From ‘White Liberal’ to ‘Rainbow Nation’ and Beyond:

The Dynamics of Party Adaptation in a Racialised Environment

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

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Abstract

The Democratic Alliance (DA) has been the only opposition party in democratic South Africa to demonstrate consistent growth in every election since 1994. In order to achieve this growth, it has had to adapt its label from a ‘White Liberal’ party to a Rainbow Nation party in a racialised environment where race still affects voter choice. The party’s greatest challenge has been to attract black voters and this has formed a central feature of its adaptation since the late 1990s. Although the DA’s growth is well-documented in the literature on elections in South Africa, there has been little scholarly interrogation of the dynamics of the DA’s growth from a party behaviour perspective. The thesis seeks to fill this gap by providing an explanation for the DA’s growth through party behaviour theory. Using the Party Evolution Model (Lamprinakou, 2008), the thesis examines the party’s origins, its identity and its political marketing adaptation from 1994 to 2017. Beginning with the formation of the Progressive Party in 1959, the thesis follows the party’s several reoriginations which led to the formation of what is now the DA. It identifies the party’s organisational type and ideological identity and how this is beginning to shift as the party attempts to attract black voters. The adaptation of the party into a modern, diverse party occurs at the organisational and political marketing levels. Through an exploration of party communications, policies and internal documents from 1994 to 2017, the thesis argues that the DA has adapted from a policy-seeking, product-oriented party to a vote-seeking hybrid of sales- and market-orientation. The thesis explores the DA’s organisational and party label adaptation; its attempts to balance its racial markets since 1994; the realignment of politics in South Africa; and the connection between the DA’s history and its present trajectory.
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Introduction

As far as ordinary black voters go, our problem goes way back and has nothing to do with the election campaign. First, we are not particularly well known by black voters. Second, the link between racial identity, interest and party support in South Africa predates our election campaign by decades and decades. There are those who say that the reason blacks don’t vote for us is our campaign. This is rubbish. They never did in the first place. (Coetzee, 6 August 1999)

The greatest challenge for the Democratic Alliance has been to attract black voters’ support. Despite the fact that the party has been the only opposition party to achieve consistent growth at every election since 1994, its support amongst the black electorate has only begun to increase over the last decade. However, the DA’s growth should not be considered insignificant as it has been seen by the electorate and commentators as a predominantly white or minority party and operates in a highly racialised and majority black political environment. Although the party’s growth was achieved in the first decade of democracy through consolidating the minority vote, the DA has attracted increasing numbers of black voters over the last ten years and adapted into the most diverse political party in South Africa.

Despite the party’s position as the Official Opposition since 1999, it has not been treated as a major player in South African politics and critics and commentators have questioned whether it would survive or whether it had reached a ceiling of support (Booysen, 1999 2005; Habib & Schulz-Herzenberg, 2011; Jolobe, 2014). This is in part due to the fact that many analysts and the media have played into the logic of the dominant party system of the ANC whilst the DA has quietly been growing in the background to the point that it is now the leading party in governing coalitions in four of the five key metropolitan cities in South Africa, as well as maintaining its power and growing its vote in the Western Cape since 2009. I say quietly as very little scholarly and public attention has been paid to how the DA has grown since 1994.

There are three potential explanations for the DA’s growth. The first is that the DA’s current growth and electoral success are due to dissatisfaction with the ANC and the liberation movement’s inability to ‘self-correct’ under Jacob Zuma’s leadership. However, this explanation would perpetuate the dominant party system approach to South African politics as well as frame the discussion within the ANC paradigm which the research aims to avoid. The second explanation is that it has grown solely through consolidating the minority vote. Although this was true for the first decade of democracy, it does not explain its increasing percentage, albeit a small percentage, amongst black voters in recent years. The third explanation is that the DA’s growth is due to the fact that it has been able to adapt its political party behaviour successfully to the political environment and become a modern, diverse political party. Other opposition parties, and in some ways the ANC, have been
unable to do the same and so it is important to examine how the DA has achieved this adaptation.

Academic study of the DP/DA has tended to focus on the party during an election period or in the literature on opposition parties in general (Schrire 2001; Booyseen, 2005; Booyseen, 2010; Ferree, 2011; Southern 2011; Habib & Schulz Herzenberg, 2011; Jolobe, 2014). The only exception has been some work by Neil Southern, who also points to the fact that the DA has received “little direct scholarly attention” (Southern, 2011: 282). Although Southern addresses the DA’s possibility for future growth, his study also does not examine the party in terms of its organisation and political marketing as a whole. There has been little to no interrogation in the academic literature of the party’s internal processes, power dynamics, policies, communication or strategy based on party documents. The literature also tends to focus on voter behaviour towards the DA as opposed to the DA’s behaviour as a political party. A political party’s behaviour includes how it organises and is structured as well as its strategy and communications. The following work seeks to fill the gap by providing a comprehensive study of the party’s behaviour with a focus on how it has adapted to its main challenge – the racialised political environment in South Africa. This environment is defined as racialised due to the fact that voters have, for the most part, voted according to racial identity; racial discourse is still predominant in South Africa; and the two major parties in South Africa are still defined in the public discourse as being ‘for’ black South Africans (ANC) or ‘for’ white South Africans (DA). Discussion around the party’s success remains focused on how it deals with race, its racial label and its ability to shake off this ‘white’ label (Jolobe, 2009; Ferree, 2011; Munusamy 2013; McKaiser 2014; Anciano, 2016). It is an unusual concept within the political party behaviour theories for a party to have a racial label, it is more common for it to have an ethnic, class or ideological label. The research argues that the DA has adapted its label from ‘White Liberal’ to what could be called Rainbow Nation.

The thesis seeks to explore the dynamics of the DA’s adaptation since 1994. In doing so, it seeks to answer the following questions:

- How has the DA adapted its electoral strategies and party label in its efforts to achieve political success in a changing but persistently racialised environment?
- To what extent, and along what dimensions, have changes in strategy and party label in turn influenced the internal character and philosophy of the DA and its policies?

As part of this exploration, the thesis examines the DA’s racialisation and how it deals with race both internally and externally.

**The racialised political environment in South Africa**

The political environment in post-apartheid South Africa remains preoccupied with race in discourse and practice. The end of apartheid was supposed to usher in an era of non-racialism and South Africa was supposed to become the Rainbow Nation where race, racial
discrimination and racism were no longer the defining issue. Although institutionalised racism no longer exists in government policy and racial discrimination has legally been abolished, political parties, commentators and analysts in South Africa continue to talk about race and racism in relation to most issues affecting the country. Race and race thinking is ‘common sense’ for South Africans. It is not simply “the racist incident but is present in the sports pages, in speeches, in forms required by a very wide range of bureaucracies” (Maré, 2014: 33). Race has always formed part of the public discourse in South African politics. During apartheid, the political discourse of black v white overlaid the confrontation between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP). In the post-apartheid era, it similarly overlays the contest between the ANC and the DA with the liberation movement painting the DA as white. It should be noted that whilst the party has had predominantly white leaders, public representatives and members for most of its history, the party has never self-identified as a white party or as a minorities party. The discourse around the party, whether issuing from the ANC or commentators, has contributed to providing the DA with a white label.

At the political level, we see various racial projects occurring in South Africa. A racial project is the way racialisation and race ideology are played out (Omi & Winant, 2014). The current governing party, the ANC, advocates non-racialism as an ideology but is argued by critics to practice racial nationalism (MacDonald, 2006; Everatt, 2011). The official opposition, the DA, advocates non-racialism but is argued by critics to be racist and to protect white privilege (Davis, 2004; Edigheji, 2004; Ferree, 2011; Maloka, 2014; McKaiser, 2014). It is important to note the difference between a racist party and a party which uses racial mobilisation (Davis, 2004). A racist party seeks racial domination and believes its racial constituency to be superior to other races. However, racial mobilisation as a strategy does not necessarily amount to racism (Davis, 2004). Racial mobilisation is a type of racial project. The research will argue that the party has advocated a non-racial project at an ideological level but has behaved in a manner which is closer to multi-racialism through its acknowledgement of race and racialism in practise at an organisational level.

Support for political parties in South Africa continues to be linked to racial identity. The DA over the last decade is, in some ways, an anomaly in this regard as it is the only party with a significant base in all four race groups. However, South African elections continue to display features of what some commentators have termed a racial census. The various explanations for the racial census will be unpacked in the literature review but the commonality between the explanations is that race still provides an informational cue for voters as to which party

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1 Both non-racialism and multi-racialism are complex terms to define. The research uses MacDonald’s understanding of non-racialism that “it prohibits the state from seeing the race of citizens (with important exceptions for the purpose of redressing past injustices)” and that “non-racialism, as a liberal ideal, does not foreclose a politics centred informally on racial interests and identities” (MacDonald, 2006: 178). Maré defines multiracialism as “shared polity and citizenship based on individuals as members of race groups” (Maré, 2014: 137).
would best represent their interests (Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Ferree, 2011). A party’s racial label therefore plays an important role in voting choice.

The DA has traditionally been referred to and considered as a white, middle-class, English-speaking liberal democratic party. This construction has its roots in the apartheid era with its predecessors the Progressive Party (PP), Progressive Reform Party (PRP) and Progressive Federal Party (PFP). These parties were the home of South Africa’s English-speaking ‘white liberals’ and capitalist class. The DP maintained this voter base as well as this image for the first democratic election. By 1999, it had earned notoriety as the party of ‘fight back’ which soon became seen as ‘fight black’. It built its brand on ‘robust’ opposition to the ANC which added to its notoriety as this was viewed as anti-transformation and anti-black. The DA appears to be unable to shake off this party image/label despite changes in its membership and leadership. In Ferree’s work on racial census voting in SA, she argues that the ANC has played a role in positioning the DA as a white party through its discourse but this has also been done by political analysts and the media – an example of what Ferree argues is the ANC’s dominance in framing the discourse (Ferree, 2011). Members of the ANC and its alliance partners often refer to the DA as a white party despite the demographic change in its membership and leadership in the second decade of the democratic era. This has been done to maintain a perception of the official opposition as ‘white’ and therefore closely associated in the voter’s mind with the former oppressor (Ferree, 2011). In addition, black members and leaders of the party are verbally attacked for being members of the DA; they are referred to as ‘puppets’, ‘tea girls’, and ‘garden boys’ of the ‘madam’. The labels given to prominent black leaders within the DA furthers the narrative of the DA being a white party with its ‘black servants’. This kind of attack is predominantly aimed at black\(^2\) members of the DA and not at other non-white members of the party in order for the ANC to maintain its dominance with black voters. In doing so, the ANC attacks underline the argument that there is a specific racialisation and racial project at play to maintain the DA as white and not a potential political home for black ANC voters (Ferree, 2011). This is not to say that the party has not struggled with other racial groups as both the coloured and Indian vote took over ten years to consolidate. However, coloured and Indian voters only represent approximately 10% of the electorate and so black voters have been, and continue to be, the most important area of growth for the DA. Without a significant increase in the DA’s black voter base, it does not stand a realistic chance of taking government at a national level.

The external racialised environment and dominance of the ANC have also required the party to change how it behaves as an organisation. Various surveys on voter behaviour have shown that there is a lack of knowledge about the DA and a belief amongst black voters that the DA would not necessarily represent their interests or would bring back apartheid. These surveys have also shown a high percentage of independents (i.e. voters with no partisan attachment) within the black electorate who do not necessarily have an attachment to the

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\(^2\) The term black is used to refer to the black African population as opposed to the definition of black in the Employment Equity Act which incorporates the coloured, Indian and Chinese population in South Africa.
ANC but on election day might vote for the party because it represents their interests and they do not trust other opposition parties to do so (Mattes & Piombo, 2001). In order for black voters to gain trust and knowledge of the DA, the party needed to achieve two things: build a presence amongst these voters and demonstrate that the party had black public representatives. The research explores how the DA has gone about moving into the black electoral market and the adaptations which have taken place in order to achieve this.

**Tracing the DA’s Adaptation**

The DA has had to adapt its behaviour to compete in the new political system which it has found itself in. In order to understand how the DA has adapted in a racialised environment, the research draws on party behaviour theories to analyse the party’s trajectory from ‘White Liberal’ to Rainbow Nation and the post-Rainbow Nation element which appears to be emerging within the party under Mmusi Maimane’s leadership. The research looks at three of the key aspects of party behaviour: party origin, identity and political marketing. This will be closely linked to the Party Evolution Model which argues that a party’s origin and organisational identity have an impact on its political marketing and ability to adapt to its environment.

In the first democratic elections in 1994, the DP only received 1.7% of the vote and so in order to survive, it had to adapt its electoral behaviour. Previously where the party could focus on particular seats, it now needed to adapt to expand its membership and electoral appeal beyond the white English-speaking vote. Through mergers with smaller parties and eventually the NNP to become the DA, the party consolidated its minority voter base. This method worked well until the 2004 elections by which time the DA had consolidated its core supporter base. However, after 2004 it needed to break into a new market (black voters) in order to continue growing. Growing beyond the minority vote required professionalising the operation and moving from a policy-seeking party (that of opposition) to that of a vote-seeking party (alternative government). In order to do this, the DA as an organisation has had to branch out from its traditional membership base and adapt how it operates and organises. This has required restructuring internally in terms of the political and professional operation as well as changing the ‘face’ and image of the party to appeal to new markets during election periods. I will argue that the organisational adaptation has had an impact on the DA’s identity whereby the party has downplayed its ideological identity in favour of a more issue-based, message-driven identity, i.e. market-oriented.

A key issue for the party has been the racial identity of its leadership and membership base, as well as where and how it organises in terms of areas within the country. Another major factor in adapting the organisation to a vote-seeking party has been increasing its activist base. The party could no longer rely on its traditional operational approach or members to attract new voters. It had to build an activist corps in township and informal settlement areas whilst retaining a presence in its traditional support base. Activists have been key to building the DA within black townships and informal settlements and creating an
environment for the DA to have a presence in these areas and attract these votes. However, in order to build this activist base, the party has also had to attract black leaders to provide it with an opportunity to operate in those areas. Diversity, therefore, has been a central factor for the party both internally and externally. In terms of leadership, the face (leader) of the party was white for the first 21 years of democracy with Tony Leon and Helen Zille as the leaders. This only changed in 2015 with the election of Maimane as leader of the party. However, if one looks beyond just the Federal Leader, the change began in earnest in 2011/2012 with the rise of Lindiwe Mazibuko and Maimane within the party. This also had an impact on how the ANC could attack the DA. In terms of broader organisational factors such as membership and activists, the party has become extremely diverse over a short period of time. However, in more recent years, it has chosen to show a predominantly ‘black face’ at events even though the majority of the party’s electoral support and public representatives remains non-black.

Whilst the DA has remained true to its traditional roots for most of the democratic era and managed to attract a small percentage of the black vote, its behaviour has changed since 2012 in a way that signals a departure from its traditional roots. The DA has always had to balance pragmatism with principle but in more recent years, it has been placing pragmatism before principle on a more regular basis in an attempt to attract the black vote. Ideologically, it will be argued that there has been a shift from liberal principles to a pragmatism of sorts in order to grow beyond its legitimately available market. Organisationally, it has grown and with this growth, there have been fractures within its once solid organisation. This ideological and organisational shift has coincided with changes in leadership supporting the political marketing theory that leaders and an ‘informal group’ around those leaders define the party strategy (Lees-Marshment, 2014).

In terms of the DA’s label or identity, it will be shown that whilst it is no longer a white party, it is also not a black party. It will be shown that the party has aimed to be seen as a South African party which crosses the racial divide. One of the major themes which runs throughout the research is the party’s need to balance its various racial markets. For the first decade of democracy, it had to appeal to minorities’ alienation in order to grow its share of the vote but balance this with a message for all South Africans. Once the minority vote was secured, it needed to bring minority voters across to a new identity which was more open to black voters. However, the research will show that the party’s discourse, particularly that of current leader Maimane, is also beginning to shift from a focus on diversity (an inclusive identity) to a focus on being black (an exclusive identity).

Structure
The thesis is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the theoretical approach, literature review and methodology. Section two serves as a thematic background to the study and covers the first two stages of the Party Evolution Model - the origin and
identity of the DA. Section three examines the party’s adaptation at an organisational and political marketing level from 1994 to 2017.

Theoretical Approach and Literature Review
The traditional manner of examining opposition parties in post-apartheid South Africa has been to examine them from an electoral performance or voter behaviour perspective. There has been little research into the dynamics of party behaviour with regards to organisational type and political marketing. The thesis takes into account the three stages in the Party Evolution Model: origin, organisational identity, and political marketing. The thesis uses an adaptation of the Party Evolution Model to frame the discussion on the dynamics of the party’s adaptation since 1994. The Party Evolution Model argues for an integration of traditional theories of party behaviour, i.e. party types and organisation, and newer theories around political marketing. The model argues that a party’s origin and organisational identity have an effect on how a party conducts its political marketing and consists of three stages in a party’s evolution: stage I is the process of formation and institutionalisation of the party (its origin); stage II is the party’s type or organisation which provides it with its identity; and stage III is the impact which stage I and II have on the party’s political marketing.

![Figure 1: Party Evolution Model](image)

Figure 1: Party Evolution Model (Lamprinakou, 2008: 108)

Political marketing is responsible for how voters see the party. The thesis will use a combination of Wolinetz’s party types and Lees-Marshment’s model of political marketing orientation to identify the DA’s adaptation. Wolinetz argues that parties can be policy-, vote-, or office-seeking. These types are defined as follows:

A policy-seeking party is one which gives primary emphasis to pursuit of policy goals, a vote-seeking party is one whose principal aim is to maximize votes and win elections, while an office-
A vote-seeking party fits in with the catch-all and electoral-professional party types. Lees-Marshment’s model classifies parties according to their market orientation. Parties could be product-oriented, sales-oriented, or market-oriented. As will be discussed further in the theoretical approach, a party can be a mixture of party types.

The literature review focusses on a discussion of the political environment in South Africa. It examines opposition politics within the context of the dominant party system. Race also plays an important role and so it is necessary to review the literature on racial politics in the country. The focus of the literature review is on voter behaviour in South Africa and examines the literature on democracy in divided societies and racial-census voting as this provides a background to the racialised environment. Although the literature on the DA will be integrated into the research, the literature review includes a brief summary of the key arguments and gaps in the literature on the DA.

Origin
The first stage in the Party Evolution Model is the formation and institutionalisation of the party. The DA is unique within the South African political context as it has re-originated several times in order to become the organisation that it is today. This chapter (Chapter 2.1), therefore, examines the formation of the Progressive Party right through to the DA’s most recent attempt at a merger with Agang-SA in order to demonstrate the DA’s process of institutionalisation. The chapter explores the initial founding of the Progressive Party which has provided the DA with its identity as a liberal opposition party. One of the key features of the DA’s institutionalisation process has been mergers with other smaller opposition parties which has allowed the party to evolve, reorganise and survive.

Identity
A fundamental aspect of a party’s behaviour is its identity which includes the party type (how it is organised) as well as the ideological or political identity of the party which contributes to a party’s label. As the DA’s organisational structure has remained the same throughout the democratic era, the chapter (Chapter 2.2) provides a background to the structures within the party and the major role-players in the organisation over the years. The ideological identity section of the chapter examines the party’s ideological standpoint since 1994 as well as how important figures in the party have viewed liberalism as this contributes to how the party communicates the ideology to voters. Recent moves to make the DA’s political identity more inclusive have raised interesting questions about the party’s adherence to liberal precepts. This chapter provides vital background in order to understand how the DA has adapted since 1994 and why certain decisions and positions have been taken over the years.
Political Marketing since 1994
The third section examines the DA’s adaptation at the organisational and political marketing levels. It is at these levels that the party adapts its party label which makes voters less or more likely to vote for the party.

Using internal party documents, speeches and press statements since 1994, the research explores the party’s internal discussions around adaptation as well as its external communication to voters. The research will be presented chronologically to show this adaptation in the party’s strategy, organisation and messaging and how it evolves into an electoral-professional, vote-seeking party. The section covers a period that begins in 1994 and is divided into five periods:

- Consolidation – 1999-2004
- Rebranding and Revisioning – 2004-2009
- Identity Crisis – 2010-2014
- i-DA Ayisafani- 2015-2017

Each chapter focuses on a period of change leading up to a national election. The final two chapters include a discussion of local elections in order to demonstrate a strategic shift in the DA.

There are two key periods which have signified the shift in party identity at an organisational, ideological and political marketing level – 2004-2008 and 2012-2017. The first period sees the party move from policy-seeking to a combination of policy-seeking and active vote-seeking\(^3\). During this period, the party put in place certain operational systems which remain in place today. Between 2004 and 2007, the DA also began to articulate its liberal ideology in a more voter-friendly manner. The period between 2012 and 2017 sees the shift to primarily vote-seeking occur at the ideological level and in some respects at the organisational level through the promotion of young, black leaders.

Within the discussion on the party’s adaptation, the broader political context during each period will be discussed as well as the party’s reaction to this. The political marketing section will also examine the media context during certain periods as this has an impact on a party’s ability to get its message across to voters.

The party has, for the most part, maintained the same policy positions except for its continuous unpacking and repackaging of its policies and vision to make them more voter-friendly. As it does this, policy positions have become more diluted and shaped by what voters want to hear. This is typical of what is called a ‘catch-all’ or vote-seeking party.

\(^{3}\) The term ‘active vote-seeking’ is used as all parties seek votes but vote-seeking parties adapt electoral techniques and their treatment of policy discussions.
Relevant policy positions are discussed in the Identity Crisis chapter as it will be used to compare certain policies from positions which the party has taken before.

There are two key interrelated points to the argument which need to be made up front. The first is that the research has been conducted from the perspective of political party behaviour and not race relations. Although race plays a central role in the DA’s decision-making, the primary focus is on how the DA as a political party has adapted its behaviour to the racialised environment. The second point is that although the DA is believed by some to be colourblind and not concerned with race, it is actually considerably race-conscious and this has shaped many of the party’s decisions which will be explored in the thesis.

Another factor to consider when examining a party’s behaviour is the difference between perception and what the party communicates and stands for. As the literature review found little analysis of party positions and internal discussions, attention will be paid to what the party has actually said over the years as opposed to assumptions about its position based on its label and what has been reported in the media. The research, therefore, quotes extensively from party documents in order to examine exactly how the party argued its position and to place some of these documents back into the public record.

Although the research will be presented chronologically, it does not seek to provide a full history of the party since 1994 even though there is a gap in the literature for a study of this type. The primary focus is the DA’s adaptation from its position as a small, white, opposition party in 1994 to a diverse, modern political party.
Section One: Theoretical Approach, Literature Review and Methodology

1.1 Theoretical Approach: the Party Evolution Model

1.1.1. Introduction
In order to understand the DA’s political adaptation, it is necessary to consider political party behaviour as well as the racialised nature of the South African political environment. Political party behaviour involves how a party is organised and how it presents itself to the electorate through what is termed political marketing. The Party Evolution Model developed by Lamprinakou provides an useful framework for an analysis of the DA’s adaptation as it argues for an integrated approach to political party behaviour and takes into account the impact of the external environment on a party’s adaptation.

The following outlines the Party Evolution Model’s three stages which includes the literature on party origin, organisation and political marketing. This will be followed by a discussion of the literature on racial politics in South Africa with a particular focus on racial-census voting and party labels. The literature review also includes a brief discussion of the key themes found in the literature on the DA.

1.1.2 Party Evolution Model
There are two strands of theory relating to political party behaviour: party organisation, and political marketing. The party organisation literature primarily focuses on how a party is organised and intra-party relations, i.e. how the leadership and lower strata interact with each other, including identifying the type of party structure and its political identity. Political marketing examines how parties behave externally through aspects such as party strategy and communication. When examining political party behaviour, the tendency is to look at either party organisation or political marketing in isolation. The Party Evolution Model argues that in order to explain a party’s behaviour, one must look at both its organisation and its political marketing and how the former impacts on the latter. The model aims to “explain the ways in which a party’s formative characteristics and organisational structure affect the process of its ‘professionalisation’” (Lamprinakou, 2008: 107). Lamprinakou argues that in order to explain party behaviour adequately, theories on party organisation and political marketing and communications need to be integrated (Lamprinakou, 2008). She has termed this integration the Party Evolution Model. It “attempts to explain party electoral behaviour with regards to the special conditions of intra-party dynamics” (Lamprinakou, 2008: 107) and how:
elements of transformation and reorganisation that go to the level of re-branding are vital characteristics of modern political parties and these parties’ organisational evolution has to be considered in the changing environmental context of each era. (Lamprinakou, 2008: 103)

The Party Evolution Model posits three stages in a party’s development. Stage I is the formation and institutionalisation of the party or its origin (Lamprinakou, 2008). Stage II examines how the party is organised and its identity or type which stems from its origin (Lamprinakou, 2008). Stage III examines the organisation’s ability to adapt its political marketing and communication (Lamprinakou, 2008).

Stage I: Origin
Stage I of the Party Evolution Model is the formation and institutionalisation process of the party or what Panebianco calls the mark of the party’s origin (Panebianco, 1988; Lamprinakou, 2008). Within the literature on party formation and institutionalisation, there are three main models of party formation and development: electoral competition; institutional; and sociological. The electoral competition tradition argues that a party’s organisation is influenced by competition from other parties. The institutional tradition gives “much greater priority to the dynamics of how an organisation was formed and to the relations between the different elements” (Ware, 1995: 94). The sociological model looks at the resources which are available to a party.

Lamprinakou’s model uses Panebianco’s conceptualisation of party formation and institutionalisation as the basis for Stage I of the model as the “founding moment of a party constitutes the most important feature of its life and functioning as it provides the characteristics of the party’s ‘historical uniqueness’” (Lamprinakou, 2008: 108). Panebianco does not wholly agree with the internal/external theory provided by Duverger and Epstein’s electoral competition approach (Duverger, 1954; Epstein, 1967) and offers the institutional model (Panebianco, 1988). He sees parties as “a structure in motion, which evolves over time, reacting to external changes and to the changing ‘environments’ in which it functions” (Panebianco, 1988: 49). His argument is that a “party’s organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor” (Panebianco, 1988: 50). The institutional approach consists of two processes: the genetic model and institutionalisation (Panebianco, 1988). The genetic model refers to how a party is formed and consists of three main factors: territorial penetration or diffusion; the presence or absence of an external institution in the party’s formation; the presence of a charismatic leader (Ware, 1995: 98). Territorial penetration is when a central body creates local and regional bodies and territorial diffusion is when independent local elites come together to form a national body (Ware, 1995). Panebianco states that at times a ‘mixed’ form of development can take place whereby territorial diffusion occurs followed by territorial penetration (Panebianco, 1988). The second element of the genetic model is the presence or absence of an external ‘sponsor’ institution “for this affects the leadership’s source of legitimation” (Panebianco, 1988: 51). The final element is the “role of charisma in the party’s formation” (Panebianco, 1988: 52), particularly the presence of a charismatic
leader. However, Panebianco argues that this could also be “situational charisma” whereby the determinant is not:

...the leader’s messianic components...but rather a state of acute social stress that gets the people ready to perceive as extraordinarily qualified and to follow with enthusiastic loyalty a leadership offering salvation from distress (Panebianco, 1988: 52).

The final aspect of the genetic model relating to the leader is an important aspect in Panebianco’s conception of institutionalisation as the leader “spells out the ideological aims of the future party” and shapes “the organisation on the basis of these aims and this social base” (Panebianco, 1988: 53).

The second process, institutionalisation, is “the process by which an organisation incorporates its founders’ values and aims” (Panebianco, 1988: 53). This involves two processes: firstly, the development of interests related to the organisation’s preservation; and secondly the development of diffuse loyalties (Panebianco, 1988). In order to measure the level of institutionalisation within a party, Panebianco looks at the “organisation’s degree of autonomy” relative to its external environment and its degree of systemness which refers to the interdependence between the party’s internal structures (Panebianco, 1988: 55). In terms of the external environment, Panebianco argues that a highly institutionalised party exercises extensive control over its environment whereas a weak institutionalisation results in a lack of control over the environment (Panebianco, 1988). Systemness refers to the level of dependence and authority amongst sub-groups. Ware summarises it as follows:

Systemness is low when a great deal of authority is left to sub-groups within the party system; systemness is high when there is a high degree of interdependence among sub-groups that is made possible by the centre’s control of resources. (Ware, 1996: 99)

The links between the genetic model and institutionalisation are as follows:

- a party formed by territorial penetration will be highly institutionalised due to the central body controlling resources and decision-making whereas territorial diffusion leads to parties that are weak institutionally due to competition for resources amongst independent local elites;
- internally legitimated parties will be strong institutionally as they do not have the constraints of externally legitimated parties who will have weak institutionalisation due to the influence of an external body; and
- charismatic leaders tend to resist institutionalisation in their party as a threat to their own power. If institutionalisation does occur, it will develop strongly in line with the original pattern of centralised authority in the party. (Ware, 1996: 99-100)

The central point of Panebianco’s theory is that a party’s formation will continue to have an impact on its behaviour as an organisation throughout its life (Panebianco, 1988). He argues that a party’s formation will have an impact on its institutionalisation which will in turn have an impact on its ability to evolve and transform based on the degree of its
institutionalisation (Panebianco, 1988). A highly institutionalised party struggles to evolve whereas a weakly institutionalised party can be more responsive to sudden changes in its environment and be more adaptive (Panebianco, 1988). Institutionalisation is therefore one of the key variables in a party’s transformation. However, the speed of transformation is also dependent on the degree of institutionalisation before transformation occurs (Panebianco, 1988). Panebianco states that “transformation is faster the lower the degree of institutionalisation before transformation begins” (Panebianco, 1988: 265). Panebianco also argues that a party which develops in opposition and remains in opposition throughout most of its life will have a greater need for strong and solid organisation (Panebianco, 1988: 69).

Panebianco’s model looks at the structural formation of the party. However, the Party Evolution Model goes further than just the structure by:

...considering characteristics that do not fall within the strict lines of the known models. The identification of these elements is linked to the initial internal organisation and structure of the party as well as its subsequent evolution and reorganisation. (Lamprinakou, 2008: 108)

This could include the ideological founding of the party as well as its initial structure. The ideological aspect and reasoning for the formation of the DA is of importance to its further adaptation and so this will be included in the discussion around its origin.

Stage II: Party Identity
Closely related to how parties develop and evolve is the type of party. Stage II considers the type of party organisation and how it provides the party’s identity (Lamprinakou, 2008). Lamprinakou describes this stage as follows:

... [it] reflects on the relationship between internal party organisation and party behaviour vis-à-vis election periods. The ways parties are organised and function internally, including the relations among the various branches of the party – leadership, activists, members – as well as their relationship with civil society and the state, provide the characteristics that mark the identity of a party. (Lamprinakou, 2008: 108)

The Party Evolution Model argues that even though the party might adapt or evolve its type in response to the demands of the market, elements of its initial identity are retained:

Party identity is very important for the survival of a political party; even when the party develops new characteristics in order to suit the demands of the new era, its traditional roots are always the lever needed to move further. (Lamprinakou, 2008: 108)

The following are the major party ideal types4: mass, cadre, electoral-professional (Panebianco), catch-all (Kirchheimer), and cartel (Katz & Mair). The following will focus on the mass, cadre, electoral-professional and catch-all parties.

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4 They are referred to as ideal types as most of the literature acknowledges the fact that parties do not necessarily fit into one mould.
Cadre and Mass Parties

Cadre and mass parties are linked to Duverger’s concept of caucus and branch party organisation (Duverger, 1954). Cadre parties are “loosely structured, elite-centred, parties with minimal organization outside of the legislature” (Wolinetz, 2002: 140). Mass parties differ in that they have “highly developed organizations which aspire to enlist a large percentage of their voters as party members” (Wolinetz, 2002: 140).

As mentioned previously, the belief is that political parties, particularly cadre parties, have become hybrids of a caucus-branch party organisation. Koole has developed what he terms the modern cadre party. He lists the characteristics of the modern cadre party as:

- predominance of the professional leadership groups (especially the parliamentary party), but with a high degree of accountability to the lower strata in the party;
- a low member/voter ratio, although members remain important as a source of finance, as a means of recruiting candidates for political office and as the bodies who are required simply to maintain the party in working order;
- a strong and broad-ranging orientation toward voters, but with a strategy which is neither catch-all, on the one hand, nor focusing on a classe gardee on the other;
- the maintenance of the structure of a mass party (with vertical organizational ties), not only to maintain a specific image, but also to guarantee a certain degree of internal democracy; and
- the reliance for financial resources on a combination of both public subsidies and the fees and donations of members. (Koole, 1994: 299)

In Wolinetz’s criticism of the mass and cadre party types he argues that they do not include certain factors such as:

...the complexity of party organization (for example, the degree to which the party is organized on different levels), the presence or absence of multiple centres of power, factional or coalitional structure, relationship to other organizations, or the ways in which parties assemble resources, conduct election campaigns, or present themselves to the public. (Wolinetz, 2002: 145)

As the above are important factors in a political party’s behaviour, it is necessary to explore these issues when attempting to understand a political party.

Catch-all and electoral-professional

The catch-all and electoral-professional party types allow for the broader scope of understanding of political parties which Wolinetz refers to. The catch-all party type was conceptualised in response to the decline in traditional support for parties along ideological or class lines. Otto Kirchheimer argued that political parties were no longer focusing on ideology but rather “bidding for the support of interest groups, emphasizing the qualities of their leaders, and seeking support wherever it could be found” (Wolinetz, 2002: 145) in response to the political market. Panebianco reconstructed the catch-all thesis by placing
more emphasis on organisation to create the electoral-professional model (Panebianco, 1988). Electoral-professional parties have the following characteristics:

- Central role of the professionals (specialized tasks)
- Electoral party, weak vertical ties, appeal to the ‘opinion electorate’
- Pre-eminence of the public representatives, personalized leadership
- Financing through interest groups and public funds
- Stress on issues and leadership, central role of careerists and representatives within the organization (Panebianco, 1988: 264)

Both the catch-all and electoral-professional party types have become common in modern political parties. Ultimately the two types are similar but have different focus points. The catch-all theory has a stronger focus on the ideological/political identity of the party whereas the electoral-professional type refers more to the party’s organisational structure.

*Policy-, vote- and office seeking*

Wolinetz argues that the aforementioned party types have limitations and calls for a new system of analysing parties (Wolinetz, 2002). He argues that there are three types of parties - policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking:

A policy-seeking party is one which gives primary emphasis to pursuit of policy goals, a vote-seeking party is one whose principal aim is to maximize votes and win elections, while an office-seeking party is primarily interested in securing the benefits of office, getting its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc. (Wolinetz, 2002: 149-150)

Whilst providing a different framework of party types, Wolinetz still places the mass, cadre, electoral-professional etc. within this framework (Wolinetz, 2002). For example, the catch-all and electoral-professional party is considered a vote-seeking party whereas the cartel party is considered an office-seeking party (Wolinetz, 2002). The use of vote-seeking to merge catch-all and electoral-professional parties allows for a combination of the ideological and organisational identity of the party to be identified.

A policy-seeking party would have policies at the centre of its political behaviour whereas a vote-seeking party leans more towards maximising votes through issue-driving. Issues can be underpinned by an ideology but sometimes the ideology is watered down by the need for the right message to voters. The political offer to voters then is not necessarily an ideological vision but a set of issues and messages which are important to voters and would be addressed by the party

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<td>Election campaigns</td>
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<td>Prominence of policy</td>
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<td>Determination of strategy</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
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<td>Use of new electoral techniques</td>
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<td>Infrastructure to support policies (e.g. research bureaux, think-tanks, affiliated organizations)</td>
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Table 1: Policy-, vote- and office-seeking parties: operational measures (Wolinetz, 2002: 155)

However, as some argue, parties do not necessarily stick to one type and often have elements of two or more types (Wolinetz, 2002; Krouwel, 2006; Lamprinakou, 2008). Wolinetz and Krouwel both raise the point that these frameworks were developed within West European party systems and do not necessarily hold true for new democracies (Wolinetz, 2002; Krouwel, 2006). As the research is not looking at developing a framework around party types in a new democracy, it will still use the frameworks discussed above but keep in mind that these frameworks do not take into consideration other dynamics such as the racial or ethnic make-up of the organisation.

Krouwel, however, argues that party models should go beyond an analysis of the organisational structure as parties are not only about structure but have “some principle, some common goal, perspective and ideology” (Krouwel, 2006: 249). Krouwel, like
Panebianco, includes the genetic origin in his understanding of party models as well as two other factors: electoral appeal and elite recruitment; and the ideological basis and extent of party competition (Krouwel, 2006). These additional factors are of particular importance to the DA’s party type and adaptation. However, Krouwel still discusses these factors within existing party types (Krouwel, 2006). The discussion will therefore refer to the elements Krouwel identifies but not limit it to pigeonholing the DA into one type of party model. As Panebianco argues, parties evolve and adapt to the changing external environment (Panebianco, 1988) so within an historical analysis it is expected that a party could change its type.

In examining a party’s identity it is therefore important to take into account Krouwel’s argument for including the genetic origin and ideological basis within the discussion.

Stage III: Political Marketing

The Party Evolution Model’s central argument occurs at Stage III which analyses how a party’s origin and organisation/identity impacts on the party as an electoral campaign communicator (Lamprinakou, 2008). It looks at how a party adapts its behaviour as a campaign communicator, for example:

Do parties alter their behaviour to suit the demands of the ‘undecided or floating’ core of the electorate? Do they yield to the wishes of their branches? Or under the pretext of winning a general election, do party organisations consign their demands over to the leadership? (Lamprinakou, 2008: 107)

Lamprinakou limits this to election campaigns and communications but a party does not cease to exist between elections and so it is therefore necessary to look at a party’s political marketing as a whole. A more recent approach to examining party behaviour is political marketing. Although there have been authors who have previously examined the links between marketing theory and politics, theories on political marketing developed in response to the shift from old Labour to New Labour in 1996. The core reason for this was Labour’s decision to put the message ahead of key principles of its ideological position – the party’s ‘Clause IV’ moment.

Political marketing is not just about election campaigns or communications but also about the ‘product’ which is being sold or marketed to the electorate. Cwalina, Falkowski & Newman define political marketing as:

...the processes of exchanges and establishing, maintaining, and enhancing relationships among objects in the political market (politicians, political parties, voters, interests groups, institutions), whose goal is to identify and satisfy their needs and develop political leadership (Cwalina, Falkowski & Newman, 2011: 17 cited in Lees Marshment, 2014)

Political marketing provides a new way of understanding modern politics in democracies (Scammell, 1999: 719). It is not limited to election campaigns or party communication but rather deals with the overall marketing behaviour of a party (Scammell, 1999; Lees-
Marshment 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2015). In identifying what makes political marketing different from campaign or communication studies, Scammell argues the following:

The ‘marketing concept’ is the key to understanding political marketing. Without it, we are essentially still talking about a modern form of propaganda. With it, we are dealing with a transformation of political organizations and fundamental relationships between leaders, parties, members and voters. (Scammell, 1999: 726)

Lees-Marshment terms the overall marketing behaviour the political product (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Political marketing is about the “design of the political product, its relationship to market demands, and the relationship between political elites and the public” (Lees-Marshment, 2015: loc 782). Lees-Marshment argues that whilst policy forms part of the political product, it also includes the following aspects: leadership/the candidate, members of the legislature, membership or official supporters, staff, symbols, constitution/rules, and activities (Lees-Marshment, 2015: loc 597). In addition to this, there are some functional tools which play a part in political marketing such as political marketing research (PMR), strategy, organisation and communication (Lees-Marshment, 2015).

The Lees-Marshment Model
The most common model used in defining party types with regards to political marketing is the Lees-Marshment model which divides political parties according to product-, sales- and market-oriented parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2010; Lees-Marshment, 2015). Although the model has some faults, which will be discussed, it provides a simple and useful model to understand parties’ political marketing behaviour.

Product, Sales and Market Orientations
Lees-Marshment has developed a framework for empirical analysis of parties’ political marketing behaviour. This framework consists of three party types - product-, sales- and market-oriented parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2010; Lees-Marshment, 2015). The product-oriented party makes “the case for what it believes in elections without reflecting on what voters want or how they react to its product” (Lees-Marshment, 2015). Product-oriented parties are typically “without much funding for campaigning and intelligence” (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 9). The sales-oriented party also does not change its product but “it uses marketing to identify persuadable voters and design more effective communication to sell the party to them” (Lees-Marshment, 2015: loc 1160). The market-oriented party on the other hand, uses market research about what voters want in order to design their product and brand (Lees-Marshment, 2015: loc 1139):

...a Market-Oriented Party designs its behaviour to provide voter satisfaction to reach its goal. It uses market intelligence to identify voter demands, then designs a product that meets their needs and wants, which is supported and implemented by the internal organisation, and is deliverable in government. It does not attempt to change what people think, but to deliver what they need and want. (Lees-Marshment, 2015: loc 1180)

In the market-oriented party:
Political marketing is used to understand the public, rather than manipulate it. Parties may use their ideology as a means to create effective solutions to public demands, but party elites try to respond to market demand, rather than trying to influence its opinion. (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 5)

The key difference between the sales and market orientations is that the former seeks to persuade and change voters’ minds whereas the latter tries to “respond to, if not follow, voter views” (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 3).

Strömbäck provides a framework for comparing political market-orientation and the likelihood of a party becoming market-oriented (Strömbäck, 2010). To guide this framework, he posits that the following have an impact on a party’s ability to adapt: the overall political system; the electoral arena; media arena; internal arena; and the parliamentary arena (Strömbäck, 2010: 19).

The political system matters in that it affects how parties can react. It includes “whether the system is party-centred or candidate-centred, the electoral system, the number of political parties, and the political culture” (Strömbäck, 2010: 19). According to Strömbäck, parties in a proportional system, such as South Africa, would find it more difficult to differentiate themselves from their competitors (Strömbäck, 2010). He argues that proportional systems tend to have stronger socio-demographic cleavages and ideology which means that “political parties function more as channels for particular groups in society” (Strömbäck, 2010: 19). This means that it would be more common to find bonding appeals to certain groups in a proportional system and bridging appeals in a majoritarian system (Strömbäck, 2010; Norris, 2004). Furthermore, Strömbäck argues that in a proportional system it “also becomes more difficult to choose a ‘flight to the centre’ as a strategy – a strategy that would otherwise be the likely result of parties becoming market-oriented” (Strömbäck, 2010: 19). Strömbäck therefore argues that it is unlikely that parties will become market-oriented in a proportional system (Strömbäck, 2010).

An important factor is the political culture, particularly for the South African context. Strömbäck says that the degree to which “social, political and ideological cleavages structure politics” could be relevant to understanding whether political parties have the space to become market-oriented (Strömbäck, 2010: 20). Although South Africa has a proportional system, it has a political culture of a dominant-party system and racial cleavages continue to play a major role in the political culture.

Strömbäck discusses the importance of the electoral arena and how “party identification, which measures people’s psychological attachment to political parties, has also decreased sharply in many countries” (Strömbäck, 2010). However, he states this within the context of established democracies. Party identification, especially with the ANC in South Africa, has remained strong for most of the democratic era. But it is worth elaborating on Strömbäck’s point as a decrease in party identification could be the case in South Africa very soon. He says that:
...the trend of declining partisanship appears almost universal, making the ‘voter market’ less frozen and more open for competition than it used to be. When most people identify with a particular party there are few incentives for the parties to try steal voters from other parties, as the likelihood of success is low and as they might lose their own voters if deviating from their expectations. (Strömbäck, 2010: 23)

But as party identification becomes less fixed, there is a stronger incentive for parties to become market-oriented “because parties in such a situation cannot take their own voters for granted and because they might be able to win new voters” (Strömbäck, 2010: 23).

The internal arena also affects whether a party can become market-oriented. This arena includes activists, members, leaders and staff (Strömbäck, 2010). If the party type is based on mass membership then “members expect to have a decisive role in designing the political product, and significant changes need to be approved by the members gathered at party conventions” (Strömbäck, 2010: 24) and so it is less likely to become market-oriented. Lilleker and Lees-Marshment argue that parties with fewer members can more easily adapt into a market-oriented party (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005). However, there is also a “tendency for parties to try shift some power back to grass-roots, for example with regards to leadership or candidate selection, in order to legitimise the organisation as a democratic one” (Strömbäck, 2010: 25). This power shift is usually at the expense of the “middle-level elite, where the most ideologically radical members and activists reside” as opposed to the central leadership (Strömbäck, 2010: 25).

Strömbäck discusses the internal arena within the context of Wolinetz’s party types. He argues that office- or vote-seeking parties are more likely to be market-oriented than policy-seeking parties (Strömbäck, 2010). With a policy-seeking party, the internal arena is more often dominated by the ideologically radical activists (Strömbäck, 2010). If a party faces “successive electoral defeats, a re-orientation and re-positioning of the party might be acceptable even to the activists” (Strömbäck, 2010:25-26). Strömbäck links electoral defeats to the likelihood of a party becoming more market-oriented (Strömbäck, 2010). A policy- and vote-seeking hybrid would be regarded as a sales-oriented party whereas a market-oriented party is purely vote-seeking. As with the discussion on party types, a party can be either sales-oriented or market-oriented depending on the situation. Once again, this is an ideal type but provides a useful framework to identify a party’s political marketing behaviour.

Strömbäck’s final arena which he discusses is the media arena. He states that:

> the news media can have considerable power with respect to what issues people think are the most important (McCombs, 2004; Wanta and Ghanem, 2007), both in general and when evaluating political actors (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), and, through framing, how people perceive different issues, actors and organisations. (Strömbäck, 2010: 26)

The media arena in countries where the media does not form part of the party-political system (i.e. are independent of political parties and do not declare support for a particular
party), will tend to be more adversarial so as to avoid being called partisan and “frame politics as a strategic game rather than as issues” (Strömbäck, 2010: 26). Parties in such systems tend to become more market-oriented so that they speak for the citizens and cannot be accused by the media of being elitist (Strömbäck, 2010: 27). Strömbäck further argues that:

...it might be the case that parties are more likely to be market-oriented in countries with a highly commercialised and competitive media system where the news coverage tends to be adversarial...parties are also more likely to be market-oriented in countries that belong to the liberal model of media and politics. (Strömbäck, 2010: 27)

The media then also plays a role in driving parties to become more market-oriented.

Critique of political marketing literature
There are two major critiques of political marketing. The first relates to political marketing as a practice and argues that it has a negative impact on democracy. The second comes from a theoretical perspective with regards to the fact that models of political marketing, such as Lees-Mershment’s, fail to take into account the role of the media. The following will provide a brief discussion on a few main points regarding the democracy critique relevant to the research. It will also discuss the role of the media and why it is necessary to incorporate this aspect into political marketing models.

In terms of the threat to democracy, one of the major concerns is that targeting certain markets makes political parties less representative. Lees-Mershment points out that:

Political marketing may skew representation. One of the problems with using market segmentation, for example, is that it enables, and arguably encourages, politicians to target certain groups whose support they need – rather than represent the public as a whole. This renders the vote of some groups worth more than others, which goes against core democratic principles of equal rights to participate in the electoral process. (Lees-Mershment, 2014: loc 7447)

Lees-Mershment also raises the issue of micro-targeting which “can become subservient to the emphasis placed on appealing to a narrow band of the electorate that shares ideological values with a political party” (Lees-Mershment, 2015: loc 7458). A closely related aspect of the lowering of representation is that “segmentation of the market and targeting of communication are to some extent responsible for causing a division in society: those to whom politics belongs and those whom politics has abandoned” (Lilleker, 2005 cited in Lees-Mershment, 2014: loc 7458).

Critics of political marketing also argue that the role of the media requires more interrogation. Temple points out that:

The media’s influence, of course, goes far beyond its interpretation of party messages at election time. Voters’ perceptions and understanding of politics in general are also largely derived through the filters of the media...The media helps both to form and mobilise public opinion and it clearly has agenda-setting and reporting roles which constrain the approaches political
candidates and parties can take. The majority of media are predisposed towards politicians or parties expressing views that chime with their own ideological or market preferences. (Temple, 2010: 268)

The media places a limit on the marketing aspects of parties in terms of how they can get their message across. It is not as easy as in standard marketing where a company is not reliant on the media but rather paid communication. The Lees-Marshal model does not factor in the media’s impact on a party's orientation.

Features of political marketing

The research will focus on certain aspects of the DA’s political marketing over the years. The following is a discussion of some of the features one finds in the political marketing literature.

Political marketing strategy

Political strategy plays a major role in parties establishing themselves within the market. Barber defines political strategy as “being about forming objectives given resources available and carrying out a plan to achieve those objectives with a pattern of consistency over time” and so in order to understand strategy “it is necessary to understand the strategic objectives of an organisation” (Barber, 2005). Within political marketing there are various concepts and frameworks which form strategy: targeting, positioning, attack and defence, sales and market orientations (Lees-Marshal, 2015: loc 1016).

Targeting involves dividing the electorate into two broad categories: traditional voters and undecided/floating voters. These groups can be further divided into demographic groups. The political product is then targeted at those groups. Positioning is about “where parties or candidates place themselves in the marketplace in relation to the competition” (Lees-Marshal, 2015: 1079). Collins and Butler have developed a theory of market positioning which breaks down political parties into the following positions: market leader, challenger, follower and niches (Collins & Butler, 2002). So for example, if the DA were only interested in obtaining the white, English-speaking, middle-class vote then it would be considered a niche. A challenger party will have a similar product to the market leader but “needs to convey differentiation or superiority” (Lees-Marshal, 2014: loc 1090). However, “it is difficult for incumbents to reposition because they are bound by their previous behaviour and record” (Lees-Marshal, 2015: loc 1437).

Political Branding

Political branding is less about the product and more about the overall image or reputation of the party. Lees-Marshal describes the political brand as “the overarching feeling, impression, association or image the public has towards a politician, political organisation, or nation” (Lees-Marshal, 2015: loc 3274). She states that once a brand has been established it is difficult to control or change (Lees-Marshal, 2015). Scammell highlights that political marketing draws on service-related marketing (Scammell, 1999). One of the key aspects of marketing services is reputation or public image (Scammell, 1999: 728). She
argues that the political science voting model often does not take into account party image/reputation and that “image is a soft variable tangled up with emotional attachments” and “is less easily modelled than policy and issue perceptions or party identification” (Scammell, 1999: 728). This model tends to rely on party identification, issue perceptions and to a lesser extent leader evaluations (Scammell, 1999: 728). Lees-Marshalment also argues that party image/brand plays an important role in political marketing. Bartle and Griffiths argue that of all the major approaches to voting behaviour, political marketing more than any other puts image at the centre of explanations which is of particular significance when a party’s image is attached to a certain racial group and historical period such as apartheid.

Communications
Under both Scammell and Lees-Marshalment’s concepts of political marketing, communications is not treated separately but rather as a subset of political marketing (Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshalment, 2001; Lees-Marshalment, 2010; Lees-Marshalment, 2015). Lees-Marshalment separates communications into two forms: static, and relational and interactive (Lees-Marshalment, 2015). Static communication refers to communication which goes directly to the public from the party. (Lees-Marshalment, 2015) Relational and interactive communication involves interacting with the public through social media, events etc. in order to build long-term relationships (Lees-Marshalment, 2015).

In terms of how parties communicate with voters in divided societies, this is typically done through bridging and bonding strategies (Norris, 2004). Bridging strategies appeal to all voters and are more inclusive whereas bonding strategies promote the interests of a particular group and develop “tightly knit social networks and clear one-of-us boundaries” (Norris, 2004: 7).

Party Evolution Model and Adaptation
By integrating the two approaches to party behaviour, the Party Evolution Model explains how a party approaches its political marketing based on how it originated and is organised (Lamprinakou, 2008). Its initial formation and process of institutionalisation have an impact on its ability to adapt its organisation to meet the demands of the political market. It also explains limitations in terms of political marketing due to the internal and external constraints on the party. Effectively, the model argues that if a party did not have certain organisational traits and identity, it could be completely responsive to the market and adapt its political product accordingly.

In terms of party adaptation, Panebianco argues that electorates “have become more socially and culturally heterogeneous, and less controllable by parties” and that “social structural transformation...influences parties, modifying their hunting grounds and political arenas” (Panebianco, 1988: 266). This necessitates party transformation as “changes in social structure and in political communication work together to erode traditional political
sub-cultures, frozen for so long because of strong organisational settlements typical of mass bureaucratic parties (Panebianco, 1988: 266-7). This sentiment is echoed by Lamprinakou:

In a rapidly increasing consumerist environment voters behave as ‘political’ consumers and parties alter their behaviour in order to address successfully the new challenges... Party electoral behaviour is closely related to the degree of its professionalisation. But in order for parties to be able to act as communication professionals, they need to be highly adaptive. The degree of adaptation is related to the internal organisation of the party and the power structure of the various branches. (Lamprinakou, 2008: 109)

The link between the three stages is how the party’s origin and identity impact on its ability to adapt to the political market.

1.1.3. Party Evolution Model, Race and the DA

The Party Evolution Model provides a useful framework to analyse the DA’s relationship with race on various levels. Firstly, it takes into account the origin and history of the party as well as its identity. The DA originated as a white party under certain political circumstances. The external environment has changed considerably and the party has had to adapt and evolve with those changes. Secondly, it looks at how its identity has been created over time. Finally, it incorporates these factors into how the party markets itself to the electorate and the limitations or options available to the party based on its history/origin and the external environment. All of the elements contribute to providing the party with its label.

Political party behaviour theories also raise an interesting aspect to the research in that party behaviour adapts and evolves in order to either take office or increase its share in the political market. For the most part, the case studies tested by these theories have been able to succeed electorally over time in response to electoral competition and adapting their behaviour. If they have not become the governing party then they have often dissipated. If it is found that the DA is highly organised, professionalised and uses political marketing in the correct way then it should be able to win office but yet it has been unable to do this at a national level. This could indicate that the party behaviour is on the right track but its origins and organisational identity, particularly the racial elements, remain a stumbling block for the political product. The thesis will therefore discuss these stages along with a close examination of the party’s relationship with race. This also indicates that party behaviour theories over the last few years have been predominantly focussed on parties that do not need to attract voters across a racially-divided electorate. The discussions have usually related to class-based divisions or interest groups. As mature democracies become more racially diverse and traditionally minority races increase towards a majority (as is happening in certain states in the United States), then attracting supporters from across races will become a more salient issue.

Lamprinakou’s argument fails to address explicitly the role of party labels/image in how parties evolve. Image has become an important aspect of modern political parties (Scammell, 1999). Even if a party evolves, it comes with a label based on its origin and
ideological identity which provides an informational cue to voters as to whether the party would represent their interests. The image of a political party is very important in terms of voter behaviour if one adopts Ferree’s heuristic approach (Ferree, 2011). The image can be its ideological stance or about whom it represents or in the South African case, a combination of the two. The origin (identity and ideology) and racialisation of the organisation then becomes essential to the party’s ability to adapt to the environment and the market. If image is a central aspect in modern politics then it follows that the origins of the party and its identity need to be examined within the context of image. Rebranding and the adaptation of a party is then determined by this origin-identity aspect. This is not to deny the argument that a highly institutionalised party will have difficulty adapting (the ANC’s inability to adapt is a case in point) but the level of institutionalisation of the party is not the only factor. The organisational type is also of importance but as parties are flexible and move through different types, this is also partly reliant on the party’s identity e.g. the DA is not a mass-cadre party but attempts to project this image in its political environment.
1.2. Literature Review: Race and the Democratic Alliance

1.2.1 Introduction
The Democratic Alliance’s party adaptation has been shaped by its position as an opposition party within a dominant party system as well as by the racialised environment in which it operates. It is therefore necessary to examine the state of opposition politics in South Africa and how race plays a role in the political environment, particularly with regards to voter choice.

The DA’s position as an opposition party within a dominant party system has shaped some of its behaviour and identity. Opposition parties in South Africa appear to be understudied, in part due to the ANC’s continued dominance. The focus of the literature review is not on examining and comparing individual opposition parties but rather on the state of opposition politics and the DA’s place within the opposition politics literature.

In order to understand the environment, the chapter will examine the influence of race on the party system in particular. In South Africa racial identity plays an important role in how voters behave which in turn has an impact on how parties behave. The racialised environment has an impact on how the DA adapts and so the literature relating to democracy in plural societies and voter behaviour in South Africa will be discussed. Although race forms a central feature of the research, the race theory literature was not found to be useful in interpreting the DA’s adaptation. However, it is important to understand the racialised political context in terms of how race impacts on voter behaviour and political party labels. The literature review focuses on democracy in plural societies and the impact which racial identity has on voter behaviour, specifically in South Africa. There are two sets of literature which provide a frame of analysis for the DA’s place in the South African party system. The first which will be discussed is the literature on democracy in plural societies. The second, and closely related, is literature on voter behaviour in South Africa and the relationship between racial identity and voter choice.

1.2.2. The Political Environment
The South African political environment is characterised by a dominant party system at the national level5 (Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer, 2001; Southall, 2001; Southall, 2005; Brooks, 2004; Southern, 2011; Ferree, 2011; de Jager & du Toit, 2012; Booysen, 2015). In electoral terms, South Africa moved from a dominant party system under the NP to a dominant party system under the ANC. Before 1994, political parties had to adapt to a whites only, majority-Afrikaner electorate; since 1994 they have had to adapt to an inclusive but overwhelmingly black electorate.

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5 I make this distinction as the DA has been in government in a major metro since 2006 and has been the party of government in the Western Cape since 2009.
The dominance of the ANC in the new democratic dispensation has had an impact on how political parties are studied in South Africa as the ANC’s dominance continues to frame the discourse of politics. As no party other than the ANC has been in power, studies have tended to focus in a general way on opposition politics as opposed to providing studies of individual political parties. The exception is in the literature on elections in which more attention is paid to opposition parties and their individual performances (Piombo & Nijzink, 2005; Southall & Daniel, 2009; Schulz-Herzenberg & Southall, 2014). Hamill points out that:

"Opposition weakness in South Africa is largely attributable to the enduring strength of the ANC, its indispensable contribution to the birth of South African democracy and its continued domination of political discourse in the country." (Hamill, 2004: 700)

The literature accepts the status quo of ANC dominance and treats opposition parties as just that – opposition – as opposed to parties that could enter government. If opposition parties were taken more seriously as potential alternative governments, their policies and organisational dynamics might have received fuller attention.

The state of opposition politics since 1994
The last time that academic consideration was given to opposition politics as a whole in South Africa was a collection of articles published in *Democratization* in 2001 and subsequently as a book titled *Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*. At that point Schrire identified three forms of opposition party in the emergent order: robust (DP/DA), co-optive (IFP), and cooperative (NNP) (Schrire, 2001). Adding to Schrire’s analysis, I would now include the EFF in the robust opposition grouping. Schrire believes that robust opposition “represents as much a style of politics as it reflects deep-seated policy and ideological disagreements” (Schrire, 2001: 141). Southall pointed to the fact that the ANC had “embarked upon a deliberate project of defining robust opposition as illegitimate” (Southall, 2001). As the DP/DA took the path of robust opposition, the ANC’s treatment of this type of opposition as illegitimate had an impact on how it was treated within the political environment. Co-optive opposition is defined by working with the governing party in coalition (Schrire, 2001). Schrire says that the NNP’s form of cooperative opposition “entailed rejecting a strategy which was based upon an almost total rejection of government actions and moderating its rhetoric when criticizing the government” (Schrire, 2001: 142). At a national level, the DA and now the EFF play the robust opposition role.

Literature in the early years of democracy was not particularly optimistic about opposition party prospects or convinced that parties could move beyond racial or ethnic mobilisation. Southall points to the fact that after the 1999 elections, opposition parties were struggling to determine how to be the opposition (Southall, 2001: 2). Schrire thought it “difficult to see how the opposition can become more effective and expand its support base” and that “South Africa’s fragile democracy would paradoxically be weakened by a stronger opposition” (Schrire, 2001: 144). Opposition parties were relegated to representing ethnic or racial minorities with little hope of growth beyond these markets (Sarakinsky, 2001;
Kotzé, 2001). The DP/DA, in particular, was viewed in the literature as a minorities party which would reach a vote ceiling. Opposition parties were viewed as not a ‘credible’ alternative to the ANC (Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Brooks, 2004; Piper, 2005; Piombo, 2005). However, Schrire did argue that the opposition played an important role in ensuring accountability (Schrire, 2001: 145).

Some viewed the ANC’s alliance partners as the real opposition albeit an “internalised” opposition (Southall, 2001; Schrire, 2008). In 1999, Booysen wrote of possibilities facing opposition politics in South Africa. She argued that:

> the challenges confronting opposition parties were daunting, and many politicians and analysts placed their faith in a ‘Big Bang’ in which the ANC’s alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) disintegrates. From this perspective it is a question of opposition parties biding their time, and positioning themselves so as to be able to pick up chunks of former ANC support, or even become a government partner for an ailing ANC. (Booysen, 1999: 250)

The disintegration of the alliance has not happened but the the ANC itself has suffered two major breakaways, resulting in the formation of the Congress of the People in 2008 and the EFF in 2013. Another possibility for the opposition’s growth was the realignment of politics (Booysen, 1999). The DA, as will be discussed, placed the realignment of politics at the centre of its messaging from the 2000s.

The opposition landscape has changed considerably since the first decade of democracy. The NNP no longer exists; three notable new contenders emerged, the Independent Democrats, COPE and the EFF. The DA absorbed the ID and COPE has seen a drastic decline in its vote since its relative success in the 2009 elections. With the change in the opposition landscape, there has also been a change in racial voting patterns to a certain extent as the ANC breakaway parties challenged the ANC for black voters.

After the 2014 elections, Schulz-Herzenberg and Southall addressed the changing dynamics of the electorate. They pointed to the fact that elections were becoming more competitive and that voters were willing to shift their vote. This boded well for the opposition but Schulz-Herzenberg and Southall wrote that larger opposition parties would need to “respond vigorously to the concerns and identities of a rapidly changing electorate in order to expand into new constituencies” (Schulz-Herzenberg & Southall, 2014: 240).

The DA is still generally not seen in the literature as a genuine challenger to the ANC. However, while it is very far from taking power at a national level, the DA can also no longer be considered a mere opposition party. It took government in the City of Cape Town (2006) and Western Cape (2009) and heads governing coalitions in City of Johannesburg (2016), City of Tshwane (2016) and Nelson Mandela Bay (2016). As part of its wins in the cities, it has brought smaller opposition parties into government through coalitions. However, the
DA remains dominant in these coalitions. The literature does not examine the DA’s switch from opposition to a party of government.

There is a gap in the literature for an updated study such as that done in 2001 on the state of opposition politics and its future. As South Africa moves towards coalition politics, there is a need to examine other political parties more closely.

1.2.3. Racial Politics in South Africa

Another factor which impacts on a party’s ability to adapt is the external environment. In the South African case, this is a racialised environment. The racialisation of the party and how it deals with race therefore becomes central to the party’s behaviour and its ability to adapt.

Although 1994 saw the end of institutionalised racism, race and racism are still dominant issues in South Africa. As MacDonald has argued “our era sees color and thinks race; it thinks race and makes suppositions about cultural identities as sources of political allegiances” (MacDonald, 2006: 33). Race is still the fundamental organising principle of South African society whether it is how citizens are classified or how resources are distributed and legislation designed. Maré discusses extensively how race and more specifically racialism or race thinking pervades all aspects of South African society. It has become ordinary and common-sense (Maré, 2014).

Ansell summarises the continuing prominence of race in post-apartheid South Africa when she states:

> The transition to democracy has itself enhanced the salience of race and racism, and aspects of the current exit from apartheid rule heighten the salience and popular appeal. In this view, far more interesting than the question of whether attitudinal racism has increased or decreased in salience or, by extension, how can it be eliminated, is analysis of the ideological role of race as a ‘nodal point’ of transitional politics. The concept of race as a nodal point of the transition directs attention to the process by which the racial idea is used—to construct moral authority for oneself and to undermine that of the opposition—as various racial projects scramble to dominate the terms, nature and pace of the transition. (Ansell, 2004: 21-22)

Race remains an important factor within South African politics and continues to shape the public discourse. As Schrire argues, it “involves a struggle for power between competing groups and interests over the issue of control over the instruments of power” (Schrire, 2001: 138). In ethnically or racially divided societies, political power is argued by some to be contested on the basis of ethnic/racial identity (Horowitz, 1991, 1993; Lijphart, 1977, 1984). Previous research has argued that South Africa does not necessarily follow this pattern but it is rather that there is no viable alternative to the governing party (Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Mattes & Glenn, 2011). Political parties in South Africa have historically campaigned based on race or ethnicity (Schrire, 2001; Davis 2004) either to unite minorities (DP in 1999), to create a political space for an ethnic group (IFP and FF+) or to discredit the opposition (ANC) (Schrire, 2001; Davis, 2004). This is done through bridging and bonding strategies.
(Norris, 2004). In the South African context, these strategies tend to use race to show whether a party is inclusive or exclusive. Race-thinking shapes how political parties are perceived and treated.

The Racial Census
As was shown above, race and racial identity play a central role in the South African political system and discourse. Horowitz developed the concept of an ethnic-census to explain voting patterns in plural societies. Although the literature on democracy in plural societies points more towards ethnic differences as opposed to racial differences, it still provides an understanding for how party systems work in divided societies.

The democracy in plural societies literature tends to focus on developing systems to allow for the representation of ethnic groups to ensure that ethnic parties are represented within the legislature (Horowitz, 1985; Horowitz, 1991; Horowitz, 1993; Lijphart, 1977; Lijphart 1984). One of the major points around ethnic groups is inclusion within the political system. Horowitz argues that “in divided societies, there is a tendency to conflate inclusion in the government with inclusion in the community and exclusion from government with exclusion from the community” (Horowitz, 1994: 35).

Of particular relevance to the research is Horowitz’s description of the problem facing opposition in ethnically divided societies:

Ethnically divided societies thus have a special version of the usual democratic problem of assuring decent treatment of the opposition. Opposition to government is always susceptible of portrayal as resistance to the popular will. An ethnically differentiated opposition can easily be depicted as consisting of particularly dangerous enemies; historical enemies, enemies who do not accept the current identity of the state, enemies who are plotting to break up the state or to steal it for their own group – as indeed they may be, given the crucial importance of state power and the costs of exclusion from it. (Horowitz, 1994: 36)

The literature argues that ethnically divided societies will produce ethnic-census elections which tend to block out one or more ethnic groups from power (Horowitz, 1985, 1991, 1994; Lijphart, 1977, 1984). South Africa differs slightly in this assessment as ethnic differences have played less of a role in voter choice than in other democracies. Whilst the IFP is predominantly Zulu, the ANC represents various ethnicities and the ethnic dynamic has a more internal and factional impact rather than external. Horowitz argues that “ethnic voting means simply voting for the party identified with the voter’s own ethnic group, no matter who the individual candidates happen to be” and that “it is party and not candidate ethnic identification which counts” (Horowitz, 1985: 320-321). If one replaces ethnicity with race then voters are more concerned with the racial identity/image of the party than its individual candidates. Horowitz argues that voter turnout statistics relate to the emergence of the ethnic party system and “vary with its stage of development, peaking at the time when it is most important that all ethnic-group members be counted” – thus the ethnic census (Horowitz: 1985).
What occurs then when a party does not identify with one ethnic group? Horowitz argues that ethnic party systems “leave little room for parties organized without regard to the pre-eminence of ethnic issues in a severely divided society” and that “there is a single axis of political conflict and a single way of pursuing that conflict: through the ethnic parties” (Horowitz, 1985: 342). Competition in ethnic party systems tends to be within the ethnic group as opposed to between ethnic groups. Horowitz lists the features of ethnic party systems as the following:

The parties act as the organisational expression of the ethnic groups they represent. As the groups advance mutually exclusive claims to power, so, too, do the parties. The ultimate issue in every election is, starkly put, ethnic inclusion or exclusion. The census quality imparted to elections, as well as the high stakes involved, raises electoral turnouts until there is a decisive test and tends to make more people more actively partisan than would otherwise be the case. (Horowitz, 1985: 348)

The DA does not subscribe to ethnic or racial identities and so in some ways is out of place in the South African political system where racial identity politics still plays a major role in how parties are perceived.

Horowitz’s argument for the ethnic-census provides a useful background for understanding voting patterns in South Africa. The fortunes of political parties during elections in the democratic era have until recently been largely race-based. There are three explanations of voting behaviour amongst the electorate in South Africa: expressive/identity voting; those emphasizing policy preferences or performance evaluations (politics-as-usual); and those highlighting the informational role of race (Ferree, 2011: 34). After the first democratic election, it was believed that South Africans voted according to racial identity (Schrire, 2001; Taylor & Hoeane, 2001; Maloka, 2001). However, others have argued that this voting pattern is not based on racial identity per se but rather a lack of an alternative party due to mistrust for the opposition which has traditionally been white. This explanation holds that the electorate still votes based on government performance but that this differs across race (Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Taylor & Hoeane, 2001; Friedman, 2004; Habib & Naidu, 2004; Ferree, 2011). A third explanation for racial census voting is the racial heuristic approach which argues that party image or label provides an informational cue to voters based on race and which party will look after the voter’s racial group or whom the voter can trust to look after his/her interests (Ferree, 2011; Habib & Schulz-Herzenberg, 2011). If either the first or third explanation is correct – and there is good reason to think that both hold some water – then race remains a highly salient variable in South African politics and voting patterns.

Mattes and Glenn argue against the proposition of a racial-census posed by Horowitz:

In contrast to the usual expectations advanced by analysts of elections in divided societies (e.g. Horowitz, 1986), few voters are attracted to a party because they see it as representing their group to the exclusion of others. On the contrary, most voters are repelled away from parties with such an image. (Mattes & Glenn, 2011: 24)
The racial census is instead based on party labels and which party is seen as more inclusive. Mattes and Glenn go on to say that:

Previous statistical analyses of the factors affecting South Africans’ voting choices have consistently identified the crucial role of voters images of whether a given party is inclusive, representing all South Africans, or exclusive, representing one group to the exclusion of others. (Mattes & Glenn, 2011: 24)

Mattes and Glenn point out that voters do not know enough about opposition parties to switch their vote. They argue that opposition parties do not do enough between election periods to make themselves known to potential voters:

Few opposition parties give evidence of a well-thought out strategy to court voters on a continuous basis by using their parliamentary platform or other events as opportunities to generate free media publicity between elections. Most wait and mount their campaign in the six to eight weeks leading up to the election, at which point it is far too late to shape or reshape your public image in any significant way. (Mattes & Glenn, 2011: 24)

The research will show that lack of strategy is not the case with regards to the DA.

Mattes and Piombo highlight what is essential to showing that opposition parties are inclusive and provide an alternative government. This includes policies which address these voters’ specific needs, the correct style of rhetoric and the use of strategic media. In addition to this, Ferree argues that:

South African voters, like voters everywhere, use party images as a cognitive shortcut to guide their voting decisions. Unlike countries where ideologies are well developed or class differences are strong, party images in SA are primarily racial in nature (Ferree, 2011: 17).

A party’s image or label plays a central role in how it bridges or bonds with voters, it also allows the voter to determine whether it is inclusive or exclusive. Ferree argues that a party label refers to the party’s “brand name, its reputation; the general ideology, values, or attributes associated with it; and the groups it is believed to represent” (Ferree, 2011: 16). Party label forms a central aspect of Ferree’s argument on how the racial census works and is also a central feature of political marketing. She argues that in South Africa, “a particular set of beliefs about political parties drives the racial census” (Ferree, 2011: 25). Voters see race as an information cue “not the emotional attachment of voters to racially exclusive parties” (Ferree, 2011). Whilst Mattes and his co-authors argue that race acts as an information shortcut for SA voters, this explanation is more about politics-as-usual (Ferree, 2011). Ferree, however, argues that:

although voting looks like politics-as-usual on one level (voters do care about performance), on a deeper level their beliefs about performance are intimately related to their beliefs about party images (Ferree, 2011: 33)

...i.e. are parties inclusive or exclusive. Ferree finds “strong evidence that party labels are heavily racialized in SA and play a powerful role in shaping voting behaviour” (Ferree, 2011:
Both the ANC and EFF use race in their communication to show that they are representative of black South Africans as opposed to other racial groups. As more breakaway parties from the ANC have developed, the racial census in some ways becomes less relevant. However, the breakaway parties also tend to attract a predominantly black constituency as opposed to a significant multi-racial constituency.

Ferree also draws attention to the impact of a dominant party system on a party’s ability to change its label. The key factor we need to understand is “how the ANC has won the battle to frame the image of the opposition in the electorate” (Ferree, 2011: 28). She argues that the ANC’s party dominance is less about clientelism and more about the liberation movement’s ability to dominate and frame the discourse:

when framing removes the opposition as a serious option in the choice set of voters, dominant parties no longer need to beg or bribe the electorate: they win by default. (Ferree, 2011: 28)

A key element of Ferree’s analysis is that whilst the racial census is true, it is not simply about the social dynamics but that politics plays a role in creating the census. She argues that “the origins of the census rest not in identity, as is often assumed, but in politics” and that “a particular set of beliefs about political parties drives the racial census” (Ferree, 2011: 25). Ferree’s argument is pertinent to understanding a party’s need to change its label and the impact which the political dynamics at play have on the party’s ability to change that label.

1.2.4. The Democratic Alliance

As Southern points out, the DP/DA has received little “direct scholarly attention” (Southern, 2011). This was also the case with the Progressives (Hackland, 1984). At the time of writing, there is no major scholarly text on the DA which traces the party from its initial formation to its current state. Outside of Leon and Zille’s memoirs, which provide valuable insights into the party’s history and internal party discussions, there is also little available information on the inner workings of the party since 1994. The lack of attention could be attributed to the party’s electoral weakness and the fact that it has not been viewed as a viable alternative to the dominant party as well as the fact that until recently, internal party documents have been unavailable.

Even though the DP/DA has been the Official Opposition since 1999, analysis of the party has tended to be contained within discussions on opposition parties in general or work on elections (Booysen, 1999; Booysen, 2005; Davis, 2004; Davis 2005; Jolobe, 2009; Jolobe 2014; Habib & Schulz-Herzenberg, 2011; Ferree, 2011; Schrire, 2001). An exception is Neil Southern’s article on the DA and its attempts at changing its racial profile (Southern, 2011). The following will provide a brief summary of the key themes which emerge in the literature as well as some of the gaps which have been identified through a reading of the literature.
Centrality of race
Race plays a central role in the literature on the DA. There are three common arguments put forward by the literature. The first is that the DA is labeled as white and as a party for the wealthy (Booysen, 1999; Booysen 2005; Ferree, 2011; Southern 2011). The second is that in order to change that label, it needs to have more black leaders but that the party continues to remain predominantly white (Booysen, 1999; Mattes & Piombo, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Ferree, 2011; Southern, 2011). Finally, the literature has argued over the years that the DA will reach or has reached its demographic ceiling as it is not attracting a significant number of black voters (Booysen, 1999; Booysen, 2005; Hamill, 2004; Jolobe, 2009). Although the arguments put forward in the literature are not necessarily incorrect on the broader points, much of the literature fails to provide an in-depth look at the party as a whole from a party behaviour and historical perspective. This failure produces inaccuracies. Thus a piece by Jolobe in 2014 claims that only in 2011 did the DA come to terms with “the fact that its political fortunes rested upon capturing a significant portion of the black African vote” and that this required “changing the racial composition of its public profile” (Jolobe, 2014). As will be shown in the research, both aspects were accepted as necessary from 1999 onwards (if not earlier) within internal party discussions. As the party’s public profile remained white until 2011, this sort of detail was sometimes missed.

Eusebius McKaiser’s Could I Vote DA?: A Voter’s Dilemma offers the only published monograph on the DA. McKaiser looks closely at the DA’s ideological positioning as well as its policies on Black Economic Empowerment and Employment Equity. McKaiser also raises important questions about the DA’s tone and who is the ‘right black’ for the DA. Although McKaiser’s work covers important themes for a potential DA voter, it is largely an extended think piece rather than a systematic empirical study of the DA.

Gaps
In conducting the literature review of the DA, it was difficult to find any academic interrogation of the party’s ideological positioning, policies or political marketing. Beyond mention that the DA is a liberal party and comes from the liberal tradition in South Africa, attention is not paid as to how it defines this liberalism and how that contributes to its policy positions. The earlier literature on the party suggested that it had few ideological or philosophical differences with the ANC, NNP and IFP (Booysen, 1999; Schrire, 2001; Jolobe, 2009). I would argue that there are fundamental ideological and philosophical differences ignored in the literature.

In addition, little attention has been paid to the organisational dynamics within the DA such as its activist base, membership or internal power dynamics. There is also a failure to interrogate the party’s professionalisation and the behind-the-scenes role which it plays in adapting the party’s label. This research attempts to start filling the gaps which were found in the literature and addresses the themes which were identified in the literature from a party behaviour perspective.
1.2.5. Conclusion

There are two key considerations in interpreting the DA’s adaptation – ANC dominance and opposition failure; and the racialised nature of party labels. Both aspects have had an impact on how the DA is treated within the literature and how the party has adapted.

Opposition politics is understudied and understood within a dominant party discourse. In more recent years, prospects for opposition parties have come to be viewed as more hopeful but the DA is still not viewed as a true contender due to its inability to attract a larger proportion of black voters, despite its provincial and metropolitan gains. What all agree is that the DA needs to find ways of attracting black voters.
1.3. Methodology

In order to answer the question on how the DA has adapted to its racialised environment, the research was approached according to the three stages of the Party Evolution Model: the DA’s origin; its identity (both as an organisation and ideologically); and its political marketing. The thesis does not seek to test the model but rather use it as a framework for analysis of the DA’s evolution.

1.3.1. Data collection

A study of a party’s strategic decisions requires access to internal party documents which are not always readily available to the public. Party documents from the Progressive era were accessed through the Progressive Federal Party/Democratic Party Records collection in the Cullen Library at the University of the Witwatersrand. Documents relating to the party post-1994 were accessed through Tony Leon’s archive at the University of the Free State’s Archive for Contemporary Affairs. These documents included Federal Executive minutes (2002-2007), speeches (1994-2004), internal party memos, internal strategy documents, and correspondence between Leon and others. Gareth van Onselen (a former party staff member) provided position papers from the 1990s and early 2000s which were unavailable online or in Leon’s archive. I was denied access to current DA internal documents as these are, by nature, strategic documents and not available to the public. Helen Zille’s office provided all her speeches and newsletters (SA Today) for her period as leader.

In order to locate more recent policies and communication, desktop research was conducted through an old version of the DA’s website which is no longer available and the current DA website. Desktop research also included media articles and DA campaign videos. Other sources included Leon and Zille’s autobiographies and available literature on the party (Progressives, DP and DA).

Prospective interviewees were selected based on their seniority within the party or their professional role. Although ten past and present senior DA members were contacted for interviews, only three made themselves available for in-depth interviews. I do not believe that this was an attempt to guard the DA from interrogation as interviews were conducted with Tony Leon, James Selfe and Paul Boughey. Both Selfe and Boughey are, at the time of writing, the highest ranking party officials in terms of party organisation and strategy. Both Maimane and Mazibuko were contacted several times for interviews and despite agreeing to be interviewed, the interviews never came to fruition. Unfortunately, the lack of availability of people of colour for interviews means that the DA voice within the research is white and male. The interviews, however, play a secondary role in my data collection. The primary focus of the primary research is on the documentary material, which has enabled me to chart the party’s adaptation in a systematic way.
1.3.2. Analysis

In conducting the analysis of party documents, consideration was given to the three stages of the Party Evolution Model and the associated theories. Analysis of internal strategy documents focused on political marketing aspects such as the party’s target market, tone, message and campaign. Federal Executive minutes and internal strategy documents were scrutinised for insights into internal organisational dynamics such as discussions around diversity and finding black leaders as well as market research and campaign decisions.

In terms of speeches and press statements, all of the available Leon and Zille pieces were examined and Maimane speeches were selected based on their availability and relevance to the research. An initial content analysis was conducted using MaxQDA on the Leon speeches in order to determine whether this was an effective method for the purpose of the research. The Leon content was analysed according to themes such as policy issues, race, and attitudes towards other parties. Although it provided some insight into how often the party addressed racial issues and how it discussed race, I decided that the quantification aspect did not add value to the unfolding narrative of the research. The initial content analysis did assist in narrowing down which speeches to examine and common messaging during certain periods as I had no prior knowledge of Leon’s leadership era. In terms of the Zille material, this was examined in order to fill the gap in my knowledge of the DA’s communications between 2007 and 2011 and to identify the key party messages during her leadership. The Maimane speeches and press statements were analysed for messaging and information on current organisational changes.

The focus in the research is on key speeches and discussion documents in the party’s history and what messages were conveyed to voters. This included a consideration of whether these messages were bridging or bonding.

The interviews focused on the following themes: ideology; organisational dynamics; race; and the DA’s relationship with the media.

In writing, the research uses a mix of thematic and chronological exposition. The origin and identity chapters of the research have been written thematically and the political marketing chapters have been written chronologically.

The research findings are integrated within the narrative. The thesis does not seek to test a hypothesis but to provide a detailed account of the DA’s adaptation. The primary material is used to illustrate this history, which is however presented within a framework structured by the Party Evolution Model.

1.3.3. Positionality

As a former DA staff member and branch chairperson, I have had to be aware of potential bias in analysing the DA. As a South African voter and a liberal, this also impacts on my
interpretation of party positions and decisions. It is ultimately my position as voter and liberal that has shaped my analysis as opposed to my former relationship to the party.

In order to explain my positionality, it is necessary to explore what led me to work for the party and why I believe the research was important. Although I was not eligible to vote during the Leon era, I considered the party to be a white, ‘shouty’ party. My belief in the party being just for minorities continued up until the 2011 elections. It was also shaped by media and academic analysis of the party. Until I conducted my own research of the 1994-2011 period in the party’s history for the thesis, I continued to believe that the party under Leon and Zille was a white party that was not concerned with non-racialism and diversity and I had to overcome my own bias against this era.

My personal views on the party only changed in 2011 with the rise of Mazibuko and Maimane. A work project which involved examining the local government manifestoes provided insight on the DA as a governing party. In 2012, I sought a position with the DA to work under Mazibuko in Parliament. Once again, due to media and academic analysis, I expected to find a predominantly white parliamentary office. Instead I found a richly diverse, young work environment. Internal party diversity continued to be evident as I moved out of the parliamentary office and onto the ground. Maimane’s campaign also displayed the diversity within the party. It made me question why the party was not getting more black votes and why it was still treated as a white party by the commentariat as this was not my personal experience of the party.

When researching a political party, researchers’ interpretations will be influenced by ideological and partisan standpoints. I have been directly involved with the DA. I am also sceptical about racial nationalism and identity or group politics. Whilst I have undertaken this research with an open mind, I must allow that these involvements and dispositions may have affected my framing and interpretation.

My experience with the DA, however, does provide me with an intimate understanding of the party and what it is trying to achieve. It has meant that I have a working knowledge of how the party operates and this provides me with a different view to other academics. My professional position with the DA involved policy research and media communication which provided me with a better understanding of the policy and political communication aspects of the party. I was also involved in Mmusi Maimane’s campaign for Premier of Gauteng which provided me with first-hand experience of how DA leaders are received in predominantly black areas and the challenges which the party faces on the ground. As a DA branch chairperson, I was also given insight into how the party operates between the various levels from branch to provincial level. Both my professional and voluntary positions within the DA have provided me with a deeper insight into how the party operates.
Section Two: Origin and Identity of the Democratic Alliance

2.1 Stage I - The Origin of the Democratic Alliance

2.1.1. Introduction
The Democratic Alliance is the result of several splits and mergers in South African opposition politics since 1959 which has allowed the party to evolve, reorganise and survive. The first stage in the Party Evolution Model is the formation and institutionalisation of the party or what Panebianco calls the mark of the party's origin. This is an essential aspect in understanding party behaviour as Lamprinakou argues that “the ways parties behave in all phases of their existence are rooted in the very early years of their formation” (Lamprinakou, 2008: 107). Although the DA does not resemble its first formation as the Progressive Party in name, as an organisation it bears a remarkable resemblance to that party. The DA was created in opposition to the United Party (UP) and the National Party (NP) in 1959 and has grown through various mergers with smaller, predominantly white, opposition parties over the decades. The DA’s origin has left its mark on the party as it has remained in opposition at a national level since its birth and until the last decade or so, remained predominantly white in leadership, members and voters.

Timeline:
- 1959 – Progressive Party formed
- 1975 – merger with Reform Party to create the South African Progressive Reform Party
- 1977 – merger with Committee for a United Opposition to form the Progressive Federal Party
- 1989 – merger with the Independent Party and National Democratic Movement to form the Democratic Party
- 2000 - merger with New National Party and Federal Alliance to form the Democratic Alliance
- 2010 – merger with the Independent Democrats

Box 1: Timeline of the DA’s development

Whilst traditional theories of party formation deal with a single event or era within a party’s life, these theories have been based on parties which have formed and remained, more or less, as the same party in terms of name and structure. Mergers are an aspect which is not examined within the traditional models of party formation as this has not been a prominent feature of party formation and party systems in the West. Mergers have been the way in which the DA has reacted to external changes and to the changing environments in which it functions (Panebianco, 1988: 49). The DA has a long history of mergers and this could be considered to be one of the major features of its identity. An analysis of the DA’s origin
therefore requires an examination from its first creation in 1959 through to its latest merger attempt with Agang-SA. Major features of the Progressive Party’s formation were its position as an opposition to nationalism, race as a central issue for the party, and the importance of a central group of ‘elites’. Another feature which has allowed the PP to grow into the DA has been its ability to merge with other opposition parties and caused several periods of reorigination in the party. These features have remained prominent in the various formations of the DA and supports the Party Evolution Model.

In order the understand the party’s institutionalisation, this chapter\(^6\) will examine the origin of the DA as the Progressive Party in 1959 and its development from the Progressive era to the formation of the DA as well as its merger with the Independent Democrats in 2010 and attempted merger with Agang-SA in 2014. As the party had several formations, this requires an examination of each of these moments as they speak to the institutionalisation of the party. The first section will examine the formation of the Progressive Party by looking at its initial formation and ideology. The second section will examine the various mergers that occurred to create the DA of today and its attempted merger with Agang-SA.

2.1.2. The Progressive Party
The South African Progressive Party was formed in 1959 when 13 progressive, liberal MPs and MPCs of the United Party broke away due to the United Party’s position against returning land back to the black majority. However, this policy position was not the only issue for the Progressive Group as they were called at the time. The United Party became increasingly conservative under De Villiers Graaff’s leadership and the more progressive group within the party did not agree with the UP’s position against giving a qualified franchise to black voters and rights to the black majority. The MPs who resigned from the UP were: Jan Steytler, Zach de Beer, Helen Suzman, Ronald Butcher, Ray Swart, Townley Owen-Williams, Sakkies Fourie, John Cope, Boris Wilson, Leo Boyd, Lester Hall, Leo Kowarsky and Clive van Ryneveld. The Progressive Group was led by Jan Steytler who would later become the founding leader of the Progressive Party.

Central to the formation of the Progressives was the “belief that ‘race’ was the most important issue and the most dangerous divide in the country” (Hackland, 2014: 366). In a statement on 25 August 1959 outlining the reasons for the group leaving the United Party, Steytler stated that:

> In the new circumstances with which we are faced we believe it to be our duty to continue our service to South Africa outside the ranks of the United Party, convinced as we are that South Africa must face up more squarely than it has in the past to problems which flow from the multi-racial composition of the nation. (Steytler, 25 August 1959)

\(^6\) As with the Democratic Alliance, there has been very little written on the Progressives as a political organisation. This chapter draws on Hackland’s study of the Progressive Party and its subsequent formations. Hackland noted in his study at the time (1984) that there were few resources available beyond autobiographical works, party documents and interviews with party members at the time. The lack of information around the Progressives remains the case today.
The PP originated in response to the changing external environment in South Africa. The group believed that South Africa needed a multi-racial political system with equal rights for all (except with regards to the franchise). At the inaugural congress of the party in November 1959, it stated its main principles and policies as being the following:

1. The maintenance and extension of the value of Western Civilisation, the protection of fundamental human rights and the safeguarding of the dignity and worth of the human person, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

2. The assurance that no citizen of the Union of South Africa shall be debarred on grounds of race, religion, language or sex, from making the contribution to our national life of which he or she may be capable.

3. The recognition that in the Union of South Africa there is one nation which embraces various groups differing in race, religions, language and traditions, that each such group is entitled to the protection of these things and of its right of participation in the government of the nation; and that understanding, tolerance and goodwill between the different groups must be fostered. (Progressive Party, Main Principles and Policies, November 1959)

The principles also included the maintenance of the rule of law, development of a modern economy and the promotion of friendly relations with other nations, “more particularly the members of the Commonwealth and those who share with us the heritage of Western Civilisation” (Progressive Party, Main Principles and Policies, November 1959). The Main Principles and Policies document also outlined the expectations for a new Constitution for the party which would provide a “political framework for inter-racial co-operation”. This new Constitution would achieve the following aims:

1. To establish conditions which will enable the peoples of South Africa to live as one nation in accordance with the values and concepts of Western Civilisation.

2. To enable suitably qualified citizens of a defined degree of civilisation belonging to any population group to participate in the government of the country, according to their ability to assume responsibility, through the holding of public office and through registration on a common electoral roll for election of members of the House of Assembly, with special provision for the representation of persons not so qualified.

3. To provide constitutional safeguards through a reform of the Senate and/or otherwise to prevent the exercise of unchecked power by any group in order to dominate any other group, white or non-white.

6. To guarantee, by inclusion in the Constitution of an entrenched Bill of Rights, the fundamental human rights and liberties of the individual, such as freedom of religion, speech and association, equal protection of the laws, and also the equal status of official languages. (Progressive Party, Main Principles and Policies, November 1959)

The Progressives wished to extend rights to all citizens but in terms of voting rights, this would be limited to those who were considered ‘civilised’ enough. Hackland provides a reasoning for this:
Although the group pledged to increase economic and political participation by ‘all races’, its primary motivation was still a conservative one...The group’s initiative was based on the conviction that the only way to defend white privilege and preserve the system, was through an extension of the rights and benefits of the system to a proportion of the black majority, the ‘civilised’ black people. (Hackland, 1984: 85)

The Western civilisation aspect of the political and economic rights would eventually be dropped by later formations of the party.

Ideology – Individualism and Multi-racialism

The Progressive Party was essentially found on the belief that there needed to be an effective opposition/alternative to nationalism (both Afrikaner and African). The Progressives based their principles and policy on the liberal notion of individualism as “well as group sentiments and the rights of groups to maintain their own character” (Steytler, 25 August 1959). Part of the Progressive offer to the electorate was an alternative ideology to that of nationalism. The alternative centred on individualism and multi-racial politics (group identity). The Progressives’ belief was that individuals should be treated equally and that “no man should be denied what he deserves because his face is black or brown” (Hackland, 1984: 208). Whilst the Progressives wished to achieve a political system of multi-racialism, this aim was also based on the belief in a ‘Western’ or white superiority in that the franchise should be qualified based on a level of education and assimilation into Western civilisation. This was most evident in the brief to the Constitutional Commission (the Molteno Commission) in 1959 which placed an emphasis on Western civilisation and education as the central factor in being able to participate politically. As Hackland points out:

Lying behind the proposals for the qualified franchise were assumptions of cultural and racial superiority. ‘Western civilisation’ referred to the life-style and culture of white South Africans and was implicitly contrasted to the ‘uncivilised’, ‘traditional’ African culture and way of life (Hackland, 1984: 104)

This belief is partly evident in the party’s policy in the early 1960s. The PP was more concerned with the ‘urban African’ than creating policy positions for the majority of black South Africans. Within these policies was a clear multi-racial project as opposed to a non-racial project as the policies all made reference to maintaining racial group identities. The only policy which could be considered to be non-racial is the PP’s position on repealing the Population Registration Act and that it would not have registered citizens based on race but this is negated by the fact that it still recognised group identities based on race in other policy positions. The Progressive Party’s position on racial classification remains a position of the DA today – it would not register citizens according to race.

However, as Hackland points out, the dominant ideology at the time provides an explanation for the Progressives belief in their ‘racially superior’ policy positions. He argues that:
the policies flowed out of what was seen and portrayed as a sensible acceptance of the social and political realities of the South African system; an acceptance of the ‘facts of life’. Class consciousness was very weak in South Africa anyway, at that time, reflecting the ubiquitousness and strength of the twin components of the dominant ideology, those of individualism and racism. In lending such credence to the validity of race as a group concept and in adopting provisions to perpetuate and even strengthen race consciousness, Progressive Party ideologists and delegates were merely reflecting the dominant ideology of their society. (Hackland, 1984: 113)

Hackland further argues that “the qualified franchise proposals were regarded as a device to maintain white domination” (Hackland, 1984: 238) which was also reflective of the dominant ideology (amongst white South Africans) at the time.

The Progressives’ ideology became less about civilisation and more about individualism and multi-racialism by the 1970s as the lines about Western civilisation were dropped from the party’s constitution. However, it could be argued that this initial sense of superiority has remained within the party’s tone and approach to the political environment in democratic South Africa.

Politically, the party stood for an alternative ideology to the government’s nationalism and the United Party’s conservatism but organisationally and practically, it stood for an effective opposition. All later formations of the party which would eventually become the Democratic Alliance maintained this structure – acting as opposition and proposing a liberal alternative to a nationalist government. Two clear offers which the Progressives made to the electorate at the time were an effective opposition (at the time the United Party had become more conservative and agreed with many of the NP’s policy positions on the black majority) and the possibility of an alternative government. As will be discussed in greater detail, these two themes formed the backbone of the DP/DA’s strategy in the democratic era. Its initial offer in 1994 was as an effective opposition with a shift in the mid-2000s to a strategy of being an alternative government or government-in-waiting.

Closely linked to the offer of opposition and a liberal alternative government was the Progressives dislike of nationalism of any form and the need for an ideological alternative to the National Party. On both sides of the political divide in apartheid South Africa was a form of nationalism - Afrikaner nationalism in government and black nationalism within the ANC etc. This can be seen in a memorandum from Professor Philippus Villiers Pistorius to the party in 1963:

our attacks on subversive movements must be as intense and prominent as our attacks on the policies of the Government...It is of the utmost importance that the party should be equally prominent on [sic] its attack on Black Nationalism and Communism and on associated movements as on the Government and the United Party (P.V. Pistorius ‘Memorandum from Professor P.V. Pistorius’, 7 May 1963 cited in Hackland, 1984: 242)

The Progressives feared the black nationalist revolution as much as they opposed the Afrikaner nationalist government (they did not fear the Afrikaner nationalists). In terms of
the black nationalist movement, the issue was three-fold: a fear that a black nationalist movement in power would have an impact on minorities; that the black nationalist movement was becoming increasingly volatile and heading towards a violent revolution; and, based on the party’s liberal beliefs, that it placed a particular group over the individual.

This idea was exemplified in their shift in strategy post-1961 whereby:

The Progressives had made one major change in their election tactics, which was to no longer avoid ‘three-cornered’ contests. They justified their decision on the grounds that the real choice was no longer between government and opposition, but between racialist and non-racialist policies, between the Progressive policies of equality of opportunity and United and National Party policies of discrimination (Hackland, 1984: 178)

As will be shown in the chapters which follow, the DA has maintained this belief that the choice is between equality of opportunity (DA) and discrimination (ANC).

One of the difficulties for the Progressives in presenting themselves as the opposition was that they only succeeded in getting one representative – Helen Suzman – elected to the House of Assembly in the first election subsequent to the breakaway from the UP. This remained the case for 13 years. However, Suzman provided the robust opposition which the Progressives wished to display and be their party brand.

Membership and Voters
An aspect of the party’s origin which continues to be of importance in the democratic era is its membership and voters as this has contributed to its identity and label. It is therefore important to look at who formed the original core of the party during the apartheid era.

Joining Steytler in forming the Progressive Party was a small group of elites:

The ‘progressives’ were all professionals and concentrated in the Cape, the traditional home of South African liberalism. In a slightly larger sample, however, (the 21 members of the first Progressive Party National Executive Committee with identifiable occupations) the Cape dominance disappeared: seven came from the Cape, ten from the Transvaal, but still only four from Natal. Seventeen were professionals, eight company directors (four in industry and two each in commerce and finance) and only one was a farmer. (Hackland, 1984: 82)

The majority of delegates at the inaugural Progressive Party congress were people drawn from the universities and professions (Hackland, 1984: 209). The Progressives believed that their strongest group of supporters “were the well-educated, the rich, the internationally oriented, the sophisticated, employers, Jews and Catholics rather than Protestants and youth” (Hackland, 1984: 286).

The Progressives believed that they would be able to seek electoral support from a potentially growing black middle class but in order to do this, government policy would need to be liberalised. This points to the Progressives and, later, the DA’s traditional voter base or target market being an educated middle class. According to a news report at the time, the Progressives boasted a diverse membership:
“Party officials are particularly proud of the growth in non-White membership which has been rapid in recent months. All meetings and all bodies of the party are organised on a completely non-racial basis” (Cape Times 8 May 1964 ‘All Races Joining the Progs’ cited in Hackland, 1984: 270)

When the PP was losing support from its white base, it needed to branch out and seek votes elsewhere. The only option at the time was to campaign in 1964 for the coloured vote for the four seats representing coloured voters in Parliament (Hackland, 1984: 128). This tactic would be echoed by the Democratic Party post-1999 and formed part of the reason for its merger with the NNP.

The external environment
The external environment played an enormous role on the party’s ability to grow its support and membership. It was unable to seek votes outside of the white population due to apartheid legislation which also affected the racial makeup of the party. According to Hackland’s interpretation of the context, the white electorate also became more conservative as the ANC and other liberation groups became more militant under apartheid’s repressive regime.

At the time of its formation, the Progs genuinely thought that the external environment was open to an alternative government. However, Hackland identifies two events which showed that the Progs had misjudged the national mood – Sharpeville and the referendum on the Republic. The Progressives believed that their survival and growth would happen due to a declining social and economic situation in South Africa. It appeared that South Africans were becoming increasingly conservative and accepting of the NP’s violent suppression of the black majority. White South Africans also did not see any harm in leaving the Commonwealth as it did not have the predicted detrimental effects on the economy and they continued to benefit economically. The party thought that with increasing racial conflict and declining economic growth due to the NP government’s policies that the electorate would be ripe for an alternative to the Nats. However, the NP managed to repress the struggle movement and this in turn led to international confidence which helped the economic situation (Hackland, 1984). Hackland argues that “the Progressive Party, without the momentum provided by social and economic upheaval, went into decline” (Hackland, 1984: 167)

The formation and early survival of the Progressive Party was also in part dependent on the financial support from prominent businessman, Harry Oppenheimer, who was also a former UP Member of Parliament. The party effectively survived for its first ten years on the continued financial sponsorship and ‘moral’ support of Oppenheimer (Hackland, 1984). Apart from small membership donations, the primary financial sponsorship of the Progs came from Oppenheimer. Hackland draws considerable links between Oppenheimer’s beliefs and policy positions and those taken by the PP over the years (Hackland, 1984). Although this link is predominantly due to Oppenheimer’s liberal beliefs, it also points to
Panebianco’s argument that an external sponsor has considerable influence on a party’s position.

Organisational change – 1965-1971

After successive electoral losses, it was clear that organisational changes needed to be made in order to progress the Progressive project. The first years of the Progressive Party saw massive electoral losses and as mentioned, only one representative in the House of Assembly. Following the elections in 1966, Zach de Beer penned an important paper on the state of the party which signalled a shift in the way the Progressives would operate. The paper includes two key points – the lack of objectives within the party (i.e. strategy) and lack of “any real functioning administrative machinery” (de Beer, *The Progressive Party, 1966-1971*, 1966). De Beer acknowledged that there was a need to target certain interest groups and identified these as:

the most modern, sophisticated elements in South Africa: the employers, the intellectuals, the top-level technologists and executives who provide leadership in any modern industrial state. It will be argued that these people are few. The reply is that they are trendsetters, and that their number and the number of those who follow them must and will grow. (de Beer, *The Progressive Party, 1966-1971*, 1966: 3)

This statement was made in the belief that “the truly progressive elements in our society will become dominant, as they are in the developed Western countries today” (de Beer, *The Progressive Party, 1966-1971*, 1966: 3). He also argued that there needed to be a shift from political theories to issue-driving. The paper also pointed to the belief that changes were occurring which would make South Africa:

more and more like other advanced urban industrial societies. Sensible politicians opposing the Nationalist Party must, therefore, plan to make gains as the sociological changes now in progress become effective. This is all that can be hoped for, other than an internal disintegration of the Nationalist Party or some cataclysmic event in the shape of a revolution or outside interference. (de Beer, *The Progressive Party, 1966-1971*, 1966: 2)

The suggestions made in this paper were adopted at the National Executive Committee meeting on 6 October 1966. This document was also written around the time of the Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill which would mean that the Progressive Party could no longer have multi-racial membership or campaign for coloured votes which was the initial strategy to increase its profile and position as a multi-racial liberal alternative. This meant that the Progressives had to develop a new strategy which “showed an exclusive orientation to the white electorate and hence a concentration of the party’s resources on white parliamentary politics” (Hackland, 1984: 273).

The late 1960s saw a leadership crisis within the party as the more ‘modern’ members such as De Beer, Eglin and Suzman wished to see the party transform into a professional operation. At one point, Steytler tendered his resignation feeling like he did not have support from his party but was convinced to withdraw. However, the need for
administrative capacity within the leadership remained an issue. It was agreed that Steytler would remain as the leader and that Colin Eglin would be the National Executive Chairman, “dividing responsibilities clearly into policy and political leadership on the one hand and administration on the other” (Hackland, 1984: 283). This division of responsibilities remains within the DA today and has been strengthened.

The De Beer memorandum led to a set of recommendations produced by Eglin which focused the party’s attention on their most responsive target market. The party would organise around a few constituencies and “organise intensively over a full four/five year period”, special attention would also be given to the youth and “people concerned with the country’s economic development” (Hackland, 1984: 289). This strategy resulted in the party increasing its votes in all the key seats which it focussed on but it still only managed to retain one seat in Parliament.

Eglin was elected leader of the party in 1971 and set in motion two initiatives which would contribute to the party’s success in the 1974 elections. The first was attracting the “modern city Afrikaner” and the second was “to become publicly identified with practical and active consultation with Blacks” (Eglin cited in Hackland, 1984: 291). Again, this strategy would be repeated by the DP/DA in the democratic era.

Linked to the theme of opposition were continued calls, particularly by the English press, to consolidate the opposition or for a realignment of politics over the years. This occurred in the early 1960s and again in the 1970s:

Steytler responded to demands in the press, for a ‘consolidation of the opposition’, following the electoral setbacks [1962], with a declaration that his party would work with anyone prepared to reject race discrimination (Hackland, 1984: 171).

However, this realignment would not include the United Party as long as it continued to support racial discrimination. In the 1970s, realignment occurred twice with the formation of the Reform Party and then again a few years later which led to the formation of the Progressive Federal Party.

2.1.3. Growth and Mergers – 1975-2014

One of the key features of the DA’s genetic origin has been its ability to merge with other parties and maintain its dominance within the new organisation. Mergers have ensured the party’s survival over the decades and also contributed to its institutional strengthening. Each reorigination of the party followed a similar pattern but with each case, the original party (the Progressives) maintained its organisational and ideological identity.

As the political climate changed during apartheid, there were growing calls for a realignment of politics in South Africa and an alternative to the National Party government. The Progressive Party formed the centre of the realignment through its ability to merge successfully with other parties and ensure that these mergers resulted in more votes for the
party and a shift towards a more progressive opposition politics. The first of these mergers occurred in 1975 with the formation of the South African Progressive Reform Party, followed by another merger shortly afterwards to form the Progressive Federal Party. The final merger which occurred during the apartheid era was in 1989 and created the Democratic Party which would take the party into the democratic era.

The shift in the political landscape post-1994 saw the ANC’s electoral dominance and the decline of the NP (which eventually became the New National Party). The electorate was split along racial lines. It also saw the emergence of various smaller opposition parties in South Africa’s new multi-party democracy. In order for the party to survive, it needed to increase its share of the vote by eliminating the competition, similar to its approach in the 1970s. The first of these mergers was with the New National Party (and Federal Alliance) in 2000 which created the Democratic Alliance. This was followed by a merger with the Independent Democrats in 2010 and an attempted merger between the DA and Agang-SA in 2014. A clear theme within these mergers was about expanding into other racial markets as well as eliminating competition for those votes. The strategic reasons behind the post-apartheid mergers will be discussed in more depth in the political marketing section but it is important to mention their organisational dynamics at this point as a feature of the DA’s re-origination.

Progressive Reform Party and Progressive Federal Party
In the 1970s, there was a call from the English press to consolidate the opposition. Colin Eglin stated that:

> there was a strong view that the Party should seek some realignment subject, however, to the reservations that the basic principles of the party were sacrosanct, that Eglin should be leader and that the Democratic Party was excluded. (Hackland, 1984: 334)

The party would also not seek any pact with the UP. However, this came at a time when yet another group within the UP were looking for change within the party and eventually split. Harry Schwarz and other reformist UP members left and formed the Reform Party. However, Hackland notes that there was a difference in the 1975 split:

> While both the reformists and the progressives had been on the left of the United Party, the progressive group had demanded a new policy direction, whereas the reformists pressed for an organisational and image transformation of the party to revitalise it. (Hackland 1984: 330)

The Progressives saw “the potential liberalisation of the United Party as a great electoral threat, attracting ‘natural’ supporters away from the Progressive Party” (Hackland, 1984: 324). The fundamental difference between the two sides was that they were merging for different reasons as the “Progressives suspected the Reformists of being motivated primarily by political expediency, and questioned their commitment to multi-racialism” (Hackland, 1984: 331), and the Reformists were concerned by the fact that the Progressives were more concerned with principle than winning votes. The Reformists were concerned
with the advantages of a united opposition and the Progressives were concerned with political compatibility (Hackland, 1984: 333). However, “despite the mutual suspicions, negotiations for a merger began almost immediately after the formation of the Reform Party” but “had they attempted to continue separately they would have been in direct competition for the same votes” (Hackland, 1984: 331-332). This would be a similar case in the merger between the DP and NNP in 2000. Also similar to the DP/NNP merger was the fact that the PP had “already committed itself to the principle of a new alignment of opposition forces to provide ‘an effective opposition’ to the National Party” (Hackland, 1984: 332).

The primary issues during this merger were around the name of the party and leadership positions. Issues of ideological positioning or policy were of little importance. The Progressives managed to keep their ideology and policy in return for a name change to the Progressive Reform Party (PRP).

The Progressive Federal Party was formed on 5 September 1977 in a merger between the PRP and the newly formed Committee for a United Opposition led by former UP member Japie Basson. Compared to the formation of the Progressive Reform Party, the formation of the Progressive Federal Party was a considerably less fraught and complicated merger. The only issue which arose was the name of the party and it was eventually agreed that it would be called the Progressive Federal Party.

The Democratic Party
The formation of the Democratic Party in 1989 occurred in a similar fashion to previous mergers during the Prog years. There was an external call both from the media and business for a consolidation of the white opposition. As with the PRP and PFP mergers, the new parties (the Independent Party and the National Democratic Movement) joining the Progressives did not necessarily hold the same liberal beliefs and were more conservative. However, Leon points out that it was “apparent that any disagreement between the three was minor compared to the major chasm which yawned between the government and the extra-parliamentary forces on its Left” (Leon, 2007: loc 4463).

A key issue within this merger was around the leadership of the new party. The initial proposal was that Worrall (Independent Party leader) and Malan (National Democratic Movement leader) would be co-leaders with the PFP’s leader, Zach de Beer, as chairman which was rejected by the PFP. In a correspondence to senior party members, De Beer stated that there was a suggestion of triumvirate leadership in some form. De Beer states in this correspondence that his judgment “on purely practical grounds, is that this is simply not viable except as a very temporary expedient” (De Beer, 16 January 1989). He went on to state that:

It remains my view that the potential strength of the proposed new party is greater than the sum of the strength of the three present ones; that there is a very strong public desire for its formation, and that we should continue to work towards that goal. (De Beer, 16 January 1989)
There was also internal opposition to the merger as happened with the PRP which was mostly over the prominence of PFP members in the new organisation of the party (Leon, 2007: loc 4463). The DP’s new constitution focused on defeating apartheid and creating a new dispensation in South Africa Democratic Party, Constitution (8th Draft), 1989.

The merger to form the DP resulted in a loss of name and, in some ways, power for the Progressive element of the party. This was perhaps due to the pressure from the media and public to form a new opposition to the NP that the Progressives were willing to surrender part of their identity and power within the new organisation of the DP. However, the Progressive element within the party would eventually regain its strength post-1994.

The Democratic Alliance

As with the decision to merge with the Reform Party, the DP decided to merge with the New National Party (and Federal Alliance) in 2000 so that there would be less competition for votes and to gain the NNP’s coloured voters.

Of particular interest with this party merger is the fact that it did not result in a long-lasting merger as opposed to previous mergers in the DA’s history. The divide between the two centres of power soon played out and within a year, the NNP left the Democratic Alliance and formed an alliance with the ANC. However, many previous NNP members remained within the DA which partly ensured its electoral survival during floor-crossing periods. The split could be attributed to the type of party organisation which evolved. The DP held the centre of power and there was distrust between the two factions which was never resolved. This was less an ideological bringing together of similar parties based on similar beliefs and objectives, and more a case of eliminating the Nats as competition and gaining votes in the process for the DP. For the NNP, it was an attempt to revive its electoral standing and power.

This merger also differed in that the NNP was already a well-established party with its own organisational structure and it attempted to maintain this structure within the Democratic Alliance. The DP centre had historically been able to swallow a party without too much trouble for its organisational structure or ideology. The NNP was institutionalised as was the DP by this point. The split from the DA was not over ideology but about organisational differences and dominance as the NNP was not particularly concerned with the ideological aspects of the party. The two parties never fully merged at an organisational level and there was a distrust between the two centres of power which had been formed. Unlike the DP formation which had co-leaders from the other parties, Van Schalkwyk was made a deputy leader as per the agreement reached between the two parties (Outline Agreement between the Democratic Party and the National Party, 24 June 2000). As part of the agreement between the two parties, a national management committee was set up to iron out any further organisational issues and design a policy for the new party. The DP ensured that they had the majority share of power on the committee by basing it on the 1999 election
results (Outline Agreement between the Democratic Party and the National Party, 24 June 2000). However, this new committee struggled to agree on party image issues:

The new management committee quickly became a site of arm-twisting over all and everything: from the party’s logo and livery to whether the national leader would feature alone in the iconography for local elections or with a ‘more inclusive imaging’ – which was Natspeak for including Van Schalkwyk on the posters and billboards...These early dynamics gave the accurate assessment that at the top leadership level, at least, ours was to be a fairly loveless union, driven more by need and necessity than by affection. (Leon, 2007: loc 15709)

This merger/formation also differed from previous formations in that the two parties had to maintain separate political identities at the provincial and parliamentary levels according to the Constitution. This caused the major, and eventually fatal, issue of two centres of power:

The continued co-existence of the NNP alongside the DA allowed the NNP to retain a separate identifiable leader, backed up by an office, staff, funding and visible perks. They retained a separate financial base for the maintenance of their structures, refusing to open their books to us on the basis of ‘donor confidentiality’ (Leon, 2007: loc 15835)

Membership also became a problematic issue as the NNP attempted to secure more members for itself in order to out-vote the DP at congress. A membership audit conducted by the DP side of the party in 2001 showed that the NNP were not playing ball when it came to providing information regarding membership. According to Leon:

The NNP favoured representation to be determined on the basis of party membership in branches and regions. The DP wanted delegates to be chosen largely on the basis of electoral support in areas across South Africa (Leon, 2007: loc 15950).

This difference between the two parties as organisations was significant as the DP had the voters and the NNP had the members. In addition, the NNP proceeded to sign up thousands of members ahead of the Congress. The DA conducted an internal audit of the membership figures and found considerable irregularities. The NNP was effectively trying to crook the books in order to ensure that if voting were to occur along membership lines then they would have the majority. A senior DP figure wrote at the time that:

At the heart of the membership conflict is the NNP’s drive for influence in the DA and the assertion of its political culture...the NNP has sought by stealth to take increasing control of the Alliance by signing up thousands of members to back up its demands in party constitutional negotiations (Financial Mail, 12 October 2001 cited in Leon, 2007: loc 15969).

The merger with the NNP, as with previous mergers in the party’s history, was also not happily received by many senior DP members who were concerned around the power dynamics. Ken Andrew believed that there was “no problem about policy and principles. The disputes are about power”. Colin Eglin argued that “The decision to form the DA was entirely top-down. It was sold as a merger on our terms and anything less than that would lead to a different view of the DA”. Dene Smuts said that “We’re going to strap the rotting carcass of the Nats onto our backs” (Leon, 2007: loc 15609).
The merger however, saw unprecedented growth for the party. In the local elections of 2000 it took 22.1% nationally and won 53% in the Cape metropole. Although an unhappy and short-lived merger, it was a successful one.

Merger with the Independent Democrats
The realignment of politics, specifically opposition politics, has been a major theme within the DA since the Progressives days. With this in mind, the DA and Patricia de Lille’s Independent Democrats merged on 15 August 2010. The Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties was far more explicit in terms of organisational merger than that of the NNP/DP merger (Memorandum of Understanding, 15 August 2010). The DA, having learnt from its experience with the NNP of having two separate organisational structures, ensured that the ID was incorporated at the senior decision-making level early on in the process. It also allowed ID members to change membership over to the DA from 2010. The fact that the ID were not a long-established party meant that the organisational structures could merge quite easily and that there were no disagreements around power-sharing. De Lille was soon elected as the DA’s candidate for Mayor of Cape Town which also ensured that political power was shared. This merger also differed in that for the first time, there appeared to be no disagreement around the party name and the party remained as the Democratic Alliance. This is perhaps the clearest sign of institutionalisation within the party in that it managed to keep its name.

Agang-SA
Although the merger with Agang-SA in 2014 never officially materialised, it provides an example of the DA’s institutionalisation. The DA needed to attract black voters and believed that in order to do this, it needed a prominent black leader from outside of the party. Part of the discussion with Mamphela Ramphele to merge the two parties was around changing the name of the party to The Democrats but she expected the DA to disband as an organisation in order to form a new party as opposed to maintaining the DA’s organisational apparatus. Although the DA was willing to rebrand itself as The Democrats, by this point in its history, it was a strong, solid organisation and so would not agree to Ramphele’s terms of disbanding the party. On this basis, as well as other reasons to be explored later, the DA did not merge with Agang-SA.

2.1.4. Conclusion
The formation of the DA today followed Panebianco’s mixed type. It began with territorial diffusion in the form of the Progressive Group, a small group of local elites who formed together. This group then had to expand its membership base after electoral losses. The mergers with other parties over the years could be interpreted as a type of territorial penetration.

The external environment had an impact in that the party did not have the external electoral support required to support its internal development. One could then argue that its reliance on the external environment meant that it had very little autonomy. However,
the fact that the external environment did not destroy the party could be argued to show that it was strongly institutionalised.

The party’s institutionalisation was weak until the 1970s. By the 1970s, its systems and structures as an organisation were in place, its central structure was cohesive and strong and it had become more autonomous as it had grown. The institutional strength of the party is evident in its ability to bring on other parties and remain the dominant power within the new parties.

The origin of the DA has left an indelible mark on the party. The early days of the Progressives are still evident within the party that is now the Democratic Alliance. Its purpose as a party, since 1959, has been to realign politics in South Africa towards a liberal ideology and based on the belief in a non-racial political system of equality and opportunities for all South Africans (apart from the qualified franchise era). As an organisation, it has focussed itself on opposition politics predominantly because of the external environment in which it found itself – fighting a type of dominant-party nationalism. Its original internal structure has remained the same despite the mergers.

Ideologically, the party has continued to propose a liberal alternative despite bringing in various other parties. The only issue which has changed since its formation in 1959, but not necessarily changed in terms of the label attributed to the party, is its belief in the superiority of Western (white) civilisation. Whilst this position changed in the 1970s, it has left a mark on the party which will be explored in the following chapters. Its racial project politically, has also changed from multi-racialism to non-racialism. Organisationally, however, it has changed from a multi-racial project (though never fully achieved due to apartheid legislation) to a white liberal project and back to its origin as a multi-racial project.

Organisationally, the party has managed to maintain its grip on the party’s identity and internal structure throughout several mergers. It was formed in opposition and has remained in opposition at a national level throughout its history. As Panebianco argues, this requires strong and solid organisation. The party was formed around a central group of ‘elites’ who maintained control of the party for over two decades and developed a strong organisation which has managed to adapt and survive several changes both externally and internally in terms of mergers with other parties. As will be shown in the chapters which follow, the central group would be a feature of the post-1994 party and, again, ensure its survival. Not only has the party managed to survive but it has managed to grow in the democratic era. This is perhaps most evident in its ability to outlive the NNP after the formation of the Democratic Alliance and continue to grow and expand its market.
2.2 Stage II - The Democratic Alliance’s Identity

2.2.1. Introduction
The DA’s organisational structure has largely remained the same despite the mergers and name changes which have occurred over the years. However, its party type and identity has evolved in order to adapt to the continued racialised environment of the democratic era.

Stage II of the Party Evolution Model deals with a party’s organisational type which provides it with its identity but as Krouwel argues, a party’s identity is not only about its organisational structure but what the party stands for. A political party’s identity can then be divided into two aspects, its internal organisation and its ideological identity. Both of these aspects constitute the party’s overall identity. However, there is a difference between the party as an organisation and the party as an ideological institution. Ideologically, one would expect a party to retain its traditional roots as it adapts internally to meet external electoral demands. But as will be argued through the research, the internal organisational adaptation to a vote-seeking party has had an impact on the party ideologically and institutionally.

The following will outline the party’s organisational structure since 1994 as well as the major role-players in the party in order to identify the party type. This will provide an overview of the decision-making structures and leadership within the party. The final section will examine the party’s ideological identity as a liberal party, how it came about, and how it has started to rearticulate its political identity over the last few years. This will be done by examining how leading figures in the party have defined its political identity.

2.2.2. The DA’s Organisational Identity
The DA is a federal party but has become increasingly centralised over the years as it has professionalised its operation. The decision-making structures of the party have remained the same throughout its history with only a change in name from national executive and council in the early Progressive Party years to federal executive and council in later formations. The major role-players within these structures have in some cases also remained the same for long periods of time since 1994 as was the case during the Progressive era. The party is very leader-centred both in organisation and communication. The day-to-day work of running the party has always fallen to a smaller group within the party centred around the Federal Leader. As the party has grown, so has the importance of the parliamentary caucus and operation where most of the party’s policy and communication are driven. This has also been the case with provincial caucuses as the DA’s numbers have increased in the provincial legislatures. However, decisions on how the party operates are still taken and run from the Federal Executive and Federal Head Office level.

The following will outline the structure of the DA as well as introduce some of the key role-players in the party.
Federal Structure

There are three major decision-making structures within the party outside of the Federal Congress: the Federal Executive, the Federal Council and the National Management Committee (NMC). The Federal Executive and Federal Council are larger decision-making bodies whereas the NMC is a smaller body which meets weekly to discuss day-to-day issues relating to the party. The Federal Executive is responsible for the overall day-to-day running of the party at a national level. The Federal Council is the highest decision-making body and deals with issues of policy or matters which have been referred to it by the Federal Executive.

As a political party, the DA is structured along a branch, constituency, provincial and federal system. Section 2.1.4 of the DA’s Federal Constitution states:

Branches are the basic organisational formations of the Party and every member of the Party must be a member of a Branch and must exercise his or her rights and privileges as a member through his or her Branch and its elected representatives and delegates. (Democratic Alliance, Federal Constitution, 2015)

Above the branch level is the constituency level which is delimited geographically. In some provinces such as Gauteng, an additional regional level has been created between the constituency and provincial structures. Each province has its own provincial constitution, congress and executive which are replicated at a regional level in provinces with regional structures.

At a federal level, the Federal Congress is the supreme decision-making and governing body in terms of policy, vision and principles of the party. When the Federal Congress is not sitting, this falls to the Federal Council which is required to meet at least twice a year but in general meets quarterly. The Federal Council consists of members of the Federal Executive, provincial leaders and other public representatives elected by the provinces and regions and is the most representative body of the party outside of the Federal Congress.

The Federal Executive has the following role:

6.3.3.1 performs the functions and exercises the powers of the Federal Council when the Council is not in session; save that only the full Federal Council may approve candidate selection regulations and any amendments thereto;

6.3.3.2 implements the decisions of the Federal Council;

6.3.3.3 appoints the Chief Executive Officer of the Party, who is in turn responsible for appointing all other Party staff, subject to the policy and directives of the federal executive;

6.3.3.4 controls and directs activities of the Party;

6.3.3.5 subject to this constitution and the constitutions of the provinces, takes decisions and makes regulations, binding on all party structures, concerning membership administration, organisation, finance, discipline and other matters affecting the welfare of the Party;
In addition to these structures is the National Management Committee which meets weekly. The NMC makes decisions on the party’s day-to-day administration. The NMC includes the Leader, the Parliamentary Leader if the Leader is not a MP, the Federal Chairperson, the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson of the Federal Council, the Chief Executive Officer (who is either a professional staff member or a public representative), the Federal Chairperson of Finance, the Chief Whip of the National Assembly and such other persons as may be co-opted to assist. The latter could include professional staff or in the case where the DA governs a municipality or province, the elected leaders (DA Federal Constitution 2015). There has always been provision for a NMC within the party’s constitution but this only became formalised in the 2000s with the formation of the Democratic Alliance. The NMC reports to the Federal Executive on any activities or decisions which it makes.

Leadership
The DA is a very leader-centred organisation both internally and externally. Although the Federal Leader is considered the leader of the party, there are two other significant leadership positions within the federal structure – the Federal Chairperson and the Chairperson of the Federal Council. When the Federal Leader is not the Parliamentary Leader then the Parliamentary Leader plays a similar role to that of the Federal Leader. The Federal Chairperson is responsible for policy formulation. The Chair of the Federal Council (and Federal Executive) is in charge of running the party at an organisational level.

Table 2: Party leadership since 1994

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<th>Leadership position</th>
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⁷ The period under Zille was the first time that the Federal Leader was not the Parliamentary Leader.
The Federal Leader of the party over the years has personified the party’s identity since 1994. Tony Leon acted as policy-driven robust opposition, Zille demonstrated the DA’s ability to be an alternative government and Mmusi Maimane has taken the focus to the racial identity of the party and overseen its shift to an issue-based, activist-driven party.

The team which surrounds the Federal Leader also has an impact on how the party operates. For a long period under Tony Leon, it was a central team consisting of James Selfe, Douglas Gibson, Ryan Coetzee, Russel Crystal, Ian Davidson, Nick Clelland, Gareth van Onselen and David Maynier. After Leon’s departure, only Selfe and Coetzee remained. Zille, however, did bring in some new staff appointments such as Jonathan Moakes, Geordin Hill-Lewis and Gavin Davis who would remain very close and loyal to her over the years but would eventually shift allegiance to Mmusi Maimane in 2015.

The two major staff positions within the party have been the CEO (a position which was created in the mid-2000s) and the Executive Director of Communications. Although the party has had an Executive Director before, the CEO position was new and part of the shift to a more professionalised operation. The first CEO was Ryan Coetzee followed by Jonathan Moakes and then Paul Boughey who is the current party CEO. The CEO has been responsible for strategy as well as overseeing the party’s organisation in conjunction with the Chairperson of the Federal Council. The Executive Director of Communications has also been a prominent role-player in the party’s professionalisation and the position has been held by Nick Clelland, Gareth van Onselen and Gavin Davis.

Voters, membership and activists
Since the era of the Progressives, the party has had a predominantly white, middle class and English-speaking voter and membership base. Members and voters do not necessarily translate into ‘troops on the ground’ which is the domain of activists. In terms of political organisation and activities, the party needs to rely on a group of activists. In areas where it did not have a presence, particularly black areas, an immense amount of work has had to be done in order to find enough members in order to create branches and train activists. Activists are also important because they provide the party with potential candidates for the legislatures and councils.

Professional staff
As a party professionalises, the executive staff structure becomes as important as the political structure. At an executive level, the demographics of this team have remained white and predominantly male. In 2016, the professional staff in executive positions consisted predominantly (95%) of white men. The senior staff complement was at 68% white and the executive management team was 86% male (Sunday Times, ‘Balancing Acts: Why Maimane faces a tough job to keep all his members happy’, 24 January 2016). This does not differ much from the executive of the party a decade earlier. In 2005/2006, of the eight heads of department, seven were white male with one white female (CEO Report, 5 May 2006). In 2017, the DA appointed its first ever black female executive director in the
party’s history. So whilst the party has managed to achieve some degree of diversity in its leadership structures, it has failed to achieve the same level of diversity in its professional leadership structure.

2.2.3. The DA’s Ideological identity
In order to understand the DA as a political party, it is necessary to understand its political ideology or identity as this forms the basis for its policies and actions. The ideological identity of a political party also forms part of its party identity and label. The DA and its predecessors have always predominantly identified as a liberal democratic party. Even when the party merged with other parties, its constitution and principles remained firmly liberal. Unfortunately for the DA, liberalism has a ‘white’ (and English) identity in South African discourse which contributes to a sense of racial exclusiveness. The ANC has also played a role in linking liberalism to whiteness by repeatedly referring to the party as white liberals. This type of labelling creates the impression that the ideology is an exclusive (white) rather than an inclusive (diverse or multi-racial) identity. The party has had to adapt its ideology to a more voter-friendly message of its values over the years.

The party first made an attempt to limit the damage of the term liberal by calling its vision/brand the Open Opportunity Society for All. Although liberal in nature, it does not explicitly use the term liberalism. However, in recent years, its brand of liberalism has changed and, in some respects, has become less about principles and ideas and more about providing the right message to voters. Although there has not been a full shift to the point that the party could no longer be considered liberal, there appears to be a lack of a unifying ideological identity or an articulation of what that ideology is.

The following will provide a discussion on the DP/DA’s various conceptions of its ideological identity over the years as well as its racial project as this contributes to the party’s political identity in the South African context. It begins with the Open Opportunity Society For All as this was the party’s articulation of its principles for almost 15 years. It will then go on to look at how some of the key figures in the DA have interpreted the party’s ideological standpoint. Finally, it will argue that there has been an ideological shift with the party’s new Values Charter in 2015.

Developing the Open Opportunity Society for All
I believe that ultimately, the DP wants South Africa to be governed by liberal policies – which flow from liberal principles – in a liberal democratic constitutional state (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The Open Opportunity Society has been the party’s articulation of its political vision since at least 2000. However, the DP did not enter the democratic era with a clearly defined vision or philosophy. The DP was what Leon called a ‘political fruit salad’. The Progressive Party

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8 The South African Institute of Race Relations (a liberal think tank) and R.W. Johnson have recently questioned whether the DA could still call itself liberal.
had been a liberal democratic party but by the time it had merged to form the DP, it had become “an amalgam of philosophies and approaches” (interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). Leon explains that this:

had grown out of where the party came from, it was a broadly anti-apartheid system party of whites; so therefore whites who felt comfortable in the system...so it really contained everyone from the end conscription campaign types through to the sort of Free Market Foundation. (Interview with T. Leon, 2017)

As the party began to bring in outsiders, the internal ideological identity was diluted and there was a lack of an unifying vision beyond seeking the end of apartheid. Even before becoming leader of the DP, Leon believed that the party had become consumed by the anti-apartheid struggle and that by the end of apartheid, it had lost its purpose and mission. Leon thought that there was a gap in the new democratic era for a liberal party and that the DP should fill that gap: “It was both a philosophical matter and strategically a smart thing to do in the post-apartheid South Africa” (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). Leon’s positioning of the party as liberal also came from his own interest in liberalism and background. As will be discussed further, the party set about devising its own liberal agenda for South Africa shortly after Leon was elected Leader of the DP.

The political identity of the party was essential to differentiate it from the ANC. Leon stated in 2003:

The DA was constantly criticized that it opposed the ANC, but what did it stand for? A political party had to go forward and had to have principles, policies and core values. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 25 April 2003)

This alternative was eventually branded the Open Opportunity Society for All and has been the DA’s brand of liberalism since the early 2000s. In a speech articulating this concept in June 2004, Leon defined the DA’s liberalism as the following:

The DA’s starting point is completely different [from the ANC]. For us, society is comprised at its most basic level of individuals, and not of racially defined groups, or for that matter of classes or ethnic groups.

I need to make clear that this does not mean we believe people are simply individuals. Identity is a complex thing, and is shaped by many forces - psychological, economic, genetic, cultural, historical, and so on - and each of us is at least in part the product of these forces.

But as liberals we do believe that people are more than the sum of the forces that are brought to bear on them, or at least that the combination of forces produces individuals with a unique outlook on the world, who construct their own meaning and who are best placed to apprehend their own truth, or truths. (Leon, ‘The DA’s Vision: an Open Opportunity Society’, 16 June 2004)

Leon also acknowledged that there were different strands of liberalism and that it was “neither necessary nor desirable that we should all subscribe to one view of what it means to be a liberal” but that, at the most basic level, liberals all agreed in the primacy of the individual (Leon, ‘The DA’s Vision: an Open Opportunity Society’, 16 June 2004). He went on
to make a distinction between how the DA’s liberal view differed from the ANC’s philosophical underpinning:

The first difference between the ANC and the DA, then, is that the DA believes the individual is the basic unit of society, while the dominant part of the ANC believes it is the racial group. (Leon, ‘The DA’s Vision: an Open Opportunity Society’, 16 June 2004)

A few months later, in a speech to the Federal Congress in 2004 articulating the DA’s new vision, Leon listed the five core principles of the party as being: individual freedom and opportunity; non-racialism and diversity; an effective opposition that is building an alternative government; a caring party that makes a difference; integrity and accountability. For the purposes of this discussion, the individual freedom and opportunity, and non-racialism and diversity aspects are most relevant. Leon described individual freedom as follows:

The foundation of the DA’s identity is our belief in individual freedom.

For us, the individual is the touchstone of value in our society - not racial groups, nor economic classes or ethnic divisions.

We do recognise that our individual identities are shaped by our families and by the communities we live in.

We embrace the concept of the individual that is reflected in the African notion of ubuntu.

"Motho ke motho ka batho" - "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu": a person is a person through relationships with other people.

Yet we also believe that people are more than the sum of their demographic parts. Each of us is unique. Each of us has the innate potential to choose our own destiny.

Therefore our party must stand up for the right of each individual to be free. (Leon, ‘A new vision for the Democratic Alliance’, 20 November 2004)

The DA believed in the primacy of the individual and individual rights but recognised that groups such as the family and community shape the individual. However, the DA believed that group rights should not override individual rights. The reference to Ubuntu in this speech is important as the Ubuntu concept would come up in later discussions around the DA’s ideological identity. From Leon’s interpretation, it acknowledges the individual but that the individual is shaped by those around her. Individual freedom was further linked to economic freedom and opportunity for all.

Non-racialism and diversity is another key aspect to examine in terms of the party’s ideological standpoint as it forms part of the DA’s response to its environment. Leon stated that:

The DA also believes, fundamentally, in non-racialism and in the value of diversity.

We believe that each and every human being is equal in dignity and worth.
Our party recognises, and acknowledges, the enormous pain and damage that centuries of racism and exploitation have inflicted on the majority of people in our country in the name of the minority.

And so we support measures to increase access to opportunity for those of our fellow citizens who were deprived and oppressed in the past.

That is a matter of basic social justice, as well as good economic sense.

Yet we do not believe that the answer to racism is more racism. We cannot put colour above all else—above opportunity, ahead of jobs, in front of better public services.

The best way to address the legacy of the past is to build the best possible future.

And so while the DA believes very strongly in diversity, we do not believe in what the ruling party calls "representivity".

There is an important difference between these two principles.

Representivity is based on the idea that only someone from a particular group can represent that group.

In other words: blacks must stand for blacks, whites must stand for whites, and so on. (Leon, “A new vision for the Democratic Alliance, 20 November 2004)

As can be seen from the above quotation, the DA’s position on non-racialism was not one of colourblindness or denial of past racial injustice as is commonly attributed to the party (McKaiser, 2014; Anciano, 2016). As was discussed in the party’s origin, the Progressives acknowledged the existence of racial identity. The DP and DA have also always acknowledged the existence of racial identity and that it remains a measure for disadvantage in South Africa. However, the party’s concept of non-racialism is aspirational and it hopes that race will one day not define economic or social circumstances.

The DA’s brand of liberalism was further unpacked through its paper Realising the Open Opportunity Society for All. It defines the Open Opportunity Society for All as follows:

The term “Open Opportunity Society for All” brings together three key concepts – individual freedom under the rule of law, opportunity with responsibility and full equality for all – and in doing so, creates a fourth concept that underpins our vision of the proper relationship between individuals, the state and society in South Africa today. (Democratic Alliance, Realising the Open Opportunity Society for All)

At the centre of this concept of the open opportunity society for all is the individual. The Open society is based on the following components:

- A constitution that enshrines the rule of law, individual rights and freedoms and the separation of powers
- Transparency and accountability, without which governments abuse their power and compromise the freedoms enshrined in the constitution.
In the DA’s opportunity society, the individual has “the opportunity to develop the capabilities needed to take advantage of the formal freedoms they enjoy; the wherewithal actually to be themselves, to develop themselves and to pursue their own ends” (Democratic Alliance, *Realising the Open Opportunity Society for All*). The “for all” section refers to the following:

- An absolute rejection of discrimination on grounds of race and other characteristics of birth
- A clear acknowledgement that that there is a long history of racial discrimination and oppression in South Africa, that it was wrong and that positive action is now required to make it right. That positive action must be targeted at individuals who still suffer the effects of discrimination, not at groups. It must provide opportunity to the disadvantaged without shutting off opportunity to the advantaged.
- A clear acknowledgement that all South Africans are legitimate and enjoy full moral equality – that is what it means to say South Africa “belongs” to all who live in it.
- The active protection and promotion of the language and culture of all South Africans. (Democratic Alliance, “Realising the Open Opportunity Society for All”)

The second point - positive action must be targeted at individuals who still suffer the effects of discrimination, not at groups - is of particular importance when placing the DA’s ideological identity within the racialised environment. It deals with race based on the individual, not the group.

For most of the democratic era, the vision in the Federal Constitution of the party reflected an articulation of the Open Opportunity Society For All. It stated the following:

The Democratic Alliance’s vision is of a prosperous, Open Opportunity Society for All that is uniquely South African; in which every person is free, secure, and equal before the law; and in which everyone has the means to improve the quality of his life and pursue her own aspirations.

Our vision rests on the belief that:
South Africans can and must overcome the historic divisions of race and ethnicity, and unite in our diversity around a shared South African identity.

All South Africans are of equal worth and have a right to full participation in the life of our common South African society.

South Africa’s Constitution is the only foundation on which an Open Opportunity Society for All can be built because it recognises that every person is equal in dignity and worth and guarantees the freedom of each individual. The rights enshrined in the constitution must be defended and promoted in order to protect the people of South Africa from the concentration and abuse of power.

An independent and effective opposition and alternative government that is loyal to the constitutional order is essential to the promotion and preservation of democracy and freedom in our country.

An independent and vibrant civil society is essential to the preservation of an open society, because it acts as a bulwark against any attempt by the state or the ruling party to impose a hegemony of thought and truth over society.

The dignity of every person and the freedoms enshrined in the constitution cannot fully be realised unless everyone has the means to pursue his own happiness and improve the quality of her life. Consequently, the creation of meaningful opportunity must be central to the programme of government at every level.

The force behind the growing prosperity of any society is a socially and environmentally responsible free enterprise economy driven by choices, risks and hard work. Without the growth in prosperity created through the exercise of the market economy there can be no opportunity, freedom loses its purpose and choices become increasingly limited.

No one must be left behind in an opportunity society. The government must therefore provide access to education and training, and promote the progressive realisation of access to social security, housing and healthcare for those who through no fault of their own are unable to provide for themselves.

The final point in the vision suggests that the DA leans towards social liberalism as it believes that the government should still play a role in addressing social issues such as welfare, education and healthcare. The DA itself does not explicitly state which strand of liberalism it belongs to.

In 2008, the DA re-branded itself but not with a different identity, vision or Constitution but a new logo. Zille places an emphasis in her speech that whilst the logo had changed, the vision remained the same:

But as we move forward, we will not cut ourselves adrift from our animating values or our vision for South Africa. On the contrary, our core beliefs and the success we have enjoyed to date, are the foundation for our regeneration and renewal.

\[9\] This was changed from “ruling” to “governing” in 2012.
What stays the same is our vision of an open opportunity society for all, founded on the bedrock of our core values. (Zille, ‘Delivering the South African Dream: One Nation One Future’, 15 November 2008)

The re-branding did not lead to an ideological shift - it kept the same vision and principles but packaged them in a more voter-friendly manner and as an alternative government for South Africa. The DA had become more of a sales-oriented party at this point in its history.

Ubuntu Liberalism Africanness?
Changes in the DA’s political identity began towards the end of 2012. There were two factors which contributed to this - the departure of long-time strategist Coetzee and the DA’s ‘backroom’ discussions with Ramaphole. The debate about the DA’s ideological identity went public in January 2013 when Maimane wrote a piece on Africanness, with some viewing this debate as the ‘old guard’ of the DA fiercely guarding the party’s principles and unwilling to accept change or a different identity. As part of this debate, the concepts of Ubuntu and Africanness were brought in and questions raised as to whether these were liberal ideas.

It is important to begin this discussion with an essay written by Coetzee in 2012 which outlined the DA’s liberal beliefs and what it needed to guard against in the future as it attempted to grow its market. The essay was written in his personal capacity but provided a detailed explanation of the DA’s interpretation of liberalism. He summarised the party’s type of liberalism as follows:

And so liberals believe in the primacy of the individual. We do not believe that the individual is all; we do not believe that group identity is illegitimate or wrong or false; but we do believe that a recognition of and respect for the individual’s uniqueness and ability to make himself are ultimately of primary importance, because unless we so do, we deny her humanity, trample his dignity and cause suffering where there need be none. (Coetzee, The liberal individual, group identity and human solidarity, 28 February 2012)

Coetzee then outlined the implications for the DA in how it dealt with the dominant political culture in South Africa:

The implications of this for the DA and South Africa are important. It is precisely because we believe in the primacy of the individual, and precisely because we respect the uniqueness of every person, that we champion the cause of diversity and pluralism. That is why we protect and promote the language and culture of every person in South Africa and work hard to ensure that the DA “feels like a home” to people of all cultures.

But, having said that, our belief in the primacy of the individual is also the reason we do not treat people as mere representatives of groups. We do not reserve positions for people on the basis of their group identities; we do not advance or retard collectives; we do not accept that in order to be a legitimate member of a particular group (“real” blacks, Afrikaners, etc.) one has to conform to a given conception of the nature of the group or the people in it. (Coetzee, The liberal individual, group identity and human solidarity, 28 February 2012)
Within this argument he made the distinction between self-identifying with a particular group, group identities and identity politics:

In politics, especially in a society that has been divided through act of law and executive fiat into groups, it is very easy to pander to group identity, and often it seems relatively cost-free to do so.

But we run a great risk by pandering to group identity, as opposed to promoting the right of individuals to self-identify with groups. Because when we do that we divide people in a way that sets them up as antagonists, and we deny their individuality and agency, and so trample their dignity.

And so we must embrace the legitimacy and importance of group identities, but we must not embrace “identity politics” which reduces people, whether implicitly or explicitly, to mere representatives of groups and seeks to advance or retard advancement on this basis. The distinction may seem subtle, but I think it is actually quite clear and easy to apply to real-world situations. (Coetzee, The liberal individual, group identity and human solidarity, 28 February 2012)

This distinction between self-identification and group identity becomes important when examining the DA’s policies on race-based legislation such as Employment Equity and Black Economic Empowerment. Coetzee wrote that:

Our approach to affirmative action is that redress is needed in response to past injustice, but that the redress needs to be targeted at individuals, not groups, who still suffer the effects of that injustice today. We do not believe, as President Mbeki once argued in parliament, that redress must be directed towards groups because the injustice was directed towards groups. His statement was deeply reflective of the assumptions of his African nationalism: it implicitly acknowledges that the existence of African nationalism in the first place is a consequence of racism – a response to it; also it implies that redress for some is in some sense redress for all, because all are part of a greater whole (so if an incredibly wealthy black person wins a BEE contract and buys a Mercedes Benz, other black people living in abject poverty have vicariously been uplifted). (Coetzee, The liberal individual, group identity and human solidarity, 28 February 2012)

The other aspect which he addressed was how liberalism defines non-racialism:

The idea of non-racialism as “colourblindness” (a quite common liberal approach) is understandably offensive to many black people because they argue, quite reasonably, that being black is an important aspect of their identity and to deny it is to deny them the right to be fully themselves. Colourblindness is not necessary for a belief in non-racism, however, any more than genderblindness is necessary for a belief in non-sexism. The requirement of non-racism is first, never to discriminate against people on the basis of their race and second, never to assume knowledge of their identities on the basis of race. Some of the opponents of colourblindness are of course racial nationalists, and they oppose the idea precisely because they assume knowledge of an individual’s identity on the basis of his race. But the fallacy at the heart of this approach is no reason for liberals to promote colourblindness in so far as it means pretending race is an illegitimate aspect of identity. (Coetzee, The liberal individual, group identity and human solidarity, 28 February 2012)
The essay provides a good summation of the DA’s principles and values within a South African context as well as the specific relation between liberalism and the racialised environment.

Late in 2012, Helen Zille delivered a major realignment speech to the Cape Town Press Club which first signalled the DA’s willingness to shift its political identity in order to attract votes. In the speech, Zille said that:

South Africa needs a convergence in the political centre, of everyone who is committed to four core values:

- Defending our constitution and securing its promise of equal rights and fair opportunities for all.
- Nurturing genuine non-racialism on the basis of reconciliation and redress.
- Growing an appropriately regulated, market-driven economy that can achieve the levels of sustainable growth needed to reduce unemployment significantly and lessen inequality.
- Building a state that puts competence above party loyalty, values service and punishes self-interest and corruption.

In South Africa, where our political affiliation tends to be ingrained in our psyche, it is especially difficult to take the leap required. It is like asking people to give up part of their identity. It is easier to remain on the burning platform. (Zille, ‘A new political order for South Africa’, 27 September 2012)

The speech was delivered at the time when the DA was in talks with Ramphele to join the party. The DA was signalling to others that it was willing to shift its political identity in order to bring other opposition parties on board.

The ideological identity debate went public in 2013 after Mmusi Maimane (National Spokesperson at the time) penned an opinion piece on Africanness and Ubuntu. Maimane was writing in response to the ANC’s Jackson Mthembu defining what it means to be African. Maimane’s piece was relatively innocuous and spoke to the need for a South African identity. It also said that Ubuntu was the core of Africanness. The piece sparked a response from former party head of communications, Gareth van Onselen, arguing that it was illiberal and was a type of collectivism that did not fit with the DA’s liberal values. The two issues which van Onselen took issue with related to the use of Ubuntu as a principle and Maimane’s final comment “Being African means being part of a community”. He argued that the opinion piece was “illustrative of a certain vein of politically correct but ideologically incompatible rhetoric starting to creep into the DA’s language” (van Onselen, ‘An erosion of the DA’s liberal values?’, 21 January 2013). van Onselen concluded by saying that:

How the DA goes about relating to such things, understanding them and connecting with those people who feels strongly about them, without compromising its core beliefs, is the next great challenge for the party. (van Onselen, ‘An erosion of the DA’s liberal values?’, 21 January 2013)
In response, Gavin Davis wrote a piece arguing that Ubuntu was not against liberalism:

It is true that the concept of Ubuntu is ill-defined. But, because of this, it is difficult to ascertain whether it is compatible with liberalism or not. Since both concepts are open to contestation (even if liberalism is far better defined), it is feasible for a person to self-identify as a liberal who believes in Ubuntu.

The third argument was the subject of fierce academic debate between communitarians and liberals in the 1980s. It fizzled out when somebody pointed out that one could be an individual in the context of a defined community - as long as group rights were not permitted to override individual rights. (Davis, ‘For liberalism to succeed we must dispense with dogma’, 22 January 2013)

It is important to examine this argument as Davis was head of communications at the time and he forms part of the group behind the shift towards the purely vote-seeking party communications. Bringing Africanness and Ubuntu into liberalism was an attempt to shift the idea of liberalism from a ‘white’ concept to something which embraced the ‘African’ idea of community. As was mentioned previously, Ubuntu was not new in the party’s articulation of its vision, this occurred in 2004 as well. However, Maimane’s use was different and was not necessarily about Ubuntu but defining “our” Africanness – a group identity.

The debate between van Onselen and Davis was less about the DA’s liberalism and more about questions around Maimane’s own ideological identity. However, it did draw some media attention to how the DA was dealing with its political identity. Writing for the Daily Maverick, Munusamy noted the following:

his [van Onselen’s] 2,949-word dispatch in response to Maimane provides a rare glimpse into the internal convulsions of the DA as it tries to position itself as a government-in-waiting after the ANC self-destructs. Van Onselen’s views are representative of a portion of the DA’s traditional constituency which is increasingly concerned by the progressive extreme makeover of the party to make it friendlier to the black middle class.

There is clearly a debate in the DA as to whether it maintains its primary liberal identity or shifts towards an ideological hodge-podge incorporating populist and even socialist ideas. The party’s strategists have realised that there is no way of growing the party in large numbers and beyond its traditional constituency without lending itself to black African identity. Without any firm ideological grounding to its metamorphosis, the DA has to borrow philosophies like Africanness and ubuntu to appeal to its target audience. (Munusamy, The DA’s future: When ubuntu, Africanness and liberalism collide, 25 January 2013)

McKaiser devotes two brief chapters of his book Could I Vote DA?: A Voter’s Dilemma to the ideological identity of the DA and the debate on Ubuntu and liberalism. Although never interrogating how the DA has actually defined its form of liberalism over the years, McKaiser’s argument about the party’s ideological identity is worth exploring. McKaiser makes the point that many South Africans are social conservatives and that the DA’s liberal political identity does not come across as inclusive. McKaiser also makes reference to the
“old white liberals” in the party needing to “stop fearing a loss of power if new values enter the party’s round-table discussions” (McKaiser, 2014: 67). His main point is to question whether the DA could make its political identity more inclusive. In a socially conservative environment, it is very difficult for liberalism to come across as inclusive. The main position which Munusamy and McKaiser both come from is that liberalism is anathema to the ‘black identity’ in South Africa.

The DA’s ideological shift became an issue again in 2013 over its positions on Employment Equity and Black Economic Empowerment which will be discussed further in the Identity Crisis chapter. As a brief summary, the DA voted for two bills in Parliament which contained racial quotas, an issue which the party had fought against for decades. Whilst liberalism is not against employment equity per se, racial quotas are not a liberal position. In a discussion with the Mail & Guardian after this incident, Mazibuko stated how she viewed liberalism: “‘The two tenets of liberalism are individual freedom and social responsibility,” she said, explaining that the second element meant each society had to acknowledge its past” (Verashni Pillay, Mail & Guardian, ‘Lindiwe Mazibuko: Poverty has a race’, 18 November 2013). In response to this incident, van Onselen wrote:

A small group of people guarded its principles and values jealously and, more often than not, acted as a bulwark against any fundamental encroachment of the DA’s core political philosophy. As its borders become more porous and as it desperately seeks to better fit into that hostile environment, it has allowed into its ranks a series of people not fundamentally liberal. (van Onselen, ‘The Anatomy of a Hollow DA Apology’, 11 November 2013)

This is the importance of having a clear political identity. The DA’s failure to address how it defines its political identity means that the message leads to backtracking on positions and ideological confusion in policy.

The Values Charter

The internal debates around the DA’s ideological positioning came to the fore again in 2015. At the DA’s Federal Congress in 2015, the party replaced the Vision section of its Constitution with the Values Charter. The Values Charter was far more issues-based than the party’s previous liberal agenda for the future of South Africa. There was a leaning towards the right message for voters and the vision espoused in the Values Charter differed in one of the core tenets of liberalism – the individual. The idea of the primacy of the individual was replaced with the primacy of the family and community. The reality is that not many voters would look at a party’s constitution or read their vision and values. The Values Charter therefore was more a document for internal reasons to guide further party positions and communications.

The DA’s former articulation of liberalism - the Open Opportunity Society For All - is mentioned once but not fully explained and there was a move away from the individual and towards the idea of community and family. Although it does say that the individual forms
part of the family, there was a shift towards an appeal to the South African community and ‘the people’.

At the core of the Values Charter is the family. Although the party had previously recognised that individuals are shaped by families and communities, the Values Charter flips this concept and places the family before the individual:

- Strong people and strong social structures such as families, in all their different manifestations, flourish in strong communities. We have a duty to do everything in our power to strengthen and support the building of durable social structures that promote cooperation in our communities, for history has shown that when South Africans work together, we are unstoppable;

- Families, however uniquely structured, help build successful individuals and provide them a foundation with which to make sense of the world and to realise their full potential as individuals;

- A successful nation must have strong family structures, no matter how they are constituted, because no government can replace the role of family;

- When individuals are deprived of the opportunity to work, their independence and dignity, as well as their ability to provide for their families and those they care for, is undermined. Therefore, our country needs an economy capable of creating work. (Democratic Alliance, Our values: freedom, fairness, opportunity, May 2015)

The primacy of the individual has been lost in this document. The rest of the Values Charter remains similar in position to previous articulations of the DA’s political identity. It is not clear why the emphasis on family was needed except to appeal perhaps to a more socially-conservative voter.

In terms of whether the DA’s liberal identity has changed, there are differing opinions. Leon believes that it has. Selfe on the other hand argues that:

Well I would say it remains liberal in the sense that it espouses core liberal principles such as freedom, fairness and opportunity. It is an organisation that seeks to maximise individual choice by recognising that some people have been left behind and has a policy suite that addresses maximising choices for as many people in South Africa as possible. It’s changed in terms of its language because we used to be terribly dogmatic about the language we used, nowadays we seek to unpack those concepts in language that voters can understand. (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017)

Selfe also said that the Open Opportunity Society for All and Values Charter were not necessarily different but sought to unpack the Open Opportunity concept in a way which would be more accessible to voters. Boughey’s response was similar:

Well that [the Open Opportunity Society for All] is very much the philosophical underpinnings and in essence a lot of effort was put into how do you takes hundreds of years of political tradition, philosophy and thought broadly speaking under a liberal tradition and communicate that in a way that is understandable and acceptable for the reasons I’ve just articulated. It has
evolved into making it more accessible and we released a series of papers that underpin these under our core values being freedom, fairness, and opportunity. (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017)

The shift to the Values Charter was in some ways, then, a market-oriented move to make the DA’s philosophical underpinnings fit the views of more socially conservative voters by changing its position to the primacy of the family as opposed to the individual. Until the party releases its new policy platform, it is unclear whether this ideological identity shift has had an impact on its policies. The impact, however, has been clear at a messaging level where Maimane has attempted to distance the party from its liberal history and will be discussed further in the #Ayisafani chapter.

Another aspect which was addressed with the launch of Vision 2029 and the Values Charter was non-racialism. As part of Vision 2029, the DA released a document on the party’s vision for a fair South Africa. The document outlines how the party would achieve fairness through building an inclusive future, providing redress for the injustices of the past as well as social and cultural inclusion. The document begins with a note on non-racialism and a response to its opponents:

A cornerstone of the DA’s value system is non-racialism. Our adherence to this value has often led our political opponents, when convenient, to call us colour-blind – and caricature the DA as a party which does not think that race matters now, nor in the past.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The DA unequivocally recognises that race shaped access to opportunity and lived experience in the past. It continues to do so in the present. (Democratic Alliance, The DA’s Vision for a Fair South Africa, 2016)

It was important for the DA to address this notion of colourblindness because it has often been accused of advocating a colourblind non-racialism. The document sets out how it would achieve non-racialism:

For the DA, this means that our policies must be deliberate in addressing the hurt and wrongdoing of the past, but also remain committed to the foundational value of non-racialism. Achieving a non-racial society does not mean that race no longer matters to individuals in terms of their self-identification, the role it played in the development of communities or how it impacted families and individuals in the past. What it does mean is that in the future, race should never again play a role in disadvantaging, or indeed advantaging, anyone in our country. (Democratic Alliance, The DA’s Vision for a Fair South Africa, 2016)

The individual and self-identification remain elements within how the DA defines non-racialism except for the fact that the primacy of the community and family has replaced the individual. Further to this, Selfe summarised the DA’s definition of non-racialism as follows:

we recognise that race exists in our society, in particular, and that very often race correlates with disadvantage by virtue of the history of apartheid and colonialism. Therefore in order for us to move from a society that is based on race to a non-racial society, we have to expand the opportunities and life choices of people so that they are in a position where they all have equality of choices. I’m not saying that they should have equality of opportunity or equality of
outcomes but that to the extent possible every South African should be able to go as far as his or her capabilities take him or her. But that in order to overcome the burden of the past we have to accept that some people and some races were disadvantaged, not circumstantially, but deliberately and therefore redressing that has to be an equally deliberate process. (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017)

This articulation is similar to the one provided by Leon in 2004 and Coetzee in 2012 and so the DA’s racial project has remained the same.

2.2.4. Conclusion
The party’s organisational structure has remained the same throughout the democratic era. It would be classified as a modern cadre party type as it is dominated by the “professional leadership groups”; has a low member/voter ratio; uses members as a source of recruiting candidates; a strong orientation toward voters and maintains the structure of a mass party with its branches and constituencies. The major organisational adaptation of the party has occurred at a professional level and in terms of its racial makeup which will be traced in the chapters which follow.

At an ideological level, the DA is liberal democratic and subscribes to non-racialism. Although current members would not say that there has been a shift in the party’s ideology, there has certainly been a shift towards an ‘ideologically-lite’ identity. The shift in the ideological identity has only started to emerge over the last few years and so is not fully formed and might not result in an ideological shift at all. The introduction of ‘family values’ and placing the family above the individual does raise questions as to the DA’s current liberal standpoint. The more salient issue in terms of its political identity is that there is a reluctance to articulate a clear ideological standpoint and this can be lost in the message and the path to this position will be outlined over the next chapters. This shift is typical of the catch-all nature of the vote-seeking party. With the current DA political identity, there is enough liberalism to keep liberals happy and enough family and community to entice potential voters who might be more socially conservative. What is clear is that there is no longer the same intellectualism and strength around the party’s ideological identity as there was during the late 1990s and 2000s as the party has become more focused on the message. Ideology is important to shape both the identity and strategy of a party and also places certain limitations on how far it is willing to go to win votes.
Section Three: Stage III - Political Marketing after 1994

3.1 Fighting Back – 1994-1999

3.1.1. Introduction
The Democratic Party entered post-apartheid South Africa as a considerably diminished white opposition party compared to its position pre-1994. It had only managed to gain 1.7% of the vote in the first democratic elections. Both externally and internally, questions were raised as to whether the party had a future in the new South Africa. The new leadership of Tony Leon in 1994 signalled an era of fighting back for the party and a brand of robust opposition and ‘muscular’ liberalism. It was also an attempt to make a place for the party in a democratic SA which was dominated by two nationalist parties, the ANC and the NP, and in an era which was strongly dominated by a discourse of reconciliation, non-racialism, racialism as well as a type of racial census voting. For a party with a core constituency of white, middle-class, English-speaking voters, the latter factors were highly problematic for its potential growth. The DP needed to grow its constituency beyond its traditional support in order to remain alive in democratic SA. Key to this growth would be growing the party’s share of the vote. In order to do this, the party needed to take votes from the NP who became its closest competition by 1996.

It is at Stage III (political marketing) of the Party Evolution Model that a party’s adaptation takes place. The first five years of democracy were the start of the party’s adaptation from the label of White Liberal to Rainbow Nation. In terms of policy and communications, it had a rainbow nation rhetoric but in terms of party label and image, it remained still very white liberal. The first move it made was to gain the Afrikaner vote, not just the middle class Afrikaner vote but that of the working class too. This was soon followed by trying to attract coloured and Indian voters. Black voters were simply not available to the DP at the time and the party was not well known amongst this target market. The DP did not have the resources to campaign in black areas or get to those voters through its communications.

As the racial dynamics of the new era changed with the departure of reconciliatory Mandela and the start of the racialist Mbeki era, the party was faced with new challenges and a very direct racial attack on its make-up and opposition style from the ANC as well as the media.

Up until 1997, the DP was without a clearly defined strategy, except that it needed to grow from 1.7% of the vote. Its primary focus in the first few years of democracy was to contribute to the Constitution, to rebuild after its poor performance in the 1994 elections and to design a set of policies fitting the new South Africa. To achieve this, it defined its image as robust opposition.
By 1997, the DP began to develop a medium-term strategy to elevate its position electorally which entailed positioning itself against both the ANC and NP. The elections in 1999 were key for the party because it needed to increase its share of the vote in order to survive which was done by creating a base of minority voters. At this point, the DP was still a product-oriented party – it did not have the financial resources to run major campaigns in the way it could in later years and focused on the product.

The following will track the DP’s strategic transition from a white liberal party to a minorities party which was a necessary first step to becoming a rainbow nation party. It examines the strategy, positioning, and target market for the first five years of democracy.

3.1.2. Political Context: Reconciliation and Racialisation

From 1994 to 1996, the political environment was one of reconciliation. This was echoed both internally and externally for the DP. It needed to reconcile itself to its new position within the political landscape as well as reconcile its ideological positioning. Leon called the party at the time a ‘political fruit salad’ of social democrat and liberal. At an external level it began its project of reconciling black and white as well as finding reconciliation between the ANC and NP with regards to the new Constitution.

But by 1997, the ANC rhetoric began to shift and the DP’s rhetoric responded in turn. The DP started to take a harder line towards the ANC and its position on race-based affirmative action and transformation.

A new liberal agenda for a new South Africa

Faced with a new political context and fewer seats than before the end of apartheid, the DP needed to regroup and find a new articulation. Leon highlights in his autobiography that:

I indicated at the time to James Selfe that by our next congress we had to unpack a more modern version of the liberal agenda rather than claim victories against apartheid – akin to asking people to ‘vote for a better yesterday’. He was firmly in agreement, and we set about commissioning policies and proposals, which we were to describe as the ‘Agenda for a Better Country’ – whose acronym, ABC, I thought a good marketing contrast to the ANC’s RDP. (Leon, 2007: loc 7083)

The Agenda for a Better Country was launched at the DP’s Federal Congress in 1995. In Leon’s speech, he identified the party’s role in the new South Africa:

This week, a Cape Town newspaper stated that the DP Congress had to "deal with the Party's future role and survival". Let me tell that newspaper, and South Africa, that I claim a unique and compelling role for this Party - it is the only political party which stands unambiguously for liberal democracy. And liberal democracy is the only alternative to socialism. As our Party grows, so an alternative vehicle to the creeping socialism of the ANC will gather speed. (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

As with later policy packages and rebrands, the DP did not intend changing its core principles. Leon states:
What we have not altered in defining our policies and making clear our philosophy, is our fundamental core conviction and belief that the individual is the touchstone of value in society. (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

At the core of the Agenda for a Better Country were the following issues: economic liberation and growth; the war on crime; and the social services revolution (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

Economic liberation and growth focused on investment, entrepreneurship and privatisation. In talking about the policy for economic liberation, Leon highlighted the importance of economic growth for poverty alleviation: “If poverty is to be alleviated, there is no substitute for economic growth. Anyone who really cares about the poor must be passionate about the need for economic growth” (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995). The focus on economic growth to create jobs and alleviate poverty has remained the party’s line throughout the period under review in the research.

An aspect of the DP’s policy position at the time which was often overlooked, was its position on social security. Under the social service revolution, Leon stated that:

The third decisive issue confronting South Africa is the need for more effective delivery and fewer promises. We have devoted most of our “ABC” to the specifics of delivering more housing, better health and high quality education for the entire country. These policies are founded on the principle that health, housing and education must reflect social values, must be equitable, must be efficient, must offer choice and provide for equality of access. (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

As part of this social service revolution, the DP discussed the importance of redress:

We enthusiastically support sensible moves and measures to champion and promote the cause of the historically disadvantaged in South Africa. There is an unarguable case that people, who, because of race or gender, have been disadvantaged in the past, need to be assisted into the future [emphasis added]. But in contrast to the ill-thought-out schemes of others, based more on the requirements of political correctness than prudent economics and simple justice, we take great care with their application. Our affirmative action policy seeks to build capacity and widen opportunity; it’s not a spoils system or the reaping of political rewards. (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

The above quote shows that the party has had a form of redress as part of its policy platform since 1995. Within the ABC, the party acknowledges the fact that:

the market does many things well. Weighed in the balance it will, in most places and in most circumstances do things better than the government. But we know that the workings of the market will not lead to full employment or automatically to a clean environment or to a universal education or to decent housing. This is the social element which the State in part has to add to the market. (Leon, ‘An Agenda for a Better Country’, 5 August 1995)

The above indicates that whilst the party stood for a market economy as a means to alleviating poverty, it also recognised that the state needed to address social issues.
Government of National Unity offer and NP invading space

After the NP pulled out of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Leon was approached by Mandela to join the GNU. After much discussion with other interested parties, Leon declined. There was a fear amongst other parties that racial polarisation might result if the other ‘black’ parties formed part of the government without any ‘white’ parties involved.

Leon mentions a discussion with Buthelezi around the GNU offer:

Buthelezi told me (and Douglas Gibson and Roger Burrows) in late January that should the PAC accept Mandela’s offer, and we reject it, prospects of racial polarisation would increase, with three essentially black parties in government arraigned against mostly white parties outside. (Leon, 2007: loc 7832)

The DP’s decision not to join the GNU was based partly on the ANC’s cadre and race politics but also on the fact that within government, it would not have the space to oppose ANC policy and build its brand (Leon, 2007: loc 7888).

The NP’s departure from the GNU also had the effect of possibly taking over the DP’s opposition watchdog role in Parliament as the NP had more seats than the DP and was now the Official Opposition. It was effectively invading the opposition space which the DP had created for itself and so was a threat to the DP’s future prospects. However, NP voters were becoming disillusioned with the party due to its failure to provide opposition to the ANC and the DP started to win by-elections in former NP strongholds.

Death of the Rainbow Nation

Leading up to the 1999 elections, the DP released a document titled The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation. The Death of the Rainbow Nation was the DP’s response to the increasing racialised rhetoric of the ANC since the Mafikeng Congress in 1997 and the re-racialisation of policy and legislation in South Africa. It was the first of many documents critiquing the ANC and South Africa’s increasing re-racialisation under the ANC, although it could be argued that South Africa was never truly de-racialised in 1994 to begin with.

In the document, the DP argued that “the ANC has shifted from the rhetoric of nation-building to the politics of racial division” (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998, p. 3). The DP states that:

Since 1994 there has been a creeping reintroduction of race policies justified by the need for "corrective action". There has also been a deliberate attempt to polarise political debate and to shift the blame for the government’s failure onto a disloyal minority. And so at the ANC national conference in Mafikeng three and a half years after his opening address to Parliament, Mandela delivered a different speech. He launched an attack on the press, on the “mainly white” opposition parties, on civil society and on the white minority in a speech that overstepped the bounds of legitimate political debate and entered the realm of racial demagoguery. There were, he said, “anti-democratic forces of counter-revolution” whose purpose is to “maintain the privileges of the white minority”. He then proceeded to name the Democratic Party as part of
these "counter-revolutionary forces". (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998, p. 3)

The DP argued that this “creeping reintroduction of race policies” was now being extended to new areas such as tertiary education and sport, and that “the public and private employment sectors are being compelled to reintroduce racial classification and racial discrimination” (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998, p. 3). The DP’s belief was that:

This programme of re-racialisation is based on a complex foundation which includes the following:

- the assumption that opportunities are of necessity finite and need thus to be parcelled out on the basis of race;
- the assumption that demographic representativity equals racial equality;
- the electoral value for the ANC of separating the interests of blacks from those of the racial minorities; (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998)

There are two ways to view this document. The first (and how it was viewed by many) is that the DP was trying to protect minority rights from a ‘white privilege’ position. The second, read in conjunction with other documents from the party, is that it held a genuine belief in non-racialism and that a country with SA’s racial history should not continue the racialist project.

We believe that a truly non-racial future requires policies that successfully create expanding opportunities for all, an attitude which welcomes critical opposition and difference, a determination to treat all citizens with equal respect irrespective of race and the will to stick to what is right even when that means giving up short term electoral gains. (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998)

The DP’s criticism was around racial representivity and the fear of “the relentless retreat of minority rights in the face of majoritarian logic” (Democratic Party, The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Un-masking the ANC’s programme of re-racialisation, 1998). The concern underlying the commitment to minority rights was not a defence of minority racial groups’ rights per se (although it served that purpose too) but a defence of the individual’s rights against majoritarianism. Welsh described the document as not being:

trivial propaganda handouts of the kind usually associated with political parties: both were serious critiques, supported by a good deal of comparative research on affirmative action programmes elsewhere in the world. Yet the ANC made no serious attempt to meet the criticism. (Welsh, 1999)

The document, however, was “highly contested” in the DP with Dene Smuts calling it ‘the death document’ (Leon, 2007; Taljaard, 2012). According to Leon, Smuts did not fully agree with the analysis and also felt it was unnecessary to produce the document (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017).
3.1.3. Developing a strategy

Although the 1995 and 1996 municipal elections showed some positive growth for the DP in some areas and it continued its robust opposition stance in Parliament, the party was still considered to be too small for the position of Official Opposition by voters and the media. By 1997, the DP was making small gains on the NP in some of its strongholds through by-elections. This growth indicated that the DP perhaps did have an opportunity to grow out of its base. At this point, the party became more strategic electorally. Its aim was to become the largest opposition party and in order to do this, it needed to remove other opposition parties and move beyond the white, English vote.

From 1997 through to the 1999 elections, the DP started to try to shake off the ‘White Liberal’ label and position itself as the Official Opposition in waiting. Key to doing this was showing that it was different from the ANC and the NP and gaining support from outside its white, English base.

Clear blue water

In a document from 1997, the DP outlines its pre-election strategy to grow beyond its base, its target market, positioning and its target image. At this point, the DP’s research showed that only 25% of the voters who felt close to the DA would actually vote for the party. The document identified three key challenges which it faced in attracting more votes:

- To overcome the “too small” objection
- To distinguish ourselves sharply from the National Party in the minds of our target market
- To distinguish ourselves from the ANC, especially in the eyes of those black voters who feel close to us (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

The key aspect to address was putting “clear blue water” between the DP and the NP and the DP and the ANC.

The “too small” objection was perhaps one of the biggest challenges for the DP. In politics, if a political party cannot be seen to be able to make a difference to voters’ lives then it will not get the vote. In order to do this, the DP needed to be big enough to have some influence. The document states that because white, coloured and Indian voters think the DP is too small:

and because they also feel close to the National Party, they vote for the Nats, whom they consider big enough to make a difference. However, they would not vote for the Nats if they hated them with a passion. Thus the fact that they feel similarly about both parties is what leads them to vote strategically...The more intensely emotionally attached our target market is to us, the less likely it is that they will vote strategically, and hence for the Nats. (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)
The “too small” image was not helped by the fact that it was also used by the media at the
time:

“Mr Leon sounded more like the head of a thriving opposition, rather than the last hope of a
party representing less than two per cent of the electorate”...Hartley was dead right that unless
we shook off the ‘less than two per cent’ tag, any other claims or pretensions would amount to
self-deluding piffle. (Leon, 2007: Loc 7123)

If the image being created by the media, ANC and the NP was that the DP was too small to
have any effect in opposition then this would impact on its ability to win votes. The DP
therefore needed to increase its votes with the 1999 election but needed to overcome this
image in order to win those votes.

Target Market
At this point, the DP’s target market was coloured, Indian and white voters. With regards to
black voters, the document acknowledged that they could not win a strategic battle in this
market and needed “to create strong emotional attachment with these [black] voters”
(Democratic Party, Message, 1997). The main obstacles which the DP saw to attracting the
black vote at the time were the following:

- Their doubt about our commitment to uplifting the previously discriminated against
- We are perceived to be a white party – there is an ethno-history tension inside them
  that causes them to think twice (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

Despite this understanding, the document does not suggest how the DP would be able to
overcome these obstacles nor how it could build an emotional attachment with these
voters. The document did, however, still discuss black voters and their concerns. The
document states that voters who feel close to the DP like the party for its practical ideas,
anti-corruption and critical stance and do not like the ANC due to its perceived
authoritarianism, lack of delivery and corruption (Democratic Party, Message, 1997). The DP
therefore needed to:

- Show that we care about upliftment – creating opportunity
- Be serious about breaking the racial mould of politics
- Be tough on corruption and lack of delivery
- Be tough on authoritarianism of the ANC (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

Although not racial in nature, the DP was also not the natural home of white Afrikaners.
There is a long history of antagonism between the English-speaking liberals and Afrikaner
nationalists. Leon states that there was “also an effete snobbery and a degree of cultural
imperialism in certain senior ranks” of the party which was opposed to adopting defecting
NP politicians (Leon, 2007: loc 8154). Although the DP had:
some very high profile Afrikaners in our senior ranks (Hennie Bester, Dene Smuts and Wessel Nel among their number), they tended to be pre-eminently liberal rather than emblematic of their communities” (Leon, 2007: loc 8138).

Leon spent time trying to make the party “more accommodating towards Afrikaans-speakers” (Leon, 2007: loc 8138). He provides the example of trying to bring Tertius Delport (a former NP cabinet member and MP) into the DP as a way of getting more prominent Afrikaners involved:

I viewed Delport as a potential signal to an increasingly untethered NP base that it was safe to cross the waters, poisoned as they had been by a history of enmity and mutual suspicion dating back to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899. (Leon, 2007, loc 8154)

This is significant in that the divide between the DP’s predecessors and the NP is often forgotten. It was a deep divide which although not based on racial differences was still present in the new South Africa and was the first hurdle facing the DP in its effort to grow its support. It needed to bridge this divide in the same way that it needed to bridge the divide with black voters but in a racialised democracy, the white Afrikaner vote was easier to do as the DP could appeal to voters who wanted a stronger opposition to the ANC.

Positioning
In terms of positioning, the document discusses creating “clear blue water” between the DP and the Nats as well as the ANC. There is recognition that framing this within an ideological difference between liberals and conservative nationalists (the NP) would not work on voters. The difference identified in the document between the two parties is the following:

- We believe in creating opportunity for all South Africans through practical solutions to the country’s most pressing problems.
- They believe in protecting certain groups on the basis of ethnicity. (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

Although this difference is discussed under the Nats in the document, it also applied to the ANC. The DP made it clear that its approach was not only about the target market but for all South Africans:

Our approach to dealing with the fears of our target market is to lift South Africa by creating opportunity for everyone, including our target market...These practical solutions can be of immediate and demonstrable benefit to our target market, as well as the poor. (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

The DP was not positioning itself to take votes away from the ANC but rather attract voters who felt alienated by the ANC and the NNP.
The document questioned whether white, coloured and Indian (WCI) voters prefer the opportunity approach or the protection on the basis of race approach (Nats and ANC). The belief was that:

Those WCI’s who currently feel close to us must do so for some reason that is not shared by other WCI’s who do not feel close to us. I believe they are, at heart, more liberal minded, more caring, less selfish, more reasonable, more aspirational, more secure, less racist, less inward-looking than the others. They may share the fears and frustrations of the others, but they are more open to our approach to dealing with those fears. (Democratic Party, Message, 1997)

This statement is also telling of how the DP saw its typical voter – rational, aspirational, liberal, caring, not racist etc.

The document identified the key elements of the DP target image as being: a tough and critical opposition; using its influence to make a difference to the lives of all South Africans; creating opportunities for all South Africans; having practical solutions to the problems facing South Africans; and that its leaders are trustworthy and competent (Democratic Party, Message, 1997). The first point – a tough and critical opposition party – was the DP’s major image but it also wished to show that it could provide an alternative. However, the image of opposition often gets lost in the discussion about the DP. For example, Jolobe argues about the pre-1999 DP that “Leon built the DP strategy around robust opposition” which is correct but then goes on to say that this strategy “was not based on profound philosophical or ideological differences with the ANC” (Jolobe, 2009: loc 2558). However, this view is incorrect as whilst the strategy was about opposition, it was opposition towards the ideology of the ANC and NP which was a type of racial nationalism in both cases.

The document spoke of all South Africans but understood that South Africa was still very much divided regarding how each racial group felt towards the new government and who could best represent their interests. The DP does not specifically make mention of racial mobilisation but in order to get the votes that it needed, this would require a certain amount of racial mobilisation and appealing to these different interests but without losing out on the possibility of attracting black voters.

Leon’s speech to the DP Gauteng South Regional Council in March 1998 encapsulates the above strategy. It also provides an insight into how the DP saw its role in South African politics and what it stood for. In the speech, Leon answers the following criticisms levelled at the party at the time:

- The DP is only interested in white voters
- The DP only criticises but offers no alternatives
- The DP is led by white males

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10 This acronym is used in the document and has been changed in recent years within the DA to CWI.
• The DP is a party of white privilege (Leon, ‘Answering the critics and some challenges for the future’, 2 March 1998)

With regards to this discussion it is important to examine Leon’s response to the criticism that the DP is interested in white voters and a party of white privilege. To the first criticism, Leon provides examples of DP public representatives assisting communities in Mitchells Plain, Alexandra and Vryburg over the previous weekend. As a reply to the party of white privilege criticism, Leon states:

It requires an ability to completely ignore the policy contributions and opposition role of the DP to reach the conclusion that the DP speaks and acts in the interests of privileged whites only and seeks to perpetuate a system of unfair racial privilege. The fact is that issues such as violent crime, unemployment, and quality education are more relevant to the poor who cannot protect themselves with large private incomes than to any other members of South Africa’s society. Our policy initiatives are unequivocally aimed at providing protection and opportunities for the poorest of South Africa’s poor. Acting as an opposition by exposing and highlighting corruption, maladministration and abuse of power by Government is in the interests of all South Africans, not just a privileged elite. (Leon, ‘Answering the critics and some challenges for the future’, 2 March 1998)

In the speech, Leon positions the DP as one for all South Africans. Whilst he does mention minorities, they are not mentioned in an exclusive sense which ties in with the message strategy above. Leon attempts to speak about the party for all South Africans which includes minorities. This was paying attention to minority groups’ sense of alienation by the ANC. In the same sense that Leon does not make minorities exclusive, he also does not make the majority (black South Africans) exclusive. At a strategy level it was targeting minorities but at a communications level it was attempting to appeal to all race groups.

3.1.4. 1999 Elections
The aim of the 1999 elections was to become the second biggest party in South Africa and thus achieve the status of the Official Opposition. This was also the first election that the DP ran a modern political campaign and started showing a certain degree of electoral professionalism. Market research was conducted and an advertising agency hired to develop the campaign.

Context
By the end of 1997, Mbeki had taken over the reins of the ANC along with his African nationalist agenda. The days of Mandela’s race reconciliation were over and replaced by an increasingly racialist discourse. Affirmative action was being legislated through the Employment Equity Act by this point and South Africa was experiencing a crime wave affecting all communities which dated back to the early 90s. Unemployment was also a high priority issue across all race groups.

The DP understood that race would remain a key indicator of party preference but that this would also be a track-record election based on the ANC’s performance in government for the first five years of democracy (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). However, it
acknowledged that there was no realistic chance of winning the election and that the ANC would remain in power. This meant that the DP had to play up its opposition role. The NP had lost credibility as an opposition party and the DP was increasing its vote in NP strongholds so now the DP was in a credible position to aim to become the official opposition (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998).

At this point in South Africa’s history, the DP was still unable to campaign in black areas. Firstly, it was often met with hostility if it tried to enter these areas and this would continue until the mid- to late 2000s. And secondly, it did not have the ground troops or black leadership to campaign in these areas. In order to increase its vote, it needed to go for the low-hanging fruit of minority voters who were feeling alienated by the ANC. As Ferree documents, the ANC made attempts with Indian and coloured voters but mostly ignored white voters in 1999 (Ferree, 2011). The ANC mobilised its base of black voters and attempted to expand into Indian and coloured voters. The DP did exactly the same: it mobilised its base but also tried to expand into the coloured and Indian market. The DP’s campaign was criticised for being racist and only going after minorities yet, arguably, the ANC employed a similar strategy. If the discussion around race groups were replaced with any other demographic group and the context was different then the manner in which parties campaigned would not even be controversial.

In 1998, Coetzee developed an advertising brief for potential consultants on what the DP was aiming to achieve for the elections. The Advertising Brief for the 1999 elections provides a significant insight into how the DP wanted to approach the campaign. The document sets out the DP’s aim and vision as follows:

1. The Democratic Party aims to defend, protect and nurture the liberal-democratic constitutional state in South Africa
2. The cornerstones of a better quality of life for South Africans are individual freedom, a reasonable and rising standard of living and a peaceful environment
3. We believe that the quality of life of all South Africans can best be improved and advanced if our country is governed according to liberal principles and policies.
4. We believe South Africa needs to be transformed from a state-centred society of compliant and recipient citizens, into an individual-centred opportunity society of free, responsible citizens. (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998)

The DP saw South Africa’s success as a liberal democracy being dependent on whether the following would be achieved over the next six years: economic and employment growth; reducing crime to realistic, manageable levels; efficient management of the public service; loyalty to the constitution and its key institutions; and a free, critical civil society (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The DP believed that the “ANC in government needs strong, effective and principled opposition if South Africa is to achieve the above” (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The DP’s fear of the ANC was its “underlying
belief in central control and government interference” (Democratic Party, *Advertising Brief*, 1998). The DP, therefore, needed to do the following:

- Vigorously and vocally criticise, oppose and expose the government or its policies when we think it is acting in a way that will harm South Africa.
- Provide alternative solutions to the great challenges that face South Africa and influence the government to adopt these. (Democratic Party, *Advertising Brief*, 1998)

The DP was not solely focused on providing opposition but also offering alternative solutions. As has been discussed previously, the alternative solutions aspect often gets lost in the discussion around the party during this era and so not much attention has been paid to the policy positions which it took at the time.

The main electoral aims for the 1999 elections identified in the *Advertising Brief* were to get 11% of the vote at a national level; to be official opposition in Gauteng; and the largest party in the Western Cape.

Target Market

Through market research in 1998/9, the DP had narrowed down its target market to white, coloured and Indian voters. As mentioned before, a very small percentage of black voters were open to the DP and so the logical decision was to campaign in markets that were more open to the party and to tailor the message to these markets. The DP attempted to do a balancing act of targeting its message to these racial groups but still keep the message for all South Africans. The target market was listed as the following groups in the 1998 Advertising Brief:

1. White, English
2. White, Afrikaans
3. Coloured, Afrikaans, English LSM 5,6,7,8 Western Cape Metro
4. Indian, English LSM 7,8

The market research provided a snapshot of how each racial group saw the political context:

*White voters:*

1. White people in South Africa are either negative about the future, or, at best, are extremely concerned about it. Very few are optimistic.
2. White people feel politically powerless, and are increasingly insecure about the extent to which their wealth can provide them with personal power and protection against the consequences of ANC rule.
3. They feel resentful at being targeted as “the enemy” by the ANC, and some feel that their language and culture is under attack by the ANC.
4. They are extremely fearful of the crime situation, and angry with the ANC, who they blame for the state of affairs.

5. They are anxious about the economy, and education, and don’t believe that life will be better for their children than it is for them. They believe things will get worse.

6. While they want to stay in South Africa, and feel attached to the country, they are concerned about the future their children will have here. (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, p. 5)

The research found that white voters viewed the DP as “tough, truth telling opposition to the ANC”. Their major issues with the party were that the party was too small; its lack of black support and softness on crime (the death penalty in particular).

**Indian voters:**

Indian voters in LSM 7 and 8 are largely aspirational people. Like coloured voters, they believe they are once again being treated unfairly, this time because they are not black enough. As with coloured voters, there is racial tension and competition with black Africans.

Indian voters are angry about the crime situation, and extremely concerned about the economy and education. Indian voters in our target market are used to a fairly high standard of education and believe it may be under threat. The problem of squatting is important to Indian voters, whose suburbs are often the site of squatting settlements in Durban.

Indian women are more conservative than men, and are extremely concerned about violent crime, a fear which may date back to the events of 1945. There is a racial undertone to this fear.

As with coloured voters, Indian voters will be attracted to the opposition party that attracts the most white voters, as they want a big, strong, opposition against the ANC. (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998)

**Coloured voters:**

1. Coloured people, especially middle class and the lower middle class, feel politically disempowered because of their colour. They used to be too black, now they are too white. They feel the need to assert their own identity on the one hand, as a means to gaining recognition and respect. On the other hand, they identify with white people, and many look up to white people. There is thus an identity tension which relates to the quest for self-respect, recognition and acceptance. The consequence is a combination of envy and resentment.

2. They hold conservative values, and particularly the middle class is aspirational

3. They are extremely anxious and angry about crime, particularly gangs, PAGAD and drug dealing.

4. They are anxious about the economy and education. They desperately want opportunities to advance themselves but don’t believe these will be forthcoming under the ANC.

5. Coloured people want a strong opposition to the ANC.

6. Many are very racist towards black people, as a result of the colour competition of many years, and the great difference in culture. (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998)
Black voters

The DP at this point only attracted 0.8% of black voters according to the research and these voters were not segmented according to LSM or location. They were spread across the country and had a variety of backgrounds. The Advertising Brief states that there was no “cost-effective means of accessing them through advertising” (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). However it also stated that it does not mean that the DP “might not wish to advertise for strategic reasons” as it was “important to project our willingness and readiness to appeal to South Africans from all communities” (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998).

What is clear from this advertising brief is that the party’s frame of analysis for its potential voter basis was racial, fitting in with an increasingly racialised SA under Mbeki’s ANC. It segmented its market according to race as opposed to the traditional method of gender, class, and locality. Although there are class-based and locality aspects to its understanding of coloured and Indian voters, this segmentation tended to be lower and upper middle class voters and in the case of coloured voters, its focus was on the Western Cape Metro. The voters which the DP was targeting were feeling alienated, disempowered and, in some cases, fearful about the future.

Positioning and Messaging

There is a slight change from the 1997 strategy document to the Advertising Brief of 1998. The DP’s “primary enemy and target” was the ANC government and this election saw an increase in negative messaging around the governing party. The document also states that this “doesn’t mean we don’t go negative on the NP, it simply means our criticism of the NP is precisely that they are not an effective opposition to the ANC” (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The ANC was positioned in this document as corrupt, racist, power hungry, incompetent, inefficient, arrogant, and breaking promises (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The NP was positioned as having weak leadership, being a weak opposition, breaking promises, untrustworthy, and dying (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The DP predicted that the ANC would position them as white, right wing, unconcerned for the poor, complicit in apartheid and small. The DP believed that the NP would position them in the following ways: anti the death penalty, soft on crime; opposed to opposition co-operation; a white party (vs their cross racial support); English, elite, unconcerned about Afrikaners; and small (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998).

The DP designed its image as being an effective, strong, principled opposition with a strong leader in Tony Leon and competent representatives generally. It also wanted to show practical solutions to the key problems facing South Africa. Another point which was listed is that it wanted its image to be one of non-racialism.

The key issues which were identified for the target market were the following: crime; the economy/job creation; corruption; education and the state of the public service generally – effective use of taxpayers’ money; and race relations (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief,
These key issues were similar to those of black voters according to other research conducted at the time of the 1999 elections.

The key themes which the DP identified were opposition, leadership, policy issues and in the case of Indian voters, minority protection. The message was then further segmented across each racial group.

Table 3: Messaging for target markets (Adapted from Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Policy Issues</th>
<th>Minority protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Stand up to the ANC, oppose, expose and criticise them with vigour and imagination on a principled basis</td>
<td>Provide a leader who can take on the ANC</td>
<td>Focus on finding solutions to the crime situation, economic situation and education situation in order to provide hope for the future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Stand up the ANC, opposing and criticising where necessary on a principled basis</td>
<td>Have a leader able to take on the ANC</td>
<td>Provide solution to the key problems of unemployment, crime, education and squatting</td>
<td>Protect the cultural and linguistic rights of minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Stand up to the ANC central government (Western Cape voters)</td>
<td>Bring crime under control; focus on job creation, education and housing (WC voters)</td>
<td>Promote tough measures to deal with crime, job creation and educational opportunities (National)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is unclear from the brief whether the different wording for the opposition and policy aspects was deliberate but it implies a different approach to each market. The leadership aspect is excluded for coloured voters because research showed that Leon’s favourability amongst this group was only at 37%, considerably less than amongst White and Indian voters. The minority protection message was evident in a speech delivered in the predominantly Indian areas of Phoenix and Tongaat. In the speech, titled ‘Making our miracle work for minorities – the ANC has betrayed its promise’, Leon makes reference to Privani Reddy who was a ‘victim’ of racial discrimination and quotas and lambasts the ANC for going back on its promise of non-racialism and replacing it with demographic representivity. This type of explicit minority protection messaging was not evident in other campaign speeches.

Tone
The DP understood that it needed to project a tone of robust opposition:
The vast majority of voters in the DP’s target market (white, coloured and Indian) want to hear the party and its leadership articulate their anger and unhappiness. For the majority of our voters therefore, the DP can hardly be too tough and blunt. (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998)

However, this needed to be done through quality, reasoned arguments and alternative policies. The DP saw this as one of their strengths. It also recognised that it “can’t actively create disillusionment” amongst its target market but “must recognise and use the disillusionment” whilst at the same time carrying a message of hope (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). The general tone needed to be tough, blunt, reasoned and positive (about the DP’s solutions for South Africa) (Democratic Party, Advertising Brief, 1998). However, a blunt and tough tone would not necessarily appeal to the majority of black voters who were still deeply attached to the ANC.

Balancing Act
It appears that at an ideological level, the DP’s image is different to that of its strategic level. It needed to say enough at the message level to tap into the alienation felt by the white, coloured and Indian market but to do this without losing its principles or cutting itself off from black voters. The DP’s target market feared the ANC majority from a group interests level whereas the DP feared the ANC majority, at an ideological level, for its increasing racialisation of the country and the dominant party threat to democracy.

The Fight Back campaign
The DP’s “Fight Back” campaign is for the future: to fight back against corruption, misuse of office, unemployment and crime. Only those blinded by a bizarre racial bigotry could assume it was directed at any group. (Leon, ‘Fighting Back for Democracy, Fairness and a Better Future’, 4 May 1999)

The Fight Back campaign was a textbook case of political marketing and would not be particularly interesting or controversial if it were not for the racialised context in South Africa. What is interesting and controversial is the impact of the campaign internally on the DP and its approach shortly after the election.

The DP hired marketing consultants Schoen and Scheinkopf following the Advertising Brief to conduct professional polling and devise a campaign for the 1999 elections. As part of this work, they developed what would become the Fight Back slogan. Leon described the decision over the slogan as follows:

I was waiting in my eyrie on the fifth floor of the Marks Building in parliament, on a weekend afternoon in February, when Ryan Coetzee accompanied Schoen and Scheinkopf to deliver me the verdict. Scheinkopf told me he had been doing a focus group in Durban, among potential Indian voters, and one of them said to him, ‘I want a party to fight back for me against the crime, the corruption, and the unemployment’. ‘Well’ Hank then explained, ‘we reckon it’s your best shot: it’s a fight back campaign.’ He then suggested the slogan (which I heard now for the first time, although its echo would follow the party and me for the next decade): ‘The guts to fight back’. (Leon, loc 14257)
Leon thought that “it would be a stunning, simple, effective and fitting climax to our five hard years of tough-minded opposition” (Leon, 2007, loc 14263). However, the fact that the DP did not see the racial implications of its Fight Back campaign slogan shows a certain lack of concern for or understanding of its environment. Leon argues that:

I took a view...that if you are a 1% party and you’re trying to become a 10% party, you might be pissing off 80% of the people to get there but you have to have edge. The party couldn’t just become or carry on being an amorphous bit of this, bit of that. Now you could say ok well that may be curbing the future but people...always find something. You’ve got to be pretty robust, you can’t always allow your opponents to define you. (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017)

In another context, Fight Back would have been an effective slogan for an opposition party but this was only five years after the end of apartheid and so was interpreted as a fight black campaign. Southern points out that “for some, this slogan was out of kilter with the reconciliatory needs of the country” (Southern, 2011: 285). Without the context of speeches and policies then the interpretation of the DP being anti-black and only fighting for minorities would have some justification. The DP’s communication and policy proposals at the time were not racist nor were they specifically designed to appeal to one racial group over another in the way in which the DP’s message has been interpreted. As Welsh points out: “Some 80 per cent of the DP’s manifesto (1999) is devoted to possible ways and means of encouraging economic growth, alleviating poverty and unemployment” (Welsh, 1999: 95).

Externally, the Fight Back campaign was painted as a fight against blacks by the ANC and a fight for minorities by commentators (Booysen, 1999; Taylor & Hoeane, 1999; Ferree, 2011;). However, if one looks at what was communicated by the DP at the time, the message was that it was ‘fighting back’ for all. At the launch of the DP’s election campaign in 1999, Leon in fact makes specific mention of the situation of black South Africans at the time:

And yes, Mr Mbeki, there is a mounting rage among the people, especially black people – and let’s briefly examine what it’s about:

It’s really about the overwhelmingly black, Grade 1 school kids who have been denied their books, because of the 80% slashing of the budget on textbooks since 1995;

It truly concerns the overwhelmingly black matriculants last year who discovered that fewer of them pass the exams than was the case when, God help us, the Nationalists were in power. Of those who pass, only 1 in 10 will find a job.

And it’s about the 500 000 South Africans of all races, but again mostly black fellow citizens - yes, half a million of them who have lost their jobs since the ANC took power in 1994.

And most of all it’s about the families of over 100 000 South Africans who have been innocently murdered, again a majority of them black, because of the unchecked crime wave which has been unleashed on our country since 1993/94.
And it's also about the R3.5 billion you've squandered every year on the 50 000 supernumerary civil servants whom you're afraid to fire, but who have no work to do! (Leon, 'The Fight Back Campaign for a Decent South Africa, 28 March 1999)

The above is an example of a bridging message to black voters to show that the DP did have their interests in mind too. Even though the DP was targeting minorities for votes, it attempted to balance this out through its communication. In the campaign launch speech, Leon attempts to balance the appeal to minority alienation and a bridging message for future black voters. Below is an example of an appeal to the alienated minority:

Under apartheid there was Job Reservation which forced employers to select their employees on skin colour. Under the ANC we have affirmative action and "representivity" which also forces employers to select their employees on skin colour. The ANC's policy of "representivity" is just ethnic rectification. It is an echo of apartheid. The ANC has passed a bill reminiscent of Dr Verwoerd, the Employment Equity Bill, which forces every employer of more than fifty people to do a racial audit on the workforce. The ANC wants employees to be classified as “Coloureds”, "Indians" and "Africans". (Leon, 'The Fight Back Campaign for a Decent South Africa, 28 March 1999)

Although not an explicit bonding appeal, it was implicitly appealing to minorities’ anger over the ANC’s employment equity policy. This was followed by positioning of the DP as different and better than the ANC and the NNP:

The Democratic Party wants employees to be classified as human beings. The Democratic Party wants people to be selected on merit and rewarded for hard work. Doesn’t the ANC understand that this country has had forty years of state racism under apartheid and is sick to death of it! Doesn’t the ANC understand that it is disgusting and demeaning to select people by race! If the ANC won’t end racial discrimination, we will!

The ANC speaks of "transformation" but all it is doing is transforming a long unemployment queue into a longer unemployment queue. The big lie of the ANC is that we are against real change. It is the other way round. They are against real change. Their policies are just making a small group of their cronies very rich while the great majority of our people get poorer. The Democratic Party wants real change for all of our people, a change to quality education, skills development, job opportunities and a meritocracy. (Leon, ‘The Fight Back Campaign for a Decent South Africa’, 28 March 1999)

Transformation was a key issue for minority voters as well as black voters but not for the same reasons. Black voters saw transformation as a positive whereas non-black voters saw this as a negative and so the message would have been interpreted differently. Although the campaign rhetoric carried bridging messages to black voters, Ferree argues correctly that:

the DP’s campaign, with its negative slant on the state of South Africa, its pugilistic stance toward the ruling party, its attempts to polarize Indian and coloured relations with Africans and its recruitment of conservatives to its lists, largely alienated African voters. (Ferree, 2011: 94)

However, the DP’s target market felt alienated by the ANC and the DP took advantage of this fact.
The real controversy in the DP’s eyes lay in its fight back against the ANC at a time when it was considered bad form to criticise the liberation movement. As part of its ‘clear blue water’ strategy, it needed to position itself against the ANC. This was widely interpreted as a fight back against black South Africans when it was really a fight against the ANC’s growing racialism under Mbeki and government failures to address voters’ needs.

Ferree (2011) and Lodge (1999) argue that the DP was primarily concerned with winning white votes and it was not interested in attracting black votes. The internal advertising brief for the ’99 election tells a slightly more complex story which has already been touched on. The DP had conducted market research and found that it could only attract 0.8% of the black vote. This group was harder to pin down than other race groups in terms of location and class. Leon often mentions in his autobiography the financial constraints which the DP had during this period and it was suggested that they did not have the finances to run campaigns in traditionally black areas. However, the Advertising Brief does say that where possible, the party should advertise in traditionally black media spaces. At a campaign events level, the DP’s primary target market was minority voters but its communications did not ignore the concerns of the black electorate. The analysis that the DP played on minorities’ feelings of alienation by the ANC and dissatisfaction with the performance of the ANC is quite correct. It did use racial mobilisation as a means to an end, much like the ANC. However, to say that it ignored the black electorate completely and only focussed on minorities in terms of its communication and policies would be incorrect.

3.1.5. After-effects of the Fight Back campaign

Fight Back caused damage to the party both internally and externally. The campaign was damaging to the DP’s label but it also ensured that the party became the Official Opposition and could go on to pursue its vision for South Africa.

The biggest criticism levelled at the party for its election campaign was the negative imaging of the ANC. This can be seen in a letter from Coetzee to Leon in which he discusses how both internally and externally, people were not comfortable with their negative positioning of the ANC. This letter is worth examining in detail as it provides some understanding of how the lead strategist thought about the campaign and state of the political landscape.

Internally, Coetzee attributed these negative sentiments to differences within the party about “‘transformation’, dealing with the past, the place of race and the extent to which we adopted an aggressive and negative stance towards the ANC” (Coetzee, 6 August 1999). He believed that people thought the DP had made compromises to win votes which were now bearing fruit. It was time for a new strategy and approach to win black voters but that there needed to be agreement on how to do this. Coetzee made it very clear that this new approach must not be a “softening towards the ANC” and provided two reasons for this (Coetzee, 6 August 1999). For the marketing reason, he said that “voters voted for the party because of its tough stance on the ANC and changing this approach would be a betrayal of those voters” (Coetzee, 6 August 1999). He also made the point that “it is never true that a
ruling party will lose votes to an opposition party because the opposition party tempers its criticism” (Coetzee, 6 August 1999). The political reason was that:

any acceptance of the ANC’s analysis of South Africa and what it requires will automatically strengthen them and weaken us because the logical conclusion of their analysis is that only the ANC and its approach are right for the country. As soon as you take the first step towards agreeing with the ANC, the internal logic of their analysis will pressure you to continue down the ANC road. (Coetzee, 6 August 1999)

Central to this discussion is the party’s approach to affirmative action and transformation. Coetzee sees transformation as “the taking over of the state by the ANC using race and apartheid as its justification” (Coetzee, 6 August 1999). He argued that:

Unless we maintain a clear analysis of why the ANC’s transformation is wrong and articulate our own, liberal programme for change, we will lead ourselves into a real corner, not the fictitious one we are currently said to be in. (Coetzee, 6 August 1999)

Coetzee’s suggestion for developing a response to the negative imaging was that the DP needed “to engage the ANC head-on over the central issue of transformation and other issues” which would require the following:

- A clear, well researched, compelling critique of the ANC’s analysis of South Africa and programme of transformation.
- A clear, well researched, compelling liberal programme for change. (Coetzee, 6 August 1999)

The party would go on to produce several documents around the theme of transformation over the next few years.

One of the other criticisms was that the DP had missed out on an opportunity to win black votes. Coetzee argues that some party members’ concern that it had not appealed to black voters was nonsense. He summed up the situation quite accurately as follows:

As far as ordinary black voters go, our problem goes way back and has nothing to do with the election campaign. First, we are not particularly well known by black voters. Second, the link between racial identity, interest and party support in South Africa predates our election campaign by decades and decades. There are those who say that the reason blacks don’t vote for us is our campaign. This is rubbish. They never did in the first place. (Coetzee, 6 August 1999)

This paragraph is a perfect summation of the party’s problem for the first decade of democracy. The DP started from a non-existent profile with black voters in 1994 and would not be able to have any impact on these voters unless it was large enough to have an impact. Also the point about racial identity and voting preference meant that the party had to overcome this barrier which would take time - black voters were not going to switch allegiance overnight to a party that they had no knowledge of and believed to have been complicit in apartheid.
The Politics of Intolerance

Shortly after the election, the DP produced a discussion document titled *The Politics of Intolerance*. There are two main arguments which the DP made in this document. The first was that the ANC delegitimates or co-opts its opponents and the second was that the media had been co-opted into the ANC’s way of thinking. The over-arching theme of the document was to justify the DP’s election campaign:

The moral indignation that the “Fight Back” campaign provoked can be ascribed to the fact that the DP had contravened the ANC’s political orthodoxy in three ways:

1. It was uncompromising in its support of merit and articulated an alternative approach to “transformation”.

2. By unashamedly pursuing minority (including Afrikaans) votes the DP challenged the politically orthodox view that the votes of certain groups are less equal than the votes of others.

3. The slogan “Fight Back” (and the endorsement by 1,5 million voters of the DP’s campaign) was a blunt refutation of the ANC’s attempt to impose its stifling ideological hegemony (“national consensus”) over South Africa society. (Democratic Party, *The Politics of Intolerance*, August 1999)

The DP’s argument was that the ANC had been delegitimising opposition parties long before the Fight Back campaign and that this was done by painting them as white parties only concerned with defending white privilege. This was mostly based on debates around transformation and affirmative action.

The DP did not go lightly on the media in this document either. The English-speaking media were accused of supporting the ANC’s paradigm:

While large parts of the English language press fell over themselves in their endorsements of the ruling party, the DP’s “Fight Back” election campaign caused a storm of outrage. The DP was accused of “racism” and of “shifting to the right.” The DP’s opposition to an ANC two-thirds majority was labelled a “Swart Gevaar” tactic.

Because not a shred of credible evidence could be produced to support these claims, accusations were made that the DP was guilty of “subliminal” racism, that the DP was appealing to the racist instincts of voters and that the campaign was perceived to be racist by the black majority. All of these claims could be made without any facts to back them up. (Democratic Party, *The Politics of Intolerance*, August 1999)

This was not entirely true: the DP *had* appealed to the “racist instincts” of voters, not explicitly in its communication but many of the DP’s voters saw opposition to the ANC in this way. Whether this was intentional is not evident in the party’s documents. Both Ferree (2011) and Welsh (1999), however, point to the fact that the media and the ANC contributed to the narrative described above.
Another important correspondence to take note of was a letter from Dene Smuts to Leon shortly after the release of The Politics of Intolerance discussion document. Smuts often acted as the counterbalance to the party’s vote-seeking behaviour. In the letter, Smuts argued against the current state of the DP and that there was a need for a strategy of Fighting Forward. She argued the widely held point that the DP had painted itself into a white/minority corner and that Politics of Intolerance continues along the same vein. She wrote:

Really, with opposition like us, Thabo hardly needs any more supporters. We just make it all come true for him: liberals are just the same as the old Nats, after all, apparently. Is this the best we can do against the intellect and subtlety of Mbeki?

The document’s defence of a minority position, coming as close as dammit to “group politics”, and followed by another round of critical comment, reinforces everything people suspect and think about the NP-DP coalition. (Smuts, September 1999)

Smuts argued that “we need to decide what it is we are, and what our strategy is” and that “All of this may have ‘worked’ during a period of guerrilla warfare but it won’t work now. Time to become what our name says” (Smuts, September 1999).

3.1.6. Conclusion

The 1999 elections were pivotal for the DP as it resulted in the party becoming the Official Opposition. Although the ‘Fight Back’ campaign was controversial, the DP succeeded in achieving its strategic objectives of becoming the Official Opposition and taking votes away from the NP. However, the campaign was also largely misunderstood and has had long-lasting ramifications for the party’s image and also the nature of its communication. The campaign was a means to an end - the DP needed to increase its support base through capturing the minority vote before it could expand its market which would be the next step.

The Fight Back campaign of 1999, at an ideological level, was ultimately against nationalism whether Afrikaner or African and against government’s track record of delivery. At an electoral level, this was a means towards a long-term end of building a liberal democratic, non-racial opposition and eventually government. Even before the 1999 elections, the party recognised that it could not focus on building a non-racial opposition and eventually governing party if it did not eliminate the competition of other opposition parties. Its primary concern could no longer be fighting off the NNP for votes.

Part of the DP’s success during the period after the 1994 elections was due to its ability to turn into a modern political party and to define a position for itself within the political market as a challenger to both the ANC and the NP through its robust opposition brand.
3.2 Consolidation: 1999 - 2004

3.2.1. Introduction
In order to maintain the position of Official Opposition, the DP/DA required a period of consolidation – both in terms of its voter base and its position as the largest opposition party. Even though the DP managed to increase its percentage of the vote, particularly with white voters, this was not secure and neither was its new voter base of coloured and Indian voters. As long as the New National Party continued to exist, there was a threat to the DP’s votes.

Following the 1999 elections, the DP regrouped and revised its strategy. The primary objectives were to consolidate its position through opposition cooperation in some form and grow its market, particularly amongst a section of the black electorate. This required some operational changes which led to the party becoming more of the electoral-professional, vote-seeking party type. The first step to consolidation was to eliminate the NNP as its competition which occurred when the two parties merged and formed the Democratic Alliance in 2000. Although the merger was short-lived, it ensured that the party no longer had competition for its new base of support.

Another challenge which the party faced was the increasingly hostile political environment under Mbeki’s ANC. Whilst the DP/DA was trying to consolidate its position, the ANC was contributing to consolidating an impression in the public mind that the party was white and racist. The environment was hostile in both ANC rhetoric and action. Campaign events in traditionally black areas were disrupted by the ANC and the liberation movement actively went door-to-door telling voters that the DA would bring back apartheid or take away social grants (Leon, 2007; Zille, 2016). This was not a conducive environment for winning votes amongst the black electorate.

The lead up to the 2004 elections differs from 1999 in that the party was now targeting a section of the black electorate. In the previous elections, this market was not included as the party had neither the resources nor the ability to campaign in black areas. It set a small, and what was thought to be conservative, target of 6% of the black vote for the 2004 elections. Although important, the black electorate was in some ways less difficult to predict than coloured voters. Coloured votes could go ANC or NNP or DA or, with the formation of the Independent Democrats, ID. The party was also less adversarial in terms of its message - ‘Fight Back’ was replaced with a slightly softer, more positive message of hope and change for a better South Africa.

This chapter focuses on the period after the 1999 elections up to the period shortly after the 2004 elections. It begins by examining the political context of ANC dominance and NNP decline as well as the focus on transformation in ANC and government discourse. The party went through its own transformation during this period as it consolidated its vote. This
involved shifting its thinking and brand from that of opposition to that of a party of opportunity. There was also the transformation of the DA into an electoral-professional party as it began to take a more professional approach towards campaigning.

3.2.2. Political context: All Power to the Party
By 2000, the DP was facing an increasingly hostile political and media environment. The ANC was cementing its position as the dominant party and the DP was struggling to get its message across in the media. The DP was criticised for its opposition, particularly towards ‘transformation’ even though its position never seemed to be fully explored by mainstream analysts. The DP was not against ‘transformation’ but against what was becoming a transformation of public institutions into ANC branches and the belief that transformation required racial representivity in all spheres of life in South Africa (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000).

Mbeki’s racial nationalism was at its zenith during this period and the party came under constant attack for its opposition stance which was equated with defending white privilege and being racist. This was a deliberate strategy on the part of the ANC (Ferree, 2011). The racial attacks are something which the party has, until recently, been unable to defend itself against because it was predominantly white and had a white leader and its previous incarnations had been supported by prominent ‘white capital’.

Beyond everyday policy issues of crime, corruption, service delivery etc. the party commented on broader political issues and ideas. The central focus of this period for the DP in terms of its political discourse was transformation and the ANC’s increasing dominance.

All Power to the Party
In March 2000, the DP released a 77-page document titled All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society. The title was a play on the ANC’s Strategy and Tactics discussion document titled All Power to the People! Building on the Foundation for a Better Life. Whilst the document outlines the ANC’s increasing encroachment on independent public institutions and in the civil service – the cadre deployment policy – it also provides insight into how the party saw the political context in South Africa and its major opponent, the ANC. Leon described it at the time as a “seminal” document.

All Power to the Party sets out, in great detail, the level of ANC cadre deployment and the conflation of party and state. The DP believed that the ANC was using ‘transformation’ and ‘representivity’ to capture the state. The party believed that this would lead to an authoritarian state and the collapse of public institutions which would be the end of South Africa’s liberal democracy. It saw itself as the only defender of that democracy and the Constitution – a role which it still positions itself in today.
The DP’s primary concern, stemming from its liberal democratic position, was that there needed to be a separation of party and state. The ANC accusation was that the DP did not want black civil servants but in the DP’s view, it was not about race but about keeping public service institutions independent of and from the governing party:

In response to our criticisms the ANC and others have argued that the government needed to get rid of a disloyal “old guard”; that the public service had to be transformed to be representative of the population of South Africa; that in practise ANC members were the only competent black candidates for senior positions; and that the Constitution provides sufficient protection against a remerging of party and state. (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000: iv)

The document shows the shift from what the ANC promised in 1994 to what started happening from 1997 onwards. It states:

In the run-up to the 1994 election and afterwards the ANC committed itself to the idea of an independent civil service. ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus stated that under an ANC government people would be appointed on the basis of ability to avoid political patronage. President Mandela stated that the ANC members being integrated into the state structures were former cadres now entering non-partisan service in government. (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000: iv)

However, this was not the case by 1997 when the cadre deployment policy was developed and implemented.

One of the key points of discussion within the document was the concept that the ANC and the black majority were one and the same:

One of the reasons [sic] the success of the ANC has been its ability to exploit South Africa’s racial fault lines in implementing this policy. Since the ANC sees no distinction between the party and “the people” (i.e. the black majority), the interests of the ANC and the black majority are viewed as indistinguishable. A state dominated by the black majority and one controlled by the ANC are seen as the same thing. (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000: 59)

The conflation of the ANC and being black was a recurring theme in DP analysis at the time. This is significant in that it has an implicit message about minority groups in South Africa i.e. that the ANC would not represent their interests. It was also problematic for the DP in that the explicit discursive link between the ANC and being black meant that black interests could therefore only be represented by the ANC which was an important barrier that the party needed to break.

Another issue which would be a recurring theme in the DP’s discussion documents was the ANC’s use of ‘representivity’ over merit:
A number of research surveys have shown that the vast majority of South Africans (of all colours) support appointments based on merit, whether it is to the civil service or national sports teams. The ANC on the other hand has stated that making every institution in society, at every level, “demographically representative” is an “imperative”, “non-negotiable” and a test of loyalty to the new South Africa.

This divide between the party and the people was further illustrated by the ANC’s own election manifesto. In the ANC manifesto the term “representivity” was not mentioned, and affirmative action was only referred to once. (The ANC making the disingenuous claim that the government had used it to create “equal opportunities.”) This is in marked contrast to an ANC in government which is infatuated by racial quotas.

Yet despite the fact that “representivity” is not particularly popular among ordinary people, alienates minorities, and leads to the erosion of the capacity of the public service, the ANC leadership has pushed on with this policy oblivious to its destructive consequences. (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000)

The DP also linked BEE and employment equity with ‘representivity’ and how it was only benefitting the ANC elite:

The primary reason is that the tiny elite that happens to benefit from policies of “representivity” and “black empowerment” is completely intertwined with the leadership of the ruling party. Because of its proximity to political power the demands of this group for special privileges have become overriding priorities of the ANC government.

● The demand for “representivity” was used by the ANC nomenclatura as an instrument to aggressively advance their careers within the civil service.

● The abolition of merit as the overriding criterion for the appointment of civil servants greatly facilitated the appointment of ANC cadres.

● Party political appointments to positions in independent state bodies were defended on racial grounds, and many in the press refrained from criticising such appointments because of a misplaced sense of racial solidarity or from a fear of being labelled racist.

● The claimed “transformation” has been used to justify government legislation which seeks to interfere in every sphere of life and activity.

● The ANC has also used racial propaganda—including accusations of racism and anti-transformationist tendencies—to attack the legitimacy of institutions such as the press and the judiciary which are independent of the ruling party.

● The remedy for this alleged lack of legitimacy – namely the implementation of “representivity”—provides a cover for cadre deployment or (where that is not possible) to make appointments based on racial patronage.

● In institutions such as the judiciary where the ANC is unable to make overt political appointments race is used as a cover to promote junior but “loyal” judges henceforth beholden to the ruling party, or as an excuse to pass over independent-minded judges for promotion.
Representivity is also a self-sustaining justification for those who accept appointments over individuals more capable than themselves. (Democratic Party, *All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society*, 2000)

It is worth noting the party’s position on Black Economic Empowerment at this time as this was one of its critiques in the *All Power to the Party* paper. In a speech delivered at the Italian Chamber of Commerce on 26 November 2003, Leon provides the DA’s position on BEE:

South Africa urgently needs a policy of black economic empowerment. But an empowerment policy cannot just create opportunities for the few. It must create opportunity for the many.

The true test of success for black economic empowerment will be whether jobs are being created in the formal economy, whether new businesses are being established, whether economic growth is expanding to include the poor - in short, whether the majority of people are actually seeing the benefits of the policy. (Leon, ‘Empowerment must create jobs, not just allocate jobs’, 26 November 2003)

As will be discussed in the Identity Crisis chapter, the party’s preferred position on BEE has always been economic empowerment which creates opportunities for all and not just the elite or those connected to the ANC.

The DP saw the re-racialisation of the public service as the start of benefitting a black elite linked to the liberation movement.

To adopt an ANC term, the “motive forces” of re-racialisation are the *nomenklatura*, and the various ANC aligned organisations which seek to gain special privileges from the party. This New Class is made up of the cadreship, the families of the liberation aristocracy, the exclusively black organisations, ANC-aligned organisations, cronies and family members of the cadreship, “The Network”, Thabo Mbeki’s Consultative Committee and so on. (Democratic Party, *All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society*, 2000)

The analysis carries a warning about the linkage between the party and state in a dominant-party system:

One of the major checks on any party seeking to erode the distinction between party and state is the prospect of a possible alternation in government at the next election. The possibility of the opposition turning the tables upon coming to power is usually enough to keep the government of the day honest. In the South African context a realistic possibility of a change in government (at least in the short term) was quite clearly lacking. With an overwhelming (and stable) majority most ruling parties would be prone to slowly and incrementally blurring the lines between party and state. In South Africa though, the ANC has set about purposefully and systematically eliminating those distinctions. The underlying reason for this undue haste is an inability to distinguish between the ANC and “the people”. This conflation of party and people is best seen in the ANC claim that critics of the ruling party are implicitly attacking the black majority. (Democratic Party, *All Power to the Party: The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society*, 2000)
The DP did not agree with the view that the black majority was the ANC or that the ANC was the black majority. However, it is this idea which has long been the political reality in discourse and practice in South Africa. Any criticism of the ANC by the DP was interpreted as anti-black as opposed to criticism of the governing party which is the role of an opposition party. This treatment of the DP’s criticism supports Horowitz’s argument about how opposition parties are treated within an ethnic party system. The DP’s position in All Power to the Party on transformation within the state was not a position of anti-black but one of meritocracy and state efficiency as well as the importance of a separation of party and state (Democratic Party, All Power to the Party: TheANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society, 2000).

In his autobiography, Leon provides a quote from one of the editorials written in response to the document which accused the DP of McCarthyism:

Should we all be terrified of a tyrannical regime’s pervasive tentacles, or should the DP be embarrassed at a McCarthyist effort to paint a false picture of the post-apartheid state? With the bulk of skilled blacks being ANC supporters, the trend the DP identifies was always going to be an aspect of South Africa’s peaceful revolution. (Business Day, 2000 cited in Leon, 2007: loc 13092)

Whilst correct in the analysis that many public servants would be ANC members or supporters, the editorial missed the point. The concern was that under the pretence of job creation and representivity, the ANC was slowly taking over state institutions in a conflation of party and state. Leon further points out an editorial in the same publication five years later following Oilgate in which it was now expressing the same concerns which the DP raised in 2000:

Yet five years later, Business Day had clearly thought again. Editor Peter Bruce wrote, in September 2005, of the ANC affiliations of all the investigative and political organs involved in the ‘oilgate’ scandal: ‘the fact that [oilgate] involves funding the ANC, of which the head of police, the President, the minister of Justice, the head of the revenue service, the leadership at PetroSA, the head of the Scorpions and the laughably termed “Public Protector” are all members, means it will never be investigated. It also means that anyone who comes too close to serious dirty tricks in the ruling party is going to find themselves being looked at hard by any one or more of the above’ (Leon, 2007: loc 13092)

This was typical of the approach both the media and the public had towards the DP at the time - if it criticised or pointed out issues with the ANC’s worldview it was accused of racism or not wishing to further ‘transformation’. The logical conclusion of what the DP was pointing out in 2000 is the present-day failure of many state institutions and the focus on enriching ANC elites as opposed to empowering the black majority.

This situation is an example of the race trouble which the party faced during this period, and for a few years after 2004. Due to the party’s label/image, it could not criticise government without it being interpreted as racism or defending white privilege by the liberation movement or commentators.
Media relations

The independent media at the time largely played into the dominant party narrative and was not particularly open to the DP’s interpretation of the political environment. The party believed it faced a hostile media environment which saw the ANC as the only solution to South Africa’s problems. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was not particularly open to the DP/DA either – and will be discussed further in the next chapter – and so without support from the independent media, the party did not have an easy media context.

Leon points out in his autobiography that many of his “detractors in the media genuinely believed that the DP/DA was ‘offside’ in the new South Africa – and didn’t hesitate to say so” (Leon, 2007: loc 13109). He believed that “there was no doubt, however, that the DP (and later the DA) was having increasing difficulty in getting its message across” (Leon, 2007: loc 13020). Leon provides an example from the DP’s Federal Congress in 2000 which was not covered by the Cape Times even though the congress took place in Cape Town:

In 2000, to take one of hundreds of examples, the Democratic Party Federal Congress in Cape Town was barely covered at all by the Cape Times. The editor at the time, John Scott, acknowledged the error and blamed communication problems in the newsroom: ‘Were you and your party colleagues to believe that this was all part of a Cape Times conspiracy to belittle the DP’s importance, I could hardly blame you. I was shocked myself.” (Leon, 2007: loc 13199)

Another example which Leon provided was a Business Day story which claimed that Leon had gone to the “verkrampte Afrikaner heartland” but failed to mention that he was actually speaking to a room full of black South Africans (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). Reports such as that further the questionable/misleading narrative that the party was focused on a certain constituency.

In Leon’s speech at the Registration Campaign Launch in Port Elizabeth in 2003, he had the following message for the media:

Let me make a statement to the media today.

The DA is serious about bringing change to South Africa. That is why we are serious about policy.

If I did not take the production and communication of substantive policy very seriously, I would not have asked someone of Ken Andrew’s stature and intelligence to devote the last few years of his political life to an exercise in policy development.

Frankly, it is much easier for us to spend our time criticising the government than it is to produce careful, thought-through solutions to the problems we face as a nation.

It is also much easier to get covered in the media by attacking the government than by producing policy alternatives.

And yet we do provide alternatives. Because we are a serious party, and our democracy deserves a serious, considered and intelligent debate about policy.
So encourage that debate. Stimulate it. And cover it.

And if the imperatives of driving up listenerships or selling newspapers make it impossible for you to do that, then fine. But don’t go around saying the DA only criticises, when you know it is demonstrably untrue. (Leon, ‘The DA’s policy: A programme for change’, 4 November 2003)

The above statement suggests that the DA did not believe that the media was interested in presenting the DA’s policy agenda. The media context was not a situation of a lack of coverage but rather the type of coverage. The party received a fair amount of coverage but for its opposition as opposed to its policies. As was discussed in terms of the media arena and political marketing, the media tends to be adversarial towards all parties in an independent media environment. The issue with the media was not the criticism but rather the fact that criticism appeared to be based on perceptions of the party’s label rather than on evidence.

In Leon’s autobiography, he discusses in detail the changes in the media environment post-94. From his interpretation, he saw the media as buying into the ANC paradigm and not wishing to be critical of the ANC in the early 2000s. Leon does acknowledge that after 2004, this situation improved as more journalists were open to assessing the liberation movement critically.

3.2.3. From opposition to opportunity

From late 1999 to mid-2000, the DP set about adapting its strategy to take advantage of its more secure position within the political landscape so that it could ‘fight forward’. In a letter to MPs and MPLs in July 1999, Coetzee outlines the party’s new positioning as follows:

As official opposition, the DP must match the ANC blow for blow with policy solutions for the problems South Africa faces. We have to be an opposition with a positive programme for a better future. This means we have to talk about solutions to unemployment, crime, corruption and delivery. Drive a positive programme. (Coetzee, July 1999)

The two key elements would be: a positive programme for a better future; and fighting power abuse.

Now that it was the Official Opposition it needed to consolidate its support and win new support amongst a section of the black electorate. There are three documents available which track the development of this strategy. These documents set the DP on its path for the next five years. The two key focus areas were consolidating the opposition and changing the party’s identity in order to attract black voters.

Developing a strategic plan for the party

In a document titled *Developing a strategic plan for the party* and written in August 1999, Coetzee provides a thorough analysis of the political landscape with the DP’s understanding of each of its opponents and its potential future. The document sets out the potential aims and objectives for the DP over the next few years which would be strengthened in later documents.
The aim for the party was that “the DP wants South Africa to be governed by liberal policies – which flow from liberal principles – in a liberal-democratic constitutional state” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). The document sets out two long-term strategic objectives which needed to be achieved in order to become an alternative government: to create a bridgehead to black voters and to maintain and grow the DP’s support base amongst minority voters.

The critical issues facing South Africa which were identified in the document were the following: achieving growth rates high enough to counter unemployment; poverty; Aids epidemic affecting the demographic profile of the population over the next ten years; crime; capacity of the state to deliver efficiently; importance of global trade and the “communications revolution” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999).

In Coetzee’s analysis of voters, he provides a description of how each racial group felt at the time. He wrote that:

there is a sharp divergence between blacks and the minority groups on what the solutions are and how well the government is addressing the problems. There is sharp divergence between blacks and minority groups on who best represents their interests. Thus, party political support continues to correlate strongly with race (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999).

According to the analysis, whites and Indians felt roughly the same which was:

generally fearful of the future, concerned about crime, unemployment and education, frustrated at the administrative incompetence of the government, alienated and angry by the government’s racial attacks on whites and its programme of “transformation” (affirmative action). (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

Indians felt “over-looked” by a government that prioritised black concerns over theirs (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). In terms of coloured voters there is a slight difference between working class and middle class coloured people:

12. Working class coloureds share the Indian concern at being “over-looked”. They are generally fearful of the government which they believe acts in the interests of blacks and against their own interests. They are predominantly concerned about “delivery”.

13. Middle class coloureds are divided. Some feel as whites and Indians do, others believe the ANC does act in their interests (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999).

According to the research, “Blacks remain concerned most about unemployment, crime and delivery” and “outside of the rural areas of KZN and parts of the Transkei, they believe the government acts in their best interests” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999).
Coetzee believed that the ANC’s hold over the majority of black voters was maintained in the following ways:

By propagating the idea that only it can embody the will of the black majority – the idea that the ANC is synonymous with the black population.

By propagating the idea of opposition parties which are supported mainly by minority voters are racist and fundamentally anti-black and work for minority interest and against those of blacks.

By driving an affirmative action programme “transformation” aimed at the black middle class and designed to make them the most direct beneficiaries of ANC rule. (patronage as a result of control of the state)

By trying to deliver social goods and services to the poor (this has been done unsuccessfully so far but is likely to be done a little better under Mbeki). (patronage as a result of control of the state)

By acting against any emergence of ethnic conflict or “tribalism” which may undermine the unity of the movement. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The positioning of the ANC and the ANC’s positioning of the opposition meant that the DP had little room to manoeuvre. Changing the perceptions that only the ANC was the representative of black interests and that the DP was racist and anti-black were the greatest challenges to overcome.

Another issue for the DP was how the ANC had begun to influence civil society. According to Coetzee’s analysis:

1. The ANC has successfully convinced English big business that it is the sole guarantor of stability and that the road ahead for South Africa must be approached from within the consensus of the ANC.

2. The ANC remains distant from Afrikaans big business.

3. The ANC has successfully achieved a much more supportive media corps placing ANC loyalists into positions of power at the SABC and by insisting on the “transformation” of the press, which has resulted in a greater number of sympathetic journalists and editors over the last five years. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The lack of civil society support was also problematic for the DP. Without the media to get the message across or support from big business and civil society organisations, the DP had little vocal support outside of its members.

As part of the strategic plan for the DP, Coetzee examined the ANC’s position towards the opposition and vice versa. According to his analysis, the ANC’s position towards the political opposition was as follows:

1. The ANC pursues a strategy of containment in respect of opposition, which takes the form of either demonization or co-option of its political opponents. They must either accept the ANC approach, or face an attempt to exclude them from legitimate political participation.
2. Because minority voters are deeply fearful and untrusting of the ANC, any attempt by a predominantly minority party to soft soap the ANC will result in loss of support for that party. Conversely, a hard line approach will be responded to by racial demonization, the purpose of which is to cut off from that party the prospect of black votes, and thus confine them to minority support. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The final point was particularly pertinent as the DP needed to balance its approach in order to maintain minority support but still be seen as an attractive alternative to the ANC for black voters.

The analysis of the other parties does not position them as a particular threat to the DP or the ANC. They are seen as taking a “non-combative” approach to the ANC and the voters which the DP was attracting were seeking a combative approach towards the liberation movement. Coetzee saw the DP’s position as that of strong opposition to the ANC and “currently subject to racial demonization by the ANC” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999).

Coetzee outlined in the document future issues in the political landscape over the next 15 years. These included the ANC’s ability to deal with service delivery, unemployment, HIV and Aids, and crime; a split within the alliance; the relationship between the ANC and IFP; and whether any opposition party manages to attract the ANC’s current support base (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). He concluded that the ANC might well be able “to deal with these pressures and use the resources of the state to maintain majority support over the next 15 years” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). He believed that based on the above factors, “we should base our decision on the assumption that there is a reasonable chance that the ANC will not win over 50% of the vote in the 2014 election” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). The strategic objective was, therefore, to position the DP “to take advantage of the fragmentation or fraying of the ANC with a view to becoming part of a government in the foreseeable future (2014)” (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999). In order to achieve this strategic objective, the DP had two operational objectives. The first operational objective was “to create a bridgehead to the ANC’s black vote”:

First, the best way position ourselves to take advantage of the fraying of the ANC’s support base is to win over some of its voters. In other words, “positioning” ourselves requires that we promote the fraying and fragmentation of the ANC’s support base...in order to take advantage of a fragmentation or fraying of the ANC’s support base, we need to be seen to be an attractive alternative to the ANC, in the eyes of those dissatisfied with it. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

However, Coetzee warned that:

Attempts by the opposition to “drive a wedge” between factions in the ANC are likely only to bring them together. However much they hate each other, rest assured they hate us more. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)
The document still did not outline how exactly the DP aimed to attract black ANC voters. The second operational objective was to maintain and advance the party’s position among minority voters. Coetzee points out that achieving these objectives of attracting both black voters and advancing the DP’s position among minority voters would require some operational changes:

> In essence, the way in which you go about winning over voters you have identified as your target market is to design a message for them and then to communicate that message to them with consistency, in volume, over time. This involves structuring every part of your organisation to achieve that end. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The document goes on to discuss opposition co-operation as a way of achieving the party’s objectives. Both the NNP and UDM were considered, and Coetzee initially advised not to cooperate with the NNP. The UDM was a more ‘Rainbow Nation’ option and would open the DP to black voters but he argued that:

> The only reason to co-operate with the UDM would be to give us access to black voters. If we can do this without them, then we should not cooperate. If we can’t then we should decide if cooperation with the UDM is consistent with our ultimate aim. This really means, would an alliance with the UDM dilute our policies and positioning in a way that leaves us “not liberal enough” and not coherent enough?

> Having said that, I think that an alliance with the UDM would seriously corrode our internal coherence and thus our policy coherence and strategic focus. For this reason an alliance with the UDM is not a good idea. (But it would really help if we could say, look, here is a message that will appeal to a defined market of black voters, so let’s go and get them and forget about the UDM.)(Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

The point about internal and policy coherence is important as with previous mergers, it was an essential aspect of the merger that the party maintained its principles and policy.

The central strategy group (Tony Leon, Ryan Coetzee, Nick Koornhof, Ian Davidson, Ken Andrew, James Selfe, Hennie Bester, Errol Moorcroft, Joe Seremane, Douglas Gibson) held a meeting to discuss this document in September 1999. It provides some valuable insight into how the growth strategy was discussed and the opinions of other central members of the DP at the time.

As part of this discussion, Leon raised concerns about the effect of destroying other opposition parties and whether “this advances or retards pluralism in South Africa” but that whatever action the DP took “must aim to counteract one-party hegemony”. He also stated that the party tended “to use the term ‘liberal’ as a code word” and that the party needed to unpack what it meant in terms of “concrete aims” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999).

In this meeting, Coetzee argued that the “only way to change the fundamental structure of politics was to access the black vote” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). He stressed the importance of creating a bridgehead to
these voters and said that if opposition co-operation could do this whilst also consolidating the party’s minority vote then this should be done. There was also an acknowledgement by Ken Andrew that “one black vote was worth five minority votes” and that “cooperation with other parties would make it marginally more difficult to attract new black votes, and if we were serious about black votes this would mean diverting resources” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). The meeting also made evident that the party did not have “the empirical evidence about what would attract black votes to the DP” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). Seremane “cautioned that every step we take should factor in the implication for the black vote” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999).

Ian Davidson made the argument that “cooperation and organic growth were not necessarily mutually exclusive” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). In his view, the party should focus on merging in the short term and “get this issue out of the way” so that it could focus on realignment (Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999).

The meeting showed that central figures thought differently about how the party’s future growth needed to be achieved. It was clear that all believed accessing the black vote was fundamental in changing the political dynamics in South Africa. However, if it were to merge with the NNP then this would have an impact on its access to black voters.

The meeting acknowledged that a merger with the NNP would be “hugely unpopular with the grass-roots of the Party” and that this group would be more open to a merger or form of cooperation with the UDM. The meeting also concluded that whatever cooperation the DP decided on must not exceed the “critical mass of integrity” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). However, they also concluded that “The DP could beat the NNP into oblivion, but this would take time. Therefore acquisition, merger or destruction are the options facing us” (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999). Although the DP knew it would be unpopular and that the NNP was a “group-driven party” which held on to its national socialist traditions, the NNP was still considered the best option in the short-term for strategic reasons (Democratic Party, Aide Memoire of discussions of strategy group, 2 September 1999).

From opposition to opportunity
By 2000, the strategy had been tightened up and approved by the party. This resulted in two documents – *Vision* and *Implementing the Strategy*.

The *Vision* document set out the DP’s vision, mission and objectives as follows:

DP vision: To promote the establishment of an open opportunity society based on liberal democratic principles.
DP mission: To build a multi-racial opposition that can:

1. Bring the ANC below 50% of the vote by 2009
2. Become an alternative government

Strategic objectives:

1. Consolidate and extend our support among minority voters.
2. Expand our support among black voters. (Democratic Party, Vision, 2000: 1)

The DP believed that its growth was important for consolidating democracy and preventing a one-party dominant state. However, in order to do this it needed to consolidate its support which meant clearing the opposition decks:

Put simply, the DP does not have the money and organisational capacity to drive successfully a message to black voters in an environment where we are forced to compete for minority voters with other opposition parties. We don’t have the firepower to fight a war on two fronts. This is a reality that cannot be wished away.

Therefore, if the DP is to succeed in building a bigger, non-racial opposition that can bring the ANC below 50% of the vote by 2009, we are going to have to clear the opposition decks first. In brutal terms, that means getting the other opposition parties out of the way so that we no longer need to compete with them for opposition voters. (Democratic Party, Vision, 2000: 1-2)

These two paragraphs are essential for understanding the party’s strategy over the next two years. Despite wishing to build a non-racial opposition, the party saw black voters as separate to minority voters and requiring a different strategy altogether which is perhaps still the case today. This is a theme/tension which runs throughout the party’s strategy and messaging and becomes more of an issue as the DA attempts to attract black voters. In order for the party to become non-racial, it needed to understand that different races saw the party differently and had different interests based on their racial group. However, in order to start addressing black voters, it needed to secure its position with minority voters first. White, coloured and Indian voters wanted an opposition to the ANC whereas black voters (those open to the DP) wanted an alternative to the ANC that still represented their interests. In some ways, black voters required a more ‘hearts and minds’ approach than other voters and would need to be convinced that the DP’s values were their values.

In this document, two options are provided to achieve the growth – either organically or through co-operation with other parties. The DP believed that it was important to start taking away some ANC votes in order to prevent a one party dominant system:

It is imperative that the DP begins [to] win the support of a section of the black community away from the ANC. The reason is simple: the overriding consideration in South Africa today is the consolidation of our democracy...In short, this means that we have got to make democracy work both politically and economically. But democracy can only take root and flourish if there is a real prospect that the ruling party could lose power. If there is no such prospect we will remain a
one-party dominant state and suffer all the negative political, economic and social costs that go with one-party dominance. (Democratic Party, *Vision*, 2000: 1)

The above had the pragmatic element of survival for the DP but was also based on principle. The DP did not wish to see a dominant-party system continue and democracy to fail. The DP’s view of democracy was not the same view as that of the ANC’s. The DP did not see it in the populist term of democracy as the ‘will of the people’ but rather as representative of the people.

The primary focus of the *Vision* document was on concluding cooperation agreements with other parties:

The key objective of our tactical moves must be to increase the pressure on the other parties to throw their lot in with the DP. This is what the public wants and we need to use that.

This then gives us leverage and closes down the space in which they are able to move.

The more we lead and are seen to lead in public, the less chance they have of getting what they want and the more we can secure a unified opposition on our own terms.

If we act timidly and defensively we give them the space to put pressure on us (Democratic Party, *Vision*, 2000).

The DP was very clear that it needed to maintain its dominance in any opposition cooperation agreement.

In *Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead*, additional steps are added to the strategic plan which would eventually shape the DA’s behaviour after 2002. Published in May 2000, there are a few differences from the *Vision* document. For example, *Implementing the Strategy* makes reference to a non-racial project as opposed to a multi-racial project. There is also less of a strategic focus on opposition cooperation and realignment and more focus on shifting the party’s identity and market. It was a change from an external focus on other parties to an internal focus on the party itself.

The document states the following objectives for the DP:

1. To extend and consolidate our hold on the supporters we already have.

2. To expand our support into new markets, particularly among black and coloured voters. (Democratic Party, *Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead*, 12 May 2000)

Key to achieving these objectives was finding a balance between opposition and opportunity:

In order to meet our first objective (consolidation of existing support) we need to own – in the hearts and minds of particularly white and Indian voters – the concept of “opposition” because
what these people want, above all, is protection from the dominant political force in the country and a means of expressing their fear and concern.

In order to achieve our second objective (extension into black and coloured communities) we need to own – in the hearts and minds of a certain section of the black and coloured electorate – the concept of “opportunity” because what these people want is a non-racial, democratic, non-ANC party that can offer the hope that opportunity provides. (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000)

It is interesting that the document mentions owning “opportunity” for both the black and coloured electorate. This suggests that not all coloured voters were open to the opposition identity and that they also needed to be targeted by the “opportunity” angle. By “opportunity”, the DP was referring to expanding economic opportunity which included education and skills training and development. There is an understanding that in order for the party to own the concept of opportunity, this needed to be internalised and become part of its identity. Up until this point, the central part of the DP’s identity had been opposition:

The DP believes, deeply and passionately, that the ANC government must be opposed vigorously for the sake of the development of democracy in South Africa. Because we believe this so passionately, we have, over time, arrived at the point where the party wakes up in the morning and “fights back” without having to engage in conscious analysis. It has become instinctive. Thus, because we have so deeply internalised opposition as part of our identity, we successfully manage to externalise it as part of our political offer (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000).

This quote is essential in understanding the DA’s transition to the “opportunity” strategy. The opposition brand had become such a major part of the party’s identity internally and externally that it was not seen as an alternative government. Voters were essentially voting for a strong opposition as opposed to voting for a party to replace the ANC as the dominant political force. It must be remembered that at this point, the party had been in “opposition” strategy mode for over forty years and was seen as the representative of the minority white, English-speaking, middle class. The ‘fight back’ mentality, whether against the NP under apartheid or the ANC in the democratic era, had been so internalised that it has struggled to move fully into the opportunity strategy although this transition to a focus on opportunity has become more visible since 2009. The opportunity identity would need to be internalised by the leadership in order for it to be externalised to voters.

Remaining in opposition strategy mode was, however, essential to maintain and grow its new support base. The document points out that if the party were to lose white votes and second place then its “ability to expand among blacks is undermined, if not killed outright” (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000). However, the document goes on to say that:

The consequence of obsessing about holding onto our base in the face of a threat from the NNP is that we are unable to focus enough mental energy, time, physical energy and money on
expanding our support among black voters. In addition, in order to hold whites, we sometimes feel compelled to do things that might harm our efforts to expand among blacks. (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000)

Once again, the tension of appealing to separate racial markets is evident. The transition from opposition to opportunity would require a series of balancing acts between the party’s various markets.

The primary concern during this period was how to deal with the other opposition parties who were competing for the same votes. The DP needed to “clear the opposition decks first” before it could meaningfully work on the opportunity strategy to grow and expand in new markets (Democratic Party, Vision, 2000). Of particular concern, was the NNP and the fact that it could take both white and coloured voters from the DP.

The document highlights the importance of starting the opportunity project now:

While we have not yet reached the point where we are in danger of failing to reach our second objective, and while the imperatives of the upcoming local government election requires of us a focus on “opposition” for the rest of the year...unless we begin to internalise opportunity now, we are not going to own the idea in the hearts and minds of the relevant sections of the black and coloured electorate in time for the 2004 election.

The leadership of the DP – the Federal Executive – must internalise the opportunity part of our identity if we are going to externalise it to the rest of the party. And unless the rest of the party internalises that aspect of our identity in turn, it will not externalise it to our market. Thus, the leaders need to lead. (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000)

Although the intention was there, the opportunity identity was not fully realised during this period due to a focus on the upcoming municipal elections and the eventual merger with the NNP.

The NNP was the DP’s greatest threat to achieving its objective of becoming an “opportunity” party. The document states:

In other words, we trying to move forward but are doing so looking over our shoulders. While we want to expand into black communities, we spend most of our time obsessing about protecting our rear from a small but potentially dangerous force of Nats.

Thus the primary strategic objective for the DP in the local government election is to kill off the NNP. We need to do this through a combination of direct assault and cooperation (in the Western Cape)

Once the election is over, we will have three and a half years to establish ownership of “opportunity” – not a very long time at all. It can’t be done if we focus all our energy over that period on fighting ownership of “opposition”. (Democratic Party, Implementing the strategy: a review of progress and recommendations for the way ahead, 12 May 2000)

It was therefore necessary to address the issue of the NNP in order to move forward.
3.2.4. Opposition cooperation

In order to consolidate the DP’s position, the party needed to ensure that it removed its opposition. During this period, it had a short-lived merger with the NNP (and Federal Alliance) which created the Democratic Alliance and also attempted a coalition with the IFP. Ahead of the 2004 elections, it also went into partnership with a few smaller parties, mostly smaller opposition parties with black or Afrikaner supporters (such as the UCDP).

Carthago dalenda est

Similar to the Progressives era when the PP was competing with the UP for votes, the DP eventually began to compete for votes with the NNP. As Leon states:

Objectively, the party closest to the DP was the now much-reduced NNP. We largely drew votes from the same pool, representing similar minorities. But this proximity served only to sharpen differences and enmities, and relations between the parties were fraught. (Leon, 2007: loc 15398)

Despite this fraught relationship, the DP had already begun considering cooperation with the NNP before the 1999 elections. Leon wrote in his autobiography that “the natural and immediate area of growth for our party lay at the expense of the NP. We clearly needed an overarching strategic roadmap” (Leon, 2007: loc 20793). This strategic roadmap was developed in a meeting held at Lourensford Estate (which would become known as the Lourensford meeting in party circles). The senior leadership present were: Hennie Bester, Ian Davidson, Peter Leon, Colin Eglin, Douglas Gibson, Eddie Trent, Mike Ellis, James Selfe and Tony Leon. Leon writes that at that meeting James Selfe wrote down:

just one sentence of which was to inform our approach for the following three years: ‘The DP’s strategic objective is the destruction of the NP as an institution’. As he wrote down those fateful words, he said as an aside to my brother: ‘Carthago dalenda est’ (Carthage must be destroyed) (Leon, 2007: loc 8037).

The DP had already gone into coalition with the NNP in the Western Cape provincial government following the 1999 elections. The discussions around cooperation were also in part due to a promise of a Codesa of the opposition (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999) which was similar to the calls in the press during the apartheid era for a realignment of opposition politics. In order to grow its position in the market, the DP began looking around for potential alliance partners soon after the 1999 elections. In an internal document, Coetzee analysed both the NNP and UDM as potential partners. This was part of a broader strategic discussion on how to grow the party. The initial discussion was around possible cooperation with both parties. With regards to the NNP, Coetzee stated the following:

1. We can get their whites, Indians and middle class coloureds without co-operating if we drive the right message to them properly.

2. We would cut ourselves off from the UDM by co-operating with the NNP, which may hinder our ability to win black votes.
3. We might cut ourselves off from potential black votes by co-operating with them (this is by no means clear however, as no empirical data exists to verify it).

4. Therefore, we should not pursue cooperation with the NNP. (Coetzee, Developing a strategic plan for the party, August 1999)

Coetzee advised that the UDM was a more strategic option in terms of growing the party and obtaining the black vote which was one of the primary objectives in seeking cooperation but this view changed by September 1999 as has already been discussed.

Prior to the meeting of the Federal Council in June 2000, Selfe produced a document on the possibility of entering negotiations with the NNP. The document concluded that the “DP’s aim should be ‘to incorporate the NNP into the DP without compromising our liberal ideology, brand integrity, organisational culture, and ensuring DP organisational dominance’” (Leon, 2007: loc 15469). This sentiment was echoed by Coetzee who said that:

‘Either we continue the war of attrition against the NNP, “killing them off one by one”, or we invite them on board our own ship and offer them the chance of contesting the election under the DP banner’. (Leon, 2007: loc 15490)

In other words, a merger/cooperation at a national level was a possibility but only if the DP remained the dominant party and its ideology and organisation remained in place. Leon states that:

I was determined that our negotiators should not fritter away through concessions the objective dominance which the DP held over the NNP. I remembered too well that precise outcome when the DP was formed to the disproportionate disadvantage of its largest component, the PFP. (Leon, 2007: loc 15562)

Following the Federal Council meeting on 11 June 2000, Leon released a press statement with the theme of consolidating the opposition and said he had been mandated by the Federal Council to invite the NNP to contest the local government elections under the banner of the DP. Following this declaration, it was in fact Martinus van Schalkwyk who suggested a full merger under a new party name.

On 24 June 2000, the DP and NNP reached an outline agreement to form a new party which would become known as the Democratic Alliance. Of particular importance with this merger was that the formation of the new party still kept the DP in a relative position of power as then leader Tony Leon would be leader of the new party with the NNP leader, Martinus van Schalkwyk as the deputy leader and not a co-leader which was an improvement on the merger which created the DP. The new party would also keep the DP’s policies. Leon said that “we were unanimous that our strength relative to the NNP would be an entrenched feature of the new set-up” (Leon, 2007: loc 15562). All in all, the DP managed to maintain, in principle, its external political dominance internally.

The preamble to the agreement between the DP and the NNP stated the following:
The parties note that they share:

A the urgent need to consolidate opposition strength among like-minded voters in all communities;

B the desire to build a political movement that is home to all South Africans from all communities and that will effectively challenge the ANC for political power;

C a commitment to strengthen multi-party democracy in South Africa;

D the realisation of the need to consolidate democracy in South Africa and prevent a de facto one party state from evolving in our country. (Outline Agreement between the Democratic Party and the National Party, 24 June 2000)

Introducing the NNP into what became the DA did not have any effect on the party’s strategy, policies or communication. Leon provided the example of sending Zille to negotiate policy matters and how this meeting only took 15 minutes (interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). The NNP had very little interest in the political identity of the party, it was mostly concerned with gaining power over the organisation through aspects such as membership.

The impact of this merger on the party was to give credence to ANC attacks of there being apartheid supporters in the DA and that it was a racist, white party. As Leon said, it “gave a gift to our enemies but it was also effective” (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). The party perhaps underestimated how difficult it would be to shake off the brief alliance with the NNP in the coming years and it remains a credible attack to make of the DA to this day as some public representatives from the NNP days have remained in the party. The irony is that after the NNP left the DA, the party formed an alliance with the ANC before disbanding.

Although the merger did not have any impact on the DA’s political marketing, it did have an impact on its external image. A merger with the UDM would have been more ideal. When asked why the DP did not manage to conclude an agreement with the UDM, Leon explained that they were “hopelessly naïve” and “incoherent”. The NNP was:

a much better fit ironically because we were sharing the same pool of voters by then and we’d beaten them and they were desperate and we could dictate the terms and then they tried to screw us over. (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017)

From the internal discussions, the NNP merger in some respects went against the party’s objectives. This was not going to make the party more attractive to black voters and in fact, possibly, harmed the party’s image with black voters.11 However, it did meet the objective of consolidating the DA’s support amongst white and coloured voters. The merger also did not have any impact on the party’s ideological positioning as the Nats had shown no interest in policy positions or influencing the ideological positioning of the DA. However, by joining forces with a party that was social nationalist, the DP put pragmatism before principle.

11 There is no clear evidence whether this is the case.
3.2.5. On message, in volume, over time: Modernising and Professionalising

The period leading up to the 2004 elections saw the DA become more of an electoral-professional party. The DA developed standardised guidelines on by-election campaigns as well as running a professionalised registration campaign for the first time. It also ran issue campaigns outside of election campaigns. Most importantly, it started running a more professional communications operation which focused on driving pertinent issues in the media.

Communications and Issue-driving

Shortly after the 1999 election, Coetzee sent a memo to the MPs and MPLs in which he started to define the new objectives for the DP and how the party needed to go about achieving those objectives. One key factor was defining the message and driving it:

If we want to break into new markets we have to define our message and then communicate it consistently, in volume, over a long period of time. Even if we get this right, don’t expect to see any major breakthroughs for three years. That is the nature of the game.

In order to change a voter’s behaviour, we must first change his perceptions and then her attitudes. Only then are we in a position to change behaviour. It takes a long time to do that. And it only works if we communicate the message consistently, and in great volume. (Coetzee, 5 June 1999)

In order to change perceptions, the DP/DA needed to start owning issues pertinent to the voters that it wished to attract. In 2002, the communications issue was further discussed in relation to ‘owning’ issues and professionalising the party’s communications. With regards to media and communications, the Federal Executive noted that:

4.2 A suitable media/communications director must be appointed as soon as possible.

4.3 Where possible, other leadership figures should be showcased at public events.

4.4 Public representatives need to take greater responsibility for initiating and improving their own statements. They should also build relationships with journalists (particularly specialists in their fields) and should invite such journalists to events (e.g. visits to hospitals)

4.5 The format of DA@Work will change to reflect more party activity and less leadership statements and speeches. All public representatives with e-mail will receive this, as well as others who want to.

4.6 The Party must improve its exposure on vernacular radio and a panel must be identified of people able to articulate the Party’s policies in all eleven languages.

4.7 Public Representatives must take responsibility for selling their own statements to the media.

4.8 The Party must hold a bosberaad with the media no later than 31 August 2002 (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 4-5 May 2002)
What can be seen from this is that the DA was trying to broaden its communications both in terms of who was communicating the message and where and how the message was communicated. The exposure on vernacular radio was particularly important if the DA wanted to build a presence amongst black voters as these stations, particularly the SABC vernacular stations, have the highest listenership in the country.

Issue-driving was done on a basis of those who were capable rather than those who reflected a certain constituency:

The Leader concluded by saying that he was busy with the reassignment of the national parliamentary spokespersons. There were key battleground issues and the best people to drive issues would be put in these portfolios, regardless of race, colour or gender. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 25 April 2003, p.3)

Added to everyday communications on issues was the start of national issue campaigns outside of the election period. This included the Basic Income Grant Campaign as well as a Crime campaign to get 150000 police officers on the street. In a Federal Executive meeting the following was noted:

The purpose of campaigns is to reinforce identity. This requires focus and communication in volume. Provinces and Regions must consolidate support after national campaigns. Campaigns must avoid being gimmicky. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 4-5 May 2002)

These campaigns would typically be spearheaded by the Federal Head Office and carried out by the provinces. The professionalization of campaigns and communications was a necessary shift for the DA in order to build its identity amongst black voters and both of the issue campaigns during this period were directed at this market.

Political marketing research
Marketing research became a more regular occurrence during this period when funds would allow. The research was not only into new markets but also to keep an eye on how the DA’s core support base viewed it so that they did not lose those votes.

As the party grew electorally, so did its ability to conduct research into the market. Although there is evidence of focus groups and polling in the late 1990s and early 2000s, this form of research requires a substantial amount of money which the party initially did not have. In later years, it began to rely heavily on polling and focus groups in order to determine how it needed to adapt and behave as an organisation.

Market research is an important feature of modern political parties as it allows a party to determine its message and identify potential voters. It can also lead to a party transitioning from a product- to sales- or market-orientation. In conducting more regular market research, the DA was beginning to adapt to a sales-orientation.
By-elections

By-elections became an important way for the DA to gauge support and show that it was growing and changing perceptions between major elections. However, it initially attempted to stand in more by-elections than necessary. The DA decided that it “cannot fight every by-election. A few campaigns fought well are preferable to many fought badly” and that there “must be a careful selection process” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 December 2002, p.6). By-election campaign operations were standardised during this period to assist with ensuring that campaigns were run professionally.

Policy formation

The DA underwent an extensive review of its policies in 2003. Policy documents were provided to interest groups for input and it was suggested that “eminent black intellectuals need to be involved in the policy-development process” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 4-5 May 2002). The party also recommended during this period that policies needed to be geared towards a programme of governance (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 4-5 May 2002).

Registration Campaigns

One of the factors which has contributed to the party’s success in recent years is its ability to register its voters. In 2003, former National Executive Director Greg Krumbock drew up a document which outlined how the DA needed to approach registration campaigns. For the most part, this strategy is still used in the party today.

3.2.6. 2004 Elections

The 2004 elections saw a shift in focus for the DA from minority voters to black voters. It devoted more resources to targeting black voters and spent more time in black areas for campaign events.

According to the Federal Executive minutes of 12 January 2004, the DA’s five internal electoral aims were the following:

i) To double the number of members in the National Assembly achieved in the 1999 election to 88

ii) To become the largest single party in the Western Cape with the view to forming the government in this province

iii) To achieve 50% of the vote with the Coalition for Change in KwaZulu-Natal and to increase DA numbers in this government

iv) To achieve a significant increase in the number of representatives in all the provincial legislatures, especially in Gauteng where the aims was to increase it to above 40% with the Party’s coalition partners

v) To become the official opposition in the North West Province, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 12 January 2004)
The above were ambitious targets based on the DA’s position at the time.

Candidates:
The DA intended on presenting a diverse group of candidates. This was advertised from the moment the DA opened its candidate nomination process in August 2003.

It is also crucial that our candidates bring diversity to the leadership of our party: the DA must start to look like South Africa.

By diversity I mean two things. First, we need a diverse combination of skills, talents, and interests among our public representatives.

And second, we need leaders that reflect the many backgrounds and walks of life among the members of our party and indeed among the people of South Africa as a whole—female and male; black, brown, and white; Afrikaans, English, African, and Asian; young and old; Muslim, Hindu, Jew and Christian; etcetera.

We are in a race with the ANC to capture the best talent of a new generation of South Africans. So far, I can safely say that we are winning. Our branches continue to expand, particularly among young people in the black community. We must tap into these new reservoirs. (Leon, ‘The Battle for 2004: There is no higher ideal, there is no greater burden’, 2 August 2003)

Although diversity was important, the speech still places merit before diversity. Booysen (2005) points out that the DA returned predominantly white males to its lists. However, she argues this point without interrogating why the DA failed to have more diversity in its candidate lists. In 2003, Leon and others within the DA made a push for more diverse candidates. The DA recognised that in order to win votes amongst its target market, it needed to start “looking like South Africa” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 29 August 2003). In the early and mid-2000s there was a drive to find suitable candidates who would make the face of the party reflective of the country. At a meeting of the Federal Executive in January 2003, Leon stated that candidate recruitment for the upcoming elections needed to result in the following:

- A significant increase in gender and racial diversity
- To retain merit in the selection of candidates
- To advance the internal unity of the DA, chiefly in the context of historical components and regional representation
- To ensure that the party had exceptional legislators and good constituency representatives in Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures
- To ensure the loyalty of the DA caucuses (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 12 January 2003)

These sentiments were echoed in a memorandum from Leon to public representatives in 2003. In it he states that the recruitment of candidates must achieve the goal of making the
face of the party “start to resemble the face of the nation in all its diversity”. He urged public representatives to conduct:

A concerted talent drive to attract into our ranks of public representatives, persons who will meet some, or all, of the above criteria and that our procedures are not exclusionary of such person’s promotion and advancement. (Leon, 3 February 2003)

There was a recognition that in order to grow, the DA needed to become more diverse:

The DA had to start looking like South Africa and needed the best quality people to represent the party and its voters...The voters were the stakeholders of the Party and the Party therefore had to advance their interests.

The vision had to be to grow the Party and it had to be an ongoing process, not only during the election period. The Party had to have a vision to change the face of the DA, otherwise it would fall into the trap of what the ANC was doing, namely to marginalize whites who were not part of the ANC. The DA had to counter that trap. The Party had to change internally...The party had to walk this road and change the way it thought and operated

New blood had to be recruited to better performance of the Party and to go forward...The national profile of the Party had to be changed (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 29 August 2003)

Another aspect which Leon highlighted was that it was incredibly difficult for people of colour who did become public representatives for the party. They were faced with extreme pressure from the ANC to “return home” (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). Leon said that “You had to have a huge strength of character to resist the ANC” (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). An aspect which is not taken into account with Booysen’s view is that whilst the DA failed to attract black leaders and candidates, this failure was not for a lack of trying. The DA could only work with what was available to them and this was not a large pool of talented, skilled, experienced black candidates despite efforts to attract black candidates. Black candidates were simply not interested in the DA and there was also a stigma attached to joining the party which has only changed recently (Zille, 2016). The DA did not make the decision to have a predominantly white candidate list, it worked with what was available to it at the time.

Target market
The target market was similar to that of the 1999 election – coloured, white and Indian voters – but for the 2004 elections, it also targeted segments of the black electorate. The coloured vote in the Western Cape was particularly important as the DA believed it had a chance of holding the balance of power in that province. In terms of black voters, the documents refer to a certain section of the black electorate and that polling was showing that progress amongst the urban black electorate was slight:

A factor that the Party had to look at professionally was its slight regression among coloured voters in the rural areas, particularly in the Western Cape. Coloured voters were generally not committed to one party. A lot of work had to be done amongst these voters before the 2004
election...The Leader said the progress of the DA amongst the black urbans were very slight. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 29 August 2003)

However, Clelland-Stokes (Communications Director) said at the time that:

"We're going to fight this election on the terrain of the better life that the ANC promised 10 years ago. We'll be taking the fight to the ANC's own psychological territory. We are spending a lot of money to communicate with black voters." (The Star, "DA spin machine sells slick self-confidence", 22 February 2004)

He also pointed out that the DA was increasing its vote amongst the black electorate and that it was focusing most of its energy on the black electorate:

"We've been able to win votes from the ANC and grow in black constituencies. We've committed enormous money and resources in identifying the things that black voters want and what they identify with. Until the launch of the campaign, Tony Leon has held 456 events in townships, squatter camps and rural constituencies. Not stage-managed imbizos where selected people tell Thabo Mbeki he is great, but real, spontaneous information sessions," (The Star, "DA spin machine sells slick self-confidence", 22 February 2004)

As part of this attempt to win over black voters, the DA entered into a Coalition for Change with the IFP. The Coalition for Change had been in the making for some time as the DA had discussions with the IFP on how best to keep the ANC out of government. An agreement with the IFP was eventually reached and was called the Coalition for Change. Leon gave the same disclaimer as with the NNP, it might not work but that they needed to do it anyway:

He said that this relationship had a much more ambitious agenda, namely to form the core of an alternative government. The perception had to be created that the DA was growing. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 October 2003, p.1).

This coalition differed from the NNP relationship in that it was never designed to be a merger nor, from a reading of the Federal Executive minutes and other strategy documents, did the DA consider the IFP as a threat to its support base. The Coalition for Change was a step towards the “opportunity” strategy of shifting the party’s identity to an alternative government:

The Chairperson said that the Party had a strategy, accepted by the Federal Council, to form the centre of an alternative to the ANC. All these interactions with other parties must be seen as working towards this strategy. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 25 April 2003, p. 4)

Booysen argues that the “DA’s Coalition for Change with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was intended to invoke a semblance of nonracialism in an attempt to induce black voters to enter a new political home” (Booysen, 2005: 133). The purpose of the campaign was also to show that the DA-IFP coalition was a viable alternative to the ANC and to provide a credible offering to the electorate.
Campaign

The messaging for this election campaign was tighter and simpler with a more positive message to South Africans. The DA chose “South Africa deserves better” as its main campaign slogan. In a Federal Executive meeting ahead of the elections Coetzee said that “it was clear from the research that the position of the Party was to offer change and that it could deliver change. The DA was a party with momentum” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 12 January, 2004, p. 7). As the party had an agreement with the IFP for this election, it also used the message of a Coalition for Change.

The campaign pledged the following:

- One million real jobs.
- 150 000 police on the streets.
- Free Aids drugs for all who need them.
- A basic income grant of R 110 per person per month.
- A Road Map to Democracy in Zimbabwe.

The term ‘real jobs’ was an alternative to the ANC’s government-manufactured jobs through increasing the public service and opening up temporary Expanded Public Works Project jobs.

At a campaign event level, the DA segmented its messaging once again and went negative with its messaging in the Western Cape in order to take coloured voters away from the NNP:

The DA was going to spread the message of hope as an alternative government. But in the Western Cape something else had to be done. The NNP vote was up for grabs and the DA had to make sure they got it. This message of hope was going to require discipline. The role of the NNP would be to try and damage the DA and be the attack dog for the ANC. (Minutes of the Federal Council Meeting, 1-2 November 2003)

The different campaign messages for the different areas are evident in the DA’s registration campaign speeches. In Mitchells Plain, the DA talked about the importance of registering for change; it apologised for the failed NNP merger but also said that the NNP let the voters down; it was also low on race speech. At the campaign launch in Soweto, the party talked about the coalition for change and raised the fear of one party dominance e.g. “That is why a vote for change next year, is a vote for the beginning of the end of one- party domination in South Africa!”. There was also talk of momentum and the speech in Soweto was far more non-racial. In Port Elizabeth it also carried a message for change but was more policy-focussed. Speeches at Western Cape rallies were far more bonding and had three themes: DA delivery; ANC-NNP failure and abandonment; and sympathising with coloured voters for being left behind through Employment Equity and a government which did not represent their interests. These speeches also included the generic change theme.

Over and above the policy and change messages was a message of diversity. This was used in terms of candidates and also as an alternative to the ‘transformation’ and ‘representivity’ line of the ANC. The diversity message also needed to be represented at campaigns:
14 people would be deployed as the public face of the Party. They would be selected very carefully in terms of their expertise as well as to represent the diversity of the Party. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 October 2003)

The party not only needed to talk about diversity but needed to show diversity at events.

The campaign events during this election were based around themes. These themes included: unemployment, crime, corruption, poverty, job creation, reconciliation and the Coalition for Change.

In terms of static communications, the DA had stated in a Federal Executive meeting that the:

*Majority of ad spend for the election would be on radio due to its reach and the fact that it had the highest frequency of repetition. Billboards would be used to further the PR campaign and ads would be placed in the biggest newspapers.* (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 2004)

The DA spent R5.9 million on radio advertisements with over R2 million spent on stations with a predominantly black listenership in comparison to R1.3 million spent on stations with predominantly white listeners (Davis, 2005: 246).

In terms of posters, the DA decided to allocate most of its posters to black areas “to ensure that the Party fought a more visible campaign in those areas” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 12 January, 2004, p. 7). The fact that the DA was making a concerted effort to campaign with the black electorate was also evident in where it placed its posters. From research conducted in three provinces, Davis identified that “the ANC dominated African townships, but the DA also placed posters in these areas of ‘uncharted territory’ for the party [DA]” (Davis, 2005: 243). For example, Davis counted one DA poster for every three ANC posters on the major thoroughfare between Gugulethu and Nyanga in the Western Cape (Davis, 2005: 244). Although the DA was making an effort in these areas, it was still ‘out-postered’ by the ANC.

Ferree conducted a study based on newspaper articles during the 55 day campaign period in order to determine the bridging and bonding patterns of the various parties during the election. Although the study was based primarily on newspaper reports as opposed to party communication, it does provide a good snapshot as to what information voters would have received about parties during the 2004 elections. In terms of the DA’s bridging and bonding appeals, Ferree found that the DA almost always spoke of itself in bridging terms and that when the ANC talked about the DA “fully half of its rhetoric was racial (six out of twelve instances) and all of it was bonding (i.e. it painted the DA as a racist or white party)” (Ferree, 2011: 117). Even though the DA once again attempted a bridging message, this was negated by the liberation movement’s bonding messages to black voters.
Booysen (2005) argues that the DA “emerged as a party that was, at best, liberal, multifaceted, and engaged in vigorous multipartyism” and “at worst, contradictory in terms of policy, internally inconsistent, and operating as an opportunistic vote-garnering apparatus” due to its very different constituencies (Booysen, 2005: 143). She points to two policy positions during the 2004 campaign which she believed contradicted the DA’s ideological and racial positioning. The first was the Basic Income Grant put forward to attract black voters. Although Booysen is correct that the DA believes in a free market economy, it has always recognised that within the South African context social welfare intervention is required. The second was the death penalty which did not actually form part of the DA’s manifesto for 2004 but Leon had made reference to bringing back the death penalty during the campaign – a leftover from the 1999 election.

3.2.7. 2004 and Beyond

The 2004 election was not a success for the DA. Although the party managed to increase its support, it did not make the inroads which it had anticipated. The campaign was successful in terms of the number of votes won but unsuccessful in respect of where those votes came from. There was the usual assessment by analysts that the DA had reached its ‘ceiling’ of support (Hamill, 2004; Booysen, 2005).

A frank assessment of the state of the DA after the 2004 elections was had and is contained in a document written by James Selfe titled The 2004 Elections and Beyond: An Assessment. The document examines the political and media context as well as the DA’s own performance, particularly amongst black voters, and its organisation. Most importantly, it contained an initial way forward for the DA.

Political context

The DA operated in a hostile political and media context leading up to the 2004 elections. It was believed that the perceptions about the political environment “were shaped by commentators and ‘analysts’. Such commentators and ‘analysts’ were, with notable exceptions, hostile to the DA and uncritical in the acceptance of the ANC’s agenda” (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004). The party believed that commentators and analysts had bought into the ANC paradigm (particularly that of ‘transformation’) and that this was true of business and civil society too. One of the key issues was, once again, transformation:

“Transformation” is actually neo-Verwoedian racism, but it is uncritically accepted as both inevitable and almost noble – an expiation for the sins of apartheid. The refusal of the DA to accept this agenda evoked a storm of protest from ANC-sympathetic journalists, and contributed to the perception, held in the chattering classes that the DA in general and Tony Leon in particular, was “too negative”. There can be few other parties and leaders who have been subjected to such sustained invective as the DA and Tony Leon over the last period. (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)

In terms of its assessment of the ANC’s campaign, it acknowledged that the liberation movement had more money and had run a “very professional and slick campaign” (2004
Elections & Beyond, 2004). It had also run a very negative campaign against the DA which in a way is a success for the DA as it legitimated the party as opposition:

While it simultaneously savaged the DA for being “racist” and “negative”, the ANC ran a negative and racist campaign against the DA. It portrayed the DA as “white” and its canvassers told voters that a vote for the DA was a vote to reintroduce apartheid. The ANC were able to run a positive external campaign and simultaneously a very negative narrow-cast campaign against the DA by doing very extensive door-to-door canvassing. Such tactics appear to have succeeded. (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)

This was detrimental to the party as it had hoped to attract more black voters during this election and had devoted a considerable amount of time and resources to achieving this.

A feature which hurt the DA was also the fact that Mbeki had undergone a makeover of sorts and was no longer the aloof intellectual during the 2004 campaign:

The most remarkable feature of the campaign was the “makeover” of the President. From an aloof and uncaring individual, the President was portrayed as warm and lovable, reaching out to minority voters and (all of a sudden) in touch with their issues. The implication of this was that many of the issues around which the DA wished to campaign were in some ways neutralized by the “new, improved” President. (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)

Although the DA managed to squeeze out other opposition parties, it did suffer some criticism for this:

The squeeze campaign against the ID was also successful. However, it caused outrage in the media and distress amongst the DA’s “blue rinse brigade”. The squeeze message against the FF+ likewise evoked strong feelings amongst other sections of the Party. The Party needs to examine the reasons why some advertisements were so offensive to some of our own supporters. (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)

Both the ID and FF+ had certain target markets (coloured and Afrikaans voters) which the DA was also trying to attract. These target markets also formed part of the DA’s base already. Once again, this was about a balancing act across the party’s various racial constituencies.

DA Campaign
Although 2004 & Beyond highlights some external factors as having a negative effect on the campaign, it also identifies many problems within the DA’s own campaign. At the level of campaigning and results, the party had failed to deliver:

It would appear that levels of black support were disappointingly low (lower than in 2000), that the levels of Indian vote were patchy and in places catastrophic, and that some White English-speaking voters voted for the ID. The effect of this was that fewer than expected MPs and MPLs were elected, and this has obviously affected morale within the Party, and in some ways dented the Party’s credibility.
The organization of the Party left much to be desired. Although the operation in Sandton was sophisticated and worked well, there was very little campaigning that was not initiated or managed by the NHQ.

The problems appeared to be at the level of provinces and regions not following NHO instruction or not having the capacity to perform their mandates. *(2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)*

A considerable amount of the section on the DA’s campaign was dedicated to its performance with black voters. It aimed to get approximately 6% of the black vote and this was considered at the time before the elections to be “appropriately conservative”:

The failure of the DA to capture the black vote could be attributed to our failure to identify with black voters convincingly. The Party spent disproportionate amounts of time and effort campaigning in black areas between 1999 and 2004. Despite this, the DA failed to capture a significant share of the black vote. Its failure to do so might be attributed to:

- The DA’s failure for the most part to establish and sustain DA structures in black areas in such a way that the DA was an accepted part of those communities
- The DA’s failure to identify with black voters as convincingly as the ANC was able to do.

While the DA leadership campaigned extensively in black areas, and addressed issues pertinent to black voters (e.g. the basic income grant, poverty, HIV/AIDS) it failed...to convince these voters of its deep-seated commitment to them and their issues. *(2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)*

As will be discussed in the next chapter, connecting with black voters would become a primary focus of the years leading up to the 2009 elections.

The assessment also points to the lack of black pro-DA media commentators:

This failure was in part compounded by the absence of credible and articulate black opinion-formers endorsing and defending the DA. This also had an effect on the perceptions of the white “chattering classes” about the DA. *(2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)*

Without black opinion-formers on board, the DA could not credibly attract the black middle class. The DA also needed to change perceptions of the white “chattering classes” who believed that the DA was not a non-racial alternative.

The document estimated that the DA achieved the following percentage of black support in the 2004 election:

- Eastern Cape – 0.6%
- Western Cape – 0.4%
- Mpumalanga – 1.5%
- Free State – 1.5%
- North-West – 0.8%
- Gauteng – 1.9%
- KwaZulu-Natal – 2.5%
The KZN result was probably higher due to the Coalition for Change campaign which focused its energies in KZN.

Beyond

The analysis of the DA’s performance in the 2004 elections set out a way forward for the party in order to deal with the issues raised by the 2004 campaign. The document recommends that the “organisation has to define new goals, new strategies and new ways of communicating both internally and externally” which would require organisational adaptations and eventually a new staff structure (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004). Re-intellectualisation was also identified as a key aspect for moving forward:

Partly to address the issue of the motivation of our activists, it is important that we re-intellectualise and re-ideologise our Party. There must be debate and ideas in the Party; our policies must be more cutting edge and newsworthy. The Party has an extremely important role to perform in exposing the nature and dangers of the new racism inherent in ANC policies. An article in which the actual nature of ANC “transformation” is exposed should be drawn up as soon as possible. Defining this debate is essential also because it will give members of the DA itself a renewed sense of mission. (2004 Elections & Beyond, 2004)

Another recommendation which was made was to improve the DA’s method in communicating with the media.

3.2.8. Conclusion

The DA grew both electorally and internally by 2004 but this was not considered a successful period and it took about two years for the party to recover fully from the ‘defeats’ of the 2004 election.

The DA’s first strategic objective of consolidating and expanding its existing support base was achieved to some extent. Its position as the Official Opposition was secure but it lost some of its new base that it had tried so hard to consolidate. It had succeeded in destroying the Nats but had failed to achieve the growth which it had hoped for in order to position itself as an alternative government to the ANC. As Davis and Ferree both argue, the 2004 elections showed that the ANC and the DA were the main political parties in South Africa at the time.

This period also saw the party realise the difficulties in maintaining a message for its core support without alienating itself from black voters. It needed to find a message which could appeal across the racial divide so that voters did not need to be targeted according to their racial group.

The shift towards an electoral-professional party type through more professionalised messaging and campaign operations is significant in that one would expect this increased professionalization to increase the party’s position electorally. What one finds instead, by the end of the 2004 elections, is that the DA failed to make inroads into the black electorate and in fact lost votes in the Indian market. The 2004 election was a qualified success for the
DA as it managed to consolidate its position as the Official Opposition even though it lost support in key target markets. However, the failings of the 2004 elections set in motion various processes which would set the DA up to become a party of government.
3.3 Revisioning, Reengineering and Rebranding – 2004 - 2009

3.3.1. Introduction
From mid-2004 to 2009, the DA went through major adaptations at an organisational and identity level which are in part responsible for its growth today. The *2004 Elections & Beyond* document called for a revisioning exercise for the DA which was set in motion in 2004 and carried on until 2005. The revisioning was followed by a reengineering of the party structures in 2006 which was the final step in turning the DA into an electoral-professional party. The end result of the revisioning and reengineering of the DA was a rebranding in 2008 under the new leadership of Helen Zille.

Key to the above process was a document written in 2006 called *Becoming a party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*. Although it contained much of the same analysis as previous strategy documents, there was a more in-depth and considered focus on the DA’s identity and changing how it was perceived. It also contained a stronger analysis of what needed to be done to attract black South Africans to the party and a ‘warts and all’ discussion about how the DA came across to voters.

The DA won the City of Cape Town (in coalition with smaller opposition parties) in 2006 and Helen Zille was elected mayor. This election victory was key to delivering on the message of the DA as an alternative government. As mayor, Zille also allowed the DA to project the image of an alternative government and this would be one of her defining legacies with the party.

In 2008, the DA launched its new brand at Constitution Hill in Johannesburg. As part of the rebranding of the DA, it started to move away from negative campaigning and to put forward a positive policy programme. The party also began to talk from a position of governance about the realignment of politics in South Africa which would become a major theme over the next decade.

The chapter will begin by examining the political context at the time. This will be followed by a discussion on the revisioning, reengineering and rebranding which the DA undertook between 2005 and 2008. It will conclude with an examination of the 2009 election.

3.3.2. Political Context
The ANC emerged from the 2004 elections with almost 70% of the vote. The defining moment of the period after that election was the leadership battle which played out between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. This resulted in a split from the ANC by several senior leaders and the formation of a new political party, the Congress of the People (COPE). The DA steered clear of involving itself in this battle. As can be seen through several Federal Executive meetings, the party line was not to involve the DA in the ANC’s internal issues but to be ready to take advantage of a potential split if it occurred.
As part of the DA’s shift during this period, it started to articulate more clearly and deliberately its own vision for South Africa and to talk less about the ANC’s policy programme.

Deconstructing the ANC’s agenda and defining the DA’s vision

After the elections in 2004, Leon delivered two speeches highlighting the differences between the ANC and the DA. The first was delivered on 10 June 2004 at Marks Park Sports Club in Johannesburg titled “Deconstructing the ANC’s agenda”. The second was delivered on 16 June 2004 in Soshanguve outlining the DA’s Open Opportunity Society for All. The locations were important, the first in a leafy, predominantly white, Johannesburg suburb to the Johannesburg Press Club and the second in a black township suburb outside of Tshwane on Youth Day.

The first of the two speeches focused on the ANC’s agenda and the role of the opposition in South Africa. According to Leon, the opposition faced the following set of challenges:

- We need to provide South Africa with a sound analysis of the state of the transition to full democracy in our country;
- We need to outline clearly why we reject the ANC’s revolutionary programme of "transformation", which informs all ANC policy and behaviour;
- We need to offer an alternative, liberal democratic vision of the future;
- We need to articulate a policy programme in support of that vision that can inspire South Africans and win their support. (Leon, ‘Deconstructing the ANC’s Agenda’, 10 June 2004)

Leon provides the DA’s interpretation of the ANC as the following:

To comprehend the ANC’s behaviour, and provide a coherent analysis of it, one must first understand the ANC's conception of itself, as outlined in its many publications.

The ANC does not view itself as an ordinary political party, one among a variety in a normal democracy. Rather, it sees itself as a movement engaged in a "National Democratic Revolution", the purpose of which is to bring about a particular outcome.

At one time the leading intellectual lights in the ANC, who tended to be members of the SACP, regarded the advent of liberal democracy in our country as the first stage in a "two-stage revolution", the second stage of which was meant to involve a transition to socialism.

But the dominant faction in the ANC today is Africanist, not communist, and the ANC's goal is the "emancipation" of the historically deprived black majority, and the creation of a utopian society. And it believes that this can only be achieved through "democratization", which requires African "hegemony" in society - a situation that can only be realized through the hegemony of the ANC. (Leon, ‘Deconstructing the ANC's Agenda’, 10 June 2004)

The DA’s argument was that the ANC equated democracy with ANC hegemony. Leon goes on to explain why the ANC’s concept of democracy was problematic:
In my view this conflation of the ANC, the "African majority" and "the people" is the source of much that has gone wrong in South Africa over the past 8 years. For it gives rise to a perverse conceptualization of what "democracy" is: if the ANC naturally represents the African majority, and if democracy is rule by "the people", then it follows that "democratization" necessarily entails the extension of ANC control.

The ANC uses two means to achieve its desired African hegemony, which it equates (and in our view confuses) with democracy: the one involves the extension of ANC control over all "levers of power" in society; the other involves the dubious concept of "demographic representivity". (Leon, ‘Deconstructing the ANC’s Agenda’, 10 June 2004)

The issues of transformation, demographic representivity and affirmative action were discussed in detail and did not differ from previous positions. The key issue, once again, for the DA is that the ANC failed to see black South Africans as individuals:

It is essential to understand the nationalist and racist conception that underlies the linked ideas of African hegemony and demographic representivity.

For the ANC, black South Africans are not individuals with a unique outlook, particular interests and specific circumstances.

Rather, individual black South Africans simply represent a larger whole - "the people" - which itself is treated as an individual personality.

It is a fatal flaw to assume that "demographic representivity" is the kind of affirmative action that is designed to eliminate imbalances and which, having achieved its aim - a "normalization" that involves colour-blindness- should fall away.

For demographic representivity specifically refuses to take into consideration the individuality of people - their different desires, interests, cultures, skills, and so on. Under the ANC, demographics shape destiny as a direct consequence of government policy. (Leon, ‘Deconstructing the ANC’s Agenda’, 10 June 2004)

In some ways this was a bridging message to black voters who rejected the ANC’s group identity.

The second speech was discussed in some detail in the chapter on the DA’s ideological identity but it is important to make mention of the strategic shift in this speech. For the first time, the speech delivered in Soshanguve articulated a real alternative to the ANC way of thinking. Although this alternative had been touched on before, the speech on the Open Opportunity Society for All is less an exposition of the ANC worldview and more of a focus on how the DA wished to see South Africa develop. This was a strategic shift for the party as it would continue to put forward more positive messaging over the next few years.

Of particular interest is that commenting on the ANC’s agenda, which had dominated much of the DA’s messaging, becomes less prominent after 2005. This is perhaps in part due to what Selfe attributes to the DA’s decision to focus on its own agenda rather than comment on other parties’ positions (Interview with J. Selfe, 2017).
Realignment of South African political landscape

The succession battle within the ANC and eventual recall of Mbeki were significant moments which then had an impact on how the DA would be required to operate. The split in the ANC and formation of Cope was a major shift at the time but would later turn out to be of little electoral impact to the DA. However, it did force the DA to speed up its rebranding exercise which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The rise of Cope could have been a threat to the DA but it had more of an impact on the ANC than on the DA in terms of votes. It is unclear whether Cope had an impact on the DA’s growth amongst black voters as the DA still managed to grow in this target market in 2009.

There were two realignment processes happening during this period. The first was the ANC split and the second was created by the DA through its messaging on the realignment of South African politics. The two in some ways went hand in hand. The ANC was unravelling and the DA was showing that it was possible for it to be a party of government. The message was that it was possible for a fundamental realignment of politics in South Africa and that the DA was leading this charge. Zille highlights the importance of becoming a party of government in 2006:

This enabled us to show, rather than tell, that we could govern better, for all the people. This would enable South Africa to continue making the crucial transition from the politics of race to the politics of policy choice, without which no democracy in a multi-ethnic society can succeed.

(Zille, 2016: 313)

By taking government, the DA hoped to shift voters from racial-census voting to voting on government’s ability to deliver services.

Media Context

In 2006, the DA released a document titled *His Master’s Voice: The SABC as Propaganda Arm of the ANC* in which it outlines how the SABC had been captured by the ANC post-1994 and the impact of that capture. As the national broadcaster, the SABC provides the majority of the population with its news and political content. Of relevance to the discussion is how the capture of the SABC impacted on the DA’s ability to reach certain voters.

The document highlights several examples of ANC-bias in the SABC newsroom. The document quotes Karima Brown, a former SABC journalist, in which she pointed to:

…a dominant editorial ethos at the SABC that hinders journalists from covering the DA. An example of this, according to Brown, was the 2005 opening of Parliament “where Tony Leon, the leader of the opposition, had responded to Mbeki’s state of the nation address and was therefore an obvious guest. But the acting executive producer ordered that Leon be canned.”


Leading up to the 2006 local government elections, the DA hired an independent media monitoring company to assess the DA’s media coverage on SABC. The monitoring of the campaign period found the following:
From its campaign launch on 15 January through to its final election message on 28 February, the DA’s election campaign consisted of 34 events. The SABC television gave no coverage, on any of its news bulletins, to 16 out the 34 of these election events. SABC 1 did not cover 24 out of 34 DA election events, SABC 2 did not cover 19 out of 34 DA election events. SABC 3 did not cover 21 out of 34 DA election events. Key events not covered included the DA’s Western Cape election launch on 21 January, the DA’s alternative state of the nation event on 2 February and the DA’s public meeting in District Six on 8 February. (Democratic Alliance, His Master’s Voice: The SABC as Propaganda Arm of the ANC, 28 June 2006)

In comparison, the ANC was covered every day that it campaigned (11 days according to the DA) and the only events which did not receive SABC coverage tended to be ANCYL events or the third or fourth ANC event for that day (Democratic Alliance, His Master’s Voice: The SABC as Propaganda Arm of the ANC, 28 June 2006).

The politicisation of the SABC at the time was linked to ANC factional battles but it has also had an effect on the DA’s ability to get equal coverage on the major news broadcaster.

3.3.3. Revisioning, Reengineering and Rebranding

The 2004 Elections & Beyond document set in motion various processes for the DA which would adapt its organisational structure and diversify its identity. The period 2004-2006 is significant in terms of party type and organisation as during this period, the DA started to make the shift towards becoming a vote-seeking, sales-oriented party. The adaptation began with a revisioning for the party and was followed by a reengineering of the party’s organisational structure. The process culminated in a rebranding of the DA with a new logo and as a party for all South Africans.

Revisioning

The revisioning exercise began in 2004 stemming from the 2004 Elections and Beyond document. The revisioning had three broad objectives which were to identify the DA’s:

- values and principles – the core beliefs that determine its political identity;
- vision – a picture of the kind of society it was working towards; and
- mission – a statement of its cause or purpose. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 August 2004, p. 3)

The revisioning process was not confined to the opinions of party members but was extended to other groups. The DA used the following groups to gather information: the party’s provincial, regional and branch structures; a group of outsiders sympathetic to the party; a group of outside critics of the party; focus groups, particularly of black voters; and public representatives (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 August 2004, p. 3).

The result of the revisioning process was launched at the DA’s Federal Congress in 2004. The DA’s new vision was as follows:
The DA’s vision for South Africa is of a prosperous, Open Opportunity Society that is uniquely South African; in which every person is free, secure, and equal before the law; and in which every person has the means to improve the quality of his life and pursue her own aspirations. (Leon, ‘A new vision for the Democratic Alliance’, 20 November 2004)

In the speech, Leon also made clear that the DA is not a party: of minorities; of negatives; or that pretends to be all things to all people. This final point is important as he further states that “we will not become an ideological fruit salad - a dash of socialism over here, a touch of liberalism over there and a few chunks of nationalism somewhere else” (Leon, ‘A new vision for the Democratic Alliance’, 20 November 2004). The new vision formulated from the revisioning process was a single, unifying vision for the DA going forward.

Stemming from the revisioning exercise, the DA set up various task groups to address key areas for the party such as diversity, organisational structure, and policies and programmes to provide opportunity. The following will discuss two of the task group reports as well as a new position document on corrective action which was developed around this time.

Adapting and diversifying to win votes
Some of the organisational failures identified in 2004 Elections & Beyond were a failure to have structures in black areas and to identify with black voters, a lack of organisation at a provincial level and the loss of committed and dedicated activists. Following on from this document, various task groups were established as part of a revisioning exercise. Of relevance to organisational adaptation is the Task Group on Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party which was headed up by Russel Crystal. Part of the revisioning process involved professionalising the operation on two levels: the political operation and the professional staff operation.

Leon stated at a meeting of the Federal Executive in 2004 that “the goal of political parties was to increase and win votes and seats” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 3 December 2004). This sentiment is echoed in the revisioning task group’s report on Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party which states:

The main purpose/objective of a political party is to maximise the votes it obtains in any particular election. It follows that everything the party does must be aimed at achieving this objective...The organisation of the party, which is in fact the operational vehicle of the party, must therefore be structured/shaped in such a way as to most efficiently achieve the objective of bringing the most votes possible to the party. (Democratic Alliance, Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005)

The fact that maximising votes needed to be reiterated suggests that the DA was not geared, organisationally, towards winning votes.

The DA realised that it had become disconnected from its voter base and had failed to make inroads into new markets, particularly the black vote which was attributed to a lack of operational structures at ground level. The task group report recognises that at both an
ideological level and ground level, the DA had failed to make any mark on the black electorate:

- It is clear that very very few people know what the DA stands for, why it exists, what its message is or even that there are many black members and public representatives of the DA.

- There is very little, if any, association with the DA representing the interests of the people or local communities amongst black voters. This is by far the greatest problem the Party faces – the DA is not perceived as part of the daily life of local communities. People do not personally experience the DA as being with/for the people and therefore lack trust in the Party. (Democratic Alliance, Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005)

The approach was to take the party to the people and improve its ground operations. The Task Group highlighted the need to be more active in communities and particularly black communities which would be achieved by using DA activists in targeted areas across the country both to show a DA presence and grow trust amongst potential voters. As an example of the type of activist numbers the DA needed and the reality of what was available to the party, it aimed to recruit 19 000 activists ahead of the 2006 municipal elections but was only capable of recruiting around 1 400 (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 5 June 2005). The DA recognised the importance of building an activist core in black areas:

The greatest resource the Party has in many traditionally black areas is its activist core. An operational plan therefore has to be put into action to utilize this resource in the most cost effective way in order to start building the DA as a truly people friendly, caring and involved organisation, which can be trusted to really represent everyone’s interests. (Democratic Alliance, Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005)

However, the Task Group also highlighted the fact that many black DA members felt sidelined within the organisation:

Black supporters, activists and members of the Party do not actually know why they are members, feel they have no real role to play and believe that (as a result of personal experiences) they are not taken seriously by the Party. Despite this they remain generally willing and loyal to “their organization and Leader” (Democratic Alliance, Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005)

In terms of ground operations, there was recognition within the Task Group’s report of the fact that the DA “is relatively inexperienced at effectively operating in traditionally black areas” (Democratic Alliance, Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005). Different operational strategies were developed for the traditional voter base and potential black voters. Of interest is that the areas which were being targeted were township or informal settlement areas. The DA was not targeting middle class black voters for this operation nor were these voters discussed as a potential target market for adding to the party’s votes. The Task Group report states that “the style of operation or the presentation of the programme differs between target markets”
(Democratic Alliance, *Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005*). The following table shows the different approaches which the DA intended taking for the different target markets.

Table 4: Operational approach to target markets (Original text adapted from Democratic Alliance, *Task Group Reviewing and Restructuring the Organisation and Systems of the Party, 2005*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Market</th>
<th>Approach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>• Clear DA branding and positioning associated with key issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• While direct involvement with specific cases is required, programmes of action are primarily implemented along the modus operandi used in by-elections (for example direct communication by means of leaflets and posters as well as electronic and telephonic interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coloured and Indian</strong></td>
<td>• Very visible DA branding associated with key issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Programmes of action need to be built around “in your face” activities, e.g. colourful loud street marches, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The programme must demonstrate a clear association with the target market involving public representatives from the target market, highlighting the fact that the DA represents them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Programmes must include a high degree of DA community activity and involvement associated directly with delivering on key issues, demonstrating through actions such as local projects, an effective operational Party structure available to the specific local community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The differing approaches indicate how South African voters across the different racial groups preferred to be interacted with in general and by the DA more specifically. The DA believed that white voters were more likely to prefer direct communication via telephone or leaflets i.e. low face-to-face engagement on issues. Coloured and Indian voters required more direct involvement in the community with representatives that looked like them and issue-focused campaigns. Black voters were not open to DA branding. The importance of local DA activists was key in the approach to black voters partly to show that there were DA members in their community but also to create a constant presence in those communities. The coloured, Indian and black target markets required more DA presence and demonstrable action than white voters. This is perhaps because white voters were not particularly concerned with the DA showing that it could make changes and were more
interested in its opposition role. The coloured, Indian and black target markets, however, needed to be shown that the DA could make a difference in their lives and communities.

The Task Group report called for an extension of the Leader’s Election and Development (LEAD) programme into other areas. As part of its attempt to attract black voters and build a presence in black areas, Tony Leon announced the creation of the LEAD Programme in 2003:

The idea behind the LEAD Programme is that the DA will only become attractive to black voters once it becomes an entrenched, organic part of black communities, assisting people to access government, particularly local government, in an effort to solve their problems...the LEAD Programme provides the DA with permanent presence in black communities. (Coetzee, Becoming a party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, October 2006: 9)

According to Leon the purpose of the programme was to identify, grow and put resources into areas where the DA had some success with black voters (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). This programme also allowed the party to bypass ‘gatekeepers’ in certain areas who were blocking growth as it was coming directly from the Leader’s office.

Focus on diversity
One of the key areas of concern for the DA has always been the lack of diversity amongst its public representatives. In order to win votes amongst its target market, it needed to start “looking like South Africa” (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 29 August 2003). However, the DA did not have access to this diversity as it did not have structures which were predominantly black to draw candidates from and prominent black leaders were not willing to join the DA. In order to improve its access to diversity, it required a concerted effort to find potential leaders. It also resulted in the creation of various programmes to ‘grow its own timber’, with the most recent incarnation being the DA’s Young Leaders’ Programme.

The link to the importance of black leaders was made as the party shifted to a vote-seeking party. It was no longer just a need for the DA to reflect South Africa but black leaders were also necessary to access black voters:

The Party’s access to black voters also had to be looked at. Internally the Party had to improve and strengthen its black leadership. The Leader said that the Party was in the process of a talent search for potential leaders from the previously disadvantaged groups and that Joe Seremane was in charge of this process. In terms of the external ramification, the LEAD project had to be promoted and more time and resources had to be spent on it.

... The Leader said that there was a lot of black talent in the Party. The DA had to look at its supply of talented people with proven track records. This process had to result in a more diverse leadership corps. (Minutes of the Federal Executive Meeting, 5 May 2006)

As part of the 2004 revisioning exercise, a Diversity Task Group was formed to examine promoting diversity in the DA. This group consisted of two of the most prominent members
of the Federal Executive at the time, James Selfe and Joe Seremane, which signified the importance which the DA placed on the diversity project. The discussion document outlined the importance of diversity within the organisation:

Our goal is to tap into the rich diversity of our population because

- This is a worthwhile end in itself;
- This will enable us to draw from the widest possible pool of potential talent; and
- This will enrich the reach, quality and credibility of our communication with the public because, with diversity, comes a collective change in empathy and understanding for the different backgrounds, experience and perspectives of the entire South African population. (Democratic Alliance, Discussion Document: Promoting Diversity in the Democratic Alliance, Draft 2, 19 May 2005: 2-3)

The focus of this process was not representivity but diversity. The DA has always made a distinction between representivity and diversity within its organisation and its position on transformation:

Representivity is about racial representation – the idea that only whites can represent whites, only blacks can represent blacks and only Indians can represent Indians. This is the kind of racialist approach favoured by Verwoerd in his day and the ANC today, and we reject it.

Diversity is about bringing into decision-making people of wide-ranging experiences and perspectives, without assuming that people can only be represented by others of the same colour or gender. (Coetzee, Becoming a party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, p. 6-7)

The diversity document which was adopted by the Federal Council in 2005 set out several steps which party structures needed to take in order to increase the DA’s diversity. Steps included drawing up plans to promote diversity of its membership, office-bearers and public representatives; training and mentorship; and allowing provincial and national leaders to intervene if diversity plans were not implemented. Further to this, the diversity document stated that:

Gatekeeping, nepotism, paternalism as well as racial, tribal and sexist bigotry must be defined and made to be disciplinary offences.

The task group itself, as well as leaders at all levels must communicate to the Party very clearly what the objectives and benefits of promoting diversity in the organisation are. Promoting diversity is a challenge, but it is also a significant opportunity, which, if tackled correctly, can cause the Party to grow significantly. Therefore, no-one in the Party must think that promoting diversity constitutes a threat to positions or office: in an expanded Party there will be room for everyone. (Democratic Alliance, Discussion Document: Promoting Diversity in the Democratic Alliance, Draft 2, 19 May 2005: 2-3)

From this task group report, one gets the sense that the party was attempting to allay the fears of some public representatives that their positions would be under threat from new
black candidates. There have been two groups who have been opposed to diversifying the organisation. Selfe described these groups as follows:

one is the sort of you know racial nationalists in the broadest possible way. So either because you articulate there’s no place for a white man in the party any longer through to black councillors and MPs deliberately gatekeeping other people out. So there’s both an ideological and practical reason why some people opposed it not always in the same camp and not only always for the same reasons. (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017)

It should be argued that these groups come from the same place - a sense of group identity which determines their position in the party.

**Corrective Action**

As part of the revisioning exercise, the DA dealt with a new articulation of its position on redress for the historically disadvantaged. A document titled *Equality and Corrective Action* was compiled by Dene Smuts and adopted by the DA’s Federal Council in 2005. The document set out the DA’s position on redress and what it termed ‘corrective action’. It begins with the following:

The DA believes every South African is equal in worth and dignity and we reject any system or policy that allows the State to grant rights and privileges to any one group on the basis of ethnic or racial nationalism while withholding them from others. (Democratic Alliance, *Equality and Corrective Action*, October 2005)

In the document, the DA outlines how the Constitution deals with equality and disadvantage.

The Constitution nowhere envisions the numbers-based quantitative approach to “transformation” espoused by the ruling party in the name of affirmative action, and neither does it anticipate race as the overriding determinant of advancement. (Democratic Alliance, *Equality and Corrective Action*, October 2005)

The DA’s argument was against the use of racial quotas or a quantitative approach to redress. The DA’s position was the following:

To enable individuals to achieve their personal potential and in so doing, enrich our society, the DA believes in equitable programmes of admission, recruitment and appointment in all spheres. Equity means fairness. It means no-one may be excluded from competing for places on the basis of any of their immutable characteristics except where differentiation is logical...But in order to advance the goal of equality and the reflection of the full diversity of our society in terms of race, ethnicity, sex, belief, culture and able-bodiedness, underrepresented categories should enjoy “plus points” or favourable consideration when they are as well qualified for appointment as the next man or woman; or when they show comparable promise. (Democratic Alliance, *Equality and Corrective Action*, October 2005)

The position paper makes clear that diversity is an important aspect for the party and South Africa as a whole:
We should be clear as a society – and in our specific case, as a voluntary association of South Africans working for the well-being of our society on the basis of our belief in the individual fundamental freedoms – that diversity is desirable. By that we do not mean that ethnic or cultural groups deserve to have representation in the institutions of society, but that individuals from diverse backgrounds should lead, participate and form part of all spheres of activity. (Democratic Alliance, Equality and Corrective Action, October 2005)

The difference for the DA was that diversity should not be a form of group representivity but based on the individual. The DA describes corrective action as follows:

The DA believes that opportunity must be fast-tracked to release the untapped talent in our country, to counteract the prejudice that still operates against a range of categories of South Africans and to correct the unequal life chances created by past policies. [Emphasis in original]

A quantitative quota approach cannot deliver equality or effective institutions in our circumstances. Instead, it can destroy human beings who are promoted beyond their present competence and it can exacerbate racial tension.

But to deny the need for speed in fast-tracking the achievement of equality is to defend the indefensible: past privilege created by an unjust order.

The DA believes it is appropriate to encourage and to incentivise institutions across society to set their own targets for achieving diversity based not on racial groupings but on the full range of SA’s colours and creeds. (Democratic Alliance, Equality and Corrective Action, October 2005)

The policy highlights the difference between the ANC’s belief in compensation through BEE as a form of corrective action whereas the DA believed that:

programmes to deal directly and on an expedited basis with South Africa’s inequality of income are as necessary as programmes to deal with inequality of opportunity. We therefore encourage and support broad-based ownership expansion schemes including employee share ownership programmes and public offerings in which shares are sold at a discount to poor people. (Democratic Alliance, Equality and Corrective Action, October 2005)

This policy document still underpins the DA’s position on employment equity and BEE at the time of writing.

Reengineering: Building the ‘Blue Machine’
The reengineering which occurred in 2006 was the start of building the ‘Blue Machine’ and was the brainchild of Coetzee who had been appointed as CEO of the DA. The reengineering saw the transformation of the party into a more vote-seeking party at an organisational level. The belief was that in order “most effectively to manage the operations of the party at every level, the proposal is to separate the operational structures from the political structures in our party” (Democratic Alliance, A New Management Structure and Operating System for the DA, 2006: 2). This new operating structure/system remains in place at the time of writing and has grown to be in line with international best practice.

The purpose for the reengineering was to address problems with the DA’s operating system which included a lack of accountability, fragmentation in terms of activities and a lack of
campaigning. Coetzee argued that the consequence of these problems was that “the DA is considerably less effective at winning and retaining support than it should be” (Democratic Alliance, A New Structure and Operating System for the DA, 2006: 2).

At the core of the reengineering process was the separation of the operational from the political. Coetzee explained why this was necessary and makes the distinction between the party as an organisation and as an institution:

The DA is not a “normal” organisation in that it has two parallel sets of structures – the political and the operational. Unique management solutions are thus required that may be less efficient and more “messy” than are the case in business. (Democratic Alliance, A New Management Structure and Operating System for the DA, 2006: 5)

The purpose of the DA’s organisation is quite simply to win votes for the DA. (The purpose of the party organisation must not be confused with the purpose of the party as an institution, which is to bring into being an Open Opportunity Society. But in order to achieve that larger objective, the party needs to grow its support. Votes are a means to an end – the Open Opportunity Society – and the purpose of the organisation is to win those votes.) (Democratic Alliance, A New Structure and Operating System for the DA, 2006: 1)

Therefore the party as an operation at that time needed to be vote-seeking but as an institution it also needed to retain policy-seeking elements, offering voters a clear vision and policy offer. The emphasis on the organisational structure and operating system winning votes was further highlighted:

The structure and systems that comprise that organisation must therefore provide the most effective means through which to engage directly with voters in an effort to win their support. Winning votes is the point of a party organisation, and we must assess any system against that objective. (Democratic Alliance, A new structure and operating system for the DA, 2006)

The emphasis was on building the DA’s presence at a grass roots level and on winning votes at the branch/constituency level. It is at this level that it becomes essential for the party as a political organisation to be able to operate effectively in black areas.

The final version of the reengineering document makes a clear distinction between political and professional structures:

The political structures (executives, councils and congresses) are to be populated by elected politicians (whether public representatives or not) and are responsible for political identity, policies and programmes of action.

The operational structure will be populated by professional staff and will be responsible for implementing programmes of action and managing people and money.

To put this another way: politicians are responsible for delivering the offer to voters and donors. Party officials are responsible for making that possible in the most effective and efficient way. (Democratic Alliance, A New Management Structure and Operating System for the DA, 2006)
In other words, politicians had to deliver the product and the professional staff had to provide the means to deliver that product. Within this new structure constituencies (which include the branch structures) were seen as having an important role to play in winning votes as they were the “front-line troops”. This new structure involved a separation of powers and handing over of a certain amount of political responsibility to the professional staff.

Another aspect of the reengineering process was the introduction of a performance management system for both the professional staff and the DA’s public representatives. This was used to ensure that both structures of the party were held accountable for implementing the DA’s programme of action.

The DA was now being fully reengineered into an electoral-professional party.

Becoming a Party for all the people

The reengineering process saw the party become vote-seeking at an organisational level. At an identity level this adaptation occurred with a document drafted by Coetzee in October 2006 titled Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA. It signalled a profound shift in how the party would think about voters and how it would change its identity. Many aspects of this document continued to guide the DA’s strategy until recently. At the core of the document was the DA’s need to relate to black voters more sincerely and to become a party for all South Africans. This was the first strategy document to show a real understanding of black voters’ distaste for the DA and to articulate exactly how the DA should go about winning over black voters.

The title of the document encapsulates the DA’s objective – to become a party for all South Africans. It points out that the “Democratic Alliance was created with the express purpose of building an opposition alternative that could be a political home to South Africans of all races” (Coetzee, 2006, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA: 1). In order to do this, the document identifies two things which needed to be done to achieve the DA’s objectives for the 2009 elections and beyond:

One was to build a party organisation that can win votes effectively. This is the purpose of the re-engineering process. The other was to build an identity that is attractive to all South Africans, and not just to South Africans from the minorities. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

The document speaks to two themes which had been dominating the party’s vision for some time. The first was its position against racial nationalism and the second was against a one-party dominant state:

First, we are not racial nationalists. We believe people are individuals, equal in dignity and worth. Racial nationalism, which seeks to advance the interests and aspirations of one racial group at the expense of others, is the root cause of division, discrimination and oppression in South Africa, and these evils are to blame for centuries of suffering in our country.
Second, our constitutional democracy (and by extension an Open Opportunity Society), depends for its success on the creation of an alternative political force that can offer South Africa a real prospect of a change in government, because the best way to avoid the centralisation and abuse of power is to ensure that power changes hand periodically. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

In order to achieve this alternative political force, the DA needed to attract more black voters whilst maintaining its core base:

If we are going to succeed in changing our circumstances, we need to take a long, hard and critical look at our performance among black voters, identify those obstacles to winning their support, and then take the necessary action to remove those obstacles.

At the same time, we need to retain and grow our support among white, coloured and Indian voters, because our objective is not to replace one set of supporters with another, but to bring together South Africans of all races.

This twin objective...is the DA’s defining challenge going forward. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

As has been mentioned before, balancing attracting new voters and maintaining its core had been the main challenge for the party for almost a decade at this point.

The most important aspect of the document was redefining its agenda as becoming a party for all South Africans, and as Coetzee states, doing what no other party in South Africa has ever managed before:

Our challenge then, is to do what no party in South Africa’s history has ever managed: to unite in one political home people of all races...it will be very difficult to succeed, because we are taking on all of South Africa’s history and the way in which that history has divided people. But if we do try, we give ourselves no chance of success. The consequences of that failure will not be borne by us alone, but by all South Africans, because the on-going triumph of racial nationalism in our country can only be damaging to the economy and destabilising to our politics in the long run. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

Coetzee points out the pragmatic reasons for moving out of its traditional voter base - that minority voters were a small proportion of the electorate and that these votes would eventually dry up. One gets a sense from this document and some of the other strategy documents before it that there were some in the party who were opposed to making a concerted effort to move into the black voter market and were comfortable with the status quo.

The key step to achieving this move in a different direction was to internalise the right identity. As part of this identity the DA needed to identify what it cared about and communicate this effectively to voters. Coetzee points out that:

the DA’s anger attaches to things like crime, corruption, discrimination against minorities and name changes, but not to racism against blacks, the state of education, unemployment or poverty. If that division provides some insight into what we care about, then what does it say
about who we care about? (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

The need to care about education, unemployment and poverty was part of the opportunity identity which the DA needed to internalise.

In terms of the identity of voters, Coetzee says that all racial groups care about the same “delivery issues” but that “everyone doesn’t care about each of these with quite the same degree of intensity because they affect different people differently” (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006). He also states that “identity issues” are a key concern for voters and one which the DA needs to understand and care about:

white South Africans generally (and of course I am forced to generalise to make these points) don’t “get” the intense anger, resentment and sensitivity that black South Africans feel about racism and its legacy. White racism against black South Africans is simply not as much an issue for whites as it is for blacks.

Moreover, white South Africans don’t have the same attachment to the cultural heritage of black South Africans- indeed black South Africans have always felt that their culture is regarded as inferior by whites, and that by extension they themselves are regarded as inferior. This issue goes very deep and all the way back to the first contacts between white and black in what is now South Africa.

But equally, many whites feel that their culture is dismissed, maligned and under threat in the new dispensation (angry responses to name changes and the quality of English on SAFm are symptoms of this). And black South Africans generally don’t share the anger and anxiety generated by affirmative action, especially when it is applied in an unjust way.

And, of course, the culture of Indian and coloured South Africans has always been marginal, as these South Africans have watched the clash of larger nationalisms unfold over the course of the past hundred years. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

Once again, there is the balancing act of appealing to all the racial groups. However, the purpose of this document was to try to find a way to bring together South Africans of all races under a shared vision and ideology. The DA, therefore, needed to do two things:

first, care as deeply about the “delivery issues” that affect black South Africans as we do about those that affect whites; second, find a way to bridge the racial divide on “identity issues”. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

At the core of this vision was the need for South Africans to learn to share South Africa:

In order to share South Africa with those who have been dispossessed through discrimination, we must begin to promote the establishment of an Opportunity Society in our country, because the extension of opportunity to all in South Africa is the best way to address the material legacy of apartheid. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)
The DA’s vision of the Opportunity society is the belief that “your future is not determined by the circumstances of your birth, but by your ability and determination to succeed” (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006). In other words, everyone should be given equal opportunities and it is up to the individual to succeed. This was not about an ideological shift but rather packaging the DA’s ideology in more voter-friendly terms. The opportunity society would be created by promoting access to the following: the labour market; capital; land and housing; quality education and skills development; sanitation, water and electricity; and healthcare. The opportunity element was not anything particularly new in the DA’s position. However, it was clearly failing to get this message across in the right way to the voters that it needed to attract.

Coetzee draws attention to the fact that the DA needed to show that it was committed to eradicating the legacies of apartheid. This would require a shift in its communication, tone and policy focus:

> If we are to succeed in being a party for all the people, the DA needs to display the same passion about eradicating the legacy of apartheid as we currently do about crime, corruption, and ANC power abuse. (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)

Coetzee also goes on to discuss the importance of actively promoting the history, culture and language of all South Africans. He uses the specific example of place name changes and how the DA is often opposed to these but never proposes any itself. He states:

> Given this, it would be difficult for black South Africans not to reach the conclusion that the DA is not interested in sharing place names, but rather in privileging the names chosen by white South Africans. (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)

The DA therefore needed to place “equal promotion of language, culture and heritage among our key priorities, and develop credibility on these issues” (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006).

Another aspect which Coetzee discusses is diversity, both within the DA and in South Africa as a whole. He makes a clear distinction between diversity and representivity:

> Representivity is about racial representation – the idea that only whites can represent whites, only blacks can represent blacks and only Indians represent Indians. This is the kind of racialist approach favoured by Verwoerd in his day and the ANC today, and we reject it.

> Diversity is about bringing into decision-making people of wide-ranging experiences and perspectives, without assuming that people can only be represented by others of the same colour or gender.

> We must always be vigilant that, in our attempts to address the legacy of the past, we don’t fall into the trap of seeing people simply as representatives of racial groups. This is precisely what we need to leave behind in our country. (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)
He drew attention to the documents *Diversity in the Democratic Alliance* and *Equality and Corrective Action* which formed part of the revisioning exercise as important to achieving this objective. The former addressed the internal dynamics and the latter addressed the external.

Coetzee re-examined the DA’s approach towards the ANC and acknowledged that some of the criticism against the party was justified.

Over the years, many people have argued that the DA is too critical of the ANC. Sometimes, this view goes together with the idea that criticism of the ANC is regarded as criticism of black people in general and that therefore such criticism harms our cause.

This is nonsense, and is based on the false and racist assumption that all black people are the same. Survey after survey confirms that hard core black ANC supporters might think we are too critical of their party, but that those black voters less enamoured of the ANC think we are either not critical enough, or get our criticism just right. (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)

The fact that not all black voters are the same is an important point for the DA to make as it had criticised the ANC for treating black South Africans as an homogenous group. Coetzee went on to address the DA’s tone towards the ANC:

in criticising the ANC we do sometimes communicate irritation, superiority or disdain. This is offensive not merely to ANC public representatives (whose feelings are not really the issue) but also to many ordinary South Africans of all races (whose feelings are very much the issue). (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)

Coetzee’s comment about “irritation, superiority or disdain” in the DA’s communication is an issue which the party has often been criticised for (McKaiser, 2014). The superiority comes off as the superiority of white over black, a case of ‘we know better’. In some ways this tone was a leftover from the ‘western civilisation’ days of the Progressives in the late 50s and 60s. This type of tone, however, is also the general tone of an opposition party and Coetzee pointed out that the DA needed to be more circumspect in how to be critical:

In determining the issues on which to be critical, we must bear in mind that what the DA needs is not a relationship with the ANC but a relationship with disillusioned ANC voters. It follows that we must speak to the ANC on behalf of those voters, with the passion and, when necessary, the anger that the situation merits. (Coetzee, *Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA*, 2006)

The document also points out that the LEAD programme needed to be extended and that the DA could not ‘parachute’ into communities just before elections and then leave. It needed to show active and constant engagement in those communities.

The most significant challenge for the DA in shifting its identity was the electoral implications. There were several factors which the party needed to take into account. The first was that the DA was part of a political culture where parties appealed to racial and ethnic exclusivity:
The most difficult thing about being a party for all the people is that we get “out-bid” by racially and ethnically exclusive parties like the Freedom Front, the Minority Front, the ID (among a minority of coloured voters), the IFP and of course the ANC, which is not a party for all the people equally.

In other words, the short term electoral risk is that many South Africans might feel that, “If you are not only for me, then you are not for me at all”. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

This position differs from research by Mattes and others that South Africans do not vote for parties who have an exclusive identity and raises questions about which interpretation is correct. From the DA’s viewpoint, it has been trying to attract voters to a way of thinking which it believed was not widely appealing – a non-racial party – but according to Mattes and others’ interpretation of South African voters, this type of non-racial, inclusive party would be appealing.

The next factor which is closely linked to the political culture was that the DA needed to find a way to represent all racial groups without being exclusive themselves:

We will have to make it very clear that while we are a party for whites, we are not only a party for whites; while we are a party for blacks, we are not only a party for blacks; while we are a party for coloureds, we are not only a party for coloureds; and while we are a party for Indians, we are not only a party for Indians. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

In order to move beyond the image of exclusivity, the DA needed to appeal to those who wanted to move beyond nationalism:

Our market must be those people from all groups that are ready to move beyond the exclusionary politics of nationalism to a South Africanism in which each person’s identity enjoys equal recognition and protection.

I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of white, coloured and Indian South Africans are ready for this move, while there are millions of black South Africans who are looking for a political party that will connect with them in the way that the ANC is increasingly unable to do.

Nevertheless, some of our current voters might desert us. But the alternative to building a party for all the people is slowly to disintegrate, as we continue to attract an ever-shrinking pool of minority voters. (Coetzee, Becoming a Party for all the people: A new approach for the DA, 2006)

It is interesting that Coetzee framed this discussion as moving away from nationalism as opposed to moving away from race politics which suggests an acknowledgement of race without the nationalistic elements. The electoral risks of losing some minority voters obviously did not outweigh the mission and this document formed the long term strategy for the DA and continues to be relevant to the party’s strategy today.

New Strategy, New Leader

Shortly after Becoming a Party For All was published, Leon made the decision to step down as Leader of the DA. However, he writes in his autobiography that it was another document
by Coetzee, *The DA and Black Voters*, which made him realise the need to step back. In his autobiography, Leon draws attention to a particular section of this document in which Coetzee writes about the DA’s identity being a “reflection of the identity of the people in it, in particular of its leadership and, most especially, of its national leader” (Leon, 2007: loc 19265). The problem with the impossibility of separating the party’s identity from its leadership identity was that the DA’s leaders were white. Coetzee argued that:

In order for the DA’s leadership to have an identity with which black South Africans can identify, one of two things must happen: either those leaders must develop that identity if they don’t already have it or they must make way for others that do...At this point the fact is that the DA doesn’t have enough existing leaders with the right identity, and there don’t seem to be others in the party with the requisite leadership skills.

It may be possible to change the DA’s identity by importing leaders into the party from the outside. The question then is, are there people on the outside who have the right identities and are willing to take up leadership positions in the DA? (Leon, 2007: Loc 19265)

Black leadership within the DP/DA had been a concern for some time already. Apart from Joe Seremane, the party had failed to find and keep black leaders in senior leadership positions for any length of time. Finding suitable leaders with the right identity, i.e. black, would become a major project of Zille’s over the next decade.

Joe Seremane, Athol Trollip and Helen Zille stood for election as Federal Leader. By this point, Zille had been Mayor of Cape Town for over a year and had built up a public profile. Jolobe highlights that:

because of the immense public interest in Zille as a political personality, for the first time the DA’s internal candidate selection procedures were scrutinised in a public forum that had traditionally paid most attention to the ruling party. (Jolobe, 2009: loc 2623)

The conflict between Afrikaners and English liberals was at the forefront of the internal leadership battle. Zille described in detail a proposed smear campaign against her which was ultimately hinged around the fact that her leadership would be a “nail in the coffin of the Afrikaner” (Zille, 2016: 261). Zille was elected leader in 2007 with 72% of the vote and would lead the DA into its new brand.

Rebranding and Realignment
In the years leading up to the 2009 elections, there were many external shifts in the political landscape with the ANC leadership battle and eventual split and formation of Cope. Whilst these were happening, the DA was working on rebranding itself into a South African party. As Southern points out, the DA’s goal was “to market itself as a modern, forward-looking party that had no reservations about being non-racial” (Southern, 2011: 286). The culmination of the rebranding process was the DA’s relaunch in November of 2008.

The reasoning for the relaunch was based on the realignment of politics theme. In describing this reasoning, Zille stated:
After the 2006 local government election, it started to become clear that the realignment of politics was beginning and that the Democratic Alliance would play a key role in that process. The ANC’s unraveling, which was just starting, together with the newly established multi-party coalition in Cape Town, indicated that there was a very real prospect of an electoral change of government in South Africa – through a coalition or otherwise – during the next ten years. (Zille, ‘The Re-launch of the Democratic Alliance’, 10 November 2008)

Zille stated that based on extensive market research, the party saw that there were more and more South Africans who wanted to see a realignment of politics in the country. These voters supported the three core principles of the DA which were freedom under the constitution, non-racialism and equality of opportunity (Zille, The Re-launch of the Democratic Alliance, 10 November 2008). In implicit reference to black voters Zille said:

But our research also told us that the DA has significant potential among voters who share our values but who have not historically supported us. The reasons are complex and varied, but are essentially a function of South Africa’s history of racial division. We are determined to do whatever possible to overcome those barriers, transcend race and enable all South Africans who share our values to give us their support. (Zille, ‘The Re-launch of the Democratic Alliance’, 10 November 2008)

The relaunch was held at Constitution Hill as the venue was “symbolically significant because we are, always have been, and always will be, the party that defends South Africa’s Constitution and the values that underpin it” (Zille, ‘The Re-launch of the Democratic Alliance’, 10 November 2008). The DA unveiled its new logo which was described as follows:

As you can see, our new logo reflects our new offer. It is a morning sun rising over the rainbow nation. It represents our dream of an open opportunity society for all. It lifts our sights and our spirits. It signals hope. And it is grounded in our love for diversity. (Zille, ‘Delivering the South African dream: one nation one future’, 15 November 2008)

The key elements of the relaunch were conveying the message that there are South Africans of all races who want change and support the DA’s principles; the DA was not just an opposition party but a party of government; and that the DA embraced diversity – it was the Rainbow Nation personified with a logo to match.

Ferial Haffajee, then editor of the Mail & Guardian, wrote of the launch that:

The DA’s forays into winning the support of black South Africans have been awkward and uncomfortable. Until now.

It was high political theatre and symbolised an appropriation of hegemony from the ANC.

The venue, Tutu and the new DA logo—which mimics the South African flag—are symbols of where Zille is taking her party: she is taking over the ANC’s principle of non-racialism just as the ruling party has shed it. At Polokwane, the ruling party reinforced its identity as a largely African party; it has eschewed the old construction of non-racialism in the make-up of its national executive committee and in its provincial structures.
But what she has succeeded in doing is creating a South African party from a previously white political formation and, in that, history has been overcome. (Haffajee, ‘Can Helen overcome history?’, 28 November 2008)

The relaunch was a success in convincing the media for a brief period that the DA was a South African party focused on non-racialism. The beliefs and principles were nothing new but the repackaging of those beliefs were convincing. For example, the principle of non-racialism has arguably always formed a core part of the DP/DA’s beliefs but journalists such as Haffajee were seeing this as a new racial project for the DA. Another example regarding the impact of the rebrand is the following analysis of the DA’s rebrand:

Under the new DA brand, Zille, in contrast to earlier DA writings, actually referred to race groups. She explained that under apartheid ‘blacks were far poorer than whites and had worse education, housing and health care’ and that the remedy for this is to ‘give full and equal opportunity to black people’. (Anciano, 2016: 17)

Anciano incorrectly perpetuates the belief that the DA talking about racial groups was new. Another example from Anciano’s paper is the following:

However, as the salience of racial identity became more difficult to ignore, under Zille’s new leadership, the DA started calling for more state intervention that implicitly aligned with racial categories. The DA was now accepting that you can’t leave everything to the market and that the state needs to provide some form of welfare intervention.  

Where the party had acknowledged the historical salience of race in regard to poverty and inequality, it now placed a focus redressing the racial legacy of apartheid. The move to rethink the role of the state was exemplified in the DA’s 2009 manifesto which expressly addressed the need for redress for historically disadvantaged (i.e. non-white) South Africans. (Anciano, 2016: 20)

In both cases Anciano’s arguments are highly debatable: the DP/DA had supported welfare intervention as well as redress for the historically disadvantaged since its 1995 ABC policy platform which specifically discussed the need for assistance to the historically disadvantaged. Leon had also referred to race in his speeches long before the new DA brand. These examples demonstrate the power of the DA’s rebrand in changing how others viewed the party.

3.3.4. 2009 Elections

In the lead up to the elections in 2009, the DA shifted into a more positive policy programme. It released 30 discussion documents with positive solutions to the problems facing the country at the time. The policies and discussion documents were “meticulously-researched, carefully considered and costed in detail” (Coetzee, ‘DA The Only Opposition Party Entering Election 2009 With A Comprehensive Policy Platform’, 15 December 2008). The DA was focusing on presenting its alternative to the South African voting public as opposed to criticising ANC policies. This was done in conjunction with a clear message of the

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12 Interview with Zwelethu Jolobe.
Open Opportunity Society in Action in order to show the DA’s success in implementing its policy programme in the City of Cape Town. In addition, the DA released a new policy suite around its core policy themes.

The campaign had two phases: a mostly positive message in the initial weeks and then a negative campaign targeting Zuma. Once again, the primary focus was the Western Cape but this time the party had a real chance of winning the province after its success in the City of Cape Town in 2006.

Candidates
The DA once again stressed its diversity but for the first time this was more visible and explicit. In Zille’s announcement of the election lists, she stated that the DA expects “all our candidates to embrace diversity and offer distinguished service” (Zille, ‘New DA Election Candidates Combine Excellence And Diversity’, 25 January 2009). Diversity was literally front and centre of the candidates’ announcement:

Up at the front, we are joined by respected academic Wilmot James, highly regarded KwaZulu-Natal politician Khosi Mdlalose, well known radio personality Niekie van den Berg, former President of AgriSA Lourie Bosman, Head of Inspections for the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Albert Fritz, as well as Bev Abrahams and Lindiwe Mazibuko who have emerged with distinction through our own ranks. We grow our own timber and also look for the tallest trees in the bigger forest. (Zille, ‘New DA Election Candidates Combine Excellence And Diversity’, 25 January 2009)

In Zille’s announcement, diversity was also front and centre in word with merit taking second place in the announcement.

Target Market
The major target markets for the 2009 elections were voters in the Western Cape and black voters. The external electoral aims were to keep the ANC under a two-thirds majority; win the Western Cape with an outright majority and to strengthen significantly the DA’s position as the Official Opposition.

There was an increased use of African languages in speeches. This was partly due to the fact that Zille was more proficient and genuine in her ability to use the languages, especially Xhosa.

Message
The campaign messaging started off positive with the slogan of “Vote to Win”. Following on from its positive policy programme, the messaging was around the key themes of the manifesto with very little direct mention of the ANC except to say that it was taking votes off the liberation movement. The key message was the choice which South Africans would be making:

There is a very clear choice facing South Africans in this election: we can choose to become an open, opportunity society for all, or we can choose to become a closed, crony society for some.
In the closed, crony society, people’s prospects depend on who they know in the ruling party, not what they know. The closed, crony society isn’t about creating opportunity: it’s about giving jobs to pals and doing favours for friends. A closed circle looking after each other, with less and less for everyone else. (Zille, ‘We’re in it to win it! DA launches elections campaign 2009’, 1 February 2009)

Besides the open opportunity society and policy offers, another core message for this election was the DA’s growth and its ability to be in government.

The DA can win: research shows it; by-election results prove it. We have won more by-elections against the ANC in the past 3 months than any other party.

We are consolidating support among our traditional voters. We are gaining support from new voters in all communities.

And we are winning votes off the ANC. Let me repeat that: Sithatha amavoti eANC. (And we are winning votes off the ANC) (Zille, ‘We’re in it to win it! DA LAUNCHES ELECTION CAMPAIGN 2009’, 1 February 2009)

The manifesto launch elaborated on the open opportunity society for all. The manifesto was based along the following four themes – opportunity, open, caring and safe society. The opportunity society was about growing the economy and creating jobs including a focus on improving education and skills training. The open society discussed the importance of defending the Constitution and putting power back in the people’s hands. The caring society called for providing “an appropriate social safety net of state grants, improving the quality of healthcare and generating more housing opportunities” (emphasis added, Zille, ‘We’re in it to win it! DA LAUNCHES ELECTION CAMPAIGN 2009’, 1 February 2009). The safe society would ensure that criminals are caught, prosecuted, convicted and punished.

At the launch of the manifesto, Zille claimed that the manifesto was pro-poor which was an important implicit bridging message to the black and coloured electorate:

Let me be clear about this manifesto: it is unashamedly pro-poor. In fact, it is the most pro-poor of any party’s manifesto, because it is the only one that focuses on breaking the cycle of poverty by creating real opportunities for all. It is not merely about poverty alleviation. It is about starting the process of poverty eradication. (Zille, ‘We’re in it to win it! DA LAUNCHES ELECTION CAMPAIGN 2009’, 1 February 2009)

The DA also packaged their policies as the following ten pledges to the electorate:

- We will ensure quality education by focusing on the essentials – reading, writing and calculating – and set performance targets for teachers and schools, and reward good performance.
- We will crack down on crime and strengthen the criminal justice system by expanding the police force to 250 000 competent officers, and employing 30 000 more qualified detectives.
- We will bring back the Scorpions.
• We will introduce a basic income grant to catch those who fall through the cracks of the social safety net.

• We will accelerate the fight against HIV/Aids – both through prevention and treatment programmes – and improve the quality of public health care by training and recruiting more nurses and doctors and by applying sound management systems.

• We will upgrade informal settlements, and ensure that housing subsidies reach many families in need, not just the fortunate few.

• We will safeguard our environment and provide a transport system that is safe, reliable, affordable, and environmentally friendly.

• We will clean up politics, and put power back where it belongs – in the hands of citizens – by giving you the opportunity to elect your President, Premier and Mayor directly.

• We will build a society that has a place for all by promoting and protecting the language and cultural heritage of all the rainbow people. (Zille, ‘For a better South Africa: The DA’s contract with the people’, 22 February 2009)

However during the squeeze period of the campaign (the last two weeks), the DA went negative with the Stop Zuma campaign. This message was used in conjunction with an anti-corruption message as well as the same fearmongering of an ANC two thirds majority as was used in 2004. Zille writes in her autobiography that:

Our final campaign call – ‘Stop Zuma’ – may have been prophetic, but it was also deeply polarising. The year 2009 was our most racially divided election, even more so than our controversial ‘Fight Back’ campaign ten years earlier. Jacob Zuma was overwhelmingly popular among black South Africans (Zille, 2016: 313).

Although the messaging was negative, the DA saw it as necessary in light of Zuma’s corruption charges. Ideally the party should have continued its positive campaign but at the same time, it could not remain silent on one of the major issues at the time.

Campaign

The campaign included the usual events around the country but with an increased emphasis on visiting rural areas of South Africa.

This was the first time that the DA used television advertisements in their campaign which was also a first for South Africa (Coetzee, ‘DA Launches SA’s First Political TV Advertising Campaign’, 26 February 2009). The DA also introduced a new way of campaigning by going online and creating volunteer websites.

The party also tried to bring in election debates with both Zille and Khume Ramulifho (then DA Youth Leader) challenging their ANC counterparts to public debates. Whilst a useful campaign tool in other democracies, South Africa does not engage in inter-party debating at the party leader level.
The DA was also turned into a campaign machine by 2009 compared to its previous campaigning abilities. For example, it had a mass canvassing and presence day with 200 events across the country (Coetzee, ‘DA Presence And Canvassing Day’, 13 March 2009).

Positioning
The DA positioned itself as an alternative government to the ANC and for the first time this held some legitimacy. It also positioned itself as the only party which could take on the liberation movement and take power. What is interesting is its positioning with regards to Cope who was the new opposition media darling. Cope was given a significant amount of media attention and was treated as the only real opposition threat to the ANC. It was also an opposition threat to the DA and so the party positioned Cope as just another ANC. In a SA Today at the time, Zille wrote:

As for COPE, although it purports to be a non-racial alternative to the ANC, whether it actually subscribes to the vision of an open, opportunity society is still not clear. The party was formed by Thabo Mbeki’s key lieutenants – some of whom helped refine the closed, crony model of governance when they were in power. Can they now build an alternative to this model? This election campaign has thrown up some doubts. In particular, COPE has been too equivocal for comfort about whether it will go into coalition with the ANC. Its cause was not helped when it chose a convicted fraudster in Allan Boesak to run for Premier of the Western Cape. Perhaps this is why the polls show that COPE has not emerged as the force that some analysts predicted. (Zille, ‘Only the DA can stop Jacob Zuma’, 9 April 2004)

In some ways, the DA bullied Cope into submission on the opposition front in the 2009 elections. It was a small threat to the DA’s potential growth amongst the black electorate and so the DA initially painted it as another ANC with the ANC painting Cope as the ‘Black DA’. Cope eventually spoke of possible cooperation between itself and the DA.

Results
The DA won the Western Cape province with 51.5% of the vote. There was a marked improvement on its performance in the City of Cape Town where it still relied on a coalition government. Coetzee attributed the DA’s success to the following:

Our success in this election is a consequence of many factors, including Helen Zille’s inspired leadership, the repositioning of the party as a truly South African entity with the ability to win power off the ANC, and the efficiency with which our structures implemented the campaign. (Coetzee, ‘DA Achieves Its Aims In 2009 Election’, 26 April 2009)

Although the DA did not release its performance amongst black voters for the 2009 election, a statement from the 2014 elections shows that the party still only managed to attract 0.8% of black voters which was the same percentage of the black vote available to the DP in the late 90s.
3.3.5. Conclusion

The period between 2004 and 2009 is probably one of the most important and positive eras for the party to date. The mechanisms which were put in place during this period are largely responsible for the DA’s growth in recent years.

Although the DA had started to professionalise in the early 2000s, it was only with the reengineering process that it truly adapted into an electoral-professional, vote-seeking party. The driving force behind this was to develop the DA’s ground war operation so that it could build a relationship with black voters. The DA adapted its organisational structure to gear itself towards winning votes.

At an identity level the DA started to show more diversity, attained government in the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape, and started to project an image of being a South African party. Although these changes were positive, it still did not get the desired black votes. A major aspect which was still holding it back was the diversity of its leadership which would be one of Zille’s leadership projects over the next few years.
3.4. Identity Crisis – 2010 - 2014

3.4.1. Introduction
Although the DA had relaunched in 2008, its identity as a South African party only really began to shift after the 2009 elections. The identity shift included aspects such as the DA’s leadership diversity, its campaigning and how it told its story. The DA’s identity was also no longer just as an opposition party but it had managed to win a province with an outright majority and by 2011, after five years of governing the City of Cape Town, could more credibly call itself an alternative government for South Africa.

One of the key changes which happened during the post-2009 period was the rise of young, black politicians in the DA such as Lindiwe Mazibuko and Mmusi Maimane. The politicians who emerged during this period were essential to shifting the DA’s identity and changing its label.

After several years of building the DA’s new brand, the party went through an identity crisis leading up to the 2014 elections with confusion around its brand and policy positions. This included changing its position on the ANC as well as insecurity on its position towards race-based legislation.

The following will examine the political identity crisis which occurred between 2009 and 2014. It will begin with a discussion on the DA’s positive identity shift with the rise of young, black leaders in the DA as well as some mistakes it made in its attempts to change the party’s face. This will be followed by the DA’s attempts to shift its brand identity to become the party of jobs and tell its own story through the Know Your DA campaign. This will include a discussion of what Zille termed the ‘plane crash’ around the Employment Equity and Black Economic Empowerment amendment bills. The chapter will finish with a discussion of the 2011 and 2014 election campaigns in order to demonstrate the shift in messaging.

3.4.2. Political Context: ANC decline
The most significant political events during this time were around Jacob Zuma, the ANC’s corruption and state capture. This was a period of lawfare for the party, dealing with issues ranging from Jacob Zuma’s corruption charges to Zuma’s upgrades to his private residence in Nkandla. Whilst the ANC faced several corruption scandals, the DA was working on the realignment of politics in South Africa.

Realignment
Throughout this period the DA carried a message of the realignment of politics in South Africa to form a new majority around shared values and challenge the ANC. The DA had two

13 Lawfare is the term which has come to be used in relation to the DA’s court battles with the ANC government.
realignment opportunities during this period. The first, with the DA-ID merger, was successful. The second, with Mamphela Ramphele, was unsuccessful. The ID was easier to bring on board than Ramphele.

The realignment message in both cases has been centred around constitutionalism and non-racialism. In 2012, Zille delivered a key speech calling for a “convergence in the political centre” of everyone who was committed to the four core values of constitutionalism, non-racialism, a market economy and the independence of state institutions (Zille, ‘A new political order for South Africa’, 27 September 2012). The core of Zille’s message was a call to other leaders and political parties to “give up part of their individual identities to form a greater entity, capable of challenging for power” (Zille, 2016: 363). The speech was delivered at the time that the DA was in negotiations with Ramphele to rebrand the DA as The Democrats. Although the negotiations were unsuccessful in 2012, realignment continued to be one of the DA’s key focus areas leading up to the 2014 elections.

The Economic Freedom Fighters
As with previous elections, a new party was formed shortly before 2014 to challenge the ANC – the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Although the EFF was a threat to the DA in terms of media coverage, the two parties were not going to appeal to the same market segment of black voters. However, another, very vocal, opposition party on the scene would have an impact on the DA’s media profile in the lead-up to a major election.

3.4.3. Black identity
When Zille was elected as Federal Leader in 2007, she pledged that she would create a platform for new faces and voices to emerge in the DA. Aside from her project of creating an alternative government, this was one of her top priorities as leader of the DA. The core component of this was providing a diversity of leadership (i.e. people of colour) within the party. The DA needed what Zille referred to as their Clause 4 moment:

We all agreed that the equivalent of a Clause 4 moment for the DA would be when the party elected an outstanding black leader with vote-winning appeal. I saw it as part of my job, as the current party leader, to create conducive conditions for that moment to arrive. (Zille, 2016: 342)

It is interesting that Zille refers to the Clause IV moment for the DA as being about the face of the party as opposed to the Clause IV moment’s original meaning about changing the fundamental principles of the party in order to open the party to more voters.

There were two ways in which the DA has found its black leaders: growing its own timber and identifying prominent black leaders to be brought in to the party.

Growing its own timber
Between 2009 and 2011, young, black leaders started to emerge within the DA and were elected to prominent positions from which to launch their public profiles. The party also grew the DA Young Leaders’ Programme during this period. This section will focus on five of
those leaders who emerged during this period: Lindiwe Mazibuko, Mmusi Maimane, Mbali Ntuli, Makashule Gana and Solly Msimanga.

**Lindiwe Mazibuko**

As Zille writes in her memoirs, the term ‘rising star’ was often attached to Mazibuko in her time at the DA. Mazibuko began her career with the DA as a staff member in the Parliamentary Research and Communications Office. Once elected a MP in 2009, she was then made National Spokesperson ahead of the 2011 local government elections. It was during this election that she was called the ‘madam’s tea girl’ by Julius Malema. This was just one of many slurs directed at Mazibuko (and other black members of the DA) during this period.

Zille described Mazibuko in her memoirs as follows:

> It soon became apparent how quickly she mastered new policy areas. The articulacy with which she could argue almost any case, from our perspective, prompted me to appoint her as party spokesperson, which is usually reserved for more senior parliamentarians. Lindiwe ticked all the boxes. And she now had the platform to raise her profile. She made such an impression that she became the face of the 2011 election campaign...She rapidly garnered a large following. She was firmly among the favourites in the succession pipeline I was trying to build. (Zille, 2016: 345)

In 2011, the party decided to hold mid-term parliamentary caucus elections for the first time and Mazibuko stood for the position of Parliamentary Leader against Athol Trollip. Zille details in her memoir how she agonised over putting her weight behind Mazibuko’s campaign because she did not believe that she was ready for the position. She eventually decided to support Mazibuko because it would look bad publicly if she were to lose and the party would have chosen a middle-aged white man over the black rising star.

Mazibuko went on to carve out a position for herself as the Parliamentary Leader and was first in the succession pipeline in the public eye. Shortly after the 2014 elections, she announced her decision to attend Harvard School of Governance. Although Mazibuko has not returned to active politics, her name continues to be brought up in discussions around the DA’s future and whether she will return to the party and challenge Maimane for the Federal Leader position in the future.

**Mmusi Maimane**

Maimane, a former pastor, diversity consultant and ANC supporter, was brought into the DA as its mayoral candidate for Johannesburg in 2011 and so, in some respects, he is not an example of the DA developing leaders from party structures such as branches or the DA Youth. However, his growth from a councillor into party leader in such a short time could be considered ‘growing its own timber’. He had no previous political experience as Zille details in her memoir:

> He was a complete novice in politics. That is always a serious issue. But he was perceptive enough to know that...He stood against an experienced and excellent councillor and party
stalwart, Jack Bloom, who would have made an outstanding mayor. But the majority of the selection panel swung behind Mmusi’s charisma, flair and communication skills (backed by obvious intelligence) – all crucial attributes in politics. And, of course, he was black. That was indeed a factor, and anyone denying it would be lying. But the fact that he was black was not the ONLY factor. It was an additional ‘plus’, on top of a host of other attributes. (Zille, 2016: 337-338)

In comparison to Zille’s description of Mazibuko, there was no mention of how Maimane articulated the DA’s position or policy.

Although it was highly unlikely in 2011 that the DA would win Johannesburg, Maimane’s candidacy allowed the party to show off another young, black leader who was both charismatic and had broad appeal.

After Mazibuko was elected Parliamentary Leader, Maimane was promoted to National Spokesperson. Although not limiting for his profile, the position was not as front and centre as Parliamentary Leader. The position also did not hold any significant power within the party. In 2012, Maimane was elected as a Deputy Federal Chairperson which was a more prominent position within the Federal structure.

In terms of name recognition, Maimane was still not nearly as well-known as Zille or Mazibuko in the run up to the 2014 elections. This changed with his candidacy for premier of Gauteng province. In a highly-publicised campaign, he was positioned as the Obama of Soweto, a phenomenon which will be discussed in detail under the 2014 elections. As part of that campaign, the party released a video called “Who is Mmusi Maimane?”. The video features various party members describing Maimane as “not pretending to be a Kasi Boy, he is a Kasi Boy” (Refiloe Ntsekhe) and “a great Baptist preacher who can make a crowd sing” (Wilmot James). No white DA members were used in the video.

The departure of Mazibuko paved the way for Maimane to be the next Parliamentary Leader (although there was speculation at the time that Mazibuko would have lost to Maimane if she had stayed). Maimane was elected the first black leader of the DA in 2015 with almost 90% of the vote which was higher than the 72% Zille obtained when she was elected Federal Leader in 2007.

Mbali Ntuli
The former DA Youth Leader is not often mentioned when talking about the succession pipeline but yet she, and Gana, are excellent examples of the DA growing its own timber. Ntuli was a graduate of the DA Young Leaders Programme in 2008. She went on to be elected as a councillor, DA Youth Leader and is currently a MPL in KZN where she was elected caucus chair in 2016.

Ntuli was side-lined in the DA’s national profile due to her vocal opposition towards the DA’s Jobs March during the 2014 election campaign which resulted in a public spat with Zille shortly after and Ntuli’s decision to step down as DA Youth Leader after the 2014 elections.
Makashule Gana

Gana is another example of the DA growing its own timber. He was active in the DA Students’ Organisation (DASO) at university and was also a part of the DA Young Leaders’ Programme in 2008. He was eventually elected the Federal DA Youth Leader in 2010 and stepped down in 2012 after he was elected as a Deputy Federal Chairperson that year. In addition to his party positions, Gana has been a councillor in the City of Johannesburg and an MP but has returned to focus on Gauteng in the Provincial Legislature as a MPL. McKaiser questions in *Could I Vote DA?* whether Gana’s working class background and accent has hindered his progression in the DA whilst the likes of Maimane and Mazibuko (both middle class) have been promoted (McKaiser, 2014).

Tshepiso Msimanga

Although Msimanga had been with the DA for many years, he only had a more public profile once he became the party’s mayoral candidate for Tshwane in 2016. Msimanga’s journey with the DA began when he wrote to Leon in 2006 advising the DA on how to connect with black voters. Leon sent Coetzee to meet with him and Msimanga was subsequently employed by the DA. He was then elected as a councillor in Tshwane and the Gauteng North Leader in 2011 before being elected as a Gauteng Member of the Provincial Legislature in 2014.

Courting black leaders

Another way in which the DA has brought diversity into its leadership, has been to attract prominent black figures to the party. This method has been less successful and more controversial for the DA. Zille writes in her memoirs that she had approached many prominent leaders and although they agreed with the DA’s principles and policies, they were not ready to make the move. Examples of questionable choices include Nosimo Balindlela and King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo. Balindlela was a former ANC Premier of the Eastern Cape who then defected to Cope before joining the DA. Although Balindlela was popular in the rural communities of the Eastern Cape, as Premier she appointed “incompetent service providers and ministers” and presided “over a continued decline in the states of education, health and housing” in the province (*Daily Maverick*, ‘DA’s new member: more whimper than bang?’, 14 November 2012). Dalindyebo, whose new DA membership was announced with much publicity, had charges of assault, kidnapping and arson pending against him at the time the DA welcomed him to the party. His membership was subsequently terminated in 2015. Neither of these examples were ideal choices for a party with a brand of good governance and promoting the rule of law but the DA was targeting Nelson Mandela Bay for 2016 and needed prominent figures from the Eastern Cape.

Mamphela Ramphele

The most notable of these courtships was that with Mamphela Ramphele. Although discussions to bring Ramphele into the party began in 2011, negotiations for her to join the
party only began in earnest in late August 2012. By that point, she had already created the Citizens Movement for Social Change and so the discussions would no longer be about bringing Ramphele into the fold but creating a new political party as she was not willing to join forces with the DA. Ramphele’s view of the situation was that “a new political force was necessary, built on the foundation of the DA’s formidable machine” and that “she and her followers did not simply want to be absorbed into the existing DA – they wanted to be part of building a new brand.” (Zille, 2016: 362). The DA had not entered negotiations with a view to disbanding but were open to a name-change if it meant that they had a prominent black figure such as Ramphele on board.

In what Zille refers to as the M-Plan, the DA would join forces with Ramphele to relaunch/rebrand the DA as ‘The Democrats’. However, from Ramphele’s side, she wanted the “complete disestablishment of the DA” which was not possible considering the machinery and voters behind the party (Zille, 2016: 367). As Zille points out in her memoirs, all Ramphele would be bringing was her brand as opposed to millions of existing voters and a large, established organisation. The negotiations did not result in the expected outcome and Ramphele launched her new party, Agang-SA, on 18 February 2013 which was a week after the day that the DA was going to announce the rebrand. By the end of 2013, Ramphele approached the DA again and it eventually decided that it would offer her the position of presidential candidate for the party. In her memoirs, Zille writes that:

I have often reflected on why I allowed the DA (and me personally) to be messed around to that extent by a single person pursuing a deluded agenda. I would never have tolerated it had she been white. (Zille, 2016: 414)

This admission is important in the context of how desperate the DA was to find a black leader who did not have the DA label attached to them. The only reason it allowed the Ramphele incident to happen was because it needed legitimacy amongst black voters and knew it did not have this on its own or within the party. In some ways this was a market-oriented move by the DA. It listened to the market that wanted a black leader for the DA but not necessarily one who was already within its ranks. The DA was willing to sacrifice its name and brand in order to meet market demands.

3.4.4. Shifting the Brand Identity
As part of a move to attract the black electorate, the DA began shifting its brand identity. Two key components of this new identity was to brand the DA as the party of jobs and to change perceptions that it would bring back apartheid. The attempted shift in identity was done through two major campaigns in the lead up to the 2014 elections, the Jobs Campaign of 2012 and the Know Your DA campaign in 2013. The former was a strong policy campaign and the latter was an image campaign with elements of a policy programme.
As unemployment disproportionately affects black South Africans, it was important for the DA to own the jobs issue. In August 2012, the DA launched a nationwide campaign for the DA’s Plan for Growth and Jobs with the tagline, “Working for Change, Working for Jobs”. This came on the heels of its march to Cosatu on jobs and the Youth Wage Subsidy a few weeks earlier. This was the largest national campaign that the party had run to date. In his statement about the launch, then National Spokesperson Mmusi Maimane, outlined the campaign as follows:

In the coming weeks, we will take this Plan all over South Africa. Our campaign will be based around five key themes:

- Education for jobs
- Helping people start their own businesses
- Giving young job-seekers a youth wage subsidy
- Building infrastructure for growth
- Lowering taxes for greater investment (Maimane, ‘DA to reach millions with Jobs Campaign’, 26 July 2012)

As part of the campaign, the DA would stage “a number of Leaders’ events designed to showcase job creation in DA governments and what we would do if given the opportunity to govern nationally” (Maimane, ‘DA to reach millions with Jobs Campaign’, 26 July 2012). The campaign included posters, billboards in key metros, pamphlets in all 11 official languages, a SMS campaign, grassroots activities and outreach and interaction programmes targeted at the youth through social media platforms (Maimane, ‘DA to reach millions with Jobs Campaign’, 26 July 2012).

The new Growth and Jobs Plan, developed by Tim Harris and William Atwell, centred on the story of insiders and outsiders in the South African economy and the need to make the economy more inclusive and create jobs. Although the party has always had a strong focus on the economy and creating jobs, the messaging for this campaign was more voter-friendly and an attempt by the DA to ‘own’ the issue in the public. The messaging was no longer just about the market economy and foreign direct investment but about jobs and growth; insiders and outsiders in the economy; mineworkers and farmworkers:

If the DA is elected to national government, so that we can implement this plan, there will be more work for more people.

The economy will grow and there will be more investment and more businesses; more jobs for mine workers, and more jobs for construction workers, more jobs for factory workers, and for farm workers, and more jobs for those who have been unemployed for far too long. (Zille, The DA is working for change, working for jobs, 28 July 2012)
The plan was an extensively researched document drawing on examples from other middle-income countries that were achieving higher growth rates than South Africa. This was not just an image campaign but backed up by a strong, substantive policy document:

Whether you like the ideas in the Democratic Alliance’s plan for jobs and growth or not, the opposition has an advantage over the ruling party in terms of economic policy: it has one.

I emphasise the word "one". It is a single and unified vision for economic development. It is uncontested within the party and when any one of its cadres talks on the subject, the DA speaks with one voice.

It is an obvious point and one the DA itself makes at the beginning of the document it released on Saturday last week. But, ultimately, it is a very important factor. It makes it easier for the party to sell its ideas politically. And while the ANC exhausts itself going into Mangaung, the DA will be on the streets punting its message. (Donnelly, DA unveils its single economic plan, M&G, 3 August 2012)

As with other DA policy positions, its economic policy was not a shift in position but rather in how it communicated the position and how it would implement the policy. The messaging was voter-friendly with a comprehensive policy plan underpinning it.

Know Your DA

In 2013, the DA launched its Know Your DA campaign. The campaign’s intention was to provide the truth about the party, from its history to its positions on central policy matters to redress the legacy of apartheid, in its own words. The campaign was divided into two separate phases. The first phase was to show that the party fought against apartheid and the second phase was to show that the DA would continue to fight the legacy of apartheid.

Phase One

The campaign was launched on 13 April 2013 in Alexandra, Gauteng by then party leader Helen Zille. The purpose of the campaign was to tell the “untold story” of the DA. The campaign included a short film, posters, pamphlets and press advertisements – particularly in traditionally black newspapers such as the Sowetan and Daily Sun. Although there were some media events around the campaign, this was not designed as an air war campaign but a ground war campaign to target the black market14. The video was turned into a DVD and provided to activists across the country to show at public meetings.

In an interview with Ranjeni Munusamy from Daily Maverick, Geordin Hill-Lewis outlined the reasons why the campaign was necessary:

Geordin Hill-Lewis, chief of staff in Zille’s office, says the party’s efforts to reach out to “new communities” were being hampered by false perceptions about the DA’s history. This included that the DA was the party that enforced Apartheid or did not oppose it.

“The other amazing misperception was that Helen Suzman was an ANC activist. This reveals the general ignorance about this history of the DA,” Hill-Lewis said. “All this shows us that ANC’s

14 ‘air war’ and ‘ground war’ are common terms in political campaigns.
propaganda war against us in townships has worked.” Hill-Lewis said the party’s research showed that people would be more receptive to the DA’s policies and vision if they trusted the party’s bona fides. (Munusamy, ‘The lost and revised history of the DA, coming soon to a soapbox near you’, 15 April 2013)

According to then-CEO, Jonathan Moakes, the DA distributed 450 000 pamphlets and “the response on the ground has been overwhelmingly positive” (Sunday Times, ‘Not bothered by raising hackles’, 28 April 2013).

The “untold story” of the DA was lambasted in the press for all that it left out. In both the video and the accompanying material, there is no mention of party leaders between Jan Steytler and Helen Zille. It was actually the tale of two Helens (as it was called by Rebecca Davis for the Daily Maverick) with the struggle stories of some of the party leaders – Wilmot James, Patricia de Lille, Joe Seremane - included. The history of the Progressives and DP is completely ignored bar the reference to the Helen Suzman era in Parliament. As Munusamy pointed out at the time:

Rather than acknowledge Leon, or any of her other predecessors such as Van Zyl Slabbert or De Beer, Zille went straight from Suzman to Patricia de Lille, the current mayor of Cape Town. (Munusamy, ‘The lost and revised history of the DA, coming soon to a soapbox near you’, 15 April 2013)

Hlongwane argues that the DA should have started with the policy aspect of the campaign and that he “would have encouraged the party to forget about trying to rewrite our history. The ANC will always own that one” (Hlongwane, ‘DA’s clumsy BEE poster misses its mark’, 10 September 2013).

Individuals who were ignored from the party’s history include members who played a significant role in the drafting of the Constitution such as Colin Eglin, James Sefie, Dene Smuts and Tony Leon. Although these members are mentioned in passing in some statements on the Know Your DA campaign, their contribution is largely ignored in the accompanying material. This was a clear racial move to ignore significant ‘white liberals’ in favour of creating a people of colour struggle history for the party. However, this was not relevant to what the campaign was trying to achieve which was to convince black voters that the DA would not bring back apartheid. Marketing-wise it is exactly what needed to be done but it was also a bit disingenuous and did not have a positive media result.

The purpose of the campaign was to allay fears that the DA would bring back apartheid and to tell its story as opposed to “being defined by its opponents”. However, within the 12:48 minute video, at least 7 minutes of the time is either showing images of non-PP members or other prominent figures within the struggle. Of particular importance, is the adoption of Mandela within the party’s history. It could be argued that Mandela belongs to all South Africans but as a political brand, he belongs to the ANC. The DA has often made reference to Mandela in speeches but not in a way which has tried to tie him in with the party’s history.
However, once again, the media and commentators were not the target market for this campaign. It was aimed at a grassroots level.

The purpose of and justification for the campaign was helped at the time by a Pondering Panda poll which found that:

black respondents were significantly more likely to believe that the DA would bring back apartheid, with 52% of blacks holding this opinion. In comparison, 26% of Indians, 21% of coloureds, and 19% of whites believed that a DA victory at the next election would bring back apartheid. (Mail & Guardian, ‘Sample survey of young blacks believe DA would bring back apartheid’, 23 April 2013)

In terms of its objective of allaying fears that the DA would bring back apartheid and that it fought apartheid, the campaign could be deemed successful. It shows various current members of the DA who were involved in the fight against apartheid as well as the role which the then party leader, Zille, played in exposing Steve Biko’s death as well as the fact that her house was used as a safe house for anti-apartheid activists.

However, the campaign also ignored the DA’s white liberal history which it carries out on a regular basis in terms of whom the party celebrates. For example, between 2012 and 2014, the DA released a statement commemorating the death of Steve Biko, founder of the Black Consciousness Movement. There has been no annual statement on the birth or death of the party’s founders or icons. In a piece criticising the DA for its adoption of Steve Biko, van Onselen wrote that:

The DA has new heroes, to be sure. Very few of them are its own. The statues that stand in its political temple today were forged in pragmatism, not liberal principle.

... Search the DA’s website for the founder of the South African black consciousness movement, Steve Biko, and professions of admiration appear. Three months ago, a year ago and two years ago, the DA offered up a statement or speech commemorating Biko’s legacy on the day of his death. In the last one, on September 13, it stated: “it is therefore our responsibility to ensure that the ideals of Steve Biko died for are upheld”.

One of those ideals was an intensely hostile attitude to liberalism and liberals alike. (van Onselen, ‘Robotic pragmatism replaces liberalism at the heart of the DA’, 5 January 2015)

The DA does not celebrate its founding nor does it make records of its history readily available for the public. This is in stark contrast to the ANC who regularly uses its history as part of its messaging. However, the DA has now appropriated other prominent struggle figures to celebrate as part of its history to the point that it now appropriates ANC leaders in its communications.

The less explicit objective of this campaign was to show that the party as an organisation had ‘transformed’ from a party of ‘white liberals’ to a party of diverse leaders. Not only did the campaign attempt to give the party struggle credentials but it also showed a significant
change in the racial make-up of the party. The visuals used in the video were of black DA members, not the white face which the public associates with the party.

**Phase Two**

The second phase of the Know Your DA campaign focused on policy issues. At the launch of the second phase Maimane introduced it as follows:

In this phase, we are correcting another falsehood peddled by our political opponents: the lie that we want to bring apartheid back.

Our opponents say that we will do this by taking away people's social grants, by stopping the redistribution of land and by abolishing Black Economic Empowerment.

Anybody who has read our policies knows that none of this true. In fact, the opposite is true.

The DA supports social grants. We support social grants because they are vital to protect the poor from the impact of extreme poverty.

The DA supports land reform. We support land reform because we must correct the evils of the apartheid system that reserved the best land for whites only.

The DA supports Black Economic Empowerment. We support broad-based Black Economic Empowerment because we want to build an inclusive economy in which everybody has a fair chance of getting ahead in life. (Maimane, ‘Know Your DA: The untold story of our fight against the legacy of apartheid’, 9 September 2013)

The three central policies of this campaign were on BEE, social grants and land reform. All three policy positions are of greater importance to black South Africans than any other market.

The centrepiece of the launch was a billboard in the Johannesburg CBD with the line “We support BEE that creates jobs, not billionaires”. The billboard did not have a positive media reaction. McKaiser wrote that:

The critical question then, which is not answered by the slogan on this billboard, is whether, in a straightforward way, the DA supports BEE with its original purpose of transforming the ownership structure and management layers of our economy to reflect the racial and gender demographics of our society in the name of economic justice.

The desire for job creation is something everyone, one would hope, sign up for. That is not the contested, principled, and policy, debate that a BEE discussion gives rise to. (McKaiser, ‘DA shows its true colours’, 16 September 2013)

Linked to this was the argument that the billboard was insulting towards black South Africans and conveyed the message that the DA wanted to keep black South Africans as labourers as opposed to successful business people. Hlongwane wrote:

But the DA’s billboard will be read within a certain context, and it struck me that you can’t blame people who take the message to mean that the opposition party would prefer to see blacks as
labour, not as owners of the means of production. The implication is there. The wording should have been different. (Hlongwane, DA’s clumsy BEE poster misses its mark, 10 September 2013)

As can be seen in the image below, if the DA wanted to portray black South Africans as labourers then the man would have been dressed in overalls rather than in a style that makes him look like an engineer/project manager/architect. This provides an example of the type of response to DA attempts at attracting black voters or changing perceptions – either the attempt did not go far enough or it was read from a certain context that does not wish to change that perception.

![DA BEE Billboard](image)

Figure 2: DA BEE Billboard

Zille explains how the DA came up with the slogan in her autobiography:

> We needed a slogan that would break the sound barrier and explain where we stood. Tim [Harris] proposed a simple slogan: ‘The DA supports BEE’. Some members of the committee supported this simple, direct approach. I (and some others) felt this would merely allow the debate to revert to the simplistic light-switch approach. It had to be more nuanced.

> Geordin [Hill Lewis] hit on what I thought was the perfect slogan: ‘The DA supports BEE that creates jobs, not billionaires.’

> That summed up our position perfectly. (Zille, 2016: 386)

However, the DA could have easily kept the slogan as “The DA supports BEE that creates jobs” or more simply “The DA supports BEE”. Instead the billboard opened up the space to criticise the DA for not wishing black South Africans to be billionaires.

At the same time, the DA launched its *Green Paper on Economic Inclusion* and a pamphlet which would be circulated to 15 million South Africans saying that it supports BEE, social grants and land reform. At the heart of the DA’s stance on B-BBEE was the following:

> We believe that the scorecard and Codes of Good Practice must be deliberately re-shaped to broaden the scope of empowerment (to go beyond mere ownership transfer) and must start moving away from an exclusive focus on racial targets and race-based redress to become a tool to incentivise economic practices that broaden the economic base and enhance economic inclusion on a non-racial basis. (Democratic Alliance, *Green Paper on Economic Inclusion*, September 2013)
Its position on BEE and employment equity will be discussed further in the next section. What must be noted at this point is that shortly after this launch, the DA was already showing some internal lack of cohesion around the matter. Wilmot James (co-author of the policy) had summarised the DA’s position on BEE on PowerFM as being closer to ‘Diversity Economic Empowerment’ based on the fact that the party would move away from race-based redress to a non-racial form of empowerment. Maimane, as National Spokesperson, then had to clarify that the party did support BEE even though, in some respects, James’s summary was more accurate of its position. The DA does not support racial quotas or believe that redress should be based on racial groups. It does support race-based redress but this support is qualified:

Race is not a perfect measure of disadvantage, but the overlap remains significant enough to justify race-based redress. Over time we would to move to other indicators of disadvantage.

This would not stop us from implementing mechanisms to prevent those who have already been empowered through redress measures from benefiting repeatedly at the expense of the genuinely disadvantaged. *(Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on the DA’s position on Redress, 2013)*

The position confusion could have been avoided if the DA was more willing to convince voters of a new way of approaching BEE rather than playing to voters’ opinions. The messaging confusion is an example of the party’s policy-seeking identity clashing with its vote-seeking identity.

Social grants
The claim has been made by the ANC that the DA would take away social grants. Social welfare is therefore an important policy position for the DA to defend. The DA has always supported a form of social welfare programme. In 2004, the DA even introduced a basic income grant into its social welfare policy which would go further than that of the ANC’s social welfare policy. The DA’s position on social grants is an important factor to examine within the South African context. The purpose of the campaign was to show voters that it supported social grants and to counteract the ANC’s messaging that the DA would take away social grants.

The policy which was released in 2013 on social grants was comprehensive and took an holistic approach to what it preferred to term social upliftment. The DA’s argument with regards to social grants is that they are necessary but should not be relied on forever and that government should provide opportunities to bring people out of the social welfare net. There is a communications gap between saying the DA does not support social grants and the DA saying that social grants should not be relied on forever. An interesting shift occurs in the 2013 policy document on Social Protection. Although the DA still supports providing social grants, the policy looks at a more integrated approach to social protection. For

\[15\] It is not clear when this messaging from the ANC started but the DA has often made reference to it.
example, the DA does not explicitly refer to a Basic Income Grant but instead states that it would ensure that poor adults are provided with suitable financial support and “are assisted through targeted labour activation strategies to lift themselves out of poverty” (Democratic Alliance, DA Policy on Social Protection, December 2013).

Land Reform
Another policy position which the DA has supposedly opposed is land reform. The DA, once again, has always acknowledged the need for land reform. In its 2013 policy, it argued that the land reform programme “must look beyond rural land and truly address the land needs of South Africans who have historically been excluded from land and property ownership, including the need for access to urban land and housing opportunities”. It also addressed the needs of citizens in the former homelands and would provide “security of tenure on the land which they live and farm”. The land reform strategy would be informed:

- not by the need to achieve quantitative land targets, but by the objectives to (i) support a thriving commercial agricultural sector that can protect South Africa’s food security,
- (ii) promote emerging small-scale farmers where economically viable, and (iii) alleviate poverty and support household food security through appropriate assistance for subsistence agriculture. The success of land reform should therefore be determined in terms of the livelihoods created or supported and economic value created, rather than the hectares of land transferred. (Democratic Alliance, DA Policy on Land Reform, December 2013)

The ‘Plane Crash’
The DA went from a strong position on jobs and the economy in 2012 to what was termed a ‘Plane Crash’ by Zille in 2013. Although Zille was referring to the DA’s mistake on the Employment Equity Amendment Bill, the ‘Plane Crash’ went far deeper than a mistake in parliamentary processes and was perhaps more of a defining moment in the party’s history than was evident at the time. As a lead up to this plane crash, Zille wrote:

Navigating the political rapids, from initial enthusiasm to disillusionment, would have been difficult for the DA in the best of circumstances. But we had to do it in the worst. We were trying to change the false perception that we, as a party, were defenders of white privilege against black aspiration. And we were in the run-up to a crucial election, which was why the ANC deliberately focused the debate on this most divisive of issues, by introducing two race-based bills in parliament early in 2014. (Zille, 2016: 378)

Parliamentary confusion
Two amendment bills were before Parliament on Employment Equity and Black Economic Empowerment in 2013. Zille had produced a memorandum in May 2013 outlining how the DA should deal with BEE and Employment Equity:

- We support the need to redress the legacy of apartheid.
- The best way is through sustained job-creating economic growth, education and skills-training aligned to the needs of the economy.
• South Africa has spent at least R500-billion on narrow-based “BEE” in the past 19 years. This has not created new jobs or broadened the base of the economy to any significant extent.

• The empowerment results have been dismal: we have only managed to “over-empower” a small, politically-connected elite.

• We need to redress both the legacy of apartheid as well as cronry-based BEE, which merely continues the legacy of apartheid by excluding the majority of disadvantaged South Africans.

• We need to start by asking what the REAL barriers are to black advancement in the economy.

• Anything that prevents job creating economic growth is a barrier to black advancement in the economy.

• Anything that prevents first-time job seekers getting jobs is a barrier to black advancement in the economy.

• Anything that undermines education and training, and that misaligns this with the needs of the economy, undermines black advancement.

• Once the requirements of growth, jobs, education, training and alignment with the economy are met, it will create opportunity on a grand scale. This will primarily advantage black South Africans and do more for BEE than any initiatives undertaken by the ANC thus far.

• Within this context we need to incentivise business to ensure opportunities, training and promotion for disadvantaged South Africans. (Zille, SA Today: A Plane Crash That Should Have Been Avoided, 7 November 2013)

The DA has always supported a form of broad-based economic empowerment and corrective action as a means to redress the legacy of apartheid and create jobs. It has, however, disagreed with the manner in which the ANC government has gone about implementing BEE legislation and it has believed in the importance of doing away with racial quotas/targets towards a non-racial empowerment. The DA has never been successful in communicating its position to the satisfaction of analysts and commentators and the nuance of its position is often lost. For example, shortly after the plane crash, the Mail & Guardian ran a piece which said the following:

Over the years, the DA has had to explain and justify its affirmative action and redress policies, advocating instead “equal opportunity”. It is a hard sell to black people who are drawn to the ruling party’s policies, which are seen as creating an environment that favours the previously disadvantaged and enables them to play a meaningful role in the economy. (Mail & Guardian, ‘EE Bill: Is Black the DA’s new true blue?’, 15 November 2013)

The party’s position has been considerably more complex than just “equal opportunity”. The aim of the party’s economic policies has always been to create an environment which allows outsiders (i.e. the previously disadvantaged) to play a meaningful role in the economy. However, the DA has disagreed with corrective action being achieved through racial quotas but rather on an individual basis. The difference between the ANC and the DA is how they
would go about achieving this objective and the DA’s belief that race would need to be phased out of this type of legislation.

The DA supported both Bills in Parliament. Its initial support for the BEE Bill was justified on the basis that the Codes would “embrace genuine broad-based empowerment” and not narrow race-based definitions. When this turned out not to be the case, the DA voted against the Bill in the NCOP.

Employment Equity was where the real ‘plane crash’ occurred. Zille attributes it in her SA Today to a “systems failure” in Parliament. In some respects, this could be said to be true. However, the MPs on the Portfolio Committee deliberating on the Bill had failed to see anything wrong with a piece of legislation that would set racial quotas and punish those who failed to meet them. The fact that this was blamed on a systems failure is disingenuous when the party has fought against racial quotas its entire history and regularly called them ‘neo-Verwoedian’ both in internal party documents and external communications. The failure of the MPs involved to understand what the DA’s position was with regards to the legislation shows that there are some within the party who neither share the ideological vision of the DA nor have an understanding on the DA’s position on racial quotas and social engineering.

The DA’s position on employment equity was still based on the position paper Equality and Corrective Action prepared by Dene Smuts and adopted by the DA Federal Council in 2005. The DA’s policy on Economic Inclusion was authored by James and Dr Frouwien Bosman. The positioning on employment equity changed slightly from its Green Paper to its final adoption of the Economic Inclusion policy at Federal Council. The September 2013 position on diversity in the workplace reads as follows:

5. Incentivising hiring and promotion practices that enhances diversity and take into account the future potential of candidates

The DA’s view on employment equity can be summarised as follows:

• The DA believes that diversity is desirable and that individuals from diverse backgrounds should lead, participate in and form part of businesses and other organisations in South Africa.

• The substantive equality enshrined in the Constitution recognises that identical treatment can result in inequality in circumstances where people start off from a position of disadvantage.

• The repeal of formal legislated barriers preventing the enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities does not in itself give people the qualifications or experience to compete equally, and prejudice against categories of people likewise puts obstacles on their path.

• Measures designed to protect or advance them must, however, be characterised by a rational relationship between means and ends.

• There is a commitment to achieving equality and a broad reflection of the country’s racial and gender composition over time with the provision that the process may not have a disproportionate impact on those affected.
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly ruled that the ultimate goal of equality must be furthered, but that corrective action cannot take the form of the arbitrary advancement of a set of interests and cannot create or entrench a new inequality.

The DA does not support quantitative racial targets for employment equity, and especially not the ethnic breakdown of racial targets into categories of previously disadvantaged people as proposed in the current amendments to the Codes of Good Practice. (emphasis added)

In order to advance the goal of equality and the reflection of the full diversity of our society in terms of ‘race’, ethnicity, sex, belief, culture and able-bodiedness, underrepresented categories should enjoy favourable consideration when they are as well qualified for appointment as the next man or woman, or when they show comparable promise.

We believe that diversity can be promoted through dedicated efforts to attract, develop and retain talented staff from a diversity of backgrounds, and propose that talent and diversity management strategies with objectives and action steps determined by entities themselves should be recognised in the employment equity scorecard.

In an attempt to limit some of the damage from the plane crash, the DA held a press conference to clarify its position on BEE and Employment Equity in November that year. It launched the newly-approved Economic Inclusion policy. The section on “Promoting workplace diversity” underwent some changes which are listed below:

- We support balanced, qualitative processes to promote diversity, which can include racial preference, but excludes racial quotas.

- We support dedicated efforts to invest in the long term potential of staff and to promote diversity through training, mentoring and career pathing.

- In order to advance diversity, persons from previously disadvantaged groups should enjoy favourable consideration when they are as well qualified for appointment as the next man or woman, or when they show comparable promise.

- We have a very strong preference for an incentive-based system of encouraging appropriate corrective measures, rather than punitive measures to impose racial representivity.

- The Constitution and the objectives of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 do not require racial quotas or demographic representivity, and expressly prevents employers from establishing absolute barriers to the employment and advancement of non-designated groups. Where demographic representivity is enforced, or quotas are imposed, it is a contravention of both the Employment Equity Act and the principles of the Constitution.

The DA’s points of clarification were around its belief in racial preference as opposed to racial quotas and that it did not believe in punitive measures but rather an incentive-based system. This also required a clearer explanation of its position on how it would implement employment equity and the BEE Codes:

In government, the DA would align legislation in support of workplace diversity with the incentive structure of the Codes of Good Practice. This will entail the following:
• Developing a Workplace Diversity Act that outlines procedural compliance measures (for example: having a corrective action plan in place, establishing a consultative forum on workplace diversity, appointing a manager to take responsibility for corrective action and submitting reports to a commission responsible for monitoring workplace diversity);

• Making points in a “Corrective Action” element of the B-BBEE Scorecard conditional on procedural compliance to the Workplace Diversity Act (similar to the manner in which points in the “Skills Development” element of the B-BBEE Scorecard is currently conditional on compliance with the Skills Development Act);

• Awarding points in the “Corrective Action” element of the B-BBEE Scorecard both for compliance to the procedural aspects of the Workplace Diversity Act and for progress towards building a workforce that is broadly representative of the South African population.

We strongly reject the proposal in the October 2013 version of the Codes of Good Practice to break down employment equity targets into racial sub-categories, as this would require an interventionist degree of racial classification. [Bold original]

In our approach, individuals would be allowed to self-identify as being black (as is the practice in the current B-BBEE Codes and Employment Equity processes). If a dispute arises, the affected individuals will have to make a case that he or she has been disadvantaged as a result of apartheid legislation. Government has no business defining race, and our approach does not require it.

The DA continued its belief in corrective action and diversity as opposed to the ANC’s paradigm of racial quotas as a means to black advancement – although the party does discuss the importance of black advancement but within a different framing.

After the Federal Council had adopted the policy on Economic Inclusion, Zille held a press conference to present the new policy and clarify the DA’s position on race-based economic policies. Zille summarised the DA’s position on economic inclusion along the lines of the memorandum which she had produced in May. The press statement also included a table differentiating the DA’s position from how it viewed the ANC’s position. The differences in position are highlighted in bold:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANC</th>
<th>DA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redress for Apartheid</td>
<td>Redress for Apartheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial self-identification</td>
<td>Racial self-identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race determines destiny</strong></td>
<td><strong>Race still matters for redress</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetuates racial categories</td>
<td>Transcends racial categories over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Representivity’</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of outcomes</td>
<td>Broadening of opportunity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The principles of redress and allowance for racial self-identification are the only points of agreement between the ANC and DA. The key difference, especially with regards to a non-racial future for South Africa, is that the DA believes that economic empowerment should transcend racial categories over time.

The real ‘Plane Crash’

The ‘plane crash’ was controversial, particularly amongst liberals and the Afrikaans press, and once again points to the balancing act which the DA has had to play as it adapts. In this instance, it lost its balance.

In the same way that McKaiser described the ANC as sleeping when the DA made its first blunder ahead of the 2014 elections with its BEE/DEE confusion, the mainstream English-speaking press was also caught sleeping over the plane crash. In a detailed timeline, Politicsweb outlines how the major EE error by the DA was only picked up by Beeld and was only actively reported on by Beeld ten days after the event occurred. The English-speaking press took a considerably longer time to pay attention to what was in fact a major crisis in the DA at the time. This is an indication of the lack of attention the media paid to the DA and its lack of knowledge that this was a major policy shift on the part of the party. The only reason this was even picked up in the press was because the editor of Politicsweb, James Myburgh who was a former party staffer and wrote most of the DP/DA’s position papers on transformation, had taken notice and written an editorial on the DA’s policy flip-flop.
The DA came under harsh criticism from certain liberal quarters in response to its sudden change in position. The response from the Institute for Race Relations, a liberal think tank, was the following:

The DA is clearly hoping its endorsement of the Bill will win it the support of ‘born-free’ black South Africans in the 2014 general election. However, skilled black youths within this group have little need of this artificial leg-up and would benefit far more from measures to boost economic growth and the generation of new jobs. At the same time, in retarding growth and investment, the Bill will ultimately harm the poor black majority, who far outnumber the black elite.

DA support for this kind of racial engineering will come as a shock to many of its current supporters. It also betrays the non-racial principles for which the party has historically stood. But the DA’s conduct is primarily a betrayal of the poor, who need sound alternatives to the ANC’s failed empowerment policies, which have done little to assist them beyond welfare and free services.

It is now apparent that the truly disadvantaged cannot look to the official opposition to provide those alternatives. This means there is no major political actor in South Africa representing their interests in this regard - a truly extraordinary situation. It remains to be seen whether any other opposition parties will seek to capitalise on this. However, this might be unlikely, as the growing ANC/DA consensus on racial engineering comes to dominate policy thinking in South Africa. (Cronje & Jeffrey, Five implications of the DA’s support for race law, 5 November 2013)

Leon also responded harshly to the incident:

The DA’s flip-flop on employment equity suggests that whatever its other lapses, the ANC now comprehensively dominates the intellectual space and defines terms of the debate within it.

In seeking to offer itself as an agent for redress and to attract a new base, the DA is far too scared of having the race and antitransformation labels stuck on it. (Leon, DA at sixes and sevens over racist employment bill, 5 November 2013)

As opposed to presenting a real alternative in terms of policy i.e. something along the lines of Diversity Economic Empowerment or Corrective Action, the DA has fed into the ANC paradigm.

One of the issues which the Politicsweb article highlighted was the DA’s silence for almost two weeks over the incident. Zille attributed this to a communications decision as the DA communications team did not wish to provide the story with more oxygen and hoped that the issue would not reach the mainstream media (Zille, 2016). The vote-seeking element within the party, i.e. the communications director and Zille’s Chief of Staff, thought it best not to communicate or explain the DA’s mistake any further. Zille eventually issued an apology for the DA’s flip-flop on the incident and took responsibility for the systems failure in Parliament.

The policy confusion during the ‘plane crash’ incident could be seen as the DA of old in conflict with the present DA. It was only one incident in the DA’s struggle to balance its conflicting racial markets and could be seen as the start of future struggles for the DA as it
starts tipping towards one racial market. Instead of trying to convince voters of its position, the DA is starting to mould its position towards black voters and in doing so is becoming more market-oriented.

3.4.5. Elections

The Local Government Elections of 2011 and the National and Provincial Elections in 2014 provide a good example of the identity crisis which occurred in the DA during this period. The DA went from a campaign in 2011 barely mentioning the ANC to a campaign in 2014 which was praising the ANC of Mandela and Mbeki and adopting ANC messaging. After successfully shifting the DA’s image to a focus on the party’s strength in government in 2011, it shifted back to a negative campaign in 2014.

2011 Elections

By 2011, the DA had been governing the City of Cape Town for five years which allowed it to campaign on its success in the city. This was the first election that the DA could also show more diversity in its leadership candidates.

Candidates

The DA had two focus cities in terms of mayoral candidates – Cape Town and Johannesburg. In Cape Town, the DA fielded Patricia de Lille for mayor and in Johannesburg, it had Mmusi Maimane as its candidate. The posters which were used nationally showed Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko (then National Spokesperson) which fitted in with the DA’s message on diversity and for the first time it could display that diversity in its leadership.

Figure 3: DA 2011 Election poster

Messaging

As some context for the 2011 election message, the DA started to shift its messaging ahead of the elections as it was able to market its success in the City of Cape Town. This allowed the DA to start promoting its message of an alternative government and the realignment of politics (due to a working coalition) more realistically. The realignment message was reinforced by the merger with the Independent Democrats in 2010. This messaging was
coupled with its philosophy of the open, opportunity society for all; the DA being more inclusive and diverse; and a shift away from attacking, or even mentioning, the ANC except in reference to the liberation movement’s continued racialisation of politics.

Zille’s speech to the Federal Congress in 2010 provides an excellent example of the new positive messaging. In her speech, Zille carried the message of the DA being for all South Africans and how it was attracting more and more people who were rejecting race politics:

So, since our first momentous choice for peace and democracy 16 years ago, it is equally significant that more and more South Africans are choosing to reject the politics of race. They realize that if the outcome of every election is predictable, because it is merely a racial census, then power abuse is inevitable.

Governments with no prospect of losing elections become self-serving and corrupt. They need racial divisions to stay in power; they undermine the rule of law to stay out of jail. Their legacy is the failed state, which has caused so much misery and poverty on our continent. (Zille, Our Success is South Africa’s Success, 24 July 2010)

For a period, there was messaging about moving away from race politics to a truly non-racial South African politics. An important message to convey was that the DA recognised that race plays a role in one’s identity but that it should not define political choices:

We are making a different choice...Very few complex plural societies have made this choice.

That is because race is a powerful mobiliser. So are culture, language, and religion. These things shape our identity. Our need to belong is real and important to us all. But more and more, South Africans are realizing that making a different political choice is not a threat to their identity. In fact, quite the reverse. Each of us can confidently be who we are only if we secure that right for everyone else. Each time we stand up for another’s rights, we defend our own.

South Africans are, increasingly, choosing to value each other by what Martin Luther King described as the “content of our characters”, not the colour of our skins. We are choosing to come together on a platform of shared values – integrity, fairness, service, tolerance, the quest for excellence. All of these override the things that separate us.

South Africans who are making this choice are coming together in the Democratic Alliance. It is the reason why the DA has become, in Professor Lawrence Schlemmer’s words, “the most non-racial party South Africa has ever had.” (Zille, Our Success is South Africa’s Success, 24 July 2010)

This type of messaging was important as an alternative to the ANC’s thinking that black South Africans could only have an ANC identity. Zille went on to talk about the DA’s by-election growth in black areas.

it sends a clear message to the political analysts who propose that we remain a party for minorities only. The voters don’t agree with you. We all know that it usually takes the analysts a few years to catch up with the voters.

What these analysts don’t understand is that the DA could never be a party just for minorities, even if we thought it strategic to do so. Our entire reason for being is to challenge the notion
that ethnic and racial nationalism is the only way South Africans can conduct their politics. And that is what we are doing. We are building a new majority. (Zille, Our Success is South Africa’s Success, 24 July 2010)

The DA was positioning itself against racial and ethnic nationalism and inviting others who were against this to join them. The realignment theme was also evident in the speech:

we must also grow our support another way – through realigning politics in South Africa.

There are people who share our values, in all political parties. If we manage to bring all those people together in one political vehicle, I believe we will be a majority. We must build this new majority.

...

I remain convinced that coalitions are a crucial step in the realignment process. We must now move to the next step. Of course we must consider every case on its merits. We have learnt lessons from the past. We know that it is pointless to exchange our principles for power. But pristine powerlessness is also self-defeating.

We must bring together all those who still believe in a place called the new South Africa. And who want to get there together, in all our glorious diversity. (Zille, Our Success is South Africa’s Success, 24 July 2010)

Throughout the speech, Zille makes reference to freedom and articulates it through the key concepts of the open opportunity society for all.

What is interesting to note in the 2010 Federal Congress speech is that the ANC is only mentioned twice in the speech and this is done in reference to the liberation movement’s service delivery record compared to the DA’s in the City of Cape Town. This would be a theme which continued into the 2011 elections and was a significant departure from the days of Fight Back and Stop Zuma.

The messaging on race and delivery continued through to the 2011 election. The DA had a strong focus on delivery and this was centred around its ‘The Cape Town Story’. This was a document compiled ahead of the elections detailing the DA’s success in the City of Cape Town and how it had changed the city “from patronage system to an open opportunity society for all”. The messaging was still around a closed, crony society for some versus the open, opportunity society for all:

The political contest in South Africa is between these two competing political philosophies. And it is no exaggeration to say that the outcome will determine whether or not we succeed as a nation. That is why The Cape Town Story represents a watershed in our history. It documents how the DA turned around a city in decline as a result of the closed, crony system. More than that, it shows how policies that promote openness and opportunity can, over time, have a profound impact on peoples’ lives. (Democratic Alliance, The Cape Town Story, 28 March 2011).
In a document prepared for the Federal Congress in 2010, the DA outlined the Open Opportunity Society for All and explained to members why it was necessary to be familiar with the concepts in the lead up to the 2011 elections:

As more and more South Africans come to see the positive difference that the open, opportunity society for all makes in their lives through policies that the DA implements where it is in government, the ANC will increasingly resort to the politics of racial mobilisation in a desperate attempt to shore up its electoral support.

The ANC will cast racial slurs against the DA with growing intensity as we approach the 2011 local government elections.

This booklet provides you with the conceptual tools and factual evidence you need to reject those slurs with the contempt that they deserve. (The Open Opportunity Society for All, July 2010)

The DA suspected that it would be faced with racist slurs and it wished to keep the message about its alternative vision.

The campaign was centred around delivery for all and the DA’s success in the City of Cape Town as well as other municipalities where the DA governed. Another message to voters was to vote on issues, not race:

My fellow South Africans, I want to make something clear today: this election is not a contest between race groups.

For too long now, we have used elections as a way of expressing racial identity and racial solidarity. This time, we must take the next step. We must make the issues the issue. (Zille, ‘Campaign Launch Speech: We Deliver For All’, 26 March 2011).

This was a positive campaign and there was very little explicit mention of the ANC except to differentiate the DA’s approach to race from the ANC’s. The election launch speech only mentions the ANC three times and not through attack or to say anything significant about the liberation movement. There are two possible reasons for this. The first was that the DA wished to keep the focus on its service delivery record. The second is that market research had shown that attacking the ANC does not attract black voters. This last reason will be explored in more detail during the 2014 elections.

Results
The DA won the City of Cape Town outright and improved its percentage of the vote nationally from 16.3% to 24.3% (Zille, ‘DA Analysis of 2011 Election Results’, 20 May 2011). According to the DA’s analysis of the 2011 election results it achieved approximately 5% of the black vote which meant that “approximately 20% of the DA’s support base is black, making the DA the most diverse party in South Africa” (Zille, ‘DA Analysis of 2011 Election Results’, 20 May 2011). According to the analysis, it also won “at least 133 wards from the ANC” and lost five to the ANC (Zille, ‘DA Analysis of 2011 Election Results’, 20 May 2011).
2014 Elections
The 2014 elections were vital for the DA as it needed to show sufficient growth amongst the black electorate and ensure that it maintained its majority in the Western Cape. The party’s aim for 2014 was to break out of the minority mould (Zille, 2016). The initial targets for the 2014 elections were to win Gauteng (either outright or through a coalition) and to achieve 30% of the vote. Although Zille denied the 30% target, this had been a long term goal for the DA. The party’s primary focus was Gauteng with a much-publicised R121 million campaign around Mmusi Maimane. It also set its sights on the Northern Cape but this was a less-likely prospect.

Candidates
The real face of the campaign was Maimane who starred in the DA’s campaign advertisements. However, in national posters and pamphlets, the party used Zille, Mazibuko, Maimane and De Lille. The DA also publicised the candidate public representatives who had come from its DA Young Leaders’ Programme. At the press conference announcing the new candidates, Zille said:

Our lists for this election represent the most diverse, young and dynamic team that the DA has ever presented to the country.

Most of our new candidates have emerged through the ranks of our party, some have joined us from other parties, and others applied via our public advertisements. All our candidates are committed to the DA’s values and share our vision of an open, opportunity society for all. (Zille, ‘DA Announces Candidate List for Election 2014’, 25 January 2014)

As an example of this young leadership group, candidates for MP included:

- Phumzile van Damme – former parliamentary staff member; Western Cape Ministerial spokesperson, graduate of the DA Young Leaders’ Programme
- Zakhele Mbele – former spokesperson in the Western Cape Premier’s office; graduate of the DA Young Leaders’ Programme
- Solly Malatsi – former spokesperson in the City of Cape Town Mayor’s office; graduate of the DA Young Leaders’ Programme

All of the above candidates were elected and now serve, respectively, as National Spokesperson, Shadow Minister of Police and Shadow Minister of Sport and Recreation (at the time of writing). This was once again an example of the positive results of the DA’s approach of growing its own timber.

Messaging
The DA took a very different approach to its message in 2014 compared to previous elections. In a major departure from 2011 and previous party positions, the DA was now praising the ANC which was in direct contradiction to the party’s brand of opposition to the ANC for almost two decades.

Although the election slogan was ‘together for change, together for jobs’, the slogan which caught media attention was Ayisafani (no longer the same). One of the core messages of the
2014 campaign was that the ANC under Zuma was no longer the same and it had left voters behind. This was used in both television and radio advertisements and, controversially, banned by the SABC. The first instalment of the #Ayisafani campaign differentiates between past ANC leaders and Jacob Zuma’s ANC. In the video, Maimane talks to himself in the mirror saying:

You voted for them. But since 2008, we have seen Jacob Zuma’s ANC. An ANC that is corrupt. An ANC for the connected few. It is an ANC that is taking us backwards. R200 million spent on upgrading the President’s private house. We have seen a police force killing our own people. An ANC where 1.4 million more South Africans lost their jobs. Where are the jobs President Zuma? I-ANC Ayisafani.

It also introduced a softening towards the pre-Zuma ANC even though the party had fought against Mbeki’s racial nationalism and was never particularly supportive of ANC policy under Mandela or Mbeki. Helen Zille, former vocal opponent of the ANC, said the following at the DA’s election manifesto launch:

The new government that came into office in 1994 had an enormous challenge: to reverse the injustice of the past and create a better life for all.

Those early days of democracy were not perfect. There is no perfect government anywhere in the world. But things did change for the better. Let me repeat: things changed for the better.

Under Presidents Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa made progress. They had a good story to tell. Banebali elingcono abanokulibalisa! Suid-Afrika se storie was een van vooruitgang. (Zille, ‘Together for Change, Together for Jobs’, 24 February 2014)

By using ‘a good story tell’, the DA was using the ANC’s own message. Zille went on to list the achievements of the ANC government:

Basic services like water, electricity, sanitation and housing were rolled out. The economy started to grow. Unemployment dropped and many people’s standard of living rose. Measures to fix the injustices of the past were introduced. (Zille, ‘Together for Change, Together for Jobs’, 24 February 2014)

But that eventually the tide turned and:

Things changed, right here in Polokwane, in December 2007. At its elective conference that year the ANC elected a new leadership. President Mbeki was recalled from office months later. And then, charges against Jacob Zuma on 783 counts of corruption were dropped. (Zille, ‘Together for Change, Together for Jobs’, 24 February 2014)

The manifesto launch was held in Polokwane where the DA argued that “a great political movement lost its sense of direction” in reference to the ANC’s Polokwane Conference that saw Zuma elected as ANC president. This was the key message for the DA – the ANC was no longer the same since Polokwane and things had gotten worse for South Africa.

Maimane’s campaign launch in Soweto in 2013 also used positive ANC messaging and on a more personal level:
What the apartheid system did was wreck the dreams of my parents and the dreams of so many others like them.

And that is why, like everybody on my street, I supported the liberation movement, and voted for the ANC.

Back then, the ANC embodied hope and change.

We believed that it would take us from the dark to the light, from oppression to freedom.

We believed the ANC would lead us to the promised land.

Indeed, the ANC brought us the hope of a better life.

President Nelson Mandela reconciled our divided nation. We began to believe in ourselves.

And when President Mbeki stood up, and proclaimed that he was an African, born of the people of this continent, our spirits soared. We shared his pride.

President Mandela and Mbeki helped get our economy on track.

They presided over the roll out of RDP houses, water, sanitation and electricity.

The social grants they introduced were a safety net for the poor.

The years have past and times have changed. I find myself wondering what happened to that era of great leadership. (Maimane, ‘Our destiny is in our hands’, 2 November 2013)

Maimane was speaking at a DA rally where the majority of DA members, public representatives and leadership present would have voted DP/DA in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The ‘we’ and ‘us’ in the speech was not directed at the DA members present (of all races) but at black voters.

One must assume that the decision to be more positive towards the ANC of Mandela and Mbeki was driven by market research which showed that black voters were more likely to vote for the DA if they admitted that the ANC had made progress in people’s lives and were less critical of the Mandela and Mbeki eras. It is the only explanation for the DA backtracking on its position towards the ANC after 20 years of criticism. The DA had forgotten its fight against Mbeki over transformation, HIV and Aids, Zimbabwe etc.

However, the campaign carried conflicting messages about the ANC and makes one question whether the party would support an ANC under Mbeki again. Attacking the ANC has proven not to work and the DA has known this for quite some time but by differentiating the Mandela and Mbeki ANC to that of Zuma, it allowed the party to both praise and attack the ANC in its messaging to voters. It is interesting to note that Mazibuko, although mostly absent from the campaign trail for health reasons, did not use the same messaging of positivity towards the ANC. She did however make reference to Zuma’s ANC but this was as far as she went in terms of the messaging on the ANC.
It is worth reiterating Coetzee’s comments from 1999 again at this point. He argued that a softening towards the ANC would be bad for the party because “voters voted for the party because of its tough stance on the ANC and changing this approach would be a betrayal of those voters”. He also made the point that “it is never true that a ruling party will lose votes to an opposition party because the opposition party tempers its criticism”. However, the DA was no longer targeting voters who wanted opposition to the ANC, it was targeting voters who longed for the ANC of old. This theme has become stronger in the party’s communications more recently and will be explored further in the next chapter.

The second instalment in the #Ayisafani series carried a more positive message about the DA also no longer being the same. The message was about bringing change but also about the DA’s growth:

We are growing, we are strong, we can win. Millions of South Africans are uniting behind a party that can bring change. Change that cuts corruption. Change that guarantees free higher education for qualifying matrics. Change that can create 1 million internships. Millions of South Africans are voting for change that will create 6 million real, permanent jobs. You can’t have a better life without a real job.

Although this was a positive message of change, it received far less media coverage than the ANC Ayisafani campaign due to the SABC ban. On YouTube, the ANC Ayisafani video has 821 759 views as opposed to the DA Ayisafani video which has 348 457 at the time of writing. In terms of press coverage, it was predominantly around the SABC ban and censorship of the ANC Ayisafani advert as opposed to the DA message of change.

Believe

The DA focused most of its resources on the Gauteng campaign. This was to be expected as it was aiming to govern the province by the end of the elections. Maimane had been selected as the DA’s candidate for Premier in Gauteng. Davis later said that this position had initially been offered to Mazibuko who had turned it down (Davis, ‘Letter: Setting the record straight’, 13 May 2014). It would have been a clear ‘parachuting’ move if Mazibuko had stood as the candidate as she had no prior connection to Gauteng. Maimane, on the other hand, is from the province and had already campaigned as the party’s mayoral candidate for Johannesburg in 2011 as well as being City of Johannesburg caucus leader.

The campaign fashioned Maimane as the new Obama, complete with imagery similar to that of Obama’s Hope campaign and the repeated use of ‘hope’ and ‘change’ in his speeches. The campaign was launched at a small event in Alexandra at the premises of Mr Mike Modise who had uplifted his community and created jobs with his carwash which set the tone for Maimane’s offer to Gauteng. Maimane embarked on a 6-week Believe Bus Tour with three to four events a day in townships and informal settlements across the province as well as weekly evening events in white, coloured and Indian areas.
Maimane’s speeches drew on his upbringing in Dobsonville, Soweto and how he used to vote for the ANC under Mbeki before realising that the ANC was no longer the same. He was a man of the people and was like the average black voter – grew up under apartheid in a township, parents struggled to make ends meet but he had overcome the barriers of apartheid thanks to the difference which the ANC of old had made. The launch of his campaign was at Walter Sisulu Square, an historically significant venue for its connection to the Freedom Charter, and was called the Believe in Change rally. The speech which he delivered at the launch provides an excellent example of the change in identity for the DA. Maimane talked of a liberation movement that “left its people behind” and his own connection to the liberation movement:

I remember another time when we joined together in a common cause. We were united against the evil system of apartheid that oppressed us.

Times were tough back then but we stuck together.

Our leaders were leaders, but they worked with us. And they led by example.

They led us towards the promise of freedom.

We felt a connection with those great leaders, past and present.

Great men and women like Albert Luthuli, Helen Joseph, Oliver Tambo, Robert Sobukwe, Helen Suzman, Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko. (Maimane, ‘Our destiny is in our hands’, 2 November 2013)

Maimane used ANC veterans and only one of the DA’s founding members was mentioned. The next section begins to refer to ‘us’ which was directed at black South Africans:

They gave us hope that we would change the system that oppressed us.

I grew up not far from here in Dobsonville. We didn’t have much.

But my parents worked hard and they were dedicated to our family. My mother worked as a cashier. My father worked at the local lock making company.

These jobs put food on the table.

My parents made sacrifices so that my brothers, sisters and I could get the education and the opportunities they never had.
What the apartheid system did was wreck the dreams of my parents and the dreams of so many others like them.

And that is why, like everybody on my street, I supported the liberation movement, and voted for the ANC.

Back then, the ANC embodied hope and change. (Maimane, ‘Our destiny is in our hands’, 2 November 2013)

The messaging was a bonding message to black voters. The point about the ANC embodying hope and change was also an important message as Maimane’s campaign was built around offering hope and change – in other words, one can infer that the DA is the new old ANC. Booysen points out that “the DA’s 2014 election campaign depicted the party as more ANC than the ANC originally” (Booysen, 2015: 205).

Maimane continues to outline the positive changes made by the old ANC but then changes tone to discuss how the ANC has changed:

The years have past and times have changed. I find myself wondering what happened to that era of great leadership.

Today, instead of opportunities for all, we only see opportunities for some.

We see a system of insiders and outsiders. People with political connections get rich, and everyone else is left to struggle on their own.

I see people struggling to get jobs.

I see people without access to basic services like electricity and sanitation. And when people exercise their right to protest against their conditions, they are beaten and killed by the police.

I don’t know about you, but this is not the change I wanted to see. (Maimane, ‘Our destiny is in our hands’, 2 November 2013)

The key message comes in the next section of the speech in which he talks about making a different political choice because the ANC has “left us”:

That is why, like so many of you here, and like so many people across this great province, I am making a different political choice.

I am making that choice because I believe in the values of Nelson Mandela – non-racialism, selflessness and opportunities for all.

Some people don’t agree with the choice we are making. They say we are betraying the struggle.

But the people who truly betrayed the struggle are the people who abuse their power to make themselves rich.

You see, we didn’t leave the ANC – the ANC left us.

The ANC left us behind, when all we ever wanted was the chance to get ahead.
That is why we are making a different choice; we are choosing a party that will cut corruption and create jobs.

Our destiny is in our hands. (Maimane, ‘Our destiny is in our hands’, 2 November 2013)

The speech continued to outline a strong message on jobs and change for Gauteng as well as the messaging of Phase Two of the Know Your DA campaign. However, it was not the policy aspects which were of importance in this speech, it was about attracting black voters. Maimane’s appeal in this speech was directed at black voters who felt betrayed and left behind by the ANC. The speech buys into the ANC notion that black South Africans are the ANC and the ANC is black South Africans – a concept which the DP/DA has been fighting against for almost two decades. In previous messaging, both Maimane and Mazibuko have been able to talk about making a different choice politically as a black South African without having to praise the ANC. In 2011, Maimane said the following:

I know that for many of you, making this change will take much courage. On my path to this stage in Soweto, I too have had to face my fears, and confront the criticism of others. But let us not forget that our great nation was forged in the fire of courage.

We need the courage to stand up for the future, and not allow our past to hold us hostage. In the five years since the last local government election, we have seen more dissatisfaction and less delivery, we have seen those in power serving their own interests, rather than serving the interests of the poor. (Maimane, ‘Election 2011: National Campaign Launch Speech’, 26 March 2011)

Mazibuko during an event for the Know Your DA campaign also spoke about her political choice without needing to mention the ANC:

Young people feel and experience the pain of their parents. I know my mother and father suffered during apartheid and worked hard to give me a better life, just as many others worked to give their children the best opportunities they could in the face of unimaginable injustices.

Our mothers, fathers, aunts, uncles and grandparents all faced the indignity of having to use the hated ‘dompas’. They were forced by the Group Areas legislation to live in segregated townships. Even an act as simple as taking us to school every day became a symbol of how determined the apartheid government was to keep black South Africans on the margins of society, denied the ability to make choices about our own lives.

... My mother cared about my future. She wanted me to have a better life. This is my story, and the story of many young, black South Africans whose parents inspired them by living excellent lives in terrible circumstances. This is why I am proud to be a public representative and a leader in the Democratic Alliance (DA) – a party which is committed to ensuring that no parent will ever again have to see their children denied access to the opportunities which will enable them to live lives of their choosing. (Mazibuko, ‘Bringing Know Your DA Campaign Home To Umlazi’, 24 June 2013)

The change which occurred in 2014 was a message to voters that the DA recognised the achievements of the ANC but also that it was equating black voters with ANC voters – a
position which it had argued against in previous years. Maimane’s speech was not directed at other races. The constant use of ‘we’ and ‘us’ was directed specifically at the black target market. Maimane’s speech also provides an example of the type of speech/rhetoric which neither Leon nor Zille could deliver legitimately. With Maimane, the DA could show a more relatable image to black voters. The difference in Maimane’s speeches from previous DA rhetoric in recent years is that this has become a more explicit bonding message as opposed to bridging. As was discussed previously, bonding strategies promote the interests of a particular group and develop “tightly knit social networks and clear one-of-us boundaries” (Norris, 2004). The use of ‘us’ and ‘we’ within the context of Maimane’s speech carried a more explicit bonding message to black voters than to other racial groups. Although Leon often gave implicit bonding messages to minorities around policy issues, this was not done in the explicit form of ‘us’ and ‘we’. The reason for this change is in part racial. The DA could now speak directly to black voters as ‘we’ because of the change in the colour of its leadership.

Results
The DA was unsuccessful in achieving its internal target of 25%, however, it did secure 4 million votes (22.2%) which was an important figure for the party to have achieved. Of particular importance was its growth with black voters:

- We grew our support amongst black South Africans from 0.8% in 2009 to approximately 6% in 2014. 40% of these votes were won in Gauteng.
- Roughly 760 000 black South Africans voted for the DA. This is more than the IFP, NFP, PAC and UCDP combined and more than any other party besides the ANC and EFF. 20% of our votes in this election were cast by black South Africans.
- We grew our support significantly among Indian South Africans (from 53.7% to 61%) and coloured South Africans (55.5% to 67.7%). Our support among white South Africans increased from 83.9% to 92.8%. (Zille, ‘DA’s Growth is a Victory for All South Africans’, 9 May 2014)

Growth in black voters from 0,8% in 2009 to 6% in 2014 showed that the DA’s strategy was working but this was still only an increase of approximately one percentage point of black voters from the 2011 elections16. However, this was still a very small percentage of the black electorate and was almost exclusively from Gauteng. The Gauteng result is significant for the DA if it aims to govern the province in 2019. In Jolobe’s analysis of the DA’s result amongst black voters, he argues that it does not point to any particular region or constituency of black voters and that “this constitutes an important achievement for the party” (Jolobe, 2014: 69). The DA’s ability to grow in the black electoral market election after election is significant in and of itself based on its history and party label, even though the percentages and absolute numbers may be small.

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16 Making a comparison between local and national/provincial elections is difficult as local elections tend to have a lower turnout but it does allow one to gauge levels of support.
3.4.6. Conclusion

The DA went from building a strong DA brand of an alternative government based on the notion of a South African party for all and owning the jobs issue to confusion on its position towards its major opponent, the ANC, and race-based legislation. This confusion, both towards the ANC and the DA’s own principles, would continue after 2014. Although not a direct erosion of the DA’s ideology, its positions leading up to the 2014 elections were certainly an example of placing the ‘right’ message above the party’s line for two decades.

The win in the Western Cape in 2009 secured the DA’s support amongst coloured voters and it could now focus, almost exclusively, on growing its share of the black vote. However, by 2013, the DA began to talk to black voters within the ANC’s paradigm thus enforcing the liberation movement’s message that all black voters are the same and all black voters belonged to the ANC. By the 2014 elections, the DA was no longer telling its story but telling the story of the ANC’s past successes.

The identity crisis during this period was around the old DA (policy-seeking) fighting with the new DA (vote-seeking) and trying to decide what it wanted to look like. Even though the DA was at its most secure position since 1994, the election in 2014 was a make or break situation in terms of its ability to win over black voters and this insecurity led to some questionable positioning – both at the policy and brand level.
3.5. i-DA Ayisafani – 2015 – 2017

3.5.1. Introduction

The DA went from an identity crisis leading up to 2014 to a wholesale identity shift after the 2015 Federal Congress. Everything about the brand was changed from the leader to the Federal Constitution to the twitter handle. This shift was to create a more inclusive identity for the party. However, this inclusion will be argued to have come at the cost of exclusion of its core, traditional supporters and its principles.

The post-2014 period saw the DA becoming purely vote-seeking. The battle between the policy-seeking and vote-seeking identities, which began in the lead up to the 2014 elections, was evident in the leadership battle between Wilmot James and Mmusi Maimane to replace Helen Zille as Federal Leader as well as the contestation around the DA’s values at the Federal Congress in 2015. The result of the Federal Congress was a win for the vote-seeking side and resulted in the DA’s new identity.

The latest rebranding of the DA provided the electorate with a new vision through its Values Charter. Whilst the DA had a rebranding in 2008, it kept its principles and policies from previous years. The “reframing” in 2015 was more than a logo and slogan change, it has seen the DA adapt its approach from focusing on policy to focusing on the message.

The narrative around the DA’s leadership has always been that the party would fare better in elections and be seen more positively if it had a black leader. In 2015, Maimane was elected as the DA’s Federal Leader. His election was an historic moment for the DA and signalled to voters that it was really no longer the same. Based on the assumption of the abovementioned narrative, the DA should have done considerably better in the 2016 elections than was the case. As will be discussed, it only managed to make very small inroads in the black township areas which were a strong focus for the DA at the time.

This period has also seen a stronger focus on race within the DA. Maimane’s brand has been racial and he sees race as an important talking point. This has resulted in the party focusing on race both internally and externally.

This chapter will examine the conflict between the policy-seeking and vote-seeking elements in the DA. It will begin with a brief summary of the political context and how the media treats the DA as this has both changed and remained the same. This will be followed by a discussion on the DA’s ‘Values’ Congress in 2015. As the DA has seemed to have stepped away from its previous strategy, the DA’s messaging and operationalisation will be discussed. It will go on to examine the major issues during Maimane’s first two years in office – race in the party, the 2016 elections and brand damage. The final section discusses the current state of the party in terms of its market and organisation.
3.5.2. Political context

Although the ANC managed to remain in the majority after the 2014 elections, it lost power in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in the 2016 local government elections. The political discourse during this period has been dominated by ANC scandals and state capture with various civil society and opposition movements coming together to protest the current state of the ANC. The DA no longer engages the ANC in policy debate but has continued its lawfare project as well as several motions of no confidence in Parliament in order to remove Jacob Zuma as president of the country.

Media Context

It is worth examining the media context again at this point in the DA’s history and to reiterate the importance of the media for a political party. The media plays a vital role in determining what information is provided to voters outside of a party’s direct communications. Despite the DA’s growth, the party as an organisation has still not received much interrogation and there remains little understanding amongst journalists and analysts of how the party operates. Aside from press conferences, campaign events, and the occasional internal leak from Federal meetings, the media still does not proactively produce analysis on the DA. The exceptions are Gareth van Onselen who writes for the Business Day and is a former DA staff member, and Eusebius McKaiser who is a radio talk show host and columnist as well as the author of Could I Vote DA?. Whilst van Onselen’s analysis is often criticised by DA members (Zille having been the most vocal) as his having an ‘axe to grind’, he provides analysis on the DA’s organisational and ideological dynamics from a former insider’s perspective. McKaiser has not grasped the party’s organisational behaviour fully but does interrogate the DA’s ideological and policy positions. The fact that other journalists are not doing this, is problematic. The DA has recently been proactive in gaining media attention by holding press conferences after Federal Executive and Council meetings. The ANC has been doing this for years and it is perhaps part of a new strategy from the DA to be more open to the media on its internal processes.

There are three recent examples in the press which illustrate the context within which the DA operates. The first occurred shortly after Maimane’s election as leader of the party. In an article written by a former DA staff member, Nelly Shamase, and former editor-in-chief of the Mail & Guardian, Verashni Pillay, the paper alleged that Maimane had been taking leadership lessons from FW de Klerk. This forwarded a certain narrative about the new black leader of the DA requiring support from the former apartheid president. Both Maimane and de Klerk rubbed the allegations despite Pillay defending the story, the Mail & Guardian was forced to apologise in the end for a false report.

The second is a blog post on the Huffington Post SA website by former journalist Sipho Hlongwane. In it, he opens the discussion by stating the following:

It is quite something to delve into the Democratic Alliance policy documents and to read an unfiltered account of where the official opposition stands on various issues. One of these is the
social safety net programme, or the welfare programme. Unlike some of the social media outbursts from the more tempestuous corners of the party, the official policy is full support for the programme. (Hlongwane, ‘How The ANC Lost The 2019 National Elections’, 9 March 2017)

Hlongwane is a seasoned journalist, he has previously worked for the Mail & Guardian and the Daily Maverick. This is the second time that he has pointed out the difference between assumptions made based on individuals within the DA and the DA’s actual policy. This is indicative of a lack of interrogation by the media on what the DA’s actual policy positions are.

The third example was pointed out by van Onselen in an opinion piece on the Save SA movement and how the South African public discourse remains within the ANC paradigm. He cites the example of Stephen Grootes’s account of the cabinet reshuffle which occurred in 2017:

Here is an anecdote to illustrate the kind of subconscious influence the ANC wields: a “notebook” account of how one reporter found out and reacted to the news President Jacob Zuma had reshuffled his Cabinet (Reporter’s Notebook: The Day South Africa woke-up)

It is a remarkable read, for it reveals in the heat of the moment not once did it occur to him to turn to the official opposition for a response.

Here is how he describes his initial reaction:

"Sipho Pityana, phone off. Gwede Mantashe (uhm, gulp), just ringing. Solly Mapaila, no answer, Derek Hanekom, no joy. Thank God for Azar Jammie, all friendly and courteous even at that time."

Save SA, the ANC, the SACP and an economic analyst.

The reporter is entirely unaware of this of course, or he would not have published the article, but there is one small question: where is Mmusi Maimane on that list? (van Onselen, ‘Today we are all Team ANC’, 3 April 2017)

In a functioning democracy which takes the opposition seriously, the first phone call a journalist might be expected to make to get comment on something as major as a cabinet reshuffle is to the Official Opposition. The first phone call which Grootes made was to Save SA – a movement which developed in 2016, is led by former ANC heavyweights and has no political standing.

The three examples illustrate three problems which the DA faces. The first is that even though it now has a black leader, Maimane’s leadership is often questioned because he is simultaneously black and leader of the DA. The second is that very little is known of actual DA policy positions. The third is that despite the DA’s position, it is not the ANC or linked to the ANC and so it is not taken seriously on matters of national importance.

When asked whether the situation with the media had improved since the mid-2000s, Selfe responded that if anything, it had become even worse. He pointed to a recent newspaper
headline in the Cape Times which read ‘Zille charged with racism’ and said it was just blatantly “untrue”. Selfe also said that “nowadays much of what is contained in, certainly the English-speaking newspapers, is complete crap” (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017). Boughey articulated the situation with the media differently:

I think the South African media landscape has become unrecognisable in the sense from what it was a few years ago. Clearly there are certain players in the market as epitomised by ANN7 or the New Age which are quite clearly ANC mouthpieces. I think there’s a begrudging recognition from, let’s put it, the more mainstream media that the DA is now a serious alternative. There is still, I would suggest, a double standard at play that sometimes in seeking a kind of so-called balance or moral equivalence there will be a desire to jump on issues related to the DA to kind of create that sense of balance in light of the fact that the ANC virtually every day is inundated with scandal after scandal and so very often you get the proverbial storm in a teacup becoming completely amplified and misread, I think, in that desire to try and create some sort of balance. (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017)

He continued by saying that even though double standards apply to the DA, “in a sense it’s fine” because the party does hold itself to a much higher standard than the ANC but that it is still an “annoyance” (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017). Boughey also provided an interesting take on commentators and analysts:

it’s a point that has been made before, which is that very often political commentators and analysts, of which there are varying degrees, are invariably an election cycle behind where the voters are at. I’m always bemused because there’s no...in fact I can think of hardly any who make these assertions based on any actual understanding of the electoral marketplace. They don’t look at opinion data. They don’t look at survey data and they project what is their own personal (view) towards a particular party as opposed to, supposedly, an analysis. (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017)

Boughey goes on to cite the “kind of chorus call ‘well the DA’s reached its ceiling’” that occurs every election despite the fact that the DA grows by about a million votes each election. Boughey also said that “by definition, that growth has to come from across the racial spectrum so I would take that set [commentators and analysts] with a massive pinch of salt because they get proved wrong every time” (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017). This is an interesting and important point to make because it speaks to the type of environment within which the DA is operating in. The South African political market (media, analysts etc.) is less sophisticated than mature democracies which regularly use opinion polls. Political commentators and analysts have also solely focused analysis on the workings of the ANC and have very little understanding or experience of a competitive political market which is only just starting to become a feature in South African politics.

3.5.3. The ‘Values’ Congress

The DA’s Federal Congress in 2015 was potentially the most contested congress in the party’s recent history. Firstly, the DA had begun preparations for a new Values Charter and the Vision 2029 campaign by February 2015 which would be rolled out after the Federal Congress. Secondly, Zille had quite suddenly decided to step down as Federal Leader (a year
before a very important municipal election) which opened up the DA to have a new leader who would, ideally, be black.

Values Charter and Vision 2029
Based on previous post-election behaviour by the party, the design of the Values Charter and Vision 2029 must have begun shortly after the 2014 election when the DA would have undertaken an assessment of its way forward. In a presentation sent to structures in March 2015 titled Reframing the DA: Vision 2029 and Values Charter, the DA outlines the reasons for the change as the following:

- The DA is currently in a very exciting phase of discussion on two documents which are of significance to the future of the Party.
- These documents are aimed at ensuring that we build on our electoral success in the 2014 Election.
- The Party has many noteworthy strengths, but an area that can still be improved upon is making sure the DA’s offer more directly intersects with the values, needs and desires of voters.
- In order to address this need, we need to focus on ensuring that:
  - Voters have a clear idea of why we do what we do, and what we want South Africa to become;
  - A coherent narrative about who we are; and
  - A clear sense of our purpose and vision. (Democratic Alliance, Reframing the DA: Vision 2029 and Values Charter, 2015)

This would require a different articulation of the Open, Opportunity Society for All:

- We need to take our philosophical underpinnings – the open, opportunity society for all – and define them in basic-level, value-laden concepts so that they can be understood by all and applied consistently in all our communications.
- Values in simple terms can be understood as emotion-laden beliefs about how things should or shouldn’t be.
- This will help the DA create our own political space and our own language, allowing us in turn to frame ourselves in an even more positive and proactive way.
- Speaking in shared values talks to the hearts of voters and connects with them emotionally. The emotional connection is critical to building trust, and trust is essential to shift voter support to the DA. (Democratic Alliance, Reframing the DA: Vision 2029 and Values Charter, 2015)

In terms of the process for adoption, these documents were accepted – unchanged – from the initial drafts in March 2015 at the Federal Congress in May that year. Although the Values Charter was circulated around the party for discussion and input prior to the Federal Congress, it still required debate and adoption at the Federal Congress. As van Onselen pointed out at the time, the Values Charter appeared in all the Sunday newspapers on the
day it was adopted at the Federal Congress. Therefore, it can be argued that there was no consideration of party member inputs as to whether it should be adopted; the adoption was guaranteed by the leadership. This fits with Wolinetz’s typology of a vote-seeking party which keeps policy decisions and debate at a leadership level.

At the time of the introduction of the Values Charter, then Chief Whip and head of Maimane’s campaign for leader, John Steenhuisen, stated that the Values Charter was “Zille’s legacy” to the DA. When asked who was behind the drafting of the Values Charter, however, Boughey said that it was not Zille and that it was the operational strategic team - working very closely with Selfe and Maimane – that created the Values Charter. He further stated that “this is a document that goes hand in hand with Mmusi’s leadership” (interview with P. Boughey, 2017). The change in ownership of the Values Charter is significant as it formed part of the DA’s new identity with Maimane. The interview was also conducted during Zille’s disciplinary proceedings and the change in ownership could be attributed to the DA no longer wishing its Values Charter to be linked with Zille.

The DA’s website states: “Our vision is underpinned by the concept of the Open Opportunity Society for All as well as the DA Values Charter” (emphasis added). The two are separate ideas (if one looks at the role of the individual and the family) which the party is trying to maintain at the same time, possibly to maintain internal cohesion too. Selfe said that the purpose for maintaining both was to unpack the open opportunity society for all concept in language which most South African voters would understand (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017).

Leadership Battle
Zille’s decision to step down as leader in 2015 was unexpected. As was the case with Leon’s decision to step down, one can assume that strategists within the DA approached Zille in the same manner as Coetzee had approached Leon about the future of the party. According to Zille’s account, she decided that to have herself as leader and a white man (Athol Trollip) as Federal Chairperson would not present the right racial profile for the DA and would “be welcome grist to the ANC’s race mill” (Zille, 2016: 467).

The leadership battle for the party provides the perfect metaphor for its competing identities – policy or votes. Wilmot James was a policy man and Maimane was the vote-winner. James had been the DA’s Federal Chairperson since 2012 and had designed and co-authored many of the DA’s policies leading up to the 2014 elections. However, he did not have the same public profile or oratory skills as Zille, Maimane and Mazibuko. Maimane on the other hand did have a very prominent public profile and was seen as a charismatic leader. In terms of policy and vision, Maimane was not nearly as strong as James. It was believed at the time that James was running as a placeholder until Mazibuko returned from Harvard. In the lead up to the Federal Congress, McKaiser conducted interviews with both candidates and concluded that whilst Maimane had the charm, James was stronger on policy and McKaiser questions what would happen if Mazibuko decided to challenge for the
position in future. He wrote that “After all, Mazibuko is both charismatic, like Maimane, and analytic, like James” (McKaiser, ‘DA’s James playing a losing game’, 6 May 2015). As is becoming evident in Maimane’s leadership, he was not chosen for his analytic or policy skills but for his people skills and his leadership has been geared towards building the grassroots level of the party.

It was an uncommonly ‘nasty’ leadership battle between James and Maimane, perhaps another sign of a deepening divide between the policy and vote-seeking identities within the party. As Jan-Jan Joubert wrote at the time:

> Whoever is elected to leadership positions today will have a huge task to heal the wounds left by three weeks of division, personal attacks, nasty emails filled with sex-related accusations, and the adoption of a values charter that has left many liberal DA supporters uncomfortable amid signs of policy drift. (Sunday Times, ‘Take Me For Your Leader’, 10 May 2015)

Maimane’s team was led by Zille’s former chief of staff, Geordin Hill-Lewis, the then executive director for communications (and MP), Gavin Davis, as well as the DA’s new Chief Whip under Maimane, John Steenhuisen. James’s team was headed up by David Maynier, a former staff member in Leon’s office and former advisor to Mazibuko. Although on the surface this appears to be a factional battle, it goes deeper and was arguably a battle between those who are more concerned with winning votes through messaging as opposed to those who believe in winning through a substantive vision and policy platform.

3.5.4. 2016 elections
The DA ran the 2016 election campaign as a national referendum on Zuma’s leadership even though it was a municipal election. Its focus areas were the key metros with the belief that it would win Nelson Mandela Bay outright and be able to form coalitions in Tshwane and, possibly, Johannesburg.

Candidates
Once again the DA was able to run a diverse set of leadership candidates. In Tshwane, it selected long-time party member and public representative Solly Msimanga. In Johannesburg, the more controversial, newly-DA Herman Mashaba was selected and in Nelson Mandela Bay, it selected Athol Trollip (white but fluent in isiXhosa). Patricia de Lille was once again selected as the mayoral candidate for Cape Town.

Messaging
The DA carried a message of ‘change’ again for the 2016 municipal elections in areas where it did not already govern and ‘keep making progress’ for areas where the DA was in government. This included three additional messages: stop corruption; better services; and create jobs.

However, it also ran with the message “Honour Madiba’s Dream”. The election video, “Honour Madiba’s dream” devotes more time to talking about race, diversity and unity than
it does to delivering services. For a municipal election the standard message would normally be expected to be around delivering services as that is what local elections are supposed to be about but as was mentioned before, the DA treated this as a referendum on Zuma’s leadership. Philip de Wet points out how much attention the DA paid to the ANC during this election:

The ANC, said DA spokesperson Phumzile van Damme in a curtain-raiser speech before Maimane, “spent the entire election campaign talking about Mmusi Maimane because they have nothing to offer”.

Maimane himself spent much of his 35-minute speech arguing against a loyalty vote for the ANC.

“In a democracy you don’t need to be loyal to one party forever,” he told the crowd.

“A vote is not a tattoo, it is not something everybody can see. It is your secret.”

“You don’t have to pledge your lifelong allegiance to any party,” he said.

Maimane quoted Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani and Nelson Mandela, sticking closely to the party’s “do it for Madiba” message throughout. He also invoked the memory of Helen Suzman, but steered well clear of any reference to his party’s recent past leadership. (Mail & Guardian, ‘Mmusi Maimane gets personal as DA launches the final weekend of election rallies’, 30 July 2016)

The DA’s message was more focused on Mandela and the current ANC than on the party’s own delivery record – in stark contrast to its 2011 campaign. It also included the phrase “We, the DA, the movement for change”. This is not the first time that the DA has used the word ‘movement’ but in this context with the use of the liberation movement’s Madiba, the connotation is that it is equating itself with a new liberation movement.

Campaign
The DA ran its largest registration campaign ever during this election (Maimane, ‘Register to Win in 2016’, 15 January 2016). The DA historically does better in municipal elections due to its ability to get its potential voters to register and so the registration campaign was vital.

An interesting factor for this election campaign was that it used Tony Leon to shore up support in its traditional base for the first time since he left the party. Leon spoke in Houghton, Chatsworth in Durban and Cape Town. Leon said that the reason for his involvement in this campaign was that he had a better relationship with Maimane than with Zille (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). I attended the Houghton event where Leon was doing an introductory speech for Mashaba. Houghton is an important suburb in the DA’s history as it was Suzman’s seat until Leon took over in 1989. The venue was packed, predominantly with what could be termed old Prog/DP supporters. If the DA’s intention was to get its core reengaged in politics then Leon was arguably an excellent choice for doing this as he clearly still pulls a crowd.
DA growth
Even though the DA managed to win expanded vote shares in the various metros which it now governs in coalition with other parties, the growth in the black vote for the DA was not significant. At the time of the elections, News24 analyst Dawie Scholtz (a former DA staff member) broke down the figures in Gauteng’s townships across the three major parties. In Tshwane, the DA’s growth ranged between 3% and 8% but in Johannesburg, this was considerably smaller with growth only between 0.7% and 2% (Scholtz, August 2017). There were the additional factors of the EFF and lower turnout in 2016 which could have affected the DA’s vote share. However, it has long been believed (both internally and externally) that what was holding the DA back was the fact that it did not have a black leader. The 2016 campaign had a black leader in Maimane at the national level as well as two black mayoral candidates in Gauteng. This raises questions about whether the argument that the DA requires a black leader for electoral growth holds any water.

3.5.5. Message over Policy
Since 2015, the DA has provided the electorate with various messages. The first was Vision 2029 in 2015 which was followed by Road to 2019 in 2016 then the Rescue Mission for a Lost Generation in 2017 and most recently, what could be called Realignment 4.0. None of these messages seem to be centred around a policy platform as yet. The DA has previously been very strong on policy and often centred its campaigns around a policy platform whether it has been with regards to the Basic Income Grant or the second phase of its Know Your DA campaign. One of the overarching messages has been about Zuma’s ANC and even this message has changed direction. The following will look at each of the messages which were conveyed before providing an explanation for the shift from two of the DA’s central figures – Selfe and Boughey.

Vision 2029
Shortly after the Federal Congress in 2015, the DA launched Vision 2029 with the promise of new policies. It was a branding exercise with little substance attached to it. The launch of Vision 2029 was centred around two videos depicting what South Africa would look like under a DA government. In his speech launching Vision 2029, Maimane said the following:

We will take our vision for South Africa to all corners of this great country so that more and more South Africans can unite behind the party that can build a better future for our children.

And we will unpack in detail the policies that we will implement to make our vision a reality when we are in national government.

Policies to get our economy growing and more inclusive. Policies focusing on land reform and BBB-EE. Policies that will make our country safer. Policies that will give our children the best possible start in life. (Maimane, ‘A future built on Freedom, Fairness and Opportunity’, 13 June 2015)

After the launch, Greg Nicolson from the Daily Maverick made the following point:
Until the details are available, Vision 2029 recognises a future many people aspire to but fails to articulate how it will be achieved or how the DA is best placed to deliver a better future compared to other political parties. For now, it’s hype searching for substance. (Daily Maverick, ‘DA Vision 2029: Imagine there’s no ANC in power? It’s easy, if you’re Mmusi Maimane’, 15 June 2015)

Two years later, the full policy platform has yet to materialise. To date, the party has released the following new policies: Vision 2029: Maximising Service Delivery by Minimising Government; Vision for a Fair South Africa; and Our Health Plan. The DA typically conducts a policy review process ahead of a national election so it is not completely unusual for it not to present a new policy programme a year after the 2014 elections. However, this was what Maimane had promised at the launch and would have fit into the DA’s narrative of a new beginning. Vision 2029 was an attempt at creating a new identity which was not backed up by any substantive policy change or programme. The rebranding exercise of 2008 at least tied in with the DA’s policy roll-out ahead of the 2009 elections and so the DA could legitimately say that it was proposing alternative policies. As Zille said back in 2008 regarding the relaunch, this was not a marketing exercise. The rebrand to Vision 2029, however, appears to have been just that. The rebrand was based on an image as opposed to a new policy offer for the DA which points more towards a market-orientation.

According to Selfe, Vision 2029 was not intended to be a new policy suite but rather “trying to show what a DA society would look like in emotive terms rather than just giving words in some sort of policy manifesto” (Interview with J. Selfe, 2017).

Road to 2019
The messaging of Vision 2029 was then replaced by the DA’s Road to 2019. After a meeting of the Federal Executive in September/October 2016, Maimane outlined changes which the DA would be making:

Our “Road to 2019” campaign consists of a long term, comprehensive plan of action to achieve our goal of being part of a national government in 2019.

FedEx also resolved that a “country recovery plan” be developed for South Africa, which will act as a blueprint for governance in 2019. The party will also undergo a comprehensive policy review and update to ensure that our policies reflect the latest in global evidence-based best practice. Our policy will remain focused on kickstarting economic growth to create jobs, rooting out corruption, and expanding opportunities for the poor and unemployed. Should a new government be formed post-election 2019, we need to be able to hit the ground running with a clear, sensible plan that delivers the right outcomes. (Maimane, ‘Road to 2019 starts today’, 1 October 2016)

Once again, the DA promised a policy review. The Road to 2019 has now become a regular message within the DA’s communication.
Rescue Mission for a Lost Generation

The DA launched its Rescue Mission for a Lost Generation campaign in February 2017 which forms part of the Road to 2019. However, once again, it promised a new policy platform as opposed to presenting one:

Together with the young people of this country we will build a brand new policy platform – a Rescue Plan for this lost generation.

Freedom, fairness and opportunity will be at the heart of this plan. A policy package that puts each young person at the centre of their own development, a master of their own destiny.

It was once again a marketing exercise as it took place just before the State of the Nation Address (SONA) in 2017 and served as the DA’s alternative SONA but was not backed by substantive policies. The rescue mission for a lost generation message has since been dropped from the party’s communications.

Realignment 4.0

As part of the Road to 2019 (or what is now marketed as #Change19), the DA dusted off the realignment narrative again. In a speech titled ‘The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa’, Maimane used the message of the “death of a once proud liberation movement” and again a positive message about the previous ANC. It should be noted that the DA by this point had rethought its stance towards Mbeki’s ANC as he is no longer mentioned in speeches on the liberation movement. Instead the DA now uses Mothlanthe and makes reference to the Arms Deal and Aids denialism:

As ANC Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe said back in 2007:

“This rot is across the board. It’s not confined to any level or any area of the country. Almost every project is conceived because it offers opportunities for certain people to make money.

A great deal of the ANC’s problems are occasioned by this. There are people who want to take it over so they can arrange for the appointment of those who will allow them possibilities for future accumulation.”

The Arms Deal, Aids denialism and, later, Nkandla and the Guptas would become the party’s defining moments. (Maimane, ‘The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa’, 16 May 2017)

The main purpose of the speech was to get South Africans to think of a post-ANC South Africa:

The ANC has become an obstacle to our progress, and we need to start visualising our future without it.

We need to start speaking of a vision of South Africa that isn’t weighed down by baggage and bled dry by corruption.

We need to look towards a post-ANC South Africa.
Because it would be a mistake to think that Jacob Zuma is a rogue element in the ANC.

It would be a mistake to think that the last remaining good guys in the ANC can change a culture of corruption that has become endemic to the party.

It would be a mistake to think that the ANC can self-correct.

If we want to save ourselves – if we want to limit the damage and rebuild this country for our children and theirs – then we need to start thinking differently.

We have to start thinking of a post-ANC South Africa, and how this South Africa can look and work. (Maimane, ‘The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa’, 16 May 2017)

Maimane delivered the latest in the DA’s realignment message and stated that “our future depends on our ability to realign our politics around a set of values instead of race” and that this would require a “commitment to certain non-negotiable values” (Maimane, The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa, 16 May 2017). Maimane pointed to the successful DA-led coalitions currently operating and said that if coalitions can work at a municipal level then they can work at a national level too.

At the same time, Maimane was not just calling for coalitions, he was also calling parties to join together and, for the first time, this realignment was extended to members of the ANC:

I am prepared to work with all parties that share this goal.

This includes those good people remaining in the ANC who have been moved by recent events to speak out about what is happening in their party.

Today, I extend a hand of friendship to all of them. I want them to know that we are open to working with them in the future, in a new and realigned political landscape. (Maimane, ‘The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa’, 16 May 2017)

By following the pattern of the DA’s previous incarnations and merger attempts, the likelihood of another merger or alliance is strong. The process begins with a landmark speech or press statement, such as Leon’s in 2000 and Zille in 2010 and 2012, which outlines the importance of realignment or opposition cooperation and is then followed by a merger. If Maimane is following a similar pattern to in the past then there is a strong likelihood that the DA is already in discussions for a merger or cooperation agreement. If the DA is not in discussions with other parties then this would be running counter to the DA’s previous behaviour and suggests that it is using the message without any substance behind it.

Pro-poor and pro-black
Towards the end of 2017, the DA began to provide some detail of future policies. This included a “job-seeker’s allowance” and doubling social grants for children to cover their nutritional needs. Once again, without the full policy it is difficult to determine what impact these new policies have on the party’s identity. However, in an interview with the Mail & Guardian discussing the new policies Maimane made two controversial statements. The first was: “I’m working hard to change the DA. We are a party that’s changing and is committed
to bringing new beginnings for all South Africans. Too many times we talk about the rich,” and went on to say that “it must be the poor’s turn to eat” (Mail & Guardian, ‘DA shifts its focus to the poor’, 20 October 2017). Maimane made these statements in outlining how the DA’s new direction is pro-poor. As has been detailed elsewhere, the DA has advocated what it has termed pro-poor policies for most of its history and it is unclear from a reading of the DA’s statements when it has talked about the rich at the expense of addressing poverty and unemployment. The second controversial statement was that “We’ve maintained that affirmative action works this way: if there are two candidates of different races and they appear for the job, pick the black one” (Mail & Guardian, ‘DA shifts its focus to the poor’, 20 October 2017). This is an incorrect articulation of the DA’s position in the past – racial preference applies in the case when candidates are equally qualified. Maimane’s statements are a market-oriented move by providing the electorate and analysts with a false impression that the DA is changing from a pro-wealthy, elite, white position to a pro-poor and pro-black position as opposed to trying to convince voters that the party has always been pro-poor and ‘pro-black’.

No longer a ‘policy wonk’

There is no doubt that the DA is working on a policy platform ahead of the 2019 elections, this is not the issue in terms of its adaptation. The difference between the DA of the past and the DA in 2017 is that it has yet to do a campaign around specific policy proposals ahead of 2019. Leading up to the 2004 elections, there was the Basic Income Grant campaign and Crime campaign. The party released 30 policy documents and position papers in the lead up to 2009. Ahead of 2014, there was the Jobs and Growth campaign in 2012 as well as the Know Your DA campaign on BEE, social grants and land reform in 2013. Despite announcing policy platforms several times, the policy proposals have not been forthcoming. An aspect of the DA’s identity has been its strong policy focus and this has been replaced by a message focus but this is likely to change in the run up to the 2019 elections once the party releases its new policy platform.

As a way of explanation and indication of its adaptation are discussions with Boughey and Selfe. Both made reference to the fact that the DA was no longer a ‘policy wonk’. Boughey provides an explanation as follows:

The challenge for any political party is to take your principles and positions and communicate them in a way that resonates and has emotional appeal and is accessible. That is why there might be a perceived shift that in terms of the way we present our alternatives is not necessarily going to be a wonkish policy presentation because nobody really pays attention to that. But they do pay attention to what do you stand for and how does that impact on people’s day-to-day lives. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

As Boughey points out in the interview the challenge which modern political parties are facing is that voters are less interested in policy and more interested in values and what a party stands for.
As a way of determining whether this leaves the DA as a sales-oriented or market-oriented party, Boughey was asked how important opinion polls and focus groups are in determining the party’s message. The response was in one sense market-oriented but also remained sales-oriented. Boughey said:

We put a lot effort and resources into understanding the electoral market which in the South African context is a complex one, it is just the nature of our society and our history. So we put a lot of effort into understanding what the needs and aspirations of South Africans are from all backgrounds and that helps inform our positioning. But at all times it does not determine our principled position on matters but it does strategically guide us as to matters of emphasis and how to make sure that we package our alternative in a way that is both accessible and relevant to the people that we are trying to reach. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

The DA’s position is therefore informed by voters but at the same time, voters do not determine its position on matters of principle. In this way, it would still consider itself sales-oriented. However, the DA is still packaging its alternative according to voters’ views (market-oriented) as opposed to convincing them of the package (sales-oriented). It is difficult to determine the full extent of the shift without the policy platform.

3.5.6. Race Talk
Race and reconciliation have become central factors in many of Maimane’s speeches and public communication. In his acceptance speech as Federal Leader he stated: “If you do not see me as black, then you do not see me”. The previous Federal Leaders of the DA have never been able to discuss their race in this way, for obvious reasons. However, Maimane has not only been talking about his race but talking about racial politics in a broader sense and within the party. The talk about his race could be seen as part of a tendency towards racial/identity politics.

The most significant of these race discussions was his race speech in 2016. The following will examine that speech, as well as Mazibuko’s reaction as she provides an important input on the DA’s internal organisational dynamics.

The Race Speech
In December 2015, the DA was linked to two high-profile racist incidents. The first was the case of Penny Sparrow (a card-carrying DA member) whose racist Facebook comments about Durban’s beachfront over the December holiday period made front page news. The second involved MP Dianne Kohler Barnard who shared a post on Facebook which said that life was better under apartheid. Maimane came under pressure to address both the Sparrow and Kohler Barnard incidents. The result of this public pressure was Maimane’s second ‘important’ race speech (he had already delivered a similar speech in 2014 during his Believe campaign). Maimane talks about how “we – as black South Africans – are still made to feel inferior because of the colour of our skin. And this inferiority complex runs deep”. He went on to say that: “All South Africans – black and white – must talk about the persistence of racialised inequality twenty years after the end of Apartheid”. Maimane used a mix of
bonding and bridging messages in the speech. But the problematic section in terms of his message was the following:

As black South Africans, we are entitled to ask uncomfortable questions.

We are entitled to ask why a black child is 100 times more likely than a white child to grow up in poverty.

We are entitled to ask why a white learner is six times more likely to get into university than a black learner.

We are entitled to ask why the unemployment level of young black South Africans is well over 60%. (Maimane, ‘Let’s find each other again’, 19 January 2016)

An arguably more neutral message, and one which would have been less exclusive in its messaging, would have been to say ‘as South Africans, we are entitled to ask uncomfortable questions etc.’. This would be a more inclusive approach to reconciliation and race. As a white, coloured or Indian South African, one should be asking these uncomfortable questions too. However, Maimane’s message serves to give expression to black voters concerns which is important for the DA to achieve. Maimane’s project of reconciliation is important but should be balanced towards getting all South Africans to be concerned about these matters too if it were targeting all South Africans as opposed to resorting to identity politics. In using bonding discourse, he furthers the separation of voters into racial groups as opposed to building an inclusive South African identity.

The key aspect of Maimane’s speech, however, were the various steps which he and the DA would be taking to address racism and diversity. The first was an antiracism pledge which each party member would be required to sign and they would have their membership revoked if they were found to be in violation of the oath which reads as follows:

I pledge to uphold the values of the Constitution, to cherish its vision for a united, non-racial, democratic South Africa, and to nourish this vision in my personal conduct.

I acknowledge that Apartheid was an evil system, and recognise that its legacy remains reflected in the unequal structure of South African society today.

I reject discrimination in all its forms, and pledge to help root it out wherever I encounter it in South Africa.

I will not perpetuate racial division, and will never undermine the dignity of my fellow South Africans.

Instead, I will commit myself to working to overcome inequality and achieving shared prosperity. (Maimane, ‘Let’s find each other again’, 19 January 2016)

The anti-racism pledge is akin to the Labour Party’s inclusion of Clause IV on its membership cards. Maimane also committed to a series of race dialogues called ‘Stand Up, Speak Out’ which would not be conducted under a party political banner. A week after his race speech, he announced the launch of these dialogues which were “to give a voice to South Africans,
and to discuss how we can confront the evil of racism and move forwards towards the united, non-racial South Africa described in our Constitution” (Maimane, ‘Let’s find each other again’, 19 January 2016). Maimane approached various civil society organisations to conduct these dialogues as well as multi-racial families, “a sub-set of people who frequently are the victims of racism” in order to “discuss their experiences of racism and how they deal with racial identity in their families” (Maimane, ‘Let’s find each other again’, 19 January 2016). Further to those outside of the DA, Maimane said that:

In addition to these external dialogues, I have also initiated platforms for dialogue within the Democratic Alliance.

The DA is already the most diverse party in South Africa’s history, but we still have some way to go. I will therefore also be hosting Stand Up, Speak Out sessions in all of our provinces, with public representatives and activists, with a focus on shifting the culture of the DA towards even greater inclusion and diversity. (Maimane, ‘Maimane launches Stand Up, Speak Out initiative’, 29 January 2016)

This was not new for the DA. In a project spearheaded by the Gauteng leadership, the Gauteng regions were approached in 2015 to conduct dialogues about race and the DA. The project was apparently halted at the Federal level. There is no evidence of the ‘Stand Up, Speak Out’ dialogues having occurred.

One of the announcements made in Maimane’s race speech was that the DA would be setting targets to create a more diverse party:

We must continue to embrace the rich diversity of South Africa – with all its challenges and contradictions. If we do not, we will not be able to have an honest conversation about our divided past, nor will we be in a position to craft our shared future.

And so, from today, I will require our structures, at constituency, regional and provincial levels, to set targets for the recruitment and development of candidates for public office. These targets, and the progress made towards achieving them, will be reviewed regularly by the Federal Executive.

My objective is to ensure that, by 2019, our parliamentary and legislature caucuses, and our decision-making structures at all levels, reflect the diversity of our complex society. And we will do it without resorting to dehumanising quotas that reduce human beings to statistics. (Maimane, ‘Let’s find each other again’, 19 Jan 2016)

However, this was neither ground-breaking nor particularly new for the party except that it was now being stated publicly by the first black Federal Leader. The fact that in 2016, Maimane was having to repeat the target-setting programme for diversity suggests that the DA has been unable to diversify sufficiently over the last decade. In order to ensure that this is achieved, targets for new candidates have been included in the professional development management system (PDMS) for public representatives. As part of the Road to 2019 press conference, Maimane announced that:
FedEx also considered the overall diversification of the party, a primary strategic objective for the DA ahead of 2019. It is vitally important to give effect to the objectives and commitments set out in the race speech I delivered earlier this year.

In the coming months, the party will finalise a diversity plan that will require DA structures – from branch level to national level – to set targets for the recruitment and development of excellent black candidates for public office. These targets, and the progress made towards achieving them, will be reviewed regularly by FedEx. (Maimane, ’Road to 2019 starts today’, 1 October 2016)

Of interest from this Federal Executive meeting is that the diversity programme had changed from setting “targets for the recruitment and development of candidates for public office” (January 2016) to the more explicit setting “targets for the recruitment and development of excellent black candidates for public office” (October 2016). This is less diversity and more clearly a race-specific target. Selfe said:

> there are many people who believe that attracting young, vibrant, black public representatives will challenge their own positions. So there’s the inbuilt resistance to it so that is why in the new PDMS form there is a section there on people you’ve recruited, leadership people, and you will get marked on it. So there’s an incentive now for people to go out and to find candidates and train them up within the party. (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017)

Selfe was asked why there was a new distinction between Maimane’s statements from ‘diverse’ to ‘black’:

> I’m not sure that you can draw this distinction in our circumstances because even on those forms we’re not making a distinction between black, white, coloured or Indian. We’re just saying that we need to go and attract people [that are] excellent, diverse candidates. (Interview with J. Selfe, 6 April 2017)

So although the targets were for black candidates, the PDMS forms would not require race classification.

Maimane’s speech discussed race in broad ‘values’ terms as opposed to specific public policy initiatives around race-based legislation.

In response to this speech, Mazibuko wrote an important opinion piece on the internal dynamics of race in the DA. Whilst applauding Maimane’s initiatives, she also said:

> But a shift in the thinking of leaders alone does not amount to leadership unless it is carried through to the entire organisation — from its public representatives and staff to its rank-and-file party membership. (Mazibuko, ‘Maimane race plan must be incorporated in DA’, 21 January 2016)

Mazibuko argues that the dialogues also need to occur within the DA:

> The party should reflect, among other things, on a culture that isolates black members and leaders, calling them a "black caucus" and branding them "illiberal racial nationalists" if they openly socialise with one another, and discouraging them from forming bonds of friendship and familiarity. (Mazibuko, ‘Maimane race plan must be incorporated in DA’, 21 January 2016)
The section of Mazibuko’s opinion piece which received public attention and debate was in reference to the:

almost exclusive dominance of white males within the party’s "brains trust", something that is beginning to come through in its communications and harm its external image as these highly disconnected men callously strut about social media like a law unto themselves. (Mazibuko, Maimane race plan must be incorporated in DA, 21 January 2016)

Mazibuko questioned whether Maimane’s diversity campaign would extend to the management of the party. Both Maimane and van Damme responded critically to Mazibuko’s statements but as was pointed out in the chapter on party identity, the DA is still run by white men¹⁷ behind the scenes. This includes the political leadership team surrounding Maimane (Steenhuisen, Hill-Lewis, Selfe, Trollip, Davis, Boughey, Moakes) which is almost exclusively white and male in the DA of 2017.

The racial project
Maimane’s leadership project has been about race and building South Africa’s non-racial future. Much of what Maimane has said to date has not differed from the DA’s previous communication around race. The major differences, however, are that it is now being spoken by the black Federal Leader of the DA – a former white party – and it has become a more explicit message to voters. Maimane’s race then also has an effect on the party’s discursive strategy. It is returning to a bonding message but this time with black voters. Maimane’s racial project may be at odds with the party’s racial project.

Another element which has emerged in Maimane’s rhetoric is referring to South Africa as a “deeply divided society” (Maimane, ‘South Africa is on the cusp of a new beginning’, 29 July 2017). In referring to South Africa as deeply divided, the messaging perpetuates the idea that there are those who are included and those who are excluded and that the races are still deeply divided which would be considered a bonding message with black voters as opposed to providing a neutral message. It is not an unifying message.

The Federal Leader has set the tone for the party in the past and so it will be interesting to monitor whether Maimane’s identity politics will become the DA’s new tone. Some would argue that identity politics and liberalism are not ideologically consistent although this remains a debate within contemporary liberalism internationally. On any account, an emphasis on groups over individuals must become a problem for any brand of liberalism at some point.

3.5.7. Zille v Maimane
In many ways, the Zille colonialism tweet incident in 2017 provides a neat summary for many of the issues facing the DA as it tries to grow to 30%. For the last five years, the DA has made a concerted effort to change its image in the eyes of black voters and gain their trust.

¹⁷ The gender dynamics of the DA are worth further interrogation.
Zille was at the core of this shift and this has been a major aspect of the legacy she left behind for the party. However, in less than 140 characters, Zille undid the hard work (and money spent) on changing this image. Although the tweet was controversial, the discussion and media coverage which followed highlights the internal battles which the DA needs to face between the old DA and the new DA. It also demonstrated the lack of public knowledge around the DA’s internal processes and perpetuated the public discourse that black leaders in the DA have no real power.

The Tweet in Context

Zille has been controversial on Twitter for quite some time (Huffington Post SA, ‘An Incomplete List Of Helen Zille’s Social Media Fails’, 28 December 2016) and admits to enjoying using the platform for discussion and debate (Zille, 2016). On 16 March 2017, Zille went too far in the eyes of the party with a series of tweets on a recent visit to Singapore and the impacts of colonialism. The tweets in question read as follows:

For those claiming legacy of colonialism was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water etc.

Would we have had a transition into specialised health care and medication without colonial influence? Just be honest, please.

Getting onto an aeroplane now and won’t get onto the wi-fi so that I can cut off those who think EVERY aspect of colonial legacy was bad.

Zille’s tweets sparked a major backlash against her and the DA on social media. Senior party members were also quick to respond saying that colonialism was wrong and could never be justified. The ensuing public debate centred around Maimane needing to take action and ‘recall’ Zille. Commentators saw this as a test for Maimane’s leadership. Maimane duly laid a charge with the Federal Legal Commission under the Social Media Policy which fits with party processes.

The aftermath

Although Zille apologised “unreservedly” for her tweets later that day, she continued to discuss the matter in public. In a piece in the Daily Maverick, Zille justified her tweet through a discussion on her recent visit to Singapore. Almost hidden towards the end of the piece was a highly controversial statement:

I have always known that African racial nationalism is the central tenet of the ANC.

But is it becoming the philosophy of the DA?

I am deeply grateful for the DA’s legacy (dare I call it colonial?) of due process of law, including audi alteram partem (hear the other side). If I am charged, I will have a fair trial and the panel will reach a conclusion, consistent with the DA and South Africa’s Constitution.

But my personal fate is irrelevant.
The real danger is that the DA, in its quest for votes, may start to swallow every tenet, myth and shibboleth of African racial-nationalist propaganda, including the scape-goating of minorities, populist mobilisation and political patronage. Then the institutionalisation of corruption will only be a matter of time.

If this were to happen, it will be irrelevant whether we win or lose elections, because we will no longer offer an alternative. (Zille, From the Inside: Lessons from Singapore, 20 March 2017)

The above statement about the party seeking votes supports the thesis argument but this vote-seeking behaviour began under Zille’s leadership as early as 2012.

Zille went on for several weeks arguing her point in the press and on social media as well as in a debate in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. Zille argued that the debate on colonialism was a debate of national importance. The DA, however, felt differently and announced that it would be instituting disciplinary proceedings against Zille. In the statement, Maimane said the following:

This has not been an easy decision to take. Ms Zille is a former leader of the Democratic Alliance, and the Premier of the Western Cape. She has contributed immensely to the growth and success of the DA over the past decade. In the course of her life, she has consistently fought oppression and discrimination. However, my job as the Leader of the DA is to grow our party and advance our project of building a non-racial, prosperous democracy. Nothing is more important that this project, and no one is bigger than it. I must protect this project, and cannot tolerate any action or behaviour by any person which undermines or harms it. It is my belief that Ms Zille’s assertions did just that, and therefore require action. (Maimane, ‘DA Federal Executive takes decision to charge Helen Zille’, 2 April 2017)

The charge was for acting in a manner which brought the party into disrepute:

In particular, the FLC will now determine if Ms Zille has breached the following provisions of the DA’s Federal Constitution:

2.5.4.1 – publicly opposes the Party’s principles or repeatedly opposes published party policies, except in or through the appropriate Party structures;

2.5.4.2 – deliberately acts in a way which impacts negatively on the image or performance of the Party;

2.5.4.5 – brings the good name of the Party into disrepute or harms the interests of the Party;

(Maimane, ‘DA Federal Executive takes decision to charge Helen Zille’, 2 April 2017)

Charging Zille was seen as the real test of Maimane’s leadership and a way of putting clear blue water between himself and Zille. Zille remains popular in the Western Cape and commentators believed that the DA could face a voter backlash if Zille were to have her party membership revoked. Coetzee believes that this would not necessarily be the case:

“I am willing to bet Mmusi is now more popular among white voters than Helen is anyway, and he is the party’s best communicator to black voters. He is the future. Voters know that.” (van Onselen, ‘Mmusi Maimane’s two year report card’, 1 June 2017).
Maimane in his speech on realignment also made sure that the DA’s position on colonialism was clear:

Colonialism was brutal because it extracted resources from African people to make rich people in Europe even richer.

We never agreed to be colonised. It was forced upon us at the barrel of a gun.

As a black South African whose family lived through colonial and Apartheid oppression, I have nothing good to say about those evil systems.

So let me say today in clear and unambiguous terms. There is no place for racists, homophobes and sexists in the party I lead.

And there is no space for people who hanker after our colonial and Apartheid past.

But, equally, as a patriot, I cannot accept the view that says we must blindly support movements who liberated us from colonialism. (Maimane, ‘The ANC is dead. Long live South Africa’, 2017)

The realignment speech should have kept its focus on ANC decline but due to the public outrage following Zille’s tweet, Maimane had to include a message which was in some ways unnecessary to the DA’s programme of action.

At the heart of the issue is the DA brand versus the principle of free speech. Zille had the constitutional right to exercise free speech, a principle which the DA upholds. However, as a seasoned politician who played a major role in shifting voters’ perceptions about the party’s apartheid past, Zille’s tweets were inexplicable from a messaging and brand standpoint.

Another issue which the incident raised is the discourse of the old DA and the new DA. It could be argued that the new DA is more ‘politically correct’ in its discourse and that although some members might share Zille’s views or believe that those views are protected under free speech, they are also aware that colonialism is still too fraught a discussion to discuss over social media or within the current social climate. Leon points out two issues in this regard. The first is that “it’s not ideal to have a serious discussion on colonialism in 140 characters” (Huffington Post SA, ‘Tony Leon: Kohler Barnard Is The Precedent For Zille’, 16 March 2017) and the second is that “the point is that a political party is not a university, it’s not an academic seminar, it’s got a political programme” and that the Zille debate was detracting from the DA’s programme (The Eusebius McKaiser Show, ‘Debate about DA’, 5 June 2017).

Public pressure and ignorance

Maimane was under enormous public pressure to take action even after announcing that Zille would undergo a disciplinary hearing. The reality is that as the Federal Leader, Maimane, did not have the power to recall or suspend Zille without the support of the Federal Executive or legal processes. In addition, the DA has strict provisions within its Federal Constitution regarding disciplinary proceedings.
In order to address the public pressure, Maimane put to the Federal Executive a motion to suspend Zille which was supported by about 80% of the Federal Executive according to a report in the *Sunday Times*. The Federal Executive’s decision to suspend Zille is another example of two issues which the DA faces – the public questioning of Maimane’s leadership because he is black and the media’s tendency towards a ‘storm in a tea cup’. The original statement stated the following:

Accordingly, Federal Executive has resolved Ms Zille be suspended from all party related activities until such time as her disciplinary hearing is concluded. A notice of suspension will be served on Ms Zille in this regard. (Maimane, ‘DA suspends Helen Zille pending outcome of disciplinary hearing’, 3 June 2017)

The key point was that a notice of suspension had been served. However, the media jumped onto the suspension. Zille fought back on social media and pointed to the Federal Constitution provision which requires notice to be given. Later that day, Selfe released a statement saying that Zille’s version of events were correct and that she had been given 72 hours to provide reasons for why she should not be suspended. Following the final statement by Selfe, the twitter commentariat jumped onto the idea that Maimane was controlled by Selfe. One political commentator, Sithembile Mbete, said the DA should stop disrespecting its black leaders. It is more plausibly seen as a case of correctly following internal processes. But the pressure to provide the right message to voters led to a communications slip-up on the part of the DA which furthered the narrative that black leadership is not respected in the party.

The end result of the Zille versus Maimane incident was that the DA reached a settlement with Zille and she apologised. The Zille tweet exposed deeper problems for the DA – its commitment to free speech is in question, and analysts and the media continue to question the position of black leaders within the party.

### 3.5.8. State of the Party

At this point in the DA’s history, it is worth a re-examination of the party as an organisation. Although it has not undergone another reengineering process and in many ways runs a similar operation to the late 2000s, the organisation has grown and so has its electoral support. Now that it is attracting more black voters and is able to campaign outside of its historical core base, the dynamics of the DA’s operations can be explored further.

**Target market**

As the DA has grown, it has been able to shift its target market to black voters. However, as Boughey points out, “there’s an under recognition that the DA draws the most diverse support of any political party in South Africa” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017). He juxtaposes the DA’s support with that of other parties which he says provide a more uniracial offer than that of the DA.
Although the general belief amongst analysts is that the DA’s natural area of growth would be in the black middle class (Mattes, 2014; BooySEN, 2015) based on its middle class history, the DA disagrees with this assumption. According to Boughey:

Well I think there’s a misnomer that the assumption is that the DA’s automatic growth market is amongst the black middle class which I think if you look at all the numerous bits of research that’s available is often misunderstood and is grossly generalised. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

He also points to the fact that the black middle class is not an homogenous group and that “ultimately people have individual reactions to the offers that are made to them” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017). The EFF for example also draws support from the black middle class as does the ANC. Boughey says that the EFF’s black middle class support “speaks to a kind of, I suppose, political consciousness which becomes more heightened and a greater sense of racial identity, all sorts of complex reasons related to our context in this country” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017).

The DA does draw support from the black middle class but from the discussion with Boughey, it appears that its immediate area of growth is amongst “urban black South Africans” with a “slightly better than the norm level of education” (Interview with P. Boughey, 2017). Boughey describes this segment as follows:

it is more likely that there will be higher levels of support that come from people that either, the so-called crudely put working poor or people who are unemployed and have in fact given up on hope. And so each of those kind of segments require a particular focus and specific message discipline. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

Boughey is quick to point out that this does not mean that the DA is not reaching out to South Africans across the aboad, including those in a rural context.

An interesting factor which Boughey raised is that one of “the biggest hurdles that we have to growth” is that “because of the nature of media and other forms of consumption of content, that too many South Africans still don’t know who we are” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017). Almost twenty years later, Coetzee’s comment that black voters do not know about the party remains relevant. Boughey went on to say that:

And if they don’t hear from us, our opponents will obviously mischaracterise what we stand for and what we intend to achieve. So our job is to reach as many South Africans as possible between now and 2019 to land our offer. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

In some ways this means that the DA is still in the same position as the DP in 1999. There are some markets that still do not know the party. It is also still attracting what Leon called the “left-behinds” which was the DA’s growth area in the early 2000s (Interview with T. Leon, 24 May 2017). This is not to say that the DA has not grown within other segments of the black electorate but it does suggest that it attracts a particular black voter who in some ways is a more sophisticated voter than the majority of South African voters, not blinded by
loyalty to the ANC or wanting opposition to the ANC but focused on government service delivery.

Activists and Membership
Another aspect of growth for the DA has been its activist and membership base. Although Boughey would not provide figures as this is considered strategic information, he did say that the DA’s membership has grown significantly and that it had thousands and thousands of activists. This ties in with the DA’s strategic objective to be an activist-driven party as announced by Maimane in his statement on the Road to 2019. As operational head, Boughey has put:

a great deal of focus on developing our activist structures, especially in certain parts of the country we have a very strong kind of amplification effect of incredibly brave and committed South Africans who go door-to-door in at times hostile territory, at their own personal risk, and we’re deeply indebted to them for doing that. (interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

The ground army has grown significantly but Boughey said that it needed to grow more because up until now:
that has been the ANC’s comparative advantage is that they can mobilise through their various structures a significant presence but increasingly they’re finding the space is contested by ourselves and a range of other actors. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

The activist mobilisation suggests that the DA is moving closer to the ANC’s way of campaigning.

Much of the discussion has been about the DA’s message which is easier to control at the air war level than it is on the ground with thousands of activists going door-to-door to give the message. Boughey was asked how the DA controls voters’ experience of the DA on the ground. He said that this was an issue which most political parties have in that “you want to have as much as possible message discipline and control the offer that is made on the doorstep” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017). However, the DA also needed to have “courage and faith in the ability of our public reps, our activists, our volunteers to deliver our offer in a way that’s appropriate to the context they find themselves in” (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017). Boughey pointed to the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012 which used a decentralised method of campaigning and that has been the DA’s approach. This requires:

an enormous amount of training and constant engagement to make sure that everyone understands where we’re at a given point and are able then to articulate our offer in as credible way as possible. (Interview with P. Boughey, 1 June 2017)

Boughey said that the DA constantly fine tunes its approach and that it would be taking a different approach leading up to 2019.

As part of the Road to 2019, Maimane announced several steps which the Federal Executive had adopted:
FedEx has noted that in order to achieve our 2019 objectives, we need to accelerate our efforts to become an activist driven party. This will require a deliberate programme to strengthen branches and activists, so that our party is in permanent campaign mode in every community between now and 2019. The FedEx has sent the message to all of our provincial and regional structures that Election 2019 has already begun. We have less than 1000 days to go, and over the course of the next 2 and a half years, we will ramp up on the ground presence several fold.

The step towards an activist-driven party is necessary in the South African electoral context.

3.5.9. Conclusion

The 2015 Federal Congress saw the DA define its new vote-seeking identity. Although van Onselen argues that the party is adrift (van Onselen, ‘The DA’s Manchurian candidate’, 13 April 2015), it does have a strategy – just not one which resembles its past strategies. Policy is not a major concern for the DA in terms of its brand, instead it is about getting across the right message to black voters and becoming more activist-driven. In this sense, it has lost some of its policy-seeking identity.

The DA is building its new vote-seeking brand around the ANC’s demise and a post-ANC South Africa. This is in part to do with the political landscape at the time but it runs the risk of becoming the political fruit salad of the early 1990s DP which was left adrift after the fall of the apartheid government.

As there is less focus on principle at the leadership level, this has resulted in less policy focus and more messaging based on what voters – particularly black ANC voters – want to hear. Driving this change is Maimane who is making his best attempts to distance the DA from its liberal history and past policies. The DA has become more market-oriented than sales-oriented at a messaging level as it goes after its target market.
Conclusion

The Democratic Alliance has adapted from a White Liberal party to a multi-racial ‘Rainbow Nation’ party. Although the intention of the thesis was not to provide a full history of the DA, the DA’s history has been defined by race and its liberal opposition to racial nationalism. From the days of the Progressives up to the present-day DA, race has played a central role in the party’s failures and successes. The DA’s formation as the Progressive Party was partly because of the racialised environment and this environment has continued to shape the party’s adaptation throughout its history.

In conclusion, the following draws together the key aspects of the research: the DA’s adaptation; its attempts to balance its racial markets; the realignment of politics in South Africa; and the connection between the DA’s history and its present trajectory.

Adaptation

Party behaviour theories argue that parties will adapt to new environments and so the DA’s adaptation in many ways is not unusual. It adapted itself into a modern political party as most political parties, particularly in mature democracies, have done. The aspect which is significant and shown through the research is the role which race has played in this adaptation whether it has been through attracting new racial markets, adapting its message or attempting to cross the racial divide by creating a party for all South Africans. If the DA had ignored the racialised context then it would not be in the position that it is in today.

At the brand level, the DA has adapted from a ‘White Liberal’ party into a Rainbow Nation party. From an organisational and political marketing standpoint, it has moved from a policy-seeking to vote-seeking party type. The party’s organisational adaptations have tied in with its political marketing adaptations as the organisational adaptation is necessary in order to facilitate the change in political marketing. If the DA had not adapted its organisation into an electoral-professional or vote-seeking party then it would have been unable to make the changes at the political marketing level.

In order to adapt to its environment, the DA as an organisation has had to evolve its party identity both operationally and ideologically. However, it has gone against Lamprinakou’s argument in some respects that “even when the party develops new characteristics in order to suit the demands of the new era, its traditional roots are always the lever needed to move further” (Lamprinakou, 2008). In the DA’s case, in changing from a policy-seeking party to a vote-seeking party, it has had to abandon its traditional roots of being a liberal, non-racial opposition party and become a more marketing-driven alternative government capable of operating in areas where it previously had no presence. At the same time, from an external perspective, it is still marked by its original party label of white opposition.
Organisation

One of the core features of the DA as an organisation has been its ability to survive and fight back. This is argued to be due to the fact that the party was relatively strongly institutionalised by the time of the 1994 elections. The strong institutionalisation is what has ensured the party’s survival and growth where other opposition parties have failed.

Organisationally, the DA has acted as an opposition party and, electorally, relied on its traditional (white, middle class) support base - particularly in the first years of democracy - in order to survive as a party. Over the last decade, it has had to adapt its party identity in order to grow into new markets and has shifted from a policy-seeking party to a combination of policy- and vote-seeking to an almost exclusively vote-seeking party type. In becoming a vote-seeking party, it has also become more market-oriented as opposed to sales-oriented.

For the first decade of democracy, the party consolidated its position primarily through mergers with other parties as opposed to actively seeking votes outside of those parties’ voters. Its primary concern was survival for the first decade of the democratic era but this was done by fighting off other opposition parties and not necessarily by fighting the ANC for votes. After merging with the NNP and FA to form the DA, the party could now focus on attracting black voters. This required major organisational changes through the reengineering process of 2005/6 which resulted in the DA becoming an electoral professional party at an organisational level. The changes which occurred with the reengineering process allowed the DA to build its ‘Blue Machine’ which has grown since 2006 to the point that the party can be in a permanent campaign mode.

At an organisational level, the DA has become fully vote-seeking. Based on Wolinetz’s typology, it meets the following criteria:

Table 5: DA and vote-seeking criteria (Adapted from Wolinetz, 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible indicators</th>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Feature Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote-seeking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal policy debate</strong> of time spent at party meetings</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of debate</td>
<td>Pro forma, diffused, unfocused</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent and level of involvement</td>
<td>Medium to low, confined to leadership or policy committee; compartmentalized</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strömbäck argues that vote-seeking parties can be sales-oriented or market-oriented. I argue that the DA is between the sales-oriented and market-oriented types currently. It is not fully market-oriented but after recent behavioural changes such as adapting its values to the market, the manner in which it handled the Zille tweet incident and Maimane’s inferences that the party was not pro-poor prior to his leadership, it would appear to be on its way to responding to the market as opposed to trying to convince the market which is a key feature of market-orientation.

Changing the label

A considerable amount of strategy has been behind changing the DA’s brand from White Liberal to Rainbow Nation. Despite beliefs that the DA is committed to being a party of minorities, the research has shown that building a liberal democratic, non-racial alternative party for all South Africans has been a significant objective in the party’s strategy since the mid-1990s. It has never seen itself as a party only for minorities but initially mobilised minorities in order to build itself up into the largest opposition party in South Africa.

In terms of the DA’s label/image, it is no longer a white party but it is also not an exclusively black party. The fact that the DA neither has a clear racial identity nor espouses a type of racial or ethnic nationalism poses a problem for both the party and its position in South African politics as South African voters still rely on racial party labels or images in making their decision. The DA’s inability (or refusal) to define its label in racial terms, i.e. we are a white party or we are a party for people of colour, could be one of the factors which has impeded its growth. In order to counteract the lack of racial identity, the DA is beginning to make use of Maimane’s predilection for racial/identity politics in order to take on a more black identity in its communication. The DA as a brand remains non-racial but through Maimane it has shifted from trying to create a common South African identity to one which
places a black identity at its core. In the South African environment, the black identity is necessary as the black population forms 80% of the population - without the black identity, the DA would not be seen as inclusive.

**Balancing act**

The party has gone through a series of balancing acts in terms of its racial markets since 1994 and at times it has faltered. It has had to balance pragmatism and principle, minority voters and black voters. The DA’s mission to cross the racial divide in a highly racialised environment is not complete and whether it will be able to maintain its inclusivity of all races is currently in question. However, the DA remains the most diverse party in South Africa and has started to bring the racial-census voting theory into question.

In order to understand the DA’s current position in the racialised environment, it is important to make a distinction with regards to why voters have voted for the party in the past. The majority of minority voters did not necessarily vote for the party in the first decade of democracy because it was liberal but rather because it posed robust opposition to the ANC and appealed to their sense of alienation in the new South Africa. There is the strong possibility that many of the party’s new black voters are also voting for the party not because it provides an alternative ideological and policy position but rather because it poses opposition to the ANC. This is an important distinction to make as it will have a long term impact if South Africa’s politics ever becomes deracialised.

The DA’s messaging through its leader has moved from bonding with minorities through to bridging and is heading back to bonding but this time with black voters. The implications of this shift back to a type of exclusivity is that the DA runs the risk of not building what it set out to achieve which is a South African party for all. The bonding-bridging-bonding sequence has tied in with the party’s policy-seeking to policy- and vote-seeking to vote-seeking adaptations.

The fact that the DA no longer focuses its messaging on its core support base and rather on black South Africans almost exclusively could have electoral implications in the future. The party tends to take for granted its non-black supporters who have also become complacent in their support for the DA. In the long run, this could also have implications for creating a truly South African party which crosses the racial divide and is based on a liberal/social democratic position rather than group politics. Those voters who vote for the DA because of its ideological positioning as liberal could abandon the party.

The DA currently has more flexibility to become market-oriented. However, this means that the DA could lose the voter base which it developed in the first decade of democracy if it shifts to a more exclusive identity focusing on black former ANC voters. At the same time, it could lose its new black voters unless it convinces a majority of South Africans to move towards a unifying political ideology and identity. It is in this respect that a strong vision based on a unifying political identity, whatever that may be, becomes important for the DA.
An identity based on disappointment and disillusionment with the ANC could be problematic if the ANC were to stage a resurgence in the next decade or so.

**Realignment**

The realignment of politics has been a central aspect of the party’s growth, mostly through mergers and coalition governments. Except for a brief period with the formation of the DP, it has not had any effect on its ideological identity. From its first merger to form the Progressive Reform Party to the latest when it incorporated the ID, the party’s principles have formed the core of this realignment. In May 2017, Maimane delivered a speech once again calling for a realignment of South African politics but for the first time, opened this invitation to ANC members. It remains to be seen if this will result in another merger or a complete realignment of politics in South Africa under a new party and if that new party will retain the DA’s principles. South Africa appears to be heading towards an era of coalition politics. The DA’s realignment project therefore becomes more important now than in the past.

**Ideological coherence**

As the DA continues to manage its different racial markets and continues its realignment project, ideological coherence becomes more of an issue for the party. The shift in core values which began to emerge in 2012 so as to open up the DA to more growth and other partners, did not have a clear ideological identity. The DA needs to decide whether it is centering its realignment on the ideology of liberalism or if this will be around something else. If it does not have some sort of ideological coherence and the party opens itself up to more diverse political identities such as the EFF then its positions on major policy issues will be affected.

The thesis draws attention to the lack of policy positions by the DA in recent years. It has shifted its focus to issue-driving, particularly around the current state of the ANC. Whilst the DA believes that voters are not interested in ‘wonkish’ policy proposals, policy is a necessary aspect of the political product even for vote-seeking parties. The lack of internal focus on a policy agenda does not provide voters with an idea of what the DA’s policy agenda would be if it were to take government. The DA of 2017 is failing to drive an alternative policy vision for South Africa which, in some ways, means that the party has reverted to type – opposition.

**History repeats itself**

In the same way that the Progressives grew through mergers, so did the DA in the democratic era. During apartheid, the growth in the Progressives was sparked by opposition to the NP government and apartheid. It saw more progressive parties join together to challenge the governing party. Within the current political climate, various opposition parties and civil society movements are banding together in order to “save SA”. Although not in the same league as the apartheid government, the ANC government of 2017 is facing
a major backlash of opposition movements. In the same way as various parties joined together to form the PFP and then the DP in opposition to the apartheid government, South Africa could see the same occur with the DA at its centre. In the DA’s current messaging, this realignment of opposition politics towards a united opposition to the ANC would appear to be happening. The party is mobilising against the ANC government and talking of a post-ANC South Africa in the same way as a post-apartheid South Africa. However, Leon warned against the DP positioning itself in this way pre-1994 and the DA should be wary of positioning itself in this way too. The DP lost its ideological positioning and it took a few years to build this up again and find a focus. However, the DA is in a position which the Progressives never managed to achieve – it is now firmly at the centre of a new politics in South Africa.

One of the themes which emerges throughout the research is the party’s belief in its principles. It was born out of a fight against nationalism and racism. It saw its liberal principles as the only way to finding a just and harmonious settlement around race relations in the country. During the apartheid days, it fought Afrikaner nationalism and in post-apartheid South Africa, it saw its fight against African (particularly black) nationalism. Tied to this is the party’s belief in individualism over group or identity politics. As the party has adapted, this core belief is being eroded in favour of winning votes and Maimane’s inclination towards identity politics could have an impact on the DA’s political identity.

What is striking in comparing the Progressives era with the current DA is the similar trajectories which have taken place. Both in essence started as policy-seeking parties but through dilution, by incorporating other parties, and necessity, in responding to the environment, the party has become vote-seeking and lost its ideological identity. In the case of the remnants of the Progressives, it took a strong leader (Leon) and group around the leader (Selfe, Gibson, Davidson, Coetzee, etc.) to establish an identity for the party in the democratic era. The party has gone through two cycles of ideological and organisational strengthening and dilution in response to the external environment. The second cycle is not complete and it remains to be seen whether it will result in an ideological strengthening again.

Findings of Primary Research

My primary research has enabled a more complex narrative about the development of the DA than is available in the current literature. Although previous literature has touched on some of the subjects discussed in this work, the primary material has yielded a fuller account of the party’s adaptation, both strategically and ideologically, over the years.

It was evident through the primary research that the party has been concerned with three issues: providing robust, liberal opposition to nationalism; working towards becoming an alternative party of government; and expanding its reach into other markets. The research shows that the party, for most of its post-1994 history, has sought clear strategy for achieving these targets.
The research demonstrated how the party adapted its behaviour in order to address issues of racial diversity and electoral growth. Key to understanding the party’s approach to the racialised environment has been its ideological positioning. Its key thinkers and politicians engaged in impressively detailed discussions at both the strategic and deeper philosophical level, grappling with, for example, the meaning of liberalism in the South African context. As was mentioned previously, the literature on the DA tends not to explore the party’s ideological positioning. The liberal focus on the individual as opposed to group identity has, my documentary evidence suggests, shaped the party’s approach to policy positions as well as organisational diversity. Party documents from the 1990s and 2000s took a strong focus on the party’s ideology and what differentiated it from other parties. Attempts to adapt the party’s liberal thinking into a more voter-friendly message were of central concern to the party at key moments in its adaptation such as the revisioning and rebranding process (2004-2008) and the Values Charter (2015). By understanding how the DA interprets liberalism and how it has applied this to its policies in an environment dominated by group identity, a fuller picture emerges about the DA’s real problem in attracting a larger portion of the electorate. They show a concern with ideological positioning and not just its party label.

#Change2019

The DA is currently campaigning on the theme of becoming the national government in 2019, either outright or in coalition. The likelihood of this is not particularly strong but it is more likely that it will be able to win another province in 2019. It is therefore important that greater local scholarly and public attention is paid to how the DA operates – whether it be its policies or internal processes.

In terms of the DA’s policy positions, the party is reportedly re-writing its position on race-based legislation. It will be an important development to monitor as any significant changes to its position could indicate a shift in its ideological stance and that it is becoming more market-oriented.

The DA’s CEO, Paul Boughey, has already indicated that the DA will be taking a different approach to campaigning in the coming years and so this is another development to pay attention to. It could result in some internal organisational changes which would be another break from its past.

The goal of this thesis was to interrogate why and how the DA still exists and grows especially when it continues to be labelled a white party. What has driven the party to adapt? What has set it apart from other parties? I argue that those who set the party on this journey had a genuine belief that the party was important for South Africa’s democracy. If Leon and others had not seen the importance of robust opposition for a liberal democracy and Zille’s era had not made a concerted effort to show that the DA was a diverse party of government then South Africa could still be facing a true one-party dominant system. It remains to be seen what Maimane’s leadership will bring to the DA but his ability to connect
with black voters across constituencies should mean that the DA will continue to grow. However, this growth will not necessarily be as a result of Maimane’s skin colour but rather the DA’s organisational machinery and messaging. The DA’s ability to adapt itself into a modern, diverse political party has ensured that it has been able to survive in the racialised environment.
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