter for the large, impoverished coloured population. Racial mixing diminished rapidly under the force of segregationist slum clearances. Rehousing projects and forced removals consolidated and even created racial differences. Racial categorisation of slum residents as 'coloured', white or African for purposes of residential segregation entrenched the cleavages forged by job reservation and set the racial hierarchy on which South African capitalism was built.

The process of racial residential segregation was achieved by application and adaptation of international town planning principles. Municipal officials, guided by British planning developments, pioneered urban management in South Africa. Colonial standards of city government were reserved for the white settler population. Slum removals and new town
developments, whether applied to white or black urban dwellers, drew heavily on international norms and experience. Unlike other industrialising nations, in South Africa the state sought to contain urban poverty and regulate the workforce by controlling the urbanisation of the indigenous population. The impress of the state not only determined who had urban access, but also dictated the terms of urban residence. When the Johannesburg City Council proved incapable of imposing order on the size and character of the urban population through the policy of racial residential segregation, it depended on employers to maintain the supervision of black migrant accommodation under state licence.

Urban racial residential segregation was not simply the corollary of the creation of African Reserves. Slum clearance and racially contained township development was the product of the co-incident interests of diverse constituencies. The white working class opposed investment in urban infrastructure that would enhance the competitive position of African workers. Migrancy and influx-control limited the flow of black urban labour, and also reduced competition for skilled jobs. White ratepayers were similarly reluctant to fund costly housing for black families. The political force of white voters underscored extensive urban welfare assistance, particularly in the depression years of the early 1910s and 1930s. Once black slum conditions in Johannesburg deteriorated with the escalation of manufacturing and industry in the 1920s, philanthropic groups gained employer support for their demand to improve African housing conditions by building segregated housing. Public health, labour productivity and political turmoil lay at the root of the move to clear slums. Segregation was as much the product of protecting and developing the most desirable urban land for whites, as it was the outcome of discrimination and suppression of black urban opportunity.
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PREFACE

The segregated Johannesburg landscape is the indelible reminder of inequitable city management that pre-dates apartheid. This thesis sets out the conditions of working-class residential life in Johannesburg between Union and World War Two and examines the policy and action of the state in transforming the geography of the city so that race became the primary organisational principle.

As a young child growing up in Johannesburg I was encouraged to observe the pattern and pace of urban life, an activity that is now an integral part of my personal and professional identity. The craft of identifying and interpreting the forces that shape people's lives in the city was sharpened under the tutelage of the University of the Witwatersrand Geography Department. Initially as a student, and subsequently as a member of staff, my intellectual development was nurtured by an exciting and active group of academics that includes Keith Beaven, Philip Bonner, John Earle, Alan Mabin, Gordon Pirie and Chris Rogerson. Their care and generosity in guiding me into the various facets of university life are sincerely appreciated. One small portion of my extensive debt to Gordon is his exemplary mentoring of this project.

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The use of racial terminology presents inevitable difficulties in historical research. I use 'black' to include Africans, coloureds and Indians. One of the points made in the thesis is that the laying out of segregated residential areas contributed to the definition of racial categories. The use of 'coloured' in particular contexts is an attempt to indicate the social construction of race. Because of the pejorative connotation of 'native' for African people in contemporary South Africa, this phraseology is only employed in quotes. Place names, and the names of certain individuals are spelt variously across the maps and archives. Like the historical record, I am inconsistent.


Susan Parnell
Johannesburg, August 1993.
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CHAPTER ONE

URBAN RACIAL SEGREGATION

Institutionalized racial residential segregation is today associated with apartheid South Africa. The racial partition of residential land also accompanied industrialization and urban growth across the colonial world and North America. Ethnic and social segregation were dominant urban motifs of racially heterogeneous societies in the first half of the twentieth century. Unlike other industrial societies, urban segregation became and remained legally entrenched in South African cities. The imposition of a racial hierarchy in South African towns depended, at least in part, on planning mechanisms normally associated with the evolution from pre-industrial to modern cities. In South Africa the impact of urban planning legislation was greatest in the inner-city slum districts of the large urban centres where the racial character of the working class was mixed. The objective in this thesis is to identify why and how slum clearance procedures and racist removals became synonymous in South African cities.

The forced relocation of more than fifty thousand people from inner-city slums transformed Johannesburg's landscape in the years between the First and Second World Wars. During this twenty year period the geography of the city came to be fashioned more overtly according to race than class. Implementation of racial segregation was particularly ruthless in re-ordering inner-city districts of Johannesburg where a large proportion of the racially heterogeneous workforce of the burgeoning industrial centre lived. Some of the workers who were relocated from centrally situated slums accepted public housing in townships or compounds; others sought shelter in black freehold ghettos or in slums as yet unaffected by public health or segregationist provisions. The effect of these slum clearances was to create a rigid pattern of racial residential segregation. Yet the practice of segregation that emerged in the inter-war years was not the same as the establishment of African locations in cities around South Africa at the turn of the century. Urban clearance programmes in Johannesburg during the 1920s and 1930s were the outcome of national rather than local urban policy. The anti-slum legislation invoked by the state to reorder the residential pattern of Johannesburg selectively echoed developments in city management elsewhere in the world.
Race and residence in international perspective

The social unity of rural settlements was idealised by anti-urban Victorians who despised and feared the growing social segregation of the poor in older central areas of town. Caricaturing the increasingly working-class inner-city as an evil place where disease and social ferment flourished, stringent sanitary reforms were introduced. British town planning became the institutionalised response to the urban underclass. Once middle-class flight to the suburbs had left tracts of purely working-class territory in the centres of towns, the political threat that slums posed to 'civilised' society, and the ruling classes belief that poor physical conditions undermined morality, spurred the introduction of urban reforms. Christian philanthropists drew parallels between the plight of the urban poor and the 'savages' of the jungles abroad, thereby encouraging a missionary zeal to resolve the slum crisis. By the beginning of the twentieth century a corps of professional (primarily medical) men had generated a series of specialist journals concerned with urban management. The sanitary condition of large urban centres such as London, which grew sooner and more rapidly than other western centres, were monitored carefully in the Victorian period. Improved statistical methods were used to demonstrate the relationship between overcrowding and mortality. Gradually the inevitability of social segregation was accepted, but this was accompanied by the widely held belief that the working class was incapable of controlling its own environment and that some form of supervision and control was essential. The consequent development of philanthropic groups concerned directly with the housing needs of the urban poor is well documented in both Britain and North America. In Britain the growing importance of the local authority as an agent of slum clearance is similarly well established.

By the post-World War One period, segregation more commonly referred to differentiation within the working class. Urban policy was also evolving, with increasing stress being placed on the value of better surroundings. In Britain, suburban home ownership for the respectable working class was promoted. The post-World War One years also saw the rise of the welfare state and subsidised council housing for the poor. Across the Atlantic the 'city beautiful' movement informed private sector development that was guided by zoning regulations in the effort to address the persistent problem of urban slums. In South Africa, shifts in the depiction of urban problems...
and the resultant changes in planning advocacy are also evident. As the ruling classes variously wished to protect colonial urban standards or change the terms of African urban settlement, they portrayed slums, often inaccurately, as either a 'native problem' or a poor white problem. The selective presentation of the conditions of the urban poor in South African cities shaped and remoulded segregationist urban planning programmes at both national and local level.

In addition to periodising changing attitudes to segregation and urban reform programmes, historical geographers and urban historians seek to explain the pattern and processes of social differentiation in the city. This task is tackled in several different ways. The ethnic, tenure, religious and occupational profile of ghetto residents is commonly disaggregated; the residential impact of shifts in the national and local economy is sometimes detailed; or the influence of social and economic conditions in migrants home countries is uncovered. As a result of painstaking research using one or more of these approaches, a richly textured record provides the basis for lively debate over the relative role of ethnicity and class in the evolution of the industrial city.

The task of assessing the relative significance of class, race and ethnic divisions in South African cities is hampered by the poor empirical record. There are insufficient sustained accounts of migrants settling in towns to allow any systematic explanation of pre-apartheid urban morphology. Construction of such a framework requires a fuller understanding of South African industrial growth, a clearer picture of the racial and ethnic networks used to gain access to urban jobs, and a more coherent account of the state's urban management role. As Johannesburg's size and economic dominance habitually made it the point of reference in policy discussions, the city provides an important case study in unravelling the history of the South African city.

Historical geographical research involves uncovering the clustering of ethnic, social and racial groups as a device for evolving meanings of ethnicity, class and race in the making of the industrial city. This notion of spatially constructed reality is developed by Anderson in her work on Vancouver where she argues that "'Chinatown' is a social construction with a cultural history and a tradition of imagery and institutional practice that has given it a cognitive and material reality in and for the west". It is not difficult to see that, like Chinatown, 'locations' were European
creations on which the separateness and inferiority of African people was built. The manipulation of access to residential space in South Africa goes beyond defining inferior territory for 'other' black people. By designating cities as European space, white colonial officials claimed a distinctive, economically privileged position that belied their minority status.

The argument that place assumes an independent political weight and meaning is particularly poignant where legislated territorial segregation was secured under colonialism. Unlike the United States, which also experienced large-scale black urbanisation after World War One, South African intellectuals embraced eugenic justifications for segregation to become world leaders in racial urban planning. Racial segregation as conceived by pre-industrial colonial planners was refined by South African officials using western ideals of city organisation.

**Race and the colonial city**

Calls for urban reform were made by individuals such as Chadwick and organisations like the Salvation Army, and their initiatives gradually diffused throughout the British Empire. It has even been suggested that urban planning was most vigorously applied in the European colonies which were seen as 'laboratories' for experimentation in the art of city government. The first principle of colonial planning was the social and spatial separation of dominators and dominated in the emerging urban centres. Almost always the mechanism of this repression was racial discrimination.

There are several useful typologies of the distinctive characteristics of colonial cities that emphasise the ubiquitous pattern of racial residential segregation that was enforced in the early twentieth century. With respect to Africa we are reasonably well informed on the genesis and distribution of racially separated locations, and much has been written about the persistence of segregationist planning into a post-independence era. There is, however, only a patchy explanation of why and how, rather than where or when, this racial urban morphology developed in what is today referred to as the Third World. In a tantalising footnote to his piece on post-colonial cities, Simon points out that the present form of Calcutta, Nairobi or Johannesburg
differs radically from colonial cities like Toronto or Melbourne, yet all these cities were established at roughly the same time by the British. Implicit in Simon’s aside is the need to confront the dimensions of the race question in the emerging morphology of colonial cities. The poorly researched inter-war period is crucial to a full understanding of how racial segregation became entrenched in colonial cities.

Notions of racial, social and spatial segregation evolved with the changing circumstances of colonial societies. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries segregation was founded on the need for military security, and on the perceived and genuine problems of maintaining urban sanitation. With subsequent diffusion of science, technology and administrative ideology the de facto practice of segregation became legally entrenched. King argues that because the ‘town and country’ planning movement coincided with the height of formal imperialism, its impact was to reorganise haphazard social and racial divisions into carefully structured, rigid racial segregation. But racial segregation did far more than incorporate subject populations into well planned metropolitan-styled cities. In South Africa it is very clear that the racial designation of urban space and the racial delineation of housing standards defined the terms of non-European settlement so that the black population was excluded from participating directly or equally in ‘modern’ urban society.

The preoccupation of urban historians and historical geographers with the description of racial space means that the development of racism and racially constituted urban areas is poorly understood, even though they are adequately, if not exhaustively, documented. Race segregation is perhaps the most distinctive feature of colonial and even post-colonial urban landscapes and it is essential to achieve greater clarity on the forces that underscore the rise of racism and segregationist town planning. South Africa, the most notorious of racist states, was a model of colonial urban management in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and it provides a curious, but important, opportunity to investigate the institutionalisation of residential segregation. The social and economic function of segregated cities that is a central theme of this thesis cannot be considered in isolation from wider debates about race in South Africa. In these debates, the
evolution of intra-urban segregation has received considerably less attention than national territorial segregation and the creation of African Reserves.

Racial segregation in South Africa

The matter of whether or not the clustering of Africans into rural Reserves under the 1913 Land Act created a cheap labour force that supported the development of capitalism in South Africa underpins a great deal of historical, sociological and geographical research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Previously, liberal interpretations of segregation stressed the role of Afrikaner nationalism in perpetuating the Reserves and the migrant labour system. In countering this interpretation, revisionist scholars placed their emphasis on the manner in which Reserves perpetuated cheap labour by subsidising the costs of reproducing it. It is now clear that the power of the capitalist class in introducing and upholding territorial segregation has been over-simplified, and possibly exaggerated. By disaggregating the forces motivating segregation, Rich, Dubow and others caution against the danger of overstating the relationship between territorial segregation and the demands of organised business. New attention is placed on the voice of the Church and of white liberals whose agenda in promoting African Reserves revolved around 'protecting Natives' from the damaging contact with Western (especially urban) values and lifestyles. Racist discourse emanating from the colonial metropole is once again receiving serious attention as a factor bolstering segregationist ideology in South Africa, but as yet the impact of international intellectual movements on the structure and form of cities is not understood.

Preliminary findings about the range of actors involved in the unfolding drama of urban segregation exist in the descriptive work on South African cities. Geographers have been particularly active in highlighting the appalling conditions of the urban poor and documenting the shift from urban segregation to urban apartheid. The strongest points to emerge from this work are that the experience of urban segregation was influenced by local constraints, and that efforts by the state to control the African workforce and segregate the South African city intensified with rapid industrialisation. As recent contributions to the broader debate on segregation have demonstrated, the obvious importance of a continual supply of labour and the racist agenda of
Afrikaner nationalists does not obviate the need for critical consideration of the part played by politically and economically powerful liberal ideologues in upholding white supremacy through territorial segregation. With respect to intra-urban segregation, the influential part played by local authorities, white ratepayers and landlords must be added to the list of constituencies interested in protecting racially divided space. Similarly, the influential role of international ideas about race, social welfare and urban planning must be included in the explanation of why South African cities came to be managed on the principle of racial division and black repression.

Until recently, the most rigorous scholarship on intra-urban segregation dealt with the origins of African locations. Although primarily concerned with pre-Union details, the literature does offer useful explanations for the genesis of urban segregation policies. Swanson's ideas about the relationship between sanitation, racism and the segregation of the city are especially interesting. Surprisingly, however, although sanitary problems were prevalent in urban areas after the influenza epidemic and persisted into the 1920s and the depression years of the 1930s, scholars either underestimate the relationship between health and race in the inter-war years, or alternatively, crudely ascribe everything to the threat of disease.

The enormous impact of mining and migrant labour on South African society has deflected attention from the patterns of settlement of non-miners, non-migrants, and non-males. Making a convincing case for a gendered analysis of cities, is the argument that urban African policy evolved in direct response to the inability of the state to control the settlement of African women, most of whom survived outside of the formal urban economy. The political and economic implications of the changing social character of permanent urban settlement, from male migrants absconding from compounds to take up rooms in town, or families moving off peri-urban farms squat on the urban periphery, to women from deep rural areas coming to the city, is developed in Sapire's account of the segregation of Brakpan. Her path-breaking research also highlights the contest between the small, often impotent, local authority and the waves of African migrants over the terms of segregated settlement.
Despite fresh research on the struggle for the city, urban segregation is still habitually regarded as an adjunct to the national segregationist policies that bolstered cheap migrant labour. Locations are generally considered important only for the transitory part they played in ensuring the flow of African labour to urban industry. By this logic, systematically espoused by Maylam, the state preferred locations to racially integrated and uncontrollable slums because they allowed officials to contain the ‘undesirable tide’ of African urbanisation. Restricted access to urban areas kept African workers dependent on the subsistence economies of the Reserves in order to reproduce themselves. A significant variation on this interpretation is offered by Hindson who suggests that African locations, introduced to control the workforce, incidentally fostered a permanent class of semi-skilled African labour. Despite a state rhetoric that identified Africans as temporary sojourners, restrictions on African urbanisation really meant that new migrants were prevented from competing with Africans who had urban jobs and legitimate accommodation in the locations. By regulating into locations, capitalists ensured a supply of semi-skilled African labour, while simultaneously upholding the myth that Africans belonged in rural areas where they enjoyed land citizenship rights denied to them in urban areas. These arguments ignore the widespread recognition of both capitalists and the state of the need to improve urban Africans’ living conditions in urban slums, initially through the municipal establishment of locations, and later under the local authority licensing and regulating compound accommodation. Moreover, implicit in the link between urban segregation and cheap labour, is the false assumption that Africans were the only people affected by slum clearances.

Residential segregation during the 1920s and 1930s is overwhelmingly portrayed as the removal of Africans to locations by the application of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. In reality the state’s removal of Africans from inner-city areas after Union was not simply the product of segregationist ‘native’ urban policy. The enforcement of anti-slum provisions and public health legislation was at least as powerful in propelling the relocation of Africans. Thousands of coloureds and Indians were also barred from white suburbs, and even poor whites were removed from city slums. Explanations of intra-urban segregation policy cannot therefore be conflated with the study of emerging ‘Native policy’, as is so often the case when explanations for territorial segregation strategies are sought.
The vast corpus of historical work on urban slum clearances in the industrial centres of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has been almost completely ignored by Southern Africanists. Yet segregationist planning in South Africa has strong parallels with socio-spatial engineering associated with the introduction of urban welfare and town planning programmes elsewhere in the world. Three major themes from the international experience inform the forthcoming analysis of slum clearance and racial segregation in inter-war South Africa, one of many colonies where institutionalised racism was the major vehicle of town planning. The periodisation of South African urban policy is the first objective in the thesis. Second, the task of identifying and explaining the patterns of social and spatial differentiation in the city, arguably the core of the historical geographies, are considered. The legislative origins of segregation are outlined; the location and type of housing occupied by working class people of all races in Johannesburg is described, and the pattern and impact of racial removals in Johannesburg is identified. Finally, the social and political relations of power that were created by the reorganisation of residential space are evaluated by linking slum clearance programmes to the creation of segregated housing services and to the invention of unequal racial categories.

Segregated cities in South Africa were formed by both black repression and white privilege. The scope of this thesis breaks with tradition by examining the political, economic and social background to legislation introduced by the state to control the growth of industrialising urban centres in the Union of South Africa through the establishment of parallel systems of urban administration; one black and one white. The first part of the thesis outlines the forces shaping legislation regulating urban development. Chapter Two is particularly concerned with an individual professional's initiative to secure state protection of urban colonial standards for European settlers. In Chapter Three the origins and political significance of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act are reviewed and reassessed. The splitting of urban policy along racial lines in the 1930s is the focus of Chapter Four. The second part of the thesis is concerned with events in Johannesburg that moulded urban management legislation, both before and after its passage through parliament. Five chapters provide cameos of different aspects of the working class Johannesburg residential experience. The position of the white poor, many of whom were women, is detailed in Chapter
Five which explores early segregation through the provision of para-state hostels. In an attempt to disaggregate the meaning of slum life for African people, Chapter Six highlights the various forms of yard accommodation available in the inner city. A portrait of the largest black ghetto, the Malay Location, is presented in Chapter Seven. The pattern of Africass removals and the uneven impact of segregationist anti-slum action is the thrust of Chapter Eight which focuses on the application of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in Johannesburg. Whites and coloureds are the prominent players in the 1930s Slums Act implementation described in Chapter Nine. The concluding part draws together the temporal and geographical variations in slum clearances and reflects on the forces and causes of racial residential segregation in South African cities.

Notes


PART II

THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The intellectual framework of South African urban history is characterised by the use of racial categories. The urban native problem, the poor white in the city, or Indian bazaars are commonly the objects of research. Racist legislation, racial repression and resistance to racism have all been examined from the point of view of a single community. Yet it was in the cities that the poor of all races met and mixed. A central theme of urban policy formation is how the state's management of cities came to depend on the construction of racial categories. The story of segregation presented here is bound up with the way racial, ethnic and social differences were forged by industrialisation and urban growth.

A dual structure of urban government was inaugurated with the passage of racially parallel legislation. The 1919 Public Health Act and the 1920 Housing Act formalised colonial standards of urban living for the settler population; the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act excluded African migrants from this sanitised urban space while simultaneously improving living standards for the industrial workforce. The working class was gradually removed from slums to segregated public housing schemes or state-supervised single quarters. Racial splitting of city management, and the racial differentiation of living standards persisted, and became more acute as the welfare of poor whites and the control of urban Africans were more clearly defined as objectives of state policy. Over the thirty years covered in the following three chapters, a racial hierarchy that was founded on geographical segregation emerged in South African cities. The African elite was crushed, coloureds became a distinct racial category and poor white protection from abject poverty was assured. In addition to racial segregation, urban policy encouraged the social differentiation of African people. The primary divide was between urban and rural, 'civilised' and 'uncivilised', 'detribalised' and 'tribal' Africans. A secondary distinction between migrant workers housed in compounds and urbanised Africans living in family housing also informed city planning practices.
National political spokesmen on the race question in the inter-war period were strangely silent on urban issues. Their voices were replaced by local English-speaking bureaucrats and urban professionals who joined the lobby of white liberals active in politics. The script on urban segregation between the World Wars leans heavily on international ideas about planning and social reform. Individual actors, like the country's first full-time Medical Officer of Health, Dr Porter, assume central stage. At final curtain it is clear that a twin policy of urban administration evolved between Union in 1910 and the passage of the 1936 Hertzog Segregation Bills. Urban segregation in South Africa bears the imprint of strategies to control the urban African population, as well as Western models of city development. However, the obsession with racial supremacy meant that no grand scheme of town planning other than residential segregation ever infused the minds or practice of the drafters of South African city plans.
CHAPTER TWO

CREATING RACIAL PRIVILEGE:
PUBLIC HEALTH AND TOWN PLANNING LEGISLATION, 1910-1920

Explanations for the rise of urban segregation in South Africa have concentrated on the creation of separate and unequal administrative structures that control black residence. These accounts create the false impression that segregated and higher-standard 'white' residential areas developed without any state interference. On the contrary, state manipulation of planning regulations to protect working-class white residential conditions in the new industrial centres was an early mechanism by which South African cities were racially segregated and the living standards of poor whites were protected. Non-racial regulations relating to overcrowding or slum removals, as well as overtly racially-discriminatory provisions, comprise a two-tier system of urban administration whose application has cast South African cities in a racial mould.

The twin character of South African planning history has recently been acknowledged, but as yet there is only a vague understanding of the social, economic and political forces shaping the birth of modern urban policy. State regulation of living standards and the racial ordering of residential opportunity, alongside the imposition of job reservation and influx controls, are crucial to unravelling the causes of racial oppression in South Africa. It is now widely accepted that the rise of racism and the institutionalisation of segregation, whether social, industrial, territorial or urban, was not the simple manifestation of white South African prejudice. Consideration of the passage of the Public Health Act of 1919 demonstrates that the drive for profit lay at the heart of the emergence of intra-urban segregationist legislation that was ushered-in under the guise of modern town planning principles. However, while the introduction of modern town planning practices may have aided the development of South African capitalism by alleviating the poor white crisis and controlling the residence of Africans, the stabilisation of sections of the working class though urban reform programmes was not an indigenous idea. Enforcing racial segregation in South Africa involved considerably greater social engineering than that entailed in the fostering of a 'respectable' British or American working class, but the processes are not dissimilar. There is a well established
link between the increasing social differentiation evident in the emerging metropolitan centres of the early twentieth century and the application of urban planning that encouraged slum removals and suburbanisation that has yet to be fully explored in colonial contexts. The case of the 1919 Public Health Act suggests that the export of British planning practices to South Africa nurtured emerging racial and class differences.

The efforts of South African capitalists to establish a white working class aristocracy through job protection and welfare initiatives provides an important key to the manner in which colonial urban policies were implemented in South Africa. South Africa's pre-industrial pattern of urban race segregation, with a separate location for the indigenous population, was common to many colonial settlements. As in other colonial settings early town planning in South Africa began as an attempt to encourage European settlement. In the face of a growing urban poor white problem, however, job reservation and urban welfare programmes were incorporated into the evolving social system of racial domination for which South Africa is still notoriously known.

The introduction of public health and town planning legislation was not intended to supplement segregationist legislation: indeed it was not intended that colonial city planning standards apply to Africans at all. Possibly because of its Euro-centric focus, much early town planning, including the Public Health Act of 1919 and the Housing Act of 1920 was, unlike the overtly racist 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act (NUAA), ignored by urban historians searching for the origins of segregationist legislation. Yet, in the first half of the twentieth century, both health and housing legislation was used to secure the racial division of urban space because regulations on African urban settlement were incomplete, ineffective and ignored. Although intended to regulate European residential conditions, planning ordinances like those of the Public Health Act provided many municipalities with an additional means of regulating African urbanisation and enforcing segregation. Urban reform initiatives of the 1910s were conceived as a means of containing the urban poor white problem that threatened the social order on which South African capitalism was being built.
Urban planning and the poor white problem

The emergence of an unemployed class of unskilled whites in the cities of the Rand during the first two decades of the 1900s produced a political crisis whose resolution lies at the heart of the explanation for the rise of racial segregation in South Africa. Two related aspects of the relationship between the poor white problem and the emergence of racial segregation are germane to the assessment of urban policy. First, in unravelling the significance of the poor white question for the evolution of city structure and form, it is useful to have a clear sense of the impact of poor whites in wider social, political and economic matters. Second, a clear understanding is required of why South African poor whites, who were no larger a percentage of the white population than in other European industrialising society, were perceived as presenting a special problem to be solved through the creation of a racial aristocracy.

Poor whites were most often Afrikaans-speaking, unskilled workers who came to urban areas, most commonly those of the Rand, because they were forced from their position as bywoners, or tenant farmers, on the Free State and Transvaal farms by drought and the growth of capitalist agriculture associated with the mineral boom. Unlike the English-speaking working class which came to South Africa with either mining or craft experience, the Afrikaner proletariat had few marketable urban skills. The Afrikaner poor (Boers), whose basic wages were between three and eight times those of African migrant labourers, therefore found it almost impossible to find jobs on the open market. Initial attempts by the state to force the mines to employ whites failed, and gradually the state itself assumed responsibility for offering welfare employment.

The Afrikaner poor in the city were problematic to at least four distinct constituencies: skilled whites (especially miners) whose jobs they threatened; the state whose efforts to maintain social control by imposing a racial order were undermined by unruly poor whites; capital which wished to avoid the creation of an organised and racially united working class; and, finally, Africans whose workplace mobility was curtailed and whose share of urban welfare initiatives was severely restricted.
Tensions between Boer and Britain in South Africa were so great before World War One that the ‘Race Question’ more commonly referred to relations between English speakers and Afrikaners than relations between white and black. The adoption of a racial division of labour on the mines rekindled antagonism from the Anglo-Boer War. The exclusion of unskilled Afrikaners from gang labour very quickly challenged the position of skilled European miners. High wages paid to whites on the Rand inflated production costs and threatened the viability of the entire mining enterprise. As Africans became increasingly skilled, and as mechanisation reduced the need for underground craft labour, the mines were pleased to reduce the ratio between white and black workers from 1:8 in 1910, to 1:12 in 1922. In the same period productivity increased. The tenuous position of the English miners was highlighted by the 1907 strike. The strike was broken by the employment of unskilled Afrikaners as scab labour in positions that had been eroded to purely supervisory jobs.

Race was a crucial determinant of workplace opportunity in the first two decades of the twentieth century, yet miscegenation was rarely mentioned. Adopting the black American leader Booker T. Washington’s idea that social differentiation was a natural human condition, South Africans from many walks of life embraced territorial not urban segregation as the solution to the ‘native problem’. Although there is some evidence of eugenicist ideas about the inferiority of blacks and the importance of maintaining racial purity, eugenics and social Darwinism only became more fashionable among South African officials after the First World War with the rise of manufacturing and urban expansion. In the pre-War period, urban cohabitation of African workers with unemployed and underemployed whites did generate ruling class anxiety because of the fear that poor whites’ resistance to economic insecurity would assume an explicitly working class character. Foremost among the fears of capital were the possibilities of racially united working-class organisation and communism. This was no idle threat, as the turbulent mining disputes demonstrated.

Mining was the dominant economic activity in South Africa before the First World War, employing a quarter of all the national workforce. The geographical extent of the poor white problem extended beyond the precinct of the mines; it was a phenomenon experienced across the country, but felt most acutely in the large urban centres. Poor whites lived in city slums, where
many resorted to crime as a means of eking out a living. Two illegal activities often associated with newly urbanised Africans, the illicit selling of liquor and prostitution, were similarly well-established niches of poor whites. In the early 1910s, an estimated ten per cent of Johannesburg's Afrikaner unemployed subsisted through the sale of banned 'white-man's' liquor to Africans. The 1913 Select Committee on the Poor White Question spared no punches in identifying the social significance of informal liquor retailing: "the efficacy of the ideology of racism as a means of exerting control over Africans is challenged by the behaviour of poor whites." African corruption by poor whites in racially mixed urban slums was also an ongoing concern among white liberals who maintained that residential segregation should be instituted as African tribal ways were detrimentally eroded by exposure to poor whites in cities.

The emergence of job reservation and the 'civilised' labour policy are well understood state responses to the weak labour market positions of skilled and unskilled whites respectively. By contrast, attitudes to the residential conditions of the white working class are poorly understood. There is a small literature on protective urban strategies to aid poor white women, but it tends to focus on the depression years of the 1930s rather than on the early twentieth century. Less specific consideration of early urban welfare projects are found in Milner's forays into poor white relief work through town planning in Johannesburg in the post-Boer War reconstruction period. The interests of capital and the state were played out in municipal poor white employment projects in much the same way as they did in the introduction of job reservation. In subsequent decades job reservation is known to have been, at the very least, compatible with capitalist profit. The economic function of white welfare is less clearly understood.

The sustained urban welfare policies towards whites which Milner initiated after the Anglo-Boer War appeared to have faltered with the depression of 1906-1909 that forced an increasing number of whites into towns. It has even been suggested that, notwithstanding keen interest in particular quarters, South Africa failed to follow the English example st by the passage of the 1909 Housing and Town Planning Act that gave local authorities power to close insanitary buildings. Consequently, the Union allegedly lagged behind several other Dominions, notably Canada, Australia and New Zealand in securing effective town planning for the colonial population.
the contrary, planning developments from one of the most neglected decades of South African urban history, the 1910s, reveals extensive efforts to secure legislation exactly like the British provisions; first for British South Africans and subsequently for all white South Africans.

Dr Charles Porter and pre-World War One town planning

Official attitudes toward town planning and public health before the First World War are revealed by examining the personality and career of Johannesburg’s first full-time Medical Officer of Health (MOH), Charles Porter, who was recruited by Lord Milner in 1901. Lionel Curtis, the Johannesburg Town Clerk who would soon become Assistant Colonial Secretary (and who was also a leading member of Milner’s Kindergarten), declared Porter “the only worthy applicant” for the important municipal post and conceded to Porter’s demand for the handsome salary of £2 000 per annum on the basis of his extensive English experience in Public Health. Milner’s and Curtis’ confidence in the appointee’s commitment to municipal government was well justified. The Johannesburg Medical Officer went on to play a central role in extending municipal control of urban affairs, thereby ensuring conditions conducive to permanent European immigrant settlement in the rough South African mining town. Increasing English-speaking settlement in South Africa to outnumber Afrikaners was, after all, a major objective of Milner’s reconstruction government. Porter also served on more than a dozen Transvaal, and Union, commissions on issues related to health and urban planning. Porter’s powerful character and influential position as the MOH of the country’s largest and fastest growing city gave him enormous influence. But modern town planning was not the product of one colonial officer’s grand design. The Johannesburg official was the first of series of powerful white South African men for whom planning was both a personal and professional obsession. Stuttaford (patron of Pinelands, South Africa’s first Garden City) and Col. Bowling (best known for his work on the first Reef town plans) were similar people who were active in later decades. Porter’s views are, however, indicative of how the problems of the towns were seen by early Union municipal officials almost all of whom were English, even in Pretoria and Bloemfontein.
Porter's attitudes to town planning were shaped by his English experience and training. Like so many colonials, for example Australia's "Town Planning Missionary" Reade, Porter had a high regard for the leadership role of the mother country. He also openly sought inspiration from planning activities elsewhere in the British Empire, notably India and Australia. Despite his admiration for German and even American urban developments, his point of reference on urban policy remained British. His letters and reports are littered with references to England and the English experience. A keen reader, with an energetic interest in the embryonic field of town planning, Porter religiously collected and passed on professional papers to other Council officials. If Milner sought a disciple to carry the gospel of British South Africanism into the municipal arena he could have wished for no more diligent a recruit than Porter. His commitment to the British model of town planning and its application in South Africa was unquestionable.

Porter was profoundly influenced by the new international ideas of urban reform and state responsibility for securing the satisfactory housing and health of the urban working class, and he spared no effort in pressing for effective legislative powers to secure his objective of orderly, low density garden city development. Within two years of his appointment in the rapidly growing and disorderly Johannesburg, Porter had drafted, and was effectively implementing, extensive anti-slab controls. These, he proudly reminded everyone, closely paralleled the subsequent English Town Planning Act of 1909. The local ordinance was, however, declared ultra vire by the Transvaal Provincial Council, who ordered that the legal domain belonged with the Province not the city. Porter was forced to campaign for new measures to control overcrowding in Johannesburg. Having established himself in Johannesburg and familiarised himself with the peculiar aspects of the South African situation, Porter worked hard to get public health and town planning legislation passed. In common with the efforts of philanthropists like Bishop Lavis and municipal officials and professional health personnel like Cluver (the 1918 mayor of Stellenbosch and future Union MOH) and Jasper Anderson from Cape Town, Porter's efforts at first appear an uncritical mimicking of British town planning action. The campaign for public health legislation was, however, rapidly transformed in an attempt to deal with peculiarly South Africa urban issues. Foremost among these was the proliferation of inadequate living quarters for the racially integrated working class in the industrial centres.
After the political unification of South Africa, Porter extended his sphere of influence beyond Johannesburg as he agitated for the introduction of a Provincial and later a South African equivalent of the English Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909. In particular, he was keen for local authorities to acquire power to close uninhabitable buildings. In canvassing local support he also stressed the importance of establishing separate residential areas or ‘locations’ for Africans, coloureds and Indians as an integral part of general town planning provisions. For Porter it was “a most important matter from the public health point of view” (his emphasis) to extend existing powers pertaining to Africans, and to force coloureds and Indians to live in racially segregated municipal locations. Porter, however, understood that the oppression of British Indians in South Africa had already drawn unwanted political heat. He also recognised that having Cape coloureds on the voters role constrained state segregationist action. Conceding that, “for high political reasons”, it was unrealistic for the Government to hope for restrictions on coloured and Indian settlement, Porter took comfort that where enforced urban segregation was not possible some measure of voluntary segregation was evident. On the subject of segregation, Porter remained convinced that Africans’ proper place while in white urban areas was in locations. In Johannesburg he continued to badger the Council to provide houses for some 7,000 Africans so that the black slum known as the Malay Location could be cleared.

Porter favoured racial segregation and saw it as an integral part of effective public health control. In common with officials throughout the British Empire, he believed that the poor (whom he identified as comprising “mean whites, coloured people and Asians”) were incapable of “even passable cleanliness”. Significantly, Porter’s position on the need for segregation was not founded on the racist conviction that Africans were any greater sanitary threat than poor whites. Responding to the 1912 smallpox outbreak, the MOH corrected segregationist zealots mobilising for African removal on the basis of the outbreak of disease by pointing out that not only was the incidence of smallpox among urban Africans low, but that in a decade of working in Johannesburg he did not know of any instance in which an African had introduced smallpox into a white family.
The Johannesburg MOH's attitudes to race and sanitation were not eccentric, nor was he renouncing standing municipal attitudes to ‘the native menace’. Recognition of the growth of white poverty and the new non-racial character of the urban underclass did not make Porter abandon his commitment to the ideal of segregation; he repeatedly recommended the physical separation of black and white residential areas. Like other advocates of intra-urban segregation, such as the Rustenburg Magistrate and Native Commissioner Stubbs, Porter argued that Africans were not only poor, but that their tribal ways left them ill-equipped to deal with the health and social hazards of the city. African access to urban areas should, therefore, be restricted to supervised municipal locations. Crucially, in the light of white urban poverty, Porter’s commitment to segregation extended to regulating whites’ urban conditions as well as those of Africans.

According to Porter, African urban exclusion or restriction would alleviate but not obviate the need for slum control: poor whites (and, unavoidably, coloureds and Indians) would remain within the formal city. In his view, the dependence of the white urban poor on unscrupulous developers of overcrowded housing and rent racketeering landlords necessitated the passage of anti-slum and public health legislation. Porter was thus a segregationist in two respects: he did not believe Africans had any inalienable right to urban residence, and he tried to establish regulations by which a white industrial city which conformed to the most modern and stringent Western planning standards could be assured.

Charles Porter began his personal campaign for public health legislation with a push to enact the 1912 Transvaal Local Government Bill. He lobbied and was able to include a few important public health clauses in the Transvaal Bill to deal specifically with the prevention of site overcrowding. In order to harness public support for his cause Porter organised press releases that drew attention to the relationship between health and bad housing conditions. He also initiated public lectures on the subject. The famous architect Herbert Baker was persuaded to deliver a public address on the desirability of low urban density. The Medical Officer’s efforts were not in vain and the call for urban reform in South Africa received a warm local and international reception. Porter’s interest, expertise and reputation in town planning matters grew
with his involvement in the drafting and passage of the Transvaal Bill and its subsequent amendment in 1916. He also developed extensive overseas connections with academics and practitioners with whom he swapped notes about the kind of terminology that might be incorporated in proposed legislation.  

Around Easter of 1914, while reading professional planning journals, Porter noticed an announcement of a forthcoming Town Planning Summer School. Abandoning his visit to the East and Australia, the MOH went instead to London where, while staying at the Empire Club, he attended the course presented "by all the leading experts". While in England, Porter renewed links with his erstwhile municipal colleagues, and initiated contact with Birmingham Councillors and several garden city developers. Unfortunately for Porter, the outbreak of war prevented him from visiting the garden housing schemes of Hereford, Harborne and Letchworth. Nevertheless, the lecture course and his rewarding personal contact with Unwin, author of the influential *Town Planning in Practice*, rekindled Porter's drive to design South African public health legislation that encompassed the fundamentals of new English planning practices.

Almost everything Porter advocated for South Africa was based on English law and English experience, but he was nevertheless vigorously opposed to certain aspects of overseas metropolitan planning. The London course exposed him to published criticism of elements of Britain's 1890 Housing and Working Classes Act that required a local authority to rebuild on the site of slum clearance schemes. The remarks bolstered his own position that rebuilding should be on the urban periphery where land was cheaper. The maxim of the Summer School was to "evacuate slums into the country by cheap transit to cheap dwellings with gardens". This was the central idea he hawked before policymakers in South Africa.  

Back from Britain, the MOH's campaign shifted from the provincial to the national level. Porter was again foremost among those who championed the passage of a national Public Health Act, and he was not shy to suggest the form it should take. However, within six months of returning to South Africa from London, Porter assumed active war duty as the Union's principal Sanitation
Officer. The additional responsibilities of war work meant that the issues of health, slums and segregation were shelved for the duration of the hostilities.

Porter was one of the first men to initiate a public campaign for strong legislative powers that would give municipalities greater control over public health and slum removals. A significant, but by no means unanimous body of opinion concurred with his interpretation of the nature and solution to urban problems. Porter's idea that removing blacks from the white city was necessary, but not sufficient, to solve urban health problems was widely accepted by divers, constituencies that included civil servants, organised white labour and even mining capitalists. Yet these apparently representative opinions were surprisingly omitted from the Draft Public Health Bill presented to the 1919 Parliament.

A draft Public Health Bill was prepared as early as 1913, but because the Commissions on venereal disease (VD) and tuberculosis (TB) had not yet reported, the Bill was delayed. The demands of war for a fit and healthy population both for defence and for the "industrial and economic struggle that lay ahead" provided a rote reminder of unfinished business.\textsuperscript{47} Even before the close of the First World War, a national consultative conference on Public Health was briefed to make recommendations on matters such as housing, water, and infectious diseases. Porter's gospel was that regulations in line with English town planning norms were necessary if any measure of effective local government control was to be brought to bear on problems in urban slums. This position was widely articulated by several delegates from the larger municipalities to the 1918 Public Health Conference. Porter himself was still on war duty and did not attend the gathering held in Bloemfontein. Milne, his young deputy, who ultimately succeeded him in the position of MOH of Johannesburg, attended in his stead. Other delegates included representatives of the Provincial Municipal Associations and all the major municipalities, as well as members of prominent welfare organisations.\textsuperscript{48}

The conference convened in September 1918, only weeks before the outbreak of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic that would kill 150 000 people in South Africa.\textsuperscript{82} The timing of the Conference is important as the form of much post-First World War segregation or "Native policy",
including the passage of Public Health Bill, has been incorrectly ascribed to the impact of 'Black October'. Undoubtedly, the high death toll from influenza and the first evidence of the rash of industrial unrest that culminated in the white miners strike of 1922, lent urgency to calls for urban reform. But, the Bloemfontein Public Health Conference, and the fairly rapid passage of the Public Health Act, occurred before the full impact of these socially and politically disruptive events were felt. The conference, rather than the epidemic, provides us with an important benchmark of segregationist thinking.

The discussion around the Public Health Bill and associated legislation concerned mostly technical medical matters such as which diseases should be notifiable. Wider policy debates that drew attention included the thorny problem of who should cover the cost of public health care in urban areas. The question involved more than just the familiar fiscal struggle between two tiers of government. The financial framework of health care, whereby local authorities were discouraged from treating Africans with TB or VD because they were only given a skeleton budget to pay for African health treatment, put in place the practice of repatriating sick Africans to rural areas. In practice this meant that only healthy, able-bodied workers remained in urban areas. This policy was made more explicit four years later in the provisions of the 1923 NUAA.

The racial character of disease was not addressed directly at either the Bloemfontein meeting or in the ensuing the Public Health Act. Nevertheless, several general comments reveal an unspoken consensus that territorial segregation provided the solution to the growing problem of disease among Africans in ‘white’ urban areas. Dr Mitchell, the Union’s Acting-MOH made it clear that whereas TB and VD were primarily diseases affecting African people, their occurrence in mainly rural areas meant that treatment was of “little concern to local authorities”. He did recognise, however, that territorial segregation was incomplete and that a sizeable percentage of infected Africans lived in ‘white’ towns. Built into his funding formula for urban TB care was the hospitalisation of whites, coloureds and the “better class of Native”. Mitchell’s own admission that TB was exacerbated by conditions of residential overcrowding, was taken up by several municipal officials who pointed out that state subsidisation of African locations was required to curtail the spread of TB. Particular difficulties of providing affordable sanitary housing for urban Africans,
and the greater impact of disease on the black community, were acknowledged by convenors and
delegates to the Conference. In pure medical matters, as more especially in applied town planning
concerns, however, representatives proceeded to debate public health in much the same way as if
the meeting had been held in New Zealand, the United Kingdom or Canada. The ambition of the
delegates and convenors was to convince government of the virtues of establishing sanitary urban
conditions that would alleviate the poor white problem and encourage colonial settlement in South
African cities.

Public health and slums

The repatriation of sick people and the screening of African urban immigrants for VD and TB
was only one aspect of the strategy to create sanitised cities. Action against slums also received
special consideration in discussions about a desirable public health policy. One of the major
objectives of the Public Health Act was to unite the disparate pre-Union Provincial laws that
operated in the absence of national alternatives. The formulation of national legislation offered the
opportunity to refine unsatisfactory aspects of existing law. Local authority representatives to the
Bloemfontein Conference agreed on several elements to be included in the new Public Health Act.
Municipalities wanted to retain powers to condemn and demolish insanitary buildings and to
prevent overcrowding. They also wished to restrict compensation payments to the market value of
site and building materials. The aim was to prevent rent racketeers demanding exorbitant
compensation based on rental incomes of condemned structures. In a measure that would have
been rejected by Porter, who was opposed to local authorities becoming landlords, the
representatives of some local authorities wanted the power to build, manage, and acquire
low-income housing, and to do this with the assistance of subsidised loans from central
government. It was also suggested that on the basis of Crro Town's difficulties in clearing the
slum of Wells Square, these loans should be granted to local authorities without requiring the
consent of ratepayers. In that way "sectional interests" could be prevented from blocking slum
clearance programmes.
Two contentious issues raised at the Bloemfontein Conference reflect the frustration experienced by municipal bodies in financing slum clearances and public health programmes. Delegates were divided on a motion that the government oppose the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the interests of health. Given that Natal’s entire location system was financed by the proceeds of the municipal monopoly of beer, resistance to this abolitionist motion was predictable. In contrast to the liquor question, there was absolute unanimity among the predominantly civil service representatives that mine-owned land on the Witwatersrand, then protected from sale by the Precious and Base Minerals Act, should be bought at 1918 prices for future housing development that would alleviate pressure on city slums. Some measure of the powerful influence of mining interests on Government is suggested by the fact that this motion on mining land disappeared without trace from any further official discussions on urban development.

Despite the extensive debate at Bloemfontein over the technicalities of the town planning component of proposed public health legislation, the draft Public Health Bill contained virtually no clauses dealing with urban planning. In the wake of the 1918 influenza epidemic, the Bill was rushed through the 1919 session of Parliament, leaving insufficient time for the Public Health Department to circulate the document to the municipal medical officers who would be the major users. The haste to pass the Bill did not prevent Porter, by then back at work in Johannesburg, from raising several questions about the Bill with his friend Dr Arnold, the Union MOH. Porter’s anxiety focused on the “regrettable” omission of town planning provisions from the proposed legislation. His influence was such that he was immediately granted a personal interview with Dr Mitchell, the Union’s Deputy MOH who had drafted the Bill. Parliamentary opposition, and criticism from Porter and other municipal medical officers, caused the Bill to be referred to a Select Committee where all the major municipalities were able to give evidence. In response to municipal opinion on the desirability of formalising and extending local authority regulation of urban density, the Bill was amended to the satisfaction of at least the Johannesburg MOH. All other aspects of town planning legislation raised by delegates to the Conference on Public Health were postponed for discussion to be co-ordinated by the new Housing Commission that was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Health.
Municipal officials had been at the forefront of the demand for urban reform, specifically requesting powers to monitor disease and control slums. In the aftermath of the Influenza Epidemic, the cry for more extensive town planning controls was taken up by the press, professional organisations, and a growing band of liberal-minded reformers. The most influential of the new pressure groupings was the white Labour Party. By virtue of their 1919 municipal election victory in Johannesburg, and the attainment of a record number of seats in the national election three months later, the interests of the white working class were publicised and institutionalised, not least in the passage of the Housing Act.

Whereas the Public Health Conference provided a platform for municipal involvement in the drafting of legislation, a rather different consultative process was established by the Housing Commission. Local authority advice was sought on two specific issues. During visits to municipalities across the Union, the Housing Commission canvassed opinion on desirable revisions to the 1919 Unhealthy Areas Bill, which resembled the first part of Britain's 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act and its various amendments. The English legislation allowed the demolition of whole areas of slum housing and established the imperative of rehousing (preferably on site). The South African version of the Act was unsuccessfully brought before the 1919 session of Parliament. The Commission also sought local authority opinions on the desirability of the introduction of government loans for new housing construction. Funding low-income housing and slum clearances were two of three major problems that arose at Bloemfontein but were omitted from the Public Health Act. The third area of concern, the need to restrict density and prevent overcrowding, was ignored by the Housing Commission's enquiry, as it was adequately addressed in the Public Health Act.

Municipal responses to the prologues of the Housing Commission reveal the extent to which town planning measures of this kind were seen as issues pertaining primarily to white urban residents. The Unhealthy Areas Bill made no mention of race yet several municipalities interpreted the Bill as a measure directed at white slum residents. The request for thoughts on housing loans for people of limited means explicitly included “coloured persons and natives”. Nevertheless, the Bloemfontein Town Council interpreted the Housing Commission's brief more selectively.
the opportunity to point out that poor whites drifting to the towns and "herding in the most insanitary places thro' their lack of means and efficiency" constituted a "national menace". On account of the national rather than local nature of the problem, Bloemfontein officials suggested that powers should be granted to remove and relocate poor whites from slums. Any costs incurred should be borne equally by central and local government.  

No mention was made of the housing problems of the black community. The reputedly liberal nature of the Bloemfontein Council's response to the slum problem in their city is surprising: only months before the town's black population was especially badly hit by influenza, a fact widely attributed to the abysmal living conditions.

The Johannesburg Town Council opposed the Unhygienic Areas Bill on the grounds that the law was unnecessary except in Cape Town, from where the Johannesburg MOH speculated the Bill had emanated. The only area of slum housing in Johannesburg was the Malay Location, and it was already owned by the Council, which had all the necessary powers to clear the slum and house the African residents in locations. In the opinion of the Johannesburg Council, all that was required was legal assistance to prevent "white and coloured people" mixing in the slums, and to restrict the widespread practice of rent-racketeering that was allegedly most acute among poor whites. According to Porter, racial residential mixing was something that could be alleviated in part by guaranteed loans on new construction for white housing.

At the same time as municipal professionals across South Africa reported on the desirability of loans for building municipal housing schemes, the Johannesburg Labour Party took independent action to address the housing problem. The party made the plight of poor whites living in slums a central local and national election issue after the First World War. Following Labour's victory in the Johannesburg Council elections, their leaders sought the advice and experience of Charles Porter in drafting legislation that would guarantee state loans for white housing construction. Typically, Porter left his mark on the proposal. He persuaded the Johannesburg drafters of the Transvaal Housing Bill that although the state should be asked to guarantee loans for housing, loans should not be subsidised. Subsidised or sub-economic loans would mean that Johannesburg residents and businesses, who paid two thirds of all Union taxes, would effectively cover the cost
of low interest loans granted to other municipalities.\(^7\)\(^2\) The Bill should not have been controversial, as all the other provinces already had the powers the Labour Party was demanding for the Transvaal. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Smuts initially disallowed parliamentary discussion on the Bill as its provisions only pertained to the Transvaal. After brief discussion the 1919 Transvaal Housing Bill was rejected and its provisions were included in the 1920 Housing Act that was the product of the Housing Commission's deliberations.\(^7\)\(^3\)

The town planning provisions that formed part of the South African Public Health Act of 1919 and the 1920 Housing Act bore a close resemblance to the resolutions adopted by the international community at the Inter-Allied Housing and Town Planning Congress held in Paris at the start of 1920. South African adoption of international planning principles on overcrowding, housing funding, and slum removals were a deliberate endeavour to forge segregationist urban policies by enhancing the urban conditions of whites. The Public Health Act and the Housing Act employed racially neutral language because it was assumed that the provisions of the Acts would not apply to Africans for whom separate legislation was already being created.\(^7\)\(^4\)

The most ominous portent of shifting post-War attitudes to segregationist policies in which increasing stress was placed on enforcing restrictions on black residence rather than enhancing white urban protection and privilege, was the testimony of Johannesburg's Medical Officer. Reporting to the Housing Commission, Porter conceded that while he supported the state's guarantee of housing loans to whites, he now understood that the real resolution of housing shortages and the urban slum problem lay in the removal of Africans. Having secured the means by which he believed white workers could be protected from rent racketeering and overcrowding, Porter became an advocate of the next stage of urban segregationist planning: the eviction of blacks from the sanitised white city.\(^7\)\(^5\)
Conclusion

Consideration of the motives behind the introduction of early town planning regulations, that most commonly took the form of anti-slum legislation, draws attention to the gap that exists in South African segregationist literature about the causes of intra-urban race separation. Sanitation has correctly been identified as the metaphor which colonialists first invoked to justify the establishment of segregated locations that facilitated the control of urbanised African workers. The sanitation literature tends to focus on the urban ‘native menace’, yet in the opening years of the century the living conditions of poor whites also challenged the unfettered development of industry in South Africa.

English ideas about town planning were initiated by Lord Milner who sought to re-create English towns on the highveld so as to attract immigrants and prevent Afrikaner control of state apparatuses. The exclusion of unskilled whites from most unskilled labour in the towns generated a political crisis whose resolution was sought in the creation of a unified white identity. The abysmal conditions of urban slums where marginalised blacks and whites lived, demanded urban reform if racial unity was to be achieved. Drawing on the European tradition of establishing a sanitised urban environment for the respectable working classes, town planning measures were sought that would prevent overcrowding and facilitate the removal of whites from slums. Simultaneously measures were proposed to exclude Africans from cities. The adoption of the Public Health Act and Housing Act some years before the acceptance of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act highlights the dual strategy employed by the state to control the urban working class, a sizable proportion of whom were white.

Discussion of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century origins of residential segregation generally ignores whites, other than noting the fact that segregationist officials found racial mixing unacceptable and sought a resolution to the problem by removing blacks. The emergence of a poor white population that challenged the social order on which the advance of industrialisation depended, made it imperative to enforce residential segregation. Segregation, by African relocation to compounds or locations offered the possibility of controlling the African workforce. The poor white population was not always employed and, unlike Africans, whites were wholly dependent on
urban wages for subsistence. The state, therefore, sought to protect whites by condoning job reservation and through urban welfare programmes.

Porter responded to the challenges of urban poverty by invoking colonial legislation to contain slum development only once insanitary conditions manifested themselves among the colonial or white community. Town planning regulations therefore were not directed at Africans whose visible presence in urban areas was restricted to mines and locations. Once industrialisation brought large numbers of Africans into the heart of towns were depicted as a ‘native menace’ and a coherent urban ‘native’ policy was sought as the panacea for urban sanitary, political and labour supply problems. The racially separate administration of urban slum communities was confirmed by the introduction of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in 1923.

Notes


Rand wages for skilled work were calculated at the prevailing European mining rate plus an amount paid to compensate for the very high cost of living on the Rand caused by high import and transport costs. Rents were as much as twice those of Cape Town, Durban or Port Elizabeth. See U.G. 12-1914.


Tensions over white scab labour were evident in the white miners' strikes of 1907, 1913 and 1922: Davies, R., *Capital, State and White Labour.*


Brink, E., 'Only decent girls are employed: the respectability, decency and virtue of the garment workers on the Witwatersrand during the thirties,' Unpublished paper presented to the *AFM Workshop,* University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1987; Brink, E., "Maar 't was 't factory melde": Afrikander family and community on the Witwatersrand in the 1920s" in Bozoli, B. (ed.), *Class, Community and Conflict,* Johannesburg, 1987, pp. 177-208; Parnell, S. and Hart, C., 'Church, state and the shelter of white working class women in Johannesburg'.


23 Government Commissions on which Porter served included: Technical Education, 1902; Miners’ Phthisis, 1903; Johannesburg Hospital, 1903; Johannesburg Prison, 1904; Venereal Diseases, 1906; Pretoria Lunatic Asylums, 1909; Mining Regulations, 1908-1910; Tuberculosis, 1912-1914.


27 IAD JGE 187 4086, MOH to T. Adams, Housing and Town Planning Department, London, 6 July 1914; Extract from *The Surveyor and Municipal Engineer*, 14 July 1911 presented to the Public Health Committee, 21 August 1911; Extract from *The British Medical Journal*, 16 March 1912, presented to the Town Clerk, 18 April 1912.

28 IAD JGE 187 4086, Memorandum by MOH in reference to slum property within the Municipal area, 23 February 1912. Porter draws attention to Johannesburg Public Health By-Laws of 1903, Chapter II, Section 1, Article 4, para. 1.

29 IAD JGE 187 4086, MOH to A. Newsholme, Chief Medical Officer, London, 26 February, 1912; MOH to T. Adams, Housing and Town Planning Department, London, 26 February 1912; Memo from the MOH to Town Clerk re: Rand Daily Mail article on Rand Shores, 23/11/1911.

30 This is discussed fully in Chapter Eight; see also Parnell, S., ‘Sanitation, segregation and the Natives Urban Areas Act: African exclusion from Johannesburg’s Malay Location’, *Journal of Historical Geography*, vol. 17, 1991, pp. 271-288.


32 IAD JGE 122 955, Porter to Dr Orenstein, Superintendent of Sanitation, Rand Mines, 10 May 1915.

33 See public announcements in *Sunday Times*, 11/08/1912; *Transvaal Leader*, 16/08/1912.

34 The ‘sanitation syndrome’ associated with the 1904 outbreak of plague provided local authority officials across South Africa, amongst whom Porter was a prominent figure, with the justification for establishing segregated African locations. Christopher, A. J., ‘The roots of urban segregation in South Africa at Union, 1910’, *Journal of Historical Geography*, vol. 14, 1988, pp. 159-69; Kazan, N., ‘African settlements in the Johannesburg area, 1904-1923’.

1 Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the Year 1912-1913, Johannesburg, 1913.

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5 IAD JGE 187 4086, MOH to T. Adams, Housing and Town Planning Department, London, 18 May 1914.

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7 IAD JGE 187 4086, Correspondence between Porter and Baker, 30 August 1912. The men agreed to discuss the content of the lecture at the Joint Municipal and Royal Sanitary Conference held in Johannesburg in November of 1912. It is therefore unlikely that the lecture Baker delivered was the same one reprinted years later, though the tone of the latter address is very much what Porter had in mind. Baker, H., 'Architecture and Town Planning: a lecture presented in Pretoria 11.07.1911', South African Architectural Record, vol. 24, 1939, pp. 92-105.

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9 See extensive correspondence between Porter and Adam between April 1913 and July 1914: IAD JGE 187 4086. Adams later came to South Africa and attended the 1918 Public Health Conference; Carr to Porter, 12 March 1915.

10 IAD JGE 187 4086, Birmingham MOH to Porter, at the Empire Club, London, 29 July 1914; Porter to Adams, 2 July 1914. It appears Adams may have alerted Porter to the Conference announcement: Porter to Lucas, M.P.C, 3 July 1914; Porter to Managing Director, Harbourne Tenants, Ltd, Birmingham, 8 September 1914; IAD JGE 187 4086, Letter to Porter from H. P. Bulmer and Co. Hereford, 27 July 1914; Unwin to Porter, 30 July 1914.

11 IAD JGE 187 4086, MOH to Councillor Clerk, 15 September 1915. He cites Edinburgh Review of October 1914; Johannesburg MOH to Shaw, Under-Secretary for the Interior, 29 September 1914.

12 IAD JGE 122 955, Porter to Orenstein, Superintendent of Sanitation, Rand Mines, 10 May 1915.

13 NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/848, Letter from Arnold, Union MOH, to Town Clerk, 6 August 1918; Report of the proceedings of the Public Health Conference, 16 September 1918, p. 5.

14 KAD 3/CT E1884, Dr J. Anderson, Cape Town MOH, to Public Health and Building Regulations Committee, 7 August 1918; Report by City of Cape Town Delegates to the Public Health Conference, Bloemfontein.


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IAD JGE 149 9728, Arnold to Porter, 16 January 1919; Porter to Arnold, Union MOH, (Copy to Mitchell Acting Union MOH), 29 January 1919; Town Clerk's Report No. 2/1919: Public Health Bill; Summary of results of conference between Dr Mitchell, Acting MOH Union and MOH, Johannesburg, no date; Porter to MOH, Union, 18 January 1919.

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IAD JGE 193 9896, Housing Committee, Minutes of evidence taken at Union Buildings from MOH, Johannesburg, 25 November 1919.


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7 VAB MBL 1/3/1/43, 101/6/6, Secretary Housing Commission, Clyde, to Bloemfontein Town Clerk, 13 August 1919; Memo for Municipal Congress: 'Unhealthy Areas Scheme Act', March 1919; VAB MBL 1/3/1/43 101/6/6, Bloemfontein Town Clerk to Secretary Housing Commission, Clyde, 15 August 1919.


9 Rent racketeering was taken up by the Labour Party newspaper, *The Labour World*, which carried dozens of articles and letters in the closing months of 1919 and the first three months of 1920.

10 For Johannesburg elections see *Labour World*, 24/05/1919; *Municipal Magazine*, September 1919, p. 45; May 1919; *Sunday Times*, 24/08/1919; *The Star*, 26/08/1919.

11 IAD JGE 193 9896, Unhealthy Areas Scheme Bill, 9 April 1919; 'Housing and Slums', draft of article intended for publication in the *South African Medical Journal*.


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IAD JGE 193 9896, Draft (Transvaal) Housing Bill, 28 August 1919; Porter to Councillor Kentridge, 8 November 1919.


CHAPTER THREE

RACIAL, SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATION UNDER THE
NATIVES (URBAN AREAS) ACT OF 1923

Public discussion of race and racial difference predated the 1910 unification of South Africa. Despite ambiguity over racial classification there was a plethora of laws governing aspects of everyday life from walking on a street pavement, to voting and property rights. Twentieth century industrialisation increased racial mixing in the towns and created new points of conflict between the races. African urbanisation in the 1910s and 1920s confirmed that cities would no longer be the preserve of colonial officials and their servants. After Union, and even more so after the First World War, few whites deviated from the view that the future of South Africa lay in the towns and depended on the resolution of 'the urban native problem'. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 (NUAA) was to provide the legislative framework for the resolution of all conflict over the growing settled African population of the towns.

From a Union administrative point of view, the passing of legislation pertaining to Africans in urban areas was an essential step towards establishing a systematic policy of 'native administration'. The 1913 Land Act and the 1920 Native Administration Act created territorial and political structures governing Africans in rural areas. Parallel legislation for urban districts was sought urgently. The idea of a specific urban policy for Africans was therefore part of a more general strategy of segregation that was already in place in the rural reserves, in industry, and in transport and school segregation. Unlike other spheres where discriminatory regulations had evolved over decades of daily activity, or were formulated by particular interest groups (e.g. the mines) in response to crises (e.g. strikes), the shaping of urban segregation policies initially appeared almost democratic, at least by South African standards. Public opinion on the government's proposals was solicited actively.
There has been a tendency to ignore the diverse responses to the 1918 and 1922 Bills out of which the NUAA emerged, and to focus on published submissions to the Select Committee of 1922 where some crucial changes in the Bill were agreed to. Yet, in the initial stages of consultation, substantial revisions were accepted that both altered the substance of the legislation and tightened its objectives. The existing emphasis on the link between urban segregation and the creation and control of an African migrant labour force misses other important social and planning processes ushered in under the NUAA. The pre-Parliamentary debates that are now scattered across provincial, municipal and private archival collections reveal that the draft Native Urban Area Bill (NUAB) was manipulated to delineate urban controls on coloured people, thereby forging a separate coloured racial identity. The 1918 Bill was premised loosely on the idea that the Public Health Act would secure a portion of towns where minimum colonial urban standards for settlers could be maintained. The implicit assumption was that coloureds and Indians were unlikely to occupy these sanitised districts for cost and cultural reasons. Racial mixing among black people would be prevented by the segregation of Africans in locations under the new legislation.

In addition to tightening the definition of 'African' and 'coloured', the state, through the NUAA, sought to regulate the workforce on which the diversifying post-World War One South African economy depended. It was the objective, rather than the unintended consequence of the NUAA to create a reliable, manageable supply of semi-skilled labour through the social differentiation of the African population into rural dwellers, urban migrants and permanently settled urbanites. This was achieved in three ways. First, permanently urbanised Africans had to be distinguished from migrants when in the cities. Second, African living standards had to be improved as the physical, social and political environment of the slums mitigated against productive employment. Third, the strategy of fashioning a regulated and segregated African urban working class depended on finding funds for locations that did not drain resources from whites. Amendments to the Natives Urban Areas Bills therefore coalesced around the racial, social and spatial differentiation of the urban working class.

The ideological imprecision of condoning a non-migrant African urban population while simultaneously embracing a policy of segregating Africans within rural reserves created practical
confusion. The ambiguous urban management strategies contained in the 1918 and 1922 Bills were challenged, particularly by local authorities who bore the brunt of daily urban administration, and by blacks whose urban status was at stake. Both constituencies wished to clarify the position of the growing number of Africans who had dropped all rural ties and for whom the cities were their only home. It transpired that black opinion on urban areas policy was almost wholly disregarded, but the submissions from local authorities had enormous impact on the final form of the NUAA.

Race definition and urban policy

The consultation process embarked upon by Prime Minister Smuts when the 1918 Bill was released in January, was rather different to that adopted in the case of the 1919 Public Health Bill. In that case a single conference provided local authorities and other interested parties with a forum to voice their opinions on the subject. A general conference on urban African policy along the lines of that convened for the Public Health Bill was thwarted by the 1922 strike. In any event, over a period of almost four years, first the Native Affairs Department (NAD), and after 1920 the Native Affairs Commission (NAC), solicited extensive responses, either by visiting or by corresponding with appropriate constituencies. Copies of the Bill written in the vernacular were distributed at location meetings following initial concern to open the consultation process to as wide an audience as possible. African scepticism over the Bill and the extent to which African interests would be weighed seriously proved to be well founded. Consultative meetings with location residents very quickly gave way to formally drafted submissions on behalf of the more powerful local authorities. It was in this manner that the Orange Free State (OFS) local authorities were able to effect one of the more critical revisions to the NUAB even before it reached the second parliamentary reading.

One consequence of the nationally applicable NUAA was to revoke provincial and municipal legal restrictions on urban segregation. In the OFS and Transvaal this gave coloureds equal legal status to white people. This meant not only free residential locational choice, but also that coloured land owners could vote in town elections. This privilege already existed in the more liberal
Cape, but it was vigorously opposed in the conservative Free State. The NAC had not considered the impact of the Bill on coloureds at all, and construed the legislation as improving the position of "Europeans and Natives". When confronted by Bloemfontein Officials' objections to the revised status of coloureds of the Province, the NAC stood by their implicit exemption of coloureds from urban segregation.¹¹ Smuts, however, wished to avoid incorporating the politically contentious 'coloured question' into the NUAB debate which he hoped would not assume a party-political character.¹² Confrontation between the central and local state was averted and an apparently happy compromise was forged through careful redrafting of the 1918 Bill: only legislation pertaining to Africans was revoked, while the position of coloureds remained unchanged.¹³ By this action, however, coloured people not only received one of several blows to their citizenship rights vis-a-vis whites, but the process of 'coloured' race-creation received new impetus.

The conservative position of Free State officials on questions of race are evident in the early 1920s action of the Bloemfontein Council. An area of ground for occupation by coloureds had been laid out and the Council was keen to see its establishment. The usual paternalism prevailed as the Town Council explained that it was not in the coloureds' best interests to live in town "in close association with drink and other evils which tend to degradation of themselves and their children".¹⁴ Significantly, the segregated scheme drew support from organised coloured opinion in the form of the African Peoples' Organisation (APO).¹⁵ The APO feared that coloureds would be grouped with Africans and would be incorporated under the NUAB. Under the guise of imploring the Town Council to recognise the fact that "coloured people, though yellow in colour, possess the intellectual and brain development of the white man", and that in Bloemfontein coloured people "knew their place" and had not tried to move into white suburbs, the APO tried to secure a guarantee of freehold under the old OPS Law No. 8 of 1893, a right they had hitherto been denied.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, white segregationists made much of the coloured organisations' request for segregation and ignored their demand for freehold.¹⁷ Europeans across the Province were champions of the principle of total segregation according to which only whites could enjoy full urban privileges, Africans would be restricted to designated rural districts, and coloureds would be barred from living in and owning property in selected portions of towns.¹⁸
A compromise was reached between the central government and the OFS, whereby the standard of coloured citizenship in the Province would be raised by granting segregated but freehold suburbs with some measure of self-government under the auspices of town councils. This provincial softening on the question of extending freehold to non-Europeans appears to have been a response to the NAC's reticence to recommend the amendment of the 1918 Bill unless adequate alternative provision was made for coloureds. OFS officials were faced with the choice of having coloureds equated with whites, or placed in a separate category with urban rights over and above those historically allowed coloureds or Africans. Even this discriminatory position was not automatically accepted by white Free State hard-liners.

The principle of racial differentiation introduced by the NUAB was vociferously opposed by the Ladybrand delegate to the Provincial Council. He regarded coloured people as "bastards", who should be excluded from any urban rights, "rather than his distinction being recognised." Similar sentiments about how giving coloureds recognition over Africans was simply "the thin edge of the wedge" were proffered by delegates from the small platteland towns of Rouxville and Winburg. Perhaps they, like the Bloemfontein Location Superintendent, believed that if coloureds were given freehold tenure and trading rights they would rise to a point from which they could challenge the economically protected position of the Boers.

In the 1910s and early 1920s the perceived imperative of preserving white racial purity was rarely challenged, but the most effective method of achieving this was contested. What the NUAB offered municipalities was a welcome mechanism for preventing the racial mixing of whites and Africans in urban slums. Moreover, the innovation of segregating African and coloured residential quarters promised the guardians of racial purity additional protection against the creation of a "snuff and butter" race of "half-castes". By restricting cross-racial contact "where black meets brown", whites believed they could stem the invasion of black blood into the white race, even when white and coloured interbreeding persisted. Many South Africans, not just the ultra-conservative Free Staters, subscribed to the "science" of eugenics. The leading figure of the NAC, Locarn, tried to explain to the Executive of the OFS Municipal Association at its meeting in Bloemfontein that the Commission sought the separation of coloureds and Africans because coloureds "should be helped
to improve the white blood they have”. The general attitude of Europeans was summed up by the OFS Executive President who agreed that the Province would have to be involved in the improvement of coloured people, but he did not think that “they should at once be brought up to the level of Europeans.”

At the same time as the NAC met OFS officials to discuss the proposed NUAB, a conference of African leaders was convened in the Free State capital for the same purpose. More than a day-and-a-half of the three-day conference was dedicated to discussion of the proposal to exclude coloured and Indian people from African locations. Although there was not absolute agreement among the appointed delegates, most felt it important to disassociate themselves from the process of race formation implicit in the NUAB’s revisions. While the African leaders were aware that many blacks preferred segregated living, they resisted the invitious legislation that would force black people apart. One fear was that if the NUAA was enforced, Africans who could do so would be tempted to “pass for coloured”, in order to evade passes and enhance their residential and occupational opportunities.

The focus on the OFS’s objections to the NUAB may appear to be a rather parochial quibble, but exactly the same issues emerged in Natal with respect to Indians. A Durban Councillor wailed that “the preferential treatment of Asiatics over privileges not enjoyed by Natives is neither just in principle nor expedient in fact”. The innovations implied in the NUAB held equally in the Transvaal where Provincial and Municipal restrictions discriminated against unrestricted coloured and Indian residence. Astonishingly, given the extensive local debate around racial residential mixing in Johannesburg in the late teens and early twenties, only the Ratepayers’ Association took up the issue formally. Possibly Transvaal bureaucrats read the lack of reference to coloureds in the 1918 NUAB in a different light to that adopted by Free State officials. Johannesburg’s Chief Pass Officer did not for a moment contemplate coloured and white equality. In responding to the Bill, he assumed all coloureds would live in locations and was only concerned how this might impinge on “respectable coloured persons”.

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The position of the Cape Municipal Association differed from the northern provinces. In the Cape, Smuts' approval of the OFS's amendment meant that coloured people who already lived in African locations would have to be re-housed. The Association sought special exemption from this obligation for existing coloured occupants, but did not oppose the introduction of legislation that restricted future location residence to Africans. Loram advised the Cape on how to approach the de facto mixing of coloureds and Africans:

Coloured people who had acquired rights in locations, or who had become one with the natives, should be allowed to remain, but it would be wiser to eliminate others gradually, and to allow no more to come in, so natives could preserve their race integrity.

By accepting Loram's proposal the Cape implicitly endorsed the creation of a more rigid racial framework of urban government in the nation's erstwhile liberal province.

Racial segmentation may have been the unintended consequence of the hasty formulation of the NUAB. It was not, however, an undesirable outcome for the South African ruling classes. Political agitation by the white working class for racial protection targeted all non-whites, not simply Africans. Given the context of urban racial conflict in the early 1920s, the prospect of incorporating coloureds and poor whites in the Transvaal and OFS into one administrative category was unlikely to be pursued seriously. Besides, the maintenance of white racial purity and the imperative of preventing miscegenation were popular views held by a cross-section of South Africans. Even English-speaking liberals adhered to the corollary of white racial purity, that of upholding traditional African values. Liberals were therefore concerned not to expose African society to the demoralising impact of Western culture by allowing anyone to tamper with traditional African life. From the perspective of the self-styled protectors of Africans, it seemed sensible, not reactionary, to isolate Africans, especially in urban areas where they were deemed to be most vulnerable.

There were practical advantages to the authorities of perpetuating and reinforcing the distinction between African and coloured people. Only African women brewed 'kaffir beer' in the cities, and African men drank it. Brewing seriously challenged the social order on which continued
industrialisation and wealth accumulation depended. By isolating that portion of the black urban population who were enmeshed in the liquor trade, an urban 'native' problem was created. Whereas it was not possible to exclude coloured or Indian people from urban areas, Africans had an identifiable rural base and their status in urban areas was therefore more malleable. Because of African citizenship of Reserves, white solutions to the urban native problem came to hinge on curtailing the number of Africans in the cities and defining where and how they might live. Astonishing though it now appears in light of the regimented and unsavoury history of compounds and locations, segregation implied the reform of African housing.

Social differentiation and urban reform

The possibility that the NUAA was a genuine urban reform initiative, as its drafters purported, has been dismissed and discounted as naive. Instead, the extent to which the revised location and hostel system established an effective mechanism of political and economic control as the adjunct of the labour system has been emphasised. Retrospectively, however, historians have been forced to acknowledge that African townships supported more than quiescent cheap labour. Family housing facilitated the growth of a class of urban-born Africans. Semi-skilled employment was the preserve of African men whose relatively privileged position in the labour market was assured by their established urban status. Blinded by the Staklandist rhetoric that defined urban Africans as 'temporary sojourners', it is easy to accept that a permanently settled urban African workforce was an unintended consequence of segregation. Yet, hidden behind the pejorative terminology, the clear intent of the drafters of the NUABs was to clear Africans from slums and at minimum, create a non-migrant workforce capable of reproducing itself in town.

Urban access for all Africans was curtailed under the NUAA. But, the NUAA did not affect all Africans' lives in the same way, nor was it ever intended to. Those Africans who obtained location accommodation had the possibility of uninterrupted family life and a protected urban environment. Less comfortable accommodation was available to legally-employed migrants in compounds. Others who were unable to evade the legal obstacles to entering urban areas, or were
unwilling to live illegally in the city, subsisted on the gradually depleting resources of the overpopulated rural areas.

The differentiation of the African population into a group of urban 'insiders' and bantustan 'outsiders' was an intentional and not an incidental consequence, of the way the NUAA was formulated. The objective of social segmentation was to be achieved by the reform of pre-Union urban policies which treated all Africans in urban areas as migrants, making only ad hoc exceptions for the educated or wealthy, and funding only make-shift segregated locations in response to sanitary problems and/or racist objections from whites. In order to reassess the intentions of Smuts and his advisers in formulating and revising urban Africans' status, it is helpful to restate the position of urban Africans prior to 1923, to reconsider the stated objectives of the Bill, and to examine the response to the NAC's recommendations.

The quality of life for Africans in South African towns after World War One was far from satisfactory. The cost of living began to escalate dramatically from 1917, undermining the survival of even those in receipt of a regular wage. Some towns had better reputations than others, but even 'model locations' in places such as Bloemfontein and Durban returned disproportionately high mortality and infection figures following the 1918 influenza epidemic. The high incidence of environmentally-sensitive diseases such as tuberculosis confirms the horrific conditions which people confronted in towns. The institutionalised disregard for African lives meant that locations were habitually built on old sewerage sites that posed a serious threat to public health. Compounds on the gold and diamond fields were, if anything, even less attractive places to live than locations, where at least families could be together. Particularly where the growth of industry outpaced the provision of housing for Africans, employers would simply allow workers to live on industrial premises in overcrowded and inadequate informal compounds. Judging by the rents people were prepared to pay, and the dramatic rise in the number of backyard rooms on city lots, slums were the least odious of the undesirable accommodation on offer. Only very rarely were African people able to escape the urban grime and save the £75 capital needed before Africans could purchase their own homes in suburbia. Aside from economic constraints on
home-ownership, restrictive title deeds and racial proclamations made it virtually impossible for Africans to purchase urban land.  

The provisions of the NUAB and the NUAA have been detailed on several occasions. It is, however, worth relating the specific measures which the authorities perceived as reformist initiatives that would improve the experience of African town life. This is not a contrived enquiry: welfare was one of the specific objectives of the Bill, alongside that of unifying Union urban policy and providing for the better "regulation and control of African areas." The first reform proposed in the Bill was that local authorities be given the power to establish 'Native Villages'. In Smuts’ words such a village was to be:

a place set aside where the better-class native could live, the educated native who had raised himself in the scale of civilisation, and it was not fair to ask that that man live amongst the rest of his people who were still in a semi-barbarous state.

The premier and the NAC toured the country promoting the Bill. They hoped that the tiny group of exempted African professionals who owned property or lived in white suburbs, and who numbered only 916 in the Transvaal, would accept the carrot of freehold and the chance to build their own homes away from the mass housing schemes of the locations. ‘Native Villages’ were an adjunct not an alternative to location development. The idea was to appease the African elite while entrenching racial segregation. Despite the very limited number of Africans who may have purchased houses in Villages, this clause in the NUAB fuelled the discussion on permanent African urbanisation, and gave rise to protective clauses that were not dissimilar to the immigration laws imposed in North America preventing the entry of undesirable immigrants.

Unravelling the debate on freehold is difficult, not least because of the semantic confusion over the term ‘Native Village’. African people disliked the use of the word ‘location’, and Loram tried to have it removed from the NUAB and substituted with the word ‘village’. The result was continual uncertainty over whether native villages, locations or both were to have freehold under the NUAB. Smuts intended Native Villages to have freehold, but he too was vague and less
convinced about the status of location tenure. The parliamentary debate led by opposition leader Hertzog used the ambiguity over location tenure to advantage by assuming that all Africans were being offered permanent tenure in urban areas. Riding on the opposition to location freehold expressed by each of the Provincial Municipal Associations, and the joint recommendations of the NAC and the Transvaal Local Government Commission, a Select Committee of Parliament eventually rejected any individual tenure being granted to Africans in either locations or villages.

The tenure issue was fundamental to the form of native urban policy implemented in South Africa. No other issue demonstrated so vividly African urban impermanence than their inability to claim fixity of land holding. The possibility of gaining freehold, even if only in Native Villages, reinforced the fact that permanent African urban settlement was being recognised. This was a fundamental challenge to those idealist segregationists who shunned anything but total partition of blacks and whites. African freehold also concerned more moderate, pragmatic segregationists who were anxious to limit the extent and location of African urban settlement although they depended on African labour and accepted that some housing for Africans workers had to be provided in cities. These segregationist leaders feared that if Africans were allowed to own land they could bequeath it, allowing future generations to settle in the urban areas. Parading the potential threat posed to white survival and supremacy by unregulated urbanisation of African people to occur, a Pretoria Councillor warned:

through the attraction of town life it is conceivable that in a few years these villages will become larger and more populous than the European towns to which they are attached, and conditions of overcrowding will result... the problem of providing for natives will become beyond the control of the European population... the place would become a centre of native influence - independent but interconnected with the European community, and this must have detrimental and far-reaching effect on our social and economic life.

Stallard was more blunt about the impact of the economic and political empowerment of urban Africans:
To exempt from the pass and registration laws the most skilled and educated native is to expose the white population to the most deadly competition which the black race is capable of offering, and to ensure the ultimate subordination of the most hopeless portion of the white race to the most competent portion of the black race.  

The battle to extend African urban freehold in designated Native Villages was lost, but the principle of the social differentiation of the urban African community remained intact. In a speech before parliament Hertzog declared boldly that "on the white man's land the native could only be a temporary resident", but he also conceded the need for superior accommodation of "educated natives". Unlike Smuts, but like the Transvaal Local Government Commission (chaired by Stullard), Hertzog stressed the importance of the educating role of 'civilised' natives on their brethren. The urban African elite were therefore not allowed special privileges and were to be forced to live in locations. The freehold proposal was only defended in the Senate by one member of the NAC, J. 

Freehold Native Villages were a dispensable sugar coating on the more bitter pill of housing the growing African population in urban locations and compounds. 

Despite widespread opposition to the establishment of an urban African middle-class, and despite Smuts' own about-turn on freehold, existing Native Villages such as Korsten (outside Port Elizabeth) and Alexandra (north of Johannesburg) were unaffected by the law, as was African ownership in urban areas not proclaimed under the NUAA. African land holdings (estimated at 8,170 stands) were frozen, and freehold land in proclaimed areas was epropriated.  

Instead of the development of the spacious new urban African middle-class villages envisaged by the NAC, the density of settlement in the enclaves of racially unregulated space escalated. Predictably, slums developed in black freehold townships like Sophiatown (Johannesburg) which provided a refuge for Africans removed under the NUAA and the Slums Act. 

52
The cancellation of freehold rights proposed in the NUAB is the most commonly cited illustration of the victory of reactionary Stallardism over the reformist recommendations of another Government enquiry, the Godley Commission on Native Passes. The tendency to overstate the importance of the land ownership question in the reform package stems partly from the wisdom of hindsight and partly from the moral outrage that African civil rights were so violently abused. The creation of an African urban elite was, however, only one aspect of the reforms proposed by the NUAB. Under the 1918 draft other crucial means of differentiating the African population were also envisaged. The creation of carefully monitored and closely regulated locations was the most important aspect of the Bill. It was this aspect of the NUAB that drew support from different constituencies, including Africans and liberal whites, who endorsed the building of African locations as "serious and comprehensive" measures that would improve the "deplorable" conditions of Africans in the towns. It was also this aspect of the Native Urban Areas legislation that fashioned a stable urban African population.

Urban Areas legislation was originally targeted at the eight largest municipalities of the Union, for it was there that Africans had migrated and settled. Cape Town, the oldest and most established urban centre in the country had only a small African population. Likewise Port Elizabeth and East London had a relatively larger coloured working class and fewer urban opportunities for Africans, and nothing like the slums of the northern cities. The NAC was at pains to reassure Bloemfontein that its location's excellent reputation meant that "the locations the Commission wished to see improved were not in the Orange Free State." In Durban the NAC was marginally less flattering. Local man, Loram, conceded that the City had "already undertaken many of the provisions of the Bill" while the outsider, Roberts (who was from Lovedale), gently asserted that the Commission had certain improvements "of a minor nature" that it would "see the local authority to implement under the Bill." No doubt the NAC had in mind the cross-subsidisation of Africans' taxes into the white city's general account.

The perceived urban crisis brought about by African urbanisation which the NAD was asked to resolve through the formulation of urban African policy for the country had a very clear geographical focus on the Transvaal, and especially Johannesburg. The urban African population
of the Witwatersrand was growing most rapidly and there was virtually no history of municipal African housing provision. The squalor of Rand locations and slums were roundly condemned in enquiry after enquiry. Mimicking the European model of rehousing slum dwellers, the explicit objective of the NUAB was to build locations as an alternative to slums. Compared to the make-shift arrangements for African housing in the 1910s, the prospect of affordable, conven-ient and adequate location housing was in many respects a dramatic improvement. The powerful lii. ..., Rheinallt Jones, mused that 'the benefits of the Bill are so many and so immediate that one is tempted to cast doubt to the winds and grasp the proffered gifts'. Following his example, however, it is essential to reflect on the darker side of the NUABs provisions for enforcing segregated locations.

Just as the query over the NUABs impact on non-African blacks was taken up most vigorously by the OFS, so the Transvaal Municipalities were the major force dictating the increasingly restrictive regulations on the manner and conditions under which African people could live in urban areas. Getting the powerful Transvaal municipalities to accept the imperative of increased African location development was relatively simple, especially as neither of the NUABs necessarily proposed to tax ratepayers for the funds. In fact the Johannesburg MOH had been pushing for additional locations for some time prior to the appearance of the Bill, though with very limited success. Western Native Township and Wemmer hostels were opened in 1918, but fell far short of meeting the housing need. Albeit in a rather tardy fashion, other Reef towns were similarly active in providing locations after World War One. The contentious points between central and local governments were how much location housing should be constructed, of what standard, for which Africans, and from which funds.

Contrary to the wishes of the central government which sought segregated housing of "all the elements of the native population, except those of a superior class specially exempted", the Transvaal municipalities rejected the 'Native Village' principle and wanted only a section of the population working in towns to be accepted for location residence. Whereas the NAC, the Godley Commission and Smuts sought to differentiate 'civilised' Africans on the grounds of their financial, cultural or educational position, the local authorities, like Hertzog and even Creswell's
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financial, cultural or educational position, the local authorities, like Hertzog and even Creswell’s
Labour Party, saw only employment status as a useful instrument of distinction. Africans either worked for whites and could therefore be granted temporary urban residence, or they were unemployed, in which case they should be returned to rural reserves. A third elite tier within African society was to be discouraged, and the fruits of economic and social privilege were to be reserved for whites. The lines of social and racial differentiation should ideally correspond, excluding Africans from the respectable upper classes.

Disagreement over the place of an African elite has masked the fact that the proposed 'native' urban policy defined a further category, namely "redundant natives". The NAC's Loram explained:

the town is a European area in which there is no place for the redundant native, who neither works nor serves his or her people but forms the class from which the professional agitators, the slum landlords, the liquor sellers, the prostitutes and other undesirable classes spring.°°

Neither the tone nor the substance of this attitude can be distinguished readily from Stallard's own words. Speaking in his private capacity at the South African Party Club, he rehearsed his view that "Natives who did not minister to the wants of the white man were redundant", and then continued to argue how these redundant natives made up the undesirable elements of slums and should therefore "be eliminated in order to remedy the deplorable state of affairs".°°

The revised NUAB which was released in 1922 did not incorporate recommendations which the largest province made through the Stallard Report. Yet the conservative Transvaal lobby had considerable impact on the final form of the Act. By challenging the definition of who would be classified redundant and how they should be treated, the Transvaal municipalities whittled away at the 1922 Bill, bringing it closer in line with the arrangements they had already agreed to in the Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission. According to Nichols, the President of the Transvaal Municipal Executive Association, Africans should only be allowed in urban areas at the discretion of whites, "to whom after all the area belongs". Reiterating the position they had already adopted in the Stallard Report, Nichols stressed the link which the Transvaal authorities wished to establish between Africans working for whites and their right to live in the city.°°
A prerequisite for being able to serve whites was that Africans were able-bodied. Provisions for
the repatriation of the sick and infirm had already been legislated under the Public Health Act.
Further measures in the NUAB enabling the local authority to repatriate the "habitually idle or
disorderly" by sending them back to where they came from or to a labour colony, failed to appease
either Transvaal or Natal officials. The municipalities complained that they had no preventative
powers, and recommended that they be allowed to preclude the entry of "weedy" Africans or anyone
who might be construed to threaten public health. Particular permission was sought to examine
African women entering the towns. Undoubtedly the hope was that this distasteful examination
would be an effective substitute for the enforcement of pass laws which African women had
successfully evaded. Local authorities were not immediately successful in extending their powers
to bar entry to the sick or diseased, nor were they able to secure the prerogative of examining
African women. They were victorious on the more fundamental issue of the repatriation of
"masterless natives".

The eleventh-hour inclusion of the Native Registration and Protection Bill into the NUAB
precluded open discussion of the kind allowed on other aspects of the Bill. Initially presented as a
relatively liberal Bill based on the findings of the Godley Commission into Native Pass laws, only
the most conservative of the clauses pertaining to Africans' passes were adopted. Equally
distressing was the omission of any compulsion for local authorities to match the regulation of
African urbanisation with the welfare component of the Bill that guaranteed location housing. The
outcome of the NUAA therefore exceeded even Stallard's repressive recommendations.

The original logic outlined in Stallard's Report was that if an African seeking work was only
registered once a local authority had been assured that approved housing was available, either on
the employer's premises or in a location or hostel, then satisfactory local authority control over
urbanisation would be assured. Passes issued by the central government's Department of Native
Labour would no longer be required. Responding confidentially to the Director of Native Labour's
enquiry as to his opinion on the proposal, Johannesburg's MOH objected to the "immensity of
special work" and cost which would be incurred by the city. He denounced the "registration and
inspection" scheme as impractical. Further resistance to the regulation of African labour through
tying satisfactory housing provision to jobs came from those who wished to protect the "legitimate supply of labour". The NUAB Select Committee were clearly swayed by these arguments as the final NUAA required African service contracts to be registered, but no mention was made of municipal responsibility to ensure effective housing supply for Africans. Fortuitously, the local authorities were not entirely absolved from their responsibilities for location development by virtue of their obligation to rehouse Africans displaced by the application of the NUAA.

Financing segregated residential development

The decision to adopt a policy of racial residential segregation as a response to permanent African urbanisation was virtually unanimous. Only Africans bruised by the detrimental impact of the 1913 Land Act expressed any disquiet about further geographical restrictions on African settlement, or about the framework of racial segregation. Among Europeans, be they state officials, employers, philanthropists or working class vigilantes, there was almost complete agreement that only Africans working for whites would be allowed to urbanise. Cities were still white space in the European mind. Resolution of the debate about how urban Africans should be excluded from cities, or how they should be governed when in urban areas, became progressively more restrictive and finally encompassed the reservations of the different local authorities. The resultant Act was startlingly conservative, and depended on the categorisation and regulation of black people. In addition, implementation of the strategy of racial and social differentiation necessitated costly construction of physically separated locations for Africans. It was the ability of the 1923 legislation to generate funds from Africans themselves for the implementation of urban segregation and upgrading that made the law the institutional cornerstone on which segregated South African cities were built.

It has been suggested that a systematic policy of segregation was not introduced into the towns prior to World War One because there was a tendency to accept "the fiction that an urban native population as such did not exist." The intensity with which demands for money to upgrade urban services for Africans were resisted by cash-strapped local authorities across the country indicates otherwise. Money for location development was in critically short supply because it
was a low priority in city budgeting. Councils justified their decisions not to spend locally generated funds on African services because all monies generated from African passes were paid to the Provinces. Ignoring the needs of urban blacks was in the interests of the white working class who opposed the 'subsidisation' of Africans, especially the semi-skilled, as it undermined their own protected position. The powerful Ratepayers' Associations wished to keep city taxes low, reinforced the cities' tendency to invest in only white urban services. Business was the only other voice that may have pushed for better living conditions for African workers, but companies were already paying some £350 000 a year in pass fees. Moreover, in the early years of manufacturing very few employers had more workers than the factory itself could shelter. Locations, especially if they were remote, would only increase workers' costs and reduce employer convenience and control. The obvious solution of getting employers to fund locations was therefore resisted. Slums were the inevitable consequence of neglect, but until inner-city blight became acute, employers were happy to accept the status-quo. Once the prevalence of slum housing impeded capitalist growth after World War One, the prospect of taxing Africans themselves for location development became considerably more attractive to commercial and manufacturing interests.

Against the background of widespread opposition to diverting existing civic funds to redress the African urban housing shortage, the NAD had to deliver a more 'neutral' source of funds for location construction. The central state adamantly refused to assume fiscal responsibility for housing Africans and managed instead to devolve responsibility for the task of housing Africans living and working in towns to local authorities. Two places in the country had better than average records of municipal location development. Aspects of the Bloemfontein and the Durban systems formed the template on which national location financing was to be based. The innovation of a Native Revenue Account was copied from Bloemfontein. The city had for some time worked on the principle that revenue raised in the location had to be spent in the location. From Durban the model of drawing funds from a municipal monopoly on the brewing of 'Kaffir Beer' was incorporated into the NUAB.
The suggested establishment of a Native Revenue Account was widely welcomed by Africans and European philanthropists. It was common knowledge that for some time funds from taxes and levies on urban Africans had found their way into general municipal funds. Some municipalities made as much as £2 000 per year from this practice. One reason profits were shown at all on African services was the inordinately high rentals inflicted on location residents. The NUAB proposed to restrict the practice by limiting rent to 10 per cent of capital cost, a most unpopular move among the guilty local authorities. Additional funds for the new Native Revenue Account were to be gleaned by appropriating the revenue which employers contributed to native contract registration. Hitherto this money had been placed at the general disposal of local authority treasurers. The new scheme was also received with some derision. In Durban, application of this clause of the NUAB meant that the £9 000 paid annually into the Borough Fund from employers taxes (thereby reducing the overall rates payable) would have to be forfeited for location expenditure, a change the Town Treasurer denounced as "monstrous".

The scale of municipal opposition to the enforcement of the Native Revenue Account proposal fell far short of the enormous wave of protest against the subsequent introduction of a municipal Kaffir Beer monopoly. Prohibitionists, African leaders and even some state officials rallied to oppose the profit from beer being used to construct African housing. The government withstood the enormous opposition to the Kaffir beer proposal, and with only minor amendments the possibility of local governments generating funds locally remained intact. Segregation now rested on local government financing of segregated housing. Upgrading depended on how much money was available, and the considerable resistance to municipal brewing meant that only a minority of towns had sufficient funds in the Native Revenue Account to fund major construction projects. In consequence, unless the demand for stable African labour was sufficient, or the political imperative of segregation was great enough to motivate for funds from white municipal budgets, the overcrowding of blacks in slums persisted.
Conclusion

The policy of racial segregation necessitated the differentiation of Africans from the rest of the black urban working class. Loosely defined linguistic, cultural and physiological differences that separated the Bantu speaking peoples, the Khoi and immigrants from India, Malaysia and China were therefore legally institutionalised with industrialisation and urban growth. The process of race formation resulting from the application of urban areas legislation is most vividly demonstrated with reference to the 'coloured' community whose intermediary social and economic position in the South African racial hierarchy was actively shaped through the passage of the NUAA.

The application of the NUAA, and its various amendments, although ostensibly aimed at making Africans only temporary urban dwellers, in fact stabilised the urban African workforce. Emphasis on the unique manner in which the South African state inadvertently ensured a semi-skilled African workforce through the repressive control of urban population numbers and location living standards ignores evidence that the South African state, through the NUAA, intended to differentiate Africans living permanently in urban areas from migrants or rural Africans. This was a strategy akin to those adopted in northern hemisphere countries where the development of the 'respectable' working class was nurtured through town planning regulations and civic projects.

Both intra-racial and inter-racial cleavages were consciously forged by the establishment of a municipal financial base to fund the separation and improvement of some Africans' urban living conditions. From a planning or geographical point of view, the distinctiveness of the NUAA lay in its potential to deliver resources for selective urban African settlement. Under the Public Health and Natives (Urban Areas) legislation the state set out to construct location housing for Africans that would simultaneously sanitise the white city, thereby establishing the segregated infrastructure that still characterises South African cities. The racially determined experience of city life and urban policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s is the focus of the next chapter.
Notes


4 *Cape Times*, 08/02/1923. Smuts argued in parliament that this was the most widely debated Bill in South Africa's history. See also CAD GNLB 285, 52/18/102, Acting Director of Native Labour to Secretary, Transvaal Native Congress, 25 September 1918.


6 NAD 3/DBN 4/1/75, Secretary, Natal Municipal Association, to Durban Town Clerk, 16 March 1923.

7 CAD GNLB 285, 52/18/102, Acting Director, Native Labour, to Superintendent, Klipspruit Location, 24 September 1918; Protector of Natives to Director, Native Labour, 24 March 1920; Notes of meeting at Boksburg Location to discuss Draft Urban Areas Bill and position of Natives in Location, 2 June 1920.

8 See VAB, MBL 4/1/37, ongoing correspondence between Bloemfontein Town Clerk and Town Solicitor.

9 CAD GNLB 285, 52/18/102, Report on proposed NUAB, 1922 by NAC.

10 *Cape Times*, 08/02/1923; see VAB, MBL 4/1/37, Extract of Minutes of Executive of Orange Free State Municipal Association, 18 May 1922.

11 See VAB MBL 4/1/37, Correspondence between Bloemfontein Town Clerk and Town Solicitor.

12 VAB MBL 4/1/37 25/2/25, Report to Council re: Coloured Location and Housing, 13 December 1921; Extract of Minutes of Special Town Council Committee, 31 March 1922.

1  VAB MBL 4/1/37 135, APO to Barlow, 31 March 1922. (copy of letter sent to Smuts); Extract of Minutes of Native Affairs Commission, 10 August 1922. Fifty coloureds refused to move voluntarily unless the new location was freehold; Town Clerk to Dr Roberts, 23 June 1922.

17 VAB, MBL 4/1/37, 25/2/25, Extract of Minutes of Special Town Council, 12 April 1922.

18 This is especially true of the TVL and OPS Municipal and Provincial debates, c.f. VAB, MBL 4/1/114, 285, Minutes of Conference on Urban Native Affairs held under the auspices of the National Association of Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Affairs, Johannesburg, 28-30 1930; Heaton Nicholls, H. G., 'The Native Bills', an address delivered at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, no date; Stubbs, E., Tightening the Coils: An Essay on Segregation, Rustenburg, 1925.

19 VAB MBL 4/1/37, Extract of Minutes of Executive of Orange Free State Municipal Association, 18 May 1922.

20 VAB MBL 4/1/37 25/2/25, Report to Town Council by Barlow, 'Urban Areas Bill, present position', 12 April 1922.


22 VAB MBL 4/1/37 135, Superintendent of Locations to Town Clerk, 12 April 1922.

23 The Labour World, 25/10/1919; Rand Daily Mail, 25/04/1922.

24 VAB MBL 4/1/37, Extract of Minutes of Executive of Orange Free State Municipal Association, 18 May 1922.

25 Rand Daily Mail, 26/05/1922.

26 South African Native Opinion, 06/06/1922.

27 Rand Daily Mail, 26/05/1922.

28 Between 1921-1929 there was a 12.2 per cent increase in Pretoria's coloureds and 14.5 per cent increase in whites. For the period 1925-1932 the increases were 44.5 and 16.1 per cent respectively: VAB MBL 4/7/114 285, Conference of Native Affairs, 1933. Similar dramatic increases in urban coloured populations following the NUA are reported in Hellmann, E., A Handbook of Race Relations, Cape Town, 1949.


30 Rand Daily Mail, 06/06/1922; Minutes of the Johannesburg Federation of Ratepayers' Associations, reported in Municipal Magazine, April 1922.

31 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Chief Pass Officer to Director of Native Labour, 13 March 1920.

32 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Secretary, Cape Province Municipal Association, to Secretary, Transvaal Municipal Association, 7 June 1922.

33 Rand Daily Mail, 25/05/1922.


*Natal Mercury*, 20/01/1923; CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Notes on Urban Areas Draft Act; *Rand Daily Mail*, 02/03/1923.


This point is made in much of the older secondary literature, e.g. Hellmann, E., 'Urban Areas', in Hellmann, E. (ed.), *Handbook on Race Relations*, Cape Town, 1949, pp. 229-274; it is clearly identifiable in Act No. 21 of 1923.

Parliamentary debates recorded in *Cape Times*, 08/02/1923.

Exemptions were granted to those with Standard Five education, parliamentary voters, chiefs recognised by the government, certified qualified artisans, people with approved business or trades, or the loosely defined category of respectable and intelligent natives who had 10 years of continuous service: Davenport, T. R. H., *The Beginnings of Urban Segregation; Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1913-1918*, p. 6.


Rand Daily Mail, 02/03/1923.

Interview with Stallard reported in *Rand Daily Mail*, 19/01/1923.


Hellmann, E., 'Urban Areas'.


CASA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.2., Report and Recommendations of the Witwatersrand Native Advisory Board Association, 19 February 1922; Draft Resolutions of the Witwatersrand Council of Churches on the NUAB.

1. VAB MBL 4/1/37, Extract of Minutes of Executive of Orange Free State Municipal Association, 13 May 1922.

2. NAD 3/DBN 4/2/1/75, Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 20 October 1921.


6. Rand Daily Mail, 23/02/1922; South African Native Opinion, 04/04/1922.


8. CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Report on proposed NUAB, submitted by the NAC.

9. CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Decision of the Executive of the Transvaal Municipal Association, 11 April 1922.

10. Natal Mercury, 20/01/1923; similar sentiments to Larum's were recorded in South African Native Opinion, 06/02/1923.


14. CAD GNLB 285 52/13/102, Report on proposed Native Urban Areas Bill 1922, submitted by the NAC.

15. NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Statement by Manager, Native Affairs Department, 8 February 1923. Layman was keen that only employed Africans married in Christian churches took up residence; Dodd to Marwick, 13 February 1918; Rand Daily Mail, 05/05/1922.


A conference was held between Native Affairs, Health and Police Departments to discuss the draft NUAB, 21 November 1921; Porter to Director of Native Labour, 22 November 1921; CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Porter to Director of Native Labour, 26 April 1922.

See section 12 of Act 21 of 1923.

South African Native Opinion, 06/06/1922.

CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.2., Report and Recommendations of the Witwatersrand Native Advisory Board Association, 19 February 1922.


Rand Daily Mail, 06/06/1922; 26/02/1923.

The Labour World, 18/10/1919.

NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Memorandum for Consideration of Public Health Committee re: The NUAB and the Native Registration and Protection Bill, 26 January 1923; South African Native Opinion, 04/04/1922; Rand Daily Mail, 06/06/1922.

VAB MBL 4/1/37 25/2/25, Chamber of Commerce of the Orange Free State to Bloemfontein Town Clerk, 16 February 1922.

Barlow, A. G. 'Better than the Durban System: A model Location'.

CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.2., Memorandum of the Witwatersrand Co. of Churches on the NUAB. Rand Daily Mail, 20/10/1922; South African Native Opinion, 14/02/1922; 20/12/1921; 06/03/1923.

Rand Daily Mail, 20/10/1922.

Bloemfontein was one such guilty Council. See Rand Daily Mail, 07/02/1922.

NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Layman to the Native Affairs Department, 13 February 1922.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SCHIZOPHRENIC CITY:
RACIALLY DEFINED PLANNING STRATEGIES IN THE 1930s

The strides that municipalities made in enforcing basic public health regulations and developing segregated African locations did not solve the slum problem. The failure of the local authorities to clear inner-city slums and to implement rigid residential segregation within the powers provided by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act (NUAA) was one of two major reasons for the revision of Union urban policy. The other was the growth of an extensive urban poor white problem. The 1920s and 1930s were the decades when South African planning assumed its distinctive segregationist character. Instead of embracing the broad conceptions of the 'city beautiful' or 'garden city' movements popular in Europe and North America, local urban professionals became obsessed by creating racially separate residential areas. International ideas were incorporated in local urban policy, but it tended to be on specific technical details such as slum clearance procedures or space and ventilation requirements, rather than on integrated urban plans or management strategies. Having abandoned the regional development of metropolitan areas in favour of narrow race zoning, the South African city began to assume its distinctive segregated form.

The 1920s and early 1930s was a period of dramatic urban growth which was accompanied by the consolidation of the racial split in urban policy that was set up by the passage of the Public Health Act and the NUAA. As the South African economy began to move away from its dependence on gold, local engineering and consumer durable manufacturing sprang up to service the mines. The diversifying economy provided new urban jobs. The growth of the towns was also fed by the movement of large numbers of black and white people fleeing the cyclical drought that plagues the African sub-continent. By the time of the Wall Street crash there had been no relieving rains and farm workers flocked to town. In the depression years slumlords did not impose a colour bar on tenancy, but the state responded to the pressure on urban resources within the racially defined framework of urban government that was set up after Union in 1910. Urban legislation was amended in an effort to redress the slum problem and enforce racial residential segregation.
African urban affairs of the depression are characterised by the continuity of the twin influences of conservative Stallardism that perceived Africans as temporary sojourners, and the more liberal acceptance of permanently urbanised Africans. Despite the ambiguous rhetoric over the position of urban Africans, the substance of the urban management practice that emerged was unambiguous. The African elite was to be repressed and influx controls were refined. Despite squabbles over which niceties of urban citizenship Africans should be allowed, the most important consequence of the coincident purposes of liberal and conservative whites was the exclusion of African migrants from towns and cities, and the creation of African urban insiders.  

With respect to whites, urban policy shifted more dramatically. Instead of indirect protection from colonial standards (e.g. on refuse removal or building regulations) whites were beneficiaries of urban welfare initiatives, most notably subsidised public housing. State action was a direct response to the urban immigration of the Afrikaner poor from drought ridden farms and small towns. Racially integrated slums and the presence of a white urban underclass whose conditions could not be distinguished from those of blacks, demanded action. In addition to the implementation of work creation schemes known as 'civilised labour' projects, white welfare extended to the urban sphere. Rather than the passive buffer of colonial standards in white suburbs, urban policy became more pro-active in the support of destitute whites.

African urban citizenship

By 1930 South Africa's urban population was 3 million, almost double the 1921 figure of 1.7 million. The most notable demographic shift was the growth in the urban African population of the largest centres which hosted almost two-thirds of all urban Africans. Cities nevertheless continued to be dominated by whites who outnumbered Africans by almost 2:1. The fact that a growing number of Africans were permanently committed to the cities and without rural ties forced city managers to confront the problem of how to treat the African population that lived in town.
Across the political spectrum Africans and Europeans, individually and collectively, acknowledged a post-1923 boom in location construction that flowed from the application of the NUAA. For many this represented a dramatic and desirable improvement in urban Africans living conditions. According to Godlo, the Chairman of the Native Advisory Board, the promulgation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 heralded the passing away of the old order of things and the approach of a new outlook in urban government and administration. For the first time in the history of Union urban legislation the Bantu was granted the semblance of a status, and the locations were defined as places set apart for the occupation, residence and other reasonable requirements of Natives, not mere compounds that Natives may occupy only when they are there to minister to the needs of the Europeans.

Among conservative whites, the increase in location housing merely compounded the unfortunate drift of African families to towns and exacerbated the process of detribalisation that challenged the viability of total territorial segregation. The rapid urbanisation associated with the late 1920s precipitated pressure within the ruling classes to amend the 1923 NUAA in such a way that the position of urban Africans was effectively controlled.

Much has been made of the fact that the 1923 NUAA contained the kernels of both Stallard and Godley's recommendations on urban policy. Incongruously, both perspectives flourished into the 1930s. Even when the NUAA was amended in 1930 and then again in 1937, contradictory ideological positions persisted: one envisaged Africans as only temporary sojourners, the other recognised a group of permanently 'detribalised' Africans. Despite fundamentally conflicting premises about the urban status of Africans, there was such considerable consensus within the ruling classes about desirable urban policies that noticeable compromise was unnecessary. The amendments, like the original 1923 Act, embraced both paternalist and repressive segregationist discourses on urban African status. What was new about African urban policy in the 1930s was the growing emphasis on influx control. Still more significant was the tendency to ignore or circumvent policy in the drive to enforce cost-effective segregation.
Unravelling the practical implications of the positions of 'liberals' or philanthropists versus the Stallardist conservatives on urban Africans' citizenship status highlights some of the implicit contradictions of city government in South Africa in the segregationist period. Nevertheless, selected aspects of African urban life illustrate that despite their different premises on permanent African urban settlement, white segregationists easily reached an alliance on urban racial policy.

Trade, trades and African social mobility

African trading rights, along with African freehold rights, were hotly contested in the preamble to the NUAA of 1923. In the Orange Free State (OFS) in particular there was vigorous and successful local authority opposition to African urban trading, even within locations, because it was feared that African traders would undermine the livelihood of white store-keepers.\(^1\)\(^2\) The subsequent opening up of African trading possibilities was the only liberal premise on an otherwise repressive list of amendments made to the NUAA in 1930.\(^1\)\(^2\) Despite the concession on trading, the impact of liberal policy on African self-employment was minimal. The most conservative municipalities ignored the 1930 NUAA clause extending limited trade privileges to Africans, and the central government did nothing to force them to acquiesce to the law. In consequence, in certain regions (notably the OFS), it was useless for Africans to even try to become location storekeepers.\(^3\)\(^3\)

Even under the original 1923 law Africans could be legally self-employed as tradesmen or professionals serving African locations. In practice, opportunities for African craftsmen were restricted, particularly in the Transvaal. Repeated attempts to allow Africans to build the locations were rejected in favour of the more expensive use of white construction labour.\(^5\)\(^6\) In construction, as in the other extensive job-creation schemes of the Pact government's civilised labour programmes, employment was not open to Africans.\(^1\)\(^8\) In many cases Africans on Government jobs lost their positions to unskilled whites.\(^1\)\(^8\) The harshness of this ruling must be judged in the context of narrowing work opportunities because of the drought and the weak economic climate where self-employment was an important source of survival rather than an avenue for massive accumulation. Whatever the economic reward, the possibility of Africans working for themselves
or for other blacks flew in the face of Stallardism which decreed that Africans in urban areas should only serve the needs of whites.

Curiously, although virtually every opportunity for Africans' economic independent advancement (including landlordism) was curtailed in urban areas, the existence of a self-employed group of Africans in the city was recognised and even encouraged. As the Native Advisory Board Committee pointed out, the NUAA insisted that Africans in locations should only carry out trades and 'other businesses' if they had no other salaried jobs. As a result, thousands of African artisans, hawkers and professionals managed to survive on the periphery of the urban economy, but only a handful of successful entrepreneurs flourished.

Limited evidence of the lives and struggles of the urban African elite in the twenties and early thirties suggests that self-employed Africans battled against social prejudice, depression and legal restriction without notable financial success. One avenue of employment for the educated was to sell goods or services for commission. More commonly, successful entrepreneurs were herbalists, liquor dealers or craftsmen. Conventional trading involved stiff competition, especially from Indian traders, that reduced the possibilities of large scale profit. In 1936 wholesalers estimated that only 15 per cent of the 400 or so grocers on the Rand were actually making a living from their endeavours. Still, among the permanently urbanised African population thousands of people in Johannesburg alone were able to open healthy bank accounts. A minority had over £1 000 saved. Banking records from the early 1930s suggest that there were few prominent African capitalists and that there was a substantial respectable working class, but nothing like an urban African bourgeoisie. Possibly Hertzog and the Stallarists had crushed this class in 1923 before it had formed properly; perhaps the economic slump was to blame. Certainly, the slow awakening of white liberals to the concentration of 'civilised Natives' in the towns, and the promotion of the interests of educated Africans, failed to stimulate the growth of the urban African elite that only became more prominent after the Second World War.

Having successfully repressed any large scale black advancement during the depression, the protection of poor whites was promoted by job reservation. But in the war for racial hegemony,
trade competition was not the only challenge presented by permanently urbanised Africans. Social and political unrest had rocked the white establishment in the early 1920s and the control of Africans was therefore accepted by conservatives and liberals alike as a necessary component of an effective urban management strategy.

**Sport, recreation and education**

The consensus around the advantages of reducing African crime and drunkenness through the provision of structured activity masks the varied motives of the patrons of African leisure. Urban Africans were acutely aware of the benefit of organised play, and leaders like Twala fought hard for the opportunity to develop games and cultural activities in town as an alternative to the prevalent street culture. Even more pressing was the African demand for urban educational facilities. Notwithstanding African initiative in this aspect of urban life, the most dominant actors in organised African education and recreation were the mines, the missionaries and later the municipalities.

White liberals, many of them devout Christians, having turned their backs on the viability of total territorial segregation sought to ease Africans' adaptation to the evil city by introducing morally defensible cultural alternatives to the destructive urban occupations of prostitution, shebeening and gambling. Organised leisure also promised exciting possibilities for racial contact on which the building of a racially harmonious society depended. The desire to assist the transition to urban life and cultivate a christianised African community in the towns meant that middle-class urban residents were the target group of the arranged choirs, concerts and debating events. White philanthropists in the city, and the tiny black elite, both believed that recreation offered a valuable avenue for developing 'civic pride' and was a welcome opportunity for Africans to express their urban citizenship.

Liberal perspectives on African social betterment were narrow. On the subject of urban education, for example, there was a unanimous belief in the advantages of vocational over academic training. While advocating that schooling "after the Western pattern" should take the place of
"training in the tribe", the form of education offered to Africans ranked domestic skills and moral teaching as more useful than the three 'Rs' (reading, writing and arithmetic) which the whites believed would only benefit one or two per cent of urban Africans. African women especially were denied any real advancement by their poor schooling. It was, however, the missionaries who provided the impetus for any urban schooling at all. The Christian zeal for enlightened subservience through education went against the grain of the protected white public. Like the "white trash" of the southern United States, poor white survival depended on there being only minimal competition from blacks.

Africans' own reasons for demanding increased spending on urban education were tied to dreams of economic prosperity and self-fulfilment, but there were also practical concerns. The extremely low wages paid to Africans made it financially impossible to stay at home and look after children in the location. Older children frequently left school prematurely to supervise younger family members. Poor schooling services compounded the tendency for children to join gangs or play truant from school in order to make money. Upholding family and community structures in the face of an untamed youth was a constant worry of the older generation.

Conservative white opposition to African schooling in towns has several explanations. Resistance extended to Africans paying for their own education through a levy under the NUAA. Of course, prior to the Hertzog Bills of 1936, Africans with secondary education could vote, thus many whites would have opposed any formal African education. Urban schooling was therefore a political and an economic threat to white hegemony. There were also demographic consequences to improving city schools, most significantly the urban settlement of African families. Stallards were more comfortable with the status quo whereby educated Africans sent their children to reputable rural mission schools like Marianhill or Lovedale. Typically, conservative white South Africans opposed any African education at all: "the Natives will demand social equality and inter-marriage if they become educated."
Keeping 'Natives' in their place was a bold motif of urban policy in the 1920s and 1930s. Leaning on the long experience of the mining companies in controlling African labour, supervised sport was encouraged in towns. Some municipal officials had to be persuaded of the value of investment in fields, halls and game equipment, a task assumed with great vigour by the well known campaigner for structured sport for Africans, the Rev. Phillips of the American Board of Missions.

Try and estimate the cash value of the fears they (Africans) will raise, the cries of "black peril" which they will inspire, the riots and clashes with police which they will cause...it pays (original emphasis) to supervise the peoples' recreation.

When it came to the recreation of urban Africans, sport was the most common device for "keeping the natives out of mischief." Liberals who dominated organisations like the Joint Council, and who were even represented in small numbers on local municipal councils, fell in with the conservatives who were more prevalent in local government, and campaigned for organised sport. The unquestionable impact of organised leisure on alcohol abuse (reputedly a 75 per cent reduction) and the associated drop in crime entrenched official support for popular games like boxing or soccer, especially on Sundays when the shebeen queens conducted a thriving business. Thus, while urban education was discouraged, modern facilities for recreation appeared in all the major cities. This apparent disjuncture between white attitudes to sport and education requires explanation. Insofar as philanthropists were convinced that sport alleviated the trauma of the social transition from rural to urban life by civilising Africans in the ways of fair play and social citizenship, expenditure in urban sport services was accepted as a wise investment. Insofar as sport offered an effective form of social control, preventing Africans from participating in politics or the urban underworld, it was perceived to be in the interests of all whites. By contrast, unlimited access to formal education challenged the foundations of the racial hierarchy on which South Africa was being built.
Housing, planning and influx control

The most important contradictions within intra-urban segregationist discourse emerged with respect to issues of housing and planning. These differences were resolved through the tightening of influx control. Contrary to Stalldism, the principle of individual family housing was enshrined in the 1923 NUAA. In upholding traditional family values in locations, the state implicitly condoned permanent African settlement in towns. The gradual improvement of the conditions of locations established under the Act for this permanently urbanised African community was a recurrent demand of the post-1923 decade. The harshest measures of the NUAA, namely, the lack of secure tenure, the limited opportunities for trade and the increasingly repressive influx controls, were issues singled out for special protest by both Africans and white liberals. In fact, in many instances the standard of housing provided in the locations was higher than African wages could sustain. By imposing a full economic rent (that commonly included the costs of lighting, sewerage and medical services), the average African family was forced to pay far in excess of the recommended 20-25 per cent of their income on housing. In the larger centres it was not uncommon for half the breadwinner's earnings to be handed over as rent. Despite this onerous rental burden and the concomitantly larger sums paid to local authorities, few locations (other than in Natal) were financially independent. This was primarily because in the Transvaal, OFS and Cape there was no revenue from municipal monopolies on beer brewing and selling until the late 1930s. The deficit on the Native Revenue Account was therefore paid from town rates.

There was considerable resistance to the "heavy burden" which locations placed on white ratepayers. Municipalities tried to reduce deficits by keeping African rentals high, or by introducing beer monopolies and cutting service costs. Typically, only the main street of a township was paved, and communal standpipes rather than individual house taps were provided. Generally, location planning standards were trimmed to within a hair's breadth of internationally accepted norms. Liberals piously postured that in the planning of locations "the same general principles apply as in planning European towns", and that a location was "practically a satellite town and is best planned as such". They nevertheless added the rider that "the plan is for Natives and not Europeans". Conservative extremists called for the wholesale abolition of locations and family
housing in favour of compounds for male workers for which employers would have to pay. In pragmatic recognition of their dependence on African labour, most municipalities agreed to subside African wages to allow for basic urban reproduction. Municipalities were, however, adamant that the size of their tax burden should be restricted by curtailing the numbers of Africans in locations. From as early as 1926 the local authorities began a successful campaign to amend the NUAA so as to limit the number of Africans whom they were obliged to house. The progressive tightening of restrictions on African entry to town was the primary purpose of the 1930 and 1937 amendments to the NUAA.

The alliance between white liberals and conservatives reached its zenith on the questions of African entry to town. The position of the Stallardists on the temporary status of urban Africans was clear from 1921 when the Transvaal Local Government Commission reported. In the next decade local authorities spelled out even more explicitly the urban policies necessary to complement total segregation. The influence of this opinion is evident in the 1928 Bill that introduced a curfew and placed a ban on African women and children joining their husbands and fathers until he could prove he had worked in town for two years. Similarly, the extension of controls on "idle, dissolute or redundant" Africans reflect the influence of Stallardism. The Colonel himself was not satisfied with the 1930 amendment to the NUAA. He wanted to extend urban registration to all Africans, to prevent any more influx of Africans, to introduce labour quotas, to remove 'surplus' natives from towns, to limit the period which Africans could be in urban areas, and to curtail their rights to purchase even unproclaimed urban land. Stallard would have been more content with the 1937 amendment which gave more direct effect to these sentiments.

There was also significant liberal opinion that favoured, or at least did not oppose, the tightening of influx controls for Africans. The two year delay on African women joining their husbands in town was objected to by some because of the erosion of family structures and values. Yet there remained a body of opinion that supported female exclusion because of the perception that exposure to the city was the primary cause of the breakdown of African social structure. By this reasoning a woman's place was in the rural homestead away from the evils of the city. By the late 1920s, the liberals most influential motive for restricting African urbanisation was the desire to
protect 'detribalised' urbanites who struggled to maintain a 'civilised' standard of living from the competition of rural Africans who would work for considerably lower wages. As a leading exponent of liberal opinion explained,

No regular class of urban labour gets a chance to develop because those natives who remain permanently in town are always subjected to the disturbing influence of wage rates of a large supply of unskilled labour. Without some degree of permanence in the labour force no degree of efficiency can be expected, and the urban native is notoriously lacking in permanence... State policy should therefore be directed to the object of giving more permanence, more stability, to the varying classes of labour, and of reducing insofar as possible its casual labour.6

The view that migrants were undercutting town Africans and impeding their progress towards 'civilisation' was expressed by several witnesses to the 1932 Native Economic Commission (NEC) and is clearly evident in the final Report of the Commission.6 The solution proposed by most white liberals, and even some Africans, was that the uncontrolled increase in African urbanisation could best be stemmed by developing the Reserves or reversing the 1913 Land Act. By this logic, liberals felt morally justified in the exclusion of most Africans from towns, even though they condemned the overtly racist motivation for conservatives adopting precisely the same path of action.6 Either way, whites condoned extending influx controls on Africans.

Having established a framework of urban African government that was acceptable in broad outline to both liberals and conservative whites, local authorities initially proved unable to implement the policy as defined under the NUAA. There were a number of court actions that had stalled segregationist removals under the 1923 NUAA.6 More fundamental difficulties arose in administering the principle of rehousing the African slum population in segregated locations. Prohibitionist and African opposition to municipal monopolies on brewing meant that there were insufficient funds in the Native Revenue Accounts. White municipalities were generally fiercely opposed to subsidising African housing.6 In addition, the dual impact of drought and recession forced enormous numbers of Africans, already adversely affected by the 1913 Land Act, to seek survival in the towns.6 Accordingly, even though there had been extensive location construction in the 1920s, the African population of the slums had increased rather than decreased.
The ruling classes responded to the growth of slum yards in two ways. First, they made ad hoc exceptions to their African urban policy that circumvented the idea of temporary sojournership and the stabilisation of the urban workforce. Second, in the light of persistent African urbanisation they sought to protect whites living in slums through racially selective urban welfare programmes. Abandoning the carefully devised strategy of limiting the number of Africans to the places available in location houses, local authorities sought to impose order on cities by the dual strategy of removing both Africans and poor whites from the slums, and licensing employers to house workers on industrial and commercial properties. Scientific respectability for these tactics was couched in the language of modern town planning and renewed interest in slum clearances. As construction of locations and the removal of slums fell entirely to local authorities overburdened by the enormous task of implementing the NUAA, the licensing of compounds became an important interim device for controlling the African population. There is certainly no evidence of significant energy channelled toward any co-ordinated planning initiatives beyond curtailing African settlement and minimising white urban poverty.

In line with the objective of improving urban conditions for Africans, the central state had stipulated in the NUAA that houses/villages or hostels were to be provided for African slum residents. Just providing sites was not good enough. Moreover, all Africans in a proclaimed area had to be rehoused. This welfare component of the NUAA legislation was ignored by local authorities utilising a legitimate loophole. The 1930 amendment allowed greater powers of influx control provided entire urban areas were proclaimed under the Act. The original intention was to force local authorities to build locations as they implemented their segregation campaigns. The revised legislation, however, also established a mechanism for avoiding precisely this responsibility. If a local authority was unable to provide suitable accommodation to all Africans affected by the proclamation of an area under the NUAA, it could licence rented properties in town as an alternative arrangement. By issuing licences rather than building houses, municipalities were able to wield wider influx control powers.

The application of the NUAA met with enormous opposition from landlords. There was also considerable difficulty applying the law because domestic servants who were exempt from the law could not be identified. Furthermore, the practice of hopping from slum to slum made it almost
impossible to force African tenants into locations. It is little wonder that municipalities made
maximum use of the licensing provisions to give them access to the more repressive influx control
provisions. By herding Africans out of proclaimed areas into locations and licensed premises, or
pushing them out to peri-urban settlements, African slum clearances were enforced. But this cheap
evasive action failed to alleviate slum conditions sufficiently because the racial character of the
urban underclass was now more heterogeneous.

Transforming the racial character of urban slums

In the closing years of the 1920s the transformation of metropolitan areas meant that slums
could no longer be construed as merely a 'native' problem. The transition was marked by increased
urban decay and a shift in the racial composition of the slumyards. The case of Johannesburg,
where this transformation was most acute, is instructive. In the four years following the initial
proclamation of the bulk of the city under the NUAA, the Native Affairs Department forcibly
removed 30 000 African people.6 6 The majority of the displaced families sought accommodation
in unproclaimed remnants of the city.6 7 It was intended that these 'black' suburbs established after
the First World War would cater for 3 000 families; by 1933 the population had swollen to 26 000
people.6 8 Other relocated Africans were housed in municipal hostels or locations.6 9 Despite these
removals the African presence in slums was not eradicated by the segregationist efforts of the
Johannesburg City Council. Some of those affected by the NUAA returned to slum areas, and there
were always new migrants seeking accommodation.7 0 One noticeable trend was for coloureds, over
whom local authorities had no power, to occupy the houses and rooms vacated by Africans.7 1
The dramatic increase in the number of poor whites in the city was more significant for the
persistance of slums than the reflux of blacks. The number of people whom the government
defined as poor whites increased nationally from 106 000 in 1916, to 120 000 in 1921, and 300 000
in 1933, and a large proportion of these newly urbanised poor sought a niche in Johannesburg.7 2
By 1933 the Johannesburg authorities deemed it necessary to conduct a survey of white housing
needs in which they found 1 121 families to be unsatisfactorily accommodated. Admittedly this
figure was only a fifth of the number of Africans relocated under the NUAA, but the situation
among whites had deteriorated dramatically from that in 1923 when 322 houses in white working-class suburbs stood empty.⁷⁻⁸

During the early years of the 1930s there was a transformation of working-class residential areas because of the dramatic increase in the number of poor whites in the city. At the most obvious level, one ramification of the increased urban population was to reduce the number of buildings available for shelter. Ironically this problem was made worse by the Pact government’s ‘civilised labour’ policy which was designed to assist poor whites. The imperative of employing more expensive white labour in construction meant that it was difficult to provide houses at low enough prices for affordable rents.⁷⁻⁸ Capitalists, faced with the prospect of not being able to profit from construction for the lower income groups, did not erect new buildings.

The impact of the civilised labour policy extended beyond restricting available housing stock. One of the most important repercussions of the policy was the large increase in the number of poor whites in urban areas.⁷⁻⁸ Between 1924 and 1929 the number of white railway labourers based in Johannesburg trebled.⁷⁻⁸ By 1931 nearly 25 000 poor whites had been absorbed into state jobs.⁷⁻⁸ A specific problem generated by the government’s white labour policy, was housing unskilled people who could not afford rents asked in the city. For example, by 1934 the number of married railway labourers requiring housing assistance in the city was 351.⁷⁻⁸ The Johannesburg City Council felt that government should be prepared to make a much more substantial contribution towards re-housing these people than it had done in the past, particularly as the white labour policy lacked any mechanism for preventing an influx from the impoverished rural areas. The promise of work, it was argued, drew homewers “away from their natural environment” by enticing them with wages which appeared high, but which under urban conditions could only provide a modest subsistence.

In the worsening depression not all new migrants to the towns benefited from state efforts to create employment for whites. The limited success of the civilised labour policy is emphasised by Department of Labour statistics for the number of unemployed white male population at the height of the worst depression years of 1932 and 1933. The Department calculated that 1.7 and 3.1 per
cent of the white population were unemployed respectively. The state managed to find subsidised
labour for 0.37 and 1.48 per cent respectively, leaving 1.33 and 1.62 per cent wholly out of
work.**

In April 1930, 3 000 white males were reported to be unemployed in Johannesburg: over 200
new employment requests were received each month by the Rand Aid Society, mainly from those
who had been living in the area for less than three months. The situation was much less severe in
other parts of the country, but similar patterns occurred, even in smaller towns. The cumulative
impact of the policy of civilised labour, depression and drought** increased pressure among whites
for inexpensive shelter. Overcrowding and insanitation had resulted in white slum conditions in the
poorer districts. The position had changed entirely from 1927 when slums had been identified as
"largely a native problem".*

By 1933 Johannesburg's new MOH, Dr Milne, reported to the Public Health Committee that
a white housing problem had been created in the city by the influx of poor whites who allegedly
were unable to afford to house themselves decently. The assessment is important for the material
shift he identifies, and also the ideological perception it reflects. Certainly by the late 1920s
significant inroads had been achieved in clearing Africans from the city. For Dr Milne to assert that
the "native" slum problem was over would have been false. On his own admission, after eviction
under the NUAA the Africans moved to a neighbouring yard in the inner suburbs where the Act
had not yet been enforced. Far more important in the Medical Officer's statement was the
recognition that the slum problem now embraced all sections of the population, including
whites.*

In the depression-ravaged 1930s, there was a dramatic increase in the extent of the slum
problem, and in the number of whites living in these unsatisfactory conditions. The visible increase
in the concentration of the poor in the inner city led one white citizen to enquire where a "decent
person of average means" could live. In his own words, every suburb near to town was becoming
"a haunt of kaffirs and half-wild white hooligans."** The most significant dimension of the growing
accommodation shortage was the changing racial composition of slumyards. The Johannesburg
Council's 1934 survey of slums and insanitary properties for the Central Housing Board showed that 928 of the 1922 families needing re-housing from the slums (i.e. 48 per cent) were white. These poor whites were not only concentrated in the racially exclusive suburbs, but were scattered through the working-class neighbourhoods of the city.

The circumstances of white people embroiled in the housing crisis of the 1930s varied tremendously across the country. At least three distinct experiences can be sketched. The first group, the "new poor" as they came to be identified in the press, found that in the deepening depression they were increasingly unable to meet the costs of urban life. In an attempt to reduce living expenses by cutting their rent, rooms of a house were sub-let. Ideally, extended kin could be found to share the house but, failing this, one or more young migrants would be taken in as boarders. Where this was not possible, a 'room to let' sign would appear in the window. Even if the quarters were small, someone was needed to help pay the rent. This practice of sub-letting was not racially exclusive. In his report for 1931 the Director of the Native Affairs Department commented that he had quite frequently found that white families were letting either part of their own premises, or outside rooms, to Africans "in order to eke out an existence". In many cases it appears that black sub-tenants were preferred because their record of payment was better than that of the poorest whites.

A second group of poor white residents of slumyards lived under much the same conditions as Africans. Their lives were moulded by their inability to afford any but the most abject housing. One such 'white' yard, allegedly not an isolated case, had one tap, measured 500 square meters, and housed 57 people. The value of the site and buildings only amounted to £330, but the slumlord received an annual rent of £150, a 45 per cent per annum return on capital invested.

Finally, there were those who could not even afford the rent for slum rooms. The plight of this third group of poor whites was highlighted in September 1931 when the unemployment association alerted a local newspaper to one of twenty "bad cases" they had considered during the month. An ex-serviceman and his family of seven had been evicted from their Johannesburg residence for failing to pay the rent and had been found living in a hollow in a disused mine dump.
Faced with a growing number of impoverished whites, the cry to rid urban areas of slums grew progressively louder from 1930 until official action was finally taken on behalf of white slum dwellers by instituting white urban welfare projects. The strategy of dealing with the white slum problem was culled from systematic urban welfare initiatives that had been pioneered in England. In particular, grandiose, but half-baked ideas about the ‘garden city’ permeated South African planning for poor whites in the 1930s.

State responses to ‘white slums’

Concern over the plight of whites living in slum conditions elicited a response unknown in the 1920s. Before any official comment on the white housing shortage had been formalised, pressure groups like the Citizens Housing Alliance and various housing utility companies were launched. Two extracts from the publicity booklet To Hell With Slums capture the emotion of the new concern. The philanthropic body pointed out that the nation could not afford “the moral and mental degradation which slum conditions create in those who inhabit them.” If there was any doubt about why action was required, the authors explained that the slum could become a fertile field for “subversive propaganda”. Slums, it was argued, were “convincing evidence of how a capitalist society failed to provide good homes for the very poor, and for this reason were a problem.”

In the Union, as in many other parts of the world, slum conditions were both a threat and an embarrassment to the authorities. Unlike cases launched in British, Canadian or American cities, in South Africa the slum question embraced not only legal and financial considerations, but also hinged on race. The significance of this racial dimension was apparent in the shift in state policy and action which came about in the early 1930s once slums were commonly accepted as a ‘white problem’.

Faced with extensive white poverty it was apparent that the state’s policy on “the slum problem” which evolved in the 1920s, was no longer appropriate. After World War One local authorities concluded that conditions under which poor whites were living would be most satisfactorily solved
by the segregation of Africans, and increased housing provision for them.\footnote{3} Eight years later the focus on African housing led to the accusation that locations were being constructed at the expense of whites, many of whom it was alleged were forced to live in quarters "more miserable than those provided for natives".\footnote{4} Solving the slum problem by re-housing Africans was no longer sufficient. Something had to be done for the rest of the slum population, especially the poor white. Slums would not disappear even if the entire African population could be removed from the slumyards, which it could not, because many, particularly women, did not qualify for municipal housing.\footnote{5,8} A significantly large proportion of the slum population was white. Rehousing this racially defined group of slum residents was organised on the basis of the English model of slum rehousing.

From 1930 the demand for white housing schemes was self-consciously political, forming an integral component of national and municipal party political campaigns.\footnote{8,6} The desire to guarantee living standards of white labour was added to ongoing concern for the segregation of the inner-city. In the 1920s this had been achieved through general Public Health legislation and the creation of protected jobs. A decade later, assisted housing provision in garden 'city suburbs' was an additional means of subsidising wages and ensuring a minimum standard of living. Nationally, urban welfare translated into the introduction of extended housing finance for poor whites. Most large towns geared themselves to accept responsibility for providing accommodation for the poor even where this entailed unavoidable cost. Prime movers in the demand for state-provided housing schemes motivated for the initiative on the grounds that whites, like the "respectable working class" of London or Birmingham, were not "inveterate or hereditary slum dwellers", and that there was some responsibility to ensure their rehabilitation.\footnote{17}

The year 1930 marked a watershed in state housing policy development. Dr Malan, Minister of the Interior, summed up the situation for whites when he redefined the nation's housing problem as centring around the very poorest classes who could not afford an economic rent under any circumstances, rather than the poor whose living conditions were restricted by the small amount they could pay. He told parliament that everything done by way of state loans for improving housing "had hardly touched the problem at all". The process of upward filtering which it had been hoped would occur once new houses constructed by the Central Housing Board increased the
housing stock of the lower income group was not forthcoming. Rather, the 'white slum' had
become a more common urban phenomenon, "drawing into its folds surrounding areas".88 Solving
the urban problem required a revision of existing measures. While one arm of the state's
bureaucratic machine devised elaborate policies for excluding Africans from full urban citizenship,
another pondered the most effective strategies for incorporating poor whites into the cities. The
reorganisation of public housing finance in line with the successful British action to clear slums was
the chosen approach. Racially separate administrative structures for allocating resources to housing
and urban infrastructure had already been created under the NUAA and Housing Act. Only a shift
of emphasis was required to ensure that white housing became not only separate but superior to
that allocated to blacks. The policy of white slum clearance was reoriented to one of rehabilitation
through subsidised housing, often along the lines of the Octavia Hill schemes where tenants
lifestyles and budgets were supervised.89 Like the management style adopted in white public
housing schemes, state financing of slum rehousing programmes in South Africa drew on English
experience.

Until 1930 the irregular supply of Central Housing Board loans (Table 4.1), and a relatively high
rate of interest were among the factors that combined to dissuade local authority officials from using
state housing funds.100 Once sub-economic funds were made available they were immediately
favoured by custodians of municipal housing, many of whom had never taken out economic
loans.101 In terms of the 1930 provisions, losses were to be shared equally between the Central
Housing Board and particular municipal authorities. Included in local authorities' share of the loss
was an allowance for the remission of rates on housing schemes, and the forfeit of one month's rent
on let units. In an endeavour to endorse the slum clearance campaign, sub-economic interest rates
were dropped by 0.5 per cent in 1934 to coincide with the passing of the Slums Act.102 Even more
important in eliciting a drive for slum clearance through council housing provision was the 1936
cut in rates to 0.75 per cent, and a readjustment of the loss ratio whereby the central state absorbed
two thirds of the cost of sub-economic construction (Table 4.1). So successful was this incentive
that by 1939 the demand for sub-economic housing funding had dried the coffers of the Central
Housing Board.103 By contrast, a year after war not all economic funds allocated by parliament
had been taken up.104

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# Table 4.1: Changes in national housing policy for whites, 1920-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ECONOMIC LOANS</th>
<th>SUB-ECONOMIC LOANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>100 per cent loan at 3 per cent</td>
<td>1930: Sub-economic loans introduced at 2 per cent to encourage slum clearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Central State loans for housing were abandoned because of lack of funds.</td>
<td>The ratio of the loss incurred was 1:1 between the the central and local housing sponsors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Funding for hostels for whites introduced.</td>
<td>1934: Sub-economic interest rates dropped to 1.5 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Central Housing Board funds petered out.</td>
<td>1936: Interest rates on sub-economic loans dropped to 0.75 per cent, and the allocation of losses changed to a ratio of 2:1 in the local authorities favour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Only 75 per cent of the amount required for construction was loaned.</td>
<td>1937: State to stand surety for 60-90 per cent on loans to individuals. Interest rates increased to 3.5 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Insufficient sub-economic funds available from the Central Housing Board to meet all the applications.</td>
<td>1939: Insufficient sub-economic funds available from the Central Housing Board to meet all the applications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differential treatment of poor whites involved not only the legal compartmentalisation of urban policy, but also the racial fragmentation of residential space. Having defined racial segregation as the solution to problems of urbanisation and industrialisation of the workforce, the state activated this policy by implementing racist removals. Contrary to popular conception, this
included all the urban poor. The full racist implications of unequal town planning lay less in the principle of slum clearance and more in the manner in which slum communities were rehoused.

Conclusion

In South Africa the major forces in the fresh awareness of conditions of urban blight stemmed from the increased proportion of whites living in slum conditions and the growing permanent African urban population. In the 1930s the call for slum clearance was coupled with the demand for proper re-housing of the white slum population, restricted African entry to towns, and minimal expenditure on urban services for Africans. The technical approach to slum clearance and public housing finance at this time may be attributed in part to an imported awareness from England where the movement to rid cities of slums through the systematic application of scientific town planning rules had gained new vigour.

In line with international trends to rehouse poor slum residents in state-financed housing, African locations and white council housing schemes were both subsidised. There were, however, a number of ways in which the re-housing programme for whites differed, in both policy and practice, from other race groups. For whites, slum removal promised a house of better quality in a more advantageous location than any black slum resident could hope for. Proximity to work, a private garden and a higher standard of construction were not all that the white slum dweller received. The white housing programme was based on the philosophy that slum residents could be socially and economically rehabilitated into a racial aristocracy if they became state tenants.

By contrast, urban African residents lived under continual threat of the growing influence of Stallardism that undermined their very presence in the city. Despite limited liberal support for the permanence of an urban African community, they received none of the urban service benefits such as trade, education or health facilities that were automatically afforded to whites. In the face of limited funds for African settlement, compound housing was favoured over family shelter. In a cruel twist, the only advantage which permanently settled urban Africans received was through the operation of influx control regulations that restricted job competition by rural migrants.

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Notes


3 Hindson, D., Pass Controls and the Urban Proletariat, Johannesburg, 1987, makes this point clearly but fails to identify how or why this insider group was created.

4 This point is developed elsewhere, but the change in state action is not periodised, nor is the simultaneous evolution of urban policies of whites related to those of Africans. The result is a tendency to inflate the overall significance of whites in the city. Parnell, S., 'Public housing as a device for white residential segregation in Johannesburg, 1934-1953', Urban Geography, vol. 9, 1988, pp. 584-602; Parnell, S., 'Shums, segregation and poor whites in Johannesburg, 1920-1934' in Morrell R. (ed.), White But Poor, Pretoria, 1992, pp. 115-129.


7 CPSA A881 Fs 14/3, Cooper, J. R., 'Urban Conditions with special reference to the Urban Areas Act and municipal administration', paper presented to Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, 5-7 July 1933; CPSA AD 1483, Evidence of Allison, Assistant Secretary of Native Affairs to NEC, 19 July 1930; Report of the Native Economic Commission, para. 417-418.


9 'Native Affairs', Municipal Magazine, December 1930; 'Developments in Municipal Housing', Municipal Magazine, January 1933.


11 VAB MBL 4/7/114 285, Minutes of Conference of urban native affairs held under the auspices of the National Association of Managers and Superintendents of urban native affairs at the City Hall, Johannesburg, 28-30 August 1933, p. 113.

12 CPSA AD 1433 Gj 2.1.3, Memorandum of the Location Advisory Boards of South Africa on the Proposed Amendment to the (Urban Areas) Act - No. 21 of 1923; Abantu-Batho, 14/08/1930.

13 Despite white liberal involvement it was pointless to trade. See Rich, P. B., 'Managing Black leadership: the Joint Councils, urban trading and political conflict in the Orange Free State', in Bonner, P., Hofmeyer, L., James, D., and Lodge T. (eds), Holding Their Ground, Johannesburg, 1989, pp. 177-200.
1. CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, 5-7 July 1933.

2. CAD NTS 7860 101/336, Falwasser to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 April 1933, points out there were some exceptions of Africans working on township services; CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Secretary for Native Affairs to Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, July 1933.


4. CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Godlo, R. H., 'Urban Native Conditions', paper presented to the Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, July 5-7 1933; Also reported in South African Native Opinion between 15/08/1933-05/09/1933.


9. CPSA Ad 1438, see for example Xuma's evidence before the NEC.


13. CPSA A 881 Fa 14/1, Conference on Native Affairs convened by the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches, September 27-29 1923; VAB MBL 4/7/1/114 285, Minutes of Conference of Urban Native Affairs held under the auspices of the National Association of Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Affairs at the City Hall, Johannesburg, 28-30 August 1933, Councillor Prophet of Bloemfontein, p. 58.


15. CPSA A 410 B2.14.10, Mrs Ballinger to Joint Women’s Committee of Europeans and Natives, 17 September 1936; South African Institute of Race Relations 'The employ of native girls trained in domestic service at native training institutions', South African Outlook, 2 January 1932.

CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.16, Memo on juvenile vagrancy and delinquency, 1936.

CPSA AD 1438, Submission of the Sophiatown and Marindale Residents Association to the NEC; see also Lucas p.7384 of NEC evidence.

CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, this request was put by R.H. Godlo 'Urban Native Conditions', paper presented to the Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, July 5-7 1933; Also reported in South African Native Opinion between 15/08/1933-05/09/1933.

This was pointed out to me by Sue Krige; see also CAD NTS 4152 11/313, 'Notes on amendments to the NUAA', 1937.

CPSA AD 1438, Evidence before the NEC by Ballenden, Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, Johannesburg.


The Star, 06/07/1935.

VAB MBL 4/7/1/114 285, Minutes of Conference of urban native affairs held under the auspices of the National Association of Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Affairs at the City Hall, Johannesburg, 28-30 August 1933: Phillips, R. ‘Value and methods of recreation in municipal native locations’, p. 54.

Phillips, R. ‘Value and methods of recreation in municipal native locations’, p. 64.

Phillips, R. E., The Bantu in the City; See also Ballenden, VAB MBL 4/7/1/114 285, Minutes of Conference of Urban Native Affairs, p. 57.

This argument is developed by Badenhorst C., ‘Mines, missionaries and the municipality’.

CPSA A 881 Fa 14/1, Conference on Native Affairs convened by the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches, September 27-29 1923; CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.3, Memorandum of the Location Advisory Board’s of South Africa on the Proposed Amendment to the (Urban Areas) Act - No. 21 of 1923. 

CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, July 5-7 1933.

VAB MBL 4/7/1/114 285, Minutes of Conference of urban native affairs. See discussion following Rutowitz’s paper p. 17ff.

Despite the centrality of the liquor monopoly in South African urban history no clear exposition has yet been produced on why only some cities use beer funds: Rogerson, C. M., 'A strange case of beer: the state and sorghum beer manufacture in South Africa', Area, vol. 18, 1986, pp. 15-24; Crush, J. and Ambler, C. (eds), Liquor and Labour in Southern Africa, Pietermaritzburg, 1992 provides the most useful clues.
Randall, R. J., 'Some reflections on the financial policy of certain municipalities towards the natives within their boundaries', *South African Journal of Economics*, vol. 7, 1939, pp. 4-30.

VAB MBL 4/71/114 285, Minutes of Conference of urban native affairs, see papers by Milne 'Housing and Public Health requirements on Native Townships and compounds in the larger urban areas', pp. 60ff.; Hamlin 'The Municipal Engineer in relation to the establishment of Native townships', pp. 94ff.; Transvaal Municipalities, especially Pretoria, were among the most conservative; see remarks by Mrs Nel from Potchefstroom and Mr Gould of Brakpan, p. 42.

NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Minutes of Conference of Municipal Native Affairs, Johannesburg, 9-11 November 1927; Ibid., see Ballendem's summing up of Conference.

Ibid., p. 13: Ballenden claimed that the Association and its members were largely responsible for the amendments; see also *South African Native Opinion*, 06/03/1928.

NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Representations on behalf of the United Municipal Associations to the Native Affairs Commission in connection with the NUAA, 1923, amendment bill, by Councillor Kemp; see also *South African Native Opinion*, 11/02/1930.

CAD JUS 802 1/568/23, Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923, Regulation No. 12 in respect of females in proclaimed area, 6 July 1931.

University of Cape Town, Jagger library, BC 79 D 34, Report of the Joint Committee on Representation of Natives and Coloured Persons and the acquisition of land by Natives, (Chairman Jansen), 2 March 1933.


CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, July 5-7 1933; CPSA A881 Fa 9/7, Lecture given by Rheinell Jones 'Town and Country Natives', no date.

University of Cape Town, Jagger library, BC 79 D 34, Report of the Joint Committee on Representation of Natives and Coloured Persons and the acquisition of land by Natives, (Chairman: Jansen), 2 March 1933; see also *South African Native Opinion*, 10/07/1930.


VAB MBL 4/71/114,285, Minutes of Conference of urban native affairs, p. 79, Presentation by Mr Rheinallt Jones.

Report of the Native Economic Commission, para. 82.

Godlo, R. H., in *South African Native Opinion*, 15/08/1933; CPSA AD 1438, Holloway to NEC and 'The Joint Meeting of the ICU and the Joint Chambers of Industry and Commerce' (included in Ballingers evidence before the NEC).

CPSA A881 Fa 14/3, Fifth National European-Bantu Conference, Bloemfontein, 5-7 July, pp. 5-7; CPSA A881 Fa 9/7, Lecture given by Rheinallt Jones 'Town and Country Natives', no date.
There was also a problem of excluding women from towns because there were no labour colonies. The "dissolute" women therefore tended to land up in gaol: see extensive discussion in: Bales, K., 'Patriarchs, passes and privilege'; Walker, C., Women and Resistance,

This figure represents almost one fifth of the 153 000 African population of Johannesburg as reported by the Director of the Native Affairs Department in his report for the year ending 31 June 1927, in Minute of the Mayor, Johannesburg, 1928; Koeh, E., 'Doornfontein and its African working class, 1914-1935, a study of popular culture in Johannesburg', Unpublished M. A., University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1983, points out that before the Supreme Court's decision the Johannesburg Council had already moved 50 000 people from the slums; See Chapter Eight.

By the mid-1930s the Council controlled some 50 000 accommodation units in the form of hostels; see Pirie, G. H. and Da Silva, M., 'Hostels for African migrants in greater Johannesburg' GoJournal, vol. 11, 1987, pp. 173-182. The following figures of housing stock owned by the Council in 1934 give some sense of the extent of official accommodation available for Africans in Johannesburg: Western Native Township (2 308 houses) - Eastern Native Township (616 houses) - Orlando (6 641 houses) - Pinville (180 houses and 2 076 stands) - Wemmer Native Men's Hostel (2 750 beds) - Malini Hostel (300 beds) - Wolhuter Native Men's Hostel (3 260 beds) - Wolhuter Native Women's Hostel (120 beds), City of Johannesburg, Coj CHDA Unsorted Box 9608, 'Draft Joint Report by Town Clerk, City Engineer, MOH, City Treasurer, Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, Director of Social Welfare re housing, Appendix A: existing housing schemes (1934)', 13 August 1943.

See The Star, 08/11/1930. A slum register was opened to monitor the re-influx of Africans to Doornfontein, City and Suburban, and Jeppestown; see also Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1933, Johannesburg, 1933.


Coj CHDA Unsorted Box 9608: 'A survey of white housing needs', 1933; 'Special Report by MOH to the Parks and Estates and Public Health Committees on housing for Europeans (Housing act (no 35) 1920), Annexure B: enumeration of empty dwellings in working class districts made during the last week of July 1923', 3 August 1923.

U.G. 19-1926, Annexure 201 of 1927 (unpublished) to shows that the cost of construction had risen by 10-25 per cent because of the policy of civilised labour; Hansard, 1927, col. 1971. It was estimated that 30 per cent more was paid on construction as a result of the 'civilised labour' policy of employing whites for unskilled work.
The Star, 31/01/1930.

Davies, R., Kaplan, D., O'Meara, D., and Morris, M., 'Class struggle'.

Caj CHDA Unsorted Box 4574A: 'Housing and slum elimination', 19 September 1935. The Council's suggestion was a 50 per cent subsidy on all housing provided by the local authority.

Caj CHDA Unsorted Box 34: 'Joint Report by MOH and acting City Engineer to the Public Health Committee', 14 November 1935. In addition, 84 married men from the South African Railways had access to their own accommodation, while the Council paid no attention to the requirements of unmarried men or women of any marital status.


Minute of the Mayor. Report of the Manager of the Non European Affairs Department, 1934, Johannesburg, 1934; Municipal Magazine, September 1933; see also Johannesburg Housing Utility Company, To Hell With Slums, Johannesburg, 1933.

Caj CHDA Unsorted Box 4574A, 'Special Report of MOH to Special Committee on Slums and Housing', 13 February 1934.

The Star, 08/12/1932. In support of the argument the complaint was levelled that '10 000 neat kaffir dwellings have been erected, but for poor whites nothing is done.'

Caj CHDA Unsorted Box 4574A, 'Slums Act 1934: Properties returned by District Inspectors requiring attention'.

The Star, 18/07/1932. Ethelreda Lewis defined the 'new poor' in this way: 'The latest group of New Poor in Johannesburg is that of the ex-officer of the army and navy, now an ex-settler too, who, after going swiftly bankrupt on the alleged farm sold to him in London, finds Johannesburg the best place in which to become a taxi-driver, a peddler of sewing-machines or an agent for some coal merchant, going from door to door in the slums.' Lewis, E., 'Johannesburg', Geographical Magazine, vol. 3, 1936, pp. 293-310.


The Star, 23/04/1932.

Minute of the Mayor. Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1932, Johannesburg, 1932, p. 108.

The Star, 14/12/1932.

The Star, 14/11/1933.

• Johannesburg Housing Utility Company, To Hell With Slums; Municipal Magazine, August 1935; The Star, 04/10/1934.

• Coj CHDA Unsorted Box 9638: Special Report by the MOH to the Parks and Estates and Public Health Committees on Housing for Europeans (Housing Act No. 35 1923), 3 August 1923.

• Coj CHDA Box 17 4575A, Minutes of Special Committee re: slums and housing, 24 July 1934.

• Hutes, K., ‘Patriarchs, passes and privilege’.

• The Sjambok, 10/05/1929.

• Municipal Magazine, August 1935; Johannesburg Housing Utility Company, To Hell With Slums, Johannesburg, 1933.

• Hansard, 1930, col.1754; Hansard, 1930, col.1755.

• Octavia Hill, a philanthropist in pre-World War One Britain, established a system of housing management that was adopted by the Johannesburg Council. Her approach to tenant rehabilitation was based on the regular collection of rent, cleanliness, and the presence of a female housing manager to liaise with the wives at home.

• Compiled from Hansard, reports of the Central Housing Board, and the National Housing and Planning Commission, from Johannesburg City Health Department Archives, from Race Relations Surveys and from secondary sources cited elsewhere in the text.

• Hansard, 1930, col.1766.


Pages 95 and 96 omitted in pagination.
PART III

RACE AND JOHANNESBURG SLUMS

The nature and pace of national urban segregation policy was dictated by slum conditions in industrialising Johannesburg. Local authority implementation of national urban policy encountered snags in all large urban cen. u., but cosmopolitan Johannesburg was the testing ground for the enforcement of the racial planning legislation discussed in the first section of the thesis. The Johannesburg experience of segregation is therefore central to the understanding of race and the South African city.

The inner-city of the country’s largest urban centre was far from socially or spatially homogeneous. The diverse racial composition, the presence of both migrants and urbanites, and the prevalence of non-nuclear family living arrangements were among the factors brought to bear on the formulation of state strategies to remove slums. In physical terms a slum could mean anything from a sub-let room in a house to a backyard shack or an industrial compound. In detailing the living conditions of the poor of Johannesburg, attention needs to be given to the place of gender in the initiation of segregated welfare strategies, to the making of racial categories through the creation of an urban ‘native’ problem, and to the suppression of political unrest through the manipulation of racial access to space. The strategy for transforming gender, race and power relations in Johannesburg was the geographical reorganisation of residential space through the removal of slums.

The local application of slum legislation demonstrates that colonial standards were not uniformly or readily achieved in Johannesburg’s racially integrated inner-city. In less than two decades the racial geography of Johannesburg was transformed; urban segregation was entrenched and the problem of slums was alleviated, but not solved. In the effort to minimise whites’ rates and taxes and to contain the urban wage bill, African workers were housed in regimented municipal accommodation that was only a marginal physical improvement on the living standards of the slums. The segregated locations, and especially compounds, created the economic and spatial conditions for racial domination.
Four themes recur across the spatial and temporal variation of Johannesburg slums. First, segregation was neither a device for sanitising the city nor was the threat of disease a mask behind which segregation was enforced. Limited but definite improvements for some urban Africans were initiated. Locations and even compounds offered cheaper and healthier, if less attractive, accommodation than the slums. Poor whites benefited immeasurably from segregationist urban welfare initiatives, often at the expense of coloureds, who became a defined but marginalised urban community, and to the detriment of Africans who were denied full urban access. Second, racial classification assumed a material base in the light of differentiated urban conditions and status. Coloureds, Africans and whites were not only allocated different locations, but public housing was of unequal standard. Indians received no public housing assistance at all. Third, segregation was not simply a crude device for controlling the urban African population and supplying cheap labour to the mines and industry. Slum removals and the imposition of racial residential segregation embodied the convergent interests of white ratepayers, Afrikaner nationalists, English-speaking liberals, local authorities and employers. Finally, urban policy makers, especially local authorities, instituted public health measures, cleared slums and built decentralised commuter townships in much the same way as other industrialising societies. In South Africa, however, town planning was the primary device by which urban racial segregation rather than social segregation was secured.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE GENDERED GENESIS OF HOSTELS FOR WHITES

Just as London's experiences dictated English housing reforms, so developments in Johannesburg led the way in the evolution of South African urban policies. Johannesburg evolved from a temporary mining camp in the aftermath of the First World War. By the 1920s it was the most populous industrial centre in the African sub-continent. In this formative period, Johannesburg's population was predominantly white, a feature which was directly challenged by African urbanisation associated with industrialisation, and fiercely protected by the white establishment who perceived Johannesburg as indelibly white space. Not only was well over half of Johannesburg's post-World War One population white, but the majority of the city's 100 000 African population was hidden in closed mine compounds out of sight of the city centre. Furthermore, several thousand Africans who worked in Johannesburg lived 13 miles away at the Klipspruit location. Domestic quarters on white suburban properties provided another important, but unobtrusive, source of accommodation for blacks. Thus, despite the growth of the black slum yards (Fig. 5.1) the racial residential character of the working-class inner-city of Johannesburg appeared to be 'white'. The housing experience of white workers in Johannesburg, a disproportionate percentage of whom were single women, is of particular significance to the understanding of both urban reform and segregation initiatives that were pioneered in South Africa and emulated across the African continent.¹

Preoccupation with the emergence of a racial ideology that underscored the establishment of segregated residential areas in Africa has obscured the influence of sexism on urban policy. Similarly, in the search for the economic and political motives behind discriminatory urban management, the role of the church, one of the most influential bodies of the early twentieth century has been underestimated. The maintenance of Christian morality in the urban slums is a well explored theme in the literature on the reform movements of Europe and North America, yet in Africa the impact of mission work is rarely considered outside of the rural mission station.² In
South Africa, a country with a strong Calvinist tradition, urban slum conditions challenged the moral values of the Church.

Figure 5.1: Johannesburg in the inter-war years.

It is a mistake to assume that all white Johannesburg residents were home-owning ratepayers. Admittedly, *burgers* had the right to vote in municipal elections despite the fact that by far the majority of the white population rented their homes. The Ratepayers' Association, once acerbically coined "the Landlords' Protection Association", did not represent even the major interests of the racial elite. There are no reliable figures on the relative importance of home ownership versus rental in inter-war Johannesburg, but the 1920 figure of only 5 per cent home-ownership among the European population was used to motivate for a Rent Act in South Africa. Thus, although white South Africans had political influence at both parliamentary and municipal levels, many Europeans were at the economic mercy of rent-racketeering landlords who were earning over 30 per cent interest on capital from rentals. In this respect Johannesburg was truly a "City of Gold".
Rental accommodation in Johannesburg commonly took the form of boarding house lodgings (Fig. 5.2). The proprietor was usually an English woman who, in her turn, employed a domestic staff of black and white women to clean and cook. The standard of the accommodation varied enormously from Orwellian doss-houses where a bed in a 'spike' (a communal sleeping room) could be let for less than 1s 6d per night, to a rather more respectable suite of rooms that were let to families for £2 - £4 per month. The doss house as seen through the eyes of one-time resident, Aloysious Smith, and the lens of his biographer, Couzens, was not a pleasant place to live:

The inmates were at the mercy of unsympathetic landlords. Conditions were worse than in the equivalent 'rat-pits' of Scotland. The cheapest bed ticket cost five to ten shillings a week compared to one shilling and threepence for a tot of whisky. Furnishings were sparse or non-existent: lice were the only things generously provided. Cold in winter was endemic but the lodging-houses were in the infelicitous phrase of a contemporary journalist, 'hotbeds of crime'. . The doss houses were places where you slept in your coat not only for warmth but 'to save it from being collared by some poor chap hasn't got one.'

Figure 5.2: A Johannesburg boarding house.
The boarding house played a central role in sheltering Johannesburg's employed, unemployed and even unemployable population because of the paucity of alternative conventional accommodation. The precedent of using white builders increased construction costs by 30 per cent. High prices were also ascribed to the expense of importing materials such as pressed-steel ceilings and the artificially induced land shortage that was caused by extensive mining house property holdings. The cost of modest housing was beyond the means of even the regularly employed, who were lucky to earn £1 a week for skilled work. One way that families met the infamously high Johannesburg cost of living was to let rooms to lodgers. These 'houses let in lodgings' could have as many as four tenants without requiring any licence. The prevalence of this practice is impossible to ascertain, but in deliberating on the difficulty of distinguishing between 'a house let in lodgings' and 'a lodging or boarding house', a district inspector pointed out that 'every second house' in the working class districts let rooms. This was probably an overstatement, but at least 2,500 houses in Johannesburg were occupied by two families and a further 300 hosted three families. Approximately 100 dwellings were known to have housed more than four families per unit. Even the most respectable civil servants depended on the extra cash generated by their role as casual landlord.

The proportion of men renting beds in boarding houses declined as Johannesburg became more established, and white men brought their families to the Rand. Between 1904 and World War One the proportion of married men in Johannesburg increased several fold. The absolute number of single people sleeping in doss houses, however, continued to increase well into the 1920s. In 1896 there were between 60 and 90 known boarding houses, a figure that almost doubled by 1919, only to return to nineteenth century levels by 1935. The doss houses remained centrally located, but unlike the turn of the century pattern very few were situated on mine property itself. Most of the boarding houses were concentrated to the east of the city, away from the ghettos of the Malay Location and New Doornfontein south of the railway line, but within walking distance of the new manufacturing establishments that clustered along the flat ground in the Doornfontein vicinity (Fig. 5.3). The residential conditions of white workers were markedly superior to those of Africans, who earned less than a third of the wages paid to Europeans, and who could not afford even doss house
shelter. But, as the socialist organ *The Labour World* was quick to point out, in the battle for affordable accommodation and the struggle against rack-renting the issue was not racial and not flag and not republican and not monarchical and not creed - nor is it a party issue. It is not an issue between town and country - for the Dutch bij-wooner on the farms feels the same way as the British workman does in mine or factory or sweating den. The widow and child of the soldier of either race will suffer in equal degree.

Figure 5.3: The geography of white boarding houses and hostels.

By stitching together the disparate threads of unhappy working lives the Labour Party was able to create an issue which united whites, regardless of ethnicity, in the call for housing reform. Nationally this white caucus was very successful in pushing through the Public Health and the Housing Act. In practical terms this legislative victory was rather hollow. Financial constraints meant very that little money was actually spent by local authorities on white housing. Local efforts to convince the authorities of the need for state assistance for white housing in Johannesburg backfired when the Medical Officer of Health, Dr Porter, discovered that only 250 of the 2 000 people living in insanitary properties were white, and that there was no overall shortage of
accommodation for whites within a mile radius of the central city. Porter's report did, however, concede a general shortage of affordable 'respectable' accommodation for whites.\textsuperscript{1} The cost of rent no doubt explains why in 1918 over a quarter of white Johannesburg residents lived with densities of more than two people to a room.\textsuperscript{2} The 1918 survey marked a watershed in Porter's perception of the nature of the housing crisis in Johannesburg by drawing his attention to the growing severity of African living conditions. Several other major players appear to have remained oblivious to the abominable black housing conditions, other than to note the threat of miscegenation and to call repeatedly for segregation. In the absence of state support for white housing improvements, and with only impotent efforts to remove Africans from the white city, several bodies initiated alternative measures to redress the slum problem, especially insofar as it began to affect white women.

White women and the slums of the golden city

Moves to clear white women living in the once-male preserve of doss houses in Johannesburg were motivated and executed by South African churches, an agent not usually associated with the shaping of the South African built environment. Concerned primarily for the moral stature of their flock, and only secondarily for the geographical isolation of their white charges, the religious architects of women's hostels bolstered the de facto segregation of Johannesburg's working class population.

Prostitution and miscegenation fuelled co-operation between church and state in the construction of hostels for poor white women in Johannesburg. After World War One a burgeoning manufacturing sector relied increasingly on the labour of unskilled, unmarried white women.\textsuperscript{3} In 1924 already 48 per cent of the manufacturing work force were white women; by 1935 this figure had increased to 73 per cent.\textsuperscript{4} The growth of the food, textile, printing, and chemical industries on the Rand offered a niche, albeit tenuous, for Afrikaner women made redundant in impoverished and drought-stricken farm areas.\textsuperscript{5} Establishing an urban manufacturing base placed a premium on affordable accommodation in Johannesburg. Of the thousands of workers who found refuge in slum areas where a room, or sometimes even just a bed, could be rented, young white women were
a minority. Nevertheless, these working-class women were singled out by both the church and the state in the moral outcry over developing slum housing. Concern over the welfare of young white women spearheaded the urban reform initiatives that depended on segregationist ideals for their implementation. Even before the relocation of Africans under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in the late 1920s, or the establishment of council housing for white families in the 1930s, hostels were built for the white daughters of the golden city.

In the years after the First World War the demand for protective hostel accommodation for white women in many respects mirrored the concern of the time for the shelter of the growing African female workforce. While white women in the inter-war years were incorporated into Johannesburg's new factories, African women were moving into previously male-dominated domestic service in the suburbs of the city. In the 1920s and 1930s there was a marked increase in the number of women resident in Johannesburg. Parallel demographic patterns for African and white urbanisation were repeated in the housing arena where critical shortages occurred for all, but were especially acute for women who needed to be near their employment. In the days when poverty knew no colour bar, white women joined the poorer class of men who let beds or rooms in Johannesburg's doss houses.

Unlike African women who came regularly to 'Egoli' to join their husbands or families, white girls, with the possible exception of Jewish immigrants, were usually the first to urbanise, leaving the men behind in the rural areas. By 1928 over 10,000 white women were employed in poorly paid urban factory jobs. With no kin in the city on whom they could rely for economic support, these young women commonly became urban renters. Poverty drove many girls into slum areas where affordable shelter could be obtained. Very few of the registered boarding houses restricted letting to men only. Until single-sex hostels were built, women shared establishments, and sometimes even rooms, with men. Cohabitation of the sexes was officially prohibited, but in an effort to fill every bed, landlords would enquire if prospective women tenants would be prepared to share rooms with men.
In the face of increasing housing shortages in Johannesburg and a steadily growing population, young white girls sometimes boarded with families in insanitary parts of town. Rooms let in suburban houses provided as unreliable a form of accommodation as the more notorious boarding houses, as they were less rigorously monitored by the city council. Rooms in the filthy lodging houses were, understandably, considered "unfit for human habitation". Regulations that followed the English boarding house rules for changing lines and airing rooms and sweeping yards were only introduced after 1927. Even then not all establishments enforced the code. Although boarding houses were not licensed to sell liquor they were widely known as drinking places. One Johannesburg social worker claimed that methylated spirits and cheap wine were served to young women by pimps as a means of enticing them into the boarding houses that doubled as houses of ill-repute. The alleged effect of this concoction was to make the girls "lose all vestige of self-respect". Apart from exposure to the evils of the backstreets, lack of home life and discipline were held to contribute to the female doss house resident's already repugnant circumstances.

Poverty has no darling. White girls were no different to the newly urbanised Africans struggling to survive in the developing city. Slums housed those in need, irrespective of race or colour. One of the major complaints of the predominantly Anglo-Dutch church community which headed a protest to the Johannesburg Municipality against boarding house proprietors was that they failed to deter "cosmopolitan" tenants. This was presumably a reference to the southern and central Europeans who began to arrive in South Africa as immigration to north America became more difficult. More sustained outrage was reserved for mixing across the colour bar.

Despite the public hysteria over miscegenation, the forces to which newly proletarianised young white women were exposed were not restricted to the so-called 'dregs of a mixed population'. Economic survival in preference to impoverishment promoted more than mere social indiscrimination across the colour line. Women, who received lower wages than their male counterparts, were compelled to seek alternate methods with which to supplement their below subsistence income. Albeit construed as socially abhorrent, prostitution ensured economic survival. Reporting on a survey of 1 000 white Johannesburg prostitutes conducted in 1939/1940, Iliffe notes...
ninety percent of full-time prostitutes were originally ill-paid unskilled workers in factories, shops, tea-rooms, domestic work and similar occupations. A high proportion of these girls were genuinely unable to live on the wages which they received for their legitimate employment.

Although some white women were attracted by lucrative prospects of life on the streets, they were more fortunate than black women because 'legitimate' employment could also be obtained. In order to cultivate the support of the white working class, the Pact government instigated a policy of 'civilised labour' by which jobs for whites were protected, and in many instances created. Encouraged by the prospect of employment, especially for the young and able-bodied, the rural destitute migrated to the towns. The civilised labour policy created jobs for whites, but could not guarantee 'civilised' behaviour. Paltry wages received by women rarely provided for even the essentials of urban living, and these workers therefore continued to live amongst the even less well paid black working class or the unemployed in the city slums. The growth of white poverty in the early 1930s associated with drought, the great depression and the rise of an African petty bourgeois elite appears to have increased the incidence of racial mixing in the lodging houses and yards. The threat of miscegenation bolstered initiatives to introduce protected housing for white women.

The exposure of young, often immature, girls to a constant tussle for urban survival was said to encourage rapid physical and moral degeneration. An encounter with young factory employees was described as follows:

One day I faced a class of thirty working girls coming from the poorest homes, coming from the new environment of factory life. Fourteen years old - children - most of them poorly dressed - some badly nourished - shy - physically and mentally retarded for their age....In their eyes one could read what these girls in their young age had seen and heard, what for their tender eyes and ears. They were not shy - on the contrary - cheeky and bold using expressions others would blush about....Slowly I recognised this new world and understood the new mentality resultant from an environment of struggle and hardship, devoid of comfort and ease.

Concern for the social, moral and physical standards of the white working class grew as the numbers of poor whites in the cities increased. Philanthropists, moralists, and racists of the time sought desperately to impose 'appropriate' codes of behaviour that would distinguish poor whites from the remainder of the working class amongst whom they lived. Particular effort and concern was focused on women. Moves to establish women's hostels in preference to the doss houses were identified as "not only a practical solution to the problem of labour control and housing, but also
as an exercise of moral reform. They were simultaneously an important step down the path of racial residential segregation.

Post-influenza epidemic initiatives to remove the most vulnerable of the white population, single young women, from the blighted inner-city of Johannesburg were startlingly successful in comparison to the rather ineffectual enforcement of the NUAA. Despite political commitment to the white working class and the implementation of residential segregation, it was the church and not the state that provided the major impetus for hostel construction for whites in Johannesburg.

Charity, chastity and the white women of Johannesburg

The moral downfall of white working women captured the interest of, among others, concerned Christian women. Understandably, as most of the migrants were Afrikaners, the Dutch Reformed Church played a dominant role in providing urban welfare services. Together with other charitable and religious organisations, including Jews and Catholics, Protestant Women's Groups campaigned to preserve female chastity, something that was overtly threatened by the lodging house environment of central Johannesburg. Particularly in the white community, chasteness was seen as a direct expression of the break-down of traditional roles tarnishing the values of the 'volk'. Women, formerly central pillars of the family, were alienated in the city and lacked the support and discipline provided by familial ties. Alone in the city, surrounded by 'corrupting' elements, they were susceptible to the 'Blink Bedrog' or 'seductive swindle' of urban life.

A primary concern of women's church and humanitarian organisations was, therefore, to safeguard vulnerable females against the enticing evil of their newly acquired independence. These social groups envisioned themselves as shepherds with the duty of rendering their defenceless charges immune to moral degradation. In order to achieve this end, migrants would have to be placed in caring, disciplined and subsidized residences from their first arrival the city. In this respect the South African experience was remarkably similar to much of the English colonial world where organisations like the Salvation Army or the Young Women's Christian Association were active in women's hostel work.
Soon after the First World War, organised groups of women began to pressurise the state to establish hostels for low-paid working women, both African and European. An alternative to the lodging houses or yards was held to be particularly imperative so that young women, black and white, could benefit from the supervision and friendly companionship in a controlled environment. In order to qualify for entry into a hostel, applicants were required to possess certain attributes; these included "good conduct and character" and a "bright and intelligent appearance." Juveniles of a "poor type" were to be denied accommodation, as girls of "weak characters, low educational attainments or poor physique tended to degenerate more quickly under conditions of town life than in rural surroundings." While the concern to segregate the races and the sexes was uppermost in the philanthropic mind, a division between 'respectable' and 'degenerate' poor people was being carved simultaneously within each gender and race group. Destitute poor whites were relatively protected by soup kitchens, and by employment, school and health programmes, and they never became a distinct sub-group within the European community. Divisions within the African working class were more obvious. The emergence of a 'respectable' or petty-bourgeois African elite on the Rand had a major political impact. The extent to which the presence of permanently settled, semi-skilled Africans prompted major shifts in urban 'native' policy is taken up in subsequent chapters. In the case of both the African and the white working class, the strategy of accommodating a segment of the labour force in austere but efficient single-sex housing guaranteed that the residential conditions necessary for the growth of the manufacturing industry on the Rand were achieved.

The move towards the provision of single-sex hostels by religious and charitable organisations had a philanthropic rather than economic ideal as its guiding motive. These bodies, which included both English and Afrikaans-speaking denominations, demonstrated an acute social consciousness geared towards the moral protection and upliftment of working-class women. Connections between the dignity of her gender and the stature of the 'volk' distinguished the concern for the Afrikaner garment worker from that expressed for African women or white men for whom hostels were also constructed. In the early 1920s, years of tumultuous labour unrest on the Rand, the political ramifications of racially 'indiscrete' actions by women of the white race underscored government support of hostel establishment. The state's social consciousness was firmly entrenched in the economic stability and political durability of the Union and its ruling race.
Gendered concerns of the state

Woman's religious organisations and the state recognised the deplorable conditions in which the female worker existed. The state was, however, concerned more with the 'abhorrent miscegeny' that characterised the areas in which working-class women lived, than with the moral condition of the women themselves. It was a firmly held public opinion that racial self-respect could be induced by physical removal from undesirable surroundings in private rental arrangements to supervised hostels. Moreover, it was feared that the economic equality of poor whites and 'non-Europeans', and the contiguity of their dwellings, tended to foster social equality. Segregated hostels would prevent the miscegeny that had noticeably weakened the colour line in working-class Johannesburg. Through the mechanism of separate accommodation, racial integration could be minimised and economic and social distance between the races intensified. Hostels were condoned because they provided youths, and more particularly women, with the opportunity to participate in urban industrial life while protected, physically and socially, from the ravages of slum life.

Particularly in the 1920s the problem of the social upliftment of urban poor whites was understood to be integrally involved with their residential separation from the African working class. By the 1930s, public housing schemes had been initiated and separate accommodation for the white working class was constructed. Unfortunately, state housing assistance in the inter-war period catered only for families. This nuclear-family bias excluded one of the most significant segments of the labour-force of Johannesburg, namely white women, from state housing assistance. Hostels filled this gap in the state's white welfare proposals, which were at least in part aimed at the segregation of urban residential areas. This is not to deny the state's concern for the moral status of young white workers. Anxiety was nevertheless quasi-moral; the desire for spiritual rehabilitation barely concealed an abhorrence of racial integration in any form.

Hostels would also serve as a form of informal influx control. Concern was increasingly directed at streams of migrants attracted to the towns by the 'civilised labour' programmes, placing stress on overtaxed city resources. It was assumed that families would allow single women to migrate alone if they were assured of an establishment where the girls would be under proper supervision.
If not, an entire family would often migrate for fear of leaving a daughte' unprotec ted. If hostel accommodation was available, only prospective workers would move to industrialising urban areas and unproductive family members would not further pressurise the overcrowded cities.

As industry increasingly demanded cheap labour and the civilised labour policy endorsed the preferential employment of whites, the economic value of white working-class women was undeniable. Unlike the early 1900s when men's indulgence in the vices of drinking, gambling and whoring were condoned to appease an unmarried male workforce on whose labour industrialisation depended, the devaluation of female workers' worth was linked to the hazards of economic destitution associated with sub-standard wages. This was stressed in parliament:

The danger is therefore great in all centres of industries and let me just cite the case of young girls also earning 15s per week barely providing for housing accommodation alone. They go into little rooms in the slums of the great towns amongst surroundings altogether undesirable and demoralising, and are often the root occasion of their work wrong. It becomes a necessity to care for such persons by means of hostels.

A 'degenerate' (unmarried mother?) female worker was not perceived as a productive worker and was of little use in a labour market where child-care facilities were virtually non-existent (though white working-class women often employed African child-minders to allow them to work). The state thus considered hostel accommodation to be an economic benefit, a source through which 'civilised' labour could be sustained and reproduced without further inflating white wages which were already higher than anywhere else in the world other than North America. Economic and political imperatives, rather than pure moral principle, made the prospect of hostel accommodation more attractive to the state.

In order to extract maximum productivity from the female working-class, as well as limiting indiscriminate influx, the state demanded that applicants for accommodation in Johannesburg possess certain credentials before being allocated hostel rooms, a sentiment little different to that embodied in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act and applied to African men. Apart from the expected minimal wage receipt, female migrants were to have succeeded in securing employment before they arrived in towns. The state's burden of having to provide for an increasing unemployed labour force would be vastly reduced. This was idealistic, a fact revealed by the Juvenile Board which demonstrated that only 10 per cent of juveniles arrived in towns to take up work already
procured. The credentials were accordingly extended in order to encompass those girls who had ‘definite prospects’ of obtaining work within one or two weeks.

As in the case of African women, where Christian compound netw... employment opportunities, hostels would also be a channel through which job allocation could occur. Positive reputations ascribed to women’s residences by industry were reinforced by assistance to new female workers from hostel committees, thereby ensuring inmates a greater chance of success in industrial careers. The establishment of hostels for white workers was a particular asset to employers, especially in instances where ‘home conditions militated against an effective training in their craft by reasons either of extreme poverty, lack of parental control or distance between home and work’. Hostels offered an environment that encouraged maximum productivity from new migrants. Hostel accommodation, where the reproduction of labour was stringently supervised, was supported as a means of transforming social burdens into economic assets.

Hostels for the white daughters of the City of Gold

Both due to their gender and colour, but also because of their integral role in nascent manufacturing on the Rand, poor white women were provided with supervised and subsidised housing. While the practice of boarding with kin or surrogate kin continued to be practised by many of the factory girls of Johannesburg, alternative accommodation, by way of some 750 beds, was also available in hostels. The importance of hostel accommodation relative to family housing is highlighted through comparison with the paltry total of 431 units completed by the Johannesburg Council for poor whites in the inter-war years. The residential plight of single white working-class women was clearly high on the urban shelter agenda.

Action was initiated by the state to broaden the scope of the 1920 Housing Act in order to permit loans for the building of hostels or other similar institutions. This preliminary measure was taken in 1925 to attempt in some way to accommodate persons in employment who were otherwise unable to secure suitable accommodation within their means. This extension of the Housing Act concerned the white population alone; it did not extend, as the Housing Act of 1920 had,
to the funding of shelter for coloureds and Indians. A Commission was appointed by the Department of Labour in 1926 to investigate the provision of hostels for Afrikaner children from rural districts. The Commission discovered some 7 000 to 8 000 juveniles residing in boarding houses in the Union's large cities, in addition to the thousands who relied on state and church settlements. The accommodation shortages were exacerbated by between 2 000 and 3 000 rural juveniles who left school each year and entered the labour market. In theory, hostels were a solution to both the absolute housing deficit and the contextual shelter crisis occasioned by racial integration, for they allowed women to overcome geographical and economic obstacles to urban employment. Ultimately, however, the post-war depression and the mounting obsession with the urban 'native problem' precluded state implementation of white hostel schemes, and women continued to shelter in the racially mixed slums.

In the early 1920s state housing funds were allocated to the imposition of the NUAA as the most effective method for redressing the urban crisis by adequately rehousing the African population, alleviating the accommodation shortage and securing residential segregation. The Companies Act of 1926 allowed for the extension of sub-economic housing loans to private organisations for the establishment of hostel accommodation for low-paid workers. These charitable associations, many of which were religious, were to register themselves as Utility Companies and were to function on a non-profit basis.

Some form of hostel accommodation was available to 230 young women before 1925. This included the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) hostels opened in Johannesburg as early as 1917, and the Salvation Army hostel opened in 1921. The fees charged for these facilities surpassed the earnings of the average factory worker. Provision had been made to some extent for 'destitute women', but since low-paid workers were not classified as destitute they were denied entry into rescue homes such as The Shelter for Women and The Good Shepherd Home. Until the outbreak of World War Two, there remained in excess of 6 400 women working in Johannesburg, a large proportion of whom were single and in desperate need of a place of residence. The Johannesburg City Council Hostel Committee was aware of the demand for cheap accommodation and stated that.
If the thousands of young girl workers were paid wages upon which they could live decently, there would be no need for hostels, but their earning capacity is such that it is an utter impossibility for them to pay the usual charges demanded by Private Hostels and Boarding Establishments.

Seven hostels catering specifically for young, single, low-paid working women were established or expanded by extra-state means during the 1930s. Almost without exception they were run by religious groups or charitable organisations. Government institutions had managed to shift the responsibility for establishing and managing white single quarters onto these bodies. In the 1930s, however, the state allocated £5 000 to the Department of Education for subsidising hostels for the most needy among Johannesburg’s residents. As the general economic climate improved following South Africa’s departure from the gold standard in 1933, the amount of money available for public housing expanded. At the time when state finances earmarked for Johannesburg were poured into township construction at Orlando (for Africans), Coronationville (for ‘coloureds’), and Jan Hofmeyr (for whites), some money also spilled into the coffers of hostel organisations. In the mid-1930s the state became more directly involved in housing single white women through financial assistance, even though it had aborted its primary commitment to the actual establishment and running of hostels.

Once the central state began to fund a portion of hostel bills, philanthropic organisations were brought under the umbrella of state welfare administration. Hostels, once receiving state grants, became answerable to a local authority Hostel Committee. This Committee was composed of members of state and charitable organisations. These in turn fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education and from 1937, the Department of Labour and Social Welfare. Once hostels for the white women of Johannesburg fell under the auspices of the state, the perceived role of the residences seems to have changed. Continual church involvement ensured the persistence of a moral code for hostel inmates, but the institutions were soon treated as regular accommodation, free of moral constraint for the single female workforce. A more fundamental factor in the decline of female tenancy in Johannesburg doss houses was the declining importance of white women in the pre-World War Two labour force.
Conclusion

Within the slum belt that girdled Johannesburg there were a number of different forms of shelter for the poor. Boarding houses hosted the majority of unmarried whites. With the shift from mining to manufacturing, Johannesburg's single people were increasingly women as well as men. These factory 'meisies', as well as the prostitutes, cooks, and chars, could not afford a suburban house and garden. The decision to share a Johannesburg doss house with the kind of man who was exposed to the harshest urban conditions was born of necessity. The plight of these white women was first taken up by Christian philanthropists who received a sympathetic ear from central and local government.

The provision of hostel accommodation for white working women stemmed initially from philanthropists' acknowledgement of the wretched conditions in which women were forced to survive. Church and state concern over the presence of white working-class women in the poor, racially-integrated quarters of Johannesburg underscored their effort to establish hostels. The church's philanthropic stance viewed economic survival as secondary, demanded only in so far as the physical body houses the spirit. Moral issues were primary, and women from various organisations sought to uplift the female worker from the depths of 'social and moral degradation'.

The state, by contrast, considered moral rehabilitation as only a minor aspect of hostel accommodation. Hostels sufficed as places of abode where women could regain their footing before making a home of their own outside the slum areas. By minimising the necessity for inferior lodgings through the extension of 'suitable' housing facilities, hostels would maintain the labour-force and in addition serve as a mechanism for promoting racial separation.

The state considered racial segregation desirable, and economic reproduction of the white working class imperative. Accordingly, hostels had an important role to play in the economy of the industrialising urban areas. Women's wages could be maintained at low levels, providing the labour force could be cheaply accommodated. Any threat of a unified labour movement across the colour bar was minimised by segregating working-class living quarters. The possibility of race tensions (such as those that underlay the 1922 strike) spreading into the suburbs was also reduced.
The productivity and political reliability of white workers, a significant proportion of whom were women, was seen to depend upon the cloistering of the young white female population. Yet, the state was reluctant to fund housing. It waited rather for other concerned organisations to take an active role in hostel construction and only then committed itself to their support.

Once the state and other concerns became involved in providing accommodation for low paid working women, their relationship was symbiotic. In time, the church and associated bodies accepted and even coaxed segregationist urban policies from the government. Although Christian philanthropists were more successful than the state in delivering alternative accommodation for white slum occupants, they did not meet real or perceived needs for clean and safe housing for women. The attentions of reformist religious groups highlight the extent to which a large segment of Johannesburg's population lived in poverty comparable with metropolitan conditions in Europe or North America. However, the relative privilege of poor whites becomes apparent when their plight is contrasted with the plight of blacks in Johannesburg's yards.

Notes


3 *Labour World*, 17/04/1920; 1/05/1920; 15/05/1920.


5 IAD JGE 90 A1286, Copy of resolution of women representing social and religious societies in Johannesburg, no date.


7 University of the Witwatersrand, African Studies Institute, Pearson and Kallaway photographic Collection.
8 Hansard, 1927, Col. 1971.


10 IAD JGE 90 A1286, 'By-laws for Common Lodging Houses', 1927.


12 IAD JGE 90 A1286, Licensing Officer to MOH, 20 October 1925.


14 van Onselen, C., New Babylon, New Nineveh; IAD JGE 90 A1286, The number of licensed boarding houses recorded in the municipal archives; Braby's Directory, Johannesburg, 1935.

15 CPSA AD 1483, Sophiatown and Marlindals Residents Association submission to the NEC, 1930, put African wages at between £4-6 and minimum subsistence costs at £6-8 per month.

16 Labour World, 10/04/1920.

17 Map compiled from lists of licences issued to Boarding Houses. IAD JGE 90 A1286; Minute of the Mayor, Minutes 27 Meeting of the Johannesburg City Council, 27 August 1912.


19 Hansard, 1927, Col. 1962.

20 IAD, CHDA Box 27 9608, Report of the MOH on the Shortage of Dwelling Houses, 5 December 1919; Unsorted Box 9608, Evidence of the MOH before the Housing Commission, 9 December 1919.


2.7 Gaitskell, D., 'Christian compounds for girls'.

2.8 Eales, K., 'Patriarchs, passes and privilege'.


2.3 IAD JGE 90 A1286. District Inspectors reports suggest only about 15 per cent of boarding houses were exclusively male.

2.4 IAD JGE 90 A1286, Extract of Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 24 May 1926; Evidence given by womens' collective, no date.

2.5 CPSA Box AH 1092 Bch1, Wage Board Report to the clothing industry, 1926.

2.6 IAD JGE 90 A1286, By-laws for Common Lodging Houses, 1927; Extract of Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 24 May 1926.

2.7 CAD VWN 468, Unsigned letter to Mr. Sachs, Germiston, 1 January 1935.

2.8 IAD JGE 90 A1286, Extract of Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 24 May 1926, Evidence given by womens' collective.

2.9 CAD VWN 468 Secretary of Public Health, Pretoria, to Secretary of Labour, 5 April 1935.

2.10 IAD JGE 90 A1286, Extract of Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 24 May 1926; Evidence given by womens' collective, no date.


2.13 Brink, E., 'The Afrikaner Women of the Garment Workers Union'; Freund, B., 'The social character of secondary industry'; Witz, L., 'Servants of the workers'.


*12* CAD VWN 454, Article by Eva Sacks, Johannesburg, 1935.


*14* Brink, E., 'Only decent girls are employed', p. 28.


*17* Brink, E., 'Maar a klomp 'factory' meide': Afrikander family and community on the Witwatersrand during the 1920s', in Bozzoli, B. (ed.), *Class, Community and Conflict*, Johannesburg, 1987, pp. 177-208; Gaitskell, D., 'Christian compounds for girls'.

*18* Brink, E., 'Only decent girls are employed'.


*20* Maud, D., 'Daughters of the golden city'; Gaitskell, D., 'Christian compounds for girls'.


*22* CAD VWN 479, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Hostels Committee, Cape Town, 28 July 1926.


*24* Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Director of Non-European Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1929, Johannesburg, 1929; Parnell, S. M., 'Public housing as a device of white residential segregation', *Urban Geography*, vol. 9, 1988, pp. 584-602; Parnell, S. M., 'Shaping a racially divided society'.

*25* CAD VWN 479, Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Hostels Committee, Cape Town, 4 July 1926, p. 3.
During the 12 months of 1925/6 618 applications from young women were received. In addition, large numbers were unplaced from previous months. After placing girls into available employment, 321 were left unemployed. Women had mainly applied for work as shorthand-typists, clerks, sales assistants, milliners or dressmakers. Domestic work appealed to only a negligible number of applicants. CAD VWN 479, Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Hostels Committee, Cape Town, 28 July 1926.
The cost of retaining one individual per week was a minimum of £1. The average starting wage of a girl in industry was between 10s and 15s per week. The Hostels Committee recommended a subsidy of 7s 6d per capita per week. The annual capitation grant eventually allocated in approved cases of girls under 21 years earning exceptionally low wages, was based on the difference between 21s per week (assumed maintenance costs) and the resident's contribution. In 1939 this subsidy was set at 2s 6d per resident worker per week; if less than £2 a week was earned, the subsidy rose to 3s 6d. In addition, 50 per cent of rental or 50 per cent of interest and redemption where accommodation was otherwise erected was afforded, plus a grant of up to £10 per resident on a pound-for-pound basis for furniture and equipment. CAD VWN 454, Union Education Department, to the Secretary of Labour and Social Welfare, 11 August 1936.

CPSA AH 646 DC 5.16, Conference of the National Council of Women, address by Mr. Forsyth, General Secretary of Trades and Labour Council, Johannesburg, 13 March 1935; Rand Daily Mail, 15/03/1935.

CAD VWN 454, Secretary of Education to Secretary of Labour and Welfare, 7 September 1936.

Rand Daily Mail, 13/12/1934.

CHAPTER SIX

BLACK JOHANNESBURG SLUM YARDS

In rows of brownish grey, the old hovels fill a Fordsburg slum. Faded window-sills—grimy window-panes. Behind them, something that goes by the name of a curtain but is, in reality, a rag.

Open doors and unwashed brats, getting dirtier and dirtier in the whirling dust.  

The complexity of Johannesburg's emerging urban crisis was accurately assessed in a journalist's 1915 observation that "Public health, social life, labour efficiency, the question of poor whites, and a dozen other matters relating to Johannesburg's future, are wrapped up in the problem of Rand slumdom." Within the space of a decade, and after years disrupted by war, an epidemic, strikes and civil unrest, there emerged perhaps the most racially repressive legislation anywhere in the world aimed at eradicating slums and controlling the pattern and extent of black urban settlement. The systematic enforcement of urban racial segregation makes it easy to forget that the inner-city was once an important focus of black settlement.

Of the approximately 105 000 African people living in Johannesburg at the close of World War One, about half (53 432) were housed and employed by the mines. A further 4 000 resided in the municipal compounds and localities. Of the remainder, approximately 30 000 comprised domestic workers living in the white suburbs. The balance (estimated to be in the region of 17 000), the bulk of the industrial workforce together with the unemployed, lived in the city between the railway line and the mine dumps. Africans from within the Union, along with Mozambicans, Swazis and Batswana lived in Johannesburg's cosmopolitan slums with immigrants from Cyprus, the United Kingdom, India and Greece. Even racially conscious South African officials had no way of categorising the spectrum of human colour found in Johannesburg. In South Africa, the racial division of urban space, and indeed racial identity itself, arose out of the experiences of racial mixing that occurred in the slums.
The origins of the Johannesburg slum yards

The dimensions of Johannesburg's slum problem were shaped by local conditions. The discovery of gold on the Rand in 1886 attracted a motley collection of fortune seekers who settled in the sizeable, but ephemeral camp of Johannesburg. A sustainable gold extraction industry was not established until the 1890s when deep-level rather than surface mining was introduced. Gradually the tents and tin structures of the prospectors made way for brick houses of artisans and managers. Even then, the residential development of Johannesburg was distorted by mining, which until the Second World War, loomed large in the local economy. Marginal levels of profit obtained from gold meant that the mines depended on migrant labour housed in compounds for the majority of the workforce. Compound housing was simultaneously adopted by the municipality, the second largest employer of labour. A modified compound arrangement was subsequently embraced by private sector employers of migrant labour. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century very little working-class housing stock existed in Johannesburg.

The dramatic growth of Johannesburg's population which was associated with the early twentieth century rise of manufacturing (Table 6.1) was not accompanied by widespread speculative building or even the owner-building that occurred at this time in places like Toronto. Given the more secure future of gold in the twentieth century (a limited but growing industrial sector successfully provided engineering services to the mines and clothing to miners), it is surprising that there was no construction boom on the Rand in the 1910 or 1920s. One possible explanation is that African workers' wages were too meagre to pay an economic rent that would support any building activity.
Table 6.1: Population of Johannesburg, 1911-1936. 

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<th>1911</th>
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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>121 857</td>
<td>134 000</td>
<td>154 058</td>
<td>262 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>102 668</td>
<td>105 000</td>
<td>123 175</td>
<td>240 805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>5 999</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>6 256</td>
<td>10 256</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>11 007</td>
<td>9 300</td>
<td>12 044</td>
<td>23 722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>240 131</td>
<td>253 300</td>
<td>295 533</td>
<td>537 217</td>
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</table>

The shortage of working-class housing associated with the growth of dense, overcrowded slum conditions can be accounted for by the mine owners' stranglehold on land rights along the Reef. The centre of Johannesburg was only walking distance from the early prospecting sites. In order to protect future prospecting options the mining houses acquired extensive freehold in areas close to town. Once the settlement grew, these sites were ideally suited to working-class housing. After it became apparent that this ground was not required for mining purposes, leasehold rights were sold in locations where the rapid erection of cheap dwellings attracted the poor who placed a premium on accessibility. Additional houses became available as the more wealthy abandoned their temporary wood and iron homes that were continually blasted by the wind and mine sand, for more desirable locations along the ridges to the north of the reef. Many of the poorest quarters of eastern Johannesburg developed in either the decaying structures of early Johannesburg or in the limited number of speculator’s buildings constructed on mine-leased land. The mines leased rather than sold their property as they were mindful of the speculative potential of their land holdings. The high cost of inner-city land, the inferior quality of initial construction and the insecurity of tenure were often cited as the cause of residential blight in early Johannesburg. One further respect in which mine control of extensive tracts of land allegedly affected the quality of life of Johannesburg residents had to do with the system of rating. Before major reforms to the municipal rating system passed in 1916, the burden of municipal taxation was carried by individual property owners rather than the large land-owning mines.
The matter of the revenue that entered the Johannesburg Council Treasury account was a major source of contention when it came to apportioning blame for the evolution of Johannesburg’s slums. These were described polemically as amongst the worst in the world,18 and were undoubtedly the worst in the nation.18 The Johannesburg Council repeatedly asserted that it could not be expected to provide housing for all the people that the central government allowed into the city without the consent of the municipality.17 What lay behind the local authority’s refusal was the fact that revenues from African pass fees were paid to the Provincial and not the Municipal Authority.1 A more fundamental reason for the persistent refusal to construct African locations as an alternative to slums was the conviction that white ratepayers should not have to fund services of any kind for blacks. The demand that blacks be excluded from city expenditure was particularly strong between 1917-1919 and 1921-1923 when the Labour Party dominated the City Hall.18 In subsequent years, with the ascendance to power of the white Ratepayers’ Associations, a rather different logic prevailed. Although segregated locations were still supported in principle, the cry that they be built ‘anywhere but in my back yard’, and from national not local money, retarded any effective black housing programme in the city.19

The paucity of housing provision for Africans, and the concomitant development of slums in Johannesburg in the first two decades of the twentieth century, is partially explained by the white supremacist attitudes prevalent in city government. Yet, even when the Council did motivate slum clearance, it encountered procedural obstacles regardless of the race at which the anti-slum action was directed. One reason was the bureaucratic muddle that surrounded urban planning. The post-Union administrative structure confused the issue of which level of government was responsible for anti-slum legislation. It took some ten years to establish that the Provincial Council could regulate conditions governing the closure of insanitary premises (achieved in the 1916 Transvaal Ordinance that greatly enhanced the Council’s powers to manage Johannesburg slums), while only Parliament could set urban ‘Native’ policy (the legal benchmark in this respect was the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923). The growth of slums in Johannesburg was not simply the product of inadequate management powers, it was also the direct consequence of the bizarre legal restrictions on African urban residence that were in turn an ad hoc response to the lack of housing provision in the city.
Under the 1906 Johannesburg Municipal Ordinance the Council had the power to force Africans to live in municipally controlled compounds or locations. Until World War One Klipspruit was the sole African location run by the Johannesburg Council. It was not a favoured place because of the long journey to the city and the appalling conditions in which people lived. Situated on a disused sewerage works, Klipspruit was unpopular with employers as well as employees. The distance and the infrequent train service (only twice daily) meant it was unrealistic to expect African staff who lived at Klipspruit to work a long day or overtime. In an effort to accommodate the demands of the manufacturers and traders for a flexible workforce, the Council evolved a plan of granting exemption certificates to African employees who worked before 7 a.m. or after 6 p.m. In addition, African workers were allowed to live on employers' premises without permits, providing the Council had approved the standard of proposed accommodation. A loophole in the regulations meant that "employers' premises" included any employer-hired venue. Africans were therefore effectively excused from living at Klipspruit not only to live on factory sites, but to reside at any address where an employer hired rooms for his or her workforce.

By 1918 some 6,000 Africans were housed on factory sites by their employers and therefore required no exemption certificates (see Table 6.2 for 1915 figures). A minority of employers allowed Africans to find their own accommodation and facilitated this process by applying for exemption certificates for them. More commonly, Africans were left to find their own lodgings without the protection of employers supporting their permit applications. The permit itself cost only one shilling so it was an unlikely deterrent to employer support. Perhaps the burden of the paperwork was greater than the inconvenience of having workers arrested and prosecuted for illegal town living. As far as the City Council was aware, few employers "cared a damn" where their labourers lived as long as they arrived at work on time. In 1915 only 369 of the 7,500 Africans enumerated in the Johannesburg yards had permission to hire private rooms. Almost half these were located in the slum districts of Ferreirastown, Marshalls, and City and Suburban that lay between the mining ground and the city. The balance of exempted Africans, bar very few inner-city residents, lived in the Doornfontein area. The largest concentration of cheap private rooms was in the Malay Location, despite the fact that no permits were issued to Africans to live there (Fig. 6.1).
### Table 6.2: 1915 Survey of African and ‘coloured’ occupation of slumyards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of accommodation</th>
<th>Permit</th>
<th>No Permit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africans on employers’ premises</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>4279</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>214</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>4684</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africans on premises hired by their employers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
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<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africans on premises hired themselves</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>2557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coloureds on employers’ premises</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>455</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coloureds on premises hired themselves</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>1722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td>2788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>6118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>385</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>14134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Especially after 1913, unless African men could prove their marriage under Christian law, they were generally refused permits and were directed to the Salisbury and Jubilee compound. The Council struggled to fill the 2,500 beds, even after housing its own employees. The slums were more expensive (about three times the price of the compound), but were nonetheless more desirable places to settle than the locations and compounds. The majority of African town residents were therefore illegal (Fig. 6.2). Compared to the inconvenience of Klipspruit and the constraints of the Salisbury and Jubilee compound, the slumyards, even when tainted by the threat of police harassment, were an attractive destination for urbanising Africans. For single women there was little
choice but to eke out a survival in the city, for there were no African women's compounds until 1929, and Klipspruit only offered housing to nuclear families. Demand explains the high densities, but not the low quality of the accommodation available to blacks in 'white Johannesburg'.

Figure 6.2: Proportion of Africans living in yards with permits, 1915.


Slums evolved because the exemption system was widely abused. Although most manufacturing firms (some of which employed as many as 200-300 people), did provide rudimentary housing for their staff, few of the cartage, warehouse or retail businesses did so and
this segment of the labour force was over-represented in the illegal yard population. There were instances in which prospective landlords manipulated the exemption clauses by posing as an employer to ensure tenant 'legality' outside the location and to encourage Africans to pay the inflated rentals. Alternatively, rent was supplied as part of a contract to hawk liquor or other illegal merchandise for the landlord. Even the Council abused its own condition that Africans only occupy sanitary housing.

The case of Ridgeway's yard in City and Suburban is a fairly typical example of how abuse of the exemption certificate system bred slum conditions in Johannesburg. In September 1907 an application was lodged for 'Sam', a watchman employed by the South African General Mission, to live in town with his wife and child so he could open the hall for evening religious meetings. A satisfactory sanitation inspection report was submitted and it was established that a white supervisor lived on the premises. After two months the Council granted the exemption "provided no well founded complaint" of Sam's family's behaviour was received. In the intervening weeks Sam had taken occupation of one of Mr Ridgeway's rooms where he quickly brushed against the law for living illegally outside the location. Despite the presence of illegals like Sam, the City Council continued to issue permits for Africans to let rooms in Ridgeway's yard. Six months after Sam's application, Littlejohn's Carriageworks employed a striker, but as their own compound was already full, applied for the Smithers family to be housed at Ridgeway's yard. It does seem though, that before 1910 the practice of granting exemption for the Ridgeway rooms was carefully monitored and applied sparingly. Even the police allowed some of their staff to move out of staff quarters to move into Ridgeway's yard.

Ridgeway's premises became popular and soon he expanded the number of people living on site. The yard must have held considerable benefits: an African named "Philemon" rated moving into the yard more important than keeping his job, possibly because it meant he could live with his family. Philemon's employer opposed his exemption because she wanted him to live on her property where she could supervise his movements, and so the Council refused his application. Philemon left his job and took illegal occupation of one of Ridgeway's rooms. Despite this, Philemon's wife, Evelina, was given a three month permit to live with him in Ridgeway's yard.
Council vigilance in restricting yard occupation to Africans who were employed in the city, and who could be assured of clean quarters, had begun to slip.

The African practice of renting rooms in yards, even without permits, became more common as the demand for shelter became more acute with the growth of industry in Johannesburg. As greater numbers of women migrated to Johannesburg, fewer legal shelter options were available and the yards became a more important source of housing for Africans. Deteriorating sanitary conditions cannot, however, be ascribed simply to illegal African settlement in Johannesburg. Not all African yard residents were illegal. For example, the Council continued to issue permits for Ridgeway’s yard and must therefore have approved the sanitary conditions encountered during routine inspections of the property. Periodic raids at the request of the police identified unexempted Africans who were prosecuted for transgressing the law. If the case of Ridgeway’s yard is in any way indicative, the Council appears to have chosen to ignore the growing density and declining standards of the yards until conditions finally reached unacceptable levels of filth, disease and/or crime. Less than ten years after the MOH issued the first known permit for an African to reside in Ridgeway’s yard, the property was condemned as unfit for human habitation. The three 50 x 50 foot stands that made up the yard were found to have 25 wood-and-iron rooms of such defective structure that total demolition was required.

The granting of exemption permits began as a pragmatic way of mediating between the principle of segregated African locations that had long been accepted in Johannesburg, and establishing a steady supply of labour to Rand industry. Official condonation of compound-like residential quarters servicing the factories, mines and shops of the cities established a nucleus of yards in the central Johannesburg area. Some of these compounds were at the rear of factories; other compound accommodation was established close to the place of employment. Monitoring the health and safety of both types of shelter was the responsibility of the employer rather than the Municipality. By contrast, if an employer did not run a factory compound, he could endorse a worker’s application to rent rooms in a ‘private yard’ under the exemption system. Exemptions failed to cater for more than a minority of Africans, and most African residents of private yards were illegal. These yards...
...rew as fast, if not faster than the compounds attached to work places. Together, the compounds and the yards, and to some extent the doss houses, constituted Johannesburg's slums.

The presence of so many black people in the inner-city of white Johannesburg undoubtedly lay at heart of white Johannesburg's demands that government solve the 'native housing problem' and clear the city slums. The resultant framework of urban African policy laid down under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 survived some 60 years with only minor amendments. Current town planning practice has its antecedents in the anti-slum legislation forged in the opening decades of this century. Unquestionably, the form of legislation drew heavily on the Johannesburg experiences in the 1910s. In order to fully understand the nature of the protest against urban Africans it is useful to establish a clearer picture of the social and physical conditions of the slumyards of Johannesburg.

Conditions in Johannesburg's backyards

Despite the prevalence of yards and compounds in Johannesburg, few of the city's affluent had much sense of where black people lived in the city. A shopping expedition to respectable downtown department or specialist stores avoided the worst residential blight that was concentrated around the rim of the city centre (Fig. 6.3). The slums were not hidden just because of their predominantly industrial locations; even in an appropriate district, a casual observer may not have been fully aware of the extent of slum quarters. A contemporary journalist warned:

You may pass them every day and never notice them. You may see an iron fence on one side of the street, and cut in that fence an unobtrusive little door; or you may observe a little alleyway, apparently leading to the back of a private house or shop. Follow it up, or pass through that little door, and you are in a different world... In the yards are hidden the girls who have run away from home, the women who have left their husbands, the victims of the passions of white men, the low Indian trader, the magician, the purveyor of infamous photographs, the ubiquitous liquor dealer.  

Typically, the worst slum properties were situated to the rear of a more formal structure, either a house or a factory. Rows of wood-and-iron rooms, often with a separate entrance for each, were erected around the perimeter of the stand. Normally each room was individually let, but
extortionate rentals encouraged sub-letting. In fact the letting of rooms in yards was allegedly the most lucrative form of property dealing in Johannesburg. One year's rental was generally greater than the value of the entire property. The corollary of the huge profits made by landlords and owners was that blacks paid at least half their monthly income on rent or were forced to supplement legitimate earnings with illegal work in order to pay the rent.

Figure 6.3: Location of pre-World War One yards.

In return for a monthly rental of between 10s and £1, a white person was guaranteed a boarding house bed. For the same money a black family could expect a 'private' room with shared cooking, cleaning and sanitary facilities. In the open courtyards fires were lit and this was the space used for the brewing, selling and consumption of liquor. Poor construction meant that partitions between the tiny rooms (on average 9 x 9 feet, but often smaller) rarely reached the hessian ceilings. A regular complaint of both inhabitants and health officials concerned the poor drainage of the yards. Spectacular highveld thunderstorms brought downpours that would cause water to rush into
the rooms whose floor levels were below that of the outside courtyard. As many floors were made from mud or dung, flooding was both inconvenient and unhealthy.

The quality of life in the cell-like structures that made up the slums was further inhibited by poor ventilation. Reporters and inspectors often complained of the dangers afforded by the cramped and overcrowded conditions. Police too objected to the maze of quarters through which they were expected to wander in order to find suspects. Yet it is clear that many slum residents kept their homes remarkably clean, especially given the adverse conditions under which they laboured. There was, however, a general problem with refuse removal and sewerage connection. Yards were rarely connected to the municipal sewerage system and even if they were, the large number of illegal occupants meant the system was severely overloaded. Likewise, the compounds built for non-residential purposes were inhospitable domestic establishments.

Slum dwellings varied enormously. Some properties that were condemned had as few as 3 outside rooms. More typically a 50 x 50 foot stand would have 10-12 rooms. Really large yards that stretched across several stands with 80-100 rooms were not uncommon. The large yards were often named after a proprietor, as in the case of Malcolm Reid's yard or Thornton's. Other yards were named after functions with which their occupants were associated. The 'Evening Chronicle' or 'Congress' yards are two examples. The most important differences between slums depended on whether it was a 'compound' run by an employer, or if it was one of the 'private' yards that were generally run by immigrant Jews in the eastern and central region, and Indians in the Malay Location.

One difference between an employer's compound and the private yards was their location. By far the most important cluster of private rooms was in the Malay Location; other concentrations were in the southern swathe of Ferreirastown, Marshalls, and City and Suburban, as well as the northern and southern suburbs. To a limited extent, the near eastern districts around Doornfontein and the city centre were also noted locations of private yards. In other portions of the city, notably Braamfontein, Burghersdorp, Jeppestown, North Doornfontein and Berea, there was virtually no private residential letting. Those townships assumed a more uniform commercial or industrial
land-use, and so compounds were the more common residential form. The Malay Location was the largest single slum area, but the districts that abutted the CBD to the south and east were almost as populous. In both these regions the occurrence of compounds and yards was approximately the same (Figs. 6.1 and 6.3).

Across the city the pre-World War One slum population was divided roughly equally into those who lived either on their employers' premises (or in rooms hired by their employers), and those who hired rooms themselves. The racial occupation of compounds and yards varied significantly. The former were occupied predominantly by Africans. In 1915 less than ten per cent of the residents of employers' yards were not African (the census enumerated only 455 coloureds relative to 5 004 Africans). Officially these quasi-compounds were also overwhelmingly male. The 1915 survey makes clear the dominance of migrancy and the very minimal allowance made by private sector employers for African family life outside of the location. Of the 6 000 Africans living in employer controlled yards, just over 300 were female (Table 6.2).

Family life was not uniformly restricted in all Johannesburg slums. In the southern suburbs where more than two thirds of African slum occupants lived on their employers' premises, the sex ratio was approximately even (45:51). There were 51 children enumerated in the district. However, the census in this case included the black freehold suburbs of Sophiatown and Newclare (Fig. 6.1), and so it may well have been that the 'employers' were in fact landlords, although it is possible that black employers were more sympathetically inclined to housing dependents. Similarly, in the other officially black quarter of the Malay Location the numbers of African women and children relative to those of men were considerably higher than those of the Johannesburg yard average which was approximately 6:1 (Table 6.2).

Among the occupants of the private yards the ratio of African men to African women was notably higher than in the employer-controlled housing, however it was by no means equal. African women's later and slower arrival in cities, as well as their predominance in the slums, reflects their exclusion from the formal capitalist labour force and accounts for their influence on the informal economy of the city. The economic and social position of coloured women is more
difficult to assess. Washerwomen, prostitutes and domestic servants in the early twentieth century are all known to have included coloureds in their ranks, but it is unclear if they maintained these niches as African women entered the urban labour market. Within the slums they were a significant constituency, outnumbering coloured men. In the private yards there were as many coloured as African women. The large total coloured population in the inner-city (Fig. 6.4) suggests a relatively undisturbed pattern of family life within the slums.

Figure 6.4: African and coloured population of slumyards, 1915.

Unfortunately, the Council's 1915 survey of slums, despite its detail, did not include whites or Indians. From other sources it would seem sensible to conclude that single young whites, men and women, would have been overly represented in the yards. Indian families, due to the racist restrictions placed on their residential and trading location, would have lived in the poorest sections of town (Fig. 6.5). Among the Johannesburg Indian community there were, however, both landlords and tenants.

The degree of control in employers' compounds should have been high as workers risked losing both their job and their shelter through any misdemeanour. Curiously, as employers needed no permit to house their own staff, roughly 5 per cent of the African population on employers' properties were illegal because they did not have permits. Presumably these were friends or family of workers, unless the employers were letting out spare capacity illegally. Under the 1906 Municipal Ordinance employers were not subjected to health inspections in the same way as commercial residential concerns once they had obtained permission to house workers and had the premises inspected. In consequence, the conditions of these employer-supervised yards was often as poor as those run by slumlords. Industrialists argued that as the future of this housing arrangement was insecure they could not be expected to invest in costly, formal-quality structures for workers. Descriptions of conditions that were unfit for animal, let alone human habitation, were applied as readily to employer compounds as to slumlords' yards.

Unlike the compounds, many of which were no more than poorly adapted industrial sheds, the private yards were more residential in character and were marked by racial heterogeneity. In 1938 the clustering of multi-racial slum housing was described thus:

Ferreirastown and Prospect Township degenerated to such an extent that few respectable European persons would rent any of the ramshackle, filthy hovels which make up the large area of these slums. They became the dwellings of aliens - Assyrians, Chinese, Indians and Peruvians, and eventually natives.

The status of 'respectable European' rather than 'poor white' seems to have hinged on whether or not one escaped the slum yards or lived in the doss houses. Whites clearly did live in the slums and
their numbers were sizeable, though not as high as the Labour Party projected in their campaign for white housing assistance. Of the 2,000 people living in condemned buildings in 1918, a quarter were white. Like the coloured population, which was numerically larger than even Africans living in yards, whites were rarely housed by private sector employers unless they were compound supervisors.

Although there is very strong evidence of ethnic clustering among Indian and coloured families who were the registered occupants or owners of houses (Fig. 6.5), within the slumyards there appears to have been considerable racial mixing. Miscegenist paranoia fed off reported incidences of "prosperous herding" of Indians, Malays, whites and "kafir people" all apparently "living in a race". White men sometimes married or co-habited with coloured women in slums where lower than in the suburbs, and where social pressure to conform to racially mixed was certainly less. Surveys of individual yards reveal that although it was common for coloureds to live in the same yards as Africans, they generally occupied their own rooms. In Fora-yard on Marshall street, for example, a white family occupied the cottage fronting onto the street. A kitchen and room behind the cottage was let to "a white man" and similar facilities to the rear were let to a family of six "Syrians". To the west of these buildings were individual structures that housed 4 coloureds, 2 Indian men, 5 French speaking "Native Madagascans", a coloured women, 4 Africans with permits, and the owner's domestic servant. There were also two unoccupied rooms.
The problems of the slums

Objections to the slums were numerous. Complaints centred on the proximity of blacks to whites, and there was widespread anxiety about health, crime, labour productivity and political instability. Each of these concerns was voiced by a range of organisations and individuals, but particular people placed different emphasis on why the slums should be removed. Reflecting the shifting local and international political climates, there were distinct periods in which either crime, health, or the labour question were the primary objections raised to the persistence of the slums.

Racism infused almost every complaint about the poor suburbs, but until the 1920s it was rare for overt cultural prejudices to be expressed publicly without supplementary evidence being cited about either the lazy ways, unhygienic habits or drunken behaviour of the offending group. A notable exception was the case made by the infamous attorney, Col. Stallard, who argued for the removal of an African 'compound' from the affluent northern suburb of Orchards on the grounds
that "a congregation of natives in a spot constitutes a nuisance per se, even though the conditions are not insanitary". Racial attitudes hardened so dramatically that by 1923 Stallard's were not minority opinions and African settlement in urban areas was made conditional on total physical separation and also the legal constraint of impermanence.

In the early twentieth century, the principle of residential segregation was not a morally contestable position. Liberal whites and even Africans agreed on its inevitability and even desirability. What was at stake were the conditions under which black people were to live in the cities. During the 1910s the almost exponential growth of the urban African population greatly influenced attitudes to the desirable outcome of segregation policies. Slums came to be seen as African enclaves and as an African problem, though demographically Africans were not even in the majority in urban slums in Johannesburg.

Sanitary problems

Plague, tuberculosis and smallpox were only some of the life-threatening diseases known to have originated within the slum districts of Johannesburg in the early twentieth century. As the locus of poverty, the largely black slums became known as "nurseries of infection" whose continued existence was perceived to threaten not only public health, but also public morals. Around the time of the "Black Peril" scare of 1912, when several white women were attacked by black men, dozens of letters were written to the press on the subject. These white citizens, who styled themselves pretentiously with pseudonyms such as "Sanitas" or "Medico", sought to alert the white public, but more especially the Council, to conditions among urban blacks that they perceived to be endangering the quality of life of the white electorate. One or two contributors suggested the upgrading of black areas, but most sought redress in moving "the plague spots" as far away as possible from the centre of town. The miasmatic belief that disease was transmitted by physical proximity underscored the virulent European opposition to even segregated locations and compounds within the city limits.
In their outrage over the threat that the slums presented to their well-being, the white public both blamed and implored the Council to solve the problem of insanitary housing. To some extent the Council, in the person of Dr Porter the Medical Officer of Health (MOH), was a receptive audience. The MOH, however, had a very rigid interpretation of the conditions which challenged public health. His concern to alleviate overcrowding and improve ventilation provided the energy to find a legal path that would allow the municipality to recover from numerous unsuccessful attempts to rid Johannesburg of slums. Yet, even after extensive research into appropriate planning legislation, successive amendments to Transvaal laws failed to allow the ready closure of buildings. In addition to consulting the English experts as he had done so often in the past, Porter began to exchange views with professionals in Johannesburg. In particular, he developed a close association with Dr Orenstein, the American-born sanitary officer employed by Rand Mines. They might well have met at the Rand Club which they both frequented and where Orenstein later lived.

Through his acquaintance with Orenstein, Porter came to be associated with the Citizen’s Alliance for Liquor Reform and the Rand Social Services League, both organisations expressly concerned with urban African living conditions. In choosing these political allies Porter was forced to compromise on his belief that the slum problem could not be equated with an urban African problem. Nobody believed more firmly in the imperative of managing the non-Africans in the slums than Porter. Even in official reports, his contempt for the poor-white and coloured slum occupant was as poisonous as his dismissal of Africans:

This slum-like property swarms with low-class white and coloured people and their children; their habits are swinish in their filthiness ... the condition of a previously cleaned yard is often not altogether incomparable after 24 hours’ subsequent habitation to that of a kraal in which a number of animals have been driven and kept for a similar period.

The compromise reached between the MOH and the reformers seems to have been that he would supply them with information required to authenticate their descriptions of urban African conditions, in return for supportive press coverage of his need for extended powers of slum
clearance. Porter edited several of the press releases issued by the reformers and supplied them with advance copies of his reports. Numerous press reports issued by the Citizen's Alliance and the Social Service League in 1915 balanced the critical picture they had painted of urban blight in Johannesburg by absolving the MOH "who has done all in his power", but who ought to have had "greater powers" to solve the slum problem.

The alliance between the MOH and the urban reformists was founded on mutual agreement that it was virtually impossible to keep Johannesburg healthy or to clear the city slums until location housing for the displaced African population was constructed. In this respect they challenged the Labour Party who refused to accept state funding for African shelter in Johannesburg. Yet there was not consensus between the Council's most influential full-time bureaucrat and the reform alliance on slum policies. Unlike the varied membership of the Reform Alliance which prioritised the resolution of the African housing problem, the MOH saw quite clearly that the slums would not vanish if cleared of Africans. He warned:

Councillors and others interested in this question must bear in mind that even these measures (forcing Africans into locations and compounds) will not touch the "coloured" persons, nor the low-class whites, who are just as bad as the natives, and often worse.

Despite these admonitions, the English-language press increasingly promoted the relocation of African slum residents as the solution to the urban sanitary problem. The urgency with which this argument was presented intensified as there was virtually no provision of shelter until Western Native Township and Wemmer hostel were opened. Only then did the Public Health Committee instruct the MOH to lift the 1917 moratorium on the prosecution of Africans who had been evading the exemption permit system and were living illegally in the yards.

Paradoxically, renewed action to control the extent of slum development, as opposed to reducing the number of Africans in slums, also took place in 1917 when several properties were condemned under the long-awaited 1916 Provincial Ordinance. In his enthusiasm to ensure that this law would be upheld by the courts, Porter sought test cases from landlords whom he knew
would challenge the closure of their properties, and he returned from war service to testify personally in court. Ironically, after pushing so hard for others to acknowledge that slums would not disappear even if Africans could be excluded from all condemned property, Porter had to concede that the simple power to close buildings was useless in upholding health and housing standards. In the absence of alternative accommodation, the slum population of Johannesburg, and especially the illegal population of the Malay Location, expanded during World War One. In the major slum districts rent profiteering flourished and exacerbated the harsh conditions of the yards. The powers that Porter had fought so hard to obtain were selectively applied, usually in the marginally-acceptable boarding-house districts in the north eastern sector of the city.  

Crime and labour productivity  

The Cape Parliamentarian John X. Merriman once dubbed Johannesburg "the University of crime". The description stuck for good reason. The slum-underground thrived on illicit gold dealing, prostitution and theft, but the most lucrative of all forbidden activity involved the illegal brewing and selling of liquor. To date the literature on traditional liquor has emphasised the place of Africans who brewed and sold "skokiaan" and "cali", both variations on traditional beer made more potent through the addition of either sugar (generally in the form of golden syrup) or alcohol (brandy or methylated spirits). Yet, in Johannesburg the prohibited preparation of liquor for sale to Africans depended on white and coloured people who grew and ground malt. Commenting on the futility of targeting only distribution networks, the sub-Native Commissioner remarked:

I have seen yards equipped with vats for soaking the grain, drying floors for it to sprout, and oil engines which run mills which grind the corn... The chief reason so many Native women make a living by the Kaffir beer Laffle is because of the facilities they have for procuring the malt ready ground.  

The critical ingredient in skokiaan was "white man's liquor", so-called because Africans could not purchase it from bottle stores. The flourishing black market was a major area of contact between Africans and whites in the slums. Prohibitionists and segregationists joined forces to announce that
miscegenation was enhanced by the illicit liquor trade and that the brewing of "Kafir beer" in the slums should be curtailed, preferably by removing the African women who brewed the beer and the African men who drank it.  

Liquor syndicates were generally controlled by white men, but the face-to-face sales were the preserve of white women, "generally of the bywoner class". Extra money could be made by selling sex as well as drink. Surprised by this evidence, the Chairman of the Assaults on Women Commission asked a witness for confirmation: he assured the Commission that "they do a lot of it". Corroborating evidence was supplied by two law enforcement officials, one of whom revealed:

On the Rand, male and female Europeans of the lowest class are constantly traveling about the locations, and most of them are not traveling for any good purpose, but with the object of selling liquor to the natives and demoralising them. Sometimes this selling takes place in the evening where the native male and the European female will be alone, and what takes place between the two in a lonely place nobody knows.

The abuse of white women by black men, such as occurred in the "Black Peril" scare, was another alleged result of the sale of liquor to Africans. Some suggested that, having experienced white women who welcomed his advances, the "untutored" African would be unable to distinguish those white women who were not similarly amenable. Others objected to African liquor consumption because men, black or white, were allegedly unable to control their sexual desires when inebriated.

Once the frenzied white anxiety around the Black Peril died down, the tone of objection to African liquor consumption began to change. The mines in particular launched an attack on the uninhibited consumption of cali, the concoction that allegedly increased the incidence of pneumonia among Africans. The church, and a small, but active white philanthropic group, stressed the deleterious impact of liquor on tribal ways and advocated total prohibition. The loudest opposition to liquor came from the police and those responsible for crime prevention.
Limited policing powers and the prevalence of brewing meant that unusual measures were adopted in the fight to prevent brewing.

Anti-crime drives in the slum-yards were conducted under the guise of sanitary inspections during which the confiscation and prosecution for illicit offences was the major objective. The police required the presence of a health official before they could enter the yards. Quite often the police initiated the time and destination of the raids. This ambiguous role caused a certain amount of tension, as after a full day's work the sanitary inspectors would have to go on a midnight expedition to the yards. If there was any reluctance from the Health Department to participate in the monitoring of yards, the police would notify the local white Councillor who would lodge a complaint. An obligatory inspection would follow. In late 1914 and early 1915 the load became so acute that the MOH requested additional temporary staff specifically to assist the police in liquor raids. When the yards were occupied by Africans with permits, or were in a satisfactory sanitary condition, the Health Department was technically powerless as these were the only two criteria on which the Health Officers could force evictions. Police brutality on late night raids when personal possessions were broken open "with considerable roughness", caused hardship to African people. They also embarrassed the MOH who was eventually forced to withdraw his support of the sanitary inspectors following complaints from the Transvaal Native Congress. While the MOH appears to have recognised that the raids were futile in the light of minimal alternative housing for evicted Africans, on numerous occasions he acquiesced to police requests for raids and evictions.

In the case of Brown's yard, a large Doornfontein property of 7 city stands with over 80 wood-and-iron rooms, the police recorded over 200 criminal offences (ranging from rape and theft to impersonation of the police and the evasion of location bye-laws) in less than a year. The yard, widely known as "one of the worst in the eastern district" because liquor was so freely available, was always clean. In cases like Brown's yard, the MOH was sympathetic to police requests to evict criminals and he revoked the permits of the "worst families" on dubious technicalities. Better police access to Brown's yard was also facilitated by the MOH's insistence on the physical rearrangement of the yard into quarters, and by coercing the white owner into cooperating with the police or risk
losing all legal African tenants though the refusal and revoking of permits for the yard. In the 1914 purge of Brown's yard the Council revoked 29 permits, and the landlord "voluntarily" evicted a further 17 families. Once police clearance was obtained, some of the Council's initial evictions were overturned and several families were allowed to return to Brown's yard.1 8

Liquor was not only central to the problem of crime in the slums, it was also perceived to undermine labour productivity. In the early 1910s the impact of slum drinking and associated miscegenation was linked to the deterioration of the moral and physical fibre of white workers. By the end of the decade, once African men were more important in the mining and manufacturing labour force, only the moral consequences of white men's drinking were of any concern.1 7

Conversely, with their increasing importance in the workforce, there was a dramatic escalation in the campaign to prevent African alcohol consumption. Indians and coloureds are almost totally absent from discussions about liquor, possibly because many were Moslem, but more likely because they were under-represented in the major formal-employment niches of Johannesburg.

On the mines, alcohol-induced absenteeism and accidents had long been a major problem. Between one and five per cent of staff were unable to work on Mondays. In the five years between 1913 and 1917 the mines lost an average of 2 20n shifts per month (1.35 per cent of the total worked) to alcohol abuse.1 8 Despite the ban on African consumption of alcohol, employers of more than fifty people were licensed to brew their own low-alcohol traditional beer. The importance of drink in attracting labour to particular mines meant that compound brewing was ubiquitous and many mine managers turned a blind eye to worker efforts to increase the strength of the brew. In 1913/1914, however, the labour unrest across the Rand provided police with an opportunity to clamp down on prohibition abuse on mine properties. Moodie argues that the success of the Native Affairs Department in forcing the mines to curtail brewing pushed tens of thousands of mine workers out of the mines and into the slums, especially on weekends. Previously miners seem to have preferred to spend leisure time with other miners on mine property.1 8 Once the liquor that was an integral part of African social life was more readily available in the town yards, miners began to frequent the slums.16
It is no coincidence that prohibitionist agitation and the demand for the removal of Africans from the slums intensified at the outbreak of the First World War. Police action against brewers escalated in the summer of 1914/1915. By winter, a major press campaign (ably abetted by the MOH) was underway to overcome Council inertia on the African location question. In similar fashion to the support lent to Milner's urban reconstruction programme after the Boer War, mining interests endorsed the campaign to rid the slums of brewers and consumers whose reduced productivity was costing them dearly. As Africans performed the bulk of the labour in Johannesburg, and Africans brewed and drank the beer in the slums, they became the target of residential control.

In a personal letter to Dr Porter, Orenstein, the most articulate and authoritative of the reformers, made clear his mission in participating in the public campaign to solve the 'native housing problem':

...my whole object is to help those who wish to bring about a reform in the housing of natives in Johannesburg. You know that I have no personal "axe to grind". I would have taken no part in the movement were I not in 'ed by the Chairman of the company employing me.

By changing the powerful white public conception of the slum to a 'native problem', the reformists were able to define the task of urban renewal in narrow, cost effective terms. Instead of the slum yards, locations (large-scale public housing projects) would provide controlled, sanitary accommodation to permanent African workers and their families; temporary or migrant workers would live in regulated compounds. The slums would disappear miraculously. In practice the slums remained because their population was not entirely African. Moreover, the fervour for segregation notwithstanding, the Johannesburg City Council would not fund adequate slum rehousing for Africans. The most vivid expression of the tensions around racial classification were played out around Johannesburg's oldest ghetto, the Malay Location.
Notes


2 Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1915.

3 IAD JGE 122 555, Town Clerk to MOH, 28 May 1915; IAD JGE 59 4574, MOH to the Chairman of the Public Health Committee, 8 June 1915; Town Cl. to MOH, 21 March 1919.

4 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Porter to Pritchard, Director of Native Labour, 22 November 1921.

5 Rand Daily Mail, 11/09/1917.


10 CPSA A1 88 Pa 97, 'The organisation of Natives in industry', no date. This point is taken up by Koch, E., 'Dormontein and its African working class, 1914 to 1945', Unpublished M. A., University of the Witwatersrand, 1983.


12 IAD JGE 121 7969, Minutes of special committee appointed to deal with the housing of Natives, 16 March 1916; *Report of the Transvaal Leasehold Townships Commission*, U.G. 34-1919.

13 IAD JGE 121 7969, MOH to Town Clerk, 9 June 1915; Rand Daily Mail, 24/12/1915.


15 CPSA AD 843, Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, Report of the Housing Committee, no date.

16 The Star, 04/06/1915. This point is made repeatedly in national enquiries. c.f. CAD GNLB 285 52/18/102, Witwatersrand Sub-Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 26 March 1920.

The Province received 2s for each pass issued on the Rand, Rand Daily Mail, 11/09/1917; CAD GNLB 285, 52/18/102, Porter to Pritchard, Director of Native Labour, 22 November 1921.

Leader, 6/12/1915; The Star, 21/5/1915.

IAD JGE 121 7969, Federation of Ratepayers’ Associations to Town Clerk, 8 December 1919; Rand Daily Mail, 07/11/1919; see also Maud, J. P. R., Johannesburg and the Art of Self-Government, Johannesburg, 1937.

CAD NTS 86 338/19/f164, Deputation of 17 Klipspruit women to the Johannesburg Mayor re: expense and inconvenience of travel to Johannesburg, 29 March 1910; In 1915 there were numerous empty houses at Klipspruit; IAD JGE 122 955, Superintendent of Locations to MOH, 26 August 1915.

Under pressure from the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the Native Location By-Laws were amended by Administrator’s Notice No. 297, 1912; The Star, 22/05/1919.

IAD JGE 122 955, Adler Garage request for MOI inspection of premises, 6 January 1914; MOH to Mr Carsten, 8 March 1915; IAD JGE 121, 7969, Minutes of a Special Meeting to deal with housing of Natives, no date.


IAD JGE 26 4321, ‘Estimated number of Natives within the Municipality other than Natives living in locations and domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices’, 30 January 1923.

IAD JGE 122 955, ‘Accommodation of Natives (other than Mine Natives) employed in Johannesburg and not resident in locations’, 9 June 1915.

Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, ‘Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices’, 23 June 1915.

Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, ‘Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices’, 23 June 1915.

Leader, 05/10/1914.

Rental in municipal compounds was only 5s per month compared to 3s in a yard, Rand Daily Mail, 13/08/1915.


Compiled from IAD JGE 122 955, ‘Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices’, 23 June 1915.

The Star, 25/01/1915.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘Number of Natives housed by employers of Native labour, Johannesburg town’, February 1918.
Numerous parties made this allegation, but it was reported in the press most actively following the release of the Report of the Citizens' Alliance for Liquor Reform, c.f. The Star, 27/05/1915.

IAD JGE 121 899, Walter Evans and Son to City Council, 17 September 1908; Acting MOH to Walter Evans and Son, 20 November 1908; Walter Evans and Son to City Council, 4 December 1908; Application form for exemption from W. Littlejohn, 5 May 1909; Application form for exemption for 'policeboy', 3 February 1910.

IAD JGE 121 899, MOH to L. Ducre Tottenham, 4 March 1910; W. Reuter (solicitor and translator) to MOH, 19 March 1910.


IAD JGE 121 899, Application form for exemption for 'storeboy' from Ginsburg, 14 September 1909; Insanitary property, Stands 632/3/4 City and Suburban, 7 November 1917; 'Power of Council to Close, Cleanse and Demolish properties'; Town Engineer to MOH, 19 December 1917.

This exemption was provided for under the Native Location bylaw as amended by Administrator's Notice No. 297, 1912; The Star, 22/05/1913; Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the Year Ending 30 June 1914, Johannesburg, 1914.

The Leader, 06/02/1915. This opinion was also expressed by officials c.f. IAD JGB 120 847, Opinion of the Acting MOH in the Report to the Public Health Committee on closing orders of Stands, 131/135/142 Ferreiras, 21 November 1917.

Evening Chronicle, 02/04/1913.

The Star, 08/10/1928.

Leader, 06/02/1915; Rand Daily Mail, 24/12/1915 gave figures of a man who leased the block for £12 a month and earned £100 in rent. Average rent for blacks was 10s to £1 per month.

Compiled from Minute of 271st Meeting of the 27 August, 1912, 272nd Meeting (adjourned) of 24 September 1912; and CAD GNLB 285 53/18/72, 'Number of natives housed by employers of native labour', 1918.

The Star, 21/05/1915.

c.f. IAD JGE 49 678, District Inspector's report on Stand 131 Ferreiras, 17 January 1917; IAD JGB 120 847, Assistant MOH to Deputy Commissioner of Police, 12 December 1914; Report of District Inspector Symes, 4 December 1914.

Rand Daily Mail, 08/11/1918.

52 IAD JGE 49 687, District Inspector Cairns to Chief Sanitary Inspector, no date; Rand Daily Mail, 07/07/1912.

53 IAD JGE 121 899, Inspector Manion to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 7 January 1918.

54 The Star, 08/10/1928.

55 IAD JGE 59 4574, List of insanitary house properties, 2 August 1916; The Star, 24/05/1915. See also Hellmann, E., Rooipark: A Sociological Survey of an Urban Native Slum Yard, Cape Town, 1948, for a detailed discussion of an unusually large yard in the 1930s.


57 IAD JGE 122 955, Fleishman vs Rex, 19 March 1915; Deputation of 7 Jewish landlords to Public Health Committee, 8 July 1917; see also Chapter Seven.

58 IAD JGE 26 4321, 'Estimated number of Natives within the Municipality other than Natives living in locations and domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 30 January 1923.

59 Eales, K. A., 'Gender politics and the administration of African women'; Gaitskell, D., 'Christian compounds for girls'.


61 Complied from IAD JGE 122 955, 'Return of Native and Coloured Persons within the Municipality other than domestic servants living at the residence of their employers and cleaners employed and living at blocks of flats and offices', 23 June 1915.

62 The Evening Chronicle, 04/04/1913.

63 The Star, 21/05/1915; 25/01/1915; Rand Daily Mail, 27/05/1915.

64 Wilson, A. N., 'The underworld of Johannesburg'.


67 Rand Daily Mail, 08/01/1918; The Leader 6/2/1915.

68 IAD JGE 29 4574, Special report by the MOH on insanitary properties, 25 April 1913.

69 IAD JGE 120 847, Assistant MOH to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, 12 December 1914.
Compiled from *United Transvaal Directory*, Johannesburg, 1915.

Transvaal Leader, 11/10/1912.


*The Star*, 07/10/1912; 02/11/1912; *The Leader* 29/01/1915.

van Onselen, C., *New Babylon, New Nineveh*.

*Rand Daily Mail*, 04/07/1912; 07/07/1912; see also *The Star*, 02/11/1912.

*Rand Daily Mail*, 28/05/1912; 15/06/1915.


*Rand Daily Mail*, 29/05/1915.

IAD JGE 59, 4574, MOH to the Chief Librarian, 29 June 1915; Porter to London MOH, 3 July 1915; Porter to Manchester City Surveyor, 3 July 1915.


See correspondence between Porter, Orenstein and the League in IAD JGE 122 955.

IAD JGE 49 804, MOH to Chas Vesity, 24 July 1914; IAD JGE 122 955, Report by MOH on 'The Slum Question', 8 June 1915. IAD JGE 121 7969, Minutes of the Special Committee appointed to deal with the housing of natives, 16 March 1916.

*Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1912-1913*, Johannesburg, 1913, p. 3.

IAD JGE 122 955, Porter to Souter, 30 April 1915; Souter to Porter, 3 May 1915; Orenstein to Porter, 12 May 1915; IAD JGE 59, 4574, Porter to Souter, re: evidence to the Provincial Select Committee of 1911, 22 June 1915.

*Rand Daily Mail*, 28/05/1915.

*Minute of the Mayor: Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1912-1913*, Johannesburg, 1913; *The Star*, 24/05/1915.

*Leader*, 06/02/1915; *Rand Daily Mail*, 27/05/1915; *The Star*, 27/05/1915.

IAD JGE 122 955, Report of the MOH to the Public Health Committee, 8 June 1915, p. 3. He also sent results of the 1915 survey to Souter, Bridgman, and the mining houses.

IAD JGE 120 847, Report by MOH to Public Health Committee re: unsanitary house property, 30 May 1917; IAD JGE 122 955, Extract of the Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 28 February 1921.
1. IAD JGE 59 4374, Porter to Chief Sanitary Officer, 19 July 1916.


3. The Leader, 01/10/1914; Wilson, A. N., 'The underworld of Johannesburg'.

4. CAD GNLB 136 1756/13/54, Sub-Native Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 24 October 1914.

5. The composition of the anti-slum caucus comprised representatives from The Rand Social Services League, the Citizens' Alliance for Liquor Reform, and the Joint Committee on Native Labour and Liquor and Housing (made up of the Transvaal Missionary Association, the Diocesan Board Missions, the Witwatersrand Church Council, the Rand Social Service League and the National Council of Women Workers, the National Temperance Union and the International Order of Good Templars); The Star, 31/01/1915.

6. CAD NTS K358, Evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, 2 February 1914.

7. Ibid.

8. The Christian Express, 01/06/1912.

9. CAD NTS K358, Evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, 2 February 1914.

9. CAD NTS 45 2427, Farrar (Rand Mines) to Pritchard re: brewing of cali by Natives, 30 October 1913.

10. The same people's names appear as members of the Joint Councils, the Citizen's Alliance for Liquor Reform and the housing utility companies. CPSA A881 Fa 9/7-9, 'Town and Country Natives', lecture delivered by Rheinallt Jones.

11. Local Government Ordinance No. 9 of 1912, section 68, para. (2).

12. IAD JGE 122 955, Inspector of Eastern Area to Chief Sanitary Officer, 18 December 1914; 6 January 1915; Detective Constable McKay to the Sub-Inspector, 19 October 1918.

13. IAD JGE 49 687, MOH to Councillor Scott, 27 March 1914.

14. IAD JGE 49 687, Extract of Minutes of Public Health Committee, 2 April 1914; IAD JGE 122 955, MOH to Town Clerk. The £450 accrued from fines over three months meant that there would be no problem paying wages.

15. IAD JGE 122 955, Deputation of Transvaal Native Congress to the Mayor, 3 June 1916; MOH to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 20 June 1916; MOH to Town Clerk, 31 August 1916; Minutes of the Public Health Committee, 21 June 1916.

16. IAD JGE 49 687, 'Summary of cases from Brown's yard, Doornfontein', 18 February 1914; Detective Cooke to District Inspector, 8 February 1914; District Inspector to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 12 February; 27 March 1914; MOH to Deputy Commissioner of Police, 13 February 1914; Deputy Commissioner of Police to MOH, 19 February 1914; unsigned note to the District Inspector informing him of police decision to overturn some evictions, 18 March 1914; Chief Sanitary Inspector to MOH, 23 March 1914; District Inspector to Chief Sanitary Inspector, 27 March 1914.
**Rand Daily Mail, 28/05/1915; 29/05/1915.** See also Chapter 5 and articles in *The Christian Express.*


4. IAD JGE 122 955, Souter to Orenstein, 3 May 1915; Porter to Orenstein, 12 May 1915.


6. IAD JGE 122 955, Orenstein to Porter, 12 May 1915.
CHAPTER SEVEN
HEALTH, RACE AND POWER IN THE MALAY LOCATION

Official concern over the Malay Location only peaked after World War One when the growth of Johannesburg's African population placed unbearable pressure on the limited shelter available to black people. The Malay Location did not pose a new threat to health in Johannesburg, although it is conceivable that the Spanish Influenza scare and overcrowding strengthened fears that the increased presence of blacks encouraged insanitary conditions that undermined public health. Certainly, the rising militancy of the African working class, which struck against the Municipality, the Railways and several smaller commercial concerns in the late 1910s, unsettled whites living in suburbs abutting the alleged centre of African protest and organisation, the Malay Location. Prompted by the growing force of Africans working in Johannesburg, whites demanded residential segregation in general, and the removal of the Malay Location in particular. Their voice on the Johannesburg City Council was strong: the white Labour Party dominated municipal politics, and ensured sympathetic reception to white ratepayers' insistence on more systematic controls on the residence of the African proletariat.

The history of the Malay Location before 1914 establishes that the occurrence of insanitary conditions in a black area was insufficient reason for the state to instigate segregationist removals if the local authority had to bear the cost of the relocation. For a brief period in the early 1920s it looked as if the voice of the white working class would be powerful enough to ensure the removal of all the black people in the Malay Location on so-called sanitary grounds. Very soon, however, the enormous cost to white ratepayers of enforcing the removal resulted in modification of the segregation plan. In the period between the Anglo-Boer War and World War One, the influx of Africans to the city exacerbated unhealthy conditions in the slums. Political unrest then heightened tensions in the Malay Location and brought the physical conditions of the place into public focus. The Johannesburg City Council was, however, unwilling to finance urban African housing and instead campaigned for the restriction of African settlement by calling for the tightening of measures proposed in the 1918 Urban Areas Bill.
The making of an urban ghetto

As early as 1893, only seven years after the founding of Johannesburg, the Transvaal Republican Government dispatched instructions to all Magistrates to establish "Coolie" locations for Asians. Two years later, this mandate was extended and 460 stands were allocated to Johannesburg for use as a Malay Location. Before the turn of the century a "Coolie" and a "Kaffir" location were marked out. A little later, Kruger gave a portion of land originally designated for black people to poor whites. This area became known as Vrededorp. Land to the north of Vrededorp was reserved for Africans, while the area to the south of Vrededorp abutting the railway was designated a Malay Location (Fig. 7.1), presumably for occupation by Cape Malays and Cape "coloured" people.

Figure 7.1: Racial allocation of land, circa 1900.

Initially, the occupation of these suburbs conformed, at least in part, to President Kruger's racial specifications. It was not very long, however, before the Malay Location was the sole remaining
district within the city reserved for occupation by "non-whites". A "Kaffir Location" south of the railway in the Brickfield vicinity (not marked on the turn-of-the-century map reproduced as Fig. 7.1), was obliterated in an accidental dynamite explosion in 1896. In 1904 the Coolie Location was deliberately destroyed by fire following the outbreak of plague and its inhabitants were moved to Klipspruit some 12 miles to the south west of the town. Finally, in 1905, the site of the Kaffir Location was turned over for use as a second cemetery for the white population. Klipspruit offered municipal housing beyond Johannesburg's boundaries to African people, but it was not until 1918, following the Municipality's construction of Western Native Township, that a limited number of homes were available to Africans within easy reach of the city.

Thousands of blacks chose to live illegally in the city, shunning the rigidly-controlled public housing of Western Native Township and Klipspruit. Like the slums to the east of town, the dilapidated Malay Location continued to attract Johannesburg's black population. Despite exorbitant rentals the Malay Location was desirable because settlement by blacks was restricted elsewhere in Johannesburg. Throughout much of the city, land proclaimed for mining was barred to black people unless they were employed by whites. Even where land was supposedly accessible to all, title deeds were used to restrict black occupation. The land shortage was exacerbated by the mining companies' speculative holding of almost a third of Johannesburg's ground. Predictably, the sizeable black population dependent on a small portion of inadequately-serviced land rapidly spawned an urban public health crisis that plagued the city for decades. As the largest concentration of black people living in private yards were in the Malay Location, it provides a touchstone of official attitudes to sanitation and segregation.

The Malay Location was laid out at a time when the future of the mining camp of Johannesburg was uncertain and it provided only rudimentary urban conveniences. These services were not upgraded immediately. From as early as 1899 the threat of removal loomed over the Location. Unlike the more affluent sections of the city that quickly displayed the trappings of wealthy mining magnates, wood-and-iron shacks persisted in the Malay Location (Fig 7.2). The apportionment of stands of regular size ensured the appearance of a grid street pattern, but roads remained untarred (Fig. 7.3). For years the Location had no sewerage or water connections, a situation
changed 0.4 in some sections in response to the outbreak of smallpox. Regularly described as the most unsavoury part of the city, the Malay Location nevertheless festered for decades under the nose of the City's MOH who conceded that its "inhospitable character" was due to uncertainty over its future.

Figure 7.1: Wood-and-iron structures on the Malay Location's main street.

Figure 7.2: Unmade roads in the Malay Location.
Unwilling to comprehensively address sanitation problems in the Malay Location, the Johannesburg City Council acted in a haphazard manner to insulate the public health crisis. For example, in order to contain the threat of disease, particularly plague, an ever-increasing number of rat-catchers were employed in the Malay Location. Persistent poor management was in part attributable to the racist perception that blacks did not require full urban services. However, municipal neglect of the physical environment also relates to the peculiar history of the Malay Location and the squabble between the local authority and the state-owned South African Railway corporation. From 1906, each institution held a portion of the Malay Location's freehold rights. Included in the title deeds was the provision that if the Malay Location ceased to be used to house black people the residents should be compensated. As both bodies wished to reclaim the valuable land where the Location was sited, the relocation of the inhabitants was no idle possibility. The resulting confusion over compensation and the interim maintenance of the Malay Location provides a superficial explanation for the persistence of urban blight in an area so close to the town centre.

Evidence of physical deterioration at the Malay Location cannot be ascribed wholly to the quarrel between the City and the Railways. As with so many other places, slum conditions developed due to the long-term uncertainty of the area. In the depression years that followed the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Johannesburg health authorities failed to enforce the sanitary by-laws of the Malay Location. By 1910, the Malay Location still had no formal water reticulation and was served instead by 325 "shallow, unprotected and polluted wells". The official population was only roughly half what it would swell to by 1919 (Table 7.1), but the density of 100 people to the acre was nevertheless cause for concern. The population began to rise from the early 1910s. Tenants, initially confined to holding only one stand, were allowed to 'purchase' stand-rights, thereby laying the foundations of the rent-racketeering that characterised later years. Indian sub-letting undoubtedly contributed to subsequent sanitary problems in the Malay Location.
Table 7.1: Population of the Malay Location, 1904-1919.² ²

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1919</th>
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<td>Indians</td>
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<td>1275</td>
<td>1406</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malays</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>889</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Coloured</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>1070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
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<td>120</td>
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<td>Chinese and Japanese</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Egyptians and Somalis</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>282</td>
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<td>339</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3376</td>
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<td>4128</td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>7512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1909 Municipal initiative to have both portions of the Malay Camp removed, rather than fund upgrading was hardly surprising.² ² Revenue from rents barely paid for rudimentary Council services. The rationale for relocation was provided by the Medical Officer:

...it is the danger spot of the town, and whatever expenditure the measure in question may involve...it will be prudently incurred.² ²

The Council resolved to address the "sanitary problem" by removing "insanitary" black residents of the Malay Location from their proximity to white working-class suburbs such as Vrededorp and Mayfair. Steps to clear out the Location population brought to a head the conflict over who would find alternative stands for evicted tenants.² ² Conflict became more intense when, in 1912, the Railway announced it would reclaim its portion of the Malay Location.² ² The contentious question of who would secure sites for the displaced population proved hypothetical. Enquiry suggested that it would be "practically impossible" to find other "suitable" ground for the black inhabitants.² ² In light of the lack of "racially controllable" alternatives, proposed dislocation of the black population became increasingly less acceptable to the local authority. By 1913 the MOH rebuffed suggestions of moving Africans from the Malay Location as "they would spread themselves throughout the Municipal Area, and the position, from a sanitary and public health point of view would not be improved.² ²

The local authority's decision to maintain the Malay Location was reached as there were limited alternative sites for a black location, and also because the Johannesburg Municipality lost the compensation dispute with the Railways. When called on to mediate, the Colonial Secretary of
Lands found it was the duty of the City to acquire new sites if the area was reclaimed.23 Legally defeated, and left with the prospect of financing the necessary re-housing of all Malay Location inhabitants, the Johannesburg authorities reluctantly condoned the persistence of an insanitary black location within the city.

Despite the Council's commitment to a policy of urban segregation and the removal of the Malay Location from its proximity to white housing, the Location remained intact. The financial priority of not burdening white ratepayers, and the problem of the shortage of land for black settlement, out-weighed the pre-war commitment to public health and urban segregation. However, the influenza scare of 1918 and the rising militance of both black and white working class communities, shifted the post-war political climate. The debate over the status of the Malay Location moved from a parochial dispute between the Johannesburg Municipality and the Railways to an issue of national prominence.

Working-class militance and the Malay Location

Notwithstanding the decision to allow black people to continue to live in the Malay Location, local authority money and effort invested in upgrading and maintenance was hopelessly inadequate, and living conditions deteriorated. During the First World War many Africans, particularly women, migrated to Johannesburg to work and were housed by the slumlords of the Malay Location. Expansion of the business district increased pressure on Malay Location accommodation.24 War prevented infrastructural improvements, but failed to stem settlement in the Malay Location. The death of thousands, especially coloureds and Africans, in the 1918 Influenza Epidemic placed the insanitary state of the Malay Location firmly at the centre of civic attention. The City Council promptly voted the substantial sum of £100 000 for improving it's "plague spot".25 The gesture was deemed to be "in the interests of the Malays and also the white community."25 Judging by the widespread and vocal response to the public announcement of the improvement plan, whites from the working-class western suburbs did not concur with City officials on what constituted their best interests. A 4,000-strong petition was submitted to the Johannesburg Council protesting the plan
The early 1920s was the heyday of conflict between the white working-class, capital and the state. Racial competition was evident in both the workplace and the domestic spheres. The Malay Location was the site of the black municipal workers strike, the railwaymen's strike, the African anti-pass campaign, and the legendary 1922 white miners' strike. Because of its location and its unique status as Johannesburg's largest non-racial suburb, the Malay Location became the reference point for debate over how to protect [white] public health and enforce urban segregation.

The political might of the white working-class in Johannesburg at the time of the petition against the Malay Location, was awesome. At public meetings and in private consultation with Prime Minister Smuts and his Ministers, Vrededorp's white residents threatened that Council failure to take action against the black population of the Malay Location would result in "independent action in defiance of the Government". Initially, only the local authority gave serious attention to the Resident Association's protest. The Council warned the Government of the danger of unleashing white fury over the African presence in the Malay Location. Lobbying for the removal of the Location, the Council made much of the fact that the growing African urban population would no longer be condoned by Johannesburg's white working-class who were clearly threatened by the increasingly militant organised African working class. In parliament, the declaration that "the Native problem" was "a white problem" suggests that the Johannesburg ratepayers' fear that a permanent urban African population challenged the privileges of the white-working-class was not a regional sentiment. This attitude assumed greater prominence as both Smuts' government and several local authorities came to the opinion that Africans could no longer be allowed unrestricted access to urban areas. The pro-white, labour-controlled Johannesburg City Council was especially swayed by the voice of white ratepayers' and tenants' associations. By backing white community organisations' opposition to African occupation of the Malay Location, the Johannesburg Council made the area the central bargaining ploy in their recommendations on the reformulation of the 1918 Urban Areas Bill.
Organised protest meetings, well-supported petitions and numerous deputations to senior members of parliament from the Western Suburbs Ratepayers' Association convinced the Council that white agitation for the removal of the Malay Location could not be ignored. In fact the Council capitalised on the unified white working-class/ratepayer campaign for the control of African urban settlement. Although the Malay Location was not theoretically an African Location, Council-funded upgrading of an area known to shelter thousands of illegal Africans was not viable even though public health was genuinely threatened by the blighted environment. In order to placate angry ratepayers who insisted on segregation, the City Council placed a moratorium on upgrading the Malay Location. In addition, the right of transfer of stands was withdrawn, and lawfully submitted building-improvement plans were boycotted. This freeze on development seriously impeded individual efforts to upgrade property in the Malay quarter at a time when the population of the ghetto was expanding to dangerously high levels (Table 7.1).

Increased African occupation of the Malay Location during the First World War had altered the suburb's racial composition, and exacerbated white opposition to the black slum. Whites had long objected to the proximity of coloureds and Indians from the Malay Quarter, but they were especially angered by the increased number of Africans because, unlike Indians and coloureds, Africans competed with whites for unskilled jobs. The demographic transformation of the Malay Location relates in general terms to the urbanisation of Africans during the Great War, but was directly associated with the rise of Indian landlords.

The Malay Location was originally intended as an area of Malay or "Coloured" occupation, but Indians from the "Coolie" Location chose to settle there rather than at Klipspruit after the 1904 plague. By 1907 the suburb was identified as an Indian enclave of the city. Nevertheless, it was the growing number of African tenants who sought refuge in the Malay Location during the First World War (Table 7.1) that made it the focus of national attention. Many Africans working in Johannesburg were unable to acquire shelter legally and therefore resorted to becoming sub-tenants in the backrooms and shacks of Indian standholders of the Malay Location.
As Indian trading outside prescribed Asiatic Bazaars was restricted, the commercial opportunity of property ownership in the Malay Location was seized quickly. Possibly exceptions existed, but all evidence of sub-letting identifies Indian control of the expensive but convenient accommodation in the congested suburb. Only three years after stand licences could be transferred, several properties came under the control of Indian people. Yet by 1909, Council estimates declared the registered Malay Location standholders as half-Indian and half-coloured (Table 7.1). By 1912, calls for the removal of “native men and women” from the Malay Location appeared in the Johannesburg press. The 1915 complaint by a long-standing coloured resident identified a sizable African population and described the Malay Location as a “second Nancefield (Klip-spruit) where you will find Amalita (gangs), and liquor smuggling”. According to a formal petition from coloured and Malay tenants, by 1917 Indians controlled 325 of the 400 stands, a fact that transformed the density and racial composition of the Location. By 1919 rent racketeering was rife. An average fifty square foot stand had ten rooms, 17 people, some livestock, and sanitary services inadequate for even one family. The problems of overcrowding and deteriorating services were not the central complaint made to the Minister of Native Affairs about Indian landlordism. The focus of the protest fell on the issue of rentals. Whereas coloured tenants had initially paid only 25s to 30s per three-bedroomed cottage, Africans were willing to pay up to £3. Three-quarters of the Malay Location stands, some of which had as many as 16 rooms, were owned by three who were singled out as the major culprits forcing coloureds to make way for the higher-paying African tenants.

Notwithstanding the extortionate rentals, the estimated 1000 Africans in the Malay Location by 1917 swelled to 5000 (over 50 per cent of the total population) by the 1919 census. The opportunity afforded by the Malay Location was attractive when compared to the lengthy journey from Nancefield, or the prospect of sharing a room with 40 other men in a municipal compound. Brushing aside the convenience of the Location, those supporting African eviction from white urban areas questioned the character of Malay Location tenants. Arguing that the increased number of Africans in the Malay Location had created a “scandalous state of affairs” for public health and morality, the Officer responsible for monitoring African passes to enter Johannesburg pointed out that as African wages rarely exceeded the rents charged by Malay Location slumlords,
tenants were certain to participate in illegal activities. The authorities were, however, protesting a situation that was of their own making.

When Klipspruit Location was established in 1904, Africans were precluded from gaining stand-rights in the Malay Location. African sub-letting in the Malay Location was made illegal after 1909, but for years after that the Municipal authorities turned a blind eye to the extent of African occupation and did not enforce the location's by-laws. In addition, the legal loophole that had allowed thousands of Africans to live on the premises of their white employers was used to maximum effect in the Malay Location. In the way in which this practice was exposed involved the conviction of two Indian shopkeepers of the Malay Location who housed 36 Africans on their premises. Although the men were registered as working for the shopkeepers, they were not employed there in a

From the point of view of most African tenants, conditions in the Malay Location were far from ideal. Demand for accommodation within reasonable distance of the city necessitated the payment of a major portion of their wage, legal or illegal, for shelter. Accusations by the Police, Native Affairs’ and Public Health Officials’ that Johannesburg’s underworld thrived in the Malay Location, and that the ghetto harboured potentially threatening diseases, are irrefutable. It has been suggested that before the War the difficulty in securing sites for new locations, and the unwelcome prospect of financing the relocation of the black population, guaranteed the Malay Location’s survival. In formulating a post-war urban policy the Johannesburg City Council continued to disregard the sanitation threat posed by the Location. However, in contrast with the previous period, the 1920s were associated with the exclusion of Africans from the Malay Location. Confronted with an expanding African population, white working-class resistance and the Spanish influenza epidemic, the Council agreed to evict Africans from the Malay Location. But first the Local Authority demanded that the 1918 NUAB be amended to give Municipalities greater powers to segregate without burdening white tax-payers and business in order to finance the removal of slums like the Malay Location.
African exclusion from the Malay Location

Elsewhere on the Witwatersrand the state's change in attitude to urban administration in the early 1920s has been ascribed to the growth of an urban African proletariat which, in the face of inflation and rising living costs, was willing to risk hardship and harassment by striking and protesting. These elements are evident in the case of the Malay Location, but here Council action to evict Africans was galvanised particularly by the resistance of the white working class to the contiguity of white Vredefort and the black Malay Location. In response to white political mobilisation against the Malay Location, the local authority backed down with unaccustomed haste on their project to upgrade the city's now predominantly African slum despite the 1918 warning of the danger of poor living conditions.

Having condoned the continued presence of the Malay Location, something had to be done to alleviate the threat of disease in the area. Two methods of dealing with the future of the Malay Location were adopted after the First World War. First, very specific strategies were adopted for containing the public health challenge posed by degenerate conditions. Second, the wider issue of local authority control of urban Africans was pursued with the central state.

Strategies for maintaining the Malay Location

While the Council blocked all development in the Malay Location as a sign that it endorsed the request that the Location be removed, the more realistic question of how to deal with the Location in situ was addressed simultaneously. The Acting Town Clerk was commissioned to enquire into the legal options surrounding the Malay Location's future. His confidential report identified three possible paths of action. First, the Johannesburg Council could find alternative stands for all the standholders renting in the Malay Location. The wholesale removal of the Malay Location had, however, been unsuccessfully pursued before the 1914. Second, it was possible to offer standholders a 33-year lease. It was feared that this option would antagonise whites and set a precedent that would be difficult to revoke at any later stage. The proposal had the advantage that rates could then be levied and this revenue used to improve services to the suburb. The
standholders, and not the local authority, would then be accountable for restricting sub-tenancy in
the Malay Location. Finally, the status-quo could be maintained and coupled with more active
enforcement of the prohibition of sub-letting, the allocation of one stand per family, and the
removal of Africans from the area. 8

Councillors were aware that the first of the three proposals would be the option favoured by the
white electorate. The second proposal was the most viable financially. It was, however, the principle
of the third alternative that the Council endorsed when it announced that Africans would be barred
from the Location, 9 while coloureds and Indians, who could not legally be prevented from
residing in the Location, would have to remain. 10 Standholders were more secure following the
1919 concession that stayed the Malay Location's demolition. Sub-tenants, particularly Africans,
faced the prospect of increased harassment. In fact no Municipal attempt to enforce the Location's
by-laws was recorded, possibly because of a 1917 court ruling that the regulations had fallen into
disuse and were no longer binding. A more probable explanation was the Johannesburg Council's
refusal to remove Africans from the Malay Location until legislation providing for finances and land
for alternative accommodation was made available. 11 This announcement marked the start of
negotiations for greater Municipal regulation of the African labour supply and for extended Council
access to funds for the construction of segregated African locations.

Restricting African urbanisation

Despite the sanitation scare of 1918, the Johannesburg Council had apparently acquiesced to
white demands over the Malay Location's future. Plans for infrastructural improvement to the
Malay Location were immediately revoked, despite legitimate concerns over public health. In
addition the local authority voluntarily petitioned both Provincial and National Government for
the abolition of the Malay quarter, and even met with the Minister of the Interior to try to secure
the Malay Location's removal.12 Yet, there is no evidence of concerted Council initiatives to
counter overcrowding and to reduce the concentration of Africans in the Malay Location as white
ratepayers required. As a matter of policy the Johannesburg Council had endorsed the cause of
white ratepayers by declaring that the Malay Location should be removed. Practically, however, the
authorities claimed they were unable to re-house Africans, a position contested by the central government's Department of Native Affairs which had assumed responsibility for removing illegal Africans from the Location.

As early as April 1917, the Department of Native Affairs received complaint about African occupation of the Malay Location from western suburb whites. Thereafter, pressure was exerted on the Municipality to enforce regulations excluding Africans from white suburbs and to build satisfactory housing for Africans. The construction of Western Native Township was a direct response to overcrowding in the Malay Location, but was also intended to provide for the gradual segregation of all Africans living permanently in Johannesburg. Accusations of Council recalcitrance in evicting Africans from the Malay Location became more vociferous after the War. It is true that following the epidemic, and in response to the complaints of Johannesburg ratepayers and the central state watchdog, the Native Affairs Department, 52 African families were relocated from the Malay Location and were preferentially re-housed at Western Native Township. However, the Police Commissioner complained that the Council immediately condoned the overcrowding problem by allowing new families to occupy the vacated "unwholesome and undesirable rooms".

There was some City Council effort to reduce excessive overcrowding in the Malay Location. Once Western Native Township was built, the Council re-initiated raids on African tenants of the Malay Location who were previously undisturbed because of the lack of alternative accommodation. In fact, the development of Western Native Township nowhere near resolved the extent of the African housing crisis of the 1920s, providing only 327 houses in the first five years after its opening. Efforts to accommodate single Africans in compounds rather than more costly family housing were stepped up as warnings of prosecution for illegal occupation were "freely posted up in the Native quarters...particularly in the Malay Location". The liberal display of warnings notwithstanding, only 25 men responded by leaving the Malay Location for compounds. The Location Superintendent called for prosecution of Malay Location Africans under various municipal by-laws. The order was a charade as there was hopelessly insufficient accommodation for Africans in Johannesburg. In 1923, municipal compounds could house only 1 000 people.
while the number of Africans living in unacceptable slums was officially estimated at 9,451. Doubtless, the extent of African slum occupation was significantly higher than that.

By publicly supporting the removal of the Location, but simultaneously failing to reduce the number of Africans in the Malay Location, the Council provoked conflict with the Department of Native Affairs. The Department argued that the town's prosperity depended on the labour of the African workers for whom the City Council refused to provide shelter. The conflict between the City and the Department of Native Affairs over the Malay Location provided the Council with a platform from which it launched more general demands for the revision of urban legislation as proposed by the Urban Areas Bill. The Council used the emotive issue of the evacuation of Africans from the Malay Location to highlight the weak position of the local authorities in acquiring land and finance for housing an expanding African workforce.

The Johannesburg authorities, like their colleagues across the country, believed that only once the number of Africans settling in towns was controlled by local authorities and once the financial resources for building African housing was secured, would the Councils be able to satisfactorily account to their white, largely working-class, constituencies on the question of urban segregation. The City Council's concern for municipal empowerment over urban African administration was taken up directly with regard to the Malay Location because of the profile the suburb had attained in the unrest associated with the strikes and the defiance campaign. The Council's problems with regard to Africans in Johannesburg were discussed with the United Municipal Executive which met in Cape Town in 1922 to discuss the Urban Areas Bill. However, the most influential forum for Johannesburg's ideas on limiting the number of Africans migrating to the cities turned out to be the Transvaal Provincial Commission on Local Government.

Unfortunately, the evidence to the 1922 Commission chaired by Col. Stallard has not survived. Doubtless, the Council's recommendations for dealing with Africans in the city were consistent with its demands over the future of the Malay Location. The most important of these were municipal restriction of the number of Africans allowed to move to Johannesburg, and the establishment of a municipal brewing monopoly to fund African housing developments. Certainly these ideas gained pride of place in Stallard's report, which emphasized the temporary status of urban Africans.
Surprisingly, Stallard's recommendations received a sympathetic hearing from Smuts, who had hitherto insisted that a stable urban African population should be fostered by allowing freehold tenure and some form of political representation. Rather than entrenching the interests of Johannesburg liberals whose support he traditionally enjoyed, Smuts supported the call by municipal health officials, the police, and working-class whites for the restriction of African migration. Bowing to pressure mounted by groups like the white workers of Johannesburg's western suburbs, and the Johannesburg City Council, Smuts crossed the floor on the Urban Areas debate.

Having satisfied themselves that the NUAA provided the means for African segregation and white appeasement, the Johannesburg City Council embraced the legislation only in 1924. Only six months after the proclamation of the NUAA in Johannesburg, the Director of Native Labour wrote of the steady progress made in implementing the Act: he conceded that success owed "very largely to conditions obtaining in the Malay Location and other parts of Johannesburg." In the same document, however, he revealed the Johannesburg City Council's willingness to sacrifice the support of those whites who had pushed for the NUAA to facilitate African exclusion from the Malay Location. Astonishingly, given the prominence of the Malay Location in the campaign for segregation, the City Council announced that the removal of Africans from the Malay Location was not a priority in segregating the city:

While appreciating the anxiety of the European residents of Vrededorp to the residence of natives at the Malay Location, one cannot but recognise that these natives are at present living in comparative isolation together with asiatics, Malays and coloured people, whereas in many of the other townships the natives are living in and about the quarters occupied by Europeans. Any attempt to treat the Malay Location as an isolated problem without the necessary accommodation being made available would merely disperse the natives in this Location throughout Johannesburg and aggravate the present position.

City officials further justified African occupation of the contentious Malay Location by arguing that as long as Indian and particularly coloured occupation could not be precluded, the fight to segregate the Malay Location would be in vain. In fact the Chief Native Commissioner and the MOH agreed that the rapid re-occupation of African shacks by coloureds meant that "the status of the Location would probably be worse than the present condition". Preliminary enquiry had revealed that there would be considerable white opposition to the re-establishment of the Location.
any further from town. The Council quickly concluded they would be unable to find "a more suitable site than the existing one".

Despite all Council attempts to leave the African population of the Malay Location undisturbed while the rest of Johannesburg was segregated, the Vrededorp ratepayers, after again visiting the Prime Minister, were able to secure a guarantee that a portion of the Malay Location would be cleared of Africans under the NUAA early in 1925. African tenants were evicted with relative ease from the northern portion of the Malay Location. Although the NUAA required the re-housing of displaced Africans, municipal housing was not provided. This omission left the Malay Location's leading slumlord, Jajabhay, who earned some £700 a week from African tenants, the opportunity to gain a court order declaring the Johannesburg Council's action *ultra vires.* Once again the endeavour of the state and whites in Johannesburg to enforce racial segregation was temporarily delayed by the Council's recalcitrance in financing African housing. The persistence of the black Malay Location in the heart of the 'white' city was one of many exceptions to the planned pattern of racial residential purity in the post-1923 segregationist period. Armed with the NUAA the Johannesburg Council dreamt it could close the city gates to unwanted African migrants and sweep the African urban workforce into locations and compounds. In the real world, enforcing segregation proved a more complex task.

Conclusion

Efforts to segregate the Malay Location on the basis of sanitation complaints were thwarted by Municipal reluctance to finance satisfactory accommodation for the black population. On several occasions before the First World War contagious diseases were attributed to conditions in the inner-city slums, the most notorious of which was the Malay Location. Before the War the sanitation threat posed by the Malay Location was not used to justify selective re-housing and racial segregation, although this policy was widely embraced. Instead, the local authority neglected its role as the keeper of public health and condoned living conditions that threatened human life. Only the anti-slum outrage that followed the influenza deaths in 1918 prompted even cursory attention to conditions in the Malay Location.
Frightened by the high casualty rate of Spanish Influenza, the Medical Officer successfully initiated a substantial upgrading grant for the Malay Location whose proximity to town and white suburbia made it the focus of white's sanitation concerns. By the end of the War, however, the political climate in Johannesburg had changed and the proposed improvement of the Malay Location was insufficient to appease white protestors. Particularly the poorer section of white society demanded nothing less than the wholesale relocation of the Malay Location. Because of its geographical location in the country's industrial heart, and its immediate proximity to white working-class strongholds, the Malay Location assumed an unnatural prominence in the formation of national policy for urban African settlement.

The Malay Location caricatured the task of local authorities in the early 1920's all over South Africa. Faced with a growing number of Africans settling in towns, primarily in the major urban centres where they crowded in the ghettos, municipalities faced an increasingly severe challenge to public health. Unwilling to burden white ratepayers and capitalists with the establishment of basic infrastructure for black citizens, the Johannesburg City Council found it was unable to finance the re-housing of black communities from the central slums. At the same time, however, white workers insisted on the immediate segregation of Africans from white residential areas. In the 1910s and 1920s the white working-class was the single most powerful political constituency, and the pressure it brought to bear on municipalities for segregation had significant impact. By supporting the call for the relocation of the Malay Location the City Council harnessed the political power of the white working-class. By failing to relocate the African population of the Location the Council drew attention to the inadequacies of the existing and the proposed legislation on urban African administration and segregation.

Using the Malay Location as an example, Johannesburg Councillors argued that in order for local authorities to effectively achieve the racial division of urban space, it was imperative that the central state grant the necessary fiscal and legislative power to construct and maintain black locations. The Johannesburg Council campaigned for segregation through constant reference to the plight of working-class whites offended by African settlement in the Malay Location. The resultant NUAA also provided the framework for the more rigid control of South Africa's urban African
labour-force. Eager to appease white insistence on segregation, the state failed to provide essential residential facilities for the urban black population because it would not foot the rehousing bill.

Notes


2 CAD, GNLB 273 218/17/102, Provincial Secretary to Town Clerk, Johannesburg, 10 June 1919.

3 CoJ CHDA 30 968, Appendix A of Report of Acting Town Clerk to the Parks and Estates Committee, 16 October 1921.

4 CAD CT 41 1758/05, Colonial Under-Secretary to the Treasury, 8 March 1904.

5 Map number: CAD LTG 97/4.

6 SATSLA, Acting Secretary to Railway Board to Colonial Under-Secretary, 11 April 1910.

7 Under the Gold Law No. 5 of 1885.


9 CAD CT 41 1758/05, Copy of Executive Council Resolution No. 1235 of 1904 referring to grant of Malay and Kaffir Locations'; CAD LDE 476 5037/1162, Secretary of Lands to Chief Engineer, Central South African Railways, 1 July 1906.
c.f. detailed correspondence in SATSLA, Unsorted records of the Inter-Colonial Council and Central South African Railways: file entitled 'Exchange of ground with Johannesburg Municipality'.

CAD GOV 1239 44/4, Report of the Public Health Committee on the condition of the Malay Location, 11 December 1909.


Compiled from: CAD GOV 1239 44/4, Report of the Public Health Commission on the condition of the Malay Location, 11 December 1909; CAD MNW 482 (2129/19), Mr Bourbon to Mining Commissioners, 1 December 1919; Dugmore, H., 'The roots of a community: the creation the Malay Location 1893-1906', Unpublished Paper presented to the Post-graduate History Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1986; Dugmore, H., 'The coloured community in Johannesburg, 1910-1936 with particular reference to the Malay Location and surrounding areas', Unpublished Paper presented to the Post-graduate History Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1989; CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box, Report of MOH to Town Clerk, 6 May 1919.

CoJ CHDA 968, Meeting of the Johannesburg City Council, 29 June 1926, Malay Location Document, p. 12.


SATSLA, Town Clerk to General Manager Central South African Railways, March 1910; Acting Secretary to the Railway Board to the Assistant Colonial Secretary, 11 March 1910; Colonial Under-Secretary to Acting Secretary of the Railway Board, 17 March 1910; Acting Secretary for the Railway Board to the Secretary for Lands, 11 April 1910.

SATSLA, Administrator of the Transvaal to Sauer, Minister of Railways and Harbours, 25 March 1912; Copy of Report of the General Manager of Railways, Malay Location, no date.

CAD GOV 1239 44/4, Town Clerk's Report to the Public Health Committee on the condition of the Malay Location, 11 December 1909.

CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box, Johannesburg Municipal Council Meeting, 29 June 1926, p. 4.

CAD LD 1653 2637/68, No. 2637/05.

Bonner, P., 'The Transvaal Native Congress', p. 43 points out that industrial establishments on the Rand increased from 862 in 1918 to 1,562 in May 1920.


Municipal Magazine, November 1919, p. 63.

CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box, Special Meeting Parks and Estates, 25 June 1920.
3. CAD MNW 482 2329/19, Resolution of Public Meeting of 22 October 1919. On hearing of the loss of the petition, deputation leader Bourbon claimed the support of some 13,000 residents for the removal of the Malay Location; Bourbon to Malan, Minister of Finance, 17 February 1920; 'Confidential Memorandum of deputation of residents of Western suburbs of Johannesburg', 18 October 1919; Western suburbs representative of the South African Party to Acting Prime Minister Malan, 19 July 1919; Acting Secretary of Mines and Industries to the Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg, 23 June 1919.


3. Cape Times, 02/10/1923.

3. CAD MNW 482 2329/19, Bourbon to Secretary for Mines and Industries; Acting Secretary for Mines and Industries to Bourbon 15 October 1919; Resolution of Public Meeting of Vrededorp Residents', 22 October 1919; 'Memo of confidential meeting with Minister of Mines and Industries', 18 October 1919; Mining Commissioner's Minute MCA 297/19.


3. Ibid.

3. c.f. The Star, 04/06/1915.


3. CoJ CHDA 968, Meeting of the Parks and Estates Committee, 27 April 1923; CAD LDE 1653 2637/65, Assistant Colonial Secretary to the Secretary for the 1.xw Department, 5 November 1908.

3. CAD LDE 467 503/162, Commissioner of Police, Occupants of Coolie and Kaffir Locations, 9 August 1907.

3. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

3. The Star, 07/10/1912; 04/06/1915.

3. CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Director of Native Affairs to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg 19 June 1917; Secretary of Native Affairs to Director of Native Labour, 19 April 1917; 1919 figures show a population density of 16.8 people to the stand: CAD MNW 482 2329/19, Bourbon to Mining Commissioner, 7 December 1919.

3. CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Acting Chief Pass Officer to Director of Native Labour, 25 April 1917; CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Director of Native Affairs to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 19 June 1917.

3. CoJ CHDA 968, Report of MOH to Town Clerk, 6 May 1919; 'Malay Location Census', 22 April 1920.

3. GNLB 273 218/17/102, Acting Chief Pass Officer to Director of Native Labour, 25 May 1917.
CoJ CHDA 968, 'Meeting of the Parks and Estates Committee', 27 April 1923; CAD LDE, 1653, 2637/65, Assistant Colonial Secretary to Secretary for the Law Department, 5 November 1908; 'Ex Parte: The Municipal Council of Johannesburg re: Malay Location, Statement of Case for Opinion; Meeting of the Parks and Estates Committee', 27 April 1923.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/02, Acting Chief Pass Officer to the Director of Native Affairs, 1917.

Sepire, H., 'African settlement and segregation in Brakpan'.

A Council deputation to Parliament demanding the Malay Location's removal was proposed twice in 1921.

CoJ CHDA 968, 'Meeting of the Johannesburg City Council', 29 June 1926; 'Malay Location Document', p. 16.

CoJ CHDA 30 968, Appendix A of Report of the Acting Town Clerk to the Parks and Estates Committee, Malay Location, 16 October 1921.


CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Acting Town Clerk to Acting Director of Native Labour, 10 January 1925; Sub-Native Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 23 July 1919.

CAD GHS 909 588/13A, 'Worst Slum in Johannesburg', 1918; Chairman of the Johannesburg Parks and Estates Committee to Prime Minister Smuts, 6 May 1921; GNLB 273 218/17/102, Provincial Secretary to Johannesburg Town Clerk, 10 June 1919; Acting Town Clerk to Minister of the Interior, 22 July 1921; Private Secretary to the Minister of the Interior, to Acting Town Clerk 23 July 1921.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Secretary of Native Affairs to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg; 'Petition from Malays and Cape Coloured people of Vrededorp', 19 April 1917; Acting Chief Pass Officer to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 25 May 1917.

CAD GHS 902 588/13A, Director of Native Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 17 February 1921.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Provincial Secretary of the Transvaal, to Town Clerk, 9 June 1919; Provincial Secretary of the Transvaal to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 June 1919; Witwatersrand sub-Native Commissioner to Director of Native Labour, 23 July 1919; Accommodation at Western Native township, 26 August 1923.


CoJ CHDA 30 955, Superintendent of Locations to MOH, 25 January 1923.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Director of Native Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 September 1924.

CoJ CHDA 30 955, MOH to Inspectors, 12 January 1923; 'Report of the Public Health Department', 30 January 1923.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Director of Native Labour to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 September 1926, p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 5-6.

CoJ CHDA 968, MOH to Town Clerk 2 February 1925.

CAD GNLB 273 218/17/102, Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg to Secretary for Native Affairs, 11 March 1925, 19 January 1925; Afrikaanse Nasionale to Minister of Justice, 28 October 1926; Director of Native Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 17 November 1926.
CHAPTER EIGHT

APPLYING THE NATIVES (URBAN AREAS) ACT IN JOHANNESBURG

When the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was passed in 1923, more than half of Johannesburg’s African population was housed by employers; less than fifteen per cent were resident in municipal locations (Table 8.1). The Council estimated that it required housing to segregate 14,500 illegally accommodated Africans from the rest of the urban population. Less than a decade later, units for twice that number had been built, while the non-township African urban population had more than doubled to over 30,000 and either lived illegally in the slums or rented space in the black freesthold suburbs. Segregation, even of the city core, had failed. Despite the weakness of the NUAA in effecting racial residential separation, the application of the legislation had far-reaching implications on how and where Africans lived in Johannesburg. The distribution of African private rental stock shifted. The inner-city yards of the teens and twenties gave way to the overcrowded slums of Alexandra and the ‘Western Areas’ in the 1930s and 1940s. More significantly, state housing or state-licensed shelter became increasingly dominant forms of tenure for urban Africans.

The process by which the law was applied, and the geographical pattern of the application of the NUAA, underscored the local state’s prioritisation of racial segregation over philanthropic concern for the reform of African living conditions. As de facto spokesperson for the Johannesburg City Council, Porter underlined the explicitly racial agenda of his Council:

"The prevalent residence of natives among white people whether of the poorer or of the more comfortably placed, is a condition against which public opinion in South Africa has rightly protested for years."

This anti-reformist emphasis is confirmed by the municipality’s response to the widespread resistance to and evasion of the NUAA. Instead of concentrating on rehousing programmes for Africans displaced by the Act, the Johannesburg authorities orchestrated and then utilised amendments to the NUAA that allowed exemptions in a manner that facilitated selective rather
than total residential improvement in urban African living conditions. By 1934 Johannesburg was far from racially divided, but the state had acquired sufficient control over racial residential zoning to ensure that Africans did not mix with whites. The post-1930 exemptions to the NUAA facilitated tighter control over urban African housing standards in locations and the inner-city.

Table 8.1: Non-compound housing occupied by African people, 1923-1934.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSING TYPE</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Housed by Employers</td>
<td>32231</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38414</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>Municipal Locations</td>
<td>6548</td>
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<td>41000</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>Private African Townships</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Mine Married Quarters</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized Quarter</td>
<td>12486</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54688</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105414</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern and process of removals

As the Johannesburg Council quickly discovered, the passage of a law does not translate neatly into practical application of the legislation. Immediately following the publication of the NUAA, the Johannesburg local authority applied for the whole city to be proclaimed for whites: in proclaimed urban areas Africans were only to be allowed if they served white employers. The obligatory census which preceded this request revealed that the Council had little chance of rehousing the displaced population in the paltry 1 200 beds, 2 008 houses and 1 400 stands available as location and compound accommodation. Nevertheless, the municipality's request for proclamation of virtually the whole city area was granted in January 1924. The Native Affairs Department knowingly ignored the directive instructing that available accommodation be guaranteed before an area was proclaimed under the NUAA. In justifying the Department's turning a blind eye to the abuse of the only reformist clause in the Act, the Secretary of Native Affairs claimed that the interests of Johannesburg Africans would be protected. He announced that he would insist on 'definite progress' being made in the supply of Johannesburg location housing to keep pace with removals. He also made the proclamation of the city under the NUAA conditional on the City Council providing the opportunity for more affluent Africans to build their own homes at Eastern Native Township. By conceding to the proclamation of the entire city, however, the
Department of Native Affairs effectively colluded with the segregationist emphasis of the Johannesburg City Council. The process and pattern of the NUAA’s early application is evidence of the brutal impact of the rapid application of Act.

Serving notices under the NUAA involved a corps of some 21 white inspectors from the Health Department. Many of these officials, like Mr Squires and Mr Doyle, were well known to the African tenants of the yards, as they had monitored illegal occupancy in their capacity as District Inspectors from before the First World War. Although the whole city was already proclaimed, the Council publicised the particular areas that had been targeted for clearance by posting notices in public places and in the press. Once the period of time specified in the notice had expired, the inspectors’ work began. To prove in court that an African lived in a proclaimed area, the person had to have been found asleep in bed, and a notice was served personally stating the illegality of African occupation of the territory proclaimed under the NUAA. Following this rude awakening, the African’s pass number and employment details were collected. Africans who had been issued with these notices were not only expected to move away from the proclaimed accommodation, but they were also barred from seeking new shelter anywhere in the city except an African location. The NUAA therefore marks the shift from private rental to public housing for the African population.

African tenants were not the only victims of the law. To ensure efficient proclamation, the Johannesburg City Council deliberately pursued and prosecuted landlords who ignored the law. Difficulties were experienced in bringing landlords to book, not least because of the awkwardness of getting Africans to appear as witnesses. One early conviction involved Hymen Baker, a well-known landlord in Doornfontein, who was fined £5 for “harbouring natives”. Given that he had already extracted more than this sum in payment of rent in advance of the Africans’ forced removal, his small fine can hardly have been financially ruinous. By contrast, the thousands of Africans who faced criminal proceedings were not only fined, but they also risked their jobs and access to urban areas.
In theory, Africans could avoid ignominious midnight raids and time-consuming court proceedings by heeding the initial posting of clearance notices and applying for municipal accommodation. Single men who were self-employed were offered shelter in the Salisbury and Jubilee Compound, and employees of whites were placed in the Wommer Hostel. Family housing was available at KL spruit and at Eastern and Western Native Townships. Municipal compounds for single African women did not exist until 1929. Forced by the need to rehouse single African women in formal employment in Johannesburg, the City Council issued interim instructions for the "disposal of these women" that included setting aside a block of houses in the Western Native Township for a women's 'compound'. Once these 100 places were filled, single women were offered accommodation at distant Klipspruit until a centrally located site for a women's compound was found.¹⁷

After the 1930 amendment to the NUAA the administration of African women in urban areas became even more complex. Women could no longer enter an urban area without proof of employment or without their husbands having already been in the city for two years. Armed with wider controlling powers, police and health inspectors spent an increasing amount of time chasing liquor sellers, washerwomen, hawkers and other "undesirable women" from the precinct of the white town.¹⁸ In Johannesburg alone, 800 women a day came before the magistrate on charges of illegal entry into town.¹⁹

Not all applications under the NUAA were initiated by the local authority. In one instance African home-owners in the black suburbs of Sophiatown and Martindale filed an application for their suburbs to be declared as Native Villages under the Act. The motivation was to allow Africans to acquire long leases and enjoy a measure of protection from segregationist removals. The presence in the suburb of 243 whites, plus a few coloured, Indian and Chinese people, many of whom were property owners, was the reason the City Council turned down the request.²⁰ More regularly, the Act was brought into action by the police at the behest of the white public who would complain to the Johannesburg City Council about specific stands where liquor was brewed.²¹ Until 1926 when the practice was made illegal, the proclamation of isolated houses occupied by Africans was common, especially if they were in predominantly white-occupied suburbs.²²
Even after 1926, when police complaints about particular properties persisted, as in the case of two stands in Hillbrow, the authorities would agree to proclaim the entire suburb in their effort to clear the African residents. This kind of action demonstrated that although the process of applying the law was carefully specified, in practice it was easily manipulated according to the racist agendas of the local bureaucrats charged with its enforcement. The initial subjugation of the NUAA to the objective of segregation over that of slum rehousing is clearly identifiable in the temporal and spatial pattern of the law's application (Fig. 8.1).

Figure 8.1: The application of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act to Johannesburg.
As one might expect, the NUAA was first enforced in one of Johannesburg's most notorious slums, Doornfontein. Within a year 1,200 Africans were removed from the suburb. The prevalence of blight and unquestionable overcrowding were among the factors that prompted action. Racial mixing was another. Simultaneous application of Act to the equally insanitary Malay Location was initially turned down even though it was one of the areas whose condition and proximity to white areas was used to motivate for the passage of anti-slam action. The Medical Officer was convinced that no purpose would be served by removing Africans when they would be immediately replaced by coloureds. Unlike the rest of the city, in the Malay Location Africans mixed with other blacks and not with whites. The MOH's hand was nevertheless forced by strenuous opposition from neighbouring poor whites. A small portion of the Malay Location bordering Vrededorp was proclaimed early in 1925. Porter offered a compromise reluctantly:

"We do not think this is the most practically useful thing to do, but it will placate the white residents in the neighbourhood and it is thought, will be in accordance with the wishes of the Minister."

The Council's lack of success in enforcing segregation in the densely populated African sectors of towns like Doornfontein made the national and local Departments of Native Affairs sceptical about extending the domain of active proclamation under the NUAA to similarly heavily populated black settlements in Wollwuter, Denver, Spes Bona, Burghersdorp and Fordsburg. Pestered by Porter's call for more vigorous action rather than despondency, the Director of Native Labour advised the Native Affairs Department to delimit these suburbs in August 1925. Less than six months later, Ophirton, another township favoured by Africans, was added to the list. However, by 1926 when the MOH's attention had turned to another of the big slum districts, Ferreirastown, the Johannesburg Council was embroiled in a series of court orders questioning the validity of the application of the NUAA in the city (Table 8.2).

After the courts forced the City Council to obey the letter of the law by demonstrating the availability of alternative accommodation, it redefined its strategy of where to apply the Act. Overcrowding and racial proximity ceased to be the guiding principles in selecting districts for clearance. Pragmatic assessment of the viability of segregationist removals and rehousing became
paramount. By delineating the city so that sections could be treated under the Act in turn, the Council was able to prioritise segregation in large portions of Johannesburg where there were only few Africans who had to be rehoused. The whole of the southern suburbs hosted only 117 single men, 38 women and 166 families.\(^3\)\(^4\) In a bid to get these areas cleared first, one Councillor argued that the northern suburbs owners were wealthier than those of the south and would not therefore be tempted to let backyard shacks to illegal Africans.\(^3\)\(^1\) In fact, the affluent north was a popular haven from the raids of the NUAA's perpetrators. The pre-proclamation census showed over 1 000 men and a handful of women and children taking refuge illegally in the north. The Council, keen to prevent this practice, instituted clearances in the north even before they did so in the south\(^3\)\(^2\) (Fig. 8.1). More curious than the protection of affluent white suburban interests was the Council's fixation with the proclamation of Albertsville.

Located to the west of the city, Albertsville was a peri-urban suburb that lay beyond the jurisdiction of the nineteenth century Gok Law which outlawed occupation by blacks. From the 1930s Albertsville was popular among coloureds who could afford to buy property away from the slums.\(^3\)\(^3\) In 1928 there were only 10 African families living in the area. The Johannesburg Council wished them forcibly removed under the NUAA. Once again, the Director of Native Labour was reluctant to recommend that the area be targeted for removal, but Milne (the new MOH) insisted. The rationale behind pushing for proclamation under the Act was a rumour that major township owners wished to build a private African location.\(^3\)\(^4\) Following the advice of the Director of Native Labour, the Native Affairs Department rejected the Council’s request.\(^3\)\(^5\) The Council responded immediately by redrafting its motivation for the area to be cleared. This time, complaints from white residents were invoked: the 14 African families were allegedly a nuisance because they “create disturbances and brew native liquor”. The Native Affairs Department was once again convinced that Albertsville should be proclaimed under the NUAA.\(^3\)\(^6\)

Instead of the inexpensive task of rehousing Albertsville Africans, the Johannesburg authorities were forced to confront the huge slum populations of Prospect, Denver, and the remaining portion of Ferreira’s Town where the number of Africans occupying slums had escalated.\(^3\)\(^7\) By the early 1930s the pressure had reinforced the tendency for poor whites to sub-let to Africans, but these
cases were spread across the city and presented nothing like the concentration of Africans in yards described by Hellmann in her 1933 portrayal of the Doornfontein slum, Rooiyard. In the tiny area of Denver, 400 families were issued with notices under the NUAA in 1932. In the precinct of the Jeppe Police Station there were 203 slum yards, whereas Prospect Township housed 2,000 Africans in only 66 yards. The largest of all the slum districts were the unproclaimed black townships of Alexandra and Sophiatown where a vibrant culture nourished amid the rubbish and decay of the ghettos.

The Johannesburg City Council had fought hard to realise the white dream of a municipal area free of Africans. But there was simply not enough township housing stock available to accommodate the African slum population. The illusion of racially pure space was therefore fostered by shepherding inner-city African slum communities into illegal accommodation in retail stock in peripheral black freehold suburbs. Neither the transition to a racially segregated city, nor the shift to a state monopoly on African housing tenure under the NUAA were totally successful. The official record is misleading. By 1930, 79 of the 10 Johannesburg townships had been proclaimed under the NUAA. Although it is unclear exactly how many people had been issued with notices under the Act, the Council itself estimated that 45,000 people still needed housing before segregation could be attained. The figure was considerably more than the total of 27,000 people the Council had successfully placed in locations and compounds in 1930.4

African evasion and slum lord resistance

The NUAA failed to effect the racial segregation of Johannesburg in part because the law was badly drafted. The law exempted domestic servants from its purview, but gave no guidelines as to what work was categorised as domestic, and provided no method of identifying domestics. Since many male servants could be defined broadly as domestic workers, much was made of the ambiguity. Even more frustrating from the authorities' perspective was that women were not obliged to hold passes of any kind until 1930. The application of the Act to this unidentifiable and untraceable population was virtually impossible.
Africans actively evaded the NUAA by a variety of means. The number of Africans who escaped the NUAA hatchet is remarkable. Initial efforts to force evicted Doornfontein tenants into African locations and hostels had only a 10 per cent success rate. In 1931 over eleven areas were proclaimed involving approximately 6 000 Africans. Of the 6 000, it is unclear if 50 or 250 took up shelter in municipal locations; whatever the correct figure, nobody was foolish enough to claim that the Council's endeavours were a success. As the African paper Abantu-Batho pointed out, whereas the Council had managed to rehouse about 5 000 African families from over 80 townships, many times that number remained in the most abject quarters in the inner-city. There were three clear reasons for the initial failure of the NUAA to either segregate or rehabilitate African housing. First, there was the Council's tardy building programme. Second, Africans were opposed to the spirit and practice of segregationist removals. Third, the successful campaign of the slumlords to challenge the legal validity of the NUAA frustrated segregation in Johannesburg.

From the start, Africans circumvented the enforcement of the NUAA. African renters simply refused to present their passes to inspectors or they left the premises as soon as the Municipal men arrived. Even once powers to demand passes were acquired, the Council's difficulties remained. The boycott of the NUAA census was a particularly effective strategy because, before 1930, it was possible to challenge the validity of the entire proclamation of an area if it could be demonstrated that the estimate of the number to be rehoused was an under-count. If the census on which housing need was estimated was unreliable, there would be insufficient alternative accommodation for slum residents and the proclamation was invalid. The Johannesburg Council argued that evasion of the census was orchestrated by the slumlords, and they were undoubtedly correct, but it was clearly in the interests of Africans to avoid being served with a notice declaring them illegal residents of a proclaimed area of Johannesburg.

By far the most common form of opposition to the NUAA was overt disobedience. Forced out of a declared property, African tenants typically sought private accommodation elsewhere in the city, though many drifted back to their original homes. The reflux of Africans to proclaimed and cleared districts was facilitated by the Supreme Court decision making all pre-1928 declarations ultra vires. This explains why the 1932 survey of insanitary properties revealed many Africans living in
Doomfontein, the fringes of the Malay Location and other previously proclaimed districts (Fig. 8.2).

Figure 8.2: Insanitary properties in Johannesburg in 1932.

African rejection of Council accommodation in favour of slumyard living cost the authorities dearly. A house standing vacant for even a month meant that no rent was received. There were also indirect costs. The practice of slum hopping meant that most Africans were hounded by inspectors on more than one occasion, incurring considerable administrative and personnel expense. Still, the local authority appeared impervious to the unpopularity of locations and compounds among African people.

After living only a few weeks in Western Native Township or the municipal compounds, many Africans absconded back to hovels in the slums. Despite the higher standard of building available to Africans in locations, municipal accommodation was unpopular. Across the country Africans complained about their treatment by location supervisors, and Johannesburg locations and
townships were no exception. Another reason the townships were avoided was the difficulty of making ends meet. Despite the low wages paid to Africans, municipal rents were high, deriving 30-50 per cent of a breadwinner's wage. Municipal officials themselves identified the imperative of more than one income per family for African subsistence, yet they denied women traditional methods of supplementing the family wage. Location regulations prohibited the brewing of liquor and made it difficult for women residents to wash clothes for money. Even the obvious strategy of taking in lodgers to augment inadequate income was forbidden. Partially as an attempt to boost the amount of accommodation that could be offered as surety against NUAA proclamations, African lodgers were allowed in municipal houses. But permit fees were payable to the Council as part of its revenue generation campaign. For the residents there was more than money at stake. Permits were required for all children over 18 years of age. This invasion of personal and family privacy was compounded by other forms of overt control extended to municipal tenants. The fencing of Western Native Township and the daily monitoring of movement were among the factors weighing against Africans accepting municipal housing. Tyamzashe, a correspondent writing to the English-language press, provided an African perception of the new townships to the ill-informed white public:

They are veritable convict stations. The authorities from time to time round up the natives and demand all their receipts, passes and special passes, and skoklostan and liquor raids are frequently carried out. If a native fails to pay his rent he is arrested and dealt with criminally. The police have authority to enter any house at any hour. In some locations an early morning raid is now and again launched on the sleeping inhabitants, and decent law abiding natives are rudely disturbed.

One example of undue force involved Jackson Motiki. After being arrested and handcuffed for failing to pay his rent, a magistrate ordered him to pay 10s a month to settle his debt. The white superintendent of the location decided this was insufficient justice. Accompanied by his African police he forced entry to Motiki's house, removed his property, and arranged to have it sold by public auction. By all accounts this was not uncommon practice in Johannesburg locations. The obsession with collecting funds to balance the expenditure on African housing generated the very
harsh penalty system for rent defaulters who were tried in a criminal court and who, if convicted, found themselves with criminal records.  

If African tenants had good reason to avoid the workings of the NUAA, so did the predominantly East European and Indian slumlords. At first reading, landlord anxiety over the enforcement of the Act appears to be an overreaction. Fines imposed on offenders were low, reaching a maximum of £10 or one month's hard labour. Shrewd lawyers could almost guarantee their clients got off charges by using one of numerous loopholes. It was easy to argue that a landlord believed his tenants were coloured or domestic servants, and therefore exempt from the NUAA. Landlords sometimes evicted their African tenants as soon as NUAA notices had been served. By the time the Act was physically enforced some months later, a fresh set of tenants who had not received notices were living on the property. As a result, when a magistrate asked if the accused before him had received notices under the Act, there was a negative response and the case was dismissed. While in the short term the landlords could and did evade the law, in the longer term their livelihood was under threat.  

Landlords made enormous profits by letting rooms to Africans. Amounts as high as £25 000 per annum were being drawn by the powerful landlords of Prospect township. Many smaller proprietors were mortgaged to the limit. The case of Hymen Baker is once again germane. Six months prior to the passage of the NUAA he acquired the leasehold of five stands in the heart of Doornfontein abutting the railway station. He paid a leasehold fee of 30s per month to Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company. In addition he had £900 worth of bonds on the properties for which he paid 8-9 per cent interest. If his story is believed, he personally subsidised this newly acquired slum venture to the tune of £10-15 per month. His prospective profit was unquestionably put at risk by the proclamation of Doornfontein under the NUAA. It is true that Baker would continue to operate as a slumlord even after proclamation, replacing African with coloured tenants. Like other landlords in the area, however, he realised that ongoing proclamation would lead to a decline in demand for rooms in the city and therefore depress rents. Predictably then, the best organised opposition to the NUAA came from the landlords.
The first sign of any sustained legal opposition to the Johannesburg City Council’s application of the NUAA came on the eve of Dr Porter’s retirement in the winter of 1925. Magistrate Lawrence, in cautioning and discharging landlord Matus of Beit Street in Doornfontein, explained that he had found him not guilty because the Council had issued a “rank rotten bad notice”. The case did not set legal a precedent, but was the first of a series fought between Johannesburg landlords (Table 8.2).

Slumlord resistance to the application of the NUAA in Johannesburg is well established. In addition to challenging their own conviction under the law, various slumlords provided financial support to Africans willing to contest segregation. At a public meeting, probably of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, Africans were urged to apply for Western Native Township or compound accommodation as a way of forcing the Council to admit that there was insufficient public housing available for NUAA victims. Benson, the lawyer who filed this and other cases against the Johannesburg Municipality, is reported to have assured the crowd that legal action would not cost the signatories “a penny.” The slumlord’s sponsorship of tenants legal costs paid off quickly. The NUAA’s proclamation in Johannesburg was overturned in 1927. Subsequent municipal action under the segregationist Act was more constrained and also had to adhere to the principle of rehousing. But in the longer term the court decisions served to reinforce local authority frustration. The Council’s “new broom”, the manager of the infant Native Affairs Department, Ballenden, led the Johannesburg based initiative to tighten municipal control over urban “native policy”. Two major changes were sought: extension of influx control and a lighter burden from African urban housing. Compromise on the latter was achieved by creating numerous exceptions to the NUAA.
Table 8.2: Litigation involving the application of the NUAA in Johannesburg.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Hodge and Jojhobhay vs Rex TPD 101</td>
<td>For Hodge and Jojhobhay because even if municipal accommodation was available, it was insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Rex vs Zock AD 384</td>
<td>For Zock because it was not possible for all Africans to leave proclaimed areas on the prescribed day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Rex vs Kostas AD 138</td>
<td>For Rex, because licences could be issued at the Council’s discretion</td>
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Segregation and sanitation by exemptions and licence

In order to preserve the ideological blanket of racial segregation that had been placed over the urban area of Johannesburg, the state devised various forms of exemptions to the NUAA to compensate for its inability to fully enforce the law. Ironically, these exemptions facilitated the neglected objective of sanitising and upgrading the accommodation of the African urban population. The incongruity of the state’s ideological construction of urban areas as white space, and the economic reality of an African labour force, meant that the practice of granting exemptions to Africans in town was well established. Although the NUAA represented a new approach to urban African policy, it carried over many of the pre-First World War traditions. One such tradition was the exemption of ‘civilised Natives’ from the imperative of living in segregated municipal locations. However, the African elite of Johannesburg in the 1920s found themselves caught between old and new policies. Exemptions granted to African men did not extend to their wives and children who, after 1924, had to live in the townships. Other exemptions were more rationally tuned to maintaining the uneasy balance between economic productivity (which depended on accessible African labour) and the principle of total racial residential segregation.

The NUAA consolidated disparate legislation governing African living in urban areas. In this respect it formalised the practice of condoning the residence of African domestic workers on the premises of their white employers. How else was morning tea to be served, or 24-hour child care
to be arranged? In addition, the Act incorporated the established practice of granting permission to Africans to live on the premises of their employers' factories. It did not extend this exemption to the practice of employers hiring additional beds in neighbouring private compounds or yards. The confusion over what was permissible under the NUAA meant that several slumlords applied to the Johannesburg City Council to continue making their living from running compound facilities for industrial workers.\(^7\)\(^2\)

Initial outrage at continued private compounding soon softened. The City Council was utterly dependent on passing on responsibility for housing to "tightly its burden", especially to the large employers. The local authority was legally entitled to do this. As the MOH assured other officials,

> It is so obvious that no local authority can fairly be called upon to provide suitable accommodation for all natives in its district, that the Act empowers the local authority to require every employer of more than 25 natives...and every employer of natives on work of a temporary nature within the urban areas, to provide or to hire accommodation for the natives in his employment.\(^7\)\(^3\)

As soon as the NUAA was proclaimed in Johannesburg's white suburban areas, the MOH made a point of informing the Master Builders' Association of the conditions under which construction workers would be exempt from the Act. Among the conditions was the stipulation that the temporary camp should not be anywhere near an institution where "European girls" were in residence.\(^7\)\(^4\) The memory of the Black Peril of 1912 had found its way into the city regulations, but it was not the safety of white women that was foremost in the mind of Johannesburg City Officials as they put pressure on employers to accept responsibility for the legal housing of African workers under the NUAA. The Johannesburg City Council was particularly anxious to force firms that employed large numbers of Africans to assist in effecting the racial segregation of the industrial workforce living in slums and in policing the ongoing African occupation of municipal compounds under the NUAA.

In 1926 the Premier Milling company was approached to assist in the application of the NUAA. Of the firm's 170 African staff, four lived in the company stables and 15 were municipal compound
residents. The bulk of the workforce lived illegally in nearby low-city slums or in African freehold locations (Fig. 8.3). Believing that under section 1(1)(c) of the NUAA, the Premier Milling firm was responsible for the proper housing of its African workers, the City Council wrote to notify the company of vacant beds at Wemmer Compound. The milling company responded to the City's directive by informing its staff that, under the NUAA, they were required to move from illegal accommodation to municipally approved shelter. Although six Africans who defied this company instruction were fired, the company was not prepared to extend its involvement to deducting compound rents from wages. Passive resistance by Premier Milling and other companies forced the Johannesburg City Council to seek legal advice. Apparently the intention of the NUAA's drafters was explicit, "requiring employers of fifty native labourers to house them in a hostel or compound to preclude the possibility of living under family conditions." The wording of the Act, however, was ambiguous over whether the employer was personally responsible for hiring satisfactory accommodation or simply for establishing that approved shelter was available.7 8

Premier Milling was, hardly surprisingly, not the only company disinclined to assume the task of policing worker housing payment. Burnt by the experience of being brought before the courts for improper application of the NUAA, the Johannesburg City Council finally decided that the wording of the law on this point was too vague to guarantee a conviction and so it never tried to force any of the larger employers to house their workers in municipal compounds.7 8 Instead, it relied (until 1930 when the Act was amended) on individual companies which were frustrated by the disturbance of workers under the NUAA to submit accommodation plans for private compounds. As these compounds were located in white Johannesburg they did not affect full scale segregation, but they did meet the local authority concerns for sanitary housing and for social control. A white supervisor lived on the premises and minimum standards based on international criteria were insisted upon.7 7 As gradually zoning became more common in the 1930s, areas became more uniformly industrial, except for residential presence of African workers in private compounds.
The inability of the local authority to successfully implement the NUAA was almost immediately apparent. Unable to secure the required public housing for relocated African slum residents, the practice of giving a temporary three month exemption to employers of more than 25 Africans was introduced as a method of saving face and rationing money. Employers who could be persuaded to build their own compounds were given a period of grace and the Council avoided assuming final housing responsibility for a large section of the industrial workforce. Of the 37 000 Africans for whom Johannesburg had to find accommodation in 1928, 15 000 were employed by firms with more than 25 workers. In the spirit of reducing the total housing requirement under the NUAA, the MOH issued a strongly worded directive that the broadest
interpretation be given to clauses in the Act on the exemption of domestic servants. For once the Chief Native Commissioner of the Witwatersrand and the City MOH concurred. In words which could just as readily have emanated from Porter, Cooke declared:

The obligations placed on the Johannesburg Municipality under the Act to provide accommodation for natives now living in unauthorised quarters are so strenuous that any relief which can be secured by legitimately throwing part of this burden on employers should, in my opinion, unhesitatingly, be adopted.

In their rush to reduce the total cost of public housing, municipal officials connived to minimise the number of Africans to be placed in family housing. Their financial reasoning was sound, if immoral: it cost only £.30 to place a man in a compound, but £.187 to house a family. The MOH concluded swiftly that the Council should aim "at reducing its liability in respect of family housing." To the chagrin of African people, the Council achieved this by recognising only Christian and not customary marriages in the granting of family accommodation.

When it came to African requests for exemptions, the interpretation of the law was less liberal than when the Council itself sought the privilege. One group of Africans was granted permission to remain in proclaimed housing until accommodation was available in the Eastern Native Township: this suited them better that the Western Township which was further from their place of work. A more typical experience was that of the Sophiatown community. The Sophiatown and Martindale non-European Ratepayers' Association requested unsuccessfully that the virtually exclusively black suburbs be granted exemption under the NUAA so that tenants could live there without fear of being forced into state locations.

Even with different types of exemptions the Johannesburg City Council was still losing ground in its battle to segregate Johannesburg. Things were difficult enough for the local authority with Africans successfully evading the law. Once the organised campaign of the slumlords began to draw support from the courts, it became clear that the Council would also lose the war. A campaign to amend the NUAA was then initiated. Mustering the joint forces of the Parks and Estates
Committee, the Public Health Committee, and the new Johannesburg Native Affairs Department, a Johannesburg Council delegation joined a similar grouping from Cape Town, and set off to interview Hertzog who was then Minister of Native Affairs. History relates that the delegation and the subsequent lobby established among local authority officials were successful in their bid to amend the 1923 Act. Yet the attention devoted to the NUAA amendments which created increasingly restrictive clauses on influx control, especially for women, has eclipsed the fact that local authorities gained a subsidiary concession. What they sought, and won, was the right to licence premises for occupation by a specified number of Africans in areas that had been proclaimed under the NUAA as white suburbs. Africans removed from private rental accommodation were thus forced to become municipal tenants or tenants of their employers.

The Johannesburg Council was not providing public housing in satisfactory quantity or quality, and so it made extensive use of the licensing provisions as a means of proceeding with its segregationist objectives. Under the licensing system it was able to extend its control not only over which Africans were allowed to remain within the city, but over which employer landlords could continue to exist. The City Council was moreover in a position to institute minimum building standards for Africans outside the locations at other peoples’ expense. This meant that the principle of supplying accommodation of a high enough standard to sustain a stable workforce could be achieved by licensing employers, rather than removing slums and constructing public housing. The report of the infant municipal Native Affairs Department, which took over the administration of the NUAA from the Health Department, was clear on the benefit of improved urban housing for Africans:

Some people still cannot understand that servants who are requested to live in squalid, uncomfortable premises, more often than not vermin infested, and to sleep on earth or concrete floors or a sheet of corrugated iron, without facilities for keeping themselves clean, cannot be fit to give the maximum output of work. The old idea that any place was fit for a native to live in, is fortunately rapidly changing and these Regulations (NUAA licences) are helping in this respect.

Nowhere was the advantage of the licensing system to the Johannesburg Council more obvious than in the difficult removal of Denver South, otherwise known as Prospect township.
The Nourse Mine, troubled by the proximity of slum-based brewing, prostitution, and crime, had long campaigned for the removal of Africans from Denver South. Like the municipality, the mine's desire for sanitised control of the residential environment was thwarted by the hold on proclamations under the NUAA following the 1927 ruling against the state. The district had half-a-dozen respectable family homes, but was predominantly comprised of white miner's cottages that had since been turned over to rooms or yards. In addition there were two official compounds in the area and several buildings that were constructed specifically as compounds for African workers (Fig. 8.4).

![Figure 8.4: Denver South (Prospect) slums.](image)

From the outset, Ballenden intended to use licensing provisions to upgrade the Denver slum. At the time of the proclamation of Denver, there were only 350 location houses and 650 compound beds available for rehousing. An acknowledged under-count in the NUAA census estimated the affected Africans at 1,681. The Municipality had a contingency plan for dealing with the predicted under-count of Denver slum dwellers. It was decided that should any of the more acceptable landlords not wish to apply for a £1 licence to house Africans, their workers would not be forced into locations. Instead, Africans would be permitted to move within the proclaimed area to other
licenced properties. Denver and surrounding areas were duly proclaimed and the inhabitants removed (Fig. 8.5).

Figure 8.5: Removals under the NUAA at Denver South (Prospect).

Once the proclamation notice had expired, Denver South landlords ceased to evict their tenants or to apply for licences, apparently in the hope that they could arrange to have the entire proclamation overturned. Faced with no real change in the position they had long abhorred, the Nourse Mine management reiterated its complaint against "the notorious and objectionable state of affairs in Denver township" which it said undermined the "efficiency and discipline" of the company's African labour force. For once the City Council believed itself to be on firm legal ground and, prompted by the Mine's complaint, instituted proceedings against landlord contravention of the NUAA proclamation of Denver South. Although the Johannesburg Council had every intention of maintaining an African presence in the area, it nevertheless sought ejection of all the tenants who were described by a City Council employee as vagrants, liquor dealers and prostitutes. Mindful of the segregationist intention of the NUAA, the City officials decided, however, that Denver South could never again become a white residential area. The Council justified African occupation in an area adjacent to the populous white suburbs of Malvern and Belgravia because Denver South constituted "a well defined quarter separated from them by the
Railway line, a row of factories and the Main Reef Road’. After much negotiation behind the scenes between the Council and the landlords, selected premises in Denver were once-again licensed for occupation by ‘respectable tenants’.  

In Denver South, licensing arguably improved conditions in the industrial compounds. In the case of Sophiatown, however, where families rented rooms, licensing meant something quite different. Proclamation of the area under the NUAA was made possible only because the City Council had the option of licensing rather than rehousing the 30 000 people. Proclamation confirmed the long-held fear that segregationist clearances would eventually be extended to the last refuge of private African rental. By 1934 the entire municipal district, including the Western Areas, but omitting Alexandra, was brought under the NUAA. Segregation was far from being realised, but significant strides had been made in controlling the situation and tenure of urban African accommodation. It would be left to the Slums Act passed in the same year, 1934, to clear the inner-city of slums, and to clear the slums of Africans. The final chapter in the segregation of inter-war Johannesburg was about to commence.

Notes

1 Using the estimated illegal African population plus the number of applications received from Africans wanting to enter Johannesburg to work. CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘Johannesburg Census’; see also Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Native Affairs when the MOHs’ estimate of 12 000 was cited, S.C. 3-1923, p. 10.

2 Minute of the Mayor: Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, for the year ended June 1932, Johannesburg, 1933.


5 Compiled from CAD GNLB 405 56/ 1/2, ‘Ex Parte: Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare Ratepayers’ Associations, Memorandum re. Native Urban Areas Act’; Minute of the Mayor: Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, for the year ended June 1932, Johannesburg, 1933; CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘Johannesburg Census’, 1921 updated to 1923.
CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘Johannesburg Census’.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, the MOH ordered this census on 22 November 1923 in anticipation of the Act; Superintendent of Locations to MOH, 8 October 1923; MOH to Director of Native Labour, 12 February 1924.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Director, Native Labour to MOH, 16 February 1924; Secretary, Native Affairs to Johannesburg Joint Council, 14 August 1924.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, List of Inspectors supplied to Deputy Commissioner of Police by Director of Native Labour, 2 April 1925.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Specimen copy sent to Chief Pass Officer with instructions from MOH, 14 March 1925.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Deputy Commissioner of Witwatersrand Division to District Commandant, 10 June 1925; Acting MOH to the Chief Native Commissioner, 30 November 1925.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘List of Instructions issued by the MOH for the segregation of natives in locations’, 10 January 1925; CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 25 June 1925.

This ruling was overturned in 1927 making previous proclamations ultra vires. See Minute of the Mayor, Minutes of the City Council, 15 February 1927, p. 50. Eales, K. A. ‘Gender politics and the administration of African women in Johannesburg, 1903-1939’, Unpublished M. A., University of the Witwatersrand, 1991.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Secretary for Native Affairs to Director of Native Labour, 25 October 1924; CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Chief Native Commissioner to Acting MOH, 6 August 1925; Acting MOH to Acting Superintendent of Locations, 11 August 1925.

CAD GNLB 402 56/11/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 2 June 1925; Rand Daily Mail, 13/01/1927.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘Natives (Urban Areas) Act 1923: Report by MOH to Parks and Estates Committee on results of application to Doornfontein Area, and on necessity for accommodation for single women’, 16 March 1925.


Eales, K. A., ‘Gender politics and the administration of African women in Johannesburg’.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Town Clerk: ‘Martindale and Sophiatown Application’, 10 March 1925.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 13 March 1925; 7 April 1925; CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 11 June 1925; CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.1.13, Secretary of Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives to Town Clerk, 8 March 1933; Town Clerk to Secretary of Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, 15 March 1933.
2 CAD GNLB 284 52/18/72, Senior Inspector, South African Police to Chief Native Commissioner, 18 October 1927.

3 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 17 March 1925.

4 Compiled from GNLB, 285 52/18/72; 405 56/1/2; 402 56/1/2 CPSA, Ad 1433 Cj 2.1.13; Government Gazette, 18/02/1927; IAD JGE 108, A1620.


6 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Town Clerk re: Malay Location, 2 February 1925; Superintendent of Locations to the Director of Native Labour, 16 March 1925; Rand Daily Mail, 08/01/1925.


8 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Private Secretary to Minister of Native Affairs, 20 March 1925.

9 CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Acting MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, listing delimited areas, 14 1925.

10 CAD GNLB 402 56/1/2, Rand Mines Secretary to Director of Native Affairs, 4 February 1927; MOH to Director of Native Labour, 11 August 1928; IAD JGE 108, A1620, Extract of Minutes of Native Affairs, 9 January 1929.

11 CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Acting MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 11 March 1926.

12 IAD JGE 108, A1620, Extract of Minutes of Native Affairs Committee, 9 January 1929; CAD GNLB 402 56/1/2, Director of Native Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 February 1929.


14 CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 19 September 1928; 23 October 1928; Director of Native Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 4 October 1928; Director of Native Labour to MOH, 11 October 1928.

15 IAD JGE 108 A1620, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 31 October 1928.

16 IAD JGE 108 A1620, Director of Native Labour to MOH, 1 December 1928.

17 CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 12 December 1928.

Minute of the Mayor: Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, for the year ended June 1929, Johannesburg, 1929.

CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, ‘List of instructions issued by the MOH for the segregation of natives in locations’, 10 January 1925; IAD JGE 108 A1620, Director of Native Labour to Secretary of Native Affairs, 20 May 1927.


CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Director of Native Labour to Chief Native Commissioner, 28 May 1925; CAD GNLB 351, 223/23/110, MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 12 May 1925; Rex versus Abelman, compare CAD JUS 585, ‘Native Criminals in Johannesburg’, Johannesburg, 9 January 1932.

Abantho-Batho, 01/05/1930.

IAD JGE 108 A1620, Director of Native Labour to Secretary of Native Affairs, 20 May 1927.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Director of Native Labour to MOH, 9 July 1925; IAD JGE 108 A1620, MOH to Manager, Native Affairs Department, 30 November 1928; Statement by Ballenden, Municipal Native Affairs Manager at interview with Minister Native of Affairs re: amending NUAA, 2 November 1927.


CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Director of Native Labour to Chief Native Commissioner, 28 May 1925; MOH to Director of Native Labour, 2 June 1925; Superintendent of Locations to Chief Native Commissioner, 17 November 1925.

See various lists issued by Superintendent of Locations in CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2.

Locations, as Mabin has commented, were the places allocated to African settlement, townships were the public housing schemes. Despite the different housing delivery process the terms have tended to be conflated, not least because townships had Location supervisors. CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Native Tenants Vigilance League to Director of Native Labour, 6 October 1927; CPSA AD 1433 Cj 2.6, ‘Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, NUAA Amendment Bill’, no date.

CPSA AD 1433, Cooke giving evidence on Native Family budgets to the NEC, 1930.

African Leader, 04/02/1933.

This was the cause of riots in Potchefstroom and Germiston. See Wells, J., 'The day the town stood still: women in resistance in Potchefstroom', in Bozzoli, B. (ed.), Town and Countryside in the Transvaal, Johannesburg, 1987, pp. 269-307.

The Star, 18/03/1929.

Abantho-Batho 13/04/1931; see a similar report in African Leader, 04/02/1933.

See complaints about rent defaulters getting records, e.g. Rand Daily Mail, 23/08/26.

CAD GN 402 56/1/2, 'Rex versus Abelman'.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Senior Inspector, South African Police to Deputy Commissioner, 1 March 1927.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour 2 June 1925.

Native Criminals in Johannesburg, 9 January 1932; IAD JGE 108 A1620, at Interview with Minister Native affairs re: amending NUAAs, 2 November 1927.

CAD GNLB 492 56/1/2, Application by Chatowitz for permission to harbour natives in the proclaimed area of Johannesburg, 12 September 1930.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, MOH to Magistrate Lawrence, 4 August 1925; MOH to Director of Native Labour, 29 July 1925.

A full account of slumlord action is provided in Bales, K. A., 'Gender politics and the administration of African women in Johannesburg'.


IAD JGE 108 A1620, Ballenden's address to Native Affairs Conference, 'NUAA as it affects health conditions in Johannesburg', no date.

NAD 3/DBN 4/1/2/75, Minutes of Conference of Managers and Superintendents of South African Municipal Native Affairs, 9-11 November, Johannesburg. IAD JGE 108 A1620, MOH to Manager, Native Affairs Department, 30 November 1928; 'Statement by Ballenden, Manager, Municipal Native Affairs, at Interview with Minister of Native affairs re amending NUAAs', 2 November 1927.

Additional Johannesburg proclamations of interest include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PROC No.</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>of July 1924</td>
<td>301 Rex vs Mateti</td>
<td>For Mateti: dates specified were insufficiently specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>166 Rex vs Scotch</td>
<td>For Scotch because date of proclamation did not specify a valid date (notice was dated 25 November, but was only posted on 12 December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>42 Hodos vs Rex</td>
<td>For Hodos because the proclamation should not have been issued as there was insufficient accommodation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Rex vs Simelane</td>
<td>For Rex, Sophiatown’s proclamation upheld</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details of these cases that did not reach the higher courts can be found in: IAD JGE 108, A1620, Transcript of Supreme Court Judgement against Hodge and Jojobay (sic), 24 October 1927; Transcript of Supreme Court Judgement against Zoek, 24 October 1927; CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2; Ex Parte; Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare Ratepayers’ Associations, Memorandum re: Native Urban Areas Act; The Star 11/12/1925; 28/01/1927.

1 See applications and correspondence in CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72.
2 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Report by MOH to Public Health Committee, 18 February 1925; Segregation of Natives in Locations Etc., 10 January 1925.
3 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Report by MOH to Public Health Committee, 18 February 1925.
4 IAD JGE 108 A1620, MOH to the Secretary, Master Builder’s Association, 23 January 1929.
5 See extensive correspondence between Premier Milling and the Department of Native Labour and the MOH, CAD GNLB 352 223/23/110.
6 IAD JGE 108 A1620, MOH to Town Clerk, 18 February 1928.
7 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Report by MOH to Public Health Committee, 18 February 1925; CAD GNLB 402 56/1/2, MOH to Director of Native Labour, 23 October 1928; IAD JGE 108 A1620, Transcript of Minutes of Native Affairs Committee, 9 January 1929.
8 Compiled from list of names and addresses, in CAD GNLB 352 223/23/110, Secretary of Premier Milling to Inspector of Native Affairs, 21 October 1926.
9 CAD GNLB 284 52/18/72, Circular from MOH re application of NUAA, 23 November 1925.
10 Municipal Magazine, 28 February p. 22.
11 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, MOH to Chief Native Commissioner, 20 March 1925.
12 CAD GNLB 285 52/18/72, Chief Native Commissioner to MOH, 21 March 1925; CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Director of Native Labour to MOH, 28 January 1926.
IAD JGE 108 A1620, 'Statement by Ballenden, Manager Municipal Native Affairs at Interview with Minister Native affairs re amending NUAA', 2 November 1927.


CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Native Tenants Vigilance League to Manager of Municipal Native Affairs Department, 15 October 1927.

CAD GNLB 284 52/18/72, Unsigned letter to Town Clerk, 3 February 1926.

CAD GNLB 402 56/11/2, Msimang to Chief Native Commissioner, 14 October 1930; Town Clerk to Sophiatown and Martindale Ratepayers' Association, 14 October 1931; Msimang to Chief Native Commissioner, 14 October 1931.

IAD JGE 108 A1620, 'Special Report on interview with Minister Native affairs re amending NUAA', 2 November 1927.


CAD GNLB 403 65/1/1, Chief Native Commissioner to Manager, Municipal Native Affairs Department, 8 November 1930.

Minutes of the Mayor, Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, for the year ended June 1932, Johannesburg, 1933.

Ibid., p. 9.

See correspondence dating from 1927 in CAD, GNLB 405/56/12.

Pearson and Kallaway Photographic Collection, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

CAD GNLB 402 56/11/2, Chief Native Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 15 July 1932; This census was known to be an undercount: Ballenden to Chief Native Commissioner, 26 March 1931.

Pearson and Kallaway Photographic Collection, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

CAD GNLB 402 56/11/2, Rand Mines to Director of Native Labour, 22 January 1932; Chief Native Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 15 July 1932; 'Rex vs Abelman'.

CAD GNLB 405 56/1/2, Ex Parte: Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare Ratepayers' Associations, Memorandum re: Native Urban Areas Act; Rand Daily Mail, 06/11/1934.
CHAPTER NINE

SLUM CLEARANCES IN JOHANNESBURG

By 1934, the year of the Slums Act, the African presence in the slums of ‘white Johannesburg’ had diminished, but had not been eradicated. After a decade of enforcing the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the number of Africans soared in non-proclaimed parts of the city and in areas where licences were liberally issued. People consistently preferred renting congested private rooms to living under municipal control at Western and Eastern Townships and even the new Orlando location, where hundreds of houses stood vacant until as late as 1939. In addition to pockets of industrial land condoned for African occupation under local authority licence, there were other concentrations of private rental. Despite the climate of racial segregation, black people continued to congregate in the traditional slum areas in the inner-city.

It would be false to assume that the NUAA had successfully forced all Africans into locations or licensed accommodation. In addition to their entrenched position as slum tenants, a growing number of Africans resided as domestic servants on white suburban properties. Municipal complaints of families living in servants’ quarters suggest that, while the number of Africans renting accommodation in the ‘white city’ may have declined in the late 1920s, the absolute numbers of black people in the proclaimed urban area remained high. The presence of illegal Africans in proclaimed Johannesburg persisted, but it was other blacks, and whites, who assumed a more prominent profile in the slums in the 1930s (Fig. 9.1). The changing racial profile of slum occupants meant that the slum problem and the urban African ‘problem’ could no longer be equated. Because it was aimed exclusively at Africans, the NUAA was no longer accepted as an adequate tool for managing the residential arrangements of the urban poor. Alternative enabling legislation for segregating urban areas was sought in the Slums Act of 1934. Although the initial motivation for the Slums Act came from Cape Town, the Johannesburg City Council lost no time enforcing the law in their own jurisdiction where large concentrations of slum properties existed.
From the 1930s the complexion of the slum population changed for reasons other than the removal of Africans under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. The growth of a poor white problem increased the number of voters living in abject slum conditions so much that the Johannesburg City Council and the central state sought new methods of addressing the real problem of the housing shortage and the perceived problem of racial mixing. By altering the way slums were depicted in public forums, the focus of urban planning expanded beyond building African locations to facilitating urban welfare programmes that excluded Indians and made only the most basic provision for coloureds. The launch of the Slums Act and the introduction of additional housing assistance for whites were measures designed specifically to ensure the social and geographical isolation of whites from the black slum population. Segregationist action under the Slums Act confirms the importance of examining the division of the city from a multi-racial perspective. Africans were affected by the Slums Act but they were not the target of this wave of planning.

The new meaning ascribed to slums only tangentially reflected the changing reality of the composition of the inner-city's poorest districts. De-emphasising the threat of the 'native menace'
was matched by near hysteria over ‘the poor white problem’, but simultaneously underrated the housing problems experienced by other minority groups. Scientific legitimacy for the panic over the conditions of whites was supplied by the Carnegie Corporation’s research which placed white workers’ shelter, employment and schooling under the spotlight. The corollary of all this attention paid to the plight of Europeans was virtual neglect of the needs of the coloured and Indian urban working class communities.

Although inner-city slums attracted many poorer coloureds who could not afford to purchase in outlying suburbs such as Albertsville or Newlands, slum housing was also populated by better-off coloured and Indian people. Aside from the advantage of its proximity, the inner-city was one of the few places available for legitimate black settlement. In Johannesburg the residential rights of the Indian and coloured population were constrained by the 1885 Gold Law which precluded the settlement of “people of colour” on mining land. A few of the downtown residential districts (e.g. the Malay Location) were exempt from the restrictions. In other slum areas of the city (e.g. Prospect) the laissez faire approach of Johannesburg Councillors to restrictions such as the Gold Law encouraged the colonisation by blacks where affordable slum accommodation was available. Even relatively affluent blacks sought out housing in districts where harassment by whites was less likely.

The manner in which the slum clearance programme of the 1930s was implemented further restricted the limited housing options of coloureds and Indians. Unlike white or African slum communities, coloureds were not offered municipal shelter until the end of the decade. Public housing for Indians was not instituted in Johannesburg until after World War Two. As a result, an increasing population was forced to scrounge shelter from an ever diminishing housing stock. The position of the coloured and Indian communities was either not considered, or was disregarded, by the Johannesburg Council in their formulation of a strategy for slum removals. The majority of the victims of the City Council’s slum clearance projects were black, while the policy and practice of clearance appears to have favoured white interest groups. The most notable beneficiaries of anti-slum action were poor whites and white industrial and commercial interests who expanded onto ground cleared of slums.
The slum policy of the Johannesburg City Council

The 1934 drive to rid the city of its slum areas was fuelled by diverse factors. An improved fiscal climate was central to the city’s commitment to the abolition of ‘urban blight’. The more favourable national economic situation spawned new industries and the expansion of existing business. This trend was most notable on the Rand where the mining and metal sectors expanded rapidly during the 1930s. As a consequence of the economic boom, additional land close to established amenities was in demand. Unfortunately, in Johannesburg this land housed thousands of the city’s poor, who rented accommodation in boarding houses, backyard rooms and private compounds. The land crisis in Johannesburg was made worse by the proximity of unused mining ground to the central city. This land was held by mining houses which refused to release the area for residential purposes despite the fact that its value as a commercial proposition was restricted by the imposition of a three-floor building limit due to fear of instability from underground mining activity. To accommodate industrial expansion, homes in Ferrelas, Marshalls, Doomfontein and other suburbs that abutted the central business area were targeted for removals.

In addition to economic pressures, political considerations influenced slum removals. Failure of the NUAA to solve the city’s slum problem heightened concern over miscegenation, particularly as the depression was associated with a tremendous increase in the number of poor whites in urban areas. Also of concern to the city fathers was the lack of official control over coloured and Indian residents. Slum legislation provided a new, and in some instances the sole method of restricting the residential location of these sections of the black community.

The municipal council of Johannesburg was favourably disposed to embarking on a major project of slum elimination in areas where there was a high concentration of coloured residence, and in areas where the licensing system initiated under the NUAA amendment of 1930 had broken down and yard culture had re-emerged. The Slums Act significantly extended municipal power by granting the right of expropriation of whole suburbs. Expropriation of both land and buildings was also allowed, facilitating non-residential redevelopment. Armed with new legislative power and fiscal, resources three methods of slum removal were open to the City Council’s slum committee.
In the first instance they could act indirectly and rezone, thus enforcing a change in land use from residential to industrial. A second approach involved direct action to evict and rehouse the displaced people. The third option was to act directly and expropriate property, evicting residents before finding an alternative non-residential use for the land.

The most cost-effective of these options was the indirect strategy of rezoning land to exclude residential use. This course was adopted in New Doomfontein. The success, and relative inexpense, of the strategy ensured its repetition in a number of suburbs close to the Central Business District. Most notable was Ferreiras, where the Government's purchase of a tract of land for the new Magistrate's Court drew the remark from the MOH that there would be no need to evict "indigent coloureds". Rather, "it would merely be a matter of time before the slums were gradually eliminated and different people ... agents and solicitors ... were attracted to the area." The second and more expensive option, but one consistent with the spirit of the anti-slum movement was to expropriate and rehouse the residents either in situ, or at some other location. The Slums Act was evoked thus in Bertrams where slum clearance accompanied and facilitated race segregation. Similar steps were taken years later at Vrededorp where alternative accommodation was offered to white slum dwellers at the South Hills housing scheme.

A third option for slum elimination was simply to expropriate the area and pay compensation to the owners whose buildings were demolished and whose tenants were evicted. This is what happened at Prospect Township (also known as Denver South). The three slums, New Doomfontein, Bertrams and Prospect were the first to be tackled by the Johannesburg Council after 1934. The experience gleaned was instructive in directing later anti-slum action. The three suburbs illustrate the divergent approaches employed to clear slum conditions and uphold the principle of race division in the city.

The segregationist impact of Slums Act prosecutions is clearly evident from the racial geography of clearances. Despite the fact that Slums Act proclamations involved a predominantly white population (Fig. 9.1), the geographical area of action corresponds with the predominantly black
suburbs. As a result of the mid-1930s clearances, formal black occupation of the inner-city shrank, leaving a smaller and more focused Indian sector to the east of the city centre (Fig. 9.2). In other words, it appears that whites were the major focus of anti-slum action, even when there were more blacks living in insanitary properties (compare Fig. 8.2 and Fig. 9.1). Black occupants were nevertheless affected by the Act, either directly because their housing or suburbs were declared slums, or because they 'voluntarily' left districts of clearance.

Reconstituting and industrial expansion in New Doornfontein

The land use of New Doornfontein had long been more mixed than residential. Light industry and wholesalers congregated in this area that lay between the mines and city. The residential population of the suburb was as dense as other city slums because of the industrial premises which incorporated many licensed compounds for workers from the area (Fig. 9.3). Many of these residents were therefore legally housed, though the actual number who found shelter far exceeded the number of licences issued under the NUA. In one case the municipal authorities claimed that 53 'boys' could be housed legitimately; but the employer argued that permission had been given for 55 permits. The number actually living on the stand was 108, suggesting that many male migrants had brought their families to town. Overcrowding in New Doornfontein was exacerbated by the practice of sub-letting. In one instance a landlord claimed to have rented to 35 people, but 145 families were found on his property. New Doornfontein did not lack people; rather, what distinguished the area was that the residential population had grown as industry grew, and the two existed cheek by jowl. Careless monitoring of the licensing system created a suburb in which 143 of the 271 properties were slums that required demolition.
Figure 9.2: Registered racial occupation of stands before and after Slums Act proclamations.
Delays in proclaiming the NUAA in New Doornfontein\textsuperscript{2,9} and the subsequent issuing of licences to house African workers meant that initial anti-slum action in 1934 affected more Africans than people of any other racial categorisation. Of the first people to be moved from Doornfontein, 90 per cent were African.\textsuperscript{31} From the 59 properties initially declared slums in New Doornfontein, 468 of those families requiring rehousing were African, 106 were coloured, 27 were Indian, and only 9 were white. Transformation of the racial character of the suburb in the following months must be attributed both to the Slums Act and the enforcement of the NUAA. The city MOH announced that in the two years following the application of the Slums Act the conditions in New Doornfontein were "at least 50 per cent better". Credit for this was attributed to the imposition of residential restrictions and the successful encouragement of new industrial development.\textsuperscript{32} The anti-slum action marked the more vigorous enforcement of licensing restrictions, made possible by the economic boom and extensive construction of housing for Africans at Orlando township.\textsuperscript{23}

The decline in the African population of New Doornfontein was viewed with great concern by the community of slumlords. Some had purchased properties with commercial development in
mind, but found slum racketeering so profitable that they had persisted in that line of business. All over Johannesburg the trend in slum areas was for coloured and Indians to move quickly into premises vacated by victims of the Natives (Urban Areas) legislation. This salvaged slum investments and guaranteed a profitable, if less dramatic, rate of return for owners. In New Doornfontein racial transposition of tenants was interrupted by the Council's decision to condemn all the wood-and-iron dwellings. Once the physical fabric of the slum yards came under attack on 'technical' rather than segregationist grounds, landlord opposition folded.

Faced with the prospect of "ruinous loss", owners of larger properties in New Doornfontein quickly organised to protect their interests. By arrangement with the Johannesburg City Council they agreed to support the conversion of their properties to commercial and industrial usage. At the same time, bigger landlords persuaded owners of less extensive property to sell to them on the grounds that even the low prices they would offer were likely to exceed the nominal value the Council would pay on expropriation. Both owners of large properties and the City Council benefited enormously by this arrangement. Landed capitalists were ensured not only the extension of their property holdings, but also the use of their land for commercial purposes. The new land use offered them a lower return than they had received on illegal slums prior to the NUAA, or on licence letting after the NUAA, but it presented a considerably more lucrative proposition than being paid out municipal valuation on expropriated land.

The Council's support for the clearance plan, which precluded the establishment of alternative housing in the area was supposedly motivated by the official recognition of the importance of rehousing occurring simultaneously with slum clearances. For the Johannesburg Council, however, lucrative rates and taxes on rezoned commercial land also promised to swell city coffers. Moreover, voluntary rezoning precluded Council payment of compensation for expropriation. A more accurate reading of the local authorities' attitude to slum rehousing is gained from the one scheme where public housing was provided for slum residents.
Slum clearance for public housing at Bertrams

The transformation of the residential suburb of Bertrams from a slum which harboured much of the city’s coloured and Indian population to a model public housing scheme for poor whites took only five years (Fig. 9.4). The Johannesburg City Council’s application of slum clearance legislation to this area which is situated only one mile east of the city centre, was a thinly disguised effort to impose residential segregation. While embracing the provisions of the Slums Act that called for rehousing slum occupants, the Council carefully selected whites only for their rehousing programme. The remainder of the suburb’s predominantly coloured population was forcibly removed and subjected to treatment so atrocious as to mock claims of humanitarian motivation for slum clearances.

Figure 9.4: Bertrams before and after slum clearance.
Insanitary conditions first developed in Bertrams as a consequence of the post-World War One municipal practice of granting residential exemption certificates to Africans,\(^3\) \(^2\) a practice that was reassumed in a different guise after the NUAA amendment of 1930.\(^3\) \(^3\) While the presence of Africans in Bertrams originated with these exemption practices, there is little doubt that, like all the other inner-city slum areas, the actual population included more than legal residents.\(^3\) \(^6\)

The slow implementation of the NUAA in Johannesburg left a large number of Africans in Bertrams undisturbed until well into the 1930s.\(^3\) \(^8\) The suburb itself was only proclaimed in 1929.\(^9\) \(^4\) Once the Act had been enforced the African population moved to the new Orlando scheme or took to the burgeoning unproclaimed suburbs of the Western Areas and Alexandra township. Slum rooms in the suburb were quickly reoccupied by coloureds.\(^3\) \(^7\) It was as a predominantly coloured slum that Bertrams came under the spotlight of the 1934 legislation when 35 properties in the suburb were declared slums. Some indication of the racial composition of the area is provided by the number of families that the Council estimated would be involved in these first slum declarations in the city. Of the 149 families, 96 (64 per cent) were coloured, 33 were white, 10 were Indian, and 10 were African.\(^3\) \(^8\)

Despite the insecurity of living in Bertrams under the NUAA and the Slums Act, the black population of the area continued to swell. When the New Doornfontein yards were cleared in 1935 the coloured population in Bertrams increased dramatically.\(^3\) \(^5\) In 1936 the Council estimated that the coloured population requiring rehousing from slums was 79 families, whereas 163 families were involved by 1936.\(^4\) \(^0\) Official figures almost certainly understated the extent of the coloured presence in Bertrams. The Bertrams Coloured and Indian Residents' Association claimed that the removal involved 500 residents.\(^4\) \(^2\)

The Maurice Freeman council housing scheme which was constructed on the Bertrams site to provide for evicted white slum dwellers, testifies to the authority's flagrant disregard for the shelter needs of blacks trapped in slum conditions. The dimensions of the accommodation shortage confronting particularly coloureds and Indians at the time of the slum clearances, is highlighted by the plight of the black population of Bertrams once slum clearance was implemented (Fig. 9.5).
THE LAST OF THE BERTRAMS SLUMS

Picture shows the last house of the Bertrams Slums in Johannesburg, which within the next 14 days will be pulled down. Four families numbering about 20 people, once lived in this house.
In 1934, all except two Bertrams properties were declared slums. Twenty acres of land were expropriated under the provisions of the Slums Act and then purchased by the Council at a cost of £127,000. Before construction of the white housing scheme could begin, however, the existing population had to be removed. Eviction notices were served on the coloured and Indian residents in September 1936, but in the absence of alternative accommodation the Council was forced to postpone the removal. A City official and the community agreed that until accommodation could be found at Prospect, tenancy at Bertrams would be extended on a weekly basis.

Agreement over the stay on removing black residents from Bertrams was brief. In apparent recognition of the uncertainty of weekly reprieves during January 1937, the Council granted a three month waiver on coloured and Indian residence in Bertrams. The Residents' Association rejected this temporary respite and responded defiantly: coloured and Indian tenants would remain in their existing homes until the Council could provide alternative housing within three or four miles of the city, regardless of the time this might take. Within days the Johannesburg authorities acted to crush all opposition to their removal project. Invoking the Slums Act that gave unlimited power to the authorities (Section 29, sub-section 2), the Council pointed out that the lack of alternative accommodation was not sufficient grounds for failing to comply with slum removal. They argued furthermore:

It cannot be denied that the residents of this area have known of the Council's intention for nearly two years and in many cases, or so it would appear, have made no effort to obtain accommodation elsewhere.

Efforts to enforce the clearance of land required for the Council's own housing scheme involved a plan whereby coloured and Indian tenants from Bertrams were provided with temporary accommodation in the area. From January 1937, coloured families of houses that were to be demolished were offered single rooms in parts of the suburb not immediately required for building purposes. The temporary nature of this accommodation was stressed, and a deadline of the end of April 1939 was imposed on continued occupancy. Although some 50 families were housed by the Council in this way, it is clear from the confidential correspondence of the Medical Officer of
Health and the City Engineer that this facility was offered reluctantly. The preferred action of the
city fathers was for the slum dwellers to relocate voluntarily to other illegal slum areas. According
to these senior city officials, the coloured population of Bertrams was pursuing a “deliberately
obstructionist” policy towards the clearance project. The advice of the officials to the threatened
population was to find shelter in Ferreiras, Doornfontein and other yards, despite the fact that the
Council were even then proposing similar slum removals in those areas.

The Johannesburg Council were wrong in supposing that the provision of temporary
accommodation and the advice of available alternative slum accommodation would persuade the
remnants of the coloured people in Bertrams to leave. In at least one instance the residents of
Kowalsky’s yard organised to resist removal in spite of conditions that were held to be even worse
than in the notorious Prospect Township. It appears that the 10 families who were tenants of
Kowalsky’s yard, and another 54 families from the rest of the suburb, refused the Council’s offer
of temporary rooms in Bertrams. The Council, it seems, turned a blind eye to the structures where
these people were living until after the end of April, although it pushed ahead with the demolition
of the stables, stores and workshops on the premises. In the end, the eviction and demolition of the
shacks at Kowalsky’s yard was implemented by Mr Kowalsky himself. By May the ground was free
for Council construction. In other parts of the suburb the Council itself enforced its May deadline
and demolished remaining buildings regardless of whether or not tenants had left the premises.
Evictions continued despite residents’ protest to the Union’s Secretary of Public Health. As the
nights grew colder with winter approaching, the City Council established a tent camp for the
coloured residents of Bertrams on vacant land abutting Prospect.

Slum expropriation in Prospect Township

Prospect Township was first dealt with as a slum in 1926 when the majority of the premises
were pronounced public nuisances under the municipal local government ordinances.
It reverted to a slum partly because the City Council refused to invest any money in infrastructure. This neglect
resulted in dirt roads, no sanitary services and inadequate drainage for a population of more than
7 000. Influx to the area following the NUAA proclamations elsewhere in the city also
precipitated infrastructural decline and chronic overcrowding. The ambiguous status of the township as a black residential area further contributed to the persistence of the slum, as owners were reluctant to invest in improvements.

Prospect was one of the few areas to escape immediate proclamation under the NUAA, and the City Council initially wished to develop it as a quasi-municipal township for Africans. It was quickly acknowledged that this would not be possible. Prospect was situated on land proclaimed for mining purposes and fell under the jurisdiction of the Gold Law. Occupation by coloureds, Indians, as well as Africans other than domestic servants, was therefore prohibited. Despite full knowledge of the restriction, the Johannesburg authorities continued to utilise Prospect to shelter black refugees from the city for a number of years. Even after the township was proclaimed under the NUAA, a system of licences exempted Prospect stand holders from the Gold Law provisions on payment of a fee of 1s per room let to Africans. A further licence fee of £1 was paid for exemption under the NUAA.

Throughout the 1930s, licensed premises at Prospect served as a dumping ground for blacks who were removed from white residential areas under either the NUAA or the Slums Act. The Council's determination to minimise costs and ensure segregation in working-class districts signalled the demise of infamous Prospect. In contrast with New Doornfontein and Bertrams, the manner in which Prospect was demolished had no echo in later removals in the city.

Prospect Township offered little by way of an industrial or commercial incentive, despite proximity to both town and the railway line. Poor drainage (because of clay soil) and the fact that not even minimal services had been established, undermined the potential of the area. The only interest in Prospect emanated from slumlords who received upwards of 35 per cent on their cheap wood-and-iron shack investments. These owners were keen to continue the rental relationship that guaranteed profits equal to and, in some instances, better than those accruing to slumlords of even New York's worst buildings, where 35 per cent returns were also recorded. In an effort to maintain Prospect as their milch-cow, the slumlords agreed to abide by changes the MOH required
of them. They went even further to propose a scheme of co-operation between owners and the Council.

The Council had no intention of allowing Prospect to persist indefinitely. Proclamation of the township under the NUAA in 1933, and the introduction of a monthly licensing system, fuelled rumours that the area was about to be expropriated. Even before this date the status of the land was unclear. Numerous requests from landowners asked the Council to make plain its intentions. Events which suggest the Council had always seen the possibility of expropriation included the refusal in early 1935 to licence the premises of a new block of flats built specifically for Africans, and the rejection of all new licence applications for exemption from the NUAA.

Midway through 1935, 20 stand owners were brought before the Slum Court. Prospect was only the third area to be dealt with by the Johannesburg City Council under the Slums Act. As in the other slum declarations in the city, owners of slum properties challenged the decision of the Council. The appeal by the Prospect slumlords was strengthened by the fact that not all members of the Slum Board felt it wise to expropriate Prospect. The Manager of the Native Affairs Department was most prominent in his denunciations. Property owners felt their case should be upheld as, until the time of the hearing (and in fact after the decision to expropriate was taken), the Council itself continued to utilise the slum quarters at Prospect as a dumping ground for housing victims of the NUAA. These factors notwithstanding, the suburb was declared a slum and the legality of demolition and expropriation was upheld.

There were three reasons for pressing ahead with the expropriation of Prospect properties. First, officials justified the action because of the importance of removing an area that over the years had undeniably been a menace to the Public Health and Police departments. Second, by 1938 when Prospect was cleared, a large proportion of completed houses at Orlando were available for occupation; the role which Prospect had served as a half-way house in the segregation process was no longer required. Finally, an alternative function for the land was found. In 1937 Prospect was sold to the South African Railways for use as a goods yard. In a happy coincidence for the
municipal powers, the Prospect site was close to South Hills, the area allocated for the largest white public housing development in Johannesburg. The proximity of Prospect (which became the new Kazerne goods yard where many of the poorest whites worked) to the proposed public housing development also provided the justification for the subsequent Council clearance of the all-white slum of Vrededorp.  

Conclusion

The slum removals in New Doornfontein, Bertrams and Prospect established the modus operandi of segregationist removals that remained unchallenged until apartheid. Details changed, but basic approaches adopted in the first anti-slum projects embarked upon by the Johannesburg City Council under the Slums Act set the pattern for later removals. Although the Slums Act was never again directly used in a clearance scheme (such as Bertrams), the apartheid removals of Sophiatown in the 1950s, Albertville in the 1960s, and Vrededorp in the 1970s carried the impress of the Bertrams experience.

The slum clearance projects of the Johannesburg City Council had three objectives: to ensure industrial expansion, to guarantee the removal of any menace to public health, and to enforce residential segregation. The impact of the anti-slum action was uneven. Industrial expansion meant that many slums gave way to the factories and office buildings of the contemporary skyline of Johannesburg. Slum clearances were less effective in improving public health or entrenching racial segregation. Unsanitary conditions were not abolished in Johannesburg. The slum problem grew, both within the city and in the black townships. Conditions in some sections even deteriorated as the refugees of slum clearances crowded together. In addition a rapidly rising population placed further pressure on the stressed working-class housing facilities.

Racial residential reconstruction of the South African city occurred as a consequence of specifically racist legislation such as the NUAA, but was extended under the guise of reformist measures like the Slums Act. Especially in the 1930s, slum legislation, which never overtly embraced race restriction, was a critical instrument of urban partition.
The relocation of the slum population of Johannesburg demonstrates that the process by which the state sought to clear slums was not monolithic. Empowered by new provisions of the 1934 Slums Act, the local authority implemented its anti-slum campaign in diverse ways. In all approaches, however, the objectives of the Johannesburg authorities remained to enforce residential segregation, clear land for business and industrial developments, and solve the 'public health problem'.

Notes

2 Minute of the Mayor. Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1936, Johannesburg, 1936.
3 Hansard, 1949, col. 6574.
4 Compiled from CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box File A 8652, Meeting of the Departmental Committee of the Town Clerk, 14 April 1934. In the survey used to compile this map the Council excluded the area known as the Malay Location where, in 1936, as many as 1849 Indians lived.
11 CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box 4574 A, Special Report of the MOH to the Special Committee on slums and housing, 13 February 1934.
In 1934 the number of exemption licences issued for Johannesburg was 38,414, a further 43,000 people were assumed to be living illegally in white suburbs.

Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the year ending 31 June 1934, Johannesburg, 1934.

Joint Report by the City Engineer and the Acting MOH to the Public Health Committee, 25 February 1937.

Draft of special report by MOH and City Engineer to the Public Health Committee on slum clearance in Bertrams, 22 March 1937.

Rand Daily Mail, 30/11/1935.

Rand Daily Mail, 11/06/1935.
CoJ CHDA Unsorted Box, File A 9528, Special Joint report of the City Engineer, MOH, Manager Non European Housing and Native Administration Department on temporary housing accommodation for non-Europeans displaced from the area expropriated by the council for a sub-economic housing scheme for Europeans in Bertrams, 21 May 1937.

Rand Daily Mail, 30/11/1935.

Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Native Affairs Department, for the year ending 30 June 1933, Johannesburg, 1933.

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Rand Daily Mail, 15/06/1935; The Star, 18/06/1935.

Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 July 1936, Johannesburg, 1936; Rand Daily Mail, 5/3/1935.

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Rand Daily Mail, 19/06/1935.

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Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1936, Johannesburg, 1936.

Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Medical Officer of Health for the year ending 31 June 1936, Johannesburg, 1936.

Minute of the Mayor, Report of the Director of the Native Affairs Department for the year ending 31 June 1936, Johannesburg, 1936.

PART IV

CONCLUSION

In the early twentieth century, the intellectual climate of eugenics and of professional planning encouraged the emergence of racially divided cities, especially in colonial contexts. In South Africa racial segregation became legally entrenched because of the society's particular configuration of race and class relations. Intra-urban segregation was achieved by the destruction of racially-integrated slums and the construction of separate public housing facilities for blacks and whites. The legislative framework for urban residential segregation was not conceived or implemented over-night. Distinct phases of racial urban planning can be detected within the broadly defined segregationist years between Union in 1910 and the start of World War Two. Similarly, the state responded differently to the uneven conditions of slums. The major temporal and geographical patterns of development and clearance in Johannesburg provide a platform for critical reflection on the causes of racial segregation, and for identifying the forces or interest groups who motivated for intra-urban segregation.

Periodising segregationist urban policy

Industrial development in South Africa brought with it slums. Urban poverty was particularly acute on the Rand where the environment built around mining provided an inhospitable residential infrastructure for the growing industrial and manufacturing workforce. The scale of urban settlement on the Witwatersrand underscored the evolution of national policy to deal with urban problems. The first coherent national planning strategies addressed the conditions of poor whites who dominated the cities. In contrast to the formalisation of planning standards for colonialists in the 1910s, African urban housing policy was rudimentary and ad hoc, with the state disregarding the scale and permanence of African urbanisation. The second phase of urban policy, which corresponds roughly with the third decade of the twentieth century, tackled the question of permanent settlement of Africans in towns. In the 1930s a third policy initiative saw the dual structure of city management consolidated with the racial revision of urban legislation and practice.
In the first decade after the political unification of South Africa there was a conscious effort by English-speaking professionals involved in city government to emulate British planning developments aimed at regulating urbanisation and preventing and clearing slums. Local authorities gradually acquired powers to prevent overcrowding on site, partially as the result of the efforts of the Johannesburg Medical Officer of Health. At city level, specifications were promulgated for the hygienic maintenance of the boarding houses patronised by poor whites. More systematic regulation of public health followed extensive consultation with municipal representatives and culminated in the Public Health Act of 1919. Anti-slum action rather than policy was initiated by religious and philanthropic organisations concerned to protect the moral status of young white female migrants. Working within the supportive infrastructure created by the state, private subsidised hostels for white women were the first visible form of welfare assistance to the urban poor. Central government paid lip-service to other white welfare demands by establishing funding guidelines, but only very limited hard cash was forthcoming for family housing.

The structure of early public health and housing legislation ignored urban Africans. Instead, Africans in cities were treated as migrants, unless they were part of the tiny educated and affluent elite; in that case honorary white status was conferred, and they claimed normal rights of land ownership and the vote. The omission of Africans from the 1919 law defining the parameters of urban health reflected the colonial assumption that cities were, with only minor exceptions, white territory. Ironically, by only planning for whites and ignoring the mushrooming black population settling in towns, conditions for the proliferation of slums were confirmed. Insofar as the state acknowledged the need for African shelter in the 1910s, minimal accommodation in compounds and segregated townships located at the urban periphery was provided for those Africans who could prove their employment. Irregular local authority supervision, rapid urbanisation, a housing shortage and African preference for inner-city shelter contributed to the disregard of the permit system and the dramatic rise of private rental among the black urban poor in the 1910s and into the 1920s. The demographic profile of cities, including Johannesburg, continued to be predominantly white, but slums could no longer be depicted as a white problem.
After World War One and the influenza epidemic of 1918, official focus shifted from the 'white' to the 'black' slum. The resolution of the urban 'native' problem was uppermost on both local and central state agendas. The formulation of African urban policy was partly an official response to the wider definition of African citizenship in South Africa. Having instituted segregated Reserves under the 1913 Land Act, complementary urban legislation was sought by local and national government. Yet there were additional, specifically urban events that influenced the evolution of African urban policy in the 20s. Foremost among the factors dictating the format of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act was political and racist posed to state security and white business prosperity by the growth of racial slums.

In Johannesburg there was little substantive physical difference between the yards where the municipality gave permission for Africans to live, and the cheap accommodation for private hire to people of any race. Away from the gaze of respectable society it was possible for the economically marginalised to brew and sell Kaffir beer, to hawk sex, to mobilise nascent political opposition, and give refuge to criminals and illegal migrants. In the effort to neutralise the volatile climate associated with overcrowded tin shacks, stressed sanitary facilities, and disease, the powerful reform alliance led by mining interests contrived successfully to misrepresent racially heterogeneous slums as the manifestation of the African urban crisis. The South African state's African urban policy in the 1920s had two objectives: to improve the living conditions of urban Africans by building sanitised segregated locations, and to guarantee that this did not cost too much by limiting the number of Africans entitled to urban accommodation.

The reassertion of social control necessary for economic growth in the 1920s was premised on the regular supply of sufficient, but not excessive, amounts of urban African labour. The isolation of Africans as a distinct category was achieved through the manipulation of the racial and social definition of slums. The presence and position of other black slum residents was ignored in the drive to regulate African settlement. Ironically, the formalisation of African urban policy through the passage of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act gave substance to the nascent racial categorisation of 'coloured'. By drawing a legal line between coloureds, Africans and whites, the NUAA cast the racist dye of unequal access to urban areas.
Despite the rhetoric of temporary sojournership for Africans introduced by the NUAA, it was not possible to exclude all Africans from urban labour, and so further mechanisms of differentiation were sought. By defining the terms and geographical situation of African residence in town, the bulk of the population was barred from urban access and relegated to life in the Reserves. The majority of the urban African workforce was then housed as migrants in compounds, and only a small proportion was afforded permanent urban status and allocated family housing. The death-knell of the small, influential African elite was sounded when African freehold in urban areas was revoked. The significance of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act lay both in the racial delineation of African urban rights relative to those of other races, and in the internal stratification of the African population. The social differentiation of the African population as an explicit objective of intra-urban segregation policy has been hitherto ignored. However, as this study of segregation and Johannesburg slums shows, by excluding the bulk of the African community from urban areas the state not only lightened the financial burden of township development and housing provision, but it also established a way of suppressing the volatile slum culture that undercut the established social order.

The 1920s were crucial years in the mobilisation of local authority interests in urban segregation. Charged with the implementation of national legislation, white-run municipalities collectively organised to extend their power over African urbanisation, to reduce the volume of housing they were being asked to construct, to limit the amount spent on African accommodation, and to restrict the proportion of the ‘white’ municipal budget allocated to location construction. Much as some officials may have desired it, abdication from the role of African township developer was not possible. Whereas employers were happy to house their unskilled staff in rudimentary quarters on factory sites, this presented enormous difficulties for the local authority which was ultimately responsible for overcrowding and the widespread contravention of standards of public hygiene in employer compounds.

The provision of public housing as an alternative to industrial slums was a crucial reformist objective of the NUAA, but there was vociferous opposition to white ratepayers funding location construction. From a municipal perspective, it was essential to restrict the number of Africans entering urban areas, and reduce the quality and cost of accommodation provided for African
workers. The local state was central to the segregation process not just because municipal employees applied the law, but because local authorities were a powerful lobby in drafting and refining race legislation.

Local authority action dominated the consolidation of segregationist urban policy. The 1930s brought to a head the practice of planning through race zoning. Renewed efforts to impose control over the urban poor were prompted by the growth of a poor white problem in the cities and the failure of the NUAA to either effectively segregate or adequately reform African housing conditions. For the first time poverty was understood to be a problem across the colour bar, but the state sought to solve the slum problem without fundamentally altering the framework of racial urban government. White privileges escalated, African urban rights were eroded, and racial residential segregation was entrenched.

The contradictory ideological base of African urban policy remained unresolved throughout the depression period. Conservatives and liberals, despite their differences, concurred on the advantages to be gained by tightening segregation and influx controls on Africans. Limited urban privileges were extended to select African families in segregated locations which offered a substantially higher standard of living at lower cost than slums. But constructing locations was not the only, or even the major official response to African urbanisation. Widespread rejection of the municipal monopoly on Kaffir beer proposed in the NUAA meant there was insufficient self-generated money for locations for Africans. Backed by white workers, employers and ratepayers, the local authorities therefore favoured the provision of cheaper compound housing over family units. Migrancy had unquestionable financial appeal to the white representatives in local government. The tendency toward Stallardism was reinforced when, following sustained and successful resistance to the application of the NUAA, the local authorities had the practice of licensing employers' single quarters legalised. Having failed to assume control over urban Africans by building public housing, the state accepted employer supervision over the domestic arrangements of workers in preference to private rental in yards.

The state, not without considerable opposition, managed to impose the principles of racial and social segregation in most portions of the city through the slum clearance initiative. It was, however,
remarkably unsuccessful in removing slums altogether. The 1920s deception that slums were an African problem meant that there was never any attempt to rehouse or remove other black people from the inner-city. Demand for cheap, convenient accommodation from poor whites, Indians, coloureds and illegal Africans underscored the persistence and even the expansion of slums.

The extension of state control over African urbanisation was symptomatic of greater intervention in all aspects of city development regardless of race. State protection of colonial standards through stringent enforcement of bye-laws and building codes in the white section of town gave way in the 1930s to the construction and management of subsidised public housing for the white poor living in slums. Drawing on international approaches to the control of slums, racially selective relocations and rehousing programmes became the mechanism for segregation as urban planners once again prioritised the housing needs of the white working class.

Slums, race and urban change

The descriptive literature on pre-segregation residential Johannesburg has emphasised the rich cultural and political milieu of working-class neighbourhoods. The picture of slumyards as the place where the self-employed, and the political, artistic and criminal underworlds lived happily around the courtyards of liquor queens, is less invented than one-dimensional. The term 'slum' incorporates the wide range of accommodation in which the Johannesburg poor survived. At the top end of the scale, boarding houses which offered varying degrees of cleanliness were the preserve of whites. Initially targeted at men, these rough and dangerous quarters were increasingly occupied by white women working in the factories. Whites also rented rooms in private homes of Johannesburg’s more respectable, but financially stretched working-class suburbs. There was no racial restriction on this practice of sub-letting, and blacks (especially coloureds), escaped the worst slum conditions in this way.

The backyard rows of wood-and-iron structures clustered around shared ablution, were the archetypal slums. These overcrowded concentrations of insanitary housing were run by individual landlords as private ‘yards’, semi-official compounds for the registered labourers of Johannesburg businesses, or make-shift shelters on factory premises. Industrial compounds were made illegal for
In a short period following the promulgation of the NUAA, but by 1930 the demand for African housing, and the state's inability to provide public stock, resulted in the reinstatement of licensed single quarters for African workers. Resilient Johannesburg slumlords, fed by an insatiable demand for illegal accommodation, resisted the strenuous efforts of philanthropists and local and central state officials to contain private rental of inadequate accommodation.

It is clear that there was significant variation in the form of slum accommodation available to the urban poor in Johannesburg. There were also related geographical differences in the racial composition of the population of the slums. White boarding houses were concentrated in a wedge to the north-east of the city. Africans were concentrated in the compound of employer which clustered around the industrial land between the railway line and the minipedia that runs east-west through the centre of Johannesburg. Private yards had a disproportionately high coloured occupancy, whereas the employers' yards were predominantly occupied by Africans. The most striking concentration of slums and of black residence was the Malay Location.

The social and spatial differentiation of the slums elicited diverse state responses. The anti-slum action taken by the state highlights the inter-play between conditions on the ground and the form of segregationist action. After Union the Johannesburg City Council sought to control the growth of slums by patrolling contraventions of its system of granting exemption certificates to Africans working extended or irregular hours. Policing the yards and the Malay Location was an attempt to reduce crime and curtail African urbanisation rather than enforce sanitary conditions. By contrast, the predominantly white boarding houses were subject to increasingly stringent health inspections. When philanthropic organisations made it clear that changing the sheets and sweeping the floors was insufficient protection for white women's morality and productivity, the state facilitated construction of segregated hostels by the private sector. When the regulation of the black slum population became too onerous, a policy of divide-and-rule was implemented by placing differential urban controls on Africans, coloureds and Indians.

The declining post-World War One living standard of African slum residents in Johannesburg was cause enough for municipal and philanthropic anxiety that the City Council mooted a public housing programme even before the NUAA was in place. The objective of fostering a respectable,
detrabalised' African population in Johannesburg was linked to the construction of housing for Christian families at Western Native Township. As in the case of the Malay Location, in situ slum upgrading was sometimes considered, but was always rejected when Africans were involved. The local authority strategy of prohibiting the growth of slums was formalised at national level by the NUAA which restricted the influx of Africans, repatriated ‘redundant’ people (mainly women), and provided for the building of locations for those urbanised African with families, while forcing the bulk of the urban work-force into less expensive and more regimented compounds. Cracks in the power of the state are revealed by the reintroduction of a system of exemptions under the 1930 amendment to the NUAA. Confronted by the inability of local authorities, most notably Johannesburg, to enforce the provisions of the NUAA and build locations, the state agreed to licence employer compounds in an effort to upgrade African residential conditions which had deteriorated so badly under the original permit system.

The role of the central state in the evolution of intra-urban segregation was ambiguously prescriptive and detached. Smuts' equivocation on the NUAA is suggestive of the extent to which national politics was out of touch with local tensions about how to manage slums. There is no question that there was significant pressure to impose a form of segregation that would uphold cheap migrant labour, but unlike the mines, smaller employers were unwilling to house their workforce in closed compounds. Where the laissez faire accommodation of workers on factory premises or in yards nearby produced a slum culture that could not be contained to the specifications of the ruling classes, employers supported clearance and upgrading. Rehousing the entire African workforce in family housing demanded an extended city tax base. Whereas limited permanent African urbanisation was desirable, and the abolition of slums was imperative to the satisfactory reproduction of the industrial workforce, capitalists opposed direct funding of locations. Instead, there was widespread acceptance of municipal provision of cheap and accessible single quarters for the majority of workers.

Local authorities were pivotal in the implementation of slum clearance and segregation, as the execution of racial planning legislation fell under the jurisdiction of town councils. It is, however, crucial to acknowledge the role of local authority employees in drafting and designing urban policy. Local government support for segregation had several roots. In Johannesburg, the City Council
was dominated at critical moments by the interests of the white Labour Party which opposed any investment in African advancement and which promoted welfare programmes for unskilled whites. The other major municipal constituency in Johannesburg fell broadly under the influence of white home-owners. Ratepayers' Associations reluctance to finance location development encouraged the extension of influx control and the reduction in the standard of housing offered to African workers. A third force shaping municipal attitudes to black settlement was that of the professional personnel. The impact of these appointees' ideas gleaned from the international experience of running cities was felt in Council chambers and at the influential provincial and national gatherings of municipal representatives throughout the segregationist period.

The Johannesburg Medical Officer of Health, Dr Charles Porter, was pivotal in instigating the dualist approach to planning whereby the interests of white English settlers and later Afrikaners were addressed within the broad context of colonial urban developments. African urban policy was then dealt with as a separate, independent affair. The place of minority groups, like that of 'coloured' people, emerged from the spaces left between the dominant groupings of Europeans and Africans. Whereas Porter and other municipal men did not necessarily oppose black urban settlement per se, they modified international standards for locations in order to reduce costs to white citizens and businesses. More sinister was the planners adaptation of the international practice of state intervention in working-class housing provision, for this placed a ceiling on African advancement in urban areas and imposed state control on urban African residential opportunities.

Like the leaders of the municipal movement, many of the major players in South African liberal and philanthropic circles followed closely the ideas and trends in overseas city management. Liberal whites were enormously influential in all matters of racial policy, and their concern extended to the position of Africans in towns. The large scale urbanisation of Africans was initially opposed by white liberals. Later recognition of urban permanence as a step along the path to 'civilisation' stimulated the splitting of the African population into 'tribalised' and 'detribalised' categories. Once the majority of the urban workforce was understood to be 'tribal', liberals fell back on their Victorian concerns to limit exposing rural Africans to urban evils. Colluding with conservative Stalwarts, they invoked eugenic notions of Negroid inferiority, and encouraged the establishment of segregated, supervised compounds in towns. Detached nuclear-family housing in African
townships was built on crude garden city plans for ‘detribalised natives’ at the behest of English liberals. Largely because there was no major opposition, either from Africans or white liberals, to the segregationist policies proposed by the various local state lobbies, racially separate public housing was rapidly and firmly entrenched.

Race, space and power

Drawing from the geographical and temporal pattern of slum clearances in Johannesburg it would seem that there was virtual unanimity among whites on successive government proposals that racial residential segregation form the basis of national urban policy. This consensus was less a result of compromise than the coincident interests of different constituencies. White ratepayers, workers and employers along with philanthropists, professionals and state officials agreed to selective African exclusion from towns, the separate treatment of coloured people, and affirmative action for poor whites. Segregation represented a viable urban management framework to those in power because it apparently resolved the four basic tensions of public health, race competition, labour supply and unrestrained urban expansion associated with industrialisation in South Africa.

Problems of urban sanitation were in no way unique to South African cities. Preventing the spread of disease was of paramount importance throughout the segregationist period, but there was never any crude invocation of the ‘sanitation syndrome’ widely associated with removals in colonial settlements. In industrialising Johannesburg, insanitary conditions unleashed official consternation because of reduced worker productivity and the philanthropic campaign against urban blight. Given the establishment character of opposition to slums, it is hardly surprising that white women workers and African men who formed the backbone of the industrial workforce attracted reformist attention and benefited, albeit disproportionately, from rehousing initiatives.

The organisation of the South African labour force between the world Wars depended increasingly on the enforcement of a racial hierarchy of jobs. For a racial aristocracy to have any meaning off the factory floor, parallel segmentation of residential opportunity was imposed. Job reservation and the segregation of housing were devices that protected poor whites from urban competition with blacks. Racial differentiation depended on racial classification. In practical terms
racial boundaries were drawn by the Public Health Act and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, and were refined through the rehousing programmes that followed the application of the Slums Act.

Race was not the only instrument of repression in urban South Africa. The social differentiation of the African population into rural outsider, temporary migrant or permanent urbanite was a crucial element enabling the insufficiently powerful state to impose its might on the urban landscape. When the state’s grand plan of segregating the city faltered, business interests stepped into the breach. Licensed compounds provided a temporary but critical interim measure that did not contravene the principle of state-enforced slum clearances and state-managed rehousing programmes.

The origins of urban segregation in South Africa were not monolithic. The bureaucratic correlation of national territorial segregation and urban segregation culminated in the restrictive definition of the position of Africans in towns. Racial residential segregation was built on the selective housing of urban Africans in locations and compounds. This filtered access to urban accommodation was entrenched by the political legitimation of unrestricted African settlement outside of Reserves. But intra-urban racial segmentation was also the outcome of reserving and developing superior portions of the city for the Anglo-Afrikaner community. Moreover, when the planning objectives of white privilege and black repression were found wanting, as in the case of coloured and Indians, contingency plans that did not jeopardise the overall balance of power in the city were embraced. In South Africa, white people’s power to designate space to others and to claim territory for their own exclusive use was founded on an alliance of ruling class interests around the policy of segregation.

The fact that the South African racial elite resorted to urban planning to control the urban underclass echoes developments elsewhere in the industrialising world. Social and ethnic inequality persisted under the British welfare state, and in North America the ghetto remained despite modern planning guidelines. Institutionalised racial residential segregation can be regarded as one of many outcomes of the concentration of wealth in the city, except that in South Africa inequality was an integral part of the urban design.
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